1

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

State of West Virginia,

Plaintiff Below, Respondent

vs) No. 18-0731 (Nicholas County 17-F-29)

Jamia Dawn Coleman,

Defendant Below, Petitioner

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Jamia Dawn Coleman, by counsel, James R. Milam II, appeals the August 

29, 2018, sentencing order entered by the Circuit Court of Nicholas County following her 

conviction for the felony offense of embezzlement. The petitioner contends that the trial 

court committed reversible error by giving the jury preliminary instructions while she was 

absent from the courtroom. She also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by 

refusing to allow her to call a witness in support of her alibi defense. Finally, she argues 

that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her conviction. Respondent 

State of West Virginia, by counsel, Mary Beth Niday, filed a response. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs, oral arguments, and the record on 

appeal. Upon review of the applicable authorities, this Court finds no substantial question 

of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the 

petitioner’s conviction is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

The petitioner was indicted by a Nicholas County grand jury on May 9, 2017, on 

one count of felony embezzlement.1 The offense allegedly occurred while the petitioner 

was employed as a waitress at the Long Point Grille & Bar during the period of April 2015 

through February 2016. The State alleged that the petitioner knowingly removed various 

food and drink items from orders of cash-paying customers after they paid their bills and 

kept the money the customers paid for those items for herself.2 The evidence indicated that 

 

1 See W.Va. Code § 61-3-20.

 

2 At trial, the evidence showed that Long Point Bar & Grille utilized a computerized 

system to keep track of its inventory and sales. The restaurant owner testified that the

waitresses used iPads to take their customers’ orders, which were automatically transmitted 

FILED

February 26, 2020

released at 3:00 p.m.

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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the petitioner had removed items from customers’ bills approximately 1,529 times, totaling 

$6,117.46.

The petitioner’s trial began on March 20, 2018. A week before her trial, the 

petitioner served a Notice of Alibi Defense upon the State. The petitioner indicated that 

her mother-in-law would testify that she was in the State of Virginia on certain dates that 

she was alleged to have committed some of the embezzlement transactions. The State 

objected to the proposed evidence, contending that the notice was untimely. The trial court 

agreed and did not allow the petitioner to present her mother-in-law’s testimony. 

Following a two-day trial, the petitioner was convicted by the jury of one count of 

felony embezzlement. Thereafter, she moved for a judgment of acquittal alleging, inter 

alia, that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. The trial court denied 

her motion. At her sentencing hearing, the petitioner was ordered to serve one to ten years 

in the penitentiary for her conviction, but the trial court stayed the sentence and ordered 

her to serve thirty days in the regional jail followed by a period of home incarceration to 

be determined by the court.3 Upon entry of the sentencing order, the petitioner filed this 

appeal. 

The petitioner first contends that the trial court committed reversible error by giving 

the potential jurors preliminary instructions while she and her attorney were in the hallway 

outside the courtroom discussing her juror strikes following the completion of voir dire. 

She argues that by giving the jury instructions in her absence, the trial court violated her 

right to be present at a critical stage of the proceeding. The State maintains the petitioner 

suffered no prejudice by being absent while a portion of the preliminary instructions were 

given and that if any error occurred, it was harmless. 

“The general right of a criminal defendant to be present during courtroom 

proceedings is addressed through the interpretation of the state constitution, a Court rule 

 

to the kitchen. Cash tickets remained open until payment was applied. Therefore, it was 

possible to print the customer’s bill, collect the cash payment from the customer, and then 

remove items from that customer’s order before applying the payment. In contrast, when 

payment was made by credit card, the order was automatically closed when the credit card

was swiped and alterations to the bill could not be made thereafter. The waitresses only 

printed server summaries at the end of their shifts, which they gave to the restaurant along 

with the money they collected from customers minus tips. The restaurant owner testified 

that she discovered the missing funds by accident one day when she accessed the computer 

system to determine which waitress had sold a certain bottle of wine. At that point, she 

noticed a pattern of drink orders being deleted from customers’ bills. 

 

3 The petitioner was also ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $6,117.46 and 

the costs and fees of prosecution.
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and statute. Consequently, our review of the issue . . . is plenary.” State v. Sites, 241 W.Va.

430, 443, 825 S.E.2d 758, 771 (2019). This Court has long recognized that “Section 14 of 

Article III of the West Virginia Constitution, as well as the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 

to the United States Constitution, establishes a criminal defendant’s right to be present at 

all critical stages of a trial.” State v. Crabtree, 198 W.Va. 620, 629, 482 S.E.2d 605, 614 

(1996). Accordingly, this Court has held: 

 The defendant has a right under Article III, Section 14 of 

the West Virginia Constitution to be present at all critical stages 

in the criminal proceeding; and when he is not, the State is 

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that what 

transpired in his absence was harmless.

Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Boyd, 160 W.Va. 234, 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977). As noted above, 

a criminal defendant is also afforded the right to be present at the critical stages of trial by 

statute and rule. The statutory basis for this right is contained in West Virginia Code § 62-

3-2, which provides: “A person indicted for felony shall be personally present during the 

trial therefor.” Likewise, “[t]he right of an accused to be present at every stage of a criminal 

trial is also protected by W.Va.R.Crim.P. 43.” State v. Barker, 176 W.Va. 553, 556, 346 

S.E.2d 344, 347 (1986). Rule 43(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure 

provides: “The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at 

every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, 

and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.” 

In Boyd, this Court observed that “a critical stage in the criminal proceeding is one 

where the defendant’s right to a fair trial will be affected.” Id. at 246, 233 S.E.2d at 719. 

Elaborating further, this Court stated that “[g]enerally, all matters starting with 

commencement of the actual trial require the presence of the accused through final 

judgment.” Id. at 246-47, 233 S.E.2d at 719. Accordingly, this Court has held that

[i]f an accused demonstrates . . . he was absent during 

a critical stage of the trial proceeding, his conviction of a felony 

will be reversed where a possibility of prejudice appears from 

the abrogation of the constitutional or statutory right.

Syl. Pt. 8, State ex rel. Grob v. Blair, 158 W.Va. 647, 214 S.E.2d 330 (1975). 

Conversely, 

[i]n a criminal proceeding, the defendant’s absence at a 

critical stage of such proceeding is not reversible error where 

no possibility of prejudice to the defendant occurs.
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Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Redman v. Hedrick, 185 W.Va. 709, 408 S.E.2d 659 (1991). There 

are

two sources of prejudice to a criminal defendant when a 

defendant is absent from a critical stage of a criminal trial: (a) 

the jury might draw an adverse inference from the defendant’s 

absence, and (b) the defendant might have information 

necessary to the effective advocacy of his or her case. 

Crabtree, 198 W.Va. at 630, 482 S.E.2d at 615. 

In this case, the petitioner argues that the giving of preliminary instructions during 

the voir dire process is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding and that because she was 

absent from the courtroom she had “no knowledge of the jurors’ reactions or mannerisms 

to indicate how the Court’s instructions affected their ability to fairly serve as jurors and to 

determine the weight and credibility to give to the witnesses who appeared before them.” 

She further claims that as a result of her absence “the jury was unable to evaluate [her] 

during this time to determine if her reactions and mannerisms may aid them in their 

decision making process.” Thus, she reasons that her constitutional right to be present at a 

critical stage of the proceeding was violated. The State maintains, however, that the 

petitioner suffered no prejudice from being absent during a portion of the trial court’s 

preliminary instructions to the jurors. The State notes that there is no evidence in the record 

to suggest any juror bias, and the petitioner has not challenged the substance of the trial 

court’s instructions. 

 The record reflects that after voir dire was completed, both the petitioner’s counsel 

and the State requested time to consider their respective juror strikes and petitioner’s 

counsel asked if they could “step out” into the hallway to do so. The trial court announced 

that while those discussions were occurring, it was going to proceed with the preliminary 

instructions to the jury “to save some time.”4 Thus, while the petitioner, petitioner’s 

counsel, and the State were in the hallway, the trial court proceeded with preliminary

instructions and advised the jury of the six stages of every jury trial. The trial court further 

instructed the jury that they were the sole judge with respect to witness credibility 

determinations and the weight of the evidence. The trial court defined the term 

“credibility” and provided the criteria to consider in making a credibility determination. 

The record shows that the petitioner and her counsel reentered the courtroom while the 

court was explaining the credibility criteria. The State came back into the courtroom 

 

4 Petitioner’s counsel did not object when the trial court stated that it was going to 

give the jurors preliminary instructions while the parties were considering their juror 

strikes. The State does not argue in this appeal that the petitioner waived her right to be 

present by failing to object. 
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shortly thereafter, while the trial court was giving instructions regarding the burden of 

proof.

Upon review, the record shows no reasonable possibility that the petitioner suffered 

any prejudice while she was briefly absent from the courtroom during the trial court’s 

preliminary instructions to the jury. With respect to the first potential source of prejudice 

outlined above, the record reflects the State was absent from the proceeding at the same 

time as the petitioner and her counsel. The same was true in Crabtree. In that case, the 

trial judge went into the jury room alone on two occasions to reinstruct the jury upon their 

request. Finding no prejudice in that situation, this Court explained:

[W]e note that neither party was present at the time the 

trial judge spoke alone to the jury. If there was prejudice to the 

defendant, it was offset by the absence of the prosecutor. 

Given this fact, it is difficult to believe the jury even considered 

the defendant’s absence, much less drew an adverse inference 

therefrom. 

Id. at 629-630, 482 S.E.2d at 614-15. The same reasoning is applicable in this case 

especially considering that the court announced in front of the jury its intention to proceed 

with preliminary instructions and neither party objected before leaving the courtroom. 

Furthermore, the petitioner and her counsel returned to the courtroom before the 

prosecutor. 

As for the second potential source of prejudice, the record shows that the 

information conveyed to the jury during the petitioner’s absence was not specific to the 

offense with which she was charged but rather was general instructions that are given 

during every criminal trial. Given these particular circumstances, there is simply no basis 

to conclude that the petitioner suffered any prejudice during her brief absence from the 

courtroom. Accordingly, we find no reversible error. 

The petitioner next argues that the trial court erred by precluding her from 

presenting witness testimony to support her alibi defense. Generally, “[t]he action of a trial 

court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise of its discretion will not be 

disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that such action amounts to an abuse of 

discretion.” Syl. Pt. 10, State v. Huffman, 141 W.Va. 55, 87 S.E.2d 541 (1955), overruled 

on other grounds by State ex rel. R.L. v. Bedell, 192 W.Va. 435, 452 S.E.2d 893 (1994). 

In this case, the petitioner argues that by excluding the testimony of her alibi witness, the 

trial court violated her constitutional right to call witnesses on her own behalf. Clearly,

[a]n appellate court is obligated to see that the guarantee 

of a fair trial under Section 10 of Article III of the West 

Virginia Constitution is honored. Thus, only where there is a 
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high probability that an error of due process proportion did not 

contribute to the criminal conviction will an appellate court 

affirm. High probability requires that an appellate court 

possess a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the 

defendant.

Syl. Pt. 11, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995).

In this case, the trial court excluded the evidence because the petitioner’s notice to 

the State of her alibi defense was untimely pursuant to Rule 12.1(a) of the West Virginia 

Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:

Upon written demand of the attorney for the state stating 

the time, date and place at which the alleged offense was 

committed, the defendant shall serve within 10 days, or at such 

different time as the court may direct, upon the attorney for the 

state a written notice of the defendant’s intention to offer a 

defense of alibi. Such notice by the defendant shall state the 

specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have 

been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and 

addresses of the witnesses upon whom the defendant intends 

to rely to establish such alibi.

 

The record shows that one week before trial the petitioner first served her “Notice 

of Alibi Defense” on the State, indicating that she would present testimony from her 

mother-in-law to demonstrate that she was in Stuart, Virginia, from December 11-13, 2015, 

and January 29-31, 2016. The State then moved to exclude the evidence as untimely. 5 In 

 

5 The State initially submitted its request for discovery to the petitioner on June 8, 

2017, specifically asking for notification of the petitioner’s intent to present an alibi 

defense. Having received no response, the State then filed a motion to compel petitioner 

to respond to its discovery materials. The petitioner did not object, and the trial court 

granted the State’s motion at a status hearing on August 9, 2017. At that hearing, 

petitioner’s counsel stated that petitioner had an alibi defense based upon her absence from 

the state of West Virginia on at least twenty to thirty dates when the alleged acts of 

embezzlement were to have occurred. At a subsequent hearing in October 2017, 

petitioner’s counsel, having not yet produced any discovery regarding petitioner’s alibi 

defense, indicated that a “ping expert” had been located who would testify that the 

petitioner’s cell phone records showed that she was not in the state of West Virginia on 

certain dates she allegedly embezzled money from her employer. The trial court ordered 

the petitioner to produce an expert report and the “ping” reports within forty-five days. No 

such evidence was produced, nor was there any further mention of an alibi defense until 
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response to the motion to exclude, the petitioner’s counsel stated at the pre-trial hearing 

that “we just recently found that we can prove an alibi defense in this case . . . and we 

found 2 weekends that we can show the defendant wasn’t working.” He further stated that 

he did not learn of the alibi defense evidence until Friday, March 9, 2018, and given the 

court’s closure on Monday, March 12, 2018,6the earliest date that he could file the notice 

was Tuesday, March 13, 2018. The trial court then granted the State’s motion to exclude,

finding the notice to be “outside the time frame.” 

The petitioner contends that the sanction of excluding evidence should only be used 

in extreme circumstances and absent evidence of a strategic plan on the part of a defendant 

to unfairly surprise the State, the sanction should not be imposed. She further argues that 

the “ends of justice were defeated” here because the State introduced evidence that she 

altered customer transactions on dates that she was out of the State and she was precluded 

from introducing witness testimony to rebut the evidence in violation of her constitutional 

right to call witnesses in her own defense. 

The State maintains that the actual notice of the nature of the petitioner’s alibi 

defense was untimely, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding witness 

testimony to support the petitioner’s alibi defense. The State further argues that even if the 

evidence should have been admitted, it was harmless error because there was evidence that 

the petitioner committed embezzlement transactions on many occasions, other than the 

days she was purportedly out of the State, which supports her conviction for one count of 

embezzlement. 

This Court has recognized that “failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 

12.1 includes the possible exclusion of an alibi witness.” State v. Schlatman, 233 W.Va. 

84, 87, 755 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2014); see also State v. Fields, 225 W.Va. 753, 759–60, 696 S.E.2d 

269, 275–76 (2010) (recognizing trial court’s authority under Rule 12.1 to exclude alibi 

witnesses). In Schlatman, this Court looked to State v. Ward, 188 W.Va. 380, 424 S.E.2d 

725 (1991), which addressed constitutional concerns arising from the exclusion of 

untimely-disclosed defense witnesses. In syllabus point one of Ward, this Court held: 

Where a trial court is presented with a defendant’s 

failure to disclose the identity of witnesses in compliance with 

West Virginia Rule of Criminal Procedure 167the trial court 

 

March 13, 2018, when the petitioner first served her notice on the State regarding her 

mother-in-law’s testimony. 

6 The record indicates that the courthouse was closed on this date because of a 

snowstorm.

7 Rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure addresses discovery in criminal cases.
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must inquire into the reasons for the defendant’s failure to 

comply with the discovery request. If the explanation offered 

indicates that the omission of the witness’ identity was willful 

and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that 

would minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the 

ability to adduce rebuttal evidence, it is consistent with the 

purposes of the compulsory process clause of the sixth 

amendment to the United States Constitution and article II[I], 

§ 14 of the West Virginia Constitution to preclude the witness 

from testifying.

188 W.Va. at 381, 424 S.E.2d at 726 (footnote added). As noted above, the petitioner 

claims no intent to surprise the State with her alibi evidence and asserts that the notice was 

provided as soon as possible. The State maintains that the court acted within in its 

discretion in refusing to allow the petitioner to present her mother-in-law’s testimony and 

that even if the testimony were permitted, it would have had limited value given there was 

evidence that the petitioner altered customers’ bills more than 1,500 times thereby 

embezzling $6,117.46. 

Upon review, we are unable to find the trial court abused its discretion by applying 

the sanction allowed by Rule 12.1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner 

indicated that her mother-in-law would testify that she was in Virginia on two separate 

weekends, December 11-13, 2015 and January 29-31, 2016. In order to convict the 

petitioner of a felony,8the State had to prove that she embezzled at least $1,000.00. The 

record does not support a finding that the amount of money embezzled on the days the 

petitioner was allegedly in the State of Virginia was such that the remaining evidence did 

not support her conviction. Accordingly, the petitioner was not prejudiced by the exclusion 

of this evidence.9 

 

8 A person who commits embezzlement is guilty of larceny. W.Va. Code § 61-3-

20. Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 61-3-13(a) (1994), in pertinent part, 

“[i]f a person commits simple larceny of goods or chattels of the value of one thousand 

dollars or more, such person is guilty of a felony, designated grand larceny[.]”

9 We note that Rule 12.1(d) provides:

Upon the failure of either party to comply with the 

requirements of this rule, the court may exclude the testimony 

of an undisclosed witness offered by such party as to the 

defendant’s absence from or presence at the scene of the 

alleged offense. This rule shall not limit the right of the 

defendant to testify.
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The petitioner’s final argument is that the evidence was insufficient to support her 

conviction. “The Court applies a de novo standard of review to the denial of a motion for 

judgment of acquittal based upon the sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Juntilla, 227 

W.Va. 492, 497, 711 S.E.2d 562, 567 (2011). Furthermore,

“‘[u]pon motion [for judgment of acquittal], the 

evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to [the] 

prosecution. It is not necessary in appraising its sufficiency that 

the trial court or reviewing court be convinced beyond a 

reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant; the question is 

whether there is substantial evidence upon which a jury might 

justifiably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.’ State v. West, 153 W.Va. 325, [168 S.E.2d 716] 

(1969).” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Fischer, 158 W.Va. 72, 211 S.E.2d 

666 (1974).

Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Grimes, 226 W.Va. 411, 701 S.E.2d 449 (2009). In addition, this Court

has explained:

The function of an appellate court when reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is 

to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether 

such evidence, if believed, is sufficient to convince a 

reasonable person of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995). 

In this case, the petitioner contends that the State failed to present any evidence 

concerning the element of intent. In that regard, she maintains that the State failed to show 

that she performed the alleged transactions “with the intent to permanently deprive Long 

Point Grille & Bar of the use and possession” of its money. 

The elements of embezzlement were identified by this Court long ago in syllabus 

point two of State v. Moyer, 58 W.Va. 146, 52 S.E. 30 (1905), as follows: 

 

Accordingly, the petitioner could have testified that she was not in the State on certain 

dates that she was alleged to have committed embezzlement transactions. 
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[I]n order to constitute the crime of embezzlement it is 

necessary to show (1) the trust relation of the person charged, 

and that he falls within that class of persons named; (2) that the 

property or thing claimed to have been embezzled or converted 

is such property as is embraced in the statute; (3) that it is the 

property of another person; (4) that it came into the possession 

or was placed in the care of the accused under and by virtue of 

his office, place, or employment; (5) that his manner of dealing 

with or disposing of the property constituted a fraudulent 

conversion and an appropriation of the same to his own use; 

and (6) that the conversion of the property to his own use was 

with the intent to deprive the owner thereof.

See also Syl. Pt. 19, State v. Riley, 151 W.Va. 364, 151 S.E.2d 308 (1966), overruled on 

other grounds by Proudfoot v. Dan’s Marine Serv., Inc., 210 W.Va. 498, 558 S.E.2d 298 

(2001) (“The essential elements of embezzlement are a trust relationship to the property or 

money involved, belonging to someone else and in the possession of the defendant by 

virtue of his office and converted to his own use with intent to defraud.”). With respect to 

the intent element, this Court has more recently explained that 

common-law embezzlement (and statutory embezzlement 

pursuant to paragraph one of W. Va. Code § 61-3-20; i.e. 

embezzlement which does not involve a public official) 

requires as an element of proof that the defendant intended to 

permanently deprive an owner of the use of his property. This 

particular element of proof is what renders garden variety 

embezzlement a specific intent offense.

State v. Brown, 188 W.Va. 12, 16 n.4, 422 S.E.2d 489, 493 n.4 (1992). 

The petitioner bases her argument on the fact that there was no evidence that her 

employer, or anyone else, actually observed any improper conduct on her part. In other 

words, the petitioner says there was no evidence to show that the bills were altered for an 

improper reason. The State maintains, however, that the intent element can be proven by 

circumstantial evidence and that in this instance, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that 

the petitioner intended to permanently deprive her employer of its money because she 

altered her customers’ bills approximately 1,529 times and the restaurant never received 

the money for the items petitioner removed from the customers’ bills after payment was 

made. 

In State v. Berry, 239 W.Va. 226, 800 S.E.2d 264 (2017), the defendant also argued 

the State failed to prove the element of intent to support his embezzlement conviction. In 

that case, the defendant, a county commissioner, used his position to embezzle funds from 
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the local convention and visitor’s bureau. Rejecting his argument that the State failed to 

prove intent, this Court explained that 

a rational jury could have concluded the petitioner’s actions 

showed a willful intent to deprive TRTC [Three Rivers Travel 

Council] of the money. In particular, the direct transfer of 

money to another personal account held by the petitioner’s son 

and to corporations he was operating with his son could have 

easily been considered by the jury as evidence of a specific 

intent to deprive TRTC of the money. Moreover, the State 

presented evidence that in 2011, a new local convention and 

visitor’s bureau for Summers County was incorporated with 

the Secretary of State’s office using the name BGN Convention 

and Visitor’s Bureau. There was testimony that the petitioner 

deposited at least two checks from BGN’s bank account into 

the same account held by his son in which the $41,699.05 

check was deposited. Based on this evidence, a rational jury 

could have concluded that the petitioner was not using his 

son’s account as a “stopgap” measure as he claimed but 

instead, had a specific intent to deprive TRTC of its money.

239 W.Va. at 236, 800 S.E.2d at 274. There was similar evidence in this case. Here, the 

State presented testimony and records showing that the petitioner’s employee identification 

number was used to alter customers’ bills more than 1,500 times to remove items paid for 

by the customers from their orders. A rationale jury could infer that the petitioner was the 

person who altered the bills. The evidence further shows that the petitioner’s employer 

never received the money paid by the customers for those deleted orders. Based on this 

evidence, a rationale jury could conclude that because the customers’ orders were altered 

after the customers paid their bills and Long Point Bar & Grille never received the money 

for the items removed from the orders, the petitioner intended to permanently deprive the 

restaurant of its money. Accordingly, we find no merit to this argument.

Having found no error, the final order of the Circuit Court of Nicholas County 

entered on August 29, 2018, is affirmed. 

Affirmed.
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ISSUED: February 26, 2020

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead

Justice Margaret L. Workman

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice John A. Hutchison