IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL WACHALA, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

ASTELLAS US LLC, et al., 

 Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-03882 

Hon. Ronald A. Guzman 

Magistrate Judge Heather K. McShain

CLASS ACTION

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

Jerome J. Schlichter 

Troy A. Doles 

Heather Lea 

Sean E. Soyars 

Kurt C. Struckhoff 

SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP

100 South Fourth Street, Suite 1200 

St. Louis, MO, 63102 

(314) 621-6115 

(314) 621-5934 (fax) 

jschlichter@uselaws.com

tdoles@uselaws.com 

hlea@uselaws.com

ssoyars@uselaws.com

kstruckhoff@uselaws.com

Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs

Luke DeGrand

DEGRAND LAW, P.C. 

10 S. LaSalle Street, Ste. 3400 

Chicago, IL 60603 

(312) 236-9200 

(312) 236-9201 (fax)

ldegrand@degrandlaw.com 

Local Counsel for Plaintiffs

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2

I. The Plan and Aon’s proprietary investments ................................................................... 2

II. Plaintiffs’ causes of action ................................................................................................ 5

III. The proposed class definitions ......................................................................................... 6

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 6

I. Standard for class certification ......................................................................................... 6

II. The proposed classes satisfy all Rule 23(a) criteria ......................................................... 8

A. The classes have proper temporal limitations and proper representatives ................ 8

B. Putative class members are too numerous to be joined (Rule 23(a)(1)) ................... 9

C. There are many questions of law or fact common to the class (Rule 23(a)(2)) ........ 9

D. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the classes (Rule 23(a)(3)) .................................... 11

E. Plaintiffs and class counsel will adequately represent the classes (Rule 

23(a)(4)) .................................................................................................................. 13

III. The proposed classes satisfy Rule 23(b). ....................................................................... 15

A. The classes satisfy Rule 23(b)(1)(A) or (B) ............................................................ 15

1. The proposed classes satisfy Rule 23(b)(1)(A). ............................................... 16

2. The proposed classes satisfy Rule 23(b)(1)(B). ............................................... 18

B. In the alternative, the classes should be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). .................. 19

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 20

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 

286 F.R.D. 388 (S.D. Ill. 2012) ................................................................................................ 15 

Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 

725 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2013) ................................................................................ 2, 7, 12, 13, 14 

Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 

No. 06-701, 2015 WL 4398475 (S.D. Ill. July 17, 2015) ......................................................... 15 

Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 

521 U.S. 591 (1997) ...................................................................................................... 13, 16, 20 

Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 

568 U.S. 455 (2013) .................................................................................................................... 7 

Arreola v. Godinez, 

546 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................... 11 

Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, 

907 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 2018) .................................................................................................... 6 

Bell v. Pension Comm. of ATH Holding Co., LLC, 

No. 15-2062, 2018 WL 4385025 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 14, 2018) ...................................................... 2 

CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 

637 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................... 11 

Clark v. Duke Univ., 

No. 16-1044, 2019 WL 2588029 (M.D.N.C. June 24, 2019) ................................................... 17 

Coan v. Kaufman, 

457 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2006) ....................................................................................................... 1 

Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 

259 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................... 20 

DeBoer v. Mellon Mortg. Co., 

64 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 1995) .................................................................................................... 19 

Donovan v. Bierwirth, 

754 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1985) ............................................................................................. 10, 12 

Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, U.A., 

657 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1981) .................................................................................................... 14 

Eliasen v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 

93 F.R.D. 408 (E.D. Wis. 1982) ............................................................................................... 19 

George v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 

641 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................... 10 

Hale v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 

No. 12-660, 2016 WL 4992504 (S.D. Ill. Sep. 16, 2016) ......................................................... 13 

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iv

Harris v. Koenig, 

271 F.R.D. 383 (D.D.C. 2010) .................................................................................................. 18 

In re Citigroup Pension Plan ERISA Litig., 

241 F.R.D. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) .............................................................................................. 16 

In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 

267 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................... 19 

In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 

589 F.3d 585 (3d Cir. 2009) ..................................................................................... 2, 10, 15, 18 

In re YRC Worldwide, Inc. ERISA Litig., 

No. 09-2593, 2011 WL 1303367 (D. Kan. Apr. 6, 2011) ......................................................... 18 

Johnson v. Rohr-Ville Motors, Inc., 

189 F.R.D. 363 (N.D. Ill. 1999) ................................................................................................ 14 

Kanawi v. Bechtel Corp., 

254 F.R.D. 102 (N.D. Cal. 2008) .............................................................................................. 18 

Krueger v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 

304 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 2014) .............................................................................................. 18 

LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 

552 U.S. 248 (2008) .................................................................................................................... 1 

Leber v. Citigroup 401(k) Plan Inv. Comm., 

323 F.R.D. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) ........................................................................................ 18, 19 

Leigh v. Engle, 

727 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1984) ...................................................................................................... 1 

Loomis v. Exelon Corp., 

No. 06-4900, 2007 WL 2060799 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2007) ...................................................... 15 

Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 

109 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 1997) .................................................................................................... 20 

Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 

473 U.S. 134 (1985) .............................................................................................................. 1, 13 

Moreno v. Deutsche Bank Ams. Holding Corp., 

No. 15-9936, 2017 WL 3868803 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 5, 2017) ...................................................... 18 

Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cnty., 

850 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................................... 9 

Neil v. Zell, 

275 F.R.D. 256 (N.D. Ill. 2011) ................................................................................................ 15 

Orr v. Shicker, 

953 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 2020) ...................................................................................................... 9 

Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 

527 U.S. 815 (1999) .................................................................................................................. 18 

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Piazza v. Ebsco Indus., Inc., 

273 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2001) .......................................................................................... 18, 19 

Ramos v. Banner Health, 

1 F.4th 769 (10th Cir. 2021) ..................................................................................................... 20 

Rogers v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 

No. 04-6476, 2006 WL 794734 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2006) ....................................................... 16 

Shanehchian v. Macy’s, Inc., 

No. 07-828, 2011 WL 883659 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2011) ....................................................... 17 

Spano v. Boeing Co., 

294 F.R.D. 114 (S.D. Ill. 2013), Rule 23(f) pet. denied, No. 13-8026 (7th Cir. Nov. 26, 

2013) ............................................................................................................................... 2, 13, 15 

Spano v. Boeing Co., 

633 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2011) .................................................................. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15 

Stanford v. Foamex L.P., 

263 F.R.D. 156 (E.D. Pa. 2009) ................................................................................................ 18 

Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 

383 U.S. 363 (1966) .................................................................................................................. 14 

Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A, 

140 S. Ct. 1615 (2020) ................................................................................................................ 2 

Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 

575 U.S. 523 (2015) ........................................................................................................ 2, 10, 20 

Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 

746 F.3d 327 (8th Cir. 2014) .................................................................................................... 20 

Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 

850 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2017) .................................................................................................... 17 

Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 

No. 06-4305, 2012 WL 1113291 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) .................................................. 17 

Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 

No. 06-4305, 2012 WL 5386033 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2012) .................................................... 15 

Wagner v. NutraSweet Co., 

95 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1996) ...................................................................................................... 11 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 

564 U.S. 338 (2011) .................................................................................................................. 10 

Statutes

28 U.S.C. §2072(b) ......................................................................................................................... 1 

29 U.S.C. §1002(21)(A)(i) .............................................................................................................. 4 

29 U.S.C. §1002(21)(A)(ii) ............................................................................................................. 3 

29 U.S.C. §1002(38) ....................................................................................................................... 4 

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29 U.S.C. §1102(a) ......................................................................................................................... 3 

29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1) ................................................................................................................... 16 

29 U.S.C. §1105(a) ................................................................................................................... 4, 11 

29 U.S.C. §1105(c)(2) ............................................................................................................... 4, 11 

29 U.S.C. §1106(a)(1)(D) ............................................................................................................. 11 

29 U.S.C. §1106(a)–(b) ................................................................................................................. 11 

29 U.S.C. §1108(b)(2)(A) ....................................................................................................... 11, 13 

29 U.S.C. §1108(b)(8) .................................................................................................................. 11 

29 U.S.C. §1109(a) ................................................................................................. 1, 10, 11, 13, 17 

29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(2) ........................................................................................................... 1, 7, 15 

ERISA §409(a)................................................................................................................................ 1 

ERISA §502(a)(2) ........................................................................................................................... 1 

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) ................................................................................................................... 9 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) ............................................................................................................. 9, 11 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) ................................................................................................................. 11 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) ................................................................................................................. 13 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)................................................................................................................. 16 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) ....................................................................................................... 2, 16 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) ....................................................................................................... 2, 18 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)................................................................................................................. 19 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)................................................................................................................. 20 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) ................................................................................................................... 8 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) ..................................................................................................................... 15 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Adv. Comm. Note, 1966 amends ............................................................. 16, 18 

Other Authorities

Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959) ........................................................................................ 12 

Rubenstein, 3 Newberg on Class Actions (5th ed. 2017) ......................................................... 9, 18 

Wright, Miller, & Kane, 7AA FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. (3d ed. 2017) ...................................... 19 

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In October 2016, the fiduciaries of the Astellas US Retirement and Savings Plan (Plan)

overhauled the Plan’s investment lineup by replacing established and well-performing options 

with newly created funds managed by the Plan’s new investment fiduciary, Aon Hewitt 

Investment Consulting, Inc. (Aon). Plaintiffs contend that Defendants made this momentous 

decision—which would profoundly affect (for better or worse) participants’ retirement savings—

without the thorough and independent investigation of the merits that ERISA demands and did so 

to advance Aon’s corporate financial interests rather than acting with an “eye single” to the 

interests of participants. Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 125 (7th Cir. 1984). As a result, the Plan 

lost tens of millions of dollars. 

Plaintiffs bring suit under ERISA §502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(2), to obtain the plan’s 

remedies under ERISA §409(a), 29 U.S.C. §1109(a). By their nature, such claims do not involve 

individual relief, but instead are “brought in a representative capacity on behalf of the plan.” 

Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142 n.9 (1985). Because Congress expressly 

authorized plan participants to seek plan-wide relief, Plaintiffs have a substantive right to recover 

any and all “losses to the plan” regardless of class certification. 29 U.S.C. §1109(a); see LaRue v. 

DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 261 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“On their face, 

§§409(a) and 502(a)(2) permit recovery of all plan losses caused by a fiduciary breach.”) 

(emphasis original); 28 U.S.C. §2072(b) (procedural “rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify 

and substantive right”). Nevertheless, it is appropriate to “employ procedures to protect 

effectively the interests” of other affected participants in §1132(a)(2) actions, usually through 

class certification under Rule 23. Coan v. Kaufman, 457 F.3d 250, 259–62 (2d Cir. 2006). 

Accordingly, in light of the inherently representative nature of §1132(a)(2) claims, breach of 

fiduciary duty cases are “paradigmatic examples of claims appropriate for certification as a Rule 

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23(b)(1) class, as numerous courts have held.” In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 

F.3d 585, 604 (3d Cir. 2009). This case is no exception. The Seventh Circuit has expressly 

approved class certification of claims challenging 401(k) plan investment options, Abbott v. 

Lockheed Martin Corp., 725 F.3d 803, 813–14 (7th Cir. 2013), and lower courts have 

overwhelmingly certified similar claims, e.g., Spano v. Boeing Co., 294 F.R.D. 114, 123–27 

(S.D. Ill. 2013), Rule 23(f) pet. denied, No. 13-8026 (7th Cir. Nov. 26, 2013); Bell v. Pension 

Comm. of ATH Holding Co., LLC, No. 15-2062, 2018 WL 4385025, at *7–11 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 

14, 2018). For the following reasons, the Court should certify this action as a class action under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1)(A) or (B). 

BACKGROUND

I. The Plan and Aon’s proprietary investments 

The Plan is a defined contribution plan (Doc. 108 ¶7; Doc. 109 ¶7), meaning participants’ 

retirement benefits are “limited to the value of their own individual investment accounts, which 

is determined by the market performance of employee and employer contributions, less 

expenses.” Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523, 525 (2015). Because plan fiduciaries determine 

the investment options made available to participants in a defined contribution plan, “the plan 

fiduciaries’ particular investment decisions” can dramatically affect participants’ retirement 

benefits. Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A, 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1618 (2020). 

The Astellas Plan is among the largest in the United States, with nearly $1.4 billion and over 

4,000 participants with account balances as of year-end 2020. Ex. 1 at 2, 4.1 The named plaintiffs 

are six individuals who participated in the Plan during the proposed class period, which 

commences on October 3, 2016. See Plaintiffs’ Declarations, attached hereto, ¶1 of each. 

1

 Cited exhibits are attached to the Declaration of Sean E. Soyars, filed herewith. 

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Until August 2016, Astellas,

2 the Plan’s “named fiduciary,” exercised authority over all 

aspects of the Plan, including determining the investment options available to participants. Doc. 

109 ¶20; Ex. 2 at 3–6; see 29 U.S.C. §1102(a). Aon (formerly known as Aon Hewitt Investment 

Consulting, Inc.) provided investment advice to Astellas. Doc. 108 ¶25; Ex. 3; see 29 U.S.C. 

§1002(21)(A)(ii). The investment selection and monitoring process was governed by an 

Investment Policy Statement (“IPS”). Ex. 2. The IPS set forth objective quantitative and 

qualitative criteria for Plan investment options, including comparisons to benchmarks and peer 

groups and a “watch list” for underperforming funds. Id. at 4–6. 

The Plan’s investment options generally performed well during this time. See e.g., Ex. 4 at 

2–3. Occasionally, a fund on the watch list warranted replacement, and Aon recommended 

alternatives. Ex. 4 at 1, 7, 10–11. Aon was able to make objective recommendations during this 

time, as it had no financial interest in the Plan’s investment options.

As of August 26, 2016, the Committee hired Aon as discretionary investment manager, 

2 For simplicity and unless otherwise indicated, references to “Astellas” are intended to include all 

Astellas-related Defendants. See Compl. ¶¶19–22 (Doc. 1). 

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thereby delegating to Aon the fiduciary responsibility to select and remove Plan investment 

options. Ex. 10; Doc. 108 ¶26; see 29 U.S.C. §§1002(21)(A)(i), (38). Astellas remained 

responsible for monitoring Aon’s compliance with fiduciary duties in performing that role. 29 

U.S.C. §§1105(a), (c)(2). The contract allowed Aon to exclusively select its proprietary funds for 

the Plan without considering non-proprietary alternatives. Ex. 10 at 7 (¶9(e)), 14 (¶2(c)).

Through a conflicted governance structure, Aon used this new authority to immediately replace 

eight of the Plan’s equity and fixed income investments with five Aon collective trusts: Aon 

Hewitt Large Cap Equity, Aon Hewitt Small & Mid Cap Equity, Aon Hewitt Non-U.S. Equity, 

Aon Hewitt Core Plus Bond, and Aon Hewitt Inflation Strategy (collectively, the “Aon Funds”). 

Ex. 11 at 3–4; Ex. 21 at 1–3. There is no evidence that Aon considered alternatives to its own 

funds. See id. 

 

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Aon’s eagerness to select the Aon Funds and years-long delay in improving the Funds’ 

performance severely harmed the Plan and participants’ retirement savings. As shown by 

Plaintiffs’ expert, with one limited exception, a prudent fiduciary without a conflict of interest 

would have had no reason to remove the legacy options which Aon jettisoned in favor of the Aon 

Funds. Pfeil Decl. ¶¶24–37. The proposed class lost a total of over $35 million compared to what 

it would have earned with prudent and loyal fiduciary oversight. O’Neal Decl. ¶16. 

II. Plaintiffs’ causes of action 

Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts in four counts that Aon and Astellas breached their fiduciary 

duties (Count I) and caused prohibited transactions (Count III) related to the Aon Funds, and that 

Astellas failed to monitor co-fiduciaries (Count IV). Doc. 1 at 50–57 (¶¶106–30).3 Plaintiffs seek 

recovery of Plan losses and appropriate equitable relief. Id. at 2 (¶3), 43 (¶¶101–02), 57–58. 

On April 13, 2021, the Court denied Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motions in substantial part. 

Doc. 99, Doc. 100 at 1. As to Astellas, the Court dismissed Count I and Count III to the extent it 

3

 Based on information received in discovery, Plaintiffs will not further pursue Count II.

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pertains to the selection of the Aon Funds. Id. As to Aon, the Court dismissed Count III to the 

extent it is based on payment of Plan assets to Aon. Id. The Court otherwise denied the motions. 

III. The proposed class definitions

As to the remaining Counts I, III, and IV, Plaintiffs seek certification of three classes:

4

Investment Loss Class

All participants in the Astellas US Retirement and Savings Plan whose Plan accounts 

invested in any of the Plan’s five Aon Collective Investment Trusts at any time between 

October 3, 2016 and June 30, 2020 and whose investment in at least one of the Aon 

Collective Investment Trusts earned less as of June 30, 2020 than the account would have 

earned had it been invested in the corresponding Legacy Investment Option(s).*5

Excluded are members of the Board of Directors of Astellas and the Astellas Retirement 

Plan Administrative Committee. 

