[Cite as State v. Cowan, 2014-Ohio-3593.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 100741 

STATE OF OHIO 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs.

CRAIG A. COWAN

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART 

AND REMANDED 

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-11-550536-A 

BEFORE: Jones, P.J., Keough, J., and E.T. Gallagher, J. 

 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 21, 2014 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Thomas A. Rein 

The Leader Bldg., Suite 940 

526 Superior Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 

Craig A. Cowan, pro se 

Inmate No. 622-034 

Marion Correctional Institution 

P.O. Box 57 

Marion, Ohio 43301

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Joseph J. Ricotta 

 Brett Hammond 

Assistant County Prosecutors 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Craig Cowan appeals from the trial court’s November 

22, 2013 sentencing judgment entry. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

 I. Statement of Case 

{¶2} In May 2011, Cowan was charged in a nine-count indictment; the charges 

were also accompanied with various specifications. The charges resulted from Cowan, 

after getting into a verbal altercation with some friends, holding a gun to the head of one 

of the victims, and shooting at three other victims.1

 

{¶3} The case proceeded to trial, with counts and specifications bifurcated 

between a jury and the court. Three counts were dismissed by the state. Cowan was 

found guilty of one count each of felonious assault, discharging a firearm on or near a 

prohibited premises, having a weapon while under disability, improperly handling 

firearms in a motor vehicle, and various specifications. He was acquitted on one charge 

of felonious assault and kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Cowan to an 

18-year-prison term that included consecutive sentences. 

{¶4} Cowan appealed, and this court upheld the convictions, “affirmed in part and 

vacated in part” the sentence, and “remanded [the case] for the trial court to consider 

whether consecutive sentences are appropriate under H.B. 86, and if so, to enter the 

proper findings on the record.” Cowan I at ¶ 46. 

{¶5} In February 2013, the trial court held a resentencing hearing. It imposed the 

 

1

For a detailed recitation of the facts, see State v. Cowan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97877, 

2012-Ohio-5723, ¶ 4-12 (“Cowan I”). 
same 18-year sentence, including the consecutive portion. Cowan again appealed, and 

this court again reversed, for a “new sentencing hearing” because the trial court failed to 

“strictly comply with the requirements of R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) prior to the re-imposition of 

consecutive sentences.” State v. Cowan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99566, 

2013-Ohio-4475, ¶ 3, 16 (“Cowan II”). This court remanded for a “de novo 

resentencing hearing.” Id. at ¶ 18. 

{¶6} Another sentencing hearing was held in November 2013, and the trial court 

reimposed the same consecutive sentence. Cowan now appeals. His counsel raises the 

following two assignments of error: 

[I.] The Court of Appeals violated Appellant’s constitutional rights under 

the Ohio and U.S. Constitutions when it ordered the trial court to undertake 

further analysis and make further findings at a resentencing hearing. 

[II.] Appellant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing as the trial court 

failed to properly impose a period of postrelease control at the resentencing 

hearing. 

{¶7} Cowan, pro se, raises the following three assignments of error: 

[III.] Appellant is entitled to have the charge of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) 

reduced to the least degree. The statute of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) was 

inappropriately charged as a first-degree felony. This case has no 

aggravating elements or physical harm to establish the degree of a 

first-degree offense by statute. 

[IV.] Appellant was violated of his due process of the law according to his 

[F]ifth [A]mendment Double Jeopardy Clause. 

[V.] Appellant was violated of his Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, 

under the cruel and unusual punishment, the penalty imposed is 

disproportionate to the offense. 

 II. Law and Analysis 
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Cowan contends that his constitutional rights 

were violated by this court ordering the trial court to determine if consecutive sentences 

were appropriate and, if so, to make the required findings on the record. 

{¶9} This court recently addressed this same contention in State v. Matthews, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100476, 2014-Ohio-3137, and found it not well taken. Specifically, 

this court held as follows: 

This assignment of error is not properly before this court. * * * If [the 

defendant] had wanted to challenge our [prior] decision * * *, her recourse 

was to seek reconsideration in this court pursuant to App.R. 26(A) or leave 

for our decision to be considered by the Ohio Supreme Court. State v. 

Devaughns, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24631, 2012-Ohio-5791, ¶ 9. She 

chose neither of these options. 

Matthews at ¶ 7. 

{¶10} Here, Cowan did seek reconsideration of this court’s decision in Cowan I, 

and did attempt to appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. Cowan also sought to reopen 

Cowan I. The motions and appeal were denied.2

 Nonetheless, Cowan’s contention is 

still not properly before us. 

Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a 

convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and 

litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any 

defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have 

been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of 

 

2

See Cowan I, motion no. 461014; reopening denied, State v. Cowan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97877, 

2013-Ohio-1172, motion no. 462840; discretionary appeal not allowed, State v. Cowan, 135 Ohio 

St.3d 1413, 2013-Ohio-1622, 986 N.E.2d 30. 

 
conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment. 

State v. Blankenburg, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-04-088, 2012-Ohio-6175, ¶ 10. 

The doctrine “promotes the principles of finality and judicial economy by preventing 

endless relitigation of an issue on which a defendant has already received a full and fair 

opportunity to be heard.” State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 

N.E.2d 824, ¶ 18. 

{¶11} Cowan has had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the issue of the 

imposition of consecutive sentences in this case. He is now barred from attempting to 

raise it again. 

{¶12} In light of the above, the first assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶13} For his second assigned error, Cowan contends that the trial court failed to 

properly impose postrelease control at the November 2013 sentencing hearing. We 

agree. 

The failure to properly notify a defendant of postrelease control and to 

incorporate that notice into the court’s sentencing entry renders the sentence 

void. State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 

864, paragraph one of the syllabus. This notification also includes 

informing a defendant of the consequences of violating postrelease control. 

See id.; R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e). 

State v. Pyne, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100580, 2014-Ohio-3037, ¶ 7. 

{¶14} In Cowan II, this court specifically remanded for a “de novo resentencing 

hearing.” Id. at ¶ 18. “[A] hearing de novo technically means hearing again, or 

hearing anew. In its purest form a de novo hearing entails a hearing where no record has 

been certified to the reviewing body.” Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. Whitman, 10th 
Dist. Franklin No. 74AP-151, 1974 Ohio App. LEXIS 3290, *26 (Nov. 19, 1974). 

Because the remand order from this court was for a de novo sentencing hearing, the trial 

court had to conduct a new sentencing hearing and comply with all sentencing 

requirements. The court made no mention of postrelease control at the November 2013 

resentencing hearing or in the sentencing judgment entry memorializing same. As such, 

we are constrained to once again reverse this case for the sole purpose of advising Cowan 

of his postrelease control requirements. 

{¶15} The second assignment of error is therefore sustained. 

{¶16} The contentions in the remaining assignments of error, which were filed by 

Cowan, pro se, are all barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The issues Cowan now 

attempts to raise were all issues that could have been raised in his first direct appeal. He 

is, therefore, now barred from raising them. 

{¶17} In light of the above, the third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error are 

overruled. 

{¶18} Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for 

resentencing for the sole purpose of advising Cowan of postrelease control requirements 

and memorializing same in a judgment entry. 

It is ordered that appellant and appellee split the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., PRESIDING JUDGE 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR