IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

AMONTAE WILLIAMS, )

individually and as a representative )

for all similarly situated persons; )

and DARRYL WILLIAMS, )

individually and as a representative )

for all similarly situated persons, )

) Case No. 20 C 4540

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. )

)

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF )

THE CITY OF CHICAGO; )

THE DAVID LYNCH FOUNDATION; )

and the UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

Amontae and Darryl Williams1 have sued the Board of Education of the City of 

Chicago (the Board), the David Lynch Foundation (the Foundation), and the University 

of Chicago (the University) on behalf of a putative class for violations of the 

Establishment Clause of the federal constitution and the Illinois Religious Freedom 

Restoration Act. In earlier decisions, this Court granted the defendants' motion to 

dismiss the plaintiffs' amended claim in part and the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend 

their complaint. See Separation of Hinduism From Our Schs. v. Chicago Pub. Schs., 

1 The Court will refer to Amontae Williams and Darryl Williams by their first names to 

avoid confusion.

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City of Chicago Sch. Dist. #299, No. 20 C 4540, 2021 WL 2036536 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 

2021); Separation of Hinduism From Our Schools v. Chicago Public Schools, No. 20 C

4540, 2021 WL 3633939 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2021). The plaintiffs now move to certify 

various classes under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(3). The 

Court denies the motion for the reasons stated below.

Background

The party seeking class certification has the burden of establishing by a 

preponderance of the evidence that certification is proper. Priddy v. Health Care Serv. 

Corp., 870 F.3d 657, 660 (7th Cir. 2017). In assessing whether the movant has met this 

burden, the district court need not accept the allegations in the complaint as true. 

Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). The court should 

instead "make whatever factual and legal inquiries [that] are necessary under Rule 23." 

Id. at 676.

The Court takes the following facts from its prior order on the defendants' motion 

to dismiss, the second amended complaint, and the parties' class certification briefing. 

A more detailed recounting of the plaintiffs' allegations can be found in the Court's May 

21, 2021 decision on the defendants' motion to dismiss. See Separation of Hinduism, 

2021 WL 2036536.

The named plaintiffs are Amontae Williams, who was a student at Bogan 

Computer Technical High School in Chicago from fall 2017 until he graduated in spring 

2019, and his father Darryl Williams. Bogan was one of eight schools that implemented 

the Quiet Time program between 2015 and 2019. 

The defendants were involved in implementing Quiet Time in Bogan and other 

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Chicago schools. The Foundation created the Quiet Time program, the University

conducted a research study evaluating its effects, and the Board permitted it to be 

incorporated into the schools' schedules.

Quiet Time involved two fifteen-minute periods of quiet activity during each 

school day, and some participating students could learn Transcendental Meditation as 

part of the program. Only those students who learned Transcendental Meditation and 

participated in the training were present for a "Puja" initiation ceremony. During the 

initiation, instructors placed items in front of a painting of an influential teacher of 

Transcendental Meditation and spoke in Sanskrit for approximately four minutes. The 

instructors also gave students a "mantra" and instructed them to repeat it while 

meditating. The parties dispute whether the mantra was a meaningless sound or a 

Sanskrit word of religious significance. Students who did not learn Transcendental 

Meditation were neither present for the ceremony nor given a mantra. 

On occasion, Transcendental Meditation instructors would come to classrooms 

and lead the students through a meditation. Leading a meditation involved telling the 

students to think of their mantra and ringing a bell to let students know when to start or 

stop meditating. Students who did not learn Transcendental Meditation were in the 

classrooms during the instructor-led meditations, but they were not required to meditate

and could engage in other quiet activities during that time. Chicago Public Schools 

teachers would sometimes lead the meditations when instructors were not present. 

Amontae began participating in Quiet Time in October 2017, but no students at 

Bogan meditated until Transcendental Meditation instructors came to the school during 

the 2018-19 academic year. Amontae was not present for any initiation ceremonies or 

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instructor-led meditations while he was a minor. He turned eighteen in September 

2018, signed a consent form in early October, and began learning Transcendental 

Meditation in mid-October. After completing four training sessions, Amontae 

sporadically practiced Transcendental Meditation during Quiet Time until spring 2019. 

Amontae is now twenty-one years old.

The plaintiffs retained counsel and brought this suit in October 2020. The legal 

services agreement between Amontae and his counsel states that Amontae "grants the 

Steering Committee authority to make final litigation decisions on behalf of the Client."

