J-A16014-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

FRANK SANTOS,

Appellee No. 2249 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order July 9, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0001509-2013

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED JUNE 25, 2015

The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s order granting the 

motion to suppress evidence filed by Appellee, Frank Santos.1 After review, 

we are constrained to vacate the order of suppression and remand for 

proceedings consistent with this memorandum. 

The relevant factual and procedural history of this case is as follows. 

On June 1, 2012, at approximately 7:45 p.m., Police Officer Jason Branyan 

was on duty working with a narcotics enforcement team in the 2800 block of 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

“The Commonwealth may take an appeal of right from an order that does 

not end the entire case if it certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will 

terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Commonwealth v. 

Lark, 91 A.3d 165, 166 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 735 

(Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). The Commonwealth has included such a 

certification in this case. (See Notice of Appeal, 8/08/14, at 1). 
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Cottman Avenue in Philadelphia. They set up undercover surveillance in a 

parking lot known to police as a location where narcotics transactions, 

thefts, and robberies regularly take place. At that time, Officer Branyan was 

a nine-year veteran of the police force, and he had made approximately one 

thousand narcotics arrests, with twenty arrests in this specific parking lot. 

His narcotics enforcement colleagues had made approximately forty to sixty 

arrests in this parking lot. 

At approximately 8:20 p.m., Officer Branyan observed a dark-colored 

Acura with New Jersey tags pull into the parking lot. It parked two rows in 

front of him, directly facing him, at a distance of approximately fifty feet. A 

few minutes later, a Toyota Rav4, driven by Appellee, pulled into the parking 

lot next to the Acura. The vehicles were in a well-lit area of the parking lot, 

and the driver’s side of Appellee’s vehicle faced the driver’s side of the 

Acura. Appellee got out of his vehicle with a clear plastic bag in his hand, 

and he entered the rear driver’s side of the Acura. Moments later, he exited 

the Acura and quickly went back into his own vehicle. 

The Acura began to leave the parking lot at a normal rate of speed, 

and Officer Branyan gave out a flash to stop it. Sergeant Cerruti2stopped 

the Acura towards the front of the parking lot and recovered twenty yellow 

oxycodone pills in a clear plastic bag from the cup holder. The sergeant 

____________________________________________

2 Our review of the record did not reveal Sergeant Cerruti’s first name.
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radioed that the stop of the Acura “was a positive.” (N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 7/09/14, at 11). 

At Officer Branyan’s instruction, Police Officer Michael Schaffer then 

stopped Appellee’s vehicle, which was still parked in the parking lot. 

Appellee got out of the vehicle and was placed in handcuffs.3 Officer Shaffer 

recovered $160.00 from the driver’s seat of Appellee’s vehicle and 

$2,241.00 from his person. The officer also recovered four amber pill 

bottles from the center console of Appellee’s vehicle. The first bottle 

contained 281 oxycodone pills; the second bottle contained fourteen 

diazepam pills; the third bottle contained five oxycodone pills; and the fourth 

bottle contained only yellow residue. The three bottles containing pills bore 

the name of Appellee’s girlfriend, Amanda Fuscia; the empty bottle was not 

labeled. 

Appellee was charged with possession with intent to deliver a 

controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance.4 On May 21, 

2013, he filed a motion to suppress evidence. On July 9, 2014, the trial 

court held a hearing at which Appellee argued that police arrested him 

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3

It is not clear from the record which officer placed Appellee in handcuffs. 

(See Trial Court Opinion, 10/24/14, at 3-4). Officer Branyan testified that, 

when he reached Appellee’s vehicle, Appellee was already in handcuffs. 

(See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 7/09/14, at 28-29). However, Officer 

Schaffer testified that he believed Officer Branyan placed Appellee in 

handcuffs. (See id. at 39). 

4 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30) and (a)(16), respectively.
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without probable cause. (See id. at 6). On that same date, the trial court 

entered its order granting the motion. On July 15, 2014, the court entered 

findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record, stating that Appellee’s

warrantless arrest lacked the requisite probable cause. (See N.T. Findings 

of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 7/15/14, at 5). This timely appeal followed.5 

The Commonwealth raises the following issue for review: 

Where an experienced police officer, with thousands of 

narcotics arrests, was conducting surveillance of a parking lot 

notorious for narcotics activity—a location where the officer had 

personally made 20 prior arrests—recognized a probable drug 

transaction unfolding in front of him, did the [trial] court, which 

disregarded the officer’s relevant experience and the crimeridden character of the surveillance location, err in concluding 

there was no probable cause to arrest [Appellee]?

(Commonwealth’s Brief, at 3).6

Our standard of review is as follows:

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression 

order, we follow a clearly defined standard of review and 

consider only the evidence from the defendant’s witnesses 

together with the evidence of the prosecution that, when read in 

the context of the entire record, remains uncontradicted. The 

suppression court’s findings of fact bind an appellate court if the 

record supports those findings. The suppression court’s 

conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an appellate 

court, whose duty is to determine if the suppression court 

properly applied the law to the facts.

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5 The Commonwealth filed a statement of errors complained of on appeal 

contemporaneously with its notice of appeal on August 8, 2014. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court entered its opinion on October 24, 2014. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

6 Appellee did not file a brief. 
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 68 A.3d 930, 934 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted). 

In its sole issue on appeal, the Commonwealth contends that the trial 

court erred in granting Appellee’s motion to suppress where the arrest was 

legal and supported by probable cause. (See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 12-

22). It maintains that the totality of the circumstances of this case, 

including the officers’ relevant experience and knowledge of this particular 

parking lot as notorious for drug activity, coupled with Appellee’s unusual 

conduct, established probable cause. (See id. at 11, 15-16). After review 

of the record, we are constrained to agree.

Our Supreme Court has stated:

[L]aw enforcement authorities must have a 

warrant to arrest an individual in a public place 

unless they have probable cause to believe that 1) a 

felony has been committed; and 2) the person to be 

arrested is the felon. A warrant is also required to 

make an arrest for a misdemeanor, unless the 

misdemeanor is committed in the presence of the 

police officer. The legislature, however, has 

authorized law enforcement officers to make 

warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed 

outside their presence in certain circumstances.

In order to determine whether probable cause exists to 

justify a warrantless arrest, we must consider the totality of the 

circumstances. Probable cause exists where the facts and 

circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to 

warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an 

offense has been or is being committed, and must be viewed 

from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police 

officer on the scene at the time of the arrest guided by his 

experience and training. . . . 
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Probable cause is made out when the facts and 

circumstances which are within the knowledge of the 

officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has 

reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to 

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 

that the suspect has committed or is committing a 

crime. The question we ask is not whether the 

officer’s belief was correct or more likely true than 

false. Rather, we require only a probability, and 

not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity. In 

determining whether probable cause exists, we apply 

a totality of the circumstances test.

Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 721 (Pa. 2014) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). 

“In determining whether probable cause exists: The time is important; 

the street location is important; the use of a street for commercial 

transactions is important; . . . the movements and manners of the parties 

are important.” Commonwealth v. Delvalle, 74 A.3d 1081, 1086 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Further, a police officer’s experience is a 

relevant factor in determining probable cause, where there is a nexus 

between the experience and the observed behavior. See Commonwealth 

v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 935-36 (Pa. 2009); see also Delvalle, supra 

at 1085-86.

In the instant case, the relevant facts and circumstances were that 

police officers with extensive experience making narcotics arrests observed a 

night-time interaction in a parking lot known for narcotics sales. (See N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 7/09/14, at 7-10). Appellee parked with the driver’s 

side of his vehicle along the driver’s side of the waiting Acura, and he exited 
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his vehicle with a clear plastic bag in his hand. (See id. at 11, 15, 17, 23). 

He entered the backseat of the Acura and quickly exited a few moments 

later, jumping back into his own vehicle. (See id. at 11-13, 24). Police 

immediately stopped the Acura and recovered twenty oxycodone pills in a 

clear plastic bag from the cup holder. (See id. at 11-12, 25). Only after 

police stopped the Acura and recovered oxycodone pills from the suspected 

buyer did they stop Appellee, who was still parked in the parking lot known 

for drug activity. (See id. at 11, 15-16, 25-27). 

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, and mindful of the above 

considerations, we conclude that the facts of this case “are sufficient to 

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that [Appellee] has 

committed . . . a crime[,]” Martin, supra at 721, through his involvement 

in the suspected drug sale. Thus, the trial court erred in determining that 

police lacked probable cause to arrest Appellee. See Johnson, supra at 

934. Accordingly, we vacate the order of suppression, and remand to the 

trial court for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/25/2015