Payment of Plan Assets Class 

All participants in the Astellas US Retirement and Savings Plan whose Plan accounts 

invested in any of the Plan’s five Aon Collective Investment Trusts at any time between 

October 3, 2016 and June 30, 2020. Excluded are members of the Board of Directors of 

Astellas and the Astellas Retirement Plan Administrative Committee.

Equitable Relief Class

All participants in the Astellas US Retirement and Savings Plan with account balances as 

of the date of judgment. 

ARGUMENT

I. Standard for class certification 

To obtain certification, a class must satisfy Rule 23(a)(1)–(4) and one of three categories in

Rule 23(b). Spano v. Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 574, 582–83 (7th Cir. 2011). While Rule 23 demands 

4 With the benefit of discovery, the proposed class definitions use more precise criteria than those 

included in the complaint. See Doc. 1 at 44 (¶102). The Court has discretion to certify a class that differs 

from the complaint, particularly where, as here, the modified definition is “narrower” than the initial 

proposal. Beaton v. SpeedyPC Software, 907 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir. 2018). Should the Court find that

an amendment is needed, Plaintiffs are prepared to promptly move for leave to amend to conform the 

complaint to the proposed definitions. 

5

 The definition of “Legacy Investment Option(s)” is set forth in Plaintiffs’ motion and the attached 

Declaration of Edward S. O’Neal, ¶12. 

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a rigorous analysis, a court may not “engage in free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification 

stage.” Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 465–66 (2013). “Merits 

questions may be considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are relevant to 

determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” Id. at 466. 

Spano involved similar ERISA claims regarding 401(k) plan fees and investments. Spano, 

633 F.3d at 576–77. The district court had certified “extraordinarily broad,” plan-wide class 

definitions with no starting or ending date for all of the plaintiffs’ claims, which “were somewhat 

vague.” Abbott, 725 F.3d at 812–13 (citing Spano, 633 F.3d at 586). Because those factors 

“made it difficult to assess the district court’s certification orders,” the Seventh Circuit vacated 

the broad classes, but emphasized that “better-defined and more-targeted classes” could well 

satisfy Rule 23. Id. at 813 (citing Spano, 633 F.3d at 586, 588). On remand, the district court 

certified several better-defined classes under Rule 23(b)(1), including claims regarding fees and 

investments similar to the claims here. Spano, 294 F.R.D. at 119–127. 

In Abbott, the Seventh Circuit clarified that the problem with the original Spano class was 

that “the breadth of the classes at issue ... and the vagueness surrounding plaintiffs’ claims” 

could lead to intra-class conflict that would undermine typicality and adequacy. 725 F.3d at 813. 

But the court made clear that it “has never held, and Spano did not imply, that the mere 

possibility that a trivial level of intra-class conflict may materialize as the litigation progresses 

forecloses class certification entirely.” Id. The court found that a claim challenging a plan 

investment that underperformed a prudent alternative satisfied the typicality and adequacy 

requirements. Id. at 813–14. Because a §1132(a)(2) action “seeks only to make the fiduciary 

refund to the Plan any losses caused by the breach,” there was no risk than any participant “who 

benefited from [defendant’s] imprudent management would have her Plan assets reduced as a 

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result of this lawsuit.” Id. at 814. And in contrast to the broad Spano class, the Abbott plaintiffs 

took “care to limit the class to those Plan participants who invested in” the challenged option and 

further limited the class to the subset of participants whose investments underperformed the 

prudent alternative, which the Seventh Circuit found to be “one reasonable way to exclude from 

the class any persons who did not experience injury.” Id. The court emphasized that after 

certification, the district court remained free to amend the class as needed “when it comes time to 

rule on the merits.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)).

II. The proposed classes satisfy all Rule 23(a) criteria 

A. The classes have proper temporal limitations and proper representatives

Spano criticized a class period with no starting or ending date. 633 F.3d at 586, 591. 

Plaintiffs’ proposed classes have reasonable temporal limitations. The Equitable Relief Class is 

limited to participants as of the date of judgment, as those participants will necessarily be 

affected by any such relief. The starting date for the Investment Loss and Payment of Plan Assets 

classes is October 3, 2016, when the Aon Funds were first included as Plan options. The ending 

date is June 30, 2020 because that is when Aon finally achieved the ability to improve the Aon 

Funds’ performance through a larger asset base and implemented an enhanced, less-conflicted 

process for monitoring the Funds. See supra, p. 5. 

Spano also requires an investment-claim class to have “a representative who personally held 

one or both of the allegedly imprudent funds[.]” 633 F.3d at 590. Plaintiffs Wachala, Preuss, 

Bickle, Adeneye, and Walsh are the proposed representatives of the two Aon Funds classes 

because they collectively invested in all five of the Aon Collective Investment Trusts during the 

class period and sustained losses relative to the Legacy Investment Option(s). See infra, Part. 

II.D–E. Plaintiffs Adeneye and Gough are proposed representatives of the Equitable Relief Class 

because they have active Plan accounts, and thus have a strong interest in ensuring Defendants’ 

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9 

future compliance with fiduciary obligations. Adeneye Decl. ¶¶1–2, 5; Ex. 24, Gough Tr. 172:6–

14. 

B. Putative class members are too numerous to be joined (Rule 23(a)(1))

The class members are “so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “While there is no magic number that applies to every case, a forty–member 

class is often regarded as sufficient to meet the numerosity requirement.” Orr v. Shicker, 953 

F.3d 490, 498 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cnty., 850 F.3d 849, 

859 (7th Cir. 2017)); see also Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions, §3:12 (“[A] class of 40 or 

more members raises a presumption of impracticability of joinder based on numbers alone.”).

Here, 2,512 individual participants invested in one or more Aon Funds from October 3, 2016 

through June 30, 2020. O’Neal Decl. ¶16. All of those participants are members of the Payment 

of Plan Assets Class. Among those participants, 2,281 participants (91%) are members of the 

Investment Loss Class, because they suffered a loss from investing in at least one Aon Trust 

relative to what their accounts would have earned by investing in the corresponding Legacy 

Investment Option(s). Id. At the fund level, at least 700 and as many as 1,600 participants 

suffered a loss attributable to each of the five Aon Funds. Id. ¶¶18–23. The Equitable Relief 

Class will have over 4,000 members as of the date of judgment. See Ex. 1 at 2. The classes 

satisfy Rule 23(a)(1). 

C. There are many questions of law or fact common to the class (Rule 23(a)(2))

Rule 23(a)(2) requires “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(a)(2). “Rule 23(a)(2) does not demand that every member of the class have an identical claim. 

It is enough that there be one or more common questions of law or fact[.]” Spano, 633 F.3d at 

585. In a defined contribution plan, “fund participants operate against a common background.” 

Id. Assertions that a fiduciary “imposes excessive fees on all participants, as well as the assertion 

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that [Defendant] has failed to satisfy its fiduciary duties in its selection of investment options, 

both describe problems that would operate across the plan rather than at the individual level.” Id.

at 586; see also id. at 588–89 (“[T]he package of investment options offered by each plan was 

the same for every participant. The question whether that package was prudent, in light of 

ERISA’s standards, is a common one.”). Indeed, “commonality is quite likely to be satisfied” in 

an ERISA fiduciary breach case. Schering, 589 F.3d at 599 n.11. 

As to Count I, the questions of whether Aon acted with prudence and loyalty in deciding to 

replace the Plan’s prior investments with the Aon Funds, and whether the Aon Funds were 

prudent for the Plan, “in light of ERISA’s standards,” are common ones, just as in Spano. Id. at 

588–89. Since all five Aon Funds were the subject of a single unified decision to overhaul the 

Plan and were included in the Plan on the same date, whether Aon used a prudent and loyal 

process to implement that decision is necessarily common for all participants. See George v. 

Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 641 F.3d 786, 796 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that an ERISA fiduciary 

breaches its duty when it fails to “balance the relevant factors and make a reasoned decision”). 

Likewise, whether Aon used a prudent and loyal process to monitor the Aon Funds after October 

2016 is another common question. See Tibble, 575 U.S. at 530 (“[T]he duty of prudence involves 

a continuing duty to monitor investments and remove imprudent ones.”). If Aon breached its 

duty, determining whether the Plan suffered a loss, and the proper measure of those losses, are 

yet more common questions. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 754 F.2d 1049, 1056 (2d Cir. 1985) 

(defining “loss” under §1109(a) and proper measure of losses). Whether “appropriate equitable 

relief” is needed to remedy any breach is a question common to the Equitable Relief Class. See

29 U.S.C. §1109(a). These questions will “resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each 

one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). 

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Regarding Count III, common questions include whether Aon caused a prohibited transaction 

in selecting the Aon Funds and whether Aon qualifies for an exemption. Doc. 1 at 53–54 

(¶¶120–21); Doc. 99 at 11–12; see 29 U.S.C. §1106(a)–(b); §1108(b)(8). As to Astellas, common 

questions include whether Astellas caused prohibited payments of Plan assets to Aon and 

whether the payments qualify for a “reasonableness” exemption. Doc. 1 at 54 (¶121); Doc. 99 at 

13; see 29 U.S.C. §1106(a)(1)(D); §1108(b)(2)(A). A claim that a defendant “imposes excessive 

fees on all participants” presents common questions. Spano, 633 F.3d at 586. Common questions 

in resolving Count IV include whether Astellas prudently selected and monitored Aon as the 

Plan’s delegated investment fiduciary, see 29 U.S.C. §§1105(a) & (c)(2), and whether any such 

monitoring failure caused a loss to the Plan under §1109(a). 

Resolving these questions will determine liability to all class members and the measure of 

loss for the Plan and all class members. The classes thus satisfy Rule 23(a)(2). 

D. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the classes (Rule 23(a)(3))

The “claims ... of the representative parties” must be “typical of the claims ... of the class.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Claims are typical when they arise “from the same event or practice or 

course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members and [the] claims are based 

on the same legal theory.” Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 798 (7th Cir. 2008). Typicality 

“should be determined with reference to the [defendants’] actions, not with respect to 

particularized defenses [they] might have against certain class members[.]” CE Design Ltd. v. 

King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wagner v. 

NutraSweet Co., 95 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1996)). To satisfy typicality in an ERISA fiduciary 

breach case, “there must be a congruence between the investments held by the named plaintiff 

and those held by members of the class he or she wishes to represent.” Spano, 633 F.3d at 586. 

Regarding the Investment Loss Class, “Plaintiffs have taken care to limit the class to those 

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Plan participants who invested in the [Aon Funds] during the class period.” Abbott, 725 F.3d at 

814. Plaintiffs Wachala, Preuss, Bickle, Adeneye, and Walsh “personally held ... the allegedly 

imprudent funds.” Spano, 633 F.3d at 590. Each of them invested in the Aon Funds and one or 

more of them suffered a loss attributable to each of the five Aon Funds. O’Neal Decl. ¶¶15–22. 

Because Aon’s actions were directed to and affected the Plan as a whole, Plaintiffs’ claims arise 

from the same course of conduct as all class members’ claims—Aon’s single unified decision to 

replace the Plan’s prior investments with the Aon Funds in October 2016 and its conduct in 

monitoring the Funds on an ongoing basis after October 2016. E.g., Ex. 11 at 2–3; Ex. 12 at 4–7. 

Thus, the proposed representatives’ claims are perfectly congruent with and typical of the claims 

of all other Investment Loss Class members. Abbott, 725 F.3d at 814; Spano, 633 F.3d at 586. 

