NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0220n.06 No. 08-5988 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. H A R O LD N O E L, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE

B EF OR E: KE I TH , B OG GS, and GR I F F I N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. De fe nd ant H aro ld N oe l a pp e a ls h is s e nte nc e of

12 0 mo nth s in

pr iso n f or be inga fe lon in p o s s es s i o n o f ammunition, in viol ation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ). Noe l argues that the district cour t failed to a pprec iate its authority

to depar t downwar d from the a dvisory Guidelines rang e based on a discha rg ed sente nce imposed in state c ourt for c onduct re lated to the fe d er al o ff ense or , alternatively , that the sentenc e imposed by the district court wa s unrea sonab l e. W e d isag ree and aff irm. I. Th e Te nn e sse e Court of Cr imi na l Ap pe a ls a c c ur a te ly se t fo rt h the ba c kg ro un d f

a c ts o f t his

c a se :No. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

- 2 - At approximately

8:15 a.m. on J une 21, 2002, prominent Memphis attorney Robert Fr iedman wa s shot and killed in the pa rking g ara g e of his of

fice building. Witnesses repor ted see ing a

well-dre ssed black ma le in his late twenties t o ear ly forties run f rom the cr ime scene to a blue Toy ota Corolla. When [Noel] beca me a suspect duringthe c ours e of the inv e sti g a tio n, of

fi c e rs dr ov e to his pla c e of re sid e nc e to q

ue sti on him

. The de fenda

nt declined to coope rate with the office rs and, for sever al hours, re fused to open the door to his apa rtment. Eventually , the defe ndant opened the locked door and wa s immediately

handcuf fed a nd taken to the police station. A fter se vera l hours of questioning , the def

endant a dmitted his i nvolvement in the shooting.

* * * The de fenda

nt had been repr esente d by the victim in a divorce case that included a custody issue reg ardinghis daug hter. He admitted that he had w aited in the par king g ara g e for the vi ctim and st ated that his plan was “[t] o shoot him for the crue l way he be tr ay e d me in r e pr e se nti ngme .” He de scr ib ed h ims e lf a s in a state of de sp a ir beca use he ha d lost every

thing, includinga plac e to live, in t h e divorc e. The defe ndant ac knowledg ed that he shot the vic tim four times with a .38 re volver fr om a distance of four

fee t. He also stated that he “wa nted to kill C hance llor Alissandratos but I

didn’t fig ure I

had enoug h time . . . .” He told offi ce rs that he then drove to his apartment, cha ng ed clothes, a

nd returne d his rental ca

r. State v. Noel , No. W2005-00160-CCA-R3-CD, 2 0 0 6 W L 2 7 29487, at *1, *6 (Te nn. Crim. App. Sept. 25, 2006) (sec ond alteration in original). Noel was char g ed with first-deg ree murder and s tood trial in Tenne ssee Criminal Court. The jury found Noe l guilty

of the lesse r included of

fense of voluntary manslaug hter. He was sente nced to six y ear s in prison. On April 20, 2006, a f

eder al g rand jury

in the Western District of T en nessee returne d an ind ic tme nt c ha

rg ingNo e l w ithtw o c ounts : bei ng a fe lon in pos se ssi on of a fi re arm , a nd a fe lon inNo. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

The g overnme nt w as able to examine the ammunition recover ed fr om Frie dman’s body and 1 de te rm in ed th at it was no t ma nu fa c tur e d in

Te nn e sse e . N oe l ha d a

pr ior c on vic tio n f

or a c ri me punishable by

imprisonment for a pe riod of more than one y ear . The 2007 e dition of the Guidelines Manua l applied. 2 - 3 - po sse ssi on

of a mmunit ion . 1 8 U.S. C. § 922( g ). Pur su ant to a ple a a g re e me nt, No e l pl e a de d g uil ty 1 to ha ving possessed ammunition in exchang e for dismiss al of the firea rm count. The district cour t

acc epted Noe l’s g uilty

plea a nd schedule d the ca se for sentenc ing. Prior to the sentenc ing he aring , the Probation Offic e prepa red a prese ntence repor

t (“PSR”). 2 B a se d o n N oe l’ s u se of ammunit ion to c omm it mur de r, the PSR in c lud e d a c ro ss- re fe re nc e to U.S.S.G. § 2 A1.1(a) for f irst-deg ree murder le ading to a base offe nse leve l of 43. Noel filed

nume ro us ob

je c tio ns to the pr e se nte nc e re po rt , arguin g that: (1 ) the Gu ide lin e pr ov isi on cross ref ere ncing first-deg ree murder was not applica ble and the ba se off

ense le vel should be ca lculated as 14; (2) those por

tions of the PSRdescr ibi n g No el ’s purported me ntal illness or emotional problems wer e inac curate; (3) Noe l w as not provided a copy of the psy cholog ical eva luation from the Fe dera l Medi ca l C en t er (“F MC”) located in For t Worth, Tex as; and (4) the g overnme nt improperly

elicited or offe red victim-impact evidenc e at the s entenc ing hear ing. I n addition, Noel asked f or a dow nwar d depar

ture on the f

ollowing g rounds: (1) he en t er ed a g uilty plea a s to the ammunition count, a

nd the g overnme nt move d to dismiss the firea rm count; (2) he had a

minimal criminal history ; (3) he a lleg edly suffe red f rom mental and emotional problems; (4) he was fif ty -four y ear s old; (5) the under ly ing state conviction wa s for volunt ar y m an s laug hter, not first-de g reeNo. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

On thi s p oin t, t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

state d: 3 An d in y our c a se be c a

us e of the fa c ts that are c on ta ine d in y our s ta te me nt, tho se fa c ts g ive rise to an appropr iate application, an appr opriate c ross-re fer ence to a first deg ree murder c harg e bec ause it ca me about as a

result of a

ly ing in wait and a

n intentional act on your par

t. - 4 - murder, a

nd he had se rved his senten ce ; an d (6 ) the shooting resulted f rom his despair a

nd desper ation. Finally , Noel made a “Spec ial Request.” He asked the district cour t to give him “c redit for time served f

rom his orig inal [st ate] arr est date, June 21, 2002.” On July 31 , 2 00 8, the di st ri ct c ourt he ld a se nte nc inghe ari ng . A ft e r h e ari ngde fe ns e counsel’s a

rg uments, the district court adopte d the finding s contained in the P SR. Noel was g iven

a cr iminal hist ory

cate g ory of I I beca use of two criminal hi story points. A base off

ense le vel of 43

was c alculate d, as authoriz ed by § 2K2.1(c )(1) , by cross-r efe renc e to § 2A1.1(a ) of the Sente ncing Guidelines base d upon t he off ense of first-deg ree murder. The off ense le vel was r educe d to 40 3 beca use of Noe l’s acc eptanc e of responsibility

. The re sulting advisory Guidelines ra

ng e wa s from 324 to 405 months, but the cha rg ed off ense had a statutory maxi mum pe nalty of 120 months. After revie wing the PSR , hear ing f rom witnesses, and a ddressing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) f actor s, the district court sentenc ed Noe l to 120 months of i mprisonment, followed by three y ear s of supervise d rele ase. Noel timely

appea led. II.No. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

- 5 - Noel ar g ues that two per tinent Sentencing Gui d elines, name ly §§ 5G1.3 and 5K2.23, authorized the district c ourt to g rant a downwar d depar ture in his case . Although § 5G1.3 on its face does not addre ss the prese nt circumstanc es, in which a defendant’s state se ntence has bee n dis c ha rg e d, a pp lic a tio n n ote 4 to § 5 G1 .3 state s: 4. Down ward Departure P rovision

