IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

DOMINIQUE STINSON and OCTAVIA 

WILLIAMS, individually and on behalf of all 

others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

LCS COMMUNITY EMPLOYMENT LLC, 

LCS MOKENA LLC d/b/a CLARENDALE 

OF MOKENA, and ALGONQUIN 

OPERATIONS, LLC d/b/a CLARENDALE 

OF ALGONQUIN, 

Defendants.

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Case No. 1:20-cv-04603 

Honorable Judge John J. Tharp, Jr. 

Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STAY LITIGATION 

PENDING RESOLUTION OF PARALLEL STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS1

1

In accord with the Court’s standing order, the parties have conferred regarding an agreed briefing 

schedule for this Motion, as well as for Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss Complaint Pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). The parties respectfully propose that Plaintiffs be provided 

until January 15, 2021 to file Responses to each Motion, and that Defendant be provided until February 5, 

2021 to file Replies. 

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Defendants LCS Community Employment LLC (“LCE”), LCS Mokena LLC d/b/a 

Clarendale of Mokena (“LCS Mokena”), and Algonquin Operations, LLC d/b/a Clarendale of 

Algonquin (“Algonquin Operations”) (collectively, “Defendants”), by their undersigned counsel, 

respectfully move this Court to stay this matter pursuant to Colorado River Water Conservation 

District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). In support, Defendants state as follows. 

INTRODUCTION 

The Court should stay this matter pending the resolution of an earlier-filed, parallel state 

court class action pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ambrose v. LCS Community 

Employment LLC, et al., No. 2019 CH 09912 (“Ambrose”). This case, like the Ambrose case, is a 

putative class action lawsuit asserting alleged violations of the Illinois Biometric Information 

Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs (hereinafter the 

“Stinson Plaintiffs”) claim that while they were employed by LCE and working at assisted living 

facilities allegedly operated by Defendant LCS Mokena and Defendant Algonquin Operations, 

respectively, Defendants violated the BIPA by collecting, storing, and disseminating their 

biometric information. (Stinson Compl. ¶¶ 4-6, 14-15.) 

Currently pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, however, is the earlierfiled, parallel Ambrose matter. (Ambrose Compl. at Ex. A hereto.) There, Kamilya Ambrose 

(“Ambrose”), another former employee of Defendant LCE, has pleaded the exact same legal and 

factual claims as do the Stinson Plaintiffs (and she is represented by one of the same law firms). 

In addition, one of the two proposed class definitions in Ambrose totally subsumes the proposed 

class definition in this case, such that the Stinson Plaintiffs, as well as all putative class members 

here, are also members of the putative class in Ambrose. As such, this case and the Ambrose case 

are “parallel proceedings” as that phrase is defined in Colorado River and its progeny. 

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Moreover, when the ten-factor test employed by the Seventh Circuit when deciding 

Colorado River abstention arguments is applied here, it is clear that this case must be stayed or 

dismissed until the Illinois court resolves the Ambrose case. In fact, eight (8) of the ten (10) factors 

outlined by the Seventh Circuit in Depuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. Orthola, Inc., 953 F.3d 469, 477 

(7th Cir. 2020) overwhelmingly support abstention here. 

Thus, Defendants respectfully request that this Court stay this matter until such time as the 

rulings in Ambrose enable a determination in this case “as to the preclusive effects of the state 

judgment or decisions.” CIGNA Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc. v. Kaiser, 294 F.3d 849, 851-852 

(7th Cir. 2002) (holding that circumstances of case warranted a stay under Colorado River until 

rulings in state court clarified whether any continued basis for a federal forum was warranted). At 

a minimum, Defendants request that this Court stay this matter until the Ambrose court rules on 

the class certification motion filed in that case.2

Facts 

I. The Stinson Matter 

The Stinson Plaintiffs filed this case in the Circuit Court of Cook County on June 9, 2020, 

and LCE3 timely removed it to this Court on August 5, 2020 pursuant to the Class Action Fairness 

Act (“CAFA”). (Dkt. No. 1.) Stinson and Williams are former employees of LCE who worked as 

certified nursing assistants at facilities LCE managed. Stinson worked at the Clarendale of Mokena 

2

In addition to this Motion, Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint 

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) (Doc. No. 29, 31.) Because this Motion 

requests a stay of this litigation, Defendants respectfully submit that the Court should rule on this Motion 

before ruling on the Motion to Dismiss. In addition, although Defendants have requested a stay, they are 

cognizant that this Court has the discretion to dismiss the matter rather than stay it. Commer. Forged 

Products v. Best Swivel Joints, L.P., No. 12 C 10250, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130881, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 

13, 2013) (Tharp, J.). 

3

In both the Stinson and Ambrose cases, Plaintiffs have abbreviated Defendant LCS Community 

Employment LLC as “LCS.” For purposes of clarity, we refer to it as “LCE,” in light of the fact that another 

defendant in Stinson (LCS of Mokena) also uses the letters “LCS” in its name. 

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facility, which the Stinson Plaintiffs allege is operated by Defendant LCS Mokena, and Williams 

worked at the Clarendale of Algonquin, which they allege is operated by Defendant Algonquin 

Operations. (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A, Stinson Compl., ¶¶ 1-5.) 

The Stinson Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants” required them to “use a biometric time 

clock system to record their time worked,” and that “Defendants required Plaintiffs and other 

employees to scan their hands in Defendants’ biometric time clock each time they started and 

finished working each shift.” (Id. ¶¶ 6-7.) They claim that Defendants thereby violated Sections 

15(a), 15(b), and 15(d) of the BIPA.4 On behalf of themselves and a putative class, they seek for 

each violation the greater of actual damages and liquidated damages of $1,000 for each negligent 

violation and/or $5,000 for each reckless or intentional violation under 740 ILCS 14/20(1)-(2), 

injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at ¶¶ 53, 60, 67.) 

Here, the proposed class is defined as: “Defendants’ workers who scanned their hands in 

Defendants’ biometric time clock system in Illinois between June 9, 2015 and the present without 

first executing a written release.” (Id. ¶ 34.) The Stinson Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class 

Certification while the case was pending in Cook County. (Dkt. No. 1, Ex. A at pp. 31-34.) 

II. The Ambrose Matter 

Ambrose, another former employee of LCE (Ambrose Compl. ¶ 12), filed her putative 

class action Complaint on August 27, 2019, ten months before the Stinson Plaintiffs filed their 

4 Specifically, in Count I, the Stinson Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated Section 15(b) of the 

BIPA by capturing or collecting Plaintiffs’ and the putative Class’s hand geometry scans and personal 

identifying information based on their hand geometry scans without first informing them in writing that 

Defendants were doing so. (Id. ¶¶ 50-52.) In Count II, they allege that Defendants violated Section 15(a) 

by possessing their hand geometry scans and personal identifying information based on their hand geometry 

scans without creating and following a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention 

schedule and destruction guidelines for biometric information. (Id. ¶ 58.) And in Count III, they allege that 

Defendants violated Section 15(d) by disclosing or otherwise disseminating Plaintiffs’ and the putative 

Class’s hand geometry scans and personal identifying information based on their hand geometry scans to 

Defendants’ timekeeping vendor without first their consent. (Id. ¶ 65.) 

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Complaint. She also filed a class certification motion shortly thereafter. (Exhibit B.) Ambrose 

alleges that her employer, LCE, as well as Defendant Carrington Care, LLC (which Ambrose 

alleges operated the assisted living facility at which she worked) collected, used and stored her 

and others’ biometric information when scanning their fingerprints in violation of the BIPA. 

