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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DAYVON WILLIAMS

(AC 42612)

Prescott, Moll and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of the crime of sexual assault in the second degree after a trial

to the court, the defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the trial

court deprived him of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel

by allowing him to represent himself and thereafter abused its discretion

by failing to order a competency hearing or to appoint counsel for him.

The defendant had been represented by three public defenders during

pretrial proceedings before two different trial judges in the several

months prior to trial, when he sought to dismiss the public defenders

and to represent himself. After the defendant rejected the state’s offer

of a plea agreement, the court canvassed him regarding his request

to represent himself, and found that he knowingly, intelligently and

voluntarily waived his right to counsel and was qualified to represent

himself. None of the public defenders at any time during those proceedings expressed concerns to the court about the defendant’s competence

to stand trial or indicated that he suffered from a mental illness or

incapacitation. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the defendant was competent to represent himself and that he made a knowing,

voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel:

a. The record supported the court’s finding that the defendant was

competent to waive his right to counsel and to represent himself, as he

had expressed his desire to represent himself on two occasions before

different judges prior to being allowed to represent himself, he was

consistently able to articulate logical reasons for that desire, his

responses to the court during its canvass of him showed that he comprehended the disadvantages and dangers of representing himself, and he

indicated that he understood the elements of the crime with which he

was charged and the range of penalties associated with a conviction.

b. Contrary to the defendant’s contentions, the court’s canvass of him

provided sufficient information to determine whether he knowingly,

voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel, as the record

was devoid of facts that should have given rise to any specific concerns

in the court’s mind: the court determined that the defendant had the

intelligence and capacity to appreciate the consequences of his decision

to represent himself, it made him aware of the penalties to which he

was exposed and the great dangers in self-representation, such as making

self-incriminating statements at trial, and its questions demonstrated

that he understood that he would be responsible for filing motions, legal

research, selecting a jury, and complying with the rules of evidence and

criminal procedure; moreover, although the court did not explicitly

advise the defendant of the statutory maximum and mandatory minimum

sentences he faced, his statements to the court and discussions with

the state regarding the plea offer sufficiently demonstrated that he was

aware of the prison time to which he was exposed if convicted, and,

contrary to his unsupported assertion, the court was not required to

advise him that he would need to register as a sex offender if he were

convicted or to ask him or his counsel if he had any mental health issues;

furthermore, the defendant’s education level and lack of experience as

a self-represented litigant did not necessarily mean that his election to

represent himself was not intelligently made, as his responses to the

court about his educational background, whether he had a history of

representing himself and his awareness of the requirements of selfrepresentation suggested that he understood those obligations.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that, because

his postcanvass conduct constituted substantial evidence of mental

impairment, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to order a

competency hearing or to appoint counsel for him after it granted his

request to represent himself: the record reflected that the defendant

interacted intelligently with the court, as he advanced arguments in
support of his defense and actively participated in the trial, at no point

after its canvass of him did the court express concerns about his competence, his actions after the state rested its case demonstrated a basic

understanding of the judicial process and a trial strategy for creating

reasonable doubt about the veracity of the allegations against him, and,

even if some of his arguments at trial were not well grounded in the

law and his representation lacked the hallmarks of an attorney skilled

in the practice of law, the defendant showed that he had a rational

understanding of the proceedings by challenging the sufficiency of the

evidence that was before the court.

Argued January 7—officially released August 3, 2021

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crime of sexual assault in the second degree,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Blawie, J.;

judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed

to this court. Affirmed.

Jennifer B. Smith, for the appellant (defendant).

Samantha Oden, deputy assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Ferencek, state’s

attorney, and Michelle Manning, senior assistant state’s

attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The defendant, Dayvon Williams, appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial

to the court, of sexual assault in the second degree in

violation of General Statutes § 53a-71 (a) (3). On appeal,

the defendant claims that the court (1) deprived him

of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel

by allowing him to represent himself, and (2) abused its

discretion by failing, sua sponte, to order a competency

hearing or to appoint counsel for him after it granted

his request to represent himself. We disagree and,

accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following procedural history is relevant to this

appeal. On May 24, 2018, the state filed a long form

information charging the defendant with second degree

sexual assault in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (3) related to

his alleged conduct involving a female victim1

in Norwalk on May 6, 2017. The defendant was represented

by three public defenders throughout the pretrial proceedings. Attorney Barry Butler first represented the

defendant at a hearing on August 31, 2017, in which it

was determined that the defendant qualified for public

defender assistance. The court, White, J., appointed the

Office of the Public Defender to represent the defendant, and, on September 1, 2017, Attorney Howard Ehring filed an appearance on his behalf.

On October 3, 2017, the defendant filed two motions

to dismiss Butler and Ehring from his case. On the same

day, he filed an application and writ of habeas corpus

ad testificandum to ‘‘regain [his] extradition rights

. . . .’’2 On October 11, 2017, the defendant, accompanied by Ehring, appeared before the court, Blawie, J.

Ehring informed the court that the defendant had called

the state’s attorney’s office and expressed his intention

to terminate public defender services and represent

himself. The court asked the defendant if he wanted to

represent himself. The defendant responded: ‘‘[T]hat’s

what it’s looking like because [Ehring] has a problem

with communication, and I feel like I can speak up for

myself.’’ The court began to canvass the defendant and

stated that, if he represented himself, he would be held

to the same standards as a lawyer. The court explained

that, if he so requested, it would be willing to appoint

standby counsel who could provide the defendant with

assistance. The court then asked the defendant if he

understood the elements of the offense with which he

was charged, which led to a discussion about whether

the defendant previously had a chance to review the

arrest warrant.

The court did not finish its canvass of the defendant

and instead began discussing the defendant’s motion

to regain his extradition rights. Before the hearing

ended, the court ‘‘urge[d]’’ the defendant ‘‘to try to collaborate with Attorney Ehring.’’ The defendant reiter-
ated that he was having difficulty communicating with

Ehring and stated that he had the same issues with

Butler. The court responded that ‘‘the right to counsel

does not include the right to counsel of your choice’’

and that it was ‘‘not yet making a finding of self-representation.’’

On November 13, 2017, the court, Blawie, J., held a

hearing and again discussed the issue of whether to

terminate the public defender services and to allow the

defendant to represent himself. The defendant argued

that his motion to dismiss Ehring should be granted on

the grounds that Ehring did not review his case with

him and failed to investigate information that he had

provided to Ehring. The defendant expressed frustration with the length of time he had been detained, stating: ‘‘I was arrested July 28 [2017]; I’ve been sitting here

three months with nothing being said to me about my

case.’’ The court again started to canvass the defendant

and informed him of the risks of self-representation.

