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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED February 12, 2015

v No. 319307 Wayne Circuit Court KCEE KINARD ODOM, LC No. 13-003337-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: C AVANAGH , P.J., and M ETER and S HAPIRO , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of thi rd-degree fleeing and eluding, MCL 257.602a(3). Defendant was s entenced to two years’ probati on and we affirm.

Defendant’s conviction arises f rom his failure to promptly sto p the vehicle he was driving when Detroit Public Schools Poli ce Department (DPSPD) officers attempted to perform a traffic stop. His sole argument on appeal is that the prosecution pres ented insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, defendant argues that th e police officers’ testimony was unreliable and there was a lack o f evidence demonstrating that defendant was aware that the police were attempting to stop him or that he intended to flee from the police. We disagree. 1

In ascertaining whether sufficient evidence was presented at t rial to support a conviction, this Court must view the evidence in a li ght most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyo nd a reasonable doubt. A reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable in ferences and make credibility choices in support of t he trier of fact’s verdict. [ People v Strickland

, 293 Mich App 393, 399; 810 NW2d 660 (2011) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).]

The elements of third-degr ee fleeing and eluding are:

1 Whether a defendant’s conviction was supported by sufficient e vidence is reviewed de novo. People v Harverson , 291 Mich App 171, 177; 804 NW2d 757 (2010).-2- (1) the law enforcement officer must have been in uniform and p erforming his lawful duties and his vehicle mu st have been adequately identif ied as a law enforcement vehicle, (2) the defendant must have been driving a motor vehicle, (3) the officer, with his hand, voice, siren, or emergency ligh ts must have ordered the defendant to stop, (4) the defendant must have been aware t hat he had been ordered to stop, (5) the defendant must have refused to obey th e order by trying to flee from the officer or avoid being caught, which conduct coul d be evidenced by speeding up his vehicle or turning off the vehicle’s lights amo ng other things, and (6) some portion of t he violation must have taken place in an a rea where the speed limit was thirty-five miles an hour or less, or the defendant’s conduct must have resulted in an accident or collision, or the defendant must hav e been previously convicted of certain prior viola tions of the law as listed in M CL § 750.479a(3)(c); MSA 28.747(1)(3)(c). [ People v Grayer , 235 Mich App 737, 741; 599 NW2d 527 (1999) ( Grayer I ).]

To satisfy the elements of third-degree fleeing and eluding, a defendant’s vehicle is not required to reach a certain speed or exceed the speed limit for a partic ular distance because “the statute itself does not limit fleeing and eluding to high-speed or long -distance chases.” Id . at 741, 745.

First, the record contains sufficient evidence to allow a reas onable jury to conclude that Officers Tamika Lance and Donald Hughes were in uniform and per forming their lawful duties in a car that was adequately identified as a law enforcement ve hicle. Lance testified that she was wearing her Detroit Public Schools Police Department (DPSPD) un iform, which consisted of jeans, a shirt with the word “police” on it, a badge around her neck, and a “duty belt.” See People v Green , 260 Mich App 710, 719-720; 680 NW2d 47 7 (2004) (noting that t he statute only requires the officer to “be in uni form” and does not contain an y minimum requirements for the uniform). Both officers also testified that they were performi ng their lawful duties at the time of the incident because state-certified DPSPD officers are authori zed to make arrests and perform traffic stops in the areas between DPS schools. Finally, the t estimony of Lance, Hughes, and defendant referenced the vehicle’s overhead lights and markings , allowing a reasonable jury to find that the officers’ car was adequately identified as a law enforcement vehicle. Although defendant’s mother testified that she did not notice any lights or markings, and defendant’s son testified that he did not see any lights when he looked back at the police car while he was riding in defendant’s vehicle, it is the jury’s responsibility to dete rmine the weight and credibility of the witnesses’ testimony. People v Dunigan , 299 Mich App 579, 582; 831 NW2d 243 (2013). Accordingly, when viewed in the light most favorable to the pro secution, the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that the officers were lawfully performing their duties in uniform and in an adequate ly identified vehicle, sati sfying the first element.

Second, the record clearly indi cates, and defenda nt does not d ispute, that he was driving a car at the time of the incident , satisfying the second element.

Third, there was sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jur y to find that an officer ordered defendant to stop with the use of his hand, voice, sire n, or emergency lights. Hughes and Lance testified that Hughes activated the overhead lights a nd siren immediately after defendant rolled through a red light and turned in front of the ir vehicle at an intersection. The DPSPD investigator testified th at defendant acknowledged that t he officers had activated the-3- emergency lights during an interview following his arrest. How ever, defendant testified that the officers did not activate the overhead lights until the vehicle reached the corner of his street and did not activate the siren until the officers turned the vehicl e around and stopped the vehicle near his residence. Defendant’s son stated that he did not see any lights while he was riding in defendant’s vehicle and did not hear a siren until defendant’s vehicle reached the block of the residence. Despite the conflicting testimony as to the exact p oint at which the officers activated the overhead lights and siren, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that the officers ordered defendant to stop by using the vehicle’s o verhead lights or siren at some point before defendant stopped the vehicle, satisfying the thir d element.

Fourth, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to estab lish that defendant was aware that the officers had orde red him to stop. Circumstantia l evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom ma y provide sufficient evidence to establish the elements of a crime. Dunigan , 299 Mich App at 582. Lance and Hughes testified that there w ere no other vehicles between the DPSPD car and defendant’s car when Hughes activated the lights and siren and followed defendant to his residence. Lance stated that the DPS PD vehicle was approximately three car lengths away from defendant’s vehicle after Hughes ac tivated the lights and siren. From this testimony, a reasonable jury could conclude that defe ndant was close enough to the DPSPD vehicle to be aware that the officers were ordering him t o stop, especially because no other vehicles were present. Moreover, there was testimony tha t defendant exceeded the speed limit and disregarded a “stop” at 6 Mile Road and Hoover Street despite the unhindered visibility and close proximity of the DPSPD vehicle after Hughes activated the lights and siren. Further, according to the DPSPD investigator, defendant acknowledged tha t he did not stop when the officers activated the overhead lights. Although defendant pro vided contrary testimony that the officers did not activate the li ghts until the officers reached the block of his residence and did not activate the siren until they tu rned around in front of his res idence, determinations regarding the weight and credibility of witne ss testimony are reserved for th e jury. Id . Accordingly, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational jury to infer that defendant was aware that the officers had ordered him to st op, satisfying the fourth element

. Fifth, there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defen dant refused to obey the order to stop by trying to flee from the police officers or oth erwise avoid being caught. Grayer I
, 235 Mich App at 741. To satisfy this element, there must be a finding that defendant had the intent to flee or avoid capture, id. at 741-742, and we may consider circumstantial evidence in order to determine whether a def endant possessed such an intent

, People v Grayer , 252 Mich App 349, 356; 651 NW2d 818 (2002) ( Grayer II ). Lance and Hughes testified that, based on the speed of the police vehicle, defendant exceeded the speed limit after Hughes activated the lights and siren and did not slow down as they pursued him with the li ghts and siren activated. Hughes testified that defendant disre garded a “stop” a t 6 Mile Road an d Hoover Street dur ing the pursuit. Contrary to the officers’ testimony, defendant denied that he w as fleeing and eluding the police because (1) he was not speeding when the officers followed him; (2) the officers did not activate the lights until they had reached defendant’s block and did not activate the siren until after the officers drove past his house; (3) he was unaware that he had a ny outstanding warrants against him or that he was driving withouta valid license; and (4) he approached the officers after he exited the vehicle at his residence. However, even though defe ndant’s testimony was contrary to that of the officers, it was the jury’s role to determine the c redibility of the witnesses and the weight afforded to the evidence. Dunigan , 299 Mich App at 582. Accordingly, there was-4- sufficient evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to support the jury’s finding that defendant intended to flee and elude the po lice, satisfying the fifth element.

Sixth, there was sufficient evidence that the violation took p lace in an area where the speed limit was 35 miles per hour or less. Lance and Hughes bo th testified that defendant’s vehicle traveled on residential roads where the speed limit was 25 miles per hour after they had turned on the overhead lights a nd siren, satisfying the sixth e lement.

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh /s/ Patrick M. Meter /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro