## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 22

- 00090

- CV

IN RE T.B.

Original Mandamus Proceeding

Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and van Cleef , JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef2 

### ME MORANDUM OPIN ION
Mother and Father are joint managing conservators of their son, L.A.W. Mother, who has the right to designate L.A.W. ’ s primary residence, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus complaining of oral statements made by the trial court during a hearing on Father ’ s motion to enforce a prior geographic al restriction. 1 Mother argues that the trial court entered a temporary order requiring her to sell her house

. Because we conclude there was no such order, we deny the petition

. I. S tan dard of Review

“ Ma n damus is an extraordinary remedy. ” In re Good Shepherd Hosp. , Inc

. , 572 S.W.3d 315, 319 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2019, orig. proceeding). To be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must show “ (1) a clear abuse of discretion or viol ati on of a duty im pos e d by law and (2) the absence of a clear and adequate remedy at law. ” Id

. (citing Cantu v. Longoria , 878 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex . 1992) (orig. proceeding)). The relator is ob ligated to prov ide t his Court with a record sufficient to establish h er right to mandamus relief. Walker v. Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833, 83 7 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) ; see In re Pilgrim ’ s Pride Corp

. , 187 S.W.3d 197, 198

– 99 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2006, o rig . proceeding); T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.7. Mother admits that there are no written temporary orders. “ Mandamus actions based
up on a court ’ s oral pronouncements are generally discouraged. ” In re Long , No. 06

- 20

- 00039

- CV, 2020 WL 5028779, at *4 (Tex. App.

— T exa rkana Aug. 25, 202 0 , orig

. proceeding ) (mem.

1 To protect the child ’ s identity, we refer to him by his initials and to his parents by ps eu donym

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 9.8

.3

op.) (quoting In re Rhew , No. 05

- 16

- 00411

- CV, 2016 WL 1551724, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Apr. 15, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing In re Bledsoe , 41 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2001, orig. p roc eeding)) ) ; see In r e Cuellar , No. 05

- 21

- 00683

- CV, 2022 WL 278238, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Jan. 31, 2022 , orig. proceeding ) (mem. op.)

. “ An oral order by a trial judge may be considered on mandamus only if it is adequately shown by the trial court

recor d. ” In re Long , 2 020 W L 5028779, at *4 (quoting In re Rhew , 2016 WL 1551724, at *1 ) (citing In re Winters , No. 05

- 08

- 01419

- CV, 2008 WL 4816379, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Dallas
Nov. 6, 2008, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) ). “ An oral ruling is subject to manda mus re vie w only if it is cl e a r, specific, and enforceable. ” Id. (quoting In re Rhew , 2016 WL 1551724, at *1 ) (citing In re Bledsoe , 41 S.W.3d at 811; In re Kelton , No. 12

- 11

- 00355

- CR, 2011 WL 5595219, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Tyler Nov. 17, 2011, orig. proceeding ) (per cu r iam) (mem. op. , n o t designated for publication )). “ An appellate court can determine whether an oral order meets these criteria by reviewing the reporters record from the hearing. ” Id

. (quoting In re Rhew , 2016 WL 1551724, at *1 ) (citing In re B ledsoe , 4 1 S.W.3d at 811 ; I n re Winters , No. 05

- 08

- 01486

- CV, 2008 WL 5177835, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Dec. 11, 2008, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.)).

“ When an oral ruling ‘ does not reveal a pronouncement t hat, standing alone and without reference to othe r docu men t s, is sufficie ntl y clear or specific

. . . , ’ we cannot conclude that a trial court abused its discretion. ” Id. (citing In re Greyhound Lines , Inc

. , No. 05

- 14

- 01164

- CV, 2014 WL 5474787, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Oct. 29, 2014, orig. proceeding) (m em. op .). The ruling mu st i n dicate a present intent , as opposed to future intent, to render a decision. In re4

Bledsoe , 41 S.W.3d 807, 811

– 12 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2001, orig. proceeding) (citing James v. Hubbard , 21 S. W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2000, n o pet.) )

. I I . Ba ckg r o und
In March 2022, the trial court entered a final order in a suit to modify the parent

