alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Stuart Robinson *v.*City of Louisville.

Municipal Corporation — Assessment of Agricultural Land for Purpose of Taxation — Taking Private Property Without Compensation.

Although, at the time of the assessment of the real estate of appellant for taxation, it was not within reach of particular city privileges, such as water, gas and regular police protection, and was used for farming, grazing and horticultural purposes only, hut these facts alone are not sufficient to exempt the same from taxation for city purposes.

*290APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON COURT COMMON PLEAS.

May 25, 1871.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :'

Although at the time of the assessment of the tax complained, of, the real estate of appellant was not within reach of particular cit-y privileges, such as water, gas, and regular police protections. Nor within one one one-fourth miles of a city school, yet it seems from the agreed facts that his premises were skirted on the west by Sixth street' leading directly into the heart of the city, and which was then graded and opened for the use of th'e public. That west of his said premises many lots had been laid out and sold, some of which belonged to appellants, that three lots are conceded to be legitimate subjects of city taxation. “That south of his premises for a distance of more than half a mile lots had been laid out and streets and alleys designated, and although very little building had been done, none of the lots further south had been sold for as much as $22.00 per front foot. And that appellant himself had laid off out of the eastern portion of his land lots fronting on Third street turnpike and disposed of the same for as much as $80.00 per front foot.”

It is true that appellant’s lands are used for farming, grazing and horticultural purposes, and that such as he has retained have not been laid out into lots; but these facts alone are not sufficient to exempt the same from taxation for city purposes. *Arbegust vs. Louisville,*2d Bush, 271. Considering all the facts presented by the record we are not prepared to decide that the Act of the General Assembly subjecting appellant’s real estate to such taxation was a palpable and flagrant abuse of legislative discretion so much so that at first blush it strikes the mind as the taking of private property without compensation, or that it is apparent that the burden was imposed without any view whatever to the interest of the propery owner in the objects to be accomplished by its collection and expenditure.

Conceiving that the facts of this case do not bring it within the principle governing the action of this court in the case of *Covington vs. Southgate,*15th B. Monroe, 330; but that it is similar in all its essential features to the cases of *Chemey vs.*
      *291Howes, 9th B. Monroe, 330, and the later case of *Abregust vs. City of Louisville.*We are constrained to concur with the court below in the conclusions reached by that tribunal.

*Caldwell, Young, for appellant.*

*Barnett, for appellee.*

Wherefore its judgment must be affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3816 Introduced in House (IH)]

108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 3816

 To require employees at a call center who either initiate or receive 
 telephone calls to disclose the physical location of such employees, 
                        and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 11, 2004

Mr. Strickland introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To require employees at a call center who either initiate or receive 
 telephone calls to disclose the physical location of such employees, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Call Center Consumer's Right to Know 
Act of 2003''.

SEC. 2. CALL CENTER REQUIREMENTS.

    (a) In General.--A United States corporation or its subsidiaries 
that utilizes a call center to initiate telephone calls to, or receive 
telephone calls from, individuals located in the United States, shall 
require each employee in the call center to disclose the physical 
location of such employee at the beginning of each telephone call so 
initiated or received.
    (b) Certification Requirement.--A corporation or subsidiary 
described in subsection (a) shall annually certify to the Federal Trade 
Commission whether or not the corporation or subsidiary, and the 
employees of the corporation or subsidiary at its call centers, have 
complied with that subsection.
    (c) Noncompliance.--A corporation or subsidiary that violates 
subsection (a) shall be subject to such civil penalties as the Federal 
Trade Commission prescribes under section 3.
    (d) Call Center Defined.--In this section, the term ``call center'' 
means a location that provides customer-based service and sales 
assistance or technical assistance and expertise to individuals located 
in the United States via telephone, the Internet, or other 
telecommunications and information technology.

SEC. 3. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION RULES.

    Not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this Act, 
the Federal Trade Commission shall prescribe rules to provide for 
effective monitoring and compliance with this Act. The Federal Trade 
Commission's rulemaking shall include appropriate civil penalties for 
noncompliance with this Act.
                                 <all>
```
Order entered March 8, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-18-01317-CV

THE ESTATE OF MAX D. HOPPER, DECEASED

On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 1

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. PR-11-03238-1

ORDER

Before the Court is court reporter Jackie Galindo’s March 6, 2019 letter requesting an 

additional four to six weeks to file the record. We GRANT the request to the extent we 

ORDER the record be filed no later than April 15, 2019. Because the record was first due 

November 29, 2018, we caution Ms. Galindo that failure to comply with this order may result in 

an order that she not sit as a court reporter until the record is filed. 

We DIRECT the Clerk of the Court to send a copy of this order to the Honorable Brenda 

Hull Thompson, Presiding Judge of Probate Court No. 1; Ms. Galindo; and, the parties.

/s/ KEN MOLBERG 

JUSTICE
U.S. District Court for the Northern District Of Illinois

Attorney Appearance Form

Case Title: Case Number: 

An appearance is hereby filed by the undersigned as attorney for:

Attorney name (type or print): 

Firm: 

Street address: 

City/State/Zip: 

Bar ID Number: Telephone Number: 

 Yes No

 Yes No

 Yes No

 Yes No

(See item 3 in instructions)

Email Address:

Are you acting as lead counsel in this case?

Are you acting as local counsel in this case?

Are you a member of the court’s trial bar?

If this case reaches trial, will you act as the trial attorney? 

If this is a criminal case, check your status. Retained Counsel

Appointed Counsel 

If appointed counsel, are you 

a Federal Defender

 CJA Panel Attorney

______________________________________________________________________

In order to appear before this Court an attorney must either be a member in good standing of this Court’s 

general bar or be granted leave to appear pro hac vice as provided for by local rules 83.12 through 83.14. 

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Under 28 U.S.C.§1746, this 

statement under perjury has the same force and effect as a sworn statement made under oath.

Executed on 

Attorney signature: S/

(Use electronic signature if the appearance form is filed electronically.)

Revised 8/1/2015

Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission v. Long Leaf Trading 

Group, Inc. et al

20-cv-3758

James A. Donelson

Charles E. McElvenny

Law Office of Charles E. McElvenny

33 N. Dearborn Suite 1000

Chicago, IL 60602

6281350 312-291-8330

charlie@cemlawfirm.com

December 16, 2021

✔

✔

✔

✔

Charles E. McElvenny

Case: 1:20-cv-03758 Document #: 93 Filed: 12/16/21 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:2531
#### Birhane Kflom MOGES, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 04-1817.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 13, 2004.

Decided Jan. 7, 2005.

*308Edward N. Leavy, Leavy & Frank, L.L.C., Bethesda, Maryland, for Petitioner. Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, David V. Bernal, Assistant Director, Jamie M. Dowd, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM.

Birhane Kflom Moges, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, seeks review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) affirming the immigration judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of deportation, and protection under the Convention Against Torture.* The immigration judge concluded that, because of changed conditions in Ethiopia, Moges did not have a well-founded fear of persecution or entitlement to asylum based on past persecution. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b) (2004); *Gonahasa v. INS,*181 F.3d 538, 541-42 (4th Cir. 1999). We have reviewed the administrative record and the immigration judge’s decision and find that the ruling of the immigration judge, affirmed by the Board, is supported by substantial evidence. *See INS v. Elias-Zacarias,*502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992).

In addition, we uphold the denial of Moges’ application for withholding of removal. “Because the burden of proof for withholding of removal is higher than for asylum — even though the facts that must be proved are the same — an applicant who is ineligible for asylum is necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal under [8 U.S.C.] § 1231(b)(3).” *Camara v. Ashcroft,*378 F.3d 361, 367 (4th Cir.2004).

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*PETITION DENIED*

*

 Moges asserts no arguments regarding the Convention Against Torture in this Court.
National(Institute(

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-6734

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. STEVEN NADROSKI, Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (4:06-cr-00027-RAJ-JEB-2; 4:07-cv-00115-RAJ)

