IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

Rodney W., ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) Case No.: 20-cv-50255 

v. ) 

 ) Magistrate Judge Margaret J. Schneider 

Kilolo Kijakazi, ) 

Commissioner of Social Security,1 ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [19] is granted and the Commissioner’s motion

for summary judgment [22] is denied. The Commissioner’s decision is remanded for further 

consideration consistent with this opinion. 

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On December 6, 2017, Plaintiff Rodney W. (“Plaintiff”) filed an application for Social 

Security disability insurance benefits and an application for supplemental security income under 

Title II of the Social Security Act. R. 15. He alleged a disability beginning on November 1, 2017. 

Id. The Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denied his applications on March 7, 

2018, and upon reconsideration on June 14, 2018. R. 86–91, 93–97. Plaintiff filed a written request 

for a hearing on July 17, 2018. R. 98–99. On April 16, 2019, a hearing was held by Administrative 

Law Judge (“ALJ”) Susan F. Zapf where Plaintiff appeared and testified. R. 30–58. Plaintiff was 

represented by counsel. An impartial vocational expert also appeared and testified. Id.

On June 17, 2019, the ALJ issued her written opinion denying Plaintiff’s claims for 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. R. 15–22. Plaintiff appealed the 

decision to the Appeals Council, and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. R. 

1–8. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ’s decision, which stands as the final decision 

of the Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 841 (7th Cir. 2007).

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); [8]. Now 

before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [19] and the Commissioner’s crossmotion for summary judgment and response to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [22].

B. Medical Background2

1

 Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for Andrew Saul. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

2 The Court summarizes Plaintiff’s medical history that is relevant to this appeal. This section does not 

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According to the medical records provided, Plaintiff has undergone multiple surgical 

procedures on his lumbar spine to address lower back pain including a spinal fusion procedure in 

January 2015. R. 458. In November 2016, Plaintiff underwent a surgical procedure to extend the 

spinal fusion. R. 432–34. After this surgery, Plaintiff’s lower back pain persisted. In March 2018, 

a spinal cord stimulator was implanted in Plaintiff to assist with his pain. R. 458. In addition to his 

lower back pain, Plaintiff suffers from bilateral shoulder pain and has been diagnosed with

tendonitis. R. 432–34.

On September 6, 2018, Plaintiff underwent a multiplanar multisequential MRI of both 

shoulders. R. 498–99. Edward LaRow, who prepared the MRI reports on September 7, recorded 

his impressions that the MRI of Plaintiff’s right shoulder showed “[t]endinosis and bursal surface 

fraying of the supraspinatus and infraspinatus tendons”; “partial tears of the supraspinatus tendon”; 

and “[s]mall amount of overlying fluid [which] could be an associated bursitis.” R. 499. LaRow 

underlined his finding that the tear in the supraspinatus tendon “involves over 50% of tendon 

thickness.” Id. Regarding the left shoulder MRI, LaRow recorded his impression that Plaintiff 

suffered from “[m]ild tendinosis and fraying of the supraspinatus tendon” and that “[t]here may 

be an associated bursitis.” R. 498.

On September 18, 2018, Plaintiff saw specialist Michael J. Gibbons, M.D., to discuss the 

shoulder MRI results. R. 496. In a record prepared for Plaintiff’s referring physician Roger Sloan, 

M.D., Dr. Gibbons stated that Plaintiff reported that he suffered from “bilateral shoulder pain, right 

worse than left intermittent for years.” Id. Dr. Gibbons found that Plaintiff’s shoulders and cervical 

spine had a full range of motion with minimal pain. Id. Dr. Gibbons concluded that the MRI results 

showed “mild subacromial bursitis” and “[m]ild rotator cuff tendonitis” in both shoulders and a 

“possible small partial tear of the supraspinatus” in the right shoulder. R. 497. Dr. Gibbons 

concluded that no surgical intervention was needed and recommended physical therapy. Id.

On November 11, 2018, Plaintiff saw specialist Robbye O. Bell, M.D., for a follow-up 

appointment to discuss the successful stimulator implantation. In a report prepared for Dr. Sloan, 

Dr. Bell stated that Plaintiff continued to receive “good benefit” from the stimulator and rated his 

current pain “a 2/10.” R. 493. Dr. Bell noted that Plaintiff noticed a worsening of pain since 

discontinuing his use of Gabapentin and ordered a refill of Plaintiff’s prescription and a follow-up 

appointment in four months. R. 493–94.

On April 12, 2019, Plaintiff underwent separate MRIs of his cervical spine and lumbar 

spine. Adeel Sabir, M.D., prepared reports for each MRI in which he discussed his findings and 

then recorded his impressions. Dr. Sabir noted that no prior dedicated cervical spine imaging was 

available for comparison. R. 655. Dr. Sabir recorded the following impressions based on the 

cervical spine MRI: (1) “[n]onspecific straightening of the lordotic curvature . . . likely to be from 

spasm or postural changes[;]” (2) “[c]entral and right paracentral disc herniation at C5-C6 deforms 

the cord but without significant overall canal stenosis[;]” and (3) “no cord edema myelomalacia, 

or significant foraminal narrowing.” R. 656. Regarding the lumbar spine MRI, Dr. Sabir noted that

a 2017 lumbar spine MRI, 2016 lumbosacral x-rays, and a 2015 lumbar spine CT scan were each 

available to him for comparison. R. 657. Dr. Sabir recorded the following impressions based on 

represent Plaintiff’s entire medical history, or the ALJ’s complete review.

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the lumbar spine MRI: (1) “findings suggestive of chronic inflammation at the post-surgical bed 

posterior to the spinal canal without associated collection[;]” and (2) “[n]o disc bulge, disc 

herniation, spinal canal stenosis, or neuroforaminal stenosis.” R. 658. 

On April 24, 2019, Plaintiff underwent an MRI examination of his thoracic spine. R. 659. 

Dr. Sabir’s MRI report noted that no prior dedicated thoracic spine imaging was available for 

comparison. Id. After summarizing his findings in detail, Dr. Sabir recorded the following 

impressions: (1) “multilevel disc degeneration resulting in bulges and protrusions as described, 

resulting in mild mass effect upon the cord at a few levels without significant overall canal 

stenosis[:]” (2) “no cord edema or myelomalacia [but noting] that the cord is not well-visualized 

from T9 to the level of the conus due to artifact from spinal leads[;]” and (3) “[m]inimal anterior 

wedging of T7, T8, and T9 vertebral bodies . . . likely to be spondylotic in origin.” R. 660. 

C. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ conducted the statutorily required five-step analysis to determine whether 

Plaintiff was disabled under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). At step one 

of the five-step analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since November 1, 2017, when Plaintiff alleges her disability arose. R. 17. At step two, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease and 

tendonitis of the shoulder. Id. The ALJ found that these impairments significantly limited

Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities. Id. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff 

did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the 

severity of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, specifically 

referencing Listings 1.02 and 1.04. Id. 

Before step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

to perform sedentary work subject to only occasionally climbing ramps or stairs, balancing, 

stooping, kneeling, crouching, or crawling; never climbing ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; 

occasionally reaching overhead bilaterally; and frequently, but not constantly, reaching forward 

with his right arm and hand. R. 18. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not perform 

any past relevant work. R. 20. Finally, at step five, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s age, 

education, work experience, and RFC, there were a significant number of jobs in the national 

economy that Plaintiff could perform, including nut sorter, stone setter, and ampule sealer. R. 20–

21. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act

from November 1, 2017, to June 17, 2019, the date of the decision. R. 21.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The reviewing court reviews the ALJ’s determination to establish whether it is supported 

by “substantial evidence,” meaning “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1120–21 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Substantial evidence is “more than a 

mere scintilla.” Wright v. Kijakazi, No. 20-2715, 2021 WL 3832347, at *5 (7th Cir. 2021). 

“Whatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the Supreme Court has emphasized, ‘the 

threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.’” Id. (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 

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1148, 1153 (2019)). As such, the reviewing court takes a limited role and cannot displace the 

decision by reconsidering facts or evidence or by making independent credibility determinations, 

Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008), and “confines its review to the reasons offered 

by the ALJ.” Green v. Astrue, No. 11 CV 8907, 2013 WL 709642, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2013). 

The court is obligated to “review the entire record, but [the court does] not replace the 

ALJ’s judgment with [its] own by reconsidering facts, re-weighing or resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. [The court’s] review is limited also to the ALJ’s 

rationales; [the court does] not uphold an ALJ’s decision by giving it different ground to stand 

upon.” Jeske v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2020). “An ALJ need not mention every piece of 

medical evidence in her opinion, but she cannot ignore a line of evidence contrary to her 

conclusion.” Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Arnett v. Astrue, 676 

F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2012)). Nor can ALJs “succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make 

their own independent medical findings,” Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996), or 

“rely on an outdated assessment if later evidence containing new, significant medical diagnoses 

reasonably could have changed the reviewing physician’s opinion.” Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 