Limiting the class to the subset of participants who suffered a loss relative to what they 

would have earned in the Legacy Investment Options perfectly aligns with Plaintiffs’ theory of 

the case. A prudent, non-conflicted fiduciary acting in the best interests of Plan participants 

would have had no reason in October 2016 to remove the Plan’s mutual funds which were 

generally performing well, especially in favor of worse-performing options from an 

inexperienced manager. Doc. 1 at 17–21, 24–25, 28–29, 31–32, 34–35, 37, 51 (¶¶43, 46, 48–51, 

59–60, 67, 74, 80, 86, 109); Ex. 4 at 2–3. Accordingly, the performance of the Legacy 

Investment Options (as defined by Plaintiffs’ experts) provides a reasonable estimate of what the 

Plan would have earned but for Aon’s conflicted decision to grow its investment management 

business at the Plan’s expense. See Bierwirth, 754 F.2d at 1056 (proper remedy is to restore “the 

trust beneficiaries to the position they would have occupied but for the breach of trust.”) (citing 

Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 205(c) (1959)). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit expressly endorses 

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the use of such a benchmark as a “reasonable” means to limit a class to those participants who 

suffered the same injury. Abbott, 725 F.3d at 814. 

The Payment of Plan Assets Class also satisfies Rule 23(a)(3). The Aon Funds charged assetbased fees to all investors. E.g., Ex. 15 at 1. Accordingly, to the extent Astellas caused a nonexempt prohibited transaction allowing Aon to receive unreasonable compensation, cf. 29 U.S.C. 

§1108(b)(2)(A), every participant who invested in an Aon Trust bore a pro rata share of the 

excess. All participants who invested in the Aon Funds were thus harmed by Astellas’ course of 

conduct in causing prohibited payments of Plan assets to Aon. Therefore, the claims of the 

named Plaintiffs who invested in the Aon Funds are typical, indeed identical, to the claims of all 

other participants who invested in the Funds. 

If Defendants are found to have breached their duties by employing a flawed investment 

monitoring process for the Plan as a whole, that uniform course of conduct will give rise to the 

claims for equitable relief of Plaintiffs and all Plan participants as of the date of judgment.

E. Plaintiffs and class counsel will adequately represent the classes (Rule 23(a)(4))

The named Plaintiffs “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23(a)(4). They have no “conflicts of interest” with absent class members. Amchem 

Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997). 

The named Plaintiffs’ interests are aligned with the class members’ interests. Plaintiffs are 

acting on behalf of their Plan, enforcing the fiduciary duties Defendants owed to the Plan, and 

seeking to obtain remedies due to the Plan. See 29 U.S.C. §1109(a); Russell, 473 U.S. at 142 n.9. 

The proposed representatives and all class members share the same objectives, the same factual 

and legal positions, and the same interest in establishing Defendants’ liability. Spano, 294 F.R.D. 

at 125; Hale v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 12-660, 2016 WL 4992504, at *7 (S.D. Ill. 

Sep. 16, 2016) (adequacy satisfied where “Plaintiffs are seeking the same relief and share the 

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same interest in establishing defendants’ liability.”).

Because the classes are limited to participants who suffered losses from investing in the Aon 

Funds, there is no risk of conflict among class members. Any participants “who have no 

complaint about [the Aon Funds], in light of the dates when they first invested and the date when 

they exited” are excluded from the class. Spano, 633 F.3d at 587. Limiting the class by 

comparison to a benchmark is “one reasonable way to exclude from the class any persons who 

did not experience injury.” Abbott, 725 F.3d at 814. 

Moreover, while class representatives must zealously advocate for the class, they need no 

more than “a marginal familiarity with the facts comprising the action” and a willingness to 

participate in discovery. Johnson v. Rohr-Ville Motors, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 363, 369–70 (N.D. Ill. 

1999); see also Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, U.A., 657 

F.2d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 1981); Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 366 (1966). 

The named Plaintiffs amply meet this standard. Each of them understands the nature of the

claims and their duties to vigorously prosecute the case to conclusion. Wachala Decl. ¶¶2–6; 

Preuss Decl. ¶¶2–6; Bickle Decl. ¶¶2–6; Walsh Decl. ¶¶2–6; Adeneye Decl. ¶¶2–7. Plaintiffs 

have shown their commitment by reviewing pleadings, staying updated on the progress of the 

case, responding to discovery, and appearing for deposition. Wachala Decl. ¶¶7–8; Preuss Decl. 

¶¶7–8; Bickle Decl. ¶¶7–8; Walsh Decl. ¶¶7–8; Adeneye Decl. ¶¶8–9; Ex. 24, Gough Tr. 

173:18–176:17, 181:12–182:23. The depositions further demonstrate their adequacy as class 

representatives.

6

 

6

 Bickle Tr. 250:19−24, 262:6−263:1, 263:13−19; Preuss Tr. 139:6−14, 168:23−169:4, 169:10:17, 

179:17−24, 181:1−16, 188:7−17; Wachala Tr. 235:13−236:5, 241:5−14; 242:12−17.

Adeneye Tr. 62:7−10, 213:17−2, 214:6−216:3, 221:11−21, 222:10−19; Ex. 24, Gough Tr. 80:16−81:8, 

82:6−18, 134:7−13, 172:7−14, 173:9−24, 176:3−8, 181:12−182:2.

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Rule 23(a)(4) also considers the adequacy of proposed class counsel. Spano, 633 F.3d at 

586. In appointing class counsel, courts consider: 

(i) the work counsel has done in identifying or investigating potential claims in the 

action; (ii) counsel’s experience in handling class actions, other complex litigation, and 

the types of claims asserted in the action; (iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable law; 

and (iv) the resources that counsel will commit to representing the class. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g). 

Before filing this action, Plaintiffs’ counsel thoroughly investigated potential claims and 

legal issues. Schlichter Decl. ¶¶20–21. Plaintiffs’ counsel has extensive class action experience, 

having been appointed as class counsel in 34 large ERISA fiduciary breach class actions and 

achieving numerous favorable settlements and judgments. Id. ¶¶2–19, 22–31. The firm is 

recognized as a “pioneer and the leader in the field,” Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 06-

701, 2015 WL 4398475, *1 (S.D. Ill. July 17, 2015), and “clearly experts in ERISA litigation,” 

Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 06-4305, 2012 WL 5386033, *3 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2012). Plaintiffs’ 

counsel will commit all necessary resources to representing the class. Schlichter Decl. ¶18. 

Counsel’s credentials are described further in the attached biography. Id. ¶33. The Court should 

appoint Schlichter, Bogard & Denton LLP as class counsel. 

III. The proposed classes satisfy Rule 23(b). 

A. The classes satisfy Rule 23(b)(1)(A) or (B) 

This ERISA fiduciary breach case is a “paradigmatic” Rule 23(b)(1) class action. Schering, 

589 F.3d at 604. Indeed, courts have overwhelmingly certified §1132(a)(2) actions under Rule 

23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or both. Neil v. Zell, 275 F.R.D. 256, 267–68 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Loomis v. 

Exelon Corp., No. 06-4900, 2007 WL 2060799, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2007); Spano, 294 

F.R.D. at 122–24; Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 286 F.R.D. 388, 405 (S.D. Ill. 2012). 

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Rule 23(b)(1) certification is proper if “prosecuting separate actions by or against individual 

class members would create a risk of:”

(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that 

would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class; or 

(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as a practical matter, 

would be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual 

adjudications or would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 

interests[.] 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). Rule 23(b)(1)(A) considers possible prejudice to the defendants, while 

23(b)(1)(B) looks to possible prejudice to the putative class members. Rogers v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 

No. 04-6476, 2006 WL 794734, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2006). Both apply here. 

1. The proposed classes satisfy Rule 23(b)(1)(A). 

Rule 23(b)(1)(A) “takes in cases where the [defendant] is obligated by law to treat the 

members of the class alike” or “must treat all alike as a matter of practical necessity.” Amchem, 

521 U.S. at 614. “One person may have rights against, or be under duties toward, numerous 

persons constituting a class, and be so positioned that conflicting or varying adjudications in 

lawsuits with individual members of the class might establish incompatible standards to govern 

his conduct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Adv. Comm. Note, 1966 amend., sub. (b)(1)(A). 

Here, Defendants owed fiduciary duties to the Plan and hence all class members. See 29 

U.S.C. §1104(a)(1). In discharging those duties, Defendants were obligated to treat all 

participants (and all class members) alike. See In re Citigroup Pension Plan ERISA Litig., 241 

F.R.D. 172, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A) satisfied “because the 

defendants have a statutory obligation, as well as a fiduciary responsibility, to ‘treat the members 

of the class alike.’”) (citation omitted).

If 2,000 individual class members each pursued a §1132(a)(2) action on behalf of the Plan, 

Defendants could be subject to varying adjudications as to whether they breached their duties to 

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the Plan, how to measure Plan losses, and whether equitable relief is warranted. Inconsistent 

adjudications on those issues in “thousands of separate individual actions” would put Defendants 

in the “untenable” position of being subject to “differing standards of duty and, thus, differing 

standards of conduct,” thereby leaving them “in limbo” and “making compliance impossible.” 

Shanehchian v. Macy’s, Inc., No. 07-828, 2011 WL 883659, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2011). 

Regarding Count I, the factfinder will determine whether Aon acted with loyalty and used 

appropriate methods to select and monitor the Aon Funds, whether the Aon Funds were prudent 

investments, and the proper benchmark alternative to measure Plan losses. See, e.g., Tussey v. 

ABB, Inc., 850 F.3d 951, 959 (8th Cir. 2017) (court must determine losses resulting from breach 

of duty in replacing a prudent investment for disloyal reasons). Count III will require a 

determination of whether payments of Plan assets to Aon were reasonable or excessive. See, e.g., 

Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 06-4305, 2012 WL 1113291, *11–13 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) 

(calculating damages based on difference between fees paid by plan and the reasonable market 

rate). Equitable relief may also be appropriate, such as requiring Defendants to implement an 

enhanced investment-review process or to obtain an independent review by an unconflicted third 

party. See, e.g., id. at *39 (ordering breaching fiduciary to “utilize[] a competitive bidding 

process ... to select a new recordkeeper”); Clark v. Duke Univ., No. 16-1044, 2019 WL 

2588029, *3 (M.D.N.C. June 24, 2019) (approving settlement involving “considerable nonmonetary relief” including the use of an independent consultant). 

Separate individual adjudications to resolve any of those issues would create incompatible 

standards for Defendants as to the amount in losses they must restore to the Plan under §1109(a) 

and how to reform the Plan and otherwise remedy Defendants’ breaches. As numerous courts 

have recognized, these claims are properly certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(A). Piazza v. Ebsco 

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Indus., Inc., 273 F.3d 1341, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 2001); Krueger v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 304 

F.R.D. 559, 576–77 (D. Minn. 2014); Kanawi v. Bechtel Corp., 254 F.R.D. 102, 111 (N.D. Cal. 

2008); Harris v. Koenig, 271 F.R.D. 383, 394–95 (D.D.C. 2010); Stanford v. Foamex L.P., 263 

F.R.D. 156, 173 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 

2. The proposed classes satisfy Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 

For similar reasons, any individual adjudication of these issues effectively “would be 

dispositive of the interests” of all other participants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). “Classic 

examples” of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) claims include “actions charging ‘a breach of trust by an 

indenture trustee or other fiduciary similarly affecting the members of a large class of security 

holders or beneficiaries, and which require an accounting or like measures to restore the subject 

of the trust.” Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833–34 (1999) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23, Adv. Comm. Notes, 1966 Amends., subd. (b)(1)(B)). In such cases, the “shared character of 

rights claimed or relief awarded entails the risk that any individual adjudication by a class 

member disposes of, or substantially affects, the interests of absent class members.” Id. at 834. 

