UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JILL A. W.,

 Plaintiff,

 Case No. 20 C 3854

 v.

 Magistrate Judge Sunil R. Harjani

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) 

[34]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. The motion 

is granted to the extent that the Court evaluates Plaintiff’s challenge to the ALJ’s step four 

determination but concludes the ALJ did not err at step four. The motion is therefore denied in all 

other respects, and the judgment entered on January 26, 2022 [33] stands. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jill A. W. (“Jill”) applied for DIB on October 2, 2017, alleging disability since 

June 29, 2016 due to Ehlers-Danlos syndrome, fibromyalgia, small fiber peripheral neuropathy, 

left side weakness with foot drop, chronic fatigue, spinal neuritis, autonomic dysfunction, 

hypothyroidism, left hip pain with labrum tear and osteoarthritis, and a sleep disorder. She has a 

history of chronic migraine headaches, an eating disorder, insomnia, irritable bowel syndrome, 

post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, depression, and medication overuse. 

After her claim was denied at all levels of administrative review, Jill sought judicial review. In 

denying Jill’s request for reversal and remand and granting the Acting Commissioner’s 

motion for summary judgment, the Court upheld the ALJ’s finding that Jill was not disabled.

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Jill A. W. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 225879 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2022). With final judgment entered, 

Jill now moves to alter or amend the judgment entered on January 26, 2022 pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

As part of her decision, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) determined that Jill had the 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with additional postural, 

manipulative, and environmental limitations. (R. 70-75). Based on that RFC, the ALJ found at 

step four that Jill could perform her past relevant work as a user support analyst supervisor and 

vice president as generally performed. Id. at 75-76. In challenging that determination before this 

Court, Jill argued that the ALJ erred by misclassifying her past work as a user support analyst 

supervisor because she did not perform the job of a user support analyst supervisor as described in 

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”). Doc. 19 at 13-14. Regarding her prior vice 

president position, Jill argued that the ALJ impermissibly relied on a broad, generic classification 

of her occupation. Id. at 14-15. She further argued that the failed to evaluate that position as a 

composite job that combined elements of a consultant and vice president and thus, the ALJ erred 

in considering how the job is generally performed as opposed to how Jill actually performed it 

with her prior employer. Id. at 15.

In its opinion, the Court did not rule on whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s 

step four determination. Jill A. W., 2022 WL 225879, at *12. Rather, the Court explained that 

the vocational expert (“VE”) testified that other jobs existed in the national economy for a 

hypothetical person with the RFC assigned by the ALJ to Jill who was further limited to simple 

routine tasks and simple work-related decisions. Id. The Court noted that if a person was limited 

to simple routine tasks and simple work-related decisions, she would be more limited than the RFC 

found by the ALJ, which included no mental limitations. Id. As a result, the Court found any error 

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in the ALJ’s step four finding was harmless because the VE testified that an individual of Jill's

background, who had the RFC to perform an even more limited range of sedentary work than 

found by the ALJ, could perform other jobs existing in sufficient numbers in the national economy, 

including document preparer, telephone information clerk, and charge account clerk. Id. Thus, the 

VE's testimony showed that the ALJ’s decision would be the same under this alternative RFC at 

step five. Id. 

DISCUSSION

In her motion to alter or amend, Jill argues that the Court erred in failing to consider her 

step four challenge based on harmless error and the VE’s testimony about other jobs where the 

ALJ did not make an alternative step-five finding. Jill also challenges the other jobs identified by 

the VE (a step five consideration). In response, the Commissioner maintains that that Jill is 

inappropriately attempting to relitigate her step four arguments that the Court has already rejected. 

The Commissioner also argues that the Court did not err in holding that any error at step four 

relating to Jill’s past relevant work was harmless. The Commissioner further submits that Jill 

forfeited her arguments regarding her past relevant work by failing to object during the hearing

before the ALJ. Finally, the Commissioner argues that: (1) Jill improperly raises new arguments 

regarding the other jobs in the national economy identified by the VE; (2) she waived any challenge 

under SSR 00-4p to the other jobs by failing to object at the hearing and failing to establish that 

any conflict was so obvious that the ALJ should have noted it; and (3) her arguments about the 

other jobs identified by the VE are without merit.

