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Filed 9/16/21 P. v. Lindstrom CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL KAJ LINDSTROM,

Defendant and Appellant.

C088699

(Super. Ct. No. 16FE022125)

Defendant Michael Kaj Lindstrom’s dog attacked and severely injured his 

neighbor. A court afterward, following a bench trial, convicted him of knowingly 

possessing a “mischievous animal” that caused serious bodily injury to another. The 

court sentenced defendant to 364 days in jail, suspended execution of sentence, and 

placed defendant on formal probation for five years.

On appeal, defendant raises five issues. He contends (1) the court wrongly denied 

his request to relieve his retained attorney, (2) his counsel was ineffective because he 
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failed to request pretrial mental health diversion, (3) his counsel was ineffective because 

he advocated against, rather than for, him at sentencing, (4) the court wrongly imposed a 

probation term that would extend beyond the five-year term of probation, and (5) he 

should be discharged from probation because a recent change in the law reduced felony 

probation to two years.

We agree with defendant’s first contention and find his remaining four arguments 

moot. Defendant sought to discharge his attorney after his conviction and before 

sentencing, stating that his attorney would not meet with him and did not provide 

adequate representation. But the trial court denied the request. Applying the standard 

applicable for indigent defendants who seek to replace their appointed counsel, the court 

denied defendant’s request because it found he had failed to show that his attorney was 

providing inadequate representation or that he and his attorney were embroiled in 

irreconcilable conflict. But because defendant sought to replace his retained counsel, not 

appointed counsel, the court should have evaluated defendant’s request under a different 

standard. In particular, the court needed to grant his request unless it concluded that 

granting it would significantly prejudice defendant or cause unreasonable delay in the

processes of justice. (People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 983, 987 (Ortiz).) Because 

we find the trial court wrongly denied defendant’s request, we reverse and remand for 

further proceedings. 

BACKGROUND

I

Factual Background

Defendant formerly owned a pit bull named Red. According to his neighbor, 

Julian Salazar, Red “was outside running loose most of the days,” generally without 

supervision. Salazar often went outside “to make sure he wouldn’t hurt the kids” in the 

neighborhood and, on most days, when Salazar told Red to “go home,” Red complied. 
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But on one date in late 2016, he did not. After hearing Red barking outside in 

early November of 2016, Salazar became concerned “[h]e might hurt one of the kids” and 

so came outside and told Red to go home. When Red failed to listen, Salazar moved 

closer to Red and again told him to go home. But rather than return home, Red pounced 

on Salazar and knocked him to the ground. Salazar, who was nearly 90 years old at the 

time, yelled for help as Red bit his neck, his face, and the rest of his body. Eventually, 

Salazar’s stepson, who had been sleeping, awoke and came outside. He initially asked 

defendant to help, but, when defendant expressed concern at being bit himself and 

refused, he approached the dog and pulled him off of Salazar.

Salazar was afterward brought to the hospital, where he remained for the next two 

weeks. He “had bites and scratches all over” requiring “something like 75 stitches,” had 

his lower lip torn down to his chin, and had “a big gash” along his neck and a “big hole” 

in his check. He also lost half of an ear, part of a finger, and a three-inch-long flap of 

skin from his forehead, though the piece of skin was later reattached. Some of Salazar’s 

wounds eventually healed, but others did not. At the time of trial, for example, Salazar

could no longer fully close his mouth and one of his hands and could no longer feel his 

lower lip and the ends of his fingers. His hearing and his ability to eat also had 

deteriorated as a result of the attack.

Apart from attacking Salazar, Red had also previously attacked other people and 

dogs. In 2014, a man noticed Red off-leash across the street while walking a friend’s 

dog. Shortly after, Red charged and bit the man and the dog. In 2015, defendant

received care from a paramedic after Red attacked him, and a few months later, also in 

2015, defendant was hospitalized after Red attacked him again. Finally, in 2016, a 

woman noticed Red off-leash across the street while walking her dog. Red afterward 

charged and attempted to attack her dog, but the owner successfully shielded her dog

from Red.
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II

Procedural Background

After the attack on Salazar, the Sacramento County District Attorney charged 

defendant with two felony counts. In count one, the prosecution alleged that defendant

knowingly possessed a dog trained to fight, attack, or kill, and, because of defendant’s 

negligence, the dog caused substantial physical injury to Salazar. (Pen. Code, § 399.5, 

subd. (a).)1In count two, the prosecution alleged that defendant knowingly possessed a 

“mischievous” dog, and, because of defendant’s negligence, the dog caused serious 

bodily injury to Salazar. (§ 399, subd. (b).)

On September 7, 2018, following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant not 

guilty of count one and guilty of count two. Counsel and the court afterward discussed 

next steps, including the possibility of pursuing mental health court and referring the 

matter to probation. In the end, at the request of both the prosecutor and defense counsel, 

the court referred the matter to probation and instructed defendant to cooperate with his 

counsel to complete the necessary forms for mental health court. The court then 

scheduled another hearing for November 2, 2018.

At the November 2, 2018 hearing, defendant’s counsel requested additional time 

to pursue mental health court. To be eligible for mental health court, defense counsel 

explained, defendant needed to be “actively, currently treating with a psychiatrist with a 

diagnosis, a medical treatment plan, and that sort of thing.” But because defendant was 

not currently being treated, defense counsel asked for a continuance until November 7, 

2018, to allow defendant time to see a psychiatrist and begin “some kind of treatment 

plan.” The court agreed to the requested continuance but expressed an interest in moving 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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things along. It noted that there had already “been such a delay” and “Lindstrom had 

made zero efforts.” 

The court later rescheduled the November 7 hearing for November 6, 2018 “to 

accommodate the Court,” but, when defendant failed to appear on the rescheduled date, 

the court scheduled another hearing for November 30, 2018. At the November 30, 2018 

hearing, defendant’s counsel informed the court that defendant saw a doctor, was 

evaluated and received a diagnosis and a treatment plan, but he declined to participate in 

the treatment plan. A family friend of defendant supplied further information. She 

explained that defendant refused treatment because the doctor “wanted to give him these 

injections and there was no . . . choice of other medications at all.” She added that she 

would “make sure that . . . he gets a different doctor.” 

After the court expressed disappointment in defendant’s failure to obtain a 

treatment plan, defendant asked for an opportunity to speak. He then asked if he could 

“fire [his] attorney and get a new attorney.” He explained that he “ha[d] not had one 

single opportunity to meet with [his] attorney and discuss the case with him, not one 

time, and [he] ha[d] requested it over and over and over.” He added that he did not 

“think [he was being] well represented.” 

Based on defendant’s comments, the court found it necessary to hold a hearing

pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123. At the hearing, defendant

asserted that his counsel had failed to meet with him to discuss his case and to develop a 

strategy. He further asserted that he wanted to call various witnesses about his character 

and the facts of the case, but, because his attorney failed to meet with him, these 

witnesses were never called. He then, among other things, claimed that one person 

admitted she opened the door to his house to let his dog outside and asserted that various 

individuals “did this on purpose to make [him] look bad.” He also claimed that someone 

had trained his dog to attack because “[t]here is someone trying to get rid of me or kill 

me”; “[t]hey want my house really bad.” Defendant’s counsel, who spoke next, 
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acknowledged he did not spend much time with defendant. But he said that was because 

defendant “want[ed] [him] to pursue defenses that [we]re not pursuable, that [we]re not 

based in reality.” He added: “I can’t track down phantom witnesses or pursue 

conspiracy theories or things like that.” After hearing from both defendant and his 

attorney, the court denied defendant’s request to relieve his counsel. It reasoned that it 

“d[id] not find that there [wa]s a breakdown in the relationship between Mr. Lindstrom 

and [his counsel],” and that Lindstrom’s counsel “ha[d] more than competently and 

professionally represented Mr. Lindstrom.” After the so-called “Marsden” hearing, the 

court allowed defendant another week to obtain a second medical opinion. 

A week later, on December 7, 2018, defendant came, according to his counsel, 

“basically empty handed.” Defendant had met with a registered nurse and obtained pills 

of some sort to treat his condition, but he had been unable to meet with another 

psychiatrist. According to defendant, his healthcare provider said it would take “between 

two weeks and two months to get assigned a new physician,” and so, instead of 

scheduling an appointment with a new psychiatrist, he scheduled a second appointment 

with his initial psychiatrist for January 2019. Defendant added that, although he had 

obtained prescription pills, he had accidentally left them at the hospital. 

The court afterward asked counsel for their recommendations and both 

recommended moving forward with sentencing. The prosecutor expressed doubt that

defendant would ultimately participate in mental health court, and defendant’s counsel 

agreed, saying, “I don’t think it’s going to work because I don’t think he is going to 

participate and cooperate.” The court also agreed and proceeded to sentencing. It

sentenced defendant to 364 days in jail, suspended execution of sentence, and placed 

defendant on formal probation for five years. 
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DISCUSSION

I

Denial of Defendant’s Request to Relieve His Attorney

Defendant first contends we should remand for resentencing because the trial court 

wrongly denied his request to relieve his attorney. We agree.

All criminal defendants have some ability to discharge their counsel. But their 

right to discharge their counsel varies significantly depending on whether they are 

seeking to replace retained or appointed counsel. An indigent defendant “seeking to 

substitute one appointed attorney for another,” for example, must “demonstrate either 

that the first appointed attorney is providing inadequate representation [citations], or that 

he and the attorney are embroiled in irreconcilable conflict [citation].” (Ortiz, supra, 51 

Cal.3d at p. 984.) But a nonindigent defendant seeking to replace retained counsel, like 

defendant, need not make any showing at all. As our Supreme Court has explained, 

“[t]he right of a nonindigent criminal defendant to discharge his retained attorney, with or 

without cause, has long been recognized in this state.” (Id. at p. 983.) 

The different treatment of indigent defendants seeking to replace appointed 

counsel and nonindigent defendants seeking to replace retained counsel is founded 

largely on different “policy concerns.” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 986.) For example, 

“it is ordinarily appropriate to require the defendant who is seeking to substitute one 

appointed counsel for another to show cause, because he is requesting duplicative 

representation and repetitive investigation at taxpayer expense.” (Ibid.) But those 

concerns are not present when a defendant seeks to retain new counsel or requests 

appointed counsel for the first time. (Ibid.) In that circumstance, “[n]o additional public 

expense or drain on the state’s limited resources is at issue, nor, as long as the motion is 

timely, is there a risk of any undesirable opportunity to ‘delay trials and otherwise 

embarrass effective prosecution’ of crime.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) 
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But although nonindigent defendants are typically accorded significant leeway in 

replacing their counsel, their right to do so “is not absolute.” (Id. at p. 983.) As our 

Supreme Court explained in Ortiz: “The trial court, in its discretion, may deny such a 

motion if discharge will result in ‘significant prejudice’ to the defendant [citation], or if it 

is not timely, i.e., if it will result in ‘disruption of the orderly processes of justice’ 

[citations].” (Ibid.) Absent a proper finding of that sort, however, the court may not 

deny the request and thereby “ignore the value we place on allowing defendants to defend 

themselves as they deem best.” (Id. at p. 987.) 

In this case, we have a nonindigent defendant who sought to replace his retained 

counsel. But as all parties acknowledge, the trial court mistakenly proceeded as if he 

were an indigent defendant seeking to replace his appointed counsel. Before sentencing, 

again, defendant asserted he was not being “well represented” and asked whether he 

could “fire [his] attorney and get a new attorney.” But the court found he could not. 

Mistakenly applying the standard applicable for indigent defendants seeking to replace 

their appointed counsel, it reasoned that defendant’s attorney had “competently and 

professionally represented Mr. Lindstrom” and “there [wa]s [no] breakdown in the 

relationship between Mr. Lindstrom and [his attorney].” A week later, the court 

sentenced defendant. 

Under similar circumstances, courts have found a trial court’s denial of a 

defendant’s motion to relieve retained counsel mandated automatic reversal. In Ortiz, for 

example, the defendant sought to replace his retained counsel four months after a mistrial 

on a murder charge and “well before any second trial.” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 

979-980, 987.) But the trial court denied the request “on the ground that defendant had 

not demonstrated his attorneys’ incompetence.” Several months after, the court found the 

defendant guilty of second degree murder following “a ‘Bunnell plea.’ ” (Id. at pp. 980-

981.) The Supreme Court later found reversible error. 
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Although, the court explained, “we do require an indigent criminal defendant who 

is seeking to substitute one appointed attorney for another to demonstrate either that the 

first appointed attorney is providing inadequate representation [citations], or that he and 

the attorney are embroiled in irreconcilable conflict [citation], we have never required a 

nonindigent criminal defendant to make such a showing in order to discharge his retained

counsel.” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 984.) And although, the court added, “[a] 

nonindigent defendant’s right to discharge his retained counsel . . . is not absolute,” it is 

subject to few limitations. In particular, the court stated, “[t]he trial court, in its 

discretion, may deny such a motion [only] if discharge will result in ‘significant 

prejudice’ to the defendant [citation], or if it is not timely, i.e., if it will result in 

‘disruption of the orderly processes of justice’ [citation].” (Id. at p. 983.) “Applying the 

law to the facts of this case,” the court found “that the trial court erred by requiring [the] 

defendant to demonstrate the incompetence of [his retained counsel] before allowing him 

to discharge them. Defendant’s motion, made after the mistrial and well before any 

second trial, was sufficiently timely; the timing reflects defendant’s genuine concern 

about the adequacy of his defense rather than any intent to delay the retrial. On this 

showing,” the court held, “discharge of the [defense counsel] would not have interfered 

with the ‘orderly processes of justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 987.)

The Court of Appeal in People v. Munoz (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 860 (Munoz) 

found similarly on facts more like our own. The defendant there sought to replace his 

retained counsel “40 days after he was convicted and 9 before he was scheduled to be 

sentenced.” (Id. at p. 864.) But the trial court, mistakenly applying the standard 

applicable for indigent defendants, denied the request and later sentenced the defendant. 

(Id. at pp. 865-866.) On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed. Although the court 

acknowledged that a request for new counsel after trial would often involve excessive 

delay and public expense (id. at p. 868), and although the court accepted that the trial 
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court in this case may have, had it applied the correct standard, been able to properly 

deny the defendant’s request (id. at p. 869), it found the record before it required reversal. 

To start, the court explained, “there [wa]s nothing in the record to suggest” that the 

trial court “inquir[ed]” into whether granting the defendant’s request would cause 

“substantial delay in the administration of justice.” (Munoz, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 869-870.) And to the extent, the court went on, the trial court assumed that 

substantial delay would occur without due consideration of the defendant’s interest in 

new counsel, that was improper. A trial court, the court explained, “ ‘must balance the 

defendant’s interest in new counsel against the disruption, if any, flowing from the 

substitution’ [citation]”; it cannot “ ‘myopic[ally] insist[] upon expeditiousness in the 

face of a justifiable request for delay. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 870.) Turning to the 

circumstances of the defendant’s request, the court doubted that granting the request 

would have led to an unreasonable delay. Among other things, the court noted that there 

was no evidence that the defendant “had an interest in delay,” the case was “not 

particularly complicated,” the trial was short (“last[ing] but two days”), and “it is unlikely 

that preparing the record for review by a new attorney would have taken an inordinate 

amount of time.” (Ibid.) On these facts, the court found “the trial court violated 

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by denying his 

motion to relieve retained counsel.” (Ibid.)

We reach a similar conclusion here. Again, as our Supreme Court explained in 

Ortiz, a trial court may deny a defendant’s request to discharge retained counsel only “if 

discharge will result in ‘significant prejudice’ to the defendant [citation], or if it is not 

timely, i.e., if it will result in ‘disruption of the orderly processes of justice’ [citations].” 

(Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 983.) But, in this case, the trial court neither explicitly nor 

implicitly found either of these two considerations present before denying defendant’s 

request. It never suggested that granting defendant’s request would “ ‘significant[ly] 

prejudice” defendant. Nor did it suggest that granting his request would “result in 
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‘disruption of the orderly processes of justice.’ ” It never, it appears, considered these 

issues at all. And although it is true, as the Attorney General points out, that the court at 

least expressed some concern with delay related to defendant’s obtaining a medical 

treatment plan, the court never expressed any similar concern related to defendant’s 

request to replace his counsel. 

Nor, considering the facts of this case, is it evident that granting defendant’s 

request would have caused any delay, let alone an “unreasonable delay in the processes 

of justice.” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 987.) After denying defendant’s request, 

notably, the court granted a continuance of a week to obtain a second medical opinion 

and treatment plan. Nothing in the record suggests that defendant would have been 

unable to retain new counsel in that period. Nor does anything in the record suggest that 

new counsel, once retained, would have been unable to sufficiently prepare in this 

timeframe. The presentation of evidence and argument for defendant’s trial, after all, 

covered only two days and about 250 pages of transcript. Considering these facts, “it 

seems unlikely that [defendant’s hiring of new counsel] would have led to ‘an 

unreasonable disruption of the orderly process of justice,’ ” if any disruption at all. 

(Munoz, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 870.) And although “[t]here may have been other 

circumstances supporting a finding of unreasonable delay, . . . they are not apparent from 

the record, and we cannot speculate about them in order to affirm the ruling.” (People v. 

Lopez (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 40, 50.) 

Apart from an absence of evidence supporting a finding of unreasonable delay, we 

also find nothing in the record suggesting that defendant sought to replace his attorney for 

any improper purpose. If anything, the record suggests the contrary. Defendant asserted 

that he “wanted to meet with [his counsel] to discuss” his case before trial, but, because 

his counsel said he was “too busy or overworked or whatever,” they “never met.” He 

added that he “wanted to call people forward that would lend some information on [his]

character and on . . . the situation itself,” but, because he was never able to “meet with 
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[his] attorney and talk with him and openly discuss [the facts of the case] . . . [and] 

develop or devise a strategy of defense,” these witnesses were never called. Defendant, 

in short, appeared to have had a legitimate belief that his counsel was not listening to him 

and not adequately representing his interest. And although his belief may have been 

partially founded on, according to his attorney, an interest in pursuing defenses “that 

[we]re not based in reality,” that alone was not ground for denying defendant’s request. 

The trial court, after all, could not deny defendant’s request to discharge his attorney 

merely because it found the request unwise or poorly reasoned, unless it found the 

“discharge w[ould] result in ‘significant prejudice’ to the defendant” or “w[ould] result in 

‘disruption of the orderly processes of justice.’ ” (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 983; see 

also ibid. [a nonindigent criminal defendant may “discharge his retained attorney[] with

or without cause”].) But again, the court never appeared to find either circumstance true.

On these facts, we find the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 

defendant’s request to relieve his retained counsel. (Munoz, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 

870.) We further find that this violation “mandates automatic reversal.” (Ibid.; see also 

Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 988 [“Reversal is automatic . . . when a defendant has been 

deprived of his right to defend with counsel of his choice.”]; United States v. GonzalezLopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 144, 147-148 [165 L.Ed.2d 409] [the “right to select counsel 

of one’s choice,” although “ ‘circumscribed in several important respects,’ ” is protected 

under the Sixth Amendment]; id. at p. 150 [“erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel 

of choice, ‘with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, 

unquestionably qualifies as “structural error” ’ ” that requires automatic reversal].)

Seeking a contrary conclusion, the Attorney General offers several cases he finds 

more relevant to our facts, including People v. Keshishian (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 425, 

People v. Lau (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 473, and People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 

Cal.App.4th 1388 (Dowdell). But all these cases are readily distinguishable. In 

Keshishian, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 425, the defendant sought to discharge his counsel 
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“on the day set for trial after the case had been pending for two and a half years.” (Id. at 

p. 429.) Importantly, in finding the “trial court did not err in denying the request,” the 

court noted that “[t]he [trial] court here applied the correct standard in rejecting 

appellant’s last-minute attempt to discharge counsel and delay the start of trial.” (Ibid., 

italics added.) Similarly, in Lau, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 473, the defendant sought to 

discharge his counsel “the moment jury selection was to begin.” (Id. at p. 479.) In 

“find[ing] no error in the court’s consideration and denial of [the defendant’s] request,” 

the court, similar to the Keshishian court, indicated that the trial court applied the correct 

standard in denying the request. (Ibid.; id. at p. 477, fn. 3.) Finally, in Dowdell, supra,

227 Cal.App.4th 1388, the defendant sought to remove her counsel on the eighth day of 

trial in a case involving “complex legal issues, numerous witnesses and exhibits, and 

hours of recorded audio.” (Id. at pp. 1411-1412.) Although, in this case, the court found 

the trial court relied on the wrong standard in considering the defendant’s request, it 

nonetheless concluded that “[t]he court implicitly found that granting [the defendant] a 

continuance long enough to retain new counsel could cause an unreasonable ‘disruption 

of the orderly processes of justice’ from the loss of too many jurors.” (Id. at p. 1412.)

But of all these cases, only one involved a trial court that mistakenly applied the 

wrong standard when evaluating a defendant’s request to relieve retained counsel. And 

the facts of that one case, Dowdell, are in no way comparable to our own. Granting the 

defendant’s request there, which came in the middle of a complicated trial, would have 

resulted in “the loss of too many jurors” and required a new attorney to spend 

“substantial time to prepare.” (Dowdell, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1412.) But nothing 

on our facts suggests a similar “ ‘disruption of the orderly processes of justice.’ ” (Ortiz, 

supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 983.) Nothing on our facts, for example, indicates that granting 

defendant’s request would have required a redo of anything, let alone a complicated trial. 

Nor do our facts support a finding that a new attorney would have needed to spend 

substantial time to come up to speed. Again, this is not a complicated case. It is a simple 
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case that involved a brief trial. And given these features of the case, we find it highly 

“unlikely that appointing new counsel for defendant would have led to ‘an unreasonable 

disruption of the orderly processes of justice.’ [Citation.]” (Munoz, supra, 138 

Cal.App.4th at p. 870.) 

II

Defendant’s Counsel’s Failure to Request Pretrial Mental Health Diversion

Defendant next contends his counsel was ineffective because he failed to request 

mental health diversion under section 1001.36. Because, however, we find that defendant 

may still seek diversion under this statute on remand, we need not address the merits of 

his argument here.

