J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.E.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.A.U., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 576 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree April 3, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 233-OC-2017, 

CP-19-DP-0000037-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.J.U., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.A.U., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 577 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 3, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 232-OC of 2017, 

CP-19-DP-0000056-2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: F.L.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.A.U., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 578 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 3, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): 231-OC-2017, 
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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CP-19-DP-0000057-2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.E.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.L.M., JR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 614 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 3, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 233-OC-2017, 

CP-19-DP-0000037-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.J.U., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.L.M., JR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 615 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 3, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2017-OC-0000232, 

CP-19-DP-0000056-2015

IN THE INTEREST OF: F.L.M., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.L.M., JR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 616 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 3, 2018
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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In the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): 231-OC-2017, 

CP-19-DP-0000057-2015

BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 07, 2018

B.A.U. (“Mother”) and S.L.M. (“Father”) appeal from the orders

terminating their parental rights.1 We find the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion and affirm the orders.

Mother and Father have three minor children, D.J.U., born June 2013, 

F.L.M., born March 2015, and R.E.M., born June 2016 (collectively, 

“Children”). In August 2015, Columbia County Children and Youth Services 

(“CYS”) received a referral based on lack of cleanliness at the residence and 

lack of cleanliness and hygiene of Children. In October 2015, the court found 

D.J.U. and F.L.M. dependent. The court found R.E.M. dependent after his birth.

A Service Plan was created, which included the following goals: Meet the basic 

needs of Children, obtain medical assistance for Children; improve parenting 

skills; improve home conditions; improve Children’s hygiene; utilize local 

resources; and comply with medical and behavioral appointments for Children 

and for Mother and Father. N.T., 4/1/18, at 8-20; Exh. CYS-B. On November 

17, 2017, CYS filed petitions for involuntary termination of Mother and 

Father’s parental rights to Children.

____________________________________________

1 Mother and Father each filed separate notices of appeal for each child. We 

have consolidated the six appeals sua sponte. 
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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In July 2016, Father moved to Arkansas, and Mother followed in August 

2016. Id. at 25. At the hearing on the petitions, Kerri Shaylor, a CYS 

caseworker, testified that Mother and Father remained in Arkansas and have 

not seen Children since they moved. N.T., 4/18/18, at 25-26. Mother has 

weekly phone calls with Children. Id. at 26. Father attends the phone calls 

less regularly. Mother and Father sent a gift card for Christmas and birthday 

cards. Id. at 26-27. Ms. Shaylor testified that Mother and Father completed 

parenting classes, but failed to complete the remaining goals. Id. at 8-20. Ms. 

Shaylor stated that she did not facilitate use of Skype for the phone calls, and 

noted Mother and Father only requested the use of video calls “a couple 

months ago.” Id. at 44-45.

CYS did not send a request to Arkansas under the Interstate Compact 

on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”)2 seeking approval to send Children to 

Arkansas until May 2017. Id. at 28. Ms. Shaylor delayed sending the request 

____________________________________________

2 The ICPC has been described as:

As drafted, the [ICPC] provides for notification of 

appropriate state or local authorities in the receiving state 

before placement by out-of-state persons and agencies. The 

authorities in the receiving state are given the opportunity 

to investigate and, if satisfied, must notify the sending state 

that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary 

to the child’s best interest. After a placement has been 

made, the sending state continues to have financial 

responsibility for support and retains jurisdiction over the 

child.

McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 479–480 (3d Cir. 1991) (alteration 

in original); 62 P.S. § 761; 55 Pa. Code § 3130.41.
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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because Mother and Father did not have appropriate housing and she did not 

want Arkansas to deny the ICPC request. Id. at 47. Arkansas denied the first

request because Mother and Father did not complete the paperwork required 

for the home study process. Id. at 28-29. CYS sent a second request in 

October 2017. Id. at 29. The process had not been completed at the time of 

the hearing due to Mother and Father’s “lack of compliance.” Id. at 31. Mother 

and Father missed two fingerprint appointments, did not return the paperwork 

to Arkansas in a timely manner, and were not following through with the 

process. Id. Ms. Shaylor stated CYS does not know whether the home in 

Arkansas was appropriate. Id.

Ms. Shaylor stated she had not “personally” completed an ICPC request 

in other cases, but CYS had, and noted she had done one prior request. Id.

at 50-51. Further, she testified that she was trained on how to make a request, 

and, when a parent moved, she copied the file and her supervisor completed

the paperwork. Id. at 51.

Ms. Shaylor further testified that Children appear happy in the foster 

home, were clean and well-dressed, and their basic, physical, and emotional 

needs were met. Id. at 33.

Mother testified that she speaks with Children by phone once a week, 

and that the foster parents denied her request to have video calls. Id. at 68-

69. She stated that she and Father obtained housing in Arkansas in December 

2016. Id. at 71. Mother claimed that they did not receive the paperwork for 

the first ICPC request in May 2017. Id. at 73. Mother stated that she moved 
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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to Arkansas because she was told “Arkansas would be a better place for” her 

and Children and she and Father were “tired of getting messed with” by the 

caseworkers. Id. at 74, 90, 92. Mother’s father, step-mother, grandmother, 

and two sisters live in Berwick, Pennsylvania, and she has no relatives in 

Arkansas. Id. at 89.

Father testified that they fixed the concerns regarding the home in 

Pennsylvania. Id. at 95-97. He and Mother moved to Arkansas because CYS

“wanted to run us around” and he was told that in Arkansas “they won’t run 

me around like they did up there.” Id. at 97-98. He attends phone calls when 

able, based on his work and school schedule. Id. at 98. He and Mother only 

received paperwork for the ICPC request in October 2017. Id. at 101. Father’s 

grandmother, great-uncle, ex-wife, and seven-year-old daughter live in 

Arkansas. Id. at 113. Father’s mother, father and sister live in Pennsylvania. 

Id. at 113.

The trial court granted the termination petitions. It found termination 

proper under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (5), (8),3 and (b). Specifically as to 

Subsection 2511(a)(1), the court found that “by conduct continuing for a 

period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition,” 

Mother and Father “have evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental 

claim to [Children] and have refused and failed to perform parental duties.” 

____________________________________________

3 The trial court’s opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(a) also cites the text of section 2511(a)(2). The petitions for 

termination filed by CYS, however, sought termination under Subsections 

2511(a)(1), (5), and (8).
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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Id. at 117-18. The court found “the services or assistance readily available to 

the parents are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal 

or placement of [Children] within a reasonable period of time.” Id. at 118.

The trial court further found that termination would “best serve the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of” Children. Id.

at 118-19. The court noted that Children, who were young, have had only 

phone contact with parents for almost two years, and that it would be “remiss 

if the Court would send the children . . . back to a place where they know 

nobody,” noting they did not “even know [Mother and Father] at this point.” 

Id. at 119.

The trial court further found CYS delayed initiating the ICPC request 

because “parents had no stable living arrangements,” and Arkansas denied 

the request to assist because Mother and Father did not complete the required 

paperwork. Trial Court Opinion, filed May 24, 2018, at 4. The trial court found 

the delay in processing the request “was due to Mother and Father’s lack of 

and/or slow compliance with paperwork, fingerprints, etc.” Id.

The trial court further found that CYS proceeded reasonably under the 

Interstate Compact, that it made reasonable efforts to assist Mother and 

Father, and that Mother and Father intentionally left Pennsylvania because 

they wanted “to terminate their involvement with [CYS].” Id. In addition, the 

trial court found Children were doing well, were with foster parents who hoped 

to adopt Children, and Children were “healthy, happy, and maturing age 

appropriately.” Id.
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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Mother and Father filed timely notices of appeal. They raise the following 

issues on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in determining that [CYS] 

presented clear and convincing evidence that grounds for 

involuntary termination exist.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when 

granting [CYS’s] Petition for Involuntary Termination of 

Parental Rights when [CYS] failed to provide reasonable 

efforts to aid the family in reunification.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and 

[committed an] error of law when it determined parents 

displayed a settled purpose to relinquish their rights by 

moving to Arkansas.