Defs.' Combined Opp'n to the Mot. for Class Certification of Pl. Amontae Williams, Ex. 

Ex. 24 at 3 (dkt. no. 189-2). The agreement also states that the Steering Committee is 

"the Client's primary avenue of communication with the [law firm]" and that the 

committee will consist of two of Amontae's attorneys—one of whom is the proposed 

class counsel—and "other adult followers of Jesus who are parents of children in the 

[Chicago Public Schools] or otherwise have a stake in the litigation." Id. There is an 

option in the agreement for the client to join the Steering Committee, but Amontae did 

not select that option. Id. at 4. Amontae testified during his deposition that he was not 

a member of the committee, did not participate in its decisions, did not know who was 

on the committee other than his counsel, and did not know how often the committee 

made final litigation decisions for him. In response to defense counsel's questions 

during the deposition, proposed class counsel instructed Amontae, "[D]on't answer 

questions about what the committee has decided for you." Id., Ex. 11, at 269:4–5.

The legal services agreement also states that it is the policy and practice of the 

plaintiffs' counsel "to recommend denial of any offer of settlement that does not include 

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recovery which the Firm considers adequate of the attorney's fees, costs, and expenses 

the Firm has incurred." Id., Ex. 24 at 3. During his deposition, Amontae testified that he 

understood the clause to mean his counsel would recommend denial of any settlement 

offers that lacked sufficient attorneys' fees and costs—including offers that are in the 

best interests of Amontae and his proposed classes.

Plaintiffs move to certify two classes. The first proposed class includes all 

students who participated in the Quiet Time program between 2015 and 2019; the 

second includes all parents, legal guardians, or other persons acting in loco parentis for 

any student who participated in Quiet Time while a minor. Plaintiffs also propose two 

subclasses within the proposed student class: (1) all students who participated in 

Transcendental Meditation training, and (2) all students who participated in the Quiet 

Time program but not Transcendental Meditation training.

Discussion

At the class certification stage, the Court does not "adjudicate th[e] case," but 

rather "select[s] the method best suited to adjudication of the controversy fairly and 

efficiently." Amgen v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 460 (2013). In order 

for the case to proceed as a class action, the Williamses must show that their proposed 

classes satisfy all the requirements of Rule 23, which sets out the criteria for class 

certification. Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cnty., 850 F.3d 849, 859 (7th Cir. 2017).

First, under Rule 23(a), a putative class must satisfy four requirements: 

numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 23(a)(1)–(4). Rule 23(a) requires the class to be so numerous that joinder of all 

members is impracticable; there are common questions of law or fact; the 

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representatives' claims are typical of those of the class; and the representatives fairly

and adequately protect the interests of the class. 

Second, the proposed class must fall within one of the three categories in Rule 

23(b). Spano v. Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 574, 583 (7th Cir. 2011). The plaintiffs argue for 

certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(1)(A) applies when 

there is a risk of "inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class 

members that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing 

the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). Rule 23(b)(3) requires finding "that the 

questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available 

methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

A. Amontae's proposed classes

The plaintiffs propose a class of all students who participated in the Quiet Time 

program—and in the alternative, various subclasses—with Amontae as the class 

representative. As a result, even if these classes satisfy the other requirements of Rule 

23(a) or Rule 23(b)(3), the motion for class certification fails if Amontae cannot 

adequately represent the proposed classes. Stampley v. Altom Transp., Inc., 958 F.3d 

580, 585 (7th Cir. 2020) ("It is well-established that a district court must find that 'the 

representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class' before 

it may allow a case to proceed" as a class action.) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)).

"[A]dequacy of representation is composed of two parts: the adequacy of the 

named plaintiff's counsel, and the adequacy of representation provided in protecting the 

different, separate, and distinct interest of the class members." Retired Chicago Police 

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Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Among other things, "[a] named plaintiff who has serious credibility 

problems or who is likely to devote too much attention to rebutting an individual defense 

may not be an adequate class representative." CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural 

Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Davidson v. Citizens Gas & 

Coke Utility, 238 F.R.D. 225, 229 (S.D. Ind. 2006) ("[P]ersonal characteristics, such as 

the credibility and integrity of a putative class representative, have a direct bearing on 

their ability to adequately represent absent members of the class.").

The defendants contend that Amontae is not an adequate class representative

for three reasons: his lack of credibility, his purportedly minimal knowledge about the 

case, and his lack of control over the litigation. The concerns about Amontae's 

credibility and knowledge regarding the litigation are not enough to render him 

inadequate, as that would require "admissible evidence so severely undermining 

plaintiff's credibility that a fact finder might reasonably focus on plaintiff's credibility, to 

the detriment of the absent class members' claims." CE Design, 637 F.3d at 728. The 

defendants' arguments about credibility are based on discrepancies between Amontae's 

deposition testimony and his other proffered evidence, which largely concern changes 

in his religious beliefs, behavior, and feelings about Transcendental Meditation. These 

inconsistencies are unlikely to be a significant factor in litigation at the class level

because they would only impact Amontae's individual damages determinations and thus 

would not undermine his credibility severely enough to distract from the other aspects of 

the case. Amontae's lack of familiarity with every aspect of the case or the specific 

reasons for suing each defendant are similarly insufficient to establish inadequacy, as 

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he demonstrated a basic understanding of the purpose of the lawsuit and his proposed 

classes during his deposition. One cannot expect a plaintiff, either a class 

representative or an individual plaintiff, to know details about evidence, legal theories, or 

strategy; that's why people hire lawyers.

Amontae's inability to make final decisions regarding this litigation, however,

precludes him from adequately representing his proposed classes. Adequacy is not

that high a bar, but a class representative should be "able to monitor the conduct of 

counsel, who as a practical matter are the class's real champions." Murray v. GMAC 

Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2006). Other courts in this district have 

concluded that named plaintiffs "must be trustworthy enough to protect the interests of 

the class" and "figurehead plaintiffs are not permitted," and the Court agrees that a 

putative class representative who cannot monitor counsel is "plainly insufficient—just a 

placeholder for the attorneys driving the case." Pope v. Harvard Bancshares, Inc., 240 

F.R.D. 383, 390 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Physicians Healthsource, Inc. v. Allscripts Health Sols. 

Inc., 254 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1024 (N.D. Ill. 2017) ("A plaintiff who seeks to be the class 

representative cannot simply shift its duties to class counsel . . . . And taking an active 

and honest and attentive and [sic] role in discovery is one of the hallmarks of an 

otherwise adequate class representative"); see also Pruitt v. Personal Staffing Group, 

LLC, 2021 WL 197399, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2021) ("This is the crux of Plaintiffs'

problem: they did not know what was happening in the litigation, because they were not 

involved in the litigation, because they surrendered their responsibilities in the litigation 

to proposed class counsel") (emphasis added).

The plaintiffs are unable to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 

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Amontae is adequate in this regard. The legal services agreement between him and his 

counsel is clear: Amontae has surrendered his responsibility to make final litigation 

decisions to a "Steering Committee" composed of proposed class counsel and other

individuals unknown to the Court, not including Amontae himself. Amontae's lack of any 

knowledge about the decisions, operations, or membership of the committee to which 

he has delegated control of the litigation further underscores his inability to take an 

"active and honest and attentive" role in the litigation or be more than just a "placeholder 

for the attorneys driving this case." Physicians Healthsource, 254 F. Supp. 3d at 1024. 

By excluding Amontae from the Steering Committee's membership while subjecting him 

to its decisions, the legal services agreement has impermissibly shifted his duties as 

named class plaintiff to his counsel, deprived him of any means of monitoring his 

counsel's conduct, and reduced him to little more than a figurehead.

2

The plaintiffs fail to meaningfully address this issue in their reply brief. They do 

not deny that the Steering Committee makes final litigation decisions but instead argue 

that Amontae retains ultimate authority because Illinois law permits him to discharge his 

counsel. This logic is flawed, however, as it would mean that every named plaintiff—no 

matter their involvement in the litigation or lack thereof—can be an adequate class 

representative simply by being able to terminate or change attorneys. No court has 

2 Plaintiffs' counsel's membership on the Steering Committee is also concerning, as the 

agreement also states that counsel will recommend—to the same committee which he 

leads—the denial of any settlement offer that lacks "adequate" attorneys' fees and 

costs. Although this conduct is unlikely to "jeopardize[] the court's ability to reach a just 

and proper outcome in the case" because any settlement would require approval by the 

Court, Reliable Money Order, Inc. v. McKnight Sales Co., 704 F.3d 489, 499 (7th Cir. 

