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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45972

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

OTIS JAMES HUGHES,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: December 5, 2019

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Steven Hippler, District Judge. 

Order denying motion to withdraw, affirmed; judgment of conviction, affirmed.

Fyffe Law LLC; Robyn Fyffe, Boise, for appellant. Robyn Fyffe argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.

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GRATTON, Chief Judge 

Otis James Hughes appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction for 

conspiracy to traffic heroin, trafficking heroin, and possession of a controlled substance with 

intent to deliver. Hughes argues that the district court erred in denying defense counsel’s motion 

to withdraw. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Hughes was indicted by a grand jury for conspiracy to traffic in heroin (Idaho Code 

§§ 37-2732B(a)(6)(B), 18-1701, 37-3732B(b)); three counts of trafficking in heroin (I.C. 

§ 37-2732B(a)(6)); two counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver 

(I.C. § 37-2732(a)); and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (I.C. § 37-2734A). The 

charges arose after officers received information that Hughes was selling heroin out of a Boise 

hotel. An undercover officer purchased heroin on multiple occasions from Hughes’ codefendant 
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(B.J.) in the parking lot of the hotel. During the transactions, B.J. collected payment from the 

officer and went to B.J.’s supplier’s hotel room (B.J. later identified his supplier as Hughes) to 

retrieve the heroin. After arresting B.J., officers obtained a warrant to search Hughes’ hotel

room. A search revealed the presence of heroin, methamphetamine, marijuana, drug 

paraphernalia, and packing materials. Thereafter, Hughes was indicted on the above-listed 

crimes.

Hughes’ and B.J.’s cases were consolidated for trial and Hughes retained private counsel 

to appear on his behalf. On November 6, although he was represented by counsel, Hughes sent a 

letter to the district court in which, among other things, Hughes asked various legal questions, 

requested to view the search warrant himself to “make sure that it is authentic and not forged,”

and explained that he would like certain motions filed. On November 20, the court held a 

pretrial conference. At the hearing, counsel advised the court that the issues with the warrant had 

been resolved and Hughes was ready to proceed to trial. At the conclusion of the conference, 

Hughes chose to address the court on his own and explained that he was innocent, thought a 

motion to dismiss should have been filed, was concerned with getting evidence in at trial, and 

wanted to know how to send letters to the court. The district court addressed Hughes’ concerns 

and asked that he speak with counsel to gain an understanding of the proceedings. 

On November 21, counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw as Hughes’ counsel. In 

support of his motion, counsel filed an affidavit which contained, in part, the following 

representations: 

6. I have reviewed his discovery with him on three separate occasions. 

The most recent being for an hour-and-a-half on Sunday, November 19, 2017, the 

day before his pre-trial conference.

7. During that visit I also discussed in detail with Mr. Hughes his request 

that I file a motion to suppress the search warrant in his case and provided him 

with my opinion that such a motion was frivolous and the legal reasoning behind 

it.

8. Despite our long meeting the day before and my explanation, 

Mr. Hughes insisted in attempting to address this issue in open court at his 

pre-trial conference on November 20, 2017.

9. Mr. Hughes previously attempted to communicate directly to the court 

in a letter addressed to Judge Hippler, dated November 6, 2017.

10. On November 20, 2017, I received a certified letter from Mr. Hughes 

which was dated November 15, 2017, in which he requests that I file a motion to 

dismiss his case based on what he describes as an “altered and fake search 
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warrant,” [sic] He lists other grounds which he believes support a dismissal of his 

case. 

11. He states in this same letter that he is sending the letter to the Idaho 

State Bar.

12. This letter was mailed prior to my meeting with him on November 19,

[sic] however, Mr. Hughes [sic] insistence on addressing these same ideas to the 

Court on November 20, makes clear that he did not accept my legal advice with 

regard to the issues he raised.

13. His contact with the State Bar, while not officially a bar complaint,

puts me in a potentially adversarial position with my client. 

14. Mr. Hughes obviously does not have confidence in my representation 

and we are at an impasse as to what is in his best legal interest.

15. In addition to the above, an ethical concern has arisen which I am not 

at liberty to disclose to the court, but which makes me unable to represent 

Mr. Hughes adequately at trial. 

The district court held a hearing on counsel’s motion. At the hearing, counsel further 

elaborated on the reasons that he sought to withdraw. Ultimately, the district court denied 

counsel’s motion to withdraw. Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial and a jury ultimately found 

Hughes guilty of conspiracy to traffic in heroin, three counts of trafficking in heroin, possession 

of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and possession of drug paraphernalia. In addition, 

the jury acquitted Hughes of possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver but found him 

guilty of the included offense of possession of marijuana. Thereafter, counsel filed a renewed 

motion to withdraw as Hughes’ attorney of record. The district court held a hearing on the 

motion, granted counsel’s request, and appointed the public defender. The district court 

sentenced Hughes to an aggregate unified sentence of twenty-two years with twelve years 

determinate. Hughes timely appeals.

II.

ANALYSIS

Hughes argues that the district court erred in denying defense counsel’s motion to 

withdraw because the district court’s decision compelled counsel to represent Hughes while 

laboring under an actual conflict of interest. Specifically, Hughes argues that the district court’s 

denial of the motion to withdraw violated his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. 

When a party challenges a district court’s denial on a motion to withdraw, we review the district 

court’s determination for an abuse of discretion. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 90, 856 P.2d 872, 

880 (1993). The trial court’s decision will only be regarded as an abuse of discretion if it
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violated the defendant’s right to counsel. State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 715, 52 P.3d 857, 860 

(2002).

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “in all criminal 

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his 

defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The amendment has been interpreted to include the right to be 

represented by conflict-free counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981). In order to 

ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial court has an affirmative duty to 

inquire into a potential conflict. State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003); 

see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980). However, “an inquiry is only required

‘when the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists,’ which is 

not to be confused with when the trial court is aware of a vague, unspecified possibility of 

conflict.” Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 619, 315 P.3d 798, 807 (2013) (quoting Mickens v. 

Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168-69 (2002)). A trial court’s failure to conduct an inquiry, under certain 

circumstances, will serve as a basis for reversing a defendant’s conviction. Holloway v.

Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978); Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346-47. 

Hughes claims (1) the court did not conduct an adequate inquiry into the conflict; (2) an 

actual conflict of interest adversely affected defense counsel’s performance; and (3) neither 

judicial efficiency nor dilatory intent can justify the district court’s violation of Hughes’ right to 

conflict-free counsel. In response, the State argues (1) that the court did not have a duty to 

inquire; (2) even if the court had a duty to inquire, its inquiry was adequate; and (3) regardless, 

there was not an actual conflict of interest. We agree with the State.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying counsel’s 

motion to withdraw. First, Hughes’ appellate argument rests on the assertion that the motion to 

withdraw proceedings should have led the district court to engage in a constitutional inquiry to 

determine if a constitutionally significant conflict of interest had arisen between Hughes and his 

counsel. We disagree. The district court did not have a duty to inquire. The district court was 

presented with a motion to withdraw by Hughes’ private counsel. The motion was supported by 

the statements in the affidavit set forth above. At the motion to withdraw hearing, counsel 

expressed his concerns that Hughes was not accepting counsel’s legal advice and had sent a letter 

to the Idaho State Bar. Counsel noted that the letter Hughes sent to the bar was not a disciplinary 
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complaint.

1 Counsel did not mention or elaborate on the ethical concern listed in the affidavit 

and concluded his argument by stating, “I think with his frequent and public complaints and his 

unrealistic view of how the case can be resolved, I can no longer give effective legal counsel.”

The district court denied counsel’s motion explaining, although the court appreciated that 

counsel may feel like he is in a difficult situation because of the letter sent to the bar, a letter to 

the bar is not a sufficient basis to withdraw, especially on the eve of trial. The district court also 

explained that Hughes’ disagreement with counsel’s strategic decisions is not a basis to allow 

withdrawal. Further, the district court (1) informed Hughes that his counsel was private and 

could be fired as Hughes saw fit; and (2) reassured Hughes that counsel was a “good lawyer and 

[could] ethically do his best job, notwithstanding that letter being filed.” In response to 

counsel’s argument and the district court’s decision, Hughes asked to speak. Hughes said that he 

had done research on his attorney and counsel was a “great attorney.” Thereafter, Hughes 

expressed his concerns with (1) counsel not filing a motion to dismiss; (2) the date on the search 

warrant in the case; and (3) any disappointment he has caused counsel in writing the letter to the 

bar. In response, the court attempted to alleviate Hughes’ concerns by explaining (1) what is 

legally required for a motion to dismiss; (2) that counsel made a diligent effort to investigate 

suppression of the search warrant; and (3) that counsel is a “very good lawyer” and “will do 

everything he can to try to get you acquitted at trial.”

Neither Hughes nor his trial counsel alleged that a conflict of interest of constitutional 

significance had arisen. Moreover, counsel’s motion alleging disagreements regarding legal 

strategy, the potential of a future adversarial relationship caused by Hughes’ contact with the bar, 

and an unspecified ethical concern did not give the trial court reason to know that any such

conflict existed. Counsel was not representing competing interests, and there was no indication 

otherwise. See Hall, 155 Idaho at 619, 315 P.3d at 807 (finding that cases involving defense 

counsel’s representation of multiple co-defendants is a situation that is more likely to give rise to 

a conflict). At best, the district court was presented with a vague, unspecified conflict of interest 

and did not have a duty to inquire under the Sixth Amendment. Id. The court properly 

considered the argument presented and the timing of the motion in relation to trial in denying

 1 It is important to note that in the affidavit, counsel concedes that Hughes’ letter to the bar 

only put him in a potentially adversarial position which does not amount to an existing conflict 

of interest.
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counsel’s request to withdraw. See State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 594, 181 P.3d 512, 523 (Ct. 

App. 2007). Thus, the district court appropriately addressed the motion before it and did not 

abuse its discretion in denying counsel’s motion to withdraw.

