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Filed 9/9/16 Roshan, LLC v. Peltekci CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ROSHAN, LLC,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SAIT PELTEKCI et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

E064205

(Super.Ct.No. UDFS1406704)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Lily L. Sinfield, 

Judge. Reversed with directions.

Law Offices of Richard Pech and Richard Pech for Defendants and Appellants.

Chandler Law Firm, Robert C. Chandler, and Carla R. Kralovic for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
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Defendants Sait and Albert Peltekci are tenants who prevailed in an unlawful 

detainer action brought by their landlord, Roshan, LLC. The Peltekcis appeal from the 

trial court’s order awarding them attorney fees under Civil Code section 1717 totaling 

less than 15 percent of their actual expenses. Despite the Peltekcis’ submission of billing 

records detailing work their counsel performed over approximately six months of 

litigation, the trial court awarded fees for only four days of trial, three days of trial 

preparation, and two pretrial motions.

A fee award under Civil Code section 1717 calculated using the lodestar method 

should represent “a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that 

time.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (PLCM Group), 

italics added.) Because the record discloses the trial court considered only a portion of 

the hours counsel spent on the case, we conclude the trial court’s application of the 

lodestar method was erroneous. We therefore remand the matter for a new determination 

of the amount of attorney fees to be awarded to Peltekcis’ counsel.

I

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Peltekcis rent space from Roshan, LLC in a commercial shopping center in 

Ontario and operate under the dba Ontario Jewelry Plaza. Their commercial lease with 

Roshan, LLC provides in the event of “an action to enforce the [lease’s] terms . . . the 

prevailing party in any such action, trial or appeal thereon, shall be entitled to his 
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reasonable attorneys’ fees to be paid by the losing party as fixed by the court.” Roshan,

LLC initiated an unlawful detainer action against the Peltekcis in September 2014,

seeking $336,432.06 in alleged unpaid rent for the period of February 2011 to July 2014. 

To represent them in the litigation, the Peltekcis hired the Law Offices of Richard Pech, a 

firm located in Santa Monica. After four months of pretrial proceedings—during which 

the Peltekcis’ counsel, Richard Pech (partner) and Thang Le (associate), conducted 

discovery, filed a number of motions, including a successful motion to compel discovery 

resulting in sanctions, and attended a settlement conference—the case went to trial. The 

jury returned a verdict for the Peltekcis, finding they had not missed any rent payments 

and Roshan, LLC had suffered no damages.

Following judgment in their favor, the Peltekcis sought attorney fees under Civil 

Code section 1717 as the prevailing party under the lease agreement. They requested a 

total of $185,897 for 618.6 hours of attorney and paralegal time spent on the case from its 

inception, through discovery, pretrial motions, trial, and postjudgment work. In support 

of the requested fee, Mr. Pech filed a declaration in which he set forth his qualifications 

and experience, as well as that of Mr. Le and the paralegal and assistants who worked on 

the case. Mr. Pech described the work his firm performed in defending the action and 

attached detailed billing records. As explained in the declaration and documented in the 

billing records, Mr. Pech’s trial team researched affirmative defenses and issues raised in 

the complaint, conducted discovery, which included deposing Roshan, LLC’s main 

witness, successfully compelled discovery responses and obtained over $2,000 in 
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sanctions, moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground the notice to pay rent or 

quit was defective, successfully moved to abate the action on the ground Roshan 

Properties, LLC was not a registered entity and therefore not authorized to sue (which 

resulted in Roshan, LLC filing an amended complaint), drafted a trial brief, prepared trial 

documents such as jury instructions and exhibit lists, pursued settlement options and 

attended a mandatory settlement conference, applied for and attended an ex parte hearing 

regarding entry of judgment, and prepared a memorandum of costs and motion for 

attorney fees. The Peltekcis filed their fees motion with Judge Lily Sinfield, who 

presided over pretrial proceedings before transferring the case to Judge Donna Garza for 

trial.

Roshan, LLC filed an opposition arguing it was not liable for attorney fees as a 

non-party to the lease and that the requested fees were excessive and unreasonable. 

Roshan, LLC did not specify which fees it viewed as unreasonable. Instead, it claimed 

$18,000 would be a reasonable fee “for the law and motion practice, four-day jury trial, 

and other claimed charges.”

