In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-3035 

RANDAL RICCI, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

DARRIN SALZMAN, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 18-cv-6993 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2020 — DECIDED OCTOBER 1, 2020 

____________________ 

Before KANNE and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.*

KANNE, Circuit Judge. This case calls for us to determine 

whether the district court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s 

amended complaint without prejudice under the doctrine of 

derivative jurisdiction even though that complaint invoked 

* Circuit Judge Barrett was a member of the panel when this case was 

submitted but did not participate in the decision and judgment. The appeal is resolved by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). 
2 No. 19-3035 

federal jurisdiction. We affirm the district court because the 

derivative jurisdiction doctrine barred it from exercising jurisdiction over the case and dismissal without prejudice was the 

appropriate result. 

I. BACKGROUND

Randal Ricci was awarded custody of his minor daughter 

in state-court divorce proceedings.1 Ricci’s daughter receives 

supplemental security income from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) and requires a “representative payee” to 

receive and manage her benefits. For nearly three years, Ricci 

served as representative payee. In August 2018, however, Defendants—SSA employees—removed Ricci as representative 

payee because they determined that he was not his daughter’s 

legal guardian. 

Ricci filed a pro se action in state court requesting that the 

court require Defendants to reinstate him as representative 

payee. Defendants, as federal employees, removed the case to 

federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 

U.S.C. § 1442. Then, Defendants moved to dismiss the action 

under the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction. They argued that 

the state court had no jurisdiction over the case when it was 

originally filed, and therefore, the federal court could not hear 

the case after it was removed. Ricci, this time with counsel, 

amended his complaint to invoke federal jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1361, which vests federal courts with jurisdiction 

over mandamus actions against federal employees. Defendants again moved to dismiss under the derivative jurisdiction 

1 These facts are drawn from Ricci’s amended complaint and are taken 

as true for purposes of this appeal. Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 861 (7th 

Cir. 2012). 
No. 19-3035 3

doctrine. Ricci responded that his amended complaint cured 

any procedural defect in removal caused by the doctrine. 

The district court agreed with Defendants, granted their 

motion, and dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice under the derivative jurisdiction doctrine. The court 

also instructed Ricci to initiate a new federal action if he 

wished to pursue his claims. Ricci filed this appeal instead. 

II. ANALYSIS

The district court’s dismissal of Ricci’s amended complaint under the derivative jurisdiction doctrine presents a 

question of law that we review de novo. See Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2001); Lopez v. 

Sentrillon Corp., 749 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 2014) (reviewing 

dismissal under the derivative jurisdiction doctrine de novo). 

Ricci makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues that 

the state court did have jurisdiction over his initial action, so 

the derivative jurisdiction doctrine poses no bar to his case 

continuing in federal court. Second, Ricci argues that even if 

the state court did not have jurisdiction over his initial action, 

this court has twice signaled that a plaintiff may cure a defect 

in removal created by the derivative jurisdiction doctrine 

simply by filing an amended complaint that invokes federal 

jurisdiction. See Hammer v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 

905 F.3d 517, 535 (7th Cir. 2018); Rodas v. Seidlin, 656 F.3d 610, 

629 (7th Cir. 2011). And because Ricci’s amended complaint 

invoked federal mandamus jurisdiction, he argues that it 

should not have been dismissed. 

Ricci’s first argument can be dealt with fairly quickly because he never made it in the district court. In response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Ricci argued only that our Rodas 
4 No. 19-3035 

and Hammer decisions allowed him to avoid the derivative jurisdiction bar because his amended complaint invoked federal mandamus jurisdiction. He did not argue that the state 

court had jurisdiction in the first place. In fact, Ricci explained 

to this court in his reply brief that he “did not argue about the 

state[] court’s jurisdiction because it was not material to his 

theory of the case.” That, he argues, was “neither accident nor 

neglect and is not a forfeiture.” But it is waiver; Ricci made “a 

deliberate decision not to present a ground for relief that 

might be available in the law.” United States v. Cook, 406 F.3d 

485, 487 (7th Cir. 2005). Because Ricci did not make his statecourt-jurisdiction argument in the district court “and instead 

raised it for the first time in [his] appellate brief, [he has] 

waived it for purposes of this appeal.” Henry v. Hulett, 969 

F.3d 769, 786 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc).2

Ricci also contends that an appellant may raise on appeal 

any issue decided by the district court. But this argument 

2 Defendants, too, confuse waiver with forfeiture. Whereas waiver “is 

a deliberate decision not to present a ground for relief that might be available in the law,” Cook, 406 F.3d at 487, “[f]orfeiture occurs when a party 

fails to make an argument because of accident or neglect,” Sansone v. Brennan, 917 F.3d 975, 983 (7th Cir. 2019). We have tried to be careful in recent 

years to distinguish the two. See Henry, 969 F.3d at 786 (“Waiver and forfeiture are distinct legal concepts.”); Reed v. Columbia St. Mary’s Hosp., 915 

