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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Linda Kidwell, Walter P. Paramski, Jr., and )

L&W Real Estate Management, LLC, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 20CV4744

)

Village of Antioch, Illinois, Gerald T. Johnson, )

individually, and in his official capacity as a )

Member of the Board of Trustees of the Village of )

Antioch, Illinois, Daniel F. Yost, individually, and )

in his official capacity as a Member of the Board )

of Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois, )

Edward A. Macek, individually, and in his official )

capacity as a Member of the Board of Trustees of )

the Village of Antioch, Illinois, Scott A. Pierce, )

individually, and in his official capacity as a )

Member of the Board of Trustees of the Village of )

Antioch, Illinois, Ted P. Poulos, individually, and )

in his official capacity as a Member of the Board )

of Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois, )

Mary C. Dominiak, individually, and in her ) 

official capacity as a Member of the Board of )

Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois, and )

Lawrence M. Hanson, individually, and in his )

official capacity as Mayor of the Village of )

Antioch, Illinois, )

)

Defendants. )

AMENDED COMPLAINT

NOW COME the Plaintiffs, Linda Kidwell, Walter P. Paramski, Jr., and L&W Real 

Estate Management, LLC, by and through their attorney, James T. Harrison of Harrison Law 

Offices, P.C., and for their Amended Complaint against the Defendants, Village of Antioch, 

Illinois, (hereinafter “Defendant Village”), Gerald T. Johnson, individually, and in his official 

capacity as a Member of the Board of Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois, Daniel F. Yost, 
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individually, and in his official capacity as a Member of the Board of Trustees of the Village of 

Antioch, Illinois, Edward A. Macek, individually, and in his official capacity as a Member of the 

Board of Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois, Scott A. Pierce, individually, and in his 

official capacity as a Member of the Board of Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois, Ted P. 

Poulos, individually, and in his official capacity as a Member of the Board of Trustees of the 

Village of Antioch, Illinois, Mary C. Dominiak, individually, and in her official capacity as a 

Member of the Board of Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois, and Lawrence M. Hanson, 

individually, and in his official capacity as Mayor of the Village of Antioch, Illinois, state and 

allege as follows:

PARTIES

1. At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiff, Linda Kidwell, was an adult resident of 

Lake County, Illinois.

2. At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiff, Walter P. Paramsky, Jr., was an adult 

resident of Lake County, Illinois.

3. At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiff, L&W Real Estate Management, LLC, 

was an Illinois Limited Liability Corporation, organized pursuant to the laws of the State of 

Illinois, with its principal place of business being at 22126 West North Avenue, in the Village of 

Antioch, Lake County, Illinois.

4. At all times relevant hereto, the Defendant, Village of Antioch, Illinois, was a 

municipal corporation, organized pursuant to the laws of the State of Illinois, with its principal 

place of business being at 874 Main Street, Antioch, Illinois.

5. At all times relevant hereto, the Defendant, Gerald T. Johnson, (hereinafter 

“Defendant Johnson”) was an adult resident of the Village of Antioch, County of Lake, State of 
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Illinois. At all time relevant hereto, Defendant Johnson was a duly elected Member of the Board 

of Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois. Defendant Johnson is sued in his individual and 

official capacities.

6. At all times relevant hereto, the Defendant, Daniel F. Yost, (hereinafter 

“Defendant Yost”) was an adult resident of the Village of Antioch, County of Lake, State of 

Illinois. At all time relevant hereto, Defendant Yost was a duly elected Member of the Board of 

Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois. Defendant Yost is sued in his individual and official 

capacities.

7. At all times relevant hereto, the Defendant, Edward A. Macek, (hereinafter 

“Defendant Macek”), was an adult resident of the Village of Antioch, County of Lake, State of 

Illinois. At all time relevant hereto, Defendant Macek was a duly elected Member of the Board 

of Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois. Defendant Macek is sued in his individual and 

official capacities.

8. At all times relevant hereto, the Defendant, Scott A. Pierce, (hereinafter 

“Defendant Pierce”), was an adult resident of the Village of Antioch, County of Lake, State of 

Illinois. At all time relevant hereto, Defendant Pierce was a duly elected Member of the Board of 

Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois. Defendant Pierce is sued in his individual and 

official capacities.

9. At all times relevant hereto, the Defendant, Ted P. Poulos, (hereinafter 

“Defendant Poulos”), was an adult resident of the Village of Antioch, County of Lake, State of 

Illinois. At all time relevant hereto, Defendant Poulos was a duly elected Member of the Board 

of Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois. Defendant Poulos is sued in his individual and 

official capacities.
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10. At all times relevant hereto, the Defendant, Mary C. Dominiak, (hereinafter 

“Defendant Dominiak”), was an adult resident of the Village of Antioch, County of Lake, State 

of Illinois. At all time relevant hereto, Defendant Dominiak was a duly elected Member of the 

Board of Trustees of the Village of Antioch, Illinois. Defendant Dominiak is sued in her 

individual and official capacities.

11. At all times relevant hereto, the Antioch Village Board possessed final policymaking authority for the Village of Antioch, Illinois, in that the Village Board possessed 

authority to adopt rules for the conduct of the Village of Antioch government.

12. At all times relevant hereto, the Defendant, Lawrence M. Hanson, (hereinafter 

“Defendant Hanson”), was an adult resident of the Village of Antioch, County of Lake, State of 

Illinois. At all time relevant hereto, Defendant Hanson was the duly elected Mayor of the 

Village of Antioch, Illinois. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Hanson possessed final 

policy-making authority for the Village of Antioch, Illinois, in that the Mayor possessed 

authority to set policy for the conduct of the Village of Antioch government. Defendant Hanson 

is sued in his individual and official capacities.

JURISDICTION

13. This Complaint contains three (3) counts: Count I is brought pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. Section 1983 and seeks redress for the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process 

rights. The Court has original jurisdiction over Count I pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 – Federal 

Question jurisdiction and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) – Civil Rights. Count II is brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and seeks redress for the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ 

substantive property rights secured by the Constitution. The Court has original jurisdiction over 

Count II pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 – Federal Question jurisdiction and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
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§ 1343(3) – Civil Rights. Count III is brought pursuant to Illinois Common Law and seeks 

redress against the Defendants Gerald T. Johnson, Daniel F. Yost, Edward A. Macek, Scott A. 

Pierce, Ted P. Poulos, Mary C. Dominiak, and Lawrence M. Hanson, for conspiracy to deprive 

Plaintiffs of their property rights. The Court has jurisdiction over Count III pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1367 – Supplemental jurisdiction.

FACTS

14. At all time relevant hereto, the Defendant Village adopted and utilized the Village 

of Antioch, Illinois, Village Code, (hereinafter “Village Code”), which codified the Defendant 

Village’s Ordinances, including the Defendant Village’s Zoning Ordinance (hereinafter “Zoning 

Ordinance”).

Parcel A

15. At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiffs owned a vacant parcel of real estate 

located on Drom Court in the Village of Antioch, Illinois, bearing permanent property index 

number 0208201084, and consisting of 3.86 acres, more or less, hereinafter referred to as “Parcel 

A”.

16. At all times relevant hereto, Parcel A was zoned “M-1 – Limited Manufacturing 

District” under the Village of Antioch’s Zoning Ordinance. 

17. At all times relevant hereto, the M-1 zoning classification permitted outdoor 

storage yards, including truck, tractor, trailer and bus storage, subject to site plan approval by the 

Village code enforcement official.

18. At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiffs intended to develop and utilize Parcel A 

for outdoor trailer storage in connection with Plaintiffs’ business, Anita Self Storage, as 

permitted under the M-1 zoning classification in the Zoning Ordinance. 
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Drom Court is a Designated Truck Route

19. At all times relevant hereto, §7-3-16(A) of the Antioch Village Code provided:

“Certain roads within the village are, by their location, design and construction, 

amendable to vehicular traffic including heavy and/or large trucks, whereas other 

local roads are not capable of accommodating these vehicles safely, and the road 

could be unduly damaged by such traffic. For these reasons, the village adopts 

and designates certain truck routes as the appropriate roads for truck traffic.”

20. At all times relevant hereto, pursuant to §7-3-16(B) of the Antioch Village Code, 

Drom Court was a designated truck route in the Village of Antioch, Illinois.

21. At all times relevant hereto, the properties along Drom Court consisted of 

multiple uses, including manufacturing/industrial, commercial, multi-family residential, and 

single family residential uses. 

Parcel B

22. At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiffs owned a parcel of real estate located on 

Drom Court in the Village of Antioch, Illinois, bearing permanent property index number 

0208201041, hereinafter referred to as “Parcel B”.

23. At all times relevant hereto, Parcel B was zoned “M-1” under the Village of 

Antioch “Limited Manufacturing District” zoning classification.

24. At all times relevant hereto, Parcel B was improved with a single structure 

containing single family residence, a residential studio apartment, and a commercial office unit 

occupied by Anita Self-Storage.

25. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs leased Parcel B’s residential units to third 

party tenants and the remainder of Parcel B was occupied by Plaintiffs’ business, Anita Self 

Storage.
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Parcel C

26. At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiffs owned a parcel of real estate located on 

Anita Street in the Village of Antioch, Illinois, bearing permanent property index number 

0208201042, hereinafter referred to as “Parcel C”.

27. At all times relevant hereto, Parcel C was zoned “M-1” under the Village of 

Antioch “Limited Manufacturing District” zoning classification. 

28. At all times relevant hereto, Parcel C was improved with commercial 

utility/storage buildings.

29. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs leased one of the commercial buildings on 

Parcel C to commercial tenants; the remainder of Parcel C was occupied and utilized by 

Plaintiffs’ business, Anita Self Storage.

Parcel D

30. At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiffs owned a parcel of real estate located on 

Anita Street in the Village of Antioch, Illinois, bearing permanent property index number 

0208201058, hereinafter referred to as “Parcel D”.

31. At all times relevant hereto, Parcel D was zoned “M-1” under the Village of 

Antioch “Limited Manufacturing District” zoning classification.

32. At all times relevant hereto, Parcel D was improved with commercial storage 

buildings containing numerous individual storage units of varying size.

33. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs utilized Parcels B, C, and D to operate 

Anita Self Storage, an outdoor storage yard business owned and operated by Plaintiffs.

34. At all times relevant hereto, an outdoor storage yard was an authorized use under 

the Village’s M-1 zoning classification. 
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35. Due to the increasing demand for trailer storage services, in 2017, Plaintiffs 

retained an engineering firm to render site plans for the development of Parcel A whereby 

Plaintiffs could improve and expand their trailer storage capacity. 

36. In the spring of 2018, Plaintiffs began clearing Parcel A to accommodate their 

expansion plan consistent with the site plan created by their engineer.

37. Thereafter, the Village contacted the Plaintiffs and told them to refrain from 

working on Parcel A until their site plan was approved by the Village. 

38. The Village also contacted Plaintiffs’ materials contractor, Peter Baker and Sons, 

and directed them not to deliver materials to Plaintiffs’ Parcel A.

39. On or about October of 2018 Plaintiff Kidwell met with Michael Garrigan, the 

Code Enforcement Official for the Defendant Village, regarding Plaintiffs’ plan to expand trailer 

storage capacity on Parcel A. 

40. Garrigan initially told Plaintiff Kidwell that improving Parcel A with a paved 

parking lot for trailer storage would be no problem since Parcel A was already zoned M-1 which

included the use Plaintiffs were contemplating.

41. Garrigan also informed Plaintiff Kidwell of the site plan and screening 

requirements under the Antioch Village Code. Plaintiff Kidwell raised safety concerns for her 

customers regarding the screening requirements on the street side of Parcel A.

42. On or about December 13, 2018, Plaintiff attended a meeting of the Village 

Zoning Board, (hereinafter “Zoning Board”) concerning the safety concerns Plaintiff Kidwell 

had raised about screening the street side of Parcel A. 
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43. During the December 13, 2018 meeting, neighbors on Drom Court were 

complaining about traffic on Drom Court attributable to “Triple Play Academy,” Parcel A’s 

adjacent neighbor to the north. 

44. The Zoning Board tabled Plaintiffs site plan review until the January 10, 2019 

meeting of the Zoning Board.

45. Thereafter, Plaintiff Kidwell engaged in a number of conversations with Michael 

Garrigan in December 2018 and January 2019, concerning Plaintiffs’ site plan and the neighbors’ 

traffic complaints about Triple Play Academy.

46. Plaintiff reminded Garrigan that the Village was responsible for the traffic issues 

caused by Triple Play Academy because the Village did not follow its own ordinance on the 

required number of parking spaces when it issued the permit to Triple Play Academy in 

November of 2018.

47. Triple Play Academy discontinued business in early 2020 as a result of Covid and 

with it any traffic issues that had been generated by its customers’ vehicles were rendered moot.

48. On January 10, 2019, Plaintiffs appeared before the Zoning Board; Plaintiffs 

agreed to install lighting as required by the Village Code but raised safety concerns about the 

screening requirements.

49. When Plaintiffs offered to screen the proposed site in order to get the site plan 

passed; the Zoning Board suggested that Plaintiffs instead apply for a variance. The Zoning 

Board continued the matter to the February 21, 2019 meeting. 

50. On January 24, 2019, Garrigan told Plaintiff Kidwell that the neighbors’ 

complaints about traffic from Triple Play Academy were not helping Plaintiffs’ get their site plan 

approved.
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51. On January 25, 2019, Plaintiff Kidwell wrote a letter to Michael Garrigan about 

the traffic complaints raised by Drom Court neighbors. Plaintiff Kidwell clarified that the traffic 

complaints were attributable to Triple Play Academy, not to Plaintiffs’ business.

52. On January 28, 2019, Plaintiff Kidwell wrote a subsequent email to Garrigan 

reiterating points from her January 25 2019 letter, and notifying Garrigan that she had operated 

Anita Self Storage for 15 years with no complaints from the neighbors on Drom Court or the 

neighbors on Anita Street.

53. Prior to the February 21, 2019 meeting of the Zoning Board, Garrigan requested 

Plaintiff Kidwell to supply Bob McCarthy, a Zoning Board member, with a copy of a survey of 

Parcels B, C, and D. Plaintiff Kidwell told Garrigan that Parcels B, C, and D, had nothing to do 

with Plaintiffs’ request for a variance to the Village Code’s privacy screening requirements for 

Parcel A.

54. Prior to the February 21, 2019 meeting of the Zoning Board, Plaintiff Kidwell 

sent out all variance letters to all neighbors entitled to notice under the Village Code, which 

included only one residential neighbor.

55. A number of the residential neighbors on Drom Court showed up for the February 

21, 2019 meeting of the Zoning Board. None of the Drom Court neighbors objected to 

Plaintiffs’ requested variance of the screening requirement.

56. The neighbors each spoke about the use of Drom Court for Plaintiffs’ business; 

the neighbors commented that: 

a) Additional trailer storage on Parcel A would increase traffic on Drom 

Court; 

b) “We don’t want her [Plaintiff Kidwell] using our road;” 
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c) None of the neighbors want any of their land condemned in order to widen 

Drom Court;

d) Plaintiffs already had an entrance to their business on Anita Street that 

could be used to access Parcel A;

e) Plaintiffs should install a road across Plaintiffs’ properties [Parcels B, C, 

and D] from Anita Street to Drom Court; 

f) Plaintiffs and their customers should use the Anita Street entrance to 

access Parcel A, not Drom Court.

57. The Zoning Board agreed that Plaintiffs should install a road from Anita Street to 

Drom Court, (across Parcels B, C, and D), and that traffic to and from Plaintiffs’ Parcel A would 

need to access Parcel A from Anita Street, rather than from Drom Court, the street upon which 

Parcel A fronts.

58. The Zoning Board denied Plaintiffs’ permit application and request for a variance.

59. On February 23, 2019, Garrigan told Plaintiff Kidwell in an email that “The 

access question is the biggest issue.” Plaintiff Kidwell responded “My access will be on Drom 

Court. I’m zoned. I get access.”

60. On February 25, 2019, Plaintiff Kidwell emailed Garrigan and asked why 

Plaintiffs’ application was turned down at the Zoning Board meeting. Garrigan responded in an 

email that read: “No support for what you are requesting.”

61. Plaintiff Kidwell notified Garrigan that Plaintiffs wished to appeal the decision of 

the Zoning Board to the Village Board and requested that Garrigan put her on the March 11, 

2019 agenda for the Village Board meeting.
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62. On March 11, 2019, the Village Board met. The Village Board’s discussion of 

Plaintiffs’ appeal focused on Plaintiffs installing a road from Drom Court to Anita Street 

(through Parcels B, C, and D). 

63. The Village Board did not allow Plaintiff Kidwell to discuss Plaintiffs’ site plan at 

the meeting and instead told Plaintiff Kidwell to come back to the Village Board when Plaintiffs 

had drawings of an access road from Drom Court to Anita Street.

64. The Village Board denied Plaintiffs’ appeal and application for a variance at their 

March 11, 2019 meeting. Plaintiff Kidwell inquired why Plaintiffs’ petition was rejected and 

was told by the Village Attorney: “Fire safety; there’s only access back to the area, a possible 

second access road, the utilization of Drom Court, and unhappy neighbors, as well as the 

screening ordinance.” 

65. On or about April of 2019, Plaintiff Kidwell asked Rich Cashmore, a mutual 

acquaintance of hers and the mayor’s, to approach the mayor to see what needed to be done to 

get their site plan for Parcel A approved. Cashmore subsequently spoke with Defendant Hanson 

and asked him what Plaintiff Kidwell needed to do to get site plan approval for Parcel A. 

Defendant Hanson replied “she needs to put in a road.”

66. On or about April 2019, Plaintiffs retained counsel to petition the Village Board 

to reconsider Plaintiffs’ application to develop the commercial use of Parcel A.

67. On or about April, 2019, Plaintiff Kidwell and Plaintiffs’ counsel met with 

Garrigan to review Plaintiffs’ revised site plan, which included lighting, landscaping, fencing, 

and screening plans together with revised engineered drawings, and to discuss the Village 

Board’s reconsideration of Plaintiffs’ appeal of the Board’s denial of the permit application and 

variance. 
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68. During the April 2019 meeting, Garrigan told Plaintiff Kidwell that she had 

satisfied the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance and approved Plaintiffs’ revised site plan. 

Garrigan agreed to forward Plaintiffs’ site plan to the Village Board for the meeting of the whole 

of the Village Board on May 22, 2019. 

69. On May 15, 2019, Garrigan notified the Village Board that Plaintiffs had 

requested reconsideration of Plaintiffs’ permit application and request for a variance. 

70. In May of 2019, the mayor directed Michael Garrigan and the Fire Chief, Jon 

Cokefield, to investigate whether emergency vehicles could access Parcel A via Drom Court. 

Plaintiff Kidwell met with Garrigan and the Fire Chief at Parcel A. The Fire Chief concluded 

that there was no problem for emergency vehicles to access Parcel A via Drom Court for 

emergency purposes. 

71. After the Fire Chief left, Plaintiff spoke with Garrigan. Notwithstanding the Fire 

Chief’s conclusions regarding adequate access to Parcel A via Drom Court, Garrigan insisted 

that Plaintiffs would have to put in a road through their existing facility from Drom Court to 

Anita Street or there would be no development of Parcel A. 

72. Garrigan told Plaintiff Kidwell that the Village Board would fight Plaintiffs’ use 

of Drom Court to access Parcel A, that the fight will cost Plaintiffs $100,000, and that it would 

cost the Village Board nothing. 

73. Plaintiff Kidwell told Garrigan that Plaintiffs are not putting in a road across their 

other parcels, when Parcel A already abuts Drom Court, a public road and designated truck route. 

Kidwell also told Garrigan that putting a road through her other parcels would require the 

destruction of parts of one or more of Plaintiffs’ buildings. 
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74. Garrigan responded that “it would be easier if you just agreed to the Village’s 

demands.”

75. Garrigan told Plaintiff Kidwell that the Village would also want an easement 

agreement for public use of the road, to which Plaintiff Kidwell responded that “there’s no way 

that is ever going to happen.” 

76. Thereafter, the Defendant Village requested a meeting with Plaintiffs and their 

counsel in May. Plaintiff Kidwell and her attorney met with Village attorney, Bob Long, 

Garrigan and Village Administrator, Jim Keim, concerning Plaintiffs’ application to expand use 

of Parcel A,

77. The meeting was entirely about Plaintiffs installing a road through Parcels B, C, 

and D, in order to access Parcel A from Anita Street. Village Administrator Keim told Plaintiff 

Kidwell and her attorney that Long, Garrigan, and Keim were “helping her” get her application 

for a permit passed, and that the only way it would pass would be if Plaintiffs put in a road from 

Anita Street to Drom Court. 

78. Plaintiffs considered relenting to the Village’s demand to inversely condemn parts 

of Parcels B, C, and D for roadway purposes and drew up a site plan with a road going through 

Parcels B, C, and D from Drom Court to Anita Street. Plaintiff met with Village Administrator 

Keim to discuss the plan but the meeting became contentious, Keim terminated the meeting, and 

Plaintiff Kidwell left without submitting the revised site plan.

79. Plaintiffs’ motion and variance were considered by the Board on May 22, 2019 

during the Village Board’s non-voting ‘meeting of the whole.’ 
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80. Plaintiffs counsel tendered a trip generation study (traffic study) to the Village 

Board showing that the planned use of the property would have a minimal impact on traffic on 

Drom Court and would be the least intensive permitted use under the M-1 zoning classification.

81. During the May 22, 2019 Village Board meeting, Garrigan presented the 

Planning, Building, and Zoning Department’s approval of Plaintiffs’ revised site plan. Plaintiffs’ 

revised site plan did not contain a road from Drom Court through Parcels B, C, and D, to Anita 

Street.

82. After Garrigan’s presentation at the May 22, 2019 Village Board meeting, the 

discussion that followed among the Village Board members continued to dwell on the notion that 

Plaintiffs would need to install a road from Drom Court to Anita Street (through parcels B, C, 

and D) before the Village Board would approve Plaintiffs’ site plan for Parcel A..

83. Plaintiffs’ appeal and a variance were placed on the agenda of the Village Board’s 

August 2019 meeting, for final action by the Village Board on Plaintiffs’ motion and request for 

a variance. 

84. At the time of the Village Board’s August 2019 meeting, the proposed use of 

Parcel A was a permitted use under the existing zoning classification, there were no objections to 

the screening variance that Plaintiff had requested, there were no enforcement actions pending 

against the Plaintiffs or their properties, Parcel A fronted on Drom Court – a dedicated truck 

route, and Plaintiffs’ site plan had received approval from Garrigan in April 2019.

85. In preparation for its August 12, 2019 Village Board meeting, the Village Board’s 

staff prepared a draft ordinance granting site plan approval for Anita Self Storage, Plaintiffs’ 

business. The proposed ordinance stated: 

a. The Corporate Authorities have concluded and found that the proposed new 

parking lot, fencing and lighting on the above-referenced property is in general 
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conformance with the Village’s Site Plan Review Ordinance as it relates to 

building materials, design, and landscape buffering.

b. The Corporate Authorities have concluded and found that the granting of a 

variance from the strict application of the fencing requirements on the west and 

south sides of the expanded parking lot is an appropriate variance from the 

Village’s Site Plan regulations in that the west side of the property abuts the 

Canadian National railway tracks and the south side of the property abuts heavily 

wooded wetlands.

c. The Corporate Authorities have concluded and found that the Site Plan approval 

for this new parking lot and variance will further enhance economic development 

within the Village and promote the general welfare of the Village and the health, 

safety and welfare of the residents of the Village.

86. During the August 12, 2019 meeting of the Village Board, Plaintiffs’ counsel 

addressed each of the issues that had been raised by the Village Board in its March 11, 2019 

meeting and in the May 22, 2019 meeting of the whole, including pre-existing traffic conditions 

on Drom Court unrelated to Plaintiffs’ business, Plaintiffs’ traffic study showing minimal traffic 

impact from the proposed development of Parcel A, confirmation of adequate emergency access 

by the Fire Chief, and photographic evidence showing buses and trucks concurrently using Drom 

Court without problems.

87. The Village Board proceeded to review Plaintiffs’ request for reconsideration and 

each of the Trustees present, as well as the Village Mayor, commented about the points raised by 

Plaintiffs’ counsel on reconsideration of Plaintiffs’ appeal.

88. The draft ordinance also stated, in relevant part:

“Staff and the Village Attorney met with an agent of the Petitioner and Attorney 

Gamrath ... and discussed the petition in an effort to resolve issues raised during 

the prior public hearings, but ultimately were unable to reach agreement on 

certain material terms which render it impossible for Staff to issue a subsequent 

report recommending approval or denial of the motion for reconsideration at this 

time.”

89. The “certain material terms” that the parties could not agree upon, referred to in 

the draft ordinance, were 1) that Plaintiffs construct a roadway from Drom Court, through 
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Parcels B, C, and D, to Anita Street, 2) that the roadway would be constructed at Plaintiffs’ 

expense, and 3) that Plaintiffs would grant the Village an easement for public use of the 

roadway.

90. Defendant Dominiak called the question for final action by the Village Board on 

Plaintiffs’ site plan; no member of the Village Board made a motion to approve or to deny 

Plaintiffs’ site plan. 

91. The Village Board did not take final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a 

variance at its August 12, 2019 Village Board meeting.

92. At the August 12, 2019 Village Board meeting, the Defendant Hanson did not 

direct the Village Board to take final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance.

93. The Village Board withheld taking final action on Plaintiffs’ site plan for the 

improper purpose of attempting to force plaintiffs to construct a public roadway from Drom 

Court, through Parcels B, C, and D, to Anita Street at plaintiffs’ expense, to force Plaintiffs to 

grant the Village an easement to use the road for public roadway purposes, and to force Plaintiffs 

to submit to the Village’s inverse condemnation of their properties without compensation to the 

Plaintiffs.

94. The Village Mayor withheld directing the Village Board to take final action for 

the improper purpose of attempting to force plaintiffs to construct a public roadway from Drom 

Court, through Parcels B, C, and D, to Anita Street at plaintiffs’ expense, to force Plaintiffs to 

give the Village an easement to use the road for public roadway purposes, and to force Plaintiffs 

to submit to the Village’s inverse condemnation of their properties without compensation to the 

Plaintiffs.
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95. The requirements that Plaintiffs install a public road at plaintiffs’ expense across 

their properties from Drom Court to Anita Street, and that Plaintiffs grant the Village an 

easement to use the road for public roadway purposes, and that Plaintiffs submit to the Village’s 

inverse condemnation of portions of Parcels B, C, and D without compensation, were arbitrary, 

unreasonable, and unlawful requirements which bore no substantial relationship to public health, 

safety, or welfare.

96. At no time relevant hereto, did the Defendant Village initiate legitimate eminent 

domain proceedings to legally acquire Plaintiffs’ property, being the portions of Parcels B, C, 

and D that would be needed for the Village to construct a roadway for public use from Drom 

Court to Anita Street across Parcels B, C, and D.

97. At all times relevant hereto, the official conduct of Village Board and the official 

conduct of the Mayor was directly attributable to the Defendant Village.

98. At all times relevant hereto, the conduct of the defendants occurred under color of 

law.

Count I

42 U.S.C. § 1983

14th Amendment – Procedural Due Process Violation

Against the Defendant Village of Antioch, Illinois

99-196. Plaintiffs adopt by reference thereto as though fully incorporated herein, 

paragraphs 1-98 of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint as paragraphs 99-196 of Count I herein.

197. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides, in relevant part:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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198. 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 provides that:

‘Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 

be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress.’

199. At all times relevant hereto, Section 10-2-4 of the Antioch Village Code identified 

the duties of the Village Board under the Village zoning ordinance. In relevant part, Section 10-

2-4 of the Zoning Ordinance provided:

“ (1) Jurisdiction. The Village Board shall maintain the following 

responsibilities and duties under this zoning ordinance: ... (b) To review and 

take final action on appeals and variances.”

200. At all times relevant hereto, the Zoning Ordinance created a mandatory duty for 

the Village Board to take final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance. 

201. At all times relevant hereto, the Village Board had knowledge of its duty to take 

final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance.

202. At all times relevant hereto, the Zoning Ordinance created procedural rights for 

Plaintiffs including the right to “final action” by the Village Board on Plaintiffs’ appeal and 

request for a variance. 

203. At all times relevant hereto, the Zoning Ordinance also created substantive 

property rights for Plaintiffs in the permitted uses of their property (Parcel A) under the Zoning 

Ordinance.

204. At all times relevant hereto, the procedural rights created by the Zoning 

Ordinance protected and enabled Plaintiffs’ substantive property rights pertaining to Parcel A.
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205. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs’ procedural and substantive due process 

rights created under the Zoning Ordinance were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution.

206. The official actions of the Village Board at the August 12, 2019 Village Board 

meeting established an official policy of the Village whereby the Board’s mandatory duty to take 

final action under the section 10-2-4 of the Zoning Ordinance was abated and the Village Board 

was free to take no action.

207. The Village Board’s action in contradiction to the Zoning Ordinance established a 

change in official policy of the Village of Antioch.

208. The Village’s change in policy had the effect of a denial of Plaintiffs’ appeal and 

request for a variance, without the benefit of final action by the Village Board from which 

Plaintiffs could appeal.

209. The Village Board’s August 12, 2019 change in policy left Plaintiffs with no 

permit to develop Parcel A, and no final action by the Village Board to appeal.

210. The Village Board’s change in policy was intentional.

211. The Village Board’s change in policy deprived Plaintiffs of the procedural rights 

under the Zoning Ordinance.

212. The Village Board’s change in policy deprived Plaintiffs of the procedural 

protections of Plaintiffs’ substantive property rights under the Zoning Ordinance.

213. The Village Board’s change in policy violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to 

due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

214. As a direct and proximate result of the Village Board’s change in policy and 

accompanying failure to take final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance, the 
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Defendant Village deprived Plaintiffs of their rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution.

215. As a direct and proximate result of the Mayor’s failure to enforce the zoning 

ordinance to require the Board to take final action, the Defendant Village deprived Plaintiffs of 

their rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

216. As a direct and proximate result of the Village’s change in policy, the Defendant 

Village deprived Plaintiffs of their procedural right to final action by the Village under the 

Zoning Ordinance.

217. As a direct and proximate result of the Village Board’s change in policy, Plaintiffs 

were deprived of their right to develop Parcel A without due process of law.

218. As a direct and proximate result of the Village Board’s change in policy, the 

Plaintiffs were deprived of constitutionally-protected property rights in Parcel A.

219. As a direct and proximate result of the Village Board’s change in policy, the 

Defendant Village has caused Plaintiffs to suffer damages of a continuing and pecuniary nature, 

including loss of use of Parcel A, continuing money damages, attorney fees, other professional 

fees, and other pecuniary losses.

220. Plaintiffs’ state court remedies are inadequate to redress plaintiffs’ damages and 

do not provide Plaintiffs with complete relief.

221. The Defendant Village is liable to the Plaintiffs for civil damages and other relief 

for the violation of Plaintiffs’ civil rights.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court grant 

judgement on their behalf and against the Defendant Village of Antioch, Illinois on Count I of 

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, and grant Plaintiffs the following relief:
22

● Compensatory damages and in an amount in excess of $100,000;

● Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

● Grant Plaintiffs the legal right to the requested permit as a consequence of the 

concerted activity of the defendant public officials intended to deprive Plaintiffs 

of their constitutional rights; or, alternatively,

● Remand Plaintiffs’ appeal to the Village Board with instructions for the Village 

Board to take final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance and to 

grant Plaintiffs the requested permit;

● Grant Plaintiffs the right to the free use of their property as permitted by law; and,

● For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Count II

42 U.S.C. § 1983

14th Amendment Substantive Due Process Violation

Against the Defendant Village of Antioch, Illinois

222-320. Plaintiffs adopt by reference thereto as though fully incorporated herein, 

paragraphs 1-98 of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint as paragraphs 222 through 320 of Count II 

herein. 

321. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides, in relevant part:

No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

322. 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 provides that:

‘Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of 

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 

be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress.’
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323. At all times relevant hereto, Section 10-2-4 of the Village Code identified the 

duties of the Village Board under the Village zoning ordinance. In relevant part, Section 10-2-4 

of the Zoning Ordinance the Village Code provided:

“ (1) Jurisdiction. The Village Board shall maintain the following 

responsibilities and duties under this zoning ordinance: ... (b) To review and 

take final action on appeals and variances.”

324. At all times relevant hereto, the Zoning Ordinance created a duty for the Village 

Board to take final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance. 

325. At all times relevant hereto, the Village Board had knowledge of its duty to take 

final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance. 

326. At all times relevant hereto, the Zoning Ordinance created procedural rights for 

Plaintiffs including the right to “final action” by the Village Board on Plaintiffs’ appeal and 

request for a variance. 

327. At all times relevant hereto, the Zoning Ordinance also created substantive 

property rights for Plaintiffs in the permitted uses of their property (Parcel A) under the Zoning 

Ordinance.

328. At all times relevant hereto, the procedural rights created by the Zoning 

Ordinance protected and enabled Plaintiffs’ substantive property rights pertaining to Parcel A.

329. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs’ procedural and substantive due process 

rights created under the Zoning Ordinance were protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution.

330. At all times relevant hereto, the Zoning Ordinance Parcel A’s “M-1” zoning 

classification provided Plaintiffs with a reasonable expectation of being able to use Parcel A for 

purposes authorized under the M-1 zoning classification, consistent with the Zoning Ordinance.
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331. At all times relevant hereto, the Zoning Ordinance created procedural rights for 

Plaintiffs including the right to “final action” by the Village Board on Plaintiffs’ appeal and 

request for a variance.

332. At all times relevant hereto, the Zoning Ordinance created substantive property 

rights for Plaintiffs in the permitted uses of their property (Parcel A) under the Zoning 

Ordinance.

333. At all times relevant hereto, the procedural rights created by the Zoning 

Ordinance protected Plaintiffs’ substantive property rights pertaining to Parcel A.

334. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiffs’ substantive property rights were protected 

by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

335. At the August 2019 meeting, the Village Board failed to take final action on 

Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance.

336. The official actions of the Village Board at the August 12, 2019 Village Board 

meeting established an official policy of the Village whereby the Board’s mandatory duty to take 

final action under the section 10-2-4 of the Zoning Ordinance was abated and the Village Board 

was free to take no action.

337. The Village Board’s change in policy and its failure to take final action on 

Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance deprived Plaintiffs of the procedural due process that 

protects Plaintiffs’ substantive property rights under the Zoning Ordinance.

338. The Village Board’s action in contradiction to the Zoning Ordinance established a 

change in official policy of the Village of Antioch.
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339. The Village’s change in policy had the effect of a denial of Plaintiffs’ appeal and 

request for a variance, without the benefit of final action by the Village Board from which 

Plaintiffs could appeal.

340. The Village Board’s change in policy left Plaintiffs with no permit to develop 

Parcel A, and no final action by the Village Board to appeal.

341. The Village Board’s change in policy was intentional.

342. The Village Board’s change in policy resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ 

property interest in the development and use of Parcel A.

343. The Defendant Village’s change in policy deprived Plaintiffs of all permitted uses 

of Parcel A under the M-1 zoning classification. 

344. The Defendant Village’s change in policy deprived Plaintiffs of their rights under 

the Zoning Ordinance.

345. As a direct and proximate result of the Village Board’s change in policy and its 

failure to take final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance, the Defendant Village 

deprived Plaintiffs of their rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution.

346. As a direct and proximate result of the Mayor’s failure to enforce the zoning 

ordinance to require the Board to take final action, the Defendant Village deprived Plaintiffs of 

their rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

347. As a direct and proximate result of the Village’s change in policy, the Defendant 

Village deprived Plaintiffs of their constitutionally-protected property interests in Parcel A 

without due process of law.
26

348. As a direct and proximate result of the Village’s change in policy the Defendant 

Village deprived Plaintiffs’ of their substantive property rights and use of Parcel A without due 

process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

349. As a direct and proximate result of the Village Board’s change in policy and the 

Mayor’s failure to enforce the zoning ordinance, the Defendant Village caused Plaintiff to suffer 

damages of a pecuniary nature, including loss of use of Parcel A, loss of income, continuing 

money damages, attorney fees, other professional fees, and other pecuniary losses.

350. Plaintiffs’ state court remedies are inadequate to redress plaintiffs’ damages and 

do not provide Plaintiffs with complete relief.

351. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, the Defendant 

Village is liable to the Plaintiffs for civil damages and other relief for the violation of Plaintiffs’ 

civil rights.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court grant 

judgement on their behalf and against the Defendant Village of Antioch, Illinois on Count II of 

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, and grant Plaintiffs the following relief:

● Compensatory damages and in an amount in excess of $100,000;

● Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

● Grant Plaintiffs the legal right to the requested permit as a consequence of the 

concerted activity of the defendant public officials intended to deprive Plaintiffs 

of their constitutional rights; or, alternatively,

● Remand Plaintiffs’ appeal to the Village Board with instructions for the Village 

Board to take final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance and to 

grant Plaintiffs the requested permit;

● Grant Plaintiffs the right to the free use of their property as permitted by law; and,

● For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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Count III

Conspiracy – Illinois Common Law

Against the Defendants Gerald T. Johnson, Daniel F. Yost, 

Edward A. Macek, Scott A. Pierce, Ted P. Poulos, Mary C. Dominiak, and 

Lawrence M. Hanson, in their individual capacity

352-449. Plaintiffs adopt by reference thereto as though fully incorporated herein, 

paragraphs 1-98 of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint as paragraphs 352 through 449 of Count III 

herein. 

450. At the time of the August 12, 2019 Village Board meeting, Plaintiffs had satisfied 

all of the legitimate requirements of the Zoning Ordinance to receive approval of the site plan 

and variance sought in Plaintiffs’ appeal. 

451. At all times relevant hereto, the Village Board had a duty under the Zoning 

Ordinance to take final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance.

452. At all times relevant hereto, each of the Defendants, Gerald T. Johnson, Daniel F. 

Yost, Edward A. Macek, Scott A. Pierce, Ted P. Poulos, Mary C. Dominiak, and Lawrence M. 

Hanson knew the Village Board had a duty under the Zoning Ordinance to take final action on 

Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance.

453. At all times relevant hereto, the Village Mayor had a duty under Illinois law to 

enforce the ordinances of the Village of Antioch, Illinois.

454. At all times relevant hereto, Lawrence M. Hanson knew that the Village Mayor 

had a duty under Illinois law to enforce the ordinances of the Village of Antioch, Illinois.

455. The Defendants Gerald T. Johnson, Daniel F. Yost, Edward A. Macek, Scott A. 

Pierce, Ted P. Poulos, Mary C. Dominiak, and Lawrence M. Hanson knew that if the Village 

Board voted to deny Plaintiffs’ appeal and variance, Plaintiffs would have legal recourse in State 

court.
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456. The Defendants Gerald T. Johnson, Daniel F. Yost, Edward A. Macek, Scott A. 

Pierce, Ted P. Poulos, Mary C. Dominiak, and Lawrence M. Hanson also knew that the Village 

Board’s failure to take final action on Plaintiffs’ site plan would have the effect of a denial 

without the Board’s having had to take final action from which Plaintiffs could appeal.

457. In contradiction to the Zoning Ordinance, each of the Defendants, Gerald T. 

Johnson, Daniel F. Yost, Edward A. Macek, Scott A. Pierce, Ted P. Poulos, Mary C. Dominiak, 

and Lawrence M. Hanson, agreed to engage in concerted action to refrain from taking final 

action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance at the August 12, 2019 Village Board 

meeting. 

458. The Defendants conspired together for the unlawful purpose of taking plaintiffs’ 

private property by inverse condemnation in that Defendants acted to force plaintiffs to construct 

a public roadway at plaintiffs’ expense from Drom Court through Parcels B, C, and D to Anita 

Street, to force Plaintiffs to give the Village an easement to use the road for public roadway 

purposes, and to force Plaintiffs to submit to the Village’s inverse condemnation of their 

properties without compensation to the Plaintiffs.

459. Each of the Defendants, Gerald T. Johnson, Daniel F. Yost, Edward A. Macek, 

Scott A. Pierce, Ted P. Poulos, and Mary C. Dominiak, acted in furtherance of their agreement 

refraining from taking final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance, at the August 

12, 2019 Village Board meeting, in contradiction to the Zoning Ordinance. 

460. The conduct of the Defendants was intentional and was taken with corrupt 

motives and with willful and wanton disregard for the rights of the Plaintiffs.
29

461. The governmental taking of private property without due process of law and 

without compensation is unlawful and is prohibited by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the United States Constitution. 

462. By their agreement, each of the Defendants agreed to commit or to participate in 

the commission of an unlawful act.

463. Defendant Lawrence M. Hanson acted in furtherance of the agreement among the 

defendants, by failing to enforce the Zoning Ordinance to require the Village Board to take final 

action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance at the August 12, 2019 Village Board 

meeting.

464. At all times relevant hereto, each of the Defendants knew that it was unlawful to 

use the Village Board’s site plan approval authority to force the Plaintiffs to submit to inverse 

condemnation.

465. The Defendants’ plan to force Plaintiffs into constructing a road across Plaintiffs’ 

private property, at Plaintiffs’ expense, so that the Village could then take Plaintiffs’ private 

property for public roadway purposes without compensation constitutes inverse condemnation.

466. The Defendants used the Village’s site plan approval authority to attempt to force 

Plaintiffs to submit to inverse condemnation without compensation.

467. The Defendants’ plan for the Village to acquire Plaintiffs’ property for public 

roadway purposes by inverse condemnation was an unlawful purpose.

468. The Defendants’ agreement to withhold final Village Board action on Plaintiffs’ 

appeal and request for a variance violated the Zoning Ordinance.
30

469. By withholding final action on Plaintiffs’ appeal and request for a variance unless 

or until Plaintiffs submitted to inverse condemnation, each of the Defendants committed an 

unlawful act.

470. At all times relevant hereto, each of the Defendants knew it was unlawful for 

government to take private property for public use, without just compensation.

471. By planning to withhold final action and enforcement of the Zoning Ordinance, 

and by their subsequent conduct of withholding final action and enforcement of the Zoning 

Ordinance, each the Defendants conspired to acquire Plaintiffs property by inverse 

condemnation, to deprive Plaintiffs’ of rights secured by the Zoning Ordinance, and each of the 

Defendants took actions in furtherance of the conspiracy.

472. The conduct of the Defendants was intentional and taken with willful and wanton 

disregard for the rights of the Plaintiffs.

473. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants Gerald T. 

Johnson, Daniel F. Yost, Edward A. Macek, Scott A. Pierce, Ted P. Poulos, Mary C. Dominiak, 

and Lawrence M. Hanson, Plaintiffs suffered a deprivation of their property rights in Parcel A.

474. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendants, Plaintiffs 

suffered damages of a pecuniary nature, including loss of use of Parcel A, lost revenues, 

continuing money damages, attorney fees, other professional fees, and other pecuniary losses.

475. The Defendants Gerald T. Johnson, Daniel F. Yost, Edward A. Macek, Scott A. 

Pierce, Ted P. Poulos, Mary C. Dominiak, and Lawrence M. Hanson are liable to the Plaintiffs 

for civil damages and other relief for the violation of Plaintiffs’ rights.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court grant 

judgement on their behalf and against the Defendants Gerald T. Johnson, Daniel F. Yost, Edward 
31

A. Macek, Scott A. Pierce, Ted P. Poulos, Mary C. Dominiak, and Lawrence M. Hanson, in their 

individual capacity, on Count III of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, and grant Plaintiffs the

following relief:

● Compensatory damages from the Defendant Village and in an amount in excess of 

$100,000;

● Punitive damages against each of the Defendants, Gerald T. Johnson, Daniel F. 

Yost, Edward A. Macek, Scott A. Pierce, Ted P. Poulos, Mary C. Dominiak, and 

Lawrence M. Hanson, in their individual capacity, and in an amount in excess of 

$300,000; and

● For such other and further relief as the court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James T. Harrison

James T. Harrison

Attorney for Plaintiffs

Harrison Law Offices, P.C.

684 S. Eastwood Drive

Woodstock, IL 60098

815-338-7773

Atty. No. 6207020

jharrison@harrisonlawoffices.com

Case No. 20CV4744