. – I n the ca se of a discharg ed ter

m of imprisonment, a downwar d depar t u re is not prohibited if the defe ndant (A) has com p l eted serving a ter

m of imprisonment; and (B ) subsec tion (b) would have provided a

n adjustment had t hat completed te rm of imprisonment been undisc harg ed at the time of sente n ci n g for the instant off ense. See § 5 K2 .2 3 ( Di sc ha rg e d T e rm s of I mprisonment). Se c tio n 5 K2 .2 3 p ro vid e s: A downwa

rd depa rture ma y be appr opriate if the defe ndant (1) ha s completed ser ving a ter m of imprisonment; and (2) subsection (b) of § 5G1.3 (I mpositi on of a Sente nce on a De fenda

nt Subject to Und ischarg ed Te rm of I mprisonment) would have provided a

n adjustment had that complete d term of imprisonment bee n undischarg ed at the time of sente ncing for the instant offen se. Any such depa

rture should be fashioned to a chieve a re asonable punishment for the instant offe nse. Section 5G1.3(b) applies when the “ter m of imprisonment resulted fr om another of fense that is releva nt conduct to the instant offe nse” unde r § 1B 1.3(a) (1), (a )( 2 ), or (a)( 3). Noe l meets the

r e l e v an t c o n d

u c t r e qu i r e m e n t o f § 5 G 1

. 3 ( b ) b e c a u s e h i s o f

f e n s e l e v e l w a s b a s e d u

p o n th e sa me actions that re sulted in his conviction for voluntary manslaug hter in state c ourt. Noel ar g ues that “[b] eca

use the re cord doe s not show that the [di strict] court was aw are of its dis c re tio n to de pa

rt [ba se d o n § 5G 1. 3 or § 5K2 .2 3 of the Se nte nc ingGu ide lin e s], the c a se sh ou ld be re manded . . . fo r re s en t encing.” Howeve r, Noe l did not adequately raise this issue bef

ore the district court. While Noel’s counse l filed a motion for a downwar d d ep ar t u re and a “ SpecialNo. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

“W e re view the tra

nscript of the se ntencinghear ing de novo in determining whether the 4 district court was awa

re of its authority

to depar t.” United States v. Y

oung , 310 F. App’ x 784, 794 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( u np u

b l i s h ed ) ( ci t i n g United States v. W illiams , 355 F.3d 893, 901 (6th Cir. 2003)).

- 6 - Request” se eking “cr edit” aga inst his feder al sentenc e for time served on a

related state off

ense, he neither c ited § 5G1.3 or § 5K2.23 of the SentencingGuidelines nor arg ued at his sentenc ing he aring that the district court should g rant a downwar d depar

ture for a cross-re fer ence d offe nse that had be en fully serve d. Acc ording ly , we hold that Noe l forfe it ed h i s appea l of this issue. See U nited States v. Simmons , 501 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[t] here is no appea lable issue save d by [ Un ite d S tat es v . B os tic , 3 71 F .3 d 8 65 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) ] wh e n a de fe nd ant w ish e s to a

pp e a l a discretionar

y fac tor and does not reque st the j udg e to exercise such discretion duringthe sentenc ing he ari ng ” ); see also United States v . Ukomadu , 236 F.3d 333, 340 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (“A de fenda nt waives the rig ht to appeal a n application of the SentencingGuidelines whe n he fails to obje ct in the tr ia l c ourt .” ); Un ite d Sta te s v . A po nte , 1 9 F

. A p p ’ x 2 1 3 , 2 2 3 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 1 ) ( u np u b li s h e d ) ( “ [W] e hold that . .

. a defe ndant has no rig ht to appellate r eview ( to the extent it can be called r eview) of a district cour

t’ s fa i l u re to de part downw ard w hen the de fenda nt did not first seek a downw ard depar ture on the a sserted ba sis in the dist rict cour t.”). I n the alter

native, we reje ct Noel’s argument. “[W ]e do not revie w a dist rict cour t’s decision not t o d ep ar t d o wnwar d unless the re cord shows that the district court wa s unawa re of , or did not understand, its discretion to make suc h a depa rture.” United States v. Santillana , 540 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2008). “[W ]e presume that the district court unde rstood its discretion, absent cle ar 4No. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

- 7 - ev i d en ce t o t he contr ary .” Id. H e r e , th e r e is n o c le ar e v id e n c e th a t t

h e d is tr ic t c o u rt d id

n ot understand its discre tion to make a downwa rd depa rture. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

ind ic a te d th a t it

ha d c on sid e re d a ll o f N oe l’ s a rgume nts : I n a n e ff or t to ke e p e ve ry

thi ngfo c us e d a

nd [str e a mli ne d], I

sa id I wo uld c on sid e r a ll of the re quests made a

nd the written doc uments, whether they are ar gu ed o r not un le ss t he y a re sp e c if

ic all y wi thd

ra wn . N oth ingha s b e e n w ith dr awn , s o I wi ll consider those

. Moreove r, the district cour t acknowle dg ed Noe l’s “Specia l Request” for jail cre dit and stated:

“ [T]he tim e se rv e d on the state se nte nc e c ann ot be c re dit e d ag a ins t this se nte nc e be c a us e that is tim e that w a s c re dit e d to a

se nte nc e that has sin c e be e n co nc lud e d.

. . . Th e B ur e a u of Pri so ns ob vio us ly will calculate cr ed i t fo r the off ense since the def

endant ha s been in fe dera l custody .” The district

c ourt ’s un de rs tand ing of the law wa s cor re c t: “ [T]he po we r t o g ra

nt c re dit fo r t ime se rv e d li e s so le ly with the Attorney

Gene ral a

nd the B urea u o f P ri sons[ ,]” and a district cour t is therefor e not authorized to awa

rd credit at sentenc ing. United States v. Crozier , 259 F.3d 503, 520 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United St ates v. W ilson , 5 03 U. S. 3 29 , 3 33 (1 99 2) ); see also United States v . O’Non , 2 68 F. Ap p’ x 454 , 4 58 (6 th Cir

. 20 08 ) (u np ub lis he d) (“ Th e state me nt by the dis tr ic t c ourt that any c re dit for time ser

ved is proper l y ca l cu l ated by the Fe dera l Bure au of Prisons is a cor rec t statement of law.”)

. The re cord doe s not establish, through c lear evidenc e, that the district court thought it was without power to depa

rt downwa

rd base d on Noel’s discha rg ed state sentenc e. To the contra ry , the evidenc e shows that the district cour t was aw are of its discretion but chose not to exercise it. See United States v. Ask

ew , 108 F. App’ x 341, 343 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (“In the abse nce ofNo. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

- 8 - ambig uous statements by the di strict court concer ning its discretion, ther e is a pre sumption t hat the

c ourt wa s awa

re of the law i t w a s c a lle d u

po n to a pp ly , a nd it s ho uld be a ssume d th a t th e c ourt , in the exercise of

its discretion, found the downwa rd departure unwarr anted.” ) (inter nal citation omi tte d) ; see also Y

oung , 310 F. App’ x at 795 (“ Absent a spe cific r equest for a downwa

rd depa rture

or var iance due to a lost opportunity to r un sentenc es concur

rently , it is hard to see how the district court was somehow confused about its authority to do so, since that was not the issue it was as ked to a dd re ss .”). The district court’s fa ilure to make an express ruling ba sed on § 5G1.3 or § 5K2.23 or to mention the court’ s discretion to depa rt downwa

rd on this basis “do es not imply a lac k of understandingof that discre tion.” United States v. Rowen , 73 F.3d 1061, 1063 ( 10th Cir. 1996). Acc ording ly , we hold that the district cour t’s decision not to depar

t downwar d is not reviewa ble. III

. We reviewsentenc e s f

o r r e a s o n a b le n e s s u n d e r a n a b u s e - o f

- discretion standa

rd. United States v. Bates , 5 5 2 F. 3 d 4 7 2 , 4 7 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007))

.

“ An a bu se of dis c re tio n o c c ur s w he n th e dis tr ic t c ourt re lie s o n c le arl y e rr on e ou s f ind ing s o f f

a c t,

. . . i m proper ly

applies the law , . . . or . . . employ s an er roneous leg al standar d.” Barner v. Pilkington N. Am., Inc ., 399 F.3d 745, 748 ( 6th Cir. 2005) (citations and interna l quotation marks omitted). When evaluating the reasonablene ss of a sentenc e, “w e conside r not only the leng th of the sentenc e but also the factors evaluated and the proc edure s employ ed by the district court in re aching its sentencing deter

mination.” United States v. J ones , 489 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir. 2007) (citationsNo. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

- 9 - and int e rn a l qu otatio n mark s omi tte d) . O ur re a so na ble ne ss i nq

uir y is t he re fo re c omp ri se d o f b oth substantive and proc edura l components. Id

. “A sentenc e may be proc edura lly unrea sonable if the district judge fails to consider the applicable Guidelines ra ng e or ne g lects to consider the other fa c tor s liste d in 18 U.S. C. § 35 53 (a ), a nd ins te a d s imp ly

se le c ts w hat th e jud g e de e ms a n a pp ro pr ia te sentenc e without such re quired c onsideration.” United States v. Fe rguson , 45 6 F .3 d 6 60 , 6 64 (6 th Cir . 2 00 6) (c itatio ns and int e rn a l qu otatio n m arks omitte d) . “ A s e nte nc e is s ub sta nti ve ly

unrea sonable if the district c ourt s el ec t s [t he] sentence arbitra rily , bases the se ntence on impermissible f

actor s, fails to c onsider rele vant sentenc ing fac tors, or g ives an unrea sonable amount of we ight to any

pertinent fa ctor.” United States v. Lapsins , 570 F.3d 758, 772 ( 6 t h C i r. 2009) (c itatio n a nd int e rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s omi tte d)

. Whil e the pr oc e dura l and su bs tanti ve c omp on e nts of the c ourt’s ana ly sis “appea r to overla p[,] ” Jones , 489 F.3d at 252 n.3, the substantive inquiry turns

on “whe ther the leng th of the sentenc e is rea sonable in lig ht of the § 3553(a ) fa ctors.” United States

v . Ta te , 516 F.3d 459, 469 ( 6th Cir. 2008). I n a dd iti on , w e a

pp ly a re bu tta ble pr e su mpt ion

of re a so na ble ne ss t o s e nte nc e s th a t f a ll w ith in a prope rly calc ulated Guidelines r ang e. United St ates v. Vonne r , 516 F.3d 382, 389 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (e n b anc ). Whe re the dis tr ic t c ourt imp os e s a

se nte nc e be low

the Gu ide lin e s r ang e , “ sim ple log ic compels the c onclusion that . . . defe ndant’s task of pe rsuading[t his court] t h at t h e more lenient sentenc e . . . is unreasona

bly long is e ven more demanding .” Un ite d Stat es v. C urry , 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008). Cf. United States v. Johnson , 4 4 5 F. 3 d 7 9 3 , 7 9 8 (5 t h C i r . 2 0 0 6 ) ( ap p l y i n g aNo. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

- 10 - presumption of re asonable ness to “statutory maxi mum sentenc es whe re that max imum falls below the appr opriate guidelines rang e”) , cert. de nied , 547 U.S. 1199 (2006). A. Noel cha lleng es both the proc edura l and substantive re asonable ness of his sentenc e. Reg ardingp r o c e d

u r a l r e a s o n a

b le n e ss, the rec ord shows that the district cour t: (1) prope rly

calc ulated and conside red the applicable Guidelines ra ng e, which w as fr om 324 to 405 months; (2) applied the rele vant fa ctors listed in § 3553(a) ; and (3) c onsidered Noel’s arguments for a lenient sentenc e. The district court then sente nced N oel t o the statutory maxi mum of 120 months, which the district court ind ic a te d w a s “ 17 y e ars low e r t ha n th e g uid e lin e min imum [and ] an a pp ro pr ia te se nte nc e in t

his

case .” The district cour

t did not err in re

jecting Noel’s leg al o bjection to a cr oss-ref ere nce to § 2A1.1(a ) f

o r f ir s t- d e g r e e mu

r d e r . “ T h is c ir c u it

c le ar ly a ll o w s d is tr ic t c o u rts to c o n s id e r a c qu itted conduct at sentencing

. . . . under the theory that a dete rmination of g uilt requires proof bey ond a

rea sonable doubt while sente ncing considerations only require proof by a p re p ondera nce of the evidenc e.” United States v. Milton , 27 F.3d 203, 208- 09 (6th Cir. 1994). I n fac t, “ [n] o limit ation shall be plac ed on the information conce rning the bac kg round, cha rac ter, a nd conduct of

a per son convicted of

an off ense w hich a c ourt . . . may rec eive and consider for the pur pose of imposing anNo. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

Th e Te nn e sse e state c ourt jud g e state d at se nte nc ing : 5 Ilistened to the p ro o f i n t h e ca se same a s the jury did and to be honest the f acts of this case, if the re w as eve r a c ase t h at was laid out for preme ditated Fir st Deg ree Murder , Idon’t know that I ’ve e ver se en a be tter one. Mr

. No el p lanned this, Mr. No e l r e nte d a

c ar, Mr . N oe l arm e d h ims e lf , M r. No e l dre sse d a s, pe r h is s ta te me nt, so that he would blend in. Mr. Noe l laid in wai t for Mr. Frie dman. Mr. Noe l shot him on c e in the c he st and the n pu t the g un up to his he a d and fi re d tw o mor e sh ots
. And, af ter the killing Mr. Noel disposed of the g un, disposed of the clothes and we nt about his business. Then g ave a very , very , detailed c onfession t o the police, d e t a i l i n g n o to n l y

w h a th e d i d

b u tw h y h e d i d i t an d w h a t h i s i n t e n t i o n s w e r e . S o , I, ag ain, I respe ct the jury

sy stem, Irespe ct what a

jury did but I don’t, Ihonestly don’t understand the ir verdic t in this case . - 11 - a pp ro pr ia te se ntence.” 18 U. S.C. § 3 66 1. He re , th e sp e c if ic fa c ts s ur

ro un din g F ri e dma

n’ s d e a th support the district court’s de cision to consider a cross-r efe renc e to § 2A1.1 for first-deg ree murder. 5 Next, Noel contends that the district court committed reve rsible proc edura l error by failing to consider a

lower se n t en ce ba sed on the a pplication of either

§ 5G1.3 or § 5K2.23 of the SentencingGuidelines. Ho we ver, a s noted above , Noel did not argue for a downwa

rd depa rture

un de r § 5G 1. 3 or § 5K 2. 23

. Thus , no t surp ri sin g ly , the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a dd re ss t his argume nt. Th a t om iss ion

do e s n ot w arr ant a

ru lin g by

thi s c ourt

that N oe l’ s sent ence was pr oc e dura lly

un re a so na

ble or a de te rm inatio n th a t r e mand is a pp ro pr ia te . “ Whe n a

dis tr ic t c ourt

a de qu a te ly

e xp l a i ns why it im po sed a p art ic ula r s e nte nc e . . . w e do no t f ur the r r e qu ir e that it

e xha us tiv e ly explain the obverse – why an al ter nativ e se nte nc e wa s not selec ted – in ever

y instance.” United Sta te s v . G ale , 4 68 F .3 d 9 29 , 9 40 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; se e als o U nit e d S tat es v . Fernandez , 443 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2006) (“ [W ]e will not conclude that a district judg e shirked he r oblig ati on to consider the § 35 53 (a ) fa c tor s sim

ply be c a us e sh e did

no t di sc us s e a c h o ne ind ivi du a lly or did no t e xpre ssl yNo. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

- 12 - parse or addr ess eve ry

argument relating to those fa ctors that the de fen d an t advanc ed.”) . “A sentenc ing judg e has no more duty than we appellate judge s do to discuss ever y argument made by a litiga n t ; ar gu m en ts clear ly

without merit can, a

nd for the sa

ke of judicia l economy

should, be passed ove r in silence.” United States v. Cunningham , 429 F.3d 673, 678 ( 7th Cir. 2005). Fur thermore , to the extent that Noel argued that he should r ece ive cre dit f or time served f

rom his origina l arre st date, the district court adequately set forth its re asons for reje cting this “Special Request.” As discussed previously , it is the Att orney Gene ral, through the B urea u of Prisons, who is authorized to gr ant a prisoner credit for tim e spent in pre- sentenc e detention. 18 U.S.C. § 3585; W ilson , 50 3 U.S. at 33 3- 35 (1 99 2) ; United States v. W estmoreland , 974 F.2d 736, 737 ( 6th Cir. 1992). “[Section] 3585(b) does not authorize a dist rict court to compute the cre dit at sentencing .” W ilson , 503 U.S. at 334. Acc ording ly , we hold that Noe l’s sentenc e is proce durally rea sonable. B.

“ As su min g that the dis tr ic t court ’s se nte nc ing de c isi on is p ro c e dura lly so un d, [we ] sho uld then consider

the substantive re asonable ness of the se ntence imposed under a n abuse- of-discr etion standard.” Ga ll , 5 52 U. S. at 51. No e l fa ils to ar tic ulate wh y his te n- y e ar se nte nc e wa s su bs tanti ve ly

unrea sonable. Howeve r, a revie w of the r ecor d shows that the district court prope rly weig hed the § 3553(a) fac tors, selec ted a punishment it believed fit Noel’s crimes, and explained the rea sons for its sentence.No. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

Section 3553(a) mandates that a dis trict court imposing a sentenc e conside r the de fenda nt’s 6 Guidel i n es ra n ge; t he natur e of the offe nse; the cha rac teristics of the de fenda nt; the need to dete r c ri min a l c on du c t, p ro te c t the pu bli c , and pr ov ide the de fe nd ant w ithtr e a tme nt; and the ne e d to a vo id sentenc ing d i s p ar ities with defenda nts who have be en found guilty of the same conduct a

nd who have similar c riminal histories. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). - 13 - After calc ulating the applicable offe nse level u n d er the Guidelines, and he aringfrom wi tne sse s and

No e l hi mse lf

, th e dis tr ic t c ourt

c on du c te d it s § 35 53 (a ) inq uir y : 6 Ithen have to g o to the 3553 fac tors. And on those, first looking at whethe r or not the def endant ha s demonstrated a propensity

for violenc e in th e fu ture, the f actor s that the cour

t lo o k s t o o n that prong point to an affir mative re sponse. The inf o r mati o n th a t th e g o v e r

n me n t p r o d

u c e d r e lati n g to th e a c ti v it ie s in the pena l instit ution point t o that fac t. * * * The c ourt has to look at the natur e and the circ umstances of the offe nse. And I

stand repe atedly

reminded that this is a 922(g )[] char g e[,] it’s a cha rg e that the de fenda

nt wa s a fe lon in [p os se ssi on ] of

a mmunit ion . B ut t

his a mmunit ion

wa s r e tr ie ve d a s a part of the crime scene wher ein there was a violent homicide

. So t h at , t he circ umstances of

the offe nse ar e ag ain ver

y dire, ve ry serious and they point in favor of the g overnme nt and ag ainst the defe ndant. The c ourt has to look at the history and the c hara cter istics of the defe ndant. Th e de fe nd ant i n th is c a se ha s o nly tw o p ri or c ounta ble of fe ns e s w hic h p la c e s h im in a Cr imi na l H ist or

y Ca te g or y I I , w hic h is re a lly

on the low e nd of the c ri min a l sc a le wh e n w e loo k at th e hig he st c ri min a l hi sto ry c a te g or y is a VI . B ut the c ourt

ha s to look at the nature and history of those of

fe n s es . And there have be en violent offe n s es , there have be en off enses involving wea

pons. Those thing s point to a decide d dang erousne ss with respec t to Mr. Noel. And while M r. Noel has ex hibited incredible c larity of thoug ht and of proc essing tod ay , o n J un e 21 of 20 02 , ag a in a bo ut t he state me nt M r. No e l de mon str a te d c lari ty of a c ti o n , b u t th a t c la

r it y o f a c ti o n w a s a c o u r s e o f e v e n ts th a t le d to an e v e n t that c ha ng e d th e liv e s of a l ot o f p e op le , in c lud ingMr . N oe l, u na lte ra bly ba se d o n th os e actions.No. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

- 14 - * * * So I can only assume that beca use of the me thodical nature of the a ctivities that led up to this act on June 21 that Mr. Noel wa s an individual who believe d that he didn’t have to a bide by traditional norms of the c ommunity . And h e s et out and sat [sic] about to take some thing s into his own hands and he used a w eapon a nd ammunition to f a c ili ta te tha

t. H e wa s a

c onvi cte d fe lon

a t th e tim e that he ma de tho se c ho ic e s. And so ag ain that fa ctor we ighs a g ainst him and in favor of the g overnme nt. * * * So in terms of the ammunition that is at i s s u e h ere , as I said befor e, is the ammunition that was ac t u ally rec overe d from the body of the victim. And so that speaks to the se riousness of this offe nse. The c ourt has to impose a sente nce that promotes respe ct for the law. Mr. Noel, ther e is no g etting a round the fa ct that y our actions demonstrate an utter lack of respe ct for the law. Your statement ex emplified real frustra tion, but there ca

n [] never be justification for a llowing your fr ustration to drive unl awf

ul acts. There are alway s conseque nces. The re ha ve to be. We live in an or dere d society

. * * * There needs to be deter

renc e. There needs to be a strong statement to the public that [t his] is not the way

to go, a nd that calls for

a ser ious, a serious sente nce. I n y our ca se, Mr. Noe l, beca use of the history

of violence , the history

of threa ts, the lack of respe ct for the rule of law, the lack of respe ct for the justice sy stem, Ifind that a ser ious sentence is warr anted. Reg arding Noel’s request for a downwa

rd depa rture ba sed on a me ntal impairment, the dis tr ic t c ourt

e xpla ine d: You have insisted that y ou need treatment. The reports, and I ’ve se nt y ou, Isuppose, some two or three times to differ ent place s for e valuations when you told me there we re mul tip le vo ic e s, wh e n y ou tol d th e re we re thi ng s in y our e y e lid s, wh e n y ou

tol d me all manner

of thing s, when y ou told me y ou couldn ’t sleep be cause there wer eNo. 08-5988

United States v. Noel

- 15 - people in five differ ent voices ta lking to y ou all the time. We have e valuated a ll of that and it has all come back ne g ative. So I don’t believe , g iven that y ou – that y ou have told me those things, I think, Mr. Noel, that ar g ues ag ai n s t an y kind of lower se ntence and ar g ues for a strong er sentenc e bec ause if, in f

act, ther e is something g oing on that with voic es in y our hea d that could ca

use y ou to, as y ou say , snap like y o u d i d b ef o re, the n that makes y ou potentially

dang erous. So, and it s ug g e sts to m e that y ou ne e d to be in a

n envi ron ment

wh e re y ou

c an, in fac t, ge t treatment a

nd monitoring for

those conditions. Thus , “ [i]t is c le ar that the dis tr ic t court c on sid e re d a ll the e vid e nc e and wa s mi nd fu l of

its obligation to im pose a se ntence that ‘fit the cr ime.’” Un ite d Stat es v. V owe ll , 51 6 F .3 d 50 3, 51 4 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Be cause Noel’s se ntence is below the Guidelines r ang e, it is entitled to a re buttable presumption of re asonable ness, and, on a buse-of -discre tion review, this cour t give s due def ere nce to the district c ourt’s conc lusion that the sentence was wa rra nted by the § 3553(a ) fac tors. U

n it e d S ta te s v . B olds , 5 1 1 F. 3 d

5 6 8 , 5 8 1 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 51). Considering the totality

of the c ircumstance s, id ., including the Guidelines, t he § 3553(a) fac tors, the

natur e of the of fe ns e , a nd No e l’ s b a c kg ro un d, we ho ld t hat th e ten -y e ar s e nte nc e is s ub sta nti ve ly

rea sonable. I V. For these re asons, we a ffirm the judg ment of the district cour t.