IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-1865

Filed July 13, 2023

SEAN MICHAEL HILLIARD,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Michael J. 

Shubatt, Judge.

Sean Hilliard appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief. 

AFFIRMED.

Thomas Hurd of Law Office of Thomas Hurd PLC, Des Moines, for 

appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
2

BOWER, Chief Judge.

Sean Hilliard appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief. 

Because he failed to establish prejudice by a preponderance of evidence, we 

affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

In 2017, Hilliard was charged with sexual abuse in the second degree for 

committing a sex act on a minor child. 

Before trial, Hilliard, claiming prejudice, filed a motion in limine requesting 

the court block admission of his criminal history. At a hearing before trial, the court 

noted Hilliard’s past offenses were not character-impugning or credibility offenses, 

finding “these really have zero value other than to say, This guy is a bad man 

because he’s committed two previous law violations.” The prosecutor asked to be 

able to use the convictions for impeachment if Hilliard testified, and the court 

deferred its ruling. Also, during the pretrial hearing, counsel stipulated to the 

admission of the video of Hilliard’s police interview, which the jury watched on the 

second day of trial.

1

About half an hour into the police interview, Hilliard referred to his criminal 

history and past character several times. He asserts several of his own statements 

should have been redacted from the video as violating the court’s limine ruling:

• “I’m a retired gangbanger, something like that can get you really 

beat up.”

• “[The minor child’s] mother was talking to one of her friends and 

telling her how that the reason why my girlfriend left me was 

because of some boys, some little boys, something like that.”

1 Counsel also stipulated to the admission of the child’s forensic interview. The 

child testified at trial.
3

• “I’m trying to get on with my life finally. Probation, I’m this far from 

getting off, you know I’m just trying to get on with my life, you 

know, drug cases, I left everything alone. I lost all my friends 

because I left the drugs alone. I stopped smoking weed.

Shockingly, I lost all the friends that used to come by every day 

because I don’t do this no more. I’m [thirty-eight] years old it’s 

time to get on with my life, you know. How long am I supposed 

to sell drugs? You know what I’m sayin’? I didn’t become a 

millionaire. Yes, I had thousands of dollars you know so I left it

alone. The thing is the skill that I have is these hands and the 

clippers. So I just left everything alone and just focused on, you 

know, doing my haircutting thing.”

• “I’m this far away from over probation and every time I look up it’s 

just something, something new.”

At the close of the State’s evidence, the parties revisited the motion in limine 

ruling left open by the court. The court noted Hilliard “mentioned the fact that he 

was on probation, he sold drugs,” and that “He wanted to move on with his life,” 

and the court ruled the State could use the information as needed since it had been 

brought out. Hilliard chose not to testify and did not present any witnesses in his 

defense. In closing, the State did not mention Hilliard’s criminal history but did 

mention his past relationship in its rebuttal closing argument, saying, “He broke up 

with his girlfriend because of something related to boys. What boys, we don’t 

know. He didn’t elaborate on.”

The jury convicted Hilliard. We affirmed his conviction on appeal, but we

found the record inadequate to address his claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel and preserved them for postconviction proceedings. State v. Hilliard, No. 

17-1336, 2018 WL 4923000, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2018). 

Hilliard timely filed his application for postconviction relief (PCR), raising his 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, specifically “failure to redact recorded 

interviews” and “failure to request limiting instructions.” Under facts supporting his 
4

application, Hilliard explained counsel “failed to redact recorded interview of 

criminal history” and “stipulated to inadmissible recorded interview.” He also 

further alleged counsel failed to object to improper vouching testimony and 

inadmissible hearsay testimony.

A postconviction trial was held October 16, 2020. Hilliard was the only 

witness; his two trial counsel were not called as witnesses by either Hilliard or the 

State. As exhibits, Hilliard submitted the transcripts from his trial. The court denied 

his application for PCR, and Hilliard appeals.

On appeal, Hilliard asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) not 

objecting to the admission of an unredacted version of his police interview in which 

his criminal history and past character were mentioned; and (2) failing to request 

a limiting instruction.2 

II. Standard and Scope of Review.

We review postconviction proceedings raising constitutional claims, 

including ineffective assistance of counsel, de novo. Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 

789, 792 (Iowa 2011). “A successful ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel failed to 

perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted.” State v. Bearse, 748 

N.W.2d 211, 214–15 (Iowa 2008). If either ground is not proven, we need not 

address the other. See Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). 

2

In his PCR application, Hilliard also listed “fail[ure] to object to improper vouching 

testimony” and “fail[ure] to object to inadmissible hearsay testimony” as facts 

supporting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. He does not appeal the 

court’s ruling on those issues.
5

III. Analysis.

Hilliard identified four references in his police interview which he asserts 

counsel should have objected to and requested redaction because they were not 

relevant and were prejudicial. Hilliard also asserts counsel was ineffective for 

failing to request a limiting instruction warning the jury the evidence would be 

inflammatory. 

Even if we found counsel failed an essential duty, Hilliard must prove he 

was prejudiced by the admission of the unredacted video and lack of limiting 

instruction. Hilliard asserts the evidence of his guilt “was not overwhelming,” and 

since the child’s testimony “was highly conflicting and contradictory” the admission 

of prejudicial evidence undermines confidence in the outcome. He attempts to

relitigate his sufficiency-of-the evidence claim from his direct appeal, with a brief 

reference at the end to the prejudicial effect of “bad-acts evidence.” The 

implication is the jury would have found Hilliard’s version of events—which was 

only relayed through the police interview video—more credible than the child’s if 

the video had been redacted to omit the statements about his past and the 

mother’s vague comment about the end of his prior relationship.

To prove the requisite prejudice, the applicant must demonstrate “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different.” Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143 (citation 

omitted). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.” Irving v. State, 533 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Iowa 1995)

(citation omitted). “General claims of prejudice are insufficient. Mere speculation 
6

is similarly inadequate. The standard is stringent.” Lopez v. State, No. 03-0590, 

2004 WL 360481, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2004) (internal citations omitted).

Hilliard has not proved prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence. Any 

prejudice is speculative at best and does not undermine our confidence in the 

outcome of the trial. See Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143. We observed in Hilliard’s 

direct appeal the jury accepted the child’s testimony as credible, which it was 

entitled to do. See Hilliard, 2018 WL 4923000, at *3. Hilliard’s statements referring 

to his criminal history were in the context of his rehabilitation, and they were 

unrelated to the charges at trial and not inflammatory. The statements about what

the child’s mother said were made in the context of her coming to Hilliard’s 

workplace and making claims about his actions to his boss—actions the child’s 

mother partially testified to during trial. Nor do we find the lack of a general limiting

instruction to be prejudicial.3

We affirm the district court’s ruling.

AFFIRMED.

3

It is difficult to evaluate the prejudice of the lack of an instruction when the 

claimant does not suggest what an appropriate instruction would have been.