[Cite as Mt. Carmel Farms, L.L.C. v. Anderson Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2024-Ohio-2879.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

MT. CARMEL FARMS, LLC,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 VS.

ANDERSON TOWNSHIP

BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS, et al.,

 Defendants,

 and

KYOCERA SENCO INDUSTRIAL

TOOLS, INC.,

 Intervenor-Appellant.

:

:

:

:

:

:

APPEAL NO. C-230423

TRIAL NO. A-2200436

 O P I N I O N.

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

Judgement Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgement Entry on Appeal: July 31, 2024

Santen & Hughes, Brian P. O’Connor and J. Robert Linneman, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Frost Brown Todd, LLC, and Charles B. Galvin, for Intervenor-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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KINSLEY, Judge. 

{¶1} In this administrative appeal, the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

vacated as unreasonable a condition imposed by the Anderson Township Board of Zoning 

Appeals (“ATBZA”) as part of a conditional-use permit issued to plaintiff-appellee Mt. Carmel 

Farms, LLC (“MCF”). That condition required MCF to construct a 14.5-foot solid fence or wall

around its semi-tractor-trailer storage area, when typically only an eight-foot fence or row of 

foliage is required.

{¶2} Intervenor-appellant Kyocera Senco Industrial Tools, Inc. (“Senco”) appeals 

the trial court’s decision, asserting in a single assignment of error that the trial court erred in 

vacating the heightened fence requirement. More specifically, it argues that the trial court 

erred by failing to consider evidence of dust that accumulates from trailers on MCF’s property, 

by improperly substituting its judgment for the ATBZA, and by finding that the ATBZA acted 

unreasonably in failing to modify the buffering requirement under Anderson Township 

Zoning Regulations (“ATZR”) Section 3.16(F)(1).

{¶3} Because the trial court applied the correct standard of review to the ATBZA’s 

decision and made no mistake of law that we can discern, we overrule Senco’s assignment of 

error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

{¶4} At issue in this case is a 30-acre storage lot (“the property”) owned by MCF. 

The property is located in the industrial development district of Anderson Township. It abuts 

several neighboring businesses, including Evans Stoneworks, a landscaping company that 

stores its products outside; Pavestone, which also stores pallets on an exterior lot until they 

can be loaded onto trailers; and Senco, a distribution facility that regularly docks, loads, and 

temporarily stores semi-tractor-trailers. The property is surrounded by an eight-foot chain 

link fence and contains a gravel driveway. The property is also visible to Senco. 
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{¶5} After inspection, an Anderson Township official notified MCF that its open 

storage of trailers was inconsistent with the zoning regulations of the industrial district and 

that MCF was therefore in violation of ATZR Section 3.16(K)(2). That section provides:

No open storage of materials, inventory or equipment 

shall be permitted within two hundred (200) feet of any 

Residence District or existing residential property line. Any 

other such open storage visible from any property line of the lot 

or tract shall, notwithstanding Article 5.2 (9), be screened by a 

solid fence or wall or dense row of foliage not less than eight (8) 

feet in height, the design of which is compatible with 

surrounding uses. Dumpsters, utility boxes and other unsightly 

appurtenances shall be screened in the same manner.

{¶6} In response, MCF sought both a conditional-use permit and a variance from 

the ATBZA. Its application for a conditional-use permit requested that MCF be permitted to 

store trailers on its property. Its variance requested that MCF be permitted to maintain its 

eight-foot chain link fence, rather than building the solid fence or wall or installing the dense 

row of foliage that Section 3.16(K)(2) requires.

{¶7} After three public hearings, the ATBZA granted MCF’s application for a 

conditional-use permit. But it also found that the sight of the stored trailers, as well as dust 

created by trucks driving across the gravel driveway, constituted nuisances under ATZR 

Section 3.16(F)(5). Consequently, the ATBZA imposed two conditions on MCF’s conditionaluse permit. The first condition required MCF to pave the gravel driveway. The second 

condition mandated that MCF construct a 14.5-foot-tall solid fence or wall to screen the 

trailers from Senco’s view. The variance was denied in light of these conditions.
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{¶8} MCF appealed the ATBZA’s decision to the Hamilton County Court of Common 

Pleas pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506, and Senco intervened in the administrative appeal. In 

the meantime, MCF paved the gravel driveway, satisfying the first condition of the 

conditional-use permit. MCF’s administrative appeal therefore focused on the second 

condition imposing the additional fencing requirement. 

{¶9} MCF presented three arguments to the magistrate below. First, it argued that 

Section 3.16(K)(2) did not apply to the property because the presence of semi-tractor-trailers 

on the property did not constitute “open storage” under that provision. The magistrate 

rejected this contention because MCF had admitted earlier in the proceeding that Section 

3.16(K)(2) applied to its activities.

{¶10} Next, MCF claimed that the ATBZA applied an incorrect standard in denying 

its application for a variance. It argued that its request to depart from the solid buffering 

requirement in Section 3.16(K)(2) was a request for a use variance, rather than an area 

variance as the ATBZA had determined. The magistrate again rejected MCF’s position, 

finding that the ATBZA correctly employed the area variance standard in assessing the type 

of fencing that was required under the (K)(2) subsection.

{¶11} Lastly, MCF challenged the second condition and the application of ATZR

Sections 3.16(F)(5) and (F)(6) to MCF’s storage of semi-tractor-trailers on the property. With 

respect to Section 3.16(F)(5), MCF contended the ATBZA improperly characterized the 

property as a nuisance. That provision provides, in pertinent part, that “all odor, dust, smoke, 

gas, emissions, noise or similar nuisance” shall be abated to protect neighboring properties.

The magistrate agreed with MCF that, under a plain reading of the section, the open storage 

of trailers on the property did not constitute a nuisance. The magistrate therefore concluded 

that the ATBZA erred in determining the property to be subject to nuisance abatement under 

Section 3.16(F)(5).
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{¶12} The magistrate also deemed the ATBZA’s decision to increase the fence height 

from eight feet to 14.5 feet under ATZR 3.16(F)(6) to be unreasonable. Section 3.16(F)(6) 

permits the zoning board to add additional landscaping and fencing requirements for the 

protection of neighboring properties. In this case, the ATBZA imposed the extended fence 

height requirement on the basis that semi-tractor-trailers being stored on MCF’s property 

were visible to the neighboring businesses, including Senco. But the magistrate held this 

conclusion to be unreasonable, given that both Pavestone and Senco routinely display their 

own unscreened outdoor storage, which, at least on the part of Senco, includes the docking, 

loading, and temporary storage of tractor-trailers.

{¶13} For similar reasons, the magistrate also found that the ATBZA acted 

unreasonably in failing to apply its discretionary powers to modify the fencing requirement 

in MCF’s favor under Section 3.16(F)(1). That section reads:

Modifications by Board of Zoning Appeals: In a case 

where the topography or other physical features of the tract or 

its relation to surrounding property may make complete 

compliance with the requirements of this section unnecessary or 

undesirable, the Board of Zoning Appeals may modify such 

requirements to the extent warranted provided the surrounding 

property and the public welfare are adequately protected. 

{¶14} In interpreting the scope of this provision, the magistrate acknowledged that it 

could be read to apply only to the physical characteristics of neighboring properties rather 

than their use. In other words, the magistrate considered limiting the ATBZA’s power to 

modify zoning requirements based solely on whether the physical attributes of the 

surrounding land makes compliance unnecessary. Relying upon the principle that ambiguity 

in zoning regulations should be construed in favor of the landowner, however, the magistrate 
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instead read this provision more broadly. See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Bd. of Zoning 

Appeals, 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, ¶ 34. In the magistrate’s view, 

Section 3.16(F)(1) permits consideration of how adjacent properties are being used in 

determining whether compliance with specific zoning regulations is necessary. In this case,

because the properties surrounding MCF are used to store and transport semi-tractor-trailers

and other equipment, the magistrate reasoned that the ATBZA acted unreasonably in 

imposing a 14.5-foot solid wall requirement to buffer an identical use on MCF’s property. The 

magistrate accordingly vacated the second condition attached to MCF’s conditional use 

permit.

{¶15} Senco objected to the magistrate’s decision. On March 21, 2023, the trial court 

adopted the reasoning of the magistrate and vacated the second condition as unreasonable.

{¶16} Senco now appeals.

Standard of Review

{¶17} Pursuant to R.C. 2506.04, appellate review of an administrative zoning appeal 

is limited to “questions of law.” Henley v. City of Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 

Ohio St.3d 142, 147, 735 N.E.2d 433 (2000). From a factual standpoint, appellate courts lack

the power to weigh evidence and are instead “require[d] to affirm the common pleas court, 

unless the court of appeals finds, as a matter of law, that the decision of the common pleas 

court is not supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence.” 

Kisil v. City of Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34, 465 N.E.2d 848 (1984). Appellate review is 

therefore highly deferential to the trial court in zoning appeals cases. Banker’s Choice, LLC 

v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 2021-Ohio-1206, 170 N.E.3d 928, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.). Furthermore, the 

standard of review in administrative appeals “permits reversal only when the court of 

common pleas errs in its application or interpretation of the law or its decision is unsupported 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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by a preponderance of the evidence as a matter of law.” Cleveland Clinic Found., 141 Ohio 

St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, at ¶ 30. As such, the law strongly favors 

affirmance in these cases. Id. at ¶ 30.

{¶18} The common pleas court, on the other hand, applies a standard of review in 

administrative appeals that more closely resembles a de novo proceeding. Id. at ¶ 24. Under 

this standard, “the court may find that the order, adjudication, or decision is unconstitutional, 

illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of 

substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record” and may overturn the 

administrative decision where it finds a violation of this standard. Id. at ¶ 22, citing R.C. 

2506.04.

Analysis

{¶19} Senco raises a single assignment of error alleging that the trial court erred in 

finding the second condition imposed by the ATBZA to be unreasonable. It presents three 

arguments in support of that claim: (1) that the trial court failed to consider evidence of dust

from the gravel driveway in determining whether the property constituted a nuisance, (2) that 

the trial court improperly substituted its judgment for the zoning board’s, and (3) that the 

trial court improperly determined the ATBZA’s failure to apply Section 3.16(F)(1) to be 

unreasonable.

{¶20} We consider each issue in turn. In doing so, we acknowledge the constraints 

placed on our review by the stringent standard of appellate review in administrative appeals. 

The law strongly favors affirming a trial court’s decision in a R.C. Chapter 2506 appeal. See 

Cleveland Clinic Found., 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, at ¶ 30. To 

overcome this presumption, Senco must demonstrate that the trial court either erred in its 
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application or interpretation of the law or that its decision was unsupported by the evidence 

as a matter of law. Id. This it cannot do.

A. Nuisance

{¶21} Senco first takes issue with the trial court’s determination that the property is 

not a nuisance as that term is used in ATZR Section 3.16(F)(5). More specifically, Senco

contends that the trial court erred in discounting evidence that dust accumulates from the 

gravel driveway across the property and instead considering only the storage of semi-tractortrailers in assessing the applicability of subsection (F)(5). But the record reflects that MCF 

had paved the gravel driveway prior to the issuance of the magistrate’s decision, and no 

evidence in the record suggests that the dust continued to be problematic after this condition 

was satisfied. Thus, we cannot say that this aspect of the common pleas court’s decision was 

unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence as a matter of law. See Cleveland Clinic 

Found. at ¶ 30. Consequently, we reject the first argument raised by Senco in support of its 

assignment of error.

B. Substitution of ATBZA’s Judgment

{¶22} Senco next argues that the court below improperly substituted its judgment in 

place of the ATBZA in two respects. First, Senco contends that the magistrate improperly 

considered the presence of semi-tractor-trailers on neighboring properties in analyzing the 

applicability of ATZR Section 3.15(F)(1). Senco concedes that trucks are present on the 

abutting properties, but contends that that use does not amount to “storage” as that term is 

used in Section 3.16(K)(2). Second, Senco contends that the magistrate should have deferred 

to the zoning board in comparing MCF’s use of its property to the presence of semi-tractortrailers on the surrounding properties. 

{¶23} With respect to Senco’s first contention, we are not persuaded that the 

magistrate improperly characterized the presence of semi-tractor-trailers on Senco’s property 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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as “storage.” The record reflects that trucks would travel onto Senco’s property and would 

temporarily remain there until they were unloaded. The record therefore contains competent, 

credible evidence to support the magistrate’s conclusion that tractor-trailers were stored on 

Senco’s property. See Kisil, 12 Ohio St.3d at 34, 465 N.E.2d 848. 

{¶24} Senco further suggests that the presence of trucks on its property must rise to 

the level of “open storage,” as that term is used in Section 3.16(K)(2), to be relevant to the 

consideration of surrounding property under Section 3.16(F)(1). But the magistrate 

explained why even the temporary storage of trucks and other items on neighboring 

properties was relevant—it negated the need to buffer MCF’s open storage from view by 

properties used for similar activities—and we see no obvious error in that interpretation. The 

plain language of Section 3.15(F)(1) neither references subsection (K)(2), nor includes the 

term “open storage.” Nor, for that matter, does Section 3.15(F)(1) specifically limit the zoning 

board to considering specific defined uses in exercising its discretionary powers. To the 

contrary, Section 3.15(F)(1) directs the zoning board to consider attributes of the surrounding 

property in assessing whether compliance with zoning regulations is necessary. The trial 

court therefore did not err in reading this provision to embrace the presence of trucks on 

Senco’s property without ascertaining whether Senco engaged in “open storage” under 

subsection (K)(2). See Cleveland Clinic Found., 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 

N.E.3d 1161, at ¶ 22. 

{¶25} With respect to Senco’s contention that the magistrate should have deferred to 

the ATBZA’s determination, that argument defies the standard of review applicable to R.C. 

Chapter 2506 administrative appeals. The magistrate’s task was to review the ATBZA’s 

decision under a de novo-like standard to determine if its decision was, among other 

problems, unreasonable or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and 

probative evidence. Id. The magistrate reviewed the evidence and concluded that the 
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ATBZA’s imposition of a heightened fencing requirement was unreasonable in light of the 

usage of the surrounding properties. Contrary to substituting its judgment for the zoning 

board’s, this outcome fell solidly within the standard of review imposed on the trial court. Id. 

Given the deference with which we review the trial court’s decision, we cannot say the trial 

court acted improperly by reaching an outcome that is squarely contemplated by the 

applicable judicial review standards. Id. at ¶ 30.

{¶26} We accordingly reject Senco’s contention that the trial court improperly 

substituted its judgment for the ATBZA’s and overrule Senco’s assignment of error.

Conclusion

{¶27} For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reject Senco’s appeal of the trial 

court’s decision vacating the fencing condition attached to MCF’s conditional-use permit. 

The trial court’s decision finding the ATBZA’s imposition of a 14.5-foot fence condition on 

MCF’s conditional-use permit to be unreasonable is accordingly affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

CROUSE, J., concurs.

ZAYAS, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

ZAYAS, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

{¶28} I dissent in part and would hold that the trial court improperly relieved MCF 

entirely from statutory obligations to screen approximately 100 tractor trailers from 

neighboring properties. 

{¶29} First, I note my concern that arial and other photographs of the area were 

submitted to the trial court by stipulation of the parties, even though these photographs were 

not submitted to the ATBZA for consideration in making a determination about this property. 

I find this troubling as the record does not reveal that any of the circumstances described in 

R.C. 2506.03 were applicable in the instant case that would normally allow the trial court to 
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proceed beyond the confines of the administrative record. Nevertheless, the photographs 

became evidence central to the trial court’s decision, despite no testimony or other evidence 

being offered—either at the ATBZA hearing or in the trial court—to explain the photographs 

or put the photographs in context, and the trial court utilized this evidence when determining 

the use and storage of neighboring properties. Yet, no party has challenged before this court 

the trial court’s use of this evidence. Consequently, given our very limited standard of review, 

I address only the arguments presented to this court. 

{¶30} “R.C. Chapter 2506 governs appeals to the courts of common pleas from final 

orders of administrative officers and agencies of political subdivisions, including municipal 

boards of zoning appeals.” Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 141 Ohio St.3d 

318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, ¶ 22. “R.C. 2506.04 governs the standard of review 

the trial court must apply in such an appeal.” Id. 

{¶31} R.C. 2506.04 provides:

If an appeal is taken in relation to a final order, adjudication or decision 

[of a board of a political subdivision], the court may find that the order, 

adjudication, or decision is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, 

unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, or 

probative evidence on the whole record. Consistent with its findings, the court 

may affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the order, adjudication, or decision, or 

remand the cause to the officer or body appealed from with instructions to 

enter an order, adjudication, or decision consistent with the findings or opinion 

of the court. The judgment of the court may be appealed by any party on 

questions of law as provided in the Rules of Appellate Procedure and, to the 

extent not in conflict with those rules, Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code. 
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{¶32} “Thus, R.C. Chapter 2506 confers on the common pleas courts the power to 

examine the whole record, make factual and legal determinations, and reverse the board’s 

decision if it is not supported by a preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative 

evidence.” Cleveland Clinic at ¶ 24, citing Dudukovich v. Lorain Metro. Hous. Auth., 58 Ohio 

St.2d 202, 207, 289 N.E.2d 1113 (1979). 

{¶33} The hearing before the common pleas court has often been described as 

resembling a de novo proceeding. See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic, 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, ¶ at 23, quoting Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34, 465 N.E.2d 

848 (1984). This is because the court can look at the whole record, weigh the evidence, and 

make both factual and legal determinations. See, e.g., Dudukovich at 207. 

{¶34} However, although the court’s review is like a de novo proceeding, it is not in 

fact de novo. See id. “ ‘The court weighs evidence to determine whether a preponderance of 

reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supports the administrative decision, and if it 

does, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of’ the administrative agency.” 

(Emphasis added.) Shelly Materials, Inc. v. City of Streetsboro Planning & Zoning Comm., 

158 Ohio St.3d 476, 2019-Ohio-4499, 145 N.E.3d 246, ¶ 13, quoting Independence v. Office 

of the Cuyahoga Cty. Executive, 142 Ohio St.3d 125, 2014-Ohio-4650, 25 N.E.3d 1182, ¶ 13. 

In other words, the court may only reverse the agency’s decision “ ‘if it is not supported by a 

preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id., 

citing Cleveland Clinic at ¶ 24. “The key term is ‘preponderance.’ If a preponderance of 

reliable, probative and substantial evidence exists, the Court of Common Pleas must affirm 

the agency decision; if it does not exist, the court may reverse, vacate, modify or remand.” 

Dudukovich at 207. 
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{¶35} Thus, the court of common pleas’ review is not completely without deference 

to the administrative agency. It cannot just blatantly substitute its judgment for that of the 

agency. Dudukovich, 58 Ohio St.2d at 207, 289 N.E.2d 1113 (“We caution, however, to add 

that this does not mean that the court may blatantly substitute its judgment for that of the 

agency, especially in areas of administrative expertise.”); accord, e.g., Shelly Materials at ¶ 

13. It must first find that the agency’s decision is “unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, 

capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, or 

probative evidence” before it may modify the agency’s decision based on its own judgment. 

See R.C. 2506.04. 

{¶36} I dissent in part from the majority’s opinion in this case because I would hold 

that the trial court exceeded the bounds of its review under R.C. 2506.04 when finding that 

the ATBZA’s decision not to apply Section 3.16(F)(1) was unreasonable. As further explained 

below, the trial court—depending on how its decision is interpreted—either made a 

determination that is not supported by the evidence in the record or blatantly substituted its 

judgment for that of the ATBZA by finding the board’s decision to be unreasonable and 

applying Section 3.16(F)(1) to relieve MCF of any obligations under Section 3.16(K)(2) to 

screen the approximately 100 tractor-trailers stored, based on certain evidence in the record

that it found persuasive, without viewing the evidence within the plain language of 3.16(K)(2) 

and the other evidence in the record that may weigh in favor of the board’s decision. 

{¶37} This case began when MCF submitted a request to the ATBZA for a conditionaluse certificate permitting it to operate a three-acre storage facility—storing around 100 

tractor-trailers—within its 30-acre property located in the ID Industrial Development District 

and a variance allowing it to screen the property with the existing eight-foot chain-link fence 

and/or existing foliage around the property. After holding several public hearings, the ATBZA 
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denied MCF’s request for a variance—finding that a variance would be substantial given that 

the trailers were visible from all adjacent property lines to the north, south, east, and west—

but granted a conditional-use certificate provided that certain conditions were met. Relevant 

to our purposes here, a condition imposed by the ATBZA required that MCF “shall install a 

solid fence or wall around the trailer storage area that complies with [Section 3.16(K)(2)] and 

the solid fence or wall shall be 14.5’ high” (“the fencing condition”). 

{¶38} MCF then filed its administrative appeal of the ATBZA’s decision in the court 

of common pleas. The issues ultimately before the trial court were the ATBZA’s denial of the 

variance and imposition of the fencing condition. After the filing of the administrative record, 

briefing, and oral argument, the magistrate entered a decision affirming the denial of the 

variance but vacating the fencing condition in its entirety. The magistrate first vacated the 

ATBZA’s imposition of the additional requirements—beyond what is already required under 

3.16(K)(2)—under 3.16(F)(6), which would include the height increase and the requirement 

that the screen must be a solid fence or wall, rather than a dense row of foliage. Then, relying 

on 3.16(F)(1), the magistrate went further and relieved MCF of compliance with the standard 

requirements of 3.16(K)(2). Senco objected to the magistrate’s decision, but the trial court 

ultimately overruled Senco’s objections and adopted the decision of the magistrate. 

{¶39} As an initial matter, based on the arguments before us, I agree with the 

majority’s conclusion to overrule Senco’s argument concerning the trial court’s decision to 

vacate the additional requirements imposed by the ATBZA under 3.16(F)(6).1 The trial court 

vacated the additional requirements under 3.16(F)(6) after finding that it was unreasonable 

for the ATBZA to hold MCF to such requirements in order to completely screen the trailers 

from view when there is “abundant outdoor storage in the surrounding area that is not 

1 I do not address Senco’s argument pertaining to 3.16(F)(5) as I concur in the majority’s opinion on this 

issue.
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completely screened from view.” Senco argues that the trial court erred in making this 

determination because there is no evidence in the record of any other storage in the area that 

violated 3.16(K)(2). Yet, nothing in the plain language of 3.16(F)(6) requires only 

consideration of other zoning violations in the surrounding area. Rather, the plain language 

of 3.16(F)(6) would permit consideration of anything relevant to determining what is 

necessary “for the protection of adjacent property.” Senco advances no argument for why the 

additional requirements were nevertheless needed for the protection of adjacent property, 

and, consequently, fails to set forth any meritorious argument as to why the trial court erred 

in finding that the board’s decision was unreasonable in this regard. Beyond that, Senco 

advances no further argument for how the trial court erred as a matter of law when vacating

the additional requirements imposed by the ATBZA under 3.16(F)(6). Consequently, I agree 

with the majority’s conclusion that this argument fails under our stringent standard of review. 

{¶40} However, I agree with Senco’s argument concerning 3.16(F)(1) and the 

standard requirements under 3.16(K)(2) and therefore dissent from the majority’s opinion to 

affirm the trial court’s decision relieving MCF of compliance with the standard requirements 

of 3.16(K)(2).

{¶41} The trial court relieved MCF completely of compliance with the requirements 

of Section 3.16(K)(2) after finding that the ATBZA should have considered whether, under 

3.16(F)(1), the storage area’s relation to surrounding property would make compliance with 

the requirements of 3.16(K)(2) unnecessary, and finding that the ATBZA erred in not applying 

3.16(F)(1) where “the property at issue’s relation to surrounding property makes the 14.15-

foot solid fence or wall requirement unreasonable.” Senco argues that, in doing so, the trial 

court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the ATBZA by applying 3.16(F)(1), 
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particularly where the language of the provision is permissive and not mandatory for the 

ATBZA. I agree. 

{¶42} First, I find curious the majority’s determination that the trial court properly 

relieved MCF completely from the screening requirements under 3.16(K)(2). While 3.16(F)(1) 

gives the ATBZA the authority to partially or completely vacate 3.16(K)(2)’s screening 

requirements under certain circumstances, it does not obligate the ATBZA to do so. See 

3.16(F)(1) (providing that the ATZBA may modify the requirements to the extent warranted); 

Turner v. City of Bexley Bd. of Zoning & Planning, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 22AP-554 and 

22AP-562, 2023-Ohio-3225, ¶ 14 (“A court must accord significance and effect to every word, 

phrase, sentence, and part of an ordinance, and avoid construing an ordinance in a manner 

that would render words or phrases superfluous.”). 

{¶43} Additionally, I would note that the record does not support that the board failed 

to consider 3.16(F)(1). Rather, the board said that the provision was inapplicable in this case. 

While saying a provision is inapplicable could be read, in isolation, to mean that the board 

did not consider the provision, a review of the hearing transcripts in the record confirms that 

the board did at least consider the provision. Therefore, to the extent that the trial court’s 

decision can read as finding that the ATBZA failed to even consider 3.16(F)(1), I would hold 

that such a determination is not supported by the record. 

{¶44} Beyond that, I would hold that the trial court blatantly substituted its judgment 

for that of the ATBZA by finding that the ATBZA should have applied 3.16(F)(1) based solely 

on the presence of “other outdoor storage” in the area that is not completely screened from 

view. 

{¶45} In pertinent part, 3.16(F)(1) states, “In a case where * * * the tract[‘s] * * * 

relation to surrounding property may make complete compliance with the requirements of 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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[Section 3.16] unnecessary or undesirable, the Board of Zoning Appeals may modify such 

requirements to the extent warranted provided the surrounding property and the public 

welfare are adequately protected.” (Emphasis added.) At issue here are the standard

requirements under Section 3.16(K)(2), which are that any “open storage visible from any 

property line of the lot or tract” be screened “by a solid fence or wall or dense row of foliage 

not less than eight (8) feet in height, the design of which is compatible with surrounding uses.” 

{¶46} The trial court relieved MCF of the express requirements of Section 3.16(K)(2) 

based on its finding that there was “other outdoor storage” in the area that was not completely 

screened from view. However, what is notably absent from the trial court’s decision is any 

consideration of the “other outdoor storage” in the area within the context of 3.16(K)(2), 

including its visibility to other properties and proximity to residential property. The majority 

suggests that nothing in 3.16(F)(1) would require consideration of surrounding property 

within the context of 3.16(K)(2) as “[t]he plain language of Section 3.16(F)(1) neither 

references subsection (K)(2), nor includes the term ‘open storage.’ ” However, as a matter of 

statutory construction, I disagree. When applying 3.16(F)(1), it clearly must be read in 

conjunction with the requirement in question, which—in this case—is 3.16(K)(2). See 

generally, e.g., Cleveland Clinic, 141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, at ¶ 

35 (“[W]e have long held that when applying a zoning provision, a court must not view the 

provision in isolation; rather, its ‘meaning should be derived from a reading of the provision 

taken in the context of the entire ordinance.’ ”); Willow Grove, Ltd. v. Olmsted Twp. Bd. of 

Zoning Appeals, 169 Ohio St.3d 759, 2022-Ohio-4364, 207 N.E.3d 779, ¶ 18 (“We interpret 

municipal ordinances and resolutions in the same manner as statutes.”). Consequently, I find 

it significant that there is no indication that the trial court considered the “other outdoor 

storage” within the specific context of 3.16(K)(2) as this indicates that the trial court did not 
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consider any evidence in the record that may weigh in favor of the ATBZA’s decision in this 

regard. 

