1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JESSICA A. TWARDOWSKI,

Plaintiff,

v.

CREDIT MANAGEMENT, LP 

Defendant.

 

Case No.: 1:20-cv-04285

Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

NOW COMES Plaintiff, JESSICA A. TWARDOWSKI (“Plaintiff”), by and through her 

undersigned counsel, responding to CREDIT MANAGEMENT, LP’s (“CMLP”) Motion for 

Summary Judgment (“CMLP’s Motion”) as follows:

INTRODUCTION

CMLP’s Motion seeks to dispose of this case in its entirety by seeking summary judgment 

in its favor with respect to Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(“FDCPA”). Plaintiff alleges that CMLP violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect a debt that 

was discharged in bankruptcy. Such damaging conduct violates the black letter law of the FDCPA 

and Defendant’s attempt to deny the obvious must fail. 

CMLP’s Motion demonstrates its miscomprehension of the legal standard at summary 

judgment. Instead of acknowledging the presence of disputed material facts, which preclude 

summary judgment, CMLP’s Motion inappropriately asks the Court to adjudicate disputed facts 

in its favor.

CMLP’s Motion must fail for multiple reasons. First, its bona fide error defense is replete 

with factual questions that cannot be decided at the summary judgment stage. Secondly, Plaintiff 

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has demonstrated a sufficient injury in fact that confers Article III standing. Thus, for the reasons 

stated below, CMLP’s Motion must be denied as a matter of law.

LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary Judgment Legal Standard 

Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing 

the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986). The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Bennington v. 

Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001). “Summary judgment is not appropriate ‘if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Payne v. 

Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003).

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiff Has Article III Standing To Pursue Her Claims. 

“Article III limits federal courts to resolving ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ To ensure that 

what is before them is in fact a case or controversy, federal courts require that plaintiffs have 

‘standing’ to sue. That means a plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact that is traceable to the 

defendant’s conduct and redressable by a favorable judicial decision.” Markakos v. Medicredit, 

Inc., 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 14339, at *2 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted). “An injury 

in fact is an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 

555, 560-61 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). “An injury is particularized if it ‘affect[s] the 

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plaintiff in a personal and individual way,’ and it is concrete if it is ‘real, and not abstract.’” Pennell 

v. Global Trust Mgmt. LLC, 990 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted) citing 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). “But a concrete 

injury need not be tangible; a risk of real harm can constitute concrete harm.” Pennell, 990 F.3d at 

1044 citing Spokeo Inc., 136. S. Ct. at 1549. “For a statutory violation, a plaintiff does not 

automatically satisfy concreteness ‘whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and 

purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.’” Id. “That is because ‘a bare 

procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm’ cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact 

requirement.” Id. 

“As the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing the elements of standing.” Spuhler v. State Collection Serv., 983 F.3d 282, 285 (7th 

Cir. 2020) citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. “Once the allegations supporting standing are 

questioned as a factual matter—either by a party or by the court—the plaintiff must support each 

controverted element of standing with competent proof, which we’ve understood as a showing by 

a preponderance of the evidence, or proof to a reasonable probability, that standing exists.” Bazile 

v. Fin. Sys. of Green Bay, Inc., 983 F.3d 274, 278 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Once the action reaches the summary-judgment stage, the plaintiff must demonstrate 

standing by setting forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts that, taken as true, support 

each element of standing.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff has Article III standing because (1) she has set forth corroborated evidence 

of a particularized and concrete injury-in-fact that is traceable to the Defendant’s conduct, and (2) 

Plaintiff’s injury is redressable by a favorable decision. Specifically, after receiving CMLP’s 

Letter that falsely represented that Plaintiff was still liable for a debt that was discharged in 

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bankruptcy, Plaintiff suffered significant emotional distress. See Plaintiff’s Response to Statement 

of Material Fact Nos. 37, 38, and 39. Plaintiff’s damages were specifically caused by the false 

representations in CMLP’s Letter as the false representations misled Plaintiff into believing that

she was still liable for the debt that was discharged in her bankruptcy. See Defendant’s Exhibit 1 

at 21; 21-25; 22; 4-7; 33:13-24; 35:25-36:3.

As demonstrated by Plaintiff’s testimony, the detailed emotional distress suffered by 

Plaintiff was unquestionably a particularized and concrete harm that lasted for an extended 

duration. See Defendant’s Exhibit 1 at 21; 21-25; 22; 4-7; 33:13-24; 35:25-36:3.

In other words, Plaintiff’s damages were not speculative or fleeting; instead, the damages 

were real and lasting. Simply put, the harm suffered by Plaintiff in this case was real and not 

abstract. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (holding that a concrete harm is one that is “real and not 

abstract”). Moreover, it is undeniable that Plaintiff’s injuries can be redressed by a jury verdict 

that compensates Plaintiff for her injuries. Accordingly, Plaintiff has Article III standing to pursue 

her claims in federal court.

Notably, the false representations in Defendant’s Letter resulted in the precise harm that 

the FDCPA was enacted to eliminate. Specifically, as the Seventh Circuit recently recognized, the 

FDCPA was enacted after “Congress found that rampant ‘abusive, deceptive, and unfair’ 

collection practices were contributing to ‘personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss 

of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.’” Markakos, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 14339, at *13 

citing 15 U.S.C. §1692(a) (emphasis added). Here, it is objectively unfair for CMLP to attempt to 

collect a discharged debt, especially considering that bankruptcy filings are public record that are 

readily available to the general public. One would think that the first thing a debt collector would 

do is check the public record before pursuing a debt. Moreover, being dunned for a debt that one 

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believed was discharged is inherently distressing as it frustrates the whole purpose of the 

Bankruptcy Code, which is to provide a debtor with a fresh start. 

Based on Plaintiff’s detailed testimony regarding the emotional distress damages caused 

by Defendant’s Letter, there could be no question that Plaintiff has Article III standing as she 

suffered the precise harm that Congress enacted the FDCPA to eliminate. Courts have consistently 

recognized that dunning a debtor for a debt that was not owed confers Article III standing. See 

Demarais v. Gurstel Chargo, P.A., 869 F.3d 685, 699 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding Article III standing 

in an FDCPA case where a debt collector attempted to collect a debt not owed by plaintiff;); 

Buchholz v. Tanick, 946 F.3d 855, 869 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Demarais and acknowledging that 

Demarais was correctly decided); Johnson v. Wetsch Abbott Osborn Van Vliet Plc, 2019 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 225822, at *11 (S.D. Iowa 2019) (acknowledging that the pursuit of a debt not owed 

confers Article III standing in an FDCPA case). Finding that Plaintiff has no standing would 

effectively render the FDCPA obsolete and would egregiously frustrate Congress’ intent to 

eliminate the precise harm that the FDCPA was enacted to combat.

a. CMLP’S Attempts to Discount Plaintiff’s Damages Must Fail. 

Specifically, CMLP’s Motion completely glosses over two incredibly important and 

contextual facts. See Defendant’s Exhibit 1, 21:21-25, 22:4-7. At her deposition, Plaintiff testified 

under oath that the false representations in Defendant’s Letter caused stress in her life. Specifically, 

Plaintiff provided the following sworn testimony:

Q: You used the word anxious, and I wanted – I want to determine exactly what it is 

that made you anxious, the totality of those circumstances. So what is it that made you 

anxious? The last question I have is you indicated that this really had an effect on your 

marriage earlier. Can you further expound on that?

A: It’s anxious to not know if the debt was discharged and to know if there was any 

other debts not discharged, if the bankruptcy didn’t, you know, fully go through. And 

I know we included that in the bankruptcy schedule. So – I mean, that is worrisome. 

Q: I’m just trying to drill down into this a little. When you say that is worrisome, what 

are you referring to? 

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A: When you get a debt collection letter – and it really took me by surprise. It made me 

anxious. The letter made me anxious because it was worrisome that it wasn’t fully 

discharged or --.... 

