alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### TEXAS COUR T OF APP EALS, T HIRD D ISTRICT, A T AUST IN

NO. 03-01-00143-CV

In the Matter of C. D. D.

FROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 98T H JUDICIAL DIST RICT

NO. J-18537, HO NORABLE JO HN K. DIET Z, JUDGE PRESIDING

Fo llowing a hea ring befo re t he juvenile co ur t , a ppe llant C. D. D. was adjud ged t o ha ve engaged i n del in quent conduct by

comm ittin g the off enses of possessi

on of cocai

ne an d ma rij uana. SeeTex. Hea lth &

Saf ety Code A nn . §§ 481 .115, .12 1 (West Sup p. 2002 ). The

j uve ni l e court ordered him committ ed t o t he T exas Yo ut h Co mmi ssio n. C .D .D . g ave no t ice o f app eal fro m the di sposi tion order. Tex . Fam

. Code A nn . § 56.01 (c)(1)(B ) (We st Supp . 2002)
. C.D. D.’s appointed co unsel on appeal fi

led a bri ef asse rt ing t ha t t he ap pe al is fri volous. The bri

ef com pli es wi th the requirem

ents f or such briefs

dis cussed

in In Re D.A.S. , 973 S.W.2d 296 (T ex. 199 8) , a nd, mor e ge ner ally, in Anders v. Cali fornia , 3 86 U.S. 7 38 (19 67). Counsel states that he has di

li gently exam in ed the rec ord an d r ese ar ched t he law a pplicable t o t he f acts and issu es in t he c as e. Co uns el’s br ief co nt ains a p ro fe ssi onal eval ua tion of the rec ord demo nst ra t ingwhy

t her e ar e no merit or iou s er ro rs t o be advan ced. A copy

of counsel ’s b

rief was deliv ered to C.D .D. an

d to h i s g ua rdi an , an d they were a dv i se d of t heir r ight t o e xamine the appe l l ate
re co rd and to fi

le a pro se brief

. A pro se brief wa s no t fil ed. We have indepe ndent ly reviewed t he2

record and agree wi

th c oun se l

tha t the appe al i s f ri vol ous . We gran

t cou ns el ’s moti on to withdraw f rom th e ca se a nd a f f i rm the j uve ni l e court’ s disposi

tion order.

Davi d Puryear, Justice Bef ore Chi ef J

ustice A boussie, Justices

B. A. Sm ith an d Puryear Af fi rmed File d: January

25, 2002 Do No t Publis

h
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

March 29, 2010 

y0322 

Order 

 

March 29, 2010 

139797 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 139797 

 COA: 293449 

Wayne CC: 00-002628 

MARCUS STAPLE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 28, 2009 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant’s 

motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).
<PAGE>
EXHIBIT 32

      CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
               PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SS. 1350 ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Report of Physical Spa & Fitness Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2004 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Robert Chui, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

/s/ Robert Chui
-------------------------
Robert Chui
Chief Financial Officer

May 24, 2004
exv10w2



 





Exhibit 10.2




Larence Park has have entered into Transition Assistance Agreements with the Company that is
substantially identical in all respects to the agreement with Clyde L. Thomas filed as Exhibit
10.34 to the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2002.
EXHIBIT 99.1



CERTIFICATIONS BY PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE

OFFICER AND PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER

REGARDING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING

TO
FORM 10-Q FOR FISCAL QUARTER ENDED JANUARY 31, 2003



I, Joseph M. Harris, President and Chief Executive Officer, state and attest that to the best of my knowledge, based upon a review of HLM Design, Inc.s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the Fiscal Quarter ended January 31, 2003
(the Report):



(1) the Report fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of the operations of HLM Design, Inc.



|                                                                     
|---------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ JOSEPH M. HARRIS                                                 
|Joseph M. HarrisPresident and Chief Executive OfficerHLM Design,
Inc.



Date: March 17, 2003



I, Vernon B. Brannon, Senior Vice President,
Chief Operating Office and Chief Financial Officer, state and attest that to the best of my knowledge, based upon a review of HLM Design, Inc.s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the Fiscal Quarter ended January 31, 2003 (the
Report):



(1) the Report fully
complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of the operations of HLM Design, Inc.

|                                                        
|--------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ VERNON B. BRANNON                                   
|Vernon B. BrannonChief Financial OfficerHLM Design,
Inc.



Date: March 17, 2003
Size Chart for EV Run Golf Shirts, Polo Shirts, and Jacket

Men’s /Unisex XS S M L XL 2XL 3XL

Chest 21 22.5 24 25.5 27 28.5

Body Length 29 30 31 32 33 33.5

Women’s XS S M L XL 2XL 3XL

Chest 19.5 20.5 21.5 22.5 23.5 24.5 25.5

Body Length 25 25.5 26 26.5 27 28 29

Size 0-2 4-6 8-10 12-14 16-18 20-22 24-26

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Size Chart for Oxford Shirts and Hooded Sweatshirt

Men’s S SM MD LG XL 2XL 3XL

Chest 15 15.5 16 16.5 17.5 18.5 19.5

Body Length 30-32 34-36 38-40 42-44 46-48 50-52 54-56

Waist 31.5 32.5 33.5 34-5 35.5 36.5 37.5

Women’s XS SM MD LG XL 2XL 3XL

0-2 4-6 8-10 12-14 16-18 20-22 24-26

Chest 32-33 34-35 36-37.5 38.5-40.5 41.5-44.5 46-48.5 50-52.5

Body Length 24-25 26-27 28-30 31-34 35-38 39-42 43-46

Waist 34-35 36-37 38-39 40.5-42.5 44-46.5 48-50.5 52-54.5
#### Yvonne PADEN, R.N., Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Respondent.

No. 04-7122.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Dec. 15, 2004.

ON MOTION

LINN, Circuit Judge.

*ORDER*

The Secretary of Veterans Affairs moves to dismiss Yvonne Paden, R.N.’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. Paden concedes that this court does not have jurisdiction over her petition for review and moves to transfer her petition for review to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Paden states that the Secretary “takes no position on this application for transfer.”

Upon being discharged from her nursing position by the Department of Veterans Affairs, Paden sought review by the Disciplinary Appeals Board. The Board dismissed her appeal as untimely and the Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Health accepted the Board’s determination. Paden asserts that she “erroneously]” sought review of this matter in this court. We agree with the parties that review is not appropriate in this forum and conclude that a transfer to the district court is warranted.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) The Secretary’s motion to dismiss is denied.

(2) Paden’s motion to transfer is granted.
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 461 Engrossed in House (EH)]

                 In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

                                                         June 10, 1998.
    Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker 
may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 2888) to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to exempt from 
the minimum wage recordkeeping and overtime compensation requirements certain 
specialized employees. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. 
General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour 
equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of 
the Committee on Education and the Workforce. After general debate the bill 
shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in 
order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 
five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the 
Committee on Education and the Workforce now printed in the bill. The committee 
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read. During 
consideration of the bill for amendment, the Chairman of the Committee of the 
Whole may accord priority in recognition on the basis of whether the Member 
offering an amendment has caused it to be printed in the portion of the 
Congressional Record designated for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII. 
Amendments so printed shall be considered as read. The Chairman of the Committee 
of the Whole may: (1) postpone until a time during further consideration in the 
Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded vote on any amendment; and (2) 
reduce to five minutes the minimum time for electronic voting on any postponed 
question that follows another electronic vote without intervening business, 
provided that the minimum time for electronic voting on the first in any series 
of questions shall be 15 minutes. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill 
for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with 
such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote 
in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill 
or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous 
question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to 
final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or 
without instructions.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
10155.

#### SKIPPER v. THE STATE.

Decided January 9, 1919.

An accusation alleging that the defendant “did unlawfully have, possess, and control spirituous, alcoholic, malt, and -intoxicating liquors and intoxicating bitters and other drinks which if drunk to excess will produce intoxication,” was not subject to demurrer on the ground that it failed to set out how the defendant controlled the liquors.

Accusation of misdemeanor; from city court of Thomasville— Judge *W.*H. Hammond. September 17, J918.

*J. M.*Austin, for plaintiff in error.

*H. J. MacIntyre, solicitor,*contra.

Bloodworth, J.

The accusation in this case alleged that the defendant “did unlawfully have, possess, and control spirituous, alcoholic, malt, and intoxicating liquors and intoxicating bitters and other drinks which if drunk to excess will produce intoxication.” The defendant demurred on several grounds, but the only ground argued in the brief of his counsel in this court was that the accusation “fails to set out how this defendant controlled said whisky and intoxicating beverages.” The other grounds of the demurrer, not having been argued in the brief, will be treated as abandoned. The ground argued was properly overruled. The defendant was charged with a purely statutory offense, and the accusation followed substantially the language of the statute. “An indictment for a purely statutory offense is sufficient which describes the offense in the language of the statute.” *Stoner*v. *State,*5 *Ga. App.*716 (63 S. E. 602). “An indictment which charges the offense defined by a legislative act in the language of the act, where the description of the acts alleged as constituting the offense is full enough to put the defendant on notice of the offense with which he is charged, is sufficiently specific.” *Glover*v. *State,*126 *Ga.*594 (55 S. E. 592). “The indictment was sufficiently full and definite in its statement to inform the defendant of the offense with which he was charged, and exact enough to protect him from a second jeopardy.” *Youmans*v. *State,*7 *Ga. App.*101 (4) (66 S. E. 383).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Stephens, J., concur.*
Commission	on	Enhancing	National	Cybersecurity

Established	by	Executive	Order	13718, Commission	on	Enhancing	National	Cybersecurity

Meeting	Agenda

June	21,	2016

University	of	California,	Berkeley

International	House

Chevron	Auditorium

2299	Piedmont	Avenue,	Berkeley,	CA

*Please	note:		Speakers/times	are	subject	to	change	without	notice.