Generally, “[a] motion under Rule 59(e) may be granted only if there has been a manifest 

error of fact or law, or if there is newly discovered evidence that was not previously 

available.” Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021). Moreover, a motion to 

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reconsider under Rule 59(e) cannot be used to “to advance arguments or theories that could and 

should have been made before the district court rendered a judgment.” Cehovic-Dixneuf v. Wong, 

895 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). With these 

standards in mind, the Court considers Jill’s motion.

A. Harmless Error Analysis 

Initially, the Court notes that Jill’s original briefing did not preserve a challenge to the 

Court’s finding that any alleged error in the ALJ’s step four finding is harmless. In the previous 

briefing, Jill did not argue, as she does now, that alleged erroneous step four findings cannot be 

rendered harmless by VE testimony when the ALJ’s decision did not include an alternative step 

five finding. Rather, Jill’s only reply to the Commissioner’s harmless error argument was: “as to 

the harmless error for the alternative Step Five jobs, again, as noted in the opening brief and infra, 

[Jill] disputes the ALJ’s finding she is capable of light work.”1 Doc. 30. Thus, Jill argued the 

ALJ’s findings as to her functional limitations were wrong, but she did not raise the precise 

argument she raises here, namely, that a harmless error finding cannot be made based on the VE’s 

testimony regarding other jobs where the ALJ did not include an alternative step five finding in 

her decision. Ordinarily, arguments not raised in the original briefing are waived. See Pole v.

Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 938-39 (7th Cir. 2009); Mungo v. Taylor, 355 F.3d 969, 978 (7th Cir. 

2004) (“Arguments raised for the first time in connection with a motion for reconsideration . . . are 

generally deemed to be waived.”). However, in this case, the Commissioner has not made a waiver 

argument, and a waiver argument can be waived. See United States v. Stapleton, 56 F.4th 532, 541 

(7th Cir. 2022) (“But rather than assert waiver, the government addressed [defendant’s] argument 

on the merits. We will do the same.”); Reck v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 27 F.4th 473, 485 

1 The Court assumes that Jill’s reference to “light work” was inadvertent and she intended to refer to 

“sedentary work” given that the ALJ’s RFC provided for a range of sedentary work. (R. 70).

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n.30 (7th Cir. 2022) (defendant “does not raise the waiver issue in her appeal brief, and a waiver 

argument can be waived.”); Nolen v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 516, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding in 

social security disability case that the government “waived the waiver issue”). By failing to argue 

that Jill forfeited this particular argument and by responding to Jill’s harmless error argument, the 

Commissioner has waived the waiver argument. The Court therefore exercises its discretion to 

proceed to the merits of the harmless error issue raised by Jill. Fifth Third Mortgage Co. v. 

Kaufman, 934 F.3d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 2019). 

The Commissioner argues that the Court properly concluded that any alleged error at step 

four was harmless. As a general proposition, the harmless error standard applies to judicial review 

of ALJ decisions in social security disability cases. Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644, 654 (7th Cir. 

2022). The Commissioner invites the Court to hold that an alternative step five finding by the ALJ 

was not necessary to find harmless error here because there is sufficient VE testimony in the record 

to justify a decision against Jill at step five. In support, the Commissioner cites cases in this district 

which have found the harmless error standard applies to a physician’s proposed RFC restriction 

not adopted by the ALJ where the VE testified that someone with that additional limitation could 

still perform the claimant’s past relevant work or a significant number of other jobs. Doc. 36 at 4. 

While the harmless error rule has been used in such a context, the Commissioner does not direct 

the Court to a decision in which a court has expressly held that the harmless error doctrine properly 

applies to an erroneous step four finding when VE testimony indicates that there were other jobs 

the claimant could perform but the ALJ ends her analysis at step four and does not make an 

alternative step five finding. Such a holding, in any event, would be inconsistent with longstanding 

precedent that judicial review is limited to the reasons offered by the ALJ. See Poole v. Kijakazi, 

28 F.4th 792, 797 (7th Cir. 2022) (“We must confine our review to the reasons supplied by the 

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ALJ, rather than allowing the government to invent new findings to rescue an insufficient decision 

on appeal.”); Jeske v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Our review is limited also to the 

ALJ's rationales; we do not uphold an ALJ's decision by giving it different ground to stand 

upon.”); Hardy v. Berryhill, 908 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 2018) (“the ALJ's decision cannot be 

defended on a basis not articulated in her order”); Campbell v. Astrue, 627 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 

2010) (“Our review is limited to the reasons articulated by the ALJ in her decision.”); Steele v. 

Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 941 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[R]egardless whether there is enough evidence in 

the record to support the ALJ's decision, principles of administrative law require the ALJ to 

rationally articulate the grounds for her decision and confine our review to the reasons supplied by 

the ALJ.”). So, the Court cannot confidently say that that any error on the ALJ’s part at step four 

in determining that Jill could perform her past work was harmless as was the case in Cooley v.

Berryhill, 738 F. App’x 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2018), Guranovich v. Astrue, 465 F. App’x 541, 543-

44 (7th Cir. 2012), and Ziegler v. Astrue, 336 Fed. App'x 563, 570–71 (7th Cir. 2009).

2

 

Accordingly, in these circumstances, the Court declines to find that the alleged errors in the ALJ’s 

step four determination were harmless and proceeds to consider Jill’s challenge to the ALJ’s step 

four finding.

B. ALJ’s Step Four Determination

Turning to step four, Jill argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in finding her 

capable of performing her past relevant work. When making a determination at step four, “[p]ast 

2 See also Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Had the ALJ conducted a step-five 

analysis to determine whether [claimant] could perform other jobs in the national economy, the error [step 

four] might be harmless. Nevertheless, he did not do so here, and we cannot fill that gap.”); Garcia v. 

Colvin, 2013 WL 3321509, at *11 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2013) (“we conclude that the ALJ's step four finding 

requires reversal. We reject the Commissioner's argument that the ALJ's step four finding is harmless error 

given the VE's testimony that Garcia could perform other work in the national economy. Not only are there 

other errors requiring remand here, the ALJ did not make a step five finding and we cannot simply ‘fill that 

gap.’”).

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work experience must be considered carefully to assure that the available facts support a 

conclusion regarding the claimant’s ability or inability to perform the functional activities required 

in this work.” SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *3 (Jan. 1, 1982). At step four, “the burden of proof 

rests on the claimant to establish that she is not capable of performing her past work.” Sevec v. 

Kijakazi, 59 F.4th 293, 300 n. 35 (7th Cir. 2023); Getch, 539 F.3d at 480. 

At the hearing, Jill testified that she has an MBA and worked previously as an IT manager 

and chief information officer at a greeting card company and as a vice president at a Dutch dairy 

trading firm and. (R. 89-91). The ALJ asked the VE to describe Jill’s past relevant work. Id. at 

118-19. The VE classified Jill’s two past jobs as User Support Analyst Supervisor (DOT 032.132-

010) and Vice President (DOT 189.117-034). Id. at 119. The ALJ asked the VE if her testimony 

was consistent with the DOT. Id. at 122. The VE responded that her testimony was largely 

consistent with the DOT, except with regard to absenteeism and off task behavior, where she 

applied her education and work experience. Id. Jill’s attorney did not question the VE. Id. In 

accordance with the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Jill could not perform her past relevant 

work as she actually performed it but she remained able to engage in such work as generally 

performed. Id. at 75-76, 119-20. Jill challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that she can perform her 

past relevant work, both as a User Support Analyst Supervisor and as a Vice President. The 

Court’s analysis focuses on the Vice President job, since it is clear that Jill has failed to demonstrate 

that the ALJ erred in evaluating her past relevant work as a vice president and this conclusion is 

dispositive of her motion. See Dowlen v. Colvin, 658 F. App’x 807, 813 (7th Cir. 2016) (a claimant

“needs to be able to perform only one of her past relevant jobs in order to be considered not 

disabled.”). Given this conclusion, the Court need not address the remaining argument Jill raises 

as to the User Support Analyst Supervisor job.

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Jill contends that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate her past relevant work as a 

vice president because: (1) the ALJ improperly relied on a broad, generic classification of her 

occupation and (2) her position “appears to be a composite of a consultant and VP.” Doc. 19 at 14-

15; Doc. 34 at 6-7. The Court disagrees with Jill on both counts. Regarding her first argument, 

Social Security Rule 82-61 makes it “clear that broad, generic occupation classification of a job 

such as ‘delivery job’ or ‘packing job’ are insufficient to test whether a claimant can perform past 

relevant work.” Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2001); see SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 

31387, at *1 (1982) (“Finding that a claimant has the capacity to do past relevant work on the basis 

of a generic occupational classification of the work is likely to be fallacious and unsupportable.”). 

In this case, however, the ALJ did not rely on a generic classification of the vice president job. 

Rather, the ALJ specifically relied on the VE’s classification of Jill’s past vice president work 

under DOT l89.117-034, which is titled “Vice President (any industry),” and the DOT’s 

description of that job. (R. 76, 119). SSR 82-61 provides that DOT numbers may be relied upon 

to define a job as it is usually performed in the national economy. SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 31387, at 

*2 (“The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) descriptions can be relied upon—for jobs that 

are listed in the DOT—to define the job as it is usually performed in the national economy. . . . It 

is understood that some individual jobs may require somewhat more or less exertion than the DOT 

description.”). Jill has not demonstrated that the ALJ’s reliance on DOT l89.117-034 equates to 

the ALJ impermissibly concluding that Jill could perform her past relevant work based on a broad, 

generic occupational classification of that job. Therefore, the ALJ did not improperly rely on a 

broad, generic classification of Jill’s past relevant work as Jill suggests. Cf. Carmickle v. Comm’r,

Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008) (remanding where ALJ relied on VE’s the 

generic classification of the plaintiff’s past relevant without explanation and VE failed to identify 

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a specific DOT listing); Leggett v. Chater, 77 F.3d 492 (Table), 1996 WL 71746, at *2–3 (10th 

Cir. Feb. 20, 1996) (holding ALJ erred in classify the plaintiff’s past relevant work as “purchasing 

agent” to refer to a generic classification of purchasing-related jobs, despite a specific DOT listing 

for “purchasing agent” which the ALJ did not mention).

Also unavailing is Jill’s assertion that the ALJ erred by not considering whether her past 

relevant work as a vice president constituted a composite job, which resulted from the ALJ failing 

to resolve the apparent conflict between the DOT definition and the VE’s classification of Jill’s 

past relevant work.

3

 “Composite jobs have significant elements of two or more occupations and, 

as such, have no counterpart in the DOT.” SSR 82–61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2. Additionally, “[a] 

claimant is not disabled if he can do his past relevant work either in the manner he performed it 

before the impairment or in the manner it is generally performed in the national economy.” Ray v. 

Berryhill, 915 F.3d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original). However, “[i]f the prior 

position was a composite job, the ALJ may not reference [the DOT] when determining whether a 

claimant can perform his past job.” Id; Wiggins v. Colvin, 2015 WL 2398478, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 

18, 2015) (“Where a claimant’s past relevant work consists of a composite job, the ALJ must 

evaluate the particular facts of an individual case.”). “‘Picking out the line’ of how to define a 

claimant’s past relevant work is ‘a task for the agency, subject to light judicial review.” Wiggins, 

2015 WL 2398478, at *5 (quoting Smith v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 251, 253 (7th Cir. 2004)).

3 The Commissioner argues that Jill forfeited this issue because neither she nor her attorney raised it

during the administrative hearing. Doc. 25 at 14-15; Doc. 36 at 2 n.2. This argument ignores that the 

Seventh Circuit has established an exception to the waiver rule when “conflicts were obvious enough that 

the ALJ should have picked upon them without any assistance.” Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 456, 463 (7th 

Cir. 2008). “[B]ecause SSR 00-4p imposes an affirmative duty on the ALJ to inquire into and resolve 

apparent conflicts, a claimant’s failure to raise a possible violation of SSR 00-4p at the administrative level 

does not forfeit the right to argue later that a violation occurred.” Id. Jill therefore did not waive the issue 

of an apparent conflict by failing to raise it before the ALJ.

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Moreover, “[i]f “evidence from a VE ‘appears to conflict with the DOT,’ SSR 00-4p 

requires further inquiry: an ALJ must obtain ‘a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict.’”

Overman, 546 F.3d at 463; SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *4 (Dec. 4, 2000). A conflict is 

apparent if it is “so obvious that the ALJ should have picked up on [it] without any assistance.” 

Weatherbee v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Overman, 546 F.3d at 463). The 

ALJ must resolve any apparent conflicts even if the claimant's counsel did not raise the issue at 

the administrative level. Overman, 546 F.3d at 463; Weatherbee, 649 F.3d at 570 (“Ruling 00-4p 

requires ALJs to investigate and resolve any apparent conflict between the VE's testimony and 

the DOT.”); see also Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, 254-55 (7th Cir. 2016) (where the VE's 

testimony appears to conflict with the DOT, “a claimant's failure to object during a hearing cannot 

excuse an ALJ's failure to” obtain a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict).

Based on Jill’s testimony and the evidence in the record regarding her work background, 

the VE classified Jill’s past work as a “Vice President” (Any Industry) (DOT 189.117-034). (R. 

118-19). The DOT lists the main duties of the vice president occupation as directing and 

coordinating activities of one or more departments and aiding the chief administrative officer in 

formulating and administering organization policies. DOT 189.117-034, 1991 WL 671490. The 

ALJ adopted the VE’s opinion that Jill’s past relevant work at the Dutch dairy trading firm was 

appropriately categorized as Vice President, DOT 189.117-034, sedentary level of exertion, skilled 

work with an SVP of 8. (R. 76). The ALJ did not analyze Jill’s past job as a composite job. Neither 

Jill nor her attorney raised the composite job issue during the hearing before the ALJ. As a result, 

Jill must now demonstrate that “the conflicts were obvious enough that the ALJ should have picked 

up on them without any assistance.” Surprise v. Saul, 968 F.3d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 2020) 

(quoting Overman, 546 F.3d at 463). Jill fails to make such a showing.

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In support of her argument that her prior vice president position appeared to be a composite 

job that combined elements of the Consultant and Vice President occupations, Jill cites her Work 

History Report and her hearing testimony. Doc. 34 at 6-7. Jill points out that in her written 

description, she wrote she was a “senior IT and HR management team leader.” (R. 311). She 

further noted “she led multiple teams and staff to stabilize technology, research, and propose new 

processes, systems, and organizations” with domestic and global travel, working 11 hours a day 

and 5-6 days per week. Id. Jill cites her testimony that her vice president position was a newly 

created position and she worked six years in this one role. Id. 89. Jill testified that her job 

responsibilities were to “review the entire way and processes [within] the company worked.” Id. 

at 89-90. So, she was “effectively . . . responsible for working with everybody.” Id. at 90. She 

indicates that she described her role as like an “internal consultant” where she “would often get 

groups of people together” and be seated for one or two hour meetings or “might lead a group” 

and be moving around at the whiteboard. Id.

Jill does not explain why any of this evidence should have alerted the ALJ that there was 

an apparent conflict between the VE’s testimony and the DOT such that she needed to evaluate 

and resolve whether Jill’s vice president position was possibly a composite job of both a Vice 

President and a Consultant. In her own report about her work, Jill listed her job title as “Vice 

President.” (R. 310). Jill contends, however, that her “testimony was enough to alert the ALJ” that 

her past position was composite. Doc. 39 at 2. Jill emphasizes that she testified that “her role was 

like an internal consultant.” Doc. 34 at 6. But in fact, the testimony Jill cites shows she merely 

testified that her vice president “role was a little bit like an internal consultant,” which was not 

sufficient to alert the ALJ to the possibility that her past work had “significant elements” from the 

Consultant job. Id. at 90 (emphasis added); SSR 82-61, 1982 WL 31387, at *2. In her briefs, Jill 

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does not even cite the DOT number for the consultant job at issue here. Doc. 34 at 6-7; Doc. 39 at 

2-3; see also Doc. 19 at 15; Doc. 30 at 16-17. Nor does Jill discuss the demands of a consultant 

job under the DOT and attempt to explain how any of the job duties she described qualify as a 

significant element of the Consultant occupation under the DOT description.4 Jill bears the burden 

of showing an apparent conflict. Based upon this record, Jill has not demonstrated that her written 

submission and testimony was sufficient to have alerted the ALJ to consider whether her past job 

as vice president was a composite job involving both the DOT occupations of Consultant and Vice 

President, thereby creating a discrepancy between the VE's testimony and the DOT. Therefore, 

Jill has waived any challenge under SSR 00-4p, and the ALJ had no duty under SSR 00-4p to 

resolve the alleged conflict.

In the end, Jill’s description of her vice president job simply showed there was a distinction 

between how the vice president job is generally performed in the national economy (sedentary 

work) and how Jill actually performed it (light work). (R. 119). And the fact that Jill performed 

4 DOT 189.167-010 defines the duties of a Consultant as:

Consults with client to define need or problem, conducts studies and surveys to obtain data, 

and analyzes data to advise on or recommend solution, utilizing knowledge of theory, 

principles, or technology of specific discipline or field of specialization: Consults with 

client to ascertain and define need or problem area, and determine scope of investigation 

required to obtain solution. Conducts study or survey on need or problem to obtain data 

required for solution. Analyzes data to determine solution, such as installation of alternate 

methods and procedures, changes in processing methods and practices, modification of 

machines or equipment, or redesign of products or services. Advises client on alternate 

methods of solving need or problem, or recommends specific solution. May negotiate 

contract for consulting service. May specialize in providing consulting service to 

government in field of specialization. May be designated according to field of 

specialization such as engineering or science discipline, economics, education, labor, or in 

specialized field of work as health services, social services, or investment services.

DOT 189.167-010, 1991 WL 671495. The Consultant occupation is at the sedentary exertional level. Id. 

Jill has offered no argument showing that any of these consultant duties made up a significant portion of 

her prior vice president position. 

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her job as a vice president at a higher exertional level than the DOT listing does not mean that she 

performed a composite job, and Jill cites no case law to stand for this proposition. Felty v. Saul, 

2019 WL 6997916, at *12 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 27, 2019) (“The fact that the exertional or functional 

requirements of the job as [c]laimant actually performed it were in excess of the DOT definition, 

does not make it a composite position.”). SSR 82-61 makes clear that “some individual jobs may 

require somewhat more or less exertion than the DOT description” and that a claimant’s former 

job “may have involved functional demands and job duties significantly in excess of those 

generally required for the job by other employers throughout the national economy.” SSR 82-61, 

1982 WL 31387, at *2. Notably, “if the claimant cannot perform the excessive functional demands 

and/or job duties actually required in the former job but can perform the functional demands and 

job duties as generally required by employers throughout the economy, the claimant should be 

found to be ‘not disabled.’” Id. Therefore, the ALJ did not err by failing to consider whether Jill’s

past relevant work as a vice president constituted a composite job. 

CONCLUSION

 For all these reasons, Jill has not shown that the ALJ committed reversible error in finding 

that she was capable of performing her past relevant work as a vice president as generally

performed. Accordingly, Jill’s Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) 

is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted as to the request that the Court evaluate

the step four challenge, but denied to the extent it seeks an order reversing and remanding the 

ALJ’s decision and amending the judgment entered on January 26, 2022. 

SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 14, 2023 ______________________________ 

 Sunil R. Harjani

United States Magistrate Judge 

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