J-A22007-16

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

J.E.C. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

C.C.C.

Appellant No. 435 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered February 19, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Civil Division at No(s): Cl-12-15695

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 06, 2016

C.C.C. (“Father”) appeals pro se from an order in this child custody 

proceeding directing him to undergo a psychological evaluation to determine 

whether he poses a risk of harm to the parties’ children. The ultimate 

determination of custody remains pending. For the reasons articulated 

below, we quash this appeal. 

J.E.C. (“Mother”) and Father married in 2004 but later divorced. The 

parties have two minor children. On October 17, 2012, Mother filed a 

custody complaint against Father. On May 6, 2013, the court ordered the 

parties to share legal custody but gave primary physical custody of the 

children to Mother and partial physical custody to Father pursuant to a 

defined schedule. Father appealed the custody order, and on May 12, 2015, 

this Court affirmed at 1387 MDA 2014. 
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On October 23, 2015, Mother filed a petition to modify custody 

alleging that the trial court had entered a Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) 

against Father on September 23, 2015 for abusing his girlfriend. Due to this 

PFA order and prior PFA orders entered against Father in 2012 and 2015, the 

court scheduled a Risk Of Harm hearing. 

On January 22, 2016, the court held a Risk Of Harm hearing. The 

court ordered Father to undergo and pay for a psychological evaluation by a 

licensed and qualified professional to determine whether he posed a risk of 

harm to the children. The prothonotary mistakenly docketed the order in 

the divorce docket instead of in the custody docket. Upon discovering this 

error, the court issued an amended order on February 18, 2016 at the 

correct docket number. Father appealed from this order, and both Father 

and the court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Father raises eight issues in this appeal:

1. Was the court’s initial misfiling of the Risk of Harm Order a 

violation of Pa.R.Civ.P. 1915.4(d), pertaining to prompt 

disposition in custody trials?

2. Whether the court erred in holding the hearing and entering 

the order pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 5329?

3. Whether the court’s decision that the children’s testimony was 

not necessary prevented the father from presenting a full 

defense?

4. Whether the court’s decision that the children’s testimony was 

not necessary violated [their] right to testify on their own 

behalf?
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5. Whether the court erred by not granting Father’s request to 

obtain Children and Youth records of the mother?

6. Whether the court exhibited bias or prejudice, failed to 

maintain judicial impartiality, and improperly apply the law as a 

result?

7. Whether the overriding concern of the court was the 

scheduling/weather related issue?

8. Where the Order and the statements made by the court in the

Reconsideration Hearing exhibits the court’s poor attention to 

detail, thus causing the competence and diligence of the court to 

be questioned?

Brief For Father, at 6-7. None of these issues are appealable at this 

juncture.

An appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order certified as 

a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory order as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 

311); (3) an interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 312, 1311, 42 

Pa.C.S. § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313). We briefly 

summarize the nature of each order. 

An order is final and appealable if it dismisses all the claims or parties 

or includes the express determination that an immediate appeal would 

facilitate resolution of the case. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b-c).

An order is a collateral order, immediately appealable as of right, if: 

(1) the matter is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; 

(2) it involves a right too important to be denied review; and (3) is such that 

the claimed right would be irreparably lost if review is postponed until final 

judgment in the case. Pa.R.A.P. 313.
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An interlocutory (non-final) order is appealable as of right if it falls 

within specific categories of orders delineated within Pa.R.A.P. 311. 

Lastly, an interlocutory order is appealable by permission if the 

appellant seeks and obtains permission to appeal the order under the strict 

requirements prescribed within Pa.R.A.P. 1311 and 1312. 

In his first argument on appeal, Father contends that the court 

violated his right under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1915.4(d) to prompt disposition of his 

custody case by filing the order directing psychological testing on the divorce 

docket instead of the custody docket. Rule 1915.4(d) provides that the 

court shall decide a custody case within 15 days after conclusion of trial. Id. 

