Filed 7/28/22 In re Julius E. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re JULIUS E., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JESSICA E. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

F083982

(Super. Ct. No. 18CEJ300315-3)

OPINION

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Todd Eilers, 

Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)

Elizabeth C. Alexander, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant, Jessica E.

David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant, Jonathan E.

Daniel C. Cederborg, County Counsel, and Carlie M. Flaugher, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-
2.

Jessica E. (mother) and Jonathan E. (father) appeal from the juvenile court’s order 

terminating their parental rights as to their two-year-old son, Julius E. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code,1section 366.26). They argue the juvenile court erred by declining to apply the 

beneficial parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)). The parents appeal separately but each join in each other’s 

arguments. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

Julius was born in October 2019 and placed in the neonatal intensive care unit 

where he received treatment for premature birth, low blood sugars, and low oxygen. It 

was reported that mother used marijuana throughout her pregnancy for pain management, 

nausea, and to increase her appetite. Father also admitted to using marijuana. 

At the time of Julius’s birth, mother was involved in another dependency 

proceeding pertaining to his teenage half siblings, Dylan P. and Chloe P. Those 

proceedings arose from an incident in October 2018 where father physically abused 

mother’s then 16-year-old son, Dylan, for a period of three to four hours during which 

Dylan suffered physical injuries, including, but not limited to, hair pulled out and wounds 

and bruises on his right thigh and buttocks. Dylan reported father hit his legs, buttocks, 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 

2 Both parents request we take judicial notice of the opinions this court filed in their 

respective petitions for extraordinary writ following the denial of reunification services

and setting a section 366.26 hearing. In mother’s opening brief, she requested we take 

judicial notice of this court’s opinion in Jessica E. v. Fresno County Superior Court

(F082256). With his opening brief, father filed a separate request for us to take judicial 

notice of this court’s opinion in Jonathan E. v. Fresno County Superior Court (F082242). 

On April 20, 2022, this court deferred ruling on father’s separate request pending 

consideration of the appeal on the merits and granted leave to the department to file an 

informal response, noting that failure to file a response may be deemed agreement that 

the request be granted. The department indicated in its respondent’s brief it did not 

object to judicial notice of the opinions filed in either case for the purpose of factual and 

procedural background and did not file a separate response to our order. We hereby grant 

both parents’ requests. 
3.

ribs and genitals with a leather belt, vacuum hose, and metal bat. He further disclosed 

father picked him up by his legs, pushed him against the wall, punched his ribs with a 

closed fist, and picked him up by pulling his hair. Dylan also stated father had physically 

abused him on several prior occasions. Mother was present during the October 2018 

incident and made no attempt to stop it. After the incident, she showed no remorse for 

what happened, stating that Dylan was a “jerk” and got what he deserved. Dependency 

jurisdiction was taken over Dylan and his twin sister Chloe. Mother was ordered to 

participate in reunification services with Chloe but was denied reunification services with 

regard to Dylan pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). At the time of Julius’s 

initial removal, mother’s reunification services had been terminated as to Chloe and a 

section 366.26 hearing was set. 

On November 1, 2019, the Fresno County Department of Social Services 

(department) took Julius into protective custody. 

On November 20, 2019, Julius was ordered detained from the parents. The court 

ordered the parents to have supervised visits with Julius for a minimum of two one-hour 

visits per week. 

A third amended dependency petition, filed January 15, 2020, alleged that Julius

came within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious 

physical harm), (b)(1) (failure to protect), and (j) (abuse of siblings). Specifically, it was 

alleged Julius was at risk of harm because of the physical abuse father perpetuated

against Dylan, mother’s failure to protect against such physical abuse, and the parents’ 

marijuana abuse. 

In the department’s jurisdiction/disposition report dated January 15, 2020, the 

social worker reported that visits between the parents and Julius went well, as “the 

parents interact well with Julius and care for his needs.” The social worker went on to 

state the parents had been observed to be affectionate toward Julius and equally tend to 
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him. However, father’s rude and confrontational behavior toward staff and the care 

provider was noted to be a concern. 

The report further stated Julius had been diagnosed with an inherited genetic 

disorder that affects the adrenal glands and their ability to produce necessary hormones

requiring him to take three separate medications throughout the day. 

The report also indicated the parents had begun participating in some voluntary 

services including substance abuse services and parenting classes. As of May 2020, they 

were both consistently testing negative for illicit substances. 

At the jurisdiction hearing on July 17, 2020, the court found Julius was described 

by section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), finding all factual allegations true except for 

those alleging substance abuse and continued the matter for disposition. The court 

ordered the parents to undergo a risk assessment. 

In November 2020, Tamika London, Ph.D., completed psychological risk 

assessments for the parents. She reported there was no evidence that either parent had the 

“ability to provide an emotional, physical, psychologically safe, and nurturing home 

environment” for Julius and they both continued to pose a “substantial risk” to Julius.

As of December 2, 2020, the parents had made some progress in child abuse 

intervention classes, and mother had attended some domestic violence classes. The 

parents continued to test negative for substances. 

The department’s recommendation for disposition was that Julius be adjudged a 

dependent of the court, mother be denied family reunification services under 

section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7) and (b)(10), father be denied reunification services 

under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), and a section 366.26 hearing be set.

At the contested disposition hearing on January 8, 2021, the juvenile court 

removed Julius from the parents’ custody. Both parents were denied reunification 

services; mother under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7) because she had been denied 

reunification services to Dylan and father under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) because 
5.

of the severity of the physical abuse he inflicted on Dylan. The court set a section 366.26 

hearing and reduced visits to a minimum of two times per month for one hour. 

Both parents filed petitions for extraordinary writ challenging the order setting a 

section 366.26 hearing in Jessica E. v. Superior Court of Fresno County (F082256) and 

Jonathan E. v. Superior Court of Fresno County (F082242). This court denied both 

petitions finding the evidence was sufficient to support the courts dispositional findings 

and orders. 

In June and July 2021, both parents filed separate section 388 petitions requesting 

the court return Julius to their care on family maintenance services or order family 

reunification services. To their petitions, they attached several proofs of completion of 

various services, including substance abuse services, a parent partner support group, and 

the Nurturing Parent Program. Additionally, father attached proof of completion of a 

52-week child abuse intervention course, and mother attached proof of weekly counseling 

from October 2020 to January 2021. The juvenile court summarily denied both petitions 

on the grounds it did not state new evidence or a change in circumstances, the proposed 

order did not promote Julius’s best interest, and, additionally, that the “[i]ssues raised ... 

have been litigated during two trials and an appeal.” 

The department’s section 366.26 report dated May 3, 2021, indicated visits 

between the parents and Julius were in person until March 18, 2020, when they were 

switched to video visits due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In-person visits resumed 

September 11, 2020, but visits returned to video in November 2020. The social worker 

reported that visits were “appropriate, as the biological parents have been consistent and 

appropriate during the visits.” It was further reported the parents were engaged with 

Julius and told him they loved him. Julius was observed not to experience distress after 

visits and “transition[ed] well after the visits.” 

The social worker observed two video visits in April 2021 and reported the parents 

utilized the full hour and the visits were appropriate. The social worker further reported 
6.

the parents spoke to Julius at above his age level, and while they attempted to engage 

Julius, he would at times become preoccupied and play on his own. The social worker 

noted the visits appeared to be “friendly visits” rather than visits demonstrating a 

“significant parent-child relationship.” The social worker observed that Julius did not 

pay attention to the parents, and the parents had to call him to gain his attention. Further, 

the parents did not appear to be able to identify Julius’s facial cues to understand his 

needs or wants. Julius was not observed to show any emotion that resembled separation 

anxiety from the parents. 

The report further indicated Julius was both “generally” and “specifically” 

adoptable. His physical health was described as good and his emotional development 

was described as healthy. Though he had a life-long medical condition, it was reported 

that “with proper medical treatment[,] ongoing support and monitoring, Julius can lead a 

normal life.” 

Julius’s care provider wished to adopt him. She had had Julius in her care since he 

was four months old, had learned all of his medical needs, and was educating herself 

about parenting a bi-racial child and was “committed to support his cultural 

connection/heritage with unbiased care and love.” She was reported to be able to meet 

Julius’s physical, emotional, and psychological needs. She was open to postadoption 

contact with the parents as long as it was safe and appropriate. 

