PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________ STEVEN KIENTZ, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. COMMISSIONER, SSA, Defendant - Appellee. No. 18-3240

_________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas (D.C. No. 5:17-CV-04067-SAC)

_________________________________ Roger D. Moore, Rehm, Bennett, & Moore, P. C., LLO, Lincoln, Ne braska, for PlaintiffAppellant. Sushma Soni, Attorney (Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen R. McAllister, United States Attorn ey, and Alisa B. Klein, Atto rney, with her on the brief), U.S. Department of Justice, Wash ington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________ Before TYMKOVICH , Chief Judge, MURPHY , and CARSON , Circuit Judges.

_________________________________ CARSON , Circuit Judge.

_________________________________ A dual status technician occupies a hybrid role—created by Congress under 10 U.S.C. § 10216—that includes a balance of traditionally civili an and traditionally military responsibilities . Dual status technicians are federal civilian employees who FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 1, 2020 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 perform “maintenance and re pair of supplies or equi pment issued to” reserve components of the United Stat es military branches, incl uding the National Guard. 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)(1)(C). A dual status technician ma y participate in the Civil Service Retirement System and receive a pensi on in retirement. Th is case requires us to consider whether a dual stat us service technician’s civ il service pension is “based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service” under 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A). Our jurisdiction to do so arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
I. Plaintiff Steven Kientz sp ent many years as a dual stat us technician with the Kansas Army National Guard, where he worked as a mech anic on electronic measurement equipment. Plaintiff’s positi on required him to simultaneously serve as a member of the National Guard, a sec ond job with separate pay and separate responsibilities. In retirement, Plainti ff receives a monthly pension payment under the Civil Service Retirement System based on his service as a dual status technician. Plaintiff also receives Social Security retirement benef its based on contributions he made to the Social Secur ity system from his separate pay as a National Guard member. And this matters because the amount of Plaintiff’s Social Security retirement benefits depe nds on how we classify Pl aintiff’s employment, and specifically his civil service pension in particular, under th e Social Security statutory scheme. We begin our anal ysis with a description of the relevant statutory background.3 A. The Social Security Administration (SSA ) calculates an individual’s Social Security retirement benefits according to a statutory formula. See 42 U.S.C. § 415. The formula determines how much money an individual receives from the SSA in retirement based partially on how much the i ndividual paid into th e system via Social Security taxes. 1 See id. From the SSA’s perspectiv e, there are two types of civilian employment: covered and noncovered. If an employer withholds Social Security taxes from an individual’s pa ycheck, the individual work s in covered employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1001(a)(1). If not, the individual works in noncovered employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(5); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1018. And only those who work in covered employment re ceive the full measure of So cial Security retirement benefits because covered em ployees pay into the Social Security system while noncovered employees do not. See 42 U.S.C. § 415. N oncovered employees (at one time including civil service employees) ofte n receive a pension instead of Social Security retirement benefits because thes e employees did not pay into the Social Security system. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1018.

1 Employees and employers generally pa y Social Security taxes to fund the “Federal Old-Age and Survi vors Insurance Trust Fund.” 42 U.S.C. § 401(a). That fund pays out Social Security retirement benefits, administered by the SSA, to qualifying “old-age” beneficiarie s based, in part, on benefici aries’ past contributions to the fund. See id.; see also Francine Lipman & Alan Smith, The Social Security Benefits Formula and the Windfall Elimina tion Provision: An Equitable Approach to Addressing ‘Windfall’ Benefits , 39 J. Legis. 181, 185 (2013).4 In some instances, there are indivi duals who spend their careers in both covered and noncovered positions. These people stand to receive both a civil service pension and Social Security retirement bene fits. And such persons could ultimately receive a windfall not availa ble to their peers who work ed solely in covered or noncovered positions. The windfall occurs b ecause of the way th e Social Security formula works. The statutory formula pr ovides persons with lower covered earnings a greater percentage (vis-à-vis what they paid in) of Social Security retirement benefits than persons with higher covere d earnings. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A)(i)– (iii). Thus, persons with both covered and noncovered earnings stand to receive a windfall from Social Security. See id. To address this inequity in the Social Security sy stem, Congress enacted the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP). Soci al Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98–21, § 113, 97 Stat. 65, 76 (codi fied at 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A)). The WEP modifies the usual statutory formula to proportionally reduce Social Security retirement benefits for a ny individual who also rece ives “a monthly periodic payment”—such as a pension payment—“based in whole orin part upon his or her earnings” for noncovered work. Id. But the WEP is not without its own exceptions. Relevant to this case, Congress decide d that certain indi viduals defending our country as members of the ar med forces should not be subj ect to the reduction. Thus, Congress created an exception to the WEP for any monthly periodic payment “based wholly on service as a member of a uni formed service.” Id . (we call this the “uniformed services exception” ). Thus, a typical military pension does not reduce an5 individual’s Social Security retirement be nefits from covered employment under the WEP, even if the individual earned th e military pension through noncovered employment. Id.; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.213(e)(9).
B. Plaintiff worked as a dual status techni cian from 1978 to 2007. To obtain and keep the dual status technici an position, Plaintiff had to remain a member of the National Guard, wear a military uniform at work, and mainta in military fitness standards. 32 U.S.C. § 709(b)(2)–(4), (j)(2 ). As a member of the National Guard, Plaintiff participated in peri odic military training drills se parate from his time as a dual status technician. See 32 U. S.C. § 502; 37 U.S.C. § 206. Plaintiff received separate military pay for his National Guard service, apart from his dual status technici an job, from 1978 to 2007. 2 See 5 U.S.C. § 5534. And Plaintiff paid Social Security taxe s on those National Gu ard wages—covered employment. He now receiv es Social Security retire ment benefits based on his contributions to Social Security from hi s National Guard wages. See 42 U.S.C. § 410(l)(1)(A), (B). At the same time, Pl aintiff also receives a military pension from a United States Department of Defense agency based exclusively on his National Guard service.

2Prior to becoming a dual status technici an, Plaintiff served in the active duty of the United States Army from 1972 to 19 76. Plaintiff was also on active duty for about two months in 2005 during his National Guard tenure.6 But for his dual status technician work , Plaintiff received civil service pay because Congress classi fied dual status technicians as federal civilian employees. 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)(1). Importantly, the government did not withhold Social Security taxes from Plaint iff’s civil service pay—th us rendering it noncovered employment. 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(6)(A) ( 1976); 20 C.F.R. § 404. 1013(b) (1979). And the dual status technician role enabled Plaintiff to part icipate in the Civil Service Retirement System—as opposed to a milit ary retirement system—which now provides Plaintiff with a civil service pensi on. So in retiremen t, Plaintiff receives two separate pensions from two separate sources: one from the United States Office of Personnel Management under the Civil Service Retirement System based on his earnings as a federal civilian employee, and another for his combined military service (including the National Guard) from an agen cy of the Department of Defense. But only Plaintiff’s civil service pension earned fro m his work as a dual status technician is at issue in this case. And it was under this backdrop that when Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security retirement benefits, th e SSA reduced his benefits by applying the WEP. Specifically, the SSA identified that Plaintiff could receive a windfall from the usual statutory formula because he pa rticipated in both co vered and noncovered employment during his career. And the SSA de termined that Plaint iff’s civil service pension from noncovered employment as a dual status technician triggered the WEP and reduced his Social Security re tirement benefits accordingly.7 Plaintiff requested reconsideration from the SSA, a determination by an administrative law judge, a nd review by the SSA Appeals Council, but had no luck. He then sought review in federal district c ourt, but the district court agreed with the SSA. The district court concl uded that Plaintiff’s Social S ecurity retirement benefits were subject to the WEP becau se his civil service pension was not “based wholly on service as a member of the uniformed service.” Plaintiff now appeals.
II. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, following the same standards as the district court. Wedelste dt v. Wiley, 477 F.3d 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 2007). When we review an agency’s legal determination, that standard is often one of deference. Id. In th is case, two types of defe rence could apply: Chevron deference or Skidmore deference. Chevr on v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). Under Chevron deference, we defer to an agency’s reasonable interpreta tion of an ambiguous statute that the agency is responsible for implementing. See Carpio v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir. 2010). Under Skidmore defere nce, we afford an agency’s informal interpretation of a statute some measure of “respect according to its persuasiveness.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). In this case, the SSA does not ask for Chevron defe rence but instead argues that we should afford Skidmore deference to its interpretation. In either instance, though, we first look “at the stat ute to determine whether Congress ‘has spoken directly to the precise question at issu e’ in such a way that its8 intent is clear and unambi guous.” Wedelstedt, 477 F.3d at 1165 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842); see also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 1 09 (1993) (explaining that not ev en Skidmore deference “is due to agency interpretati ons at odds with the plain language of the statute itself”). “If congressional intent is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry is complete.” Wedelstedt, 477 F.3d at 1165. In that circumstance, we “owe no deference to the agency’s interpretation and must give effect to the statute as Congress intended it.” Id. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude the plain language of the uniformed services exception, in combination with the re levant statutory context, resolves the question before us. See infra Part III. We therefore do not reach whether to afford deference to the SSA’s interpretation of the relevant statute because our inquiry begins and ends with the text. See Wedelste dt, 477 F.3d at 1165.
III. The single issue in this case is whether Plainti ff earned his dual status technician pension “based w holly on service as a member of a uniformed service.” 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A). Plai ntiff contends the dual stat us technician position is “so irreducibly military in natu re” that the uniformed serv ices exception applies to insulate his Social Secur ity retirement benefits fromthe WEP (and therefore from reduction). By this, Plaintiff means that hi s civil service pension is based wholly on his service in the National Guard becau se, among other things , Congress required Guard membership for him to hold the dual status technici an position. One court of appeals has agreed with Plai ntiff’s position. Petersen v. Astrue, 633 F.3d 633 (8th9 Cir. 2011) (concluding that a pension paym ent based on a dual status technician’s service met the unifo rmed services exception to the WEP). The SSA, on the other hand, contends that the dual status technician position is not wholly military in nature and, theref ore, Plaintiff did not earn his pension from that position based wholly on service as a me mber of the National Guard. By this, the SSA means that Plainti ff earned his civil service pe nsion in his capacity as a federal civilian employee. And Plaintiff’ s role as a dual stat us technician was distinct from his role as a National Guard member, for which he earned separate pay and separate retirement benefits. One c ourt of appeals has agreed with the SSA’s position. Martin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 903 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 2018) (concluding that a dual status technician’s Social Security retirement benefits were subject to the WEP because his civil se rvice pension was not “based wholly on service as a member of the uniformed services”). In co ming to our own answer, we consider the plain language and structure of the unifo rmed services exception, context of the full statutory scheme, and ch aracteristics of Plai ntiff’s role in our analysis. See Hamer v. City of Trinid ad, 924 F.3d 1093, 1103 (10th Cir. 2019) (observing that “the mean ing of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context,” so we look to “the specific contex t in which that language is used” and “the broader context of the statute as a whole”). To understand the breadth of the uniform ed services excepti on, we must first define key terms in the stat utory provision. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (“A fundamental ca non of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise10 defined, words will be interpreted as ta king their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 140 (2012) (“Wo rds are to be give n the meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign them .”). The uniformed services exception applies to monthly periodic payments “bas ed wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service.” 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A )(ii). We afford “w holly” the ordinary meaning of “entirely” or “excl usively.” American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1463 (1981) (hereina fter American Heritage). 3 As used in the Social Security Act, the term “service” means employment or work. See 42 U.S.C. § 410(a) (defini ng covered “employment” as “any service performed” that meets a specified criteria). We also afford th e word “as” in the phrase “service as a member of a uniformed service” the ordina ry meaning of “in the role, capacity, or function of.” American Heritage at 76. Finally, the statute defines “member of a uniformed service” to include “any person appointed, enlisted, or inducted in a component of the Army . . . including a re serve component.” 42 U.S.C. § 410(m). 4

3 See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner , A Note on the Use of Dictionaries, 16 Green Bag 2d 419, 427 (2013) (listing the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language as one of “the most useful and au thoritative for the English language generally and for la w” among “contemporaneous-usage dictionaries -- those that reflect meanings current ata given time” (id. at 423)).

