NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL
- TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 19a0505n.06
Case No. 19

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JAVONTAE L. DYSON , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY , Defendant

- Appellee

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: SUTTON , COOK, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges. COOK, Circuit Judge. C laim ing that a disability prevented him from working , Javontae Dyson applied ( as an adult ) for 82 days of unpaid Social Security child ’s insurance benefits
available to disabled children of a parent meeting the monetary threshold . An ALJ denied those
benefits. Because substantial evidence supports th at decision, we AFFIRM.
I.
A fter administrative denial of Dyson’s claim , he requested a hearing and submitte d
evidence in support

. I n analyzing Dyson’s claim , t he ALJ applied the test laid out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) and determined Dyson to be unentitled to the benefits he sought

. From the evidence, t he ALJ assessed that Dyson suffered from several severe impairments , including a “ learning disorder ,” “a djustment disorder, ” and “ personality disorder. ” Dyson complains that the ALJ’s decision bypassed evidence of his other medical conditions:Case No. 19

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- schizophrenia, “maj[or] depression , ” asthma, knee problems , mor bid obesity, hypertension, and glaucoma and retinal detachment in his right eye. The ALJ’s review of Dyson ’s severe impairments resulted in the administrative conclusion
that those caused “ mild restriction in activities of daily living; m ild difficulties in social functioning; and moderate difficulties maintaining concentration, persistence or pace,” but did not “meet or medically equal” the statutory criteria necessary to obtain benefits

. T hat is, t hough Dyson’s impairments compromised h is “ability to perform work at all exertional levels,” his “limitations have little or no effect on ” his ability to perform jobs for which he is qualified.
Afte r t he Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied his appeal , Dyson brought this action , and t he district court affirm ed the ALJ’s decision

. This appeal followed.
II. To collect child’s insurance benefits, Dyson must show that, before reaching age 22, he was dependent on a parent receiving Social Security benefits and he could not “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment” lasting at least 12 mont hs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d) , 423(d)(1). So long as the ALJ’s decision “is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards,” we will affirm it. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C . § 405(g) ) . In the social security context, “the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill , 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) . Though we require “more than a mere scintilla,” evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” is enough. Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB , 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) )

. This court does not weigh evidence, assess credibility, or resolve conflicts in testimony

— that’s the ALJ’s job. Crum v. Sullivan , 92 1 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990)

. We willCase No. 19

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- affirm “if substantial evidence, or even a preponderance of the evidence, supports the claimant’s position, so long as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec ., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003)

. We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that the ALJ supported his decision with
substantial evidence. Valley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 427 F.3d 388, 390 (6th Cir. 2005)

. III. According to Dyson , the ALJ erred in fail ing to consider his non

- severe impairments as part of his “ residual function al capacity, ” defined as “the most [a claimant] can still do despite” any “physical and mental limitations[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)

. He points to Socia l Security Ruling 96

- 8p , which commands an ALJ, in assessing a claimant’s residual function al capacity (“RFC”) , to consider evidence of non - severe impairments: In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not “severe.” While a “not severe” impairment(s) standing alone may not significantly limit an individual ’ s ability to do basic work activities, it may

-- when considered with limitations or restrictions due t o other impairments

-- be critical to the outcome of a claim.
SSR 96

- 8p, 1996 WL 374184 , at *5 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996).
As Dyson observes, the medical records before the ALJ show numerous health conditions beyond the three severe impairments of lea r ning, adju stment, and personality disorders. And true,
the ALJ ignored th o se other afflictions in denying benefits. But substantial evidence supports t his decision

. For starters, the ALJ properly disregarded evidence of Dyson’s other medical conditions when determining his residual function al capacity
because the evidence fell outside the narrow temporal window relevant to Dyson’s claim

— December 31, 2007, his alleged onset date, through March 21, 2008, the day before his twenty

second birthday

. For that 82

- day period, Dyson submitted only one medical document

— a “MissedCase No. 19

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- Appointment Record” for March 7, 2008

. Dyson , therefore, provided no eviden tiary support for
establ ishing his medical conditions’ impairing effects during the relevant time period . Dyson submitted plenty of records pertinent to before and after his claimed disability dates

. But “disability is determined by the functional limitations imposed by a condition, not
the mere diagnosis of it.” Hill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 560 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Higgs v. Bowen , 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988) ) ; see also SS R 96

- 4p, 1996 WL 374187 , at *1 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (“A ‘symptom’ is not a ‘medically determinable physical or mental impairment[.]’”)