{¶47} Importantly, the trial court did not find that the ATBZA’s decision was not 

supported by a preponderance of evidence. Instead, the trial court said that the ATBZA’s 

decision was unreasonable based on certain evidence it picked from the record that—in its 

view—supported the application of 3.16(F)(1), a provision that is permissive to the board. A 

decision is only unreasonable where it is not governed by reason or is irrational. (Citations 

omitted.) Reed v. Vermillion Local School Dist., 83 Ohio App.3d 323, 326, 614 N.E.2d 1101 

(6th Dist.1992). A decision is not unreasonable simply because there may be certain evidence 

that may favor a different decision. The key question is where the preponderance of the 

evidence lies, and the record is devoid of any indication that the trial court considered 

whether, based on the whole record, a preponderance of the evidence supported the ATBZA’s 

determination. 

{¶48} To be sure, the administrative record is not devoid of any evidence to support 

the ATBZA’s decision. Rather, there are a number of distinguishing features about the 

property in question that could support the board’s decision that 3.16(F)(1) was inapplicable. 

To name a few, the storage facility in question is an approximately three-acre area that always 

stores around 100 trailers, while the Senco facility next door only stores around one tenth of 

that amount. Further, the other large quantity of storage trailers in the area (storing around 

150 trailers across the street) are largely screened from view, while the MCF trailers can be 

viewed from all sides. Even further, the MCF storage is bordered on at least two sides by what 

appears to be a residential area, while the other large-quantity storage of trailers appears to 

be bordered mainly by wooded areas or other industrial properties. While there was evidence 

that MCF’s tractor-trailers are visible to residential and commercial neighbors, the entire 
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record is devoid of any testimonial or expert evidence on visibility to neighbors of Senco’s 

property use. In other words, there are a number of other considerations to be weighed from 

the evidence when considering the ATBZA’s decision under 3.16(K)(2) and (F)(1) regarding 

this specific property. Yet, there is no indication that the trial court considered any of this 

evidence when reviewing the ATBZA’s decision. This is particularly troubling where 

3.16(F)(1) is discretionary to the board to begin with. 

{¶49} To be clear, I am not suggesting that the trial court’s decision should be 

reversed because the ATBZA’s decision was supported by the evidence. Quite differently, I 

am saying that the trial court’s judgment should be reversed because it inappropriately 

applied the required standard of review under R.C. 2506.04 when making the determination 

that the ATBZA’s decision was unreasonable. A court of appeals may reverse the decision of 

the common pleas when it errs in its application or interpretation of the law. Cleveland Clinic, 

141 Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, 23 N.E.3d 1161, at ¶ 30; see, e.g., Athenry Shoppers, 

Ltd. v. Planning & Zoning Comm. of Dublin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-742, 2009-Ohio2230, ¶ 24-26 (reversing the decision of the trial court in an administrative appeal after 

finding that the trial court failed to apply the standard of review under R.C. 2506.04 and 

instead “effectively substituted its judgment” for that of the agency by focusing on certain 

evidence it found persuasive rather than weighing all of the evidence in the record to 

determine whether the agency’s decision was supported by a preponderance of the 

substantial, reliable, and probative evidence). The trial court cannot find that the ATBZA’s 

decision was unreasonable simply because it disagrees with the board’s decision based on 

certain evidence from the record. It must follow the directives of R.C. 2506.04. Accordingly, 

I would reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment that relieves MCF completely of its 

obligations under 3.16(K)(2).
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Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.