NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT MARK JACKSON, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D14-2197 ) MICHELLE JACKSON, ) ) Appellee. ) ________________________________ ) Opinion filed September 18, 2015. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Kimberly Carlton Bonner, Judge. Mark Jackson, pro se. Jaime L. Wallace of Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., Sarasota, for Appellee.

NORTHCUTT, Judge. Mark Jackson challenges a final summary judgment in favor of h is former wife, Michelle, as well as an order assessing fees against him. The appeal was untimely as to the summary judgment and we dismiss that aspect of the case, but we reverse the fee order. The Jacksons were divorced in 2012 by a final judgment that in corporated a 2009 postnuptial agreement. After the dissolution proceeding was completed, Mark- 2 - sued Michelle, alleging that s he had breached the postnuptial a greement when she unsuccessfully challenged its validity in the dissolution litig ation. He sought to recover his attorney's fees for this "bre ach of contract." Michelle fi led an answer and affirmative defenses. In January 2014 the circuit cour t granted Michelle's motion fo r summary judgment. On February 26, the court entered a "Final Order of Summary Judgment and Order Imposing Sanctions." In regard to the summary judgment, the order stated: "Pursuant to the court's prior order, summary judgment is enter ed in favor of the Defendant who shall go hence without day." As to the sanctions , it said: "The court finds that the Defendant is entitled to fees under Florida Stat ute § 57.105 in the amount of $8,073.62 and directs the Defendant to submit a Final Judgme nt in that amount." On April 9, the court entered a final judgment awarding attorney's fees in this sum "for which let execution issue." Mark filed a notice of appeal on May 6, 2014. The notice was untimely vis-à-vis the final summary judgment on the claim for breach of contract. That judgment was rendered on February 26, 2014. See Catchings v. Fla.-McCra cken Concrete Pipe Co., 135 So. 561, 562 (Fla. 1931) (characterizing go hence without day as words of finality); Raymond v. Caldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc., 848 So. 2d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (dismissing as untimely an appeal from summary judgment; "an order which grants a motion for summary judgment, and inclu des the words 'go hence without day' is a final judgment"). The circuit court do cket does not reflect that any motions for rehearing had been filed. Therefore, the thirt y-day period for appealing the judgment expired on March 28 . See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b) (requiring notice of- 3 - appeal to be filed "within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed"). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal insofar as it challenges the summary judg ment. Mark's appeal of the attorney’s fee judgment was timely, howev er. Section 57.105(1) provides for an award of reasonable fees when the court finds that the losing party . . . knew or should have known that a claim or defense when initially presented to the court or at any time before trial: (a) Was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense; or(b) Would not be supported by the application of thenexisting law to those material facts. As Mark argues, the order is defic ient because it contains no f indings to support the fee award. See Mason v. Highlands C ty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 817 So . 2d 922, 923 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). In addition to the finding on entitlement, a fee or der must include findings to justify the amount. Perez v. Perez, 100 So. 3d 769, 771 (Fl a. 2d DCA 2012). In Mason we noted that "[a] finding that a party is entitled t o recover attorney's fees under section 57.105 must be based upon substan tial, competent evidence presented at the hearing on attorney's fees or otherwi se before the court and in the record." 817 So. 2d at 923. The circuit court docket s hows that a fee hearing was held, but the record on appeal does not contain a transcrip t. It is the appellant's burden to provide an adequate record. But even when the appell ant has not done so, a fee award without adequate findings to justify the amount is re versible. Harris v. McKinney, 20 So. 3d 400, 403 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). We reverse the judgment imposing fees against Mark. On remand , the circuit court shall enter an order setting forth the basis for its finding of entitlement as- 4 - well as the facts supporting the amount awarded. See In re Gua rdianship of Ansley, 94 So. 3d 711, 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (reversing and remanding def icient fee order). Dismissed in part; reversed and remanded in part.

BLACK and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.