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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JESSICA MACARAEG, KAREN SANDERS

and JACQUELYN S. HARRELL, 

individually and on behalf of a class of 

similarly situated individuals,

Plaintiff,

v.

MRS BPO, LLC, d/b/a MRS

ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

NOW COME Plaintiffs JESSICA MACARAEG, KAREN SANDERS and 

JACQUELYN S. HARRELL by and through their undersigned attorney, James C. 

Vlahakis, and pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et 

seq. (“FDCPA”) submit the following Class Action Complaint against Defendant MRS 

ASSOCIATES, LLC as follows:

I. Parties, Jurisdiction and Venue

1. Plaintiffs JESSICA MACARAEG, KAREN SANDERS and JACQUELYN S.

HARRELL have file this putative Class Action Complaint pursuant to the Fair Debt 

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §1692, et seq., against Defendant MRS 

ASSOCIATES, LLC.

2. Plaintiff JESSICA MACARAEG is a citizen and resident of the State of

California.

3. KAREN SANDERS is a citizen and resident of the State of Illinois and

resides in this judicial district.

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4. Plaintiff JACQUELYN S. HARRELL is a citizen and resident of the State of

Michigan.

5. Defendant MRS ASSOCIATES, LLC (“MRS”) is a "debt collector" as the

phrase is defined in Section 1692(a)(6) of the FDCPA.

6. MRS is a wholly owned subsidiary of MRS Associates, Inc.

7. MRS is a limited liability corporation organized under the laws of New

Jersey.

8. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by Section

1692k(d) of the FDCPA and 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1337, as the action arises under the 

laws of the United States.

9. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 as Plaintiff

Karen Sanders resides in this District to the extent Defendant Convergent transmitted 

a collection letter to Ms. Sanders in this jurisdiction.

II. Summary and Purpose of the FDCPA

10. The introduction section of the FDCPA contains “Congressional findings”

and a “declaration of purpose”. 15 U.S.C. § 1692. In particular, § 1692 states as follows:

(a) Abusive practices

There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and 

unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. 

Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of 

personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, 

and to invasions of individual privacy.

(b) Inadequacy of laws

Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are 

inadequate to protect consumers.

(c) Available non-abusive collection methods

Means other than misrepresentation or other 

abusive debt collection practices are available for the effective 

collection of debts.

(d) Interstate commerce

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Abusive debt collection practices are carried on to a substantial 

extent in interstate commerce and through means and 

instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where 

abusive debt collection practices are purely intrastate in 

character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate commerce.

(e) Purposes

It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate 

abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that 

those debt collectors who refrain from using 

abusive debt collection practices are not competitively 

disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to 

protect consumers against debt collection abuses.

11. One purpose of the FDCPA was to address “the use of abusive, deceptive, 

and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).

12. In enacting the FDCPA, Congress determined that “[a]busive debt 

collection practices contribute to” societal harms, include increasing “the number of 

personal bankruptcies,” “marital instability,” “the loss of jobs,” and “invasions of 

individual privacy.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a). 

13. Congress determined that “[e]xisting laws ... are inadequate to protect 

consumers” and that “[m]eans other misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection 

practices are available for the effective collection of debts.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(b)-(c). 

14. Accordingly, the FDCPA generally focuses on a debt collector’s conduct 

without regard for the validity of the alleged debt because “[m]eans other than 

misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are available for the 

effective collection of debts.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(c). 

15. The FDCPA protects ethical collectors from being competitively 

disadvantaged. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). 

III. Relevant FDCPA Definitions

16. Section 1692a(3) of the FDCPA defines “consumer” to mean “any natural 

person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.”

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17. Section 1692a(4) of the FDCPA defines the term “creditor” to mean “any 

person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed[.]”

18. Section 1692a(5) of the FDCPA defines the term “debt” to mean “any 

obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction 

in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the 

transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes[.].

19. Section 1692a(6) of the FDCPA defines the term “debt collector” to mean 

“any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any 

business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly 

collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be 

owed or due another.”

20. Section 1692a(2) of the FDCPA defines the term “communication” to mean 

“the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person 

through any medium.”

21. Section 1692e of the FDCPA states that “[a] debt collector may not use any 

false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection 

of any debt.” 

22. Section 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA prohibits “[t]he false representation 

of...the character, amount, or legal status of any debt”.

23. Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA prohibits “[t]he use of any false 

representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain 

information concerning a consumer.” 

