alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 482 Engrossed in House (EH)]

                 In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

                                                         June 23, 1998.
    Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker 
may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 4101) making appropriations for Agriculture, Rural Development, Food 
and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies programs for the fiscal year 
ending September 30, 1999, and for other purposes. The first reading of the bill 
shall be dispensed with. Points of order against consideration of the bill for 
failure to comply with clause 2(l)(6) of rule XI or clause 7 of rule XXI are 
waived. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one 
hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member 
of the Committee on Appropriations. After general debate the bill shall be 
considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. The amendment printed in 
the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution shall be 
considered as adopted in the House and in the Committee of the Whole. Points of 
order against provisions in the bill, as amended, for failure to comply with 
clause 2 or 6 of rule XXI are waived. During consideration of the bill for 
further amendment, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may accord 
priority in recognition on the basis of whether the Member offering an amendment 
has caused it to be printed in the portion of the Congressional Record 
designated for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII. Amendments so printed 
shall be considered as read. The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may: (1) 
postpone until a time during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole 
a request for a recorded vote on any amendment; and (2) reduce to five minutes 
the minimum time for electronic voting on any postponed question that follows 
another electronic vote without intervening business, provided that the minimum 
time for electronic voting on the first in any series of questions shall be 15 
minutes. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the 
Committee shall rise and report the bill, as amended, to the House with such 
amendments as may have been adopted. The previous question shall be considered 
as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without 
intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-40386

Summary Calendar

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KIM IVAN MORILLA,

 Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:94-CR-128-1

- - - - - - - - - -

January 22, 1996

Before WIENER, PARKER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Kim Ivan Morilla entered a conditional guilty plea to one

count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana. 

Pursuant to his plea agreement, he now appeals the district

court's denial of his motion to suppress. Morilla admits that

the initial stop of his camper truck was valid. He contends that

the subsequent detention and search of his vehicle violated his

Fourth Amendment rights.
No. 95-40386

-2-

We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion

and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the

district court's denial of Morilla's motion to suppress. 

Morilla's conviction is AFFIRMED.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Appellate case name: Urelift Gulf Coast, L.P. v. Travis Bennett

Appellate case number: 01-14-00534-CV

Trial court case number: 2014-01204

Trial court: 295th District Court of Harris County

On July 17, 2014, appellees Travis Bennett and Stabilicore, LLC filed a motion to 

dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. The motion is DENIED.

Following review of the response to appellees’ motion filed by Urelift on July 28, 2014, 

we agree that the order constitutes a final, appealable judgment. Although the order does not 

specifically address the counterclaims appellees made in their First Amended Original Answer 

and Counterclaims, the “declaratory judgment” claim operated as an affirmative defense to the 

petition filed by Urelift because declaratory judgment is not available to settle disputes already 

pending before a court. See Houston Aeronautical Heritage Society v. Graves, No. 01-12-

00443-CV, 2013 WL 6506301, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 10, 2013, no pet.). 

The issue of whether a valid and enforceable confidentiality agreement existed between the 

parties was already pending in the trial court, and therefore the declaratory judgment 

counterclaim on that issue could not stand.

Further, the original order, drafted by attorneys for Bennett and Stabilicore, contained 

language granting them attorney fees. Judge Baker affirmatively struck that paragraph from the 

order, thus denying the counterclaim for attorney fees.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: ___/s/ Harvey Brown

X Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: August 19, 2014
**Exhibit 99.1**

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by section 906 has been provided to ESG Re Limitedand will be retained by ESG Re Limited and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of ESG Re Limited (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the periodended September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Alasdair P. Davis, ChiefExecutive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:

 

(1)           The Report fullycomplies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act 1934; and

 

(2)                                  Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ Alasdair  P. Davis   |   |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Alasdair P.  Davis       |
| Chief  Executive Officer |
| March 31,  2003          |

 

----
Exhibit 99.2









Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

To the Management of Protective Life Insurance Company and The Bank of New York, as Indenture Trustee of Protective
Life Secured Trust 2004-25, (collectively the "Management")
and Wilmington Trust Company, as Trustee of Protective Life Secured Trust 2004-25 (the "Trust"):

We have examined Management's assertion, included in the accompanying "Management Assertion Regarding the Collection and Distribution of Trust Money by The Bank of New York (Indenture Trustee)," that the collection of payments on the funding agreements and distribution of payments to the noteholders has occurred as required by Section 5.02 of the Indenture agreement dated November 7, 2003 between the Trust and the Indenture Trustee during the year ended December 31, 2004.  Management is responsible for the assertion.  Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the assertion based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting management's assertion and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.  We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.