Submitted: October 14, 2008 Decided: October 17, 2008

Before KING, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Steven Nadroski, Appellant Pro Se. Howard Jacob Zlotnick, Assistant United States Attorney, Ne wport News, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Steven Nadroski seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable.

Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003); Slack v.

McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Nadroski has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Nadroski’s motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We further deny Nadroski’s motion for appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
#### Segundo Fermin Villena PERALES, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 03-73743.

Agency No. [ AXX-XXX-XXX ].

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 6, 2004.*

Decided Dec. 16, 2004.

Raul E. Godinez, Law Office of Raul E. Godinez, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.

Regional Counsel, Western Region Immigration & Naturalization Service, Laguna Niguel, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Legal Officer, Office of the District Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Earle B. Wilson, Efthimia S. Pilitsis, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Div./Office of Immigration Lit., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

*598Before GOODWIN, WALLACE and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Segundo Fermín Villena Perales, a native and citizen of Peru, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision summarily affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum and withholding of removal and for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the denial of asylum for substantial evidence and may reverse only if the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. *Lata v. INS,*204 F.3d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir.2000). We deny the petition.

Substantial evidence supports the tPs finding that petitioner failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. Because anonymous threatening phone calls and traffic incidents committed by unknown assailants fail to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, petitioner’s asylum claim fails. *See Lim v. INS,*224 F.3d 929, 936-37 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that threats against a former police officer where neither he nor his family were harmed and they remained in the Philippines for six years after the threats began did not constitute past persecution); *Nagoulko v. INS,*333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir.2003) (holding alien did not show a well-founded fear of future persecution since possibility of such persecution was too speculative).

Because petitioner failed to establish eligibility for asylum, it follows that he failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal. *See Alvarez-Santos v. INS,*332 F.3d 1245, 1255 (9th Cir.2003).

In addition, petitioner does not make out a CAT claim because he failed to demonstrate it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if he returned to Peru. *See Kamalthas v. INS,*251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.2001).

Petitioner’s argument that the BIA improperly applied the streamhning procedures to this case is also foreclosed by *Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft,*350 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir.2003) (stating that where “we can reach the merits of the decision by the IJ or the BIA, an additional review of the streamlining decision itself would be superfluous.”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
## In T he Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07 - 23 - 00212 - CV IN THE INTEREST OF X.R. AND X.A., CHILDREN On Appeal from the 320th District Court Potter County, Texas Trial Court No . 097429 - D - FM , Honorable Carry A. Baker , Associate Judge Presiding 

### July 26 , 2023 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ. In January 20 23 , the Department of Family and Protective Services filed suit to terminate the parental rights of M.V. to her children, X.R. and X.A. 1 M.V. is represented in the proceedings by appointed trial counsel. On June 13, 2023, the Department filed a “Permanency Report to the Court
– Temporary Managing Conservatorship,” recommending, among other things, that the Department continue to serve as temporary managing conservators of the children. A day later, M.V. and S.P., relationship unknown,

1 To protect the child ren’ s privacy, we refer to A ppellants and the child ren by their initials. See T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 109.002(d); T EX . R. A PP . P . 9.8(a)(b).2

filed a notice of appeal , pro se, from the purported “denial of placement of the children . . . with relatives.” We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. We have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final judgment or from an interlocutory order made immediately appealable by statute. See Lehmann v. Har - Con Corp ., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001); Stary v. DeBord , 967 S.W.2d 352, 352
– 53 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam). Here, the trial court has not entered a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order . See T EX . F AM . C ODE A NN . § 109.002(b) (permitting appeals from final orders) ; In the Interest of A.J ., No. 02 - 11 - 00442 - CV, 2012 Tex. App . LEXIS 476, at *1
– 2 (Tex. App.
— Fort Worth Jan. 19, 2012, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (holding that a permanency hearing order is neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order). By letter of June 23 , 2023 , we notified Appellants that it did not appear that a final judgment or appealable order had been issued by the trial court and directed them to show how we have jurisdiction over th is appeal. M.V. filed a response and an “amended appeal” but has not demonstrated grounds for continu ing the appeal. Because Appellants have not presented this Court with a final judgment or appealable order, t h e appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See T EX . R. A PP . P . 42.3(a). Per Curiam
**EXHIBIT23.1**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTEREDPUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to theincorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-115490 on Form S-4of our report dated March 27, 2007, relating to the consolidated financialstatements and financial statement schedule of WII Components, Inc. appearingin this Annual Report on Form 10-K of WII Components, Inc. for the year endedDecember 31, 2006.
| */s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP* | * * |
|---------------------------------|----------|
| * *                        |
| Minneapolis, MN                 |
| March 27, 2007                  |

 

----
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.1 CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350) I, Charles E. Ramey, OF US Dataworks, Inc. certify pursuant to section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that: (i) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30,
2004 (the Report), which this statement accompanies fully complies with the
requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and (ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of US
Dataworks, Inc. Dated: November 15, 2004 /s/ Charles E. RameyCharles E. RameyChief Executive Officer
9968.

#### Langston *v.*The State.

Harwell, J.

1, The charge of the court respecting the time limit within which the defendant could be convicted, while inaccurate, is in this case harmless, since the date of the offense as laid in the indictment and as shown by the testimony was well within the statutory period and prior to the finding of the indictment. *Adams*v. *State,*22 *Ga. App.*252 (2) (95 S. E. 877).

2. The instructions of the court on the subject of alibi, set out in the 2d and 3d special grounds of the motion for a new trial, are not erroneous, when viewed in the light of the entire charge and of all the facts of the case; and if further instructions were desired upon the subject, an . appropriate timely written request therefor should have been tendered.

3. The court having instructed the jury as to the weight and effect of the defendant’s statement, and upon the subject of reasonable doubt, it was not error to Omit to charge specifically upon the theory of reasonable doubt growing out of the statement of the accused alone, or when considered in connection with the other evidence in the ease. *Rouse*v. *State,*136 *Ga. 363*(5), 364 (71 S. E. 667). See also *Vaughn*v. *State,*88 *Ga.*731, 738 (16 S. E. 64). This ruling disposes of the 4th and 5th special grounds of the motion for a new trial.

4. Inasmuch as the State’s evidence made out a case of assault with -intent to rape, and the accused relied upon the defense of alibi, a charge *83upon the subject of assault, or assault and battery, was not only not required, but would have been wholly inappropriate. Accordingly, no merit appears in grounds 6 and 7 of the motion for a new trial. .

Decided November 16, 1918.

Indictment for assault with intent to rape; from Jeff Davis superior court—Judge Highsmith. May 4, 1918.

*S. D. Dell,*for plaintiff, in error.

*Alvin V. Sellers, solicitor-general, J. Marie Wilcox,*contra.

5. The alleged newly discovered evidence being cumulative and impeaching in character, the court did not err in overruling the -grounds of the motion for a new trial based on such evidence.

S. The evidence authorized the verdict.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Broyles, *P. J., and*Bloodworth, *J., concur.*
10063.

#### Skinner *v.*Jones.

Decided April 23, 1919.

Complaint; from city court of Waynesboro—Judge W. H. Davis. July 3, 1918.

*H. J. Fullbright,*for plaintiff in error.

*F. S. Burney,*contra.

Wade, C. J.

No error of law is complained of, and there is evidence'to support the verdict.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Jenkins and Luke, JJ., concur.*