722, 728 (7th Cir. 2018). The court will only reverse the decision of the ALJ “if the record compels 

a contrary result.” Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations and quotations 

omitted).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff provides two arguments for remand. Plaintiff argues that: (1) the ALJ failed to 

adequately consider whether Plaintiff’s condition met Listing 1.04; and (2) the ALJ impermissibly 

“played doctor” in determining that the medical imaging—including medical resonance imaging 

(“MRI”) —and physical examinations did not demonstrate a more restrictive RFC without 

properly consulting a medical expert. This second argument challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that 

Plaintiff’s “allegations are inconsistent with the evidence” based on her findings that Plaintiff’s 

“physical exams have largely been unremarkable, recent diagnostic imaging was inconsistent with 

his complaints, and [Plaintiff] reported significant improvement with his symptoms after the 

implantation of a spinal cord stimulator.” R. 20. Plaintiff notes that the ALJ fails to identify the

specific medical imaging or physical exams that she found unremarkable or inconsistent. [19, at p. 

8]. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have provided this evidence for medical expert review

and that this medical expert should have appeared and testified at Plaintiff’s hearing. 

While no medical expert testified at the hearing, a significant portion of the medical record 

was reviewed by medical experts. In her decision, the ALJ declined to give controlling weight to 

any medical opinion but found the opinions of the non-examining state agency consultants—

Young-Ja Kim, M.D., and Reynaldo Gotanco, M.D.— “persuasive as they are generally consistent 

with the medical evidence.” R. 19. However, while Dr. Kim and Dr. Gotanco in their opinions 

dated February 22 and June 13, 2018, respectively, found that Plaintiff was capable of light work 

with certain exertional and postural restrictions, R. 59–68, R. 70–81, the ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff should be further limited to sedentary work due to her back pain and reported inability to 

stand for more than 45 minutes. R. 19–20. The Commissioner argues that Dr. Kim’s and Dr. 

Gotanco’s opinions, which pre-dated the ALJ’s opinion by more than a year, considered Plaintiff’s 

surgeries and subsequent improvement and that the records postdating their opinions only show 

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that Plaintiff improved with treatment. [22, at p. 6]. While the ALJ benefited from their opinions 

in her analysis of the records they reviewed, the benefits of their opinions do not simply extend 

prospectively. See Kemplen v. Saul, 844 F. App'x 883 (7th Cir. 2021) (finding that the ALJ erred 

by not securing a medical opinion to include the 2017 MRI results that post-dated the state medical 

consultants’ opinion).3

While generally discretionary “[t]he use of a medical expert can help ALJs resist the 

temptation to ‘play doctor,’ a label that usually produces a remand on judicial review, by 

evaluating medical evidence on his or her own.” Gebauer v. Saul, 801 F. App'x 404, 408 (7th Cir. 

2020). “It is an ALJ's responsibility to recognize the need for further medical evaluations of a 

claimant's conditions before making RFC and disability determinations.” Chase v. Astrue, 458 F. 

App'x 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that the ALJ “overstepped his role” by determining the 

claimant’s degree of foot elevation without seeking an additional medical evaluation) (internal 

citations omitted). See Nichole M. S. v. Saul, No. 19 C 7798, 2021 WL 534670 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 

2021) (finding “after dismissing the state agency medical consultants’ assessments because they 

were outdated, and without an opinion from another medical expert, the ALJ erred by relying on 

her own interpretation of the medical records” as “despite Nichole’s attorney stating the record 

was complete, the ALJ still had a duty to obtain additional evidence if the record was insufficient 

to make a disability determination.”).

No medical expert was consulted to opine on whether the 2019 MRI results were consistent 

with Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms. Nor does the medical record include any treatment records 

interpreting the 2019 MRI results. In her decision, the ALJ noted that the “[t]hough there are no 

accompanying treatment records, [Plaintiff] underwent diagnostic imaging of his spine in early 

2019.” R. 19. She summarized these results as showing that Plaintiff had “disc herniation at C5-6 

without stenosis, multilevel disc degeneration of his lumbar spine without stenosis, and 

inflammation at the post-surgical bed of his lumbar spine.” R. 19. The ALJ concluded without 

further explanation that “recent diagnostic imaging was inconsistent with [Plaintiff’s] complaints.” 

R. 20.

The Seventh Circuit has “said repeatedly that an ALJ may not ‘play[ ] doctor’ and interpret 

‘new and potentially decisive medical evidence’ without medical scrutiny.” McHenry v. Berryhill, 

911 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Goins v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2014). 