As demonstrated by Plaintiff’s testimony, CMLP’s Letter caused Plaintiff to not only 

worry about the particular debt that CMLP was attempting to collect, but to also worry about the 

overall status of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy filing. In other words, the anxiety caused by CMLP’s Letter 

ballooned to anxiety about the legal effect of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy discharge as the letter misled 

Plaintiff into believing that she may still be liable for all the debts that were discharged in her 

bankruptcy. Such elevated anxiety is unquestionably a concrete harm that confers Article III 

standing.

CMLP heavily relies on Brunett v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 982 F.3d 1067 (7th Cir. 

2020) to support its proposition that Plaintiff does not have Article III standing. In Brunett, the 

plaintiff sued defendant after receiving a letter that contained an alleged false representation 

regarding the tax consequences arising from the forgiveness of the debt at issue. Id. at 1067-68. 

The plaintiff testified at her deposition that the letter did not mislead her to her detriment and that 

the letter did not otherwise injure her. Id. at 1068 (emphasis added). Unlike the plaintiff in Brunett, 

Plaintiff was misled to her detriment into believing that her bankruptcy discharge had no legal 

effect and that she was still liable for a debt that was discharged in bankruptcy. As a result, unlike 

the plaintiff in Brunett, Plaintiff suffered cognizable injuries in the form of elevated emotional 

distress. In light of the disparity between the alleged damages in Brunett and the case at bar, 

Brunett is distinguishable and does not bar Plaintiff from pursuing her FDCPA claims in federal 

court.

CMLP also relies on Pennell v Global Trust Mgmt., LLC, 990 F.3d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir. 

2021) to support its contention that Plaintiff does not have Article III standing. In Pennell, the 

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court held that the plaintiff did not have standing because she was unable to show that a collection

letter led her to “change her course of action or put her in harm’s way.” Here, unlike the plaintiff 

in Pennell, Plaintiff reacted to the letter by reaching out to her bankruptcy counsel to verify that 

her bankruptcy was successful. See Plaintiff’s Response to Statement of Material Fact No. 48. In 

other words, but for CMLP’s attempt to collect a discharged debt, Plaintiff would not have 

questioned the legal effect of her bankruptcy nor would she have lost time conferring her counsel. 

There is no question that misleading a discharged debtor into believing their bankruptcy had no

legal effect puts the debtor in “harm’s way” as she now has to address the possibility of having to 

pay back all the debt that was discharged in bankruptcy. 

CMLP’s Motion harps on the fact that Plaintiff immediately sent the letter to her counsel 

and therefore was not harmed. CLMP’s argument is unpersuasive because had the Plaintiff not 

contacted her counsel, then CMLP would argue that Plaintiff could not have suffered any harm as 

she did not even reach out to her counsel to address her fears that her bankruptcy discharge had no 

legal effect. The fact that Plaintiff immediately reached out to her counsel corroborates Plaintiff’s 

contention that she suffered significant emotional distress after reading the letter and believing she 

is still liable for the debt. Simply put, this court should not punish Plaintiff for acting swiftly, in 

fear that her bankruptcy discharge had no legal effect, in response to an illegal collection attempt 

by CMLP. 

There is no question that Plaintiff suffered an injury-in-fact that confers Article III standing. 

Finding otherwise will effectively render the FDCPA obsolete, leaving consumers with no 

recourse for the rampant abusive conduct by debt collectors that inspired Congress to enact the 

FDCPA. For the foregoing reasons, the Court should find that Plaintiff has Article III standing to 

pursue her claims in federal court. 

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II. CMLP’s Bona Fide Error Defense Must Fail as it Presents Questions of Fact that 

Cannot be Decided at Summary Judgment. 

The bona fide error defense provides a defense to a debt collector who shows by a 

preponderance of evidence that the violation was (1) not intentional; (2) the violation resulted 

from a bona fide error; and (3) the debt collector maintained procedures reasonably adapted to 

avoid any such error. Kort v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., 394, F.3d 530, 536 citing 15 

U.S.C. §1692k(c). The bona fide error defense is an affirmative defense in which the defendant 

bears the burden of proof. See Alexander v. Unlimited Progress Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

21013, at *10 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (defendant bears the burden of proving the bona fide error defense); 

Edmonds v. Nat’l Check Bureau, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17476, at *18 (S.D. Ind. 2003) 

(“Because ‘bona fide error’ is an affirmative defense under the [FDCPA], a defendant bears the 

burden of proving” the elements to the defense); Gonzalez v. Lawent, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

9504, at *18 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (bona fide error defense is an affirmative defense that the defendant 

bears the burden of proving). 

Whether a debt collector is entitled to the bona fide error defense is usually a question of 

fact. See Ferris v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52237, at *17-26 (N.D. 

Ill. 2019) (denying summary judgment on debt collector’s bona fide error defense; finding the 

defense to be a question of fact); Keisler v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

31987, at *15 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (finding that a debt collector’s bona fide error defense was a 

question of fact); Ramirez v. Palisades Collection LLC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48722, at *19-20 

(N.D. Ill. 2008) (finding genuine issue of fact with respect to the bona fide error defense precluded 

summary judgment); Rosado v. Taylor, 324 F. Supp. 2d 917, 933 (N.D. Ind. 2004) (denying crossmotions for summary judgment on debt collector’s bona fide error defense; finding issues of 

material fact). 

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CMLP contends that it cannot be held liable for the alleged violations of the FDCPA 

because it is protected by the bona fide error defense. Specifically, CMLP contends that it has 

satisfied all three elements of the bona fide error defense and thus summary judgment must be 

entered in its favor. CMLP’s contention must be rejected because it has failed to establish as a 

matter of law that (1) the violation was unintentional; (2) the violation resulted from a bona fide 

error; and (3) it maintains procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error. Moreover, as courts 

have consistently held, if a debt collector’s bona fide error defense is replete with factual issues

it cannot be decided at summary judgment.

a. CMLP Failed to Follow its Own Policies and Procedures.

CMLP contends that it engages in a multi-pronged procedure to avoid violations like the 

one that occurred against Plaintiff. Specifically, CMLP contends that its policy is not to accept any 

accounts from creditors where the creditor knows the account is subject to bankruptcy. See

Defendant’s Exhibit 12 ¶ 4. Here, there is no question that CMLP’s client Walgreens had 

knowledge of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy discharge. Specifically, it is undisputed that Plaintiff duly 

listed Walgreens on her bankruptcy petition. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that 

Walgreens did not have knowledge of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy. Notably, CMLP does not and cannot 

argue that Walgreens did not have knowledge of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy. Despite Walgreens having 

actual knowledge of Plaintiff’s bankruptcy, CMLP still accepted the placement of the debt, in 

direct violation of CMLP’s own policies and procedures. 

There are questions of fact as to how CMLP attempted to comply with the next steps of 

their policy and procedures. Specifically, CMLP sent some information to LCI (Defendant’s third 

party monitoring company) to perform a “bankruptcy scrub”, but the totality and specific 

information that was sent is unknown. CMLP’s Motion discusses generally what was sent, but a 

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complete account of the information sent to LCI in its native form is unavailable. Plaintiff expects 

this information to be revealed at trial, and the trier of fact will determine if it was sufficient to 

comply with CMLP’s policies. What we do know at this point is that CMLP received some 

information from LCI that showed Plaintiff was not subject to bankruptcy. The following sworn 

testimony provided by CMLP’s corporate witness discusses that information: (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 

1 at Page 37-38).

Q: And at the time that Credit Management sent the collection letter that was referenced in the 

complaint, paragraph 17, were they aware of the bankruptcy discharge?

A: No 

Q: Can you provide me some details regarding why the information was not provided to Credit 

Management? 

A: When we sent the information to LCI, they matched it up against their database and they did 

not consider it a hit from the information that they had in PACER, so they didn’t send us back a 

notification saying that there had been any bankruptcy activity.

CMLP continues to explain that, in addition to this initial “scrub,” LCI continues to monitor 

accounts and update CMLP if it finds new bankruptcy information that applies to any of CMLP’s 

current accounts. DSMF 12-13. Notably, CMLP again, during the second step of CMLP’s policies 

and procedures, failed to comply. Specifically, CMLP’s corporate witness provided the following 

sworn testimony: (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at Page 38-39)

Q: Do you know if LCI provided continuous or rolling updates on Ms. Twardowski’ s account 

that we have previously discussed? And when I say previously discussed, LCI provides rolling 

and updated information to Credit Management on active files. Do you know if there was 

updated information provided by LCI? 

A: On this particular account? 

Q: Yes 

A: Not to my knowledge, no. 

Q: Do you know why there wasn’t any information provided? 

A: Again, because they didn’t consider it a hit based on the information that we provided to 

them. 

CMLP’s own policy and procedures show that Bankruptcy Monitoring will continue to be

monitored by their vendor to protect against those situations in which a bankruptcy was filed after 

the account was placed with CMLP for collections. Defendant’s Exhibit 8 Paragraph 5.2.1. As 

demonstrated above, CMLP has failed to follow numerous policies and procedures. Numerous 

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questions of fact exist as to whether the violation was intentional or not, and such questions can 

only be answered by a trier of fact. 

Specifically, in order to be entitled to the bona fide error defense, a debt collector must 

actually employ or implement its policies. Johnson v. Riddle, 443 F.3d 723, 729 (10th Cir. 2006). 

Furthermore, a bona fide error is "an error made in good faith; a genuine mistake, as opposed to a 

contrived mistake." Ross, No. 04 C 6557, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11407 at *22.

Ali v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168877, *22. Here, instead of 

offering evidence to establish that it actually employs and implements its purported policies, 

CMLP glosses over the specifics. CMLP’s Motion does not offer any evidence on how it 

implements and trains its employees on its purported policies. CMLP provides no support as to 

why their policies and procedures were not followed in the collection of Plaintiff’s subject debt. 

All the information provided leaves a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the error was in 

good faith or contrived, with a preponderance of the evidence leaning towards a contrived mistake.

Based on CMLP’s reasoning, a debt collector would be able to skirt FDCPA liability by 

merely creating policies but not actually implementing and following them. CMLP’s reasoning 

must be rejected because it would render the FDCPA obsolete as it would allow debt collectors to 

violate the FDCPA with impunity. Here, Plaintiff has presented evidence that suggests that CMLP 

did not actually employ or implement its purported policy pertaining to Plaintiff’s subject debt. 

Accordingly, CMLP has failed to satisfy the bona fide error defense, and thus is not entitled to 

summary judgment in its favor. 

b. CMLP’s Policies And Procedures Do Not At Minimum Have A Process To 

Inform Employees What Actions To Take In Certain Circumstances To Avoid 

Error And Thus Are Not Reasonable. 

In the event the Court finds that CMLP’s violation was unintentional and resulting from a 

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bona fide error, CMLP is still not entitled to summary judgment on its bona fide error defense 

because whether CMLP’s procedures were reasonably adapted to avoid the error is a question of 

fact. Specifically, “the inquiry as to whether a given procedure is reasonable is by its nature factintensive and, therefore, typically reserved for a jury.” Narwick v. Wexler, 901 F. Supp. 1275, 1282 

(N.D. Ill. 1995); Thomas v. Bowman Heintz Boscia & Vician, P.C., & Ind. Prof'l Corp., 2009 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 77305, at *9-10 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (same); Gaisser v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 

593 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (holding that the question of whether the debt 

collector implemented procedures to reasonably avoid FDCPA violations was one for the jury). 

As cited in CMLP’s Motion, a reasonable procedure is one that is reasonably adapted to 

avoid clerical or factual errors through processes that have mechanical or other such regular orderly 

steps. Leeb v Nationwide Credit Corp., 806 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2015). At a minimum, such 

processes or mechanical steps should inform employees what actions they should take in certain 

circumstances, rather than just represent a “thinly specified ‘policy’ allegedly barring some action 

but saying nothing about what action to take.” Id. at 900. 

Reviewing CMLP’s procedures shows that they are merely thinly specified policies and

say nothing about what specific action to take to prevent errors. CMLP’s Motion states that 

CMLP’s policy is not to accept any accounts from creditors where the creditor knows the account 

is subject to bankruptcy. CMLP’s Motion page 11. Specifically, CMLP refers us to a declaration 

at DSMF 7. A review of CMLP’s policy provides no specific information as to what action to take 

to ensure that CMLP complies with this procedure. CMLP procedure is merely a declaration by 

their corporate representative. 

Moreover, CMLP’s policy and procedure provide no specifics regarding what action is to 

be taken by employees to ensure that accounts are continuously monitored by their third party 

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provider, LCI. CMLP’s own policy and procedures show that Bankruptcy Monitoring will 

continue to be monitored by its vendor to protect against those situations in which a bankruptcy 

was filed after the account was placed with CMLP for collections. Defendant’s Exhibit 8 Paragraph 

5.2.1. However the procedure provides no specifics as to what employees should do to ensure that 

the policies and procedures are followed. As discussed above, both of these significant procedures 

were not followed; nor do CMLP’s own policy and procedures explain in specifics what employees 

should or should not do to ensure these, and other, policies and procedures are followed. 

In light of the factual issues pertaining to CMLP’s procedures, the Court should find that 

CMLP is not entitled to summary judgment on its bona fide error defense as a matter of law.

c. Blind Reliance on Information Provided by a Third Party is Insufficient to 

Support a Bone Fide Error. 

CMLP contends that its reliance on information from a third party scrub vendor is sufficient 

as a matter of law. Specifically, CMLP contends that it utilizes a third party vendor, LCI, to scrub 

a new account for bankruptcy. Upon receipt of a new account DSMF 8-11. Under this procedure, 

new accounts are sent to LCI, which compares the new placements with information from their 

database to look for bankruptcy filings and identify accounts subject to bankruptcy. Id.

In other words, CMLP solely relied on information from LCI in determining that Plaintiff’s 

debt was not discharged. Such blind reliance is insufficient because sole reliance on information 

provided from a third party is insufficient to establish the bona fide error defense. Kottler v. Gulf 

Coast Collection Bureau, Inc. (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming district court’s rejection of the bona fide 

error defense where debt collector solely relied on information provided to it by a third party); 

Mercedes v. Nat’l Bus. Factors Inc., 979 F.3d 758, 763 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that “unquestioned 

reliance on a [third party’s] information” does not support a bona fide error defense; noting that 

such reliance was “not a procedure reasonably adapted to avoid receiving inaccurate 

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information”); Reichert v. Nat'l Credit Sys., 531 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming a 

district court’s rejection of the bona fide error defense where the debt collector relied on 

information from a third party); Scott v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 139 F. Supp. 3d 956, 

972 (S.D. Iowa 2015) (rejecting bona fide error defense where debt collector relied on false 

information provided by a third party vendor). 

Simply put, CMLP’s procedures cannot be found to be adequate as CMLP has not offered 

any evidence to establish that it maintained procedures to verify that the information it was 

provided by LCI was accurate. Based on the foregoing, CMLP’s blind reliance on information 

provided by LCI frustrates its bona fide error defense.

CONCLUSION

CMLP’s Motion for Summary Judgment blatantly ignores the evidence in this case and the 

legal standard for summary judgment. Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence in which a 

reasonable jury in federal court could return a verdict in her favor. Accordingly, CMLP is not 

entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 

Respectfully Submitted,

Dated: June 16th, 2021

/s/ Victor T. Metroff

Mohammed O. Badwan, Esq. 

Victor T. Metroff, Esq. 

Counsel for Plaintiff

Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd.

2500 S. Highland Avenue, Suite 200

Lombard, Illinois 60148

(630) 575-8180

mbadwan@sulaimanlaw.com

vmetroff@sulaimanlaw.com

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Victor T. Metroff, an attorney, certify that on June 16th, 2021, I caused the foregoing to 

be served upon counsel of record through operation of the Court’s Case Management/Electronic 

Case File (CM/ECF) system.

 

 /s/ Victor T. Metroff

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