1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

TIMOTHY DUNN,

Plaintiff,

v.

HAMRA ENTERPRISES and HAMRA 

MANAGEMENT COMPANY, LLC,

Defendants.

No. 20 C 04329

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Timothy Dunn sued Hamra Enterprises and Hamra Management Company, 

LLC (collectively, “Hamra”), alleging retaliation in violation of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”) and retaliatory discharge under Illinois law. Hamra has 

moved for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons set forth below, Hamra’s 

motion is denied.

Background

The following facts are undisputed except where otherwise indicated. Hamra 

is a franchisee of various restaurants and hotels, including Wendy’s, Panera Bread, 

Noodles & Company, and Holiday Inn Express & Suites. R. 62 ¶ 2. Dunn was 

originally hired by Hamra in the position of facilities manager in July 2001. R 62 ¶ 

6. In 2013, he was promoted to Director of Maintenance. Id. In 2016, he assumed the 

position of Regional Director of Facilities (“RDF”) for the Chicago area. Id. At the time 

Dunn assumed the Chicago RDF role, Hamra also employed RDFs in its two other 

markets: New England and Missouri. R. 62 ¶ 7. Dunn held the RDF position until his 

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employment with Hamra was terminated on May 14, 2020. R. 62 ¶ 1. Dunn’s direct 

supervisor at the time of his termination was Ben Kaplan. R. 62 ¶ 15.

Dunn’s position as RDF entailed supervising several technicians who reported 

to him, managing the facilities in his region, managing budgets, and providing 

oversight on capital projects. R 62 ¶ 8. His duties also included vendor relations, site 

inspections, and ensuring regulatory compliance. Id.

At the time of his termination, Dunn supervised four field technicians in the 

Chicagoland area. R 62 ¶ 14. Dunn was typically responsible for tracking, collecting, 

and submitting hours worked by the field technicians and other employees that 

reported to him. R 62 ¶ 10. His team would record their hours on timesheets, which 

were then entered electronically and sent to Hamra’s payroll department by Dunn. 

R. 62 ¶ 11.

In early February of 2020, Kaplan exchanged emails with Hamra management 

regarding the “Reorganization of Development / Construction Leadership.” R. 62 

¶ 17. Kaplan’s email proposed that he “oversee all development which includes 

construction” and that “facilities leadership remains the same.” R. 56-2. It also made 

other proposals concerning a “facilities / construction point person” in each market. 

Id. At some point in February 2020, Kaplan was asked to take over facilities 

leadership for Hamra. R. 62 ¶ 15.

The start of the COVID-19 pandemic brought with it a host of rapid changes. 

Beginning March 16, 2020, Kaplan directed the facilities department to stop all nonessential work due to COVID. R. 62 ¶ 18. Kaplan told the department that Hamra 

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would authorize work necessary to keep its restaurants open. Id. Kaplan also told 

Dunn to have his team prepare the Panera Bread restaurants for outdoor dining and 

to install signs and banners. R. 62 ¶ 36. Kaplan was aware that this task might 

require Dunn’s team to work overtime. R. 62 ¶ 37. However, according to Dunn, 

Kaplan instructed him not to record any of the team’s overtime hours on their 

timecards for submission. R. 72 ¶ 6. Kaplan denies ever telling Dunn to omit overtime 

hours. Id. At least some of Hamra’s restaurants saw a decline in sales in the early

weeks of the pandemic. R. 62 ¶ 19.

On March 22, 2020, Kaplan emailed Hamra management to discuss the 

immediate reduction of facilities team hours to 20 per week. R. 62 ¶ 20. Two days 

later, Kaplan submitted a proposal for reduced hours and restructuring on the 

facilities team to Hamra management. R. 62 ¶ 21. The proposal included laying off 

the administrative assistant and warehouse repair technician on Dunn’s team, but 

kept Dunn in place as the Chicago RDF. Id.; R. 56-5.

According to Dunn, he first raised the issue of nonpayment of overtime around 

this time. Dunn allegedly asked Kaplan if he could add unpaid overtime hours to a 

laid-off employee’s final timecard so it would be included in his final pay, and that 

Kaplan said no. R. 72 ¶ 7. Dunn objected and said the employee was owed the money, 

having put in the overtime hours. Id. Kaplan denies telling Dunn this overtime could 

not be paid. Id.

Additional developments soon followed. Hamra’s RDF for the New England 

market retired on March 27, 2020 and his position was not filled. R. 62 ¶¶ 22, 30.

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Kaplan sent an email to Hamra management on April 1, 2020, indicating that none 

of the facilities technicians in Chicago were HVAC certified, requiring Hamra to bring 

in outside vendors for maintenance work. R. 62 ¶ 23; R. 56-7. Dunn testified at his 

deposition that he was HVAC certified, and that one of his technicians had received 

HVAC certification while employed by Hamra. R. 52, at 50:20-51:4. Two days later, 

Kaplan emailed Hamra management and several other employees, including Dunn, 

to say that Chad Halley would be taking over as RDF for Southern Bread (a collection 

of restaurant locations in Mississippi, Tennessee, and Arkansas), removing this from 

Dunn’s area of responsibility. R. 62 ¶ 24. The email thanked Dunn for his “awesome 

continued leadership.” R. 56-8.

Dunn alleges that he raised the unpaid overtime issue again after certain 

employees’ pay was reduced in early April. R. 72 ¶ 8. He claims to have asked Kaplan 

how the pay reduction would affect the overtime that was still owed, and that Kaplan 

told him Hamra was not going to pay that overtime. Id. Kaplan denies saying this. 

Id. Dunn allegedly raised the issue a third time later in April, after Hamra received 

a Paycheck Protection Program loan from the government. R. 72 ¶ 9. Dunn asked 

Kaplan whether the receipt of the loan meant that Hamra was going to pay Dunn’s 

team for their overtime, and Kaplan said no. R. 72 ¶ 9. Kaplan likewise denies this. 

Id.

On April 27, 2020, Kaplan sent an email to Hamra management informing 

them of imminent plans to move the Chicagoland facility warehouse to a new location

in Carpentersville that was closer to the restaurants it serviced. R. 56-9. In the email, 

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Kaplan said, “At one point I was thinking that [Dunn] might quit over this change.” 

Id. Kaplan also suggested that at least some of the Chicago area technicians spent 

multiple hours per day driving to and from work and said he would “deal with this 

once we come out of this crisis.” Id.

By May of 2020, Kaplan had decided that Hamra’s facilities infrastructure 

needed to be restructured to improve cost-effectiveness. R. 62 ¶ 26. In a May 2 email, 

Kaplan proposed promoting Halley (then the RDF for Missouri and Southern Bread) 

to Senior Director of Facilities, a newly created position. R. 62 ¶ 27. Under the 

proposal, the RDFs for each market, including Dunn, would report to Halley. Id. At 

the time, Kaplan was also in the process of reviewing the qualifications of all Hamra’s 

technicians, with the stated goal of each having experience in some or all of several 

relevant facilities disciplines, apparently in order to cut down on the expense of hiring 

outside vendors. R. 62 ¶ 28. A member of Hamra’s management asked whether a 

director was needed in each market given that Halley would be overseeing the entire 

department under Kaplan’s proposal. R. 62 ¶ 29. Kaplan said yes and that it would 

be “good to have someone in each market as a leader.” R. 56-11.

On May 7, Dunn sent an email to Kaplan expressing several concerns. First,

he said his team was unhappy with recent scheduling changes. R. 72 ¶ 11. Next, he 

said that members of his team were concerned about the lack of hygiene facilities 

(restrooms and sinks) at the new maintenance facility in Carpentersville. Id.

According to Dunn, this absence meant technicians needed to use the restrooms at 

the Panera Bread next to the Carpentersville facility, which was apparently not being 

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deep-cleaned and had a confirmed COVID diagnosis among its staff. Id. Finally, the 

May 7 email asked about the status of the additional hours worked by technicians in 

mid to late March that were still unpaid. R. 72 ¶ 10. Dunn said his technicians were 

aware that their co-worker who had been terminated had not been paid for his 

overtime at the time of his termination, and that the “events and circumstances are 

weighing heavily.” R. 72 ¶ 10.

Kaplan forwarded Dunn’s email to Hamra management with additional 

comments. R. 72 ¶ 12. Kaplan said that since telling Dunn about the maintenance 

facility relocation, Dunn had been “very challenging to work with” and had “a very 

negative attitude with a bunch of our operators in Chicago and including with me.” 

Id. Kaplan further wrote, “I know this should not be personal but I have to say that 

where I believe this is going is not a good outcome for him.” Id. Kaplan also forwarded 

Dunn’s email to Sonja Breuer, Hamra’s director of Human Resources, writing, “Also 

this email from Tim is not good. I have been struggling with his negative attitude 

since we shut down his warehouse a week ago.” R. 72 ¶ 15. Breuer responded, “Wow, 

read Tim’s response. Sounds like it was a bitch session. Do we owe them the hours 

worked?” Id.

The morning of May 8, 2020, Kaplan sent another email to Hamra 

management regarding Dunn’s email, writing, “I believe we might need to take 

immediate action with Tim and probably another two of his team. It’s taken me a bit 

of time but right now with Tim and his teams [sic] behavior, we would be better off 

with no one in facilities in Chicago.” R. 72 ¶ 17. Kaplan then sent a revised 

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restructuring plan for the facilities department to Hamra management. R. 62 ¶ 31. 

The proposal included laying off two field technicians in the Chicago market and one 

field technician in the New England market. Id. The May 8 proposal did not include 

any changes to Dunn’s position, though it identified him as a “high risk of departure.”

R. 62 ¶ 31; R. 56-13; R. 72 ¶ 14. However, Kaplan also referenced Dunn’s May 7 email 

and said he wanted to “discuss what all of this means ... in regard to [Dunn] and his 

leadership in the market.” R. 56-13. Simeon Shelton, a member of Hamra’s 

management team, responded, “I think we need to eliminate [Dunn]’s position, I don’t 

believe we need him if Chad can oversee the entire department. I also don’t see his 

email as being supportive of anything we are trying to do, but I would simply 

eliminate his position because its [sic] not needed anymore.” R. 56-13. Shelton 

referred to Dunn’s complaint about the Carpentersville situation as a “veiled threat”

and told Kaplan to forward the email to Breuer if he had not already done so. Id.

Kaplan submitted a third proposal on May 9. R. 62 ¶ 33. This proposal 

eliminated the RDF positions in all markets. Id.

Breuer called Dunn on May 8 (the day after his email to Kaplan) regarding the 

unpaid overtime issue. R. 72 ¶ 30. The two also discussed the team’s concerns over 

the lack of hygiene fixtures at the new maintenance facility. R. 72 ¶ 32. Breuer asked

Dunn to send her an email containing all overtime hours his team had worked, which 

he provided on May 11, 2020. R. 72 ¶ 30. Hamra sent each of the technicians a letter 

and a check for their unpaid overtime wages on May 12. R. 62 ¶ 47.

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On May 14, 2020, Hamra terminated four employees: Dunn, two field 

technicians from Chicago (including Dunn’s son), and one field technician from New 

England. R. 62 ¶ 34. The two other Chicago field technicians remained employed. R. 

62 ¶ 35. Separately, and before Dunn was terminated, Breuer told another member 

of Hamra’s management that Dunn could be a “total ass” sometimes and called him 

“litigious.” R. 72 ¶¶ 35-36. Hamra disputes that Breuer had any involvement in the 

decision to terminate Dunn, saying that her role was purely administrative as 

Hamra’s head of HR. Hamra did not approach Dunn about accepting a position as a 

technician, even with lower pay, instead of termination. R. 72 ¶ 28.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322-23 (1986). To defeat summary judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than 

a “mere scintilla of evidence” and come forward with “specific facts showing that there 

is a genuine issue for trial.” Johnson v. Advocate Health and Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 

887, 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court considers the entire evidentiary record and 

must view all of the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence 

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 948 

(7th Cir. 2018). The Court does not “weigh conflicting evidence, resolve swearing 

contests, determine credibility, or ponder which party’s version of the facts is most 

likely to be true.” Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 2021 WL 4486445, at *1 

(7th Cir. Oct. 1, 2021). Ultimately, summary judgment is warranted only if a 

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reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Analysis

I. Retaliatory Discharge under Fair Labor Standards Act

To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation in employment under 

the FLSA, Dunn must show: (1) that he engaged in protected expression or activity; 

(2) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the 

protected conduct and the adverse action. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance 

Plastics Corp., 703 F.3d 966, 972 (7th Cir. 2012). That Dunn suffered an “adverse 

employment action” is undisputed. Therefore, the Court must determine whether the 

evidence in the record, taken in the light most favorable to Dunn, would permit a 

reasonable jury to conclude that Dunn engaged in some protected expression or 

activity and that Hamra terminated his employment because of that conduct. 

At the outset, a note on how the Court’s analysis should proceed. Courts 

previously discussed “direct” and “indirect” methods of proving retaliation claims, 

utilizing slightly different standards, frameworks, or tests for each. See, e.g., Schmidt 

v. Hands On CDL Driving Sch., Inc., 2022 WL 656170, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 4, 2022) 

(discussing past practice). However, the Seventh Circuit has repudiated these 

distinctions, holding that the “legal standard ... is simply whether the evidence would 

permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, 

religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment 

action.” Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). In assessing 

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this question, “all evidence belongs in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole.” 

Id. at 766.

a. Protected Expression or Activity

As to the first disputed element, “[a]n employee engages in a protected activity 

by either: (1) filing a charge, testifying, assisting or participating in any manner in 

an investigation, proceeding or hearing under Title VII or other employment statutes; 

or (2) opposing an unlawful employment practice.” Northington v. H & M Int’l, 712 

F.3d 1062, 1065 (7th Cir. 2013). While an employee can “file” a charge via an oral or 

written complaint to his or her employer, the complaint “must be sufficiently clear 

and detailed for a reasonable employer to understand it, in light of both content and 

context, as an assertion of rights protected by the statute and a call for their 

protection.” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 14 (2011); 

see also Northington, 712 F.3d at 1065 (“Vague and obscure ‘complaints’ do not 

constitute protected activity.”). The key is whether the complaints objectively provide 

“fair notice” to the employer of the statutory right asserted. See Kasten, 563 U.S. at 

14. “The number and nature of prior discussion between the employer and employee, 

the employee’s assertion that the employer was breaking the law, and the employer’s 

reaction to the complaint are relevant in determining whether the complaint is 

protected.” Garcia v. Draw Enters. III, LLC, 2018 WL 6045206, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 

19, 2018). This issue presents “a matter of factual analysis” that ordinarily must be 

resolved on a case-by-case basis. See Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 45 

(1st Cir. 1999).

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The Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Dunn engaged in 

protected expression, because his complaints concerned Hamra’s alleged knowing 

and willful (if temporary) refusal to pay its employees for overtime hours they worked.

Dunn testified that he complained to his supervisor, Kaplan, who was in direct 

contact with Hamra’s management executives throughout the relevant period, about 

his team’s unpaid overtime three times, and that each time he was told the overtime 

would not be paid. This repetition supports Dunn’s position. See Kasten, 703 F.3d at 

976 (noting that employee’s repeated verbal complaints supported finding that 

employer had fair notice of plaintiff’s assertion of rights). Furthermore, the 

complaints concerned specific employees who had apparently not been paid for a 

specific period of time. They are thus distinguishable from the sort of “abstract 

grumblings” that courts have held insufficient to support a retaliation claim under 

the FLSA. Compare Starnes v. Wallace, 849 F.3d 627, 632 (5th Cir. 2017) (finding 

complaints that company was “violating the law” by not paying an employee for travel 

and overtime were sufficiently detailed), with Sloan v. Am. Brain Tumor Ass’n, 901 

F.3d 891, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that while employee’s failure to mention the 

FLSA in her complaints was “not necessarily fatal,” the complaints were insufficient 

because they merely alleged the employer was violating the law without offering any 

specificity as to how).

Likewise, a jury could view Dunn’s subsequent written complaint and Hamra’s 

response as evidence that Hamra understood (or should have understood) Dunn’s 

complaints as an assertion of protected rights. The written complaint reiterates the 

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unpaid overtime issue, even noting that a terminated employee had not yet been paid 

for time owed. A member of Hamra’s management, on being apprised of this email, 

said that it “reads like a veiled threat” and told Kaplan to forward it to the HR 

director. Cf. Garcia, 2018 WL 6045206, at *8 (citing evidence that employee’s 

supervisor quickly raised the employee’s complaint with in-house counsel and HR 

supervisor as indicative of employer’s understanding). Shortly thereafter, Hamra

(through Breuer) requested information about the unpaid time and sent its employees 

their overdue wages.

To be sure, Dunn’s complaints were not so explicit as to make this an easy case. 

But even if Dunn failed to use magic words like “illegal” or cite particular statutory 

provisions in his complaints, an employer should not need an employee to remind it 

of its legal obligation to pay non-exempt employees for their overtime work under the 

FLSA. Other decisions suggest that complaints of obviously unlawful payment 

practices can form the basis of a retaliatory discharge claim even in generalized form. 

See, e.g., EEOC v. White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding 

women who complained about unequal pay relative to male employees had 

sufficiently asserted their rights under the FLSA to state a retaliatory discharge 

claim). And to the extent Hamra disputes that the oral conversations between Dunn 

and Kaplan took place (either at all or in the manner Dunn describes), this is simply 

a factual disagreement that cannot be resolved on summary judgment.1

1 The Court declines to take up Dunn’s undeveloped argument that Hamra’s position 

on this fact issue is sanctionable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

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The Court also disagrees with Hamra’s contention that Dunn’s complaints 

were merely part of his job (because part of his responsibilities was reporting his 

team’s hours to payroll) and therefore outside the scope of the FLSA’s anti-retaliation 

provision. See Mousavi v. Parkside Obstetrics, Gynecology & Infertility, S.C., 2011 WL 

3610080, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2011). This argument seems to draw primarily on 

caselaw outside the Seventh Circuit, and it is questionable whether it is consistent 

with Ortiz and later cases. In any event, a jury could reasonably conclude that Dunn 

stepped outside his ordinary job responsibilities when he lodged multiple complaints 

about Hamra’s apparent overtime violations, including nonpayment to an employee 

who no longer worked for Hamra. This is especially true given Dunn’s testimony that 

Kaplan told him not to record his team’s overtime hours, in contravention of his 

ordinary practice.

b. Causal Relationship

As to the second disputed element, a plaintiff claiming unlawful retaliation 

must show that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the adverse 

employment action—in other words, that Hamra would not have terminated Dunn 

had he not made his complaints. See Lesiv v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 39 F.4th 903, 915 

(7th Cir. 2022). Causation may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including 

“(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements or behaviors; (2) evidence that similarly 

situated employees were treated differently; or (3) a pretextual reason for adverse 

employment action.” Kasten, 703 F.3d at 973. Hamra argues that Dunn’s termination 

was merely a product of the ongoing facilities restructuring, and that his position was 

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eliminated alongside others due to redundancy and a lack of desired qualifications 

among his team.

A jury could no doubt find the timing of Dunn’s termination indicative of 

retaliatory motive. Dunn had worked for Hamra for nearly 20 years, including 4 in 

his position as RDF for Chicago, yet the evidence permits a finding that Hamra made 

the decision to eliminate his position within days of receiving his written complaint, 

and he was in fact terminated soon thereafter. Whether the timing alone is sufficient 

to create an inference of causation is debatable. Compare Moser v. Ind. Dep’t of Corrs., 

406 F.3d 895, 905 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[S]uspicious timing alone rarely is sufficient to 

create a triable issue.”); with Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th 

Cir. 2011) (“Occasionally, however, an adverse action comes so close on the heels of a 

protected act than an inference of causation is sensible.”). Here, however, the added 

context around the decision to terminate Dunn’s employment supports a reasonable 

inference of causation. See Loudermilk, 636 F.3d at 315 (“Deciding when the inference 

is appropriate cannot be resolved by a legal rule; the answer depends on context.”).

First, although the elimination of Dunn’s RDF position could be viewed as part 

of Hamra’s ongoing restructuring process (which had begun several months earlier), 

just a few days before Dunn’s May 7 email, Kaplan himself had advocated for keeping 

him in place, saying it would be helpful to have an established leader in the market. 

Other evidence similarly reflects that Hamra had a positive view of Dunn’s 

contributions in his leadership role in the weeks before he was terminated. Second, 

Dunn has provided evidence to undercut the argument that his termination was 

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related to a lack of qualifications among his staff. He testified that he and at least 

one of his technicians were HVAC certified, so the idea that Hamra was incurring 

undue expense because it had to hire outside vendors could be seen as pretextual. 

Finally, evidence from around the time Dunn was terminated suggests others among 

Hamra’s management responded negatively to his complaints, including labeling him 

as “litigious.” Hamra disputes the relevance of some of this evidence, but extending 

all reasonable inferences in favor of Dunn, these factors bolster the suspicious timing 

enough to create a triable issue of fact.

A jury may ultimately believe Hamra’s explanation that Dunn’s termination 

was simply a by-product of the reorganization, meant to improve efficiency at a time 

when the restaurant industry was under significant stress. But “[t]he fact that the 

defendant may be able to produce evidence that the plaintiff was fired for a lawful 

reason just creates an issue of fact: what was the true cause of the discharge?” Stone 

v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 643 (7th Cir. 2002); see also 

Schmidt, 2022 WL 656170, at *5 (denying summary judgment despite defendant’s 

explanation providing a “potential, even powerful, lawful reason” for plaintiff’s 

termination). Here, the evidence is far from one-sided, and Hamra is not entitled to 

summary judgment. It will be up to a jury to decide which story holds water. 

II. Retaliatory Discharge under Illinois Law

The tort of retaliatory discharge acts as a “limited and narrow” exception to 

the general rule that an at-will employee may be discharged at any time and for any 

reason. Turner v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 911 N.E.2d 369, 374 (Ill. 2009). To state a claim 

for retaliatory discharge under Illinois law, “an employee must allege that (1) the 

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employer discharged the employee, (2) in retaliation for the employee’s activities, and 

(3) that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy.” Id. “Illinois courts 

have held that the ‘clear mandate of public policy’ standard is met in the context of 

workers' compensation claims and whistleblowing.” Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 

515 F.3d 757, 766 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Reid v. Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of 

Am., 2013 WL 1087557, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2013) (explaining that the 

whistleblower theory typically involves an employee terminated for reporting 

unlawful or improper conduct ); Michael v. Precision Alliance Group, LLC, 952 N.E.2d 

682, 687 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). A retaliatory discharge claim can encompass “the 

reporting of the violation of regulations and statutes other than the Criminal Code.” 

Stebbings v. Univ. of Chi., 726 N.E.2d 1136, 1145 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). The 

whistleblower theory likewise requires proof that the employee’s discharge 

contravened a clearly mandated public policy. Reid, 2013 WL 1087557, at *5 (citing 

Mackie v. Vaughan Chapter-Paralyzed Veterans of Am., Inc., 820 N.E.2d 1042, 1049 

(Ill. App. Ct. 2004)). Dunn’s termination is undisputed, and for the reasons explained 

above, a reasonable jury could conclude that it was in retaliation for Dunn’s 

complaints. The remaining question is whether his termination violated Illinois 

public policy, which is a question of law for the Court to resolve. Id. at 374-75.

As Hamra points out, Illinois courts have at times been reluctant to extend the 

reach of retaliatory discharge. See McGrath v. CCC Info. Servs., Inc., 731 N.E.2d 384, 

389-90 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (collecting cases). To that end, the Illinois Supreme Court 

has held that “generalized” expressions of public policy will not suffice—the employee 

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must identify a “clear mandate of public policy” that is violated by the discharge. See

Turner, 911 N.E.2d at 375-76. Dunn identifies two policies he says were violated: (1) 

the policy against firing employees for reporting violations of the Illinois Minimum 

Wage Law (“IMWL”), and (2) the policy of protecting employees who report 

occupational health hazards.

At least one court in this district has already found that termination for 

reporting an IMWL violation satisfies the public policy element of retaliatory 

discharge. See Reid, 2013 WL 1087557, at *6 (citing Stebbings, 726 N.E.2d at 1144). 

On this authority, the Court finds that Dunn’s complaints about overtime pay satisfy 

the public policy element.

Furthermore, Dunn’s complaint about potential health and safety hazards at 

the Carpentersville maintenance facility is sufficient as well. Illinois courts “are most 

likely to grant relief if the noncriminal regulations or statutes involved in retaliatory 

discharge suits involve health and safety.” Stebbings, 726 N.E.2d at 1145; see also

Gomez v. The Finishing Co., 861 N.E.2d 189, 197 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“Preventing the 

discharge of an employee who reports occupational health hazards furthers the public 

policy of protecting the lives and property of Illinois citizens.”). Dunn’s complaint 

regarding the Carpentersville facility concerned an apparent failure to provide basic 

hygiene accommodations and potential (or even likely) exposure to COVID-19. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Dunn’s alleged complaints and subsequent 

termination concerned important matters of public policy that will support a claim of 

retaliatory discharge. For this reason, and incorporating the discussion above 

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regarding protected activities and causation, Hamra has not shown that it is entitled 

to summary judgment on Dunn’s common law retaliatory discharge claim.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Hamra’s motion for summary judgment (R. 55) is 

denied.

ENTERED:

______________________________

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: September 16, 2022

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