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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

Ekwan E. Rhow - State Bar No. 174604 

Dorothy Wolpert - State Bar No. 73213 

Thomas R. Freeman - State Bar No. 135392 

Marc E. Masters - State Bar No. 208375 

 mmasters@birdmarella.com 

BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, NESSIM, 

DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW, P.C. 

1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor 

Los Angeles, California 90067-2561 

Telephone: (310) 201-2100 

Facsimile: (310) 201-2110 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Misty Hong, minor 

A.S., through her mother and legal guardian 

Laurel Slothower, and minor A.R., through 

her mother and legal guardian Gilda Avila 

[Additional Counsel on Signature Page] 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MISTY HONG, minor A.S., through her 

mother and legal guardian LAUREL 

SLOTHOWER, minor A.R., through her 

mother and legal guardian GILDA AVILA, 

MEGHAN SMITH, minors C.W. and I.W., 

through their mother and legal guardian 

MIKHAILA WOODALL, and minor R.P., 

through her mother and legal guardian 

LYNN PAVALON individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

BYTEDANCE, INC., a corporation, 

TIKTOK, INC., a corporation; BEIJING 

BYTEDANCE TECHNOLOGY CO. 

LTD,, a privately-held company; and 

MUSICAL.LY, a corporation. 

Defendants. 

 CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

Hon. Lucy H. Koh 

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION 

COMPLAINT FOR: 

(1) Violation of the Computer Fraud and 

Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 

(2) Violation of the California 

Comprehensive Data Access and Fraud 

Act, Cal. Pen. C. § 502 

(3) Violation of the Right to Privacy - 

California Constitution 

(4) Intrusion upon Seclusion 

(5) Violation of the California Unfair 

Competition Law, Bus. & Prof. C. §§ 

17200 et seq.

(6) Violation of the California False 

Advertising Law, Bus. & Prof. C. §§ 

17500 et seq.

(7) Negligence 

(8) Restitution / Unjust Enrichment 

(9) Violation of the Illinois Biometric 

Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, 

et seq.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. INTRODUCTION. ..................................................................................................... 1

II. THE PARTIES. .......................................................................................................... 1

A. The Plaintiffs. .................................................................................................. 1

B. The Defendants. ............................................................................................... 2

C. Alter Ego And Single Enterprise Allegations. ................................................ 3

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE. ................................................................................ 6

IV. THE RISE OF DEFENDANTS AND THEIR DANGEROUS APPS. ..................... 7

A. Defendant Beijing ByteDance Becomes A China-Based Tech Giant Focused 

On Overseas Markets, Particularly In The United States. ............................... 7

B. The Musical.ly App Evolves Into The TikTok App. ...................................... 8

C. The TikTok App Becomes A Global Phenomenon With A Strong Presence 

In The United States. ....................................................................................... 9

V. DEFENDANTS’ THEFT OF PRIVATE AND PERSONALLY-IDENTIFIABLE 

TIKTOK USER DATA AND CONTENT............................................................... 12

A. Defendants’ Secret Taking Of Private TikTok User Videos and TikTok 

User/Device Identifiers Without Notice Or Consent. ................................... 12

1. Defendants Settle An FTC Lawsuit Alleging They Unlawfully 

Collected And Used Children’s Data. ................................................ 12

2. The TikTok App Secretly Takes Users’ Private Videos Before Users 

Are Given The Choice Whether To Save Or Post Them. .................. 12

3. The TikTok App Covertly Takes User/Device Identifiers. ................ 14

4. Defendants’ Theft Of Private And Personally-Identifiable User Data 

And Content Begins Even Before Users Can Choose Whether To Sign 

Up With TikTok And Create An Account. ........................................ 16

5. Defendants’ Theft Of Private And Personally-Identifiable Data And 

Content Continues Even After Users Close The TikTok App. .......... 17

6. Defendants Carefully Conceal Their Misconduct. ............................. 17

7. Defendants’ Privacy Policies And Terms Of Use Do Not Constitute 

Notice Of, Nor Consent To, TikTok User Data Theft, The Arbitration 

Provision Or The Class Action Waiver. ............................................. 17

B. Defendants Come Under United States Government Scrutiny. .................... 19

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

1. The United States Government Investigates Defendants’ Stockpiling 

Of TikTok Users’ Private And Personally-Identifiable Data And 

Content For The Chinese Government. .............................................. 19

2. Defendants Unpersuasively Deny They Transfer TikTok Users’ 

Private And Personally-Identifiable Data And Content To The 

Chinese Government. ......................................................................... 21

C. Transfers Of Private And Personally-Identifiable User Data And Content 

From TikTok Users To China Without Notice Or Consent. ......................... 22

1. The TikTok App Secretly Transfers Private And PersonallyIdentifiable User Data And Content To Servers In China. ................ 22

2. Defendants’ Privacy Policies Do Not Constitute Notice Of Or Consent 

To The Transfer Of Private And Personally-Identifiable TikTok User 

Data And Content To Servers In China. ............................................ 25

3. The China-Based Tech Giants Also Possess TikTok Users’ Private 

And Personally-Identifiable Data And Content While They Work 

Cooperatively With The Chinese Government. ................................. 25

VI. DEFENDANTS’ THEFT OF TIKTOK USER BIOMETRICS. .............................. 30

A. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act Regulates Face Geometry 

Scans, Voiceprints And Information Derived Therefrom. ............................ 30

B. Defendants Unlawfully Collect, Use And Profit From TikTok User 

Biometrics, Face Geometry Scans, Voiceprints And Information Derived 

Therefrom. ..................................................................................................... 31

1. Defendants’ BIPA And Other Biometrics-Related Violations Are 

Evidenced By The TikTok App’s Functionality And Code. .............. 32

2. Defendants’ BIPA And Other Biometrics-Related Violations Are 

Further Evidenced By Defendants’ China-Based Operations. ........... 37

3. Defendants’ BIPA And Other Biometrics-Related Violations Are Also 

Evidenced By Their Obligation To Accumulate And Share Data, 

Including Biometrics, With The Chinese Government. ..................... 43

VII. DEFENDANTS UNJUSTLY PROFIT WHILE PLAINTIFFS, THE CLASS AND 

THE TWO SUBCLASSES SUFFER HARM. ......................................................... 50

VIII. FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND TOLLING. ........................................... 51

IX. NAMED PLAINTIFF ALLEGATIONS. ................................................................. 52

A. The California Plaintiffs. ............................................................................... 52

1. Plaintiff Misty Hong. .......................................................................... 52

2. Plaintiff A.S. ....................................................................................... 53

3. Plaintiff A.R. ...................................................................................... 55

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

B. The Illinois Plaintiffs. .................................................................................... 57

1. Plaintiff Meghan Smith. ..................................................................... 57

2. Plaintiffs C.W. and I.W. ..................................................................... 58

3. Plaintiff R.P. ....................................................................................... 60

X. CLASS ALLEGATIONS. ........................................................................................ 61

XI. CAUSES OF ACTION. ............................................................................................ 66

XII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF. .......................................................................................... 86

XIII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL. ............................................................................... 88

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

I. INTRODUCTION. 

1. TikTok is one of the most popular entertainment apps for mobile devices in 

the United States. It has acquired one of the largest installed user bases in the country on 

the strength of its popular 15-second videos of fun activities like dancing, lip-syncing, and 

stunts. Unknown to its users, however, the TikTok app also includes China-based 

surveillance software. The TikTok app clandestinely has vacuumed up and transferred to 

servers in China (and to other servers accessible from within China) vast quantities of 

private and personally-identifiable user data and content that can be employed to identify, 

profile and track the physical and digital location and activities of United States users now 

and in the future. 

2. The TikTok app also surreptitiously has taken TikTok users’ private draft 

videos they never intended for publication – without notice or consent. Defendants and 

their sophisticated China-based engineering team covertly mine these private videos, as 

well as publicly posted TikTok user videos, for highly sensitive and immutable biometric 

identifiers and information. In addition to this mining of TikTok user videos at the server 

level in China, the functionality and code of the TikTok app itself evidences Defendants’ 

collection and use of TikTok users’ biometric identifiers and information – again without 

notice or consent. 

3. In short, the TikTok app’s lighthearted fun comes at a heavy cost. 

Meanwhile, Defendants unjustly profit from the secret harvesting of this massive array of 

private and personally-identifiable TikTok user data and content by using it for targeted 

advertising, improvements to Defendants’ artificial intelligence technologies, the filing of 

patent applications, and the development of consumer demand for, and use of, Defendants’ 

other products. Defendants’ conduct violates statutory, constitutional, and common law 

privacy, data, biometrics and consumer protections, and it should be stopped. 

II. THE PARTIES. 

A. The Plaintiffs. 

4. Plaintiff Misty Hong is, and at all relevant times was, an individual and 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

resident of Palo Alto, California. 

5. Plaintiff A.S., a minor, is, and at all relevant times was, an individual and 

resident of Stevenson Ranch, California. A.S. brings this suit by and through her mother 

and legal guardian, Laurel Slothower, who is, and at all relevant times was, an individual 

and resident of Stevenson Ranch, California. 

6. Plaintiff A.R., a minor, is, and at all relevant times was, an individual and 

resident of Pasadena, California. A.R. brings this suit by and through her mother and legal 

guardian, Gilda Avila, who is, and at all relevant times was, an individual and resident of 

Pasadena, California.1

7. Plaintiff Meghan Smith is, and at all relevant times was, an individual and 

resident of Champagne, Illinois. 

8. Plaintiffs C.W., a minor, and I.W., a minor, are, and at all relevant times 

were, individuals and residents of Chicago, Illinois. C.W. and I.W. bring this suit by and 

through their mother and legal guardian, Mikhaila Woodall, who is, and at all relevant 

times was, an individual and resident of Chicago, Illinois. 

9. Plaintiff R.P., a minor, is, and at all relevant times was, an individual and 

resident of Chicago, Illinois. R.P. brings this suit by and through her mother and legal 

guardian, Lynn Pavalon, who is, and at all relevant times was, an individual and resident of 

Chicago, Illinois.2

B. The Defendants. 

10. Defendant ByteDance, Inc. is, and at all relevant times was, a Delaware 

corporation with its principal place of business in Palo Alto, California. Defendant 

ByteDance, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ByteDance, Ltd., a Cayman Islands 

corporation. 

1

 Plaintiffs Misty Hong, A.S. and A.R. are collectively referred to as the “California Plaintiffs.” 

2

 Plaintiffs Meghan Smith, C.W., I.W. and R.P. are collectively referred to as the “Illinois 

Plaintiffs.” The California Plaintiffs and the Illinois Plaintiffs are collectively referred to as the 

“Plaintiffs.” 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

11. Defendant TikTok, Inc. f/k/a Musical.ly, Inc. (“TikTok, Inc.”) is, and at all 

relevant times was, a California corporation with its principal place of business in Culver 

City, California.3

 Defendant TikTok, Inc. also maintains offices in Palo Alto, California 

and Mountain View, California.4

 The name change from Musical.ly, Inc. to TikTok, Inc. 

occurred in May 2019. Defendant TikTok, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of TikTok, 

LLC, which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of TikTok, Ltd. And TikTok, Ltd. – like 

Defendant ByteDance, Inc. – is a wholly owned subsidiary of ByteDance, Ltd. 

12. Defendant Musical.ly n/k/a TikTok, Ltd. is, and at all relevant times was, a 

Cayman Island corporation with its principal place of business in Shanghai, China. 

Defendant Musical.ly was the parent company of Musical.ly, Inc. Defendant Musical.ly 

changed its name to TikTok, Ltd. and, as noted above, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 

ByteDance, Ltd. 

13. Defendant Beijing ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd. (“Beijing ByteDance”) 

is, and at all relevant times was, a privately held company headquartered in Beijing, China. 

Defendant Beijing ByteDance is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ByteDance Co., Ltd., 

which is also headquartered in Beijing, China. ByteDance Co., Ltd. is owned by founder 

Zhang Yiming (98.8%) and Zhang Lidong (1.2%). Defendant Beijing ByteDance and 

ByteDance Co., Ltd. operate as one company. 

14. ByteDance, Ltd. owns 100% of ByteDance (HK) Co., Ltd., which is 

headquartered in Hong Kong. ByteDance (HK) Co., Ltd. in turn owns 100% of Beijing 

ByteDance Network Technology Co., Ltd., which is headquartered in Beijing, China. 

C. Alter Ego And Single Enterprise Allegations. 

15. At all relevant times, Defendants TikTok, Inc. and ByteDance, Inc. have 

3 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/tiktok-has-mountain-view-office-near-facebook-poachingemployees.html. 

4 https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/05/inside-tiktok-culture-clash-where-usviews-about-censorship-often-were-overridden-by-chinese-bosses/; 

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/tiktok-has-mountain-view-office-near-facebook-poachingemployees.html. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

shared offices in Silicon Valley5 and also have shared employees. U.S. and China-based 

employees of the ByteDance family of companies perform work on and concerning the 

TikTok app that is at the center of this lawsuit, including the functionality and operation of 

the TikTok app and the Chinese version of the app (“Douyin”) that Defendant Beijing 

ByteDance operates in China. One Director of Engineering in the Mountain View office 

leads an “augmented reality” team that is tasked with transforming state-of-the-art artificial 

intelligence and augmented reality technologies into fun features and creative tools for 

both the TikTok and Douyin apps. 

16. At all relevant times, Defendant Beijing ByteDance has directed the 

operations of Defendants TikTok, Inc. and ByteDance, Inc. with respect to the TikTok app, 

and Defendants TikTok, Inc. and ByteDance, Inc. have reported to Defendant Beijing 

ByteDance. In fact, at all relevant times, Defendant Beijing ByteDance has collected and 

analyzed data from the United States regarding the performance of various features of the 

TikTok app, and has worked with Defendants TikTok, Inc. and Defendant ByteDance, Inc. 

to address performance issues. Additionally, at all relevant times, Defendant Beijing 

ByteDance and its engineers have done significant coding for the TikTok app and its many 

versions and updates. 

17. At certain relevant times, with respect to Defendants’ monitoring and 

censorship of content on the TikTok app, management in China has determined content 

review policies enforced in Defendant TikTok, Inc.’s Culver City office; a content review 

manager in the same Culver City office was reporting to someone in China; and another 

content reviewer was required to seek authorization from someone in China in order to 

access non-published information about user accounts when content concerns arose. Also, 

at certain relevant times Defendant Beijing ByteDance employed a vast number of content 

reviewers in China to review TikTok videos uploaded by United States users, and these 

5

 In addition to ByteDance-TikTok cross-listed personnel in Palo Alto, TikTok logos and 

paraphernalia are found in the ByteDance, Inc. Palo Alto office. See

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RymGJG0miv0. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

reviewers in China had authority to take down any such videos if the content was deemed 

inappropriate or illegal. 

18. These facts are consistent with public reporting. For example, “[m]ultiple 

TikTok sources, who spoke with The Intercept on the condition of anonymity ..., 

emphasized the primacy of ByteDance’s Beijing HQ over the global TikTok operation, 

explaining that their ever-shifting decisions about what’s censored and what’s boosted 

are dictated by Chinese staff, whose policy declarations are then filtered around 

TikTok’s 12 global offices, translated into rough English, finally settling into a muddle 

of Beijing authoritarianism crossed with the usual Silicon Valley prudishness.”6

19. At certain relevant times, Defendant Beijing ByteDance employees have 

collected TikTok users’ feedback regarding upgraded and/or newly-introduced features, 

and the departments responsible for managing and monitoring TikTok user experience 

have been based in China. At certain relevant times, employees in these departments 

reported to their supervisors in China, who in turn shared their findings with Defendant 

TikTok, Inc. in the United States. At certain relevant times, Defendant Beijing ByteDance 

employees also distributed questionnaires to TikTok users, and collected and recorded 

reports from such users about problems they were experiencing. At certain relevant times, 

employees in the United States contacted TikTok users, and took notes regarding such 

users’ experiences. At certain relevant times, these notes were translated into Chinese and 

sent to Defendant Beijing ByteDance executives to review and analyze. 

20. At certain relevant times, Defendant Beijing ByteDance made key strategy 

decisions for Defendants TikTok, Inc. and ByteDance, Inc., as well as for offices 

elsewhere in the world, and Defendants TikTok, Inc., ByteDance, Inc. and the other offices 

were tasked with executing such decisions. A publicly-available interview of Isaac Bess 

and Gregory Justice on YouTube is consistent with these facts. In that interview, Isaac 

Bess identifies himself as responsible for leading “ByteDance” business development from 

6 https://theintercept.com/2020/03/16/tiktok-app-moderators-users-discrimination/. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

Los Angeles, and Gregory Justice identifies himself as part of Defendant TikTok, Inc.’s 

content team in Los Angeles. Both discuss having regular all-hands bi-monthly meetings 

with the CEO in China to discuss global strategy with the “local teams.”7

21. At all relevant times, and in connection with the matters alleged herein, each 

Defendant acted as an agent, servant, partner, joint venturer and/or alter ego of each of the 

other Defendants, and acted in the course and scope of such agency, partnership, and 

relationship and/or in furtherance of such joint venture. Each Defendant acted with the 

knowledge and consent of each of the other Defendants and/or directed, authorized, 

affirmed, consented to, ratified, encouraged, approved, adopted, and/or participated in the 

acts or transactions of the other Defendants. 

22. At all relevant times, and in connection with the matters alleged herein, 

Defendants were controlled and largely-owned by the same person, founder Zhang 

Yiming, and constitute a single enterprise with a unity of interest. Recognition of the 

privilege of separate existence under such circumstances would promote injustice. 

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE. 

23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1332(d) & 1367 because: (i) this is a class action in which the matter in 

controversy exceeds the sum of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs; (ii) there are 

100 or more class members; and (iii) some members of the class are citizens of states 

different from some Defendants, and also because two Defendants are citizens or subjects 

of a foreign state. 

24. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because: (i) they 

transact business in the United States, including in this District; (ii) they have substantial 

aggregate contacts with the United States, including in this District; (iii) they engaged and 

are engaging in conduct that has and had a direct, substantial, reasonably foreseeable, and 

intended effect of causing injury to persons throughout the United States, including in this 

7 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lKV6wsdI4-A (at 0:20 – 0:54; 15:59 – 17:08). 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

District, and purposely availed themselves of the laws of the United States. 

25. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1391, venue is proper in this District 

because: (i) a substantial part of the conduct giving rise to the claims occurred in and/or 

emanated from this District; (ii) Defendants transact business in this District; (iii) one 

Defendant has its principal place of business in this District; (iv) two Defendants have 

offices in this District; and (v) Plaintiff Misty Hong resides in this District. 

IV. THE RISE OF DEFENDANTS AND THEIR DANGEROUS APPS. 

A. Defendant Beijing ByteDance Becomes A China-Based Tech Giant 

Focused On Overseas Markets, Particularly In The United States. 

26. Defendant Beijing ByteDance was founded in 2012 and makes a variety of 

video and news-aggregation apps.8

 It “regards its platforms as part of an artificial 

intelligence company powered by algorithms that ‘learn’ each user’s interests and 

preferences through repeat interaction.”9

 Because Defendant Beijing ByteDance emerged 

only after other China-based tech giants had taken over the market in China, Defendant 

Beijing ByteDance has looked to overseas markets, including those in the United States, 

for growth.10

27. Defendant Beijing ByteDance had $7.2 billion in annual revenue for the year 

2018. It far surpassed this number in 2019, booking $7 billion to $8.4 billion in revenue in 

a better-than-expected result for the first half of 2019.11 Defendant Beijing ByteDance 

currently is worth between $75 billion and $78 billion.12 Investors in Defendant Beijing 

8 https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktoks-videos-are-goofy-its-strategy-to-dominate-social-media-isserious-11561780861. 

9 https://www.law360.com/articles/1213180/sens-want-tiktok-investigated-for-national-securitythreats; https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1239. 

10 https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktoks-videos-are-goofy-its-strategy-to-dominate-social-media-isserious-11561780861. 

11 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/30/tiktok-owner-bytedances-first-half-revenue-better-thanexpected-at-over-7-billion-sources.html. 