(Ambrose Compl. ¶¶ 9, 20, 25.) Just as the Stinson Plaintiffs have alleged here, Ambrose claims 

that LCE and Carrington Care, LLC violated Sections 15(a), (b), and (d) of the BIPA.5 The relief 

sought in Ambrose is exactly the same as that sought in Stinson: statutory or actual damages under 

740 ILCS 14/20(1)-(2), injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at ¶¶ 52, 62, 80.) 

Ambrose seeks to represent two putative classes. The second class is far broader than the 

putative class in Stinson, and completely subsumes it. Thus, every proposed Stinson class member 

— including Stinson and Williams — fall within the second proposed class in Ambrose: 

All residents of the State of Illinois who had their fingerprints collected, captured, 

received, otherwise obtained, or disclosed at a facility managed by LCS in Illinois. 

(Id. ¶ 39.) Ambrose further alleges that LCE “is a for-profit limited liability company that manages 

senior living communities throughout the United States. It partners with over 140 communities to 

staff their facilities.” (Ambrose Compl. ¶ 1.) This necessarily includes the Illinois facilities 

allegedly operated by Defendants LCS of Mokena (where Stinson worked) and Clarendale of 

Algonquin (where Williams worked). (Stinson Compl. ¶¶ 3-5.) 

5 Specifically, in Count I, Ambrose alleges that Defendants violated Section 15(a) of the BIPA by 

failing to make certain disclosures and obtain written releases from her and putative class members before 

allegedly obtaining their biometric identifiers or information and failing to publish a written policy with 

guidelines for the retention and destruction of biometric data. (Id. ¶¶ 50-51.) In Count II, Ambrose claims 

that Defendants violated Section 15(b) of the BIPA by collecting her and other putative class members’ 

biometric information without written consent. (Id. ¶¶ 54, 59.) And in Count III, she claims that Defendants 

violated Section 15(d) by failing to obtain consent from her and putative class members before allegedly 

disclosing their biometric identifiers or information to third parties. (Id. at ¶¶ 66-67.) 

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Argument 

The Seventh Circuit employs a two-step analysis in deciding whether abstention pursuant 

to the abstention doctrine articulated in Colorado River is appropriate, and both of those steps are 

satisfied here. Depuy, 953 F.3d at 477 (affirming decision to abstain from federal case in favor of 

parallel state proceeding). The first step is to determine “whether the concurrent state and federal 

actions are actually parallel.” Id. “Once it is established that the suits are parallel, the court must 

consider a number of nonexclusive factors that might demonstrate the existence of exceptional 

circumstances” for the federal court to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. Clark v. Lacy, 376 

F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming decision to stay federal case) (quotations omitted). 

Here, the Ambrose and Stinson matters are parallel proceedings. Further, the ten factors 

articulated by the Seventh Circuit with respect to whether abstention is appropriate consistent with 

Colorado River heavily weigh in favor of this Court abstaining from exercising jurisdiction, with 

eight (8) out of ten (10) of those factors weighing convincingly in favor of abstention. 

I. The Stinson and Ambrose Matters are Parallel. 

“The threshold question in applying Colorado River abstention is whether the state and 

federal cases are parallel; that is, whether substantially the same parties are contemporaneously 

litigating substantially the same issues in another forum.” Commer. Forged Products v. Best Swivel 

Joints, L.P., No. 12 C 10250, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130881, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 13, 2013) 

(Tharp, J.). The parties and claims need not be identical, so long as there is a “substantial likelihood 

that the state litigation will dispose of all claims presented in the federal case.” Depuy, 953 F.3d at 

477-78. As we explain below, Stinson and Ambrose are parallel in every relevant respect. 

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A. The Cases Contain Substantially the Same Parties 

1. Plaintiffs 

Plaintiffs Ambrose, Stinson, and Williams have the exact same interests: to serve as class 

representatives to redress alleged violations of the BIPA on behalf of themselves and a putative 

class against their former employer, LCE, and the respective defendant facility entities. Thus, 

although the individually named Plaintiffs in each action are different, the interests of the Stinson

Plaintiffs are “similar to or represented by the [Ambrose] class members.” Jacobson v. City of 

Chicago, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2002). Indeed, the proposed class definitions in 

Ambrose and Stinson overlap, with the far broader second proposed class definition in Ambrose

subsuming the proposed class in Stinson. Further, the claims of Stinson and Williams squarely fall 

within the second proposed class in Ambrose, and Stinson and Williams are putative class members 

in Ambrose. And the Plaintiffs in both cases are represented by the same counsel. Thus, Ambrose 

provides a vehicle for litigation of their alleged BIPA claims. 

District Courts within the Seventh Circuit have repeatedly held that Colorado River

abstention is proper under these circumstances. In Shyne v. Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board, 

No. 18-cv-01231, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241279, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2018), the court granted 

a motion to stay pursuant to Colorado River where the parties to a federal class action were 

substantially the same as those in a state court class action, even where classes had not yet been 

certified in either case. Id. at **4-5. “Plaintiffs here . . . are not named as parties in the [state 

court] case. Nonetheless, the state case is a class action in which the plaintiffs seek to represent 

the same class of 230 officers with pending Merit Board cases that Plaintiffs seek to represent 

here.” Id. at *7. “Thus, the named plaintiffs in each action would be included within the proposed 

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class in each action.” Id. The parties also had “an identity of their interests” given that they sought 

the same legal relief, id. at **7-8, which is also true here. Supra at 3-4. 

Likewise, in Lake v. Neal, No. 07 C 2742, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118247, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 

Oct. 30, 2007), the plaintiff in a federal class action was not a named plaintiff in a similar state 

court class action. A class had not been certified in either matter. Nevertheless, the court explained 

that the state court case “is a putative class action, and the proposed class is, as far as this court 

can tell, identical to the class proposed by Lake in his federal suit.” Id. at *5. “Lake also fails to 

mention in his response to defendants’ [Colorado River] motion that he is a member of the putative 

state court class. . . .” Id. “The plaintiffs are, therefore, ‘substantially the same’ in both cases.” Id.; 

see also Jacobson v. City of Chicago, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Although the 

[federal] class members technically are not parties to the [Illinois class] action, such identity is not 

required . . . . Both the [federal] and [state] plaintiffs, . . . represent or seek to represent classes of 

annuitants in the City’s health care plans. . . . Thus, the parties in the state and federal actions are 

substantially similar . . . .”).6

2. Defendants 

The Defendants in the Stinson and Ambrose cases are also substantially the same. LCE is 

the first-named Defendant in both cases, and it employed all three Plaintiffs (and the putative class 

members). Although the Stinson Plaintiffs have named individual facility entities as defendants in 

their respective cases in addition to LCE, both are LCE-staffed communities. (Stinson Compl. ¶¶ 

1-6; Ambrose Compl. ¶¶ 1 (noting 140-plus communities nationwide affiliated with LCE).) 

Further, “the addition of [defendants] to a proceeding, by itself, does not destroy the parallel nature 

6 See also Klabo v. Easy Heat, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-0877 AS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4459, at *13-14 

(N.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2004) (“Both [the federal and state] actions consist of classes, whether putative 

or certified, of persons injured by Defendant’s allegedly defective heating device. . . . Mr. Klabo himself, 

the named plaintiff in the [federal] action, is a class member in the [state court] case.”) 

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of state and federal proceedings.” Clark, 376 F.3d at 686 (affirming abstention despite the addition 

of four defendants to the federal litigation which were not named in the state court case, noting 

that the parties must “be substantially the same — not completely identical,” and “[w]hen we focus 

on the parties’ litigation interests . . . the addition of these four defendants has little impact on the 

overall similarity of the disputes.”) (emphasis supplied); Interstate, 847 F.2d at 1288 (same).

Here, the litigation interests of LCS of Mokena and Algonquin Operations are undoubtedly 

aligned with those of LCE. Plaintiffs themselves allege that “Defendants” acted in concert: every 

allegation of wrongdoing in the Complaint is made jointly against all three Defendants. (Stinson 

Compl. ¶¶ 29-43; 46-67.) Thus, to the extent the Court does not dismiss the facility-specific entities 

due to their lack of involvement as Defendants request in their concurrently-filed Motion to 

Dismiss, there is no question that all Defendants will present an aligned defense: that they did not 

violate the BIPA. P&G v. Alberto-Culver Co., 99 C 1158, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23140, at *9 

(N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 1999) (different defendants to federal and state actions shared “substantially 

similar litigation interests.”); Card v. Graystone Mortgage Corp., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5961, at 

*10 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 20, 2015) (same where defendants had “aligned interests.”). Moreover, all three 

Defendants here (and the Defendants in Ambrose) are represented by the undersigned counsel who 

confirm Defendants have common interests and a unified defense strategy. 