After a hearing on the motion, the court took the matter under submission and 

issued a statement of decision. At the outset of the decision, the court noted that the 

Peltekcis had filed their motion in the law and motion court (Judge Sinfield) as opposed 

to the trial court (Judge Garza) and that neither party had objected to the former hearing 

the motion. The court also rejected Roshan, LLC’s argument it was not liable for 

attorney fees.
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As to the amount of the award, the court stated it had reviewed the Peltekcis’

moving papers and attachments and found the requested fee “excessive and 

unreasonable.” The court cited three instances of unreasonable fees. First, it found 

excessive 25.8 hours of travel, preparation, and trial time for the first day of trial because 

only Mr. Pech had appeared in court.

1

 Second, it found excessive the 9.7 hours a legal 

assistant had billed on the fourth day of trial for travel and trial assistance, which 

included running the PowerPoint presentation for closing argument. Third, it found the 

approximately one hour Mr. Le spent preparing a subpoena duces tecum to be duplicative 

of the approximately one hour a legal assistant spent on the same document: “The court 

finds unpersuasive that two different individuals and two hours were required to prepare 

a [subpoena duces tecum].” Finally, the court found the Peltekcis had not demonstrated it 

was necessary to hire a Santa Monica firm as opposed to a local, Inland Empire firm with 

lower billing rates. The court selected $300 as a reasonable billing rate for a local

unlawful detainer attorney.

The court concluded the Peltekcis were entitled to a total of $23,800 in fees. It

explained how it reached this amount using the lodestar method: “[T]he court considered 

the minutes which reflected a four (4) day trial commencing around 10:00 a.m. each trial 

day and concluding around 4:00 p.m.—six (6) hours of trial work. The court also added 

 

1 The statement of decision refers to December 3, 2015 as the first day of trial, 

and on appeal the Peltekcis cite this date as an example of error in the court’s analysis; 

however, we conclude the error was simply typographic and the court intended to refer to 

February 3, 2015.
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ten (10) hours of trial preparation days for three days and three (3) hours per day of travel 

time for four (4) days. The court multiplied those total hours of 66 to $300 per hour for 

the local unlawful detainer attorney rate. The total sum from these calculations is 

$19,800 . . . The [Peltekcis] prevailed on the Motion to Compel in October 2014, and the 

Motion to Abate in December 2015 [sic] . . . The court awards an additional $2,000.00 

per prevailing motion to the award for attorney fees. Thus, the court awards to the 

[Peltekcis] $23,800 in attorney fees as the prevailing party.” To summarize, the court 

allocated 36 hours for the trial and 30 hours for trial preparation for a total of 66 hours, 

and added to that total $4,000 for two successful motions.

As support for this reduced figure, the court cited Save Our Uniquely Rural 

Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179 

(SOURCE), a case where this court affirmed an 80 percent reduction in attorney fees. 

(Id. at p. 1189.) Analogizing to that case, the court reasoned a reduction of the Peltekcis’

requested amount was appropriate because the unlawful detainer action was a relatively 

short and simple case and because they had hired expensive, non-local counsel without 

justification.

The Peltekcis timely appealed.
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II

DISCUSSION

A. The Fee Award Was Not Designed to Fully Compensate Counsel

The Peltekcis argue the trial court erred in awarding fees for only four days of 

trial, three days of trial prep, and two pretrial motions and disregarding the rest of the

time their counsel spent litigating the case. The Peltekcis’ argument is well taken. While 

a trial court has broad discretion to determine a reasonable fee for the hours the 

prevailing party expended on a case, the fee must fully compensate the party, meaning 

the court cannot award fees for only a portion of the case unless it finds the other portion 

unreasonable and thus not compensable.

We review a fee award for abuse of discretion. (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th 

at p. 1095.) As an initial matter, the Peltekcis argue we should afford less discretion to 

the court’s order because the judge who issued it did not preside over the trial. There is 

some authority for the proposition that a reviewing court may apply a less deferential 

standard of review to a fee order issued by a judge other than the one who presided over 

the merits of the litigation. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino

(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 603, 616 (Center for Biological Diversity) [“when, as here, the 

fee order under review was rendered by a judge other than the trial judge, we may 

exercise ‘ “somewhat more latitude in determining whether there has been an abuse of 

discretion than would be true in the usual case” ’ ”].) However, Judge Sinfield presided 

over the case for several months before transferring it to Judge Garza for trial and thus is 
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familiar with the issues of this case and counsel’s performance. In any event, we need 

not decide whether to modify our standard of review because the court’s application of 

the lodestar method was erroneous under either abuse of discretion standard.

When attorney fees are authorized by contract, Civil Code section 1717, 

subdivision (a) provides, “the prevailing party . . . shall be entitled to reasonable 

attorney’s fees.” The trial court must fix a reasonable fee award, and it has broad 

discretion in determining the amount. (Civ. Code, § 1717; PLCM Group, supra, 22 

Cal.4th at p. 1096.) “The court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended 

on the case and a reasonable hourly rate for the work.” (Douglas E. Barnhart, Inc. v. 

CMC Fabricators, Inc. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 230, 249, italics added, citing PLCM 

Group, at p. 1095.) The hours “reasonably spent” includes “those necessary to establish 

and defend the fee claim.” (Serrano v. Unruh (1982) 32 Cal.3d 621, 639.)

In this case, the court used the widely-accepted lodestar method to determine the 

fee award.2 Under the lodestar method, a court must first determine the actual hours 

counsel has spent on the case, subtract any hours it finds inefficient or unreasonable, and 

multiply that amount by a reasonable billing rate. (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin

(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 697; Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State 

 

2 The Peltekcis contend the court’s predominate error was a failure to use the 

lodestar method, which they argue is mandatory. The lodestar method is not mandatory. 

(PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1097 [the lodestar method is “presumably 

reasonable” but “the trial court is not precluded from using other methodologies”].) In 

any event, it is evident from the statement of decision that the trial court did use the 

lodestar method.
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University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395, (Horsford) [“[T]he court’s discretion in 

awarding attorney fees is . . . to be exercised so as to fully compensate counsel for the 

prevailing party for services reasonably provided to his or her client”].) The court has 

discretion to adjust the product of this calculation upward or downward “based on 

consideration of factors specific to the case,” such as the complexity of the litigation, 

counsel’s skill, and the amount of money involved, “in order to fix the fee at the fair 

market value for the legal services provided.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 

p. 1095.)

A court abuses its broad discretion if it “applie[s] ‘the wrong test’ or standard” in 

setting the fee. (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 92 

(Gorman) [reversing fee award because appellate court could discern no rational basis for 

the court’s downward adjustment of the lodestar amount].) A court incorrectly applies 

the lodestar method when it fails to fully compensate counsel for “services provided” on 

the case. (Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at pp. 395-396.) “The basis for the trial 

court’s calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those 

that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time.” (Id. at p. 395, italics added.)

Several cases illustrate this point. In Horsford, the appellate court reversed the fee 

award because it did not appear, “from a review of the record of the fee award hearings, 

that the trial court undertook its review of the fee issue with a focus on providing an 

award of attorney fees reasonably designed to fully compensate plaintiffs’ attorneys for 

the services provided.” (Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 395.) The appellate 
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court held the trial court erred in “completely disregarding” the billing records and failing 

to “use [those] records as the starting point for its lodestar determination.” (Id. at p. 397.)

The appellate court explained that “verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers 

of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are

erroneous.” (Id. at p. 396.)

In Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, the prevailing party requested 

$15,647 in fees and the court awarded $3,000. (Id. at p. 681.) The appellate court found 

the award bore “no rational relationship to the actual fees incurred” based on its 

observation that, “[o]f the 80 hours [counsel] and his associate expended on the matter, 

almost 35 hours were devoted to trial preparation, drafting the trial brief, trailing and 

attendance at trial” and that “[t]his time alone accounted for more than $4,000 in fees.” 

(Id. at p. 686.)

In Center for Biological Diversity, the fee award excluded over 55 percent of the

hours counsel claimed to have spent litigating the appeal. (Center for Biological 

Diversity, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 620.) The appellate court concluded it was error 

to set a rate that did not “fully compensate” (id. at p. 623) counsel for the services 

provided, stating, “ ‘California courts have consistently held that a computation of time 

spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of 

an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.’ ” (Id. at p. 616, italics added, quoting PLCM 

Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.) The appellate court explained that, on remand, “a 

reduction of some of the claimed hours for the appeal . . . may be justified on the ground 
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of duplication,” but the starting point must be full compensation. (Center for Biological 

Diversity, at p. 622.)

The court’s fee award in this case suffers from the same defect—it fails to take 

into account all hours reasonably spent on the litigation. While it is true we “indulge all 

intendments and presumptions to support the trial court’s order,” we are required to do so 

only on “matters as to which the record is silent.”3 (Hill v. Affirmed Housing Group

(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1196 (Hill).) Where the record clearly discloses the trial 

court has made a mistake of law, we must reverse. Here, the trial court explicitly stated it

awarded fees for only four days of trial, three days of trial preparation, and two pretrial 

motions, despite the fact the billing records demonstrate Mr. Pech’s firm spent time 

litigating the case in the months leading up to trial (developing case strategy, conducting 

discovery, filing various motions, pursuing settlement) and in the weeks after trial 

(obtaining entry of judgment and moving for attorney fees). The record also 

demonstrates the parties attended five days of trial. The parties gave closing argument on 

the fourth day, but they appeared in court the following day for jury questions and the 

 

3 We note a silent record does not shield a trial court’s fee award from reversal in 

every instance. When the appellate court can hypothesize no rational reason for the 

award from a silent record, the award must be reversed. (E.g., Gorman, supra, 178 

Cal.App.4th at p. 101 [reversing award on a silent record, stating “after much puzzlement 

and frustration, we have been unable to surmise any mathematical or logical explanation 

for the trial court’s award. . . . Instead, the number appears to have been snatched 

whimsically from thin air. It is the essence of arbitrariness to make an award of attorney 

fees that cannot be justified by the plaintiffs’ request, the supporting bills, or the 

defendant’s opposition”].)
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verdict. The court’s failure to consider the fifth day of trial as well as the pretrial and 

posttrial work was error.

SOURCE, supra, which the trial court relied on in reducing the fee from $185,897 

to $23,800 does not support that type of reduction here. In SOURCE, the prevailing party 

requested $110,599, with a multiplier of two, for a total of $221,198. (SOURCE, supra, 

235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1183.) The trial court found the requested amount “ ‘outrageous,’ ” 

concluded a multiplier was not warranted, and reduced the fee to $19,176. (Ibid.) 

Although the trial court did not explain how it had arrived at this amount, the record 

supported “reasons for reducing the fees that the court might legitimately have relied 

upon, even if it did not state them explicitly.” (Id. at p. 1185.) The appellate court 

concluded it was obliged to presume the award was reasonable unless it was “convinced” 

the award was “clearly wrong.” (Id. at p. 1186.) In this case, we cannot escape the 

conclusion the court’s award was clearly wrong because the court made clear it was 

compensating counsel only for two motions and 66 hours of trial and trial preparation out 

of the 618.6 hours documented in the billing records.

We are not suggesting that on remand the trial court should “become enmeshed in 

a meticulous analysis of every detailed facet of the professional representation.” (PLCM 

Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1098.) Rather, the court should determine the number of 

hours counsel reasonably spent on the entire litigation—not just during trial and not just 

on motions that were successful—and multiply that number by a reasonable rate. In 

conducting this analysis the court is free to disregard hours it finds to be excessive or 
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duplicative. A prevailing party is not “automatically entitled” to all hours claimed in the 

fee request. (Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1243.) 

In reviewing the hours the Peltekcis’ counsel spent on the litigation, the trial court may 

determine that some were not reasonably spent. “[T]rial courts must carefully review 

attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or 

duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation.” (Gorman, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 64, citing Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.)

Putting aside the error regarding the number of compensable hours, the trial court

did not err in using $300 as a reasonable billing rate. The Peltekcis do not challenge that 

rate on appeal and they did not justify the higher rate in their motion. “[T]he party 

seeking the fee award has the burden to prove that it was justified in paying higher rates 

to attorneys from outside the local market.” (SOURCE, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1187.) A trial court “may make its own determination of the value of the services” as 

“[t]he value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has 

its own expertise.” (PLCM Group, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096.)

B. Roshan LLC’s Corporate Status

The Peltekcis contend the trial court erred in failing to treat their motion for fees 

as uncontested because Roshan, LLC was suspended by the California Secretary of State 

when it opposed the motion and, as such, was prohibited from litigating the issue. Even 

if Roshan, LLC were suspended at that time, a court is not required to accept an 

uncontested fee request. Civil Code section 1717 directs the court to determine a 
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reasonable fee award. (Gorman, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 91-92 [Code Civ. Proc.,

§ 1021 provides that compensation for attorney fees is left to the agreement of the parties

unless a statute provides otherwise and Civ. Code, § 1717 provides that fees authorized 

by contract shall be “fixed by the court”].)

C. Attorney Fees on Appeal

The Peltekcis seek attorney fees incurred in the current appeal. As the prevailing 

party on appeal, their lease and Civil Code section 1717 entitle them to such fees. (Hill, 

supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1199.) “ ‘Although this court has the power to fix attorney 

fees on appeal, the better practice is to have the trial court determine such fees.’

[Citation.]” (Center for Biological Diversity, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 624.)

III

DISPOSITION

The order for attorney fees is reversed. We remand the matter to the trial court to 

determine—in addition to the fees it already awarded—the reasonable value of the 

Peltekcis’ pretrial and posttrial attorney fees and costs, including those pertaining to this 

appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

SLOUGH

J.

We concur:
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HOLLENHORST

Acting P. J.

MILLER

J.