IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

 

FARIDA K., ) 

 ) No. 20 C 4492 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman 

 v. ) 

 ) 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting ) 

Commissioner of Social Security, ) 

 ) 

Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Farida K. appeals the Acting Commissioner’s decision denying her application for Social 

Security benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the Acting Commissioner’s 

decision. 

Background

On March 22, 2017, plaintiff filed an application for benefits, which was denied initially, 

on reconsideration, and after a hearing. (R. 24-43, 112, 122.) The Appeals Council declined 

review (R. 1-3), leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Acting Commissioner

reviewable by this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-

62 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Discussion

The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially, affirming if it is supported by 

“substantial evidence in the record,” i.e., “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” White v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1992) 

(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “Although this standard is generous, 

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it is not entirely uncritical,” and the case must be remanded if the “decision lacks evidentiary 

support.” Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The regulations 

prescribe a five-part sequential test for determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a). The Acting Commissioner must consider whether: (1) the claimant has performed 

any substantial gainful activity during the period for which she claims disability; (2) the claimant 

has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant’s impairment meets or 

equals any listed impairment; (4) the claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform 

her past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is able to perform any other work existing in significant 

numbers in the national economy. Id.; Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001). The 

claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2); 

Zurawski, 245 F.3d at 886. If that burden is met, at step five, the burden shifts to the Acting 

Commissioner to establish that the claimant is capable of performing work existing in significant 

numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2).

At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

from the alleged disability onset date, December 31, 2011, through her date last insured (“DLI”), 

June 30, 2015. (R. 26.) At step two, the ALJ determined that, through the DLI, plaintiff had the 

severe impairments of anemia, vestibular system disorder (vertigo), obesity, major depressive 

disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. (R. 27.) At step three, the ALJ found that, through the 

DLI, plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 

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equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Id.) At step four, the ALJ found that, 

through the DLI, plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work but had the RFC to perform 

light work with certain exceptions. (R. 30-41.) At step five, the ALJ found that, through the DLI, 

jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could have performed,

and thus she was not disabled. (R. 41-43.) 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of consulting expert, Dr. 

Samardzija. (See R. 39.) Dr. Samardzija opined that plaintiff’s ability to relate to other,

understand, remember, and follow simple directions, maintain attention required to perform 

simple, repetitive tasks, sustain concentration, persistence, and pace, and withstand the stress and 

pressures associated with day-to-day work activity was “[v]ery [p]oor.” (R. 1535.) The doctor 

further said that plaintiff had a marked limitation in her ability to understand, remember, and carry 

out simple instructions and make simple work-related decisions and an extreme limitation in her 

ability to understand, remember, and carry out complex instructions, make complex work-related 

decisions, and interact with others. (R. 1542-43.) Dr. Samardzija based these opinions on the 

results of a memory test she administered, which showed that plaintiff’s memory was “grossly 

impaired” and suggested she may have delusional thoughts. (R. 1542.) Dr. Samardzija said these 

limitations had “[p]ossibly” been present since 2010, when plaintiff’s husband allegedly left her, 

though the doctor was unsure if that was the correct year. (R. 1543.) The ALJ gave “little weight” 

to the doctor’s opinions because they were rendered more than three years after plaintiff’s DLI, 

the doctor “speculated” as to the date the limitations began, and the only objective evidence on 

which the opinions were based, the results of a memory test, was deemed suspect by testifying 

expert, Dr. Monis. (R. 39.) 

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Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Samardzija’s opinions runs afoul of 

the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2012). The ALJ in 

Bjornson had considered post-DLI evidence in determining that plaintiff was not disabled. Id. at 

642. On appeal, the Commissioner argued that all post-DLI evidence was irrelevant, an argument 

the court said was “both . . . factually mistaken and violate[d] the Chenery rule, because the 

administrative law judge ruled that post-[DLI] medical data could be considered.” Id. (emphasis 

in original). Thus, Bjornson does not hold that an ALJ’s refusal to consider post-DLI evidence is 

a violation of Chenery, as plaintiff suggests. The Chenery rule is a doctrine related to 

administrative review principles in general, not a substantive principle of law related to Social 

Security review. Rather, the Bjornson court said the Commissioner’s argument in that case that 

post-DLI evidence was irrelevant violated Chenery because it was not an argument on which the 

ALJ had relied. Id.; see Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that “the 

Chenery doctrine . . . forbids an agency’s lawyers to defend the agency’s decision on grounds that 

the agency itself had not embraced”).

Alternatively, plaintiff argues that it was error for the ALJ to reject Dr. Samardzija’s 

opinions simply because they were rendered post-DLI. The Court would agree, if that were the

ALJ’s sole rationale for disregarding the doctor’s opinions. But it was not. Rather, the ALJ gave 

little weight to the opinions because Dr. Samardzija could not say how long plaintiff had suffered 

from the limitations she found. (R. 39; see R. 1543 (Dr. Samardzija stating that plaintiff’s 

limitations “possibly” started when her husband left her in 2010, but she was “not certain” if that 

was accurate).) Because an ALJ must consider post-DLI evidence only if it “shed[s] light on 

[plaintiff’s] impairments and disabilities” during the insured period, Million v. Astrue, 260 F. 