Finally, the disposition of the Ambrose case will dispose of the claims here. The second 

proposed definition in Ambrose covers all individuals whose biometric information was allegedly 

collected, captured, received, otherwise obtained, or disclosed at any LCE-affiliated assisted living 

facility in Illinois — including those associated with LCS Mokena and Algonquin Operations — 

and it encompasses the named Plaintiffs in Stinson and every putative class member in Stinson. 

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(Ambrose Compl. ¶ 39.) Thus, for purposes of this analysis, the defendants in Stinson and Ambrose

are substantially the same.

B. The Same Claims Are Present in Each Case. 

There can be no doubt that “substantially the same issues” are being litigated in the Stinson

and Ambrose cases. See Clark, 376 F.3d at 686. The Stinson and Ambrose Plaintiffs have raised 

the same factual and legal claims: that LCE (and the respective Defendant entities for each facility) 

violated their rights under Sections 15(a), (b), and (d) of the BIPA by allegedly collecting their 

biometric information when they clocked in and out of work. Depuy, 953 F.3d at 477 (affirming 

abstention where claims in the federal and state actions were the same); Tyrer v. City of South 

Beloit, 456 F.3d 744, 752-53 (7th Cir. 2006) (“the two suits will be resolved largely by reference 

to the same evidence”). And the Stinson and Ambrose Plaintiffs seek the same relief. See Clark, 

376 F.3d at 687 (“the relief requested in this case is substantially similar to that requested in 

the [state court] action,” which was a factor weighing in favor of abstention). 

For all of the above reasons, the Stinson and Ambrose matters are parallel. As such, there 

is “a substantial likelihood that the state litigation will dispose of all claims presented in the federal 

case.” Depuy, 953 F.3d at 477-78. For example, if the Ambrose court certifies the second class, 

any judgment or settlement entered in that action will bind all members of that class — including 

Stinson and Williams. 735 ILCS 5/2-805 (“Any judgment entered in a class action brought under 

Section 2-801 of this Act shall be binding on all class members, as the class is defined by the court, 

except those who have been properly excluded from the class.”).7 Thus, such a ruling would 

necessarily preclude a re-litigation of the Stinson Plaintiffs’ claims (or those of the putative class) 

in this forum, as the claims in Stinson and Ambrose are the same. The Court should therefore stay 

7 By filing this Motion, Defendants do not waive, and expressly reserve their right to, challenge any 

class certification motion in Ambrose or this matter. 

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this case until “the state action (including any appeals) concludes, or at any appropriate juncture 

before then, any party may move to lift the stay and proceed in a manner consistent with the state 

court’s rulings and applicable preclusion law.” Rodriguez, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150646, at *18. 

II. Abstention Is Proper Under the Seventh Circuit’s Ten-Factor Test. 

Because Stinson and Ambrose are parallel, “the Court must next determine whether 

‘exceptional circumstances’ make abstention appropriate.” Best, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130881, 

at *6. In doing so, courts should examine a non-exhaustive list of ten (10) factors, each of which 

is evaluated below. Depuy, 953 F.3d at 477. These ten factors overwhelmingly weigh in favor of 

this Court abstaining from exercising jurisdiction here. 

A. Whether the case concerns rights in property. 

There is no “property” at issue here, so this factor can be disregarded. Depuy, 953 F.3d at 

478 (“This case is not about property, and so Factor 1 can be ignored.”). 

B. The inconvenience of the federal forum. 

This factor does not support abstention, as the Federal and Cook County courthouses are 

blocks away from one another. Defendants, however, submit that this factor is of minimal 

importance, as no party will be inconvenienced by proceeding in state court. Jacobson, 233 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1008 (considering this factor largely neutral given short distance between federal and 

state courthouses in Chicago: “the two forums . . . are equally convenient to the parties.”). This is 

particularly true where both Stinson and Ambrose were originally filed in Cook County. 

C. The desirability of consolidating litigation in one place (put otherwise, the value in 

avoiding “piecemeal” or broken-up proceedings). 

This factor weighs heavily in favor of abstention. As this Court held in the Best case: “It is 

not an effective use of judicial resources to have courts in two jurisdictions examining the same 

legal and factual issues.” Best, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130881, at *12. 

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This is especially true under these circumstances. In both Stinson and Ambrose, the courts 

have been called upon to decide the exact same legal and factual issues. Further, the Stinson

Plaintiffs are members of the putative classes in the Ambrose matter. Thus, were this dispute to 

continue proceeding as two separate class actions, a serious risk of inconsistent rulings would 

result, including any rulings on class certification. As the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed earlier this 

year, “functionally identical suits in two places creates a high risk of inconsistent results and 

wasteful duplication.” Depuy, 953 F.3d at 478; see also Lake, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118247, at 

*7-8 (“the suits concern identical underlying facts and involve plaintiffs who are members of both 

putative classes. The court therefore finds that there is a great risk of piecemeal litigation if this 

suit is allowed to proceed.”); Jacobson, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (“The exercise of our jurisdiction 

potentially could lead to inconsistent judgments” with those in the state court class action). 

Finally, the fact that both Stinson and Ambrose are class actions only amplifies the waste 

of judicial and party resources that will occur if the Court does not abstain here. “[T]he Colorado 

River doctrine first and foremost implicates judicial economy concerns, which primarily affect the 

court and the judicial system as a whole.” Kane v. Bank of America, National Ass’n, No. 13 C 

8053, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77726, at *17 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 2017) (citing Freed, 756 F.3d at 

1022). This is especially true in the class action context, as “the very nature of a class action is 

rooted in the efficient allocation of judicial resources to resolve numerous identical claims.” 

Romine v. Compuserve Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22980, at *16 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 1998) 

(granting abstention motion). Even Plaintiffs admitted as much, with Stinson and Williams 

alleging in their Complaint that a “multiplicity of actions” would create “a hardship to the Class, 

to the Court, and to Defendant.” (Stinson Compl. ¶ 41.) Similarly, Ambrose alleged that 

“[e]conomies of time, effort, and expense will be fostered and uniformity of decisions will be 

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ensured” with a “single adjudication” by a “single court.” (Ambrose Compl. ¶ 43, emphasis 

added.) These interests will be directly undercut if two complex, parallel, and time-consuming 

class actions are allowed to proceed — all while creating the substantial risk of inconsistent rulings 

between this Court and the Ambrose court on an array of substantive issues. 

D. The order in which jurisdiction was obtained in the concurrent fora. 

This factor also weighs in favor of abstention. Ambrose was filed in August 2019, and 

Stinson was filed 10 months later in June 2020. Interstate Material Corp. v. Chicago, 847 F.2d 

1285, 1289 (7th Cir. 1988) (seven-month difference); Rodriguez, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150646, 

at *14 (nine-month difference). 

E. The source of governing law—federal or state. 

This factor strongly supports abstention, as all of the claims in Stinson and Ambrose matters 

are governed by Illinois state law under the BIPA. See Best, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130881, at 

*11 (“In the Court’s view, the strongest reasons for abstention are that (1) state law governs the 

claims, and therefore there is no federal interest and no particular expertise for this Court to apply 

. . . .”); Freed, 756 F.3d at 1022 (same); Day v. Union Mines, 862 F.2d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 1988).

F. The adequacy of the state-court action to protect the federal plaintiff’s rights. 

There can be no question that the state court is an adequate forum for the Stinson Plaintiffs. 

“The state court is eminently competent to protect Plaintiffs’ rights given that their claims turn on 

a question of state law.” Rodriguez, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150646, at *14 (citing Ingalls v. AES 

Corp., 311 F. App’x 911, 915 (7th Cir. 2008)); Lake, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118247, at *8.

G. The relative progress of the state and federal proceedings. 

This factor also weighs in favor of abstention, as the Ambrose matter is slightly farther 

along than this matter. In this case, concurrently with this Motion, Defendants have filed a Motion 

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to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). In Ambrose, however, Defendants 

already filed a motion to dismiss on October 27, 2020, followed by a motion to stay the litigation 

pending the decisions from the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court.8 After oral 

argument on November 2, 2020, the circuit court granted Defendants’ motion. Here, no discovery 

has taken place, while in Ambrose, Plaintiff has already requested discovery in the form of the 

deposition of a potential witness. Infra at 6. As such, this factor too weighs in favor of this Court’s 

abstention from jurisdiction over Stinson.

9

H. The presence or absence of concurrent jurisdiction. 

This factor also counsels in favor of abstention. Both this Court and Illinois courts have 

jurisdiction over the claims in this case. In fact, the Stinson Plaintiffs originally filed their 

complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County, and Defendants subsequently removed this matter 

to federal court under CAFA. As this Court held in Best, where the defendant moved for dismissal 

under Colorado River after having previously removed the action to federal court: “With respect 

to the concurrent jurisdiction factor . . .the plaintiff, filed suit in Illinois state court, deliberately 

eschewing a federal forum; it would be incongruous to pretend that [the plaintiff] cared about 

accessing a federal forum.” Best, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130881, at *9. 

8 Defendants’ motion to stay was premised upon a pending ruling from the Illinois Appellate Court 

for the First District in Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., Case No. 1-20-0563 (1st Dist.) (“Tims”) as to 

the applicable statute of limitations in BIPA actions, and on a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois 

Supreme Court in McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC, Case No. 1-19-2398 (1st Dist.) 

(“McDonald”) on the issue whether the Illinois Workers Compensation Act preempts statutory claims for 

damages under the BIPA. On November 2, 2020, the court granted that Motion. (Ex. C.) 

9 To the extent Plaintiffs complain about the progress of Ambrose given the court’s decision to stay 

that matter, the state court has the power to manage its docket as it sees fit. And “it is [Plaintiffs] that [have] 

risked extra time by loading up different court systems with parallel actions.” Depuy, 953 F.3d at 479. 

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I. The availability of removal. 

This factor “intends to prevent a federal court from hearing claims that are closely related 

to state proceedings that cannot be removed.” Freed, 756 F.3d at 1023. Here, Ambrose cannot be 

removed, as the 30-day window to remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) has long since expired. 

Thus, granting this Motion would “prevent [this] court from hearing claims” that are closely related 

to the Ambrose case that cannot be removed, counseling in favor of abstention here. Rodriguez, 

2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150646, at *16 (finding that this factor weighed in favor of abstention). 

J. Whether the federal action is vexatious or contrived. 

This factor also weighs in favor of abstention because the claims of the Stinson Plaintiffs 

could have been brought — and could still proceed as part of — the Ambrose case. As the Seventh 

Circuit has held, “this factor can weigh in favor of abstention when the claims and parties in the 

federal suit could have been included in the original state court proceeding.” Freed, 756 F.3d at 

1024; Interstate Material Corp., 847 F.2d at 1289 (“Without presuming [plaintiff’s] motives, we 

see no reason why all claims and all parties could not have been, and still could not be, part of one 

suit.”). As discussed above, the claims of the Stinson Plaintiffs squarely fall within the second 

proposed class definition in Ambrose: the Stinson Plaintiffs are Illinois residents who claim that 

their biometric information was “collected, captured, received, otherwise obtained, or disclosed at 

a facility managed by [LCE] in Illinois.” (Compl. ¶ 39.) As such, there is no reason why the Stinson

Plaintiffs could not have been named Plaintiffs in the Ambrose case. Jacobson, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 

1009 (“We question why Plaintiffs filed the instant suit rather than joining” the previously-filed 

state action).10 In fact, the Stinson and Ambrose plaintiffs are represented by the same counsel. 

10 Defendants are aware of this Court’s holding in Best, which noted that, because the defendants had 

removed the matter that they then moved to stay, the factor did not weigh in favor of abstention: “[Plaintiff] 

did not intend to bring this action as a ‘federal’ case; it is at [defendant’s] behest that the case is now in 

federal court.” Id. at *8. However, given the posture of this case — where the Ambrose Plaintiff’s own class 

Case: 1:20-cv-04603 Document #: 32 Filed: 12/14/20 Page 15 of 18 PageID #:806
15 

There is no reason that their counsel could not have simply chosen to add Stinson and Williams as 

named plaintiffs, and LCS of Mokena and Algonquin Operations as named defendants in the 

Ambrose matter. To the extent Plaintiffs argue that it would not have been appropriate to include 

claims against different operating entities in a single lawsuit, such an argument is directly undercut 

by the fact that they did just that in this matter, naming both LCS of Mokena and Algonquin 

Operations as named defendants in a single action. 

Conclusion 

This case and the Ambrose case are parallel proceedings, and almost every factor that the 

Seventh Circuit instructs federal courts to review in deciding whether to abstain overwhelmingly 

weighs in favor of abstention here. This Court has the discretion to abstain from exercising its 

jurisdiction here, and Defendants respectfully request that the Court stay this matter pending either 

the resolution of the Ambrose matter or further rulings by that Court that would inform this Court 

whether any possibility of continued federal judicial involvement is warranted (e.g., a ruling on 

the class certification motion in Ambrose), or grant any further relief deemed just and appropriate 

consistent with applicable precedent in this District. See Shyne, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241279, at 

*13 (“there are ample grounds for abstaining under Colorado River. As such, this action will be 

stayed until the resolution of the [state court class action] case”); Lake, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

118247, at *5 (same); Jacobson, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (same). 

WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated herein, Defendants respectfully request that the 

Court grant the instant Motion and stay this matter until the resolution of the Ambrose matter, or 

at a minimum, until the Ambrose court rules on a class certification motion in that case, and enter 

any further relief it deems just and appropriate. 

definition includes the Stinson Plaintiffs — there is “no reason why all claims and all parties could not have 

been, and still could not be, part of one suit.” Interstate, 847 F.2d at 1289 

Case: 1:20-cv-04603 Document #: 32 Filed: 12/14/20 Page 16 of 18 PageID #:807
16 

Dated: December 14, 2020 

By: 

Respectfully submitted, 

DEFENDANTS LCS COMMUNITY 

EMPLOYMENT LLC; LCS MOKENA LLC 

D/B/A CLARENDALE OF MOKENA; AND 

ALGONQUIN OPERATIONS, LLC D/B/A 

CLARENDALE OF ALGONQUIN 

/s/ Jason A. Selvey 

One of Their Attorneys 

Jason A. Selvey 

Jody Kahn Mason 

Jonathan B. Cifonelli 

Jackson Lewis P.C. 

150 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 2500 

Chicago, IL 60601 

Tel.: 312.787.4949 

Fax: 312.787.4995 

Jason.Selvey@jacksonlewis.com 

Jody.Mason@jacksonlewis.com 

Jonathan.Cifonelli@jacksonlewis.com 

Case: 1:20-cv-04603 Document #: 32 Filed: 12/14/20 Page 17 of 18 PageID #:808
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Jason A. Selvey, an attorney, certify that on December 14, 2020, I caused a true and 

correct copy of the attached Defendants’ Motion to Stay Litigation Pending Resolution of 

Parallel State Court Proceedings, to be filed with the Court by electronic filing protocols, and 

that same will therefore be electronically served upon all attorneys of record registered with the 

Court’s ECF/CM system. 

/s/ Jason A. Selvey 

4847-3035-7972, v. 1

4823-8270-3571, v. 4

Case: 1:20-cv-04603 Document #: 32 Filed: 12/14/20 Page 18 of 18 PageID #:809