UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

In Re: LEO C. LOEVNER,

Debtor.

LEO C. LOEVNER,

Debtor-Appellant,

No. 97-2568

v.

LUCIUS LAMAR; JEANNE C. MURPHY;

D. & J. OSTROWSKY,

Claimants-Appellees,

GREY HODNETT, Trustee,

Trustee-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

T.S. Ellis, III, District Judge.

(CA-97-899-A, CA-97-919-A, BK-95-11782-SSM)

Argued: October 30, 1998

Decided: December 1, 1998

Before WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

STAMP, Chief United States District Judge for the

Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: David Edgar Jones, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Lawrence Thomas Brooke, Fairfax, Virginia; Bernard Fensterwald, III,

Vienna, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Mark A. Bayer, Washington, D.C., for Appellee Hodnett.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Leo C. Loevner appeals an order of the district court affirming

United States Bankruptcy Judge Stephen S. Mitchell's dismissal of

appellant's petition pursuant to Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code,

11 U.S.C. § 1301, et seq. Finding no error in the district court's opinion, we affirm.

I.

Appellees, Greg Hodnett, Lucius Lamar, Jeanne C. Murphy and

David Ostrowski ("Creditors"), were customers of Loevner who

worked as an investment advisor. After Loevner lost certain money

that the Creditors had entrusted to him, the Creditors each filed suit

against Loevner in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia. In

1992, the circuit court rendered judgments in favor of each creditor.

In 1993, Loevner filed for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7, seeking

discharge of all of his debts. The Creditors instituted adversary proceedings to establish that the state court judgments were not dischargeable. United States Bankruptcy Judge Douglas O. Tice, Jr.

ruled that the judgments were not dischargeable debts. In 1994, Judge

Tice issued separate orders in each creditor's case. Each order

excepted from discharge the amount of the applicable state court

judgment. Those amounts totaled $213,645.50.

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In 1995, Loevner filed Chapter 13 proceedings and the Creditors

filed proofs of claims. Those claims included interest amounts that

had accrued from the time the state court judgments were rendered.

Those claims totaled $309,870.19. Loevner objected to those amounts

and United States Bankruptcy Judge Stephen S. Mitchell overruled

the objections and dismissed the Chapter 13 petition because under

Chapter 13 bankruptcy, a debtor may not owe more than $250,000 in

non-contingent, liquidated, unsecured claims on the date the petition

was filed. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). Judge Mitchell found that the claims

should be allowed in the amounts as stated. United States District

Judge T.S. Ellis, III, affirmed Judge Mitchell's decision.

Noting that "interest is an integral part of a non-dischargeable debt

under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code . . . ." (J.A. at 117), the

district court found that Judge Mitchell had construed Judge Tice's

orders correctly and likewise found that Judge Tice had not entered

new judgments but simply refused to discharge existing judgments

that included interest dating from the date of the state court judgment.

Both parties to this appeal agree that the Creditors are entitled to

post-judgment interest as a part of the non-dischargeable debt. The

parties dispute whether that interest began to accrue from the date of

the state court judgments or from the date of Judge Tice's orders.

Loevner urges this Court to find that Judge Tice entered new judgments and because he did not expressly state that the state court judgments "plus interest" were excepted from discharge, post-judgment

interest accrued from the date of Judge Tice's orders and not the date

of the state court Chapter 13 bankruptcy because he would not owe

more than $250,000 in non-contingent, liquidated, unsecured claims

on the date the petition was filed.

It is clear to this Court after reviewing the record in this matter that

the bankruptcy court did not enter new judgments against Loevner;

rather, it simply refused to discharge existing judgments. The bankruptcy court's memorandum opinions and orders referred to excepting

from discharge the individual state court judgments. Moreover, with

respect to Hodnett's claims, Judge Tice noted that the state court

judgment had been partly satisfied which indicates that the bankruptcy court was simply refusing to discharge the judgment as

opposed to entering a new judgment. With respect to the claims of

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Lamar, Murphy, and Ostrowski, the bankruptcy court noted that

because the judgments were excepted from discharge pursuant to Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code that attorney's fees and other

ancillary costs were appropriately included in the proofs of claims.

These considerations indicate that it was the state court judgment as

it existed that the bankruptcy court refused to discharge and that the

court was not entering new judgments. This Court also finds that postjudgment interest from the date of the state court judgments was properly included in the claims filed in the Chapter 13 proceedings.

Jennen v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 771 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1985),

upon which Loevners relies, does not compel a different result. Loevner argues that Jennen stands for the proposition that if a creditor fails

to assert its entitlement to interest on a non-dischargeable debt before

the bankruptcy court, the creditor foregoes its entitlement to such

interest. Under this rationale, according to Loevner, the Creditors

have foregone that interest which accrued from the date of the state

court judgments to the date of the judgments rendered by Judge Tice

because they failed to seek that interest in the bankruptcy proceedings. Had the court in Jennen decided this issue, Loevner's argument

might be persuasive. However, the court "decline[d] to reach or

decide this claim [which was] raised for the first time on appeal" and

remanded the issue to the bankruptcy court. 771 F.2d at 1132.

As previously noted, the district court found that the bankruptcy

court had not entered new judgments against Loevner but merely

found that existing judgments plus interest accrued thereon were nondischargeable. This Court finds no error in that ruling.

II.

We have carefully considered the briefs and oral argument of the

parties and those portions of the record pertinent to the various arguments. Having done so, we find no reversible error in the opinion and

decision of the district court. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning

of the district court.

AFFIRMED

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