### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 18

– 0081
Filed June 5 , 2020

STATE OF IOWA , Appellee ,

vs.
KAMIE JO SCHIEBOUT , Appell ant

.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, Patrick H. Tott (trial and sentencing) and Jeffrey A. Neary ( restitution order), Judge s
.

The defendant requests further review of a court of appeals decision affirming her conviction for theft

. DECI SION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND
REMANDED FOR DISMISSAL
.

Mark C. Smith (until withdrawal) and Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy , Assistant Appellate Defender , for appellant

.

Thomas J . Miller, Attorney General, Thomas J. Ogden , Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas Kunstle, County Attorney, for appellee.2
McDERMOTT, Justice.
Kamie Jo Schiebout wrote checks without authorization from a bank
account that was not hers. The State cha rged her with violating Iowa Code
section 714.1(6) ( 2015 ), which provides a person commits theft “if the person knows that such check .

. . will not be paid when presented.” All
seven checks the State charged Schiebout with writing were paid when presented. The jury nonetheless found Schiebout guilty. This appeal requires us to address the types of conduct Iowa Code section 714.1(6) forbids. Schiebout contends the State’s evidence presented at trial was insufficient to show she k new the checks would not be paid when presented. Schiebout argues presenting a check without authorization, which was the substance of the State’s evidence, is different than providing a check one knows will not be paid when presented, which is the subjec t of section 714.1(6). As a result, Schiebout asserts the district court committed reversible error in denying her motion for acquittal at trial. We agree. The text of section 714.1(6) forbids knowingly presenting a check that will not be paid when pre sented. Evidence that she presented
check s without authorization is , without more, insufficient to establish this particular crime. Because the State failed to present sufficient evidence supporting a conviction under section 714.1(6) and, specifically, that Schiebout knew the checks would not be paid when presented, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals , reverse th e judgment of the
district court , and remand for dismissal

. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Schiebout’s former husband, Ma tthew, served as treasurer of Sandy Hollow Ducks Unlimited, the local chapter of the national Ducks Unlimited organization. The chapter had a checking account at American State3 Bank. Only two people had signature authority on the checking account:
Matthe w, as the chapter’s treasurer, and the chapter’s president. Matthew kept the chapter’s checkbooks in the basement of the house he had shared with Schiebout before their separation. Schiebout had never been a member of the chapter and never had
check

- wri ting authority on the chapter account. Nonetheless, months after Matthew and Schiebout separated and Matthew moved out, Schiebout wrote a series of unauthorized checks on the chapter’s account, signing her own name on each check.
Over a two

- month period , twelve checks were drawn on the account. Only one was written by the chapter president or treasurer. Despite this,

t he bank honored all twelve checks, even those presented after the account ultimately became overdrawn. The bank mailed several overdraf t n otices to Matthew, but he didn ’ t open any of them. Matthew first learned someone had been writing unauthorized checks on the chapter’s account when the bank eventually reached him by phone. Upon examining the check images at the bank, Matthew recogniz ed the signatures as
Schiebout’s. He re ported the matter to the Orange City Police Department. Around this time, but before the police had contacted her, Schiebout wrote two more checks on the chapter’s account at Schweser’s, a clothing
store. Schiebou t knew the store clerk and told her the checks were “her
husband’s.” Unlike with the other checks, t he bank did not honor either
check to Schweser’s because the account was overdrawn. No evidence suggests Schiebout thereafter attempted to pass any more c hecks. Schiebout told an employee at the bank she had “grabbed the wrong
checkbook.”
T he State charged Schiebout with second

- degree theft under Iowa Code sections 714.1(6) and 714.2(2), and as a habitual offender under4

Iowa Code sections 902.8 and 902.9(1)( c ) based on prior criminal
convictions. At trial, the State presented evidence on eleven checks, but the jury was instructed to consider only seven checks as instances of alleged theft. The two checks Schiebout unsuccessfully passed at
Schweser’ s were presented but not charged as part of the theft. At trial, t he State provided images of five of the seven checks that were charged . The State could not present images of two of the checks because the merchant, Wal

- Mart, processed them as “automated clearinghouse” (or ACH) withdrawals in which Wal

- Mart converted the paper check s into an electronic transfer that pulled funds from the checking account. With the funds electronically transferred, Wal

- Mart
handed the check s back to Schiebout wi thout submitting the check s to the bank. For the two Wal

- Mart checks, the State instead presented receipts showing the check numbers and store photos and video
surveillance of Schiebout at both the register and leaving with a cart of items, all of which c oincided with the dates and locations of the ACH
transfers. The State asked the jury to consider Schiebout’s actions as part of a single scheme and, thus, to aggregate the seven checks in calculating the total value of property to determine the degree of theft. The seven checks totaled $1256.93.
The four other checks that came into evidence , including the two
Schweser’s che cks, were n ot made part of the charged theft but instead
were offered to help prove elements of the charged crime. Matthew
identif ied the signature on every check admitted into evidence as Schiebout’s. Two checks contained Schiebout’s personal information, such as her driver’s license number or date of birth, handwritten across the top.5
At the close of the State’s evidence, Schieb out moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing the State failed to prove the knowledge element of section 714.1(6). The district court took the motion under advisement. Schiebout made a renewed motion for acquittal after the defense concluded its case, whi ch the district court again took under advisement. The district court ultimately denied the motion for acquittal in an oral order in which the court noted its r eliance on State v. James concerning the knowledge element. 310 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa 1981) ,

overruled by State v. Hogrefe , 557 N.W.2d 871 (Iowa 1996). T he district

court found the State had provided sufficient evidence on the knowledge
element because Schiebout “was aware that she was not an authorized signer on this account” and “ not being an authorized signer

. . . she should have known that they would not be accepted and could not have been accepted in a legal fashion by the bank. ” The district court instructed the jury on the knowledge element , Jury Instruction No. 13, as foll ows: For the defendant to know something means she had a conscious awareness that at the time she gave the checks to the various businesses they would not be paid by the bank because the defendant was not an authorized signer on the account on which the c hecks were drawn. The jury found Schiebout guilty of second

- degree theft. At a second trial focused on Schiebout’s habitual offender status, the jury found
Schiebout to be a habitual offender under Iowa Code section 902.8. The
district court sentenced her to an indeterminate prison term of fifteen years, with a mandatory minimum of three years based on her habitual offender status. The district court found Schiebout lacked the ability to pay certain items of restitution and waived other costs.6

Short ly thereafter, the district court ordered Schiebout to pay the Sioux County Sheriff’s Office $28,136.31 for medical services provided
while she was a detainee there. At the hearing, Schiebout did not receive and did not have counsel representing her. Dis tinguishing other types of restitution, the district court held Iowa law does not require an ability

- to

pay determination before ordering a convicted person to pay for medical
aid. Schiebout appealed. She asserted the district court erred in denying
the motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence both that Schiebout knew the checks would not be paid when presented and that she obtained property or services in exchange for the
checks. Schiebout alternatively sought a new tria l asserting the jury was not properly instructed on the checks it was allowed to aggregate to meet
the dollar amount threshold for second

- degree theft. Schiebout also asserted the district court’s ruling imposing the sheriff’s claim for
reimbursement of t he medical aid costs was improper and that she was
entit led to counsel at the hearing. We transferred the appeal to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed Schiebout’s conviction on the sufficiency of evidence , accepting the contention that knowledge of her lack of authorization in presenting the checks satisfied the knowledge element under
section 714.1(6). The court of appeals further found no error in the jury instruction on aggregating the dollar amounts of the checks. On the
district c ourt’s order concerning payment for medical aid, the State, on appeal, conceded medical aid is subject to the reasonable

- ability

- to

- pay requirement i f treated as restitution under section 910.2 and further
conceded Schiebout was entitled to counsel at the restitution hearing. The7 court of appeals vacated the order requiring payment for medical aid and remanded for further proceedings. We granted Schiebout ’s application for further review.
II. Standard of Review. Issues of statutory interpretation a re reviewed for correction of legal

error
. State v. Nall , 894 N.W.2d 514, 517 (Iowa 2017). We likewise review
claims of insufficient evidence for correction of legal error

. Id. We wi ll uphold the verdict on a sufficiency

- of

- evidence claim if substantial evidence supports it. State v. Trane , 934 N.W.2d 447, 455 (Iowa 2019). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict, we consider “all of the re cord evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.” State v. Thomas , 847 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Iowa 2014) (quoting State v. Sanford , 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012)). Evidence is substantial “if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it can convince a rational jury that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Trane , 934 N.W.2d at 455 (quoting State v. Ramirez , 895 N.W.2d 884, 890 (Iowa 2017) ).
III. Analysis.
Iowa Code s ection 714.1(6) states, A person commits theft when the person

. . . [m]akes , utters, draws, delivers, or gives any check, share draft, draft, or written order on any bank .