12 https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/05/inside-tiktok-culture-clash-where-usCase: 1:20-cv-04723 Document #: 35 Filed: 05/11/20 Page 11 of 94 PageID #:212
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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

ByteDance include Sequoia Capital China, Russian billionaire Yuri Milner, Japanese 

technology giant SoftBank, and big private-equity firms such as KKR, General Atlantic, 

and Hillhouse Capital Group.13

28. Most of Defendant Beijing ByteDance’s revenue is generated from 

advertising.14 “ByteDance has [] been doubling down on its advertising business as the 

company’s management sets increasingly ambitious revenue goals.”15 “As with pretty 

much all major social media and content startups, ByteDance monetises through 

advertising. Specifically, it runs targeted advertising within user feeds – providing them 

promotional content in between using the app.”16

B. The Musical.ly App Evolves Into The TikTok App. 

29. Defendant Musical.ly (named, and now known as, TikTok, Ltd.) and 

Defendant Musical.ly, Inc. (named, and now known as, TikTok, Inc.) launched the highlypopular social media and social networking app “Muscial.ly” in 2014. This app allows its 

users to (i) create video selfies of themselves dancing and/or lip-syncing with a musical 

soundtrack in the background, and (ii) share such videos with friends.17 There are simple 

tools provided by the Musical.ly app that users can utilize to create and edit these videos, 

and the app provides a large online music library from which users may select their 

background music. The Musical.ly app was designed “to capture the YouTube 

phenomenon of teenagers sharing videos of themselves singing or dancing to popular 

views-about-censorship-often-were-overridden-by-chinese-bosses/; 

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiktok-cfius-exclusive/exclusive-us-opens-national-securityinvestigation-into-tiktok-sources-idUSKBN1XB4IL. 

13 https://www.wsj.com/articles/lip-syncing-app-musical-ly-is-acquired-for-as-much-as-1-billion1510278123; https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiktok-cfius-exclusive/exclusive-us-opensnational-security-investigation-into-tiktok-sources-idUSKBN1XB4IL. 

14 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-15/bytedance-is-said-to-hit-lower-end-ofsales-goal-amid-slowdown. 

15 https://technode.com/2019/09/20/bytedance-launches-video-ad-tools-for-tiktok-douyin/. 

16 https://www.businessofapps.com/insights/bytedance-social-media-advertising-company/. 

17 https://www.wsj.com/articles/lip-syncing-app-musical-ly-is-acquired-for-as-much-as-1-billion1510278123. 

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music.”18 Beyond the creation and sharing of videos, the Musical.ly app provides a 

platform through which users can interact, including by commenting on other users’ videos 

and “following” other users’ accounts. Users also can send direct messages in order to 

communicate with other users on the app. By November 2017, the Musical.ly app had 60 

million monthly active users.19

30. Meanwhile, in 2016, Defendant Beijing ByteDance launched its own app 

called “Douyin” in China, which mimicked the Musical.ly app.20 By 2017, shortly before 

its purchase of Defendants Musical.ly and Musical.ly, Inc., Defendant Beijing ByteDance 

introduced an English-language version of the Douyin app outside China under the name 

“TikTok.” In August 2018, after having acquired Defendants Musical.ly and Musical.ly, 

Inc., Defendant Beijing ByteDance combined the Musical.ly app with its TikTok app, 

merging all existing accounts and data into a single app under the retained “TikTok” 

name.21

31. The Musical.ly and TikTok apps are hereafter collectively referred to as the 

“TikTok app,” and the Musical.ly and TikTok users are hereafter collectively referred to as 

the “TikTok users.” 

C. The TikTok App Becomes A Global Phenomenon With A Strong 

Presence In The United States. 

32. The TikTok app has become “one of the world’s fastest-growing social 

media platforms” and a “global phenomenon” with a massive American audience.22 In 

18 https://www.wsj.com/articles/lip-syncing-app-musical-ly-is-acquired-for-as-much-as-1-billion1510278123. 

19 https://www.wsj.com/articles/lip-syncing-app-musical-ly-is-acquired-for-as-much-as-1-billion1510278123; https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/technology/tiktok-national-securityreview.html. 

20 https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktoks-videos-are-goofy-its-strategy-to-dominate-social-media-isserious-11561780861. 

21 http://culture.affinitymagazine.us/tik-tok-is-scamming-people-stealing-information/. 

22 https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/05/inside-tiktok-culture-clash-where-usCase: 1:20-cv-04723 Document #: 35 Filed: 05/11/20 Page 13 of 94 PageID #:214
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November 2019, the Washington Post reported that the TikTok app had been downloaded 

more than 1.3 billion times worldwide, and more than 120 million times in the United 

States.23 However, by April 2020, TechCrunch reported that the TikTok app’s worldwide 

downloads already had surpassed 2 billion, and that in “the quarter that ended on March 31, 

TikTok was downloaded 315 million times — the highest number of downloads for any app 

in a quarter.”24 It is the most downloaded non-game app in the world.25 The TikTok app 

routinely outranks its top competitors – such as Facebook, Snapchat, and Instagram – on 

the Apple and Google app stores.26 In fact, it has been the most downloaded app on the 

Apple and Google app stores for months.27 As of August 2019, the TikTok and Douyin 

apps had 625 million monthly active users.28 The average user opened the TikTok app 

more than 8 times per day and spent approximately 45 minutes on the app daily as of 

March 2019.29

33. In January 2020, Barron’s reported on the TikTok app’s revenue: “The 

wildly popular short-video service generated $176.9 million in revenue in 2019—71% of 

the total $247.6 million in revenue the app has ever generated, according to new data from 

the app-tracking firm SensorTower. In the fourth quarter alone, TikTok had revenue of 

$88.5 million, up two times from the third quarter and up six times year over year, most of 

that from advertising and in-app purchases, SensorTower reports. China accounted for 

views-about-censorship-often-were-overridden-by-chinese-bosses/. 

23 https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/05/inside-tiktok-culture-clash-where-usviews-about-censorship-often-were-overridden-by-chinese-bosses/. 

24 https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/29/tiktok-tops-2-billion-downloads/. 

25 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/25/china-camera-apps-may-open-up-user-data-to-beijinggovernment-requests.html. 

26 https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/05/inside-tiktok-culture-clash-where-usviews-about-censorship-often-were-overridden-by-chinese-bosses/. 

27 https://thehill.com/policy/technology/469114-tiktok-faces-lawmaker-anger-over-china-ties. 

28 https://thehill.com/policy/technology/469114-tiktok-faces-lawmaker-anger-over-china-ties. 

29 https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktoks-videos-are-goofy-its-strategy-to-dominate-social-media-isserious-11561780861. 

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about 69% of the company’s 2019 revenue, according to the firm, with U.S. revenues 

accounting for 20%.”30 Evidencing the TikTok app’s rapid growth, three months later, 

TechCrunch reported that: “Users have spent about $456.7 million on TikTok to date, up 

from $175 million five months ago. Much of this spending — about 72.3% — has happened 

in China. Users in the United States have spent about $86.5 million on the app, making the 

nation the second most important market for TikTok from the revenue standpoint.”31

34. This level of success globally and in the United States is rare for a Chinabased tech giant. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg acknowledged as much, stating that the 

TikTok app “is really the first consumer internet product built by one of the Chinese tech 

giants that is doing quite well around the world. It’s starting to do well in the U.S., 

especially with young folks.”32 Indeed, Defendant TikTok, Inc. recently took over office 

space in Silicon Valley once occupied by Facebook’s WhatsApp messaging app, and is 

poaching employees from rival Facebook by offering salaries as much as 20% higher.33

Other competitors from whom Defendant TikTok, Inc. is hiring away employees include 

Snap, Hulu, Apple, YouTube and Amazon.34

35. One key to Defendants’ financial success is the targeted advertising that they 

run through the TikTok app. Such targeted advertising relies heavily upon knowledge of 

each user’s preferences.35 Through a secretive and highly-invasive information gathering 

campaign, Defendants have unlawfully accumulated private and personally-identifiable 

data and content on TikTok users that Defendants are assembling in user profiles or 

30 https://www.barrons.com/articles/beware-facebook-tiktok-revenues-are-exploding51579201752. 

31 https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/29/tiktok-tops-2-billion-downloads/. 

32 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/tiktok-has-mountain-view-office-near-facebook-poachingemployees.html. 

33 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/tiktok-has-mountain-view-office-near-facebook-poachingemployees.html. 

34 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/14/tiktok-has-mountain-view-office-near-facebook-poachingemployees.html. 

35 https://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/tiktok-advertiser-audience-network-targeted-ads/. 

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dossiers and monetizing for the purpose of unjustly profiting from their unlawful activities. 

V. DEFENDANTS’ THEFT OF PRIVATE AND PERSONALLYIDENTIFIABLE TIKTOK USER DATA AND CONTENT. 

A. Defendants’ Secret Taking Of Private TikTok User Videos and TikTok 

User/Device Identifiers Without Notice Or Consent. 

1. Defendants Settle An FTC Lawsuit Alleging They Unlawfully 

Collected And Used Children’s Data. 

36. On February 27, 2019, the United States, on behalf of the Federal Trade 

Commission (“FTC”), filed a lawsuit against Defendants Musical.ly and Musical.ly, Inc. 

alleging they had violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act by collecting and 

using personal data from children under age 13 without the required notice and consent.36

37. On the same date, Defendants Musical.ly and Musical.ly, Inc. stipulated to 

an order mandating, among other things, a civil penalty in the amount of $5.7 million and 

injunctive relief concerning the collection and destruction of children’s personal data.37

38. This is the largest civil penalty ever imposed for such a violation.38 The FTC 

also published a statement indicating that, “[i]n our view, these practices reflected the 

company’s willingness to pursue growth even at the expense of endangering children.”39

2. The TikTok App Secretly Takes Users’ Private Videos Before 

Users Are Given The Choice Whether To Save Or Post Them. 

39. Unless shared through the affirmative consent of the TikTok user, videos 

created using the TikTop app, which often include close-ups of faces and private acts 

36 United States of America v. Musical.ly and Musical.ly, Inc., United States District Court, 

Central District of California, Case No. 2:19-cv-1439. 

37 United States of America v. Musical.ly and Musical.ly, Inc., United States District Court, 

Central District of California, Case No. 2:19-cv-1439. 

38 https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktoks-videos-are-goofy-its-strategy-to-dominate-social-media-isserious-11561780861; https://www.techinasia.com/tiktok-owner-bytedance-gathers-1-billionmonthly-active-users-apps. 

39 https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/tiktok-pay-5-7-million-over-alleged-violation-childprivacy-n977186. 

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unintended for public consumption, are inherently private, personal and sensitive. 

40. After using the TikTok app to record a video, a screen presents TikTok users 

with certain options, including the following: (i) an “x” button; (ii) a “next” button; and 

(iii) a button for effects. The “x” button takes TikTok users to a screen with options, 

including “reshoot” and “exit.” The “next” button takes TikTok users to a screen with 

options, including “save” and “post.” The “effects” button takes TikTok users to a screen 

offering the ability to modify the video. 

41. Once TikTok users click the “next” button, but before they click either the 

“save” or “post” buttons, their private videos that are neither saved nor posted (the 

“Private Videos”) are transferred from their mobile devices to the following domain owned 

and controlled by Defendants: muscdn.com. The “mus” portion of the domain name stands 

for Musical.ly, and the “cdn” portion of the domain name stands for content distribution 

network. 

42. During the secret transfer of TikTok users’ Private Videos to the domain and 

servers mentioned above, there is no progress bar or any other indication that their Private 

Videos are being transferred. Nor is the taking of the Private Videos disclosed in any of 

Defendants’ privacy policies or other disclosure documentation. TikTok users are thus 

prevented from knowing that Defendants have taken their Private Videos. No user consent 

exists. 

43. This highly invasive breach of TikTok users’ privacy is not the only harm 

that befalls such users as a result of Defendants’ theft of their Private Videos. Defendants 

also take highly sensitive and immutable biometric identifiers and information from these 

Private Videos, as discussed below, and unjustly profit from such activities. 

44. Defendants released a December 2019 version of the TikTok app that 

transfers five thumbnail images uniformly distributed across each of the Private Videos 

(the “Private Video Images”) to byteoversea.net. The domain byteoversea.net is controlled 

by Defendants and has numerous sub-domains. Accordingly, when data and content 

arrives at byteoversea.net, it is routed to one or more of these sub-domains. The various 

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sub-domains are spread across the globe, including within China. 

45. Defendants’ taking of the Private Video Images is not disclosed in any of 

Defendants’ privacy policies or other disclosure documentation. TikTok users are thus 

prevented from knowing that Defendants have taken their Private Video Images. No user 

consent exists. 

3. The TikTok App Covertly Takes User/Device Identifiers. 

46. Also unknown to TikTok users is that the seemingly innocuous TikTok app 

infiltrates their mobile devices and extracts a remarkably broad array of private and 

personally-identifiable data and content that Defendants use to track and profile TikTok 

users for the purpose of, among other things, targeting them with advertisements from 

which Defendants unjustly profit. 

47. This unlawful secret taking of private and personally-identifiable data and 

content from TikTok users’ mobile devices is contrary to American norms. The United 

States Supreme Court has recognized that, in contemporary society, cell phones are so 

ubiquitous and inextricably intertwined with the user’s personal privacy that such devices 

have become “almost a ‘feature of human anatomy.’” Carpenter v. United States, 138 

S.Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018) (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)). The 

United States Constitution thus provides a privacy right that protects individuals against 

unreasonable governmental searches of their physical movements through historical cell 

phone records in the possession of their service providers. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2218. 

48. From each mobile device on which the TikTok app is installed, Defendants 

take a combination of, among other items, the following user identifiers and mobile device 

identifiers (“User/Device Identifiers”): 

 a. username, password, age/birthday, email address, and profile image; 

 b. user-generated content, including messages sent through the apps; 

 c. phone and social network contacts; 

 d. the mobile device’s WiFi MAC address (i.e., media access control 

address), which is the unique hardware number on the WiFi card adapter that tells the 

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internet who is connected to it; 

 e. the mobile device’s International Mobile Equipment Identity 

(“IMEI”) number, which is a unique number given to every mobile device that is used to 

route calls to one’s phone, and that reflects information about the origin, model, and serial 

number of the mobile device; 

 f. the user’s International Mobile Subscriber Identity (“IMSI”) number, 

which is a unique number given to every subscriber to a mobile network; 

 g. the IP address (i.e., Internet Protocol address), which is a numerical 

label assigned to each user mobile device connected to a computer network that uses the 

Internet Protocol for communication. IP addresses allow the location of literally billions of 

digital devices that are connected to the Internet to be pinpointed and differentiated from 

all other such devices; 

 h. the device ID, which is a unique, identifying number or group of 

numbers assigned to the user’s individual mobile device that is separate from the hardware 

serial number; 

 i. the OS version, which is the operating system on the user’s mobile 

device; 

 j. the mobile device brand and model/version; 

 k. the hardware serial number, which is the unique, identifying number 

or group of numbers assigned to the user’s individual mobile device; 

 l. the Advertising ID, which is a unique ID for advertising that provides 

developers with a simple, standard system to monetize their apps; 

 m. mobile carrier information (e.g., the name of the phone company); 

 n. network information, including the technology that the carrier uses; 

 o. browsing history; 

 p. cookies; 

 q. metadata; and 

 r. precise physical location, including based on SIM card, cell towers 

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and/or GPS. 

49. Theft of physical and digital location tracking data is highly invasive of 

TikTok users’ privacy rights. Two United States Senators observed that “[l]ocation data is 

among the most sensitive personal information that a user can share with a company ... 

Today, modern smartphones can reveal location data beyond a mere street address. The 

technology is sophisticated enough to identify on which floor of a building the device is 

located.”40 Location data reveals private living patterns of TikTok users, including where 

they work, where they reside, where they go to school, and when they are at each of these 

locations. Location data, either standing alone or combined with other information, 

exposes deeply-private and personal information about TikTok users’ health, religion, 

politics and intimate relationships. 

50. The TikTok app also invites users to sign in through Facebook, Google, and 

Twitter. What users do not know is that this “single sign-on” option gives Defendants 

access to TikTok users’ private and personally-identifiable data and content stored on these 

other social media accounts, including User/Device Identifiers such as the user’s photos 

and friends/contacts information. 

4. Defendants’ Theft Of Private And Personally-Identifiable User 

Data And Content Begins Even Before Users Can Choose 

Whether To Sign Up With TikTok And Create An Account. 

51. The TikTok app begins taking private and personally identifiable user data 

and content immediately upon the completion of the download process and before TikTok 

users even have the opportunity to sign-up and create an account. TikTok users therefore 

do not have an opportunity to learn about the existence of, much less consent to, any of 

Defendants’ privacy policies or other disclosure documentation before the TikTok app 

begins mining their mobile devices for their data and content. 

40 https://www.law360.com/consumerprotection/articles/1221312/sens-prod-zuckerberg-whykeep-tracking-user-locations-. 

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5. Defendants’ Theft Of Private And Personally-Identifiable Data 

And Content Continues Even After Users Close The TikTok App. 

52. Even when TikTok users stop using the app and close it, Defendants 

continue to harvest private and personally-identifiable data and content from such users’ 

mobile devices. There are no disclosures in any of Defendants’ privacy policies or other 

disclosure documentation that such surreptitious taking of private and personallyidentifiable user data and content occurs when the TikTok app is closed. TikTok users are 

thus prevented from knowing that Defendants have taken their private and personallyidentifiable data and content while the TikTok app is closed. No user consent exists. 

6. Defendants Carefully Conceal Their Misconduct. 

53. At the same time that Defendants utilize the TikTok app to covertly tap into 

a massive array of private and personally-identifiable user data and content, they go to 

great lengths to hide their tracks. They do so by obfuscating the source code that would 

reveal the private and personally-identifiable user data and content actually taken from 

users’ mobile devices. 

7. Defendants’ Privacy Policies And Terms Of Use Do Not 

Constitute Notice Of, Nor Consent To, TikTok User Data Theft, 

The Arbitration Provision Or The Class Action Waiver. 

54. Defendants have adopted various privacy policies and terms of use for the 

TikTok app over the years. Certain privacy policies, revealed by investigation of counsel 

but not seen in the ordinary course by users, purport to disclose that the TikTok app takes 

certain (but not all) of the private and personally-identifiable user data and content above. 

Certain terms of use, revealed by investigation of counsel but not seen in the ordinary 

course by users, purport to require arbitration and class action waivers. 

55. Because the TikTok app begins taking private and personally-identifiable 

user data and content – including User/Device Identifiers – immediately upon the 

completion of the download process, and before TikTok users are even presented with the 

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option of signing-up for and creating an account, TikTok users have no notice of, and 

cannot consent to, the privacy policies and terms of use prior to such theft. Moreover, 

because the TikTok app takes Private Videos and Private Video Images even if TikTok 

users have not signed up for an account, TikTok users who have not signed up for an 

account have no notice of, and cannot consent to, the privacy policies and terms of use 

prior to such theft. 

56. Moreover, even at the point at which TikTok users have the option to sign-up 

and create an account, Defendants do not provide such users actual notice of privacy 

policies or terms of use. Nor do Defendants present TikTok users with conspicuouslylocated and designed hyperlinks to their privacy policies and terms of use, much less 

conspicuous warnings accompanying such hyperlinks. The TikTok app thus allows users 

to utilize it without ever placing them on actual or constructive notice of the privacy 

policies and terms of use. This lack of actual or constructive notice deprives TikTok users 

of the opportunity to accept or reject TikTok’s privacy policies and terms of use, rendering 

such documents unenforceable. See, e.g., Colgate v. Juul Labs, Inc., 402 F.Supp.3d 728 

(N.D. Cal. 2019); Arena v. Intuit Inc., 2020 WL 1189849 (N.D. Cal. 2020). 

57. Additionally, certain privacy policies and terms of use are ambiguous as to 

what conduct they purport to cover. Such privacy policies and terms of use are also 

substantively and procedurally unconscionable. The ambiguities render meaningless the 

purported disclosures and requirements in the remainder of these documents, and the 

substantive and procedural unconscionability render such documents unenforceable. 

58. Moreover, even if TikTok users in California had knowingly accepted the 

terms of use (which they did not), the purported waiver of the right to seek public 

injunctive relief in a court of law is unenforceable under California law. See, e.g., McGill 

v. Citibank, 2 Cal.5th 945 (2017); Blair v. Rent-A-Center, 928 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2019). 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

B. Defendants Come Under United States Government Scrutiny. 

1. The United States Government Investigates Defendants’ 

Stockpiling Of TikTok Users’ Private And Personally-Identifiable 

Data And Content For The Chinese Government. 