Section 1001.36, which became effective a little over two months before 

defendant’s trial, “authorizes a pretrial diversion program for defendants with qualifying 

mental disorders.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 623, 626 (Frahs).) It defines 

“pretrial diversion” to “mean[] the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or 

permanently, at any point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is 

charged until adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health 

treatment . . .” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) 

Although the statute does not define the phrase “until adjudication,” case law 

offers three potential interpretations. Under the first, the time of adjudication is the time 

that guilt is found. (People v. Graham (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 827, 832-833 (Graham) 

[“a request for ‘pretrial diversion’ under section 1001.36 is timely only if it is made prior 

to the jury’s guilty verdict”], review granted Sept. 1, 2021, S269509; People v. Craine

(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 744, 755 [the term “adjudication” in § 1001.36 is “shorthand for 

the adjudication of guilt or acquittal”], review granted Sept. 11, 2019, S256671,

disapproved of on other grounds by Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th 618.) Under the second, the 

time of adjudication is the time a jury is impaneled and sworn. (People v. Braden (2021) 

63 Cal.App.5th 330, 333 (Braden) [“a defendant is ineligible for diversion under section 
15

1001.36 after his trial begins”], review granted July 14, 2021, S268925; People v. Torres

(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 849, 855 [“ ‘Until adjudication’ means before the jury is 

impaneled and sworn.”], disapproved of on other grounds by Frahs.) And under the 

third, the time of adjudication is the time of sentencing. (People v. Curry (2021) 62 

Cal.App.5th 314, 320 (Curry) [“section 1001.36 contemplates mental health diversion 

until entry of the judgment of conviction”], review granted July 14, 2021, S267394; 

Craine, at p. 755 [“At most, ‘adjudication’ could be synonymous with the rendition or 

pronouncement of judgment, which occurs at the time of sentencing.”].) 

The distinction between these three interpretations is important, for if a case is 

“adjudicat[ed]” only once the sentence is rendered, then we would have no need to 

consider defendant’s contention here. In that event, because our finding in part I of our 

Discussion requires the vacatur of defendant’s sentence, defendant would be able to 

pursue diversion under section 1001.36 on remand and his claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel would be moot. But if, on the other hand, a case is “adjudicat[ed]” once guilt 

is established (or even earlier, at the time a jury is impaneled and sworn), then he would 

not. Our finding in part I, after all, does not set aside the court’s finding of guilt, which 

occurred before defendant sought to replace his counsel. And so, were the term 

“adjudication” to be construed in this latter manner, then defendant would be unable to 

pursue diversion under section 1001.36 on remand.

Considering the ordinary meaning of the term “adjudication,” the structure of the 

mental health diversion law, and the stated purposes of the law, we construe the phrase 

“from the point at which the accused is charged until adjudication” to mean “the point at 

which the accused is charged until” judgment—which is to say, until the time that the 

court orally pronounces sentence. Because of this conclusion, we find that defendant’s

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is moot.

We begin our analysis with the term “adjudication.” As discussed, it is a term 

with several potential meanings. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, for example, it 
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has two meanings: (1) “[t]he legal process of resolving a dispute,” and (2) “judgment,” 

which is itself defined to mean “[a] court’s final determination of the rights and 

obligations of the parties in a case.” (Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019).) According to 

some other dictionaries, on the other hand, the term’s meaning is a bit broader. The 

Random House Dictionary of the English Language, for example, defines the term to 

mean, with respect to the law, either “the act of a court in making an order, judgment, or 

decree,” “a judicial decision or sentence,” or “a court decree in bankruptcy.” (Random 

House Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed. 1987) p. 25, col. 2.) Several other 

dictionaries offer similar definitions. (See Webster’s New Collegiate Diet. (9th ed. 1988) 

p. 56, col. 1 [adjudication means, among other things, “a judicial decision or sentence”]; 

see also Braden, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 337 [stating that, in Merriam-Webster’s 

online dictionary, the “first definition of ‘adjudication’ is ‘the act or process of 

adjudicating a dispute’ ”].) Putting these several definitions together, we are left with 

three general meanings for the term “adjudication”: the legal process of resolving a 

dispute, a judicial decision other than a judgment, and a judgment.

But of these several potential definitions, we find only one—the term defined as 

“judgment”—is reasonable in the context of section 1001.36. Consider first the 

definition of adjudication as the “legal process of resolving a dispute.” (Black’s Law

Dict. (11th ed. 2019).) Assuming this definition of “adjudication” applied here, we 

would have to read section 1001.36 to say that a defendant may seek diversion “at any 

point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until” the 

“legal process of resolving a dispute.” But that sentence makes no sense. The term 

“adjudication” in section 1001.36, after all, refers to a “point in the judicial process,” and 

the “legal process of resolving a dispute” is plainly not a “point in the judicial process.”

Consider next the definition of adjudication as a judicial decision other than a 

judgment. (See Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed. 1987) p. 25, 

col. 2; Webster’s New Collegiate Diet. (9th ed. 1988) p. 56, col. 1.) Courts most often 
17

employ this understanding of the term when referring to the “adjudication of guilt.” In In 

re Harris (1989) 49 Cal.3d 131 (Harris), for example, our Supreme Court discussed the 

scope of a proceeding “from filing to adjudication of guilt”—meaning, from the filing of 

charges to the finding or plea of guilt. (Id. at p. 136.) In other cases, the court has on 

occasion similarly discussed the “judgment of guilt” or “judgment about guilt” when 

referring to the jury’s finding of guilt. (People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 912 

(Montiel) [discussing a jury’s “judgment of guilt”], disapproved of on other grounds by 

People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 686 fn. 13; People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 

90, 109 [discussing a jury’s “ ‘ “judgment about guilt” ’ ”].) And the Legislature too has 

occasionally used similar language, at times referring to the “adjudication of guilt” and 

“adjudication by a trier of fact.” (Veh. Code, § 15210, subd. (d) [“adjudication of guilt”]; 

§ 299, subd. (c)(1) [“adjudication by a trier of fact”].)

But when the terms adjudication and judgment are used to refer to the finding of 

guilt, that is typically clear from context. The court in Harris, for example, did not refer 

to the scope of a proceeding “from filing to adjudication”; it referred to the scope of a 

proceeding “from filing to adjudication of guilt.” (Harris, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 136.) 

And the court in Montiel, in like fashion, did not refer simply to the guilty verdict as the 

“judgment”; it instead referred to the jury’s “judgment of guilt.” (Montiel, supra, 5 

Cal.4th at p. 912.) That in mind, had the Legislature intended in section 1001.36 to refer 

to the time that guilt is established, we would have expected it to use the phrase “until 

adjudication of guilt,” or at least provided some other indication of this intent, rather than 

simply use the phrase “until adjudication.” 

We are left, then, with the final definition of adjudication—adjudication as 

“judgment.” And considering the term in this fashion, without any qualifying reference 

to guilt, we understand the time of “adjudication” in section 1001.36 to mean the time 

“when the trial court orally pronounces sentence.” (See People v. Karaman (1992) 
18

4 Cal.4th 335, 344 [“In a criminal case, judgment is rendered when the trial court orally 

pronounces sentence.”].) 

Several considerations, some of which we have already touched on, guide us in 

reaching this conclusion. First, we find this construction best accords with the 

Legislature’s unqualified use of the word “adjudication” in section 1001.36. The 

Legislature, importantly, did not refer to the “adjudication of guilt.” Nor did it refer to 

the adjudication of some particular issue. It instead referred simply to the point of 

“adjudication” in the “judicial process.” Considering this context, and seeing no 

indication of a contrary intent, we understand this language to refer to the time of 

judgment rather than the time of some other, earlier judicial decision in the judicial 

process. (Compare Harris, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 136 [referring to the “adjudication of 

guilt”] with Beeler v. American Trust Co. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 435, 437 [using the terms 

“judgment” and “adjudication” interchangeably; discussing the “judgment” and “the date 

of entry of such adjudication”].)

Second, we find this construction is consistent with the Legislature’s broad 

statement of purpose in section 1001.35, which, as our Supreme Court has explained, 

evinces the Legislature’s intent that “ ‘the mental health diversion program . . . apply as 

broadly as possible.’ [Citation.]” (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 632; see also § 1001.35, 

subd. (a) [the mental health diversion program serves, among other things, to 

“[i]ncrease[] diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ 

entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety”]; Curry, 

supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 324 [the Legislature’s stated intent in § 1001.35 favors “the 

conclusion we should interpret the phrase ‘until adjudication’ to mean ‘until the judgment 

of conviction’ (of which sentencing is a necessary component) rather than ‘until 

adjudication of guilt’ ”].) 

Finally, to the extent any ambiguity remains on the meaning of the term 

“adjudication,” we find our construction of that term is favored under the rule of lenity. 
19

(See Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 183, 202 [when “ ‘ “two reasonable 

interpretations of the same [criminal] provision stand in relative equipoise,” ’ ” the rule of 

lenity requires the ambiguity to “ ‘ “ ‘be resolved in favor of lenity, giving the defendant 

the benefit of every reasonable doubt on questions of interpretation’ ” ’ ”]; Walsh v. 

Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1963) 59 Cal.2d 757, 764-765 [“it is ‘the 

policy of California [citation] to construe and apply penal statutes as favorably to the 

defendant as the language of the statute and the circumstances of its application may 

reasonably permit’ [citation]”].)

In reaching this conclusion, we stand by our recent decision in Curry, supra, 62 

Cal.App.5th 314. (Id. at p. 323 [“the phrase ‘until adjudication’ should be interpreted to 

mean ‘until the judgment of conviction’—which does not occur until sentencing”].) But 

we acknowledge that two published decisions since Curry have rejected our reasoning. 

(See Braden, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 333; Graham, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 829, 

review granted.) We briefly address those two decisions here, starting with Braden. 

The court there expressly “disagreed with People v. Curry (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 

314,” concluding that “a defendant is ineligible for diversion under section 1001.36 after 

his trial begins.” (Braden, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 333.) Its reasoning was fourfold. 

First, the court based its conclusion on the fact “that the Legislature five times in the text 

of section 1001.36 referred to the mental health diversion program as ‘pretrial’ diversion. 

[Citation.] Regardless of the precise moment that defines the beginning of trial, a case is 

no longer ‘pretrial’ once a trial has started.” (Ibid.) But “pretrial diversion,” again, is a 

defined term that “means the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or 

permanently, at any point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is 

charged until adjudication.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) That definition in mind, although we 

would generally agree that a case is no longer “pretrial” once a trial has started, we 

cannot agree that a case has been prosecuted to “adjudication” before a trial has even 

begun. Our conclusion in this regard, we acknowledge, highlights the tension between 
20

the terms “pretrial” and “adjudication.” But “[w]hen ‘a statute includes an explicit 

definition’ of a term, ‘we must follow that definition, even if it varies from a term’s 

ordinary meaning.’ [Citation.]” (Van Buren v. United States (2021) ___ U.S. ___ [141 

S.Ct. 1648, 1657, 210 L.Ed.2d 26, 37-39].)

Second, the Braden court based its conclusion on our Supreme Court’s decision in 

Morse v. Municipal Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 149 (Morse). In Morse, the court considered 

the latest point in time that a defendant could seek pretrial diversion under section 1000

et seq.—a statutory scheme that allows pretrial diversion for certain drug crimes. (Morse,

at p. 153.) In addressing this question, the court found determinative a statute in that 

scheme, section 1000.1, that makes a defendant’s participation in the diversion program 

contingent on the defendant waiving his or her right to a speedy trial, which is a right that 

a defendant may only assert before the commencement of trial. Based on this 

requirement, the court concluded that “the plain meaning of the waiver of speedy trial 

language of section 1000.1 is that the defendant’s consent to referral of his case to the 

probation department should be tendered to the district attorney prior to the 

commencement of trial.” (Morse, at p. 156.) 

Considering this holding, along with section 1001.36’s similar requirement that a 

defendant must waive his or her right to a speedy trial to participate in mental health 

diversion, the Braden court concluded that Morse “requir[es] us to construe section 

1001.36 as precluding requests for mental health diversion after trial begins.” (Braden, 

supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 335.) We find differently. Section 1000 et seq., the statutory 

scheme covered in Morse, is not altogether comparable to section 1001.36. Most 

importantly here, although both statutes require defendants to waive their speedy trial 

rights before participating in a diversion program, and although both refer to pretrial 

diversion, only section 1001.36 defines the phrase “pretrial diversion” to allow diversion 

until the time of “adjudication”—which, again, is a time that we hold occurs after trial 

has begun. This broad definition of “pretrial diversion” may leave the requirement that a 
21

defendant waive his or her right to a speedy trial inapplicable at times, but that alone is 

not, in our view, a reason to write the phrase “until adjudication” out of the definition of 

“pretrial diversion.”

Third, the Braden court stated, “construing section 1001.36 as requiring that a 

diversion request be made before trial is consistent with the nature of California diversion 

programs, which long have had a purpose of reducing the systemic burdens of criminal 

trials.” (Braden, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 335.) But although true that pretrial 

diversion programs can serve to avoid the necessity of trial, and although true that this 

result may be beneficial, this is not among the stated purposes of the diversion program

before us. According to section 1001.35, this program has three purposes: “(a) Increased 

diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and 

reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety. [¶] (b) Allowing 

local discretion and flexibility for counties in the development and implementation of 

diversion for individuals with mental disorders across a continuum of care settings. [¶] 

(c) Providing diversion that meets the unique mental health treatment and support needs 

of individuals with mental disorders.” These purposes, as we explained in Curry, 

demonstrate “[a] legislative intent that the mental health diversion program apply as 

broadly as possible” (Curry, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 324)—not simply an intent that 

the diversion program apply narrowly to minimize the number of trials. 

We find that true even though, as the Braden court noted, three older cases have 

stated that pretrial diversion programs serve to avoid the necessity of trial. (Braden, 

supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 335-336.) Two of these three cases, importantly, concerned 

section 1000 et seq. (People v. Alonzo (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 466, 467; People v. 

Hudson (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 661, 663.) But, again, that statutory scheme does not 

include an expansive definition of the term “pretrial diversion,” and so we decline to find 

these cases helpful to our analysis. 
22

The Braden court’s third cited case, Gresher v. Anderson (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 

88, is more complicated. That case concerned section 1001 et seq., a statutory scheme 

that provides a diversion program similar to that here and that offers an identical 

definition of “pretrial diversion.” (§ 1001.1 [defining “pretrial diversion”].) The Gresher

court considered in particular whether a statute—which allows the State Department of 

Social Services to cease processing certain types of applications when the applicant “is 

awaiting trial for a crime other than a minor traffic violation”—applies when the 

applicant is in “pretrial diversion” under section 1001.1. (Gresher, at pp. 110-111.) The 

court found it did not. It reasoned that “a trial is not contemplated” for persons who 

pursue pretrial diversion under section 1001.1, and so, unless they are removed from their 

diversion program for cause, “it cannot reasonably be said that persons in diversion 

programs are ‘awaiting trial.’ ” (Gresher, at p. 111.) The court added that “[t]he purpose 

of [all diversion and deferred entry of judgment] programs is precisely to avoid the 

necessity of a trial” (ibid.)—which is the point that the Braden court focused on in its 

own analysis (Braden, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 335). 

We decline, however, to agree with this broad proposition, which the Gresher

court offered without citation or explanation. Although we generally agree with that 

court’s bottom line—a “trial is not contemplated” (or perhaps better to say, no future trial 

is contemplated) for persons who pursue pretrial diversion under section 1001.1—we 

cannot agree that the purpose of all diversion programs is to avoid the necessity of a trial. 

Several diversion programs, after all, allow a defendant to pursue diversion until the time 

of “adjudication.” (See §§ 1001.1, 1001.36, 1001.50, 1001.70, 1001.80.) And, again, we 

cannot say that a case could be prosecuted to “adjudication” before the determination of 

guilt and even before the start of trial.

Fourth, the Braden court construed the term “adjudication” to “refer[] to the 

process of adjudicating an issue,” explaining that, when a word in a definition is 

susceptible of more than one reading, courts should adopt the one that best matches the 
23

ordinary meaning of the defined term—which, in this case, is “pretrial diversion.” 

(Braden, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 336-337.) We agree, as mentioned, that the term 

“adjudication” could be interpreted in this manner in some contexts. (See Black’s Law

Dict. (11th ed. 2019) [the term “adjudication” means, among other things, the “legal 

process of resolving a dispute”].) We agree too that, as the Braden court noted, “[i]n 

settling on a fair reading of a statute, it is not unusual to consider the ordinary meaning of 

a defined term, particularly when there is dissonance between that ordinary meaning and 

the reach of the definition.” (Bond v. United States (2014) 572 U.S. 844, 861 [189 

L.Ed.2d 1, 15].) But those considerations are not, in our view, enough to adopt the 

Braden court’s construction of the term “adjudication.” To start, although it is certainly 

not unusual to consider the ordinary meaning of a defined term like “pretrial diversion,”

“[w]hen ‘a statute includes an explicit definition’ of a term, ‘we must follow that 

definition, even if it varies from a term’s ordinary meaning.’ [Citation.]” (Van Buren, 

supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [141 S.Ct. at p. 1657, 210 L.Ed at pp. 37-39].) Moreover, 

although “adjudication” could be construed as the process of adjudicating an issue in 

some instances, applying that construction here, as discussed, would leave a nonsensical 

definition of “pretrial diversion.” Again, the term “adjudication” in section 1001.36 

refers to a “point in the judicial process,” and the “process of adjudicating an issue” is 

certainly not a “point in the judicial process.”

We turn next to the court’s decision in Graham, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th 827, 

review granted, which also rejected our decision in Curry, though on somewhat different 

grounds. While declining to “go as far as” the Braden court, it “h[e]ld that a request for 

‘pretrial diversion’ under section 1001.36 is timely only if it is made prior to the jury’s 

guilty verdict.” (Graham, at pp. 829, 832-833.) In support, the court first stated that “the 

phrase ‘pretrial diversion’ by itself strongly suggests a timing requirement.” (Id. at p.

833.) But although we agree that section 1001.36 sets a timing requirement, we find that 

this requirement resides in the definition of “pretrial diversion,” not in the word “pretrial” 
24

alone. Even the Graham court appeared to agree on this point, for had it allowed itself to 

be guided by the word “pretrial” alone, then it would have concluded that “pretrial” 

diversion may occur only pretrial—a conclusion that it itself declined to adopt. (Graham, 

at p. 829.)

Second, turning to the definition of “pretrial diversion,” the court stated that the 

term “ ‘adjudication’ typically refers to an adjudication of guilt.” (Graham, supra, 64 

Cal.App.5th at p. 833, review granted.) In support, the court cited our Supreme Court’s 

decision in Harris, which, as covered already, referred to the “adjudication of guilt.” 

(Harris, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 136.) But we find Harris to be poor support for this 

proposition for several reasons. First, in our view at least, the term “adjudication” does 

not typically refer to the adjudication of guilt. Considering Black’s Law Dictionary, for 

example, the term “adjudication” does not refer to the “adjudication of guilt” at all; it 

refers instead either to (1) “[t]he legal process of resolving a dispute” or (2) “judgment,” 

which is itself defined to mean “[a] court’s final determination of the rights and 

obligations of the parties in a case.” (Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019).) Second, 

although the court in Harris used the phrase “adjudication of guilt,” our Supreme Court

in other cases has used the word “adjudication” to mean judgment. (See French v. 

Rishell (1953) 40 Cal.2d 477, 479 [using the phrase “final judgment” and “final 

adjudication” interchangeably]; Beeler v. American Trust Co., supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 437

[using the terms “judgment” and “adjudication” interchangeably]; Seligman v. Kalkman

(1860) 17 Cal. 152, 156, 159 [“ ‘adjudication’ and ‘judgment’ are synonymous” when the 

term “judgment” means “ ‘the final determination of the rights of the parties in the action 

or proceeding’ ”].) And lastly, the California Supreme Court has also at times used the 

phrase “judgment of guilt” or “judgment about guilt” when referring to a jury’s verdict 

(Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 912; People v. Souza, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 109), yet no 

one, we expect, would assert that the term “judgment” typically refers to a jury’s verdict 
25

(see People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46 [“In criminal actions, the terms 

‘judgment’ and ‘ “sentence” ’ are generally considered ‘synonymous.’ ”]).

Third, the Graham court found that the stated purposes of the mental health 

diversion program “are fully served by allowing defendants to seek mental health pretrial 

diversion prior to adjudication of their guilt.” (Graham, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 833, 

review granted.) But one of these stated purposes, again, is “[i]ncreased diversion of 

individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the 

criminal justice system while protecting public safety.” (§ 1001.35, subd. (a).) Although 

this purpose is certainly served in part in allowing mental health diversion before the 

finding of guilt, it is more “fully served” by allowing diversion until the time of 

sentencing.

Finally, the Graham court expressed concern about “the inefficient use of finite 

judicial resources” were section 1001.36 to be construed more broadly. In particular, the 

court noted: “If a defendant knows that pretrial diversion is available even after going to 

trial, why not see what happens at trial and then, if the jury returns a guilty verdict, seek 

pretrial diversion? Does a defendant receive ineffective assistance of counsel if her 

lawyer does not take this approach?” (Graham, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at pp. 833-834, 

review granted.) But although we acknowledge that our construction of section 1001.36 

would, relative to the Graham court’s construction, result in more defendants pursuing 

trial before attempting to pursue mental health diversion, we decline to find that this 

consideration alone requires a narrow interpretation of the term “adjudication.” The 

Legislature, after all, may have thought it better to maximize the number of individuals 

who participate in mental health diversion programs than to minimize the number of 

individuals who pursue trial. Construing the statute in this manner, to be sure, may 

demand more judicial resources. But it could very well result in more efficient use of 

resources overall. Indeed, according to an analysis of a bill that “amended section 

1001.36 just a few months after it was enacted, community-based treatment for a 
26

mentally ill individual costs much less than jailing the same individual, and greatly 

reduces recidivism. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. Of Sen. Floor Analysis, Unfinished Business 

Analysis of Sen. Bill 215 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 23, 2018, p. 2 

[community-based treatment for a mentally ill defendant costs roughly $20,000 per year; 

jailing the same defendant costs more than $75,000].)” (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 

635.) 

In short, because we find a defendant may seek pretrial diversion if he or she 

chooses to do so any time prior to sentencing, we conclude that defendant’s claim here of 

ineffective assistance of counsel is moot.

III

Defendant’s Remaining Contentions

We briefly address defendant’s three remaining contentions, all of which we find 

unnecessary to address in light of our conclusion in part I of our Discussion.

First, raising another argument for ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant

contends his counsel was ineffective because he advocated against him, rather than for 

him, during sentencing. Defendant notes in support, among other things, that he 

indicated to the trial court that he desired more time to obtain an appointment with a new 

psychiatrist, but rather than ask for a continuance, his counsel argued: “I don’t think it’s 

going to work because I don’t think he is going to participate and cooperate.” Second, 

defendant contends one of the terms of probation (namely, the prohibition on his having 

an animal for 10 years) was improper because it exceeded the five-year term of 

probation. And finally, in a supplemental brief, defendant contends he should be 

discharged from probation because a recent amendment to section 1203.1 reduced felony 

probation to two years. But because our conclusion in part I of our Discussion requires 

the vacatur of defendant’s sentence, we find all these issues moot.
27

DISPOSITION

Defendant’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded to allow defendant to 

obtain counsel of his choice. After defendant has an opportunity to do so, the trial court 

must then proceed from the point that defendant originally sought to discharge his 

attorney.

 /s/

BLEASE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

 /s/

MAURO, J.

 /s/

DUARTE, J.