The court may extend the decision date for good cause but not for more 

than 45 days after conclusion of trial. Id. 

This issue is not appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341, because there is no 

final order disposing of all parties and issues in Father’s custody case, and 

the court did not make an express determination that an immediate appeal 

of this issue would facilitate resolution of this case. Nor is this issue 

appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 313, because this issue does not satisfy any of 

Rule 313’s three criteria. The brief delay in docketing the order properly (1) 

is not separable from and collateral to the substance of the custody action; 

(2) does not involve a right too important to be denied review; and (3) is 

not a right that will be irreparably lost if review is postponed until final 

judgment in the case. 
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This is merely an interlocutory order that does not fall within any 

category of appealable interlocutory orders with Pa.R.A.P. 311. Father did 

not seek or obtain permission to appeal this interlocutory order under 

Pa.R.A.P. 1311. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review this issue.

In his second argument on appeal, Father insists that the court abused 

its discretion in ordering him to undergo psychological testing to determine 

whether he poses a risk of harm to the children. This order is not a final 

order under Pa.R.A.P. 341, because the court did not enter a final order 

disposing of all custody issues or make an express determination that an 

immediate appeal of this issue would facilitate resolution of this case. It 

does not fall within any category of appealable interlocutory orders under 

Pa.R.A.P. 311. Nor did Father seek or obtain permission to appeal this order 

under Pa.R.A.P. 1311. Lastly, this order does not satisfy the collateral order 

doctrine. See Miller v. Steinbach, 681 A.2d 775, 777 (Pa.Super.1996) 

(order directing father to submit to and pay for psychological evaluations 

before custody determination was not final order or otherwise appealable; 

order was not appealable interlocutory order under Pa.R.A.P. 311, father 

failed to invoke procedure for interlocutory appeal by permission, and order 

was not collateral order because it was intertwined with custody 

determination).

It is illuminating to distinguish two other decisions from the present 

case. In one decision, we held that an order compelling a parent to undergo 
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psychological testing is appealable under the collateral order doctrine 

because the order implicated the parent’s privacy rights. Matter of T.R., 

665 A.2d 1260, 1263 (Pa.Super.1995), reversed on other grounds, 731 

A.2d 1276 (Pa.1999) (order compelling testing appealable as collateral order 

because parent’s privacy interests were separable from the main cause of 

action, right of privacy was too important to be denied review, and 

postponement of review until after final judgment would cause irreparable 

harm to the parent’s privacy interests). On another occasion, we held that a 

discovery order compelling a parent to produce allegedly privileged mental 

health records to the other parent was an appealable collateral order. M.M. 

v. L.M., 55 A.3d 1167, 1168 n. 1 (Pa.Super.2012). These decisions are 

inapposite here, because Father does not contend that the order in question 

violated his privacy rights or any privilege. He argues only that 

psychological testing is unreasonable because he does not have any criminal 

history. Brief For Father, at 18-21. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to 

review Father’s argument.

We address Father’s third through eighth arguments together. Father 

complains that the court erred in refusing to permit his children to testify; 

denying his request for Mother’s CYS records; failing to remain neutral and 

impartial; focusing unnecessarily on scheduling and weather-related issues; 

and ignoring important evidence. Once again, these issues are not 

appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 341, because the court did not enter a final order 
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disposing of all custody issues or make an express determination that an 

immediate appeal of these issues would facilitate resolution of this case. 

These issues do not fall within any category of appealable interlocutory 

orders under Pa.R.A.P. 311. Nor did Father seek or obtain permission to 

appeal these issues under Pa.R.A.P. 1311. Finally, these issues do not 

implicate the collateral order doctrine, because they are not separable from 

the underlying custody issue, are not too important to be denied review, and 

can await a final order without causing irreparable harm to Father. 

In short, none of the issues raised by Father are appealable. We 

therefore quash this appeal.

Appeal quashed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/6/2016