The department filed an addendum report dated December 16, 2021, detailing 

in-person visits between the parents and Julius from November and December. The 

social worker made several observations about the interactions between the parents and 

Julius during the visits. The social worker reported that when mother pulled “fuzzies” 

from Julius’s hair, he “whined a little and pulled away.” Julius and the parents played 

with the air hockey table, causing Julius to smile. Julius smiled to the parents and ran 

towards them but stopped before reaching them to look at a bag of toys. When mother 

held her arms out toward Julius, Julius scooted backwards. The parents showed physical 
7.

affection toward Julius. Julius appeared to enjoy playing with the parents but did not 

show distress when separating from them. 

The department recommended adoption as the most appropriate permanent plan 

for Julius and that parental rights be terminated.

The contested section 366.26 hearing was conducted on January 5, 2022. Mother 

testified on her own behalf that Julius was removed at birth from the hospital and never 

came home with her. She only missed one visit due to being sick. She had asked for 

more visitation but was never given an answer. As visitation progressed, Julius became 

“a lot closer” to mother and he would go to her and they would play and interact together. 

Julius trusted mother to pick him up and they got along. They would play Hot Wheels 

together and there was a “definite bond” between Julius and mother and father. Mother 

stated she misses Julius when he is not around and she is attached to him. She sought to 

find toys and games to make him think and challenge him and his creativity. After visits,

Julius “never wants to leave.” He got “grabby” and wanted mother and father to go with 

him. At almost every visitation, the parents had to walk him to the car so he stays calm. 

Mother further testified she and Julius suffer from the same genetic illness and she 

understood “a great deal of what he’s going through.” She could tell whether he had 

taken his midday medications on time and “know[s] the signs.” She testified “[i]t would 

be great for him to be able to have somebody in his life that has the same thing, who 

knows what he is going through” and that she had a challenging childhood not having 

anyone around with the same condition. When she was younger, she wanted to know if 

what she was going through was normal. She further testified that she had nothing 

against Julius’s foster parent but her having the condition herself gave her a different 

insight on what is needed to make sure he stays healthy. She stated “[t]here will be a 

bond there that is going to be very hard to break in that we both have this condition. We 

both are—will be able to lean on each other for support as to what is going on with 

ourselves. I’ll be able to know what he is feeling when he gets sick, and be able to make 
8.

sure he stays out of the hospital more—I’ll know what needs to be done to take care of 

him.” The condition does not impact her day-to-day ability to do basic things. 

Mother also testified she had completed as many services as she could, was 

presently employed, and had stable housing. She did not feel there was anything that 

would impact her ability to provide care for Julius.

Father testified on his own behalf that he did not miss a single visit throughout the 

proceedings. At visitations, he and Julius would wander around and explore and play 

together. Julius was curious and looked to the parents to help him explore. Julius was 

happy and comfortable with the parents and when he was upset, he wanted to be with 

them. Father stated that Julius got fussy at times if he was having a headache which is 

part of his medical condition. Julius was able to be redirected at other times when he was 

getting into things he is not supposed to and is very intelligent. Father stated Julius did 

not want to leave visits, wanted to continue to spend time with mother and father, and 

was not happy to get into the car after visits. Father also testified he knew how to do 

Julius’s medical procedures if he missed taking his medication, and mother was a good 

resource because she grew up with the condition.

Father testified he felt it would be better for Julius not to be adopted. Father was 

adopted and he knew what it felt like to not know who your parents are and not have 

them in your life and have questions you cannot get answers to. Father was never able to 

make contact with his biological family and had medical and family questions. He 

wanted Julius to know him and mother. Father had spoken to other adoptees and

explained, “[w]e all have those questions. We all want to know what happened with our 

parents, who they are, what they were, and what our family history was. That’s 

something that’s just a natural question of what happens when you’re adopted, and I want 

Julius to be able to have us in his life so he knows us, and so that he can talk to us and ask 

us questions and know who he is and where he came from.” 
9.

The department called the social worker in rebuttal. The social worker testified 

the parents had not progressed to unsupervised visits and he was unsure what the reasons 

were. He noted no concerns during the visits he observed and that visitation was overall 

positive. He did not observe Julius disliking to leave visits like mother testified to.

When it came to goodbyes, Julius exhibited no distress. The social worker observed 

Julius run toward the parents at the outset of a visit, but stop short at some toys and 

looked down at the toys. 

The social worker further testified that Julius called his foster parent “momma” 

and they had a parent-child bond. Julius had been with her since he was four months old. 

The social worker did not believe Julius would benefit from continuing a relationship 

with the parents and does not believe it would be detrimental to Julius for their parental 

rights to be terminated. He testified it did not appear Julius and mother had an emotional 

attachment. 

The parents argued the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to 

terminating parental rights applied. The department noted it was not disagreeing that the 

parents maintained visitation, but argued they had not proven that terminating parental 

rights would be detrimental to Julius. Minor’s counsel noted he was submitting on the 

recommendation in the report and did not see a legal basis to apply the exception. 

The juvenile court began its ruling by stating it had read and considered the 

section 366.26 report and the addendum report but that it “would like to point out some 

specific sections that [the court] had been considering.” The court noted the incident 

where Julius ran toward the parents then stopped short to look at the toys and that reports 

indicated Julius had held his arms out to the care provider after visits and did not 

experience distress when separating from the parents, Julius had become preoccupied 

during some visits, and the visits appeared to be more friendly rather than a significant 

parent-child relationship. The court went on to state it found the parents to be credible in 

their testimony. The court further stated it appreciated mother’s perspective about having 
10.

the same genetic condition as Julius and father’s testimony regarding being an adoptee 

“and the questions that remain.” The court noted it was “clear from the testimony of the 

parents that there is an emotional connection between the parents and the child.” 

The court found there was clear and convincing evidence Julius was adoptable.

As for whether the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied, the court first 

stated it found the parents regularly visited Julius. The court found as to the “second 

prong,” which the court defined as “whether the relationship is that of a parent-child 

relationship and not a relationship of a friendship or visitor relationship,” that the parents 

had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence they had a “parent-child relationship 

rather than a visitor or friendship relationship.” The court noted that “[i]t’s somewhat of 

a double-edged sword with a child of this age, right, because the parents want to bring in 

toys to give the child something to play with and to interact with the child. And as the 

Court has previously stated, it didn’t appear that there was any inappropriate interaction 

with the parents and the child. However, it’s a double-edged sword because then is the 

child going to the parents because of the toys that are being brought or is it because of the 

parental relationship? So this court is not—I’m not stating based specifically on the toys 

itself, but the Court is just making a comment in regards to that.” The court went on to 

say it was relying on the overall evidence to come to its conclusion.

The court further stated that even if it were to conclude there was a parent-child 

relationship, it would nonetheless find the exception did not apply because the parents 

had not met by a preponderance of the evidence the “third prong”—that the relationship 

“outweighs the benefit of adoption to the point of great harm to the child.” The court 

accordingly concluded the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply. 

The court ordered adoption as Julius’s permanent plan and the parents’ parental 

rights were terminated.

Both parents filed timely notices of appeal from the court’s order.
11.

DISCUSSION

I. Preliminary Legal Principles

At a section 366.26 hearing, when the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing 

evidence the child is adoptable, it is generally required to terminate parental rights and 

order the child be placed for adoption unless a statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, 

subd. (c)(1).) One of the statutory exceptions is the beneficial parent-child relationship 

exception, which applies when “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining 

that termination would be detrimental to the child” where “[t]he parents have maintained 

regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing 

the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) 

The California Supreme Court has recently clarified in In re Caden C. (2021) 

11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.) that there are three elements a parent has the burden to prove 

by a preponderance of the evidence to justify the application of the beneficial parentchild relationship exception: (1) “regular visitation and contact with the child, taking into 

account the extent of visitation permitted”; (2) “that the child has a substantial, positive, 

emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would 

benefit from continuing the relationship”; and (3) “that terminating that attachment would 

be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a 

new, adoptive home.” (Id. at pp. 632‒633, 636‒637.) 

Also relevant to the parents’ arguments on appeal, the Caden C. court discussed 

factors that were inappropriate to consider in determining whether the exception applies. 

First, when the court determines the third element, “the court is not comparing the 

parent’s attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential adoptive 

parent(s) [as n]othing that happens at the section 366.26 hearing allows the child to return 

to live with the parent.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) Second, a court’s sole 

reliance on a parent’s failure to ameliorate the issues which led to the dependency is 

inappropriate because at the time of a section 366.26 hearing, a court “all but presupposes 
12.

that the parent has not been successful in maintaining the reunification plan meant to 

address the problems leading to dependency.” (Caden C., at p. 637.) 

II. The Juvenile Court’s Alleged Failures to Receive Information Regarding the 

Parents’ Relationship with Julius and Make Explicit Findings on the Record

Mother makes several claims, to which father joins, that the juvenile court erred 

procedurally. She first contends the matter must be reversed and remanded because the 

court erred by failing to receive information from the department as to the quality of her 

relationship with Julius, citing In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 854 (J.D.). J.D.

does not support mother’s contention. 

In J.D., the appellate court considered the appellant parent’s contention the court 

erred by declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. The J.D.

court remanded the matter because it could not “be certain the juvenile court did not 

consider” factors deemed improper by Caden C., which was published while the appeal 

was pending. (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 854.) In conducting its analysis, the 

appellate court observed the evidence showing the strong relationship between the 

appellant parent and the child was introduced by the parent rather than the agency, who 

“provided very little information in its prior reports during the case about the quality of 

[the parent’s] relationship with [the child] or even the nature of her interactions with him 

during visitation.” (Id. at p. 860.) The appellate court noted the agency’s lack of 

information “was not appropriate and did a disservice to not just [the parent] and [the 

child] but also the juvenile court” and went on to detail the importance of the social 

worker and required reports to dependency proceedings. (Ibid.) 

Notably, however, the J.D. court went on to state: “To be clear, it was not the 

agency’s burden to disprove the existence of the beneficial relationship exception—the 

burden of proof on this issue was squarely on mother. [Citation.] Moreover, there is 

tension in the case law concerning the extent to which the agency must address facts 

pertinent to the beneficial relationship exception in the section 366.26 report itself. We 
13.

express no opinion here about the adequacy of the agency’s section 366.26 report. 

[Citations.] Our point here is that by the time the juvenile court scheduled the 

section 366.26 hearing, the agency’s prior reports should already have provided 

objective, disinterested information about the quality of [the child’s] attachment to [the 

parent], which would have assisted the court in evaluating the beneficial relationship 

exception when [the parent] asserted it.” (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 861.) The 

J.D. court did not reverse the order terminating parental rights for inadequacy of the 

department’s reports; therefore, the case does not support mother’s claim that reversal is 

required for this reason. 

Further, J.D. appears to be factually distinguishable as the department here

included detailed summaries of several of the parents’ visits with Julius in the 

section 366.26 report and its addendum report. Mother does not specify, apart from J.D.,

a legal basis for her argument that the department’s reports were insufficient or how 

exactly they were lacking. Accordingly, we reject this claim. 

Mother also argues the juvenile court erred by ruling without making explicit

findings for each of the elements set forth in Caden C. Mother cites no authority, and we 

have found none, that the juvenile court, in finding the beneficial parent-child 

relationship exception inapplicable, must recite specific findings relative to its 

conclusions regarding any or all of the three elements of the exception. (See In re A.L. 

(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156.) As the court stated in A.L., “we infer from 

section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D)—under which the juvenile court is required to 

‘state its reasons in writing or on the record’ when it makes a finding that termination of 

parental rights would be detrimental to the child—that the court is not required to make 

findings when it concludes that parental rights termination would not be detrimental.”

(Ibid.) The A.L. court concluded “although a statement by the trial court of its findings 

(or reasons) for its decision is helpful in conducting appellate review, it was not a legal 
14.

requirement in this instance.” (Ibid.) We do not find the juvenile court’s ruling here to 

be insufficient. 

Finally, mother requests a bonding study between she and Julius upon remand. 

Because we will not be remanding the matter for the reasons set forth in this opinion, 

mother’s request is denied as moot. However, to the extent that mother is arguing the 

court erred by failing to order a bonding study before ordering termination of parental 

rights, we reject this contention. While Caden C. noted that trial courts should “seriously 

consider, where requested and appropriate, allowing for a bonding study or other relevant 

expert testimony” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633, fn. 4), we do not read Caden C.

as standing for the proposition that a trial court errs where it does not sua sponte order a 

bonding study. There is no indication in the record, nor does mother assert, that she

requested a bonding study below; thus, we find no error.

III. The Juvenile Court’s Decision Declining to Apply the Beneficial Parent-Child 

Relationship Exception

In addition to mother’s procedural arguments, both parents argue the court erred 

by declining to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to terminating 

parental rights. We disagree.

We review the first two elements—whether the parents regularly and consistently 

visited and whether a beneficial relationship exists—for substantial evidence and the 

third element—whether “terminating that attachment would be detrimental to the child 

even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home”—for 

abuse of discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636, 639‒641.) Under the 

substantial evidence standard of review, “a reviewing court should ‘not reweigh the 

evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ 

[Citation.] The determinations should ‘be upheld if ... supported by substantial evidence, 

even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the trial court might have 

reached a different result had it believed other evidence.’ ” (Id. at p. 640.) “Review for 
15.

abuse of discretion is subtly different, focused not primarily on the evidence but the 

application of a legal standard. A court abuses its discretion only when ‘ “ ‘the trial court 

has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently 

absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)3

Here, the parties appear to agree that the first element—the parents regularly and 

consistently visited—was met; we agree with the parties and need not discuss this 

element any further. As for the second element, the juvenile court found the parents had 

not met their burden in proving it, noting they appeared to be merely friendly visitors to 

Julius. And as for the third element, the juvenile court stated that even if it had found the 

parents had met their burden to prove the second element, the court would not find the 

parents had met their burden to prove “the parental relationship outweighs the benefit of 

adoption to the point of great harm to the child.” We conclude the court’s factual 

findings were supported by the evidence and its ultimate ruling was not an abuse of 

discretion. 

We cannot say the court erred by finding the parents had not met their burden to 

prove the second element. In determining the second element, the court may consider 

factors such as “ ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s 

custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and 

the child’s particular needs,’ ” as well as “how children feel about, interact with, look to, 

or talk about their parents.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) 

Here, Julius was removed from the parents shortly after his birth and never lived 

with them. While visits went well, Julius was reported to leave visits without distress and 

3 The Caden C. court explained “ ‘there likely will be no practical difference in 

application of the two standards,’ ” but “[a]t its core, the hybrid standard we now endorse 

simply embodies the principle that ‘[t]he statutory scheme does not authorize a reviewing 

court to substitute its own judgment as to what is in the child’s best interests for the trial 

court’s determination in that regard, reached pursuant to the statutory scheme’s 

comprehensive and controlling provisions.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) 
16.

showed no signs of separation anxiety, and there was no evidence he appeared to miss the

parents when he was not with them. The reports and testimony indicated Julius appeared 

to enjoy spending time with the parents, but there were moments he seemed preoccupied 

with other activities. While the interactions between Julius and the parents appeared to 

be mostly positive, based on the evidence presented, the court could reasonably infer 

Julius did not have a significant emotional attachment to the parents. We acknowledge, 

as the juvenile court did, that mother had the same medical condition as Julius, and father 

was adopted at a young age and sought to be there for Julius to answer questions and 

offer support from the perspective of an adoptee. While these factors weigh in the 

parents’ favor, we cannot say they compelled the juvenile court to find there was a 

benefit to continuing the relationship, based on Julius’s very young age and the consistent 

reports he transitioned from visits without issue. (See In re Travis C. (2017) 

13 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1225 [“ ‘The judgment will be upheld if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, even though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the 

trial court might have reached a different result had it believed [the] other evidence.’ ”].) 

We reject the parents’ arguments that the juvenile court relied on improper factors 

in determining whether the exception applies. First, the parents argue the juvenile court 

improperly relied on whether the parents filled a “parental role.” To support this 

contention, father cites J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 833. In his reply brief, he expands on 

his argument, asserting we should follow In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197 

(L.A.-O.) and In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261 (D.M.) to the extent they “reject use 

of a ‘parental role’ analysis in determining the applicability” of the beneficial parentchild relationship. Father’s reliance on these cases is misplaced. 

In J.D., in deciding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not 

apply, the juvenile court found the child and appellant parent had a positive relationship 

but that it did not “ ‘amount to [a] parental bond.’ ” (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 851.) Caden C. was published while the appeal was pending, and the appellate court 
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noted that the Caden C. court “did not address whether, to satisfy the second element, the 

nature of a parent’s relationship must be ‘parental,’ a descriptor the Supreme Court did 

not use and that, standing alone, is vague and unhelpful in this context.” (J.D., at p. 864.) 

Noting the Caden C. court “said only that the child must have a ‘substantial, positive, 

emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would 

benefit from continuing the relationship,’ ” the J.D. court explained that it could not “be 

sure whether the juvenile court’s determination that [the parent] did not occupy a 

‘parental’ role encompassed factors that Caden C. deemed irrelevant” and as such, the 

court appears to have applied the wrong legal standard under Caden C. (J.D., at pp. 864‒

865.) The J.D. court remanded the matter for a new section 366.26 hearing consistent 

with Caden C. (J.D., at p. 870.) 