The court stated: ‘‘[W]hen you’re indigent, you’re entitled to the Office of Public Defender’s services, but

appointment of counsel does not mean appointment of

counsel of your choice. You have two very capable

lawyers in this office; they’re both qualified to handle

this matter . . . .’’ The court reminded the defendant

that it would appoint standby counsel upon his request

but that having standby counsel was ‘‘far different . . .

from having representation in a full capacity . . . .’’

The court noted that Ehring had represented hundreds

of people in the defendant’s position over the course

of thirty-two years as a public defender and that he had

the defendant’s ‘‘best interest in mind . . . .’’ The court,

however, did not finish its canvass at this time. Instead,

at the end of the hearing, the court directed a judicial

marshal to bring the defendant to a conference room

in the courthouse so that he could speak privately

with Ehring.

On December 13, 2017, the defendant appeared

before the court, White, J., with Attorney Benjamin

Aponte from the Office of the Public Defender. The

state represented that the defendant had filed motions

to remove Ehring from his case and noted that, during

previous hearings at which these motions were heard,

the court ‘‘did not get through the entire canvass.’’ The

state then requested that the court ask the defendant

if he still wanted to represent himself and, if so, to

canvass him. The following exchange occurred between

the court and the defendant:

‘‘The Court: Okay. Mr. Williams, do you want to represent yourself?

‘‘The Defendant: At a point in time, I felt like I had

to speak up for myself and represent myself. Recently,

Attorney Aponte actually came—came and visited me

in Bridgeport Correctional Center. He ha[s] taken the

initiative to do that, so I will like to go forward with
Aponte, if I can.

‘‘The Court: I’m going to take what you said as a no,

that you don’t want to represent yourself now. Am I—

is that correct?

‘‘The Defendant: Yes.’’

The court continued the hearing with Aponte as counsel for the defendant.

On February 2, 2018, the state made an offer to

resolve the case through a plea agreement in exchange

for a sentence of ten years of incarceration, suspended

after four years, followed by fifteen years of probation.

The defendant rejected this offer. On the same date,

the defendant appeared before the court, White, J., to

address his decision to reject the offer. The court asked

the defendant if he ‘‘had enough time to speak to [his]

attorney about the offer . . . .’’ The defendant

responded, ‘‘no.’’ The court, the defendant, Aponte, and

the prosecutor then engaged in the following colloquy:

‘‘The Court: Okay. We’ll pass it and talk to your lawyer.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Excuse me, I would like to speak

on the record. May I address the court, please?

‘‘The Court: It’s not a good idea, you might say something to hurt your own case and—

‘‘[The Defendant]: Not at all—sorry, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Okay. If you want to say something, I’ll

listen, but it’s really not a good idea.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Honorable Judge White, I am the

defendant, and I don’t feel as if I’m being treated fairly

in this matter here. It’s been an ongoing case for nine

months now. It’s been—information on my—against

me for nine months now. I’ve been in the state of Connecticut for six months, going on a complete seven,

because I was arrested in New York City, and I’ve been

held in my city jail for nineteen days, to be exact. And

since I’ve been here in the state of Connecticut, I have

[had] more than enough time to speak with lawyers,

but they never showed up to speak to me, so I feel like

I’m being treated unfairly. My eighth amendment3

right

is being violated once again. I previously dismissed

Ehring, who’s sitting over there to the left of me. And

I feel like I need to initiate pro se and be given a law

library or something to exercise my rights from here

on because—

‘‘The Court: Sir, are you telling me you want to represent yourself?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I’m gonna have to—I’m going to

have to.

‘‘The Court: No, you don’t have to. You can’t afford

counsel, and you have counsel provided for you, so it’s

not true that, that—
‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, I want to initiate pro se.

‘‘The Court: Okay. How far did you go in school?

‘‘[The Defendant]: G.E.D. equivalency of a high school

diploma.

‘‘The Court: Okay. Have you ever represented yourself in a criminal case before?

‘‘[The Defendant]: No, I haven’t. I’d be willing to do so.

‘‘The Court: Do you understand the elements of the

offense that you’re charged with?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Do you understand the range of penalties?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Do you understand that you’re going to

have to file motions on your own?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Do you understand that you’re gonna

have to do legal research on your own?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, and speaking of which, I filed

two speedy trial motions—

‘‘The Court: Let me—sir, let me finish asking questions and then—

‘‘[The Defendant]: I’m sorry.

‘‘The Court: —I’ll give you a chance to speak further.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Do you understand that—I take it you’ve

elected to have a jury trial, is that right?

‘‘[The Defendant]: At this moment, I have to speak—

I’m undecided at this moment.

‘‘The Court: Well, I’m gonna assume that you’re going

to have a jury trial instead of a court trial. If you have

a jury trial, you’re gonna have to pick the jury on your

own, you’re going to have to make proper motions; you

understand that?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Understood.

‘‘The Court: And whoever the trial judge is will probably give you some leeway, but you’re going to have to

comply with the rules of evidence; do you understand that?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: And the rules of procedure and filing any

proper motions, so you understand all that?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: And do you understand that there are

great dangers in self-representation?
‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Okay. I just want to make sure you understand and just tell you that, if you try the case yourself,

you might ask questions or make comments that are

incriminating in nature, or it might put you in a bad

light, and you’re gonna talk, and you’re gonna be stuck

with what you have to say. And it’s really not a good

idea, in most instances, for people to represent themselves. I think it was Abraham Lincoln who said that a

lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client;

somebody said that.

‘‘[The Defendant]: I’m familiar.

‘‘The Court: There’s a lot of wisdom in that. Do you

understand what I’m telling you?

‘‘[The Defendant]: I’m familiar.

‘‘The Court: Okay. And you—obviously, you understand that, if you can’t afford counsel, I would provide

one for you at no cost to you. You understand that?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes. At any moment?

‘‘The Court: And you have a—

‘‘[The Defendant]: If I—

‘‘The Court: Listen to me.

‘‘[The Defendant]: —choose to give up my status—

‘‘The Court: Please listen to me and let me finish. So,

you understand that you have a constitutional right to

be represented by counsel and you want to give up that

right and represent yourself, is that correct? Is it?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Is there anybody forcing you or threatening you to do this?

‘‘[The Defendant]: No.

‘‘The Court: Do you want to look at me, sir? So, you’re

doing what you’re doing voluntarily and of your own

free will?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Mr. Aponte, do I need to ask him anything else?

‘‘[Attorney] Aponte: No, Your Honor, thank you.

‘‘The Court: State, do I need to ask him anything else?

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: No, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: All right. I’m gonna make a finding that

[the defendant] is knowingly, intelligent[ly], and voluntarily waiving his right to counsel, and he’s qualified to

represent himself. And I am removing a public defender

at this point; at some later point, if it’s appropriate, I may

ask the public defender to step in as standby counsel;

it’s discretionary with the court. That would just mean
that you’d have one of the public defenders, probably—

‘‘[The Prosecutor]: Judge, I—

‘‘The Court: —Mr. Aponte, there to answer any questions you might have, but Mr. Williams, please pay attention. It’s gonna be up to you to fully represent yourself.

The public defender doesn’t have any more responsibility with this case.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Understand—

‘‘The Court: Do you understand what I just told you?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.’’ (Footnote added.)

The court then advised the defendant about the mandatory minimum sentence for the crime with which he

was charged. The following exchange occurred

between the court and the defendant:

‘‘The Court: I should add, before the state’s attorney

goes on, there’s a mandatory minimum—

‘‘[The Defendant]: Ten years.

‘‘The Court: Well, no not a mandatory minimum—

‘‘[The Defendant]: I mean, nine months, I’m sorry.

‘‘The Court: Yes. A mandatory minimum of nine

months sentence.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Nine months, ten—okay.’’

On June 5, 2018, the date on which jury selection

was to begin, the defendant waived his right to a jury

trial and elected a court trial. The court, Blawie, J.,

canvassed the defendant and found that he had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to

a jury trial. On June 18, 2018, a trial was held before

the court, Blawie, J. After the state rested, the defendant orally moved for a judgment of acquittal on the

ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a

guilty verdict. The court denied the motion. The defendant then rested without presenting evidence. On June

19, 2018, the court found the defendant guilty of second

degree sexual assault in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (3).

On October 1, 2018, the court sentenced the defendant

to ten years of incarceration, execution suspended after

six years, and twenty years of probation. As part of the

special conditions of probation, the court ordered the

defendant to register as a sex offender for a period of

ten years pursuant to General Statutes § 54-252. This

appeal followed.

Additional facts and procedural history will be set

forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court deprived him

of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel

by allowing him to represent himself. We disagree.

In this claim, the defendant raises three distinct argu-
ments. First, he argues that he was not competent to

waive his right to counsel. Second, he argues that he

was not competent to represent himself.4 Third, he

argues that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to counsel.

We begin by setting forth the legal principles governing this claim. ‘‘The sixth amendment to the United

States constitution provides: ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have

the assistance of counsel for his defense.’ This right is

made applicable to state criminal prosecutions through

the fourteenth amendment’s due process clause. See,

e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 83 S. Ct.

792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). Embedded within the sixth

amendment right to assistance of counsel is the defendant’s right to elect to represent himself, when such

election is voluntary and intelligent. See, e.g., Faretta

v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L.

Ed. 2d 562 (1975).

‘‘We have long recognized this important right. See,

e.g., State v. Flanagan, 293 Conn. 406, 418, 978 A.2d 64

(2009); State v. Brown, 256 Conn. 291, 302, 772 A.2d

1107, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1068, 122 S. Ct. 670, 151 L.

Ed. 2d 584 (2001). We have also observed, however,

that ‘[t]he right to counsel and the right to self-representation present mutually exclusive alternatives.’ . . .

State v. Flanagan, supra, 418. Although both rights are

constitutionally protected, a defendant must choose

between the two. Id. We require a defendant to clearly

and unequivocally assert his right to self-representation

because the right, unlike the right to the assistance of

counsel, protects interests other than providing a fair

trial, such as the defendant’s interest in personal autonomy. State v. Jones, 281 Conn. 613, 648, 916 A.2d 17,

cert. denied, 552 U.S. 868, 128 S. Ct. 164, 169 L. Ed.

2d 112 (2007). ‘Put another way, a defendant properly

exercises his right to self-representation by knowingly

and intelligently waiving his right to representation by

counsel.’ . . . State v. Flanagan, supra, 418.

‘‘Once the right has been invoked, the trial court must

canvass the defendant to determine if the defendant’s

invocation of the right, and simultaneous waiver of his

right to the assistance of counsel, is voluntary and intelligent. See, e.g., State v. Pires, 310 Conn. 222, 231, 77

A.3d 87 (2013). The United States Supreme Court has

explained: ‘[I]n order competently and intelligently to

choose self-representation, [a defendant] should be

made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that he

knows what he is doing and his choice is made with

eyes open.’ . . . Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S.

835. That court further explained that a record that

affirmatively shows that the defendant is ‘literate, competent, and understanding, and that he [is] voluntarily

exercising his informed free will’ is sufficient to support
a finding that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently

invoked his right. Id. Practice Book § 44-35

serves to

guide our trial courts in making this inquiry. State v.

Flanagan, supra, [293 Conn. 419]. Nevertheless,

‘[b]ecause the . . . inquiry [under Practice Book § 44-

3] simultaneously triggers the constitutional right of a

defendant to represent himself and enables the waiver

of the constitutional right of a defendant to counsel,

the provision of § [44-3] cannot be construed to require

anything more than is constitutionally mandated.’ . . .

Id. Thus, the court need not question a defendant

regarding all of the Practice Book § 44-3 factors. State

v. T.R.D., 286 Conn. 191, 204, 942 A.2d 1000 (2008).

Instead, the analysis under that rule of practice is

designed to help the court answer two questions:

‘[W]hether a criminal defendant is minimally competent

to make the decision to waive counsel, and . . .

whether the defendant actually made that decision in

a knowing, voluntary and intelligent fashion.’ . . .

State v. D’Antonio, 274 Conn. 658, 712, 877 A.2d 696

(2005). To date, courts have recognized four instances

in which a court may deny a defendant’s timely request

to represent himself. A defendant’s request may be

denied when a court finds that the defendant is not

competent to represent himself; see, e.g., Indiana v.

Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 174, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 171 L.

Ed. 2d 345 (2008); or that he has not knowingly and

intelligently waived his right to the assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, supra, 835. A court

can also deny such request because it was made for

dilatory or manipulative purposes; e.g., State v. Jordan,

305 Conn. 1, 22, 44 A.3d 794 (2012); see also United

States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1238 (10th Cir.),

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 905, 121 S. Ct. 248, 148 L. Ed.

2d 179 (2000); or because the defendant’s behavior is

disruptive or obstructive. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, supra, 834 n.46; State v. Jones, supra, [281 Conn.

648].’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote in original.) State

v. Braswell, 318 Conn. 815, 827–29, 123 A.3d 835 (2015).