24. Section 1692f of the FDCPA states, “[a] debt collector may not use unfair 

or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”

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IV. Defendant MRS’s Debt Collection Activities

25. MRS regularly uses the mails and/or telephone to collect, or attempt to

collect, delinquent consumer accounts.

26. MRS is a “debt collector” as defined by Section 1692a(6) of the FDCPA

because it “regularly collects or attempts to collect debts owed or due or asserted to be 

owed or due another” by and through its use of the United States Postal Service to mail 

debt collection letters to consumers living within this Juridical District and the United 

States.

27. MRS acted as a “debt collector”, as this term defined by § 1692a(6),

because MRS mailed letters to all three Plaintiffs to collect defaulted consumer.

IV. The Subject Collection Letters

A. MRS’s June 10, 2019 Collection Letter to Plaintiff Sanders

28. Plaintiff Sanders is a “consumer” as defined by Section 1692a(3) of the

FDCPA because MRS regards her as a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a “debt” 

allegedly owed a “[c]reditor” identified as “National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-

2”. It is not clear if the identified creditor is the original or current creditor.

29. The debt that Plaintiff Sanders allegedly owes to National Collegiate

Student Loan Trust 2005-2 is a “debt” as this term is defined by Section 1692a(5) of the 

FDCPA because the debt was incurred for Sanders’ personal use. This debt fell into a 

default status after Ms. Sander suffered financial difficulties. 

30. On or about June 10, 2019, MRS mailed a collection letter to Plaintiff

Sanders’ address in Lombard, Illinois. 

31. A true and accurate image of the June 10, 2019 collection letter is depicted

below:

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35. MRS’s June 10, 2019 collection letter was and is a “communication” as

defined in by Section 1692a(2) of the FDCPA because the Collection Letter conveyed 

information regarding the Subject Debt.

36. The June 10, 2019 collection letter identified three payment options.

37. The first option was a single, one time payment of $21,331.72 that had to

be received by MRS by June 24, 2019.

38. The second option involved three equal payments of $8,049.71, where the

first of the three payments had to be received by MRS by June 24, 2019.

39. The third option involved six equal payments of $4,69.66, where the first

of the three payments had to be received by MRS by June 24, 2019.

40. As depicted above, the June 10, 2019 collection letter warned Plaintiff,

“[w]e ae not obligated to renew these offers.”

B. MRS’s January 20, 2020 Collection Letter to Plaintiff Harrell

41. The Plaintiff Harrell is a “consumer” as defined by Section 1692a(3) of the

FDCPA because MRS regards her as a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a “debt” 

allegedly owed to a “[c]reditor” identified as “TD Auto Finance LLC”.

42. The debt that Plaintiff Harrell allegedly owes to TD Auto Finance LLC is a

“debt” as this term is defined by Section 1692a(5) of the FDCPA because the debt was 

incurred for Harrell’s personal use.

43. Ms. Harrell began to fall behind on payments after she was diagnosed with

a medical condition where her medical expenses took priority over her car payment. Ms. 

Harrell tried to work out a refinance with TD Auto. TD Auto refused and the vehicle was 

repossessed. It is not clear if TD Auto Finance LLC is now the current creditor.

44. On or about January 20, 2020, MRS mailed a collection letter to Plaintiff

Harrell’s address in Jackson, Michigan. 

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Option 1: A monthly payment plan on the full balance of the account.

Option 2: You pay $2,844.90 in ONE PAYMENT to be resolved in this office 

on or before 2/02/2020.

Option 3: You make TWO PAYMENTS of $1,778.07 each. The first 

payment to be received in this office on or before 02/02/2020 and the 

second payment on or before 03/01/2020.

51. As depicted above, the January 20, 2020 collection letter warned Plaintiff, 

“[w]e ae not obligated to renew these offers.”

52. February 2, 2020, fell on a Sunday.

53. Even if the January 20, 2020 letter was truly mailed to Plaintiff on January 

20, 2020, and it was received within three or four days, Plaintiff Harrell would have had 

approximately one week to secure and mail the proposed discount payments to MRS. 

54. Plaintiff Harrell became distressed and anxious when she read the short 

payment deadlines.

55. Plaintiff has been unable to resolve her debt with MRS for a dollar figure 

she can afford.

C. MRS’s January 4, 2020 Collection Letter to Plaintiff Macaraeg

56. The Plaintiff Macaraeg is a “consumer” as defined by Section 1692a(3) of 

the FDCPA because MRS regards her as a natural person allegedly obligated to pay a 

“debt” allegedly owed to a “[c]reditor” identified as “JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.”.

57. The debt that Plaintiff Macaraeg allegedly owes to JPMorgan Chase Bank 

N.A. is a “debt” as this term is defined by Section 1692a(5) of the FDCPA because the 

debt was incurred for Macaraeg’s personal use.

58. On or about January 4, 2020, MRS mailed a collection letter to Plaintiff 

Macaraeg’s address in Portville, California.

59. A true and accurate image of the January 4, 2020 letter is depicted below:

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61. MRS’s June 10, 2019 letter identified JPMorgan Chase N.A. as the creditor 

and listed a balance of $1,250.

62. MRS’s January 4, 2020 letter was the first letter that MRS sent to Plaintiff 

Macaraeg.

63. The body January 4, 2020 letter begins by stating:

The above referenced creditor has placed your account with our office 

for collection. We recognize that sometimes circumstances or events 

can make it difficult to satisfy your financial obligations. Resolving an 

overdue debt is never easy. Often the hardest part is taking the first 

step. We are ready to assist you to find a solution that is both fair and 

reasonable by presenting two payment options that will enable you to 

resolve your balance with JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.:

64. Next, the January 4, 2020 letter describes the two payment options:

65. Below the payment options was the following phrase:

If you need additional time to respond to these offers, please contact us.

We are not obligated to renew these offers.

66. Because MRS’s January 4, 2020 letter was the first letter that MRS sent 

to Plaintiff Macaraeg, the letter contained certain disclosures mandated by Section 

1692g of the FDCPA that are depicted below:

SINGLE PAYMENT MONTHLY PAYMENTS PLAN

Make a ONE-TIME payment 

of $625.43 by 02/20/2020

to resolve your account

Can’t make a settlement right 

now? We can work with you 

on a payment plan for the full 

balance of your account.

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67. The thirty (30) time-period by which Plaintiff would be required to seek 

validation of the debt as required by 1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA would be triggered from 

Plaintiff’s receipt of the January 4, 2020 collection letter. See Chauncey v. JDR Recovery 

Corp., 118 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1997) (consumer triggers verification rights by mailing 

out written notice of dispute on thirtieth day after receiving validation notice).

68. Based upon the due date of the one-time discounted payment option, if a 

consumer sought verification at or near the end of the statutorily mandated 30-day 

validation period, it would be nearly impossible for MRS to provide verification in time 

for the consumer to tender payment in acceptance.

V. of Relevant FDCPA Court Opinions and MRS’s Conduct

69. In Evory v. RJM Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007), 

the Seventh Circuit created the above quoted “safe harbor” language for debt collectors 

to use to protect themselves when conveying time-sensitive discounted settlement offers 

to consumers. 

70. According to the court, "[t]he concern is that unsophisticated consumers 

may think that if they don't pay by the deadline, they will have no further chance to 

settle their debt for less than the full amount.” Evory, 505 F.3d at 775.

71. In the case of Preston v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., (7th Cir. 2020), 

Judge Illana Rovner issued a concurring opinion that cast doubt on the continued use 

of the phrase “[w]e are not obligated to renew this offer”.

72. As correctly observed Judge Rovner:

I have doubts that this [safe harbor] language actually 

accommodates the competing goals that the Evory court identified. 

In fact, the current safe-harbor language emphasizes and amplifies 

the creditor's message that it is a time-limited offer. The language 

is no different from the creditors' language of "limited time offer" or 

a "time sensitive matter," or "act now," and reinforces the idea that 

if the debtor does not act immediately, she may lose the opportunity 

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to do so forever. As such, I propose that this circuit reconsider 

whether the language of the safe-harbor provision announced in 

Evory realistically honors the goals that the opinion sought. Adding 

the following two words to the language, undoubtedly would do so 

more accurately: "We may, but are not obligated to, renew this 

offer."

* * *

Preston did not raise the question of the safe-harbor language in 

this case, and therefore this is not the appropriate time to 

reconsider it, but should it emerge in a future case, I urge the court 

to reexamine whether this safe-harbor language achieves the 

intended balance between the interests of creditors and debtors.

Preston, 948 F.3d at 778.

73. As depicted below, MRS’s practices involve sending highly discounted 

settlement offers to consumer with very short deadlines to induce consumers by 

including the warning, “[w]e are not obligated to renew this offer” and “[w]e are not 

obligated to renew these offers” to impact the how Plaintiffs read and understood the 

details of offers in order to manipulate and/or urge consumers like the Plaintiffs to 

accept the discounted settlement offers. 

74. MRS’s conduct in drafting the Subject Collection Letters to increase the 

acceptance of the discounted settlement offers by making the offers appear to be timesensitive and not subject to renewal, was undertaken to increase profits for MRS. 

75. In acting in this manner, MRS has violated Sections 1692e, e(2)(A), e(10) 

and f of the FDCPA. 

76. For example, as discussed below, MRS’s use the phrase “[w]e are not 

obligated to renew these offers” constitutes a “false, deceptive, or misleading 

representation or means in connection with the collection of [a] debt.” 

77. Misrepresentations of the character, amount or legal status of any debt, 

injure or risk injury to interests expressly protected by Congress in the FDCPA. See, 

e.g., Oloko v. Receivable Recovery Servs., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140164, * (N.D. Ill. Aug. 

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19, 2019); Richardson v. Diversified Consultants, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118786, *10-11 

(N.D. Ill. July 17, 2019) (“the receipt of a communication misrepresenting the character 

of the debt (here, the amount owed) is the kind of injury that Congress sought to prevent 

through the FDCPA. ‘Such an injury falls squarely within the ambit of what Congress 

gave consumers in the FDCPA: ‘a legally protected interest in certain information about 

debts,’ with ‘deprivation of information about one’s debt (in a communication directed 

to the plaintiff consumer) a cognizable injury.’” (internal citations omitted); Pierre v. 

Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 2017 WL 1427070, *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2017); Saenz v. 

Buckeye Check Cashing of Illinois, 2016 WL 5080747, *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2016); 

Bernal v. NRA Grp., LLC, 318 F.R.D. 64, 72 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (holding that Plaintiff had 

standing to challenge misleading communication sent to him because the 

communication violated his “right to be free from such misleading communications”). 

See also Degroot v. Client Servs., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6677 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 15, 2020) 

(“[A]n informational injury can be concrete when the plaintiff is entitled to receive and 

review substantive information.”); Untershine v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 18-cv1484 (E.D. Wis. August 9, 2019).

78. Misrepresentations may cause consumers to make incorrect decisions

about their finances and which creditors to pay (before paying another creditor).

79. Plaintiffs and other consumers like them who received a similar form letter

from MRS where the letters contained time-sensitive offers and the phrases “[w]e are 

not obligated to renew these offers” or “[w]e are not obligated to renew this offer” suffered 

real harm resulting from MRS’s FDCPA violations because the complained of wording 

resulted in a false sense of urgency relative the contents of and the instructions 

contained within each collection letter.

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80. Based upon common collection industry practices and MRS’s own 

practices, MRS has mailed more than forty (40) form collection letters to postal 

addresses in the State of Illinois in the past year where the form of the collection letter 

was identical to the letters received by the named Plaintiffs.

81. Based upon common collection industry practices and MRS’s own 

practices, MRS has mailed more than forty (40) form collection letters to postal 

addresses in the State of California in the past year where the form of the collection 

letter was identical to the letters received by the named Plaintiffs.

82. Based upon common collection industry practices and MRS’s own 

practices, MRS has mailed more than forty (40) form collection letters to postal 

addresses in the State of Michigan in the past year where the form of the collection letter 

was identical to the letters received by the named Plaintiffs.

83. There are common questions of fact between Plaintiff’s claims and those 

of the class because MRS sent form collection letters to Plaintiffs and the putative class 

member.

84. There are common questions of law involving Plaintiffs’ claims and those 

of the class with regard to whether MRS violated Sections 1692e, e(2)(A), e(10) and f of 

the FDCPA,

85. The claims brought by Plaintiffs are typical of the claims that are being 

brought on behalf of the proposed class members because the claims are related to form 

letters used by MRS to collect consumer debts. 

86. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the proposed 

class members. 

87. Plaintiffs’ counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 

proposed class members. Mr. Vlahakis is an experienced consumer class action litigator. 

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For example, he was appointed to the Steering Committee in a nationwide class action 

against, In Re: Apple Inc. Device Performance Litigation, 18-md-02827 (N.D. Cal.) (Dkt. 

Entry no. 99). After grueling litigation, the parties proposed a $310 to $500 million dollar 

settlement to the court and obtained preliminary approval of the settlement on on May 

15, 2020 (Dkts. 415-16, 420, 429). Further, as a partner of Hinshaw & Culbertson, 

LLP, Mr. Vlahakis has defended over a hundred consumer-based claims since 1998. As 

a defense attorney in the below cases, Mr. Vlahakis recognizes the defenses inherent in 

class actions. See, Jamison v. First Credit Servs., 290 F.R.D. 92 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2013) 

(defeating a TCPA certification motion); Pesce v. First Credit Servs., 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 188745 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 2012)(decertifying a previously certified class action).

88. As a former defense attorney, Mr. Vlahakis has worked with opposing 

counsel to obtain court approval of various class action settlements. See, e.g., Prater v. 

Medicredit, Inc., 2014-cv-0159, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167215 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 7, 2015) 

($6.3 million dollar TCPA based automated dialing system wrong party settlement). 

Further, Mr. Vlahakis, on behalf of Crown Mortgage Company, obtained favorable 

declaratory relief before the Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”) relative to a 

TCPA junk facsimile-based cause of action. See, FCC’s Order of October 30, 2014, FCC 

14-164, in CG Docket Nos. 02-278 and 05-338. The FCC’s Order is located at 

https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-14-

164A1.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

89. As counsel for Neal Preston, the undersigned obtained partial reversal of 

the district court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal of the aforementioned case of Preston v. Midland.

90. Lastly, Mr. Vlahakis’ firm has the available resources to provide notice to 

class members and to litigate this case to trial. 

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91. Questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 

available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.

92. Because of the expense involved in litigating an individual FDCPA claim, 

it is unlikely that any putative class member’s interests in individually controlling the 

prosecution of an FDCPA lawsuit would override the efficiency of litigating the illegality 

of Defendants’ conduct in the context of a class action.

93. Because MRS utilized a standard form letter and the identity of the 

putative class members is readily ascertainable, there are no likely difficulties in 

managing this case as a putative class action.

94. A class action is a superior method of litigating the legality of Defendants’ 

conduct, and a class action is manageable.

VIII. Causes of Action

Count I. The Use of the Phrase “[w]e are not obligated to renew these offers” 

in conjunction with the short payment deadlines in relationship to 

the mailing dates of the collection letters violates Section 1692e of 

the FDCPA

95. Plaintiffs KAREN SANDERS, JESSICA MACARAEG and JACQUELYN 

S. HARRELL restate and incorporates the above Paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

96. Section 1692e of the FDCPA states that “[a] debt collector may not use any 

false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection 

of any debt.” 

97. By using the safe-harbor language, “[w]e are not obligated to renew these 

offers”, the Subject Collection Letters violate Section 1692e of the FDCPA.

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98. MRS’s use the phrase “[w]e are not obligated to renew these offers” 

constitutes a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with 

the collection of [a] debt.” 

99. Each collection letter contained very short payment deadlines in relation 

to the settlement offers conveyed.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs KAREN SANDERS, JESSICA MACARAEG and 

JACQUELYN S. HARRELL respectfully requests that this Honorable Court:

a. Declare that the practices complained of above are unlawful and violate 

Section 1692e of the FDCPA;

b. Award Plaintiffs statutory and actual damages, in an amount to be 

determined at trial, for the underlying FDCPA violations;

c. Award Class Members statutory damages; and

d. Award the Plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney fees as provided 

under 15 U.S.C. §1692k.

Count II. The Use of the Phrase “[w]e are not obligated to renew these offers” 

in conjunction with the short payment deadlines in relationship to 

the mailing dates of the collection letters violates Section 1692e(2)(A) 

of the FDCPA 

100. Plaintiffs KAREN SANDERS, JESSICA MACARAEG and JACQUELYN 

S. HARRELL restate and incorporates the above Paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

101. Section 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA prohibits “[t]he false representation 

of...the character, amount, or legal status of any debt”.

102. By using the safe-harbor language, “[w]e are not obligated to renew these 

offers”, the Subject Collection Letters violate Section 1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA.

103. MRS’s use the phrase “[w]e are not obligated to renew these offers” 

constitutes “false representation of...the character, amount, or legal status of” of the 

Subject Debts.

