SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5412-16T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RAZEAR MULDROW,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Submitted November 28, 2018 – Decided 

Before Judges Koblitz and Mayer.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 10-07-1361.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Janet A. Allegro, Designated Counsel, on the 

briefs).

Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Samuel J. Marzarella, Chief 

Appellate Counsel, of counsel; Shiraz I. Deen, 

Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

December 18, 2018
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Defendant appeals from a June 28, 2017 order denying his petition for 

post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm.

 Defendant was charged with first-degree conspiracy to commit murder, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-

3(a); first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1; 

second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); second-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); second-degree 

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); firstdegree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a); first-degree attempted witness 

tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a); second-degree conspiracy to commit witness 

tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a) and 2C:5-2; and second-degree certain persons 

not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).

The State moved pre-trial to admit evidence of defendant's gang affiliation 

at trial.1 Defendant opposed the motion. The trial judge issued a comprehensive 

written decision allowing evidence of defendant's gang membership to be 

admitted at trial. Based on the trial judge's ruling, defendant pleaded guilty to 

 

1

 We need not summarize the facts leading to defendant's conviction. The basis 

for defendant's petition is PCR counsel's failure to advance all arguments on 

defendant's behalf in the PCR brief and at the hearing. 
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one count of first-degree conspiracy to commit murder. On the plea form, 

defendant did not reserve the right to appeal the judge's gang evidence ruling

Defendant was sentenced to seventeen years in prison subject to an 85% 

period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and a five-year period of parole supervision upon release. 

Defendant's sentence was affirmed at a Sentence Only Argument (SOA) 

calendar.

On April 8, 2016, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR. Defendant's 

assigned counsel filed a supplemental brief in support of defendant's petition, 

asserting defendant's trial counsel improperly informed defendant that evidence 

of his gang affiliation would be admissible at trial. The State submitted a brief 

in opposition to defendant's PCR petition, which included a copy of the trial 

court's twenty-six page decision, allowing evidence of defendant's gang 

membership at trial. 

The PCR judge heard argument on June 28, 2017. Knowing evidence of 

defendant's gang membership was deemed admissible by the trial judge and not 

a misstatement of the law by trial counsel, PCR counsel told the judge he had 

no additional arguments and relied on the argument advanced in his PCR brief. 

The judge denied the PCR petition, concluding defendant's argument was 
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procedurally barred in accordance with Rule 3:22-4(a) as the issue related to a 

trial error that could have been raised on direct appeal. The judge also rejected 

defendant's argument that he would not have pleaded guilty absent his trial 

counsel improperly advising him that evidence of his gang affiliation would be 

admissible at trial. The judge concluded defendant's trial counsel gave correct 

legal advice supported by the trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of

defendant's gang membership. The judge found defendant failed to satisfy the 

two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel established in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in 

State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). 

On appeal, defendant argues:

SINCE THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO RECEIVE 

ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FROM 

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COUNSEL, THE 

MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE 

TRIAL COURT TO ASSIGN NEW POSTCONVICTION RELIEF COUNSEL TO REPRESENT 

HIM, TO PERMIT THE FILING OF 

SUPPLEMENTAL SUBMISSIONS ON HIS 

BEHALF, AND TO CONDUCT A NEW HEARING 

RELATING THERETO (Not raised below).

Defendant claims his PCR counsel was ineffective because counsel raised 

only one argument in the PCR petition and was unaware the argument had been 

rejected by the trial judge. Defendant also contends that once PCR counsel
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realized the trial court allowed evidence of defendant's gang affiliation, PCR 

counsel failed to raise other arguments in support of the PCR application. 

Defendant argues PCR counsel's representation was utterly lacking, constituting

no representation at all. 

This appeal requires our review of two separate standards. One standard 

governs a claim of ineffective assistance as to trial counsel. The other standard 

governs a claim of ineffective PCR counsel. 

To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a 

defendant must satisfy the two-part test enunciated in Strickland by demonstrating 

that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance 

actually prejudiced the accused's defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also Fritz, 

105 N.J. at 58.

The performance of PCR counsel is examined under a different standard 

than the standard applicable to review of trial counsel's performance. With 

respect to a claim of ineffective PCR counsel, the Supreme Court has held:

PCR counsel must communicate with the client, 

investigate the claims urged by the client, and 

determine whether there are additional claims that 

should be brought forward. Thereafter, counsel should 

advance all of the legitimate arguments that the record 

will support. If after investigation counsel can 

formulate no fair legal argument in support of a 
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particular claim raised by defendant, no argument need 

be made on that point. 

[State v. Webster, 187 N.J. 254, 257 (2006).]

The relief afforded to a defendant based on ineffective PCR counsel is a 

new PCR hearing. See State v. Hicks, 411 N.J. Super. 370, 376 (App. Div. 

2010). In Hicks, we noted, "relief is not predicated upon a finding of ineffective 

assistance of counsel under the relevant constitutional standard. Rule 3:22-6(d) 

imposes an independent standard of professional conduct upon an attorney 

representing a defendant in a PCR proceeding." Ibid. (citations omitted). 

Whether PCR counsel met the obligations under Rule 3:22-6(d) is distinct from 

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. Ibid.

Here, PCR counsel filed a brief raising the argument insisted upon by 

defendant in accordance with Rule 3:22-6(d). "[A]s in any case in which a brief 

is filed, [PCR] counsel may choose to stand on it at the hearing, and is not 

required to further engage in expository argument." Webster, 187 N.J. at 257. 

As the Court noted in State v. Rue, 175 N.J. 1, 19 (2002), "[i]n some cases, the 

record will give PCR counsel a wealth of grist for his or her mill, in some cases, 

not." It is the obligation of PCR counsel to "advance all of the legitimate 

arguments that the record will support." Webster, 187 N.J. at 257. 
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Defendant argues his PCR counsel failed to comply with his obligations 

under Rule 3:22-6(d) by raising additional arguments in the PCR brief, entitling 

defendant to new counsel and a new PCR hearing. Defendant provides no 

evidence that PCR counsel failed to discharge his responsibilities under Rule

3:22-6(d). Defendant provided no certification describing his interactions with 

PCR counsel, whether PCR counsel met with defendant to discuss the case, and 

the information or suggestions defendant provided to his PCR counsel. 

Although defendant argues his PCR counsel's performance was deficient, he 

fails to identify a single meritorious claim supporting his PCR petition that PCR 

counsel should have advanced to the PCR court. 

There is no proffer demonstrating PCR counsel could have fashioned more 

effective arguments than the argument he presented in the PCR brief. Nor does 

defendant identify any specific arguments he believes should have been made 

or advanced by his PCR counsel. On this record, PCR counsel was not 

ineffective. 

Affirmed.