The Seventh Circuit has frequently found MRI results to fall within this category. See McHenry, 

911 F.3d at 871 (finding that the ALJ erred by comparing an MRI report with earlier medical 

treatment records himself without the assistance of a medical expert); Goins, 764 F.3d at 680 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (finding that the ALJ erred in interpreting a claimant’s first MRI in 11 years herself 

rather than submitting the new MRI for medical expert review). In Kemplen, the Seventh Circuit 

clarified that while new MRI evidence does not always need to be submitted for medical expert 

review, the ALJ errs by evaluating the significance of the evidence herself when it is “new and 

potentially decisive.” Kemplen, 844 F. App'x at 887. In Donna M. J. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 

3 The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff waived by failing to raise it in his opening brief the argument that the state 

agency medical consultants’ opinions were outdated by the later MRI results. [22, at 7]. Plaintiff did argue in his

opening brief that the ALJ “played doctor” in assessing medical imaging results without the benefit of medical 

expert. [See 19]. Given that analyses of these two arguments inherently overlap, the Court considers the “playing 

doctor” argument in this discussion and therefore need not address the waiver issue.

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3:20-CV-00556-MGG, 2022 WL 594144, (N.D. Ind. Feb. 28, 2022), the court interpreted Kemplen

as requiring that “the ALJ's opinion must demonstrate to a reviewing court that the new evidence 

is insubstantial when weighed against the evidentiary record.” Donna M. J., 2022 WL 594144, at 

*5–6 (finding that the ALJ failed to “explain why the x-ray and MRI are consistent with the 

evidentiary record [since] the ALJ did not compare or contrast the x-ray and MRI to prior medical 

findings [n]or did the ALJ accompany the x- ray and MRI summaries with commentary or context 

from medical professionals.”).

The Commissioner argues that an updated medical opinion is not required to assess new 

medical imaging if the ALJ’s decision remains supported by substantial evidence. [22, at 7]. This 

argument fails to confront the standard for determining if a decision is supported by substantial 

evidence. When an ALJ interprets “potentially decisive” medical evidence without the aid of 

medical experts, her decision is not supported by substantial evidence. See McHenry, 911 F.3d at

872. The Commissioner cites the Seventh Circuit’s finding in Karr that an MRI only available to 

one medical professional who examined the claimant did “not undermine [its] conclusion that the 

ALJ reached her decision based on substantial evidence.” Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 

2021). This finding in Karr was made not in determining whether the ALJ erred in assessing the 

MRI without medical expert review, but in determining whether statements made in a letter 

authored by the physician who reviewed the MRI were “extreme.” Id. Thus in Karr unlike in this 

case, the ALJ had the benefit of reviewing a physician’s interpretation of the MRI results.

The 2019 spinal MRI reports were provided after the record was reviewed by medical 

expert and could have, upon medical expert review, decisively corroborated the extent of the 

disabling back pain alleged by Plaintiff. Thus, the ALJ erred in assessing this “new and potentially 

decisive medical evidence” herself without the aid of medical expertise. See Goins, 764 F.3d at 

677.

Further, not only did the ALJ assess the MRI reports herself without consulting a medical 

expert, she did so without so any discussion of how she reached her conclusion. The ALJ did not 

even go so far as to assert that the 2019 MRI reports are consistent with past MRI reports. The 

Commissioner does make this argument in her brief. She contends that the 2019 MRI reports show

no significant changes from the previous MRI reports. [22, at p. 6]. However, the previous reports 

which the Commissioner cites to for comparison: lumbar spine x-rays and CT scans performed in 

spring 2017, R. 408–20; a lumbosacral spine x-ray performed on November 20, 2016, R. 430; and

a lumbar spine MRI and x-rays performed in November 2017, R. 435–36, were each performed 

on the lumbar spine within a year of his 2016 surgery while the 2019 MRIs were performed on the 

lumbar, thoracic, and cervical spines more than a year after the stimulator implantation. 

In interpreting the 2019 MRI results herself, the ALJ impermissibly “played doctor . . .

“[b]ecause without an expert opinion interpreting the MRI results in the record, the ALJ was not 

qualified to conclude that the MRI results were ‘consistent’ with h[er] assessment.” See Akin v. 

Berryhill, 887 F.3d 314, 317 (7th Cir. 2018). See Dolan v. Colvin, No. 15 CV 50185, 2016 WL 

6442226, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2016) (finding that the ALJ impermissibly “play[ed] doctor” 

when she concluded that a “March 2013 MRI showed no significant changes compared to the April 

2010 findings” since no medical expert compared the MRI results and “although this second MRI 

report refers in places to ‘mild’ findings, such as ‘mild lumbar canal stenosis’ and ‘[m]ild 

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spondylotic changes,’ these are medical terms that are not obvious to a layperson, and thus need 

interpretation by an expert.”); Graf v. Berryhill, No. 17 CV 50086, 2018 WL 6018604 (N.D. Ill. 

Nov. 16, 2018) (finding that when the ALJ rejected opinions from treating physicians, gave only 

some weight to the state-agency doctors’ opinions which failed to review later evidence, “[t]he 

lack of any opinion supporting the ALJ's analyses strongly suggests that the ALJ was playing 

doctor, especially given the need to sort through a complex medical record addressing numerous 

and sometimes overlapping conditions”); Joseph J.L. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-CV-621-

MAB, 2022 WL 856811, at *9 (S.D. Ill. March 23, 2022) (“there is no medical opinion in the 

record that sheds light on the significance of the 2017 MRI...[g]iven the unknown but potential 

significance of the 2017 MRI, the ALJ erred in drawing conclusions from the technical medical 

evidence without relying on a medical expert”).

“There is always a danger when lawyers and judges attempt to interpret medical reports.” 

Israel v. Colvin, 840 F.3d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 2016). See Moon v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 718, 722 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (finding the ALJ erred in relying on a claimant’s “unremarkable” MRI results as 

evidence discrediting her alleged migraine symptoms, because “[d]octors use MRIs to rule out 

other possible causes of headache . . . meaning that an unremarkable MRI is completely consistent 

with a migraine diagnosis”). In Israel, the Seventh Circuit found that in affirming the ALJ’s 

determination the district court erred when “without citing any medical opinion” it characterized 

2007 and 2010 MRI results as “inconsistent on their face with Israel’s claim of disability.” Israel, 

840 F.3d at 439. Recognizing the district court made clear errors in assessing the MRI reports, the 

Seventh Circuit found that the MRI reports “appear[ed] consistent, at least in part” with the 

claimant’s allegations. Id. at 440. The Seventh Circuit ultimately found that as “Israel’s treating 

physician was aware of these results and apparently did not find them inconsistent with Israel’s 

subjective report of disabling pain” the MRI reports “should be reviewed by a physician to 

determine whether they are in fact consistent with Israel’s claim of disability.” Id. (“Because no 

physician in the record has opined on whether these results are consistent with Israel’s claim of 

disabling pain, and because the reports are replete with technical language that does not lend itself 

to summary conclusions, we cannot say whether the results support or undermine Israel’s claim.”).

While here there are no treatment records postdating the MRI results from which to deduce the 

reactions of Plaintiff’s treating physician, as in Israel, the ALJ has provided only her own

conclusion about the MRI reports’ consistency with Plaintiff’s allegations without the benefit of 

any medical expert opinion or even her own reasoning.

The ALJ did have medical expertise to rely upon when determining that Plaintiff’s “more 

recent shoulder pain” was “consistent with diagnostic imaging showing tendinosis but his physical 

exams did not reveal significantly diminished functioning.” R. 20. The 2018 MRI examinations 

performed on Plaintiff’s shoulders are contextualized within the treatment record. Unlike the 2019 

MRI results, the ALJ benefitted from a medical interpretation of these MRI results available to 

her. See R. 496. Similarly, the ALJ had the benefit of some medical expertise in determining that 

the recent physical examinations were unremarkable since she could review the treatment notes of 

Plaintiff’s physicians. However, the last physical examination in the medical record preceded 

Plaintiff’s 2019 MRI examinations by five months and thus does not contain a medical expert 

interpretation of the MRI results. See R. 654. 

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The Court finds that the ALJ erred in evaluating the 2019 spinal MRI results independently 

without the benefit of expert medical opinion. While the Court does not presume to know how to 

interpret the 2019 MRI reports, a medical expert could find them to support Plaintiff’s allegations 

of debilitating back pain – potentially leading to a finding of disability. For these reasons, the Court 

finds that the ALJ did not support her decision with substantial evidence. Because the Court finds 

that a remand is necessary, the Court need not consider Plaintiff’s other argument for remand.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [19] is granted and the 

Commissioner’s memorandum in support of motion for summary judgment [22] is denied. The 

Commissioner’s decision is remanded for further consideration consistent with this opinion.

Date: 12/05/2022 ENTER:

_______________________________

 United States Magistrate Judge

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