59. United States Senators Charles Schumer and Tom Cotton sent an October 

2019 letter to the Acting Director of National Intelligence describing “national security” 

risks associated with the TikTok app. The Senators noted that there is evidence that 

Defendants may share private and personally-identifiable user data and content with the 

Chinese government: 

TikTok’s terms of service and privacy policies describe how it collects data 

from its users and their devices, including user content and communications, 

IP address, location-related data, device identifiers, cookies, metadata, and 

other sensitive personal information. While the company has stated that 

TikTok does not operate in China and stores U.S. user data in the U.S., 

ByteDance is still required to adhere to the laws of China. 

Security experts have voiced concerns that China’s vague patchwork of 

intelligence, national security, and cybersecurity laws compel Chinese 

companies to support and cooperate with intelligence work controlled by the 

Chinese Communist Party. ... With over 110 million downloads in the U.S. 

alone, TikTok is a potential counterintelligence threat we cannot ignore. 

Given these concerns, we ask that the Intelligence Community conduct an 

assessment of the national security risks posed by TikTok ... and brief 

Congress on these findings.41

60. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) is an 

inter-agency committee of the United States government that reviews the national security 

41 https://www.law360.com/articles/1213180/sens-want-tiktok-investigated-for-national-securitythreats; https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1239. 

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implications of foreign investments in United States companies or operations. Chaired by 

the United States Secretary of the Treasury, CFIUS includes representatives from 16 

United States departments and agencies, including the Defense, State, Commerce and 

Homeland Security departments. CFIUS is reviewing Defendant Beijing ByteDance’s 

acquisition of Defendants Musical.ly and Musical.ly, Inc.42

61. Additionally, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism 

held a hearing in November 2019 that Defendant TikTok, Inc. declined to attend although 

it had been invited. The Chairman, Senator Josh Hawley, stated in opening remarks that: 

“TikTok should answer ... to the millions of Americans who use their product with no idea 

of its risks.”43 Chairman Hawley also told reporters that: “The idea that TikTok is not 

sharing data, is not taking direction from Beijing, that just does not appear to be true.”44

62. Indeed, the risk that Defendants send TikTok user data to the Chinese 

government is so great that the U.S. Army has banned the app on government-owned 

devices. That decision was based on concerns specific to Defendants and their close 

relationship to the Chinese government. The Army banned the TikTok app despite the fact 

that it had been using it for recruiting purposes until it realized the risk.45 The U.S. Navy, 

Marines, Air Force and Coast Guard, as well as the Department of Defense and the 

Transportation Security Administration have likewise banned the TikTok app due to the 

risk that user data is being sent to China.46

42 https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/05/inside-tiktok-culture-clash-where-usviews-about-censorship-often-were-overridden-by-chinese-bosses/. 

43 https://thehill.com/policy/technology/469114-tiktok-faces-lawmaker-anger-over-china-ties. 

44 https://thehill.com/policy/technology/469114-tiktok-faces-lawmaker-anger-over-china-ties. 

45 https://www.businessinsider.com/us-government-agencies-have-banned-tiktok-app-2020-2

46 https://www.businessinsider.com/us-government-agencies-have-banned-tiktok-app-2020-2#1-

the-navy-banned-tiktok-from-government-devices-1; https://www.engadget.com/2020-01-04-

nearly-whole-us-military-bans-tiktok.html

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

2. Defendants Unpersuasively Deny They Transfer TikTok Users’ 

Private And Personally-Identifiable Data And Content To The 

Chinese Government. 

63. In July 2019, amid growing scrutiny, Defendant TikTok, Inc. retained 

consultants who opined that there is “no indication” that the Chinese government accessed 

TikTok users’ data.47 But the lead consultant admitted that the review and analysis was 

limited to a narrow and recent four-month period: “He added that in the analysis from July 

[2019] to October [2019], which included interviews with TikTok employees and a review 

of the app’s underlying computer code, his team found no way TikTok could send data to 

China during those months.”48 And, the consultants did not address whether TikTok user 

data could be accessed from, as opposed to “sent to,” China. 

64. Defendant TikTok, Inc. also issued a public statement in which it 

represented: “First, let’s talk about data privacy and security. We store all TikTok U.S. 

user data in the United States, with backup redundancy in Singapore. Our data centers are 

located entirely outside of China, and none of our data is subject to Chinese law.”49

65. This public statement is carefully couched in the present tense and studiously 

avoids mention of past practices. In fact, the statement does not actually say that no private 

and personally-identifiable user data and content is transferred to China. Rather, it says 

that private and personally-identifiable user data and content is stored in the United States 

(but not necessarily exclusively in the United States) and that the current data centers are 

located outside China (but not whether these data centers transfer private and personallyidentifiable user data to China or make it accessible there). Even Defendant TikTok, Inc.’s 

February 2019 Privacy Policy, which is not viewed by users in the ordinary course, states 

47 https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/05/inside-tiktok-culture-clash-where-usviews-about-censorship-often-were-overridden-by-chinese-bosses/. 

48 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/technology/tiktok-national-security-review.html. 

49 https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/statement-on-tiktoks-content-moderation-and-data-securitypractices. 

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that “[w]e may share your information with a parent, subsidiary, or other affiliate of our 

corporate group.” Although this language is ambiguous, it apparently “means it would 

include China-based ByteDance.”50 Accordingly, Defendant TikTok, Inc.’s public 

statement (above) and its February 2019 Privacy Policy are, at best, highly misleading. 

C. Transfers Of Private And Personally-Identifiable User Data And 

Content From TikTok Users To China Without Notice Or Consent. 

1. The TikTok App Secretly Transfers Private And PersonallyIdentifiable User Data And Content To Servers In China. 

66. Affinity published an article entitled “TikTok is Scamming People & Stealing 

Information.” Quoting from a pre-2019 TikTok privacy policy, the article reports that 

“they store and process user data in United States of America, Singapore, Japan or to 

China.”51 The article also reports that Defendant TikTok, Inc. is “offering personal 

information to third parties and the Chinese government.”52

67. CNBC published an article entitled “China’s globally popular camera apps 

may open up user data to Beijing requests” in which it confirms that a TikTok privacy 

policy from 2018 acknowledged transmission of private and personally-identifiable user 

data and content to China: “TikTok’s 2018 privacy policy said the company can transfer 

international users’ data to China, according to archived versions of that web page.”53

Even Defendant TikTok, Inc.’s August 2018 Privacy Policy, which is not seen by users 

and which by its own terms does not even apply to United States users, states: “We will 

also share your information with any member or affiliate of our group, in China, for the 

purposes set out above, to assist in the improvement or optimisation of the Platform, ... 

50 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/25/china-camera-apps-may-open-up-user-data-to-beijinggovernment-requests.html. 

51 http://culture.affinitymagazine.us/tik-tok-is-scamming-people-stealing-information/. 

52 http://culture.affinitymagazine.us/tik-tok-is-scamming-people-stealing-information/. 

53 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/25/china-camera-apps-may-open-up-user-data-to-beijinggovernment-requests.html. 

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increase user numbers, development, engineering and analysis of information or for our 

internal business purposes ....” 

68. Quartz published an article by David Carroll entitled “Is TikTok a Chinese 

Cambridge Analytica data bomb waiting to explode?” Mr. Carroll is an associate professor 

at the Parsons School of Design in New York, and in 2017 he sued Cambridge Analytica 

in the United Kingdom. In his Quartz article, Mr. Carroll quoted from Defendant TikTok, 

Inc.’s August 2018 Privacy Policy that reveals that private and personally-identifiable user 

data and content is transferred to China.54 Mr. Carroll further reported that, in emails 

between him and Defendant TikTok, Inc. in March and April 2019, Defendant TikTok, 

Inc. (i) confirmed that, at least prior to February 2019, U.S. TikTok user data may have 

been processed in China; and (ii) provided confusing answers about what happened after 

that, including that U.S. TikTok user data may have continued to be processed by systems 

operated by “one of our China registered entities,” and may exist there in some form, even 

where such user data is stored elsewhere.55 

69. The New York Times has reported that a source “said the American 

government had evidence of the [TikTok] app sending data to China.”56 That explains why 

the Defense Department, Navy, Army, Marines, Air Force, Coast Guard and 

Transportation Security Administration have taken the extraordinary step of prohibiting 

their members from using the TikTok app on any government-issued devices, and have 

advised that their children also remove the TikTok app from their devices.57 United States 

Senators also have proposed a bill banning federal employees from using the TikTok app 

on government-issued phones because it “presents a major security risk.”58

54 https://qz.com/1613020/tiktok-might-be-a-chinese-cambridge-analytica-scale-privacy-threat/. 

55 https://qz.com/1613020/tiktok-might-be-a-chinese-cambridge-analytica-scale-privacy-threat/. 

56 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/technology/tiktok-national-security-review.html. 

57 https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-military-bans-tiktok-over-ties-to-china-11578090613. 

58 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-tiktok/us-senators-seek-to-ban-federal-employeesfrom-using-tiktok-on-their-phones-idUSKBN20Z1E4. 

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a. Evidence Of Post-February 2019 Transfers. 

70. Even after Defendant TikTok, Inc. adopted its February 2019 Privacy Policy, 

the TikTok app secretly transferred private and personally-identifiable user data and 

content to China where, under Chinese law, it is subject to collection and use by the 

Chinese government. Specifically, Defendants used the TikTok app to transfer private and 

personally-identifiable user data and content to the following two servers in China as 

recently as April 2019: (i) bugly.qq.com and (ii) umeng.com. 

71. Private and personally-identifiable TikTok user data and content transferred 

to bugly.qq.com as recently as April 2019 includes at least the following items: (i) the OS 

version; (ii) the mobile device model; (iii) the WiFi MAC address; (iv) the hardware serial 

number; (v) the device ID and (vi) the IP address. Private and personally-identifiable 

TikTok user data and content transferred to umeng.com as recently as April 2019 includes 

these same six items, plus at least the following item: (vii) the number of bytes users’ 

mobile devices have uploaded and downloaded. 

b. Evidence Of Pre-February 2019 Transfers. 

72. The TikTok app transferred private and personally-identifiable TikTok user 

data and content to various servers in China prior to the February 2019 Privacy Policy, 

including to at least the following servers: (i) musemuse.cn; (ii) zhiliaoapp.com; (iii) 

mob.com; and (iv) umeng.com. 

73. The private and personally-identifiable TikTok user data and content 

transferred to one or more of these four China-based servers includes biometrics and 

User/Device Identifiers. Additional private and personally-identifiable TikTok user data 

and content transferred to one or more of these four China-based servers includes: (i) a list 

of the other apps installed on users’ mobile devices; and (ii) more specific location data. 

Such information reveals TikTok users’ precise physical location, including possibly 

indoor locations within buildings, and TikTok users’ apps that possibly reveal mental or 

physical health, religious views, political views, and sexual orientation. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

2. Defendants’ Privacy Policies Do Not Constitute Notice Of Or 

Consent To The Transfer Of Private And Personally-Identifiable 

TikTok User Data And Content To Servers In China. 

74. TikTok users do not knowingly consent to Defendants’ privacy policies 

because notice and warnings of the privacy policies are not adequately displayed, as 

discussed above. Additionally, many provisions of the privacy policies are ambiguous, 

providing inadequate notice of what private and personally-identifiable user data and 

content is taken and where it is being sent. Notably, even scholars with expertise in such 

matters, such as Mr. Carroll, cannot discern what is being taken and where it is going. 

Certainly, ordinary TikTok users cannot be expected to understand such baffling 

“disclosures.” This ambiguity further renders the notice inadequate to establish informed 

user consent. 

75. In addition to the above-stated deficiencies, privacy policy provisions stating 

that certain TikTok user data and content will be sent to servers in China is contradicted by 

Defendants’ public assurances that no such transfers occur. Moreover, TikTok users whose 

data and content is sent before they even have an opportunity to sign-up and create an 

account do not actually or constructively receive notice, and therefore cannot be deemed to 

have assented to, such transfers to China. 

3. The China-Based Tech Giants Also Possess TikTok Users’ Private 

And Personally-Identifiable Data And Content While They Work 

Cooperatively With The Chinese Government. 

76. The bugly.qq.com server is owned and operated by China-based tech giant 

Tencent Holdings Limited (“Tencent”), and the umeng.com server is owned and operated 

by another China-based tech giant Alibaba Holding Group Limited (“Alibaba”). Tencent 

and Alibaba thus possess TikTok users’ private and personally-identifiable data and 

content. Such data transfers to Tencent and Alibaba servers were accomplished through 

Tencent and Alibaba source code that Defendants embedded within the TikTok app. 

77. Also embedded within the TikTok app is source code from China-based tech 

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giant Baidu, Inc. (“Baidu”) as well as source code from a China-based software 

development kit (“SDK”) known as Igexin. The Igexin SDK is notorious for causing the 

removal of some 500 apps from the Google play store in 2017 after it was discovered that 

Igexin constituted a “secret backdoor” that allowed its operators “to install a range of 

spyware.”59 Specifically, Igexin “could update the app to include spyware at any time, with 

no warning. The most serious spyware installed on phones were packages that stole call 

histories, including the time a call was made, the number that placed the call, and whether 

the call went through. Other stolen data included GPS locations, lists of nearby Wi-Fi 

networks, and lists of installed apps.”60

78. Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent – popularly known by the acronym “BAT” – 

are “China’s original tech titans”61 and dominate the fields of artificial intelligence, social 

media, and the internet in China. The private and personally-identifiable TikTok user data 

and content they possess may well be used by the Chinese government in the future, if it 

has not already. 

79. BAT routinely assist the Chinese government in the surveillance and control 

of its people through biometrics. “Biometric surveillance powered by artificial intelligence 

is categorically different than any surveillance we have seen before. It enables real-time 

location tracking and behavior policing of an entire population at a previously impossible 

scale.”62 The Chinese government is taking full advantage of China-based technology 

corporations like BAT to assist: “Beijing is embracing technologies like facial recognition 

and artificial intelligence to identify and track 1.4 billion people. It wants to assemble a 

vast and unprecedented national surveillance system, with crucial help from its thriving 

59 https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/08/500-google-play-apps-with-100-

million-downloads-had-spyware-backdoor/. 

60 https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/08/500-google-play-apps-with-100-

million-downloads-had-spyware-backdoor/. 

61 https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccafannin/2019/08/23/baidu-alibaba-tencent-clash-to-leadchinas-tech-future-while-a-new-b-arises/#18cc42e414d0. 

62 https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/evangreer/dont-regulate-facial-recognition-ban-it. 

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technology industry. ... China has become the world’s biggest market for security and 

surveillance technology, with analysts estimating the country will have almost 300 million 

cameras installed by 2020. Chinese buyers will snap up more than three-quarters of all 

servers designed to scan video footage for faces ....”63

80. The Chinese government relies on China-based technology companies like 

BAT to assist in government investigations of criminal activity and political dissent, as 

well as surveillance activities: “The Chinese police ‘request data from Alibaba for their 

own investigations, ... tapping into the trove of information the tech giant collects through 

its e-commerce and financial payment networks. ... Companies including Alibaba [], 

Tencent [], and Baidu [] are required to help China’s government hunt down criminal 

suspects and silence political dissent. Their technology is also being used to create cities 

wired for surveillance. ... Apple disclosed that more than 35,000 user accounts were 

affected by 24 Chinese law-enforcement requests in the first half of this year [2017], many 

in connection with fraud investigations. It said it provided information on about 90% of 

them. Chinese companies don’t release any information on the number of requests from 

the government, the nature of the requests or the compliance rate.’”64

81. The Chinese government’s use of BAT to sort and analyze information, 

including information gathered from smartphones, is also well documented: “Along with 

access to online data, China’s government wants something else from tech companies – the 

cloud computing prowess to sort and analyze information. China wants to crunch data 

from surveillance cameras, smartphones, government databases and other sources to create 

so-called smart cities and safe cities. ... Police now work with Alibaba to use surveillance 

footage and data processing to identify ‘persons of interest’ and keep them out, local police 

official Dai Jinming said at a recent conference sponsored by Alibaba. Tencent is working 

with police in the southern city of Guangzhou to build a cloud-based ‘early-warning 

63 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china-surveillance-technology.html. 

64 https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-tech-giants-have-a-second-job-helping-the-governmentsee-everything-1512056284. 

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system’ that can track and forecast the size and movement of crowds, according to a 

statement from the Guangzhou police bureau.”65

82. The Wall Street Journal has reported on the significant patronage that BAT 

receive from the Chinese government, the growing number of tech entrepreneurs who have 

become members of the legislature under President Xi Jinping (including, for example, 

Tencent’s Tony Ma), and BAT’s pledges of loyalty to the Chinese government.66 “‘The 

government is always the boss and the tech firms are there to serve the goals of the 

Chinese government.’”67

83. Defendant Beijing ByteDance is emerging as a threat to BAT’s exclusive 

status: “there’s a new B in the BAT trio on the horizon: the world’s highest-valued 

unicorn, ByteDance ....”68 Like BAT, Defendant Beijing ByteDance is subject to the same 

cybersecurity laws mandating cooperation with the Chinese government that are described 

in Senator Schumer and Senator Cotton’s letter. Senator Hawley, according to the Wall 

Street Journal, described the resulting threat to TikTok users by stating: “all it takes is one 

knock on the door of their parent company [Defendant Beijing ByteDance], based in 

China, from a Communist Party official for that data [from Defendant TikTok, Inc.] to be 

transferred to the Chinese government’s hands, whenever they need it.”69 In the same Wall 

Street Journal article, a former TikTok employee from the Los Angeles office stated that: 

“We’re a Chinese company ... We answer to China.”70

65 https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-tech-giants-have-a-second-job-helping-the-governmentsee-everything-1512056284. 

66 https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-godfathers-of-chinese-tech-get-an-offer-they-cant-refuse1520510404. 

67 https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-godfathers-of-chinese-tech-get-an-offer-they-cant-refuse1520510404. 

68 https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccafannin/2019/08/23/baidu-alibaba-tencent-clash-to-leadchinas-tech-future-while-a-new-b-arises/#18cc42e414d0. 

69 https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-looking-at-ways-to-shake-off-its-ties-to-china11574073001. 

70 https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-looking-at-ways-to-shake-off-its-ties-to-chinaCase: 1:20-cv-04723 Document #: 35 Filed: 05/11/20 Page 32 of 94 PageID #:233
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84. A Washington Post opinion piece entitled “Could TikTok allow China to 

export repression?” describes the danger to TikTok users in the United States if 

Defendants provide such users’ private and personally-identifiable data and content to the 

Chinese government: “TikTok’s leaders protest that they store local information locally, so 

whatever data the company has on the behavioral patterns or personal attributes of some of 

the most vulnerable American citizens are not ‘subject to Chinese law.’ But it’s reasonable 

to wonder whether TikTok might not comply with targeted intelligence requests from the 

repressive regime ruling over its parent company ByteDance. TikTok’s younger users will 

be voting in the coming years; down the line, they may hold positions of power. A trove of 

their information is a valuable asset.”71

85. The Wall Street Journal, in an article entitled “U.S. Orders Chinese Firm to 

Sell Dating App Grindr Over Blackmail Risk,” also has reported on the dangers Americans 

face from the Chinese government’s accumulation of their private and personallyidentifiable data and content, including blackmail and other sinister scenarios: “U.S. 

national-security experts said Chinese government knowledge of an individual’s usage of 

Grindr could be used in certain cases to blackmail U.S. officials and others with security 

clearances, such as defense contractors, and force them to provide information or other 

support to China. They have also envisioned more elaborate scenarios. For example, one 

could use Grindr’s location data to discern that a certain user works at a 

telecommunications firm and pays regular visits to the same building in Northern Virginia 

that intelligence officials frequent. Chinese-intelligence officials could then determine that 

that individual is the telecommunications firm’s intelligence liaison, and they would know 

both whom to target and how to threaten that person with potentially compromising 

information. ... The risk has grown as the Chinese government acquires more large data 

sets through hacking and other means, allowing it to build databases with detailed profiles 

11574073001. 