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104. Each collection letter contained very short payment deadlines in relation 

to the settlement offers conveyed.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs KAREN SANDERS, JESSICA MACARAEG and 

JACQUELYN S. HARRELL respectfully requests that this Honorable Court:

a. Declare that the practices complained of above are unlawful and violate 

Section 1692e(2)(A) the FDCPA;

b. Award Plaintiffs statutory and actual damages, in an amount to be 

determined at trial, for the underlying FDCPA violations;

c. Award Class Members statutory damages; and

d. Award the Plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney fees as provided 

under 15 U.S.C. §1692k.

Count III. The Use of the Phrase “[w]e are not obligated to renew these offers” 

in conjunction with the short payment deadlines in relationship to 

the mailing dates of the collection letters violates Section 1692ee(10) 

of the FDCPA 

105. Plaintiffs KAREN SANDERS, JESSICA MACARAEG and JACQUELYN 

S. HARRELL restate and incorporates the above Paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

106. Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA prohibits “[t]he use of any false 

representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain 

information concerning a consumer.” 

107. By using the safe-harbor language, “[w]e are not obligated to renew these 

offers”, the Subject Collection Letters violate Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA.

108. MRS’s use the phrase “[w]e are not obligated to renew these offers” 

constitutes a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect the 

Subject Debts.

109. Each collection letter contained very short payment deadlines in relation 

to the settlement offers conveyed.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs KAREN SANDERS, JESSICA MACARAEG and 

JACQUELYN S. HARRELL respectfully requests that this Honorable Court:

a. Declare that the practices complained of above are unlawful and violate 

Section 1692e(10) of the FDCPA;

b. Award Plaintiffs statutory and actual damages, in an amount to be 

determined at trial, for the underlying FDCPA violations;

c. Award Class Members statutory damages; and

d. Award the Plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney fees as provided 

under 15 U.S.C. §1692k.

Count IV. The Use of the Phrase “[w]e are not obligated to renew these offers” 

in conjunction with the short payment deadlines in relationship to 

the mailing dates of the collection letters violates Section 1692ef of 

the FDCPA 

110. Plaintiffs KAREN SANDERS, JESSICA MACARAEG and JACQUELYN 

S. HARRELL restate and incorporates the above Paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

111. Section 1692f of the FDCPA states, “[a] debt collector may not use unfair 

or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”

112. By using the safe-harbor language, “[w]e are not obligated to renew these 

offers”, the Subject Collection Letters violate Section 1692f of the FDCPA.

113. MRS’s use the phrase “[w]e are not obligated to renew these offers” 

constitutes and unfair means to collect or attempt to collect the Subject Debts.

114. Each collection letter contained very short payment deadlines in relation 

to the settlement offers conveyed.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs KAREN SANDERS, JESSICA MACARAEG and 

JACQUELYN S. HARRELL respectfully requests that this Honorable Court:

a. Declare that the practices complained of above are unlawful and violate 

Section 1692f of the FDCPA;

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b. Award Plaintiffs statutory and actual damages, in an amount to be 

determined at trial, for the underlying FDCPA violations;

c. Award Class Members statutory damages; and

d. Award the Plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney fees as provided 

under 15 U.S.C. §1692k.

VI. Class Definitions

115. Plaintiffs KAREN SANDERS, JESSICA MACARAEG and JACQUELYN 

S. HARRELL restates and incorporates the above Paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

116. Plaintiff Sanders intends to represent a class of Illinois residents who were 

sent a similar form letter as the one depicted in the Complaint where MRS attempted to 

collect a debt on behalf of National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2005-2, and where 

the letters were sent within one year of the filing of this Civil Action until MRS modifies 

its letter.

117. Plaintiff Harrell intends to represent a class of Michigan residents who 

were sent a similar form letter as the one depicted in the Complaint where MRS 

attempted to collect a debt on behalf of TD Auto Finance LLC, and where the letters were 

sent within one year of the filing of this Civil Action until MRS modifies its letter.

118. Plaintiff Macaraeg intends to represent a class of California residents who 

were sent a similar form letter as the one depicted in this Complaint where MRS 

attempted to collect a debt on behalf of JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., and where the 

letters were sent within one year of the filing of this Civil Action until MRS modifies its 

letter.

Plaintiff demands trial by jury.

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Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ James C. Vlahakis

James C. Vlahakis

Counsel for Plaintiffs

KAREN SANDERS, JESSICA

MACARAEG and JACQUELYN S. 

HARRELL

Sulaiman Law Group, Ltd

2500 S Highland Ave, 

Suite 200

Lombard, IL 60148

Telephone: (630) 575-8181

jvlahakis@sulaimanlaw.com

Date: 5/30/2020

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