alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 31.1I, JasonLiddell, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K, and all reports onForm 8-K containing distribution or servicing reports filed in respect ofperiods included in the year covered by this annual report, of Merrill LynchDepositor, Inc., on behalf of PPLUS Trust Series DCNA-1;     2. Based on my knowledge, the information in these reports, taken as awhole, does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to statea material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading as of thelast day of the period covered by this annual report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the distribution or servicing informationrequired to be provided to the depositor by the trustee under the pooling andservicing, or similar, agreement, for inclusion in these reports is included inthese reports;     4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed by thedepositor and the trustee under the pooling and servicing, or similar, agreementand based upon my knowledge and the annual compliance review required under thatagreement, and except as disclosed in the reports, the depositor and trusteehave each fulfilled its obligations under that agreement; and     5. The reports disclose all significant deficiencies relating to thecompliance by the depositor or trustee with the minimum servicing or similarstandards based upon the report provided by an independent public accountant,after conducting a review in compliance with the Uniform Single AttestationProgram for Mortgage Bankers or similar procedure, as set forth in the poolingor servicing, or similar, agreement, that is included in these reports.In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on informationprovided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: The Bank of New York andits officers and agents.        Date: March 26, 2007 /s/ Jason Liddell   Vice President
<Page>

                                                                  Exhibit 10.113

Paradise Valley Marketplace Shopping Center

                                   ASSIGNMENT

     This Assignment is made as of the 8th day of April 2004 by INLAND REAL
ESTATE ACQUISITIONS, INC., an Illinois corporation ("Assignor") to and for the
benefit of INLAND WESTERN PHOENIX, L.L.C., a Delaware limited liability company
("Assignee").

     Assignor does hereby sell, assign, transfer, set over and convey unto
Assignee all of its right, title and interest as Buyer under into that certain
Letter Agreement for the purchase and sale of a Shopping Center dated as of
January 21, 2004, as amended and entered into by Paradise Valley Marketplace,
LLC, a North Carolina limited liability company, as Seller, and Assignor, as
Buyer (collectively, the "Agreement"), for the sale and purchase of the property
described by the Agreement, located in Phoenix, Arizona.

     Assignor represents and warrants that it is the Buyer under the Agreement,
and that it has not sold, assigned, transferred, or encumbered such interest in
any way to any other person or entity. By acceptance hereof Assignee accepts the
foregoing assignment and agrees, from and after the date hereof, to (i) perform
all of the obligations of Buyer under the Agreement, and (ii) indemnify, defend,
protect and hold Assignor harmless from and against all claims and liabilities
arising under the Agreement.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Assignor and Assignee have executed this instrument as
of the date first written above.

                                ASSIGNOR:

                                INLAND REAL ESTATE ACQUISITIONS, INC.
                                an Illinois corporation

                                By: /s/ Steven Sanders
                                   ---------------------------
                                Name:
                                     -------------------------
                                As Its: SR V P
                                       -----------------------

                                ASSIGNEE:

                                INLAND WESTERN PHOENIX, L.L.C.,
                                a Delaware limited liability company

                                By: Inland Western Retail Estate Trust, Inc.,
                                a Maryland corporation

                                By: /s/ [ILLEGIBLE]
                                   ---------------------------
                                Name: [ILLEGIBLE]
                                     -------------------------

                                As Its: Authorized Agent
                                       -----------------------
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### OCT 30 1997 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
RONALD RAY COLEMAN,

Petitioner-Appellant,
v. STEVE HARGETT; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,

Respondents-Appellees. No. 96-6209 (D.C. No. CIV-96-16-M) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges
.

After examining petitioner’s brief and the appellat e record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would notmaterially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without ora l argument.1 Because petitioner filed his habeas petition before enactment of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 19 96 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, AEDPA’s certificate of app ealability requirements do not apply to this appeal. See United States v. Kunzman , No. 96-1310, 1997 WL 602507, at *1 n.2 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 1997). Instea d, the pre-AEDPA certificate of probable cause requirements apply here. Regardless of the label we attach to the requirements, petitioner’s substantive burden is th e same, see Lennox v. Evans , 87 F.3d 431, 434 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 746 (1997), overruled in part byKunzman , 1997 WL 602507, at *1 n.2. -2- Petitioner seeks review of the district court’s ord er denying his petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Before petit ioner can proceed on appeal, however, he must secure a certificate of probable c ause from this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. 1 Based upon our review of the record as a whole, w e conclude that petitioner has failed to make a subst antial showing of a denial of a constitutional right. See Barefoot v. Estelle , 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983); Lennox v. Evans , 87 F.3d 431, 434 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 746 (1997), overruled in part byUnited States v. Kunzman , No. 96-1310, 1997 WL 602507, at *1 n.2 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 1997). We, therefore, DENY the application for a certificate of probable cause, and DISMISS the appeal. Petitioner’s motion for re imbursement of fees is-3-

GRANTED. His motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees is DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge
9676.

#### Creswell *v.*Williams.

Jenkins, J.

1. The writ in this case pertains to a cause of action in what was originally 'an equitable petition, in which it was. sought to restrain the defendant from disposing of certain lumber which the petitioner claimed he had purchased from the defendant under the terms of a written contract; but the cause was amended on the trial by striking from the petition all prayers for equitable relief, and proceeded solely for the recovery of damages by virtue of the alleged breach of the contract of sale. The contention of the plaintiff on the trial was that the defendant had breached the contract of sale by refusing to deliver to him the lumber purchased. The defendant, on the other hand, contended that the plaintiff had himself breached the contract by reason of his failure to count and receive each car of lumber before removing it from the mill-yard, and also by his failure to remove such lumber within a reasonable time. *Reid:-*While the testimony going to show a breach of the terms of the contract on the part of the plaintiff himself is not to our minds altogether clear, still it can not be said that the jury were wholly unauthorized to thus construe it, and there*191fore the verdict must not be set aside as being without evidence to support it. Nor can the verdict be disturbed upon the ground of the alleged error in the charge, since the finding of the jury, to the effect that the contract had been actually breached by the plaintiff, renders immaterial the propriety of the charge which it is complained improperly authorized the jury to limit a portion of the damages claimed under the terms of the contract as construed by plaintiff.

Decided January 14, 1919.

Action on contract; from Catoosa superior court—Judge Tarver. March 9, 1918.

*M. L. Harris,*for plaintiff.

*W. E. Mann, Rosser & Shaw,*for defendant.

*Judgment■ affirmed.*

*Wade, C. J., and Luke, J., coneur.*
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 

COOK COUNTY CRIMINAL DIVISION 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) 

 Plaintiff. ) 

 ) 

 V. ) No. 20CR003451

 

 

JERVELLE T. GATES 

Defendant. 

 ) 

 ) 

 ) 

 

 

MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 

 

NOW COMES the Defendant, Jervelle T. Gates, by and through his attorney Cierra 

Norris from The Law Office of C.N. Norris, LLC, and moves this Honorable Court to enter an 

Order granting The Law Office of C.N. Norris, LLC leave to withdraw as counsel herein. In 

support thereof Counsel states as follows: 

 

1. That The Law Office of C.N. Norris, LLC, is currently the attorney of record for Jervelle 

T. Gates in the above referenced matter. 

2. That Illinois Rule of Professional conduct 1.16(b) states a lawyer may seek to withdraw 

from representation when a client, by other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for 

the lawyer to carry out the employment effectively. 

3. That certain irreconcilable differences concerning this cause have arisen between counsel

and the Petitioner which necessitates that Counsel withdraw as attorney herein. 

4. That pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 139(c)(2), Jervelle T. Gates is advised that 

he has 21 days in which to file his own Appearance or to retain new counsel once an 

Order of withdrawal is entered. 

 

WHEREFORE, for the above and foregoing reasons, The Law Office of C.N. Norris, 

LLC, Cierra Norris, respectfully prays this court to enter an order instanter granting them leave 

to withdraw as the attorney of the Defendant, Jervelle T. Gates, and granting him time to obtain 

new counsel or file a pro-se appearance. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Case: 1:20-cr-00345 Document #: 43 Filed: 10/13/20 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:99
By: /s/ Cierra Norris

Cierra Norris 

Attorney for Defendant 

 

Case: 1:20-cr-00345 Document #: 43 Filed: 10/13/20 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:100
Case: 1:20-cr-00345 Document #: 43 Filed: 10/13/20 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:101
1 NO. 12- 15 -00170- CV

____________________________________

IN THE TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS

____________________________________
Linda Ann Parrish Richardson and Gary Bruce Richardson, Co -Trustees

Of the M.C. Parrish, Jr. Testamentary Trust, et al,

Appellants,

vs.

Donald Roger Mills, and wife, Rhonda Mills and Beverly Mills Pool Appellees.

____________________________________
On Appeal from the 145th Judicial District Court

Nacogdoches County, Texas

APPELLEE’S UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR EXTENSION

OF TIME TO FILE BRIEF

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

COMES NOW, Appellees, Donald Roger Mills, and wife, Rhonda Mills and

Beverly Mills Pool, and file this their Unopposed Motion for Extension of Time to

File Brief, and would show this Honorable Court as follows:

1.

Appellees’ brief is currently due to be filed in this Court on December 16

,

2015 . Appellees respectfully request that the deadline to file Appellees’ Brief be

ex tended to January 15, 2016

. ACCEPTED 12-15-00170-CV TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS

TYLER, TEXAS 12/4/2015 9:51:42 AM

Pam Estes CLERK2 2.

This is the first request for an extension of time to file their brief.

3.

The undersigned counsel has had various and numerous commitments to

handle matters, including litigation matters, for other clients prior to Decemb er 16,

2015, which have interfered with and impeded the undersigned counsel’s ability to

complete Appellee’s Brief in a timely and effective manner.

In addition, the undersigned has had out of town trips due to the

Thanksgiving holidays and will be working with a limited staff due to vacations

during the month of December. Further, the undersigned has out of town trips

scheduled for two days before Christmas and Christmas day, all of which are work

days.

Because of such trips and due to the various commitments to handle matters

for other clients during the thirty (30) day period following the filing of

Appellant’s brief in this appeal, the undersigned will be unable to complete in a

timely and effective m anner Appellee’s brief in this appeal by its original due date.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellees respectfully pray

that the Court of Appeals grant Appell ee s ’ Unopposed Motion for Extension of

Time to File Brief and that the deadline be extended to January 15 , 201 6

, and for

such other and further relief to which the Court of Appeals deems appropriate.3 Respectfully submitted,

GUIDRY, BATES & HOYT ATTORNEYS, LLP 118 E. Hospital Street, Suite 100 Nacogdoches, Texas 75961 (936) 560

- 6954 telephone (936) 560

- 5996 facsimile bates@gbhattorneys.com

/s/ William Guidry

____________ William D. Guidry State Bar No. 08594000

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE

I hereby certify that I conferr ed with counsel for Appellant s , Richard Merrill and Berry Bowen , by email and t he y ha ve agreed to th is motion for extension.

/s/ William Guidry____________ William Guidry

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing motion has been provided to counsel
listed below via electronic service and email on this 4th day of December, 2015.

/s/ William Guidry____________ William Guidry
#### Kuljit Singh PARMAR, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 03-72030.

United States Court *of*Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 6, 2004.*

Decided Dec. 10, 2004.

*566Earle A. Sylva, Esq., Rai Law & Associates, PC, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

George T. Heridis, Esq., Rai & Associates, PC, Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Legal Officer, Office of the District Counsel, San Francisco, CA for Respondent.

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Kuljit Singh Parmar, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming without opinion the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) order denying his application for asylum and withholding of removal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the IJ’s adverse credibility finding for substantial evidence. *Singh v. Ashcroft,*367 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.2004). We deny the petition.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination because Parmar’s testimony was rife with inconsistencies, including how many police were present at the rally that precipitated his second arrest and the length of his second detention. *See, e.g., id.*In addition, the IJ properly based the adverse credibility finding on the falsified birth certificate Parmar submitted. *See Desta v. Ashcroft,*365 F.3d 741, 745 (9th Cir.2004). Finally, the IJ properly rejected Parmar’s explanation that his testimony was inconsistent because he suffered a head injury in the mid-1990s, which caused memory loss. Parmar did not testify about the head injury until confronted with his inconsistent testimony, and he never provided any documentary proof of the head injury. *See, e.g., Li v. Ashcroft,*378 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir.2004) (IJ properly considered and rejected petitioner’s explanation for inconsistent testimony).

Parmar’s contention that the BIA and IJ erred in not granting him relief under the Convention Against Torture is without merit because he never applied for that relief.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
EXHIBIT 10.156

 

 

DOLLAR THRIFTY AUTOMOTIVE GROUP, INC.

 

September 26, 2007

 

 

Due to the recent change in the payment method provided by Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc. as it relates to the Board retainers and Committee meeting fees, I am making the following elections effective immediately:

 

Election of Payment of Meeting Fees (Check one)

 

I am currently not deferring meeting fees and have meeting fees paid in cash and paid by DTAG on a quarterly basis.

 

|     X     | I elect to continue being paid in cash |
|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|

 

|             | I elect to be paid in DTAG Shares of Stock with such DTAG Shares of Stock being issued to me on a yearly basis. |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

Election of Payment of Board, Committee and Committee Chair Retainers (Check one)

 

I am currently not deferring retainer fees and have retainers fees paid to me in DTAG 

Shares of Stock with such DTAG Shares of Stock being issued to me on a yearly basis.

 

|             | I elect to continue being paid in DTAG Shares of Stock |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|

 

|     X     | I elect to be paid in cash with cash paid by DTAG on a quarterly basis. |
|---------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

/s/  Molly Shi Boren             

Molly Shi Boren
#### JOHNSON v. MAYO YARNS, INC.

No. 290P97

Case below: 126 N.C.App. 292

Petition by plaintiff for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 23 July 1997.
EXHIBIT B

Case: 1:20-cv-04001 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:286
Case: 1:20-cv-04001 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:287
Case: 1:20-cv-04001 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:288
Case: 1:20-cv-04001 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:289
Case: 1:20-cv-04001 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:290
Case: 1:20-cv-04001 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:291
Case: 1:20-cv-04001 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:292
Case: 1:20-cv-04001 Document #: 1-2 Filed: 07/08/20 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:293
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
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<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                              98
<SECURITIES>                                    59,936
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</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

OUYEINC LTD.,

Plaintiff,

v.

1Baaaai and et al., 

Defendants.

Case No. 20 cv 3488

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 41(a)(1)

Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Ouyeinc Ltd.

(“Ouyeinc” or “Plaintiff”) hereby dismisses this action with prejudice pursuant to settlement as 

to the following Defendants:

Defendant Name Line No.

OSP 172

Nkhift 160

VfjksjlfI23 242

TomorrowShop22 232

GjfkjfV1812 96

ytucjndks787 266

Furnituversely20 88

Greenrober 100

Ulittlebanana 239

Case: 1:20-cv-03488 Document #: 75 Filed: 10/26/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:310
goodsalestore 99

ishop 113

Bigpang 28

best_eshop 23

Wannabest 247

Arthumcco 11

Long SH. Trad 295

wen bao shop 277

haiwang shop 275

long island 274

Sheline 291

FY Trading 89

Isfang 112

Pumio 313

SSHY 214

W7 Factory 244

DATED October 26, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James A. Karamanis

James A. Karamanis

Barney & Karamanis, LLP

Two Prudential Plaza

180 N. Stetson, Ste 3050

Chicago, IL 60601

Tel.: 312/553-5300

Attorney No. 6203479

James@bkchicagolaw.com

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF Ouyeinc Ltd.

Case: 1:20-cv-03488 Document #: 75 Filed: 10/26/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:311
**Exhibit 3.3.1**

**Bylaw Amendment – Effective June 12, 2007**

AMENDMENTSTO THE BYLAWS OFFIRST CONSULTING GROUP, INC.

1.             Section 17 of Article IV of the Bylaws shallbe amended in its entirety to read as follows:

**Section 17.  Election of Directors.**   At each annual meeting ofstockholders of the corporation commencing at the annual meeting ofstockholders in 2008, all directors shall be elected for a one (1) year termexpiring at the next succeeding annual meeting of stockholders, by suchstockholders having the right to vote on such election.  The term of each director serving as of andimmediately following the date of the 2007 annual meeting of stockholders shallexpire on the date of the next annual meeting of stockholders after such date,notwithstanding that such director may have been elected for a term thatextended beyond the date of such annual meeting of stockholders.  Each director shall hold office until histerm expires or until the director’s prior death, resignation, disqualificationor removal from office; provided that each director shall serve notwithstandingthe expiration of the director’s term until the director’s successor shall beduly elected and qualified.

2.             Section 20 of Article IV of the Bylaws shallbe amended in its entirety to read as follows:

**Section 20.  Removal.**   Unless otherwise restrictedby law, the Certificate of Incorporation or these Bylaws, any director or theentire Board of Directors may be removed, with or without cause, by the holdersof a majority in voting power of all issued and outstanding stock entitled tovote at an election of directors.

----