Because of the trust-like nature of a defined contribution plan, with fiduciary duties owed to 

the plan and not to particular individuals, courts have routinely certified similar claims as Rule 

23(b)(1)(B) class actions. Schering, 589 F.3d at 604; Leber v. Citigroup 401(k) Plan Inv. Comm., 

323 F.R.D. 145, 165 & n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“Most courts that have certified ERISA class 

actions alleging breaches of fiduciary duties have done so under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).”); Moreno v. 

Deutsche Bank Ams. Holding Corp., No. 15-9936, 2017 WL 3868803, *9 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 5, 

2017) (“[C]ourts regularly certify 23(b)(1)(B) class actions ... in ERISA cases alleging breach of 

a fiduciary duty[.]”) (quoting Rubenstein, 3 Newberg on Class Actions §4:20 (5th ed. 2017)); 

Krueger, 304 F.R.D. at 577–78; In re YRC Worldwide, Inc. ERISA Litig., No. 09-2593, 2011 WL 

1303367, *9 (D. Kan. Apr. 6, 2011); Stanford, 263 F.R.D. at 173–74; Harris, 271 F.R.D. at 394. 

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Even if absent participants were not barred by res judicata from litigating the same claims, as 

a “practical matter” a prior adjudication of whether Aon breached its duties to the Plan in 

selecting the Aon Funds would heavily influence a subsequent court’s adjudication of the same 

issue. Eliasen v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 93 F.R.D. 408, 413 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (finding Rule 

23(b)(1)(B) satisfied because “[o]ther courts could, as a matter of comity, give deference” to 

fiduciary breach and damages findings “as a determination of the identical factual questions 

presented in a subsequent suit.”). Thus, Plaintiffs satisfy both Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B). 

B. In the alternative, the classes should be certified under Rule 23(b)(3).

When a class satisfies both Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(3), Rule 23(b)(1) controls.7 “To 

hold otherwise would ‘directly contraven[e]’ the stated purpose” of Rule 23(b)(1). Leber, 323 

F.R.D. at 165 (quoting Wright, Miller, & Kane, 7AA FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. §1772 (3d ed. 

2017)); accord DeBoer v. Mellon Mortg. Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1995) (Rule 23(b)(3) 

“should not be used, so as to avoid unnecessary inconsistencies and compromises in future 

litigation.”). It is thus an abuse of discretion to certify an ERISA fiduciary breach action under 

Rule 23(b)(3) if the class also satisfies Rule 23(b)(1). Piazza, 273 F.3d at 1352. Nevertheless, the 

class also satisfies the “predominance” and “superiority” requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). 

The predominance requirement is met when the issues “subject to generalized proof, and thus 

applicable to the class as a whole ... predominate over those issues that are subject only to 

individualized proof.” In re Mexico Money Transfer Litig., 267 F.3d 743, 746-47 (7th Cir. 2001). 

Here, for the same reasons that Rule 23(a)(2) commonality is met, there are many common 

issues of law and fact. Aon selected the Aon Funds for the entire Plan. The evidence that Aon 

breached its fiduciary duties in making that decision consists solely of Plan-level facts that are 

7

 The Equitable Relief Class is also certifiable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). 

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20 

the same for all Plan participants. The evidence needed to calculate losses is also common proof: 

the performance of the Aon Funds relative to the legacy options during the relevant period. 

A class action is “superior to other available methods” of adjudication, Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(b)(3), when it “would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote . . . 

uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or 

bringing about other undesirable results.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615. 

Given the expense of federal court litigation and the need for expert testimony on these 

complicated financial issues, the losses suffered by individual class members are too small to 

feasibly pursue on an individualized basis. “The policy at the very core of the class action 

mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any 

individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 

F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997); Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 665 (7th Cir. 2001) 

(similar). Given the nature of the allegations seeking Plan-wide relief for the same Plan-level 

breaches of fiduciary duties, no class member has an interest in individually controlling the 

prosecution of this matter that seeks to recover losses on behalf of the Plan.

Concentrating all litigation concerning the Plan’s fiduciaries in a single action would 

undeniably conserve party and judicial resources by resolving questions concerning the Plan in 

one proceeding, rather than sorting out the disparate effects of many and possibly contradictory 

orders in individual cases. Finally, Plaintiffs’ counsel has litigated numerous 401(k) plan class 

action claims through trial with no apparent manageability issues. See, e.g., Tibble, 575 U.S. at

526; Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 336 (8th Cir. 2014); Ramos v. Banner Health, 1 F.4th 

769, 773–74 (10th Cir. 2021). Thus, Rule 23(b)(3) certification is proper. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification should be granted. 

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21 

October 15, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

 /s/ Sean E. Soyars 

SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP

Jerome J. Schlichter 

Troy A. Doles 

Heather Lea 

Sean E. Soyars 

Kurt C. Struckhoff 

100 South Fourth Street, Suite 1200

St. Louis, MO, 63102 

(314) 621-6115 

(314) 621-5934 (fax)

jschlichter@uselaws.com

tdoles@uselaws.com 

hlea@uselaws.com

ssoyars@uselaws.com

kstruckhoff@uselaws.com

Lead Counsel for Plaintiffs

DEGRAND LAW, P.C. 

Luke DeGrand

 10 S. LaSalle Street, Ste. 3400 

Chicago, IL 60603 

(312) 236-9200 

(312) 236-9201 (fax)

ldegrand@degrandlaw.com

Local Counsel for Plaintiffs

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that this document filed through the ECF system will be sent electronically to 

the registered participants as identified on the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) on October 15, 

2021. 

 

/s/ Sean E. Soyars 

 Sean E. Soyars 

Case: 1:20-cv-03882 Document #: 141 Filed: 10/15/21 Page 27 of 27 PageID #:2843