alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-50369

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAVIER TORRES,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(DR-01-CR-117-1-FP)

--------------------

November 7, 2002

Before DAVIS, WIENER, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Javier Torres appeals from his conditional

guilty-plea conviction for possession with intent to distribute

marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). He

contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to

suppress evidence found by Border Patrol Agents in the trunks of

two inoperable automobiles that were located on property owned by

his parents within 25 miles of the border. Torres argues, contrary

to the articulation of the border patrol agents, that there were no
2

exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search of the two

vehicles, and that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the

search was not authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3). We disagree.

A border patrol agent testified that he followed tracks from

the border area to the trunk of a "junked" vehicle and that the

trunk appeared to have been opened recently. He further testified

that, on three previous occasions, he had discovered illegal aliens

hiding in the trunks of vehicles. Based on findings that the

border patrol agents could reasonably believe that persons may have

been inside the trunk and possibly in need of medical assistance,

the district court concluded that exigent circumstances existed.

Even if we assume, without deciding, that Torres had a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the vehicles and the property, we are

convinced that the district court's finding of exigent

circumstances based on the need to ensure that no one suffered harm

or injury was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Blount,

123 F.3d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Vasquez, 953

F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1992).

AFFIRMED.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 35 Agreed to House (ATH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 35

 Expressing the condolences of the House on the death of the Honorable 
                             Frank Tejeda.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 4, 1997

 Mr. Gonzalez submitted the following resolution; which was considered 
                             and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Expressing the condolences of the House on the death of the Honorable 
                             Frank Tejeda.