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and 

committed an error of law when it ignored the fact that 

[CYS] failed to submit a timely referral to the Interstate 

Compact on the Placement of Children knowing parents had 

relocated to Arkansas.

Mother’s and Father’s Br. at 5-6. We will address these claims together.

Mother and Father argue they failed to meet their goals because CYS 

did not make a timely ICPC request. They argue the trial court ignored this 

failure, as well as other CYS failures, such as their failure to facilitate video 

calls between Mother and Father and Children. They further maintained CYS 

relied on old information regarding the conditions of their home and that the 

court erred in finding they evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish their 

parental rights. 

When reviewing orders terminating parental rights, we must “accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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2012). Where “the factual findings are supported,” we review the decision “to 

determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id.

We will reverse a decision “for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration 

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained the reason for applying 

an abuse of discretion standard to termination decisions:

[U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to 

make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, 

where the trial judges are observing the parties during the 

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even 

where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often 

the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate 

court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court 

and impose its own credibility determinations and 

judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long 

as the factual findings are supported by the record and the 

court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law 

or an abuse of discretion.

Id. at 826-27 (citations omitted).

A trial court may terminate parental rights only after finding grounds for 

termination existed under Section 2511(a) and that termination is in the 

child’s best interest under Section 2511(b). Although the trial court terminated 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to several subsections of Section 2511(a), 

we need only conclude that its decision was proper under any one subsection 

of Section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en 

banc). Here, we conclude that the trial court properly terminated Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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Section 2511(a)(1) provides:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . .

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused 

or failed to perform parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1). Further, with respect to section 2511(a)(1), “the 

court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice 

of the filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

“Although it is the six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition that is most critical to the analysis, the trial court must consider the 

whole history of a given case and not mechanically apply the six-month 

statutory provision.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004). 

Further:

Parental duty is best understood in relation to the needs of 

a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and 

support. These needs, physical and emotional, cannot be 

met by a merely passive interest in the development of the 

child. Thus, this court has held that the parental obligation 

is a positive duty which requires affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial 

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a 

genuine effort to maintain communication and association 

with the child.
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent ‘exert himself to take and maintain a 

place of importance in the child's life’.

Id. (quoting In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462 (Pa.Super.2003). Parental duty 

requires that a parent “act affirmatively with good faith interest and effort, 

and not yield to every problem, in order to maintain the parent-child 

relationship to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult circumstances.”

Id. (quoting In re Adoption of Dale A., II, 683 A.2d 297, 302 (Pa.Super. 

1996)). A parent is required to “utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting 

obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship.” Id.

Here, the trial court found Mother and Father “evidenced a settled 

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to [Children] and have refused and 

failed to perform parental duties.” N.T., 4/1/18, at 117-18. In its 1925(a) 

opinion, the trial court clarified that “it cannot be any clearer that Mother and 

Father’s conduct evidenced a failure to perform parental duties for at least six 

months, more specifically for at least 18 months before the petition was filed.” 

TCO at 7. It found

From at least August 2016 through the time of the hearing, 

Mother and Father have not seen the children at all. Mother 

has made regular telephone calls, but that is not parenting 

in the least. Mother and Father left Pennsylvania in the 

summer of 2016, to avoid the requirements and help that 

[CYS] was providing them and their children. They have not 

returned. They did not attend the hearing except by phone. 

There is no indication they are going to return to 

Pennsylvania.
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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TCO at 7-8. The trial court noted that there was “some indication” that Mother 

and Father were waiting until their financial situation improved before they 

saw Children, but noted that “[p]arental rights may not be preserved by 

waiting for some more suitable financial circumstances or convenient time for 

the performance of parental duties and responsibilities,” and that parents 

must act “affirmatively, with good faith interest and effort.” Id. at 8 (quoting 

In the Interest of C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000)). The court 

concluded:

Mother and Father, without good reason, voluntarily left 

their children in foster care in Pennsylvania to be raised by 

other adults. In the meantime, the minor children have been 

growing and maturing. Their development through 

childhood and adolescence into adulthood cannot wait for 

Mother and Father to be ready to provide care. The minor 

children need[] proper guidance and nurturing now. Both 

Mother and Father have many relatives and connections in 

the Berwick area. Their lengthy relocation many miles away 

to Arkansas without their children is inexcusable.

