******************************************************

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******************************************************
APPENDIX

ROBERT CHIULLI, JR. v. CHRIS

CHIULLI ET AL.*

Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford

File No. CV-12-6036511S

Memorandum filed July 8, 2014

Proceedings

Memorandum of decision on plaintiff’s action alleging, inter alia, breach of contract. Judgment for the

defendants.

George W. Kramer, for the plaintiff.

Richard P. Kuzmak, Joseph W. Bibisi and Eric H.

Rothauser, for the defendants.
Opinion

PECK, J. This lawsuit arises out of an agreement to

share the proceeds from an anticipated sale of real

property identified as Lots 3A and 3B Alumni Road,

Newington. The plaintiff, Robert Chiulli, Jr., has sued

his cousin, the defendant Chris Chiulli, and the latter’s

business, Double ‘‘C’’ Construction Company, LLC

(Double ‘‘C’’), in two counts alleging breach of contract

and conversion and statutory theft, pursuant to General

Statutes § 52-564. In count one, the plaintiff alleges that

on February 4, 2008, the parties entered into a contract

whereby, in exchange for the plaintiff filing a release

of a notice of assignment on the Newington land

records, the defendants promised to pay the plaintiff

$30,000 upon the closing of the sale of those properties,

and that the defendants sold the lots in question on or

about February 18, 2011, but did not inform the plaintiff

of that sale or pay him the $30,000. In count two, the

plaintiff alleges that the defendants had the funds to

pay the $30,000 from the sale of the properties in 2011

but failed to pay him, and that the failure to do so

constitutes conversion and statutory theft. The plaintiff

seeks damages in the amount of $30,000, attorney’s

fees and costs, punitive damages and treble damages

pursuant to § 52-564. In their answer to the complaint,

the defendants have denied the material allegations of

both counts. A court trial was held on December 18,

2013, at which both Robert Chiulli, Jr., and Chris Chiulli

testified. Posttrial briefs were filed by the parties, and

closing argument was held on March 17, 2014.

The principal issue at trial focused on the scope of

the contract between the parties as memorialized in a

letter dated February 4, 2008, which was admitted into

evidence as a full exhibit by agreement of the parties.1

The defendants claim that their obligation to pay the

plaintiff $30,000 related to a specific deal concerning

Lots 3A and 3B as contemplated on February 4, 2008,

which deal ultimately failed, while the plaintiff claims

that the defendants’ obligation to pay him $30,000 was

open-ended and extended to the defendants’ ultimate

sale of the lots in question in February, 2011.

The court finds the following facts. Lots 3A and 3B

Alumni Road were originally owned by Newington Business Park (NBP). In 2003, Double ‘‘C’’ entered into an

agreement with NBP, giving the defendants the right to

purchase Lots 1, 2, 3 (3A and 3B).2 On April 10, 2006,

NBP passed a resolution authorizing the sale of the lots

to the defendant Double ‘‘C’’ and/or its assignees for a

total amount of $187,000. In 2006 and 2007, the parties

had verbal agreements relating to the purchase of Lot

3 for $72,000. According to the 2006 agreement between

the parties, the defendants were to assign their right

to purchase Lot 3 to the plaintiff. Thereafter, the plaintiff

was to purchase Lot 3 from the defendants for $72,000

with $57,000 going to NBP and $15,000 going to the
defendants. The 2007 agreement contemplated the

plaintiff purchasing Lots 3A and 3B directly from NBP

for $57,000 and then paying the defendants $15,000.

Under both scenarios, the total to be paid by the plaintiff

forthe lots was $72,000, with $15,000 going to the defendants. The 2006 agreement required two closings, while

the 2007 agreement contemplated one closing. The

plaintiff planned to sell one of the lots and keep the

remaining lot for his own use.

The plaintiff filed a notice on the Newington land

records, dated October 8, 2007, of the defendants’

assignment to him of their right to purchase Lots 3A

and 3B.3 The plaintiff spent approximately $9500 for

engineering work and other costs relating to the subdivision of the property. Neither the 2006 nor the 2007

agreement ever came to fruition because the plaintiff

was either unwilling or unable to move forward with

the purchase.4 The plaintiff did not pay the defendants

any money or anything else of value for the assignment

of the lots.5

In 2008, Jim Cassidy, an engineer who did work for

both Robert Chiulli, Jr., and Chris Chiulli, approached

Chris about a prospective buyer for Lots 3A and 3B.

The name of the buyer was Phil Rouquier.6 Cassidy

approached Chris because he knew that Chris ‘‘controlled’’ the deal with NBP. NBP was Chris Chiulli’s

client. Chris approached Robert about the sale but did

not disclose the name of the buyer. There is no dispute

that Chris told Robert that the anticipated purchase

price for this deal was $140,000. Chris and Robert made

a deal, reflected in the February 4, 2008 letter, that if

Robert signed a release of the notice of the assignment

previously filed on the Newington land records dated

October 8, 2007, Chris would pay Robert $30,000 ‘‘at

the closing for any prior agreements.’’ Robert was aware

that Chris had a specific buyer and the specific sales

price of $140,000 in mind when he approached Robert

about making this deal.

On February 4, 2008, the parties entered into a written

agreement (the contract), whereby the defendants

agreed that if the plaintiff ‘‘signs the February 4, 2008

release of Notice on the Newington Land Records Book

1950 at Page 567 that Robert Chiulli Jr. will receive

$30,000 at the closing for any prior agreements.’’

(Emphasis added.) The contract was drafted by Chris

on behalf of himself and Double ‘‘C’’ Construction, and

signed by him and by the plaintiff, Robert Chiulli, Jr. The

term ‘‘prior agreements’’ is undefined in the contract.

At trial, both parties agreed that parol evidence was

required to assist the court in interpreting the contract.

Also on February 4, 2008, the plaintiff executed a

release of the notice of the assignment to purchase Lots

3A and 3B. The release was recorded in the Newington

land records. At the time that the release of the assignment was filed on the Newington land records, there
was no dispute that Robert had the right as an individual

to execute the release. The deal with Rouquier fell

through, and Lots 3A and 3B were not sold in 2008

for $140,000.

The plaintiff testified that he believed the contract

was not conditioned on a specific buyer purchasing the

lots and that the reference to prior agreements applied

to any agreements involving the sale of the property.

However, in his proposed findings of fact, the plaintiff

acknowledges that he knew that Chris had a specific

buyer in mind when he approached him about this deal.

See Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact and Posttrial

Brief, #7, p. 2. The plaintiff also testified that he believed

that when a closing on the property occurred, the defendants would be required to pay him $30,000. He further

testified that he believed $30,000 was a fair amount

because of his time and expense he incurred in developing the property in the approximate amount of $9500.

Chris Chiulli testified that he believed it was clear that

the contract applied specifically to the anticipated

agreement with Rouquier and the sales price of $140,000

for Lots 3A and 3B. Chris further testified that the plaintiff never paid him for the assignment of the lots in

the first place and that the defendants also incurred

substantial expense in an effort to develop and sell the

lots. If the deal with Rouquier had gone through, Chris

would have paid the plaintiff the agreed upon amount

of $30,000.

In June, 2008, the plaintiff sustained serious injury

from an assault in a Massachusetts bar or restaurant

that left him in a coma and hospitalized until December,

2008. He did notlearn thatthe Rouquier deal fellthrough

until after he got out of the hospital. The injury caused

him to suffer some memory loss. The plaintiff filed a

personal injury lawsuit in connection with the assault.

In November, 2011, the plaintiff entered into a stipulated

judgment with Mount Sinai Hospital for a bill relating

to his hospitalization and rehabilitation from his injuries. The stipulation provided for a reduced amount if

payment of the judgment was made by a specified date.

In an effort to raise that amount, he was required to

raise $100,000 by November, 2012, which necessitated

the sale of some of his assets, including the sale of his

Mercedes to Chris for $23,000. At the end of 2012, the

plaintiff settled his lawsuit for five (5) million dollars,

after three weeks of trial.