Tuesday, June 21, 2016

9:00 A.M.	 – 9:05 A.M. Welcome		

Betsy Cooper, Executive	Director,	Center	for	Long-Term	Cybersecurity,	UC-Berkeley

Nils Gilman, Associate	Chancellor,	UC-Berkeley

9:05 A.M.	 – 9:15	A.M. Meeting	Opening	and	Remarks		

Thomas	E.	Donilon,	Commission	Chair

Samuel	J.	Palmisano,	Commission	Vice	Chair

9:15 A.M. – 10:45 A.M. Panel	1:	Addressing	Security	Challenges	to	the	Digital	Economy	

Geoff	Belknap,	CISO,	Slack

Patrick	Heim, Chief	Trust	Officer,	Dropbox

Hemma	Prafullchandra, EVP	and	Chief	Technology	Officer,	Products,	HyTrust

Alex	Stamos, CISO,	Facebook

10:45 A.M. – 11:00 A.M. Break	

11:00 A.M. – 12:30 P.M. Panel	2:	Collaborating	to	Secure	the	Digital	Economy	

Thomas	Andriola, Vice	President &	CIO,	University	of	California	System

Dr.	Cynthia	Dwork, Distinguished	Scientist,	Microsoft	Research

Eric	Grosse, Vice	President,	Security	Engineering,	Google

Eli	Sugarman, Cyber Initiative	Program	Officer, The	William	and	Flora	Hewlett	Foundation

12:30 P.M. – 1:30 P.M. Lunch	

1:30 P.M. – 3:00 P.M. Panel	3:	Innovating	to	Secure	the	Future	of	the	Digital	Economy	

Gilman	Louie, Partner,	Alsop	Louie	Partners,	former	CEO,	In-Q-Tel

Mark	McLaughlin,	Chair,	National	Security	Telecommunications	Advisory	Committee	

(NSTAC); Chairman,	President	and	CEO,	Palo	Alto	Networks

Ted	Schlein, Managing	Partner,	Kleiner	Perkins	Caufield	&	Byers	(KPCB)

3:00 P.M. – 3:15 P.M. Public	Comment	

3:15 P.M. – 3:30 P.M. Center	for	Long-Term	Cybersecurity	(CLTC)	Briefing	

Steve	Weber, Faculty,	School	of	Information,	UC-Berkeley	

3:30 P.M. – 5:00 P.M. Commission	Discussion	

5:00 P.M Meeting	Adjourned
H. Res. 580

In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

October 8, 1998.

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall

be in order to consider in the House the joint resolution

(H.J. Res. 131) waiving certain enrollment requirements for

the remainder of the One Hundred Fifth Congress with respect to any bill or joint resolution making general or continuing appropriations for fiscal year 1999. The joint resolution shall be considered as read for amendment. The previous

question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution

to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) one

hour of debate on the joint resolution equally divided and

controlled by the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader

or their designees; and (2) one motion to recommit.

Attest:

Clerk.
9444.

#### Maddox Coffee Company *v.*McHan.

Wade, C. J.

1. “A motion in arrest of judgment differs from a motion for a new trial, in this: The former must be predicated on some defeet which appears on the face 'of the record or pleadings, while the latter must be predicated on some extrinsic matter- not so appearing. *199It also differs from' a motion to set aside a judgment, in this: The motion in arrest of judgment must be made during the term at which such judgment was obtained, while a motion to set aside may be made at any time within the statute of limitations.” Civil Code (191(f), § 5958. The limitation provided by the statute, as to the time within which each must be made, constitutes the only difference between a motion to set aside and a motion to arrest a judgment: *Artope*v. *Barker,*74 *Ga.*462; *Regopoulas*v. *State,*116 *Ga.*596 (42 S. E. 1014); *Garfield Oil Mills*v. *Stephens,*16 *Ga. App.*655, 660 (85 S. E. 983). There -was therefore no merit whatever in the contention, raised by demurrer, that- the motion to set aside should be dismissed because interposed subsequently to the term of the court at which the judgment was obtained.

Decided April 11, 1918.

Certiorari; from Fulton superior court—Judge Pendleton. No^, vember 26, 1917.

*O. D.*Maddox, *8. A.*Massell, for plaintiff.

*Mayson &*Johnson, for defendant.

2. The defendant duly filed a plea presenting a meritorious defense to the action, and setting forth fully the alleged facts constituting his . defense, which was referred to in the motion to set aside the judgment against him and thus made a part of said motion, so that the motion itself disclosed *th'e*specific nature *and*character of the defense relied upon. *Pryor*v. *American Trust &c. Co.,*15 *Ga. App.*822, 829 (84 S. E. 312). It was not incumbent upon the movant to establish or attempt to establish by proof the alleged defense set up in his motion to set aside, when filing the same, nor could evidence tending to negative the alleged defense be then properly introduced by the opposite party in resisting such motion. It was not , necessary for the court . to go further, in this connection, than to determine that a legally good and meritorious defense was, alleged by the movant.

3. The judge of the municipal court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the motion to set aside the judgment, and, under all the facts and circumstances in proof, in thereafter actually setting aside said judgment' and remanding the case for trial; and the judge of the superior court properly overruled the certiorari.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Jenkins and Luke, JJ., concur.*
Exhibit 13.10

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the accompanying Annual Report on Form 20-F of Inmarsat Limited (the "Company") for the annual period ended
December 31, 2004 (the "Periodic Report"), I, Rick Medlock, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge the Periodic Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

| |  | /s/RICK MEDLOCKRick Medlock Chief Financial Officer
| |  | ---------------------------------------------------

Date:
April 29, 2005

---



QuickLinks
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 497 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 497

  Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to require a two-
thirds vote on any bill or joint resolution that either authorizes the 
President to enter into a trade agreement that is implemented pursuant 
to fast-track procedures or that implements a trade agreement pursuant 
                          to such procedures.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 25, 1998

Mr. Traficant submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                         the Committee on Rules

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
  Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to require a two-
thirds vote on any bill or joint resolution that either authorizes the 
President to enter into a trade agreement that is implemented pursuant 
to fast-track procedures or that implements a trade agreement pursuant 
                          to such procedures.

    Resolved, That clause 5 of rule XXI of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is amended by adding at the end the following new 
paragraph:
    ``(e) No bill or joint resolution that--
            ``(1) authorizes the President to enter into a trade 
        agreement that is implemented by a bill or joint resolution 
        that is considered by each House of Congress under procedures 
        that preclude amendments; or
            ``(2) implements any trade agreement and that is not 
        subject to amendment;
shall be considered as passed or agreed to unless so determined by a 
vote of not less than two-thirds of the Members voting.''.
                                 <all>
```
#### Harrison H. Reed et al. v. Nelson *W.*Northrup, executor

*Liability as agent for collection*— Judgment *against surety.*

A man bought an interest of $600 in a mortgage for $1000, and agreed that in case of its prompt payment, when due, he would pay his assignor $400 and interest. But the mortgager refused to pay it unless $200 was deducted and it appeared that the property was only good for $800 and that the deficiency could not be collected. The assignee accordingly accounted for only $200. *Held,*in a suit for the rest of the $400, that he was no more than a collecting agent for plaintiff and that he had discharged his obligation.

Judgment cannot be rendered in the circuit court against a surety upon an appeal from the decision of commissioners on claims against an estate.

Error to Kent. (Montgomery, J.)

April 18.

April *25.*

Appeal from disallowance of claim against estate. Claimant brings error.

Affirmed in part.

*John C. Quinsey*and *H. J. Felker*for appellant.

Summary judgment cannot be given against a surety on an appeal from commissioners on claims in the probate court, without a proper and separate action for that purpose: Freeman on Judgments § 72; *Montgomery v. Merrill*86 Mich. 97.

*Blair, Kingsley & Kleinhans*for appellee.

Campbell, J.

This controversy arose out of a claim against James Mortimer Smith for a balance alleged to remain unpaid by him as holder of an assigned mortgage, in which plaintiff was interested in part.

On the 9th of July, 1874, Smith purchased of plaintiff an interest of $600 in a mortgage for $1000, made by John Jebb. The mortgage was thereupon assigned to Smith, who agreed, in case of its prompt payment, to pay back to plaintiff $400 and interest thereon. But it was further pro*443vided. that if Smith had any delay or expense in collecting he should be paid therefor.

When the mortgage became due Jebb refused to pay it unless $200 should be thrown off. The court finds that the property was only good for the balance, and that no deficiency could have been collected of him. Smith, in consideration of this state of things, threw off $200 and collected the balance, for which he accounted.

We can see no reason why this did not discharge Smith’s obligation. He was no more than a collecting agent for plaintiff of the balance over his own interest in the mortgage, and did all that under the circumstances was possible. The judgment was therefore correctly given in favor of respondent against claimant.

But the judgment which was rendered against the surety on the appeal bond was not authorized by law. *Willard v. Fralidk*31 Mich. 431.

The judgment as to McGrath, the surety, must be reversed with costs. As to Beed, it must be affirmed with costs.

The other Justices concurred.