IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tradesmen International, LLC, :

Broadspire, and IMC Construction, :

Petitioners :

:

 v. : No. 450 C.D. 2022

: Submitted: March 3, 2023

Demetrius Brown (Workers’ :

Compensation Appeal Board), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: July 14, 2023

Tradesmen International, LLC (Employer), along with IMC Construction and 

its third party administrator, Broadspire,

1

filed a Petition for Review of the April 7, 

2022 order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed the 

Workers’ Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) August 12, 2021 order granting, in part,

Demetrius Brown’s (Brown) Claim Petition he filed under the Workers’ 

Compensation Act (Act).

2

 On appeal, Employer argues the Board erred by affirming 

1 Employer was a subcontractor of IMC Construction (IMC). IMC held a workers’ compensation 

insurance policy with Broadspire, and as a result, IMC defended the case on behalf of Employer. 

Board Opinion, 4/7/22, at 1 n.1.

2 Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710.
2

the WCJ decision when it was not supported by substantial, competent evidence. 

Employer further argues the Board erred by affirming the WCJ’s transfer of the 

burden of proof to Employer. Upon review, we affirm.

I. Background and Procedural History

On February 15, 2020, Brown worked as a plumber for IT Landes, who 

subcontracted him to Employer. WCJ Decision and Order, 8/12/2021 (WCJ Dec.), 

Findings of Fact (F.F.) ¶ 1.a. On that date, Brown tripped and fell when walking up

some steps at a job site, and he injured his right hand, back, and neck. Id. ¶ 1.b. 

Brown continued to work for the rest of his shift that day. Id. Brown did not report 

the incident when it happened because he did not think he had suffered a major 

injury. Id. Although his back hurt after he fell, Brown continued to work the 

following week as well. Id. ¶ 1.c.

On February 21, 2020, however, Brown reported to the emergency room (ER) 

at Abbington Hospital because his right hand was swollen. Id. ¶ 1.d. Brown had 

developed an infectious tenosynovitis in the tendons of his fourth and fifth fingers. 

Id. ¶ 1.c. On February 21, 2020, and again one week later, Brown underwent surgery 

on his right hand. Id. ¶ 1.d. The surgeries drained fluid that had accumulated in the 

tendons of Brown’s hand because of the infection. Id. ¶ 1.c. 

Brown then reported his February 15, 2020 injury to Employer’s foreman. Id. 

Employer’s Pre-Construction Compliance Coordinator, Derna O’Brien (Ms. 

O’Brien), indicated Employer learned of the injury on March 3, 2020. Id. ¶ 5.a.-b. 

Employer issued a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP) on March 31, 2020.3 On 

3 Employer issued the NCP outside the 21-day limit required by the Act, and accordingly, the WCJ 

granted the Penalty Petition Brown filed along with his Claim Petition. Employer did not appeal 

the portion of the Board’s order affirming the WCJ’s grant of Brown’s Penalty Petition. 
3

April 23, 2020, Brown submitted a Claim Petition seeking full disability benefits 

from February 21, 2020, and ongoing. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 4a-8a.

In a decision and order circulated August 12, 2021, the WCJ granted Brown’s 

Claim Petition in part. The WCJ ordered Employer to pay Temporary Total 

Disability (TTD) benefits from February 21, 2020, until June 26, 2020, which is the 

date the WCJ found Brown was fully recovered from his work injury. WCJ Dec. at 

11. In an April 7, 2022 opinion and order, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision 

and order in its entirety. Employer’s Petition for Review to this Court followed. 

Employer presents three issues on appeal.4 First, Employer argues Brown’s 

medical expert did not render a legally sufficient opinion that Brown’s work-related 

4 We have reframed Employer’s issues on appeal for purposes of clarity and ease of analysis. In 

its Petition for Review, Employer presented its issues as follows:

a. The [Board] committed an error of law, and its Decision was not supported by 

substantial, competent evidence, in affirming the WCJ’s finding that Claimant’s 

medical expert, Dr. Gregory Nelson, rendered a legally sufficient opinion regarding

causation. Dr. Nelson based his causal opinion upon the “temporal proximity” 

between Claimant’s complaints and the work incident. The opinion was legally 

insufficient and incompetent as set forth in the Supreme Court’s holding in [Lewis 

v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ.),] 498 A.2d 800 (P[a]. 

1985).

b. The [Board] committed an error of law, and its Decision was not supported by 

substantial competent evidence, in affirming the WCJ’s finding that Claimant and 

Dr. Nelson offered credible and persuasive testimony. The WCJ erred in accepting 

the testimony of Claimant and Dr. Nelson insofar as they offered conflicting 

testimony about the alleged hand injury and whether Claimant had cut his hand or 

had broken the skin. Claimant and his expert offered contradictory testimony 

regarding the alleged mechanism yet the judge accepted the evidence as credible. 

Moreover, Claimant offered inconsistent testimony about the condition of his hand 

after the alleged work incident.

c. The [Board] committed an error of law by affirming the WCJ’s transfer of the 

burden of proof to the defense. Although the WCJ correctly noted that Claimant 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
4

injury was the cause of his disability. Second, Employer argues the Board and the 

WCJ erred in finding that Brown and his medical expert offered credible and 

persuasive testimony when those witnesses offered conflicting testimony. Lastly, 

Employer argues the WCJ incorrectly shifted the burden of proof on the issue of 

causation to Employer. 

II. Discussion 

In a workers’ compensation appeal, we are limited to determining whether the 

necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether the Board 

committed an error of law, or whether the Board’s decision violates a party’s 

constitutional rights. See Elberson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Elwyn, Inc.), 936 

A.2d 1195, 1198 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Substantial evidence is such relevant 

evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 

Republic Steel Corp. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Shinsky), 421 A.2d 1060, 

1062 (Pa. 1980). 

A. Causation

Employer argues Brown’s evidence failed to support a finding that his workrelated injury caused his disability. Brown’s disability did not occur at the time of 

the incident and the causal relationship between the work injury and his subsequent 

disability was not obvious. As a result, unequivocal medical evidence was necessary 

to establish causation. Jeannette Dist. Mem’l Hosp. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (Mesich), 668 A.2d 249 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).

bears the burden of proof on a Claim Petition, he then asserted that the defense 

medical expert had failed to provide an explanation for the cause of the alleged 

work injury. Employer bore no burden of proof. Claimant alone had that burden 

and he failed.

Employer’s Petition for Review ¶ 8.a-c. 
5

When a physician states that in his professional opinion a claimant’s injury 

was caused by a specific incident, that testimony constitutes unequivocal medical 

expert testimony. Indus. Recision Servs. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Farbo),

808 A.2d 994 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). In contrast, medical expert testimony which 

assumes a causal relationship between an injury and a recent event based solely on 

temporal proximity is equivocal and incompetent in finding a work-related injury. 

Lewis v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ.), 498 A.2d 800 (Pa. 

1985). Questions of credibility, conflicting medical evidence and evidentiary weight 

fall within the WCJ’s authority, and the WCJ is free to accept the testimony of any 

witness, including medical witnesses, in whole or in part. Ingrassia v. Workers’

Comp. Appeal Bd. (Universal Health Servs., Inc.), 126 A.3d 394, 399 n.5 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2015). 

Brown presented the deposition testimony of Gregory Nelson, M.D. (Dr. 

Nelson). Dr. Nelson stated Brown “contracted the infection when his hand scraped 

the cement steps.” WCJ Dec., F.F. ¶ 2.b. Brown testified he did not notice a cut on 

his hand immediately after his fall, but his hand was “grazed” and had a “little 

redness.” Id. ¶ 1.b. Dr. Nelson testified a cut was not necessary and the abrasion 

was sufficient to break the skin and lead to the infection. Id. ¶ 2.f. Dr. Nelson 

“related [Brown’s] diagnoses to the February 15, 2020 incident” based upon “the 

timing of [Brown’s] symptoms and the fall.” Id. ¶ 2.g. Dr. Nelson’s testimony was 

not equivocal, nor did he assume a causal relationship based solely on the timing of 

the incident. The WCJ found Dr. Nelson’s testimony on causation, “credible and 

convincing, based upon his experience.” Id. ¶ 8. 

Employer presented the deposition testimony of John Nolan, Jr., M.D. (Dr. 

Nolan). Dr. Nolan opined that a deep puncture wound would have been required to 
6

cause Brown’s infection. Because Brown suffered no such puncture wound, but did 

in fact develop an infection, the WCJ did not credit this portion of Dr. Nolan’s 

testimony. The WCJ carefully considered and weighed the expert medical testimony 

on causation, and we conclude the Board did not err when it affirmed the WCJ in 

this regard. 

B. Conflicting Testimony

Employer also argues the Board erred in accepting testimony from Brown and

Brown’s expert, Dr. Nelson, when their testimony conflicted at times. Questions of 

credibility, conflicting medical evidence, and evidentiary weight fall within the 

WCJ’s authority, and the WCJ is free to accept the testimony of any witness, 

including medical witnesses, in whole or in part. Ingrassia, 126 A.3d at 399 n.5. 

The WCJ is the ultimate factfinder, but a WCJ must provide reasons for accepting 

or rejecting evidence. Id. at 402-03. 

Section 422(a) of the Act provides a WCJ “shall specify the evidence upon 

which the [WCJ] relies and state the reasons for accepting it . . .” 77 P.S. § 834. 

When faced with conflicting evidence, the WCJ “must adequately explain the 

reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence.” Id. 

Here, the WCJ did not fully accept the testimony of Brown or Dr. Nelson. 

Rather, the WCJ accepted each of their testimony, in part, and provided an 

explanation for doing so. For example, the WCJ did not find Brown fully credible, 

based on his “demeanor and deportment” when testifying live before the WCJ. WCJ

Dec., F.F. ¶ 6. Specifically, the WCJ witnessed Brown make a fist, despite Brown’s

testimony he could not do so. Id. Further, the WCJ did not find Brown credible 

regarding his back and neck injuries because his testimony conflicted with the

medical reports. Id. The WCJ rejected Brown’s testimony regarding the status of 
7

his right hand where it conflicted with the accepted testimony of Dr. Nolan. Id. The 

WCJ noted Dr. Nolan was a “board-certified orthopedic surgeon, whose

qualifications in such regard exceed those of Dr. Nelson.” Id. ¶ 8. The WCJ rejected 

Dr. Nelson’s testimony about Brown’s alleged back and neck injuries. However, 

the WCJ found Brown’s testimony about his initial injury “credible and convincing” 

given the consistent reports he gave at the ER. Id. ¶ 6. 

The WCJ discussed why he accepted some testimony and rejected other

testimony. He carefully parsed out portions of testimony he found credible, and those 

he did not. Except for Ms. O’Brien, the WCJ did not fully accept the testimony of 

any one individual. We find no error in the WCJ’s acceptance or rejection of 

testimony, nor in the Board’s affirmation of the WCJ.

C. Burden of Proof

In its third and final issue on appeal, Employer argues the WCJ incorrectly 

shifted the burden of proof on causation to Employer. It is well established that the 

claimant bears the burden to prove each element required to establish entitlement to 

benefits in a claim petition proceeding. Inglis House v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal 

Bd. (Reedy), 634 A.2d 592 (Pa. 1993).

 While the WCJ found Employer’s expert, Dr. Nolan, did not provide a viable 

opinion on causation, the WCJ also acknowledged Employer did not carry this 

burden. WCJ Dec., F.F. ¶ 8. Rather, the WCJ juxtaposed the testimony of Dr. 

Nelson and Dr. Nolan as further explanation for accepting the opinion of Dr. Nelson, 

finding his testimony “credible and convincing.” Id. Thus, the WCJ concluded 

Brown met his burden of proof regarding causation and did not improperly shift the 

burden of proof to Employer. 
8

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the Board did not err when it affirmed 

the WCJ’s order granting Brown’s Claim Petition. Accordingly, we affirm the 

Board’s order.

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision in this case.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Tradesmen International, LLC, :

Broadspire, and IMC Construction, :

Petitioners :

:

 v. : No. 450 C.D. 2022

:

Demetrius Brown (Workers’ :

Compensation Appeal Board), :

Respondent :

O R D E R 

 AND NOW, this 14th day of July, 2023, the April 7, 2022 order of the 

Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is AFFIRMED.

______________________________

STACY WALLACE, Judge