71 https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/could-tiktok-allow-china-to-exportrepression/2019/11/02/1729f038-fa79-11e9-8906-ab6b60de9124_story.html. 

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of targets.”72

VI. DEFENDANTS’ THEFT OF TIKTOK USER BIOMETRICS. 

A. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act Regulates Face 

Geometry Scans, Voiceprints And Information Derived Therefrom. 

86. In 2008, Illinois enacted the Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 

740 ILCS 14/1, et seq. This was due to the “very serious need [for] protections for the 

citizens of Illinois when it [comes to their] biometric information.” Illinois House 

Transcript, 2008 Reg. Sess. No. 276. The Illinois Legislature recognized the importance of 

protecting the privacy of individuals’ biometric data, finding that “[b]iometrics are unlike 

other unique identifiers that are used to access finances or other sensitive information.” 

740 ILCS 14/5(c). “For example, social security numbers, when compromised, can be 

changed. Biometrics, however, are biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once 

compromised, the individual has no recourse [and] is at heightened risk for identity theft 

....” Id. 

87. BIPA thus focuses on “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information.” 

Biometric identifiers consist of “a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of 

hand or face geometry.” 740 ILCS 14/10. A “scan” under BIPA means to examine by 

observation or checking, or systematically in order to obtain data especially for display or 

storage. In re Facebook Biometric Information Privacy Litigation, 2018 WL 2197546, *3 

(N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018). “Geometry” under BIPA is the relative arrangement of parts or 

elements. Id. Neither the term “scan” nor the term “geometry” require “actual or express 

measurements of spatial quantities like distance, depth, or angles.” Id. Biometric 

information constitutes “any information, regardless of how it is captured, converted, 

stored, or shared, based on an individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an 

individual.” 740 ILCS 14/10. 

72 https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-orders-chinese-company-to-sell-grindr-app-11553717942. 

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B. Defendants Unlawfully Collect, Use And Profit From TikTok User 

Biometrics, Face Geometry Scans, Voiceprints And Information Derived 

Therefrom. 

88. Defendants’ unlawful collection, possession, storage, dissemination, use and 

profiting from biometrics, face geometry scans and voiceprints of TikTok users, and the 

information derived therefrom, takes three forms. 

89. First, Defendants’ BIPA and other biometrics-related violations are 

established by the functionality and code of the TikTok app itself. This functionality and 

code includes: (a) content recommendations based on TikTok users’ race/ethnicity and 

age; (b) scans of face geometry to determine TikTok users’ age; (c) censoring video 

content to remove people Defendants consider “ugly”; (d) the augmented reality feature 

that scans face geometry while processing users’ videos; (e) code for deepfake videos; and 

(f) code for age, race/ethnicity and emotion recognition. 

90. Second, Defendants’ BIPA and other biometrics-related violations are 

further established by their ongoing work in China, which includes: (a) the application of 

facial recognition technology73 to TikTok users’ videos by highly-trained engineers skilled 

in computer vision, convolutional neural network and machine learning; (b) patent 

applications for face, voice, age, race/ethnicity and emotion recognition technologies; and 

(c) the publicly-known functionality of Douyin that allows its users to perform facial 

recognition on faces selected by such users from other users’ videos. 

91. Third, Defendants’ BIPA and other biometrics-related violations are also 

established by Defendants’ legal and political obligations to accumulate and share vast 

troves of data, including biometrics, in order to assist the Chinese government in meeting 

two crucial and intertwined state objectives: (a) world dominance in artificial intelligence; 

73 Facial recognition “is a technology capable of identifying or verifying a person from a digital 

image or a video frame from a video source. There are multiple methods in which facial 

recognition systems work, but in general, they work by comparing selected facial features from a 

given image with faces within a database.” See

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facial_recognition_system.

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

and (b) population surveillance and control. 

1. Defendants’ BIPA And Other Biometrics-Related Violations Are 

Evidenced By The TikTok App’s Functionality And Code. 

92. There are six specific categories of functions and code within the TikTok app 

that reveal BIPA violations: the race/ethnicity and age-based content recommendations; 

the scans to determine age; the removal of so-called “ugly” videos; the augmented reality 

feature; the deepfake video code; and the age, race/ethnicity and emotion recognition 

code.74 These also evidence violations of the other statutory, constitutional and common 

law claims set forth herein. 

93. That the TikTok app violates BIPA and other laws is highlighted by 

comments from a “Bytedance representative” who confessed to The Verge that “TikTok 

makes use of the company’s AI technologies in various ways, from facial recognition for 

the filters through to the recommendation engine in the For You feed. ... We build 

intelligent machines that are capable of understanding and analyzing text, images and 

videos using natural language processing and computer vision technology. This enables us 

to serve users with the content that they find most interesting ....’”75

94. Similarly, Marketing Technology Insights reported on Defendants’ use of 

facial recognition technology in the TikTok app in violation of BIPA and other laws, 

stating that Defendant TikTok, Inc. and the TikTok app “deploy[] AI and Face 

Recognition technology to analyze user’s interests and preferences through their 

interactions with the content, and display a personalized content feed to each user.”76

a. Race/Ethnicity And Age Based Content Recommendations. 

95. Marc Faddoul, a researcher at the University of California at Berkeley who 

74 This evidence also constitutes a basis for the other statutory, constitutional and common law 

causes of action herein. 

75 https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/30/18107732/bytedance-valuation-tiktok-china-startup

(emphasis added). 

76 https://martechseries.com/mts-insights/staff-writers/pay-attention-to-tiktok-content/ (emphasis 

added). 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

studies artificial intelligence, conducted an experiment in or about February 2020 that 

revealed the TikTok app recommends content based in part on race/ethnicity and age 

information that it gleans from TikTok users’ digital face images. Buzzfeed described his 

findings: “In the app, when a person follows a new account, they can click an arrow 

that then recommends other accounts to follow. Faddoul noticed that when he did this, 

the recommended accounts tended to look just like whoever he’d just followed — 

right down to ethnicity and hair color.”77 

96. Recode also reported on Faddoul’s research in its article entitled “There’s 

Something Strange About TikTok Recommendations”: 

When artificial intelligence researcher Marc Faddoul joined TikTok a few 

days ago, he saw something concerning: When he followed a new account, 

the profiles recommended by TikTok seemed eerily, physically similar to the 

profile picture of the first account. Following a young-looking blond woman, 

for instance, yielded recommendations to follow more young-looking blond 

women. ... 

Following black men led to recommendations to follow more black men. 

Following white men with beards produced recommendations for more white 

men with beards. Following elderly people spawned recommendations for 

other elderly people. And on and on. ... 

Faddoul also told Recode that he believes it’s more likely that TikTok is 

using something he calls automatic featurization. This type of 

recommendation algorithm could take “signals” from profile images to find 

profile pictures with similar attributes. These kinds of signals would be 

correlations between the pictures, which could correspond to anything from 

skin color to having a beard. The algorithm is simply looking for similarities 

in the photos or profiles. ... 

77 https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/laurenstrapagiel/tiktok-algorithim-racial-bias. 

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“What I suspect is happening is that TikTok is featurizing the profile 

picture,” he says, “and using these features in the recommendation engine.”78

b. Face Scans To Determine Age. 

97. Defendants also scan face images taken from TikTok user videos in order to 

determine TikTok users’ age. The Wall Street Journal has reported that “TikTok has built 

an artificial intelligence tool that scans faces in videos to estimate users’ ages.”79 Both 

Faddoul’s research and this Wall Street Journal article are consistent with evidence of 

Defendants’ work in China on TikTok user videos as well as their patent applications in 

China for face, voice, age, race/ethnicity and emotion recognition technologies (below). 

c. Removal Of Videos Of So-Called “Ugly” People. 

98. Public reporting indicates that “the makers of TikTok ... instructed 

moderators to suppress posts created by users deemed too ugly .... Today, The Intercept

and The Intercept Brasil are publishing two internal TikTok moderation documents .... 

One ... describes algorithmic punishments for unattractive and impoverished users. The 

documents appear to have been originally drafted in Chinese and later — at times 

awkwardly — translated into English for use in TikTok’s global offices.”80 Defendant 

TikTok, Inc. uses artificial intelligence technology in its Culver City office to review and 

flag user content. Given the presence of this AI technology and the sheer volume of 

TikTok user videos that are reviewed for “ugliness,” it is apparent that Defendant TikTok, 

Inc. is using facial recognition technology to identify and remove such users’ videos. 

d. Augmented Reality Features. 

99. The TikTok app uses an advanced video editor and camera face filters. 

Employing this technology, TikTok users edit their videos to, among other things, morph 

their face into another face; change the size, shape, height and width of their face; change 

78 https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/2/25/21152585/tiktok-recommendations-profile-look-alike. 

79 https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-wants-to-grow-up-but-finds-it-tough-to-keep-kids-out11581858006. 

80 https://theintercept.com/2020/03/16/tiktok-app-moderators-users-discrimination/. 

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particular features of their face (e.g., eyes, ears, nose, lips, mouth, cheeks), including the 

size and shape of such facial features; and so on. Users thereby create videos in which their 

faces and specific facial features take on cartoonish dimensions and appearances, and in 

which they can appear older, etc. 

100. This functionality is a form of augmented reality (“AR”).81 To perform AR, 

the TikTok app examines, detects and localizes the face and the arrangement of its various 

parts (e.g., the eyes, ears, nose, lips, mouth, cheeks) relative to the other parts, and then 

also tracks the face and its various parts (and their relative arrangement) while in motion. 

101. The following relevant code is located within the TikTok app: 

“FaceDetectManager”; “faceDetectMaxTime”; “faceDetectMinTime”; 

“Requirement_Face_3D_Detect”; “Requirement_Face_Detect”; 

“Requirement_Face_Track”; “face_track.model”; “maxScanTime”; “minScanTime”; and 

“faceID”. Additional code for pitch, yaw and roll – “the three dimensions of movement 

when an object moves through a medium”82 – is within the TikTok app as well. 

102. This functionality and code reveal Defendants’ use of face geometry scans 

on TikTok users. While it is currently unclear whether Defendants upload such face 

geometry scans from TikTok users’ mobile devices, in addition to performing separate 

face geometry scans at the server level, this functionality and code demonstrate 

Defendants’ technological ability and willingness to perform such scans on TikTok users. 

81 AR “is an interactive experience of a real-world environment where the objects that reside in the 

real world are enhanced by computer-generated perceptual information .... AR can be defined as a 

system that fulfills three basic features: a combination of real and virtual worlds, real-time 

interaction, and accurate 3D registration of virtual and real objects. ... This experience is 

seamlessly interwoven with the physical world such that it is perceived as an immersive aspect of 

the real environment. In this way, augmented reality alters one’s ongoing perception of a realworld environment .... With the help of advanced AR technologies (e.g. adding computer vision, 

incorporating AR cameras into smartphone applications and object recognition) the information 

about the surrounding real world of the user becomes interactive and digitally manipulated.” See

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Augmented_reality. 

82 https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pitch,_yaw,_and_roll. 

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e. Code For Deepfake Videos. 

103. There is code within the TikTok app, as well as within Douyin, for 

performing facial recognition. TechCrunch reported that there is “Face Swap” code within 

the TikTok app for “life-like deepfakes technology.” It “asks users to take a multi-angle 

biometric scan of their face, then choose from a selection of videos they want to add their 

face to and share.”83 Defendants admitted that such code is present in the TikTok app, but 

denied its use. A TikTok spokesperson “insisted that ‘after checking with the teams I can 

confirm this is definitely not a function in TikTok ....’ They later told TechCrunch that 

‘the inactive code fragments are being removed to eliminate any confusion,’ which 

implicitly confirms that Face Swap code was found in TikTok.”84

104. That the “Face Swap” code is present in the TikTok app demonstrates 

Defendants’ technological capacity and intent to perform facial recognition on TikTok 

users. Further, the “Face Swap” code further confirms the direct involvement of Defendant 

Beijing ByteDance in the TikTok app, because there would otherwise be no way for the 

TikTok app to include facial recognition code that Defendants TikTok, Inc. and 

ByteDance, Inc. have denied was ever used in the United States. 

f. Code For Age, Race/Ethnicity And Emotion Recognition. 

105. There is additional code within the TikTok app designed to recognize users’ 

age, race/ethnicity and emotions. The code separates race/ethnicity into at least four 

categories: “Blac” [sic.]; “Indian”; “White”; and “Yellow.” The code also distinguishes 

between at least seven different ranges of emotion: “Angry”; “Disgust”; “Fear”; “Happy”; 

“Neutral”; “Sad”; and “Surprise.” 

106. To place TikTok users within one of these categories, the TikTok app would 

have to use face geometry scans and/or voiceprints. It is currently unclear whether this 

code is active at the mobile device level and, if so, whether Defendants upload any such 

83 https://techcrunch.com/2020/01/03/tiktok-deepfakes-face-swap/. 

84 https://techcrunch.com/2020/01/03/tiktok-deepfakes-face-swap/. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

face geometry scans and voiceprints from TikTok users’ mobile devices. Nonetheless, the 

age, race/ethnicity and emotion recognition code within the TikTok app is consistent with 

Faddoul’s research (above) and also directly correlates to Defendants’ China-based work 

on TikTok user videos and patent applications (below). 

2. Defendants’ BIPA And Other Biometrics-Related Violations Are 

Further Evidenced By Defendants’ China-Based Operations. 

107. Defendants’ BIPA violations are further established by their ongoing work in 

China, which includes: (a) the application of facial recognition technology to TikTok 

users’ videos by highly-trained engineers skilled in computer vision, convolutional neural 

network and machine learning; (b) patent applications for face, voice, age, race/ethnicity 

and emotion recognition technologies; and (c) the Douyin app’s functionality that allows 

its users to perform facial recognition on faces selected by such users from other users’ 

videos. These factors also evidence violations of the other statutory, constitutional and 

common law claims set forth herein. 

a. Defendants’ China-Based Team Of Highly-Skilled 

Computer Vision, Convolutional Neural Network, And 

Machine Learning Engineers. 

108. Defendants’ artificial intelligence work within China, which is closely tied to 

its United States operations, is among the most sophisticated in the world. “ByteDance has 

received accolades for being a top AI innovator from CBInsight who recognized the 

company on its 2018 AI 100 List as well as from Fast Company, who placed it on its most 

innovative companies list. In 2016, it founded its AI Lab, a research division led by WeiYing Ma, formerly of Microsoft Research Asia. The Lab’s primary focus has been on 

developing innovative technologies to enhance ByteDance’s content platforms.”85

109. Defendants have a team of engineers in cutting-edge fields such as computer 

85 https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/12/05/ai-in-china-how-buzzfeed-rivalbytedance-uses-machine-learning-to-revolutionize-the-news/#6579bada40db. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

vision,86 convolutional neural network (“CNN”),87 and machine learning,88 all of which are 

foundational to the face geometry scans and voiceprints that Defendants conduct on and/or 

derive from the Private Videos and the posted videos of TikTok users. 

110. Defendants’ China-based engineering team includes, among others: (i) a 

research scientist focused on facial recognition, object detection, computer vision and 

machine learning who has worked for Defendants since 2018; (ii) a computer vision and 

image processing algorithm engineer who has worked for Defendants since 2017; (iii) a 

computer vision algorithm engineer who has worked for Defendants since 2019; (iv) a 

machine learning and neural network engineer who has worked for Defendants since 2017; 

(v) an algorithm engineer who focuses on video retrieval and who has worked for 

Defendants since 2018; and (vi) an algorithm engineer who has worked for Defendants 

86 Computer vision “is an interdisciplinary scientific field that deals with how computers can gain 

high-level understanding from digital images or videos. ... Computer vision tasks include methods 

for acquiring, processing, analyzing and understanding digital images .... The classical problem in 

computer vision, image processing, and machine vision is that of determining whether or not the 

image data contains some specific object, feature, or activity. ... • Object recognition (also called 

object classification) – one or several pre-specified or learned objects or object classes can be 

recognized, usually together with their 2D positions in the image or 3D poses in the scene. ... • 

Identification – an individual instance of an object is recognized. Examples include identification 

of a specific person’s face or fingerprint .... • Detection – the image data are scanned for a specific 

condition. ... Currently, the best algorithms for such tasks are based on convolutional neural 

networks. ... Several specialized tasks based on recognition exist, such as: • Content-based image 

retrieval – finding all images in a larger set of images which have a specific content. ... • Facial 

recognition.” See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_vision#Recognition. 

87 CNN “is a class of deep neural networks, most commonly applied to analyzing visual imagery. 

... They have applications in image and video recognition, recommender systems, [and] image 

classification .... CNNs use relatively little pre-processing compared to other image classification 

algorithms. This means that the network learns the filters that in traditional algorithms were handengineered. This independence from prior knowledge and human effort in feature design is a 

major advantage.” See

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convolutional_neural_network#Image_recognition. 

88 Machine learning “is the study of computer algorithms that improve automatically through 

experience. It is seen as a subset of artificial intelligence. Machine learning algorithms build a 

mathematical model based on sample data, known as “training data”, in order to make predictions 

or decisions without being explicitly programmed to do so. Machine learning algorithms are used 

in a wide variety of applications, such as ... computer vision, where it is difficult or infeasible to 

develop conventional algorithms to perform the needed tasks.” See

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Machine_learning. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

since 2017. 

b. Facial Recognition Technology Applied To TikTok Videos. 

111. Wei-Ying Ma is a ByteDance Vice President in Beijing and has led the AI 

Lab since 2017. He is known for having developed a highly respected image retrieval 

system called NeTra, which is a tool for navigating very large image databases. Ma 

recently delivered a keynote speech at a Taipei Web Conference in which he 

acknowledged that Defendants use facial recognition technology and face geometry scans 

on their enormous and ever-growing database of face images from user videos. During his 

speech, Ma used visual representations that show facial recognition and face geometry 

scans being performed on specific regions of face images. Chinese language text 

accompanying the face images indicate the type of facial expression and the age of the 

individuals represented by the face images. English language notes to the side of the face 

images refer to “emotion analysis,” “object detection and tracking,” and “content-based 

recommendation.” Ma made the following representations during his speech while these 

face images, accompanied by the aforementioned Chinese language and English language 

statements, were visually presented on the screen: 

We are actually receiving a huge number of video created by users every 

day, so it’s at the hundreds of millions of video per day. Imagine the amount 

of computation and also video understanding we need to do here. And here 

just to give you a glimpse of all kinds of video understanding tasks we need 

to run, and let me show you for example, you just saw that video, and for 

video like that we actually do all kind of analysis. We need to automatically 

classify and also do a lot tagging and understand the structure inside the 

video and also run copyright infringement detecting and duplicate detection 

and also object detection and tracking. So based on this video, we convert 

this video into a structural representation, and here just to give you one of the 

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examples.89

112. Defendants’ team of engineers in China also includes a computer vision and 

machine learning engineer who has worked for Defendants since 2018. His job 

responsibilities have included face/body detection and face attribute recognition, including 

specifically on TikTok users’ videos. 

113. Within China, Defendant Beijing ByteDance makes no secret of its 

processing and analysis of users’ videos from around the world. TechNode reported that 

one of its vice presidents publicly told a gathering that “ByteDance” required more chips 

to continue uploading, processing and analyzing its vast database of videos accumulated 

from around the world. This vice president stated that “‘Bytedance has the largest number 

of users in the world whose videos need to be analyzed and processed and uploaded, and 

we are purchasing a large number of chips.’”90

114. Defendants’ wealth of video recordings from TikTok users is critical to 

Defendants’ success in making the TikTok app one of the most popular in the world: “The 

[TikTok] app heavily utilizes AI that is trained on the vast quantity of video footage to 

understand the preferences of users, while also using machine learning to make creating, 

editing, and promoting the videos as easy as possible.”91

115. Indeed, “all of ByteDance’s products use artificial intelligence and machine 

learning to deliver content that users want. The company’s intelligent machines use 

computer vision and natural language processing technology to understand and analyze 

written content, images and videos. Then, based upon what the machines know about each 

user, they deliver the content it believes each user would want. As a user interacts with the 

content by taps, swipes, time spent with each article, comments and more, large-scale 

machine learning and deep learning algorithms continue to learn about a user’s preferences 

89 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2D29f4-J2mw (at 18:18 – 19:17). 

90 https://technode.com/2018/04/24/bytedance-jinri-toutiao-ai-chips/ (emphasis added). 