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App’x 918, 921-22 (7th Cir. 2008), and Dr. Samardzija’s opinions do not, the ALJ’s rejection of 

them was not error.1 

Next, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ should not have given more weight to the opinions of

testifying expert Dr. Monis, than to those of Dr. Samardzija, who had examined plaintiff. Among 

other things, Dr. Monis said that plaintiff’s scores on the Wechsler Memory Scale, which Dr. 

Samardzija had administered, were unreliable because they suggested plaintiff had dementia or a 

severe brain injury that rendered her unable to converse or function. (R. 96-97.) The ALJ credited 

this testimony because Dr. Monis reviewed the entire record, her testimony was “supported by the 

medical evidence,” and she is a “programmatic expert.” (R. 38.) The regulations that govern 

plaintiff’s application state that an ALJ will generally give more weight to the opinion of an 

examining medical source than to that of a non-examining source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). 

However, they also direct ALJs to evaluate all medical opinions in accordance with a number of 

factors, including how consistent the opinion is with the record as a whole, whether the opining 

source is a specialist, and how well the opining source understands the SSA’s disability programs 

and evidentiary requirements. Id. Because the ALJ considered the medical opinions in accordance 

with these factors, his decision to accord Dr. Monis’s opinions more weight than those of Dr. 

Samardzija is not a basis for remand.2 

Plaintiff also contests the ALJ’s subjective symptom analysis, which the Court will disturb 

only if it is “patently wrong.” Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019) (quotation 

omitted). The ALJ said “there is not sufficient objective support for the consistency, frequency, 

1 Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ rejected the opinions of Drs. Hsin and Sheynin only because they were rendered 

post-DLI. (ECF 19 at 12.) However, the ALJ’s decision shows that the timing of the opinions was only one of a 

number of factors the ALJ considered. (See R. 39-40.) 2 Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ should not have credited the opinions of testifying expert Dr. Todd over those 

of Dr. Samardzija. However, Dr. Todd testified that the records he reviewed did not enable him to determine whether

plaintiff’s physical symptoms were cause by psychological impairments. (R. 54-56.) Thus, his testimony is not in 

tension with Dr. Samardzija’s opinions. 

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or the symptom level that [plaintiff] alleges she had proximate to June 2015” because pre-DLI: 

(1) plaintiff had not received inpatient mental health treatment or psychiatric counseling; (2) 

plaintiff’s mental impairments had been treated with medication by her primary care provider; and 

(3) plaintiff generally responded to that treatment. (R. 29, 37.) Moreover, he said plaintiff 

complained of dizziness pre-DLI, but her complaints stopped in October 2014 and did not resume 

until after the DLI. (R. 34-35.) Similarly, the ALJ noted that plaintiff complained about weakness 

and fatigue pre-DLI, but she reported improvements in both after starting Wellbutrin in 2014. (Id.) 

Because the ALJ’s symptom analysis is not patently wrong, i.e., does not lack explanation or 

support, Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014), it is not a basis for remand.

Lastly, citing to O’Connor-Spinner v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 614, (7th Cir. 2010), plaintiff 

contends that the RFC does not adequately account for her limitations in concentration, 

persistence, or pace. (ECF 19 at 15.) In O’Connor, the Seventh Circuit said an ALJ’s use of

“terms like ‘simple, repetitive tasks’” in a hypothetical posed to a vocational expert (“VE”) “will 

not necessarily exclude from the VE’s consideration those positions that present significant 

problems of concentration, persistence and pace.” Id. at 620. Unlike the ALJ in O’Connor, the 

ALJ here asked the VE to identify jobs suitable for a person who, among other things, could not 

perform fast-paced tasks. (R. 99-100; see R. 38 (ALJ finding that “[t]here was also a moderate 

pace deficit due to mental fatigue, which functionally caused moderate limitation in ability to 

complete a workday without symptoms and perform at a consistent pace, therefore, she could not 

perform fast-paced tasks.”).) In short, the ALJ’s hypothetical adequately accounted for plaintiff’s 

persistence and pace limitations.

3

3 Plaintiff also argues that the RFC is flawed because it does not incorporate limitations to which Drs. Hsin and 

Samardzija opined. (ECF 19 at 15-16.) However, as discussed supra, the ALJ reasonably rejected these doctors’ 

opinions. Thus, his failure to include limitations from them in the RFC is not error. 

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Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court affirms the acting Commissioner’s decision, 

grants the acting Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [26], and terminates this case. 

SO ORDERED. ENTERED: August 16, 2022 

 

 

 

 M. David Weisman 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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