- child relationship , which gave Mother the “ exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the

c hild within a 200

- mile radius of Harrison Co u nty, Texas. ” T he o r der further specified that , if Mother were to relocate outside of the 200

- mile radius , “ then [Fathe r] [would] become the primary joint managing conservator with the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the chil d within a 2 00

- mile radi us o f Harrison County. ” In September, Father filed a motion to enforce that provision , arguing that Mother had moved to Seabrook, Texas , which he represented was outside of the 200

- mile radius of Ha rrison County

. On October 3 1, the trial cou r t held a hea rin g on the motion for enforcement. After the hearing , the parties agreed that Mother and her fiancée had moved “ greater than 200 miles in driving time, ” and the trial cou rt expressly deferred a finding on t he motion to enforc e and said it would no t m a ke a f

i n ding “ until

. . . a later hearing [,] if necessary. ” Instead, the trial court outlined what was “ going to happen [that day] for a temporary basis , ” by stating , “ [L.A.W.] will continue to live with his m other u ntil the end of this semester or January 1 st , w hichever comes first.

. . . Come January 1st, [Mother] either live[s] within the 200

- mile radius or [L.A.W.] goes to live with his father and he gets custody

. ” After the trial court asked if th e par ties had questions, Mother ’ s counsel sought to clar i fy w h ether th ey had to be physically relocated by5

January 1 “ as long as they [had] something on paper that [they were] moving. ” The trial judge responded, “ They have to have a contract for sale

. ” 2
III. There Was No Clear and Specific Temporary Order to Sel l Mother ’ s House Mother argues in her petition for a writ of mandamus that the transcript establis hes that the trial court entered temporary orders requiring her to obtain a contract to sell her home. We dis agree. Instead, we conclude th at the trial c our t defe r red its ruling on the motion to enforce, reminded M other of the prior geographical restriction in the March 2022 order, and warned Mother th at she had “ until Janua ry 1st to fix that issue. ” In our vi ew, the trial court gave Mother a grace period to e nsu r e compliance with its prior orde r. In context, we consider the trial court ’ s comments as an indication on how he might rule on Father ’ s motion to enforce the geog raphical restriction in the future

. While , in response to counsel ’ s question, the hea r i ng t ranscript showed t he type of evidence that the trial court would accept at “ a later hearing [,] if necessary , ” we find that the transcript was not clear and specific enough to constitute a n order to sell the house. 3 On the record pr ovided, we conc lud e that
Mot h er failed to demonstrate an entitlement to mandamus relief.

2 Father also f

iled a petition to modify the parent

- child rel ationship and prayed that he be given the right to d es i g nate L.A.W.’s primary residence. The trial court ha d not ruled on Father’s petition at the time this opinion issued , to our knowledge

. Nevertheless, Mother complains that the trial court abused its discretion “ by changing

— on temporary orders

. . . — t

h e d e signation of the par ent with the primary right t o determine the child’s residence from Mother to Father. ” Because the alleged temporary orders did no t give Father th e primary right to determine L.A.W.’s residence, we find this argument meritless. W e al s o decline to address Mother’s arguments related t o the merits of Father’s petition, which are not ripe for review until determined by the trial court.

3 Mother compla ins that the 200

- mile restriction is ambiguous and that the trial court orally ruled t h a t s he had to live with in a 200

- mile driving range of H a rrison County, Texas. Because the trial court did not rule on the motion to enforce the geographical restricti on, the issue of whether the geographical restriction is measured by linear or drivin g d i st a n ce is still pe ndin g before the trial court. A s a result, Mother’s arguments in her petition for a writ of mandamus inviting this Court to r ule on which measurement is proper are premature and invite an advisory opinion.6

I V . Conclusion
W e deny the petition for writ of mandamus. 4 See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.8(a).

Charles van Cleef Justice
D ate Submitted: December 19 , 2022 Date Decided : D e c embe r 20 , 2022

4 In conjunction with the p e t it i o n for a writ of man damus, Mother filed a motion fo r an emergency stay of the trial court ’ s temporary orders

. Because we deny the mandamu s petition, the emergency motion is denied.