alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

 

No. 09-1279

THE SHELL COMPANY (PUERTO RICO) LIMITED,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

LOS FRAILES SERVICE STATION, INC.,

Defendant, Appellant.

 

ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this Court issued on May 5, 2010, is amended as

follows: 

On the cover sheet replace "Raul M. Arias-Marxuach with whom

Nannette Berríos Haddock, Frank LaFontaine, and McConnell Valdes

LLC were on brief for appellee." with "Nannette Berríos Haddock

with whom Raul M. Arias-Marxuach, Frank LaFontaine,and McConnell

Valdes LLC were on brief for appellee."

On page 1, line 1, "Petroleum Practices Marketing" should be

replaced with "Petroleum Marketing Practices". 

On page 23, line 24, "sublease of the station from LFSS"

should be replaced with "sublease of the station from Shell".

On page 19, line 19, "proximity does not does not" should be

replaced with "proximity does not".
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18

- 20039 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
PEDRO BRIONES

- GARCIA , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:17

- CR

- 496

- 1

Before HIGGINSON, COSTA, and HO, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Pedro Briones

Garcia has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Briones

- Garcia h a s not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED September 27, 2018 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 18-20039 Document: 00514658927 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/27/2018No. 18

- 20039

2 nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave
to wit hdraw is GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 18-20039 Document: 00514658927 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/27/2018
Exhibit 23.1



LOGO



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM
ENGINEERS AND GEOLOGISTS



As independent petroleum
engineers and geologists, we consent to the references to our firm in the W&T Offshore, Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004 and to the incorporation by reference in this Form 10-K to our estimates of reserves and
value of reserves, and to the use of our reports on reserves and the incorporation of the reports on reserves for the years ended 2004, 2003, and 2002 included in the W&T Offshore, Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-K made on or about March 30, 2005.



NETHERLAND, SEWELL & ASSOCIATES, INC.By:

/S/    FREDERIC D.
SEWELLFrederic D. SewellChairman and Chief Executive Officer




Dallas, Texas

March 30, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                       1,741,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               22,211,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                   655,000
<INVENTORY>                                 26,653,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            51,801,000
<PP&E>                                      18,280,000
<DEPRECIATION>                               7,183,000
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             127,112,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       34,580,000
<BONDS>                                    110,920,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         1,000
<OTHER-SE>                                  26,946,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               127,112,000
<SALES>                                     92,296,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            92,296,000
<CGS>                                       70,604,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               70,604,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            18,129,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           5,995,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (2,432,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                  (829,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (1,603,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (1,603,000)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
##### 



Exhibit 10.60

FOURTH AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
FOR PHILIP M. PANZERA

This Fourth Amendment (this Amendment) is entered into on September 28,
2001, between Hawker Pacific Aerospace (HPA) and Philip M. Panzera
(Employee), in order to amend that certain Employment Agreement, dated
October 1, 1998, as previously amended (the Agreement), between HPA and
Employee as herein set forth:

1. Term of Agreement. Notwithstanding the written notice, dated June 29,
2001 (the Prior Notice), from David L. Lokken, President and Chief Executive
Officer of HPA, to Employee to the effect that the Agreement would not be
extended past September 30, 2001, Section 5.1 of the Agreement is hereby
amended to read in its entirety as follows:



| |  |  | 5.1 Terms of Agreement. The original term of Employees
employment with HPA commenced on October 1, 1998 and shall
continue until September 30, 2001. Thereafter, Employees
employment with HPA shall continue month-to-month, until
terminated in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.
| |  |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Base Salary. Employees base salary, as provided for in Section 4.1 of
the Agreement is hereby increased to $185,000 (one hundred and eighty-five
thousand dollars), effective October 1, 2001.

3. Severance Pay. The Without Cause Severance Pay to which Employee is
entitled based on the Prior Notice and the provisions of Section 5.3(A) of the
Agreement shall be paid using the base salary rate in effect at the time of the
Prior Notice.

4. Termination. Section 5.2 of the Agreement is hereby deleted in its
entirety.

5. No Other Change. Except as set forth in this Amendment, the Agreement
shall remain in full force and effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Amendment as of the
date set forth above.

|                         |  |                                       |  |                       
|------------------------ |  | ------------------------------------- |  | ----------------------
|HAWKER PACIFIC AEROSPACE |  | EMPLOYEE                             
|                        
|By:                      |  | /s/ David L. Lokken                   |  | /s/
Phillip M. Panzera
|                         |  |                                       |  |                       
|                         |  | David L. Lokken                       |  | Phillip M. Panzera    
|                         |  | President and
Chief Executive Officer |  |
10208.

#### Five Minute Vulcanizer and Auto Supply Company *v.*Fleming *et al.*

Decided April 19, 1919.

Rehearing Denied May 13, 1919.

Certiorari; from Fulton superior court—Judge Ellis. October 31, 1918.

*Walter S. Dillon, C. M. Lancaster,*for plaintiff.

*A. E. Wilson, R. W. Crenshaw,*for defendants.

Jenkins, J.

1. “There must be a time averred in the writ, showing when every material or traversable fact transpires.” Thus, a demurrer, or a motion to dismiss in the nature of a demurrer, attacking a plea wherein it is sought to set up damages by reason of the breach of a contract, 'upon the ground that no time was stated when the alleged breach occurred, was properly sustained. *Warren*v. *Powell,*122 *Ga.*4 (49 S. E. 730); *Cagle*v. *Sheppard,*1 *Ga. App.*192 (57 S. E. 946) ; *Mandeville Mills v. Dale,*2 *Ga. App.*607 (3) (58 S. E. *1060) ; Anthony*v. *Dudley Sash, Door & Lumber Co.,*21 *Ga. App.*412, 414 (94 S. E. 634.

2. The date when the alleged breach of the contract by the plaintiff occurred was a material fact in this case, since the defendants admitted .that they had received from the plaintiff, under the contract, the amount of goods stated in the petition; and had the date been alleged, the plaintiff might have been enabled to show that at that time the, defendants had already breached the contract by a failure to pay for the goods thus delivered; and in such event the defendants would not.be entitled to recover damages from the plaintiff for a subsequent failure upon its part to comply with the contract. *Branch*v. *Palmer,*65 *Ga.*210; *Savannah Ice Co. v. American Transit Co.,*110 *Ga.*142 (35 S. E. 280).

3. The defendants having failed to cure by an amendment the defect 'in their plea, in accordance with the order of the judge of the municipal Court, the judge did not err in dismissing the plea, and in thereafter directing a verdict for the plaintiff; and the judgment of the superior court sustaining the certiorari was therefore erroneous. This ruling being controlling, the remaining assignments of error need not be passed upon. ’ .

*Judgment reversed.*

*Wade, C. J., and Luke,*J., *concur.*
Exhibit 31.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer  of Periodic Report Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(a) and Rule 15d-14(a)

I,
Penni F. Roll, certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Ares Capital Corporation;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.     The
registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f))
for the registrant and have:



5.     The
registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



Date:
February 28, 2012

/s/ PENNI F. ROLL Penni F. Roll Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer)


---



QuickLinks
Exhibit
      32.1




Certification
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley act of 2001.




In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Delek Resources, Inc. (the “Company”) on
      Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Leonard Sternheim,
      President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted
      pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2001, that:




(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.




Dated:
                  May 21, 2007/s/
                    Leonard SternheimLeonard
                    Sternheim, President,
                    Chief Executive Officer
#### Linda ORLANDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of NEW YORK WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD, Robert B. Williams, Carl Sofia, Eileen Lacy, William Keegan and Thomas R. Coyne, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 03-7941.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Dec. 29, 2004.

Ambrose W. Wotorson, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellant. Marion S. Buchbinder, Senior Assistant Solicitor General, Patrick J. Walsh, Assistant Solicitor General, for Appellee.

Present: NEWMAN, POOLER, and KATZMANN, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Dis*166trict Court’s civil judgment be AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-appellant Linda Orlando appeals from a civil judgment, dated August 14, 2003, dismissing all of her employment discrimination and retaliation claims following an adverse jury verdict. Orlando appeals several of the district court’s evidentiary rulings. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history and specification of appellate issues and hold as follows.

This court reviews the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and we will only reverse if our refusal to do so is “inconsistent with substantial justice.” *Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab.,*381 F.3d 56, 76 (2d Cir.2004). Orlando’s three main arguments are that the district court abused its discretion when: (1) it allowed into evidence Orlando’s yearly employment evaluations and counseling memoranda from as far back as 1989; (2) it allowed into evidence a May 13, 1993 grievance decision that denied Orlando’s complaint about not receiving certain assignments; and (3) it excluded Orlando’s evidence that her locker at work had been vandalized and robbed in 1999. We have reviewed the record, and find that the district court’s evidentiary decisions were not an abuse of discretion or “inconsistent with substantial justice.”

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
##### 



CITIZENS EFFINGHAM BANCSHARES, INC.
AND SUBSIDIARY

Exhibit 99.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
For the Nine Months Ended September 30, 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Citizens Effingham Bancshares,
Inc. and Subsidiary (the Company) on Form 10-QSB for the period ending
September 30, 2002 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on
the date hereof (the Report), I, Harry H. Shearouse, President and Chief
Executive Officer (and as the Companys chief accounting officer), certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | To the best of my knowledge, the Report fully complies with the
requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934; and                              
| | --- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| | (2) |  | To the best of my knowledge, the information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operation of the Company.

/s/Harry H. Shearouse

Harry H. Shearouse
President and Chief Executive Officer







Date: November 8, 2002

-12-
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 60 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 60

   Providing amounts for the expenses of the Committee on Veterans' 
               Affairs in the One Hundred Fifth Congress.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 13, 1997

     Mr. Stump (for himself and Mr. Evans) submitted the following 
   resolution; which was referred to the Committee on House Oversight

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
   Providing amounts for the expenses of the Committee on Veterans' 
               Affairs in the One Hundred Fifth Congress.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. AMOUNTS FOR COMMITTEE EXPENSES.

    For the expenses of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs (hereinafter 
in this resolution referred to as the ``Committee''), including the 
expenses of all staff salaries, there shall be paid, out of the 
applicable accounts of the House of Representatives for committee 
salaries and expenses, not more than $5,744,757 for the One Hundred 
Fifth Congress.

SEC. 2. SESSION LIMITATIONS.

    Of the amount specified in section 1--
            (1) not more than $2,744,855 shall be available for 
        expenses incurred during the period beginning at noon on 
        January 3, 1997, and ending immediately before noon on January 
        3, 1998; and
            (2) not more than $2,999,902 shall be available for 
        expenses incurred during the period beginning at noon on 
        January 3, 1998, and ending immediately before noon on January 
        3, 1999.

SEC. 3. VOUCHERS.

    Payments under this resolution shall be made on vouchers authorized 
by the Committee, signed by the Chairman of the Committee, and approved 
in the manner directed by the Committee on House Oversight.

SEC. 4. REGULATIONS.

    Amounts made available under this resolution shall be expended in 
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Committee on House 
Oversight.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
     THIS SCHEDULE  CONTAINS SUMMARY  FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF ICG FUNDING, LLC FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30,
1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                    SEP-30-1998
<CASH>                               18,889
<SECURITIES>                           0<F1>
<RECEIVABLES>                          0<F1>
<ALLOWANCES>                           0<F1>
<INVENTORY>                            0<F1> 
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                      9,555
<PP&E>                                 0<F1>
<DEPRECIATION>                         0<F1>
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                      135,535
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                 1,116
<BONDS>                               4,699
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>               127,944
<PREFERRED>                            0<F1>
<COMMON>                               0<F1> 
<OTHER-SE>                            1,776
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>        135,535
<SALES>                                0<F1>
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                       0<F1>
<CGS>                                  0<F1>
<TOTAL-COSTS>                          0<F1>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                       0<F1>
<LOSS-PROVISION>                       0<F1>
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                   (5,886)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                       5,886
<INCOME-TAX>                           0<F1>
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                   5,886
<DISCONTINUED>                         0<F1>
<EXTRAORDINARY>                        0<F1>
<CHANGES>                              0<F1>
<NET-INCOME>                          5,886
<EPS-PRIMARY>                          0<F1>
<EPS-DILUTED>                          0<F1>
<FN>
<F1>THIS VALUE IS NOT APPLICABLE.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### S. J. Kitnel *v.*John A. Higgins.

Limitation — Statutes Of — Cause of Action Accrued in Another State— Removal to This State.

If appellee left the state of Arkansas before the statutory bar became complete and became a resident of Kentucky, lie cannot avail *501himself of our statute, until he has resided here the full term of five years after giving our courts jurisdiction of his person.

APPEAL FROM PAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT.

September 26, 1871.

*Allen &*Morton, *for appellant.*

Waters, *for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

The peremptory instruction in favor of the appellee was erroneous. If, by any rational deduction from the fact's proved in the trial, a right of action might be maintained, the court should not instruct as in case of a non-suit.

In this case the defense relied upon is the statute of limitation. The cause o faction accrued in the state of Arkansas, and whilst the evidence is not clear as to the citizenship of appellee at the time, 'inasmuch as he was then the lessee of a farm in the state and was present at the time of the conversion of the cotton gin, it may be assumed that he was then a resident of that state'. It is not shown that he remained in Arkansas until by the laws of that state the action was barred by the lapse of time. Sec. 19, Art. 4, Chapter 63, R. S.

If he left Arkansas before the statutory bar became complete and become a resident of Kentucky, he cannot avail himself of our statute until he has remained here the full term of five years after giving our courts jurisdiction of his person.

The evidence does not show that he had resided in Kentucky five years next proceeding the institution of this action.

The onus was upon the appellee to bring himself within the statute. Failing to do so by evidence so satisfactory as to exclude any rational deduction against the existence of a state of facts sustaining his plea, the question should not have been taken from the jury.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.