1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MISH INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 

INC., on behalf of itself and all others similarly 

situated,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

VEGA CAPITAL LONDON, LTD., et al., 

Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-04577

Judge: Hon. Manish S. Shah 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Mish 

International Monetary Inc. (“Plaintiff”) hereby moves for certification of the Class defined in ¶1 

below. Plaintiff is separately submitting a Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion for Class 

Certification (“Memo”), the expert report of Professor Craig Pirrong and the declaration of Bejamin 

M. Jaccarino, Esq. and exhibits thereto. 

In support of its motion for class certification, Plaintiff respectfully states as follows:

1. Plaintiff seeks to certify the following Class:

All persons and entities that sold a May 2020 light sweet crude oil (WTI) futures 

contract (“May contract”) traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange between 9:00

a.m. CST and 1:30 p.m. CST (inclusive) on April 20, 2020 (including by trade at 

settlement (“TAS”)), to liquidate a long position in the May contract. Excluded from 

the Class are Defendants, their officers, directors, management, employees, 

subsidiaries, or affiliates and federal governmental entities. 

2. The Class here is far more cohesive and homogenous than the many prior classes 

which have repeatedly been certified in actions (like this one) alleging manipulation of commodity 

futures contract prices in violation of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §1, et seq. (“CEA”) 

and the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 et seq. (“Sherman Act”). In re Term Commodities Cotton 

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Futures Litig., 12-cv-5126, 2022 WL 485005 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2022), petition for review denied, 22-472 

(2d Cir. 2022); Ploss v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (N.D. Ill. 2020), petition for review 

denied, No. 20-8001 (7th Cir. 2020); Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC, 244 F.R.D. 469 (N.D. Ill. 

2007), aff’d, 571 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2009); In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 269 F.R.D. 366 

(S.D.N.Y. 2010), petition for review denied, 10-4110-mv (2d Cir. 2010); In re Nat. Gas Commodities Litig., 

231 F.R.D. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), petition for review denied, (2d Cir. 2006); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 

182 F.R.D. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 194 F.R.D. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), petition 

for review denied, 262 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2001).

3. To certify the Class, Plaintiff must establish the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and 

the two requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) by a preponderance of the evidence. Messner v. Northshore 

Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir. 2012). Rule 23(a) requires numerosity, commonality, 

typicality, and adequacy of representation. Id. Rule 23(b)(3) requires common issues predominate 

over individual ones, and that a class action is superior to other available methods (if any) for the 

fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Id. Plaintiff must also demonstrate the Class is 

“ascertainable.” Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2015).

4. Ascertainable. A class is ascertainable when it is clearly defined, objectively based, 

and not premised on the merits. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 659-60, 72. The Class identifies a particular 

group (traders of one specific WTI crude oil futures contracts on one specific futures exchange), 

harmed during a particular time frame (between 9:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. on April 20), in a particular 

location (on the centralized New York Mercantile (“NYMEX”) futures exchange), in a particular 

way (trading in a market manipulated by Defendants1 and selling a May contract at artificially 

1 Defendants refers to Vega Capital London Ltd., Adrian Spires, and the Vega Trading Defendants 

(or “VTDs”), which include Paul Commins, George Commins, Christopher Roase, Elliott Pickering, 

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depressed prices caused by Defendants). Class membership is not defined by success on the merits. 

The Class is ascertainable. Memo at “IV.” 

5. Numerosity. Rule 23(a)(1) requires “the class is so numerous that joinder of all 

members is impracticable.” There are hundreds of geographically dispersed Class members. Memo 

at “V.A.” Joinder of, at a minimum, hundreds of Class members located around the world would 

be impracticable. Id. Numerosity is satisfied. 

6. Commonality. Rule 23(a)(2) requires there be “questions of law or fact common to 

the class.” “[A] single common question will do to fulfill Rule 23’s commonality requirement.” 

Prokhorov v. IIK Transp., Inc., 20-cv-6807, 2023 WL 2711599, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2023) (Shah, 

J.). Plaintiff and every Class member assert the same legal claims, against the same Defendants and 

such claims are based on Defendants’ same course of alleged misconduct. Thus, there are 

numerous common questions of law and fact, including (1) whether Defendants engaged in a 

conspiracy to manipulate the price of the May contract on April 20, 2020, and (2) whether 

Defendants’ conspiracy to manipulate artificially depressed the price of the May contract. 

 Commonality is satisfied. Id. at “V.B.” 

7. Typicality. Rule 23(a)(3) requires “the claims or defenses of the representative 

parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” “A plaintiff’s claim is typical if it arises 

from the same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class 

members and is based on the same legal theory.” Ploss, 431 F. Supp. 3d at 1011, citing Lacy v. Cook 

Aristos Demetriou, Connor Younger, James Biagioni, Henry Lunn, Paul Sutton, and Matthew Rhys 

Thompson.

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Cty., Illinois, 897 F.3d 847, 866 (7th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff and every Class member traded the same 

standardized May contract in the same centralized marketplace. Plaintiff and all Class members 

seek relief from the same Defendants pursuant to the same set of statutes and laws—the Sherman 

Act, CEA, and common law unjust enrichment. The claims of all Class members, including 

Plaintiff, arise from Defendants’ same exact common course of misconduct and are based on the 

same exact legal theory: Defendants conspired to manipulate downward the prices of the May 

contract on April 20 by abusing the Trade at Settlement (“TAS”) mechanism,

 Typicality is satisfied. 

Memo at “V.C.”

8. Adequacy. Rule 23(a)(4) requires “the representative parties will fairly and 

adequately protect the interests of the class.” “‘[A]dequacy of representation is composed of two 

parts: the adequacy of the named plaintiff’s counsel, and the adequacy of representation provided in 

protecting the different, separate, and distinct interest of the class members.’” Stampley v. Altom 

Transp., Inc., 14-cv-3747, 2015 WL 5675095, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2015) (Shah, J.) (quoting 

Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993). 

9. Plaintiff is Adequate. To be adequate “[a] named plaintiff must be a member of 

the putative class and have the same interest and injury as other members.” Beaton v. SpeedyPC 

Software, 907 F.3d 1018, 1027-28 (7th Cir. 2018). “The Seventh Circuit has made clear that the bar 

for a named plaintiff’s adequacy is not set high.” Stampley, 2015 WL 5675095, at *5. On April 20, 

Plaintiff sold ten (10) May contracts on the NYMEX to liquidate a long position in such contract 

and lost $92,490. Memo at “V.D.” Thus, Plaintiff is a Class member. Plaintiff and all Class 

members suffered the same exact injury due to Defendants’ alleged violations of the CEA and 

Sherman Act—i.e., each sold the May contract at an artificially low price and thus received less 

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money for such sale than they would have absent the artificially depressed price. Plaintiff and all 

Class members thus have the exact same interest in establishing Defendants conspired to 

manipulate and artificially depress the price of the May 2020 contract. Plaintiff is adequate. Id.

10. Counsel is Adequate. In determining the adequacy of counsel, a district court 

“must consider” the Rule 23(g)(1)(A) factors and “may consider any other matter pertinent to 

counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class.” Prokhorov v. IIK 

Transp., Inc., 20-cv-6807, 2023 WL 2711599, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2023) (Shah, J.). Each Rule 

23(g)(1)(A) factor supports appointing Lovell Stewart Halebian Jacobson LLP and Miller Law LLC 

(“Plaintiff’s Counsel) as counsel for the Class. Memo at “V.D.” Plaintiff’s Counsel has repeatedly 

been appointed by this Court and other courts in cases like this one alleging manipulation of 

commodity futures prices in violation of the Sherman Act and CEA. Id. Plaintiff’s Counsel are 

adequate.

11. Predominance. Rule 23(b)(3) requires “questions of law or fact common to class 

members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” When “one or more 

of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the 

action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will 

have to be tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative defenses peculiar to some 

individual class members.” Tyson Foods Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016). “In antitrust 

cases, Rule 23, when applied rigorously, will frequently lead to certification.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 

814. Similarly, “courts considering class certification for price manipulation claims under the CEA 

have also found common questions to predominate.” Kohen, 244 F.R.D. at 480 (collecting cases).

12. Based on the elements of Plaintiff’s Sherman Act, CEA, and unjust enrichment 

claims, there are at least two overarching, common questions that cause common questions to 

predominate: (1) whether Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to manipulate the price of the May 

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contract on April 20, 2020, and (2) whether Defendants’ conspiracy to manipulate artificially 

depressed May contract prices. Memo at “VI.A.” Common, class-wide evidence is available to

answer the foregoing common questions on behalf of the entire Class. Id. 

13. Superiority. Rule 23(b)(3) requires a class action be “superior to other available 

methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” First, each of the Rule 23(b)(3) 

“matters pertinent” to the superiority inquiry supports a finding of superiority. Memo at “VI.B.” 

Second, permitting Class members to pursue their claims in the aggregate is superior because it will 

promote judicial economy and uniformity of decision. Id. Third, a class action is superior because 

it would not be economic for many Class members to pursue individual actions because of 

“negative value claims,” i.e., the high cost of litigating the complex claims here would exceed a 

potential individual recovery. Id. 

WHEREFORE, the Court should certify the Class, appoint Plaintiff as Class 

representative, and appoint Plaintiff’s Counsel as counsel for the Class. 

Dated: February 19, 2024

 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Christopher McGrath

Christopher Lovell 

 Christopher M. McGrath

 LOVELL STEWART HALEBIAN 

JACOBSON LLP

500 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2440

New York, New York 10110

Telephone: (212) 608-1900

Marvin A. Miller

Andy Szot 

MILLER LAW LLC

115 S. LaSalle Street, Suite 2910

Chicago, Illinois 60603

Telephone: (312) 332-3400

Counsel for Plaintiff

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