BLD

- 105 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 16

- 3958

___________ DARNELL JACOB WILLIAMS, Appellant

v. JOSEPH D. MACUT; PRIME CARE, INC.; PRISON MED ICAL STAFF

____________________________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil No. 3

- 15

- cv - 01645 ) District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion

____________________________________ Submit ted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 January 19, 2017
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : February 14, 2017 )

_________ OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full C ourt and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2

Darnell Williams appeals, pro se and in forma pauperis, the District Court’s order dismissing his c omplaint for failure to state a claim and denying leave to amend. Because no substantial question is presented, we wil l summarily affirm.
Williams is incarcerated at the Fores t State Correctional Institution in Marien ville, Pennsylvania. He alleged Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection violations occurred while receiving medical treatment for an injured left ring finge r. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Williams alleged Defendants Joseph D

. Macut, Prime Care Medical, and
Prison Medical Staff negligently and recklessly misdiagnosed his injury , causing him pain and suffering. The District Court granted Defendant Mac ut and Prime Care
Medical ’s motion to dism iss for failure to state a claim, and denied leave to amend

. Williams timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo the
District C ourt’s decisio n to grant a motion to dis miss. Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co. , 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012). Dismissal is appropriate if the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2 007)

. When considering a motion to dismiss, we must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reaso nable inferences in the light mo st favorable to the nonmovant

. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC , 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014)

. We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of
discretion. U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P. , 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014).3

Williams failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim

. To state an Eighth
Amendmen t claim, a plaintiff m ust allege a cts or omissions by prison officials that
indicate deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility , 318 F.3 d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). Deliberate indifference occurs when the
defendant knows of the need for medical care and intentionally refuses to provide it, exposing the inmate to “undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro , 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitt ed). Mere disagreement with a prescribed treatment, however,
is not an actionable constitutional violation. Id.
The allegations of Williams’ complaint and the medical records attached to it
foreclose his Eighth Amendment claim. Williams alleged that he initially injured his left ring finger while playing basketball in late May 2013, and was denied treatment and not prescribed physical therapy. However, the medical records reveal that Williams was initially seen by Defendant Macut on June 3, 2013 , and s ubsequently seen more than twelve times by Defendants in the four months following his injury

. Defendants repeatedly examined and treated his finger, which eventually required x

- rays and surgery

. W hile Williams may disagree with the prescribed treatment, such disagreement is
insufficient to state a § 1983 claim. See Lanzaro , 834 F.2d at 346 . Accordingly, Williams failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference, and dismissal was appropriate. Furthermore, given the thorough description of the medica l treatment Williams received ,4

the District Court was within its description to deny leave to amend. See Schumann , 769 F.3d at 849.
Williams likewise failed to state an equal protection claim. To state a successful § 1983 claim for denial of equal prot ection, a plaintiff must allege purposeful
discrimination

– that he was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals
because of his membership in a protected class

. Keenan v. City of Philadelphia , 983 F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1992). Altern atively a “class of one” equal protection claim may be
stated if a plaintiff alleges that the Defendants irrationally and intentionally treated him differently from other similarly situated individuals

. Phillips v. County of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 243 ( 3d Cir. 2008). Williams fails to state an equal protection claim under either theory. In his complaint , Williams merely listed the Equal Protection Clause as a federal law that was violated; he made no mention of membership in a protected class , addresse d the equal protection claim nowhere else in the complaint , and alleged no facts
that indicate he was treated differently

– either purposefully or otherwise

– from similarly
situated individuals

. See id. ; Keenan , 983 F.2d at 465. Ac cordingly, dismissal w as
proper. In light of the above , denial of leave to amend was also within the District Court’s discretion. For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.