2013), plaintiffs' counsel is reminded that he cannot contract his way out of his 

obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct. 

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adopted such an interpretation. It would effectively render Rule 23's adequacy 

requirement a dead letter, and courts have emphasized the importance of the named 

plaintiff's involvement in the litigation. See, e.g., CE Design, 637 F.3d 721; Physicians 

Healthsource, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1007; Pope, 240 F.R.D. 383. Given that the plaintiffs'

counsel has so little trust in his own client's abilities that he created a committee to 

remove decision-making authority from that client, there is no basis for the Court to find

the named plaintiff "trustworthy enough to protect the interests of the class." Pope, 240 

F.R.D. at 390.

For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Amontae is an inadequate 

class representative. The Court denies his motion for class certification on this basis

and thus need not address whether the proposed student classes satisfy the other 

requirements of Rule 23(a) or Rule 23(b).

B. Darryl's proposed class

The Court denies Darryl's motion for class certification, as it turns out that Darryl 

lacks standing to bring his claim in this case. "Before a class is certified, . . . the named 

plaintiff must have standing, because at that stage no one else has a legally protected 

interest in maintaining the suit." Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 676 (7th 

Cir. 2009). As the Court acknowledged in ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss, 

"parents have standing as a result of their right to direct the religious training of their 

children" under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 

Fleischfresser v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist. 200, 15 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing cases). 

But having found no case that extends that parental right to adult children, the Court 

concluded that Darryl has standing "only to the extent his claims involve events that 

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took place before his son's eighteenth birthday." See Separation of Hinduism, 2021 WL 

2036536, at *7.

The problem here is that none of the events giving rise to Darryl's claim occurred 

before Amontae's eighteenth birthday. The parties do not dispute that when Amontae 

began learning Transcendental Meditation, he was already a legal adult. During his 

deposition, Amontae testified that he was present for an initiation ceremony in October 

2018, after he had turned eighteen a month earlier. He also stated that no one at his 

school was meditating in class during his junior year, when he was still a minor, and that 

the Transcendental Meditation instructors did not come to his school until the following 

year. Therefore, to the extent that Darryl's claim is based on either the Transcendental 

Meditation initiation or instructor-led meditation, it must be dismissed, and his motion for 

class certification must be denied for lack of standing.

Darryl contends that he has standing despite these facts, but none of his 

arguments are persuasive. His first contention—that his parental rights were violated 

when other students at other schools witnessed the Transcendental Meditation initiation 

or instructor-led meditation—lacks any legal support, as does his argument that

Amontae was coerced as a minor because the defendants gave other students food 

and snacks. Although courts have recognized that students are vulnerable to coercion, 

it was in the context of graduations or football games where attending the event with the 

religious component was either mandatory or had great significance in a typical

student's life. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir.

2012) (en banc); Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). Based on the 

available evidence, the Court cannot say that offering pizza and snacks to encourage 

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student participation in optional activities is equivalent to holding a graduation ceremony 

in a church or permitting student-led prayers at football games, and Darryl cites no legal 

authority supporting such an interpretation. Lastly, Darryl contends that he has a right 

to be informed about the origins and possible religious roots of any school program—

including ones in which his child never participated as a minor—despite Seventh Circuit 

precedent to the contrary. See Crowley v. McKinney, 400 F.3d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 2005) 

("It is one thing to say that parents have a right to enroll their children in a private school 

that will retain a degree of autonomy . . . . It is another thing to say that they have a 

constitutional right to school records, or to be playground monitors, or to attend school 

functions").

The Court therefore denies Darryl's motion for class certification and dismisses 

his section 1983 claim for lack of standing.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the plaintiffs' motions for class 

certification [dkt. nos. 155 & 156] and dismisses plaintiff Darryl Williams's section 1983 

claim for lack of standing. The Court sets the case for a telephonic status hearing on 

September 22, 2022 at 8:35 a.m. for the purpose of setting a schedule for further 

proceedings, as well as a trial date. The parties are directed to confer regarding a 

schedule and are to submit a joint status report with a proposal (or separate proposals if 

they cannot agree) by no later than September 20, 2022.

________________________________

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY

 United States District Judge

Date: September 13, 2022

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