4 Elsewhere, Congress clarifies that a “reserve component” includes the “Army National Guard of the United States.” 38 U.S.C. § 101(27)(F). The SSA does not dispute—and we agree—that Plaintiff was a “member of a uniformed service” based on his membership in the National Guard when he concurrently held the dual status technician position.11 Next, we look to the grammatical st ructure of the uniformed services exception. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (explaining that courts should consider “the grammatical structure of the statute” in statutory interpretation); see also Scalia & Garner, supra, at 140 (explaining that the “rules of grammar govern” statutory interpre tation “unless they c ontradict legislative intent or purpose”). The uniformed services exception contains several prepositions. See Bryan A. Garner, The Redbook: A Manual on Legal Style ¶ 10.46 (2002) (explaining that a preposition “is usually positioned before a noun, pronoun, or nominative phrase or clause a nd relates its subject to anot her word in the sentence”). Most important to our inquiry, Congress us ed “as” as a preposition, and “member” serves as the object of that preposition. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(i i). Therefore, “as a member” is a prepositional phrase that de scribes the type of work that a monthly periodic payment must be base d on to qualify for the unifor med services exception. See id.; Chicago Manual of Style § 5.173 (16th ed. 2010) (“A prepositional phrase consists of a preposition, its object, and any words that modify the object.”). The provision further specifies that qualifyi ng service must be as a member “of a uniformed service” based on Congress’s use of the preposition “of.” See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(ii). Likewise , “on” is a preposition th at forms the prepositional phrase “based wholly on service.” See id. “On” also modifies the monthly periodic payment by describing the underlying basis fo r a qualifying payment. See id. And the adverb “wholly” modifies the verb that immediately precedes it—“based”—to12 further describe the nature of work th at qualifies for the uniformed services exception. See id. In context, the prepositional phrases esta blish the full crit eria for a payment— the principal object of the provision—to qua lify for the uniformed services exception. First, the prepositional phrase “based wholly on” restricts a qualifying payment to a specific reason. See id. And that reason or basis is “servi ce,” specifically service “as a member” of an identifiable group. See id. Finally, the provision identifies that group as “a uniformed service.” See id. Together, the prepos itional phrases in the statute demonstrate that onl y payments Plaintiff receive s based exclusively on his work in the capacity of a uniformed service (National Guard) member fit under the uniformed services exception. See Martin, 903 F.3d at 1164 (agreeing that “as,” in context, “appears to limit the uniformed services exce ption only to payments for work performed in one’s capac ity or role as a member of the uniformed services”). Put another way, any pension payment that Plaintiff receives ba sed on work outside of his exclusive capacity as a Nationa l Guard member does not qualify for the uniformed services exception and thus s ubjects his Social S ecurity retirement benefits to the WEP. We therefore agree with the Elev enth Circuit that the fact Plaintiff “was a member of a uniformed service at the sa me time he performed the noncovered employment at issue” is insufficie nt to qualify for th e uniformed services exception. See id. We reject the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning for several reasons. For one thing, the statutory text dictates that “the work for which [P laintiff] now receives civil13 service [pension] payments—his employment as a dual status technician—must have been performed in his role as a member of a uniformed service.” Id. (emphasis in original). But the Eighth Ci rcuit opined that “absent fro m the [uniform ed services] exception is a requirement thatthe service be only in a non-civilian or military duty capacity” and rejected a so-called “military duty require ment.” Petersen, 633 F.3d at 637 (internal quantitation marks omitted). That is not how we read the statute. See Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2004) (relying on “unmistakably clear language” to interpret a statute even thou gh other courts to consider the subject provision reached opposite results). Indeed, the statute requires that a qualif ying pension-holder’s service be “as a member of the uniformed service.” 42 U.S. C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(ii). We interpret that phrase to mean the service for which a dual status te chnician receives a pension payment must have been in the capacity of a National Guard me mber to qualify for the uniformed services exception. See Martin, 903 F.3d at 1164. Otherwise, “if Congress had intended the unifo rmed services exception to cover any payments made to someone who had been a member of a uniformed service, it could have accomplished that object ive much more simp ly by excepting payments ‘to’ a member of a uniformed service.” Id. Accordingly, we conclude th at Plaintiff’s civil service pension payments cannot qualif y for the uniformed servi ces exception to the WEP14 simply because Plaintiff wa s in a uniformed service—th e National Guard—while he held the dual status technician position. 5 Next, we must determine wh ether the military characte ristics of Plaintiff’s dual status technician employmen t made Plaintiff’s service “wholly” as a National Guard member. To that end, we “look to Co ngress’s conception of the dual status technician role, as evidenced by the rest of the statutory sc heme.” Id. at 1165. In the statute describing the dual status technici an role, Congress unambiguously states: “For purposes of this secti on and any other provision of law, a military technician (dual status) is a Federal civilian employee . . . .” 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)(1) (emphasis added). Elsewhere, Congress reiterated th at dual status technicians are “authorized and accounted for as a separate category of civilian employees.” 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)(2) (emphasis added) . And the very title “dua l status” reflects a civilianmilitary balance of res ponsibilities. See Martin, 903 F.3d at 1166 (similarly considering the title of the role). So by repeatedly describi ng the incumbent as a “civilian employee,” we observe that Congres s expressed its clear intent that a dual status technician does not work wholly as a member of the military in that position. 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)(1).

5 Although the parties ma ke arguments based on th e statute’s legislative history, we need not consider the legislativ e history to interpret the statute in this case. See Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Comm unications, Inc., 158 F. 3d 1074, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998) (observing that we only look “t o the legislative hist ory if the statutory language is unclear”).15 Additionally, dual status technician s—like all federal technicians—are appointed in the civil service and receive the same civil servic e pay and retirement benefits as other members of the federal ci vil service. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2105, 5105, 5332, 5342, 8332(b)(6), 8401(30). Indeed, th e Office of Personnel Management pays Plaintiff his monthly pension payments based on his work as a dual status technician under the Civil Service Retirement Sy stem, not a military pension system. Conversely, Plaintiff’s National Guard uni t is a component of the United States Army, and Plaintiff receives that pension pa yment from the Department of Defense. See 38 U.S.C. § 101(27)(F). Thus, Plaintiff’ s position as a dual status technician was distinct from his National Guard positi on based on the civil service status, compensation, and retirement plan he received in the former role. We recognize that the dual status natu re of Plaintiff’s position did include some military-specific requirements. Namely, the posit ion required him to maintain membership in the National Guard, hold a specific military gr ade, and wear the appropriate military uniform while performing his dual st atus technician role. 32 U.S.C. § 709(b)(2)–(4). Further, a dual st atus technician’s failure to maintain his National Guard membership or required milita ry grade results in the termination of his dual status technician employment. 32 U.S.C. § 709(f)(1)(A); see also Petersen, 633 F.3d at 635 (acknowledging that a dual st atus technician occupies a “hybrid” role with some aspect s more consistent with military employment and other aspects more consistent with traditiona l civilian employment (citi ng 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a))).16 But Plaintiff had many sepa rate responsibilities as a National Guard member that were detached from his dual status tec hnician role. For inst ance, Plaintiff had to meet certain military requi rements, such as assembli ng periodically for “drill and instruction,” for which he r eceived military pay. 32 U.S.C. § 502; see 37 U.S.C. §§ 204(a)(2), 206. A dual status techni cian fulfills these military service requirements during periods when he is not working as a technician. See Walch v. Adjutant Gen.’s Dep’t of Tex., 533 F.3d 289, 291 (5th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing a dual status technician’s “full-time ci vilian position with the Guard, a Monday through Friday job if you will, as a ‘fede ral technician’” fr om his “traditional National Guard position”). In this case, Plaintiff had to fulfill his National Guard service requirements when he was not wo rking on electronic equipment as a dual status technician. Indeed, if Plaintiff wanted to perform his National Guard duty at a time when he would otherwise be at his dual status technician job, he had to request formal military leave from hi s dual status technician j ob for that purpose. See 5 U.S.C. § 6323. Thus, the responsibilities th at Plaintiff fulfille d as a National Guard member separate from his dual status tec hnician responsibilities also demonstrates that his two positions were distinct. As the Supreme Court has reasoned, al l National Guard me mbers “must keep three hats in their closets— a civilian hat, a state militiahat, and an army hat—only one of which is worn at any particular time .” Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 348 (1990). Importantly, the uniformed services exception includes the word “wholly” to indicate that a qualifying pension payment mustbe entirely or17 exclusively from military se rvice. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(ii). The Eighth Circuit necessarily overlooked the word “wholly” to conclude that a pe nsion payment based on a plaintiff’s work in a “hybrid” role qualified for the uniformed services exception. See Petersen, 633 F.3d at 636–37 (giving decidedly more weight to the military aspects of the dual st atus technician role than Congress’s characterization of the role as “civilian”). Although there is some overlap, the clear di stinctions between Plaintiff’s dual status technician positi on and his National Guard position indicate that Plaintiff did not work wholly as a member of the National Guard at his dual status technician job. See Martin, 903 F.3d at 1164 n.67 (“Ju st because [the plaintiff] was a member of the National Guard and al so worked for the Na tional Guard in his dual status technician capacity does not mean that both roles were performed in his capacity as a me mber of the Guard.”). Stated differently, Plain tiff’s federal civilian em ployment as a dual status technician was not wholly as a member of the Nationa l Guard because Plaintiff cannot simultaneously act wholly in two distinct capacities. See 10 U.S.C. § 10216(a)(1); see also Perp ich, 496 U.S. at 348. As the Supreme Court explained, Plaintiff must take off hi s National Guard hat to put on his civilian dual status technician hat and vice versa. See Perpich, 496 U.S. at 348. He cannot wholly wear both hats simultaneously. Se e id. Thus, we conclude th at Plaintiff’s civil service18 pension is not “wholly” based on service as a member of a uniformed service, and his pension payments are ther efore subject to the WEP. 6 Accordingly, we hold that certain Na tional Guard-specific requirements are not “sufficient to place dual status techni cians within the sweep of the [uniformed services] exception—especially given the provision’s use of the word ‘wholly.’” See Martin, 903 F.3d at 1168. Plaintiff’s dual status technician work was at least partially distinct from the perfo rmance of his military duties. See Walch, 533 F.3d at 291. And Plaintiff receive d separate compensation and separate pensions for his performance of those distinct roles. So Plaintiff’s civil serv ice pension payments from his employment as a dual st atus technician are not base d “wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service.” 42 U.S.C. 415(a)(7)(A). We th erefore agree with