    Resolved, That the House has heard with profound sorrow of the 
death of the Honorable Frank Tejeda, a Representative from the State of 
Texas.
    Resolved, That the Clerk communicate these resolutions to the 
Senate and transmit a copy thereof to the family of the deceased.
    Resolved, That when the House adjourns today, it adjourn as a 
further mark of respect to the memory of the deceased.
                                 <all>
```
#### Maurice GRAYTON, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, Respondent.

No. 04-3379.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Nov. 29, 2004.

Before MICHEL, SCHALL, and GAJARSA, Circuit Judges.

ON MOTION

GAJARSA, Circuit Judge.

*ORDER*

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) moves to dismiss Maurice Gray-ton’s petition for review as untimely. Grayton opposes and moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

On April 20, 2004, the Merit Systems Protection Board issued a final decision in Grayton’s case, specifying that its decision was final and that any petition for review must be received by this court within 60 calendar days of receipt of the Board’s decision. Grayton received the decision on April 27, 2004. Grayton’s petition for review was received by the court on July 7, 2004, 71 days after his receipt of the Board’s decision.

Our review of a Board decision is governed by 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1), which provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, any petition for review must be filed within 60 days after the date the petitioner received notice of the final order or decision of the Board.” This filing period is “statutory, mandatory, [and] jurisdictional.” *Monzo v. Dept. of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration,*735 F.2d 1335, 1336 (Fed.Cir.1984). Thus, under the time provision of the statute, Grayton’s petition for review was due in this court within 60 days of receipt of the Board’s final decision, i.e., June 28, 2004.

Grayton states that “a calculation of 56-business days transpired falling within the federal guidelines for time.” However, pursuant to Fed. R.App. P. 26(a)(2), intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays are excluded in computing time only when the relevant time period is less than 11 days. Grayton had 60 days to file a petition for review and thus Grayton’s petition for review was required to be filed within 60 calendar days, not 60 business days, in order to be timely. Furthermore, the Board’s decision stated that a petition for review must be received by the court within 60 *calendar*days of the date of receipt. Because Grayton’s petition for review was received on July 7, 2004, 11 days late, the court must dismiss Grayton’s petition as untimely.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) OPM’s motion to dismiss 04-3379 is granted.

(2) Each side shall bear its own costs.

(3) All pending motions are moot.
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION

PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14(B) OR RULE 15D-14(B)

OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350



In connection with the Annual Report of EPL Intermediate,
Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 29, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Steven E. Carley, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                      
|----------------------
|                      
|/s/ Stephen E. Carley 
|Stephen E. Carley     
|President             
|EPL Intermediate, Inc.
|March 28, 2005        



This certification is made solely for
the purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, and not for any other purpose. A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to EPL Intermediate, Inc. and will be retained by EPL Intermediate, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
SCWC-14-0000895

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

________________________________________________________________

BRELIE GAIL BALON TUMANENG, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

BRIXON ANDRES TUMANENG, Respondent/Defendant-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-14-0000895; FC-D NO. 12-1-7982)

ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., Nakayama, McKenna, Pollack, and Wilson, JJ.)

Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant Brelie Gail Balon Tumaneng’s 

application for writ of certiorari filed on January 22, 2016, is 

hereby accepted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that no oral argument will be heard 

in this case. Any party may, within ten days and pursuant to 

Rule 34(c) of the Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure, move for 

retention of oral argument.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, March 3, 2016.

Charles H. Brower /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

for petitioner 

 /s/ Paula A. Nakayama

Richard J. Diehl

for respondent /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna 

 /s/ Richard W. Pollack

 /s/ Michael D. Wilson

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-14-0000895

03-MAR-2016

09:52 AM
Applications, Considerations, and Strategies 

for Implementation of DART-MS in Forensic Laboratories

Time Title Speaker Affiliation 

Fundamentals 

10:00 – 10:05 Introduction Edward Sisco NIST

10:05 – 10:30 Fundamentals of DART-MS Chip Cody JEOL

Traditional Analysis 

10:30 – 10:45 The Decision to Implement: Lessons 

Learned Amber Burns Maryland State Police, Forensic Sciences Division

10:45 – 11:00 Strategies for Instrument Validation Erin Shonsey Alabama Department of 

Forensic Sciences

11:00 – 11:15 Overcoming Legal Acceptance Juli Cruciotti Virginia Department of 

Forensic Science

11:15 – 11:30 Use of DART-MS in a Non-Traditional 

Environment Sara Kern Forensic Chemistry Center, US FDA

11:30 – 12:00 Panel Q&A

12:00 – 1:00 Lunch Break 

Instrument and Software 

1:00 – 1:20 Modifications to DART-MS Edward Sisco NIST

1:20 – 1:40 DART-MS as a Trace Screening Tool Liz Robinson NIST

1:40 – 2:00 DART Library & Search Software Arun Moorthy NIST

2:00 – 2:20 PIMISA & AnalyzerPro Fred Li IonSense

2:20 – 2:40 Mass Mountaineer Chip Cody JEOL

2:40 – 3:10 Panel Q&A / Wrap-up
#### Adah R. Addison *v.*Hess Y. Addison.

Divorce — Grounds for — Five Years’ Separation.

Five years’ separation without cohabitation and the failure of the husband in that time to provide or attempt to provide- a home for his family leave no doubt that he has, at any time since the separation', in good faith contemplated the resumption of his marital relations with his wife.

Held, that these facts make out a stautory ground of divorce.

APPEAL FROM LOUISVILLE CHANCERY COURT.

September 21, 1871.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The supplemental petition of appellant, filed on the first day of October, 1870, substantially alleges that she and her husband had lived separate and apart for five consecutive years next preceding that date without cohabitation. The last two with the intention of abandonment. To this petition appellee entered his appearance by filing an answer.

The -proof conclusively establishes the five years’ separation, and all the -circumstances proven in t'he case tend to show 'that there had been- no -co-habitation between the parties during that time.

*226
      *Fleming, for appellant.*

The positive refusal of appellant in 1868, when appellee was in Louisville, to permit him to hold any intercourse with her except in the presence of third parties, and then only for the purpose of allowing him to see his children, sufficiently indicates that she had then determined never to live with him again. This presumption is not rebutted by the character of the letters she subsequently wrote him. These letters refer almost exclusively to their children, and there is nothing in any of them calculated to lead to the conclusion that she was looking forward to a time when she would again go back to her husband to live. The carefully studied expressions of tenderness in these letters are only such as would naturally be used by a woman of elevated sentiments, as appellant appears to be in- addressing a man whom she had once recognized as her husband and who was the father of her children.

The failure of appellee for five years to provide, or so far 'as the record shows to attempt to- provide a home for his family, the fact that he has .attempted -upon but one occasion to see his wife during that time, and the utterly heartless and brutal manner in which he has conducted the defense in this case leaves no doubt upon one’s mind that he has at no time since the separation contemplated in good faith the resumption of his marital relations with his wife.

We are of opinion that the proof in the record makes out a statutory ground for a divorce from, the -bonds of matrimony, and that the chancellor erred in not giving the *appellee*this relief. The judgment is affirmed so far as it gives to Mrs. Addison -the custody of her children, but reversed- in- so far as it refuses to give a divorce *a vinculo matrimonii.*

The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Fourth Amendment to Credit Agreement dated November 4, 2005



 EXHIBIT 10.2 
  
 FOURTH AMENDMENT TO CREDIT AGREEMENT 
  
 This FOURTH Amendment to Credit Agreement (the “Amendment”) is made and entered into as of November 4, 2005, by
and between BANK OF THE WEST (the “Bank”) and BIOLASE TECHNOLOGY, INC. (the “Borrower”) with respect tot he following: 
  
 This Amendment shall be deemed to be a part of and subject to that certain Credit Agreement dated as of May 14, 2003, as it may be amended from time to
time, and any and all addenda and riders thereto (collectively the “Agreement”). Unless otherwise defined herein, all terms used in this Amendment shall have the same meanings as in the Agreement. To the extent that any of the terms or
provisions of this Amendment conflict with those contained in the Agreement, the terms and provisions contained herein shall control. 
  
 WHEREAS, the Borrower and the Bank mutually desire to extend and/or modify the Agreement. 
  
 NOW THEREFORE, for value received and hereby acknowledged, the Borrower and the Bank agree as follows: 
  

	1.	Deleting Financial Condition. Section 6.2 of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety. 

  

	2.	Representations and Warranties. The Borrower hereby reaffirms the representations and warranties contained in the Agreement and represents that no event, which with notice or
lapse of time, could become an Event of Default, has occurred or is continuing. 

  

	3.	Confirmation of Other Terms and Conditions of the Agreement. Except as specifically provided in this Amendment, all other terms, conditions and covenants of the Agreement
unaffected by this Amendment shall remain unchanged and shall continue in full force and effect and the Borrower hereby covenants and agrees to perform and observe all terms, covenants and agreements provided for in the Agreement, as hereby amended.


  

	4.	Governing Law. This Amendment shall be governed and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of California to which jurisdiction the parties hereto hereby consent
and submit. 

  

	5.	Counterparts. This Amendment may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original and all of which together shall constitute one and the
same instrument. 

  
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this
Amendment has been executed by the parties hereto as of the date first hereinabove written. 
  

									
	BANK:	 	 	 	BORROWER:
			
	BANK OF THE WEST	 	 	 	BIOLASE TECHNOLOGY, INC.
					
	BY:	 	/S/    ROBERT THOMAS	 	 	 	BY:	 	/S/    ROBERT E. GRANT
	NAME: Robert Thomas, Vice President	 	 	 	NAME: Robert E. Grant, CEO
					
	 	 	 	 	 	 	BY:	 	/S/    JOHN HOHENER
	 	 	 	 	NAME: John Hohener, Executive VP and CFO
				
	 	 	 	 	 	 	ADDRESS:
					
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	981 Calle Amanecer
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	San Clemente, CA 92673

  

 -1-
#### Amir Hussein Habib IBRAHIM; M.A. Ibrahim; M.A. Ibrahim; Eshraga Salah Mabrouk, Petitioners, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.

No. 04-1725.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 10, 2004.

Decided Jan. 11, 2005.

Michael M. Hadeed, Jr., Becker, Ha-deed, Kellogg & Berry, P.C., Springfield, Virginia, for Petitioners. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Linda S. Wendtland, Assistant Director, Edward C. Durant, Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM.

Amir Hussein Habib Ibrahim (“Ibrahim”), his wife, Eshraga Salah Mabrouk, and their two minor children, citizens of Sudan, petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming, without opinion, the immigration judge’s order denying Ibrahim’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Ibrahim is the primary applicant for asylum; the claims of his wife and children are derivative of his application. *See*8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(3) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.21(a) (2004).

