UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4023

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DALLAS MCKOY HARRIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:02-cr-00202-BO-1)

Submitted: March 27, 2014 Decided: April 8, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer 

P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Dallas McKoy Harris pled guilty to conspiracy to 

distribute and possess with intent to distribute at least 50 

grams of cocaine base. In January 2003, the district court 

sentenced Harris to 144 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by 

60 months of supervised release. This sentence was subsequently 

reduced to 120 months pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2012). 

In March 2011, Harris was released from incarceration. 

In June 2012, the probation officer moved for 

revocation of Harris’ supervised release, alleging that Harris 

committed four violations of his supervised release. Harris 

admitted to the Grade C violations alleged, but disputed the 

charged Grade A violation of trafficking in cocaine base. After 

a hearing, the district court found that Harris committed all 

four charged violations. The court revoked supervised release 

and imposed a thirty-month sentence of imprisonment. Harris 

appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support 

the finding that he violated his supervised release by 

trafficking in cocaine base. Finding no clear error, we affirm.

We review a district court’s decision to revoke 

supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). To revoke release, 

the district court must find a violation of a condition of 

release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. 
3

§ 3583(e)(3) (2012). We review for clear error factual findings 

underlying the conclusion that a violation of the terms of 

supervised release occurred. See United States v. Carothers, 

337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003). 

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that Harris violated the conditions of 

supervised release by trafficking in cocaine. The government 

presented evidence that Harris was driving a vehicle from which 

79 grams of crack cocaine was thrown. A Raleigh police officer 

stopped the vehicle and detained Harris and his two passengers. 

One passenger was found in possession of 27 grams of cocaine and 

a sum of money. Cocaine residue was found on a black tray under 

the front passenger seat.

Harris denied knowing that there was cocaine in the 

vehicle and denied having seen the 79 grams of crack being 

thrown from the truck. Harris was charged in state court with 

trafficking cocaine by possession by vehicle and conspiracy to 

traffic cocaine. He pled guilty to misdemeanor maintaining a 

vehicle for the storage of a controlled substance.

Based on this evidence, the district court found it 

more likely than not that Harris was involved in the trafficking 

of crack cocaine. The North Carolina offense of trafficking of 

cocaine requires proof that the defendant was in possession of 

28 grams or more of cocaine. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(3). 
4

Possession can be actual or constructive. United States v. 

Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 873 (4th Cir. 1996). Constructive 

possession can be shown by evidence of dominion and control over 

the drugs themselves or over the premises or vehicle in which 

the contraband is found. United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 

107 (4th Cir. 1992).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, 

see United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010), 

the evidence established each of the elements of trafficking. 

The amount of cocaine base exceeded 28 grams, and Harris pled 

guilty in state court to maintaining a vehicle for the storage 

of a controlled substances, thus establishing his knowledge of 

the presence of the drugs. See State v. Simpson, 748 S.E.2d 

756, 759 (N.C. App. 2013). This evidence, along with the fact 

that Harris was driving the vehicle in which crack cocaine was 

found and from which the crack cocaine was thrown, supports the 

district court’s finding that it was more likely than not that 

Harris knowingly possessed—either actually or constructively—

more than 28 grams of crack cocaine, and thus violated the 

conditions of his supervised release by trafficking.

Accordingly, we find no clear error in the district 

court’s determination the Harris committed the Grade A violation 

of his supervised release. See United States v. White, 620 F.3d 

401, 410 (4th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Stevenson, 
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396 F.3d 538, 542 (4th Cir. 2005) (providing that court of 

appeals will not reverse factual finding if district court’s 

view of the evidence is plausible in light of the totality of 

the evidence, even if the appeals court would have resolved the 

facts differently).

We therefore affirm the revocation judgment and the 

30-month sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED