NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CASSIE F., WARREN M.,

Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, 

S.C., T.C., D.M., Z.M.,

Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 19-0174 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. B8015JD201704063

The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Harris & Winger, PC, Flagstaff

By Chad Joshua Winger

Counsel for Appellant Cassie F.

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Alison Stavris

Counsel for Appellant Warren M.

Arizona Attorney's General Office, Tucson

By Dawn Rachelle Williams

Counsel for Appellee

FILED 9-10-2020
CASSIE F., WARREN M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Cassie F. ("Mother") and Warren M. ("Father") appeal the 

termination of their parental rights to their children. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 "We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding 

the juvenile court's order." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 

547, 549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (citation omitted). 

¶3 This case involves X.M. and D.M., the children of Mother and 

Father, and S.C. and T.C., the children of Mother and Michael C. In 2012, 

the Maine Office of Child and Family Services ("OCFS") investigated 

allegations that Michael C. and Mother had abused or neglected S.C. and 

T.C., and the two children were taken into the custody of the Maine 

Department of Health and Human Services. Ultimately, Michael C.'s 

parental rights were terminated after it was determined he sexually abused 

S.C. Mother's parental rights were not terminated, but OCFS found that she 

had severely neglected T.C. and emotionally abused S.C. After OCFS's case, 

Mother was reunited with S.C. and T.C. Though Father's rights were not at 

issue in the Maine investigation, OCFS noted that he also emotionally and 

physically abused S.C. 

¶4 After S.C. and T.C. were reunited with Mother, the family 

moved to Arizona. In November 2017, the Mohave County Sheriff's Office 

investigated a report that S.C. had been physically abused. An Arizona 

Department of Child Safety ("DCS") safety specialist informed the Sheriff's 

Office that S.C. had stated that Father hit her and T.C. with a large metal 

spatula. S.C. also stated that Father would strike her on the back of the head 

to discipline her. When law enforcement officials investigated the family's 

home, a camper located within a local park, Father denied that the family 

owned a metal spatula and Mother denied knowledge of any abuse. 

However, law enforcement located the spatula just where S.C. said it would 

be. DCS began its investigation, and the children were found dependent 
CASSIE F., WARREN M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3

and removed from Mother and Father's home on March 8, 2018. When the 

children were removed, X.M. and D.M.'s diapers were "saturated," and both 

children had rashes consistent with wearing soiled diapers for a prolonged 

period. 

¶5 In its investigation, DCS discovered that S.C. had slept in a 

tent near the camper for seven to eight months, during which she was 

exposed to extreme heat without any immediate access to water. Neighbors 

saw S.C. wandering around the campground unsupervised, asking for food 

and water. Coyotes were known to roam the campground at night, but S.C. 

could not use the restroom in the camper and was forced to walk, 

unsupervised, half a block away to use a "Porta Potty." 

¶6 Further investigation revealed that all four children were 

underfed and the family's camper was very small and lacked electricity and 

running water. The camper's air conditioner did not work and Father had 

expressed concerns that "the floor [was] weak" and someone could fall 

through. At the campground, the children were often left unsupervised

outside for "extended periods" so that Mother and Father could sleep. 

¶7 D.M. is developmentally delayed. During the children's

dependency, Mother and Father resisted DCS's request that he be referred 

to an Arizona Early Intervention program to assist his development. This 

prompted DCS to file a motion to suspend the parents' special-education 

rights, which the juvenile court granted. In so ruling, the juvenile court 

found that the parents' refusal to allow D.M. access to special education was 

unreasonable and contrary to D.M.'s best interests. 

¶8 On November 16, 2018, DCS moved to terminate Mother's

and Father's parental rights based on abuse and neglect. Roughly one week

before trial, Mother and Father informed DCS that they sold their camper 

and moved into a hotel that would provide more appropriate shelter for the 

children. 

¶9 After a one-day trial, the juvenile court found that DCS had 

proven the statutory grounds and termination was in the children's best 

interests, and granted DCS's petition to terminate Mother's and Father's

parent-child relationship with the children. Mother and Father timely 

appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-

120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).
CASSIE F., WARREN M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4

DISCUSSION

¶10 Father argues that DCS did not prove the statutory grounds

justifying termination. Separately, Mother argues that: (i) the juvenile 

court's factual findings were legally insufficient to establish neglect of the 

children; (ii) the juvenile court's factual findings were insufficient to 

establish abuse of T.C., D.M, or X.M.; (iii) A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) was 

unconstitutional as applied; and (iv) DCS was obligated to offer 

reunification services that were not provided. Both parents also challenge 

the juvenile court's best-interests finding, with Father asserting that the 

court erred factually and Mother arguing the court erred as a matter of law. 

We begin with the arguments related to the statutory grounds for 

termination.

I. Statutory Grounds.

¶11 To terminate a parent-child relationship, the juvenile court

must find that clear and convincing evidence supports one of the statutory

grounds for severance. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005);

A.R.S. § 8-533(B). We review a trial court's termination order for an abuse

of discretion. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8

(App. 2004). We accept the court's findings of fact unless no reasonable

evidence supports them. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278,

280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002).

¶12 Termination of a parent-child relationship is justified when a 

parent "has neglected or wilfully abused a child." A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). The 

juvenile court found that DCS proved Father willfully abused a child, 

Mother failed to protect the children from abuse, and that both parents 

neglected all four children. Mother and Father challenge these findings. 

We first address the statutory ground of neglect.

¶13 The juvenile court found that severance was justified because 

Mother and Father neglected their children. "Neglect" is defined as "[t]he 

inability or unwillingness of a parent . . . to provide [their] child with 

supervision, food, clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or 

unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child's health or 

welfare . . . ." A.R.S. § 8-201(25). 

A. Father's Alleged Neglect.

¶14 Father argues the juvenile court erred because the evidence 

was insufficient to show he was unable or unwilling to provide necessities 

to the children. As support, he points to his completion of a parenting plan, 
CASSIE F., WARREN M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

his anger management and domestic violence counseling, and his efforts to 

find appropriate housing before the termination of his parental rights. But 

these efforts do not negate the evidence relied on by the juvenile court. 

Father does not dispute that, despite DCS informing him of housing 

programs, the children were forced to remain in unsafe housing for over 

half a year. Further, Father failed to provide his children with sufficient 

food. Father essentially argues that past neglect is irrelevant because he is 

now willing and able to care for his children, citing Jade K. v. Loraine K., 240 

Ariz. 414, 417, ¶ 12 (App. 2016). However, Jade K. does not support Father's 

position. 

¶15 In Jade K., a parent allowed their child to play outside 

unsupervised and the child ingested mushrooms that caused her to become 

ill. Id. at 415, ¶ 3. On appeal, the question was whether the parent's inability 

or unwillingness caused the child's lack of supervision. Id. at 417-18, ¶¶ 12, 

16. Nothing in Jade K. suggests that the parent's ability or willingness at the 

time of the termination hearing is relevant. This is consistent with A.R.S. § 

8-533(B)(2), which states that termination is justified if a parent "has

neglected" a child. The past-tense verb "neglected" shows that it is a 

previous unwillingness or inability to provide for a child that justifies 

termination, not current circumstances. See Jason R. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 

2 CA–JV 2018–0046, 2018 WL 2966878, *2, ¶ 9 (Ariz. App. 2018) ("As we 

determined in Jade K. v. Loraine K., past neglect may serve as a basis for 

termination . . . ."). 

¶16 As with Jade K., the question before us is whether reasonable 

evidence supports the juvenile court's conclusion that Father's failure to 

provide sufficient food and safe shelter to his children was caused by his 

inability or neglect, rendering him unfit to be a parent. See Jade K., 240 Ariz. 

at 417, ¶ 12. We find that the record, see supra ¶¶ 3-7, 14, amply supports 

the juvenile court's conclusion, and affirm its finding that DCS proved the 

statutory ground of neglect as to Father.

B. Mother's Alleged Neglect.

¶17 Mother argues that the juvenile court's factual findings are 

legally insufficient for the statutory ground of neglect. Mother does not 

argue that "insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's specific 

findings of fact," but argues those findings are insufficient to justify 

termination as a matter of law. Mother additionally claims that no evidence 

was presented to support a finding that there was an unreasonable risk of 

harm to her children and that, accordingly, the juvenile court failed to make 

any such finding. DCS asserts that Mother has waived any challenge to the 
CASSIE F., WARREN M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6

factual sufficiency of the juvenile court's order and that, in any case, the 

juvenile court's order is factually sufficient. Assuming this argument was

not waived, Francine C. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 1 CA-JV 19-0366, 2020 WL 

3422523, at *4-5, ¶¶ 14, 21 (Ariz. App. 2020), the juvenile court's order 

makes sufficient factual findings to support termination.