‘‘A defendant is presumed to be competent [to stand

trial].’’ General Statutes § 54-56d (b). However, our

Supreme Court, relying on Indiana v. Edwards, supra,

554 U.S. 164, has held that, ‘‘when a trial court is presented with a mentally ill or mentally incapacitated

defendant who, having been found competent to stand

trial, elects to represent himself, the trial court also

must ascertain whether the defendant is, in fact, competent to conduct the trial proceedings without the assistance of counsel.’’ State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 527–

28, 973 A.2d 627 (2009) (Connor I).6

In Connor I, the

court ‘‘conclude[d] . . . in the exercise of [its] supervisory authority over the administration of justice, that

a defendant, although competent to stand trial, may not

be competent to represent himself at that trial due to

mental illness or mental incapacity.’’ Id., 506. Therefore,

‘‘upon a finding that a mentally ill or mentally incapaci-
tated defendant is competent to stand trial and to waive

his right to counsel at that trial . . . trial court[s] must

make another determination, that is, whether the defendant also is competent to conduct the trial proceedings

without counsel.’’ Id., 518–19. The issue ‘‘is not whether

the defendant lack[s] the technical legal skill or knowledge to conduct the trial proceedings effectively without counsel. . . . Rather, the determination of his competence or lack thereof must be predicated solely on

his ability to carry out the basic tasks needed to present

his own defense without the help of counsel . . . notwithstanding any mental incapacity or impairment serious enough to call that ability into question.’’ (Citation

omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 529–30. ‘‘The United States Supreme Court

has stated the basic tasks needed to present [one’s]

own defense include organiz[ing] [a] defense, making

motions, arguing points of law, participating in voir

dire, questioning witnesses, and addressing the court

and jury . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Connor, 170 Conn. App. 615, 622, 155 A.3d 289,

cert. granted, 325 Conn. 920, 163 A.3d 619 (2017) (appeal

withdrawn January 5, 2018).

With these principles in mind, we now consider

whether the court erred in allowing the defendant to

represent himself. We review a trial court’s decision

regarding a defendant’s request to proceed as a selfrepresented litigant under the abuse of discretion standard of review. See, e.g., State v. Braswell, supra, 318

Conn. 830. ‘‘In determining whether there has been an

abuse of discretion, every reasonable presumption

should be given in favor of the correctness of the court’s

ruling. . . . Reversal is required only where an abuse

of discretion is manifest or where injustice appears to

have been done. . . . In general, abuse of discretion

exists when a court could have chosen different alternatives but has decided the matter so arbitrarily as to

vitiate logic, or has decided it based on improper or

irrelevant factors. . . . Our review of a trial court’s

exercise of the legal discretion vested in it is limited

to the questions of whether the trial court correctly

applied the law and could reasonably have reached

the conclusion that it did.’’ (Citations omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Connor, supra, 170

Conn. App. 621.

A

We first address two portions of the defendant’s claim

that are legally and factually interrelated. First, the

defendant argues that he was not competent to waive

his right to counsel. Second, the defendant argues that

he was not competent to represent himself. Because a

substantially similar analysis governs both claims, we

address these arguments simultaneously. With respect

to these arguments, the defendant asserts that the court

did not adequately consider the heightened require-
ments articulated in Edwards and mandated by our

Supreme Court in Connor I. The defendant points to

several occurrences that took place prior to the February 2, 2018 canvass during which his behavior demonstrated that he might have had a mental impairment.

He asserts that he was ‘‘disruptive, repeatedly interrupted the court, sometimes refused to respond to the

court’s questions, referred to himself in the third person

. . . showed signs of memory loss and confusion, had

difficulty following the court’s instructions, and was

unable to perform basic tasks that were necessary to

his defense . . . .’’ He also argues that he was ‘‘unable

to organize his defense and focus on relevant law pertaining to the sexual assault charge.’’ We disagree.

First, we note that the defendant was represented

by three different public defenders over the course of

several months prior to the February 2, 2018 canvass.

He expressed his desire to represent himself on two

separate occasions before a different judge prior to this

canvass. His various attorneys never expressed concerns to the court about the defendant’s competency

to stand trial, thereby requiring an evaluation pursuant

to § 54-56d, nor did they indicate to the court that he

suffered from a mental illness or incapacitation.7

Second, we are not persuaded that the precanvass

conduct on which the defendant relies should have

alerted the court to concerns about his competency to

waive his right to counsel or to represent himself.8 Our

review of the record reveals that the defendant was

consistently able to articulate logical reasons for his

desire to represent himself. Specifically, he was

unhappy with the representation he received from his

public defenders, and he indicated that they did not

visit him frequently, did not review his case with him,

and failed to investigate information that might have

helped his case. His responses to the court’s questions

at the pretrial hearings show that he comprehended the

disadvantages and dangers of representing himself, and

he indicated that he understood the elements of the

crime with which he was charged and the range of

penalties associated with a conviction.

In support of this claim, the defendant relies heavily

on State v. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 483. Connor I,

however, is easily distinguishable from the present case.

In Connor I, the court repeatedly was made aware of the

possibility that the defendant suffered from a significant

mental health problem, possibly related to his having

suffered a stroke prior to the time of his criminal trial.

Id., 489–504. In Connor I, defense counsel, the state,

and the defendant himself alerted the court to the fact

that the defendant’s competence to stand trial and to

waive his right to counsel was a significant issue to be

decided at trial.9

Id. In the absence of evidence of such

nature in the present case, we conclude that the record

supports a finding that the defendant was competent
to waive his right to counsel and that he was competent

to represent himself at trial. Accordingly, these portions

of the defendant’s claim are unpersuasive.

B

We next address the defendant’s claim that the court

abused its discretion in determining that his waiver

of the right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent because the court ‘‘failed to comply with the

federal constitutional standard and Practice Book § 44-

3’s requirement to conduct a ‘thorough inquiry’ into

whether the defendant was truly knowingly, voluntarily,

and intelligently waiving his right to counsel.’’ We disagree with the defendant’s claim.

