### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Fe br ua ry 16, 200 5 S es sio n D EB R A A N N WI LL IA M S v. GE OR GE JA Y WI LL IA M S, IV

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 98D1036 Sam uel H. Payne, Judge

No. E2004-00423-COA- R3-CV - F ILED MAY 24, 2005

Debr a Ann Williams (“Mother”) and Ge org e Jay Wil liams, I V (“ Father” ) we re divorc ed i n 1998. Mother wa s desig nated the c ustodial parent of the parties’ two minor children. In 2003, Father filed a Petition for Mod i fi ca t i o n and Contempt seeking , in part, a c hang e in custody or visitation, and relief from the r equire ment that Father c arry life insuranc e or, in the alternative, that Mother a lso be re qu ir e d to ma int a in l if

e ins ur a nc e . M oth e r f

ile d a c ou nte r c la im r e qu e sti ng , in pa rt , in c re a se d c hil d suppo rt an d the rig ht to claim the tax ex emption for both childre n. After a trial, the Trial Court enter ed an or der holding , int e r a lia , “th a t the re ha s bee n no ch a ng e in ci rc ums ta nc e s whi c h w ou ld justify the modification of the f inal judgme nt” as re qu es t ed b y Father a nd dismiss ing F ather ’s petition for modification. The Trial Court, how ever , incre ased child support in a ccor dance with the g uidelines and he ld that for purpose s of calculating child support under the g uidelines, Father wa s no t e nti tle d to a

re du c tio n in his a nn ua l e arn ing s f or state inc ome ta xes h e ma y pa y . F a the r a

pp e a ls r a is in g is s u e s r e g ar d in g c u s to dy , visitation , li f e in s u r a n c e , c h il d s u p p o r t, a n d a tt o r n e y ’ s f e e s
. We re ve rs e a s to the a wa

rdto M oth e r o f the ta x exempti on fo r o ne c hil d, a nd a ff ir m a s to a ll o the r i ssu e s.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed, in p art, Reve rsed, in part; Case R em anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS , P.J . and S HAR ON G. LEE , J ., joined.
J ames A. Me aney , I I I , Atlanta, Ge org ia, for the Appellant, Ge org e Jay Wil liams, I V.
L isa Z . B ow ma n, Chatta no og a , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lle e , D e br a

An n Wil lia ms.In t hi s O p i ni o n, we shal l ref er t o t he M ari t al D i ss o l ut i o n A greem ent , t he P erm anent P arent i ng P l an, and t he 1 F ina l D e c re e o f D ivo rc e c o llec tive ly as “the D ivo rc e D e c re e .” -2- OP IN ION
Bac kgr ound
Mother and F ather

enter ed into a Marital Dissoluti o n Agreement and a Permane nt Parenting Plan, which wer e appr oved by the Trial Court and incorporated into their Final Dec ree of Divorce (“the Divorce Dec ree ”)

. The Divorce Dec ree desig nated Mother as the custodial pare nt of 1 the parties’ two minor children and set Father’s c hild support obligation at $689.00 per month. The Divorce Dec ree also provided, in part, that F ather would rec eive the ta x exemption for both children and that F ather

would provide li fe insurance on his own l ife with benefits pay able to the c hildren.
I n J anuary

of 2 0 0 3 , F ath e r

f iled a Petition for Modification and Contempt (“ Petition”) claiming , in part, that Mother “ has fa iled and re fused to comply with th e ex p re s s t erms and conditions of the [Final] Decre e [of Divorce ]” and that there “has be en a substantial c hang e in the status of the parties which materially aff ects the w elfa

re a nd best interest of the children

. ” I n the Petition, Father soug ht, in part, an a war d of primary phy s i ca l custody

of the c hildren or, in the alternative, incre ased visitation, and relief from the require ment that Father maintain life insurance, or in the alternative, an order that Mother also be require d to maintain insurance on her life . Mother a ns we re d a nd fi le d a

c ou nte r- c omp la int

se e kin g , in pa

rt , in c re a se d c hil d s up po rt , th e ri g ht t o c la im the tax ex emption for both childre n, and her attorney ’s fe es. The c ase w as tried in Aug ust of 2003.
At tr ia l, F a the r t e sti fi e d th a t he still is emp loy e d b y the At la nta

B ra ve s B a se ba ll Org anization, as he wa s at the time of the divorc e. He is the head minor lea g ue tra iner for the Atlanta B rave s org anization. Father testified he maintains a re sidence in Gree nville, South C arolina; sp e nd s a po rt ion of

the y e ar i n F lorida

fo r s pring tr a ini ng ; and ma int a ins a n ad dit ion a l r e sid e nc e in Richmond, Virg inia wher e he r esides during the base ball season. F ather testified t hat during t he off season, f rom approximately

