Filed 7/11/24 In re N.G. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re N.G., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B327646

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. Nos. 

22CCJP01749,

 22CCJP01749A )

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.G., et al., 

Defendants and 

Appellants.
2

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Dismissed. 

Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Appellant mother T.G.

Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Respondent father R.G.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Mother T.G. appeals from the juvenile court’s visitation 

order involving her daughter, N.G. Because N.G. turned 18 while 

this appeal was pending, we invited the parties to submit 

supplemental letter briefs addressing whether this matter should 

be dismissed as moot. Mother has not objected to the dismissal. 

We therefore dismiss the appeal.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

N.G. (born in June 2006) is the daughter of mother and 

father, R.G. In May 2022, the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a dependency petition 

on behalf of N.G. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 

300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (c), and (d).1 The petition alleged 

that mother physically abused N.G. (counts a-1 and b-2), mother 

and stepfather, A.G., engaged in violent physical altercations in 

N.G.’s presence (counts a-2 and b-3), stepfather sexually abused 

N.G. (counts b-1 and d-1), mother medically neglected N.G. by 

failing to provide mental health treatment (count b-4), mother 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and 

Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
3

failed protect N.G. from stepfather’s alcohol and marijuana use 

(count b-5), and mother emotionally abused N.G. (count c-1).

The petition also alleged that father failed to protect N.G. from 

the sexual and physical abuse. 

At the adjudication and disposition hearing in August 2022, 

the court sustained the allegations in the petition as to mother 

and dismissed the allegations as to father. The court exercised

jurisdiction over N.G., ordered her removed from mother, and 

placed her with father. N.G. then moved to father’s home in 

Georgia. 

At a review hearing on February 22, 2023, the court found 

the conditions that justified jurisdiction no longer existed as N.G. 

was doing well with father. The court terminated jurisdiction 

with sole legal and physical custody to father. The court awarded 

mother monitored in-person and telephonic visitation with N.G. 

subject to father’s discretion. Specifically, the court stated that 

father had discretion as to whether mother’s visits were 

monitored and “where they occur,” as well as discretion to “set up 

phone calls with mother and [N.G.] and the conditions for those.” 

Mother appealed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, mother challenges the portion of the court’s 

February 22, 2023 order setting the terms of her visitation. 

Specifically, she argues that by failing to specify a minimum 

frequency or duration for visitation and leaving the scheduling at 

father’s discretion, the court delegated to father “the authority to 

deny Mother any visitation with N.G. whatsoever.” 

N.G. turned 18 in June 2024, while this appeal was 

pending. We therefore requested letter briefs from the parties 
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addressing whether the matter should be dismissed as moot.2 

Mother filed a letter stating that she “understands this court’s 

concern and submits the decision on this issue to the court’s 

sound discretion.” Father filed a letter agreeing that the case 

was moot and dismissal was appropriate.

A court is tasked with the duty “‘to decide actual 

controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and 

not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, 

or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the 

matter in issue in the case before it.’” (In re D.P. (2023) 14 

Cal.5th 266, 276.) A case becomes moot when a court cannot 

render effective relief. “[R]elief is effective when it ‘can have a 

practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ 

[Citation.] It follows that, to show a need for effective relief, the 

plaintiff must first demonstrate that he or she has suffered from 

a change in legal status.” (Id. at p. 277.) “This rule applies in the 

dependency context.” (Id. at p. 276, citing In re N.S. (2016) 245 

Cal.App.4th 53, 60 [“the critical factor in considering whether a 

dependency appeal is moot is whether the appellate court can 

provide any effective relief if it finds reversible error”].) 

Here, mother challenges the parameters of the court’s 

visitation order. Because the juvenile court terminated 

jurisdiction, its exit orders regarding custody and visitation are 

enforceable by the family court. But the family court only has 

subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate custody or visitation 

over “minor” children, which is statutorily defined as a person 

under 18 years of age. (See Fam. Code §§ 2010(b), 3022 

2 DCFS has not made an appearance in this appeal. We 

granted father’s request for appointment of counsel on appeal 

and he filed a respondent’s brief.
5

[jurisdiction extends to parties’ minor children]; see also Fam. 

Code §§ 6500, 6501 [defining “minor”].). Thus, even if we were to 

reverse the visitation order, the family court no longer has 

jurisdiction to make orders regarding visitation between mother 

and N.G., who is no longer a minor. (See Marriage of Jensen

(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 587, 594 [holding that because “visitation 

is a form of custody,” the court “had no authority to issue a 

visitation order regarding [the child] after he reached the age of 

majority”]; see also Conservatorship of Navarrete (2020) 58 

Cal.App.5th 1018, 1031, citing Jensen.)

Because we cannot render effective relief, this appeal is 

moot. We may nevertheless exercise our discretion to reach the 

merits if a challenged finding could impact current or future 

dependency proceedings or if “[p]rinciples of fairness” favor 

discretionary review. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 284-

286.) Mother has not identified any legal or practical 

consequences from the court’s visitation order that would 

warrant our exercise of discretion. We therefore decline to do so 

and dismiss the appeal as moot.

DISPOSITION 

Mother’s appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P. J. MORI, J.