IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

EXTRADITION OF FRANCIS CARR

No. 20 CR 370

Magistrate Judge Beth W. Jantz

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pursuant to agreements between the Government of Ireland and the United 

States, Ireland has requested that the United States extradite Francis Carr to

Ireland to face a charge of dangerous driving causing the deaths of two persons.1

The Court bifurcated the extradition proceedings at the parties’ request, and at 

issue now is whether the offense with which Carr is charged is extraditable under 

the treaty. [See dkt. 17.] For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that the 

Government has shown that the charged crime for which extradition is requested—

dangerous driving causing the death of two persons—is covered by the treaty and 

thus extraditable.

1 Extradition between the two countries is governed by (1) the Treaty on Extradition 

between the United States of America and Ireland, U.S.-Ir., July 13, 1983, T.I.A.S. 

10813, and (2) the Instrument as contemplated by Article 3(2) of the Agreement on 

Extradition between the United States of America and the European Union signed 

25 June 2003, as to the application of the Treaty on Extradition between the United 

States of America and Ireland signed July 1983, S. TREATY DOC. No. 109-14 (2006). 

For ease of reference, the Court refers collectively to these documents as “the 

treaty” throughout this Memorandum Order and Opinion.

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BACKGROUND

The following allegations are drawn from the Irish charge now pending 

against Carr, the accompanying extradition request documents, and the parties’ 

filings with this Court. 

In June 2017, in Ireland, Carr crashed his car into a pillar, resulting in the 

deaths of his two passengers. [Dkt. 22-1, Exh. 1 to Gov’t’s Mem., Extradition 

Request Docs., 33–40.] According to witnesses, Carr drove his car away from the lot 

of a local pub at a high speed and then, approximately ten minutes later, other 

witnesses heard what sounded like a car doing donuts, followed by a crash.

[Dkt. 22-1 at 33–40.] A witness went to the scene of the crash and pulled Carr out 

of the driver’s side of his Lexus. [Dkt 22-1 at 36.] A police officer who arrived on 

the scene observed a black Lexus positioned “at a right angle to the road, with the 

passenger side of the vehicle, crushed against a farmyard block wall.” [Dkt. 22-1 at 

37.] One of the passengers died upon impact, and the other passenger died several 

hours later from injuries suffered in the crash. [Dkt. 22-1 at 38–39.] Scene 

witnesses pointed to Carr, who was sitting on house steps across the street, as 

another person who had been in the car. [Dkt. 22-1 at 37.] Carr told a paramedic 

that he was driving and said that he “had killed all his friends.” [Dkt. 22-1 at 36–

37.] He was later taken to the hospital for treatment of his injuries, but no tests 

were done to establish the level of any alcohol in his system. [Dkt. 22-1 at 39.]

On February 14, 2018, Carr was formally charged with dangerous driving 

causing the deaths of two victims, in violation of Ireland’s section 53(1) of the Road 

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Traffic Act of 1961, as amended, and the District Court Area of Castlebar, Ireland, 

issued a warrant for his arrest. [Dkt. 22-1 at 49–52.] In Ireland, dangerous driving

causing the deaths of two victims carries a punishment of up to ten years in prison. 

[Dkt. 22-1 at 30 (statement of facts), 44 (text of Irish statute).]

On January 30, 2019, pursuant to the extradition treaty between Ireland and 

the United States, Ireland submitted a formal request through diplomatic channels 

for Carr’s arrest and extradition. [Dkt. 22-1 at 4–5 (letter requesting extradition).]

An Assistant Legal Adviser for the Department of State has declared that the treaty 

between the United States and Ireland is in full force and effect, and that the 

offense for which extradition is sought is extraditable under Article II of the treaty. 

[Dkt. 22-1 at 1–3 (declaration of Tom Heinemann).] On July 20, 2020, this Court 

issued an arrest warrant, and Carr was taken into custody on July 22. [Dkts. 5, 8.]

In a written opinion on August 18, 2020, the Court ordered Carr detained without 

bail pending the outcome of these proceedings, and the District Court subsequently 

affirmed that detention upon Carr’s appeal. [Dkts. 19, 33.]

At the parties’ request, the Court bifurcated the extradition proceedings, first 

ordering briefing on the issue regarding the scope of the treaty between the United 

States and Ireland. [Dkt. 17.] Following the completion of briefing, the Court held 

oral argument on that issue on October 2, 2020. [Dkt. 39.] As with the bail 

decision, the Court commends both counsel for their helpful briefing, thorough and 

thoughtful oral arguments, and vigorous representation of their respective clients.

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DISCUSSION

I. Framework of extradition proceedings

International extradition proceedings are governed by 18 U.S.C. §3184, under 

which a judicial officer “must decide whether to certify to the executive branch that 

the treaty requirements for extradition are satisfied.” Matter of Extradition of 

Schumann, No. 18 CR 283, 2018 WL 4777562, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2018). In 

determining whether extradition is appropriate, the Court looks at whether (1) the 

judicial officer has jurisdiction to conduct the extradition proceedings; (2) the Court 

has jurisdiction over the defendant; (3) the relevant treaty is in full force and effect;

(4) the crime for which extradition is requested is covered by the treaty; and 

(5) there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause that the 

defendant committed the offense. Id.

In this case, Carr’s counsel confirmed during oral argument that Carr does 

not contest the first three requirements, and the Court finds that they are easily 

met. First, federal magistrate judges are explicitly authorized by §3184 to consider 

extradition, and second, the Court has jurisdiction over Carr because he was 

arrested and is presently in custody in the Northern District of Illinois. 

See 18 U.S.C. §3184; Schumann, 2018 WL 4777562, at *3. Third, Carr does not 

dispute the declaration of the Department of State’s legal advisor that the treaty 

between the United States and Ireland is in full force and effect. [See dkt. 22-1 at 

1–3.]

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As planned, the Court reserves ruling on the fifth and final requirement—

whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause—for a 

later hearing after briefing from the parties regarding any discovery and 

evidentiary issues. At issue now is whether the Government has established the 

fourth requirement—that the crime for which extradition is sought is covered by the 

treaty; in other words, if it is an “extraditable offense.”

II. The charged crime is covered by the treaty and is therefore an 

extraditable offense.

The Government argues that the treaty defines an extraditable offense as one 

for which there is “dual criminality,” meaning that, as relevant here, the 

defendant’s alleged conduct is punishable in both countries by a period of 

imprisonment of one year or more. [Dkt. 22, Gov’t’s Mem., 6.] Under this approach, 

the Court need only look at the alleged acts constituting the “offense” and 

determine whether they would be a felony in both the United States and Ireland; 

the names and elements of the offenses do not have to match. [Dkt. 22 at 6–9.] 

See generally DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 1997) (“If there 

is probable cause to believe that [the defendants] committed a crime in Canada, and 

there is probable cause to believe that the conduct would have been criminal if 

committed in the United States, then extradition is appropriate. This is the ‘dual 

criminality’ requirement. . . . If the acts of the accused are considered criminal in 

both nations, extradition follows even if the requesting country does not have a 

criminal statute analogous to the one that makes the acts criminal in the United 

States.”) The Government maintains that Carr’s conduct underlying the dangerousCase: 1:20-cr-00370 Document #: 41 Filed: 11/03/20 Page 5 of 18 PageID #:729
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driving charge in Ireland qualifies as extraditable because it is punishable under 

United States federal law as involuntary manslaughter, 18 U.S.C. §1112, which has 

a potential maximum penalty of 8 years in prison, or under Illinois law as reckless 

homicide while driving a motor vehicle, 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (Class 3 felony); 730 ILCS 

5/5-4.5-40(a), which has a potential maximum penalty of 5 years in prison. [Dkt. 22 

at 10–11.]

Carr concedes that, if the Court applies only this one-step dual criminality 

analysis, then that standard has been satisfied in this case and the charged crime 

here would therefore be extraditable, because Carr’s alleged conduct is punishable 

by a year or more in prison in both countries. [See dkt. 31, Carr’s Resp., at 11.] But 

he maintains that this particular treaty’s language imposes an additional

requirement beyond dual criminality—that is, the charged offense’s legal 

elements, not just the alleged acts involved, must be punishable as a felony in both 

the United States and Ireland. [Dkt. 31.] Thus, he argues that, because the Irish 

offense of dangerous driving provides for a mens rea lower than “gross negligence”—

which is what is required for involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide in the 

United States and Illinois, 18 U.S.C. §1110(b); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-40(a)—the charged 

crime in Ireland would be a misdemeanor in the United States, and therefore is not 

an extraditable offense under the treaty. [Dkt. 31 at 15–18; see dkt. 22-1 at 41–42 

(Ireland’s statement regarding relevant law) (explaining that to establish an Irish 

charge of dangerous driving, a defendant must have acted “in a manner in which a 

reasonably prudent man, having regard to all the circumstances, would clearly 

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recognise as involving a direct and serious risk of harm to the public”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).]

Because Carr concedes that the dual criminality requirement is met in this 

case, the Court focuses its analysis on whether the treaty imposes any additional 

requirement that the legal elements of the charges constitute felonies in both the 

United States and Ireland. For the several reasons that follow, the Court concludes 

that the treaty does not impose a further prerequisite beyond dual criminality, and 

thus Carr has been charged with an extraditable offense covered by the treaty.

A. General principles of treaty interpretation

Treaties are to be construed liberally so as to promote the fulfillment of

treaty obligations, so where a provision “fairly admits of two constructions,” the 

more liberal one is “preferred.” Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293–94

(1933). In the extradition context, a liberal construction is particularly favored, and 

thus, an extradition treaty “should be construed more liberally than a criminal 

statute or the technical requirements of criminal procedure.” Id. at 298.

Interpretation of a treaty “begins with its text.” Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 

491, 506 (2008); see also Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396–97 (1985). “The clear 

import of treaty language controls unless ‘“application of the words of the treaty 

according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or 

expectations of its signatories.’” Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 

176, 180 (1982) (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)). When 

interpreting a treaty, the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as 

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the “postratification understanding” of the signatories can be used as “aids to its 

interpretation.” Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. This treaty’s language

Turning to this treaty’s text, the Court begins with Article II, which covers

“Extraditable Offences.” As relevant here, section 1 provides that “[a]n offence

shall be an extraditable offence only if it is punishable under the law of both 

Contracting Parties by imprisonment for a period of more than one year, or by a

more severe penalty. . . .” [Dkt. 22-1 at 11 (text of the treaty) (emphasis added).]

Subsection 2(a) further explains that it makes no difference “whether the laws of 

the Contracting Parties place the offence within the same category of offence or 

denominate the offence by the same terminology . . . .” [Id.]

Carr points to the following in arguing that, given the language of this 

particular treaty, the analysis should have a second step or additional requirement

beyond just dual criminality in order to also compare the legal elements of the Irish 

and American charges. First, Carr contends that the treaty uses “offence”2 in 

Article II and throughout the treaty to refer to “the legal elements of the charge.” 

[Dkt. 31, Carr’s Resp., 3–8.] He cites that the language does not mention acts or 

conduct but instead speaks in broad terms about “an offence punishable under the 

Law” [sic] and argues that subsection 2(b)’s “carve-out for jurisdictional elements” 

would be “superfluous” if the elements of the offenses did not need to match.

2 The treaty uses the Irish spelling of “offence.” When quoting from the treaty, this 

opinion will maintain that spelling, but will otherwise use the American spelling of 

“offense.”

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[Dkt. 31 at 3, 5–7.] Carr also cites to Article XI and Article VIII as examples of 

sections where, in his view, “offence” is clearly used to mean the legal definition of 

the crime. [Dkt. 31 at 3–6.] Additionally, Carr contends that a natural reading of 

“offence” is that it refers to “the crime as generally committed,” relying on Supreme 

Court precedent in cases involving interpretation of domestic criminal statutes. 

[Dkt. 31 at 3–5 (quotation marks omitted).] He further argues that the Court 

should apply in this treaty context what is known as the “categorical approach” 

from those domestic criminal cases, and that that approach focuses on the elements 

that an offense normally entails, rather than the alleged conduct in a particular 

instance. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1217–18 (2018). [Dkt. 31 at 3–

6.]

Starting with Carr’s invocation of the “categorical approach,” Carr’s counsel 

forthrightly acknowledged during oral argument that he was not aware of any

precedent for applying the categorical approach in the context of treaties, and this 

Court has not found any either. Indeed, the categorical approach is a poor fit for 

treaty interpretation for two main reasons. First, unlike criminal statutes which 

are to be read narrowly in order to protect defendants’ rights—on the flip side—

treaties are construed more liberally with a view toward fulfilling reciprocal treaty 

obligations. See Factor, 290 U.S. at 298 (explaining that treaties should be 

construed more liberally than criminal statutes and rules of procedure); see also In 

re Extradition of Jarosz, 800 F. Supp. 2d 935, 948–49 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (ordering 

extradition to Poland when accused was charged with driving under the influence of 

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alcohol and causing a traffic accident that resulted in deaths). Applying an 

elements-based categorical approach that was developed to analyze criminal 

statutory questions would thus seemingly be at odds with ensuring that a treaty is 

given its full effect.

Second, relying on what meaning United States’ domestic law alone has given 

the word “offense” would ignore that the treaty was drafted as a joint effort 

between the United States and Ireland, and that the countries’ mutual

understanding of the term is what should control. See Air France, 470 U.S. at 399–

400 (“[I]t is our responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning 

consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties”). Thus, the 

Court holds that the categorical approach is not applicable in this extradition treaty 

context.

As for this treaty’s language to which Carr cites, a reading of the treaty does 

not make it plain or clear that it uses “offence” in a necessarily elements-based 

sense. The treaty never defines the term “offence”—not even in section 1 of Article 

II where it defines “extraditable offence”—and Article XI and Article VIII upon 

which Carr relies do not further clarify its meaning in any particular way. 

[See dkt. 22-1 at 11, 13–17.] At most, those articles show that “offence” can have 

different meanings depending on the context. For example, in Article XI, the treaty 

uses the term to refer to the generic crime, providing that when the description of 

an offense is changed after extradition, “the offence” must be “composed of the same 

constituent elements as the offence for which extradition was granted.” [Dkt. 22-1 

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at 16.] In Article VIII, however, the treaty uses “offence” both when discussing the

“facts of the case” and “the legal description” of the offence, which dual use shows 

that the term may be elements-based or acts-based depending on the context. 

[Dkt. 22-1 at 14, ¶¶ 3(b), (c).]

Further, immediately following the definition of “extraditable offence,” 

subsections 2(a) and 2(b) explicitly state to ignore elemental differences such as 

whether the offenses are labeled the same or whether there are similar 

jurisdictional requirements. [Dkt. 22-1 at 11.] Contrary to Carr’s argument that 

subsection 2(b) is redundant if “offence” is not being used in the generic sense, 

[dkt. 31 at 5–7], subsections 2(b)’s admonishment to ignore the United States 

federal law’s jurisdictional requirements can be read as simply making explicit the 

notion that elements do not matter in determining whether an offense is 

extraditable. Overall, subsections 2(a) and 2(b) read together suggest that the

contracting parties intended the treaty to apply broadly rather than for extradition 

to be limited by elemental differences in the countries’ differing criminal codes.

Carr also relies on language in three cases to support his position that an 

additional requirement beyond dual criminality exists, [dkt. 31 at 9], but none of 

them persuade the Court that such a distinction can be supported. First, Carr cites 

language from Arias Leiva: “In addition to finding a treaty offense, the 

determination of extraditability requires that the doctrine of ‘dual criminality’ be 

satisfied.” Aria Leiva v. Wilson, No. 17-23938-CIV, 2018 WL 9662551, at *15 

(S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-23938-

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JLK, 2018 WL 9662549 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Arias Leiva v. 

Warden, 928 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added). That case, however, did 

not describe how determining whether a charged crime is a treaty offense 

meaningfully differs from the dual criminality standard; instead, the court analyzed 

whether the defendant’s “acts” were criminal in both jurisdictions. See Arias Leiva, 

2018 WL 9662551, at *16–17 (emphasis added). 

Similarly, although the court in Ramnath also described dual criminality as 

two separate requirements—that the charged crime must be both covered by the 

treaty and considered a crime by both countries—it went on to explicitly state that 

the elements of the crimes do not need to be “precisely identical,” and focused 

instead on the “essential character of the criminal transaction.” United States v. 

Ramnath, 533 F. Supp. 2d 662, 673 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (emphasis in original). 

Lastly, Carr’s third cited case, Platko, is inapposite because, in that case, the 

treaty at issue specifically listed extraditable offenses rather than provide a catchall provision, as does the treaty at issue here. See In re Extradition of Platko, 

213 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1235 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2002). [Cf. dkt. 22-1 at 11 (text of 

treaty).] Thus, the Platko court first considered whether the charged crime was a 

listed offense, and second, turned to the question of “dual criminality.” Id. at 1235–

36. Separating those two inquiries made sense there, but it does not suggest that 

any additional requirement must be satisfied when treaties have a broad definition 

of “extraditable offense” instead of a list of specific offenses. 

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The Government for its part argues in support of a broad interpretation of 

“offence,” and contends that Article II is better read together as simply 

incorporating the dual criminality standard. [Dkt. 22 at 6–9.] Under that 

standard, 

[t]he law does not require that the name by which the crime is described 

in the two countries shall be the same; nor that the scope of the liability shall 

be coextensive, or, in other respects, the same in the two countries. It is enough 

if the particular act charged is criminal in both jurisdictions.

Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 312 (1922) (emphasis added); see also DeSilva, 

125 F.3d at 1113.

As the Government points out, other courts—which admittedly were not 

addressing in those cases Carr’s unique textual argument here—have interpreted 

this same United States-Ireland treaty as providing for just a dual criminality 

requirement. See In re McCabe, 10–XR–90622 NJV, 2011 WL 723561, at *10–11 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011); Markey v. U.S. Marshal Serv., No. 3:10-CV-61 RM, 

2010 WL 1541176, at *2–3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2010). Even if not directly on point, 

these cases are persuasive evidence that a fair reading of the treaty is that there is 

no additional requirement or step beyond determining dual criminality based on the 

charged acts. See McCabe, 2011 WL 723561, at *10 (in discussing extraditability 

under the US-Ireland treaty, “the elements of the crime in both countries also need 

not be the same”).

Furthermore, even assuming that the treaty could be read to require the 

elements of the offenses to match, Carr’s more onerous reading still would not 

prevail. The treaty’s plain text may be overridden if giving the words their more 

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usual meaning would cause a result that was ‘“inconsistent with the intent or 

expectations of its signatories.’” Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 180 (quoting Maximov, 

373 U.S. at 54). And if “two constructions” can be fairly gleaned from the treaty’s 

text, “the more liberal construction is to be preferred.” Factor, 290 U.S. at 293–94.

As discussed above, deriving two meanings from the word “offence” is—at best for 

Carr—possible here. In that event, the Court must opt for the broader reading of 

the treaty. 

For all of these reasons, the Court therefore concludes that the treaty’s 

language merely requires dual criminality, rather than additionally mandating that 

the offense’s elements also constitute felonies in both countries.

C. Secondary aids to interpretation of this treaty

Although Carr argues that the Court’s analysis should end with the “clear” 

text of the treaty, [dkt. 31 at 9], the Court finds it appropriate to also consider 

secondary aids to interpretation because, as just explained, this is not a case in 

which the text is unambiguously in his favor. Cf. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 

490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989) (rejecting reference to secondary materials where text was 

clear). Indeed, the Supreme Court has frequently considered “the history of the 

treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties” to 

ascertain a treaty’s meaning and to “resolve ambiguities in the text.” Air France, 

470 U.S. at 396, 400 (“In interpreting a treaty it is proper, of course, to refer to the 

records of its drafting and negotiation.”); see also GE Energy Power Conversion 

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France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637, 1645–48 

(2020); Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507–13.

The secondary evidence is further inconsistent with Carr’s reading of the 

treaty. In this case, the position that the treaty requires only dual criminality is 

supported by the Executive Branch’s materials regarding this treaty, as follows.

As an initial matter, the United States’ interpretation of its treaty is 

‘“entitled to great weight.’” Medellin, 552 U.S. at 513 (quoting Sumitomo, 457 U.S. 

at 184–85); but cf. GE Energy, 140 S. Ct. at 1647 (noting that this may be an open 

question, but not reaching it in that case). In this case, the Department of State’s 

previous determination that Carr’s offense is extraditable under the treaty, 

[dkt. 22-1 at 3 (declaration of adviser)], therefore should be afforded deference.

See, e.g., In re Extradition of Velasquez Pedroza, No. 19MJ1696-RBB, 2020 WL 

549715, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2020).

Additionally, both the President and the Senate recognized at the time of the 

treaty’s ratification in 1984 that the treaty was incorporating a commonly used, 

one-step dual criminality approach, and tellingly mentioned no step or requirement 

past that. The President’s letter transmitting the treaty to the Senate for 

ratification describes Article II as adopting “the modern practice of permitting 

extradition for any crime punishable under the laws of both contracting Parties for 

a minimum period” and as “also follow[ing] the practice of recent United States 

extradition treaties in indicating that the dual criminality standard should be 

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interpreted liberally in order to effectuate the intent of the Parties that fugitives 

be brought to justice. . . .” [Dkt. 22-2, Exh. 2 to Gov’s Mem., at 2 (emphasis added).]

The United States Senate Committee Report on this treaty also echoes that 

understanding of just a one-step, liberal approach:

To avoid any problems stemming from the use of different terminology to 

define offenses and the placement of offenses in different categories in Ireland 

and the United States, Paragraph 2(a) follows the practice of all recent United 

States extradition treaties in indicating that the dual criminality standard 

should be interpreted broadly in order to effectuate the intent of the Treaty to 

maximize each country's ability to bring to trial and punish fugitives from 

justice who seek haven in the other country. 

[Dkt. 36-5, United States Senate Committee Report (June 20, 1984), at 3.]

Carr parses these materials and contends that they support the existence 

of another requirement beyond dual criminality, in part because the transmittal 

letter discusses the requirement that the crime be punishable for a year or more 

in each jurisdiction before explicitly discussing dual criminality. [Dkt. 31 at 9–

11.] But this strained reading of the text misses the broader picture of these 

documents. In each, the focus is an emphasis on a broad application of the 

treaty, which indicates that imposing an implicit, additional, and potentially 

onerous requirement beyond dual criminality was not what the parties intended.

Instead, these materials provide further support for liberally construing the 

treaty to only necessitate that Carr’s alleged conduct be punishable as a felony 

in both countries, rather than requiring a technical match between the elements 

of the charged crimes in the United States and Ireland.

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D. Other extradition treaties

Both parties compare and contrast other extradition treaties to the treaty at 

issue here to support their reading. [Dkt. 31 at 7–8, 12–15; Dkt. 36, Gov’t’s Reply, 

at 4–6.] The Court appreciates the broader context that these materials offer and 

the parties’ work to cite them, but declines to place any deciding weight on these 

comparisons in this particular case, for two reasons.

First, the focus here should be on what these signatory nations meant in this

treaty, rather than what was meant in other treaties by other signatories.

See, e.g., Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507 (providing that in a treaty analysis, drafting 

history and signatory nations’ understanding of the treaty may be considered); Air 

France, 470 U.S. at 396–400 (explaining that it is courts’ “responsibility to give the 

specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of the 

contracting parties”) (emphasis added). Second, and relatedly, the parties have not

cited cases in which courts have engaged in this type of comparative treaty analysis 

in order to determine the meaning of a particular treaty. Thus, looking to the 

language of other treaties and what other countries intended by that language is of 

limited utility in this case. 

* * * * *

For all of the reasons above, the Court therefore determines that the 

United States-Ireland treaty requires only dual criminality for an offense to be 

extraditable, meaning that just the charged conduct must be criminal and 

punishable by a year or more in prison in both jurisdictions.

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Here, that requirement is met, as Carr concedes, [dkt. 31 at 11]. Carr 

allegedly drove in such a grossly negligent manner—at a high rate of speed and 

doing donuts—that he caused a crash and the deaths of his two passengers.

[Dkt. 22-1 at 33–40.] In Ireland, the offense of dangerous driving causing death of 

two victims is punishable by up to 10 years in prison. [Dkt. 22-1 at 30 (statement of 

facts), 44 (Irish statute).] And in the United States, Carr’s conduct could be charged 

as a felony under United States federal or Illinois state law, as involuntary 

manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. §1112 (maximum penalty of 8 years in prison), or as 

reckless homicide while driving a motor vehicle, 720 ILCS 5/9-3(a); 730 ILCS 5/5-

4.5-40(a) (maximum penalty of 5 years in prison), respectively.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court finds that the charged crime for which 

Ireland has requested Carr’s extradition is an extraditable offense under the treaty.

Accordingly, the Court orders the parties to brief, pursuant to the previously set 

schedule, the evidentiary and discovery issues for the probable-cause portion of 

these extradition proceedings. [See dkt. 17.]

Dated: November 3, 2020

E N T E R:

BETH W. JANTZ

United States Magistrate Judge

Case: 1:20-cr-00370 Document #: 41 Filed: 11/03/20 Page 18 of 18 PageID #:742