September 1 to Mar ch 1, he w orks from his home.
Father testified that his salary has incre ased since the entry of the Divorc e De cre e. He testified that his salary for 1999 wa s $35,000 with an $800 monthly housing allowance for the months from April throug h Aug ust, w hich totals $4,000 in housing allowanc e for the y ear . Father testif i ed t hat his curr ent ea

rning s, are $49,000 annually with a $4,000 a y ear

housing a llowance , wh ic h to ta ls $ 53 ,0 00 fo r the y e ar. F a the r t e sti fi e d th a t hi s h ou sin g a llo wan ce doe s n ot c ov e r h is additional living expenses in Virg inia.

Father a lso testified that he now is required to pay state income ta x in South C arolina and in V irg inia due to the living arr ang ements dictate d by his job. He testified South Carolina has a n in c ome ta x of “ abo ut 7 pe rc e nt, 6 p e rc e nt. ” He te stifi ed Vi rgin ia has an inc ome ta x tha t is substantially

simil ar to South Carolina’s. F ather introduced income and expense stateme nts at trial-3-

sh ow ing , in part, his g ro ss w a g e s a ndde du c tio ns fo r, a mon g oth e r thin g s, fe de ra l in c ome ta x, Sou th Carolina income ta x , and Virg inia income tax for a one y ear period.
F a the r t e s t i f

i e d r e g ar d i n g h i s r e a s o n s f o r f i l i n g t h e P e t i t i o n
. H e t e s t i f i e d ab o u t hi s c on c e rn s r e g ard ing the c hil dr e n’ s me dic a l c are a nd state d: “M os t of the inf orma tio n I

g e t a bo ut the ir medical c are is either fr om the child themselves or me having to contact the doc tor themselves....” He testified r eg arding communication betwe en himself and Mothe r an d s ta te d : “ M y c oncerns are that beca use there is no communication, I ’m either le ft to find out things from the children w hich is not how this should be done or throug h the Court.” He stated: “The re is no coope ration bec ause one , [Mot her] wo n ’t communicate, w on’t talk. Any time that there is a me aning ful conve rsation that should take plac e about something , she hang s up, she doesn’t want to talk any more. All of a sudden, I don’t have time for y ou beca use y ou’re a bad person.” He a dmitted: “I think our communication betwee n the both of us is difficult.” F ather also testified re g arding his conce rns about the c hildren’s education and stated: “We boug ht them books to rea d. The mot her was buy ing the m video g ames for them, but making them pay for books to re ad. To me, that was bac kwar ds.”
F a the r t e sti fi e d

re g ard ing his vis itatio n w ith the c hil dr e n a nde xpla ine d: “ A r ou ndtr ip [from Mother’s re sidence to F ather ’s], y ou’re looking at 500 miles, y ou know, in a we ekend. It’s 12 5 th e re - - no , e xcu se me . It is 25 0 mi le s f ro m G re e nv ill e to he re , a nd the n 25 0 so it’ s 50 0 mi le s -

- . . . ro un d trip. 1, 00 0 mi le s in a we e ke nd .” F a the r a dmi tte d he do e s n ot s e e the c hil dr e n at le a st 80 da y s a y e ar “ du e to my sc he du le a nd pa rt of it i s d ue to the ina

bil ity to j us t se e the m f

inanc ia lly and with trave l constraints during the y ear when I ’m off w ork.”
After the trial, the Trial Court e ntere d its order on Nove mber 13, 2003, holding , inter ali a , “that ther e has be en no chang e in circ umstances wh i ch would jus tify the modification of the fi n al j u d gm en t

. . . , ” th at “c h i l d s u p p o rt s h o u l d b e i n cr ea s ed co m m en s u ra t e w i t h [ Fa t h er ’s ] ea rn i n gs and in ac corda nce w ith the child support g uidelines and that [Father] is not entitled to a reduc tion in his annual ea

rning s for a dditional St ate taxes that he may pay due to his employ ment.” Among other thing s, the Trial C ourt order ed Father to pay child support in the amount of $971 per month, awa rded Mother

the tax deduction for one of the parties’ child re n , an d o rdered that as a dditional chil d s u p p o r t F a th e r s h a ll p a y M o th e r ’ s a tt o r n e y ’ s f e e s in th e a mo u n t o f $ 5 0 0

. T h e Trial Court ref used to incre ase visitation, but, w ith the ag ree ment of the parties, a mended the D ivorce Dec ree to revise the dates for visitation keeping in mind Father ’s nee d to transp o rt the childre n a g reat dista n ce t o h i s h o m e in another state for visitation. I n its memorandum opinion issued from the bench, the Trial Court stated:
The Court finds no basis to chang e custody at all.

