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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

WINDY CITY LIMOUSINE COMPANY, 

LLC, a limited liability company,

Plaintiff,

v.

CINCINNATI FINANCIAL 

CORPORATION, a corporation; 

THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE 

COMPANY, a stock insurance company;

THE CINCINNATI CASUALTY 

COMPANY, a stock insurance company; 

THE CINCINNATI INDEMNITY 

COMPANY, a stock insurance company; 

and VALLEY COMPANIES, INC., a 

corporation,

Defendants.

No. 1:20-cv-4901

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND 

Plaintiff, WINDY CITY LIMOUSINE COMPANY, LLC (“WCL”), by and through its

attorneys, CORBOY & DEMETRIO, P.C., moves this Honorable Court to remand this cause to 

the Circuit Court of Cook County, State of Illinois pursuant to 28. U.S.C. §1447. In support of this 

motion, Plaintiff states as follows: 

I. INTRODUCTION 

On June 15, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County,

Chancery Division, against Defendants seeking declaratory judgment regarding the rights and 

obligations of the parties under an insurance agreement, Policy: ENP 053 90 57 (“the Policy”), 

entered into by the parties.

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On August 20, 2020, Defendants, Cincinnati Financial Corporation, The Cincinnati 

Insurance Company, The Cincinnati Casualty Company, and The Cincinnati Indemnity Company 

(collectively, “TCC Defendants”), filed a Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), 

asserting original subject matter jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to diversity of citizenship under 

28 U.S.C. § 1332.

This Court should remand this case back to the Circuit Court of Cook County because: (1) 

Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing federal jurisdiction is proper; and (2) 

Illinois State Court is best equipped to handle this declaratory judgment action involving 

interpretation of an insurance agreement regulated by the State of Illinois. 

II. ARGUMENT

A. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IS IMPROPER.

i. Complete diversity among the parties is absent.

TCC Defendants base their notice of removal solely on diversity of citizenship under 28 

U.S.C. §1332. (Notice of Removal; 1:20-cv-4901, Fed. Dkt. No. 1, PageID 5 at ¶16). Diversity 

only exists if all the plaintiffs and all the defendants are citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. 

§1332 (a) (1). Further, a district court does not have original jurisdiction if any defendant is a 

citizen of the state in which the action is brought. 28 U.S.C §1441 (b) (2). Both Plaintiff and 

Defendant, Valley Insurance Group (“VIG”), are citizens of the State of Illinois. (Exhibit A –

Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment; 1:20-cv-4901, Fed. Dkt. No. 1-1, PageID 14 at

¶1; PageID 15 at ¶3). Thus, this Court does not have diversity jurisdiction over this matter. 

ii. TCC Defendants fail to meet their heavy burden of establishing Plaintiff 

fraudulently joined VIG. 

The doctrine of fraudulent joinder, viewed within the scope of the issues and potential 

issues to arise in this case, fails to provide a basis for TCC Defendants to move this Honorable 

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Court to disregard the Illinois citizenship of VIG. Under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, a 

district court considering removal may disregard the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant, 

assume jurisdiction over the case, dismiss the non-diverse defendant, and thereby have original 

jurisdiction under diversity of citizenship. Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 763

(7th Cir. 2009). A removing defendant must “show, after resolving all issues of fact and law in 

favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot establish a cause against the in-state defendant.” Poulos

v. Naas Foods, Inc., 959 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1992). A removing defendant bears a “heavy 

burden” to establish fraudulent joinder. Schur, 577 F.3d at 764. The Seventh Circuit found this 

burden is even more favorable to the plaintiff than the burden applied to a motion to dismiss under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. Ultimately, “the district court must ask itself whether 

there is any reasonable possibility the plaintiff could prevail against the non-diverse defendant.”

Id.

Here, TCC Defendants cannot meet their heavy burden of showing Plaintiff fraudulently 

joined the non-diverse Defendant, VIG. Plaintiff filed its declaratory judgment lawsuit in state 

court seeking a judicial declaration that the Policy covers certain business losses arising out of the 

COVID-19 pandemic and that Defendants are obligated to properly investigate, process, and 

honor all covered losses. At the threshold of this analysis is the fact that Defendant VIG, as the 

procurer of the policy at issue and intermediary in the claims process -- held out by TCC 

Defendants as an agent representing TCC Defendants under the Policy -- is a proper party to this 

declaratory judgment action.

Notably, for example, on the first page to the Policy, also known as Form IA 443 04 14, 

TCC Defendants expressly direct Plaintiff that “For Professional advice and Policy changes or 

questions, please contact your local independent agency: Valley Insurance Group.” (Exhibit A; 

1:20-cv-4901; Fed. Dkt. No. 1-1, PageID 23). TCC Defendants further direct Plaintiff that “Should 

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your needs change, your agent (VIG) is available to review and update your policy.” Id.

(Parenthetic reference not original but added for context). Additionally, TCC Defendants state that 

“If you experience a policy-related loss, you may report it by contacting your local professional 

independent agency representing The Cincinnati Insurance Companies...” Similarly, the Policy’s 

Common Policy Declarations, also known as Form IA 4443 04 12, identifies Defendant VIG as 

the agency for the Policy. (Exhibit A; 1:20-cv-4901, Fed. Dkt. No. 1-1, PageID 26). Likewise, the 

Policy, within Form IP 409IL (1/91) entitled “IMPORTANT INFORMATION TO 

POLICYHOLDERS ILLINOIS” advises Plaintiff that “In the event you need to contact someone 

about this policy for any reason, please contact your agent (VIG).” (Exhibit A; 1:20-cv-4901, Fed. 

Dkt. No. 1-1, PageID 32). (Parenthetic reference not original).

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that the essential requirements of a declaratory 

judgment action are: (1) a plaintiff with a legal tangible interest; (2) a defendant having an 

opposing interest; and (3) an actual controversy between the parties concerning such interests. 

Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 170 (1993).

In its Complaint, Plaintiff specifically alleges that the policy was procured by and through 

Defendant VIG, as agent of TCC Defendants, within the course and scope of their agency 

relationship. (Exhibit A; 1:20-cv-4901, Fed. Dkt. No. 1-1, PageID 15 at ¶5). Plaintiff’s Complaint

further alleges that Defendant VIG initiated Plaintiff’s COVID-19-related loss claim with TCC 

Defendants. (Exhibit A; 1:20-cv-04901, Fed. Dkt. No. 1-1, PageID 20 at ¶31). Additionally, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint places all Defendants on notice that an actual case or controversy exists 

regarding Plaintiff’s rights and TCC Defendants and Defendant VIG’s obligations in procuring 

and performing under the Policy to indemnify Plaintiff for the full amount of covered losses 

incurred as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. (Exhibit A; 1:20-cv-4901, Fed. Dkt. No. 1-1,

PageID 21 at ¶40).

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Here, because the pleadings and the issues raised therein, relate to and reflect upon 

Defendant VIG’s duties and obligations to Plaintiff – both directly and as an agent of TCC 

Defendants – Plaintiff is entitled to join VIG as a defendant in order for the trial court to make a 

complete determination of the controversies at bar. Specifically, as set forth above, Defendant VIG 

is a proper and necessary party for Plaintiff to prove coverage under a policy of insurance which 

was procured by Defendant VIG, under which the denied claim at issue was initiated by Defendant 

VIG, and in which the Policy holds out Defendant VIG as TCC Defendants’ representing agent 

specifically vested with authority by TCC Defendants to speak as to coverage questions and policy 

interpretation.

Accordingly, with respect to the threshold issues before this Honorable Court, as well as 

those issues with a reasonable possibility of arising in this controversy, TCC Defendants fail to 

meet their heavy burden of establishing that Plaintiff fraudulently joined Defendant VIG.

Therefore, remand is proper and required.

iii. TCC Defendants fail to meet their burden of showing the amount in 

controversy requirement is met. 

TCC Defendants have not met their burden of showing the amount in controversy 

requirement for diversity jurisdiction is met. A defendant cannot remove a case to federal court 

based on diversity jurisdiction unless the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. 

§1332 (a). The removing party assumes the burden of demonstrating both the complete diversity 

and amount in controversy requirements are met. Chase v. Shop ‘N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 

110 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1997). In the Seventh Circuit, a defendant seeking to remove a case 

based on diversity jurisdiction is required to proffer evidence to establish jurisdiction exists to a 

reasonable probability. Id. 

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First and foremost, Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment does not seek money 

damages and no demand in excess of $75,000.00 has been asserted by Plaintiff. Rather, the legal 

issues raised by the pleadings before this Honorable Court are solely whether Plaintiff’s claimed 

elements of damages were properly investigated by Defendants TCC and VIG in accordance with 

their obligations to Plaintiff, and whether there is coverage under the Policy for those claimed 

elements of damages. Notably, the pleadings before this Honorable Court do not raise an issue as 

to what specific dollar amount is owed to Plaintiff under the Policy in the event that there is either 

a finding of either coverage or improper denial of coverage.

Accordingly, TCC Defendants fail to meet their burden that there exists an amount in 

controversy before this Honorable Court which exceeds $75,000.00. Rather, the only controversy 

at issue sought by Plaintiff’s Complaint at this time is a declaration of rights and obligations of the 

parties under the Policy irrespective of dollar amount.

B. The Abstention Doctrine of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act favors 

remand to Illinois State Court.

Assuming, arguendo, that this Honorable Court were to find Diversity Jurisdiction, this 

Honorable Court should nonetheless exercise its broad discretion to remand provided for under 

the Abstention Doctrine of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 

491, 494 (1942); Wilton v. Seven Falls Company, 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995); 28 U.S.C. 2201(a). 

Specifically, abstention is appropriate here because Illinois State Court has an important interest 

in and is better suited to handle this declaratory judgment action involving Defendants who are 

regulated by the State of Illinois Insurance Code and Department of Insurance, that issued an 

insurance policy to an Illinois resident, and where that insurance policy is further regulated by the 

State of Illinois Insurance Code and Department of Insurance.