In this claim concerning the adequacy of the court’s

canvass, the defendant raises three main arguments,

namely, that the court did not make him aware of the

‘‘risks and disadvantages’’ of self-representation, did

not make him aware of the penalties to which he was

exposed, and failed to elicit whether he possessed ‘‘the

intelligence and capacity’’ to appreciate the consequences of his decision to represent himself.10

We note that a defendant ‘‘does not possess a constitutional right to a specifically formulated canvass

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Diaz, 274 Conn. 818, 831, 878 A.2d 1078 (2005). Instead,

‘‘[h]is constitutional right is not violated as long as the

court’s canvass, whatever its form, is sufficient to establish that the defendant’s waiver was voluntary and

knowing.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

With respect to the defendant’s claim concerning the

risks and disadvantages of self-representation, our previous recitation of the procedural history of this case

reflects that the defendant expressed his desire to represent himself at two hearings prior to February 2, 2018,

during which proceedings the court, Blawie, J., twice

attempted to canvass him and advised him about the

risks of self-representation. On February 2, 2018, the

court, White, J., canvassed the defendant. The court

asked questions that were sufficient to demonstrate

that the defendant knew what was expected of him if

he chose to represent himself. The court asked if the

defendant understood that he would be responsible for

filing motions, conducting legal research, selecting a

jury, and complying with the rules of evidence and

criminal procedure. The court advised him that there

are great dangers in self-representation, such as making

self-incriminating statements at trial.11 We are not persuaded that the court failed to advise the defendant

about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.

The defendant next argues that the court failed to

advise him of the range of penalties that he would face

upon conviction, as is required by State v. Diaz, supra,

274 Conn. 828, and State v. T.R.D., supra, 286 Conn.
206. The defendant asserts that the court should have

specifically told him during its canvass that he would

face a maximum sentence of ten years of imprisonment

if convicted.12 In response to this argument, the state

points to the fact that it met with the defendant on

February 2, 2018, to discuss a plea offer, and that the

defendant attended a hearing on the same date to discuss his rejection of that offer. The state acknowledges

that, at this hearing, the court did not inform the defendant during the canvass about the potential exposure

should he be convicted of second degree sexual assault.

Nevertheless, the state argues that this error was harmless because, ‘‘[f]rom this offer, which was put on the

record, the trial court reasonably could infer that the

defendant had a meaningful appreciation of his potential punishment.’’ We agree with the state.

In Diaz, the defendant waived his right to counsel

after being canvassed by the trial court pursuant to

Practice Book § 44-3. State v. Diaz, supra, 274 Conn.

828. During its canvass, the court referred only to the

charges pending against the defendant as ‘‘very substantial’’ and to his cases as ‘‘big prison time cases . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 832. The defendant represented himself at trial, and a jury found him

guilty of all counts as charged. Id., 827. On appeal,

the defendant’s primary claim was that his waiver of

counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent ‘‘by

virtue of the trial court’s failure to inform him of the

range of possible penalties that he would face upon

conviction.’’ Id., 828. Our Supreme Court agreed and

concluded that the defendant was entitled to a new

trial. Id., 828, 834. The court stated that the trial court’s

comments ‘‘provided no real guidance to the defendant

with respect to the actual prison time to which he was

exposed.’’ Id., 832.

In T.R.D., a defendant claimed that ‘‘his waiver of

counsel could not be found [to have been] knowing

and intelligent in the absence of anything in the record

demonstrating that the defendant knew the possible

term of incarceration . . . .’’ State v. T.R.D., supra, 286

Conn. 198. The state conceded ‘‘that the court never

specifically advised the defendant of the range of possible penalties he faced upon conviction.’’ Id., 202. Our

Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘there is simply no evidence present in the record from which we could infer

that the defendant had any meaningful appreciation of

the period of incarceration he faced if convicted of

the charges he faced.’’ Id., 206. Accordingly, the court

granted the defendant a new trial. Id.

In the present case, however, the record reflects that

the defendant had a meaningful appreciation of the

possible penalties he faced if convicted after trial. At

the February 2, 2018 hearing, the state informed the

court that its plea offer was ‘‘[t]en [years of incarceration] suspended after four [years], fifteen years proba-
tion . . . .’’ The defendant rejected that offer and

elected to represent himself at trial. During the required

canvass, the court asked the defendant if he understood

the ‘‘range of penalties,’’ and he said that he did understand the range of penalties. Immediately after its canvass, the court informed the defendant that there was

a mandatory minimum sentence. Before the court could

state the length of the minimum, the defendant interjected and said, ‘‘[t]en years.’’ After the court informed

him that he was mistaken, the defendant said, ‘‘I mean,

nine months, I’m sorry.’’ The court confirmed that the

defendant was correct, to which he responded, ‘‘[n]ine

months, ten—okay.’’ Thus, even though the court did

not explicitly advise the defendant of the statutory maximum sentence and the mandatory minimum sentence,

the defendant’s statements to the court, along with his

discussions with the state regarding his plea offer that

took place immediately prior to the canvass, sufficiently

demonstrate that he was aware of the actual prison

time to which he was exposed if convicted.

Additionally, the defendant asserts that, pursuant to

State v. Davenport, 127 Conn. App. 760, 15 A.3d 1154,

cert. denied, 301 Conn. 917, 21 A.3d 464 (2011), the

court was required to advise him that he would need

to register as a sex offender if convicted but failed

to do so. The defendant misconstrues Davenport. In

Davenport, this court held that, when a criminal defendant is required to register as a sex offender pursuant

to General Statutes § 54-251 (a),13 ‘‘prior to accepting

the defendant’s [guilty] plea, the court [is] required to

both inform him that an entry of a finding of guilty after

accepting his plea would subject him to the sex offender

registry requirements and determine that he fully understood those consequences of his plea.’’ Id., 766. In the

present case, there is no such statutory requirement,

as the defendant was not attempting to plead guilty.

Rather, he was being canvassed with respect to his

decision to represent himself.

Finally, we address the argument that the court failed

in its canvass to elicit whether he possessed ‘‘the intelligence and capacity’’ to appreciate the consequences of

self-representation. The defendant asserts that the

court had an obligation to determine whether he was

‘‘familiar with Connecticut’s procedural and evidentiary

rules.’’ The defendant also suggests that the court was

required to ask him if he ‘‘had any mental health issues

or ask his counsel whether they perceived the defendant

to have mental health issues.’’

The defendant does not draw our attention to any

legal requirement for these specific inquiries to have

been made as part of the court’s canvass, and we are

not aware of any such requirement in our jurisprudence.

We are persuaded that the court aptly inquired as to

whether the defendant understood the types of responsibilities and dangers that flowed from his desire to
represent himself, and that the defendant’s responses

to the court’s inquiries reflected that he possessed the

intelligence and capacity to appreciate the consequences of self-representation. The court inquired

about the defendant’s educational background, to

which the defendant replied that he had obtained a

‘‘G.E.D. equivalency of a high school diploma.’’ Also,

the court asked the defendant if he had a prior of history

representing himself, to which the defendant replied

that he did not but that he nonetheless was willing to

represent himself. The court inquired if the defendant

was aware of the fact that self-representation would

require him to select a jury, to comply with the rules

of evidence, to follow proper procedures, to file ‘‘proper

motions,’’ and to conduct research. The defendant’s

responses to these inquiries did not suggest confusion

or uncertainty but that he understood these obligations.

As we explained in part I A of this opinion, the record

is devoid of any facts that should have given rise to

any specific concerns in the court’s mind about the

defendant’s capacity to waive his right to counsel and

to represent himself. The defendant now asserts, without any reference to authority, that he had a ‘‘low education level’’ and, combined with his lack of a history of

self-representation, his responses ‘‘showed [that] he did

not possess the intelligence and capacity to appreciate

the consequences of the decision to represent himself.’’

Our review of the entire canvass reflects that it provided

the court with sufficient information to determine

whether the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently waived his right to counsel, and we are not

persuaded that any further inquiries were required.

We likewise reject the defendant’s suggestion that

his education level and lack of experience as a selfrepresented litigant necessarily meant his election to

represent himself was not intelligently made. His

responses to the court’s inquiries expressed his general

understanding of the duties and risks that flowed from

his election, and a willingness to perform all of the

tasks required of him at trial. To accept the defendant’s

present argument would tend to undermine the weighty

principle that ‘‘a defendant need not himself have the

skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently

and intelligently to choose self-representation . . . .’’

Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 835. Moreover,

the type of inquiry into the defendant’s technical knowledge of law and practice on which the defendant relies

is unwarranted, for a defendant’s ‘‘technical legal

knowledge . . . [is] not relevant to an assessment of

his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.’’

Id., 836.

Practice Book § 44-3 is designed to help courts determine ‘‘[w]hether a criminal defendant is minimally competent to make the decision to waive counsel, and . . .

whether the defendant actually made that decision in
a knowing, voluntary and intelligent fashion.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Braswell, supra, 318

Conn. 829. After reviewing the transcript of the court’s

canvass concerning self-representation, we conclude

that the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing

the defendant to represent himself, or in determining

that he made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent

waiver of his right to counsel.

II

The defendant next claims that the court abused its

discretion by failing, sua sponte, to order a competency

hearing or to appoint counsel for him after it granted

his request to represent himself.14 We disagree.

The defendant did not raise this issue at trial and

seeks review of this unpreserved claim pursuant to

State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823

(1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773,

781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015). ‘‘Under Golding, a defendant

can prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following conditions are

met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged

claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3)

the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and

. . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if

subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to

demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional

violation beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . The first two

Golding requirements involve whether the claim is

reviewable, and the second two involve whether there

was constitutional error requiring a new trial.’’ (Citation

omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Kitchens, 299 Conn. 447, 466–67, 10

A.3d 942 (2011).

The defendant has met the first two Golding requirements in that the record is adequate to permit review

and that his claim is of constitutional magnitude. We

conclude, however, that the defendant’s claim does not

satisfy the third prong of Golding because the constitutional violation alleged by the defendant does not exist

and, therefore, he was not deprived of a fair trial.15

‘‘At the outset, we set forth the relevant standard of

review and legal principles that guide our resolution

of the issue. We review the court’s determination of

competency under an abuse of discretion standard.

. . . In determining whether the trial court [has] abused

its discretion, this court must make every reasonable

presumption in favor of [the correctness of] its action.

. . . Our review of a trial court’s exercise of the legal

discretion vested in it is limited to the questions of

whether the trial court correctly applied the law and

could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it

did. . . .

‘‘The conviction of an accused person who is not
legally competent to stand trial violates the due process

of law guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.

. . . This rule imposes a constitutional obligation, [on

the trial court], to undertake an independent judicial

inquiry, in appropriate circumstances, into a defendant’s competency to stand trial . . . . [Section] 54-

56d (a) codified this constitutional mandate, providing

in relevant part: ‘A defendant shall not be tried, convicted or sentenced while the defendant is not competent. . . . [A] defendant is not competent if the defendant is unable to understand the proceedings against

him or her or to assist in his or her own defense.’

‘‘This statutory definition mirrors the federal competency standard enunciated in Dusky v. United States,

362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788, 4 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1960) (per

curiam). According to Dusky, the test for competency

must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present

ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable

degree of rational understanding—and whether he has

a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. . . . Even when a defendant is

competent at the commencement of his trial, a trial

court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting

a change that would render the accused unable to meet

the standards of competence to stand trial. . . . Thus,

in appropriate circumstances, a trial court must, sua

sponte, make a further inquiry into a defendant’s competence to ensure that he is competent to plead guilty.

. . . A court is required to conduct such an inquiry

whenever [the court becomes aware of] substantial evidence of mental impairment. . . . Substantial evidence

is a term of art. Evidence encompasses all information

properly before the court, whether it is in the form of

testimony or exhibits formally admitted or it is in the

form of medical reports or other kinds of reports that

have been filed with the court. Evidence is substantial

if it raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s

competency . . . .

‘‘Nonetheless, § 54-56d (b) presumes that a defendant

is competent, and [t]he standard governing the determination of competency to stand trial is a relatively low

one and . . . mental illness or reduced mental capacity

does not alone provide a basis for concluding that a

defendant is not competent to stand trial. . . . An

accused may be suffering from a mental illness and

nonetheless be able to understand the charges against

him and to assist in his own defense . . . .’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Paulino, 127 Conn. App. 51, 61–63, 12 A.3d 628 (2011).

In the present case, the defendant claims that his

conduct after the court’s February 2, 2018 canvass constituted substantial evidence of mental impairment.

Thus, he argues, the trial court had a duty ‘‘to either

order a competency evaluation or appoint counsel

for [him].’’
In State v. Paulino, supra, 127 Conn. App. 51, a criminal defendant waived his right to counsel and claimed

on appeal that the trial court should have, sua sponte,

during the trial, ordered a competency evaluation. Id.,

52, 56. The defendant pointed to behavior on his part,

during the trial proceedings, that he argued constituted

substantial evidence of mental impairment. Id., 65. For

example, ‘‘he responded ‘God told me so,’ when asked

by the court why he was electing a court trial rather

than a jury trial,’’ and ‘‘expressed a desire to ‘contact

the whole world’ about his case . . . .’’ Id. In disposing

of the defendant’s claim, this court noted that it was

‘‘unaware . . . of evidence that was before the court

that would have indicated that the defendant suffered

from any known or apparent mental disease or defect,

much less one that would have impacted his ability to

understand the charges against him and assist in his

defense.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 63–64. Additionally, this court stated that ‘‘the trial judge is in a particularly advantageous position to observe a defendant’s

conduct during a trial and has a unique opportunity to

assess a defendant’s competency. A trial court’s opinion, therefore, of the competency of a defendant is

highly significant. . . . As such, the trial court was entitled to rely on its own observations of the defendant’s

responses during the canvassing, in light of his

demeanor, tone, attitude and other expressive characteristics. . . . The trial court was in the best position

to assess whether the defendant behaved rationally at

that time.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 64–65. The trial court ‘‘offered no indication that it thought that the defendant was incompetent

to stand trial.’’ Id., 64.

