UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

JAMIE HILL, et al., )

Plaintiffs, )

) No. 20 CV 50286

v. ) Judge Iain D. Johnston

)

MERCY HEALTH SYSTEM CORP., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of a class action 

settlement [65]. It asks the Court to preliminarily approve the parties’ proposed settlement of 

this case, preliminarily certify the settlement class, approve notice of the settlement to the class, 

and schedule a fairness hearing. But the proposed preliminary approval order also asks the Court 

to enter a preliminary injunction that would bar class members and their agents, heirs, etc., from 

asserting any of the claims that are the subject of the settlement agreement against the defendants 

in any other litigation. The Court questioned its authority to enter such an injunction, which the 

parties addressed in a joint position paper. Dkt. 68.

The parties identified the source of this Court’s authority to enjoin class members from 

filing other suits as the being the All Writs Act, which permits federal courts to “issue all writs 

necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 

principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). In support, they quote In re Jimmy John’s Overtime 

Litig., 877 F.3d 756, 767 (7th Cir. 2017) for the proposition that an anti-suit injunction is 

appropriate to “protect pending or finalized class settlements.” But In re Jimmy John’s did not 

involve a settlement agreement, and regardless, it reversed a district court order that entered an 

anti-suit injunction that had been aimed at preventing managers from suing franchisee employers 

until after the claims against Jimmy John’s itself were resolved. The Seventh Circuit held that an 

anti-suit injunction under the All Writs Act is an “extraordinary” form of relief, and that the “in 

aid of . . . jurisdiction” language is interpreted narrowly. For that latter proposition, In re Jimmy 

John’s relied on Adkins v. Nestle Purina Co., 779 F.3d 481, 483-84 (7th Cir. 2015). Although 

Adkins involved the Anti-Injunction Statute, both it and the All Writs Act use the phrase “in aid 

of . . . jurisdiction” and cases interpreting one statute are persuasive when interpreting the other. 

See In re Jimmy John’s, 877 F.3d at 763. In Adkins, the Seventh Circuit explained that thwarting 

other suits that could imperil a settlement is not “in aid of jurisdiction,” and that the issue of 

jurisdiction is limited to whether a court has been designated by statute as an appropriate forum 

for a dispute. See Adkins, 779 F.3d at 483-84.

Both In re Jimmy John’s and Adkins also note that even when a statute like the All Writs 

Act or Anti-Injunction Act authorizes a court to issue an injunction, the court must also comply 

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, including an explanation of the reasons why it was 

issued. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). This was a major concern of the Court causing it to ask the 

Case: 3:20-cv-50286 Document #: 69 Filed: 11/24/21 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:732
parties for authority. The proposed preliminary approval order contains no such explanation, and 

the Court will not create one without any evidence being presented for it to make the necessary 

findings. Additionally, Rule 65(d)(2) requires actual notice to all persons bound by an 

injunction, but the proposed notice to the class says nothing of the injunction, though it does 

refer class members to a website with the proposed Settlement Agreement itself.

The parties have cited other cases they claim also support the use of anti-suit injunctions

to aid settlements, but all of them predate In re Jimmy John’s and Adkins. For instance, in 

Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel Related Srvs. Co., Inc., 264 F.R.D. 438, 450 (N.D. Ill. 2009), the 

district court held that the All Writs Act authorized it to stay a state court case to effectuate a 

settlement in the federal case because it would “assur[e] the integrity of the class, ensur[e] the 

enforceability of the court’s orders, and protect[] any settlement funds.” But that rationale would 

not seem to survive In re Jimmy John’s and Adkins. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 356 F.3d 

781 (7th Cir. 2004) reversed a district judge’s order granting final settlement approval, and only 

fleetingly mentioned that anti-suit injunctions are “occasionally” issued without analyzing when 

such injunctions are appropriate. Finally, in In re Synthroid Marketing Litig., 197 F.R.D. 607, 

610 (N.D. Ill. 2000), a district judge stated that an “injunction, where necessary to protect the 

court's earlier orders, including preliminary approval of the settlement of this class action, is 

authorized under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).” But the judge declined to issue an 

injunction after concluding that sending corrective letters to class members, who had received 

inaccurate information about the suit from a non-party, would be effective.

The position paper also includes a string-cite of numerous other cases that have entered 

anti-suit injunctions as part of the order preliminarily approving a class settlement. But the two 

Northern District of Illinois cases cited do not explain their bases for entering a preliminary 

injunction. These cases are not precedential. Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011). 

Moreover, cases that do not discuss an issue have no precedential value. United States v. L.A. 

Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33 (1952).

The Court has a fiduciary duty to the class members. Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel 

Related Servs. Co., 877 F.3d 276, 283 (7th Cir. 2017). The Court is not going to enjoin class 

members from filing other litigation that may upset this settlement simply to help ensure that this 

case is removed from its docket. The parties have provided no legal bases for that request nor 

any facts upon which a proper injunction could be entered.

For these reasons, the Court will not sign the proposed preliminary approval order 

containing a preliminary injunction. By December 10, 2021, the parties shall submit a revised 

proposed preliminary approval order for the Court’s review.

Date: November 24, 2021 By: _________________________

IAIN D. JOHNSTON

United States District Judge

Case: 3:20-cv-50286 Document #: 69 Filed: 11/24/21 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:733