. . . I just found out y ’all just like to fuss. I fee l so sorry

for y our childre n. I t’s a wonde r they don’t nee d all kinds of counseling beca

use I ’m sure the y

can f eel this tension every

time y ou g et tog ether

. The thi ng s that y ou’re talking a bout...[ are ] t he same things y ou had whe n y ou g ot divorced. Y ou wer e tra veling, t h e s am e thing. I wouldn’t send the c hildren wher e they ’re g oing to live in thre e diffe rent homes in Florida, Carolina, Richmond.-4-

I wo uld n’ t do that at all

. I n fa c t, I ’m no t eve n sur e that wou ld be in the be st i nte re st for the c hildren at a ll.
The Trial Court a lso state d: “ I ’m not going to increa se y our [child] support simplybeca use y ou don’t see [the childre n] . . . 80 day s a y ear
. . . . You’re doing pretty g ood considering - - y ou’re doing mor e than most people I

g et that have to do as much trave ling a s y ou do.”
Father filed a

Motion for New Trial and a Motion to Alter or Amend, both of w hich the Tria l Co urt de nie d. F athe r a pp e a ls t o th is C ou rt

.

Discussion Although not stated ex actly as such, Father raises five issues on appe al: 1) whe ther the Tria l Co urt e rr e d in c omp uti ng c hil d s up po rt wi th ou t giv ing F a the r a de du c tio n f

or his state inco m e t ax es withheld in South C arolina a nd Virg inia and for his life insurance premiums; 2) whether the Trial Court er

red in refusing to modify

custody or visitation; 3) whether the Trial Court err ed in awa

rding to Mothe r the tax exemption for one of theparties’ children; 4) w hether the Trial Cou rt e rr e d in re fu sin g e ith e r t o e lim inate the re qu ir e me nt that F ath er car ry lif e ins ur a nc e or

to require Mother to maintain a simila r p o licy ; and, 5) whe ther the Trial Court erre d in awar ding a tto rn e y ’s fe e s to Mo the r. Mo the r r e qu e sts a n a wa rdof a tto rn e y ’s fe e s a ndc os ts o n a pp e a l.
Ou r r e vie w i s de novo up on the re c or d, a c c omp a nie d b y a pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss of the finding s of fac t of the trial court, unless the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise . Tenn. R. A pp . P. 13 (d ); Bogan v. Bogan , 60 S.W .3d 721, 727 (Tenn. 2001)

. A trial court' s conclusions of law ar e subjec t to a de novo revie w with no presumption of cor rec tness. S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon County Bd. of Educ

. , 58 S.W .3d 706, 710 (Tenn. 2001) . We review child support decisions for a buse of discr etion. State ex re l. Vaughn v. Kaatrude , 21 S.W .3d 244 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Howeve r, a trial court’s discretion is lim ited beca use such “ discretion must be exercise d within the strictures of the Child Support Guidelines.” Berryhill v. Rhode s , 21 S.W .3d 188, 193 (Tenn. 2000) ; see also Jone s v. Jone s , 930 S.W .2d 541, 545 (Tenn. 1996)

.

Our S upreme Court discussed the abuse of discre tion standard in Eldridge v. Eldridge , s t at i n g:

Un de r the abu se of

dis c re tio n s tand ard , a

tr ia l c ou rt ’s ru lin g “ wi ll b e up he ld so long a s rea sonable minds can disag ree as t o [t he] propriety of t he dec ision made.” A trial court abuses its discretion only when it “a

pplie[s] an incor

rec t leg al standar d, or re ache [s] a dec ision which is ag ainst logic or re asoning that cause [s] an injustice to the par ty

c o mp lain in g
. ” T h e ab u s e o f d is c r e ti o n s tan d ar d d o e s n o t p e r mi t the app e llate c ou rt

to s ub sti tut e its jud g me nt f or that of the tr ia l c ou rt

. Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted).-5- Ap pe llate c ou rt s ord ina

ri ly pe rm it disc re tio na

ry de c isi on s to stan d w he n r e a so na ble judicial minds can differ conce rning their soundness. Ove rstreet v. Shone y’s, I nc. , 4 S.W .3d 694, 70 9 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 9) . A tr ia l c ou rt ’s dis c re tio na ry de c isi on mus t ta

ke int o a c c ou nt a

pp lic able law and be consistent with the fac ts before the court. Id

. When revie wing a dis cre tionary decision by the trial court, the “appe llate courts should beg in w ith the pr esumption that the decision is corr ect and should revie w the evide nce in the lig ht most favorable to the decision.” Id

.

We first consider whether the Trial C ourt err ed in computi ng child support without g iving F ather

cre dit for state income taxes withheld in hi s state of residenc e and for his life insurance pr e miu ms. I n p e rt ine nt p art , T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 5- 10 1 p ro vid e s:
I n c a se s in vo lvi ng chi ld su pp ort, u po n a pp lic a tio n o f e ith e r p art y , th e c ou rt sh a ll decr ee an incre ase or

decr ease of such a llowance wh en there is found to be a signific ant variance , as def ined in the child su p p o rt g uidelines established by subsection (e ), betwee n the g uidelines and the amount of support cur rently order ed unless the variance has re sulted from a pr eviously court-or dere d deviation from the g uidelines and the c ircumstance s which caused the de viation have not chang ed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101 (a )(1) (A) (S u p p
. 2 004). Ne ither party contests on appe al the Tria l Court’s holding that a

signific ant variance exis ts justi fy ing an incre ase in c hild support. Rather, Father a rg ues that in ca lculating his net i ncome for purposes of determining if a signific ant variance exis ts, the Trial Court should have a llowed him a deduc tion for state income taxes.

I n pertinent pa

rt, the child support g uidelines provide:
Net income is c alculate d by deducting from g ross income of the oblig or F I CA (6.2% S ocial Security

+ 1.45% Me dicar e for

reg ular wa g e ea

rner s and 12.4% Social Se c urity + 2. 9% Me dic are fo r se lf

-e mpl oy e d, a s of 19 91 , or

a ny a mou nt s ub se qu e ntl y se t by F e de ra l law a s FI CA ta x), the a mou nt o f w ith ho ldi ng ta x de du c te d f or a sin g le wag e earner claiming one withholding allowa nce ( copies of a ppropriate table will be p ro v i ded to courts with the guide lines), and the amount of any adjustment(s) or cre dit(s) to the obligor ’s net income pursuant to subpa rag raphs (c) , (e) , (f) and (g ) of this parag raph. Tenn. Comp. R. & Reg s., ch. 1240-2- 4-.03(4) (b)( 1) (2003)

.

Under the g uidelines, an oblig or, such a s Fa ther, is entitled t o deduct FI CA tax and wi thh o l d i n g t a x. T h e g u i d e l i n e s d o n o ts p e c i f i c a l l y a d d r e s s w h e t h e r

a n o b l i g o r

m a y d e d u c ts ta te withholding tax. However , as to the withholding tax deduc tion, the g uidelines do state that “c opiesW e ut i l i ze t he gu i del i nes i n ef fect at t he t i me of

t r i al i n t hi s mat t er
. W e n ot e t hat t hes e g ui del i nes ha ve s i nce 2 bee n a men ded. -6- of appr opriate tab le will be provided to courts with the guidelines .

. . .” Id . (empha sis added). A s 2 the g uidelines state that the a ppropriate tab le for with h o l d i n g t ax will be provided, rather than appropriate tables , we c onclude that unde r the g uidelines only fede ral withholding tax, not state, may be deduc ted. I f it were otherwise, the g uidelines would state that appr opriate tables would be pr ov ide d a ndc ou rt s wou ld nee d to ha ve c op ie s o f t able s f or e a c h a nde ve ry

state that ha s a

state income tax. Further , we take judicial notice that ea ch o f t he fifty states has its own state taxation sy stem. For example, some states have a state inc ome tax wherea s other states, suc h as Tenne ssee, do not have a

state income ta x . Be cause Tenne ssee r aises its s t at e re venue w ithout resorting to a state inc ome ta x, we thi nk it i s re le va nt that the g uid e lin e s do no t pr ov ide fo r a ny de du c tio n o r c re dit for a ny T en n es see ta x es paid by an oblig or. An oblig or is not give n a cr edit or deduc tion for Tenne ssee taxes, which a re ta x es other tha n an income tax, paid by the obligor . We do not believe the intent of t he guidelines is to allow an obligor who pay s state taxes to a state other tha n Tenne ssee to ge t a deduc tion while those obligors w ho pay taxes to Tennessee r ece ive no such de duction.
Ev e n if we are inc or

re c t in ou r h old ing that st a te inc ome ta xes a re no t a llo we d a s a de du c tio n u nd e r the g uid e lin e s, F a the r pr ov ide d no pr oo f of wh a t e ff e c t his pa y me nt of

state inc ome ta x ha s u po n h is fe de ra l wi thh old ing ta x, su c h a s p e rh aps low e ri ng his fe de ra l ta xes. F or a ll the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m the Tria l Cou rt ’s ho ldi ng that F a the r is no t e nti tle d to a re du c tio n in ne t in c ome for state taxes he may

pay
. Father also arg ues that he should re ceive a cr edit towards the amount of child support ow e d u nd e r the g uid e lin e s f or the a mou nt h e pa y s to maint a in ins ur a nc e on his lif e . G ive n th e fa c ts of this case , we f

ind no error

by the Trial Court in n o t am en d i n g the Divorc e De cre e bec ause, a s discussed later

in this Opini on, we f

ind no material c hang e in circ umstances r eleva nt to the life insurance . We affirm the Trial Court’s dec ision refusing to awar d Father a cre dit for his insuranc e premiums.
We next consider w hether the Trial Court er

red in re fusin g t o modify custody or visitation. I n Kendrick v . Shoemake , our Supreme Court held that “a tria l court may modify an aw ard of child custody

when both a material c hang e of c ircumstance s has occurre d and a c hang e of c ustody is in the child’s best interests.” Kendrick v . Shoemake , 90 S.W .3d 566, 568 (Tenn. 20 0 2 ). The Kendrick Court stated: As explained in Bl air , the “ thr e sh oldiss ue ” is w he the r a ma te ri a l c ha ng e in circ umstances has occur

red after the initial custody

determination. Id . a t 15 0. Whil e “[t] here are no hard a nd fast rules for determining when a child’s circ umstances ha ve chang ed suff

iciently to warr ant a c hang e of his or her custody ,” the f ollowing f

actor s ha ve fo rm e d a so un d ba sis fo r d e te rm ini ng wh e the r a ma te ri a l c ha ng e in circu m s t ance s has occ urre d: the chang e “ha s occur red a fter the entry

of the orde r so ug ht t o b e mod if

ie d, ” the c ha ng e “ is n ot o ne th at was know n o r r e a so na bly-7-

anticipated when the order was enter ed,” and the chang e “is one that aff ects the child’s well-be ing in a

meaning ful way .” Id . (citations omitted).
Id

. at 5 7 0 (q u o t i n g Blair v. Badenhope , 77 S.W .3d 137 (Tenn. 2002) ).

When making a

determination reg arding the best intere st of the child for pur poses of m o d i f yi n g c u s t o d y:
The c ourt shall consider a ll releva nt fac tors including the foll o w in g w h e r ea pplicable: (1 ) T he love, a ffe ction and emotional ties existi ng betwee n the par ents and child; (2 ) T h e d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e p ar en t s t o p ro v i d e t h e c h i l d wi t h fo o d , cl o t h i n g, medical c are , education and other ne cessa ry car e and the degr ee to which a pare nt has been the primary

car eg iver; (3) The importance of continuity in the child’s life a nd the leng th of time the c hil d ha s liv e d in a sta

ble , sa tis fa c tory e nv ir on me nt; pr ov ide d, that wh e re the re is a finding , under § 36-6-106( 8), of child abuse, as def ined in § 39-15-401 or

§ 39-15- 40 2, or c hil d s e xua l a

bu se , a s d e fi ne d in § 3 7- 1- 60 2, by on e (1 ) p are nt, a ndthat a non-per petrating pa

rent ha s relocated in o rd er to flee the perpe trating pare nt, that s u c h r e l o c a t i o n s h a l l n o tw e i g h a g a i n s ta n a w ar d o f c u s t o d y; (4 ) T he sta

bil ity of the famil y

un it o f the pa

re nts ; (5 ) T he me nta l andph y sic a l he a lthof the pa re nts ; (6) The home, school and c ommunityrec ord of the c hild; (7) The rea sonable pre fer ence of the child if twelve (12) y ear s of ag e or olde r. The c ourt may hear the pref ere nce of a y oung er child upon reque st. The pre fer ence s of o ld e r c h il d r e n s h o u ldn o r ma ll y b e g iv e n g r e a te r

w e ig h t th a n th o s e o f

y o u n g er children; (8) Evide nce of

phy sical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other pa rent or to any other pe rson; provided, that wher e there are alleg ations that one (1) pare nt ha s c omm itt e d c hil d a

bu se , [a s d efi nedin § 39 -1 5- 40 1 o r § 39 -1 5- 40 2], o r c hil d se xua l a bu se, [ as def

ine d in § 3 7- 1- 60 2], a g a ins t a famil y me mbe r, the c ou rt

sh a ll consider a ll evidence rele vant t o the phy sical and emotional safe ty of the c hild, and determine, by

a clea r pre pondera nce of

the evidenc e, whe ther such a buse has occur red. The court shall include in its dec ision a written findi ng of all evide nce, and-8-

all finding s of fa cts conne cted thereto. I n addition, the court shall, whe re a ppropriate , re fe r any iss ue s o f a

bu se to the juv e nil e c ou rt fo r f urthe r p ro c e e din g s; (9) The char acte r and behavior of a ny other pe rson who re sides in or fre quents the home of a

pare nt and such pe rson’s intera ctions with the child; and (10) Ea ch par ent’s past a nd poten t ial for f uture pe rformance of par enting r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e w i l l i n g n e s s a n d ab i l i t y o f e a c h o f t h e pa re nts to fac ilitate and enc ourag e a c lose and c ontinuing par ent-c hild rela tionship between the child and the other

pare nt, consistent with the best interest of the c hild. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-106(a ) (2001)

.