F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Some of our opinions use the terms waiver 

and forfeiture interchangeably, but ... we need to pay attention to the difference.”). The difference often matters because we can sometimes review 

forfeited issues for plain error, but we can’t review waived issues at all. 

Henry, 969 F.3d at 786. It isn’t so important here, though, because we 

wouldn’t review the issue either way. Id. (explaining the “rare situation[s]” in which we review forfeited arguments in civil cases).
No. 19-3035 5

similarly falls victim to Ricci’s own briefing, which stresses 

that the district court entered dismissal “without discussing 

whether the state court had jurisdiction over any portion of 

the controversy” and “[w]ithout resolving this question.” We 

decline to address an issue that Ricci concedes was not fully 

argued, discussed, or resolved in the district court. We therefore assume without deciding that the state court did not have 

subject-matter jurisdiction over Ricci’s claims for injunctive 

relief against these federal officials. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (judicial review under the Social Security Act is available only in 

U.S. district courts). 

Moving on to Ricci’s second argument on appeal: that the 

district court should not have dismissed his amended complaint without prejudice under the derivative jurisdiction 

doctrine. Traditionally stated, this doctrine provides that “if 

the state court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or the 

parties, the federal court acquires none upon removal, even 

though the federal court would have had jurisdiction if the 

suit had originated there.” Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 

242 n.17 (1981) (citing, among other cases, Minnesota v. United 

States, 305 U.S. 382, 389 (1939)). We have since clarified that 

this doctrine “is best understood as a procedural bar to the 

exercise of federal judicial power. That is, the doctrine creates 

a procedural defect in removal, but is not an essential ingredient to federal subject matter jurisdiction.” Rodas, 656 F.3d at 

619. As such, it can be forfeited if not timely raised before the 

trial court. Id. at 623, 629. Moreover, “[t]he doctrine provides 

a background rule against which all of the removal statutes 

operate; it applies unless abrogated.” Id. at 618. 

Congress has abrogated the doctrine with respect to the 

general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(f) (“The court to 
6 No. 19-3035 

which a civil action is removed under this section is not precluded from hearing and determining any claim in such civil 

action because the State court from which such civil action is 

removed did not have jurisdiction over that claim.” (emphasis 

added)). But it has not abrogated the doctrine with respect to 

the federal officer removal statute at issue here, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1442. Rodas, 656 F.3d at 616 (“[T]he doctrine of derivative jurisdiction has been abrogated in the general removal statute 

... but not the federal officer removal statute.”); see also Lopez, 

749 F.3d at 350 (“[A]ny ambiguity about the endurance of the 

derivative action doctrine as applied to removals under § 1442 

was eliminated when Congress amended § 1441 in 2002 to 

add the words ‘removed under this section.’”). On that much, 

the parties seem to agree. 

Ricci argues that we have nevertheless approved a procedure that permits a plaintiff to bypass the derivative jurisdiction bar by filing an amended complaint that properly invokes federal jurisdiction. He points to language from Rodas

and Hammer. We think Ricci puts too much stock in these 

cases. 

It’s true that in Rodas we stated “that any defect in removal 

created by the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction would be 

cured if [the plaintiff] simply filed an amended complaint.” 

656 F.3d at 629. But as the district court recognized, Rodas only 

held that because the doctrine is not strictly jurisdictional, it 

can be waived or forfeited and must be asserted before a ruling on the merits. Id. at 623. The Rodas defendants did not 

raise their derivative jurisdiction argument until after judgment was entered, so it was forfeited and the court was not 

barred from exercising its jurisdiction. Id. at 614, 623–24. Accordingly, courts in this circuit have widely recognized that 
No. 19-3035 7

the “Rodas exception” applies “only in the context of a case 

where the dispute has proceeded to a disposition on the merits.” Pelto v. Office of Reg’l Chief Counsel, No. 11-CV-815-WMC, 

2013 WL 5295678, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 19, 2013); accord Brown 

v. Hosp. “A”, No. 2:17-CV-125, 2017 WL 5989717, at *2 (N.D. 