In his petition for review, Ibrahim disputes the immigration judge’s finding that he was firmly resettled in the United Arab Emirates. We have reviewed the administrative record and find no error in the immigration judge’s conclusion that Ibrahim was firmly resettled and is thus ineligible for asylum. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2000); *Mussie v. INS,*172 F.3d 329, 331-32 (4th Cir.1999). Ibrahim also takes issue with the immigration judge’s finding that his claims lacked credibility and contends that he suffered past persecution and faces future persecution in Sudan due to his political beliefs. As the firm resettlement bar to asylum applies here and Ibrahim is therefore ineligible for asylum, we need not address these additional claims.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials be*314fore the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED.*
How to Access

the NIST-Guest Network

1

How can I access the NIST-Guest Network?

As with any wireless network, your personally owned device should detect and present you with an 

option to connect to wireless networks in range. NIST-Guest is broadcasted and is the network to 

connect your device with.

1. Connect wirelessly to SSID: NIST-Guest

2. Open your browser, as needed. 

a. If using iOS (iPhones and iPads), access a web page that does not use https:// (for 

example, http://captive.apple.com) to get to the Access and Use Policy.

b. If using Android devices, a web page will automatically open with the Access and Use 

Policy. 

3. Review the complete Access and Use Policy by scrolling to the bottom of the Window. 

Acknowledge that you agree to the terms identified by selecting ACCEPT.

For example, iPhones:

>Settings >Wi-Fi >Choose A Network >Select NIST-Guest

Open your browser and load a site using http:// (for example, http://captive.apple.com). You will be 

directed to the Access and Use Policy. 

Please review the complete Access and Use Policy by scrolling to the bottom of the window. To 

acknowledge that you agree to the terms identified, select ACCEPT. If you choose DECLINE, access to the 

NIST-Guest WiFi Network will not be permitted. 

You should then be directed to a welcome page. This may require you to refresh the page several times.

Access is available for thirty (30) days. Thereafter, you will need to repeat these steps when accessing 

NIST-Guest.
How to Access

the NIST-Guest Network

2

From what locations can I access NIST-Guest?

The NIST-Guest will utilize existing access points located throughout each campus. The signal will carry 

over slightly beyond these areas (e.g., to outdoors, neighboring buildings and floors). 

What if I walk to areas outside the NIST-Guest locations? 

The connection will drop if the user moves to locations outside the covered area(s). Because 

connectivity is for one day, if the user returns to the covered area within the same day, the device will 

automatically reconnect to NIST-Guest. 

What information do I have to provide to connect?

The NIST-Guest collects the MAC address of the end user’s device, but no information from or about the 

user. 

What is the maximum user throughput?

The maximum user throughput on NIST-Guest is 1 Mbps (megabits per second). 

What can prevent my access?

Device access will be blocked if (1) it is a NIST-owned device; (2) malware or other malicious activity is 

detected; or (3) inappropriate online behavior is detected.
#### Elijah Litton, etc., *v.*Mary E. Carty, etc.

Sheriff and Constable — Failure to Return Execution — Motion—Judgment— No Defense that Whole of Execution Could Not Have Been Made.

It is no defense, on a motion against a sheriff for failure to return an execution within thirty days, that the whole of the execution could not have been made. The restrictive provision of the statute as to executions against insolvent defendants does not apply.

APPEAL PROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT.

October 28, 1871.

Opinion by

Judge Hardin :

This appeal is prosecuted by the appellant, Litton, late sheriff of Whitley county, and the sureties in his official bond from a judgment rendered upon a motion against them for $959.86, with interest from the 30th of March, 1867, and $281.80 damages for the failure of the sheriff to return an execution which came to his hands against J. R. Evans and W. H. Duncan, for thirty days after the return day thereof, without reasonable excuse for such failure.

The execution was for $667.87 with interest from the 11th of April, 1860, and $11.50 costs, and was returnable on the third *449Monday in January, 1867, and appears to have been returned in March, 1867.

*Rodman, for appellant.*

*James, for appellee.*

The defendant attempted to show a reasonable excuse for the failure to return the execution by proving that it was lost by a deputy sheriff, but although he proved the loss of his coat with the execution in a pocket of it, it appears that thirty days had then elapsed after the return day and the liability of the sheriff and his sureties had already accrued before the loss of the coat.

Nor could the judgment have been avoided on the ground that the whole of the execution could not be made. As it sufficiently appears that Evans had property out of which a part of it could have been made and the restrictive provision of the statute as to executions against insolvent defendants, not having property in the county out of which any part of an execution could be made, does not apply as was decided by this court in *Goodrum v. Root, etc.,*2 Metcalf 427.

Nor is the responsibility of the sheriff and his deputies diminished in this case by the act of August 28, 1862, to amend article 18, of chapter 36, of the Revised Statutes (Myers’ Supp. 213). That act being restricted in its application to cases in which all or a part of the debt is paid over and nothing in its terms or by any reasonable construction could apply in a case like this.

The foregoing opinion was heretofore delivered in this case with a mandatory order affirming the judgment, but on the petition of the appellants, a rehearing was granted. From a more careful examination of the record we find the judgment is erroneous in allowing interest on the $959.36 adjudged, from the 30th day of March, 1867, instead of the 30th of November, 1867, as claimed in the notice. The judgment is now reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.