Second, even if the district court had a duty to inquire, the court engaged in an adequate 

inquiry.

In order to satisfy the inquiry requirement, a trial court’s examination of 

the potential conflict must be thorough and searching and should be conducted on 

the record. The court “must make the kind of inquiry that might ease the 

defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust, and concern.” However, in determining

whether a conflict exists, trial courts are entitled to rely on representations made 

by counsel. A court may inquire further into facts, but “is under no original or 

continuing obligation to do so.”

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 704, 215 P.3d 414, 424 (2009) (internal citations omitted).

Whether a trial court’s failure to adequately inquire into a potential conflict of interest is 

enough, on its own, to justify reversal depends on whether the defendant objected to the conflict 

at trial. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348 (1980). When a trial court fails to make a proper inquiry, 

but the defendant did not object to the conflict at trial, the defendant’s conviction will only be 

reversed if he or she can prove that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s

performance. Id.

The record in this case demonstrates that the trial court conducted a proper inquiry into 

any potential conflict of interest. As set forth above, the district court held a hearing on 

counsel’s motion and allowed counsel to express his concern regarding Hughes’ representation.

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In addition, the court gave Hughes the opportunity to voice his concerns with counsel’s 

representation and thoroughly addressed each of Hughes’ questions. The court reminded Hughes 

that, because counsel was private, he was free to fire counsel as he saw fit. Hughes did not 

indicate an intention to fire his counsel. Neither counsel nor Hughes alleged a conflict of interest 

that would prevent counsel from representing Hughes at trial. Based on the facts presented, the 

district court’s inquiry into counsel’s motion was adequate. 

 2 On appeal, Hughes argues that the district court was required to accept counsel’s 

representation that he could no longer give effective legal counsel. However, it is within the 

district court’s purview to determine if a conflict exists. Severson, 147 Idaho at 704, 215 P.3d at 

424. Although the court is entitled to rely on counsel’s representations, it is not required to do 

so. Id. 
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Finally, although we need not discuss Hughes’ contention because we conclude that the 

district court’s duty to inquire was not triggered and the court’s inquiry was adequate, we are 

inclined to address Hughes’ argument that an actual conflict of interest existed in this case. 

Because Hughes did not object at trial, he is required to make a showing that an actual conflict of 

interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348. In an effort 

to prove that an actual conflict existed, Hughes points to purported violations of the duty of 

loyalty, duty of confidentiality, and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct and argues that trial 

counsel violated these rules by disparaging Hughes at the motion to withdraw hearing. Hughes 

claims counsel did so in an effort to promote counsel’s own interests thereby creating a conflict 

of interest which adversely affected Hughes at trial. Hughes asserts that “counsel’s statements 

[in the affidavit and at the hearing] benefitted only one person--counsel--by justifying his heroic 

efforts with a client he found unreasonable.” In addition, Hughes faults the district court for 

allowing counsel to express his concerns with representing Hughes. Hughes’ argument is both 

factually and legally without merit. 

Factually, counsel simply advised the district court regarding the issues he was having 

with Hughes. In no way did counsel disparage his client, promote his own interests, or disclose 

confidential information. The prosecutor was already aware of the content presented at the 

hearing. Moreover, the majority of counsel’s argument was filed in his affidavit and not 

discussed in open court. Counsel acted appropriately by explaining the reasons that he sought to 

withdraw at the motion to withdraw hearing. A motion to withdraw hearing is precisely the 

appropriate venue for trial counsel to explain to the court why he or she seeks to withdraw. 

Hughes’ contention that the district court had some duty under these facts to prevent counsel 

from discussing the events which led to his motion to withdraw is incorrect. 

Legally, Hughes’ argument does not rise to the level of an actual conflict. To 

demonstrate an actual conflict under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show: (1) that his 

counsel actively represented conflicting interests; and (2) that the conflict adversely affected his 

lawyer’s performance. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350; Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482-84. As discussed 

above, Hughes makes a factual allegation that counsel disparaged Hughes and placed Hughes in 

a negative light thereby violating his duty of loyalty and confidentiality which created an actual 

conflict. As an initial matter, if the allegations had factual merit, Hughes’ argument would 

require this Court to find in the first instance that counsel’s conduct violated the Idaho Rules of 
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Professional Conduct. We decline to make that determination as this is not the appropriate venue 

for such a contention. Additionally, Hughes’ allegations that counsel disparaged him and placed 

him in a negative light do not demonstrate that counsel was actively representing conflicting 

interests and does not rise to the level of an actual conflict pursuant to relevant case law.

Moreover, Hughes has not articulated that counsel’s alleged conflict had an adverse effect on his 

lawyer’s performance. Consequently, Hughes’ argument is factually without merit and, legally, 

no actual conflict of interest has been shown. Therefore, the district court’s denial of counsel’s 

motion to withdraw did not violate the United States Constitution and was not an abuse of 

discretion.

III.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly denied counsel’s motion to withdraw. Therefore, the district 

court’s order denying counsel’s motion to withdraw is affirmed.

Judge HUSKEY and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.