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While federal courts have the discretion to exercise jurisdiction over an action under the 

Declaratory Judgment Act, they are “under no compulsion to exercise such jurisdiction.” Brillhart,

316 U.S. at 494; see also Wilton, 515 U.S. at 286. The Seventh Circuit further explained that 

exercising the abstention doctrine “is an inherently discretionary call for the district court, 

‘because facts bearing on the usefulness of the declaratory judgment remedy, and the fitness of 

the case for resolution, are peculiarly within [its] grasp.’” Arnold v. KJD Real Estate, LLC, 752 

F.3d 700, 707 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288). The Wilton/Brillhart Doctrine is 

typically invoked when parallel state proceedings are ongoing, as the state suit raises concerns of 

comity, federalism, efficiency, and fairness. Nationwide Ins. V. Zavalis, 52 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir.

1995). The Seventh Circuit has explained, however, that “[e]ven if there is no parallel proceeding, 

the district court still has discretion to decline to hear a declaratory judgment suit.” Ray v. Raj 

Bedi Revocable Tr., No. 3:19-CV-711 DRL-MGG, 2020 WL 1184755, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 11, 

2020) (quoting Med. Assur. Co. v. Hellman, 610 F.3d 371, 379 (7th Cir. 2010)); Envision 

Healthcare, Inc. v. PreferredOne Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Here, Illinois State Court is best suited to adjudicate a declaratory judgment action 

involving a dispute of an insurance contract issued within Illinois by an insurer (TCC) regulated 

by the State of Illinois, procured through an Illinois insurance agent (VIG) also regulated by the 

State of Illinois, and delivered to an Illinois consumer (WCL). Notably, the McCarran-Ferguson 

Act, 15 U.S.C §1011-15, gives states preeminence in the domain of insurance regulation, because 

most insurance disputes arise under state law and are resolved in state court. Hartland Lakeside 

Joint No. 3 Sch. Dist. v. WEA Ins. Corp., 756 F.3d 1032, 1035 (7th Cir. 2014). States have the 

legitimate power of police to regulate the business of insurance because it affects public interest. 

Northwestern Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243.

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For example, in Argonaut Great Central Ins. Co. v. McDowell County, 626 F.Supp.2d 554, 

564 (W.D. N.C. 2009), the court declined to retain jurisdiction of the declaratory judgment action 

involving an insurance dispute because “it would unduly interfere with legitimate activities of the 

state, which include interpretation of contracts of insurance.” Similarly, in the matter at bar, like 

the dispute in Argonaut, Plaintiff, here, seeks a declaratory judgment regarding an insurance 

contract issued in Illinois to an Illinois consumer involving multiple defendants regulated by the 

State of Illinois.

Accordingly, this Honorable Court should exercise its broad and sound discretion to 

remand this matter to Illinois State Court where the State of Illinois has both the legitimate interest 

and power to interpret the insurance policy at issue and determine the rights of the parties at issue.

III. Conclusion 

This Honorable Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit under § 1332. 

Specifically, Defendant TCC, as the removing party, cannot meet its heavy burden of establishing 

that there is complete diversity among the parties, that the non-diverse defendant has been 

fraudulently joined, or that the nature of the dispute and the relief sought involves a controversy 

exceeding $75,000.

In addition, notwithstanding this Honorable Court’s determination under § 1332, this 

Honorable Court should exercise its broad discretion under the Abstention Doctrine of the 

Declaratory Judgment Act and remand this matter to Illinois State Court where this insurance 

dispute, involving an insurance policy and parties regulated by the laws of the State of Illinois

should be decided by an Illinois State Court.

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For each of the above reasons, Plaintiff’s choice of forum should be restored, and this 

matter remanded for further proceeding in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. 

Respectfully submitted,

CORBOY & DEMETRIO, P.C.

___/s/ Daniel S. Kirschner _ By: Daniel S. Kirschner

One of the attorneys for Plaintiff

Thomas A. Demetrio (#611506)

Daniel S. Kirschner (#6256210)

Corboy & Demetrio, P.C.

Attorneys for Plaintiff

33 North Dearborn Street, 21st Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 346-3191

tad@corboydemetrio.com

dsk@corboydemetrio.com

Primary E-Mail: ccfiling@corboydemetrio.com

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 18, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which 

will send notification of such filing to:

Mr. J. Hayes Ryan

Ms. Katherine P. Decker

GORDON & REES SCULLY MANSUKHANI, LLP

One North Franklin, Suite 800

Chicago, IL 60606

P: 312-565-1400

F: 312-565-6511

hayesryan@gordonrees.com

kdecker@grsm.com

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT VALLEY COMPANIES, INC.

Mr. Michael P. Baniak

LITCHFIELD CAVO, LLP

303 W. Madison Street, Suite 300

Chicago, IL 60606

P. 312-781-6596

baniak@litchfieldcavo.com

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORPORATION; THE 

CINCINNATI INSURANCE COMPANY; THE CINCINNATI CASUALTY COMPANY; THE 

CINCINNATI INDEMNITY COMPANY

__/s/ Daniel S. Kirschner _

DANIEL S. KIRSCHNER

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