PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 1 2

- 1 511

____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

LAWRENCE SCOTT WARD,

A ppellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D. C. No. 2

- 0 8

- c r

- 0 01 4 8

- 001 ) District Judge: Honorable Petrese B. Tucker

Argued on Ma rch 5 , 201 3

Before: S CI R ICA, JORDAN and ROTH, Cir cuit Judges

(Opinion filed: October 1 5 , 2013 )2 Peter Goldberger , Esq

. (Argued)
50 Rittenhouse Place Ardmore, PA 19003

Counsel for Appellant

Sonja M. Ralston , Esq

. United States Department of Justice
Criminal Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Suite 1264 Washington, DC 20 530

Bea L. Witzleben , Esq

. (Argued) Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street

, Suite 1250 Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellee

O P I N I O N

ROTH

, Circuit Judge :

Lawrence S cott Ward appeals the District Court’s judgment of sentence. Ward alleges several sources of error
in the proceedings below, including a violation of Federal3 Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 on the theory that the District Court improperly required that he d eliver his allocution under
oath

. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District
Court ’s judgment of sentence

.

I. Background

On August 27, 2006, Ward arrived at Dulles International Airport after a trip to Brazil. A search of Ward’s possessions revealed that he was in possession of child pornography. Ward was arrested and indicted in the Eastern District of Virginia for that offense.

After Ward’s arrest in Virginia, federal agents

searched his office at the Wharton Graduate School of Business, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where he served as
an Emeritus Professor . The search revealed numerous photographs and videos of Ward engaged in sex acts with minors later identified as J.D. and R.D. The pictures and videos were taken in Brazil, where J.D . and R.D. lived. A
search of Ward’s email showed communications between
Ward and J.D. and R.D. in which Ward requested that the boys engage in various sex acts, including having sex with other men chosen by Ward. The investigation also exposed
evidence that Ward had paid for J.D.’s housing and provided J.D.’s family with money

.

Between March and August 2006, Ward attempted to acquire a visa for J.D. to visit the United States. During the visa application process, Ward made several false statements
to S tate Department personnel, including misrepresentations that J.D.’s family was affluent when in fact it was destitute.4 Ward allegedly did this to show that there was little ris k that J.D. would overstay his visa.

On May 17, 2007, after unsuccessfully att empting to
consolidate the cases pending in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Eastern District of Virginia, Ward pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of Virginia case and received a sentence of 15 years of imprisonment. On March 13, 2008, War d was indicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on two counts of shipping child pornography in
interstate commerce

, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)

, and one count of false statements to a federal official

, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. O n August 21, 2008, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging W ard with an additional two counts of inducing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct

, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).

On November 17, 2008, Ward pleaded guilty in t he
Eastern District of Pennsylvania case to all five counts of the superseding indictment. At the sentencing hearing, the government requested and received a two

- level sentencing
enhancement because Ward ’s conduct involved two victims.
The District Court sentenced Ward to 300 months of incarceration, lifetime supervised release, a $100,000 fine, and a $500 special assessment. 1 However, the District Court

1 The District Court originally intended not to impose a fine but to award restitution of $100,000. When the prosecutor expressed concern about restitution because the victim, J.D., could not be found, the court responded, “so the $100,000 will be a fine, not restitution.”5 did not specify a pa rticular sentence for each charge to which Ward pleaded guilty

.

Ward appealed th e sentence to this Court on three grounds: (1) challenging the two

- level enhancement, (2) asserting that the District Court ’s rationale for imposing a fine
was flawed , and (3) arguing that his sentence was an impermissible general sentence. We found no e rror in the
District Court’s conclusion that Ward’s crime involved two
victims. United States v. Ward , 626 F.3d 179, 183

- 84 (3d Cir. 2010). We also held that the District Court

, in switch ing the $100,000 from restitution to a fine, stated insufficient

re asons for imposing that fine

, but

, because Ward did not object to the fine at sentencing, we concluded that this error

was not plain

. Id. at 185

- 86. Finally, w e held that the District Court erred by failing to impose a separate sentence for each

count of the superseding indictment

. Id. at 184. This error was reversible; thus, we remanded the case to the District Court for resentencing. Id. at 186.

