IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MARIA G.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 4101

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Maria G.’s claims for 

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate 

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion 

to reverse the Commissioner’s decision [Doc. No. 19] is granted in part, and the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 26] is denied.

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security 

Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by her first name and the first initial of her last 

name.

2

 Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(d).

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BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 8, 2017, Plaintiff filed claims for DIB and SSI alleging 

disability since August 17, 2017. The claims were denied initially and upon 

reconsideration, after which she timely requested a hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on March 6, 2019. Plaintiff

personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel. A

vocational expert (“VE”) also testified.

On May 10, 2019, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claims for benefits, finding her

not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration 

Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s 

decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the 

District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 

(7th Cir. 2005). 

II. ALJ DECISION

Plaintiff’s claims were analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential 

evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of August 17, 2017. At step 

two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

generalized anxiety disorder; major depressive disorder; fibromyalgia; lupus;

asthma; hypothyroidism; degenerative joint disease; and sacroiliac joint arthritis. 

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The ALJ concluded at step three that Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in 

combination, do not meet or medically equal any listed impairments. 

Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with the following additional 

limitations: can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can occasionally stoop, 

crouch, crawl, kneel, and climb ramps and stairs; should avoid concentrated 

exposure to poorly ventilated areas, moving machinery, unprotected heights, and 

pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts, and gases; requires a sit/stand 

option that allows her to sit for 20 minutes after standing for 20 minutes and vice 

versa, provided she is not off task more than 10 percent of the work period; can 

perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks with only occasional interaction with the 

public, coworkers, and supervisors.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be unable to perform her 

past relevant work as a receptionist, registration clerk, or social services aide. 

However, at step five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, 

work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform jobs existing in 

significant numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding that she is not 

disabled under the Social Security Act.

DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

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physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a plaintiff is 

disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff

presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does 

the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform her former 

occupation? and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4). 

An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that 

the plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 

389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, 

precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 

one to four. Id. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the 

burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

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2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even 

in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of 

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not 

high. Substantial evidence is . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and 

means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019)

(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in 

evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also 

Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision 

must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is 

adequately supported”) (citation omitted).

However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved 

of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838 

F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has 

adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every 

piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide 

some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. 

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Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to 

a plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 

conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate 

the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful 

appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 

2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to 

fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately 

articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 

1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). 

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons, 

including: (1) the ALJ did not properly evaluate Plaintiff’s RFC; (2) the ALJ erred in 

evaluating the opinion of Dr. David Mael; and (3) the ALJ did not properly evaluate 

Plaintiff’s allegations.

In advancing her first argument, Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that the ALJ 

failed to adequately account for her expressed need to lie down to alleviate pain and 

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fatigue. Pertinent to that topic, at the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she has to 

“nap, lay down, take it easy” when she has flareups of her fibromyalgia and/or

lupus. (R. 58.) Plaintiff further testified that she takes roughly hour-long naps on a 

daily basis due to severe fatigue. (Id. at 63-64.) Despite these statements, the ALJ’s 

decision does not address Plaintiff’s asserted need to lie down in any manner.

“An ALJ errs when the RFC fails to account for a claimant’s allegation that 

he needs to lie down.” Tincher v. Colvin, No. 13 C 8410, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

90961, at *25 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2015) (citation omitted). Accordingly, in completely 

failing to address Plaintiff’s allegations concerning her need to lie down, the ALJ 

erred. See Eula M. v. Berryhill, No. 17 C 6669, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84685, at *23 

(N.D. Ill. May 20, 2019) (“The ALJ was required to explain either (1) why plaintiff’s 

testimony could not be accepted or (2) why she could work on a full-time basis 

despite her alleged need to lie down for three hours when she experienced 

migraines.”). The ALJ’s error was not harmless, as the VE testified that Plaintiff 

would not be allowed to lie down or nap in the workplace. (R. 78.)

Ultimately, the ALJ’s failure to account for Plaintiff’s asserted need to lie 

down requires that this matter be remanded. See Gibson-Jones v. Chater, No. 96-

2626, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7640, at *13 (7th Cir. Apr. 14, 1997) (“We therefore . . . 

remand the case to the ALJ so that he may identify more specific medical evidence 

supporting his rejection of [the claimant’s] testimony that she needed to lie down 

daily. The ALJ must more specifically articulate his reasons for believing that [the 

claimant’s] testimony is contradictory and inconsistent. If the ALJ is unable to 

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articulate more specific reasons, he must award [the claimant] the relief she 

requests because, if she needs to lie down daily, she will be unable to perform even 

sedentary work with a sit/stand option.”); Wesolowski v. Colvin, No. 15 C 8830, 2016 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144261, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2016) (“The ALJ also failed to 

explain why he did not include Wesolowski’s need to lie down intermittently. On 

remand, the ALJ should expand the record if necessary in order to properly 

determine Wesolowsi’s RFC.”).

Based on its conclusion that remand is necessary for the above reasons, the 

Court need not explore in detail the remaining errors claimed by Plaintiff. The 

Court emphasizes that the Commissioner should not assume these issues were 

omitted from the opinion because no error was found. Indeed, the Court admonishes 

the Commissioner that, on remand, special care should be taken to ensure that 

Plaintiff’s RFC is properly assessed, the medical opinions are properly weighed, and 

Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms are properly evaluated.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s 

decision [Doc. No. 19] is granted in part, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment [Doc. No. 26] is denied. The Court finds that this matter should 

be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this 

Order.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

DATE: June 1, 2022 ________________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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