Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-1803 | January 30, 2020 Page 1 of 13

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark K. Leeman

Logansport, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Benjamin J. Shoptaw

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of B.B., A Child 

Alleged to be a Delinquent,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

January 30, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JV-1803

Appeal from the Fulton Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Arthur Christopher 

Lee, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

25C01-1804-JD-79

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] B.B., a minor, appeals his adjudication as a delinquent for an act that would be 

considered intimidation if committed by an adult, a Level 6 felony. We affirm. 
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Issue

[2] B.B. raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether there was sufficient 

evidence to adjudicate B.B. as a delinquent for an act that would be considered 

intimidation if committed by an adult, a Level 6 felony. 

Facts

[3] B.B. spent a significant amount of time with his friend R.A., who was a tenth 

grader at Rochester High School (the “high school”) in 2018. The pair had 

been close friends for a long time, and R.A. was practically a member of B.B.’s 

family. In 2018, B.B. communicated with R.A.—in person, on the phone, and 

over Snapchat—about B.B.’s desire to shoot students at the high school. B.B. 

did not attend the high school; he was homeschooled.1

 

[4] Initially, R.A. believed B.B. was joking about the shooting; however, in March 

2018, R.A. began taking the statements seriously after B.B. made repeated 

statements about his plan to shoot students, B.B.’s tone became more serious,

and B.B. had access to an assault rifle in his house. R.A. knew this assault rifle 

was in B.B.’s home because B.B. and R.A. previously shot the assault rifle in 

B.B.’s yard.2

 Additionally, one weekend, B.B. sent R.A. a picture of the assault 

rifle and said: “[d]on’t come to school tomorrow.” Tr. Vol. II p. 44. One day 

at B.B.’s house, B.B. showed R.A. a section of notes on B.B.’s phone that B.B. 

1 According to B.B.’s mother, B.B. was homeschooled because B.B. has “anxiety issues” and has “thrived 

much better at homeschool than he did in the large environment.” Tr. Vol. II p. 29. 

2 At an earlier hearing, B.B.’s mother disputed that B.B. had access to this weapon. 
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described as a “manifesto,” which described B.B.’s plan to shoot students at the 

high school. Id. R.A. never read the “manifesto” and never kept any of the 

messages B.B. sent to him over Snapchat or to R.A.’s phone. 

[5] R.A. suspected the shooting would occur on April 20, 2018, which was the 

anniversary of the Columbine High School shooting. According to R.A., B.B. 

planned to get on the school bus, enter the high school, hide in a bathroom until 

classes began, and then begin shooting. Out of fear that B.B. may actually go 

through with the attack, R.A. told other students at the high school about B.B.’s 

threats; however, he did not notify school administrators or the police. 

Subsequently, the high school administrators became aware of the threats and

contacted local law enforcement. Beginning April 20, 2018, the high school 

rerouted the school bus stops to prevent the bus from passing B.B.’s residence, 

limited the high school entrance to one entry point, and implemented 

additional security as a result of B.B.’s threats. Many students did not attend 

the high school for several days. 

[6] Officer Matt Campbell, with the Rochester City Police Department, led the 

investigation into B.B.’s statements and actions. B.B. was interviewed with his 

mother present, and Officer Campbell obtained consent to search B.B.’s cell 

phone. Officer Campbell obtained assistance from Detective Travis Heishman, 

with the Fulton County Sheriff’s Office, to extract information from the phone. 
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Officers located the “manifesto” that R.A. described3 and the notes that 

contained ingredients required for a “flash powder,” which is an explosive, 

along with photographs, and reference to writings attributed to the shooters in 

the Columbine High School attack. Id. at 64, 66. The references to the 

Columbine High School shooters were transmitted to another person via text 

message from B.B.’s phone; however, the recipient of the text message was 

never identified during the proceedings. 

[7] The photos on B.B.’s phone included photographs of the assault rifle and of 

B.B. holding the assault rifle. The “manifesto” on B.B.’s phone included 

statements indicating that B.B. planned to harm others, such as: “I’m not doing 

this because I’m mad at anyone, it’s just that suicide is overrated, if you want to 

die take others with you,” and “[s]ometimes I wonder why I want to shoot up 

the school but then I remember all of the hatred and loneliness I feel everyday, 

knowing nobody.” State’s Ex. 2.

[8] On April 20, 2018, the State filed a petition alleging that B.B. was a delinquent 

child for committing an act that would be considered intimidation if committed 

by an adult, a Level 6 felony. The specific allegations in the petition for 

delinquency were as follows: 

Between January 2018 and April 18, 2018, [B.B.] did 

communicate a threat to [R.A.] with the intent of interfering with 

3 On B.B.’s phone, the notes were kept under the heading, “[J]ournal.” Tr. Vol. II p. 71. This document also 

described B.B.’s depression, for which he was prescribed medication. 
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the occupancy of Rochester High School, to wit: by sending a

threat about bringing guns to school and shooting people, which 

act constitutes the Level 6 Felony of Intimidation if committed 

by an adult, pursuant to IC 35-45-2-1(a)(3)(B)([i]) and (b)(1)(A).

Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 11. 

[9] The juvenile court held a fact finding hearing on June 6, 2019. Witnesses 

testified to the foregoing facts. Jana Vance, superintendent of Rochester 

Community Schools, testified that B.B.’s threats interfered with school

attendance. On June 17, 2019, the trial court entered an order adjudicating 

B.B. a delinquent for committing an act that would be intimidation if 

committed by an adult, a Level 6 felony. On July 22, 2019, the juvenile court 

proceeded to disposition and ordered B.B. to serve sixty days, suspended, in 

secure detention at Kinsey Youth Center. B.B. was placed on probation until 

January 12, 2020. B.B. now appeals his adjudication. 

Analysis

[10] B.B. argues the evidence was insufficient to support his adjudication as a 

delinquent for an act that would be considered intimidation, a Level 6 felony,

because the State failed to prove that B.B. knew or had reason to know that his 

statements regarding the planned shootings would be communicated to any 

victims. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile 

adjudication, “we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility.” 

B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018) (citing K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 

538, 543 (Ind. 2006)). “We consider only the evidence favorable to the 
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judgment and the reasonable inferences supporting it.” Id. “We will not 

disturb the adjudication if there exists substantive evidence of probative value to 

establish every material element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

E.H. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 681, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied (citations 

omitted). 

[11] Indiana’s intimidation statute includes, in relevant part: 

(a) A person who communicates a threat with the intent:

(1) that another person engage in conduct against the other 

person’s will; [(“Subsection 1”)]

(2) that another person be placed in fear of retaliation for a 

prior lawful act; [(“Subsection 2”)]

(3) of:

(A) causing:

(i) a dwelling, a building, or other structure; 

or

(ii) a vehicle;

to be evacuated; or

(B) interfering with the occupancy of:

(i) a dwelling, building, or other structure; or
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(ii) a vehicle; or [(“Subsection 3”)] 

(4) that another person be placed in fear that the threat will 

be carried out, if the threat is a threat described in:

(A) subsection (d)(1) through (d)(5); or

(B) subsection (d)(7) through (d)(8); [(“Subsection 

4”)]

commits intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor.

Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a). 

[12] B.B. was alleged to be a delinquent child pursuant to Subsection 3, and 

specifically, that B.B. interfered with the occupancy of the high school. See Ind. 

Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(3)(B)(i). B.B.’s case was elevated to a Level 6 felony 

because B.B.’s threat was “to commit a forcible felony.” Ind. Code § 35-45-2-

1(b)(1)(A). 

[13] The statute defines “threat” as follows: 

“Threat” means an expression, by words or action, of an 

intention to: 

(1) unlawfully injure the person threatened or another 

person, or damage property; 

(2) unlawfully subject a person to physical confinement or 

restraint; 
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(3) commit a crime; 

(4) unlawfully withhold official action, or cause such 

withholding; 

(5) unlawfully withhold testimony or information with 

respect to another person’s legal claim or defense, except 

for a reasonable claim or witness fees or expenses; 

(6) expose the person threatened to hatred, contempt, 

disgrace, or ridicule; 

(7) falsely harm the credit or business reputation of the 

person threatened; or 

(8) cause the evacuation of a dwelling, a building, another 

structure, or a vehicle. 

Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(d). 

[14] “Whether a statement is a threat is an objective question for the trier of fact.” 

Newell v. State, 7 N.E.3d 367, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “A 

defendant’s intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone, and 

knowledge and intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each 

case.” Chastain v. State, 58 N.E.3d 235, 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied

(citations omitted). 

[15] B.B.’s specific argument is that the evidence was insufficient because the State 

failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that B.B. knew or reasonably should 
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have known his plans to shoot students at the high school would be 

communicated to the potential victims. B.B.’s argument is essentially that B.B. 

did not intend his message to be repeated to anyone except R.A., and because 

there is no evidence or indication that B.B. sought to shoot R.A., B.B. did not 

threaten victims as B.B. claims the statute requires. See Appellant’s Br. p. 15. 

[16] In support of his argument, B.B. cites J.T. v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1119 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1999). In J.T., a fifteen-year-old high school student typed a document,

which included statements that “someone shall choose to die” on a particular 

day and identified a specific student at J.T.’s high school in the threat. J.T., 718 

N.E.2d at 1121. J.T. printed the document on a printer at the school library, 

and J.T. intended a second student, who was not the student targeted in the 

document, to pick up the document and deliver it to J.T.; instead, the document 

was intercepted by the school librarian. The librarian turned the document in 

to the assistant principal, who notified law enforcement. After an investigation, 

J.T. was accused of being a delinquent, and the charging information alleged

that J.T. “did communicate a threat to commit a forcible felony to [the student], 

with the intent that [the student] be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior 

lawful act. . . .” Id. at 1122. Accordingly, J.T. was alleged to be a delinquent 

child under Subsection 2. 

[17] In vacating J.T.’s adjudication, our Court found that J.T. did not know or have 

good reason to know the document would reach the specific student identified 

in the document. In doing so, our Court distinguished J.T.’s case from Ajabu v. 

State, 677 N.E.2d 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied, as follows: 
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In [Ajabu], this court construed the phrase “communicates a 

threat to another person” in the intimidation statute. There, the 

defendant had made threats through the print, radio and 

television media. The defendant sought reversal of his 

convictions for intimidation and argued that the person alleged to 

be threatened must be present for the threat to be communicated 

under the statute. We recognized that the definition of 

“communicate” requires that a person make a thing known or 

transmit information to another, and that the text of the 

intimidation statute does not limit the phrase “communicates a 

threat to another person” to only those threats made directly to 

or in the presence of the threatened party. Thus, we decided that 

communication can be indirect, and we affirmed the conviction 

because the defendant had used means of communication that he 

“knew or had good reason to believe would reach” the victims. 

J.T., 718 N.E.2d at 1123 (citations omitted). 

[18] The State argues J.T. is distinguishable because J.T. was alleged to be a 

delinquent child for committing an act that would be considered intimidation if 

committed by an adult under Subsection 2; the threat in B.B.’s case, however, 

was charged under Subsection 3. We agree with the State on this point. 

Reading the plain language of the statute, it is clear that the legislature intended 

that threats under Subsections 1 and 2 must be communicated4 to a specific 

victim, while Subsection 3 does not require the communication of the threat to 

a specific victim. See Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(1) (Subsection 1) (requiring that 

a person communicate a threat with the intent “that the other person engage in 

4 As our cases have held, communication of a threat may be made directly to the victim, or indirectly, such as 

through a news reporter. See Ajabu, 677 N.E.2d at 1043. 
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conduct against the other person’s will”); see also Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(2)

(Subsection 2) (requiring that a person communicate a threat with the intent 

“that another person be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act”). 

[19] B.B.’s case is more similar to some of the facts in E.B. v. State, 89 N.E.3d 1087 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2017). E.B., a high school student, who was displeased with 

recent discipline he received at school, sent a text message to another student 

warning the second student to wear red the following Tuesday because E.B. 

“intended to shoot anybody who wasn’t wearing red.” E.B., 89 N.E.3d at 1089

(internal quotations omitted). E.B. also communicated to a third student a 

similar warning and told the third student to “tell the ones that he cares about.” 

Id. (citations omitted). E.B.’s sister overheard E.B. speaking on the phone 

regarding E.B.’s plan to shoot the assistant principal based on E.B.’s displeasure 

with his recent discipline. Students shared this information with the school 

administrators, and law enforcement was notified. 

[20] After an investigation, the State alleged that E.B. was a delinquent child for 

committing two separate intimidation offenses: Count I related to E.B.’s 

specific threat against the assistant principal, pursuant to Subsection 1; and 

Count II related to E.B.’s communication for “interfering with the occupancy 

of the school” by sending a text message to a student that he would shoot 

anyone not wearing red, pursuant to Subsection 3. Id. at 1090. Our Court 

found that, as to the threats against the assistant principal, no evidence existed

of the communicated threat to the assistant principal and, thus, the State could 

not prove intimidation under Subsection 1 because E.B. did not place the 
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assistant principal “in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act.” Id. at 1091. On 

the other hand, as to the second count under Subsection 3, our Court found 

ample evidence that E.B. intended to interfere with the occupancy of the school 

when E.B. told students to wear red and told others to share these instructions. 

Our Court found that “it should have been foreseeable to E.B. that news of 

E.B.’s plan would spread throughout the school. Word did spread, and after 

the school informed parents about the incident, absenteeism more than doubled 

the following day.” Id. at 1093. 

[21] As in E.B., B.B.’s communication to R.A. evidenced B.B.’s threat to interfere 

with the occupancy of the school pursuant to Subsection 3.

5

 B.B. argues that 

R.A. was not an intended victim, and accordingly, no threat was 

communicated. At a minimum, B.B.’s intent was that R.A. would not attend 

school to avoid the shooting, and thus, B.B. intended to interfere with the 

occupancy of the school. R.A. ultimately shared B.B.’s threats, which resulted 

in significant absences from school. 

[22] Regardless, the State argues, and we agree, that B.B. should have known or had

good reason to know that his threats to shoot the students at the high school 

would be communicated to others and the high school administration. B.B. 

was not discreet in his plans to kill persons at the high school, evidenced by: 

B.B.’s repeated statements to R.A., B.B.’s snapchats to R.A. regarding the 

5 B.B. does not challenge any other element of the offense. 
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same, and B.B. showing the manifesto to R.A. Unless R.A. was a coconspirator in the attack, and no such argument has been made, a reasonable 

fact finder could conclude that B.B. knew or should have known that R.A. 

would report a plan of mass murder to other students at the high school. R.A. 

behaved in a predictable way when he exposed B.B.’s plans.

[23] The State presented sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could 

conclude B.B. committed intimidation to interfere with the occupancy of the 

high school. 

Conclusion

[24] The evidence was sufficient to adjudicate B.B. a delinquent child for an act that 

would be considered intimidation if committed by an adult, a Level 6 felony. 

We affirm. 

[25] Affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.