RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4397-15T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

S.P.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

Y.M.,

Defendant.

______________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF P.P., S.P., O.P.,

R.P. and A.K.B.,

Minors.

_____________________________________________________

Submitted October 11, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Fisher and Sumners.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, 

Atlantic County, Docket No. FN-01-0172-10.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Anthony J. Vecchio, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 18, 2017
2 A-4397-15T3

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Melissa Dutton 

Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel; Kimberly S. Dinenberg, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minors (Todd Wilson, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

This action, commenced by the Division of Child Protection 

and Permanency, asserted that defendants Y.M. and S.P. abused or 

neglected their infant child R.P., who was born in January 2010 

and who sustained skull and rib injuries at three different times 

within a two-week period in or around April 2010. This is now the 

third time the matter has come before us.

On the first occasion, we granted leave to appeal and 

summarily reversed an order entered in favor of defendants because 

the trial judge's findings "d[id] not account for" N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.46(a)(2), which, as we then said, specifies that when the 

Division submits "'proof of injuries sustained by a child or of 

the condition of a child of such a nature as would ordinarily not 

be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts or omissions 

of the parent,' such proofs 'shall be prima facie evidence that a 

child . . . is an abused or neglected child.'" Following that 

remand, the judge concluded the shifting of the burden of 
3 A-4397-15T3

persuasion to defendants compelled a finding that defendants 

abused or neglected the child. Also, after providing defendants 

with the opportunity to present expert testimony, the judge 

reversed herself and precluded that testimony.

That determination prompted the second appeal. For reasons 

set forth in an unpublished opinion, we agreed that the burden of 

persuasion was properly shifted to defendants but concluded that 

the trial judge erred in refusing defendants the opportunity to 

provide expert testimony to contest the cause of the child's 

injuries. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. Y.M. and S.P., 

Nos. A-3450/3507-11 (App. Div. Jan. 15, 2014).

Following that remand, another judge conducted a three-day 

hearing that included expert testimony from both defendants and 

the Division. By way of his written opinion, Judge Jeffrey J. 

Waldman explained how the defense expert had failed to persuade 

him that defendants had not abused or neglected the child.

Defendant S.P. appeals,1 arguing only:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT [S.P.] 

ABUSED AND NEGLECTED HIS CHILDREN BECAUSE 

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE PRESENTED THAT HE CAUSED 

THE INJURIES TO [R.P.] AND WHERE [S.P.] 

PRESENTED EXPERT TESTIMONY EXPLAINING 

POTENTIAL CAUSES OF THE INJURY OTHER THAN 

ABUSE.

 

1 Only S.P., the child's father, appeals. The child's mother, Y.M., 

had appealed past rulings but does not now appeal.
4 A-4397-15T3

We find insufficient merit in this argument to warrant further 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Judge Waldman's findings were based on substantial evidence 

he found credible and, for that reason, we must defer to those 

findings. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1974); N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. H.B., 375 N.J. Super. 148, 172 (App. 

Div. 2005). Finding no principled reason for second-guessing the 

judge's findings or the conclusions drawn from those findings, we 

reject defendant S.P.'s arguments.

Affirmed.