alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

Art Ask Agency

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.:

1:20−cv−04608

Honorable

Manish S. Shah

The Individuals, Corporations, Limited Liability

Companies, Partnerships, and Unincorporated

Associations Identified on Schedule A Hereto, et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Monday, January 25, 2021:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: No defendants have

objected to the motion for entry of default judgment. The motion [66] is granted. Based on

the evidence submitted in support of the temporary restraining order and the admission of

liability by virtue of the default, plaintiff has established that a permanent injunction

should be entered. The infringement of plaintiff's marks and copyrights irreparably harms

plaintiff and confuses the public. The infringement was willful and statutory damages are

awarded. After considering the nature of the products, the price point, the absence of any

concrete evidence of lost profits or high−volume infringement by defendants, the value of

the plaintiff's brand, and the need to deter infringement that is easily committed and

difficult to stop, the court concludes that $50,000 is an appropriate award of statutory

damages. Enter Final Judgment Order. Terminate civil case. Plaintiff's counsel is directed

to review this court's default judgment order closely and, in the future, submit proposed

orders that incorporate the changes the court made to the proposed order submitted in this

case. Notices mailed. (psm, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cv-04608 Document #: 70 Filed: 01/25/21 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:3397
Exhibit 32.1








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. Section 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Annual Report of Ecolocap Solutions Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the “report”), I, Michael Siegel, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated this 14th day of April, 2011.








MICHAEL SIEGELMichael SiegelChief Executive Officer
Opinion issued May 12 , 2022

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01 - 21 - 00573 - CV

——————————— IN THE MATTER OF J. B. J. On Appeal from the 314th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 2020 - 00424J
MEMORANDU M OPINION Appellant, J.B.J., has filed an unopposed motion to dismiss this appeal. No opinion has issued in this appeal. Accordingly, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 42.1(a)(1). We dismiss any other pending motions as moot. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Landau, Hightower, and Rivas

- Molloy.
**EXHIBIT 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report of 1-800 CONTACTS, INC. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod ended April 3, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commissionon the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jonathan C. Coon, Chief Executive Officerof the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)           The information contained in the Report fairly presents,in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations ofthe Company.

 

A signed original of thiswritten statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company andwill be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 
|   | /s/ Jonathan C. Coon    |   |
|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|   | Chief Executive Officer |
|   | Date: May 13, 2004      |

 

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6507

DENNIS STRAPEC,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

VIRGINIA PAROLE BOARD; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, District Judge.

(CA-96-337)

Submitted: November 6, 1997 Decided: November 19, 1997

Before WIDENER and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph William Kaestner, KAESTNER & PITNEY, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; Edward D. Ross, Jr., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Linwood

Theodore Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's orders denying

relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994) (current

version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997)). We have

reviewed the record and the district court's opinion and orders and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of

probable cause to appeal and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of

the district court. Strapec v. Virginia Parole Bd., No. CA-96-337

(E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 1996; Mar. 26, 1997). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521

U.S. ___, 1997 WL 338568 (U.S. June 23, 1997) (No. 96-6298). We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
10076.

#### McDonald *v.*The State.

Decided November 23, 1918.

Conviction of manslaughter; from Calhoun superior court— Judge Harrell. August 17, 1918.

*A. L. Miller,*for plaintiff in error.

*R. C. Bell, solicitor-general, F. A. Hooper, C. J. Taylor,*contra.

Broyles, P. J.

1. The charge upon the law of voluntary manslaughter was authorized by the evidence.

2. The verdict was amply supported by the evidence, and the’ court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bloodworth, J., concurs. Stephens, J., not presiding.*
9729.

#### Boyd *v.*Newton County.

Decided February 1, 1919.

Trover; from Newton superior court—Judge Smith. April 17, 1918.

*Rogers & Knox,*for plaintiff in error. *King & Johnson,*contra.

Stephens, J.

1. Timber when felled, cut, and stacked into cord-wood becomes.personalty, and does not pass as a part of tbe realty upon the sale of the land upon which it lies. When, therefore, the *owner*of land, who was the owner of forty-three cords of wood stacked thereon, sold said land and made to the purchaser a warranty deed conveying the land, the title to said wood did not thereby pass to such purchaser. There being no evidence of any contract of the sale of said wood, the title to the same remained in the vendor of the land, and he could recover such wood from the purchaser of the land by an action in trover.

2. The court did not err in ruling out evidence that, there wgs a tenant house on the place. Even if such evidence authorized the inference that at the time of the execution of the deed to said land it was occupied by a tenant having the right to cut and gather fire-wood, it did not negative the positive and uncontradicted testimony that the title to the particular wood in question was at the time of said sale in the plaintiff.

3. The trial judge did not err in directing a verdict for the plaintiff.

4. The, prayer of the defendant in error for the allowance of damages against the plaintiff in error for- bringing this case to this court for the purpose of delay, as contended by defendant in error, is denied.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur.*
Please direct any questions to Dr. John Zachary,

Response to

NIST AI Risk Management Framework: Second Draft

Call for Comments

Submitted by

National Artificial Intelligence Institute (NAII)

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)

September 29, 2022

• The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy announced the forthcoming AI Bill of

Rights at the VA NAII BRAIN Summit on September 8, 2022. It has similar aim as the NIST AI RMF

but satisfies a different goal (support policies and practices around AI to protect American civil

rights). It is recommended to update Table 1 to present a comparison between the NIST AI RMF,

Executive Order 13960, and the WH AI Bill of Rights once it is released.

• In Appendix B “How AI Risks Differ from Traditional Software Risks”, NIST may consider

expanding on security and privacy controls from NIST standards (e.g. 800-53 rev5) that have a

positive impact on addressing AI risks, either partially or in full.

• Suggestions for Attributes of AI RMF (p4):

o Strengthen number 8 to describe alignment with and a unique risk-based perspective of

trustworthy AI principles compared to other federal standards and guidelines, especially

EO 13960 and the forthcoming White House AI Bill of Rights.

o Include an attribute to describe an AI RMF success criterion

• Provide more guidance and detail on risk measurement and stratification (high, medium, low) to

support a standardized approach to describing trustworthy AI risk.

• Editorial suggestions:

o Update subsection 3.2.1 with bullets or integrated the text into fewer cohesive

paragraphs

o Update the last sentence of 3.2.2 to “Conversely, the lowest-risk AI systems and

contexts may suggest potentially lower prioritizations.”

o Update headers for subsections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 to accurately reflect intent of narrative

o Figure 4 does not appear referenced in the text. Also, the figure suggests most principles

are dependent on the “Accountable & Transparent” principle, but that isn’t described in

the text.

o The text switches between “Accountable & Transparent” and “Transparent &

Accountable”.

o Suggest using the form “Fair and bias in managed”, i.e., remove the em-dash.

o Suggest using bullets in section 4.1 for “Measures of accuracy”, “Reliability”, and

“Robustness or generalizability”

o Suggest a general reordering of AI RMF principles where “Safe” and “Secure and

Resilient” are adjacent since they are very similar in nature.

o Suggest a general reordering of AI RMF principles where “Fair and Bias is Managed” is

adjacent to “Privacy-Enhanced”
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                             478
<SECURITIES>                                         9
<RECEIVABLES>                                      809
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        391
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  1687
<PP&E>                                            6048
<DEPRECIATION>                                    3516
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    4841
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                             1636
<BONDS>                                              0
<COMMON>                                            30
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          1
<OTHER-SE>                                        2767
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      4841
<SALES>                                           3417
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  3421
<CGS>                                             2025
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                     2025
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  1266
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  47
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                 83
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                        83
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .02
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
7787.

#### Swicord *v.*Crawford *et al.,*receivers.

Decided April 4, 1919.

Complaint; from city court of Cairo—Judge Willie. July 19, 1916. .

*S. P. Cain, Little, Powell, Smith & Goldstein,*for plaintiff in error.

*M. L. Ledford, Claude Christopher,*contra.

Broyles, P. J.

L “Stockholders in a bank incorporated under the laws of this State since the passage of- the act of 1893, whether original subscribers, or purchasers of stock from the corporation, or transferees of such stockholders, are individually liable equally and ratably (and not one for another as- *sureties)'*to depositors of said corporation for all moneys deposited therein, in an amount equal to the face value of their respective shares of stock.” *Crawford*v. *Swicord,*147 *Ga.*548 (94 S. E. 1025). " .

2. “In a suit brought by the receivers of an insolvent bank, chartered under the laws of Georgia since the act of 1893 (Acts 1893, p. 70), against a stockholder thereof upon his statutory individual liability to depositors of the bank (Civil Code of 1910, § 2270), the defendant can not set off the amount of his individual deposits which he had in the bank when it became insolvent and ceased to operate. . . Nor can he set off an amount of money which, subsequently to the insolvency and closing of the bank but prior to the commencement of such suit against him, he voluntarily paid to other depositors of the bank to reimburse them for the loss of their deposits.” *Swicord*v. *Crawford,*148 *Ga.*719 (S. E.).

3. The first ruling stated above was made by the Supreme Court when this case was carried there by certiorari, and the contrary rilling by this court (20 *Ga. App.*35, 92 S. E. 394) was thereby reversed and overruled. Under the ruling of the. Supreme Court, the. trial court did not err in overruling the general demurrer to'the plaintiff’s petition. The contrary ruling by this court is, on review, hereby expressly overruled.

4. Under the ruling in paragraph 2, supra, the judge, sitting without the intervention of a jury, did not err in rendering judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount sued for.

5. The former judgment of reversal rendered by this court and reported in 20 *Ga. App.*35, is ordered vacated, and the plaintiff in error is taxed with all costs of the proceedings in the trial court and in the reviewing courts.

*Judgement affirmed.*

*Bloodworth and Stephens, JJ., concur.*
108TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3915

AN ACT

To provide for an additional temporary extension of programs under the Small Business Act and the Small

Business Investment Act of 1958 through April 2, 2004,

and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 3915 EH

1 SECTION 1. ADDITIONAL TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF AU2 THORIZATION OF PROGRAMS UNDER THE

3 SMALL BUSINESS ACT AND THE SMALL BUSI4 NESS INVESTMENT ACT OF 1958.

5 The authorization for any program, authority, or pro6 vision, including any pilot program, that was extended

7 through March 15, 2004, by section 1(a) of Public Law

8 108–172 is further extended through April 2, 2004, under

9 the same terms and conditions.

10 SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF CERTAIN FEE AUTHORIZATIONS.

11 Section 503(f) of the Small Business Investment Act

12 of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 697(f)) is amended by striking ‘‘Octo13 ber 1, 2003’’ and inserting ‘‘May 21, 2004’’.

Passed the House of Representatives March 10,

2004.

Attest:

Clerk.
108TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. R. 3915

AN ACT

To provide for an additional temporary extension of

programs under the Small Business Act and theSmall Business Investment Act of 1958 throughApril 2, 2004, and for other purposes.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

DONOVAN M. HENRY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D22-1559

[January 26, 2023]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Caroline C. Shepherd,

Judge; L.T. Case No. 502015CF012851A.

James S. Lewis, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GERBER, KUNTZ and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
H. R. 3942

One Hundred Eighth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

the twentieth day of January, two thousand and four

An Act

To redesignate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 7 Commercial Boulevard in Middletown, Rhode Island, as the ‘‘Rhode Island Veterans Post

Office Building’’.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REDESIGNATION.

The facility of the United States Postal Service located at

7 Commercial Boulevard in Middletown, Rhode Island, is hereby

redesignated as the ‘‘Rhode Island Veterans Post Office Building’’.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper,

or other record of the United States to the facility referred to

in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Rhode

Island Veterans Post Office Building’’.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
EXHIBIT 35.2

 

ANNUAL SERVICER’S CERTIFICATE

 

GE DEALER FLOORPLAN MASTER NOTE TRUST

 

March 26, 2014

 

The undersigned, aduly authorized officer of GE Commercial Distribution Finance Corporation (“CDF”), as the sub-servicer (the“Sub-Servicer”), pursuant to the Amended and Restated Sub-Servicing Agreement dated as of August 10, 2006 (asmay be further amended and supplemented from time to time, the “Agreement”), between General Electric CapitalCorporation and CDF, does hereby certify that:

 

1.        CDFis, as of the date hereof, Sub-Servicer under the Agreement.

 

2.        Theundersigned is an authorized officer who is duly authorized pursuant to the Agreement to execute and deliver this certificate tothe GE Dealer Floorplan Master Note Trust.

 

3.        Areview of the activities of Sub-Servicer during the fiscal year ended December 31, 2013 (the “reporting period”), andof its performance under the Agreement, has been made under my supervision.

 

4.        Tothe best of my knowledge, based on such review, Sub-Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all materialrespects throughout the reporting period.

 

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,the undersigned has duly executed this certificate the date first above written.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

HOWARD COHAN, CASE NO. 20-04695

Plaintiff,

vs. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF SOUGHT

BOLINGBROOK MOTEL, INC.,

d/b/a HAMPTON INN & SUITES

BOLINGBROOK,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

JOINT STIPULATION OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiff, Howard Cohan (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant, Bolingbrook Motel, Inc., d/b/a 

Hampton Inn & Suites Bolingbrook (“Defendant”) (“Plaintiff and Defendant are collectively 

referred to as the Parties”), hereby stipulate, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, that the captioned case be voluntarily dismissed with prejudice without costs 

or fees being assessed by the Court.

Jointly submitted this 29th day of January, 2021.

Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Robert M. Kaplan By: /s/ Lisa Handler Ackerman

Counsel for the Plaintiff Counsel for Defendant

Law Offices of Robert M. Kaplan, PC Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker

1535 W. Schaumburg Rd., Suite 204 55 W. Monroe Street, Ste 3800

Schaumburg, IL 60194 Chicago, IL 60603

Tel: (847) 895-9151 Tel.: (312) 704-0550

rmkap@robertkaplanlaw.com lisa.ackerman@wilsonelser.com

Case: 1:20-cv-04695 Document #: 11 Filed: 02/01/21 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:34
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C.
§ 1350)




I,
Charles E. Ramey, of US Dataworks, Inc. certify pursuant to section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:




(i)           the
Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009 (the “Report”),
which this statement accompanies fully complies with the requirements of section
13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(ii)           the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of US Dataworks, Inc. as of
the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.




Dated:  August
14, 2009




/s/ Charles E. RameyCharles
      E. RameyChief
      Executive Officer
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**

**SANTO BORRERO-BEJERANO,**

**Petitioner :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 564 MAL 2015** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 24th day of November, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of** 

**Appeal is** DENIED

**.**