The court in L.A.-O. considered the appellant parents’ argument that Caden C. 

“overruled lower appellate court decisions holding that a parent asserting the parentalbenefit exception must show that he or she occupies a ‘parental role.’ ” (L.A.-O., supra, 

73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 201‒202.) The appellate court declined to make such a sweeping 

holding but did conclude under the facts of that case, remand was necessary. In arriving 

at its conclusion, the appellate court discussed thoroughly how the term “parental role” 

was ambiguous and that it thought it was “better not to use the words ‘parental role’ at 

all.” (Id. at p. 211.) The court noted a “parental role” was defined by case law as a “list 

of ‘nots’ ”: “It is not merely frequent and loving contact; it is not merely pleasant visits; 

it is not being merely a friendly visitor; and it is not merely an emotional bond (as 

opposed to a significant, positive, emotional attachment).” (Ibid.) The court went on to 

note the list was “consistent with Caden C.” but lamented that it “tells us nothing about 

the mysterious X factor that will boost the parent up from being merely a friendly visitor 

into the requisite parental role.” Rather, the guidance given by Caden C. was only that 

the “X factor ... must result in a ‘substantial, positive, emotional attachment.’ ” (L.A.-O.,

at p. 211.) The L.A.-O. court noted the juvenile court’s ruling was “terse” and that it only 
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stated the parents had “ ‘not acted in a parental role in a long time’ ” whereas the 

prospective adoptive parents had been. (Ibid.) The appellate court acknowledged the 

juvenile court “may have meant that the children had a substantial, positive, emotional 

attachment to the prospective adoptive parents but not to the parents” and “[t]hat would 

be legally correct.” (Ibid.) The court went on, “However, from its reference to a long 

time, it seems to have meant that they were not capable of taking custody, or had not 

been good parents, or had not been providing necessary parental care,” which “would be 

erroneous.” (L.A.-O., at p. 212.) The court remanded the matter for reconsideration in 

light of Caden C. 

Similarly, in D.M., the juvenile court concluded the exception did not apply, 

focusing on the appellant parent’s failures to be involved with the children’s medical 

needs and appointments and concluding his efforts “ha[d] not risen to the level of a 

parent.” (D.M., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 268.) The appellate court concluded the 

juvenile court’s findings “that father did not act like a parent” without any discussion 

about the attachment between the parent and the child was not consistent with Caden C.’s

prescription that the focus must not be on “a parent’s ability to care for a child or some 

narrow view of what a parent-child relationship should look like,” but rather “whether 

there is a substantial, positive emotional attachment between the parent and child.” 

(D.M., at pp. 270‒271.) 

Distilling the principles from the above cases, as well as Caden C., we find the 

parents’ blanket assertion that the court may not consider whether they occupied a 

“parental role” is a vast oversimplification. Rather, the case law cited by father 

establishes a juvenile court’s determination that a parent does not occupy a “parental 

role” may be error if it considers certain attributes relevant only to whether the parent can 

take custody of the child and ignores the pertinent question of whether the child has a 

“significant, positive, emotional attachment” to the parent. Much of the problem lies 

within the ambiguity of the language used by the juvenile courts in these cases and we do 
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not disagree with the court in L.A.-O. that trial courts should use language as precise as 

possible when discussing its findings with regard to the application of the beneficial 

parent-child relationship exception. As the Caden C. court advises, at the stage of the 

section 366.26 hearing, the focus is not on attributes of the parents as custodial caretakers

but on the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 632, 634.) 

Here, the juvenile court found the parents did not have a “parent-child” 

relationship with Julius but rather had a “friendship or visitor relationship.” While the 

juvenile court did not use the exact words from Caden C.—whether the child had a 

“significant, positive, emotional attachment,” we note the court did have the benefit of 

the Caden C. opinion, as it was published six months before the section 366.26 hearing in 

the present case. (See Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 563 

[we presume the trial court followed the law].) Reading the juvenile court’s ruling as a 

whole, we find nothing that demonstrates to us that by defining the second element as 

whether the parents had a “parent-child relationship,” the juvenile court was assessing 

whether the parents could take custody of Julius, or considering any other inappropriate 

factor set forth by Caden C. Rather, the court’s focus appeared to be on the nature of the 

parents’ and Julius’s relationship. For example, the court pointing out the fact that Julius

ran to the parents but stopped short at the toys at one of the visits tends to show the court 

was focused on Julius’s reaction and relationship to the parents, not the parents’ custodial 

attributes. By finding the parents had the relationship of a friendly visitor rather than a 

parent-child relationship, it necessarily found a substantial, positive, emotional 

attachment justifying the application of the exception did not exist. As the L.A.-O. court 

pointed out, the Caden C. ruling is not inconsistent with a finding that a “friendly visitor” 

relationship did not satisfy the second element of the exception. (L.A.-O., supra, 

73 Cal.App.5th at p. 211.)

Father, joined by mother, also contends the court improperly emphasized Julius’s 

relationship with his caretaker. While the Caden C. court noted the juvenile court must 
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not compare the parent’s attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any 

potential adoptive parents, we do not read the Caden C. court’s statement as precluding 

any consideration of a child’s well-being in an adoptive home. To the contrary, the 

Caden C. court also explained that in determining the third element, courts must 

“determine ... how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in 

effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the 

child’s life.... [¶] ... That subtle, case-specific inquiry is what the statute asks courts to 

perform: does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh ‘the harm [the 

child] would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship 

with [the parent?]’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The Caden C. court also 

explained that in determining the third element of the exception, the “court must ... 

determine, for the particular child, how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and 

even counterbalance” the harm a child may experience from losing a relationship with his 

or her parent. (Id. at p. 640.)

The Caden C. court’s comments lead us to conclude the juvenile court should 

avoid focusing on a parent’s custodial attributes, but a child’s well-being in an adoptive 

home should be contemplated as relevant to the ultimate question of whether the child 

would suffer detriment from the termination of parental rights. 

We do not find error on this basis. Julius’s ability to thrive in the care of his care 

provider was relevant to the question of whether Julius would suffer detriment should his 

relationship with the parents be terminated. There is no evidence the juvenile court, for 

example, clearly found a substantial, positive, emotional attachment but discarded such a 

finding solely because the parents could not take custody of Julius or because Julius had a 

stronger attachment to his care provider. Rather, in making its findings, the juvenile 

court appeared to consider Julius’s relationship with his care provider appropriately—that 

he had been with her almost his whole life and was doing well in her care despite the fact 
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he was out of his parents care, factors that pertained to Julius’s well-being rather than the 

parent’s ability to take custody of him. 

Father, joined by mother, also argues that “any reliance the juvenile court placed 

on the fact that the parents had, according to the court, made no progress toward 

alleviating the issues leading to the dependency, was error.”4 We find no evidence for 

father’s assertion the juvenile court relied on such a consideration in the record, and 

father only cites the fact that the juvenile court denied the parents’ section 388 petitions 

months prior to the section 366.26 hearing, which does not support his claim. 

Accordingly, we reject it. 

Finally, in his reply brief, father notes that he and mother “did everything they 

could do to qualify” (unnecessary capitalization omitted) for the exception. Father states, 

“per any analysis under the current dependency/reunification framework, the parents’ 

efforts to apply for the exception was virtually doomed from the onset” and because 

Julius never lived with the parents, forming a bond with him was “an almost 

insurmountable task.” We do not disagree with father that in a case like this, where a

child is removed as an infant and reunification services were denied because of risk of 

physical abuse, the application of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception is 

difficult to prove; but we note that father’s comments do not advance a legal basis for us 

to reverse the juvenile court’s order. We note the beneficial parent-child relationship 

exception exists for the benefit of the child, not the parents, and at the time of the 

section 366.26 hearing, the focus is on the stability and permanence for the child, not 

4 The Caden C. court advised that parents “need not show that they are ‘actively 

involved in maintaining their sobriety or complying substantially with their case plan’ 

[citation] to establish the exception.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 637, fn. omitted.) 

We note that in so stating, the Caden C. court did not preclude a juvenile court from 

considering a parent’s struggles in its beneficial relationship determination, just that they 

“are relevant only to the extent they inform the specific questions before the court: 

would the child benefit from continuing the relationship and be harmed, on balance, by 

losing it?” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 638.) 
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reunification. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) While we acknowledge this 

was not an easy case, the juvenile court came to the decision it felt was correct within the 

dependency framework, and on review, we find no legal error. 

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s January 5, 2022 order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

 DE SANTOS, J.

WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, ACTING P. J.

MEEHAN, J.