IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

IN RE: TIKTOK, INC., 

CONSUMER PRIVACY 

LITIGATION, 

This Document Relates to All Cases 

MDL No. 2948 

Master Docket No. 20-cv-4699 

Judge John Z. Lee 

Magistrate Judge Sunil R. Harjani 

MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 

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Table of Contents 

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1

II. BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................. 2

A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations ........................................................................................... 2

B. The Risks of TikTok’s Defenses to Plaintiffs and the Class ................................ 4

C. Litigation and Procedural History ......................................................................... 8

III. SETTLEMENT TERMS ................................................................................................ 13

A. The Settlement Classes ....................................................................................... 13

B. Monetary Relief for Settlement Class Members ................................................. 13

C. Plan of Allocation ............................................................................................... 14

D. Injunctive Relief .................................................................................................. 15

E. Release ................................................................................................................ 16

F. Class Representative Service Awards ................................................................. 17

G. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs .................................................................................. 17

H. Settlement Administration .................................................................................. 17

IV. CLASS NOTICE & RESPONSE ................................................................................... 18

A. Notice was disseminated via a robust multi-faceted campaign including 

widespread publication and advertising, direct emails, and in-App notice. ....... 18

B. The claims rates of 1.4% for the Nationwide Class and 13% for the Illinois 

Subclass falls well within the range of comparable class action settlements. .... 22

C. Only a fraction of 1% of the class opted out of the Settlement. ......................... 23

D. Only four individuals objected, and none of their objections is colorable. ........ 24

E. CAFA notice was provided and no objections followed. ................................... 24

V. STANDARDS FOR SETTLEMENT APPROVAL ....................................................... 24

VI. FINAL APPROVAL IS WARRANTED ........................................................................ 28

A. The strength of Plaintiffs’ case compared to the amount of the Settlement favors 

final approval. ..................................................................................................... 28

B. An assessment of the likely complexity, length, and expense of continued 

litigation favors approval of the Settlement. ....................................................... 30

C. The lack of opposition to the Settlement favors final approval. ......................... 32

1. The Helfand Objection was filed by a serial objector and lacks merit. .. 32

2. The Cochran Objection was filed by a serial objector, did not comply 

with the requirements of the Preliminary Approval Order, and lacks 

merit. ....................................................................................................... 37

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3. The Mark S. Objection did not comply with the requirements of the 

Preliminary Approval Order, restates objections previously considered 

and rejected by the Court, and fails to disclose that Mark S. has asked 

another court to award him legal fees for this “remarkable” Settlement. 39

4. The Litteken Objection failed to comply with the requirements of the 

Preliminary Approval Order, restates objections this Court has already 

considered and rejected, and continues a string of baseless and irrelevant 

ad hominem attacks. ................................................................................ 45

D. The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the time 

of Settlement, as well as the opinion of competent counsel, favor final approval.

 ............................................................................................................................. 57

VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 59

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Table of Authorities 

Cases Page(s) 

Adkins v. Facebook, Inc., 

No. 18-CV-05982, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87097 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2021) ................... 29-30 

Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 

616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980) .................................................................................................. 24 

Bayat v. Bank of the W., 

No. C-13-2376, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50416 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2015) ............................ 22 

Bower v. MetLife, Inc.,

No. 1:09-CV-351, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149117 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2012) ..................... 50 

Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 

No. 3:11-CV-03082, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19275 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016) .................... 34 

Burns v. Elrod, 

757 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1985) .................................................................................................. 20 

Champs Sports Bar & Grill Co. v. Mercury Payment Sys., LLC, 

275 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2017) ....................................................................... 38, 40, 41 

Collins v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC,

No. 19-22864, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218673 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2020) ................ 33, 34, 35 

Cotton v. Hinton, 

559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977) ................................................................................................ 31 

Ferron v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co.,

No. 20-CV-62136, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129955 (S.D. Fla. July 13, 2021) ...................... 38 

Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 

966 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2013) .................................................................................... 29 

Gascho v. Glob. Fitness Holdings, LLC,

No. 2:11-CV-436, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46846 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2014) ......................... 51 

Gehrich v. Chase Bank U.S., 

316 F.R.D. 215 (N.D. Ill. 2016) ............................................................................................. 30 

Grady v. De Ville Motor Hotel, Inc., 

415 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1969) ................................................................................................ 30 

Case: 1:20-cv-04699 Document #: 195 Filed: 03/31/22 Page 4 of 68 PageID #:3421
Halley v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 

861 F.3d 481 (3d Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................... 51 

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 

150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) ................................................................................................ 30 

In re AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Litig., 

270 F.R.D. 330 (N.D. Ill. 2010) ....................................................................................... 25, 28

In re AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 

789 F. Supp. 2d 935 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2011) ................................................................... 20, 32 

In re Briscoe, 

448 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2006) ............................................................................................. 21, 22 

In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,

No. 1:17-MD-2800, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118209 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2020) ................... 38 

In re Google Buzz Privacy Litig.,

No. 10-00672, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146767 at *4-10 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011) ............... 29 

In re Google LLC St. View Elec. Commc’ns Litig.,

No. 10-md-02184, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47928 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2020) ....................... 29 

In re Google Plus Profile Litig.,

No. 5:18-CV-06164, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13571 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2021) .................... 29 

In re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 

No. 08-1999, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121684 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2010) .............................. 50 

In re LinkedIn User Priv. Litig., 

309 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ........................................................................................... 29

In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 

618 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2010) .................................................................................................. 51 

In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 

164 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2000) .................................................................................... 58 

In re NFL Players Concussion Injury Litig., 

821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016) .............................................................................................. 50-51 

In re Northfield Lab’ys, Inc. Sec. Litig., 

No. 06-C-1493, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12741 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2012) ......................... 25, 26 

Case: 1:20-cv-04699 Document #: 195 Filed: 03/31/22 Page 5 of 68 PageID #:3422
In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust Litig., 

527 F. Supp. 3d 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) .................................................................................... 54 

In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 

No. 08-C-1832, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25290 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 29, 2016) ......................... 21, 28 

In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 

No. 16-5073, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166675 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2021) ................................. 53 

In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig.,

No. 2445, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231508 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2021) ....................................... 54 

In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prods. Liab. Litig., 

895 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2018) ...................................................................................... 49-50, 53

In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 

357 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (D. Kan. 2018) ..................................................................................... 38 

Isby v. Bayh, 

75 F.3d 1191 (7th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................ 24, 27, 28, 58 

Johnson v. Uber Techs.,

No. 16-C-5468, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161155 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2018) ............................. 5 

Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., 

877 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................................ 51, 52 

Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs.,

No. 07-CV-1707, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26167 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2016) ............................ 20 

Keil v. Lopez, 

862 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2017) ................................................................................................... 50 

Kolinek v. Walgreen Co., 

311 F.R.D. 483 (N.D. Ill. 2015) ....................................................................................... 22, 25

Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 

696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012) .................................................................................................. 29 

Legg v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings,

No. 14-61543-CV, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122695 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2016) ................ 34-35 

Manigault-Johnson v. Google, LLC, 

No. 2:18-cv-1032,2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59892 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2019) ....................... 43, 44 

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McKinnie v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 

678 F. Supp. 2d 806 (E.D. Wis. 2009) ................................................................................... 58 

Miracle-Pond v. Shutterfly, Inc.,

No. 19-CV-04722, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86083 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2020) ....................... 4-5 

Norcia v. Samsung Telcomms. Am., LLC,

No. 14-CV-00582, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135256 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2021) ............... 34, 35 

Parker v. Time Warner Ent. Co., L.P., 

631 F. Supp. 2d 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) .................................................................................... 29 

Perez v. Asurion Corp., 

501 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2007) .................................................................................... 22 

Peter v. Doordash, Inc., 

445 F. Supp. 3d 580 .................................................................................................................. 5 

Poertner v. Gillette Co., 

618 F. App'x 624 (11th Cir. 2015) ........................................................................................ 22

Pollard v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, 

320 F.R.D. 198 (W.D. Mo. 2017) ........................................................................................... 23 

Redman v. Radioshack Corp., 

768 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................................ 51, 52 

Schulte v. Fifth Third Bank, 

805 F. Supp. 2d 560 (N.D. Ill. 2011) ...................................................................................... 31

Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp.,

No. CV 12-0215, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137184 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2016) ...................... 33 

Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 

667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) ................................................................................... 23 

Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express, Inc., 

463 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................. 28 

T.K. v. ByteDance Tech. Co, 

No. 19-CV-7915, 2022 WL 888943 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2022) .............................................. 41 

Wilkins v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 

No. 14-C-190, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23869 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2015) .......................... 20-21 

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Wong v. Accretive Health, Inc., 

773 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................. 27 

Wright v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC,

No. 14-C-10457, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115729 (N.D. Ill. 2016) ........................................ 30 

Statutes 

28 U.S.C. § 1715 .......................................................................................................................... 24 

50 U.S.C. § 1601 ............................................................................................................................ 9 

50 U.S.C. § 1701 ............................................................................................................................ 9 

740 Ill. Comp. Stat. §14/1, et seq. .............................................................................................. 3, 4 

Rules 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ................................................................................................................. passim

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I. INTRODUCTION 

The Settlement presented for approval here is one of the largest data privacy settlements in 

history – a $92 million non-reversionary cash settlement fund with additional injunctive relief that 

directly addresses the privacy concerns raised by Plaintiffs’ claims.1 The Court preliminarily 

approved the Settlement on September 30, 2021, after a hearing and thorough consideration of 

objections to Plaintiffs’ motion for approval. ECF Nos. 161 (Memorandum Opinion) and 162 

(Preliminary Approval Order) (collectively, the “Preliminary Approval Orders”). 

After the Court preliminarily approved the Settlement, Notice was issued to the Class via 

a nationwide media campaign, a social media campaign across multiple platforms, a paid search 

campaign, direct emails to class members, and direct messages within the TikTok application 

(“App”). The Notice Plan has been successful. Over 1.2 million individuals submitted Valid 

Claims. Each Nationwide Class Member who submitted a Valid Claim will receive approximately 

$27.19, and each Illinois Subclass Member who submitted a Valid Claim will receive 

approximately $163.13 after the deduction of Settlement-related costs, including the expenses of 

the Settlement Administrator and the costs of Notice to the Class, any service awards, any fee 

awards, and any other administrative fees and expenses which may be approved by the Court. This 

result compares favorably with other court-approved privacy class action settlements. 

In contrast to the 1.2 million individuals who found the Settlement terms favorable and 

submitted a Valid Claim, only four have objected to the Settlement and just 28 filed valid requests 

to opt out of the Settlement. Of those four objections, two were filed by individuals who objected 

at the preliminary approval stage and raise substantially similar arguments to those the Court 

1

 Capitalized terms have the same meanings as set forth in the September 4, 2020 Settlement 

Agreement and Release (“Settlement Agreement”), as clarified by the February 16, 2021 

Addendum No. 1 to Settlement Agreement and Release (“Addendum”) (collectively, the 

“Settlement”), ECF No. 122-1. 

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2 

already considered and rejected. The other two objections were filed by serial objectors and lack 

both credibility and merit. 

These facts indicate a successful Notice Plan and widespread support for the Settlement by 

Class Members. Accordingly, Plaintiffs now seek final approval of the Settlement and final 

certification of the Nationwide Class and the Illinois Subclass. The Settlement achieved an 

excellent result for the Class and satisfies all criteria for final settlement approval. 

II. BACKGROUND 

This multidistrict litigation (MDL) consists of 21 putative class actions against U.S. 

defendants TikTok Inc. (“TikTok”) and ByteDance Technology Inc. (“ByteDance”), and foreign 

defendants TikTok, Ltd. and Beijing ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd. (“Beijing ByteDance”) 

(collectively, “Defendants” or, in the Settlement, “Defendant’s Released Parties”). The cases 

allege that Defendants invaded Plaintiffs’ and putative class members’ privacy through the popular 

TikTok application and its predecessor application Musical.ly, a video-sharing social networking 

service used to create short videos. 

A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations 

This case involves Defendants’ collection, use, and transmission of highly sensitive 

personal data via Defendants’ ubiquitous TikTok App. See Consolidated Amended Class Action 

Complaint (“Complaint”), ECF No. 114. The App allows users to create and share 60-second 

videos—typically of people doing activities such as dancing, lip-syncing, and stunts—and boasts 

a substantial worldwide fanbase. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 128, 131, 134. TikTok’s popularity has exploded over 

the past year as the COVID-19 pandemic has left users bored and spending more time at home. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the TikTok App infiltrates its users’ devices and extracts 

a broad array of private data including biometric data and content that Defendants use to track and 

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3 

profile TikTok users for the purpose of, among other things, ad targeting and profit. Id. at ¶¶ 9-18, 

137-192, 240-298, 402-417.

With regard to Plaintiffs’ core claims under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act 

(BIPA), 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. §14/1, et seq., the Complaint alleges that the App uses a complex 

system of artificial intelligence to recognize facial features in users’ videos, which allows the user 

to use various filters and stickers. Id. at ¶¶ 240-281, 402-417. Plaintiffs allege that the App also 

analyzes faces to determine the user’s age, race/ethnicity, and gender, using proprietary algorithms 

to attempt to prevent minor children from using the App and to recommend content and profiles 

for the user to follow. Id. at ¶¶ 242-243, 245, 250, 258-259. By utilizing this private and biometric 

information, Plaintiffs contend, TikTok maintains a competitive advantage over other social media 

apps and profits from its use of improperly obtained data, all while failing to comply with the 

minimum requirements for handling users’ biometric data established by BIPA. 

The Complaint also alleges violations of a number of other statutory, common law, and 

constitutional claims arising from Defendants’ alleged taking and transmission of other private, 

legally protected data. Plaintiffs assert claims for violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 

(CFAA), California Comprehensive Data Access and Fraud Act (CDAFA), California 

Constitutional Right to Privacy, California Unfair Competition and False Advertising laws, Video 

Privacy Protection Act (VPPA), Intrusion Upon Seclusion, and Restitution/Unjust Enrichment. Id.

at ¶¶ 338-401. Underlying Plaintiffs’ VPPA claim, for example, are allegations that TikTok 

unlawfully transmitted class members’ personal and private viewing histories to third parties like 

Facebook and Google. Id. at ¶ 159. In support of their CFAA claim, as another example, Plaintiffs 

allege that Defendants exceeded the scope of their authorized access to Plaintiffs’ and class 

members’ devices and the private information contained on those devices. Id. at ¶ 340. 

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While these data privacy violations alone support Plaintiffs’ legal claims, TikTok’s 

apparent ties to China compound Plaintiffs’ concerns. Id. at ¶¶ 3. The Complaint alleges that 

Defendants do not adequately disclose that user data collected from Plaintiffs is stored and shared 

with affiliates in countries outside the United States, such as China (conduct which TikTok denies). 

Beijing ByteDance has spent the last decade using technologies such as artificial intelligence and 

facial recognition. Id. at ¶ 271. Defendants’ reported connections to the Chinese government have 

very recently come under close public scrutiny and several U.S. Senators formally requested a risk 

assessment of Defendants’ data collection activities, and the U.S. Department of Defense issued 

an internal memorandum encouraging its employees to avoid installing the App. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 6, 200, 

203, 205, 219, 342. 

B. The Risks of TikTok’s Defenses to Plaintiffs and the Class 

TikTok has taken the position that the foreign Defendants are not subject to personal 

jurisdiction, and that Plaintiffs’ claims are based on speculation about how the App works and an 

incorrect interpretation of governing law. 

First, TikTok has repeatedly asserted that Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to an arbitration and 

class action waiver agreement. According to TikTok, at all relevant times, every TikTok user 

agreed to an arbitration and class-waiver provision in the App’s Terms of Service (“Terms”). When 

users create their accounts in the App, they encounter a sign-in screen with hyperlinks to the Terms 

that read: “By continuing, you agree to TikTok’s Terms of Use and confirm that you have read 

TikTok’s Privacy Policy.” 

While Plaintiffs believe TikTok’s policies were not adequately presented or otherwise 

disclosed to its users, and that class members should not be bound by their provisions, Plaintiffs 

acknowledge that courts have consistently held that users were on notice of—and thus had agreed 

to—virtually identical disclosures. See, e.g., Miracle-Pond v. Shutterfly, Inc., No. 19-CV-04722, 

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5 

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86083, at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2020) (granting motion to compel 

arbitration and staying class action where contract was formed with hyperlinked policies near a 

sign-in button); Peter v. Doordash, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 580, No. 19-CV-06098 (N.D. Cal. 2020) 

(same); Johnson v. Uber Techs., No. 16-C-5468, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161155, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. 

Sept. 20, 2018) (same); Dohrmann v. Intuit, Inc., 823 F. App’x 482 (9th Cir. 2020) (reversing 

denial of motion to compel arbitration where website required acknowledgment of agreement 

before proceeding). 

According to TikTok, even minors who may be able to disaffirm the arbitration agreement 

may not be able to establish disaffirmance collectively on behalf of a class because disaffirmance 

purportedly presents individualized issues. Thus, TikTok’s position is that arbitration would create 

a dispositive threshold procedural problem for Plaintiffs before any factual or legal merits are even 

considered. And even if minors could overcome the arbitration agreement through disaffirmance, 

some of the claims asserted in this litigation would, according to TikTok, be released in connection 

with another action, T.K., et al. v. Bytedance Tech. Co., Ltd. et al., No. 1:19-CV-07915 (N.D. Ill.) 

(Blakey, J.) (“T.K.”), if not for the settlement benefits achieved here. As part of the Settlement, 

TikTok has agreed not to dispute claims filed by members of the class in T.K. 

In addition, with respect to the foreign Defendants, TikTok has repeatedly asserted that 

they do not have sufficient contacts with any of the forums in which the underlying putative class 

actions were filed for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction because the foreign entities have 

no direct relationship with Plaintiffs and do not operate in the United States. Though Plaintiffs 

believe they could overcome the jurisdictional hurdle with discovery, Defendants’ arguments carry 

a significant risk if this case were to proceed in litigation. 

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If Plaintiffs were able to overcome these procedural issues, TikTok has asserted multiple 

defenses to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. With regard to BIPA, for example, TikTok has 

represented that TikTok does not and never has collected from its users any biometric identifiers 

or derivative information protected by law, nor has it ever shared U.S. user data with the Chinese 

government. Defendants have expressed their confidence that, if this case were to proceed on a 

litigation track, they will secure a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) dismissal for 

failure to state a claim based on, inter alia, technical arguments that: (1) Defendants’ App compiles 

only anonymized, generalized “demographic data” through “facial landmarking,” and does not 

collect any biometric information of TikTok users; and (2) even if the information the App utilizes 

does constitute biometric information within the meaning of BIPA, that information resides on the 

users’ devices, and is not collected or stored by Defendants within the meaning of applicable law. 

In support of its position that it has not violated BIPA, TikTok has asserted that its user 

video data is not used to identify anyone. TikTok has explained that App users cannot tag or label 

faces in videos with a user’s real name or identity. This contrasts with Facebook, for example, 

which requires its users to use and display “the same name that you use in everyday life” when 

using Facebook. Facebook also allows users to tag the faces of their friends and themselves in 

photos and videos. Because Facebook users must use their real names, their faces are tagged with 

their real names whenever they are tagged in a photo or video. By contrast, TikTok does not have 

a face-tagging feature, nor a real name requirement, and thus does not associate a particular face 

with an individual’s identity. 

The TikTok App also has special effects features that enable users to alter, enhance, and 

modify their facial features in their video images. TikTok has explained that the technique 

employed to enable these special effects features is called “landmarking” and uses artificial 

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7 

intelligence to locate the position of a face or specific facial features within a video frame, e.g., the 

location of a nose relative to the location of the eyes. That general “landmarking,” according to 

TikTok, does not involve generating any face template or personally identifiable data, and thus 

does not give rise to biometric privacy violations under BIPA. 

Although TikTok has admitted that the App uses technology for “demographic 

classification,” which includes recognizing visual patterns that indicate age, gender or other 

characteristics, TikTok has contended that this is fundamentally different than facial recognition 

because it does not create facial templates and is not capable of identifying a user. While Plaintiffs 

disagree with TikTok’s contentions, Plaintiffs recognize that the question of what constitutes 

biometric information under BIPA is novel and evolving, and is a risk if the litigation proceeds. 

As another example, TikTok asserts Plaintiffs will be unable to state a claim under the 

VPPA, which protects consumers against the disclosure of their video viewing histories. TikTok 

has contended that it is not a video service provider within the meaning of the statute, it does not 

transmit the requisite personally identifiable information (PII) with video viewing histories, any 

such transmission is subject to the statute’s ordinary course of business exception, and that its 

privacy policy fully discloses its data sharing practices. While Plaintiffs have rebuttals to each of 

these arguments, they acknowledge the real risk of continued litigation, that circuit court decisions 

on this claim have reached varying conclusions on comparable sets of facts, and the dearth of 

successful settlements of VPPA claims. 

With respect to Plaintiffs’ CFAA claim, aimed at protecting against hacking, Defendants 

have argued that Plaintiffs cannot establish proof of economic damages. TikTok has further 

contended the claim will be substantively defeated because Plaintiffs voluntarily granted TikTok 

access to their devices and TikTok complied with the disclosures in its privacy policy about the 

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8 

data it would access and collect, i.e., it never exceeded the scope of its authorized access. Again, 

while Plaintiffs are well prepared to refute these arguments, each step of litigation brings risk that 

Co-Lead Counsel balanced against the benefits achieved through the Settlement. 

C. Litigation and Procedural History 

The history leading up to the Settlement began long before the Judicial Panel on 

Multidistrict Litigation’s (JPML) August 4, 2020 transfer order creating the MDL in this District. 

See also ECF Nos. 122-6 and 122-8 (Declarations of Katrina Carroll and Ekwan Rhow, discussing 

pre-MDL procedural history). The first filed case of all related cases in this MDL is Hong v. 

ByteDance, Inc. et al., 5:19-cv-07792-LHK, filed in the Northern District of California in 

November 2019. Led by court-appointed Co-Lead Counsel Mr. Rhow, counsel from Hong first 

mediated with Judge Layn Phillips (Ret.) in April 2020 (before the additional cases comprising 

the MDL were filed). Although the parties engaged in an in-depth analysis of the issues involved, 

the first mediation was unsuccessful. 

Beginning in late April 2020, additional class action cases against TikTok were filed in 

four federal districts: the Northern District of Illinois, the Southern District of Illinois, the Northern 

District of California, and the Central District of California. On May 15, 2020, counsel from the 

Southern District of Illinois filed a motion with the JPML seeking transfer and coordination in the 

Southern District of Illinois, or in the alternative, in this Court. MDL No. 2948. Highly contentious 

litigation among groups of Plaintiffs’ counsel and Defendants ensued thereafter. On August 4, 

2020, the JPML consolidated the related actions and transferred them to this District. 

The second mediation with Judge Phillips, which occurred on August 13, 2020, was 

spearheaded by a group of Plaintiffs’ counsel led by now-Co-Lead Counsel Katrina Carroll. As 

described in her declaration (ECF No. 122-6), 16 firms, representing 11 of the 19 consolidated 

actions, collaborated in the months leading up to the mediation, well before the JPML’s 

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consolidation order, to pursue the second settlement opportunity. Ms. Carroll and PSC member 

Jonathan Jagher traveled to California to appear in person and five additional delegates selected 

by participating plaintiffs’ counsel actively participated by phone.2 

By the time the parties met with Judge Phillips on August 13, 2020, tremendous political 

pressure had mounted against TikTok, creating a unique settlement opportunity for the Class. Just 

one week before the mediation, on August 6, 2020, then-President Trump issued an executive 

order pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq., 

the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq., and section 301 of title 3, United States 

Code, titled Executive Order on Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok (the “First Executive 

Order”).3

 

In the First Executive Order, President Trump stated that TikTok presented a “national 

emergency” that “threaten[s] the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 

States.” The First Executive Order stated that the TikTok App would be banned in the U.S. unless 

ByteDance Ltd. sold or spun-off its domestic TikTok operations to a U.S. company within 45 days. 

President Trump later extended the 45-day deadline to 90 days through a second executive order 

titled Regarding the Acquisition of Musical.ly by ByteDance Ltd. (the “Second Executive 

Order”).4

 The Second Executive Order also prohibited ByteDance from any ownership interest in 

Musical.ly and required that ByteDance divest: (i) any interests in assets or property in the 

2

 Seven delegates participated in the second mediation: Co-Lead Counsel Katrina Carroll; PSC 

members Jonathan Jagher (Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC) and Michael Gervais (Susman 

Godfrey LLP); and Robert Foote (Foote, Mielke, Chavez & O’Neil, LLC); Joseph Guglielmo 

(Scott+Scott Attorneys at Law LLP); Tina Wolfson (Ahdoot & Wolfson, PC); and Tiffany Yiatras 

(Consumer Protection Legal, LLC). 

3

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/11/2020-17699/addressing-the-threatposed-by-tiktok-and-taking-additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency. 

4

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/19/2020-18360/regarding-the-acquisitionof-musically-by-bytedance-ltd. 

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operation of TikTok in the United States; (ii) any data obtained or derived from TikTok or 

musical.ly; and (iii) immediately upon divestment, destroy any data obtained or derived from 

TikTok or Musical.ly. 

TikTok was thus motivated at the second mediation session to resolve this litigation in 

order to shed existing liabilities and maximize its value in preparation for its imminent sale. The 

second mediation session was hard-fought on all fronts and lasted almost 13 hours, culminating in 

an agreement in principle and a signed term sheet for a class-wide resolution, later memorialized 

in a signed agreement on September 4, 2020. 

At the time of the second mediation, the MDL was in a state of procedural limbo: the 

administrative transfer of the related actions had not been fully effectuated and the Court had not 

created a leadership structure subsequent to its pre-consolidation appointment of current Co-Lead 

Counsel Katrina Carroll as interim lead Plaintiffs’ counsel. ECF No. 18. 

On August 17, 2020, the Court entered Case Management Order No. 1, in which it set a 

process for the appointment of lead and liaison counsel for Plaintiffs. ECF No. 4. Numerous 

attorneys and attorney groups applied – including competing factions who attended the first and 

second mediations. At the September 25, 2020 hearing on those applications, the Court noted that 

some applications suggested that a combination of the various groups would result in a “forced 

marriage” or “a team of rivals.” ECF No. 91, 11:19-21. The Court viewed the leadership group 

differently, however: 

I . . . would like to think of it as an all-star team of sorts or an 

Olympic team, made up of individuals form perhaps different 

individual teams, but who are asked to come together to pursue the 

interests of all plaintiffs as a whole in this litigation. 

Id. at 11:21:12-2. The Court ultimately appointed three attorneys to serve as Co-Lead Counsel: 

Ekwan Rhow (from the lead Northern District of California action) and Katrina Carroll (from the 

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lead Northern District of Illinois action) along with Elizabeth Fegan (in recognition that, “perhaps 

most important of all in this circumstance, [she is] fair and level-headed.”). Id. at 12:17-25. 

After the Court appointed the Leadership Group,5 that group immediately began 

collaborating to vet and analyze the Settlement Agreement, conduct and evaluate confirmatory 

discovery, continue negotiations with defense counsel, negotiate the Addendum to the Settlement 

Agreement, and ultimately reach consensus on the Settlement terms Plaintiffs now present to the 

Court for approval. 

Various members of the Leadership Group were charged with analyzing a broad array of 

legal, factual, and strategic issues. The Leadership Group engaged in a candid, collaborative—and 

at times oppositional—process to assess the case and the proposed settlement benefits. See also

ECF No. 122-7 (Declaration of Elizabeth Fegan further discussing process). Through that process, 

and six months of continued negotiations with defense counsel, Co-Lead Counsel was able to 

improve the already substantial Class recovery obtained in the Settlement Agreement through the 

clarification of some of its core terms. For example, as detailed in the Addendum and Ms. Fegan’s 

declaration, the Addendum makes clear that the scope of the injunctive relief applies to defendants 

other than TikTok, and assures that the injunction's prohibitions of wrongful conduct (and the 

warranty relating to that conduct) extend beyond the function of the App, and apply to Defendants’ 

5

 The Court appointed: Katrina Carroll (now Lynch Carpenter LLP, formerly Carlson Lynch, 

LLP), Elizabeth A. Fegan (Fegan Scott LLC), and Ekwan Eric Rhow (Bird, Marella, Boxer, 

Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, P.C.) as Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead Counsel; Shannon 

Marie McNulty (Clifford Law Offices, P.C.) as Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel; and Jonathan Jagher 

(Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC), Megan E. Jones (Hausfeld LLP), Michael Gervais 

(Susman Godfrey LLP), Amanda K. Klevorn (Burns Charest LLP), and Albert Y. Chang (Bottini 

& Bottini, Inc.) as Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee (“PSC”) (collectively, the “Leadership Group”). 

ECF No. 94. 

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treatment of App-derived data on the server. The Addendum also specifies that a third party will 

oversee TikTok’s privacy compliance training program. 

Through that process, and six months of continued negotiations with defense counsel, the 

Leadership Group was able to improve upon the already substantial Class recovery through the 

Addendum. For example, the Addendum expanded the scope of the injunctive relief to apply to 

defendants other than TikTok, ensured that prohibitions of wrongful conduct and the warranty 

relating to that conduct extended beyond the function of the App and applied to Defendants’ 

treatment of App-derived data on the server, and now requires third-party oversight of TikTok’s 

privacy compliance training program. 

The substantial Settlement has also garnered the support of firms outside of the Leadership 

Group, who have been involved in this litigation since before consolidation, and their class 

member clients, who are proposed Class Representatives. See ECF No. 122-2 (Exhibit listing class 

representatives and their counsel). 

On February 25, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a motion seeking preliminary approval of this 

Settlement. ECF No. 122. Three objections to that motion were filed – one by Mark S. (through 

his counsel Scott Drury), another by Dennis Litteken (through his counsel Edelson PC), and a third 

by Brian Behnken and Joshua Dugan (through their counsel Labaton Sucharow LLP). The Court 

held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion on March 2, 2021. ECF No. 134. On March 23, 2021, at the 

Court’s request, Plaintiffs filed supplemental briefing regarding the representation of minor Class 

Members, the process through which Co-Lead Counsel valued the claims in this action, and 

consideration of class notice by email and/or in-App notification. ECF No. 137 (“Supplemental 

Memo”). Following that Supplemental Memo, on September 30, 2021, the Court overruled the 

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pending objections and granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of the Settlement. See 

generally Preliminary Approval Orders. 

Plaintiffs, with the Court-approved Settlement Administrator, then implemented the Notice 

Plan. Now, after widespread support for the Settlement by the Class, Plaintiffs seek final approval 

of the Settlement, final approval of the Plan of Allocation, and final certification of the Nationwide 

Class and Illinois Subclass. 

III. SETTLEMENT TERMS 

The Settlement Agreement and Addendum contain the following key terms, which are 

described in further detail in Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action 

Settlement (“Preliminary Approval Motion”), ECF No. 122, and its accompanying documents, 

including the Settlement itself: 

A. The Settlement Classes 

The Settlement Classes, certified for settlement purposes only, are defined as follows: 

Nationwide Class: All persons who reside in the United States who 

used the App—the TikTok video-sharing application (or its 

Musical.ly predecessor) distributed in the U.S.—prior to September 

30, 2021. 

Illinois Subclass: All persons who reside in the State of Illinois and 

used the App—the TikTok video-sharing application (or its 

Musical.ly predecessor) distributed in the U.S.—in the State of 

Illinois to create videos prior to September 30, 2021. 

Preliminary Approval Order, ¶ 2 (also noting exclusions from the Settlement Class). 

B. Monetary Relief for Settlement Class Members 

TikTok has agreed to pay $92,000,000 to create a Settlement Fund for the benefit of Class 

Members, who receive a pro rata payment (per the Plan of Allocation described below), after the 

deduction of settlement-related costs, including the expenses of the settlement administrator and 

the costs of notice to the Class, any service awards, any fee award, and any other administrative 

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fees and expenses which may be approved by the Court. Id. at § 4.1-5. See also Preliminary 

Approval Order, ¶ 13. No portion of the Settlement Fund will be returned to Defendants. Id. at 

§ 4.5. 

Class Members may submit one claim per Class Member to receive a payment from the 

Settlement Fund according to the Plan of Allocation (discussed infra). Id. at § 5.3.1. 

While it is not possible to predict the precise amount each Class member will receive until 

the Settlement Administrator has completed vetting the claims and the Court has determined the 

amount to be awarded for fees, costs, and incentive awards, Class Counsel estimate that each 

Nationwide Class member will receive $27.19 and each Illinois Subclass member will receive 

$163.13 after deductions for Court-approved attorneys’ fees and costs, Court-approved incentive 

awards to the Plaintiffs, and costs of Notice and claims administration. 

C. Plan of Allocation 

The Plan of Allocation provides that the Net Settlement Funds will be divided into pro rata

shares that are equal to the sum of (1) the total number of valid claims submitted by Nationwide 

Class members and (2) the total number of valid claims submitted by Illinois Subclass members 

multiplied by five. Plan of Allocation, ECF No. 122-3, p. 2. Each Illinois Subclass member who 

submits a valid, authorized claim will be paid six pro rata shares (one as a member of the 

Nationwide Class and five as a member of the Illinois Subclass). Id. Each Nationwide Class 

member who is not a member of the Illinois Subclass will be paid one pro rata share. Id. 

This Plan of Allocation was determined through the independent analysis and negotiation 

of two attorneys selected by Co-Lead Counsel to analyze the merits of the claims asserted, 

advocate the interests of their respective subgroups, and negotiate an allocation of Settlement funds 

between the two groups. See Preliminary Approval Motion, pp. 13-14; Declaration of Jim Zouras, 

ECF No. 122-11; Declaration of Jonathan Rotter, ECF No. 122-10; Declaration of Elizabeth A. 

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Fegan, ECF No. 122-7. After this assessment, the Illinois Subclass was awarded additional shares, 

in part because of the value of the Illinois-only BIPA claim, which provides for statutory damages 

and has a historically higher settlement value than some other asserted claims. 

D. Injunctive Relief 

TikTok, together with the other Defendants’ Released Parties, has agreed not to do the 

following unless disclosed expressly in the TikTok Privacy Policy and in compliance with all 

applicable laws: 

 Use the App to collect or store a user’s biometric information or identifiers (as 

defined by applicable law); 

 Use the App to collect geolocation or GPS data; 

 Use the App to collect information in users’ clipboards; 

 Use the App to transmit U.S. user data outside of the U.S.; 

 Store U.S. user data in databases outside of the U.S.; or 

 Pre-upload U.S. user-generated content. 

Id. § 6.1; Addendum § 2.1 (“‘App’ means the TikTok video-sharing application (or its Musical.ly 

predecessor) distributed in the U.S., including its device-side and server-side operations.”); 

Addendum § 2.5 (“[w]ith respect to the Injunctive Relief in Section 6 of the Agreement, “TikTok” 

means any of Defendants’ Released Parties to the extent they are engaged in the operation of the 

App or involved in receiving or accessing user data obtained through the App”). 

Consistent with the intent of the injunctive relief in Section 6 of the Settlement Agreement, 

the Parties jointly reviewed multiple categories of user data potentially in TikTok’s possession that 

should be deleted from TikTok’s servers. Following confirmation from TikTok as to what 

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Generated Content identified in Section 6.2 of the Settlement Agreement. Addendum § 4.2. 

In addition, TikTok will require newly designed training on compliance with data privacy 

laws and company procedures for all relevant incoming employees and contractors, and annual 

training thereafter. Settlement Agreement § 6.3. TikTok will provide a written verification under 

oath of compliance with the foregoing within 90 days of the Effective Date. Id. § 6.4. TikTok will, 

at its own expense, hire a third party to review the data privacy law compliance training for a 

period of three years and to provide a written verification of this review along with the verification 

required by Section 6.4 of the Settlement Agreement to Class Counsel. Addendum § 4.3. TikTok 

will not disclose to any third party the “personally identifiable information” of a “consumer” who 

uses the App, as those terms are defined by the VPPA, except to the extent such disclosure is not 

prohibited by the Video Privacy Protection Act; nor will TikTok share user data collected through 

the App with third parties without disclosing in its Privacy Policy the categories of third parties 

with whom user data is shared. Addendum § 4.1. 

E. Release 

In exchange for the relief afforded by the Settlement Agreement, Defendants’ Released 

Parties6

 will receive a release of all Released Claims.7 The release is narrowly tailored to the claims 

6

 Defendants’ Released Parties are: “The current defendants in the Civil Actions, as well as any 

and all of their current or former directors, officers, members, administrators, agents, 

representatives, servants, employees, attorneys, parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, divisions, 

branches, units, shareholders, successors, predecessors, assigns, and all other individuals and 

entities acting on their behalf.” Settlement Agreement § 2.10. 

7

 Released Claims are: “[A]ny and all claims, complaints, actions, proceedings, or remedies of any 

kind, whether known or unknown (including, without limitation, claims for attorneys’ fees and 

expenses and costs), arising from or related to the Civil Actions or the collection and use of any 

user data, including biometric data, whether in law or in equity, under contract, tort or any other 

subject area, or under any statute, rule, regulation, order, or law, whether federal, state, or local, 

on any grounds whatsoever, arising from the beginning of time through the Effective Date, that 

were, could have been, or could be asserted by the Releasing Parties.” Settlement Agreement 

§ 2.30. 

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related to “the Civil Actions or the collection and use of any user data, including biometric data” 

and thus covers the claims actually at issue (or that could have been asserted based on the alleged 

facts) in this MDL through the date of preliminary approval. 

F. Class Representative Service Awards 

The Settlement Agreement permits Plaintiffs’ counsel to seek service awards for Class 

Representatives to be paid from the Settlement Fund in an amount up to $2,500 each. Settlement 

Agreement, § 13.2. Contemporaneously with this motion, Plaintiffs have filed a motion seeking 

service awards of that amount. The Settlement is not contingent on Court approval of any service 

awards. Id. at § 13.4. 

G. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 

The Settlement Agreement permits Plaintiffs’ counsel to apply to the Court seeking a 

reasonable portion of the Settlement Fund as payment of any reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 

Id. at § 13.1. The Settlement is not contingent on Court approval of an award of attorneys’ fees or 

costs. Id. at § 13.4. 

The Notice informed the Class that Class Counsel would seek an award of attorneys’ fees 

of no more than 33.33% of the common fund and costs. Notice, ECF No. 122-4, p. 8. 

Contemporaneously with this motion, Class Counsel has filed a motion seeking an attorneys’ fee 

award of 33.33% of the common fund and reimbursement of $789,836.62 in costs. 

H. Settlement Administration 

All Notice and Administrative Costs will be paid from the Settlement Fund. Settlement 

Agreement, § 4.5. The Notice Plan and settlement administration was conducted by Angeion 

Group, LLC (“Angeion”) by methods ordered by the Court and described in the Declaration of 

Steven Weisbrot of Angeion submitted in connection with preliminary approval, ECF No. 122-12, 

and the declaration of Steven Platt, also with Angeion, filed in connection with this motion (“Platt 

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Decl.”). See also Preliminary Approval Motion, p. 15. The Notice and Administrative Costs as of 

January 31, 2022 are $2,143,540.55, and Angeion estimates that the future administrative cost will 

be $1,132,727.88, for a total cost of administration of $3,276,268.43. Platt Decl., ¶ 42. 

IV. CLASS NOTICE & RESPONSE 

Per the Settlement, Notice Plan, and the Court’s Preliminary Approval Orders, the 

Claims Administrator issued Class Notice. See generally Platt Decl. The Claims Administrator 

set up a Settlement Website, established and staffed a toll-free hotline, disseminated emails to 

nearly 81 million Class Member email addresses, coordinated with TikTok to commence inApp notification, and initiated media, social media, and paid search campaigns, as well as a 

custom claims-stimulation program with additional targeted social media advertising 

placements. See generally id. 

A. Notice was disseminated via a robust multi-faceted campaign including 

widespread publication and advertising, direct emails, and in-App notice. 

On November 14, 2021, the Claims Administrator launched the Notice Plan. Platt Decl., 

e.g., ¶¶ 7, 11, 12, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29. The Notice Plan included a comprehensive media notice 

program that targeted the known demographics of the Settlement Class and was designed to deliver 

an approximate 95.23% reach with an average frequency of 5.85 times each. Id. at ¶ 35. (This 

reach is separate from and in addition to the direct notice efforts, the Settlement Website, the tollfree hotline, the claims stimulation package, and the Illinois-specific notice plan). The nationwide 

media portion of the Notice Plan was successful; it resulted in an approximate 96.78% reach with 

an average of three times each. Id. at ¶ 36. 

The number of impressions achieved by the media campaigns also exceeded Plaintiffs’ and 

the Claims Administrator’s initial targets. The internet banner notice portion of the Notice Plan 

was designed to serve approximately 64.3 million impressions nationally and 1.5 million 

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impressions in Illinois. Id. at ¶ 20. This aspect of the program exceeded those targets; it served 

over 126.1 million impressions nationally and 3.5 million in Illinois. Id. at ¶ 20. The national social 

media campaign also exceeded target impressions: for Facebook and Instagram, the Claims 

Administrator served over 115.2 million impressions nationwide and 4.5 million for the campaign 

focused on Illinois; for Twitter, the Claims Administrator served over 39.7 million and over 346 

thousand impressions for the Nationwide and Illinois campaigns, respectively. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25. In 

sum, there were hundreds of millions of views on various aspects of the Notice Plan’s media 

campaign. 

Beginning on November 14, 2021, the Claims Administrator also commenced direct email 

notice to over 80.9 million email addresses associated with Class Members, making multiple 

attempts for certain email addresses as needed. Id. at ¶ 7. Approximately 70% of those mails were 

successfully delivered. Id. at ¶ 10. 

On November 15, 2021, TikTok also commenced and completed the in-App notification 

to all standard mode TikTok accounts having certain data corresponding to a United States location 

in the same manner that TikTok would distribute other TikTok-originated in-App notifications.8

Id. at ¶ 11. 

The Claims Administrator also set up a Settlement Website linked to the ads, where 

potential Settlement Class Members could find important documents and court filings including 

the long form notice and the Preliminary Approval Order. The website was established at 

www.TikTokDataPrivacySettlement.com on November 13, 2021. Id. at ¶ 30. Settlement Class 

8

 This excludes users in the under-13 experience (called “TikTok for Younger Users”) because 

there is no Inbox feature in TikTok for Younger Users. Id.

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Members could submit their claims directly through the website. Id. As of March 15, 2022, the 

settlement website had over 13.7 million page views. Id. at ¶ 31. 

And finally, beginning November 13, 2021, the Claims Administrator established and 

maintained a 24/7 toll-free number to field questions about the settlement and to allow potential 

Class Members to request mail copies of the long form notice. Id. at ¶ 32. As of March 15, 2022, 

the Claims Administrator received a total of 2,579 calls to the toll-free number, totaling over 8,000 

minutes of call time. Id. at ¶ 33. 

Due process does not require that every class member receive notice. In re AT&T Mobility 

Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 789 F. Supp. 2d 935, 968 (N.D. Ill. June 2, 2011) (collecting 

cases). Rather, parties are required, “within the limits of practicability, to send such notice as [is] 

reasonably calculated to reach most interested parties.” Burns v. Elrod, 757 F.2d 151, 157 (7th Cir. 

1985); see also Memorandum Opinion, p. 28 (“The best notice practicable is that which is 

‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency 

of the action.’”) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)) 

(other citation omitted). 

The Notice Plan was successful. The media campaign alone has reached the vast majority 

of Class Members and exceeded the threshold for adequate notice. See Memorandum Opinion, p. 

28 (“The Federal Judicial Center has found that a notice plan calculated to reach between 70% and 

95% of the class in total is reasonable and . . . the median reach calculation on approved notice 

plans is 87%.”); see also, e.g., Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., No. 07-CV-1707, 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26167 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2016) (granting final approval where notice, 

including digital ads, was estimated to have reached 70% of the settlement class), aff’d, 877 F.3d 

276, 288 (7th Cir. 2017); Wilkins v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., No. 14-C-190, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

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23869 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2015) (granting final approval where a combination of direct notice and 

banner ads were estimated to have reached 79.2% of the class); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. FrontLoading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-C-1832, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25290 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 

29, 2016) (approving the use of banner ads as notice where many settlement class members could 

not be identified in Defendants’ records); In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 207 (3d Cir. 2006) 

(affirming the trial court’s decision to use a notice plan that included banner advertisements on the 

internet directing class members to the official settlement website). Of course, the Notice Plan was 

further supported by multiple means of direct notice in addition to the Settlement Website and 

broad media coverage of this high-profile Settlement. In sum, the Notice Plan was well executed 

and achieved the best practicable notice. 

There was also significant media coverage of the Settlement. After the Notice period 

commenced, the Settlement, and information about filing a claim, was reported by USA Today,9

NBC News,10 Business Insider,11 the New York Post,12 Today,13 Newsweek,14 Mashable,15 and 

numerous other national and local news outlets. 

9

 https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2021/11/15/tiktok-settlement-class-actionlawsuit/8633539002/ (last accessed 3/28/2022). 

10 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/need-know-tiktoks-class-action-lawsuit-rcna5781 

(last accessed 3/28/2022). 

11 https://www.businessinsider.com/tiktok-data-privacy-settlement-how-to-submit-claim-2021-

11 (last accessed 3/28/2022). 

12 https://nypost.com/2021/11/17/tiktok-agrees-to-92m-settlement-users-in-for-a-payday/ (last 

accessed 3/28/2022). 

13 https://www.today.com/money/tiktok-notification-about-settlement-payment-isn-t-scam-heres-t239286 (last accessed 3/28/2022). 

14 https://www.newsweek.com/tiktok-class-action-lawsuit-settlement-eligible-claim-1649615 

(last accessed 3/28/2022). 

15 https://mashable.com/article/tiktok-settlement-claim (last accessed 3/28/2022). 

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B. The claims rates of 1.4% for the Nationwide Class and 13% for the Illinois 

Subclass falls well within the range of comparable class action settlements. 

Class Members submitted an almost unprecedented 1,215,541 valid claims by the Claim 

Deadline, Platt Decl., ¶ 37 – TikTok has repeatedly maintained that it is impossible to estimate the 

total number of class members because they cannot account for the common practice of users 

creating multiple TikTok accounts on multiple devices or the creation of artificial accounts by 

information-gathering entities. At the high end, TikTok has provided a conservative estimate of 

89 million class members while recognizing the actual class size could be much smaller. Using 

this high-end conservative estimate, approximately 1.4% of the Settlement Class submitted a 

claim. Of those claims, 177,024 are for the Illinois Subclass, amounting to a claims rate of 

approximately 13% of the roughly 1.4-million-member Illinois Subclass (again, using a very highend conservative estimate that could in fact be much lower). Id. at ¶ 38. 

These claims rates fall in line with other consumer class action settlements. See, e.g., 

Declaration of Professor William B. Rubenstein, In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 

15-CV-03747 (N.D. Cal.) (“Facebook BIPA”), ECF No. 517-2, p. 4 (classes above 2.7 million 

class members average claims rates of 1.4%); Poertner v. Gillette Co., 618 F. App'x 624, 626 (11th 

Cir. 2015) (approving unfair trade practices settlement with 7.26-million-member settlement class 

and 1% claims rate); Perez v. Asurion Corp., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (1.1% 

of 10.3-million-member settlement class filed claims); see also Kolinek v. Walgreen Co., 311 

F.R.D. 483, 493 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (approving TCPA settlement with 2% claims rate); Davenport v. 

Discover Fin. Servs., No. 1:15-CV-06052 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2017) (approving settlement with 3% 

claims rate); Bayat v. Bank of the W., No. C-13-2376, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50416, at *1 (N.D. 

Cal. Apr. 15, 2015) (approving TCPA settlement with approximately 1% claims rate); Arthur v. 

SLM Corp., No. C10–0198 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 8, 2012) (claims rate of approximately 2%); 

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Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 329 n.60 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (claims rates in 

consumer class settlements “rarely” exceed 7%, “even with the most extensive notice campaigns”); 

Pollard v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, 320 F.R.D. 198, 214 (W.D. Mo. 2017) (citing numerous 

finally approved settlements with claims rates less than 1%). See also Preliminary Approval 

Motion, pp. 24-25. 

It is expected that Nationwide Class Members will receive an award of approximately 

$27.19 and Illinois Subclass members will receive an award of approximately $163.13, after 

deductions for Court-approved attorneys’ fees and costs, Court-approved incentive awards to the 

Plaintiffs, and costs of notice and claims administration. See Platt Decl., ¶ 43. This is within the 

range of acceptable settlement amounts. See infra § VI. A. 

Should the Court grant final approval of the Settlement, payments will be automatically 

issued to all Class Members who submitted Valid Claims within 14 days of the Effective Date. 

Settlement Agreement, ¶ 5.2.4. 

C. Only a fraction of 1% of the class opted out of the Settlement. 

The Claims Administrator received only 28 valid requests for exclusion by the January 31, 

2022 deadline. Platt Decl., ¶ 39. An additional 4,040 requests for exclusion (some duplicative) 

were submitted “in mass” by four law firms on behalf of 2,253 individuals, which the Settlement 

Administrator deemed invalid for violating the prohibition on mass opt outs in the Settlement 

Agreement. Id. at ¶ 40. Two other invalid requests for exclusion were made, as well – one 

postmarked after the deadline, and another that was filed with a Claim Form seeking payment in 

the Settlement. Id. Even including the invalid requests for exclusion, less than a tiny fraction of 

1% of the Class (less than 0.005%) sought to opt out of the Settlement. 

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D. Only four individuals objected, and none of their objections is colorable. 

Only four individuals filed objections: Mark S. and Daniel Litteken – whose objections 

were already denied at preliminary approval, and Steven Helfand and Jennifer Cochran by her 

counsel George Cochran – serial objectors who lack credibility. None of those objections has 

merit, and each is addressed in further detail below, in Section VI. C. 

E. CAFA notice was provided and no objections followed. 

On March 5, 2021, pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1715, the Claims 

Administrator caused Notice of the Settlement and related materials (“CAFA Notice”) to be sent 

to the Attorneys General of all U.S. states and territories, as well as the Attorney General of the 

United States. Platt Decl., ¶ 5. No objections were received to the Settlement from the Attorneys 

General of the United States. 

V. STANDARDS FOR SETTLEMENT APPROVAL 

As the Seventh Circuit recognizes, federal courts strongly favor and encourage settlements, 

particularly in class actions and other complex matters, where the inherent costs, delays, and risks 

of continued litigation might otherwise overwhelm any potential benefit the class could hope to 

obtain: 

It is axiomatic that the federal courts look with great favor upon the 

voluntary resolution of litigation through settlement. In the class 

action context in particular, there is an overriding public interest in 

favor of settlement. Settlement of the complex disputes often 

involved in class actions minimizes the litigation expenses of both 

parties and also reduces the strain such litigation imposes upon 

already scarce judicial resources. 

Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 312-13 (7th Cir. 1980) (citations and quotations 

omitted), overruled on other grounds by Felzen v. Andreas, 134 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 1998); see also 

Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Federal courts naturally favor the settlement of 

class action litigation”); 4 Newberg on Class Actions § 11.41 (4th ed. 2002) (citing cases). 

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The traditional means for handling claims like those at issue here—individual litigation on 

behalf of millions of individuals—would unduly tax the court system, require a massive 

expenditure of public and private resources and, given the relatively small value of the claims of 

the individual Settlement Class Members, be impracticable. Indeed, the Supreme Court has 

repeatedly recognized that class actions save the resources of the courts and parties, and ensure 

aggrieved plaintiffs can obtain relief: 

[T]he law recognizes class actions as a legitimate part of the U.S. 

litigation system. The Supreme Court has made this clear on several 

occasions. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 . . . 

(1982) (explaining that, in appropriate cases, “the class action 

device saves the resources of both the courts and the parties by 

permitting an issue potentially affecting every class member to be 

litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23”); Deposit Guar. 

Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 . . . (1980) (“Where it is not 

economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional 

framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, 

aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they 

may employ the class-action device.”). In addition, Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 23 provides for the use of such a procedure. 

Kolinek, 311 F.R.D. at 497 (quoting In re AT&T Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 

789 F. Supp. 2d 935, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citations omitted). For these reasons, the proposed 

Settlement is the best vehicle for Settlement Class Members to receive relief to which they are 

entitled in a prompt and efficient manner. 

Under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a class-action settlement may be 

approved if the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); In re AT&T 

Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Litig., 270 F.R.D. 330, 345 (N.D. Ill. 2010). “Approval of a 

class action settlement is a two-step process.” In re Northfield Lab’ys, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 06-C1493, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12741, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2012) (citing In re AT&T Mobility 

Wireless Data Servs. Sales Litig., 270 F.R.D. 330, 346 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (quoting Saranchak v. 

Beard, 616 F.3d 292, 314 (3d Cir. 2010))). “First, the court holds a preliminary, pre-notification 

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hearing to consider whether the proposed settlement falls within a range that could be approved.” 

Id. “If the court preliminarily approves the settlement, the class members are notified.” Id. 

The first step in the settlement approval process is a preliminary fairness determination. 

“The parties must provide the court with information sufficient to enable it to determine whether 

to give notice of the proposal to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A). This is so the Court may 

make “a preliminary determination on the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement 

terms[.]” Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.632 (4th ed. 2004); see also 4 Alba Conte & Herbert 

B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 11.25 (4th ed. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(e)(1)(B). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, as amended in 2018, calls for front-loaded scrutiny of a proposed 

settlement so that any issues are identified before notice goes out to the class. Fed R. Civ. P. 23(e) 

states that grounds exist for class notice where the parties show that “the court will likely be able 

to: (i) approve the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2); and (ii) certify the class for purposes of judgment 

on the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B). To that end, where, as here, the proposed settlement 

“would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a hearing and only on finding that 

it is fair, reasonable, and adequate after considering whether”: 

(A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class; 

(B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; 

(C) the relief provided for the class is adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, 

and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of 

distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-member 

claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of 

payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and 

(D) the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other. 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). If the court preliminarily finds that the settlement is fair, adequate, and 

reasonable, “[t]he court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would 

be bound by the proposal . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B). 

The second step in the process is a final fairness hearing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); also 

Manual for Complex Litigation, § 21.633-34; In re Northfield Lab’ys, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 06 C 

1493, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *15-16 (“Second, the court holds a fairness hearing and considers, 

among other things, any objections filed by class members.”). 

The first step in this process—including front-loaded scrutiny of the settlement and the 

consideration of objection to preliminary approval—has occurred. Plaintiffs now respectfully 

request that the Court take the second step in the process by granting final approval of the 

Settlement. 

A proposed class action settlement should be approved if the Court, after allowing absent 

class members an opportunity to be heard, finds that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and 

adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). When making this determination at the final approval stage, 

courts in this Circuit consider the following factors: 

(1) the strength of plaintiffs’ case compared to the terms of the proposed settlement; 

(2) the likely complexity, length, and expense of continued litigation; 

(3) the amount of opposition to settlement among affected parties; 

(4) the opinion of competent counsel; and 

(5) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed. 

Wong v. Accretive Health, Inc., 773 F.3d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Gautreaux v. Pierce, 

690 F.2d 616, 631 (7th Cir. 1982)); Isby, 75 F.3d at 1199; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (listing 

factors for final approval). In reviewing these factors, courts view the facts “in the light most 

favorable to the settlement.” Isby, 75 F.3d at 1199. In addition, courts “should not substitute their 

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own judgment as to the optimal settlement terms for the judgment of the litigants and their 

counsel.” In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 2016 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS, 25290, at *26-27 (citing Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305, 315 (7th Cir. 1980)). 

VI. FINAL APPROVAL IS WARRANTED 

A. The strength of Plaintiffs’ case compared to the amount of the Settlement favors 

final approval. 

“[T]he ‘most important factor relevant to the fairness of a class action settlement’ is the 

first one listed: the strength of plaintiff’s case on the merits balanced against the amount offered 

in the settlement.” Synfuel Techs., Inc. v. DHL Express, Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 653 (7th Cir. 2006) 

(internal quotes and citations omitted). Courts “do not focus on individual components of the 

settlements, but rather view them in their entirety in evaluating their fairness.” Isby, 75 F.3d at 

1199 (cleaned up). Because the “essence of settlement is compromise, courts should not reject 

a settlement ‘solely because it does not provide a complete victory to plaintiffs.’” In re AT&T 

Mobility Wireless Data Servs. Sales Litig., 270 F.R.D. at 347 (citations omitted). 

While Plaintiffs strongly believe in their claims, Plaintiffs recognize that Defendants 

have asserted a number of potentially case-dispositive defenses. The Court recognized this, too. 

Indeed, in its Memorandum Opinion, the Court found numerous risks associated with continued 

litigation, for example: 

 the class action waiver and arbitration agreements in TikTok’s terms of service; 

 TikTok’s warranty and confirmatory discovery regarding whether TikTok used 

the App in violation of BIPA; 

 “numerous colorable” disputes to Plaintiffs’ VPPA claim, including whether 

TikTok is engaged in a covered business or Class Members are “subscribers”; 

 Class Members’ acceptance of TikTok’s terms of service; 

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 the “high bar” prescribed by California Constitutional and intrusion upon 

seclusion; 

 the difficulty establishing damages; and 

 the low or cy-pres-only historical settlements in comparable cases. 

Memorandum Opinion, pp. 22-24. 

Despite these material risks, Plaintiffs achieved an excellent result for the Class. The 

estimated recovery of $ 27.19 per Nationwide Class Member and $163.13 per Illinois Subclass 

Member is well within the range of recovery for other comparable, court-approved privacy class 

action settlements, many of which only obtain injunctive relief. E.g., T.K., 19-cv-07915, ECF No. 

94 ($3.06 per claimant in privacy class action); In re Google Plus Profile Litig., No. 5:18-CV06164, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13571, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2021) (estimated per-claimant 

recovery of $0.20 to $29.60 with an average of $2.50 in privacy class action); Fraley v. Facebook, 

Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 939, 942–44 (N.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d sub nom., Fraley v. Batman, 638 F. 

App’x 594 (9th Cir. 2016) ($15 per claimant in privacy class action); In re LinkedIn User Priv. 

Litig., 309 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (approximately $14.81 per claimant in privacy class 

action); Parker v. Time Warner Ent. Co., L.P., 631 F. Supp. 2d 242, 258, 268–69 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), 

aff’d sub nom. Lobur v. Parker, 378 F. App’x 63 (2d Cir. 2010) ($5 per claimant in privacy class 

action); Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 820–22 (9th Cir. 2012) (cy-pres-only resolution of 

Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) claim brought on behalf of tens of millions of 

class members); In re Google Buzz Privacy Litig., No. 10-00672, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146767 

at *4-10 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011) (cy-pres-only settlement of ECPA claims); In re Google LLC St. 

View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., No. 10-md-02184, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47928 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 

2020) (cy-pres-only settlement of ECPA claims); Adkins v. Facebook, Inc., No. 18-CV-05982, 

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2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87097 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2021) (injunctive-only relief in data breach case); 

Carroll v. Crème de la Crème, Inc., 2017-CH-01624 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cnty. June 25, 2018) (credit 

monitoring and no monetary relief in BIPA case). See also ECF No. 137-2 (chart of comparable 

privacy settlements). 

“In light of the potential difficulties at class certification and on the merits . . ., the time 

and extent of protracted litigation, and the potential of recovering nothing, the relief provided 

to class members in the Settlement Agreement represents a reasonable compromise.” Wright v. 

Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 14-C-10457, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115729, at *39 (N.D. Ill. 

2016). 

B. An assessment of the likely complexity, length, and expense of continued 

litigation favors approval of the Settlement. 

“In most situations, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval 

are preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.” Newberg on Class 

Actions, § 11:50. This is, in part, because “the law should favor the settlement of controversies, 

and should not discourage settlement by subjecting a person who has compromised a claim to the 

hazard of having the settlement proved in a subsequent trial.” Grady v. De Ville Motor Hotel, Inc., 

415 F.2d 449, 451 (10th Cir. 1969). It is also, in part, because “[s]ettlement is the offspring of 

compromise; the question we address is not whether the final product could be prettier, smarter or 

snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate and free from collusion.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 

F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Gehrich v. Chase Bank U.S., 316 F.R.D. 215, 228 (N.D. 

Ill. 2016) (“The essential point here is that the court should not ‘reject[ ]’ a settlement ‘solely 

because it does not provide a complete victory to plaintiffs,’ for ‘the essence of settlement is 

compromise’”). 

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Litigation would be lengthy and expensive if this action were to proceed. See, e.g., Cotton 

v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[C]lass action suits have a well deserved 

reputation as being most complex.”). Although the parties engaged in certain confirmatory 

discovery to evaluate the Settlement, continued discovery would likely include the production and 

review of millions of pages of documents, numerous depositions, and extensive expert analyses. 

Continued litigation would involve extensive motion practice (including motions to compel 

arbitration, to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims, for class certification, and for summary judgment) and 

ultimately a trial on the merits—each of which has the potential for appeal, further risking and 

delaying any benefit to the Class. The Court recognized this at preliminary approval: 

Proceeding to trial likely would take years and entail extensive fact 

and expert discovery and motion practice, including, in all 

probability, a contested motion to certify, motions for summary 

judgment, and Daubert motions. Furthermore, after the completion 

of pretrial proceedings, many of the individual cases that comprise 

this MDL would be sent back to their transferor courts for trial, 

absent a stipulation by the parties to try the cases in this Court, 

potentially resulting in even further motion practice and delay. 

Memorandum Opinion, p. 26 (citations omitted). 

 Instead of facing the uncertainty of a potential award in their favor years from now, the 

Settlement allows Plaintiffs and Settlement Class Members to receive immediate and certain relief. 

See, e.g., Schulte v. Fifth Third Bank, 805 F. Supp. 2d 560, 586 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“Settlement allows 

the class to avoid the inherent risk, complexity, time, and cost associated with continued 

litigation.”) (citation omitted). This factor thus favors settlement approval. 

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C. The lack of opposition to the Settlement favors final approval. 

In contrast to the 1.2 million claims in support of the Settlement, only four objections were 

filed.16 “Such a remarkably low level of opposition supports the Settlement.” In re AT&T Mobility 

Wireless Data Servs. Sales Tax Litig., 789 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (the “tiny fraction” of opt-outs and 

objections supports approval); Memorandum Opinion, p. 27 (“The Court also finds it noteworthy 

that, out of an estimated 89 million members of the Settlement Class, only two (Mark S. and Dennis 

Litteken) have objected to the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of this widely published 

settlement so far.”). 

Moreover, none of the objections raises meritorious concerns. Two of the objections 

(Helfand and Cochran) were filed by serial objectors with material credibility concerns. Three of 

the objections (Cochran, Mark S., and Litteken) have procedural deficiencies and should be 

stricken as invalid. And all four objections fail on their merits, having raised issues already 

considered and rejected by this Court in connection with preliminary approval, or parroting one 

another’s claims that Class Members do not have an opportunity to respond to Class Counsel’s fee 

request, which is simply untrue. None of the objections provides a basis to deny final approval and 

relief to more than one million claimants who support the Settlement. 

1. The Helfand Objection was filed by a serial objector and lacks merit. 

a. Mr. Helfand’s claim that he is a Class Member who was injured is not 

credible. 

Mr. Helfand is a former attorney who was disbarred because of conduct related to class 

action settlement objections. The State Bar of California found that, among other egregious 

16 The objections were filed by: Steven Franklyn Helfand, pro se, ECF Nos. 182 and 192; Dennis 

Litteken, through his counsel Edelson PC, ECF No. 184; Jennifer Cochran, through her counsel 

George W. Cochran, ECF No. 186; Mark. S., as Parent and Legal Guardian of His Minor Son, 

A.S., through his counsel Scott R. Drury of Loevy & Loevy, ECF No. 187. 

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conduct, Mr. Helfand: (1) filed objections in the name of class members without being authorized 

by the class member to do so, (2) misled a court and opposing counsel, (3) settled an objection on 

appeal without the client’s authorization, (4) misappropriated settlement proceeds, and (5) 

committed other acts of moral turpitude. In re Equifax Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 

1:17-MD-2800, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *268 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2020) (citation omitted); In 

re Steven Franklyn Helfand, No. 206667 and Joseph Darrell Palmer, No. 125147, Case Nos. 17-

O-00411 and 17-O-00412 (State Bar Court of Los Angeles). 

Nevertheless, Mr. Helfand continues to act as a serial objector.17 Here, the timing of Mr. 

Helfand’s download of the TikTok application suggests that he downloaded the application for the 

sole purpose of objecting. Mr. Helfand downloaded the TikTok application on April 10, 2021, six 

weeks after Plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of the Settlement on February 25, 2021. 

According to the screen shots attached to his objection, Mr. Helfand follows just one other TikTok 

account, is not followed by any accounts, and he has never shared a video on the application. Mr. 

Helfand has a history of “falsely claim[ing] to have purchased products, so he could file 

objections.” Collins v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC, No. 19-22864, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218673, at 

*14. Mr. Helfand appears to have been similarly motivated here to interfere with the Settlement 

and extort a payment, rather than to benefit the Class. Accordingly, his objection should be given 

little, if any, weight. 

17 Collins v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC, No. 19-22864, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218673, at *5 (S.D. 

Fla. Nov. 16, 2020) (Helfland is “a well-known serial objector who has represented himself and 

third parties in objecting to multiple class action settlements.”) (quoting Gay v. Tom’s of Maine, 

Inc., No. 0:14-cv-60604, ECF No. 43, at 4 n.1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2016)). See also Spann v. J.C. 

Penney Corp., No. CV 12-0215, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137184, at *32 n.11 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 

2016) (Steven Helfand is a “known serial objector”). 

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Moreover, Mr. Helfand failed to disclose the dozens of objection he has filed as required 

by the Preliminary Approval Order. In 2020, Mr. Helfand testified that he had objected to 50 or 

more class action settlements. Collins v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC, No. 19-CV-22864, 2020 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 218673, at *16. See also Norcia v. Samsung Telcomms. Am., LLC, No. 14-CV-00582, 

2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135256, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2021) (noting Mr. Helfand’s “50 or 60 

cases . . . as an objector or as an attorney for objectors.”) (citation omitted). Although the 

Preliminary Approval Order requires the disclosure of any other class settlement objection made 

within the previous five years, Mr. Helfand did not disclose any of these dozens of objections. He 

suggests he was not required to do so because he is proceeding pro se, and the notice requires 

disclosure regarding “times in which that counsel has objected to a class action settlement.” 

Helfand Obj., p. 5 (emphasis in original). Such gamesmanship should not be rewarded. 

This is not the first time he has filed objections to settlements in which he is not a class 

member, including by making false or misleading claims that he purchased the product at issue, 

nor objections that fail to meet the requirements of courts’ preliminary approval orders. E.g., 

Hooker v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 4:13-CV-00003, ECF No. 209, ¶ 20 (E.D. Va. Dec. 22, 2016) 

(striking objection because Helfland was not a class member and the objection did not meet the 

requirements of the preliminary approval order) (cited in Collins v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC, 2020 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218673, at *8); Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp., Inc., 3:11-CV-03082, 2016 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 19275 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 17, 2016) (Mr. Helfand is a “professional objector” whose 

efforts courts have “repeatedly turned aside”; he has “provided no proof that he is a class member”; 

“he neither provides receipts nor identifies the products he 

claims to have bought”; and “[t]he court could therefore almost certainly strike his 

objection”); Legg v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, No. 14-61543-CV, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

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122695, at *9 n.2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2016) (“objector[] Steven Helfand . . . [is] not [a] member[] 

of the Settlement Class and therefore lack[s] standing to object to the Settlement”). Other courts 

have similarly found his testimony “uncooperative, evasive, vague, confrontational, difficult, 

inconsistent, rude, [and] threatening.” Collins v. Quincy Bioscience, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

218673, at *4. See also Norcia, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135256, at *11 (making an “adverse 

credibility finding” after considering the substance of his deposition and in-court testimony, and 

observing his demeanor at the final approval hearing.”). 

b. Further undermining his credibility, even if he is a Settlement Class 

Member, Mr. Helfand’s objection lacks merit. 

In addition to Mr. Helfand’s lack of credibility, the two bases for his objection lack merit. 

First, Mr. Helfand contends that Plaintiffs’ fee application (due March 31, 2022) will be filed after 

the objection deadline (January 31, 2022). Helfand Obj., pp. 2-3. This, according to Mr. Helfand, 

violates due process, Rule 23(h), and Ninth Circuit case law holding that class members should be 

allowed an opportunity to examine counsel’s fee motion. Id. But responses to Plaintiffs’ Motion 

for Final Approval and Motion for Attorneys’ Fees are not due until April 14, 2022 (the “Fee 

Response Date”). Preliminary Approval Order, ¶ 25. Class members will have an adequate 

opportunity to examine and respond to counsel’s fee motion prior to final approval. Mr. Helfand’s 

objection is thus meritless. 

After his objection, Mr. Helfand filed a second submission (without leave of Court), 

complaining that the Fee Response Date was added to the home page of the Settlement Website in 

January 2022. ECF No. 192. There is nothing improper about the addition of information that may 

be of assistance to Settlement Class Members. In fact, it is one of the explicit purposes of the 

Settlement Website; the Preliminary Approval Order requires that the website: 

[M]ake available copies of this [Preliminary Approval] Order, Class 

Notices, the Settlement Agreement and all Exhibits thereto; 

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instructions on how to submit Claims online, by email, or by mail; 

Orders of the Court pertaining to the Settlement; and such other 

information as may be of assistance to Settlement Class 

Members or required under the Settlement Agreement. 

Preliminary Approval Order, ¶ 15 (emphasis added). The Fee Response Date is in the Court’s 

Preliminary Approval Order (which is on the Settlement Website and has been throughout the 

notice period). The date was later added to the landing page of the Settlement Website for 

additional clarity and assistance to the Class. It is unclear exactly what Mr. Helfand’s criticism of 

this information is, other than that it is “too little and too late.” But the Fee Response Date has long 

been prescribed by Court order available on the Settlement Website, it was further highlighted on 

the website more than a month before any fee petition was due and even further before any 

responses to that petition would be required, and no Class Member has been deprived of their right 

to respond to counsel’s fee request. 

As a second basis for his objection, Mr. Helfand complains about the allocation of the 

settlement fund between the Nationwide Class and Illinois Subclass. He suggests that the Illinois 

Subclass was given preferential treatment and was able to “extract concessions” as a result of 

home-court favoritism stemming from the case having been filed in an Illinois court, in part by 

Illinois-based plaintiffs’ attorneys. Helfand Obj., pp. 3-4. He complains that the two classes are 

being treated differently “based simply on where they live and/or used the application.” Id. at 3-4. 

Of course, there is no support for the idea that this Court or counsel have given improper 

preferential treatment to the Illinois Subclass. Illinois Subclass members are entitled to more shares 

of the Settlement because the Illinois BIPA claim provides a unique avenue for statutory damages 

available only to Illinois users. Supra. Co-Lead Counsel appointed independent counsel for each 

of the classes to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the claims available to the respective 

classes and to research, negotiate, and make a recommendation regarding the appropriate 

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settlement allocation between the two classes. Supra. Each class is represented by multiple Class 

Representatives. Supra. The provision of additional Settlement shares to Illinois Subclass members 

is well founded and proper. 

Later in his objection, tacitly recognizing the valid, BIPA-related distinction between the 

two classes, Mr. Helfand contends that the Illinois Subclass should not be entitled to additional 

shares because that subclass cannot be certified. Helfand Obj., pp. 4-5.18 But Mr. Helfand further 

contends that the Nationwide Class cannot be certified either. Id. If anything, Mr. Helfand’s 

arguments regarding class certification risks support that the $92 million (plus injunctive relief) 

Settlement is an excellent result in a case that faces meaningful risks should it proceed in litigation. 

For these reasons, Mr. Helfand’s objection should be denied. 

2. The Cochran Objection was filed by a serial objector, did not comply with 

the requirements of the Preliminary Approval Order, and lacks merit. 

a. Ms. Cochran failed to provide the information required by the 

Preliminary Approval Order. 

The Cochran Objection also carries no weight. As a procedural matter, the objection should 

be stricken because Ms. Cochran did not provide the Court-ordered information required for each 

objection. The Preliminary Approval Order requires that objectors disclose: “the identity of all 

counsel who represent the objector . . . along with a statement of the number of times in which that 

18 Mr. Helfand raises a number of hypothetical questions in arguing that the Illinois Subclass 

definition is ambiguous such that the Subclass cannot be certified. Each of his hypotheticals is 

plainly answered by the Subclass definition. 

For example, Mr. Helfand queries whether a person who “happens to use TikTok while waiting to 

board a new plane at O’Hara is a member of the Subclass, even if they only filmed video in Iowa?” 

Helfand Obj., p. 4. No. The Subclass definition requires that the individual used the App “to create 

videos” in Illinois. As another example, Mr. Helfand queries: “What about if they filmed video in 

O’Hare and were using TikTok, but their video was not going to be used on TikTok, but then they 

decide to use it that way after all?” Id. That person would be a Class Member if they are an Illinois 

resident, because they used the App “to create videos” while in Illinois. 

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counsel has objected to a class action settlement within five years preceding the submission of the 

objection, the caption of the case for each prior objection, and a copy of any relevant orders 

addressing the objection.” Preliminary Approval Order, ¶ 9. 

Ms. Cochran’s counsel is George W. Cochran. Cochran Obj., p. 2. Mr. Cochran “is a serial 

objector to class action settlements, with a history of attempting to extract payment for the 

withdrawal of objections.” In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 357 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1104 

(D. Kan. 2018); In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2800, 2020 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118209, at *266 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2020) (same). Indeed, the Cochran Objection 

notes that Mr. Cochran has objected to 17 class settlements (that he can recall) in the last five 

years. Cochran Obj., p. 3. But the Cochran Objection does not include “a copy of any relevant 

orders addressing” any of those 17 objections, as the Preliminary Approval Order requires. Supra. 

The objection must also include “the objector (and the objector’s attorney’s) signature on 

the written objection” and “all agreements that relate to the objection or the process of objecting, 

between the objector or objector’s counsel and any other person or entity.” Preliminary Approval 

Order, ¶ 9. Mr. Cochran has not signed the objection, nor has Ms. Cochran produced her retainer 

with Mr. Cochran or any other agreement relating to the objection. 

Because the objection fails to provide this Court-ordered information, it should be stricken. 

Ferron v. Kraft Heinz Foods Co., No. 20-CV-62136, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129955, at *43 (S.D. 

Fla. July 13, 2021) (“[b]ecause [objector] failed to comply with the Court’s Order Preliminarily 

Approving Class Action Settlement and Certifying the Settlement Class, this Court strikes his 

Objection as invalid.”); Champs Sports Bar & Grill Co. v. Mercury Payment Sys., LLC, 275 F. 

Supp. 3d 1350, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (striking objection for “willful refusal to comply with the 

requirements of the Preliminary Approval Order.”); Hooker, 4:13-cv-00003, ECF No. 209, ¶ 20 

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(supra). And because Mr. Cochran is a serial objector, the substance of Ms. Cochran’s objection, 

if considered, should be given little weight. 

b. Ms. Cochran objects to a fee request of one-third of the Settlement 

fund; Class Counsel has not made such a request. 

Even if the Court opts to consider the substance of Ms. Cochran’s objection, it should be 

denied on its merits. Ms. Cochran’s sole objection is to a hypothetical attorneys’ fee award that 

Class Counsel had not yet requested (nor had the opportunity to support with briefing and lodestar). 

Plaintiffs will address their fee request and the appropriate bases for award in their separate motion. 

Accordingly, Ms. Cochran’s objection should be denied. 

3. The Mark S. Objection did not comply with the requirements of the 

Preliminary Approval Order, restates objections previously considered 

and rejected by the Court, and fails to disclose that Mark S. has asked 

another court to award him legal fees for this “remarkable” Settlement. 

Mark S.’s objection also lacks merit. Mark S., via his counsel Scott Drury, makes 

substantially the same objections he made in connection with preliminary approval. See ECF No. 

126. The Court already considered and rejected those objections. See generally Memorandum 

Opinion. 

What is more, despite Mark S.’s opposition to this Settlement at preliminary approval, his 

attempt to enjoin this Settlement in other proceedings against TikTok before Judge Blakey, and 

his present objection to final approval – Mark S. has sought attorneys’ fees and a plaintiff service 

award in the TikTok action before Judge Blakey, claiming responsibility for this Settlement’s 

benefits. 

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The Mark S. Objection should be denied.19

c. Mark S. objects to the Settlement but seeks legal fees for its 

“remarkable” benefits. 

The Mark S. Objection focuses on relief to minors under the age of 13. This focus stems 

from Mark. S.’s objection (via his counsel here, Scott Drury) in another action against TikTok 

which specifically focuses on that age group, T.K. v. ByteDance Technology, Ltd., et al., 19-cv07915 (N.D. Ill.) (Blakey, J.). The T.K. settlement achieved a $1.1 million fund for under-13 

TikTok users who alleged VPPA claims, among other privacy violations. Id. at ECF Nos. 5 

(motion), 94 (order).

In September 2020, Mark S. asked the T.K. Court to enjoin this MDL Settlement, and to 

deprive all Class Members of relief in this case, in deference to the T.K. settlement. Id. at ECF 

Nos. 51-52. He sought that injunction despite contending that the T.K. settlement was inadequate, 

and in disregard of the millions of MDL Class Members above the age of 13 who were not 

members of the T.K. class at all. Id. at ECF Nos. 51-52. Judge Blakey denied that request. Id. at 

ECF No. 68 (also denying Mark S.’s motion to intervene). No one – not even defendants – objected 

to the under-13 minors’ “double recovery” under both the T.K. and MDL settlements except Mark 

S. See id. Mark S.’s objection did nothing to increase the settlement fund in T.K. and likewise, his 

objection at preliminary approval here in no way benefited this Class. 

19 Moreover, despite the requirements of the Preliminary Approval Order, the Mark S. Objection 

does not include “a copy of any relevant orders addressing” counsel’s prior class settlement 

objection. Instead, the objection simply states that the “objection and related orders are publicly 

available.” Mark S. Obj., p. 7. The objection also does not include the following requirements 

(Preliminary Approval Order, ¶ 9(v) and (vii)): “all agreements that relate to the objection or the 

process of objecting, between the objector or objector’s counsel and any other person or entity” or 

“a declaration under penalty of perjury that the information provided by the objector and objector’s 

counsel is true and correct.” The objection should be stricken for these willful failures to comply 

with the Court’s order. Supra. 

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Nevertheless, in June 2021, Mark S. requested over $1.5 million in legal fees and a $2,500 

service award in T.K. Id. at ECF No. 71. In seeking those fees, Mark S. claimed that he and his 

counsel were responsible for the Settlement benefit here, in the MDL. Id. In other words, despite 

seeking to enjoin this Settlement, twice objecting to it, and having in no way increased its value, 

Mark S. takes credit for $6.256 million of the MDL Settlement benefits (amounting to 6.8% of the 

Settlement fund, based on Mark S.’s estimate that 6.8% of the Class is under 13). Id. at p. 5.20

Recognizing that his request exceeded the entire T.K. settlement fund, Mark S. offered to take a 

pro rata value of his fees in T.K., and noted his intention to also seek fees in this MDL. Id. at pp. 

2, 13. On March 25, 2022, the court denied Mark S.’s requests for a service award and fees (and 

all of his objections to the T.K. settlement), stating: “[e]ven if Mark S. could somehow take credit 

for Defendants’ agreement to permit a ‘double recovery’ for members of the Proposed Settlement 

Class (which he cannot), his request is utterly misplaced. . . . Mark S. did not obtain a substantial 

benefit for the Proposed Settlement Class.” T.K. v. ByteDance Tech. Co, No. 19-CV-7915, 2022 

WL 888943, at *27-28 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2022). 

While taking credit for this Settlement in T.K. – and boasting that its benefits are “quite 

remarkable” and “easily justif[y] a fee award of 33.33%” (Id. at ECF No. 71 at pp. 2, 12) – Mark 

S. yet again objects to this Settlement here in the MDL. These objections should again fail. 

d. The Mark S. Objection fails on its merits. 

First, Mark S. argues, as he did at preliminary approval, that conflicts exist between minor 

and non-minor class members and minors were not adequately represented. Mark S. Obj., pp. 8-

10. At the preliminary approval hearing, the Court requested that Class Counsel provide 

20 The first of 21 putative class actions comprising this MDL was filed six months before Mark 

S.’s objection to the T.K. settlement. Nothing about Mark S’s objections in either T.K. or this MDL 

have benefited the Class. 

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supplemental briefing specifically addressing representation of and advocacy for minor class 

members’ interests, and Class Counsel did so. ECF No. 137 (“Supplemental Memo”). That 

briefing noted that minor class members were well represented by proposed Class Representatives, 

those representatives’ guardians, the Leadership Group, and individual counsel retained by minor 

Class Representatives. Id. at 1-7. The Supplemental Memo further explained that the issues Mark. 

S. raised regarding the representation of and relief to minors were thoroughly vetted by Class 

Counsel. Id. The Court considered Mark S.’s objection and overruled it. Memorandum Opinion, 

pp. 15-17. 

Nevertheless, Mark S. continues to contend that minors are in a better legal position than 

non-minors because they have a right to disaffirm arbitration agreements. Id. at 8-10. He claims 

that “Class Counsel negotiated the Settlement believing the alternative was worthless class claims. 

That was not the case for minor class members.” Id. at 9. That is simply untrue. Class Counsel was 

well aware of and considered arguments related to disaffirmance in negotiating and evaluating the 

Settlement. Supplemental Memo, pp. 3, 12. Both Class Counsel and the Court recognized, 

however, the risks associated with such an argument. Id.; Memorandum Opinion, p. 16 (overruling 

this objection in light of those risks and noting that “proposed class counsel, all of whom represent 

minor Plaintiffs, represent that they studied this issue while negotiating the settlement”). 

Mark S. argues that a “second conflict” arises because the Settlement did not require that 

TikTok destroy the personal information of individuals who represented upon sign up that they 

were over the age of 13, but who TikTok can “estimate” are actually below the age of 13. Mark S. 

Obj., p. 10. Mark S. fails to explain the need for this relief, as he failed to do when he raised the 

same issue at preliminary approval. Memorandum Order, p. 16. His argument appears to stem from 

the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (“COPPA”) and its prohibitions against certain 

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collection of minors’ data. See Mark S. Obj., p. 2. But COPPA has no private right of action that 

Plaintiffs here could enforce. See Manigault-Johnson v. Google, LLC, No. 2:18-cv-1032, 2019 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59892, at *18-20 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2019). 

Moreover, Mark S. recognizes that the FTC has already pursued such claims against 

TikTok and personal data for those who “self-identified as being under 13” is already being 

destroyed pursuant to the FTC order. Id. at p. 2.21 In addition, the Settlement Agreement here 

provides for the deletion of data for all Class Members, including those under 13. Settlement 

Agreement ¶ 6.2, Addendum, ¶ 4.2. With this in mind, the Court considered and overruled this 

same objection by Mark S. at preliminary approval. Memorandum Opinion, pp. 16-17 (“the Court 

discerns no reason why minor class members under thirteen would suffer harms that are different 

than those of older minor class members, after the settlement is implemented”). For the same 

reasons, Mark S’s objection should be overruled again. 

Second, the Mark S. Objection argues that Class Counsel had yet another purported conflict 

when they negotiated and agreed to the Settlement. Mark S. Obj., pp. 10-11. But the objection does 

not identify what that conflict was. Instead, it argues that Class Counsel were in a “weakened and 

conflicted position during any settlement discussions” because “they were saddled with their 

violation of the T.K. preliminary injunction which precluded them from bringing new claims or 

amending existing claims that fell within the broad release in T.K.” i.e., BIPA and VPPA claims 

on behalf of minors under 13. Id. at 10-11. That makes no sense. None of the complaints filed in 

this action omit claims for minors under 13, and there is no indication that Class Counsel ever felt 

21 Even if Plaintiffs could pursue COPPA claims, Mark S.’s proposed data deletion relief fails to 

consider the practicability of using artificial intelligence-driven age estimates to implement classwide relief and the class certification issues that continued litigation of such claims would raise. 

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“saddled” with the preliminary injunction in T.K. or failed to pursue minors’ claims.22 Indeed, 

Mark S. was unsuccessful in his attempt to enforce the T.K. injunction in this case. 

Based on Mark S.’s contention, minors under 13 should get nothing in the Settlement here, 

having released their claims in the T.K. action. But Class Counsel ensured that they do benefit 

from this Settlement. ECF No. 122-1, Settlement Agreement, § 2.4 (provision expressly allowing 

T.K. class members to participate in this Settlement). In fact, it is Mark S. who has repeatedly 

sought to prevent under-13 class members from recovering in this case, supra, and it is Plaintiffs 

who have advocated for those minors and obtained relief on their behalf. Mark S.’s objection 

should be rejected. 

Third, the Mark S. Objection again challenges the Settlement’s value, claiming that it is 

“suspicious” that there is no basis for the $92 million amount. Mark S. Obj., p. 12.23 In truth, Class 

Counsel’s Supplemental Memo explains how Class Counsel evaluated and valued the claims. ECF 

No. 137, pp. 7-23. And again, the Court overruled this identical objection at preliminary approval. 

Memorandum Opinion, pp. 20-22 (“[T]he Seventh Circuit has clarified that ‘the Synfuel/Reynolds 

evaluation of potential outcomes need not always be quantified, particularly where there are other 

reliable indicators that the settlement reasonably reflects the merits of the case.’ . . . Many of the 

same reliable indicators of a reasonable, negotiated settlement are present here. . . . And . . . the 

22 In fact, Mark S. and his counsel argued before Judge Blakey that the T.K. case did not involve 

BIPA at all. E.g., T.K., ECF No. 52-3, p. 8 (“MR. DRURY: [. . .] Now I don’t want to get bogged 

down in BIPA because this case is not about BIPA and I want to make that clear for the Court.”). 

See also id. at ECF No. 50-14 (Mark S.’s proposed consolidated complaint, which contains no 

BIPA claim). 

23 Mark S. also falsely claims that Plaintiffs “rel[ied] on an artificially low claims rate in an effort 

to convince the Court that the Settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Mark S. Obj., p. 14. 

The preliminary approval motion included a range of potential claims rates. Preliminary Approval 

Motion, pp. 24-25. Moreover, this brief provides the actual claims rate ( conservatively estimated 

to be at least 1.4%) which us typical in class actions like this one and is in line with Plaintiffs’ 

prior projections. 

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Court finds that the settlement agreement is well within the range of fairness, reasonableness, and 

adequacy[.]”) (citations omitted). It should be overruled again. 

Finally, Mark S. again argues that the notice plan does not provide the best notice 

practicable. Here, the target audience was determined by the Settlement Administrator’s research 

and expertise, together with input from TikTok, with the goal of reaching TikTok users of all ages, 

and Notice was also provided to Class Members by email and in-App notification. E.g., ECF No. 

122-12 (Weisbrot Declaration regarding Notice Plan). This issue, too, was raised at preliminary 

approval and overruled by the Court. See ECF No. 126 (Mark S.’s initial objections), p. 12; 

Memorandum Opinion, p. 33.24 Mark S.’s objection fails again. 

Mark S. has provided no basis to upend this Settlement, particularly while seeking fees for 

the “remarkable” Settlement benefits that Mark S. had nothing to do with. The Mark S. Objection 

should be denied. 

4. The Litteken Objection failed to comply with the requirements of the 

Preliminary Approval Order, restates objections this Court has already 

considered and rejected, and continues a string of baseless and irrelevant 

ad hominem attacks. 

a. Mr. Litteken’s continued ad hominem attacks are false, do nothing to 

undermine the value of the Settlement, and should be rejected. 

As has been commonplace in Mr. Litteken’s efforts in this case, the Litteken Objection 

begins with a histrionic and false narrative claiming that the Settlement was the result of a “reverse 

auction.” Litteken Obj., pp. 1-2. In support, Mr. Litteken complains that the Settlement was 

reached prior to the appointment of lead counsel and before discovery and motions practice. Id. 

As has been well established, however, settlement analyses and negotiations continued for months 

24 The Mark S. Objection also argues final approval is improper because the fee petition is due 

after objections. Mark S. Obj., pp. 7-8. As addressed herein, all Class Members will have an 

opportunity to review and respond to the fee petition prior to final approval. 

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after the initial Settlement Agreement was reached in September 2020. See, e.g., Declaration of 

Elizabeth A. Fegan, ECF No. 122-7. Indeed, the Court appointed the Leadership Group that same 

month, and the Leadership Group then diligently vetted the settlement and continued the dialogue 

with TikTok. See id. That Court-appointed counsel conducted confirmatory discovery, including 

via expert-led onsite review of TikTok’s source code. See id. In February 2021, a Settlement 

Addendum was added that further strengthened and clarified the Settlement. See id. And only then 

– after five additional months of analyses, negotiations, and confirmatory discovery – did Plaintiffs 

seek Court approval of the Settlement. See ECF No. 122 (Preliminary Approval Motion). The 

“motion practice” that Mr. Litteken complains has not yet occurred includes inevitable motions to 

compel arbitration and to dismiss the case entirely – motions which could have decimated 

Plaintiffs’ claims prior to any discovery at all. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion, p. 26. The fact 

that those motions have not yet occurred weighs in favor of the Settlement, not against it. See id. 

Mr. Litteken tries to undermine the integrity of the pre-leadership settlement negotiations 

by falsely suggesting the Settlement was initially reached by a single attorney and an “undisclosed 

client.” Litteken Obj., pp. 2, 11. That is irrelevant, given the work performed by the Leadership 

Group, and it is also untrue. The single attorney on which Mr. Litteken directs his focus – Katrina 

Carroll – was Court-appointed Interim Lead Counsel at the time the August 2020 mediation was 

scheduled. (She is now one of the Court-appointed Lead Counsel). She was one of seven attorneys, 

each from a different law firm, who attended that mediation and entered into the initial Settlement 

Agreement on behalf of Plaintiffs. ECF No. 122-6, ¶¶ 17-19.25 And those seven attorneys 

represented seven proposed class representatives who were named in the initial agreement. 

25 Those seven attorneys were a delegation from a broader group of 16 law firms that came together 

to collaborate on behalf of Plaintiffs in the months leading up to the mediation. ECF No. 122-6 

(Carroll Decl.), ¶ 18.

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Settlement Agreement, ECF No. 122-1, p. 18. Even still, Settlement approval was not sought until 

further analyses, confirmatory discovery, negotiation, and agreement by the Court-appointed 

Leadership Group. 

And when approval was finally sought, it was done with support extending well beyond 

the seven attorneys who reached the initial agreement, the initial seven proposed class 

representatives, and the renowned mediator who facilitated the Settlement. Indeed, Settlement 

supporters included the three Court-appointed Class Counsel firms, six additional firms in the 

Leadership Group, more than a dozen additional law firms who were retained by Class 

Representatives, and 35 proposed Class Representatives. See ECF No. 122-2 (Class 

Representatives and their counsel). In other words, there were dozens of potential “auction 

bidders” who could have opposed the Settlement had any of them believed the Settlement process 

was “ineffectual” – as Mr. Litteken now suggests even though the Settlement dwarfs many of his 

counsel’s own privacy settlements (ECF No. 137-2 (settlement comparables chart)).26 In fact, none 

of the dozens of law firms who filed cases that were consolidated in the MDL now objects to the 

Settlement. And what is most important, the Settlement now has the support of over 1.2 million 

Class Members who have filed Valid Claims. 

Mr. Litteken’s counsel’s preoccupation with Ms. Carroll is misguided and appears to be 

motivated by his personal legal issues. See ECF No. 166 (Edelson PC motion stemming from 

unrelated Edelson arbitration). The Leadership Group achieved an excellent result for the Class 

through hard-fought, arms’-length negotiations. 

26 Moreover, as Mr. Litteken notes (Litteken Obj., pp. 10-11), some of the counsel who now 

support the Settlement were skeptical about it before seeing its terms. Those concerns were 

resolved when that counsel saw the benefits achieved for the Class and participated in the robust, 

months-long analyses of the Settlement and continued negotiations. 

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b. The Litteken Objection fails to comply with the requirements in the 

Court’s Preliminary Approval Order. 

In his objection, Mr. Litteken acknowledges that he intentionally failed to comply with the 

Preliminary Approval Order’s requirements for objections. Litteken Obj., pp. 4-5. The Preliminary 

Approval Order requires that objectors provide “a copy of any relevant orders addressing” prior 

class settlement objections (of which Edelson disclosed four), “all agreements that relate to the 

objection or the process of objecting, between the objector or objector’s counsel and any other 

person or entity,” and “a declaration under penalty of perjury that the information provided by the 

objector and objector’s counsel is true and correct.” Preliminary Approval Order, ¶ 9 (iv), (v) and 

(vii). Instead, Mr. Litteken states that he will not provide “his retainer agreement with his counsel, 

his declaration, [or] his counsel’s declaration” absent further Court instruction, and that “[t]he 

orders addressing each of [Edelson’s prior] objections are matters of public record.” Litteken Obj., 

pp. 4-5. The objection should be stricken for these willful failures to comply with the Court’s order. 

Supra. 

c. The Litteken Objection repeats the same arguments the Court 

considered and rejected at preliminary approval. 

The substantive sections of the Litteken Objection offer no more support for disrupting the 

Settlement than its ad hominem attacks. Mr. Litteken’s objections are almost entirely repetitive of 

the objections that he raised at preliminary approval, which the Court considered and overruled. 

i. Mr. Litteken’s request for additional class notice regarding 

attorneys’ fees is not supported by Rule 23 or the precedent 

he cites. 

First, Mr. Litteken mimics the Helfand Objection’s claims about the need for Class 

Members to have the opportunity to respond to counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees. Litteken Obj, 

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pp. 5-8. As discussed above, that objection is without merit; Class Members have an opportunity 

to oppose Counsel’s fee request and no Class Member has been aggrieved.27 

In fact, Mr. Litteken’s proposed remedy for this objection illustrates that Class Members 

have been provided adequate notice of and opportunity to respond to counsel’s fee request. More 

specifically, Mr. Litteken suggests that Plaintiffs “re-notic[e] ... the class so that they have all 

information about Class Counsel’s fee request to which they are entitled at the time they are 

obligated to object.” Litteken Obj., p. 8. But Class Members already have all information “to which 

they are entitled” – and more, including counsel’s detailed fee application – weeks prior to the Fee 

Response Date. 

While Class Members are entitled to respond to counsel’s fee request, there is no 

requirement that the deadline to object to a fee request be the same as the deadline for objections 

to settlement approval. In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prods. Liab. 

Litig., 895 F.3d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Rule 23(h) does not require that class counsel’s fee 

motion be filed before the deadline for class members to object to, or opt out of, the substantive 

settlement. Rather, the rule demands that class members be able to ‘object to the motion’—that is, 

27 Mr. Litteken’s suggestion that the Fee Response Date applies only to the Defendant (Litteken 

Obj., p. 7) is wrong. Plaintiffs and Defendant both recognize the Court’s Order as providing Class 

Members the right to oppose an attorneys’ fees request by the Fee Response Date. 

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the motion that class counsel must file to make a claim for fees under Rule 23”) (citations omitted) 

(emphasis in original).28

Rule 23(h) requires only that fee motions be “served” on the parties and “directed to class 

members in a reasonable manner.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1). Plaintiffs have complied with this 

provision via the Notice, the posting of the Preliminary Approval Order, the public filing of their 

motion for attorneys’ fees, and the posting of that motion on the website upon filing. 

The Notice discloses that “Class Counsel intends to request up to 33.33% of the Settlement 

fund for attorneys’ fees.” ECF No. 122-4, p. 7. The Notice states that “[t]he Court will hold a 

hearing to decide whether to approve the Settlement and any requests for fees and expenses” and 

provides information about the hearing. Id. at 9. The Notice refers Class Members to the Settlement 

Website several times, provides the website’s URL in the footer of every page, and informs Class 

Members that they are “urged to review more details in the Settlement Agreement” and to visit the 

website for those details. Id. at 9. Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees motion, with the specifics of 

their fee request, is being publicly filed on the Court’s docket and placed on the Settlement 

Website. The requirements of Rule 23 have therefore been met. See, e.g., In re NFL Players 

Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 446 (3d Cir. 2016) (Notice that allowed class members to 

28 See also Bower v. MetLife, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-351, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149117, at *14-16 

(S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2012) (Rule 23(h) “does not by its plain language require that the fee petition 

be submitted at any specific time. . . .[C]lass members were informed of the maximum amount of 

fees, expenses, and contribution awards that would be sought by Class Counsel in the notice(s) 

months ago. Such notice comports with the requirements of Rule 23(h). . . . [And] objectors had a 

fair opportunity to prepare objections to the fee petition after it was filed and before the Fairness 

hearing.”); Keil v. Lopez, 862 F.3d 685, 706 (8th Cir. 2017) (A schedule that failed to provide class 

members with any opportunity to respond to a fee request prior to final approval – which is not the 

case here because of the Fee Response Date – was at most harmless error because the objectors 

had the opportunity to respond via appeal); In re Lawnmower Engine Horsepower Mktg. & Sales 

Practices Litig., No. 08-1999, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121684, at *21 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2010) 

(same where class members could have responded (and some did) following class notice or after 

reviewing the full fee motion). 

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“ballpark the size of class counsel’s eventual fee request. . . [e]ven if the class members were 

missing certain information—for example, the number of hours class counsel worked and the 

terms of any contingency fee arrangements class counsel have with particular [plaintiffs]—[still 

provided] enough information to make an informed decision about whether to object to or opt out 

from the settlement.”).29 

Neither of the Seventh Circuit cases Mr. Litteken cites – Kaufman v. Am. Express Travel 

Related Servs. Co., 877 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 2017) and Redman v. Radioshack Corp., 768 F.3d 622 

(7th Cir. 2014) – supports a different reading of Rule 23. Kaufman and Redman follow the Ninth 

Circuit’s decision in In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 993-95 (9th Cir. 

2010). In Mercury, the court held that “a schedule that requires objections to be filed before the 

fee motion itself is filed denies the class the full and fair opportunity to examine and oppose the 

[fee] motion that Rule 23(h) contemplates.” Id. at 995. 

Following that reasoning, Redman reversed the approval of a settlement where the 

attorneys’ fee motion was not filed until after the objection deadline. 768 F.3d at 637-38. The court 

found that objectors were “handicapped” at the time of the objection deadline because detailed 

hours, expenses, and rationale in support of the fee request had not been submitted. Id. at 638. But

29 See also, e.g., Halley v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 861 F.3d 481, 500 (3d Cir. 2017) (Notice that 

included a smaller fee percentage than counsel actually requested after the deduction of costs still 

provided “the critical information” and “did not deprive the class members of the ability ‘to make 

informed decisions’ on whether to opt out of the settlement or object to the fee award.”) (citation 

omitted); Gascho v. Glob. Fitness Holdings, LLC, No. 2:11-CV-436, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

46846, at *96 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2014) (Notice of fee request was “directed to class members in a 

reasonable manner” where maximum fee request was in long-form notice and motion for 

attorney’s fees was filed in advance of fairness hearing); T.K., 19-cv-07914, ECF No. 94, pp. 20-

21 (finding that the class “received sufficient notice of fees” and “had ample opportunity to voice 

their concerns” in light of the settlement notice, which specified the maximum fee request and a 

fee motion filed two weeks in advance of the objection deadline, even though “the settlement 

notice does not appear to provide class members with information about the filing of the full fee 

petition”) (emphasis in original). 

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Redman makes no mention of any opportunity to respond to class counsel’s fee motion at all. See 

generally id. Here, in contrast, there is a discrete deadline for Class Members to respond to the 

attorneys’ fees request – the Fee Response Date – and it falls after the submission of supporting 

details and rationale in Plaintiffs’ March 31, 2022 brief. 

Kaufman is distinguishable too. In Kaufman, the court addressed whether briefs in support 

of a settlement (not attorneys’ fees) must be filed prior to the objection deadline. 877 F.3d at 284. 

In dicta, Kaufman referenced Mercury and Redman in comparing Rule 23(h), which requires 

supporting motions before a fee objection deadline, and Rule 23 more broadly, which “has no 

provision that would require parties to file briefs in support of the settlement prior to the deadline 

to file objections.” Id. The decision’s reference to “the deadline to object to the settlement” (on 

which Mr. Litteken relies) was imprecise, and did not contemplate a scenario with separate 

settlement and fee objection deadlines (which was irrelevant to the issue under consideration), but 

it was not a holding that such scenarios are improper or that attorneys’ fees motions must be filed 

before objections to the settlement itself. See id. at 284 (“The Intervenors urge us to extend 

Redman's reach to apply to the filing of briefs in support of settlement before the deadline to object. 

But, as the Ninth Circuit made clear [in Mercury], the plain text of Rule 23(h), which deals 

exclusively with attorneys’ fees and costs, is what requires parties to file motions for attorneys’ 

fees before the deadline to object to the settlement. There is no such requirement for the filing of 

briefs in support of a settlement agreement”). 

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit itself has repeatedly made clear that Mercury “rejected as 

insufficient Rule 23(h) notice when the motion for attorneys’ fees was due after the deadline for 

class members to object to the attorneys’ fees motion.” In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 

779 F.3d 934, 954 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (finding notice sufficient where it stated the 

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requested fee percentage and class members had 15 days after the filing of a fee motion to object). 

“Rule 23(h) does not require that class counsel’s fee motion be filed before the deadline . . . to 

object to . . . the substantive settlement.” Volkswagen, 895 F.3d at 615 (emphasis in original). 

Through the Notice and the March 31, 2022 motion for attorneys’ fees, Class Members 

have the information they need to consider counsel’s fee request and respond by the April 14, 2022 

Fee Response Date. Accordingly, Mr. Litteken’s demand for additional notice should be denied 

and his objection should be overruled. 

ii. The Court has already rejected Mr. Litteken’s request to 

mandate app-store subpoenas because the Notice Plan 

provides the best notice practicable under the 

circumstances. 

Second, Litteken raises issues about notice that the Court already considered and rejected 

at Preliminary Approval. Litteken Obj., pp. 8-10; Memorandum Opinion, pp. 29-30. In addition to 

the publication, email, and in-App notice that has already occurred, Mr. Litteken claims that Class 

Counsel should subpoena application (“app”) platform providers for the email information of those 

who downloaded TikTok. Id. at 9. In support, Mr. Litteken cites In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 

No. 16-5073, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166675, at *16-23 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2021), which rejected 

publication-only notice in favor of 26 subpoenas to pharmacy benefit managers, third-party payors, 

and chain store pharmacies (entities that plaintiffs had identified as potential subpoena recipients 

more than a year prior in plaintiffs’ motion for class certification). 

But Suboxone did not have the expansive notice program that this case has – including 

direct email to nearly 81 million addresses, a media campaign that had well over 100 million 

impressions, and in-App notice to Class Members. As noted in a later Suboxone opinion: “Courts 

have consistently recognized that due process does not require that every class member receive 

actual notice so long as the court reasonably selected a means likely to apprise interested 

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parties. . . . Rule 23 does not require the parties to exhaust every conceivable method of identifying 

the individual class members.” In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) 

Antitrust Litig., No. 2445, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231508, at *22-23 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2021) 

(citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, notice requires only a “reasonable effort,” taking into 

account the cost-benefit of further notice. In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion) 

Antitrust Litig., 527 F. Supp. 3d 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (rejecting the approach taken in Suboxone 

in another antitrust case with similar notice considerations).30

Mr. Litteken’s proposal is not only legally unsupported and duplicative of the robust notice 

program that already occurred – there is no indication that the costly undertaking would increase 

the reach of the Notice program or drive additional claims. There is no suggestion that Class 

Members are more likely to check an email account used for app store purchases than the email 

account used to register the TikTok App. There is no suggestion that each Class Member has their 

own app store account such that more email addresses could be obtained from the app store 

providers than from TikTok itself (for example, family members may share an app store account 

or the TikTok App itself, even if they have their own TikTok accounts). There is no suggestion 

that the additional notice would be more effective than the actual Notice that already occurred – 

which reached more than 97% of the Class, multiple times, through digital media alone, and 

included other means of direct notice, too. Platt Decl., ¶ 36. But it is clear that Mr. Litteken’s 

proposal would be costly and would delay the provision of Settlement benefits to the Class. As the 

Court previously concluded, the existing Notice Plan constitutes the best notice practicable under 

30 Mr. Litteken also requests that, in connection with “a second round of notice, the Court should 

also order the parties to produce information about whether this [first round of] notice truly was 

effective—for instance, did it translate to the types of claim rates one expects with robust direct 

notice?” Id. at 9. The claims rates are included in this brief as is routine in motions seeking the 

final approval of a class settlement. 

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the circumstances of this case. Memorandum Opinion, pp. 28-30 (“The Federal Judicial Center 

has found that a notice plan calculated to reach between 70% and 95% of the class in total is 

reasonable and that, according to a study of recent published decisions, the median reach calculation 

on approved notice plans is 87%.”) (citation omitted). 

iii. Mr. Litteken’s arguments about the Settlement’s value and 

allocation are disingenuous and self-contradicting. 

Finally, Mr. Litteken feigns concern over the unremarkable fact that the settling defendant 

has denied that it engaged in wrongdoing while agreeing to pay to resolve allegations of that 

wrongdoing. Litteken Obj., pp. 3-4, 10-14. Mr. Litteken complains that the allocation of additional 

Settlement shares to Illinois Subclass members is unfair because “everyone admits TikTok Didn’t 

violate BIPA.” Id. at 10. The Settlement, as all settlements are, was a balancing of both parties’ 

independent strength and risk assessments. The fact that the Settlement achieves substantial 

compensation for wrongdoing that TikTok denies only supports the strength of the Settlement. 

And to be clear, TikTok denies all of the claims against it, as is plainly disclosed on the first page 

of the Notice. As Mr. Litteken’s counsel is well aware, this is common – if not universal – in 

settlements, just as Facebook denied wrongdoing in Facebook BIPA.

31

Mr. Litteken’s complaints about the Settlement’s value are self-contradicting. On one hand, 

Mr. Litteken complains that the additional shares to the Illinois Subclass overvalue the BIPA claim 

and are thus “not fair . . . and should be readjusted to reflect reality.” Litteken Obj., pp. 13-14. On 

the other hand, Mr. Litteken claims “TikTok got off cheap,” and cites Facebook BIPA as the top 

comparator, id. at pp. 14-15, even though the Court already deemed Facebook BIPA “a poor 

comparator to this case,” Memorandum Opinion, p. 25. The fact that more shares were allocated 

31 https://www.facebookbipaclassaction.com/media/2989470/fby_not_200911.pdf (“Facebook 

denies all allegations of wrongdoing and liability.”) (last accessed 3/28/2022). 

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to Class Members pursuing a BIPA claim – which is one of the few asserted claims with statutory 

damages, and which has higher historical success rates – reflects the Settlement’s fairness and the 

careful consideration of the value of the case and each of its claims. Mr. Litteken’s objection should 

be overruled. 

iv. Mr. Litteken’s patchwork of other complaints is also 

unavailing. 

Mr. Litteken’s objection contains a hodgepodge of other irrelevant or untrue complaints. 

For example, Mr. Litteken claims that the Settlement’s gross recovery of $1.03 per class member 

is “dead last” for “recent privacy settlement[s] with a class size of over a million people.” Litteken 

Obj., pp. 14-15. In support, however, Mr. Litteken cites a table of the 20 “highest” settlements 

since 2015, not the most recent. Id. (citing table from the Declaration of William A. Rubenstein in 

Facebook BIPA, ECF No. 499-3).32 As discussed above, this Settlement is well within the range 

of recoveries in comparable cases. 

Mr. Litteken claims that the attorneys who determined the allocation did so “with 

information hand-selected for them.” Litteken Obj., p. 13. In truth, allocation counsel was not 

limited in the information they were entitled to consider. 

Mr. Litteken also complains that the mediator was not involved in allocation 

determinations (beyond overseeing the mediation that resulted in the allocation range in the initial 

Settlement Agreement). Litteken Obj., p. 13. But this was a benefit to the Class obtained by the 

Court-appointed Leadership Group. Leaving the allocation determination to independent 

Plaintiffs’ counsel saved the Class costs associated with continued mediation and ensured that 

32 Professor Rubenstein also noted in that declaration that “most [privacy class action] settlements 

are far below $100 million and . . . many are ‘full cy pres’ settlements that return no money to 

class members directly.” Facebook BIPA, ECF No. 499-3 at ¶¶ 13. He further recognized the risk 

in proceeding through class certification, including that “some courts . . . have taken the position 

that class cannot be certified for statutory damages.” Id. at ¶ 19. 

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TikTok and its counsel could not affect Class Member recovery based on their own interests in the 

valuation of BIPA and non-BIPA claims. 

Mr. Litteken claims Ms. Carroll “barred competing counsel” (now Co-Lead Counsel 

Ekwan Rhow) from participating in the August 2020 mediation. Id. at p. 11. In truth, Mr. Litteken’s 

cited document reflects that “Ms. Carroll invited [Mr. Rhow] to participate in the August 13 

mediation” and he initially declined. ECF No. 11-1 ¶¶ 4-8 (TikTok, not Ms. Carroll, later revoked 

a subsequent offer to participate in light of concerns related to a potential conflict of interest, but 

welcomed Mr. Rhow’s co-counsel to attend). In any event, Mr. Rhow himself has since fully 

evaluated the Settlement, engaged in extensive negotiations with TikTok, and supports this 

Settlement. 

As the Court concluded at Preliminary Approval, none of Mr. Litteken’s objections warrant 

depriving the Class of the Settlement’s benefits. In sum, the extremely low opposition to the 

Settlement, including just four objections that provide no credible reason to disrupt Class 

Members’ recovery, support final approval. 

D. The stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed at the 

time of Settlement, as well as the opinion of competent counsel, favor 

final approval. 

The Court has recognized the substantial effort Plaintiffs undertook to reach the Settlement 

here: 

The Settlement Agreement was initially reached through hardfought, arms’-length negotiations, which were mediated, on two 

separate occasions, by a reputable former federal judge. It was 

refined through further negotiation by a Court-appointed leadership 

group comprising a diverse cast of experienced plaintiffs’ attorneys. 

Defendants have forcefully disputed their liability at every stage, 

raising a host of factual and legal defenses. The parties have 

exhaustively analyzed and debated their respective positions as part 

of their negotiations. And Plaintiffs have reviewed substantial 

confirmatory discovery, including an expert-led analysis of 

TikTok’s source code. What is more, although the initial agreement 

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was inked while this MDL was in its early stages, it capitalized on 

urgent and extraordinary political pressure upon Defendants to shed 

TikTok’s existing liabilities, and the Settlement Agreement has 

since been vetted again by the entire Plaintiffs’ Leadership Group. 

Memorandum Opinion, p. 21. This factor thus supports final approval of the Settlement. See, e.g., 

Isby, 75 F.3d at 1200 (“the discovery and investigation conducted by class counsel prior to entering 

into settlement negotiations was ‘extensive and thorough.’”). 

Moreover, the Court appointed experienced, competent counsel to oversee this case. The 

Leadership Group comprises nine attorneys with considerable privacy and consumer class action 

experience. They each endorse this Settlement, and that, too, weighs in favor of final approval, as 

the Court previously recognized: 

Moreover, all three of Plaintiffs’ Interim Co-Lead Counsel, whom 

the Court found well qualified to serve in that role, have attested to 

their belief that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and 

adequate. Carroll Decl. ¶ 41; Pls.’ Mot, Ex. G, Fegan Decl. ¶ 3, ECF 

No. 122-7; id., Ex. H, Rhow Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 122-8. Add to this 

the opinion of Judge Phillips (whom Chambers and Partners, a 

respected legal company, has named one of the top mediators in the 

United States) that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, 

“especially when measured against the significant obstacles 

standing in the way of . . . Plaintiffs’ claims.” Id., Ex. I, Phillips 

Decl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 122-9. 

Memorandum Opinion, p. 27. See also, e.g., In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 

1002, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (placing “significant weight on the unanimously strong endorsement 

of these settlements” by “well-respected attorneys”); McKinnie v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 

678 F. Supp. 2d 806, 812 (E.D. Wis. 2009) (factors including that “counsel endorses the settlement 

and it was achieved after arms-length negotiations facilitated by a mediator . . . suggest that the 

settlement is fair and merits final approval”). 

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VII. CONCLUSION 

This $92 million plus injunctive relief Settlement provides an excellent result for the Class. 

The Settlement has garnered substantial support from the Class, with over 1.2 million Valid Claims 

filed, fewer than 40 exclusions, and just four objections – none of which raises a credible concern. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court finally approve the Settlement. 

Dated: March 31, 2022 By: /s/ Katrina Carroll 

Katrina Carroll 

LYNCH CARPENTER LLP 

111 W. Washington St. 

Suite 1240 

Chicago IL 60602 

312.750.1265 

katrina@lcllp.com 

Elizabeth A. Fegan 

Melissa Ryan Clark 

FEGAN SCOTT LLC 

150 S. Wacker Dr., 24th Floor 

Chicago, IL 60606 

Ph: 312.741.1019 

Fax: 312.264.0100 

beth@feganscott.com 

Ekwan Rhow 

BIRD, MARELLA, BOXER, WOLPERT, 

NESSIM, DROOKS, LINCENBERG & RHOW, 

P.C. 

1875 Century Park East, 23rd Floor 

Los Angeles, CA 90067 

(310) 201-2100 

erhow@birdmarella.com 

Plaintiffs’ Co-Lead Counsel 

Jonathan Jagher 

Freed Kanner London & Millen LLC 

923 Fayette Street 

Conshohocken, PA 19428 

(610) 234-6487 

jjagher@fklmlaw.com 

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Michael Gervais 

Susman Godfrey LLP 

1900 Avenue of the Stars 

Suite 1400 

Los Angeles, CA 90067 

(310) 789-3100 

mgervais@susmangodfrey.com 

Albert Y. Chang 

Bottini & Bottini, Inc. 

7817 Ivanhoe Avenue 

Suite 102 

La Jolla, CA 92037 

(858) 914-2001 

achang@bottinilaw.com 

Megan E. Jones 

Hausfeld LLP 

1700 K Street NW, Suite 650 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

(202) 540-7200 

mjones@hausfledllp.com 

Amanda K. Klevorn 

Burns Charest LLP 

365 Canal Street 

Suite 1170 

New Orleans, LA 70130 

(504) 799-2845 

aklevorn@burnscharest.com 

Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee 

Shannon Marie McNulty 

Clifford Law Offices, P.C. 

120 North LaSalle Street, Suite 3100 

Chicago, IL 60602 

(312) 899-9090 

smm@cliffordlaw.com 

Plaintiffs’ Liaison Counsel

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