In our opinion, Management's assertion referred to above is fairly stated, in all material respects, based on the criteria defined in the accompanying "Management Assertion Regarding the Collection and Distribution of Trust Money by The Bank of New York (Indenture Trustee)."



PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Birmingham, AlabamaMarch 30, 2005











Management Assertion Regarding the Collection and Distribution of Trust
Money by The Bank of New York (Indenture Trustee)





Management of the Trust asserts that it has collected payments on the funding agreements and distributed payments to the noteholders as required by Section 5.02 of the Indenture agreement dated November 7, 2003 between the Trust and the Indenture Trustee for the year ended December 31, 2004.  This assertion is based on the following criteria:

1. The payments made by Protective Life on the funding agreements that secured the Notes, for the year ended December 31, 2004, are included in Protective Life's Secured Trusts P & I Payments: 1/1/04 through 12/31/04 (P & I Payments report).
2. The payments made by Protective Life on the funding agreements that secured the Notes, for the year ended December 31, 2004, are included in the Indenture Trustee's History of Transactions List.
3. The amounts due on the Notes are reported as a component of the charges from Cede & Co., the nominee of the Depository Trust Company, on the Indenture Trustee's Payment Obligation Report System (PORS Report).
4. Charges from Cede & Co. are included in the Indenture Trustee's screen prints titled The Depository Trust Company Activity History Details, which represent the charge confirmations to Cede & Co., the nominee of the Depository Trust Company.
Exhibit 32

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Village Bank and Trust Financial Corp. (the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2007, the undersigned Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that based on their knowledge and belief: (1) the Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and (2) the information contained in the Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2007 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods presented.

 

 

 

| /s/ Thomas W. Winfree   |   | March 25, 2008 |
|-------------------------|--------|----------------|
| Thomas W. Winfree       |   | Date           |
| Chief Executive Officer |   |           |

 

 

 

 

| /s/ C. Harril Whitehurst, Jr. |   | March 25, 2008 |
|-------------------------------|--------|----------------|
| C. Harril Whitehurst, Jr.     |   | Date           |
| Chief Financial Officer       |   |           |
9780.

#### Wisenbaker, *et al. v.*Arnett.

Decided November 12, 1918.

Complaint; from city court of Valdosta-—Judge Cranford. April 12, 1918.

*O. M. Smith,*for plaintiffs. *F. S. Harrell,*for defendant.

Luke, J.

1. Where a judge gives in charge to the jury the general prin-

ciples of law applicable to an issue in the case, a party who desires more specific and concrete instructions as to his contentions should make a request therefor in writing; and where the court has correctly instructed the jury as to the law applicable to the issues involved in the ease, failure to affirmatively, state the contentions of the parties as shown by the pléadings is not cause for a new trial. See *Charleston & Western Carolina Ry. Co.*v. *Duckworth,*7 *Ga. App. 350*(2) (66 S. E. 1018); *Wrightsville & Tennille R. Co.*v. *Gornto,*129 *Ga.*204 (2, 3) (58 S. E. 769).

2. The court did not err upon the question of the admissibility of the evidence as complained of in the motion for a new trial. See *Lawson*v. *Prosser,*146 *Ga.*421 (91 S. E. 469).

3. The charge of the court, when considered' as a whole, was full and fair; the evidence authorized the verdict, which the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion, approved. All assignments of error have been carefully examined, and for no reason assigned did the court err in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Wade, C. J., and Jenlcins, J:, concur.*
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

MERCIS B.V., 

Plaintiff,

v.

THE PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED 

ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE “A”,

Defendants.

Case No.: 1:20-cv-04293

Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), Plaintiff hereby files this Notice of Voluntary 

Dismissal, without prejudice, as to the following Defendant(s) identified on Schedule A of the 

Complaint:

NO. DEFENDANT

266 Mqfun Blocks Store

158 0_hk170

DATED: October 22, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Keith A. Vogt

Keith A. Vogt (Bar No. 6207971)

Keith Vogt, Ltd.

