alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 23.1**Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm**The Board of DirectorsBioMed Realty Trust, Inc.:We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-117977 on Form S-8and in Registration Statement Nos. 333-129025, 333-137376, 333-139827 and 333-143658 on Form S-3 ofBioMed Realty Trust, Inc. of our report dated of February 28, 2008, with respect to theconsolidated balance sheets of BioMed Realty Trust, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2007and 2006, and the related consolidated statements of income, stockholders’ equity, comprehensiveincome, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2007, theaccompanying financial statement schedule III, and the effectiveness of internal controls overfinancial reporting of BioMed Realty Trust, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2007, whichreport appears in the December 31, 2007 annual report on form 10-K of BioMed Realty Trust, Inc.      KPMG LLP
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of American Patriot Financial Group, Inc. (the "Registrant") on Form 10-K for the period ending
December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, T. Don Waddell, Chief Financial Officer of the Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)   The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.

| | /s/T. DON WADDELLT. Don Waddell Chief Financial OfficerAmerican Patriot Financial Group, Inc.
March 31, 2008
| | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

---



QuickLinks
Exhibit 12.1



I, Justin Tang, certify that:



1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of eLong, Inc.;



2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material
fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present
in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4. The companys other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the company and have:



a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;



b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the companys disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about
the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and



c) Disclosed in this report any change in the companys internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period
covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the companys internal control over financial reporting; and



5. The companys other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal
control over financial reporting, to the companys auditors and the audit committee of the companys board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the companys ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and



b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant
role in the companys internal controls over financial reporting.



Date:
June 29, 2005



|       |  |                                      
|------ |  | -------------------------------------
|       | 
|By:    |  | /s/    JUSTIN TANG                   
|Name:  |  | Justin Tang                          
|Title: |  | President and Chief Executive Officer
9685.

#### Maryon *v.*City or Atlanta.

Decided May 13, 1919.

Wade, C. J.

1. In reply to a question propounded to the Supreme Court in this ease that court held: “It is not a prerequisite to suit against a municipal corporation in this State, for injury to person or property, that the written notice required under the Civil Code, § 910, should specify any amount of money claimed as damages.” 149 *Ga.*(99 S. E. 116).

*(a)*Under this ruling the trial judge erred in sustaining a general demurrer to the plaintiff’s petition, upon the ground that the antecedent notice required under the provisions of section 910 of the Civil Code was insufficient in that it failed to specify any amount of money as damages.

2. It was said by this, court' in *Mayor &c. of Macon*v. *Stringfield,,*16 *Ga. App.*480, 481, 482 (85 S. E. 684) : “The paper which this section of the code [Civil Code, § 910] requires to be presented is there designated as ‘a claim for money damages;’ and a claim for money should state the amount of money claimed. One of the things required by this section is a statement of the ‘extent’ of the injury. The reason for this requirement is obvious. The object and purpose of the statute was to require such information as would apprize the governing authority of the municipality of the amount of the claim and enable the proper officials to investigate the injury complained of and determine whether or not to adjust the demand without suit. . . The word ‘extent,’ as used in this section of the code, bearing in mind the *object to be accomplished, by the notice*[italics ours], must include not only the nature and character of the injury for which payment is demanded, but also the amount of the damage, measured in the only terms by which the city could adjust the same, to wit, in dollars and cents.” It was further held, however,'in *Williamson*v. *Mayor &c. of Savannah,*19 *Ga. App.*784 (92 S. E. 291), that “it is not essential that the *amounts -*[italics ours] claimed in both the notice and the suit should be identical.” The constitutional amendment which created this court provides that “The decisions of the Supreme Court shall bind the Court of Appeals as precedents.” The above-quoted ruling of the Supreme Court in this case, though directly contrary to the previous ruling of this court in *Mayor &c. of Macon*v. *Stringfield,*supra, must therefore control this question, so long as adhered to by that court; and anything to the contrary to be found in the eases of *Mayor &c. of Macon*v. *Stringfield,*supra, or elsewhere, will not be followed.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Jenkins and Luke, JJ., concur.*

*717Action for damages; from city court of Atlanta—Judge Eeid. April 6, 1918.

The notice referred to in the decision described an injury to the plaintiff’s, person, stated the time and place of the injury, and the negligence which caused it, and concluded with a prayer that, upon consideration of the claim, "just compensation for such injuries” be awarded.

*Hines & Jordan,*for plaintiff.

*J. L. May son, S. D. Hewlett,*for defendant.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-50669

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAMON MUNOZ-GARCIA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-02-CR-522-DB

--------------------

October 30, 2002

Before DeMOSS, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Ramon Munoz-Garcia appeals the sentence imposed following

his guilty plea conviction of attempting to illegally reenter the

United States after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

Munoz-Garcia contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(b)(2) define separate offenses. He argues that the

aggravated felony conviction that resulted in his increased

sentence is an element of the offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)

that should have been alleged in his indictment. Munoz-Garcia

maintains that he pleaded guilty to an indictment which charged
No. 02-50669

-2-

only attempted simple reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He

argues that his sentence exceeds the two-year maximum term of

imprisonment which may be imposed for that offense. 

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Munoz-Garcia acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by

Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1202 (2001). This court

must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court

itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of

the district court is AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 12.1

             GE FINANCIAL ASSURANCE HOLDINGS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES

               Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges

                        Three Months Ended April 1, 2000

                                  (Unaudited)
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                         Ratio of Earnings
                                                                                          to Fixed Charges
(Dollar amounts in millions)                                                          ----------------------
<S>                                                                                     <C>
Net earnings                                                                                     $160
Provision for income taxes                                                                         94
Minority interest                                                                                   1
                                                                                      ---------------
Earnings before income taxes and minority interest                                                255
                                                                                      ---------------
Fixed charges:
 Interest                                                                                          27
 Interest portion of net rentals                                                                   12
                                                                                      ---------------
Total fixed charges                                                                                39
                                                                                      ---------------

Less interest capitalized, net of amortization                                                    ---
                                                                                      ---------------
Earnings before income taxes and minority interest, plus fixed charges                           $294
                                                                                      ===============
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges                                                                7.5
                                                                                      ===============
</TABLE>


For purposes of computing the ratios, fixed charges consist of interest on all
indebtedness and one-third of rentals, which management believes is a reasonable
approximation of the interest factor of such rentals.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-82,357-01

EX PARTE ISREAL REYES, SR. , Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. CR2012-428-1 IN THE 207th DISTRICT COURT

FROM COMAL COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of one count of

aggravated assault with a deadlyweapon against a familymember, one count of endangering a child,

and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. Applicant was sentenced to twenty years’

imprisonment for the aggravated assault count and ten years’ imprisonment on the other two counts. 

Applicant contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because counsel failed

to timely file a notice of appeal. 
2

Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984); Ex parte Patterson, 993 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Ex parte

Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). In these circumstances, additional facts are needed. 

As we held in Ex parte Rodriguez, 334 S.W.2d 294, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), the trial court is

the appropriate forum for findings of fact. The trial court shall order counsel to respond to

Applicant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court may use any means set out in

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d).

If the trial court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. 

If Applicant is indigent and wishes to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint an

attorney to represent Applicant at the hearing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04. 

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether Applicant

was denied his right to a meaningful appeal because Applicant’s counsel failed to timely file a notice

of appeal. The trial court shall also make any other findings of fact and conclusions of law that it

deems relevant and appropriate to the disposition of Applicant’s claim for habeas corpus relief.

This application will be held in abeyance until the trial court has resolved the fact issues. The

issues shall be resolved within 90 days of this order. A supplemental transcript containing all

affidavits and interrogatories or the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from any hearing or

deposition, along with the trial court’s supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall

be forwarded to this Court within 120 days of the date of this order. Any extensions of time shall

be obtained from this Court. 

Filed: November 19, 2014

Do not publish
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 23, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-41598

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ELIAS GOMEZ-ROMERO,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:04-CR-821-ALL

--------------------

Before KING, GARWOOD, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Having pleaded guilty, Elias Gomez-Romero (Gomez) appeals

his conviction and 63-month sentence for being illegally present

in the United States following deportation in violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1326. 

Gomez’s constitutional challenge to 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is

foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,

235 (1998). Although Gomez contends that Almendarez-Torres was

incorrectly decided and that a majority of the Supreme Court
No. 04-41598

-2-

would overrule Almendarez-Torres in light of Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), we have repeatedly rejected such

arguments on the basis that Almendarez-Torres remains binding. 

See United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 276 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 298 (2005). Gomez properly concedes

that his argument is foreclosed in light of Almendarez-Torres and

circuit precedent, but he raises it here to preserve it for

further review. Accordingly, Gomez’s conviction is affirmed.

Gomez contends that his sentence must be vacated because he

was sentenced pursuant to mandatory Sentencing Guidelines that

were held unconstitutional in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005). Although Gomez asserts that the error in his case is

structural and not susceptible of harmless error analysis, we

have previously rejected this specific argument. See United

States v. Walters, 418 F.3d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 2005). 

In the alternative, Gomez contends that the Government

cannot show that the sentencing error was harmless. We review

Gomez’s preserved challenge to his sentence for harmless error

under FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). See Walters, 418 F.3d at 463.

The district court sentenced Gomez to the lowest sentence in

the relevant guidelines sentencing range. The record does not

indicate, and the Government has not shown, that the district

court would have imposed the same sentence under an advisory

guidelines regime. See United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165,

170-71 (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we vacate Gomez’s sentence
No. 04-41598

-3-

and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED IN PART; SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
         18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
          AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Creative Beauty Supply of New
Jersey Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year end
December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Carmine Catizone, Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:
            (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
           (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company.

/s/Carmine Catizone
-----------------------------
Carmine Catizone
Chief Executive Officer

March 28, 2006


        CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
         18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
          AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Creative BeautySupply of New
Jersey Corporation (the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended
December 31, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Daniel Generelli, Chief Executive
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:
            (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
           (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and result of
operations of the Company.

/s/Daniel Generelli
-----------------------------
Daniel Generelli
Chief Financial Officer

March 28, 2006
Exhibit 99.1



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report  of CompX  International  Inc.  (the
Company)  on Form 10-Q for the period  ending  March 31,  2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, David A.
Bowers, Vice Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1) The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.


/s/  David A. Bowers
-----------------------------------------------------------------
David A. Bowers
Vice Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer




May 8, 2003








*    A signed  original of this  written  statement  required by Section 906 has
     been  provided to CompX  International  Inc.  and will be retained by CompX
     International Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange  Commission
     or its staff upon request.



<PAGE>