Ind. Dec. 4, 2017); Abu-Humos v. First Merit Bank, No. 15-CV6961, 2015 WL 7710374, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2015). Here, 

Defendants asserted the doctrine in their very first responsive 

pleading in federal court, and no substantive issues have been 

decided. So Rodas is inapposite. 

Ricci then points to similar language in Hammer. There, after the case was removed from state court, the Department of 

Health and Human Services (“HHS”) timely moved for dismissal under the derivative jurisdiction doctrine, and the 

plaintiff moved to remand the case back to state court. Hammer, 905 F.3d at 524. The district court remanded the case for 

lack of removal jurisdiction under § 1442, but we concluded 

on appeal that the district court did have removal jurisdiction 

and “should not have remanded this case to state court.” Id.

at 535. 

We then turned to “the appropriate remedy.” Id. HHS 

wanted outright dismissal, but we declined “because the merits of HHS’s defense ha[d] not been resolved” and “[t]he district court, in the first instance, must evaluate ... the propriety 

of dismissal under the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction.” Id.

We then stated—and this is what Ricci clings to—that the 

plaintiff “could, if she so chooses, amend her motion for declaratory relief to constitute a proper complaint that engages 

with the federal court’s jurisdiction. Such a modification 

would cut out the intermediate step between dismissal of this 

case and the filing of a new one ... .” Id.
8 No. 19-3035 

We do not believe that in Hammer we “attempt[ed] to abrogate” the derivative jurisdiction doctrine “in a few sentences of dicta.” Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads v. Foxx, 815 

F.3d 1068, 1079 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting New York v. Army Corps 

of Eng’rs, 896 F. Supp. 2d 180, 196 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)). And dicta 

it was, so we are free to depart from it. Wilder v. Apfel, 153 F.3d 

799, 803 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Dicta are the parts of an opinion that 

are not binding on a subsequent court ... .”). More fundamentally, “it rests with Congress to determine not only whether the 

United States may be sued, but in what courts the suit may be 

brought.” Minnesota, 305 U.S. at 388 (emphasis added). Congress has not abrogated the doctrine with respect to removals 

under § 1442, and neither have we. 

Nor did we hamstring the doctrine by fashioning a new 

rule permitting plaintiffs to sidestep it with an amended complaint. Hammer relied only on Rodas for its suggestion that the 

plaintiff could avoid the derivative jurisdiction bar by amending her complaint. Hammer, 905 F.3d at 535 (citing Rodas, 656 

F.3d at 625). But again, the Rodas defendants forfeited the derivative jurisdiction argument. And in Rodas, we made clear 

that even though the doctrine is only a “procedural bar”—and 

even though “the justification for the rule is hardly obvious”—it is nevertheless “binding on us.” Rodas, 656 F.3d at 

615. It therefore “remain[s] mandatory. We must apply [it] if 

properly invoked.” Walker v. Weatherspoon, 900 F.3d 354, 356 

(7th Cir. 2018); see also Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 

(2005) (holding that non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules 

“assure relief to a party properly raising them”); S. Ill. Power 

Coop. v. EPA, 863 F.3d 666, 669 n.2 (7th Cir. 2017) (explaining 

that a non-jurisdictional rule is nevertheless “mandatory” 

where the defendant “invokes its benefit”). 
No. 19-3035 9

When the derivative jurisdiction doctrine is timely raised, 

then, it properly results in dismissal without prejudice. This 

should come as no surprise, for that is the remedy that district 

courts have routinely applied. E.g., Ajabu v. Harvey, No. 18 C 

1243, 2018 WL 3586588, at *5–6 (S.D. Ind. July 28, 2018) 

(“[U]nder the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction, dismissal 

without prejudice is the proper result.”); Brown, 2017 WL 

5989717, at *2; Abu-Humos, 2015 WL 7710374, at *1 n.1; Pelto, 

2013 WL 5295678, at *3. And it is the remedy that other circuits 

have widely affirmed. E.g., Lopez, 749 F.3d at 351; Palmer v. 

City Nat. Bank, of W. Va., 498 F.3d 236, 249 (4th Cir. 2007); see 

also Rodriguez v. United States, 788 F. App’x 535, 536 (9th Cir. 

2019); Patriot Cinemas, Inc. v. Gen. Cinemas Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 

216 (1st Cir. 1987). 

In sum, we hold that when a defendant timely raises the 

derivative jurisdiction doctrine, it erects a mandatory bar to 

the court’s exercise of federal jurisdiction, and a plaintiff cannot circumvent that bar merely by filing an amended complaint invoking federal jurisdiction. 

We are cognizant, however, of the practical issues that 

could arise if a defendant raises the doctrine in a case that’s 

far along—say, at summary judgment or on the eve of trial. 

What if, by that point, the statutory limitations period has expired and the plaintiff cannot initiate a new action? 

Federal law suggests an answer to this problem. Under 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c), “[a] motion to remand [a] case on the basis of 

any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must 

be made within 30 days after the filing of [a] notice of removal 

under section 1446(a).” That the derivative jurisdiction doctrine is not jurisdictional but “creates a procedural defect in 

removal” therefore “suggests that derivative jurisdiction 
10 No. 19-3035 

should ordinarily be raised within 30 days.” Rodas, 656 F.3d 

at 629. True, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) “by its terms ... applies only 

to plaintiffs who seek to remand a case.” Id. Nonetheless, 

“procedural defects in removal ... generally must be raised 

within 30 days,” id. at 621, so we think it appropriate to adopt 

a similar rule requiring defendants to assert the derivative jurisdiction doctrine within 30 days from removal. If raised 

within 30 days, it results in dismissal without prejudice. But 

after that window passes, it is forfeited and the plaintiff may 

proceed. 

There is sufficient basis for such a rule. Again, “despite its 

perhaps improvident name,” the derivative jurisdiction doctrine “is best understood as a procedural bar to the exercise of 

federal judicial power.” Id. at 619. It thus causes a defect in 

removal “other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1447(c). And because “derivative jurisdiction counts 

as a procedural defect, not a subject-matter-jurisdiction defect,” “it ‘must [be] made within 30 days’ of ... removal.” Fed. 

Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Gilbert, 656 F. App’x 45, 53 (6th Cir. 

2016) (Sutton, J., concurring) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)) (citing Rodas, 656 F.3d at 621); see also McMahon v. Bunn–O–Matic 

Corp., 150 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[A]ny defect in the 

removal process other than the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction must be raised within 30 days or is forfeited.”), abrogated 

on other grounds by Kaiser v. Johnson & Johnson, 947 F.3d 996, 

1013 (7th Cir. 2020). “In that vein, it seems noteworthy that in 

every case we located in which the Supreme Court discussed 

the matter of derivative jurisdiction, the matter appears to 

have been raised promptly upon removal, prior to adjudication on the merits.” Rodas, 656 F.3d at 624 (citing cases). 
No. 19-3035 11

And a 30-day rule makes good sense. It puts the onus on 

defendants to raise the doctrine in a timely fashion and affords them its full benefit when they do. It also spares plaintiffs the misfortune of litigating a case until the eve of judgment, just to be booted from court without the ability to initiate a new action because the limitations period quietly expired in the meantime. 

Finally, nothing in our precedent requires that we permit 

future defendants to assert the derivative jurisdiction doctrine 

at any point before judgment. We held in Rodas that raising 

the doctrine after judgment is entered is clearly too late, but 

that is not to say that it would be timely if raised at any point 

before then. We have never held that a defendant can string a 

plaintiff along until a jury is empaneled only to trigger the derivative jurisdiction bar at the last minute. There would be no 

reason for such a rule; after all, the doctrine causes a defect in 

removal, so the applicability of the doctrine is apparent from 

that moment, and 30 days is ample time to raise it. 

Of course, none of that rescues Ricci’s case. Defendants 

raised the derivative jurisdiction doctrine one week after removal and again three weeks after Ricci filed his amended 

complaint. That’s exactly how it should be done. 

III. CONCLUSION

We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of 

Ricci’s amended complaint without prejudice. We, like the 

district court, remind Ricci that if he wishes to pursue his 

claims, the doors to the federal courthouse are open to him if 

he files a new complaint.