F a the r a rg ue s th a t Mo the r r e fu se s to “c oo pe rate wi th the fathe r o n p are nti ng iss ue s, to abide by

either the letter or the spirit of t he decre e, or to provide a prope r emotional, educ ational or phy sical environme nt for the children.” Father claims Mother refuses to cooper ate in tra nsporting the c hil dr e n f

or vis itatio n, do e s n ot p ro vid e F a the r w ith inf orma tio n r e g ard ing the c hil dr e n’ s h e a lth car e, does not c omply with r ecommendations of the childre n’s pediatrician, is not awa re of what her own mother doe s as a voluntee r at the children’ s school, does not pr ovide a copy of her ta x return eac h y ear as re quired by

court orde r, and ig nored F ather ’s written re quest for me diation.
A court never

rea ches the best interest a naly sis unless there fir st is shown t o be a materia l chang e of c ircumstance s. The Trial Court specific ally found t hat “[ t] he thi ng s that y ou’re talking a bout...[ are ] t he same things y ou had whe n y ou g ot divorced.” Our ca re fu l review of the rec ord re veals that the evidence does not preponde rate ag ainst the Trial Court’s finding that F ather has fa iled to make the thre shold showing of a material chang e in circ umstances. As Father ha s failed to make the thre shold showing, we do not r eac h the best interest ana ly sis. W e af firm the Tria l Court on this iss ue.
We nex t co n s i der w hether the Trial Court er

red in a war ding to Mother the tax exemption for one of the pa rties’ c hildren. As this Court stated in Bo uti n v . B ou tin : Marital dissolution agr eeme nts are e ssentially contra ctu al i n the sense that they are the produc t of the parties’ neg otiation and ag ree ment

. E x cept f or leg al obligations that remain under the court’s control, these a g ree m en t s should be construed and enfor ced using the customary principles of c ontrac t law.
Bo uti n v . B ou tin , No. 01A01-9601- CH-00014, 1996 Tenn. App. L EXI S 770, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec . 4, 1996) (c itations omi tted), no appl. perm. appeal filed

.

The c entra l tenet of c ontrac t construction is that the intent of the contra cting parties at the time of ex ec uting the a g ree ment should gove rn. Pl an te rs G in Co. v . F e d. Com pre ss & W arehouse Co., Inc

. , 78 S.W .3d 885, 890 (Tenn. 2002) . The pa rties’ intent is presumed to be that-9-

sp e c if ic a lly e xpre ssed i n th e bo dyof the c on tr a c t. " I n o the r w or ds , th e ob je c t to be a tta ine d in construing a contr act is to asce rtain the mea ning and intent of the parties as expr es s ed in the lang uag e used a nd to give eff ect to such intent if it does not conflict with any rule of la w, g ood mo ral s, or p ub li c po li cy ." Id . at 890 (quoting 17 Am. J ur. 2d, Con tra c ts , § 245).

Father a nd Mother contr actua lly ag ree d that Father would re ceive the tax ex emption fo r b othc hil dr e n. Th is p ro vis ion is c le ar andun a mbi g uo us a ndwe mus t g ive e ff e c t to the pa

rt ie s’ intent. I t is not the role of this Court “to make a differ ent contra ct than that executed by the parties.” Posner v. Posne r , No. 02A01-9710-CV-00249, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXI S 930, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec

. 30 , 1997), no appl. perm. appeal filed

. See also, e .g., Central Drug Store v. Adams , 201 S.W .2d 682 (Tenn. 1947) . “I n the abse nce of fraud or mistake, a c ontrac t must be interprete d and enfor ced a s written eve n though it conta ins terms which m ay be thoug ht to be harsh or unjust.” Tenpenny v . Tenpenny , No. 01-A- 01-9406-CV-00296, 1995 T enn. App. L EXI S 105, at *15 (Te nn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 1995) , appl. perm. appeal de nied July 3, 1995

.

Howeve r, courts certa inly maintain jurisdiction to modi fy custody u n d er the appropriate circum stance s. I f, in fac t, custody was c hang ed, it might we ll be that a chang e of the al l o ca t i o n o f t h e t ax ex em p t i o n fo r a ch i l d wo u l d b e s u b j ec tt o m o d i fi ca t i o n as a p ar to f t h e c h an ge of custody . Her e, howe ver, the re is no chang e of c ustody

.

I n addition, we note that e ven if we are in error and the a war d of t he tax exemption g e ne ra lly is m od if ia ble e ve n w ith ou t a

c ha ng e of c us tod y , Mo the r ha s pr ov e n no ma te ri a l c ha ng e in circ umstances. The evidenc e shows that Mother, w ho was not working full-time at the time the Di vo rc e De c re e wa s e nte re d, is no w e mpl oy e d f ull -t ime . H ow e ve r, Mo the r c a nn ot r e a so na bly c la im that her obta ining f

ull-time employ ment was an unanticipated cha ng e g iven that the parties were obtaining a

divorce . As there was no mate rial cha ng e prove n, mod i fi ca t i o n o f t he tax ex emption allocation, eve n if allowable , would not be proper. For all these re asons, we r ever se the Trial Court’s awa rd to Mother of the tax ex emption for one of the parties’ childre n.
We next consider w hether the Trial Court erred in r efusing either to e liminate the require ment that Father car ry life insurance or to requir e Mother to maintain a simil ar policy . Father c ite s to Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 5- 10 1( g ) f or the pr op os iti on that th e c ou rt ma y dir e c t e ith e r o r b oth pa rt ie s to ma int a in l if

e ins ur a nc e . T e nn . Co de An n. § 36 -5 -1 01 (g ) (S up p. 20 04 ). Whil e F a the r i s c orr ect that T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 5- 10 1( g ) d oe s p ro vid e a s st a te d, the pa rt ie s in thi s c a se contra ctually ag ree d that Father and not Mothe r would maintain life insuranc e. Thus, Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101( g ) is not applicable to the issue be fore us.

F a the r andMo the r c on tr a c tua lly a g re e d in the Di vo rce De c re e that F a the r w ou ld provide life insurance on his own l ife and would list the parties’ two minor children as the primary benef iciarie s under the life insurance policy or policies. I n addition, the parties c ontrac tually ag ree d t h at “F at h ers h al l m ai n t ai n s ai d l i fe i n s u ra n ce o n t h e p ar t i es ’ m i n o r c h i l d re n u n t i l t h ey re ac h t h e a ge of majority .” As discussed a bove, we must g ive effec t to the parties’ intent and construe the contra ct as written.-10- I n addition, our Supreme Court has instruc ted:
Te nn e sse e c ou rt s h a ve uti lize d eq uit able g ro un ds to p ro te c t pe rs on s le g a lly mandated to be listed as benef iciarie s of a life insurance policy . As such, it is clear under Tenne ssee law that an enfor cea ble ag ree ment, such as a marital d issoluti on ag re e me n t, w h ic h man d a te s th a t an in d iv id u a l b e li s te d a s a b e n e f ic ia r y o f a lif e insuranc e p o licy

exis ting at the time of the ag ree ment vests in that individual an e q u i t ab l e i n t e r e s ti n t h e d e s i g n a t e d p o l i c y.
* * * [W ]e conclude that no significa nt differ ence exis ts betwee n circ umstances in which an identifiab le li f

e in s u r a n c e p o li c y

e xis te d a t th e ti me o f

th e d iv o r c e , . . . a n d [a situation where the policy was purc hased post-divorc e].”
Ho lt v . H olt , 995 S.W .2d 68, 72 & 77 ( Tenn. 1999) ( citation omitted).
Father and Mother c ontrac tually ag ree d that Father would provide life insuranc e on his lif e , a ndwe will n ot r e write thi s c on tr a c t. E ve n if the a g re e me nt t o p ro vid e lif e ins ur a nc e is cate g orized as modifiable c hild support and not a contra ctual ag ree ment, Father provided no e vid e nc e of

a ma te ri a l c ha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s. F a the r c la ims the re is a ma te ri a l c ha ng e in circ umstances be cause he no long er ha s ly m p h oma ca ncer . Howeve r, this is a chang e that wa s a nti c ipate d b y

the pa rt ie s a nd pr ov ide d fo r in the Di vo rc e De c re e by the pr ov isi on that F a the r w ou ld “maintain said life insurance on the parties’ min o r ch i l dren until they rea ch the a g e of ma

jority .” Cle arl y , th e pa

rt ie s a nti c ipate d th a t F a the r wo uld ha ve to re ma in a liv e in o rd e r f or him to b e able to continue to maintain life insura nce until the minor childre n, who were both under the ag e of f ive at the t ime the Di v o r c e D e c r e e w a s e n te r e d , r e a c h e d th e a g e o f ma jo r it y
. T h u s , th e f

a c t th a t F a the r su rv ive d lymph oma

c a nc e r i s n ot a

ma te ri a l c ha ng e in c ir c ums ta nc e s th a t wo uld jus tif y a c ha ng e in the re quirement that F ather maintain life insuranc e.
Father a lso cites to Dix v. Carson in support o f hi s contention that the Tria l Court err ed by not addre ssing whe ther life insurance is a ppropriate in this ca se. Dix v. Carson , No. 02A01- 9704-CV-00093, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXI S 840, at *42 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1998) , appl. perm. appeal denied J

une 21, 1999

. Howeve r, it was unnec essary for the T rial Court to addre ss whether lif e ins ur a nc e wa s a

pp ro pria te in this c a se a s th e pa rt ie s ori g ina lly a g re e d th a t F a the r w ou ld m a int a in insurance on his life. There is no provision in t he contr act that Mother provide insura nce on he r life, and we find no abuse of

discretion in t he Tria l Court’s refusa l to order Mother to provide such insurance

. F ina lly , w e c on sid e r w he the r the Tria l Co urt e rr e d in a wa rd ing a tt orn ey ’s fe e s to Mo the r. I n p e rt ine nt p art , T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 5- 10 3 p ro vid e s:-11-

The plaintiff spouse may rec over from the defendant spouse, a nd the spouse or othe r person to whom the c ustody of the child, or childre n, is awar ded may rec over f rom the other spouse rea sonable attorney fee s incurre d in enforc ing any decr ee f or alimony and/or c hild support, or in reg ard to a ny sui t o r action conc erning the adjudication of the custody or the c hang e of c ustody

of any child, or children, of the parties, both upon the orig inal divorce hearing and at any subsequent hea

ring , which fee s may be fixed and allowe d by the court, be fore whom such ac tion or proce eding is p e nd ing , in the dis c re tio n o f s uc h c ou rt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-103 (c ) (Supp. 2004).

I n this case, Mother is the s pouse t o whom custody of t he children was a war ded and, a s th e tr ial in th is ca se c on c e rn e d, in p art , a dju dic a tio n r e g ard ing c us tod y , M oth e r w a s e nti tle d to rec over suc h rea sonable attorney fee s as wer e fixed and allowe d by the Trial Court in its discre tion. Father failed to prove a

materia l c hang e in c ircumstance s to justify a chang e in custody . The Trial Court awar ded Mother $500 in attorney ’s fees. W e believe , at a minimum, that reasona ble minds could disag ree as to the propriety of t he dec ision made by the Trial Court to awa

rd attorne y ’s fe es to Mother, the very

essenc e of a discretionary decision. We be lieve this to be especia lly so g iven that a lth ou g h M oth e r p re va ile d r e g ard ing the c us tod y iss ue , F ath e r

a r g u e s th a t Mo the r “ re fu se d to c omp ly with th e te r ms o f th e p ar e n ti n g p lan r e q u irin g me d iati o n
. . . ” a n d th a t if s h e had complied “ no attorney ’s fe es would have been a ccr ued or awa

rded.” We note , howeve r, that the parties did attempt to mediate prior to the trial of t his matter. The mediation was unsucce ssful. Given this, we will not substitut e our judg ment for that of the Trial Court, and we find no abuse of discre tion in the awar d of attorne y ’s fe es.

Mother re quests an aw ard of attorn ey ’s fe es and costs on appeal. “T his Court has rec og nized that ‘[t he] allowance of attorne y ’s fe es for [an appea l] is f

or the benef

it of the child, and the custodial spouse should not have to be ar the expense incurr ed on the child’s behalf.’ ” Huntley v. Huntley , 6 1 S

. W

. 3 d 3 2 9 , 3 4 1 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 2 0 0 1 ) ( q u o t i n g Ragan v. Ragan , 858 S.W .2d 332, 334 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)). Acc ording ly , we gr ant M other her reasonable attorney ’s fe es incurr ed on appea l. On remand, the Tria l Court shall determine the a mount of Mother’s re asonable attorney ’s fe e s in c ur re d in thi s a

pp e a l.

Conclusion The judg ment of the Tri al C o u rt i s re verse d as to the aw ard to Mother of the tax exemption for one child and affirme d as t o all other issues, and this cause is rema nded to the Tria l Court for a de termination of re asonable attorney ’s fe es incurr ed by Mother in this appea l and for-12-

collection of the costs below. Exercising our discre tion, the costs on appea l are assessed a g ainst the Appellant, Ge org e Jay

Wil liams, I V, and his sure ty

.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE