alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
| **CERTIFICATE OF OFFICER****OF****LENNAR PARTNERS, INC.********Pooling and Servicing Agreement****dated as of June 1, 2004 (the "Agreement"), by and among****Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc., as Depositor, Wachovia****Bank, N.A., as Master Servicer, LaSalle Bank N.A., as Trustee,****ABN AMRO Bank N. V., as Fiscal Agent and****Lennar Partners, Inc., as Special Servicer****(CGCMT 2004-Cl)**The undersigned, Susan K. Chapman, as Vice President of LENNAR PARTNERS, INC., a Florida Corporation (the "Company"), in accordance with Section 3.13 of the Agreement, does hereby certify on behalf of the Company that (i) a review of the servicing operations of the company during the year ended December 31, 2004 and of its performance under the Agreement has been made under my supervision; (ii) to the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the company has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects and there has been no default in the fulfillment of any such obligation throughout such period ended December 31, 2004, (iii) the Company has not received any notice regarding qualification, or challenging the status, of any REMIC Pool as a REMIC under the REMIC Provisions or of the Grantor Trust as a "grantor trust" for income Tax purposes under the Grantor Trust Provisions from the Internal Revenue Services or any other governmental agency or body. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed and delivered this Certificate as of the 1st day of March, 2005. */s/ Susan K. Chapman*Susan K. Chapman Vice President Lennar Partners, Inc. |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
10055.

#### Ray *v.*The State.

Broyles, P. J.

1. Under repeated rulings of the Supreme Court and of this court, an excerpt from the charge of the trial judge which is correct in itself will not be considered erroneous because some other correct principle of law is not included therein or added thereto. In such a ease the motion for a new trial should asqign error, not upon the charge given, but upon the failure of the court to charge the other principle of law involved. Under this ruling the first special ground of the motion for a new trial is without merit.

2. The excerpt from the charge, set forth in the second special ground of the motion for a new trial, while in some particulars inaccurate, does not require a new trial of the case, the inaccuracy being beneficial instead of harmful to the accused.

3. None of the excerpts from the charge, as complained of in the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th special grounds of the motion for a new trial, when considered in the light of the entire, charge and of the facts of the case, require a new trial. The instructions as a whole were full, fair, and as favorable to the defendant as he was entitled to under the law. See, in this connection, *Mosley*v. *State,*11 *Ga. App.*1 (2) (74 S. E. 569), and the statement of Chief Justice Bleckley in *Brown*v. *Matthews,*79 Ga. 1 (1) 7 (4 S. E. 13).

4. A special ground of the motion for a new trial complains of certain questions asked a'witness for the State by the court, and of the answers elicited, on the ground that the questions and answers had a tendency to prejudice the movant’s cause with the jury, and indicated judicial disapproval of certain conduct of the defendant, disclosed by such examination. This ground of the motion, however, fails to show that the questions and answers were objected to at the time, or that there was a motion to exclude this evidence, or a motion for a mistrial of the case. Accordingly, under repeated rulings of this court, no question for adjudication is presented.

*125Decided November 23, 1918.

Conviction of manslaughter; from Cherokee superior court— Judge Morris. July 15, 1918.

*John 8. Wood, George D. Anderson,*for plaintiff in error.

*Herbert Clay, solicitor-general,*contra.

5. The remaining special grounds of the motion for a new trial are without merit.

6. The verdict was authorized by the evidence, and the court did not err in overruling the motion for'a new trial!

*Judgment-affirmed.*

*Bloodworth, J., concurs. Stephens, J., not presiding.*
# FILED

Sep te mb er 2 0, 19 95
Cec il Cr ow son , Jr

. Ap p e l l a te C o u rt C l e rk IN THE CO UR T OF CR IM IN AL AP PEALS OF TENN ESSEE

AT NA SH VILLE
M AR CH SE SSIO N, 1995

W ILLIA M A. R AN SOM , ) ) Appel lan t, ) No. 01C 01- 9410- CR -0 0361 ) ) D av ids on C ounty v

. ) ) Ho n . A n n La cy Jo h n s, Ju d ge ) ST AT E OF TE NNESSEE , ) (W rit of Habea s Corpus) ) Appel lee

. )

CO NC UR RI NG OPI NI ON

I concu r in Judge Hay es' opin ion, b ut I f eel com pelled to explain w hy it

w as appr opr iat e for the t ri al cour t not to tr eat t he pet it ion as one seek ing pos tc on v i c ti on r el i ef. J ud g e H ay es c i te s R ay v

. St at e, 4 89 S .W .2 d 84 9, 8 50 ( Ten n. C r i m. App.) , c er t. deni ed ( Tenn. 1972 ), for t he pr oposi ti on th at a tr ial co urt i s n ot r eq uir ed to
tr eat a habeas co rp us peti ti on as a po st- conv ic ti on pet it ion , but may do s o i n i ts
dis cr eti on. See T.C .A. § 40- 30- 108 ( 1990) , amende d by 1995 Tenn. Pub . Ac ts, ch

. 207 § 1 ( to be co difie d at T.C. A. § 40- 30- 105( c) for a cti ons filed on o r after Ma y 10,
199 5). Th is does no t me an th at a trial court is ent itled to ref use to treat an inv alid
habeas co rp us peti ti on as a po st- conv ic ti on pet it ion so as to defeat a v ali d pos tconv ic ti on c lai m. Ther e must be a mater ial or su bst anti al basi s t o s uppor t t he tr ial

cour t' s d eci si on.

In th is case, the petitio ner's po st-conviction case se eking to atta ck his
hab itual crimina l sente nce b y atta cking his underlyi ng convi ctions h as be en h eld in abey ance pur suant to Stat e v . Pr inc e, 78 1 S. W .2d 8 46, 8 52 ( Tenn. 1989 ), i n or der for
him to fil e s epar ate p eti ti ons to at tac k e ach of his pr ior co nv ic ti ons. N one of thos e pr ior

conv ic ti ons, onl y

hi s h abi tual cr imi nal one, oc cur re d i n D av ids on C ounty

. Thus, the2 tr ial co ur t w oul d hav e no jur is dic ti on to ente rt ain thi s p eti ti on as one seek ing pos tconviction relief

f or his previ ous co nvictions. T.C.A . § 40-3 0-10 3(a) (Supp .19 94), amended by

1995 Tenn. Pub . Ac ts ch. 207 § 1 ( to be co difie d at T.C. A. § 40- 30-
104 (a)).

Jo seph M. Tipt on, J udg e
<PAGE>   1

                                   EXHIBIT 11

                            PROMUS HOTEL CORPORATION
                       COMPUTATIONS OF PER SHARE EARNINGS
                    (IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE AMOUNTS)

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                             THREE MONTHS ENDED       NINE MONTHS ENDED
                                                SEPTEMBER 30,           SEPTEMBER 30,
                                            -------------------     ---------------------
                                             1998        1999         1998         1999
                                            -------     -------     --------     --------

<S>                                         <C>         <C>         <C>          <C>
Net income ............................     $51,830     $63,083     $140,034     $142,808
                                            =======     =======     ========     ========
Basic Earnings per Share:

    Weighted average outstanding shares      86,552      78,673       86,631       81,156
                                            =======     =======     ========     ========
    Net income per basic share ........     $  0.60     $  0.80     $   1.62     $   1.76
                                            =======     =======     ========     ========
Diluted Earnings per Share:

    Weighted average outstanding shares      86,552      78,673       86,631       81,156
    Effect of dilutive securities:
       Stock options and warrants .....         447         233          721          272
                                            -------     -------     --------     --------
    Weighted average shares assuming
       Conversion .....................      86,999      78,906       87,352       81,428
                                            =======     =======     ========     ========
    Net income per diluted share ......     $  0.60     $  0.80     $   1.60     $   1.75
                                            =======     =======     ========     ========
</TABLE>
9951.

#### Smith *v.*The State.

Decided December 3, 1918.

Accusation of possession of intoxicating liquor; from city court of Dublin—Judge Flynt. June 4, 1918.

*W. A. Dampier,*for plaintiff in error.

*S. P. New, solicitor,*contra.

Broyles, P. J.

"1. Upon the trial of a misdemeanor ease in the city court of Dublin the defendant, before arraignment and before pleading to the merits of the case, has a right to demand a jury of twelve, but he has not the right to demand a'panel of twenty-four jurors from' which to strike the jury. 6a. Laws, 1904, pp. 140-144, sec. 4 (p. 143). See also, in this connection, *Conyers*v. *Graham,*81 *Ga.*615 (4) (8 S. E. 521); *Mattox*v. *State,*115 *Ga.*212, 214 (41 S. E. 709). Under this ruling the amendment to the motion for a new trial is without merit.

2. The general grounds of the motion for a new trial, not having been referred to in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error, are treated as abandoned. . •

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bloodworlh, J., concurs. Stephens, J., not presiding.*
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS  SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL   INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM  THE
REGISTRANT'S  UNAUDITED  BALANCE  SHEET AS OF AUGUST 31, 1998 AND THE  UNAUDITED
STATEMENTS  OF OPERATIONS  AND  STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS FOR THE SIX MONTHS THEN
ENDED  AND  IS  QUALIFIED  IN  ITS  ENTIRETY  BY  REFERENCE  TO  SUCH  FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                          0000835585
<NAME>                C-Phone Corporation
<MULTIPLIER>                            1
<CURRENCY>                            USD
       
<S>                                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                       6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             FEB-28-1999
<PERIOD-START>                MAR-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                  AUG-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                         1
<CASH>                          6,568,021
<SECURITIES>                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                     438,950
<ALLOWANCES>                     (174,215)
<INVENTORY>                     1,687,588
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                8,662,211
<PP&E>                          1,141,709
<DEPRECIATION>                 (1,032,825)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  8,816,357
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>             722,053
<BONDS>                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>             749,290
<PREFERRED>                             0
<COMMON>                           75,957
<OTHER-SE>                      7,269,057
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    8,816,357
<SALES>                           879,915
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                  905,427
<CGS>                           1,139,621
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   1,149,064
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                        0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                 (103,991)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                      0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                (1,939,044)
<INCOME-TAX>                            0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>            (1,939,044)
<DISCONTINUED>                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                         0
<CHANGES>                               0
<NET-INCOME>                   (1,939,044)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                       (0.31)
<EPS-DILUTED>                       (0.31)
        


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1 Section 1350 Certification   Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002   (Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of Symmetry Medical Inc., a Delaware corporation (the Corporation), does hereby certify that: The Annual Report on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 29, 2012 (the Form 10-K) of the Corporation fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 10-K/A fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Corporation. Dated: November 7, 2013 /s/ THOMAS J. SULLIVANThomas J. SullivanChief Executive Officer /s/ FRED L. HITEFred L. HiteChief Financial Officer
Order entered February 20, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-00006-CV

IN RE IC, JAMES DONDERO, Relator

Original Proceeding from the 256th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DF-11-16417

ORDER

Before Justices Brown, Schenck, and Reichek

Before the Court is relator’s January 3, 2019 petition for writ of mandamus. This original 

proceeding is one of multiple proceedings filed in relation to the underlying suit affecting the 

parent-child relationship (“SAPCR”) and pending in this Court. See 05-18-00629-CV, 05-18-

01125-CV, and 05-18-01368-CV. In each of these proceedings, relator complains, at least in 

part, of orders enforcing a fee provision in the parties’ divorce decree. On the Court’s own 

motion, we conclude this proceeding should be consolidated into cause number 05-18-00629-

CV. 

Accordingly, we ORDER cause number 05-19-00006-CV CONSOLIDATED into 

cause number 05-18-00629-CV. We DIRECT the Clerk of Court to remove all documents from 

cause number 05-19-00006-CV and refile them in cause number 05-18-00629-CV and to treat 
cause number 05-19-00006-CV as a closed case. We ORDER that all future pleadings be filed 

in and bear only cause number 05-18-00629-CV. 

The Court will issue a briefing schedule in cause number 05-18-00629-CV in due course. 

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
#### Gustave Schullhofer, plaintiff, *vs.*Max Metzger, defendant.

1. A husband is not necessarily liable -for moneys advanced to or for the benefit of the wife.

2. When a party claims to hold a husband liable for money advanced to or for the benefit of the wife, he should in his pleading either aver the money to have been loaned and advanced to the husband, or to the wife, or for her benefit, at the husband’s request, or with his consént; or that he subsequently acquiesced; or that she was the agent of the husband in procuring the advance; or he should allege such facts as that an implied agency from the husband to the wife may arise therefrom.

(Before Jones, J., at Special Term,

December, 1867.)

Motion for leave to amend answer.

Jones, J.

If the proposed amendment constituted a valid counter-claim, I should not hesitate to allow it. But *577it clearly does not. A husband is not necessarily liable for moneys advanced to or for the benefit of the wife.

When a party claims to hold a husband liable for money advanced to or for the benefit of the wife, he should in his pleading either aver the money to have been loaned and advanced to the husband, or that it was loaned and advanced to the wife or for her benefit, at the husband’s request, or with his assent; or that he subsequently acquiesced ; or that she was the agent of the husband in procuring the advances; or else he should allege such facts as that an implied agency from the husband to the wife may arise therefrom.

The proposed amendment merely alleges that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in a certain sum “for moneys paid, laid out and expended for the benefit of the wife of the defendant.” This is insufficient.

The present motion must1 be denied, with $5 costs; but as the defendant may be able to make an answer which will show on its face that the husband is liable for the items mentioned in the account presented, this denial is without prejudice to.a motion for leave to serve a proposed amended answer showing such liability, on condition of moving within five days after service of the order to be entered hereon, and paying said $5 within that time.
#### STATE v. GREEN

No. 308A97

Case below: 126 N.C.App. 437

Petition by defendant for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 and Appellate Rule 16(b) as to issues in addition to those presented as the basis for the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals denied 23 July 1997.
INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANT'S REPORT
                         -------------------------------






Board of Directors and Stockholders
SFSB Holding Company

We have  reviewed the  accompanying  consolidated  balance sheet of SFSB Holding
Company and  subsidiary as of September 30, 2001,  and the related  consolidated
statements of income for the nine-month and three-month  periods ended September
30, 2001 and 2000, and the  consolidated  statements of cash flow and changes in
stockholders'  equity for the nine-month  period ended September 30, 2001. These
consolidated  financial  statements  are  the  responsibility  of the  Company's
management.

We conducted our review in accordance with standards established by the American
Institute  of  Certified  Public  Accountants.  A review  of  interim  financial
information  consists  principally  of applying  analytical  and  procedures  to
financial  data and making  inquiries of persons  responsible  for financial and
accounting matters. It is substantially less in scope than an audit conducted in
accordance with auditing  standards  generally  accepted in the United States of
America,  the objective of which is the  expression of an opinion  regarding the
financial  statements taken as a whole.  Accordingly,  we do not express such an
opinion.

Based on our review, we are not aware of any material  modifications that should
be made to the  accompanying  financial  statements for them to be in conformity
with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America.

We have  previously  audited,  in accordance with auditing  standards  generally
accepted in the United States of America,  the consolidated  balance sheet as of
December 31, 2000, and the related consolidated statements of income, changes in
stockholders'  equity  and cash  flows for the year then  ended  (not  presented
herein);  and in our report dated  February 16, 2001 we expressed an unqualified
opinion  on  those  consolidated  financial  statements.  In  our  opinion,  the
information  set  forth in the  accompanying  consolidated  balance  sheet as of
December 31, 2000, is fairly stated,  in all material  respects,  in relation to
the consolidated balance sheet from which it has been derived.


/s/ S.R. Snodgrass, A.C.


Wexford, PA
November 9, 2001
9694.

#### Robinson *v.*The State.

Decided February 12, 1919.

Conviction of manslaughter; from Talbot superior court^Jndge Howard. March 33, 1918.

*W. D. Crawford, A. P. Persons, George C. Palmer,*for plaintiff in error.

*C. F. McLaughlin, solicitor-general, T. T. Miller, J. H. McGehee,*. contra.

Stephens, J.

1. The various exceptions taken to the' charge of the court are without merit, and show no error. The charge fairly presented all the issues and substantially covered all matters contained in the various requests to charge.

2. The court committed no error in sustaining the objection to the testimony offered' as set out in the 19th ground of the amendment to the motion for new trial: Nor was there error in overruling the objections to the admission of the testimony offered for the purpose therein stated, as set out in the 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d grounds.

3. The alleged newly discovered evidence set forth in the 26th ground of the amendment to the. motion for new trial was merely cumulative in its nature, and, a counter-showing having been made on the hearing of the motion, there -was not presented sufficient cause for a new trial.

4. The evidence supported the verdict and no error of law was committed by the trial judge in overruling the motion' for new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
|                                                                                                    |   |   |   | Three-month period      |   | Three-month period      |   |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|------------------------------|--------|------------------------------|--------|
|                                                                                                    |   |   |   | ended                        |   | ended                        |   |
|                                                                                                    |   |   |   | September 30, 2007 |   | September 30, 2006 |   |
|                                                                                                    |   |   |   |                         |   |                         |   |
| Net                  income                                                                             |   |   |   |                         |   | $7,277                       |   |   | $7,590 |   |
| Deduct:                  Senior preferred stock and series A preferred stock                  dividends |   |   |   |                         |   | 6,270                        |   |   | 6,269 |   |
|                                                                                                    |   |   |   |                         |   |                         |   |   |   |   |
|                                                                                                    |        |        | (A)    |                              |   |  $1,007                 |        |   | $1,321 |   |
| Common                  share outstanding                                                               |   |   | (B)    |                         |   | 100                          |   |   | 100 |   |
|                                                                                                    |   |   |   |                         |   |                         |   |   |   |   |
| Earning                  per share                                                                      |   |   | (A/B)  |                         |   | $10                          |   |   | $13 |   |

----