UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

HANGZHOU CHIC INTELLIGENT 

TECHNOLOGY CO.; and UNICORN 

GLOBAL, INC.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE PARTNERSHIPS AND 

UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 

IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE A,

Defendants.

No. 20 C 4806

Judge Thomas M. Durkin

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ patents by selling certain

hoverboard products. Two of the defendants—Dongguan Saibotan Nengyuan Keji

Co., Ltd. (d/b/a GYROOR US) and Dongguan Dongxin Baozhuang Zhipin Co., Ltd. 

(d/b/a Tomoloo DX)—have moved to dismiss for insufficient service of process. R. 165; 

R. 177. Those motions are denied.

This is one of many cases filed in this District alleging counterfeit product sales 

in the United States, on internet market places like eBay and Amazon, by defendants 

located outside the United States. Plaintiffs in these cases often join tens or hundreds 

of defendants in a single case, but it is rare for any of the defendants to appear. 

Almost all the claims are resolved by settlement or default judgment.

Because the defendants are located outside the United States and are allegedly 

somewhat fly-by-night operations intent on evading U.S. laws, plaintiffs generally 

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seek temporary restraining orders through ex parte proceedings. Plaintiffs contend, 

and district courts usually agree, that it is necessary to restrain the defendants’

assets without notice in order to prevent them from removing their assets from the 

United States or otherwise hiding them. Those orders also usually permit service by 

email based on the plaintiff’s allegation that true physical addresses for the 

defendants are not readily ascertainable or verifiable.

On September 22, 2020, the Court entered a temporary restraining order in 

this case permitting service by “electronic publication and e-mail,” R. 42 at 5 (¶ 6), 

followed by a preliminary injunction entered on November 24, 2020, R. 113. On 

November 25, Plaintiffs published copies of the preliminary injunction order and the 

third amended complaint on a website dedicated to this case, hosted by Plaintiffs’ 

counsel. See R. 185-2 at 1 (¶ 3). Using third-party discovery permitted by the 

injunction orders, Plaintiffs’ counsel obtained email addresses for the defendants who 

bring these motions—Gyroor and Tomoloo—and sent them emails attaching the 

complaint, the orders, and discovery requests, on December 28 and December 23, 

respectively. See R. 185-2 at 2 (¶¶ 5-6). Gyroor and Tomoloo appeared in this case on 

January 7 and 15, 2021. R. 152; R. 157.

Gyroor and Tomoloo argue that Plaintiffs should have served them with 

process in accordance with the Hague Convention at their physical addresses in 

China that are available on their Amazon webpages. Plaintiffs argue that any 

addresses available for Gyroor and Tomoloo are not reliable, and in any case, the 

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require Plaintiffs to attempt service according 

to the Hague Convention before asking the Court to order service by email.

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Hague Convention service is optional

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. In accordance with most other courts, this 

Court has previously held that while Hague Convention service is certainly 

satisfactory, Rule 4(f)(3) also allows service “by other means not prohibited by 

international agreement, as the court orders.” See Monco v. Zoltek Corp., 2018 WL 

3190817, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2018); Strabala v. Zhang, 318 F.R.D. 81, 115 (N.D. Ill. 

2016); see also Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 

2002). Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not require Plaintiffs to attempt 

Hague Convention service prior to seeking alternative service pursuant to Rule 

4(f)(3).

The real question on this motion is whether the allegations Plaintiffs made in 

their motion for email service were sufficient for the Court to find that email service 

was appropriate in this case. Plaintiffs supported their motion for email service with 

a declaration from one of their attorneys asserting that:

E-commerce stores operating in foreign jurisdictions that 

offer for sale or sell infringing products typically: (1) 

provide incomplete and/or false names and physical 

address information to conceal their locations and to avoid 

liability for their unlawful conduct; and (2) primarily rely 

on electronic communications to communicate with third 

party service providers and customers.

Generally, when . . . e-commerce stores that offer for sale 

or sell infringing products list[] a physical address, it is 

likely illegitimate. E-mail is a reliable mechanism for 

providing notice to e-commerce stores.

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R. 24 at 1 (¶¶ 2-3). The motion was filed on August 18, 2020 and the Court granted it 

on September 22, 2020, R. 41.

Defendants Gyroor and Tomoloo argue that Plaintiffs’ general contentions 

about the availability and reliability of addresses for e-commerce stores are unsound 

and insufficient to support an order that they in particular be served by email. They 

point out that their addresses are available on their Amazon seller profile pages, a 

fact that the Court has been able to verify by visiting the Amazon website. They also 

contend that these are the same addresses listed on the Chinese search engine 

Baidu.com. Gyroor and Tomoloo apparently mean to argue that these addresses are 

reliable and should have been used to serve them because the same addresses are 

listed on Amazon and Baidu.com. And service of process at a physical address in 

China must be made in accordance with the Hague Convention because China has 

objected to service of process by postal mail. See Luxottica Grp. S.p.A. v. P’ships &

Unincorporated Assocs. Identified on Schedule “A”, 391 F. Supp. 3d 816, 827 (N.D. Ill. 

2019).

As an initial matter, it is not clear that Gyroor and Tomoloo provided addresses 

on their Amazon websites at the time Plaintiffs filed their motion for email service. 

Plaintiffs filed their motion on August 18, 2020, but Amazon only instituted the 

requirement that sellers provide a physical address on the U.S. version of its website 

on September 1, 2020. See AMAZON SERVICES SELLER FORUMS, “Advance notice: 

Business name and address to be displayed on the seller profile page starting 

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September 1, 2020,” July 2020;1 CNBC WEBSITE, “Amazon sellers in the U.S. will 

have to list their names and addresses,” July 8, 2020;2 CNET WEBSITE, “Amazon 

sellers will need to list their business name, address on their profiles,” July 8, 2020.3

Perhaps Gyroor and Tomoloo provided their addresses prior to Amazon’s 

requirement. But they do not make that contention in their motion. This undermines 

their argument that their addresses were discoverable by Plaintiffs at the relevant 

time.

But even if their addresses were available, Gyroor and Tomoloo do not 

challenge the other allegations that justified email service in this case. Plaintiffs

plausibly alleged that Gyroor and Tomoloo sell counterfeit products online and are 

located outside the United States. Gyroor and Tomoloo may be able to point to 

physical addresses provided on Amazon, but this does not change the fact that there 

is an epidemic of counterfeit products being sold from outside the United States on 

the internet, and that the characteristics of Gyroor’s and Tomoloo’s websites and 

selling activities allegedly match those of thousands of other websites offering 

counterfeit products. These allegations demonstrate exigent circumstances justifying 

an injunction of Gyroor’s and Tomoloo’s websites and freezing of their associated

assets. Time is of the essence with an injunction in place, so the Court authorized 

 1 Available at https://sellercentral.amazon.com/forums/t/advance-notice-businessname-and-address-to-be-displayed-on-the-seller-profile-page-starting-september-1-

2020/658140.

2 Available at https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/08/amazon-sellers-in-the-us-will-haveto-list-their-names-and-addresses.html.

3 Available at https://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-sellers-will-need-to-list-theirbusiness-name-address-on-their-profiles/.

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email service in order to provide Gyroor and Tomoloo (and the other defendants in 

the case) with notice as quickly as possible. The injunction should not linger while 

the parties and the Court wait for Hague Convention process when an instantaneous, 

reliable, and traceable means of providing notice is available in the form of email.

In addition to arguing that Plaintiffs’ allegations did not justify email service, 

Gyroor and Tomoloo argue that email service violates the Hague Convention and so 

is not permissible under the terms of Rule 4(f)(3) because it is “prohibited by 

international agreement.” But Gyroor and Tomoloo concede that the Hague 

Convention does not mention email service. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 

v. Caniff, 2020 WL 956302, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2020) (“The Convention does not 

affirmatively authorize, nor does it prohibit, service by email.”). Nevertheless, the 

Supreme Court has held that the Hague Convention prohibits at least one form of 

service without explicitly mentioning that form of service. See Volkswagenwerk

Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 703-04 (1988) (holding that the Hague 

Convention implicitly prohibits “notification au parquet”); see also Luxottica, 391 F. 

Supp. 3d at 825 (“Concluding that ‘[t]here is no question but that the Conference 

wanted to eliminate notification au parquet,’ the [Supreme Court] pointed to Articles 

15 and 16, which do not mention that or any other method of service.” (quoting 

Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 703)). But the Supreme Court has also explained that

alternative means of service unmentioned by the Hague Convention are not

prohibited if “the receiving state has not objected to [that alternative form of service].”

Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon, 137 S. Ct. 1504, 1513 (2017) (citing Brockmeyer v.

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May, 383 F.3d 798, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2004)); Commodity Futures, 2020 WL 956302, at 

*5-6 (“apply[ing] the [Water Splash] analysis to service by email”).4

Gyroor and Tomoloo argue that China would “object” to email service and so it 

is not permissible according to Water Splash. They cite China’s objection to postal

service “in the territory of the People’s Republic of China” under the Hague 

Convention. See HAGUE CONFERENCE WEBSITE, “Declarations of the People’s Republic 

of China” (1992).5 But many courts have rejected the analogy of postal service to email 

service. Those courts observe that the instantaneous and traceable nature of email 

cures the concerns with postal service. See Sulzer Mixpac AG v. Medenstar Indus.

Co., 312 F.R.D. 329, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Anova Applied Elecs., Inc. v. Hong King

Grp., Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 465, 471 (D. Mass. 2020); The Neck Hammock, Inc v. 

Danezen.com, 2020 WL 6364598, at *4 (D. Utah Oct. 29, 2020). For this reason, “the 

majority [of courts] have concluded that a country’s objection to [postal service under 

the Hague Convention] does not equate to an objection to email service.” The Neck

Hammock, 2020 WL 6364598, at *4; see also Zanghi v. Ritella, 2020 WL 589409, at 

*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2020) (citing cases); Jackson Lab’y v. Nanjing Univ., 2018 WL 

615667, at *4 (D. Me. Jan. 29, 2018) (citing cases); Rubie’s Costume Co., Inc. v. Yiwu

 4 There is also a second element to this analysis that is not relevant here. The 

Supreme Court explained that the alternative form of service must be “authorized 

under otherwise-applicable law.” See Water Splash, 137 S. Ct. at 1513. By this the 

Supreme Court meant that the alternative form of service must comply with the law 

of the lawsuit’s forum. See id. (remanding in part for consideration of “whether Texas 

law”—the law of the forum—“authorizes the methods of service [at issue]”). Gyroor 

and Tomoloo do not argue that Illinois law prohibits email service. 

5 Available at https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/notifi 

cations/?csid=393&disp=resdn.

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Hua Hao Toys Co., 2019 WL 6310564, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 2019); Genus

Lifesciences Inc. v. Tapaysa Eng’g Works Pvt. Ltd., 2021 WL 915662, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 

Mar. 10, 2021).6 Furthermore, unlike postal service, email does not require physical 

intrusion on Chinese territory, which is China’s express objection to the availability 

of postal service under the Hague Convention. For these reasons, the Court finds it 

is inappropriate to interpret China’s objections to postal service under the Hague 

Convention as encompassing service by email.

Gyroor and Tomoloo also argue that Chinese law prohibits service by email. 

But the Chinese law provisions the parties cite permit email service under certain 

circumstances. See, e.g., R. 24 at 6 (Article 87) (“Subject to the consent of the person 

on which a procedural document is to be served, the document may be served by way 

of . . . electronic mail[.]”). Most notably, Chinese law permits its courts to order service 

by email on a party outside of China, in part because email permits the person to be 

served to “acknowledge” receipt. See id. at 8 (p. 47, Article 267) (“A people’s court may 

serve procedural documents on a party without a domicile within the People’s 

Republic of China in the following ways: . . . Service by . . . e-mail and any other 

means through which the receipt of the document may be acknowledged.”). If China 

permits its courts to order service of Chinese process by email on defendants outside 

China, it cannot credibly object to U.S. courts ordering the same on defendants 

 6 However, some courts have found that China’s objection to postal service implicitly 

incorporates an objection to email service. See, e.g., Anova Applied Elecs., Inc. v. Hong

King Grp., Ltd., 334 F.R.D. 465, 471 (D. Mass. 2020); Gang Li v. Dolar Shop Rest.

Grp., LLC, 2019 WL 4393637, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2019). This Court finds the 

majority position more persuasive.

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located in China. Thus, the Court finds that China has not “objected” to email service, 

and the Court’s order of email service pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) was appropriate.

Conclusion

Therefore, the motions to dismiss [165] [177] are denied.

ENTERED:

______________________________

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

United States District Judge

Dated: April 1, 2021

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