While his appeal was pending, Ward maintained contact with J.D. and R.D., who at this point had fathered
children . Ward attempted to establish a relationship with those children. Additionally, Ward violated prison rules by spending money on other inmates and attempting to use his attorneys to make contact with his victims for non

- legal

reasons.

At the re se ntencing hearing o n February 9, 2012, the
District Court personally addressed Ward, asking if he wished to speak on his own behalf. When Ward indicated that he
wished to make a statement , the District Court, o ver defense counsel’s objection, insisted that his allocution be delivered6 under oath

, pursuant to that judge’s individual practice. Ward was placed under oath and proceeded to speak about his contrition for violating societal norms, his interest in rehabilitation, his personal struggle in coming to terms with the fact that he is a homosexual, his recent diagnosis of leukemia, and his hope that he would have a sentence short enough that he would not die in prison because he wanted to maintain his ties with family and friends.

After Ward allocuted

, the District Court sentenced him to the same prison term of 300 month s of incarceration, but increased the fine from $100,000 to $250,000. The District
Court explained that the increased fine was not meant as punishment for Ward’s successful appeal of his sentence; rather, the court stated that the $250,000 fine was within the advisory range and that the amount was a reasonable figure which Ward had the means to pay. The District Court also ordered that Ward have no contact with any person under 18

years of age, especially hi s victims’ children in Brazil.

II. Discussion 2

Ward challenges his sentence on seven independent grounds, arguing that his sentence should be vacated because (1) he ha d the right to deliver an unsworn allocution

, (2) the
District Court i mpermissibly increased his fine

, (3) the
government present ed in sufficient evidence to warrant a sentencing enhancement for Ward’s involvement in a pattern of prohibited s exual conduct, (4) the District Court did not

2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742
and 28 U.S.C. § 1291

.7 adequately explain the reasons for choo sing a 300 month

sentence

, (5) the District Court ’s refusal to grant Ward’s

requ est for a downward variance was procedurally unreasonable; (6) a 300 month sentence wa s substantively
unreasonable

, and (7) the District Court impermissibly failed
to order res titution. All of Ward’s arguments are unavailing.

A. May the Court Require that Allocution be
Sworn

. 3

Ward argues that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32 affords all criminal defendants the right to deliver an
unsworn allocution. 4 The issue of whe ther a criminal defendant has the right to an unsworn allocution is a matter of first impression in this Court and appears to be a novel question of federal law. As with any analysis of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, our inquiry is guided by the text of the rule as well as its history and purpose. See United States v. Higgs , 504 F.3d 456, 459 (3d Cir. 2007). For the

reasons that follow , w e conclude that there is no right to

3 Following oral argument, the Court directed the United
States to file a supplemental brief, stating the formal position of the Department of Justice as to whether a criminal defendant may be required to be sworn at a sentencing hearing

– either at the beginning or immediately before allocution. The Department of Justice filed such a brief. Ward was permitted to file a response and he did so. This
post

- argument briefing has been considered in our resolution of this appeal.

4 Our review of a district court’s compliance with Rule 32 is plenary. United States v. Cherry , 10 F.3d 1003, 1013 (3d Cir. 1993).8 deliver an unsworn allocution . We leave it to th e unfettered
discretio n of the district c ourt s to decide whether the defendant will be placed under oath during allocution.

1. Legal Framework

“[T]he right of allocution is deeply rooted in our legal
tradition” and dates back to at least the fifteenth century. U.S.

v. Adams

, 252 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2001) . The rules of evidence in early English and American common law deemed criminal defendants “incompetent as witnesses.” Ferguson v. Georgia , 365 U.S. 570, 574 & n.3 (1961) (citing 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England

, 369 (1769)). As a result, they could not testify on their own behalf at trial or plead legal defenses like insanity or justification. Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocution , 75 Fordham L. Rev. 2641,
2646

- 47 (2007 ). Thus, allocution, before sentencing, was the defendant’s one chance to argue for mitigation. Adams , 252
F.3d at 282 ; Paul W. Barrett, Allocution , 9 Mo. L. Rev. 115,
120

- 21 (1944). Although the right of allocution predates the founding of the Republic , it is not a right guaranteed by the
Constitution. 5 Adams , 252 F.3d at 282.

5 There is some authority in other circuits suggesting that the right of allocution may be protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g.

, Boardman v. Estelle , 957 F.2d 1523, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (habeas case, di scussing right of allocution in state court); United States v. Moree , 928 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1991) (discussing right of defendant to be present at sentencing); Ashe v. North Carolina , 586 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1978) (habeas case, discussing right of allocution in state court). We do not adopt their reasoning.9 However, a cknowledging the historical and common law roots of the right of allocution, Congress codified the right in 1944 by promulgating Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32

. Id. at 280 (citing Green v. United States , 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (plurality opinion)). The text of Rule 32 sets forth only two requirements: the sentencing court must address the defendant personally and must permit the defendant to speak or pres ent any information to mitigate the sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(a)(ii). The rule is silent
as to whether the allocution should be sworn or unsworn

. There is no legislative history discussing whether a defendant
should be allowed to deliver an uns worn allocution, nor do the committee notes address the question.

The Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in Green recognized the historical roots of the common law right of
allocution

, highlighting the equitable concern that a criminal
defendant must always be asked if he has anything to say
before sentence is imposed so that he has “the opportunity to present to the court his plea in m itigation.” 365 U.S. at 304.

T he rationale supporting th is procedural requirement is that even “[t]he most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself.” Id. Rule 32 was codified with
this policy in mind. Id.

The cases decided since Green confirm that the critical purpose of Rule 32 is threefold : (1) to allow the defendant to present mitigating circumstances

, (2) to permit the defendant to present personal characteristics to enable the sentencing
court to craft an individualized sentence

, and (3) to preserve the appearance of fairness in the cri minal justice system. See10 Thomas, Beyond Mitigation , 75 Fordham L. Rev. at 2643. Thus, allocution “ is designed to temper punishment with mercy in appropriate cases, and to ensure that sentencing
reflects individualized circumstances. ” United States v. D e Alba Pagan , 33 F.3d 125, 129 (1 st Cir. 1994) . “ Aside from [ allocution ’s] practical role in sentencing, the right ‘has value in terms of maximizing the perceived equity of the process,’”
United States v. Barnes , 948 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 18

- 459 (2d ed. 1980)), because the defendant is given the “right to speak on any subject of his choosing prior to the imposition of

sentence

. ” Barnes , 948 F.2d at 328.

The contemporary practice of swearing or n ot

s wearing defendants before a Rule 32 allocution varies by district and by judge. Although no federal court has addressed the question of whether a Rule 32 allocution must be unsworn, our sister circuits have made passing references

to both sworn and unswor n allocutions. Compare , e.g. , United States v. Kaniss , 150 F.3d 967, 969 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that the defendant’s Rule 32 allocution was sworn )

, with United States v. Whitten , 610 F.3d 168, 199 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that a defendant may deliver “an u nsworn, uncrossed allocution”); see United States v. Gilbert , 244 F.3d 888, 924 n.79 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that Black’s Law Dictionary defines allocution as an “unsworn statement” that
“is not subject to cross examination”). However, under Rule
32

, no court has ever held that a criminal defendant has an affirmative right to deliver an unsworn allocution.

Moreover, the Sentencing Guidelines do not distinguish between sworn and unsworn statements, permitting a sentence enhancement for any false stateme nt,11 whether sworn or not, made during an allocution. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; United States v. Parker , 594 F.3d 1243,
1249

- 50 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying § 3C1.1 enhancement for a false statement made during the defendant’s allocution without distinguishing b etween sworn or unsworn statements). 6

2. Analysis

W e conclude from the above review that , although allocution may frequently be unsworn, neither the Constitution nor Rule 32 require that this be so. W hether an
allocution is sworn or unsworn does not affe ct a defendant’s right to make a statement to the s entencing court n or does it
subvert the policy goals of Rule 32

. The reason for allocution is not to permit t he defendant to re

- contest the factual issues of innocence and guilt

. Rathe r, the purpose of a llocution is to
afford the defendant an opportunity to raise mitigating circumstances and to present his individualized situation to the sentencing court. See Adams , 252 F.3d at 280; see also
Shelton v. Carroll , 464 F.3d 423, 442 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding

t hat the defendant had no constitutional right to make factual statements about his involvement in the crime during allocution in a capital case).

U nder existing jurisprudence, t he defendant’s right of
allocution is not unlimited . The sentencing judge h as always

6 The Application Note to § 3C1.1 states, without distinguishing between sworn and unsworn statements, that “providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate judge” is sufficient to warrant an enhancement. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 app. note 4(F).12 retained the discretion to place certain restrictions on what

may be presented during an allocution. See, e.g.

, United
States v. Mack , 200 F.3d 653, 657

- 58 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s refusal to allow the defendants to
discuss th eir beliefs about environmental issues and civil disobedience); United States v. Li , 115 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 1997) ( “[A] defendant’s right to allocution is not unlimited in terms of either time or content.”). These decisions confirm
that a sentencing j udge may impose procedural limitations during an allocution, so long as the judge personally
addresses the defendant and off ers him the opportunity to address the court before the sentence is pronounced

. See
United States v. Hall , 152 F.3d 381, 392 (5th C ir. 1998) (interpreting Rule 32 narrowly as imposing only its two stated requirements)

, abrogated on other grounds by United States
v. Martinez

- Salazar , 528 U.S. 304 (2000); see also United States v. Pelaez , 930 F.2d 520, 523 (6th Cir. 1991) ( confirming th at Rule 32 has only two procedural requirements, but also holding that the sentencing judge must meaningfully consider the defendant’s statement during
allocution )

.

Moreover, w hen a defendant presents such a statement, the fact that the court puts the def endant under oath could have the effect of enhancing the credibility of the defendant’s presentation and leaving a more meaningful impression on the sentencing court. See Estes v. Texas , 381 U.S. 532, 558 (1965); Celine Chan, Note, The Right to Allocution : A Defendant’s Word on its Face or Under Oath? , 75 Brook. L. Rev. 579, 582 (2009). That being said, the Supreme Court has also noted that, regardless of whether the statement is sworn, all “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong13 presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison , 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).

We conclude, therefore, that the choice by a particular judge to require that the defendant be sworn for the allocution
is not in consistent with the procedural requirements of Rule
32.

Ward

, however, argues that the District Court’s requirement of a sworn allocution overstepped the bounds of
Rule 32

– that

by placing Mr. Ward under oath as if he were appearing as a witness, the district court
violated one of the essential attributes of the defendant’s historic and fundamental right to present a personal allocution prior to being
sentenced. This right includes an opportunity for the defendant personally to express remorse to the court, to explicate factors in mitigation, and to plead for mer cy prior to the imposition of sentence, an opportunity that is by its nature and by hundreds of years of historical tradition both
unsworn and without cross

- examination.

T his concern is without merit. A s discussed above, the purpose of Rule 32 is to give the defendant an opportunity to speak about mitigating circumstances and offer his reasoning
for a more lenient sentence. Ward was free to address the sentencing court on any and all of these topics. These are not topics that address the factual ele ments of guilt

, which have already been decided by the jury.14 We would also point out that, rather than exercising
his r ight to allocution, Ward could have remained silent. A risk in speaking at allocution, whether sworn or unsworn, is
that the allocuti on statement can be used in subsequent criminal prosecutions. See Harvey v. Shillinger , 76 F.3d 1528, 1535 (10 th Cir. 1996) (“A defendant’s choice to exercise his right to allocution, like the choice t o exercise the right to testify, is entirely his own; he may speak to the c o urt, but he is not required to do so.”). If the defendant is concerned about future use of his statement against him, it
makes no difference whether the statement was sworn or not.

See Whitten , 610 F.3d at 199 (holding that that pro secutors may use “an unsworn, uncrossed allocution” by a criminal defendant in a subsequent proceeding against the same defendant). 7 Ward ’s argument t hat an unsworn allocution

7 Ward also cites to a case from an intermediate Tennessee appellate court, State v. Keathly , 145 S.W.3d 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003), which appears to be the only court to have
addressed the r ight to an unsworn allocution. The court in Keathly found a violation of the right of allocution because the defendant should have been “permitted to make an unsworn statement to the court without having been subjected to rigorous cross

- examination.” Id. at 130. Keathly is distinguishable for two reasons. First, the court interpreted Tennessee law (the text of which mirrors Rule 32) as granting the right to an unsworn allocution based on the definition of the term in Blalck’s Law Distionary. Id.
at 124 . The court did not engage in an analysis of the history or purpose of the right of allocution. Instead, it just looked to the definition provided in Black’s Law Dictionary and cited an Eleventh Circuit case that cited the dictionary for the same proposi tion. Id. at 125 (citing Gilbert, 244 F.3d at 924).15 would have allowed him to deliver a more candid statement to the sentencing cou rt is not persuasive.

In sum

, w e conclude that the District Court retained
the discretion to require Ward to deliver a sworn allo cution.

W e find no basis to hold that the District Court violated Rule
32 when it re quired Ward’s allocution to be s worn. T he
District Court’s decision t o place Ward under oath did not impinge upon Ward’s right to speak on his own behalf, nor
did the administration of an oath affect Ward’s ability to present a plea of mitigation. Consequently, we find that there
was no viola tion of Ward’s right of allocution.

Second, and more importantly, the court held that the

cross

- examination during the defendant’s allocution was improper under Tennessee law because it transformed the function of the allocution far beyon d an opportunity for the defendant to express contrition and request leniency. Id. at 129

- 30. Indeed, the fact that the allocution was subject to

cross

- examination appears to be the dispositive issue in Keathly . Here, however, Ward was not subject to cr oss

examination. For these reasons, we do not find Keathly to be persuasive.16 B. The Remaining Grounds for Appeal 8

1. The Increase of Ward’s Fine Fr om $100,000 to $250,000

Ward claims that the District Court vindictively
increased his fine at resentencing from $100,000 to $250,000

, in violation of the Fifth Amendment

. The Due Process clause forbids judges from retaliating against a defendant for succeeding on an appeal by impos ing a more severe sentence on remand. See North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969). In such cases, the defe ndant is typically entitled to a presumption of vindictiveness , although the government may rebut the presumption by “proffering legitimate, objective
reasons for its conduct. ” Esposito , 968 F.2d at 303 (citations omitted)

. Additionally , the Supreme Cour t has limited application of the presumption to circumstances in which
there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the increase d sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness. Alabama v. Smith

, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989). Where there is no reasonable
likeli hood of vindictiveness , the burden remains upon the defendant to prove actual vindictiveness. Id. at 799

- 800

.

Here, the District Court acknowledged that the new fine was being imposed to correct an error identified by us in
his earlier appeal

, i.e

. , the failure to state sufficient reasons for imposing the fine . The District Court then exami ned the

8 In challenges to the sentence, we review a district court’s factual findings for clear error and exercise plenary review over its applications of legal precepts. United State s v. Esposito , 968 F.2d 300, 302

- 03 (3d Cir. 1992).17 relevant factors: the G uidelines range, Ward’s ability to pay,
and Ward’s crimes. At the second sentencing, with this information at hand, the District Court arrived at the figure of $250

, 000 as an appropriate fine. Additionally, the District Court explicitly stated that the increased sentence was not
vindictive. ( While certainly not determinative , a district court’s statement of its aim and intention in pro nouncing sentence is a factor to be considered in making a determination about vindictiveness.) Ward offers no evidence of vindictiveness other than stating that he is entitled to a presumption of vindictiveness based on the increased
fine.

Assuming, how ever, that the presumption of vindictiveness applies, the particular facts of this case overcome the presumption . First, as the government points out, the District Court never actually considered the appropriate factors when assessing a fine during the fi rst sentencing

, but it did so at the second sentencing. Second, and contrary to Ward’s assertion, there is evidence in the record that his sentence was partially based on the government’s new information presented at his second sentencing. Specifically,

a fter Ward objected to the imposition of the $250,000 fine, the government responded by saying: “Let me say that from what I understand, the Court is intending to increase the
amount of the fine based on the new information and not
based on the fact that t he defendant took an appeal. ” The District Court responded

Absolutely. It is not based upon that. My understanding of the opinion from the 3 rd

Circuit was that there was no basis in the previous sentencing for the imposition of the18 $100,000. And based upon the presentence report and the defendant’s financial background, the $250,000, which is under the guidelines, is a reasonable figure and he is in a position to afford that. And so that’s the basis

of that

.

The court’s statement confirms that the co urt analyzed the factors for imposing a fine. That objective evidence,
combined with the court’s statement is adequate on this record to overcome any presumption of vindictiveness. Given the lack of evidence or argument that there was actual
vindictivene ss, the District Court did not err in determining to
increase Ward’s fine.

Therefore, we reject Ward’s argument that the
increased fine was vindictive.

2. The Five Level Enhancement for
Ward’s Engag ement in a Pattern of
Prohibited Sexual

- Conduct

Ward cl aims that there was insufficient evidence to
support the District Court’s application of a five level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5 (b) (1) for engaging in a pattern of prohibited sexual conduct.

Section 4B1.5(b)(1) provides that, “[i]n any case in

w hich the conviction is a covered sex crime and the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity invo lving prohibited sexual
conduct [,] [t]he offense level shall be [increased by] 5 [.]” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1)

. The commentary to subsection (b) provides that a “defendant [has] engaged in a pattern of19 activity involving prohibited sexual conduct if on at least two separate occasions, the defendant engaged in prohibited
sexual conduct with a minor.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) app. note. 4(a). Prohibited sexual con duct with a minor includes the production of child pornography

. Id.

At Ward’s re sentencing, the District Court made note
of the entire record that had been submitted at his first sentencing and incorporated all findings made therein. The
District Cou rt also received new evidence showing that Ward produced photos and videos of J.D. engaged in sex acts. When the District Court announced Ward’s new sentence, it stated that it was considering “not only the information t hat was given here today, but the i nformation that was given previously about Mr. Ward’s contact with young people, young men, previously.” Given the extensive evidence of a pattern of prohibited sexual conduct, the District Court did not err in imposing the five level enhancement under § 4B1.5(b)(1).

3. T he Imposi tion of a Within

- Guidelines

Range Sentence

Ward contends that his sentence should be vacated
because the District Cou rt failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1).

Section 3553(c)(1) provides that , when the G uidelines

range of the sentence spans more than 24 months, the sentencing court must explain “the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the range ”

. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). A sentencing court will satisfy the requirements of § 3553(c)(1) when it gi ves “concrete reasons for its choice20 of sentences.” United States v. Gricco , 277 F.3d 339, 363 (3d Cir. 2002)

.

Here, the G uidelines range for Ward’s sentence ran
from 292 to 365 months

— a s pan of 73 months. The District Court imposed a 300

- month senten ce. Before imposing the sentence, the District Court listed a variety of reasons why the sentence was necessary, including the seriousness of the crimes, Ward’s lack of respect for the law, his high risk of reoffending, and the need for general and specif ic deterrence.
This was clearly a sufficiently detailed explanation of the
reasons for Ward’s sentence. See Lloyd , 469 F.3d at 326 (holding that the sentencing court provided an adequate explanation for the defendant’s sentence when i t discussed
the defe ndant’s criminal history, the sentences received by his

co

- defendants, and the danger of his crime to society).

Ward takes issue with the District Court ’s failure to

state why a 300 month sentence was more appropriate than any other sentence within the 2 92 to 365 month range

. This argument misconstrues the law. The District Court did not have an obligation to state why a 300 month sentence was more appropriate than all other possible sentences. Rather, the District Court needed only to state why the 30 0 month
sentence was sufficient

. See Gricco , 277 F.3d at 363

. Therefore, we reject Ward ’s argument that the District Court failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1).

4

. Ward’s Request for a Downward
Variance

Ward claims that he was entitled to a downward variance based on his age, physical and psychological21 condition, and the atypically harsh conditions of confinement to which he was subject. Ward argues that the District Court’s alleged failure to consider and appreciate the
relevance of these f actors rendered his sentence procedurally
unreasonable

.

We may not overturn a sentence on procedural unreasonableness grounds when the sentencing judge has “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments an d has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v.
United States , 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Here, the District Court did not disregard Ward’s arguments at sentencing. The District Court specifically addressed and reje cted each claim.
The District Court’s consideration of Ward’s arguments for a variance adhered to the Supreme Court’s guidance in Rita. Therefore, we will not disturb the sentence on procedural reasonableness grounds.

5

. Ward’s Sentence Is N ot Substanti v ely
Unreasonable

Ward argues that 300 months of incarceration is substantively unreasonable because the sentence exceeds his projected life expectancy. We will affirm unless “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that pa rticular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Id . at 568.

T he fact that Ward may die in prison does not mean that his sentence is unreasonable. See U.S. v. Watson , 482
F.3d 269, 273 (3d Cir. 2007)

. Looking at the totality of the
ci rcumstances, we are not convinced that Ward’s sentence

—22 which is within the advisory Guidelines range

— is substantively unreasonable

. The District Court found that Ward posed a grave danger to society and had committed serious crimes, thus necessitating a l ong sentence. The
District Court was well within its discretion to impose a 300 month sentence. We therefore reject Ward’s argument that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

6. Restitution

Ward contends that the District Court failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 2259, which requires the sentencing court to
order the defendant to pay restitution to his victims if their
losses can be determined . 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a), (b)(3), & (b)(4)(A). Ward now requests that we vacate his sentence
and remand for resentencing so that the District Court can
order restitution. Ward did not object to the District Court’s decision not to order restitution at his resentencing. As a result, we review the District Court’s decision for plain error.
United States v. Cou ch , 291 F.3d 251, 252

- 53 (3d Cir. 2002).

Ward lacks standing to raise this challenge because only the crime victim, the crime victim’s legal representative, or the government may assert rights related to a restitution award. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(1). Ther efore, his argument is
meritless.

Ward , however, asserts that he has standing because the imposition of a fine was directly related to the District Court’s inability to impose restitution. This argument misconstrues the record on appeal. On Ward’s first appeal,

w e noted that the District Court’s decision to impose a fine instead of restitution was improper because “the Court simply23 translated the intended restitution into a fine owed to the government, without engaging in any analysis as to why a
fine wa s appropriate and despite it having appeared . . . that no fine would be imposed.” Ward , 626 F.3d at 185

- 86 (c itation omitted). At Ward’s re sentencing, as noted above,
the District Court did not translate the intended restitution into a fine. Instead, t he District Court considered the factors relevant to the imposition of a fine, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3572. Based on the record before us, the District Court’s decision to impose a fine at re sentencing was un related to its
decision not to order resti tution. We therefore will not consider Ward’s argument that the relatedness of t he fine and restitution gives him standing to challenge the failure to order
restitution.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgmen t of sentence.