91 https://dzone.com/articles/the-data-thats-driving-chinas-hidden-champions (emphasis added). 

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to refine its content delivery for the future. The end result is a high-quality content feed 

based upon each user’s preferences and interests. As more content is accumulated by the 

system, the better the algorithms get to enhance the content experience.”92

c. Face, Age, Race/Ethnicity And Emotion Recognition Patent 

Applications. 

116. One of Defendants’ engineers in China stands out for his inventions that 

form the basis of numerous patent applications filed by Defendants’ sister company 

Beijing ByteDance Network Technology Co., Ltd. The underlying technology in these 

patent applications involves age, race and emotion detection through face images, 

including those derived from videos. The specific patent applications include, among 

others, the following: 

 a. Facial image identifying method.93

 b. Use of face images and a facial recognition model to determine ethnic 

information, to then determine race, to ultimately determine age.94

 c. Use of face and body images, and a facial recognition model, to 

determine age.95

 d. Use of image data sets and audio data sets to determine age.96

 e. Use of face images extracted from videos to determine age.97

 f. Use of face images extracted from videos to determine age.98

 g. Human facial expression recognition method.99

92 https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/12/05/ai-in-china-how-buzzfeed-rivalbytedance-uses-machine-learning-to-revolutionize-the-news/#6579bada40db (emphasis added). 

93 Publication No. WO2020037963A1. 

94 Publication No. CN110046571A. 

95 Publication No. CN109993150A. 

96 Publication No. CN110321863A. 

97 Publication No. CN110163170A. 

98 Publication No. CN110188660A. 

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 h. Use of face images extracted from videos to determine emotions 

based on expression recognition.100

 i. Use of face images extracted from video segments to identify a face 

characteristic by parsing the face image.101

117. This same engineer was one of the inventors involved in two earlier patent 

applications filed by a Chinese university that concern face attribute recognition102 and a 

face verification method that determines whether faces in two images are the same or 

distinct.103

118. “TikTok’s owner, Beijing-based ByteDance, is a hit app factory that has 

spent the last decade learning how to use artificial intelligence, machine learning, and 

facial recognition to figure out what people like and serve them endless streams of 

entertainment tailored to their interests and emotions. Its apps are used by billions of 

people, including 1.45 billion global downloads for TikTok alone. The company has years 

of data informing it on how people think, feel and act, making it an expert on what makes 

people tick and how to persuade them to watch, share or like certain content.”104

d. Voiceprint Patent Applications. 

119. Beijing ByteDance Network Technology Co., Ltd. filed additional patent 

applications for a method for voice extraction involving voiceprints,105 a voice recognition 

method,106 and an age recognition method based on audio.107 This is consistent with 

99 Publication No. CN110097004A. 

100 Publication No. CN110175565A. 

101 Publication No. CN110163171A. 

102 Publication No. CN106203395B. 

103 Publication No. CN106203533B. 

104 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2019-10-29/worries-that-tiktok-is-a-threat-tonational-security-have-merit (emphasis added). 

105 Publication No. CN110503961A. 

106 Publication No. WO2019214628A1. 

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reporting that Defendant Beijing ByteDance “uses various AI technologies in its services 

[including] voice recognition ....”108 In fact, during Wei-Ying Ma’s recent keynote speech 

at a Taipei Web Conference (above), he discussed the use of audio to identify speakers and 

he published a slide during his speech entitled “Speaker Identification” that stated: “Detect 

identity, age, gender of speakers.”109

e. The Douyin App’s Facial Recognition Function. 

120. The Douyin app provides its users with an “in-video” search tool that uses 

facial recognition technology. Users of Douyin can press the “Search” button while a video 

is playing, drag a rectangle around the target face in the video, and cause the Douyin app 

to perform a search (based on the face in question) for other videos in which the targeted 

person appears.110 This subjects anyone using the Douyin app to “behind-the-scenes facial 

recognition analysis.”111 While U.S. TikTok users cannot access this feature, there is 

evidence that they are subject to the same behind-the-scenes facial recognition analysis, as 

discussed herein. 

3. Defendants’ BIPA And Other Biometrics-Related Violations Are 

Also Evidenced By Their Obligation To Accumulate And Share 

Data, Including Biometrics, With The Chinese Government. 

121. Defendants’ BIPA violations are further established by Defendants’ legal 

and political obligations to accumulate and share data, including biometrics, in order to 

assist the Chinese government in meeting two crucial and intertwined state objectives: (a) 

world dominance in artificial intelligence; and (b) population surveillance and control.112 

107 Publication No. CN110335626A. 

108 https://medium.com/syncedreview/intel-and-bytedance-partner-on-ai-lab-b678036cbda4

(emphasis added). 

109 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2D29f4-J2mw (at 30:04). 

110 https://radiichina.com/tiktok-new-video-search-function-is-from-the-future/. 

111 https://futurism.com/the-byte/tiktok-facial-recognition (emphasis added). 

112 This evidence also constitutes a basis for the other statutory, constitutional and common law 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

a. The Chinese Government’s Plan To Become The World 

Leader In Artificial Intelligence. 

122. In 2017, the Chinese government released its Next Generation Artificial 

Intelligence Development Plan, in which it set 2030 as the temporal goal for becoming the 

world leader in artificial intelligence. To ensure achievement of its artificial intelligence 

goal, the Chinese government selected the five leading technology companies as “national 

champions” and assigned them particular areas of research and development within the 

artificial intelligence field. In exchange, these companies receive government support, 

including access to finance, preferential contract bidding and sometimes market share 

protection. The list of “national champions” has grown to at least 15 in recent years.113

123. The United States government has taken notice. Last November, Congress’s 

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, chaired by former Google CEO 

Eric Schmidt, published an interim report warning that China was outpacing the United 

States in artificial intelligence spending.114

b. The Chinese Government’s Program Of Population 

Surveillance And Control. 

124. The Chinese government’s monitoring of and control over its own 

population are well known. Most notable is its pervasive use of artificial intelligenceenabled cameras to conduct video surveillance of its population.115 As the South China 

Morning Post reported: “China’s goal of becoming a global leader in artificial intelligence 

(AI) is nowhere more manifested than in how facial recognition technology has become a 

part of daily life in the world’s second-largest economy. Facial recognition systems, which 

are biometric computer applications that automatically identify an individual from a 

database of digital images, are now being used extensively in areas such as public security, 

causes of action herein. 

113 https://fortune.com/longform/tiktok-app-artificial-intelligence-addictive-bytedance-china/. 

114 https://fortune.com/longform/tiktok-app-artificial-intelligence-addictive-bytedance-china/. 

115 https://fortune.com/longform/tiktok-app-artificial-intelligence-addictive-bytedance-china/. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

financial services, transport and retail across the country.”116 In fact, the Chinese 

government employs a variety of biometrics for population surveillance and control: “In 

addition to voice recognition, there are facial and pupil recognition, gathering of DNA 

samples—building the world’s largest DNA database—and fingerprint scans.”117 

c. Data Accumulation, Including Biometrics, Through ChinaBased Technology Companies Is A Critical Part Of 

Achieving The Chinese Government’s Twin Goals. 

125. Artificial intelligence algorithms feed on data to learn and improve – thus, 

the more data the better the development of the algorithms driving the advance of the 

artificial intelligence.118 With better artificial intelligence comes more effective population 

surveillance and control. 

126. To advance these interrelated goals, the Chinese government has worked 

hand in glove with China-based technology companies to accumulate and share data. For 

example, the China-based company Megvii, a leader in computer vision, has the world’s 

largest open source database (Face++) for training other facial recognition algorithms. It 

has reportedly used government data banks to help compile this training program.119 As 

another example, the Chinese government partnered with the China-based technology firm 

d-Ear Technologies to build a database of voiceprints for voice recognition purposes.120

127. “Private [China-based] corporations and the [Chinese] Communist Party’s 

security apparatus have grown together, discovering how the same data sets can both cater 

to consumers and help commissars calibrate repression. ... Many [China-based] tech firms 

116 https://www.scmp.com/tech/start-ups/article/2133234/meet-five-chinese-start-ups-pushingfacial-recognition-technology. 

117 https://vlifestyle.org/codec-news/?l=business/content-2254742-china-gathers-people-s-voicesnew-identification-technology-drawing-concerns. 

118 https://fortune.com/longform/tiktok-app-artificial-intelligence-addictive-bytedance-china/. 

119 https://fortune.com/longform/tiktok-app-artificial-intelligence-addictive-bytedance-china/. 

120 https://vlifestyle.org/codec-news/?l=business/content-2254742-china-gathers-people-s-voicesnew-identification-technology-drawing-concerns. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

make a point of hiring the relatives of high party officials, and a vast state database of 

headshots might be shared with a private firm to train new facial recognition software, 

while the firm’s trove of real-time user data might be offered to police, for a panoramic 

view of potential ‘troublemakers.’”121

128. Such data accumulation is not confined to China’s borders. For example, the 

Chinese government is compiling a tremendous storehouse of private and personallyidentifiable data on ordinary Americans. Recently, Chinese government-sponsored hackers 

stole data belonging to approximately 500 million Marriott International guests. 

“[M]achine learning is yielding uses for large data sets that humans alone could not 

imagine – or even understand – given that machine learning can generate correlations 

among data that the machine itself can’t explain. ... Beijing’s plan may be simply to 

vacuum up as much data like this as possible and then see what today’s machine 

learning—or, better yet, tomorrow’s machine learning—can do with it.”122

129. The lengths to which the Chinese government will go to obtain such data 

about ordinary Americans is further evidenced by other large-scale hacking schemes, 

including one involving 145 million Americans whose data was held by Equifax,123 and 

another involving 78 million Americans whose data was held by Anthem.124 “The United 

States assessed that China was building a vast database of who worked with whom in 

national security jobs, where they traveled and what their health histories were, according 

to American officials. Over time, China can use the data sets to improve its artificial 

intelligence capabilities to the point where it can predict which Americans will be primed 

for future grooming and recruitment ....”125 “The hacks, security researchers said, were an 

121 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/05/02/opinion/will-china-export-its-illiberalinnovation.html. 

122 https://www.justsecurity.org/62187/weapons-mass-consumerism-china-personal-information/. 

123 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/us/politics/equifax-hack-china.html. 

124 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/technology/anthem-hack-indicted-breach.html. 

125 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/10/us/politics/equifax-hack-china.html. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

extension of China’s evolving algorithmic surveillance system, which has greatly 

expanded over the past few years.”126

130. The Chinese government’s goal of obtaining private and personallyidentifiable data (including biometrics) of ordinary citizens throughout the world is also 

evidenced by the deal struck by China-based CloudWalk Technology in Africa. 

CloudWalk, with the Chinese government’s blessing, entered into a strategic partnership 

agreement with Zimbabwe to begin a large-scale facial recognition program. With access 

to a database containing millions of Zimbabwean faces, CloudWalk and the Chinese 

government intend to train their algorithms in order to further improve their facial 

recognition capabilities. “With the largest surveillance system already in place, China is 

also building one of the world’s most comprehensive facial recognition databases. 

Rolling out the technology in a majority black population will allow CloudWalk to more 

clearly identify other ethnicities, getting ahead of US and European developers.”127

d. Defendants Are Obligated By Chinese Law And Politics To 

Accumulate And Secretly Share Their Data, Including 

Biometrics, With The Chinese Government. 

131. Given the Chinese government’s illegal extraction of massive quantities of 

private and personally-identifiable data (including biometrics) from hundreds of millions 

of ordinary Americans and others, there is no reason to believe that the Chinese 

government has refrained from extracting the same type of U.S. TikTok user data from 

Defendants. In fact, to access that data, there is no need to hack major U.S. corporations or 

the China-based technology companies, like Defendants, that have surreptitiously amassed 

such information on their own. That is because such China-based companies are required 

by law to secretly provide that data to the government upon demand: 

The message contained in each of China’s state security laws passed since 

126 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/technology/anthem-hack-indicted-breach.html. 

127 https://qz.com/africa/1287675/china-is-exporting-facial-recognition-to-africa-ensuring-aidominance-through-diversity/ (emphasis added). 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

the beginning of 2014 is clear: everyone is responsible for the party-state’s 

security. According to the CCP’s definition of state security, the Party’s 

political leadership is central. ... And the party expects Chinese people and 

citizens to assist in collecting intelligence. The Intelligence Law states ‘any 

organization and citizen shall, in accordance with the law, support, provide 

assistance, and cooperate in national intelligence work, and guard the secrecy 

of any national intelligence work that they are aware of...’ Not only is 

everyone required to participate in intelligence work when asked, but that 

participation must be kept secret.128

132. Consequently, Defendants must “support, provide assistance and cooperate” 

by accumulating TikTok user data, including biometrics such as face geometry scans, 

voiceprints and information derived therefrom, and then share such data with the Chinese 

government. In an article entitled “Take China’s TikTok App Security Threat Seriously,” 

Bloomberg reported that many “Hong Kong protesters say that regardless of whether 

TikTok is censoring content or not, they fear posting on a social media site owned by 

ByteDance, a Beijing company that must hand over user information to Chinese authorities 

if asked, just like all its compatriots.”129

133. In fact, Defendants in this action – including even the two based in the 

United States (Defendants TikTok, Inc. and ByteDance, Inc.) – have objected to Plaintiff 

Misty Hong’s requests for the production of relevant documents in this lawsuit “to the 

extent they seek state secrets or any other information that cannot be disclosed without 

violating Chinese law, including the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets 

and/or Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (“State Secrets”).” 

Defendants apparently interposed this “State Secrets” objection in order to comply with 

128 https://capx.co/britain-must-avoid-being-sucked-into-huaweis-moral-vacuum/. See also

https://www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-national-intelligence-law-defense-offense. 

129 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2019-10-29/worries-that-tiktok-is-a-threat-tonational-security-have-merit. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

China’s Intelligence Law requirement that “[n]ot only is everyone required to participate in 

intelligence work when asked, but that participation must be kept secret.”130 This “State 

Secrets” objection flatly contradicts Defendant TikTok, Inc.’s misleading public statement 

that “none of our data is subject to Chinese law.”131

134. Defendant Beijing ByteDance has a particularly strong incentive to 

cooperate with the Chinese government. In 2018, China’s State Administration of Radio 

and Television, an arm of the Chinese Communist Party, ordered Defendant Beijing 

ByteDance to shut down one of its apps due to “vulgar” content. That prompted the CEO 

of Defendant Beijing ByteDance to publicly apologize. His re-dedication to the Chinese 

Communist Party resulted in his being named one of the “100 outstanding private 

entrepreneurs” who were “chosen for being ‘emblematic of the country’s private economic 

development’, while also being people who ‘resolutely uphold the Party’s leadership 

....’”132

135. In a further show of allegiance to the Chinese government, Defendant 

Beijing ByteDance actively supports and participates in the spreading of Communist Party 

propaganda. It signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the Ministry of Public 

Security’s Press and Publicity Bureau to promote the credibility of the police department, 

including within an area of China known for severe repression, demolition of mosques, 

and wide-spread detention centers for ethnic minorities. Under that agreement, “all levels 

and divisions of police units from the Ministry of Public Security to county-level traffic 

police would have their own Douyin account to disseminate propaganda. The agreement 

also reportedly says ByteDance would increase its offline cooperation with the police 

department ....”133

130 https://capx.co/britain-must-avoid-being-sucked-into-huaweis-moral-vacuum/. 

131 https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/statement-on-tiktoks-content-moderation-and-data-securitypractices. 

132 https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/company/bytedance. 

133 https://chinatechmap.aspi.org.au/#/company/bytedance. See also

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

136. Combined with evidence of the TikTok’s app’s functionality and code, the 

application of facial recognition technology to TikTok user videos, the patent applications 

for facial, voice, age, race/ethnicity and emotion recognition technologies, and the Douyin 

app’s facial recognition feature, Defendants’ legal obligations and political ties to the 

Chinese government make clear their large-scale BIPA and other biometrics violations. 

VII. DEFENDANTS UNJUSTLY PROFIT WHILE PLAINTIFFS, THE CLASS 

AND THE TWO SUBCLASSES SUFFER HARM. 

137. Defendants use the User/Device Identifiers, the biometric identifiers and 

information, and the Private Videos and Private Video Images to create a dossier of private 

and personally-identifiable data and content for each TikTok user. These are living files 

that are supplemented over time with additional private and personally-identifiable user 

data and content, and utilized in the past, the present and the future for economic and 

financial gain. 

138. Defendants’ unlawful possession and control over these ever-expanding 

dossiers make tracking and profiling TikTok users, and targeting them with advertising, 

much more efficient, effective and lucrative. These living dossiers of private and 

personally-identifiable data and content are used to analyze TikTok users’ income, 

consumption habits, and preferences. Such information provides guidance as to what 

methods of advertising will be most effective on particular TikTok users, what products – 

including Defendants’ own products – will be most attractive to particular TikTok users, 

and how much to spend on particular ads. Defendants unjustly have earned and continue to 

earn substantial profits and revenues from such targeted advertising and from generating 

increased demand for and use of Defendants’ other products. 

139. Defendants also unlawfully leverage these living dossiers of private and 

personally-identifiable TikTok user data and content to improve their artificial intelligence 

technologies and file patent applications, thereby unjustly increasing their past, present and 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/tiktoks-owner-is-helping-chinas-campaign-of-repressionin-xinjiang-report-finds/2019/11/28/98e8d9e4-119f-11ea-bf62-eadd5d11f559_story.html. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

future profits and revenues – and their market value. 

140. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs, the Class and the Subclasses have incurred, and 

continue to incur, harm as a result of the invasion of privacy stemming from Defendants’ 

covert theft of their private and personally-identifiable data and content – including their 

User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, and Private Videos and 

Private Video Images. Plaintiffs, the Class and the Subclasses also have suffered and 

continue to suffer harm in the form of diminution of the value of their private and 

personally-identifiable data and content as a result of Defendants’ surreptitious and 

unlawful activities. Moreover, Plaintiffs, the Class and the Subclasses have suffered and 

continue to suffer injuries to their mobile devices. The battery, memory, CPU and 

bandwidth of such devices have been compromised, and as a result the functioning of such 

devices has been impaired and slowed, due to Defendants’ clandestine and unlawful 

activities. Finally, Plaintiffs, the Class and the two Subclasses have incurred additional 

data usage and electricity costs that they would not have incurred but for Defendants’ 

covert and unlawful actions. 

VIII. FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND TOLLING. 

141. The applicable statutes of limitations are tolled as a result of Defendants’ 

knowing and active concealment of their unlawful conduct alleged above – through, 

among other things, their obfuscation of the source code, misleading public statements, 

and hidden and ambiguous privacy policies and terms of use. Plaintiffs, the Class and the 

two Subclasses were ignorant of the information essential to pursue their claims, without 

any fault or lack of diligence on their own part. 

142. Also, at the time the action was filed, Defendants were under a duty to 

disclose the true character, quality, and nature of their activities to Plaintiffs, the Class and 

the two Subclasses. Defendants are therefore estopped from relying on any statute of 

limitations. 

143. Defendants’ fraudulent concealment is common to the Class and the two 

Subclasses. 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

IX. NAMED PLAINTIFF ALLEGATIONS. 

A. The California Plaintiffs. 

1. Plaintiff Misty Hong. 

144. Plaintiff Misty Hong is currently a full-time college student. In or about 

March or April 2019, Ms. Hong downloaded the TikTok app onto her mobile device. At 

the time Ms. Hong downloaded the TikTok app, she did not read any privacy policy or 

terms of use, nor did she see discernible hyperlinks to or warnings about these items. In 

fact, she never clicked the sign-up button and never knowingly created an account with 

Defendants. However, months later, she discovered for the first time that Defendant 

TikTok, Inc. had created an account for her, without her knowledge or consent, and 

provided her with a user name (the word “user” followed by a combination of numbers 

followed by “@” followed by the word “user” followed by a combination of letters and 

numbers) and assigned her phone number as the account password. 

145. Shortly after completing the download of the TikTok app onto her mobile 

device, Ms. Hong made approximately five or six videos using the TikTok app on her 

mobile device. Images of her face were captured in some or all of these videos. Ms. Hong 

experienced difficulty in timing the background music to lip-syncing and dancing. 

Consequently, after shooting each video, Ms. Hong (i) sometimes pressed the “next” 

button and (ii) sometimes pressed the “x” button and then the “reshoot” button. Ms. Hong 

neither saved nor posted any of these videos. But, as a result of sometimes pressing the 

“next” button, Defendants took some of these Private Videos without Ms. Hong’s 

knowledge or consent. Images of Ms. Hong’s face also have been captured in Musical.ly 

and/or TikTok videos recorded and posted by others. 

146. During the time that the TikTok app was installed on Ms. Hong’s mobile 

device, Defendants surreptitiously performed the following actions without notice to or the 

knowledge and consent of Ms. Hong: (i) Defendants took her User/Device Identifiers and 

Private Videos from her mobile device; (ii) Defendants took her biometric identifiers and 

information (including face geometry scans and voiceprints) from her and her friends’ 

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mobile device and/or videos; (iii) Defendants took her private and personally-identifiable 

data and content from her mobile device before she had the opportunity to sign up and 

create an account; (iv) Defendants took her private and personally-identifiable data and 

content from her mobile device after she closed the TikTok app; and (v) Defendants 

transferred some or all such stolen data and content to servers located in China – including 

to servers under the control of third-parties who cooperate with the Chinese government. 

147. Defendants performed these acts for the purpose of secretly collecting Ms. 

Hong’s private and personally-identifiable data and content – including her User/Device 

Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, and Private Videos – and using such data 

and content to track, profile and target Ms. Hong with advertisements. Further, Defendants 

have used Ms. Hong’s private and personally-identifiable data and content for the purpose 

of developing their artificial intelligence capabilities and patenting commercially-valuable 

technologies. Defendants and others now have access to a living and information-laden 

dossier on Ms. Hong that can be used for further commercial advantage and other harmful 

purposes. Defendants have profited, and will continue to profit, from these activities. 

148. Meanwhile, Ms. Hong has incurred harm as a result of Defendants’ invasion 

of her privacy rights through their covert taking of her private and personally-identifiable 

data and content – including her User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and 

information, and Private Videos. Ms. Hong also has suffered harm because Defendant’s 

actions have diminished the value of her private and personally-identifiable data and 

content. Moreover, Ms. Hong has suffered injury to her mobile device. The battery, 

memory, CPU and bandwidth of her device has been compromised, and as a result the 

functioning of that device has been impaired and slowed, due to Defendants’ clandestine 

and unlawful activities. Finally, Ms. Hong has incurred additional data usage and 

electricity costs that she would not have incurred but for Defendants’ covert and unlawful 

actions. 

2. Plaintiff A.S. 

149. Plaintiff A.S., a minor who is currently 15 years old, first downloaded the 

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Musical.ly app to her mobile device and created a user account in 2016 when she was 

under age 13. She subsequently downloaded the Musical.ly app in 2017 to a new mobile 

device that was hers. In 2019, A.S. downloaded the TikTok app to another new mobile 

device that was hers. A.S. and her legal guardian have never seen or read any of 

Defendants’ privacy policies or terms of use. 

150. Beginning in 2016, A.S. created numerous videos using the Musical.ly app 

and the TikTok app. Many are Private Videos containing images of her face, while many 

others are videos containing her voice and images of her face that she intentionally 

uploaded and posted. A.S. used the augmented reality features and facial filters on her face 

in both Private Videos and in videos that she intentionally uploaded and posted. 

151. During the time that the TikTok app was installed on A.S.’s mobile devices, 

Defendants surreptitiously performed the following actions without notice to or the 

knowledge and consent of A.S. or her legal guardian: (i) Defendants took her User/Device 

Identifiers, Private Videos and Private Video Images from her mobile devices; (ii) 

Defendants took her biometric identifiers and information (including face geometry scans 

and voiceprints) from her mobile devices and/or videos; (iii) Defendants took her private 

and personally-identifiable data and content from her other social media accounts; (iv) 

Defendants took her private and personally-identifiable data and content from her mobile 

devices before she had the opportunity to sign up and create an account; (v) Defendants 

took her private and personally-identifiable data and content from her mobile devices after 

she closed the TikTok app; and (vi) Defendants transferred some or all such stolen data 

and content to servers located in China – including to servers under the control of thirdparties who cooperate with the Chinese government. 

152. Defendants performed these acts for the purpose of secretly collecting A.S.’s 

private and personally-identifiable data and content – including her User/Device 

Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, Private Videos and Private Video Images 

– and using such data and content to track, profile and target A.S. with advertisements. 

Further, Defendants have used A.S.’s private and personally-identifiable data and content 

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for the purpose of developing their artificial intelligence capabilities and patenting 

commercially-valuable technologies. Defendants and others now have access to a living 

and information-laden dossier on A.S. that can be used for further commercial advantage 

and other harmful purposes. Defendants have profited, and will continue to profit, from 

these activities. 

153. Meanwhile, A.S. has incurred harm as a result of Defendants’ invasion of her 

privacy rights through their covert taking of her private and personally-identifiable data 

and content – including her User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, 

Private Videos and Private Video Images. A.S. also has suffered harm because 

Defendant’s actions have diminished the value of her private and personally-identifiable 

data and content. Moreover, A.S. has suffered injury to her mobile devices. The battery, 

memory, CPU and bandwidth of such devices have been compromised, and as a result the 

functioning of those devices has been impaired and slowed, due to Defendants’ clandestine 

and unlawful activities. Finally, A.S. has incurred additional data usage and electricity 

costs that she would not have incurred but for Defendants’ covert and unlawful actions. 

3. Plaintiff A.R. 

154. A.R. downloaded the Musical.ly app to her mobile device and created a user 

account in or about 2017 when she was approximately 12 years old. Subsequently, in 

2019, while still a minor, A.R. downloaded the TikTok app to a new mobile device that 

was hers. A.R. and her legal guardian have never seen or read any of Defendants’ privacy 

policies or terms of use. 

155. A.R. created numerous videos using the Musical.ly app and the TikTok app. 

Many are Private Videos containing images of her face, while many others are videos 

containing images of her face that she intentionally uploaded and posted. A.R. used the 

augmented reality features and facial filters on her face in her Private Videos. A.R.’s voice 

and images of A.R.’s face have been captured in Private Videos recorded by others, as well 

as in videos that were recorded, uploaded and posted by others. 

156. During the time that the TikTok app was installed on A.R.’s mobile devices, 

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Defendants surreptitiously performed the following actions without notice to or the 

knowledge and consent of A.R. or her legal guardian: (i) Defendants took her User/Device 

Identifiers, Private Videos and Private Video Images from her mobile devices; (ii) 

Defendants took her biometric identifiers and information (including face geometry scans 

and voiceprints) from her and her friends’ mobile devices and/or videos; (iii) Defendants 

took her private and personally-identifiable data and content from her mobile devices 

before she had the opportunity to sign up and create an account; (iv) Defendants took her 

private and personally-identifiable data and content from her mobile devices after she 

closed the TikTok app; and (v) Defendants transferred some or all such stolen data and 

content to servers located in China – including to servers under the control of third-parties 

who cooperate with the Chinese government. 

157. Defendants performed these acts for the purpose of secretly collecting A.R.’s 

private and personally-identifiable data and content – including her User/Device 

Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, Private Videos and Private Video Images 

– and using such data and content to track, profile and target A.R. with advertisements. 

Further, Defendants have used A.R.’s private and personally-identifiable data and content 

for the purpose of developing their artificial intelligence capabilities and patenting 

commercially-valuable technologies. Defendants and others now have access to a living 

and information-laden dossier on A.R. that can be used for further commercial advantage 

and other harmful purposes. Defendants have profited, and will continue to profit, from 

these activities. 

158. Meanwhile, A.R. has incurred harm as a result of Defendants’ invasion of 

her privacy rights through their covert taking of her private and personally-identifiable data 

and content – including her User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, 

Private Videos and Private Video Images. A.R. also has suffered harm because 

Defendant’s actions have diminished the value of her private and personally-identifiable 

data and content. Moreover, A.R. has suffered injury to her mobile devices. The battery, 

memory, CPU and bandwidth of her devices have been compromised, and as a result the 

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functioning of those devices has been impaired and slowed, due to Defendants’ clandestine 

and unlawful activities. Finally, A.R. has incurred additional data usage and electricity 

costs that she would not have incurred but for Defendants’ covert and unlawful actions. 

B. The Illinois Plaintiffs. 

1. Plaintiff Meghan Smith. 

159. Plaintiff Meghan Smith downloaded the TikTok app to her mobile device 

and created a user account in 2018. Ms. Smith has never read and does not recall seeing 

any of Defendants’ privacy policies or terms of use. 

160. Ms. Smith created numerous videos using the TikTok app. Many are Private 

Videos containing her voice and images of her face, while many others are videos 

containing her voice and images of her face that she intentionally uploaded and posted. 

Ms. Smith used the augmented reality features and facial filters on her face in both Private 

Videos and in videos that she intentionally uploaded and posted. 

161. During the time that the TikTok app was installed on Ms. Smith’s mobile 

device, Defendants surreptitiously performed the following actions without notice to or the 

knowledge and consent of Ms. Smith: (i) Defendants took her User/Device Identifiers, 

Private Videos, and Private Video Images from her mobile device; (ii) Defendants took her 

biometric identifiers and information (including face geometry scans and voiceprints) from 

her mobile device and/or videos; (iii) Defendants took her private and personallyidentifiable data and content from her mobile device before she had the opportunity to sign 

up and create an account; (iv) Defendants took her private and personally-identifiable data 

and content from her mobile device after she closed the TikTok app; and (v) Defendants 

transferred some or all such stolen data and content to servers located in China – including 

to servers under the control of third-parties who cooperate with the Chinese government. 

162. Defendants performed these acts for the purpose of secretly collecting Ms. 

Smith’s private and personally-identifiable data and content – including her User/Device 

Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, Private Videos and Private Video Images 

– and using such data and content to track, profile and target Ms. Smith with 

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advertisements. Further, Defendants have used Ms. Smith’s private and personallyidentifiable data and content for the purpose of developing their artificial intelligence 

capabilities and patenting commercially-valuable technologies. Defendants and others now 

have access to a living and information-laden dossier on Ms. Smith that can be used for 

further commercial advantage and other harmful purposes. Defendants have profited, and 

will continue to profit, from these activities. 

163. Meanwhile, Ms. Smith has incurred harm as a result of Defendants’ invasion 

of her privacy rights through their covert taking of her private and personally-identifiable 

data and content – including her User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and 

information, Private Videos and Private Video Images. Ms. Smith also has suffered harm 

because Defendant’s actions have diminished the value of her private and personallyidentifiable data and content. Moreover, Ms. Smith has suffered injury to her mobile 

device. The battery, memory, CPU and bandwidth of such device have been compromised, 

and as a result the functioning of that device has been impaired and slowed, due to 

Defendants’ clandestine and unlawful activities. Finally, Ms. Smith has incurred additional 

data usage and electricity costs that she would not have incurred but for Defendants’ covert 

and unlawful actions. 

2. Plaintiffs C.W. and I.W. 

164. Plaintiff C.W., a minor who is currently 11 years old, and Plaintiff I.W., a 

minor who is currently 8 years old, are siblings who each downloaded the TikTok app to 

their own mobile devices and created their respective user accounts in or about March 

2019. C.W., I.W. and their legal guardian have never seen or read any of Defendants’ 

privacy policies or terms of use. 

165. C.W. and I.W. each created numerous videos using the TikTok app. Each 

has videos containing images of their respective faces that they intentionally uploaded and 

posted. C.W. and I.W. used the augmented reality features and facial filters on their 

respective faces in videos they intentionally uploaded and posted. 

166. During the time that the TikTok app was installed on C.W.’s and I.W.’s 

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mobile devices, Defendants surreptitiously performed the following actions without notice 

to or the knowledge and consent of C.W., I.W., or their legal guardian: (i) Defendants took 

their User/Device Identifiers from their mobile devices; (ii) Defendants took their 

biometric identifiers and information (including face geometry scans and voiceprints) from 

their mobile device and/or videos; (iii) Defendants took their private and personallyidentifiable data and content from their mobile devices before they had the opportunity to 

sign up and create an account; (iv) Defendants took their private and personallyidentifiable data and content from their mobile devices after they closed the TikTok app; 

and (v) Defendants transferred some or all such stolen data and content to servers located 

in China – including to servers under the control of third-parties who cooperate with the 

Chinese government. 

167. Defendants performed these acts for the purpose of secretly collecting 

C.W.’s and I.W.’s private and personally-identifiable data and content – including their 

User/Device Identifiers and biometric identifiers and information – and using such data 

and content to track, profile and target C.W. and I.W. with advertisements. Further, 

Defendants have used C.W.’s and I.W.’s private and personally-identifiable data and 

content for the purpose of developing Defendants’ artificial intelligence capabilities and 

patenting commercially-valuable technologies. Defendants and others now have access to 

a living and information-laden dossier on C.W. and I.W. that can be used for further 

commercial advantage and other harmful purposes. Defendants have profited, and will 

continue to profit, from these activities. 

168. Meanwhile, C.W. and I.W. have incurred harm as a result of Defendants’ 

invasion of their privacy rights through Defendants’ covert taking of C.W.’s and I.W.’s 

private and personally-identifiable data and content – including their User/Device 

Identifiers and biometric identifiers and information. C.W. and I.W. also have suffered 

harm because Defendant’s actions have diminished the value of their private and 

personally-identifiable data and content. Moreover, C.W. and I.W. have suffered injury to 

their mobile devices. The battery, memory, CPU and bandwidth of such devices have been 

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compromised, and as a result the functioning of those devices has been impaired and 

slowed, due to Defendants’ clandestine and unlawful activities. Finally, C.W. and I.W. 

have incurred additional data usage and electricity costs that they would not have incurred 

but for Defendants’ covert and unlawful actions. 

3. Plaintiff R.P. 

169. R.P., a minor who is currently 11 years old, downloaded the TikTok app to 

her mobile device and created a user account in 2018. R.P. and her legal guardian have 

never seen or read any of Defendants’ privacy policies or terms of use. 

170. R.P. created numerous videos using the TikTok app. Many are Private 

Videos containing images of her face, while many others are videos containing images of 

her face that she intentionally uploaded and posted. R.P. used the augmented reality 

features and facial filters on her face in both Private Videos and in videos that she 

intentionally uploaded and posted. Images of R.P.’s face have been captured in videos that 

were recorded, uploaded and posted by others. 

171. During the time that the TikTok app was installed on R.P.’s mobile device, 

Defendants surreptitiously performed the following actions without notice to or the 

knowledge and consent of R.P. or her legal guardian: (i) Defendants took her User/Device 

Identifiers, Private Videos and Private Video Images from her mobile device; (ii) 

Defendants took her biometric identifiers and information (including face geometry scans 

and voiceprints) from her mobile device and/or videos; (iii) Defendants took her private 

and personally-identifiable data and content from her mobile device before she had the 

opportunity to sign up and create an account; (iv) Defendants took her private and 

personally-identifiable data and content from her mobile device after she closed the 

TikTok app; and (v) Defendants transferred some or all such stolen data and content to 

servers located in China – including to servers under the control of third-parties who 

cooperate with the Chinese government. 

172. Defendants performed these acts for the purpose of secretly collecting R.P.’s 

private and personally-identifiable data and content – including her User/Device 

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Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, and Private Videos and Private Video 

Images – and using such data and content to track, profile and target R.P. with 

advertisements. Further, Defendants have used R.P.’s private and personally-identifiable 

data and content for the purpose of developing their artificial intelligence capabilities and 

patenting commercially-valuable technologies. Defendants and others now have access to 

a living and information-laden dossier on R.P. that can be used for further commercial 

advantage and other harmful purposes. Defendants have profited, and will continue to 

profit, from these activities. 

173. Meanwhile, R.P. has incurred harm as a result of Defendants’ invasion of her 

privacy rights through their covert taking of her private and personally-identifiable data 

and content – including her User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, 

and Private Videos and Private Video Images. R.P. also has suffered harm because 

Defendant’s actions have diminished the value of her private and personally-identifiable 

data and content. Moreover, R.P. has suffered injury to her mobile device. The battery, 

memory, CPU and bandwidth of her device have been compromised, and as a result the 

functioning of that device has been impaired and slowed, due to Defendants’ clandestine 

and unlawful activities. Finally, R.P. has incurred additional data usage and electricity 

costs that she would not have incurred but for Defendants’ covert and unlawful actions. 

X. CLASS ALLEGATIONS. 

174. Plaintiffs seek class certification of the class set forth herein pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“Rule 23”). Specifically, Plaintiffs seek class 

certification of all claims for relief herein on behalf of a class and two subclasses defined 

as follows: 

Class: All persons who used the TikTok app and/or the Musical.ly app on one or 

more of their mobile devices while residing in the United States. 

California Subclass: All persons who used the TikTok app and/or the Musical.ly 

app on one or more of their mobile devices while residing in California. 

Illinois Subclass: All persons who, while residing in Illinois, used the TikTok app 

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and/or the Musical.ly app on one or more of their mobile devices and who, while residing 

in Illinois, (i) used either app to make a video containing his or her own face and/or voice, 

and/or (ii) had his or her own face and/or voice captured in a video made by someone else 

with either app. 

175. Plaintiffs are the proposed class representatives for the class. California 

Plaintiffs are the proposed class representatives for the California Subclass. Illinois 

Plaintiffs are the proposed class representatives for the Illinois Subclass. 

176. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or refine the definitions of the Class and 

the two Subclasses based upon discovery of new information and in order to accommodate 

any of the Court’s manageability concerns. 

177. Excluded from the Class and the two Subclasses are: (i) any judge or 

magistrate judge presiding over this action and members of their staff, as well as members 

of their families; (ii) Defendants, Defendants’ predecessors, parents, successors, heirs, 

assigns, subsidiaries, and any entity in which any Defendant or its parents have a 

controlling interest, as well as Defendants’ current or former employees, agents, officers, 

and directors; (iii) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion 

from the class; (iv) persons whose claims in this matter have been finally adjudicated on 

the merits or otherwise released; (v) counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants; and (vi) the 

legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons. 

178. Ascertainability. The proposed Class and Subclasses are readily 

ascertainable because they are defined using objective criteria so as to allow Class and 

Subclass members to determine if they are part of the Class and/or one of the two 

Subclasses. Further, the Class and two Subclasses can be readily identified through records 

maintained by Defendants. 

179. Numerosity (Rule 23(a)(1)). The Class and two Subclasses are so numerous 

that joinder of individual members herein is impracticable. The exact number of Class and 

Subclass members, as herein identified and described, is not known, but download figures 

indicate that the TikTok app has been downloaded more than 120 million times in the 

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United States. 

180. Commonality (Rule 23(a)(2)). Common questions of fact and law exist for 

each cause of action and predominate over questions affecting only individual Class and 

Subclass members, including the following: 

 a. Whether Defendants engaged in the activities and practices referenced 

above; 

 b. Whether Defendants’ activities and practices referenced above 

constitute a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; 

 c. Whether Defendants’ activities and practices referenced above 

constitute a violation of the California Comprehensive Data Access and Fraud Act, Cal. 

Pen. C. § 502; 

 d. Whether Defendants’ activities and practices referenced above 

constitute a violation of the Right to Privacy under the California Constitution; 

 e. Whether Defendants’ activities and practices referenced above 

constitute an intrusion upon seclusion; 

 f. Whether Defendants’ activities and practices referenced above 

constitute a violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, Bus. & Prof. C. §§ 17200 

et seq. 

 g. Whether Defendants’ activities and practices referenced above 

constitute a violation of the California False Advertising Law, Bus. & Prof. C. §§ 17500 et 

seq.

 h. Whether Defendants’ activities and practices referenced above 

constitute negligence; 

 i. Whether Defendants’ activities and practices referenced above 

constitute unjust enrichment concerning which restitution and/or disgorgement is 

warranted; 

 j. Whether Defendants’ activities and practices referenced above 

constitute a violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, et 

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seq.; 

 k. Whether Plaintiffs and members of the Class and two Subclasses 

sustained damages as a result of Defendants’ activities and practices referenced above, 

and, if so, in what amount; 

 l. Whether Defendants profited from their activities and practices 

referenced above, and, if so, in what amount; 

 m. What is the appropriate injunctive relief to ensure that Defendants no 

longer unlawfully: (i) take private and personally-identifiable TikTok user data and content 

– including User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, and Private 

Videos and Private Video Images; (ii) utilize private and personally-identifiable TikTok 

user data and content to develop and patent commercially-valuable artificial intelligence 

technologies; (iii) utilize private and personally-identifiable TikTok user data and content 

to create consumer demand for and use of Defendants’ other products; (iv) transfer such 

private and personally-identifiable TikTok user data and content to servers in China and to 

third parties either in China or whose data is accessible from within China; (v) cause the 

diminution in value of TikTok users’ private and personally-identifiable data and content; 

(vi) cause injury and harm to TikTok users’ mobile devices; (vii) cause TikTok users to 

incur higher data usage and electricity charges; (viii) retain the unlawfully assembled 

TikTok user dossiers, including all private and personally-identifiable data and content 

therein; and (ix) profile and target, based on the above activities, TikTok users with 

advertisements. 

 n. What is the appropriate injunctive relief to ensure that Defendants 

take reasonable measures to ensure that they and relevant third parties destroy unlawfullyacquired private and personally-identifiable TikTok user data and content in their 

possession, custody or control. 

181. Typicality (Rule 23(a)(3)). Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of 

members of the Class and two Subclasses because, among other things, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Class and two Subclasses sustained similar injuries as a result of 

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Defendants’ uniform wrongful conduct and their legal claims all arise from the same 

events and wrongful conduct by Defendants. 

182. Adequacy (Rule 23(a)(4)). Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the 

interests of the Class and two Subclasses. Plaintiffs’ interests do not conflict with the 

interests of the Class and Subclass members, and Plaintiffs have retained counsel 

experienced in complex class action and data privacy litigation to prosecute this case on 

behalf of the Class and two Subclasses. 

183. Predominance & Superiority (Rule 23(b)(3)). In addition to satisfying the 

prerequisites of Rule 23(a), Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements for maintaining a class 

action under Rule 23(b)(3). Common questions of law and fact predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual Class and Subclass members, and a class action is 

superior to individual litigation and all other available methods for the fair and efficient 

adjudication of this controversy. The amount of damages available to Plaintiffs is 

insufficient to make litigation addressing Defendants’ conduct economically feasible in the 

absence of the class action procedure. Individualized litigation also presents a potential for 

inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and increases the delay and expense presented by 

the complex legal and factual issues of the case to all parties and the court system. By 

contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides 

the benefits of a single adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by 

a single court. 

184. Final Declaratory or Injunctive Relief (Rule 23(b)(2)). Plaintiffs also 

satisfy the requirements for maintaining a class action under Rule 23(b)(2). Defendants 

have acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the Class and two 

Subclasses, making final declaratory and/or injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the 

Class and two Subclasses as a whole. 

185. Particular Issues (Rule 23(c)(4)). Plaintiffs also satisfy the requirements for 

maintaining a class action under Rule 23(c)(4). Their claims consist of particular issues 

that are common to all Class and Subclass members and are capable of class-wide 

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resolution that will significantly advance the litigation. 

XI. CAUSES OF ACTION. 

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 

Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 

(On Behalf of the Plaintiffs and the Class) 

186. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if 

fully set forth herein. 

187. The Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s mobile devices are, and at all relevant times 

have been, used for interstate communication and commerce, and are therefore “protected 

computers” under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B). 

188. Defendants have exceeded, and continue to exceed, authorized access to the 

Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s protected computers and obtained information thereby, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (a)(2)(C). 

189. Defendants’ conduct caused “loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year 

period . . . aggregating at least $5,000 in value” under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I), 

inter alia, because of the secret transmission of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and 

personally-identifiable data and content – including User/Device Identifiers, biometric 

identifiers and information, and Private Videos and Private Video Images never intended 

for public consumption. 

190. Defendants’ conduct also constitutes “a threat to public health or safety” 

under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(IV), due to the private and personally-identifiable data 

and content of the Plaintiffs and the Class being made available to foreign actors, including 

foreign intelligence services, in locations without adequate legal privacy protections. That 

this threat is real and imminent is evidenced by the ban on the TikTok app instituted by the 

Defense Department, Navy, Army, Marines, Air Force, Coast Guard and Transportation 

Security Administration, as well as the proposed legislation by United States Senators that 

would ban federal employees from using the TikTok app. As Senators Schumer and Cotton 

wrote in an October 23, 2019 letter to the Acting Director of National Intelligence 

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concerning TikTok, “[s]ecurity experts have voiced concerns that China’s vague 

patchwork of intelligence, national security, and cybersecurity laws compel Chinese 

companies to support and cooperate with intelligence work controlled by the Chinese 

Communist Party. Without an independent judiciary to review requests made by the 

Chinese government for data or other actions, there is no legal mechanism for Chinese 

companies to appeal if they disagree with a request.”134

191. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to “maintain a civil 

action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other 

equitable relief.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). 

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 

Violation of the California Comprehensive 

Data Access and Fraud Act, Cal. Pen. C. § 502 

(On Behalf of the Plaintiffs and the Class) 

192. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if 

fully set forth herein. 

193. Defendants’ acts violate Cal. Pen. C. § 502(c)(1) because they have 

knowingly accessed, and continue to knowingly access, data and computers to wrongfully 

control or obtain data. The Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable 

data and content accessed by Defendants – including the User/Device Identifiers, the 

biometric identifiers and information, and the Private Videos and Private Video Images 

never intended for public consumption – far exceeds any reasonable use of the Plaintiffs’ 

and the Class’s data and content to operate the TikTok app. There is no justification for 

Defendants’ surreptitious collection and transfer of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private 

and personally-identifiable data and content from their mobile devices and their other 

social media accounts; for Defendants’ clandestine collection and transfer of the Plaintiffs’ 

134 https://www.law360.com/articles/1213180/sens-want-tiktok-investigated-for-national-securitythreats; https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1239. 

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and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content before they even signup and create an account; for Defendants’ covert collection and transfer of the Plaintiffs’ 

and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content when the TikTok app 

is closed; or for Defendants having embedded source code within the TikTok app that 

transfers the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content 

to servers and third-party companies based in China where such servers and third-party 

companies are subject to Chinese law requiring the sharing of such data and content with 

the Chinese government. 

194. Defendants’ acts violate Cal. Pen. C. § 502(c)(2) because they have 

knowingly accessed and without permission taken, copied, and made use of data from a 

computer – and they continue to do so. Defendants did not obtain permission to take, copy, 

and make use of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and 

content – including the User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, and 

Private Videos and Private Video Images never intended for public consumption – from 

their mobile devices and their other social media accounts. Nor did Defendants obtain 

permission to take, copy, and make use of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and 

personally-identifiable data and content from their mobile devices before they even signup and create an account. And Defendants did not obtain permission to take, copy, and 

make use of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and 

content from their mobile devices when the TikTok app is closed. Finally, Defendants did 

not obtain permission to embed source code within the TikTok app that transfers the 

Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content to servers 

and third-party companies based in China where such servers and third-party companies 

are subject to Chinese law requiring the sharing of such data and content with the Chinese 

government. 

195. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to compensatory 

damages, including “any expenditure reasonably and necessarily incurred by the owner or 

lessee to verify that a computer system, computer network, computer program, or data was 

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or was not altered, damaged, or deleted by the access,” injunctive relief, and attorneys’ 

fees. Cal. Pen. C. § 502(e)(1), (2). 

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 

Violation of the Right to Privacy – California Constitution 

(On Behalf of the California Plaintiffs and the California Subclass) 

196. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if 

fully set forth herein. 

197. The California Plaintiffs and the California Subclass hold, and at all relevant 

times held, a legally protected privacy interest in their private and personally-identifiable 

data and content – including the User/Device Identifiers, the biometric identifiers and 

information, and the Private Videos and Private Video Images never intended for public 

consumption – on their mobile devices and in their other social media accounts that 

Defendants have taken. 

198. There is a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the California 

Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass’s data and content under the circumstances present. 

199. The reasonableness of the California Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass’s 

expectation of privacy is supported by the undisclosed, hidden, and non-intuitive nature of 

Defendants’ taking of private and personally-identifiable data and content – including the 

User/Device Identifiers, the biometric identifiers and information, and the Private Videos 

and Private Video Images never intended for public consumption – from the California 

Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass’s mobile devices and other social media accounts. 

200. Defendants’ conduct constitutes and, at all relevant times, constituted a 

serious invasion of privacy, as Defendants either did not disclose at all, or failed to make 

an effective disclosure, that they would take and make use of – and allow third-party 

companies based in China to take and make use of – the California Plaintiffs’ and the 

California Subclass’s private and personally-identifiable data and content. Defendants 

intentionally invaded the California Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass’s privacy 

interests by intentionally designing the TikTok app, including all associated code, to 

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surreptitiously obtain, improperly gain knowledge of, review, and retain their private and 

personally-identifiable data and content. 

201. These intrusions are highly offensive to a reasonable person, as evidenced by 

substantial research, literature, and governmental enforcement and investigative efforts to 

protect consumer privacy against surreptitious technological intrusions. The offensiveness 

of Defendants’ intrusion is heightened by Defendants’ making the California Plaintiffs’ 

and the California Subclass’s private and personally-identifiable data and content available 

to third parties, including foreign governmental entities whose interests are opposed to 

those of United States citizens. The offensiveness of Defendants’ intrusion is further 

heightened by Defendants’ secret collection and transfer of the California Plaintiffs’ and 

the California Subclass’s private and personally-identifiable data and content before they 

even sign-up and create an account; by Defendants’ covert collection and transfer of the 

California Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass’s private and personally-identifiable data 

and content when the TikTok app is closed; and by Defendants’ clandestine collection and 

transfer of the California Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass’s private and personallyidentifiable data and content from their other social media accounts. The intentionality of 

Defendants’ conduct, and the steps they have taken to disguise and deny it, also 

demonstrate the highly offensive nature of their conduct. Further, Defendants’ conduct 

targeted the California Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass’s mobile devices, which the 

United States Supreme Court has characterized as almost a feature of human anatomy, and 

which contain the California Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass’s private and 

personally-identifiable data and content. 

202. The California Plaintiffs and the California Subclass were harmed by, and 

continue to suffer harm as a result of, the intrusion as detailed throughout this First 

Amended Complaint. 

203. Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm suffered by 

the California Plaintiffs and the California Subclass. 

204. The California Plaintiffs and the California Subclass seek nominal and 

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punitive damages as a result of Defendants’ actions. Punitive damages are warranted 

because Defendants’ malicious, oppressive, and willful actions were calculated to injure 

the California Plaintiffs and the California Subclass, and were made in conscious disregard 

of their rights. Punitive damages are also warranted to deter Defendants from engaging in 

future misconduct. 

205. The California Plaintiffs and the California Subclass seek injunctive relief to 

rectify Defendants’ actions, including but not limited to requiring Defendants to stop 

taking more private and personally-identifiable data and content of the California Plaintiffs 

and the California Subclass from their mobile devices and their other social media 

accounts than is reasonably necessary to operate the TikTok app; to make clear disclosures 

of the California Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass’s private and personallyidentifiable data and content that is reasonably necessary to operate the TikTok app; to 

obtain the California Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass’s consent to the taking of their 

private and personally-identifiable data and content; to stop transferring the California 

Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass’s private and personally-identifiable data and 

content to China, to servers located in China, or to servers or companies whose data is 

accessible from within China; and to recall and destroy the California Plaintiffs’ and the 

California Subclass’s private and personally-identifiable data and content already taken in 

contravention of the California Plaintiffs’ and the California Subclass’s right to privacy 

under the California Constitution. 

206. The California Plaintiffs and the California Subclass seek restitution and 

disgorgement for Defendants’ violation of their privacy rights. A person acting in 

conscious disregard of the rights of another is required to disgorge all profit because 

disgorgement both benefits the injured parties and deters the perpetrator from committing 

the same unlawful actions again. Disgorgement is available for conduct that constitutes 

“conscious interference with a claimant’s legally protected interests,” including tortious 

conduct or conduct that violates another duty or prohibition. Restatement (3rd) of 

Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, §§ 40, 44. 

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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

Intrusion upon Seclusion 

(On Behalf of the Plaintiffs and the Class) 

207. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if 

fully set forth herein. 

208. “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude 

or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other 

for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 

person.” Restatement (2nd) of Torts § 652B. 

209. The Plaintiffs and the Class have, and at all relevant times had, a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in their mobile devices and their other social media accounts, and 

their private affairs include their past, present and future activity on their mobile devices 

and their other social media accounts. 

210. The reasonableness of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s expectations of privacy 

is supported by the undisclosed, hidden, and non-intuitive nature of Defendants’ taking of 

private and personally-identifiable data and content from the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s 

mobile devices and other social media accounts. 

211. Defendants intentionally intruded upon the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s 

solitude, seclusion, and private affairs – and continue to do so – by intentionally designing 

the TikTok app, including all associated code, to surreptitiously obtain, improperly gain 

knowledge of, review, and retain the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personallyidentifiable data and content – including the User/Device Identifiers, the biometric 

identifiers and information, and the Private Videos and Private Video Images never 

intended for public consumption. 

212. These intrusions are highly offensive to a reasonable person, as evidenced by 

substantial research, literature, and governmental enforcement and investigative efforts to 

protect consumer privacy against surreptitious technological intrusions. The offensiveness 

of Defendants’ intrusion is heightened by Defendants’ making the Plaintiffs’ and the 

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Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content available to third parties, 

including foreign governmental entities whose interests are opposed to those of United 

States citizens. The offensiveness of Defendants’ intrusion is further heightened by 

Defendants’ secret collection and transfer of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and 

personally-identifiable data and content before they even sign-up and create an account; by 

Defendants’ covert collection and transfer of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and 

personally-identifiable data and content when the TikTok app is closed; and by 

Defendants’ clandestine collection and transfer of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private 

and personally-identifiable data and content from their other social media accounts. The 

intentionality of Defendants’ conduct, and the steps they have taken to disguise and deny 

it, also demonstrate the highly offensive nature of their conduct. Further, Defendants’ 

conduct targeted the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s mobile devices, which the United States 

Supreme Court has characterized as almost a feature of human anatomy, and which contain 

the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content. 

213. The Plaintiffs and the Class were harmed by, and continue to suffer harm as 

a result of, the intrusion as detailed throughout this First Amended Complaint. 

214. Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm suffered by 

the Plaintiffs and the Class. 

215. The Plaintiffs and the Class seek nominal and punitive damages as a result of 

Defendants’ actions. Punitive damages are warranted because Defendants’ malicious, 

oppressive, and willful actions were calculated to injure the Plaintiffs and the Class, and 

were made in conscious disregard of their rights. Punitive damages are also warranted to 

deter Defendants from engaging in future misconduct. 

216. The Plaintiffs and the Class seek injunctive relief to rectify Defendants’ 

actions, including but not limited to requiring Defendants to stop taking more private and 

personally-identifiable data and content from the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s mobile devices 

and other social media accounts than is reasonably necessary to operate the TikTok app; to 

make clear disclosures of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable 

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data and content that is reasonably necessary to operate the TikTok app; to obtain the 

Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s consent to the taking of such private and personally-identifiable 

data and content; to stop transferring the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personallyidentifiable data and content to China, to servers located in China, or to servers or 

companies whose data is accessible from within China; and to recall and destroy the 

Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content already 

taken in contravention of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s privacy rights. 

217. Plaintiffs and the Class seek restitution and disgorgement for Defendants’ 

intrusion upon seclusion. A person acting in conscious disregard of the rights of another is 

required to disgorge all profit because disgorgement both benefits the injured parties and 

deters the perpetrator from committing the same unlawful actions again. Disgorgement is 

available for conduct that constitutes “conscious interference with a claimant’s legally 

protected interests,” including tortious conduct or conduct that violates another duty or 

prohibition. Restatement (3rd) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, §§ 40, 44. 

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

Violation of the California Unfair Competition Law, 

Bus. & Prof. C. §§ 17200 et seq. 

(On Behalf of the Plaintiffs and the Class) 

218. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if 

fully set forth herein. 

219. The Unfair Competition Law, California Business & Professions Code §§ 

17200, et seq. (the “UCL”), prohibits any “unlawful,” “unfair,” or “fraudulent” business 

act or practice, which can include false or misleading advertising. 

220. Defendants violated, and continue to violate, the “unlawful” prong of the 

UCL through violation of statutes, constitutional provisions, and common law, as alleged 

herein. 

221. Defendants violated, and continue to violate, the “unfair” prong of the UCL 

because they took private and personally-identifiable data and content – including the 

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User/Device Identifiers, the biometric identifiers and information, and the Private Videos 

and Private Video Images never intended for public consumption – from the Plaintiffs’ and 

the Class’s mobile devices and other social media accounts under circumstances in which 

the Plaintiffs and the Class would have no reason to know that such data and content was 

being taken. 

222. The Plaintiffs and the Class had no reason to know because (i) there was no 

disclosure of Defendants’ collection and transfer of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s 

biometric identifiers and information, Private Videos and Private Video Images not 

intended for public consumption; (ii) there was no disclosure of Defendants’ collection and 

transfer of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and 

content before they even sign-up and create an account; (iii) there was no disclosure of 

Defendants’ collection and transfer of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and 

personally-identifiable data and content when the TikTok app is closed; (iv) there was no 

disclosure that Defendants had embedded source code within the TikTok app that transfers 

the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content to 

servers and third-party companies based in China where such servers and third-party 

companies are subject to Chinese law requiring the sharing of such data and content with 

the Chinese government; and (v) there was no effective disclosure of the wide range of the 

private and personally-identifiable data and content, including User/Device Identifiers, that 

Defendants took from the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s mobile devices and other social media 

accounts. 

223. Defendants violated, and continue to violate, the “fraudulent” prong of the 

UCL because (i) Defendants made it appear that the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s 

User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, and Private Videos and 

Private Video Images would not be collected and transferred unless the Plaintiffs and the 

Class chose to do so, but in fact Defendants collected and transferred such data and content 

without notice or consent; (ii) Defendants made it appear that the Plaintiffs’ and the 

Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content would not be collected and 

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transferred before they had signed-up and created an account, but in fact Defendants 

collected and transferred such data and content before sign-up and account creation 

without notice or consent; (iii) Defendants made it appear that the Plaintiffs’ and the 

Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content would not be collected or 

transferred while the TikTok app is closed, but in fact Defendants clandestinely collected 

and transferred such data and content when the app was closed without notice or consent; 

(iv) Defendants made it appear that the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personallyidentifiable data and content would not be transferred to servers and third-party companies 

based in China where such servers and third-party companies are subject to Chinese law 

requiring the sharing of such data and content with the Chinese government, but in fact 

Defendants covertly transferred such data and content to servers and third-party companies 

based in China without notice or consent; and (v) Defendants have intentionally refrained 

from disclosing the use to which the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personallyidentifiable data and content has been put, while simultaneously providing misleading 

reassurances about Defendants’ data collection and use practices. The Plaintiffs and the 

Class were misled by Defendants’ concealment, and had no reason to believe that 

Defendants had taken the private and personally-identifiable data and content that they had 

taken. 

224. The Plaintiffs and the Class have been harmed and have suffered economic 

injury as a result of Defendants’ UCL violations. First, the Plaintiffs and the Class have 

suffered harm in the form of diminution of the value of their private and personallyidentifiable data and content. Second, they have suffered harm to their mobile devices. The 

battery, memory, CPU and bandwidth of such devices have been compromised, and as a 

result the functioning of such devices has been impaired and slowed. Third, they have 

incurred additional data usage and electricity costs that they would not otherwise have 

incurred. Fourth, they have suffered harm as a result of the invasion of privacy stemming 

from Defendants’ covert theft of their private and personally-identifiable data and content 

– including their User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, and Private 

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Videos and Private Video Images. 

225. Defendants, as a result of their conduct, have been able to reap unjust profits 

and revenues in violation of the UCL. This includes Defendants’ profits and revenues from 

their targeted-advertising, improvements to their artificial intelligence technologies, their 

patent applications, and the increased consumer demand for and use of Defendants’ other 

products. The Plaintiffs and the Class seek restitution and disgorgement of these unjust 

profits and revenues. 

226. Unless restrained and enjoined, Defendants will continue to misrepresent 

their private and personally-identifiable data and content collection and use practices, and 

will not recall and destroy Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s wrongfully collected private and 

personally-identifiable data and content. Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate. 