6 Plaintiff identifies seve ral cases stemming from Fere s v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), in support of his position that his role was irreducibly military in nature. See 340 U.S. at 146 (barring certain claims brought by servicemembers for injuries “incident to military service”); see, e.g ., Wood v. United States, 968 F.2d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying the Fe res doctrine to bar a National Guard technician’s challenge to a National’s Guard personnel decision). Feres and its progeny, however, are irrelevant to this in quiry. Those cases me rely establish that suits based on injuries suff ered incident to milita ry service are generally nonjusticiable, and they do not bear on the interpretation of the uniformed services exception or Plaintiff’s specifi c role. Although Plaintiff’s role did not afford him the same employment rights that most civilians enjoy, such is the nature of a dual status role. See Martin, 903 F.3d at 1166 (“Even th e use of the title ‘ dual status’ suggests that dual status technicians are employed not just in thei r capacity as members of the National Guard.”). Limited employment rights relative to other civilian employees cannot transform a “dual status” ro le into a wholly military one.19 the district court and the SSA that Plaintiff’ s Social Security retirement benefits are subject to the WEP. 7
AFFIRMED.

7 In deciding that Plaintiff’s pension ear ned as a dual status technician does not qualify for the uniformed services exempti on to the WEP, we need not address the SSA’s argument—which it did not raise before the district court—that Plaintiff’s pension is partially based on a short period during whic h he worked as a purely civilian, non-dual status electronic mech anic before he became a dual status technician. See supra note 2. We also observe that Plain tiff raises an argument for th e first time in his reply brief based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Plaintiff concedes, he did not raise an Equal Protection argum ent to the district court, nor did he raise the argument in his opening brief. Therefore, Plaintiff has waived this argument, which we decline to address on appeal. See, e.g., In re: Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 872 F. 3d 1094, 1113 (10th Cir. 2017) (observing that “arguments raised fo r the first time in a reply brief are waived”).