111 West Jackson Boulevard, Suite 1700

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Telephone: 312-675-6079

E-mail: keith@vogtip.com

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

Case: 1:20-cv-04293 Document #: 34 Filed: 10/23/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:9029
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 

document was electronically filed on October 22, 2020 with the Clerk of the Court using the 

CM/ECF system, which will automatically send an email notification of such filing to all registered 

attorneys of record.

/s/ Keith A. Vogt

Keith A. Vogt

Case: 1:20-cv-04293 Document #: 34 Filed: 10/23/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:9030
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 21
- 0586 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. JACOB CHRISTIAN PALMER ,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including October 26, 2022, within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

September 19 2022

09/19/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0586
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shannon TAYLOR, also known as Shandoe, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-30006.

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Decided Dec. 28, 2004.

Cristina Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Patricia A. Gilley, Gilley & Gilley, Shreveport, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JONES, BARKSDALE and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Shannon Taylor appeals the sentence imposed on remand following his guilty-plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base. He argues that the district court used information protected by an immunity agreement to calculate his sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines in violation *362of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8. In view of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on remand, Taylor has not shown that the district court erred in finding that the Government established the evidence used to calculate Taylor’s offense level was obtained from legitimate independent sources — his codefendants, Dale Anderson and Marcus Wemberly. *See United States v. Cantu,*185 F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir.1999).

Taylor also argues that his sentence should be vacated in view of *Blakely v. Washington,*— U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). Taylor acknowledges that the issue is foreclosed by *United States v. Pineiro,*377 F.3d 464, 473 (5th Cir.2004), *petition for cert. filed,*(U.S. July 14, 2004) (No. 04-5263), but states that he is raising it to preserve it for further review.** “[0]nly those discrete, particular issues identified by the appeals court for remand are properly before the resentencing court.” *United States v. Marmolejo,*139 F.3d 528, 530 (5th Cir.1998) *(“Marmolejo II’).*In Taylor’s first appeal, this court vacated his sentence because Taylor’s plea agreement contained a use immunity agreement and remanded for an evidentiary hearing concerning whether the Government obtained the information in the Presentence Report concerning the drug quantity attributable to Taylor from an independent source. *Taylor,*277 F.3d at 725-27. Therefore, this was the only issue before the district court on remand. Because Taylor could not have challenged the sentencing enhancements in the district court on remand, he may not raise this issue on appeal after remand. *See Marmolejo II,*139 F.3d at 530. Therefore, we will not address Taylor’s argument that the district court erred in calculating his sentence under the Guidelines in view of *Blakely.*

AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.

**

 In *Pineiro,*this court held that *Blakely*does not apply to the federal Sentencing Guidelines. *Id.*
#### Michael CULLEN, an individual and on behalf of the General Public, Plaintiff—Appellant, v. BANK ONE CORPORATION, an entity of unknown form; et al., Defendants—Appellees.

No. 03-55347. D.C. No. CV-02-00760-RMB/CGA.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 10, 2004.

Decided Dec. 27, 2004.

Deborah L. Raymond, Law Office of Deborah L. Raymond, Solana Beach, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

*619George G. Weickhardt, Ropers Majeski Kohn & Bentley, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before B. FLETCHER, NOONAN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM

Michael Cullen appeals the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of his Truth-in-Lending-Act (TILA) claim against Bank One. Cullen alleges that the action violated the automatic stay of bankruptcy and that the bankruptcy filing deprived the district court of jurisdiction pursuant to local rules. Holding that Cullen lacked standing, we affirm the dismissal.

In the days before the district court was to rule on his amended complaint, Cullen filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. Upon the filing of his bankruptcy petition, Cullen’s pending lawsuit became estate property as a potential asset. *Dunmore v. U.S. (In re Dunmore),*358 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir.2004). The debtor therefore lacked standing to continue as plaintiff. *Turner v. Cook,*362 F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 2004).

Holding that Cullen lacked standing to appeal the district court’s ruling to this court, we dismiss the appeal.

DISMISSED.
Form of Supplemental Retirement Plan Tax Gross-Up Letter Agreement



 Exhibit 10.8 
  
 [FREESCALE LETTERHEAD] 
  
  
  
  
                         , 2004

  
 [Name] 
                                       
       
                                       
       
                                       
       
  
  
 Dear [Name]: 
  
 As you
know, the Board of Directors of Motorola, Inc. (“Motorola”) has awarded you $             to compensate you for the loss of your unvested benefits under the Motorola Elected
Officer Supplemental Retirement Plan (the “Plan”) and to further motivate you to make Freescale a success. Fifty percent of the award will be paid to you on the two-year anniversary of the date Motorola distributes its remaining interest
in Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. (“Freescale”) to Motorola’s common stockholders (the “Distribution Date”) and the other 50% on the three-year anniversary of the Distribution Date. These payments are conditioned on your
remaining an employee of Freescale or any successor thereof on the date of payment. However, you will be entitled to a lump sum payment of any unpaid portion of the award if your employment with Freescale or any successor is terminated by your death
or disability or by Freescale or its successor without cause. 
  
 The Board of Directors of
Freescale has approved the reimbursement of any tax cost you incur as a result of the receipt of these payments from Motorola on a grossed-up basis. For purposes of determining the amount of the gross-up payment, you will be deemed to pay federal
income taxes at the highest marginal rate of federal income taxation in the calendar year in which the gross-up payment is to be made and state and local income taxes at the highest marginal rate of taxation in the state and locality in which you
are resident at that time, net of the maximum reduction in federal income taxes which could be obtained from the deduction of such state and local taxes. 
  
 You hereby agree to notify Freescale of the amount of any payment received from Motorola in payment of the award and the date of such payment. 
  
 Please affix your signature to the enclosed copy of this letter agreement and return it to me at your
earliest convenience. 
  
 Sincerely, 
  
  
  
  
 FREESCALE SEMICONDUCTOR, INC. 
  
  
  
 ACCEPTED: 
  
  
                                       
                       
  
 Date:
9982, 9983.

#### Patterson *et al. v.*Bank of Alapaha; and *vice versa.*

Luke, J.

1. This suit being upon a written contract which was in part unconditional and in part conditional, the court did not err in sustaining a special demurrer to that portion of the defendant’s plea which was directed solely to the unconditional part of the contract, as the plea was not under oath. See Civil Code (1910), § 5660; *Monk*v. *National Bank of Tifton,*12 *Ga. App.*253 (76 S. E. 278) ; *Turner*v. *Bank of Mayfield,*13 *Ga. App.*547 (79 S. E. 180) ; *O’Kelley*v. *Welch,*18 *Ga. App.*157 (89 S. E. 76); *Trippe*v. Sheppard, 21 *Ga. App.*279 (2) (94 S. E. 328).

*623Decided April 19, 1919.

Complaint; from city court of Thomasville—Judge W. H. Hammond. June 17, 1918.

*Titus, Dekle & Hopkins,*for Patterson *et at.*

*Merrill &*Grantham, contra.

2. As to the conditional portion of the contract, the court properly held that in so far as it denied the service of notice for the collection of attorney’s fees, verification was unnecessary; and on the trial of this issue the court (by written consent sitting as a trior of both law and fact) did not err in rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff, for principal, interest, and attorney’s fees separately, there being ample proof submitted by the plaintiff to warrant such a judgment, and no evidénce being introduced by the defendants. *Ford*v. *Wright,*9 *Ga. App.*177 (70 S. E. 965) ; *Monk*v. *National Bank of Tifton,*supra.

3. The other questions presented for review are controlled by the following “ruling made in this case by the Supreme Court, to which court the ease was sent on the idea that it raised a constitutional question: “Upon inspection'of the record in this ease it appears that this constitutional question, which if properly presented would be within the jurisdiction of this court for determination, is raised for the first time in the bill of exceptions, and that it was not raised in and passed upon by the lower court. *No*valid assignment of error is therefore made so as to make this question the subject of review. No other question is made in the record which would bring the case within the jurisdiction of this court. It is therefore ordered' that the ease be transmitted to the Court of Appeals.” 148 *Ga.*356 (96 S. E. 863).

*Judgment affirmed on the the main hill of exceptions; cross-hill dismissed.*

*Wade, C. J., and Jenkins, J., concur.*