TCO at 8-9. The record supports the trial court’s factual findings and it did not 

abuse its discretion in finding CYS established by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination was proper under Section 2511(a)(1), including 

that, during the relevant six month period, Mother and Father failed to perform 

parental duties. 

Further, Section 2511(a)(1) requires a finding that the parent either 

evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish their parental claim or a failure to 

perform parental duties. At the hearing, the court found parents evidenced
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both by moving to Arkansas, without good reason, and not seeing Children.

Contrary to Mother and Father’s claim, this was not an abuse of discretion.

In addition, the trial court did not err in finding CYS made reasonable 

efforts in these circumstances. CYS did not immediately place a request under 

the ICPC, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding CYS acted 

reasonably where, as here, CYS wanted to ensure there was appropriate 

housing and where, after the request, parents did not comply with the 

requirements. Mother and Father claim Arkansas did not receive the May 2017 

request. However, Ms. Shaylor testified that Arkansas denied the request 

because Mother and Father failed to complete the home study paperwork, and 

the trial court credited this testimony. N.T., 4/18/18, at 28, 31. Further, 

although Ms. Shaylor testified that a person need not have their own home 

before an ICPC request is made, she also testified that if the housing was not 

adequate, the request would be denied. Id. at 53.

We further note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that 

“while reasonable efforts should be considered and indeed, in the appropriate 

case, a trial court could insist upon their provision,” a trial court may grant a 

petition to terminate parental rights even if an agency failed to provide 

reasonable efforts. In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 675 (Pa. 2014). Here, even 

if CYS did not engage in reasonable efforts, any such failure did not impact 

Mother and Father’s failure to perform parental duties, as the failure resulted 

from their relocation and refusal to return, and was not due to any perceived 

lack of reasonable efforts by CYS.
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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Mother and Father also argue that Ms. Shaylor relied on old information 

to support the termination petition. Although the information relied on by Ms. 

Shaylor regarding the conditions of the home were from prior to the move to 

Arkansas, this was because Mother and Father moved and failed to take 

reasonable steps to comply with the ICPC process. Therefore, because Mother 

and Father delayed the process, CYS did not have information regarding their 

Arkansas home.

Mother and Father also argue the trial court erred in finding Ms. Shaylor 

credible because she was not appointed to the case until after Mother and 

Father moved to Arkansas, and because her testimony was inconsistent 

regarding whether she had previously completed an Interstate Compact 

request. However, “the trial court, as the finder of fact, is the sole determiner

of the credibility of witnesses and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved 

by [the] finder of fact.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1115-16 (Pa.Super. 2010) 

(quoting In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 228 (Pa.Super. 2002)). 

When supported by the record, as they are here, we must accept the credibility 

determinations of the trial court. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826.

To the extent Mother and Father also challenge the trial court’s findings 

under Section 2511(b), see Appellant Br. at 12, we find that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in finding termination proper under Section 

2511(b). 

Section 2511(b) provides:
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(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The focus under Section 2511(b) is not on the parent, 

but on the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa.Super. 

2008) (en banc). Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must determine 

“whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa.Super. 2005). This Court has explained that 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into [the] needs and welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287.

Here, the trial court found that termination of Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights would best serve Children’s developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare. N.T., 4/2/18, at 118-19. It noted that Children 

have not seen Mother and Father in two years, and stated Children did not 

know Mother and Father. Id. at 119. It also noted that Children were doing 

well, lived with foster parents who hoped to adopt Children, and Children were 

“healthy, happy, and maturing age appropriately.” TCO at 4. We conclude its 

factual findings are supported by the record, including Ms. Shaylor’s testimony 

that Children were doing well with foster parents. The trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in finding termination would best serve Children’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs.

Orders affirmed.
J-A24020-18; J-A24021-18

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/07/2018