As in Paulino, the defendant in the present case

points to several instances after the trial court’s February 2, 2018 canvass in which he contends that his conduct showed ‘‘substantial evidence of [his] mental

impairment and established that he would not be able to

assist in his own defense.’’ Additionally, the defendant

argues that his conduct during the criminal trial gave

rise to a duty on the part of the court to order a competency evaluation or to appoint counsel for him. He

argues that he filed ‘‘nonsensical, incoherent motions,

contesting the trial court’s jurisdiction over him and

relying on the articles of the [Uniform Commercial

Code],’’16 ‘‘referred to himself in the third person, filed

special limited appearances on his behalf,17 was disruptive, frequently interrupted the trial court, and had difficulty staying focused.’’ (Footnote added.) He asserts

that, during the trial, he asked few questions on crossexamination, did not object to any of the state’s questions during the direct examination of the victim, did

not present any evidence in support of his defense, and

elected not to testify. Additionally, the defendant argues

that his ‘‘refusal to cooperate with his attorneys . . .

showed that he could not conform his behavior and
brings into question his comprehension of the judicial

process.’’

The state, on the other hand, accurately draws our

attention to several instances during the trial in which

the defendant meaningfully participated in his defense.

For example, when the state offered into evidence photographs of the house where the sexual assault took

place, the defendant objected on relevance grounds.

While cross-examining the victim, he ‘‘attempted to

challenge the victim’s credibility by questioning her

regarding the delay in her disclosure to the police and

whether she had been intoxicated at the time of the

incident.’’18 Through his cross-examination of his

cousin, Michael Harris, and the defendant’s brother,

Kaynon Williams,19 the defendant demonstrated that

neither of them had actually witnessed the alleged

assault.20

The state notes that, after the defendant renewed his

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, he moved for

a judgment of acquittal in which he argued that the

evidence that the state presented was insufficient to

convict him. The defendant stated that ‘‘there were

plenty of inconsistent statements, phrases, that were

used by the alleged witnesses and victim. There’s no

physical evidence, no DNA, no clothing evidence, no

witnesses saw anything.’’ The defendant further contended that the victim could have been ‘‘mental[ly]

impaired’’ at the time of the alleged assault because

she testified that she was ‘‘tipsy’’ from drinking alcohol

and smoking marijuana. Moreover, the state notes that,

‘‘[d]uring closing arguments, the defendant argued that

there was insufficient evidence to convict him because

the state’s case was dependent upon the victim’s testimony, the victim had been intoxicated, and the rest of

the evidence was circumstantial.’’

We are not convinced that the defendant’s behavior

after the February 2, 2018 canvass should have

prompted the court, sua sponte, to order a competency

hearing. At no point after the canvass did the court

express concerns about the defendant’s competency.21

Furthermore, the defendant’s actions after the state

had rested its case demonstrate that he had a basic

understanding of the judicial process and a trial strategy

for creating reasonable doubt about the veracity of the

allegations against him. Even if some of his arguments

were not well grounded in the law, and his representation lacked the hallmarks of an attorney skilled in the

practice of law, he showed that he had a rational understanding of the proceedings by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence that was before the court. In

short, the record reflects that the defendant interacted

intelligently with the court, advanced arguments in support of his defense, and actively participated in the trial.

We conclude, therefore, that the court did not abuse

its discretion in not ordering, sua sponte, a competency
hearing. Accordingly, the defendant has failed to demonstrate that a constitutional violation exists and that

it deprived him of a fair trial.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of sexual assault, we decline to identify the victim. See General

Statutes § 54-86e.

2 The record reflects that, on July 28, 2017, the defendant was arrested

in New York, where he resided, and charged with second degree sexual

assault. He then waived procedures incidental to extradition proceedings

and was extradited to Connecticut on August 16, 2017.

3 We presume the defendant meant that his rights under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution were being violated.

4

In support of this argument, the defendant primarily points to his conduct

after the February 2, 2018 canvass that, he asserts, should have alerted the

court that he was not competent to waive his right to counsel. Because the

court’s decision could have been informed only by what was known to it

at the time that it ruled on the defendant’s request to represent himself, we

will consider only the defendant’s conduct prior to the court’s decision to

allow the defendant to represent himself.

5

‘‘Practice Book § 44-3 provides: ‘A defendant shall be permitted to waive

the right to counsel and shall be permitted to represent himself or herself

at any stage of the proceedings, either prior to or following the appointment

of counsel. A waiver will be accepted only after the judicial authority makes

a thorough inquiry and is satisfied that the defendant: (1) Has been clearly

advised of the right to the assistance of counsel, including the right to the

assignment of counsel when so entitled; (2) Possesses the intelligence and

capacity to appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent oneself;

(3) Comprehends the nature of the charges and proceedings, the range

of permissible punishments, and any additional facts essential to a broad

understanding of the case; and (4) Has been made aware of the dangers

and disadvantages of self-representation.’ ’’ State v. Braswell, 318 Conn. 815,

828–29 n.4, 123 A.3d 835 (2015).

6 During the pendency of the direct appeal in Connor I, the United States

Supreme Court held in Indiana v. Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 177–78, that

a defendant who is competent to stand trial nevertheless may lack the

competency to represent himself. In light of Edwards, our Supreme Court

in Connor I remanded the case to the trial court for additional competency

proceedings. State v. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 528. During the proceedings

on remand, the trial court determined that the defendant was competent

to represent himself at his criminal trial, and the defendant appealed, challenging the competency determination. See State v. Connor, 152 Conn. App.

780, 100 A.3d 877 (2014) (Connor II), rev’d, 321 Conn. 350, 138 A.3d 265

(2016). In Connor II, this court reversed the trial court’s judgment on the

ground that the competency hearing was procedurally flawed and directed

the trial court to grant the defendant a new criminal trial. Id., 810, 817. The

state appealed from this court’s decision, and our Supreme Court later

concluded that this court erred in reversing the judgment and ordering a new

trial because this court had, sua sponte, raised the issue of the procedural

adequacy of the remand hearing without giving the parties an adequate

opportunity to be heard on this issue. State v. Connor, 321 Conn. 350, 354,

138 A.3d 265 (2016) (Connor III). In Connor III, our Supreme Court

remanded the case to this court to consider the defendant’s claim that ‘‘the

trial court abused its discretion when it erroneously concluded that the

[defendant] was competent to represent himself at [his criminal] trial despite

his mental illness or mental incapacity.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 360; see also State v. Connor, 170 Conn. App. 615, 620, 155 A.3d 289,

cert. granted, 325 Conn. 920, 163 A.3d 619 (2017) (appeal withdrawn January

5, 2018). This court concluded that ‘‘the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in determining that the defendant had been competent to represent himself

at his criminal trial.’’ State v. Connor, supra, 170 Conn. App. 631.

7 The defendant requests that this court take judicial notice of the results

of a competency evaluation that was conducted in connection with an

incident in Virginia, which led to his being arrested there in 2009. This

information is not part of the trial court record, as it was not presented to

the trial court at any time. Accordingly, we do not consider this evaluation.

8 This court has recognized that ‘‘[t]he trial judge is in a particularly
advantageous position to observe a defendant’s conduct during a trial and

has a unique opportunity to assess a defendant’s competency. A trial court’s

opinion, therefore, of the competency of a defendant is highly significant.

. . . Indeed . . . a trial judge who presides over a defendant’s . . . trial

will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions,

tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Connor, supra, 170

Conn. App. 629.

9

In Connor I, the defendant’s behavior caused the prosecutor to state

that, under the circumstances, the court ‘‘ha[d] . . . no choice but to order’’

a competency evaluation. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Connor, supra, 292 Conn. 490. For example, at a hearing in which the defendant

requested that the court discharge his public defender, he stated that ‘‘the

left side of [his] brain [was] not working as it should . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. After the court ordered a competency evaluation, the evaluation team was unable to conduct its assessment of the

defendant because he refused to cooperate with the team. Id., 491. Additionally, there were times when he did not speak or otherwise participate in

court proceedings. Id., 501.

10 The defendant also argues that the court, during its canvass, should

have asked him or his counsel whether he had any documented or perceived

mental health issues. He does not, however, cite authority stating that a

court is required to make this inquiry during its canvass, nor are we aware

of any such authority. Therefore, we conclude that this aspect of the claim

lacks merit.

11 We note that the court, Blawie, J., also advised the defendant: ‘‘[T]he

danger of self-representation is that you’re at a disadvantage. And you would

not be able to make the same objections to evidence to preserve the record

for purposes of appeal, to understand the strength and weaknesses of the

prosecutor’s case. Because a competent trained attorney has the skill and

training to defend and protect your rights, to assess the issues, and to

understand the appropriate way to proceed.’’

12 The crime of second degree sexual assault under § 53a-71 (a) (3), as a

class C felony, carries with it a maximum sentence of ten years of incarceration, with a mandatory minimum of nine months of incarceration. See General Statutes §§ 53a-35a (7) and 53a-71 (b).

13 General Statutes § 54-251 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Prior to

accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from a person with respect

to a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or a nonviolent sexual

offense, the court shall (1) inform the person that the entry of a finding of

guilty after acceptance of the plea will subject the person to the registration

requirements of this section, and (2) determine that the person fully understands the consequences of the plea. . . .’’

14 The defendant does not indicate whether this claim relates to his competence to stand trial, his competence to waive his right to counsel, or his

competence to represent himself. In the section of his appellate brief devoted

to this claim, the defendant argues that ‘‘[t]he record from [his] pretrial

hearings showed substantial evidence of [his] mental impairment and established that he would not be able to assist in his own defense.’’ Accordingly,

we interpret this claim to be about the defendant’s competence to stand

trial pursuant to § 54-56d, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘For the purposes

of this section, a defendant is not competent if the defendant is unable to

understand the proceedings against him . . . or to assist in his or her own

defense.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 54-56d (a).

15 In his brief to this court, the defendant also argues that the trial court

committed plain error by failing to order a competency evaluation. ‘‘[T]he

plain error doctrine . . . has been codified at Practice Book § 60-5, which

provides in relevant part that [t]he court may reverse or modify the decision

of the trial court if it determines . . . that the decision is . . . erroneous

in law. . . . The plain error doctrine is not . . . a rule of reviewability. It

is a rule of reversibility. That is, it is a doctrine that this court invokes in order

to rectify a trial court ruling that, although either not properly preserved

or never raised at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal of the

trial court’s judgment, for reasons of policy. . . . The plain error doctrine

is reserved for truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the

error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public

confidence in the judicial proceedings. . . . A party cannot prevail under

plain error unless it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result

in manifest injustice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Houghtaling v.

Commissioner of Correction, 203 Conn. App. 246, 281–82, 248 A.3d 4 (2021).
For the reasons set forth in our Golding analysis, we do not agree that the

defendant has demonstrated that plain error exists.

16 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss in which he argued that the

court did not have jurisdiction over him. The court denied this motion. At

trial, after the state had rested, the defendant renewed his previous motion

to dismiss, arguing that ‘‘[c]riminal codes and statutes do not apply to

human beings.’’

17 At the beginning of the trial, the defendant stated that he was ‘‘making

a special appearance on behalf of the defendant, who is right here.’’

18 The state presented evidence that the assault occurred at the home of

the defendant’s cousin, Michael Harris. The victim testified that she fell

asleep at about 5:35 a.m. on the morning of May 6, 2017, and that the assault

occurred shortly thereafter. Detective David Hudyama of the Norwalk Police

Department testified that, on the night of May 8, 2017, the victim, Harris,

and Harris’ sister went to the police station and reported the assault. Additionally, the state presented evidence that the victim had arrived at Harris’

house at approximately 2 a.m. on May 6, 2017, and consumed alcohol

throughout the night and smoked marijuana.

19 Kaynon Williams, the defendant’s brother, testified at the trial.

20 The state presented evidence that the defendant and the victim were

alone in Harris’ bedroom when the assault occurred. The victim testified

that, immediately following the assault, she went downstairs into a room

where Harris, Kaynon Williams, and two other individuals were located,

and told Harris that she needed to speak with him. She then testified that

she and Harris went into the basement of the home, but before she could

tell Harris what had occurred, the defendant walked into the basement.

Harris testified that he forced the defendant to leave his home. The victim

testified that she told Harris about the assault after the defendant left Harris’ home.

21 See footnote 8 of this opinion.