. Dyson ’s diagnos is with an ailment in (or before) 2005 does not mean that
ailment impaired him between December 31, 200 7 and March 2 1 , 2008. N one of Dyson’s records shed light on his level of impairment during that relevant time

. And the evidentiary burden is Dyson’s to carry. See Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 548 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a claimant bears the burden of proving his lack of residual functional capacity). Take Dyson’s asthma. The record shows he suffered from asthma both before and after the relevant period , b ut not between December 31, 2007 and March 2 1 , 20 08. E ven if we assume that he remained asthmatic during that time, Dyson proffers no evidence that asthma impaired his functioning

. H e maintains that his asthma “supported limitations that concerned the avoidance of pulmonary irritants, fumes, odors, dust, etc.” Yet, t hough he bears the burden of proving his RFC , Dyson provides no corroborating medical evidence. Same goes for the rest of Dyson’s non - severe conditions : The ALJ lacked evidence of how these impaired his functioning capacity during the relevant period. See Essary v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 114 F. App’x 662, 667 (6th Cir. 2004) ( holding ALJ did not err by ignoring claimant’s medically documented obesity when the claimant “failed to present evidence of any functional limitations resulting specifically from her obesity”) ; Long v. Apfel , 1 F. App’x 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming no

- disability finding where “[t]he record

. . .Case No. 19

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- does not contain a single statement by a treating physician indicating that Long’s health problems result in any specific work

- impairing limitations”)

. Given the lack of medical evidence supporting Dyson’s stance that these health conditions impaired hi s work functioning , t he ALJ appropriately bypassed his non - severe impairments in calculating his RFC. Considering the three severe impairments recognized by the ALJ , substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision here

. T he ALJ noted at the outset of his decision that Dyson received “no real care” and “no specific treatment” for his severe impairments before reaching age 22. And Dyson’s testimony show s his ability to carry out daily functions: “ he took care of four children, cooked, cleaned, and d rove while working until March 31, 2008.” Reviewing Dyson’s education al
and medical records, the ALJ further observed that Dyson could “read at the level of a sixth grader” and “handle simple math calculations,” while having no “difficulty interacting wit h others[.]” The ALJ next looked to an “impartial medical expert,” Dr. Larry Kravitz , who reviewed Dyson’s entire medical record and “opined that [he] could perform simple, repetitive tasks ” notwithstanding his impairments. Finding Dr. Kravitz’s conclus ions consistent with the record, the ALJ gave them “significant weight[.]” The ALJ accordingly found that Dyson “could have handled simple instructions” during his period of alleged disability. He also reasoned that the record “showed [Dyson’s] ability to work at the level of substantial gainful activity during which he took care of four children.” F inding that he “was able to understand, remember, and carryout simple instructions; deal with cha nges in a routine work setting; and respond appropriately to supervision and coworkers,” the ALJ concluded that “although [Dyson’s] impairments were severe, they did not preclude him from completing basic work related activities. ” By relying on Dr. Kravi tz’s opinion and ensuring that the opinion was consistent with Dyson’s medical records, the ALJ supported his decision with substantial evidence. We regularlyCase No. 19

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- find that substantial evidence supports a no - disability determination when the ALJ relies primar ily on independent medical advice consistent with the claimant’s medical records. See Glasgow v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 690 F. App’x 385, 387 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding no

- disability finding supported by substantial evidence where independent psychologists fo und that, though the claimant produced evidence of “work

- preclusive limitations,” he “could perform simple, repetitive tasks”)

. Just as i n Glasgow , after reviewing Dyson’s medical records, Dr. Kravitz opined that, even with his impairments, Dyson “could perform simple, repetitive tasks

. ” The ALJ reasonably
credited these conclusions as consistent with Dyson ’ s medical records, and thus adequately supported his no

- disability determination. Id. at 387

. Dyson protests that, in considering hi s severe and non

- severe impairments, the ALJ should have obtained expert vocational testimony to determine whether Dyson could perform any of the work that “exists in significant numbers” in the regional or national economy. 4 2 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2) (A)

. A s explained, though, the ALJ properly ignored Dyson’s non

- severe impairments. True, t he Commission bears the burden of identifying a “significant number of jobs in the economy
that accommodate the claimant ’ s residual functional capacity

. . . and vocation al profile [.] ” Jones , 336 F.3d at 474

. But Dyson points to no authority requiring the ALJ to consult an expert. Indeed, we rejected that very argument not long ago. See Collins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 357 F. App’x 663, 670

– 71 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding t hat, where, like Dyson, claimant had “solely nonexertional” impairments, ALJ did not err by relying on statutory guidelines rather than an expert)

. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding of Dyson ’s non

- disability during the relevant period and the denial of child ’ s insurance benefits ; we will not disturb it

. We AFFIRM.