¶18 "We will review a juvenile court's termination order in the 

light most favorable to sustaining the court's decision[.]" Denise R. v. Ariz. 

Dep't of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92, 95, ¶ 10 (App. 2009). The termination order

cites testimony from a DCS caseworker, who said the children often lacked 

sufficient food and that S.C. would go to neighbors asking for food and 

water. Relying on this evidence, the court found that Mother "failed to 

ensure [her] children ha[d] food[.]" Mother does not challenge this factual 

finding, and we therefore accept the juvenile court's factual findings 

regarding insufficient food as true. Standing alone, a parent's 

unwillingness or inability to provide food for their children is sufficient to 

justify termination, so long as that lack of food causes the children an 

unreasonable risk of harm to their health. See A.R.S. §§ 8-201(25) and 8-

533(B)(2). 

¶19 At the outset of its discussion on neglect, the court noted that 

DCS alleged Mother "caused an unreasonable risk of harm to [her] 

children's health or welfare . . . ." The court also found DCS had proven the 

statutory ground of neglect by clear and convincing evidence. We presume 

that the juvenile court knows and follows the law. See State v. Williams, 220 

Ariz. 331, 334, ¶ 9 (App. 2008). Given that the juvenile court expressly noted 

an unreasonable risk of harm was alleged and found that DCS proved its 

case by clear and convincing evidence, we find that the juvenile court 

necessarily found that Mother's neglect caused an unreasonable risk of 

harm to her children. 

¶20 As to Mother's argument that no evidence supported such a 

finding, we find that the fact the children "often lacked sufficient food" 

provides reasonable evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that 

Mother caused the children to suffer an unreasonable risk of harm to their 

health. It is difficult to imagine a scenario where a child who "often lacked 

sufficient food" did not face an unreasonable risk of harm to their health.

Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court's finding that the statutory 

ground of neglect was proven as to Mother.
CASSIE F., WARREN M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

C. Statutory Ground of Abuse.

¶21 Mother and Father challenge the juvenile court's finding that 

termination of their parental rights was justified by the statutory ground of 

abuse, raising arguments based on the recent case Sandra R. v. Dep't of Child 

Safety, 248 Ariz. 224 (2020). Because we have affirmed the juvenile court's 

findings against Mother and Father on the statutory ground of neglect, we 

need not address arguments pertaining to the statutory ground of abuse. 

See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002) 

(stating that when clear and convincing evidence supports any one of the 

statutory grounds for termination, it is unnecessary to address other 

grounds).

II. Waiver of Mother's Other Challenges.

¶22 Mother argues that the juvenile court's application of A.R.S. § 

8-533(B)(2) is unconstitutional. She also asks us to repudiate our decision 

in E.R. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56 (App. 2015) (finding that A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B)(2) is not limited to cases involving serious physical or emotional 

injury) and challenges the adequacy of DCS's reunification efforts.

1 DCS 

argues that Mother has waived these arguments. We agree.

¶23 "We generally do not consider objections raised for the first 

time on appeal." Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 452, ¶ 

21 (App. 2007); see also Trantor v. Fredrickson, 179 Ariz. 299, 300 (1994) 

("[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, errors not raised in the trial court 

cannot be raised on appeal."). Mother notes that the waiver doctrine is not 

"an unalterable rule[,]" Reid v. Reid, 222 Ariz. 204, 208, ¶ 16 (App. 2009), and 

argues that application of the doctrine in this instance is inappropriate 

because the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court "provide no 

post-verdict/trial procedure to challenge a termination order." But at the 

time of the termination hearing, Mother was aware of the services she had 

received from DCS and never challenged their adequacy. She was aware 

that DCS was not alleging that her neglect of the children caused them 

serious injury. And she was aware that A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) justifies 

termination based solely on her past actions. These facts form the 

foundation of Mother's various constitutional challenges, and we see no 

1 DCS challenges Mother's assertion that any reunification services 

were required. As we find the issue waived, we need not address these 

arguments.
CASSIE F., WARREN M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

8

reason why she could not have raised these arguments before the juvenile 

court. 

¶24 Mother also argues that waiver is inappropriate because we 

review constitutional issues de novo. See In re Andrew C., 215 Ariz. 366, 367, 

¶ 6 (App. 2007). But the issue of waiver is distinct from the standard of 

review, and a party may undoubtedly waive challenges to the 

constitutionality of a statute. See Romero v. Sw. Ambulance, 211 Ariz. 200, 

204, ¶ 7 (App. 2005) (holding that plaintiff waived constitutional challenges 

to a statute by failing to present those issues to the trial court). Accordingly, 

we find that Mother has waived her other challenges to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) 

because she failed to raise these issues before the juvenile court.

2

III. Best Interests.

¶25 Both Mother and Father challenge the juvenile court's bestinterests finding. Terminating a parent-child relationship is in a child's best 

interests if the child will benefit from the termination or will be harmed if 

the relationship continues. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 16 

(2016). Relevant factors in this determination include whether: (1) the 

current placement is meeting the child's needs, (2) an adoption plan is in 

place, and (3) the child is adoptable. See id. at 3-4, ¶ 12. Courts "must 

consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the 

severance determination, including the child's adoptability and the parent's 

rehabilitation." Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 1 (2018). 

"The existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a biological 

parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not dispositive in 

addressing best interests." Dominique M. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 

96, 98, ¶ 12 (App. 2016). 

¶26 Moreover, "[i]n a best interests inquiry, . . . we can presume 

that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has 

already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination 

by clear and convincing evidence." Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 35; see also

Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-6831, 155 Ariz. 556, 559 (App. 1988) ("In 

most cases, the presence of a statutory ground will have a negative effect 

on the children."). Once a juvenile court finds that a parent is unfit, the 

2 Mother does not ask this Court to review the juvenile court's decision 

for fundamental error. See Brenda D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437,

447, ¶ 37 (2018) (noting court may review for fundamental error). 

Therefore, we do not address whether fundamental error review would be 

appropriate here. 
CASSIE F., WARREN M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

9

focus shifts to the child's interests. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 285, ¶ 31. Thus, in 

considering best interests, the court must balance the unfit parent's 

"diluted" interest "against the independent and often adverse interests of 

the child in a safe and stable home life." Id. at 286, ¶ 35. Of foremost 

concern in that regard is "protect[ing] a child's interest in stability and 

security." Id. at ¶ 34 (citing Pima Cty. Juv. Severance Action No. S-114487, 179 

Ariz. 86, 101 (1994)).

¶27 In its best-interests finding, the juvenile court noted that, 

despite receiving services from two different state child welfare agencies 

for seven years, Mother and Father had "shown a consistent disregard for 

their children's safety and well-being." The court also noted that Mother 

and Father failed to "take reasonable and timely steps to maintain a safe, 

stable residence for their family." Additionally, all four children were

adoptable: X.M. and D.M. resided with an adoptive placement, and S.C. 

and T.C.'s maternal grandmother expressed a willingness to adopt those 

children. In the final portion of its analysis, the court expressed concern 

that the children could be subjected to continued abuse and neglect if 

returned to Mother and Father. Based on these facts, the court found that 

termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights was in the children's 

best interests. 

¶28 Father argues the juvenile court erred because it failed to 

consider his participation in services. This is untrue. The court noted that 

"[t]o Father's credit, he completed" two parenting classes and domestic 

violence counseling, but found that other evidence established that 

termination was in the children's best interests. See supra ¶ 27. "The 

appellate court's role is not to weigh the evidence." State v. Fischer, 242 Ariz. 

44, 52, ¶ 28 (2017). Because reasonable evidence supports the juvenile 

court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights was in the 

children's best interests, we affirm that finding.

¶29 Finally, Mother asserts that the court erred when it 

considered the risk of abuse in the best-interests inquiry. See Sandra R., 248 

Ariz. at 230, ¶ 26 (holding that courts should determine the risk of harm to 

non-abused children during the statutory unfitness inquiry and not during 

the best-interests analysis). But given the totality of the juvenile court's 

findings, see supra ¶ 27, we find no error. See Sandra R., 248 Ariz. at 231, ¶ 

32 (affirming best interests finding when reasonable evidence supported 

that the "severance of parental rights will benefit the children because they 

require a home environment free of a heightened risk of abuse" and 

children were in adoptable home placements). Accordingly, we affirm the 
CASSIE F., WARREN M. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

10

juvenile court's determination that termination of Mother's parental rights 

was in the children's best-interests.

CONCLUSION

¶30 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the juvenile court in 

all respects.