. . and obtains property, the use of property, including rental property, or service in exchange for such instrument, if the person knows that such check, sha re draft, draft, or written order will not be paid when presented.

a
. Whenever the drawee of such instrument has refused payment because of insufficient funds, and the maker has not paid the holder of the instrument the amount due thereon within ten da ys of the maker’s receipt of notice from the holder that payment has been refused by the drawee, the8 court or jury may infer from such facts that the maker knew that the instrument would not be paid on presentation.

. . . b

. Whenever the drawee of such instrument has refused payment because the maker has no account with the drawee, the court or jury may infer from such fact that the maker knew that the instrument would not be paid on presentation. Interpreting the key words of this statute, to suppor t a conviction
the State must thus prove “when the person .

. . gives any check” the

person “knows ” the check “will not be paid when presented.” Id. Unless otherwise defined by the legislature, we give words their ordinary meaning. State v. Damme , ___ N.W.2d

___ ,

___ (Iowa 20 20 ). “Interpreting a statute requires us to assess it in its entirety to ensure our interpretation is harmonious with the statute as a whole rather than assessing isolated words or phrases.” State v. Pettijohn , 899 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 2017). On the knowledge element, the State’s evidence focused almost completely on Schiebout’s lack of authorization to write checks on the chapter’s checking account. The State succinctly state s its argument in its appeal brief : “ A reasonable jur or could conclude that because Schiebout knew she was not authorized to sign the checks, she knew the bank would not pay them.” But the State’s argument, without more, invites a logical fallacy because t he premise doesn’ t require the conclusion.
T he Stat e presented evidence of Schiebout’s lack of authority to write checks from the account, but the record contains no other evidence on the
determinative issue: whether Schiebout knew the bank would fail to pay
the checks when she presented them

. The distri ct court instructed the jury the State must prove Schiebout possessed a “conscious awareness” that the checks would not be paid when p resented because she was not an authorized signer on the account

.9 Jury Instruction No. 13; see also Jury Instruction No. 14 (knowledge
el e ment requiring State to prove Schiebout “knew at the time she gave the checks to local organizations or businesses that they would not be paid by the bank because [she] was not an authorized signer on the account”); Sahu v. Iowa Bd. of Med

. Exam ’ rs , 537 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa 1995) (defining “knowledge” to mean the defendant had a “conscious awareness” of the element requiring knowledge). Jury instructions, when not objected to, become the law of the case for purposes of appellate review fo r sufficiency

- of

- evidence claims. State v. Canal , 773 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Iowa 2009). The evidence in this case was insufficient to support a finding that
Schiebout , simply because she was not an authorized signer on the account, possessed a conscious aware ness that the checks would not be paid when presented. Any such claimed knowledge by Schiebout clashes with the reality that the bank did in fact pay each of the checks. T h at the bank paid the
checks when presented is not determinative o n the issue of S chiebout’s knowledge . But there was no other sufficient evidence presented from
which to conclude Schiebout knew

— in this case, contrary to fact

— that the bank would refuse payment when she presented the checks. The
statements Schiebout made that the check s were “her husband’s” or that she “grabbed the wrong checkbook” at best show knowledge she lacked authorization on the account, not that she knew the bank wouldn’t pay
the check s when she presented them

. Indeed, her experience would have provided her with knowledge going the other direction

— that the bank always paid the checks when she presented them. In particular, her two experiences at Wal

- Mart, in which the check was electronically submitted through t he ACH payment process as she stood by the cashier’s stand, reasonably would have confirmed for10 her the bank’s practice of paying each check when presented . Businesses that accepted two other checks presented at trial (but that were not among
the seven ch ecks considered by the jury as charged) likewise processed
the checks as ACH transfers. Section 714.1(6) includes two presumptions establishing a defendant’s knowledge, but neither applies in this case. Subsections 714.1(6)( a ) and ( b ) apply only when “t he drawee of such instrument has refused payment.” Iowa Code § 714.1(6)( a )

– ( b ). The drawee, American State Bank, did not refuse payment on any of the seven checks. By the plain language of these subsections, as applied to the facts of this case, these p resumptions are not triggered. The State correctly cites our prior observation that the Iowa theft statute is “modeled after the Model Penal Code, with slight variation.”
State v. Donaldson , 663 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Iowa 2003). But Iowa Code section 714.1( 6) and the associated Model Penal Code section 224.5 addressing theft by bad checks differ in a manner significant in this case

. Unlike Iowa’s theft statute, the Model Penal Code states a person is presumed to know that the check would not be paid “if .

. . the issuer had
no account with the drawee at the time the check or order was issued.” Model Penal Code § 224.5 (Am. Law Inst. 1980) . But the absence of this language in Iowa Code section 714.1(6) means the district court could n’t presume Schiebout kn ew the checks would n’ t be paid merely because the
bank account did n’t belong to her. We’ re bound by the language of the statute as enacted, not by the unenacted language of the Model Penal
Code. See , e.g. , State v. Isaac , 756 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Iowa 2008) (finding
Iowa Code section 709.9 (2005) narrower than its associated Model Penal Code provision). We interpret and apply statutes using “the legislature’s chosen statutory language, ‘not what it should or might have said.’ ” State11

v. Ross , 941 N.W.2d 341 , 346 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div. , 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004)). We can ’ t exercise legislative power to amend the Iowa Code “in the guise of interpretation

. ” In re Det. of Geltz , 840 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Iowa 2013).
As we’ ve n oted previously, Iowa Code section 714.1 prescribes ten different ways a person can commit theft. Nall , 894 N.W.2d at 518

– 19 (providing historical background on Iowa’s theft statutes). That there might be another subsection of Iowa’s theft statute arguably better suited
to the facts of this case isn’t before us. We’ ve previously noted Iowa’s theft

by

- check statute (section 714.1(6)) deals with “a common means of theft (bad checks) with potentially difficult quest ions of proof,” while the theft

by

- d eception statute (section 714.1(3)) “is meant as a catch

- all crime to encompass the full and ever changing varieties of deception.” Hogrefe , 557 N.W.2d at 8 78. As to these two statutes, “[f]actual scenarios may overlap, but the legal schemes in which the y are situated are complementary rather
than redundant.” Id. We hold the district court erred in denying Schiebout’s motion for acquittal and , therefore , vacate the court of appeals decision and reverse the district court’s judgment of conviction wi th i nstructions that the charges be dismissed. See Nall , 894 N.W.2d at 524

– 25 ; Isaac , 756 N.W.2d
at 821. Concerning the district court’s restitution order charging Schiebout for medical aid pursuant to Iowa Code section 356.7, a prisoner may be charged for such costs only if “convicted of a criminal offense or sentenced for contempt of court for violation of a domestic abuse order.” Iowa Code section 356.7(1) (2015)

. With Schiebout’s conviction vacated, she cannot
be held liable under section 356.7 for the se charges. See id. ; see also Iowa
Code § 910.2(1) (requiring “judgment of conviction” for a restitution order12 to issue); State v. Dudley , 766 N.W.2d 606, 614 (Iowa 2009) (restitution procedures and standards of chapter 910 do not apply to an acquitted defendant). The district court’s restitution order is thus sim ilarly vacated.
IV. Conclusion. For these reasons, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand for an order dismissing the case

. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DIST R ICT COURT
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR DISMISSAL
. All justices concur except Oxl ey and McDonald, JJ., who dissent.13

#18

– 0081, State v. Schiebout OXLEY, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. This case reaches us on appeal from the district court’s denial of
Schiebout’s motion for judgment of acquittal, which is the means by which we consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. “The principles governing our review of a district court’s denial of a criminal defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal are wel l

- established.” State v. Serrato , 787 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 2010). Where the defendant does not challenge the jury instructions, those instructions become law of the case and define the law against which the evidence is measured. See State v. Canal , 773 N.W.2d 528, 530

– 31 (Iowa 2009). The majority gives lip service to this standard, but only after first providing its interpretation of Iowa Code section 714.1(6) (2015), an issue not before us since Schiebout did not challenge the jury instructions below. Element 4 of Jury Instruction No. 14, the marshalling instruction, required the state to prove “[t]he Defendant knew at the time she gave the checks to local organizations or businesses that they would not be paid by
the bank because the Defendant was not an authorized signer on the

account .” (Emphasis added.) Jury Instruction No. 13 added a “conscious awareness” definition to the knowledge element, explaining, For the defendant to know something means she had a conscious awareness that at the time s he gave the checks to the various businesses they would not be paid by the bank because the defendant was not an authorized signer on the account on which the checks were drawn. (Emphasis added.) In considering a sufficiency challenge, we “consider all of the record evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State, including all14 reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.” State
v. Thomas , 847 N.W.2d 438, 442 (Iowa 2014) (quoting State v. Sanford , 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012)). “[T]he evidence must raise a fair inference of guilt and do more than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture.” State v. Kern , 831 N.W.2d 149, 158 (Iowa 2013) (quoting State
v. Webb , 648 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2002)). “Importantly, ‘[j]urors ar e not expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observation and experience of the affairs of life, but may give effect to such inferences as common knowledge or their personal observation and experience may reasonably draw from the
fac ts directly proved.’ ” State v. Stevens , 719 N.W.2d 547, 552 (Iowa 2006) (quoting State v. Manning , 224 N.W.2d 232, 236 (Iowa 1974) (affirming conviction against challenge to sufficiency of evidence to establish intent element of crime)). “Knowledge .

. . may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and in a case like this that is usually necessary.” State v.
Coburn , 244 N.W.2d 560, 563 (Iowa 1976) (quoting People v. Adams , 340 P.2d 677, 679 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)) (addressing “[k]nowledge of
lack of suf ficient funds and intent to defraud” under predecessor statute to section 714.1(6) and concluding “[t]he combined effect of the checks placed in evidence and the other testimony was to show inferentially the existence of such knowledge and intent” (quoting Adams , 340 P.2d at 679)). Using these standards to measure the evidence against the instructions provided to the jury, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to make the fair inference that Schiebout knew she was not an authorized signer on the Duc ks Unlimited account and that she had a
conscious awareness when she wrote the checks that the bank would not
cover the checks because of that fact. Kamie and Matthew Schiebout15 separated in April 2015, and Kamie moved out of their shared home around July. Their divorce was final on November 29. Matthew closed their joint checking account in April, which upset Kamie when she learned the account was closed because Matthew was not keeping up on his support obligations. After Matthew opened an individual ac count, and while they were still married, Kamie snuck checks out of the back of his checkbook and wrote one or two checks. Although Matthew did not challenge her actions, he was careful not to allow her access to his checkbook again. Kamie did not begin using the Ducks Unlimited checks until at or
around the time their divorce was final in late November. She wrote at least two checks prior to presenting the first check to Wal

- Mart that was processed as an ACH transaction. Unlike the individual account Matthew opened following their separation, the Ducks Unlimited checking account was owned by a nonprofit entity with which Kamie had no relationship. As the treasurer, Matthew never used the Ducks Unlimited checkbook for personal expenses, only to cover e xpenses related to an auction the organization hosted each year. The Ducks Unlimited checkbook was not on Matthew’s dresser or in his pants pocket; Kamie had to sneak the checks out of storage in the basement of the house she no longer lived in.
Based on the evidence that the checks she wrote were numbered at least 150 checks from the last properly authorized check, the jury could have found she went to lengths to avoid getting caught taking a book of checks
out of the bottom of the box.
Kamie’s knowled ge that the bank would not pay checks she wrote as an unauthorized signer on the Ducks Unlimited account is also evidenced by the stories she told about her use of the checks. When questioned by the clerk at Schweser’s clothing store about using a Ducks16

U nlimited check, Kamie told the clerk it was her husband’s check

— clearly not true both because she was no longer married to Matthew and the account was not “his” account but owned by a nonprofit for which Matthew previously served as the treasurer. She tol d a different story to the bank’s vice president when she said she mistakenly “grabbed the wrong
checkbook”

— a checkbook that she had to sneak out of storage in the
basement. From these “direct facts,” the jury was well within its province to rely
on its common knowledge and experience and reasonably infer that Kamie
knew she was not authorized to write the Ducks Unlimited checks and she was consciously aware that would cause the bank not to pay them when presented to the bank. See Stevens , 719 N.W.2d at 552; see also Delay

Wilson v. State , 264 P.3d 375, 377 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011) (concluding the “evidence supported a reasonable conclusion by a jury that Delay

- Wilson had not merely made a mistake when she issued the two checks .

. . , but
knew that there w ere insufficient funds in her accounts to pay the checks” to support conviction under statute criminalizing issuance of “a check knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee” (second quote Alaska Stat. § 11.46.280(a) (2008)). That there is other evid ence from which the jury could have found differently does not mean the jury’s verdict was unsupported by sufficient evidence. The majority’s opinion effectively requires nonpayment of the check by the bank as an element of the offense of theft by check under
section 714.1(6). Whether or not nonpayment is required by the statute is not properly before us on a sufficiency review where the instructions were unchallenged and did not require nonpayment as an element. Nonetheless, the majority defines the st atute as requiring the State to prove: “ ‘when the person . . . gives any check’ the person ‘knows’ the check17 ‘will not be paid when presented.’ ” The majority then concludes that standard is not met here, explaining “there was no other sufficient
evidenc e presented from which to conclude Schiebout knew

— in this case, contrary to fact

— that the bank would refuse payment when she presented the checks.” By starting with the language of the statute and its interpretation of that language to focus on the “perso n ‘know[ing]’ the check ‘will not be paid when presented,’ ” the majority sets up an impossible evidentiary standard requiring the State to prove knowledge of a future event. Yet our cases consistently measure knowledge from the defendant’s perspective at the time the check is issued, not what will happen in the future. See State v. Hogrefe , 557 N.W.2d 871, 879 (Iowa 1996) (reconciling discrepancies between theft by deception and theft by check in prior cases and holding “criminal liability should attach
if at the time the defendant issued the check , the defendant (1) never had the intention to pay the check or (2) knew he or she would not be able to pay it”); see also State v. Rojas

- Cardona , 503 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Iowa 1993) (affirming conviction based on e vidence from which “a jury could find that
at the time he tendered the check

. . . , [defendant] knew his account was closed[; h]e therefore knew the check was worthless and would never be paid by the bank” (emphasis added)), overruled on other grounds by Hogrefe , 557 N.W.2d 871. The majority also goes astray relying on the statutory inferences allowed when a bank in fact refuses payment of a check in certain circumstances, see Iowa Code § 714.1(6)( a )

– ( b ), where no such inferences were addressed in the ju ry instructions. The statutory inferences are evidentiary standards, not elements of the crime. See Coburn , 244 N.W.2d at 562 (discussing the predecessor to section 714.1(6) and explaining that “the 10 day ‘make good’ notice provision in [Iowa] Code [sec tion] 713.4 is18 merely a rule of evidence, not an element of a [section] 713.3 offense”). The fact that section 714.1(6) includes statutory inferences does not preclude use of the theft by check statute when the checks are ultimately cashed by the bank, as the majority effectively holds. It just means the state must prove the requisite criminal intent without the benefit of the statutory inferences. When the statutory inferences of section 714.1(6) are unavailable, “[k]nowledge . . . , like any other fact , may [still] be proved by
circumstantial evidence . . . .” Id. at 563 (quoting Adams , 340 P.2d at 679). Finally, the majority’s reliance on the statutory language discounts the language used in the instructions. Jury Instruction No. 13 and No. 14 follow the phrase “would not be paid by the bank” with the dependent clause “because the defendant was not an authorized signer on the account,” putting the focus on the reason the checks would not be paid.
Commentators have described the know ledge element as satisfied “where the party [issuing the check] knows that the check will be dishonored or does not have any reasonable grounds for believing that the check will be paid.” 35 C.J.S. False Pretenses § 42 (2020) (emphasis added). This is consistent with our prior cases measuring knowledge from the defendant’s perspective at the time the check is issued. See Hogrefe , 557 N.W.2d at 879; Rojas

- Cardona , 503 N.W.2d at 595; State v. James , 310 N.W.2d 197,
200

– 01 (Iowa 1981) (describing the “guilty knowledge,” or mens rea, required to violate section 714.1(6) as “obtaining . . . something of value through the use of a check which the perpetrator knows is worthless” (quoting State v. Smith , 300 N.W.2d 90, 92

– 93 (Iowa 198 1))), overruled on other grounds by Hogrefe , 557 N.W.2d 871. It is also how the jury apparently understood the instructions, an understanding that was supported by the evidence.19 I do not disagree with the majority’s struggle with the ambiguous language of the statute. But I do disagree with the majority’s efforts to interpret the statute where that issue is not before us. I respectfully dissent. McDonald, J., joins this dissent.