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

Violation of the California False Advertising Law, 

Bus. & Prof. C. §§ 17500 et seq.

(On Behalf of the Plaintiffs and the Class) 

227. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if 

fully set forth herein. 

228. California’s False Advertising Law (the “FAL”) – Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 

17500, et seq. – prohibits “any statement” that is “untrue or misleading” and made “with 

the intent directly or indirectly to dispose of” property or services. 

229. Defendants’ advertising is, and at all relevant times was, highly misleading. 

Defendants do not disclose at all, or do not meaningfully disclose, the private and 

personally-identifiable data and content – including the User/Device Identifiers, the 

biometric identifiers and information, and the Private Videos and Private Video Images 

never intended for public consumption – that they have collected and transferred from the 

Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s mobile devices and other social media accounts. Defendants also 

do not advertise that Defendants secretly take private and personally-identifiable data and 

content from the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s mobile devices before they even sign up and 

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create an account, or that Defendants covertly take private and personally-identifiable data 

and content from the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s mobile devices even when the TikTok app 

is closed. Nor do Defendants disclose that the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and 

personally-identifiable data and content has been made available to foreign entities, 

including foreign government entities. As United States Senator Josh Hawley said on 

November 18, 2019: “If your child uses TikTok, there’s a chance the Chinese Communist 

Party knows where they are, what they look like, what their voices sound like, and what 

they’re watching” . . . “That’s a feature TikTok doesn’t advertise.”135

230. Reasonable consumers, like the Plaintiffs and the Class, are – and at all 

relevant times were – likely to be misled by Defendants’ misrepresentations. Reasonable 

consumers lack the means to verify Defendants’ representations concerning their data and 

content collection and use practices, or to understand the fact or significance of 

Defendants’ data and content collection and use practices. 

231. The Plaintiffs and the Class have been harmed and have suffered economic 

injury as a result of Defendants’ misrepresentations. First, they have suffered harm in the 

form of diminution of the value of their private and personally-identifiable data and 

content. Second, they have suffered harm to their mobile devices. The battery, memory, 

CPU and bandwidth of such devices have been compromised, and as a result the 

functioning of such devices has been impaired and slowed. Third, they have incurred 

additional data usage and electricity costs that they would not otherwise have incurred. 

Fourth, they have suffered harm as a result of the invasion of privacy stemming from 

Defendants’ covert theft of their private and personally-identifiable data and content – 

including their User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and information, and Private 

Videos and Private Video Images. 

232. Defendants, as a result of their misrepresentations, have been able to reap 

135 https://www.law360.com/articles/1220783/no-more-data-storage-in-china-gop-senator-s-billsays. 

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unjust profits and revenues. This includes Defendants’ profits and revenues from their 

targeted-advertising, improvements to their artificial intelligence technologies, their patent 

applications, and the increased consumer demand for and use of Defendants’ other 

products. The Plaintiffs and the Class seek restitution and disgorgement of these unjust 

profits and revenues. 

233. Unless restrained and enjoined, Defendants will continue to misrepresent 

their private and personally-identifiable data and content collection and use practices, and 

will not recall and destroy Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s wrongfully collected private and 

personally-identifiable data and content. Accordingly, injunctive relief is appropriate. 

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

Negligence 

(On Behalf of the Plaintiffs and the Class) 

234. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if 

fully set forth herein. 

235. The Plaintiffs and the Class entrusted Defendants with their private and 

personally-identifiable data and content – including the User/Device Identifiers, the 

biometric identifiers and information, and the Private Videos and Private Video Images 

never intended for public consumption. Defendants had a duty to handle that data and 

content with care due its sensitivity, and the expectation that such data and content would 

not be shared with third parties. This duty included Defendants’ assurances that thirdparties would not improperly collect or obtain such data and content, and Defendants’ 

public statements, made in response to direct inquiries about the ability of China-based 

entities to access U.S. TikTok user data, that the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and 

personally-identifiable data was not in fact subject to such access. 

236. The Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s willingness to entrust Defendants with their 

private and personally-identifiable data and content was predicated on the understanding 

that Defendants would take appropriate measures to protect it. Defendants had a special 

relationship with the Plaintiffs and the Class as a result of being entrusted with their 

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private and personally-identifiable data and content, which provided an independent duty 

of care. 

237. Defendants knew that the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personallyidentifiable data and content had value, and Defendants have earned substantial revenues 

and profits as a result of collecting and using such private and personally-identifiable data 

and content. This includes Defendants’ profits and revenues from their targetedadvertising, improvements to their artificial intelligence technologies, their patent 

applications, and the increased consumer demand for and use of Defendants’ other 

products. 

238. Defendants failed to use reasonable care to safeguard the Plaintiffs’ and the 

Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content, giving third parties access to it 

without taking precautions to protect the Plaintiffs and the Class. Indeed, Defendants took 

no precautions at all, instead making the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personallyidentifiable data and content directly available to third parties in jurisdictions with 

inadequate privacy protections, and in jurisdictions with inadequate constraints on 

governmental use of private and personally-identifiable data and content. 

239. Defendants’ failure to use care in allowing access to the Plaintiffs’ and the 

Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content has caused foreseeable harm. 

Private and personally-identifiable data and content that can be used to track the physical 

movements and online activities of the Plaintiffs and the Class, and that is biometrically 

unique to each of the Plaintiffs and the members of the Class, has been transmitted to 

China-based companies, thereby exposing the Plaintiffs and the Class to a heightened, 

imminent risk of misuse, fraud, identity theft, Chinese government surveillance, and 

financial harm. 

240. The Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and 

content Defendants negligently allowed third parties to access allows such data and content 

to be aggregated with other data and content to identify, profile and target the Plaintiffs 

and the Class. As such, it is reasonable for the Plaintiffs and the Class to obtain identity 

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protection and credit monitoring services, and to recover the cost of these services from 

Defendants. 

241. The injury to the Plaintiffs and the Class was a proximate, reasonably 

foreseeable result of Defendants’ breaches of duty. 

242. Defendants’ conduct also constitutes gross negligence due to their extreme 

departure from ordinary standards of care, and their knowledge that they had failed to 

secure the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content. 

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

Restitution / Unjust Enrichment 

(On Behalf of the Plaintiffs and the Class) 

243. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if 

fully set forth herein. 

244. The Plaintiffs and the Class have conferred substantial benefits on 

Defendants by downloading and using the TikTok app. These include the Defendants’ 

collection and use of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data 

and content – including their User/Device Identifiers, biometric identifiers and 

information, and Private Videos and Private Video Images never intended for public 

consumption. Such benefits also include the revenues and profits resulting from 

Defendants’ collection and use of such data and content for Defendants’ targetedadvertising, improvements to their artificial intelligence technologies, their patent 

applications, and the increased consumer demand for and use of Defendants’ other 

products. 

245. Defendants have knowingly and willingly accepted and enjoyed these 

benefits. 

246. Defendants either knew or should have known that the benefits rendered by 

the Plaintiffs and the Class were given with the expectation that Defendants would not take 

and use the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s private and personally-identifiable data and content 

that Defendants have taken and used without permission. For Defendants to retain the 

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aforementioned benefits under these circumstances is inequitable. 

247. Through deliberate violation of the Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s privacy 

interests, and statutory and constitutional rights, Defendants each reaped benefits that 

resulted in each Defendant wrongfully receiving profits. 

248. Equity demands disgorgement of Defendants’ ill-gotten gains. Defendants 

will be unjustly enriched unless they are ordered to disgorge those profits for the benefit of 

the Plaintiffs and the Class. 

249. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct and unjust 

enrichment, the Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to restitution from Defendants and 

institution of a constructive trust disgorging all profits, benefits, and other compensation 

obtained by Defendants through this inequitable conduct. 

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 

Violation of Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq.

(On Behalf of the Illinois Plaintiffs and the Illinois Subclass) 

250. Plaintiffs repeat and incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs as if 

fully set forth herein. 

251. BIPA makes it unlawful for any private entity to, among other things, 

“collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a 

customer’s biometric identifiers or biometric information, unless it first: (1) informs the 

subject . . . in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected 

or stored; (2) informs the subject . . . in writing of the specific purpose and length of term 

for which a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and 

used; and (3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier 

or biometric information or the subject’s legally authorized representative.” 740 ILCS 

14/15(b). 

252. Plaintiff Meghan Smith is, and at all relevant times was, an adult and 

resident of Illinois, and thus is, and at all relevant times was, a “person” and/or a 

“customer” within the meaning of BIPA. 740 ILCS 14/15(b). Plaintiff C.W. and Plaintiff 

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I.W. are, and at all relevant times were, minors and residents of Illinois, and thus are, and 

at all relevant times were, “persons” and/or “customers” as well. Id. Plaintiff C.W.’s and 

Plaintiff I.W.’s mother and legal guardian, Mikhaila Woodall, is Plaintiff C.W.’s and 

Plaintiff I.W.’s “legally authorized representative” within the meaning of BIPA, and 

served in such capacity at all times relevant to this action. Id. Plaintiff R.P. is, and at all 

relevant times was, a minor and resident of Illinois, and thus is, and at all relevant times 

was, a “person” and/or “customer” as well. Id. Plaintiff R.P.’s mother and legal guardian, 

Lynn Pavalon, is Plaintiff R.P.’s “legally authorized representative” within the meaning of 

BIPA, and served in such capacity at all times relevant to this action. Id.

253. Each Defendant is, and at all relevant times was, a “corporation, limited 

liability company, association, or other group, however organized,” and thus is, and at all 

relevant times was, a “private entity” under the BIPA. 740 ILCS 14/10. 

254. The Illinois Plaintiffs and the Illinois Subclass had their “biometric 

identifiers,” including their face geometry scans and voiceprints, as well as their 

“biometric information” collected, captured, received, or otherwise obtained by 

Defendants as a result of the Illinois Plaintiffs’ and the Illinois Subclass’s use of the 

TikTok app. 740 ILCS 14/10. 

255. At all relevant times, Defendants systematically and surreptitiously collected, 

captured, received or otherwise obtained the Illinois Plaintiffs’ and the Illinois Subclass’s 

“biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” without first obtaining signed written 

releases, as required by 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(3), from any of them or their “legally 

authorized representatives.” 

256. In fact, Defendants failed to properly inform the Illinois Plaintiffs and the 

Illinois Subclass, or any of their parents, legal guardians, or other “legally authorized 

representatives,” in writing (or in any other way) that the Illinois Plaintiffs’ and the Illinois 

Subclass’s “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” were being “collected or 

stored” by Defendants. Nor did Defendants inform the Illinois Plaintiffs and the Illinois 

Subclass, or any of their parents, legal guardians, or other “legally authorized 

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representatives,” in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which the Illinois 

Plaintiffs’ and the Illinois Subclass’s “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” 

were being “collected, stored and used” as required by 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(1)-(2). 

257. BIPA also makes it unlawful for a private entity “in possession of a 

biometric identifier or biometric information” to “sell, lease, trade, or otherwise profit 

from a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric information.” 740 ILCS 

14/15(c). 

258. Defendants are, and at all relevant times were, “in possession of” the Illinois 

Plaintiffs’ and the Illinois Subclass’s “biometric identifiers,” including but not limited to 

their face geometry scans and voiceprints, and “biometric information.” Defendants 

profited from such “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” by using them for 

targeted advertising, improvements to Defendants’ artificial intelligence technologies, 

Defendants’ patent applications, and the generation of increased demand for and use of 

Defendants’ other products. 740 ILCS 14/15(c). 

259. Finally, BIPA prohibits private entities “in possession of a biometric 

identifier or biometric information” from “disclos[ing], redisclos[ing], or otherwise 

disseminat[ing] a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric information 

unless” any one of four enumerated conditions are met. 740 ILCS 14/15(d)(1)-(4). None of 

such conditions are met here. 

260. Defendants disclose, redisclose and disseminate, and at all relevant times 

disclosed, redisclosed and disseminated, the Illinois Plaintiffs’ and the Illinois Subclass’s 

“biometric identifiers,” including but not limited to their face geometry scans and 

voiceprints, and “biometric information” without the consent of any of them or their 

“legally authorized representatives.” 740 ILCS 14/15(d)(1). Moreover, the disclosures and 

redisclosures did not “complete[] a financial transaction requested or authorized by” the 

Illinois Plaintiffs, the Illinois Subclass or any of their legally authorized representatives. 

740 ILCS 14/15(d)(2). Nor are, or at any relevant times were, the disclosures and 

redisclosures “required by State or federal law or municipal ordinance.” 740 ILCS 

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14/15(d)(3). Finally, at no point in time were the disclosures ever “required pursuant to a 

valid warrant or subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.” 740 ILCS 

14/15(d)(4). 

261. BIPA mandates that a private entity “in possession of biometric identifiers or 

biometric information” “develop a written policy, made available to the public, 

establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric 

identifiers and biometric information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining 

such identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years of the individual’s last 

interaction with the private entity, whichever occurs first.” 740 ILCS 14/15(a). 

262. But Defendants do not publicly provide any written policy establishing any 

retention schedule or guidelines for permanently destroying the Illinois Plaintiffs’ and the 

Illinois Subclass’s “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information.” 740 ILCS 14/15(a). 

263. BIPA also commands private entities “in possession of a biometric identifier 

or biometric information” to: (1) store, transmit, and protect from disclosure all biometric 

identifiers and biometric information using the reasonable standard of care within the 

private entity’s industry; and (2) store, transmit, and protect from disclosure all biometric 

identifiers and biometric information in a manner that is the same as or more protective 

than the manner in which the private entity stores, transmits and protects other confidential 

and sensitive information. 740 ILCS 14/15(e). Based on the facts alleged herein, including 

Defendants’ lack of a public written policy, their failure to inform TikTok users that 

Defendants obtain such users’ “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information,” their 

failure to obtain written consent to collect or otherwise obtain TikTok users’ “biometric 

identifiers” and “biometric information,” and their unauthorized dissemination of TikTok 

users’ “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information,” Defendants have violated this 

provision too. 

264. Defendants recklessly or intentionally violated each of BIPA’s requirements 

and infringed the Illinois Plaintiffs’ and the Illinois Subclass’s rights to keep their 

immutable and uniquely identifying biometric identifiers and biometric information 

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private. As individuals subjected to each of Defendants’ BIPA violations above, the 

Illinois Plaintiffs and the Illinois Subclass are and have been aggrieved. 740 ILCS 14/20. 

265. On behalf of themselves and the Illinois Subclass, the Illinois Plaintiffs seek: 

(1) injunctive and equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of the Illinois 

Plaintiffs and the Illinois Subclass by requiring Defendants to comply with BIPA’s 

requirements; (2) $1,000.00 or actual damages, whichever is greater, for each negligent 

violation of BIPA by Defendants; (3) $5,000.00 or actual damages, whichever is greater, 

for each intentional or reckless violation of BIPA by Defendants; and (4) reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs, including expert witness fees and other litigation expenses. 740 

ILCS 14/20(1)-(4). 

XII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests relief against Defendants as set forth 

below: 

(a) entry of an order certifying the proposed Class and Subclasses pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; 

(b) entry of an order appointing Plaintiffs as representatives of the Class and 

Subclasses; 

(c) entry of an order appointing Plaintiffs’ counsel as co-lead counsel for the Class 

and Subclasses; 

(d) entry of an order for injunctive and declaratory relief as described herein, 

including but not limited to: 

 (i) enjoining Defendants, their affiliates, associates, officers, employees 

and agents from transmitting TikTok user data and content to China, to other locations or 

facilities where such TikTok user data and content is accessible from within China, and/or 

to anyone outside the defendant companies; 

 (ii) enjoining Defendants, their affiliates, associates, officers, employees 

and agents from taking TikTok users’ private draft videos (including any frames, digital 

images or other content from such videos) and biometric identifiers and information 

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without advanced notice to, and the prior written consent of, such TikTok users or their 

legally authorized representatives (and, for the Illinois Subclass, without being in 

compliance with BIPA); 

 (iii) enjoining Defendants, their affiliates, associates, officers, employees 

and agents from taking physical/digital location tracking data, device ID data, personallyidentifiable data and any other TikTok user data and content except that for which 

appropriate notice and consent is provided and which Defendants can show to be 

reasonably necessary for the lawful operation of the TikTok app within the United States; 

 (iv) mandating that Defendants, their affiliates, associates, officers, 

employees and agents recall and destroy the TikTok user data and content already taken in 

violation of law; 

 (v) mandating that Defendants, their affiliates, associates, officers, 

employees and agents remove from the TikTok app all SDKs based in China or whose data 

is otherwise accessible from within China; 

 (vi) mandating that Defendants, their affiliates, associates, officers, 

employees and agents implement protocols to ensure that no TikTok user data and content 

is transmitted to, or otherwise accessible from within, China; 

 (vii) mandating that Defendants, their affiliates, associates, officers, 

employees and agents hire third-party monitors for a period of at least three years to ensure 

that all of the above steps have been taken; and 

 (viii) mandating that Defendants, their affiliates, associates, officers, 

employees and agents provide written verifications on a quarterly basis to the court and 

counsel for the Plaintiffs in the form of a declaration under oath that the above steps have 

been satisfied. 

(e) entry of judgment in favor of each Class and Subclass member for damages 

suffered as a result of the conduct alleged herein, punitive damages, restitution, and 

disgorgement, to include interest and prejudgment interest; 

(f) award Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and 

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(g) grant such other and further legal and equitable relief as the court deems just and 

equitable. 

XIII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL. 

Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all issues so triable. 

DATED: May 11, 2020 Ekwan E. Rhow - State Bar No. 174604 

Dorothy Wolpert - State Bar No. 73213 

Thomas R. Freeman - State Bar No. 135392 

Marc E. Masters - State Bar No. 208375 

BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, 

NESSIM, DROOKS, LINCENBERG & 

RHOW, P.C. 

1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor 

Los Angeles, California 90067-2561 

Telephone: (310) 201-2100 

Facsimile: (310) 201-2110 

By: /s/ Marc E. Masters 

 Marc E. Masters 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Misty Hong, minor 

A.S., through her mother and legal guardian 

Laurel Slothower, and minor A.R., through her 

mother and legal guardian Gilda Avila 

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FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT CASE NO. 5:19-cv-07792-LHK 

DATED: May 11, 2020 Marc L. Godino – State Bar No. 182689 

Jonathan M. Rotter – State Bar No. 234137 

Pavithra Rajesh – State Bar No. 323055 

GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP 

1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100 

Los Angeles, California 90067-2561 

Telephone: (310) 201-9150 

Email: info@glancylaw.com 

By: /s/ Jonathan M. Rotter 

 Jonathan M. Rotter 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs Misty Hong, minor 

A.S., through her mother and legal guardian 

Laurel Slothower, and minor A.R., through her 

mother and legal guardian Gilda Avila 

DATED: May 11, 2020 David M. Given – State Bar No. 142375 

Nicholas A. Carlin – State Bar No. 112532 

Brian S. Conlon – State Bar No. 303456 

PHILLIPS, ERLEWINE, GIVEN & CARLIN LLP 

39 Mesa Street, Suite 201 

The Presidio 

San Francisco, CA 94129 

Telephone: (415) 398-0900 

Email: dmg@phillaw.com 

By: /s/ David M. Given 

 David M. Given 

Attorneys for Meghan Smith, minors C.W. and 

I.W., through their mother and legal guardian 

Mikhaila Woodall, and minor R.P., through 

her mother and legal guardian Lynn Pavalon 

ATTESTATION 

I, Jonathan M. Rotter, am the ECF user whose identification and password are being 

used to file this document. In compliance with Local Rule 5-1(i)(3), I hereby attest that 

each of the Signatories herein, concur in this filing. 

DATED: May 11, 2020 s/ Jonathan M. Rotter 

 Jonathan M. Rotter 

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PROOF OF SERVICE BY ELECTRONIC POSTING 

 I, the undersigned say: 

 I am not a party to the above case and am over eighteen years old. On May 11, 

2020, I served true and correct copies of the foregoing document, by posting the document 

electronically to the ECF website of the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of California, for receipt electronically by the parties listed on the Court’s Service 

List. 

 I affirm under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America 

that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on May 11, 2020, at Los Angeles, 

California. 

 s/ Jonathan M. Rotter 

 Jonathan M. Rotter 

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