alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Processing Domain-Specific Language with

Hybrid Technologies

Jacob Collard – jacob.collard@nist.gov

April 15, 2021

NIST Information Technology Lab
Domain-Specific Concepts

A Technical Abstract (Davis et al 2019)

A standard approach to evaluating language models analyzes

how models assign probabilities to valid versus invalid

syntactic constructions (i.e. is a grammatical sentence more

probable than an ungrammatical sentence). Our work uses

ambiguous relative clause attachment to extend such

evaluations to cases of multiple simultaneous valid

interpretations.

1
Domain-Specific Concepts

A Technical Abstract (Davis et al 2019)

A standard approach to evaluating language models analyzes

how models assign probabilities to valid versus invalid

syntactic constructions (i.e. is a grammatical sentence more

probable than an ungrammatical sentence). Our work uses

ambiguous relative clause attachment to extend such

evaluations to cases of multiple simultaneous valid

interpretations.

1
Goals and Challenges

Goals

• Identify concepts from domain-specific texts

• Identify relations between concepts

• Apply concepts and their relations to practical problems

2
Goals and Challenges

Goals

• Identify concepts from domain-specific texts

• Identify relations between concepts

• Apply concepts and their relations to practical problems

Challenges

• Symbolic processing is often not robust

• Neural networks are hard to configure

2
General Approach

Data Syntax

Analysis Concepts

Neural Parser

Rule-based normalization

Data organization

3
Parsing and Normalization

<

a >

standard <

approach <

to >

evaluating >

language models

A standard approach to evaluating language models

Standard approaches to language model evaluation

Standard language model evaluation approaches

Approaches to evaluating standard language models

:3:

standard :2:

:1:

evaluate :0:

language model

approach

standard:3:evaluate:1:language:0:model:2:approach

4
Semantic Structure

standard :3: evaluate :1: language :0: model :2: approach

5
Taxonomy

• language model

• neural language model

• masked language model

• causal language model

• large language model

• sentence

• grammatical sentence

• ungrammatical sentence

• interrogative sentence

6
Identifying Relations

nsubj

compound

language models

iobj

dobj

assign probabilities

amod

syntactic constructions

(language models, assign probabilities, syntactic

constructions)

7
Future Work

• Concepts identified in this way can be combined with topic

models and language models

• User interfaces for exploring concepts and relations are

critical

• Evaluation is also critical – and difficult

• Users and developers can curate results

• Combining neural and symbolic models provides both

robustness and power

8
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          69,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               21,767,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   520,000
<INVENTORY>                                 26,092,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            51,349,000
<PP&E>                                      18,098,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               9,169,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             124,436,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       37,477,000
<BONDS>                                    101,994,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  26,946,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               124,436,000
<SALES>                                     47,180,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            47,180,000
<CGS>                                       37,167,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               37,167,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             5,304,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           3,017,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,692,000
<INCOME-TAX>                                   688,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,004,000
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,004,000
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
# t
taitSin on .„ J.

Parraguirre Pickering on its petition for writ relief. In the stay motion, which this court subsequently denied, petitioner presented issues and a summary of arguments pertaining to its request for writ relief. Thus, although petitioner's only filing in this court was the July 25 emergency stay motion, it appears that the motion was intended as a combined stay motion/writ petition. In seeking writ relief, petitioner asserts that because the district court had not entered a written order denying its request for a preliminary injunction, there was no order on which to base an appeal. Petitioner thus appears to argue that given the lack of a written, appealable order, a petition for writ relief is the appropriate method to seek this court's review of the district court's oral ruling denying the preliminary injunction. Petitioner's reasoning is flawed, 

### see NRAP 3A(b)(3) (providing that an order refusing to grant an injunction is substantively appealable); 

### Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008) (explaining that writ relief is typically not available when the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law); 

### Rust v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 103 Nev. 686, 689, 747 P.2d 1380, 1382 (1987) (explaining that a district court's oral ruling is ineffective for any purpose), and as petitioner has an adequate remedy in the form of an appeal from any final, appealable written order, we deny the petition for writ relief.

It is so ORDERED.

Saitta

SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA 2
(0) 1947A

### cc: Hon. Timothy C. Williams, District Judge Brandon L. Phillips, Attorney At Law, PLLC Malcolm Cisneros/Irvine CA Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 

### 3
(0) 1947A 94e147
```

[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3917 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

  2d Session
                                H. R. 3917

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 30, 2004

  Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental 
                                Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
  at 695 Marconi Boulevard in Copiague, New York, as the ``Maxine S. 
                  Postal United States Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The facility of the United States Postal Service located at 695 
Marconi Boulevard in Copiague, New York, shall be known and designated 
as the ``Maxine S. Postal United States Post Office''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the facility referred to in section 1 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Maxine S. Postal United 
States Post Office''.

            Passed the House of Representatives March 29, 2004.

            Attest:

                                                 JEFF TRANDAHL,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-6171

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LARRY JUNIOR COPELAND, a/k/a La-la,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Wilmington. James C. Dever III, Chief District Judge. (7:10-cr-00066-D-1; 7:14-cv00225-D)

Submitted: September 24, 2018 Decided: October 3, 2018

Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Larry Junior Copeland, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Larry Junior Copeland seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on 

his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice 

or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A 

certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable 

jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on 

procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Copeland has not 

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and 

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument 

would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
10234.

#### RANDALL *v.*THE STATE.

Decided April 12, 1919.

The evidence being insufficient to support the verdict of guilty, the trial judge erred in overruling the motion for new trial.

Conviction of vagrancy; from Glascock superior court-r Judge Walker. October 35, 1918.

*J. C. Newsome,*for plaintiff in error.

*R. C. Norman, solicitor-general,*contra.

Stephens, J.

Aaron Eandall was convicted in the superior court of Glascock county under an indictment charging vagrancy. The date named in the indictment was August 15,1918. The indictment contained several counts; the jury found the defendant guilty only on the second count, which specifically charged' the defendant with the offense of vagrancy, for that he did on the date and in the county named lead an idle, immoral, profligate life, having no property to support him and being able to work, and failing and refusing to work, did not work, etc.

The evidence on behalf of the State showed, briefly, that during the year 1917 the defendant had made a good crop,—some thirteen bales of cotton and 150 bushels of com, and, after paying his debts, had money sufficient to purchase an. automobile, fifty dollars in cash, and some corn. Sometime after October, 1917, he moved from Glasqhck county to Jefferson county, and there remained until sometime in May, 1918, when he returned to his father’s house in Glascock county, where he remained for two or three weeks, during which time, the State’s witnesses testified, they did not see him do any work, although he. might have worked. He was arrested at his father’s house and carried back to Jefferson county, and there remained until sometime in July, 1918, when he again returned *540to Glascock county, where he was afterwards prosecuted for this offense. Evidence on behalf of the defendant, which was uncontradicted in any particular, showed that after he moved back to Glascock county, in July, he went to work for a Mr. Coxwell and worked continuously during that month, except two or three days. There was further positive evidence on behalf of the defendant showing that he did work the greater part of the time when he was in Glascock county. His employer, Mr. Coxwell, testified positively to this. This case falls squarely under the rulings laid down in the eases of *Hartman*v. *State,*119 *Ga.*427 (46 S. E. 628), and *Elders*v. *State,*17 *Ga. App.*742 (88 S. E. 414).

The learned trial judge erred in-overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
**EXHIBIT32**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

The certifications set forth below are hereby submitted to theSecurities and Exchange Commission pursuant to, and solely for the purpose ofcomplying with, Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United StatesCode in connection with the filing on the date hereof with the Securities andExchange Commission of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of MAIRHoldings, Inc. and subsidiaries (the “Company”) for the quarter endedSeptember 30, 2004 (the “Report”).

 

Each of the undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer and ChiefFinancial Officer, respectively, of the Company, hereby certifies that, as ofthe end of the period covered by the Report:

 

1.               Such Report fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.               The information contained in the Report fairlypresents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results ofoperations of the Company.

 

 
| /s/ PAUL F. FOLEY |
|-------------------|

 

Paul F. Foley

President and Chief Executive Officer

November 15, 2004

 

 
| /s/ ROBERT E.  WEIL |
|---------------------|

 

Robert E. Weil

Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer

November 15, 2004

 

----
9838.

#### Humphrey *v.*The State.

Decided November 7, 1918.

Conviction of shooting at another; from Quitman superior court —Judge Worrill. April 20, 1918.

*Charles W. Worrill,*for plaintiff in error.

*B. T. Castellow, solicitor-general, R. R. Arnold,*contra.

Harwell, J.

Only a question of fact is involved in this case. Trouble arose between two small boys—one fourteen and the other seven years of age—over a can of fish-bait and some peanuts. On the ground near them lay a loaded shotgun belonging to a third child, aged twelve. The oldest boy seized the gun, pointed it at the seven-year-old child, and discharged it in his face, wounding him and destroying one of his eyes. Upon the trial for assault with intent to murder a verdict of “shooting at another,” with a recommendation to mercy, was returned; the jury declining to believe the defendant’s statement. The verdict was amply authorized by the evidence, and this court can not interfere.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 574 Engrossed in House (EH)]

                 In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

                                                       October 6, 1998.
    Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to 
consider the conference report to accompany the bill (H.R. 4194) making 
appropriations for the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban 
Development, and for sundry independent agencies, boards, commissions, 
corporations, and offices for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1999, and for 
other purposes. All points of order against the conference report and against 
its consideration are waived. The conference report shall be considered as read.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
EXHIBIT 15.1
                         CONSENT OF DELOITTE AND TOUCHE

November 15, 1999

ESG Re Limited
Skandia International House
16 Church Street
Hamilton, Bermuda

We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the American
Insitutute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited interim financial
information of ESG Re Limited and subsidiaries for the periods ended September
30, 1999 and 1998, as indicated in our report dated November 8, 1999 because we
did not perform an audit, we expressed no opinion on that information.

We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in your
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 1999 is
incorporated by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-40107 on Forms S-8
and in Registration Statement No. 333-76983 of Form S-3.

We are also aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c) under
the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a part of the Registration
Statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or
certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.

/s/ Deloitte & Touche
-------------------------
Deloitte & Touche
Hamilton, Bermuda
<PAGE>
                                  EXHIBIT 31.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

I, Melvin L. Adams, President and Chief Executive Officer of Airxcel, Inc.,
certify that:

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Airxcel, Inc.;

2 Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:

a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that material
   information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
   subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
   particularly during the period in which this quarterly report is being
   prepared;

b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
   procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of this
   quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and

c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
   the disclosure controls and procedures based on our evaluation as of the
   Evaluation Date;

5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):

a) all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
   which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
   summarize and report financial data and have identified for the registrant's
   auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and

b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
   employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls;
   and

6. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this
quarterly report whether or not there were significant changes in internal
controls or in other factors that could significantly affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

Date:       November 5, 2003
     --------------------------------

By:         /s/ Melvin L. Adams
   ----------------------------------
Melvin L. Adams
President and Chief Executive Officer


                                       16
#### John A. Rain, etc., *v.*Kitty Sturgeon’s Admr.

Gifts — Causa Mortis — By Delivery — Consideration—Mere Promise Cannot be Enforced.

An individual can mate a gift by delivery but his mere promise to mate a gift can not be enforced, although in writing, unless there is a consideration for the promise. The fact that one named a child for another, where there is no relationship existing, is not sufficient to uphold a promise.

APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT.

February 22, 1872.

*576
      *Wilson, for appellant.*

*Merriott, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Peters :

The paper on its face shows that Mrs. Sturgeon, who signed it, never intended it to have the force and character of a valid promisory note in her life time.

It was not delivered to be enforced against her, but against her estate after her death.

An individual can make a gift of goods, chattels and money to another by delivery, but his promises to make *a.*gift of any of these things cannot be enforced. But if there is a consideration for the promise, it is not a gift. *Phelps vs. Phelps,*28 Barb. 121, 7. Johns; Repts. 25. *Pearsons vs. Pearson.*We then must inquire whether there is a sufficient consideration proved in this case to uphold the promise. It does not appear that there was any consideration for the promise except that appellant had named a daughter for Mrs. Sturgeon, but there was no relation between the parties, and no consideration of blood, therefore, existed to uphold the promise. It is then a mere promise to pay a sum of money as a mere gratuity or gift, and, although it is in writing, cannot be enforced. *Mark v. Clark & Wife,*11 B. Monroe 44. Judgment must be affirmed.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:20−cr−00495

Honorable Robert M. Dow Jr.

Terrance P Link

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Tuesday, January 18, 2022:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr: Telephone conference

held. Defense counsel's oral motion to waive Terrance Link's appearance for today's

hearing is granted. At the request and by agreement of the parties, a further telephone

conference is set for 5/17/2022 at 9:00 a.m. Joint status report is due no later than

5/12/2022. Christopher J. Stetler's motion to withdraw as counsel for the government [19]

is granted. Participants should use the Court';s toll−free, call−in number 877−336−1829,

passcode is 6963747. Without objection time is excluded to and including 5/17/2022 in

the interest of justice for the complexity of the case, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(7)(A) − (B) and United States vs. O'Connor, No. 09−2476 (7th Cir. Sept. 1,

2011). Emailed notice (cdh, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cr-00495 Document #: 20 Filed: 01/18/22 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:52