1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 20 CR 447 

v. ) Honorable Robert W. Gettleman 

 ) 

KOSHAUN HUGHES, ) 

 Defendant. ) 

DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 

QUASH ARREST AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 

 

Both of the exceptions to the warrant requirement raised by the government)

require officers to identify the facts and circumstances that raise to the level of 

probable cause (the automobile exception) or reasonable suspicion (protective search 

exception) that evidence of contraband would be found in the car or that the officers 

safety was in danger. 

The facts relied on by the government to establish probable cause, or for the

protective search, reasonable suspicion, are: Mr. Hughes’ motions to the back seat, 

and his nervousness when interacting with the officers. 

a. The automobile exception 

To start, based on Mr. Hughes’ argument in his original motion, Mr.

Hughes’s position is that there is a factual dispute as to whether the officers, 

namely Officer Sigartu, could see Mr. Hughes reach towards the back seat. It is 

further Mr. Hughes’ position that he was not asked about the presence of a firearm 

in the car before the search began. Even if the Court considers Mr. Hughes’ 
2

response that there was “weed” in the car in response to the officer asking whether 

there was contraband in the car, many steps of inference must be made before 

coming to a probable cause determination. 

Up to 30 grams of Marijuana is now legal to possess in the state of Illinois. 

With this in mind, officers would presumably need to present facts giving them 

probable cause to believe that Mr. Hughes had more than 30 grams of Marijuana in 

the car for it to be converted into “contraband”

In the case cited by the government in its response, United States v. Kizart, 

967 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2020), the defendant admitted to having smoked marijuana 

inside the car and the officers in that case smelled the odor of burnt marijuana upon 

approaching the car. Id. at 694. It was the smell of burnt marijuana that gave 

officers probable cause to search the car for evidence of criminal activity. Id. at 695. 

In Mr. Hughes’ case, none of the reports mention that the officers smelled burnt 

marijuana, which would have provided them with probable cause to search the car 

independent of the disputed facts here. Moreover, the fact that the officers failed to 

note even the smell of fresh marijuana would weigh against probable cause to 

believe that Mr. Hughes had violated 410 ILCS 705/10-35(a)(2)(D), prohibiting the 

illegal transportation of marijuana that is unsealed and inaccessible while the 

vehicle is moving. The scope of a search is defined by the object of the search and 

the places in which there is probable cause to believe it may be found.” United 

States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982). If the officers had smelled fresh 

marijuana, they could then reasonably believe that Mr. Hughes was transporting 
3

marijuana in an open, unsecured container. Absent that, Mr. Hughes’ admission 

that there was weed in the car is not determinative of illegal contraband in the car. 

The court is then left with Mr. Hughes’ nervousness during his interaction

with the officers and whether his nervousness supported probable cause to search 

the vehicle for contraband. The Seventh Circuit has stated that 

"nervousness alone is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause or 

reasonable suspicion." See e.g., United States v. Leiva, 821 F.3d 808, 818 (7th 

Cir. 2016). (emphasis added). 

b. Protective search.

The government’s argument that officers were entitled to search the car 

based on Mr. Hughes’ movements to that backseat are again the subject of 

dispute. If the court is not persuaded by the officers testimony of Mr. 

Hughes’ movements, the only other factor giving rise to reasonable suspicion 

to search the car for officer safety is Mr. Hughes’ nervousness. 

Again, Mr. Hughes’ nervousness is not enough to rise to the level of 

reasonable suspicion. See Huff v. Reichert, 744 F.3d 999, n.3 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(gathering cases from this circuit and others in which nervousness alone was 

insufficient to support reasonable suspicion: “nervousness is “of limited value 

in assessing reasonable suspicion” and/or is so common that it along cannot 

justify a Terry stop. United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 

2010); accord United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 40 (1st Cir. 
4

2005)(“Nervousness is a common and entirely natural reaction to police 

presence”); United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630-31 (6th Cir. 

2004)(“[A]lthough nervousness has been considered in finding reasonable 

suspicion in conjunction with other factors, it is an unreliable indicator, 

especially in the context of a traffic stop. Many citizens become nervous 

during a traffic stop, even when they have nothing to hide or fear.”); United 

States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 656 n. 49 (5th Cir. 2002) (“We have 

never held that nervousness alone is sufficient to create reasonable suspicion 

of criminal activity.”); United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 929 (8th Cir. 

2001) (suspect’s nervous demeanor alone was not enough to establish 

reasonable suspicion.”); United States v. Chavez- Valenzuela, 268 F.3d 716, 

726 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that “extreme nervousness during a traffic stop 

does not alone “support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and does 

not justify an officers continued detention of a suspect after he has satisfied 

the purpose of the stop.”); United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir. 

1999) (“Nervousness...alone will not justify a Terry stop and pat-down.”)).
5

WHEREFORE, defendant KOSHAUN HUGHES, respectfully requests 

that his motion to suppress be granted. 

Respectfully Submitted,

/s Quinn A. Michaelis

Quinn A. Michaelis

Attorney for KOSHAUN HUGHES

73 W. Monroe, Suite 106

Chicago, IL 60601

312-714-6920

 

 

 

 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 

 I hereby certify that on February 26, 2021 I electronically filed the above 

DEFENDANT’S REPLY TO GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 

QUASH ARREST AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 

with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system to all listed parties in the case.

Respectfully Submitted on February 26, 2021.

By His Attorney,

s/ Quinn A. Michaelis

Quinn A. Michaelis

Attorney For KOSHAUN HUGHES

73 W. Monroe, Suite 106

Chicago, Illinois 60601

312-714-6920