1

Filed 12/1/22 P. v. Johnson CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KENYATTA ANDREW JOHNSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

E079189

(Super. Ct. No. RIF149172)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge. 

Dismissed.

Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant Kenyatta Andrew Johnson appeals from a postjudgment 
2

order denying his Penal Code1section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95)2petition to 

vacate his attempted murder conviction and for resentencing under the procedures 

established by Senate Bill Nos. 775 and 1437. Counsel has filed a brief under the 

authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California

(1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), requesting this court to conduct an independent review of 

the record. In addition, defendant has had an opportunity to file a supplemental brief 

with this court and has not done so. Because defendant is not entitled to Wende/Anders

review from denial of the challenged postjudgment petition and he has not raised any 

claim of error in the denial, we dismiss his appeal as abandoned.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3

Defendant, who was not an identified gang member, shot Quincy Brown, a 

member of the Crip criminal street gang, in the stomach. Defendant was also in 

possession of cocaine at the time he was detained.

1

 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2

 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as section

1172.6, with no substantive change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We cite to section 

1172.6 for ease of reference unless otherwise indicated.

3

 A summary of the factual background is taken from our nonpublished opinion in 

defendant’s direct appeal, People v. Johnson (May 17, 2012, E053171). The facts of 

defendant’s underlying offenses from his direct appeal established that defendant acted 

alone and was the sole person who attempted to kill the victim. (See ibid.)
3

A jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), being a 

felon in possession of a firearm (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)), and selling or transporting

cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a).) As to the attempted murder, the 

jury found true the enhancement allegation that defendant personally and intentionally 

discharged a firearm and proximately caused great bodily injury or death to another 

person, not an accomplice (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Defendant admitted having suffered a 

prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1) & 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)) and three prior 

prison terms (§ 667.5). The trial court sentenced defendant to a determinate term of 19 

years and an indeterminate term of 25 years to life.

On January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 became effective, which amended the 

felony-murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to 

murder. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Senate Bill No. 1437 also added 

former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6), which created a procedure for offenders 

previously convicted of murder to seek retroactive relief if they could no longer be 

convicted of murder under the new law. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) Effective January 

1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 clarified that “persons who were convicted of attempted 

murder or manslaughter under a theory of felony murder and the natural probable 

consequences doctrine are permitted the same relief as those persons convicted of murder 

under the same theories.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1.)
4

On February 14, 2022, defendant in propria persona filed a petition for 

resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95.

Defendant was appointed counsel, and on June 10, 2022, the court held a hearing 

on the petition. During that hearing, the prosecutor informed the court that defendant was 

not eligible for relief and thus his petition should be denied because defendant was the 

actual shooter and the jury instructions showed that defendant was not prosecuted under 

either the felony-murder rule or under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. 

After defense counsel did not “take issue with these representations,” the court denied the 

petition. Defendant timely appealed.

III.

DISCUSSION

After defendant appealed, appointed appellate counsel filed a brief under the 

authority of Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a 

statement of the case, a summary of the procedural background and potential arguable 

issues, and requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record.

We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and he 

has not done so. Thus, no claim of error has been raised.

Our high court is currently considering whether an appellate court must conduct an 

independent review of the record when counsel files a Wende brief after the trial court 

denies a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. (People v. Delgadillo, rev. 

granted Feb. 17, 2021, S266305; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2).) Court of 
5

Appeal cases have consistently held that we are not required to conduct such a review 

and may dismiss an appeal as abandoned if the defendant does not file a supplemental 

brief. (People v. Cole (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1031-1032, 1039-1040, review 

granted Oct. 14, 2020, S264278; People v. Figueras (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 108, review 

granted May 12, 2021, S267870; People v. Scott (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1131, 

review granted Mar. 17, 2021, S266853.) Some cases have explained that we have 

discretion to review the record independently for arguable issues, either where an initial 

review does not show the defendant is obviously ineligible for relief (such as when the 

defendant was convicted on a theory he was the actual killer) or as a routine matter. (See 

People v. Gallo (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 594, 598-599; People v. Flores (2020) 54 

Cal.App.5th 266, 269-274.)

In this case, we conclude defendant is not entitled to Wende review of an order 

denying his petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. Review pursuant to Wende, 

or its federal constitutional counterpart Anders, is required only in the first appeal of right 

from a criminal conviction. (Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 555; 

Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 536-537; People v. Serrano (2012) 211 

Cal.App.4th 496, 500-501 (Serrano).) The constitutional right to counsel extends to the 

first appeal of right, and no further. (Serrano, supra, at pp. 500-501.) The appeal before 

us, “although originating in a criminal context, is not a first appeal of right from a 

criminal prosecution, because it is not an appeal from the judgment of conviction.” (Id. 

at p. 501.) While a criminal defendant has a right to appointed counsel in an appeal from 
6

an order after judgment affecting his substantial rights (Pen. Code, §§ 1237, 1240, subd. 

(a); Gov. Code, § 15421, subd. (c)), that right is statutory, not constitutional. Thus, 

defendant is not entitled to Wende review in such an appeal. (See Serrano, supra, at p. 

501 [no Wende review for denial of postconviction motion to vacate guilty plea pursuant 

to section 1016.5].)

Applying Serrano here, defendant has no right to Wende/Anders review of the 

denial of his section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. Furthermore, because defendant 

has not raised any claim of error, and because this appeal concerns a postjudgment 

proceeding in which there is no constitutional right to counsel, we will dismiss 

defendant’s appeal as abandoned.

We note, however, that the result would be the same even if we were to exercise 

our discretion to conduct an independent review. There is no dispute that defendant acted 

alone. There is also no dispute that defendant was the actual shooter who solely 

attempted to kill the victim, that defendant personally and intentionally discharged the 

firearm at the victim, and that he was not prosecuted under either the felony-murder rule 

or the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The trial court correctly denied 

defendant’s petition.
7

IV.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed as abandoned.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

J.

We concur:

MILLER

Acting P. J.

FEILDS

J.