UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RAFAEL L. T.,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

KILILO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration,

 Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

 No. 20-cv-3469

 Magistrate Judge Susan E. Cox

ORDER

Plaintiff RAFAEL L. T. appeals the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration (“Commissioner”) denying his disability benefits. The parties have filed 

cross-motions for summary judgment.1 As detailed below, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

[dkt. 16] is GRANTED; Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. 21] is DENIED. The Court 

hereby remands this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

Standard of Review

In disability insurance benefits cases, a court’s scope of review is limited to deciding whether 

the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is based upon substantial evidence and the 

proper legal criteria. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence 

exists when a “reasonable mind might accept [the evidence] as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir. 

2001). The Court cannot let the Commissioner’s decision stand if the decision lacks sufficient 

evidentiary support, an adequate discussion of the issues, or is undermined by legal error. Lopez ex 

rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003).

1 Plaintiff has filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [dkt. 16], which the Court 

construes as a motion for summary judgment.

Case: 1:20-cv-03469 Document #: 24 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 1 of 6 PageID #:3388
2

Analysis

Plaintiff filed a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits, which was denied initially and upon 

reconsideration. [Administrative Record (“R.”) 188.] As part of the evaluation of his claim, Plaintiff 

was given a consultative medical examination by State agency medical consultant, Dr. Roopa Karri, 

M.D. [R. 916.] Dr. Karri issued a four-page Internal Medicine Consultative Examination report 

detailing her findings and opinions about Plaintiff’s condition based on her examination. [R. 916-19.] 

Later, an initial Administrative Hearing was scheduled. Prior to that Administrative Hearing, Plaintiff 

submitted to the ALJ a Request to Issue Subpoena to Dr. Karri. [R. 494-95.] The Request detailed, 

among other things, that Plaintiff sought Dr. Karri’s testimony because Plaintiff “[did] not know 

whether the ALJ [would] rely on the opinions from this medical witness when issuing the decision.” 

[R. 495.] Additionally, Plaintiff wanted to know the extent of Dr. Karri’s knowledge, training, and 

experience; time expended; documents reviewed; observations made at the exam (as Plaintiff felt they 

were inconsistent with other medical evidence of Record); and the process and basis used to provide 

the disclosed opinions.2 [Id.] No subpoena was issued for Dr. Karri’s testimony and Dr. Karri did not 

testify at the Administrative Hearing.

After the Administrative Hearing, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Edward Studzinski

issued an unfavorable August 28, 2018 decision, finding Plaintiff not disabled and denying him Social 

Security disability benefits. [R.188-98.] Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council (“AC”) and the 

matter was returned to ALJ Studzinski pursuant to a remand order from the AC. [R. 206-08.] The AC

vacated the ALJ’s August 28, 2018 decision because, inter alia, the ALJ failed to even consider 

Plaintiff’s timely request to subpoena Dr. Karri. [R. 207.] To remedy this error, the AC directed the 

2 Defendant’s argument that Dr. Karri’s report contains no “opinions” is a nonstarter. [Dkt. 22, p. 3.] Not only 

does the report facially contain a whole category of Dr. Karri’s “Impressions” (as well as other language where Dr. 

Karri states “It is my opinion that...”) [R. 919], but Plaintiff has detailed, inter alia, how he intended to inquire as 

to the process and basis for Dr. Karri’s other observations (even if Defendant describes them as “objective.”)

Case: 1:20-cv-03469 Document #: 24 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 2 of 6 PageID #:3389
3

ALJ to evaluate Plaintiff’s subpoena request. [Id.]

After a second Administrative Hearing, ALJ Studzinski again issued an unfavorable decision, 

which purported to remedy the errors identified by the AC. [R. 10-31.] Therein, the ALJ denied 

Plaintiff’s request to subpoena Dr. Karri because he did “not rel[y] solely upon this examination in 

[his] decision.” [R. 10.] That was the extent of the ALJ’s “evaluation” of Plaintiff’s subpoena request.

However, Plaintiff’s concern was never that the ALJ would rely solely on Dr. Karri’s opinion; 

his concern was that the ALJ would rely upon it at all. [R. 494-95.] Indeed, Plaintiff’s concerns were 

well-founded: after rejecting both the opinion of the medical expert (“ME”) who testified at the 

supplemental hearing and the opinion of Plaintiff’s primary care physician, the ALJ assigned “great 

weight” to the non-examining State agency medical consultants (one of whom is Dr. Karri). 

[R. 25-26.] 

Though the ALJ does not specifically assign a weight to Dr. Karri’s opinion, it appears he 

accepted it in its entirety. Citing to Dr. Karri’s consultative examination, the ALJ noted her largely 

unremarkable findings, including 5/5 grip strength, the ability to make fists and oppose fingers, and 

5/5 motor strength in all extremities. [R. 19.] Like the non-examining State agency consultants, Dr. 

Karri appeared to believe no manipulative limitations were warranted. [See R. 166, 180.] Without 

referring to Dr. Karri by name, the ALJ deferred to her findings regarding Plaintiff’s upper extremity 

limitations and rejected the opinion of the ME that Plaintiff would be limited to only occasional use 

of the bilateral hands for reaching, feeling, fingering, pushing, and pulling. [R. 24, 61, 944-45.]

The discrepancy between the ME’s assessment of upper extremity limitations and Dr. Karri’s 

assessment of upper extremity limitations is pivotal, given the ALJ’s explanation for his single 

modification to the RFC assessment in his second decision – that Plaintiff can frequently, as opposed 

to occasionally, perform fine and gross manipulation with his dominant left upper extremity. 

[Compare R. 17 with R. 193.] At the second hearing, the ALJ specifically asked the Vocational Expert 

Case: 1:20-cv-03469 Document #: 24 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 3 of 6 PageID #:3390
4

(“VE”) whether reducing this limitation to “occasional” would affect the occupational base, and the 

VE testified that all work would be precluded at both the light and sedentary exertional level.3

[R. 81-83.] Thus, based upon the second VE’s testimony alone, the ALJ would have had to declare 

Plaintiff disabled under his initial RFC assessment. [See R. 193.]

Yet faced with his prior decision finding limiting Plaintiff to occasional fine and gross 

manipulation with his dominant left upper extremity, rather than declare Plaintiff disabled under that 

rubric, the ALJ in his new decision made the astounding assertion that his earlier RFC limitation to 

“occasional” left upper extremity fine and gross manipulation in his initial decision was a 

typographical error. [R. 22.] It is difficult for the Court to imagine that typing the word “occasional” 

rather than “frequent” can be attributed to a mere typo. More importantly, the significance of this 

difference cannot be understated in the instant matter – the effect of this typo, as the ALJ discovered 

during the second hearing, was the difference between a finding of disability and no disability. Yet

the ALJ went on to assert he again reviewed the Administrative Record and, essentially, remains 

convinced that “frequent” is appropriate (despite this not being part of his original opinion).” [R. 22.]

The ALJ’s current insistence that there are insufficient objective and clinical findings to support the

limitation he included in the first RFC assessment through a “typo” is so flimsy it borders on 

pretextual. The Court finds the ALJ’s explanation in this regard unsupported by substantial evidence.

Although cross-examination via subpoena “is not an absolute right in administrative cases,” 

an administrative claimant is entitled to “such cross-examination as may be required for a full and 

true disclosure of the facts.” Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049, 1057 (7th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up; 

citations omitted). The denial of a subpoena for the second time in this matter, when the ALJ knew 

3 This line of questioning satisfied the first of the four bases for remand listed in the AC’s order: the ALJ’s failure 

to pose a hypothetical to the VE regarding “occasional” left sided fine and gross manipulation, despite including 

that limitation in the first RFC assessment. [R. 193, 206.]

Case: 1:20-cv-03469 Document #: 24 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 4 of 6 PageID #:3391
5

he had wholesale adopted the opinions of Dr Karri, strikes the Court as not just clearly incorrect, but

fundamentally wrong; in light of these facts, no reasonable person could agree with the ALJ’s denial 

of a subpoena to probe Dr Karri’s opinions. Plaintiff laid out the facts he expected to develop via Dr. 

Karri’s testimony, and these facts are specific to Dr. Karri and her report (e.g., Dr. Karri’s knowledge, 

training, and experience; time expended on the exam of Plaintiff; the process and basis of Dr. Karris’ 

exam observations and opinions); the Court does not find these facts could have been proven without 

issuing a subpoena in this matter. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(d)(2). And, in reality, the truth of the 

matter is that Dr. Karri’s opinions (adopted in full but not referred to by name) in were crucial to the 

ALJ’s determination to deny Plaintiff’s disability benefits in the instant matter. Thus, the Court finds 

the issuance of the subpoena was “reasonably necessary for the full presentation of the case” 20 C.F.R. 

§404.950(d)(1); the ALJ knew, or should have known, this based on his initial opinion. Particularly 

in light of the Appeals Council’s directive to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s request for a subpoena 

(whatever the nature of Dr. Karri’s report), the ALJ’s failure to do so constitutes reversible error.

Separately, the Court also finds the ALJ failed to satisfy the AC’s order to “evaluate” Plaintiff’s 

subpoena request due to an inadequate single-sentence-discussion of this issue, which is a related, but 

independent, basis for remand. Lopez, 336 F.3d at 539.

Additionally, given that the ALJ had an opportunity to correct the errors identified by the 

Appeals Council and failed to do so (indeed, seemingly “doubling down” on at least one of the errors), 

the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s case be assigned to a different ALJ on remand. Robert M. W. 

v. Saul, 2020 WL 6801842, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2020) (citing Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 

309 (7th Cir. 1996) (recommending reassignment because “[t]he tone of the administrative law 

judge’s opinion suggests that she may have an unshakable commitment to the denial of this 

applicant’s claim.”)). The Court further recommends the Agency issue a subpoena for Dr. Karri’s 

testimony in this matter if, upon review of the file, there is going to be another Administrative 

Case: 1:20-cv-03469 Document #: 24 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 5 of 6 PageID #:3392
6

Hearing.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court must reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with 

this Order. The Court offers no opinion as to the other alleged bases of error in the ALJ’s decision as 

raised by Plaintiff other than those discussed herein. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment 

[dkt. 16] is GRANTED; Defendant’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. 21] is DENIED. The Court 

hereby remands this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

Entered: December 6, 2021 ______________________________

Susan E. Cox,

United States Magistrate Judge

Case: 1:20-cv-03469 Document #: 24 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 6 of 6 PageID #:3393