After the Rouquier deal fell through, Chris assumed

that he and Robert would revert to their prior

agreements whereby Robert would purchase the property and Chris would get $15,000 at the time of the

closing. Chris offered to sell the lots to Robert after

the Rouquier deal fell through and after Robert got out

of the hospital, but Robert lacked the financial

resources at that time to commit to a purchase. There

is no evidence that at any time between February, 2008,
and February, 2011, the plaintiff sought to purchase or

sell Lots 3A or 3B.

On February 18, 2011, Chris Chiulli purchased Lots

1, 2, 3A and 3B from NBP for $187,000 plus closing

expenses for a total of $194,935.85. The settlement statement (Defendants’ Exhibit D) reflects a $100,000 credit

to Chris for money owed to him by NBP. The total cost

to the defendants for purchase of the property was

$86,892.35 plus $43,880.53, for a total of $130,772.88.

The same day, February 18, 2011, Double ‘‘C’’ sold

Lots 2, 3A, and 3B to Michael Geer for a total amount

of $141,674, including the deposit. (Defendants’ Exhibit

B.) After the payoff of a second mortgage, the defendants received $131,624.96. The defendants did not

inform the plaintiff of the sale of Lots 2, 3A, and 3B

and did not pay him $30,000 from the proceeds. This

transaction included Lot 2, which was not part of any

agreement between the parties.

In May, 2011, the defendant Double ‘‘C’’ sold Lot 1

to Daniel Pizzoferrato for $82,240.64. The net sale price

was $75,464.64 after settlement charges and closing

costs. (Defendants’ Exhibit C.) The settlement statement lists the purchase price as $82,241. In this transaction, $75,465 was paid from the proceeds to the Internal

Revenue Service. (Defendants’ Exhibit C, line 504.) Lot

1 was not part of any agreement between the parties

and was sold in a separate transaction.

The defendant Double ‘‘C’’ paid NBP a total of

$194,934.85 for Lots 1, 2, 3A and 3B and received a total

of $207,089.60 from the sale of the lots. After development costs and closing expenses, Double ‘‘C’’ netted

only $12,154.75 from these transactions. After purchasing the four lots for $194,934.85 and then selling Lots

2, 3A, and 3B for $131,674, the defendants experienced

a shortfall of approximately $63,000 without taking into

account development costs that exceeded $100,000. The

plaintiff did not learn about the sale of Lots 3A and 3B

until 2012 when he checked the Newington land records

and found out that the properties had been sold, at

which time he immediately demanded payment.

Although there are credibility issues relating to the

testimony of both Robert Chiulli and Chris Chiulli, they

are not material to the resolution of this lawsuit. There

is no question that in February, 2011, Robert Chiulli

could have used the $30,000 to help pay his hospital

bill and believes his cousin Chris withheld moneys that

could have helped at a critical time. Robert believes

that Chris was less than forthcoming about the ultimate

disposition of Lots 3A and 3B. However, the testimony

of both individuals reflects what amounts to bad blood

between them, which does not alter the essential facts

of the case or the legal issues presented.

I

STANDARD OF PROOF
‘‘While a plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference that may be legitimately drawn from the evidence,

and has the same right to submit a weak case as a

strong one, the plaintiff must still sustain the burden

of proof on the contested issues in the complaint and

the defendant need not present any evidence to contradict it.’’ Gulycz v. Stop & Shop Cos., 29 Conn. App. 519,

523, 615 A.2d 1087, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 923, 618

A.2d 527 (1992). The general burden of proof in civil

actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential elements of the causes of action set forth in the

complaint by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

II

COUNT ONE—BREACH OF CONTRACT

In count one of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges

breach of contract. The plaintiff first argues that the

February 4, 2008 contract was a valid and binding document which was breached by the defendants’ failure to

pay him $30,000 upon the closing of the sale of Lots

3A and 3B on February 18, 2011. The defendants counter

that their promise to pay $30,000 was a one-time deal

based on a specific sale of Lots 3A and 3B for $140,000.

The defendants also assert that, in any event, Robert

Chiulli, Jr., did not have the authority to sign the release

of the assignment, and therefore, there was no valid

consideration for the February 4, 2008 agreement and

the contract was unenforceable for that reason alone.

‘‘The essential terms of a valid contract are an offer,

acceptance of that offer, and consideration.’’ Cimino

v. Drucas Builders, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-09-5007828 (December 30, 2011) (Abrams, J.), aff’d, 141 Conn. App. 905, 62

A.3d 643, cert. denied, 309 Conn. 914, 70 A.3d 38 (2013).

In the present case, there was an offer made by the

defendants to pay Robert Chiulli, Jr., $30,000 ‘‘at the

closing for any prior agreements,’’ if Robert was to

sign a release of the notice of assignment from the

defendants of their option to buy Lots 3A and 3B from

NBP filed on the Newington land records dated October

8, 2007. Acceptance of these terms was evidenced by

the signatures of the parties to the transaction.

The defendants argue that the stated consideration

for the $30,000 payment by the defendants is illusory

because Eastern Development, LLC, not Robert Chiulli,

Jr., was assigned the option to buy Lots 3A and 3B, and

therefore, Robert had no authority to sign a release of

the assignment in his individual capacity.

‘‘Consideration consists of a benefit to the party

promising, or a loss or detriment to the party to whom

the promise is made. . . . Whether an agreement is

supported by consideration is a factual inquiry reserved

for the trier of fact and subject to review under the

clearly erroneous standard. . . . The conclusion
drawn from the facts so found, i.e., whether a particular

set of facts constitutes consideration in the particular

circumstances, is a question of law . . . and, accordingly, is subject to plenary review. . . . [T]he doctrine

of consideration does not require or imply an equal

exchange between the contracting parties . . . . The

general rule is that, in the absence of fraud or other

unconscionable circumstances, a contract will not be

rendered unenforceable at the behest of one of the

contracting parties merely because of an inadequacy

of consideration.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Milford Bank v. Phoenix Contracting

Group, Inc., 143 Conn. App. 519, 529, 72 A.3d 55 (2013).

The admissible evidence establishes that the consideration, as recited in the February 4, 2008 agreement,

was valid. The only mention of Eastern Development,

LLC, as the assignee of the right to purchase Lots 3A

and 3B, is in the unsigned ‘‘Assignment and Assumption

Agreement,’’ dated May 17, 2006, one of several documents contained in Defendants’ Exhibit A. Further, the

notice of assignment, dated October 8, 2007, filed on

the land records, states that Double ‘‘C’’ Construction

and/or Chris Chiulli assigned their rights to purchase

the property to an assignee stated as ‘‘Robert Chiulli,

Jr.’’ No other party is listed as assignee, and the notice

is signed by Robert Chiulli, Jr., individually. Further,

the reference in the February 4, 2008 contract is to ‘‘the

February 4, 2008 release of Notice on the Newington

Land Records Book 1950 at page 567,’’ which volume

and page number is the location of the notice of assignment executed and filed by Robert Chiulli, Jr., on October 8, 2007.7 No one questioned the validity of the

release of the assignment as consideration for the contract until the trial of this lawsuit, and the court finds

no legitimate basis forthis claim. In his testimony, Chris

Chiulli never disputed the authority of Robert to execute the release of the assignment contained in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1. For these reasons, the court finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that Robert Chiulli, Jr.,

had the authority to execute the release of the notice

of assignment and to file it on the Newington land

records. Therefore, the plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that there was valid consideration for the defendants’ payment of $30,000.

The more significant issue concerning the February

4, 2008 agreement is the meaning of the phrase ‘‘at the

closing for any prior agreements.’’ The plaintiff argues

this phrase reflects an open-ended promise to pay him

$30,000 at any closing of the sale of Lots 3A and 3B,

including the sale concluded with Michael Geer on February 18, 2011. On the other hand, the defendants argue

that at the time of the February 4, 2008 contract, the

parties had a specific understanding that the performance of the contract contemplated only a specific sale

to a buyer (Rouquier) for $140,000, and that ‘‘for any

prior agreements’’ referred to the previous verbal
agreements between them from 2006 and 2007, whereby

the plaintiff would purchase the property at a cost of

$72,000 in one or two transactions and the defendants

would receive $15,000 at the closing.

‘‘[T]he determination as to whether contractual language is plain and unambiguous is itself a question of

law subject to plenary review.’’ Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, 311 Conn. 93, 101–102, 84 A.3d 828 (2014).

‘‘In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, the

words of the contract must be given their natural and

ordinary meaning. . . . A contract is unambiguous

when its language is clear and conveys a definite and

precise intent. . . . The court will not torture words

to impart ambiguity where ordinary meaning leaves no

room for ambiguity. . . . Moreover, the mere fact that

the parties advance different interpretations of the language in question does not necessitate a conclusion

that the language is ambiguous.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest-Connecticut, LLC, 259 Conn. 665,

670, 791 A.2d 546 (2002). ‘‘In contrast, a contract is

ambiguous if the intent of the parties is not clear and

certain from the language of the contract itself. . . .

[A]ny ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the

language used by the parties. . . . The contract must

be viewed in its entirety, with each provision read in

light of the other provisions . . . and every provision

must be given effect if it is possible to do so.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 670–71.

‘‘If the language of the contract is susceptible to more

than one reasonable interpretation, the contract is

ambiguous.’’ Id., 671. When a contract is ambiguous

the court must consider extrinsic evidence and make

factual findings as to the parties’ intent. Cruz v. Visual

Perceptions, LLC, supra, 106.

The term ‘‘at the closing for any prior agreements’’

is not defined within the contract and is unquestionably

ambiguous, requiring consideration of extrinsic evidence in the form of the testimony and exhibits submitted in evidence at trial. Based on all the relevant

evidence, the court finds that the plaintiff has failed to

prove the validity of his interpretation of the contract

by a preponderance of the evidence.

As previously discussed, there is undisputed evidence

of agreements between the parties prior to February 4,

2008, one in 2006 and another in 2007. In the 2006

agreement, the parties agreed that Robert would purchase Lots 3A and 3B from the defendants for $72,000,

$57,000 of which would be paid to NBP and $15,000

would be paid to the defendants. In 2007, the parties

agreed that Robert would purchase the lots directly

from NBP, and the defendants would receive $15,000

at the closing. Further, $30,000 is twice the sum of

$15,000 that the parties had agreed that the defendants

would receive in either the 2006 or 2007 agreement. It is
unlikely that Chris reasonably would have contractually

committed to pay Robert $30,000, unless Chris was

certain that he would be able to deliver that sum to

Robert and make a more substantial profit for himself

and Double ‘‘C.’’

The language of the contract states that if the plaintiff

signed the February 4, 2008 release of the notice of

assignment on the Newington land records, the defendants promised that the plaintiff ‘‘will receive $30,000

at the closing for any prior agreements.’’ (Emphasis

added.) Robert’s testimony confirmed that he knew that

Chris had a specific buyer in mind when Chris came

to him about this deal. He also knew that Chris anticipated a sale of Lots 3A and 3B to that buyerfor $140,000,

with no mention of any other sales price. In addition,

the use of the specific participle ‘‘the’’ before the word

closing, further suggests that a particular closing was

contemplated. Although the contract sales price to

Michael Geer on February 18, 2011, was listed on the

settlement statement as $140,000, that sale also

included Lot 2, a parcel not covered by the February

4, 2008 agreement, which only covered Lots 3A and 3B.8

Finally, the plaintiff argues that because Chris Chiulli

drafted the contract, its terms must be construed

against him. However, the Supreme Court has recently

determined that this rule of interpretation is only to be

used as a last resort when the court finds the contract

language ambiguous after considering the external evidence. Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, supra, 311

Conn. 108 (‘‘[i]t would make absolutely no sense to

require the trial court to construe the agreement against

the defendant if the extrinsic evidence showed that it

was more likely than not that the parties had a contrary

intent’’). Here, the court has considered extrinsic evidence and finds that the evidence reflects more likely

than not that the contract was intended by the parties

to be limited to a specific sale of the property for

$140,000 to a particular buyer. Therefore, the drafting

of the document by the defendants is not an appropriate

factor for consideration by the court. Based on all the

foregoing evidence, the court finds that the plaintiff has

failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that the February 4, 2008 contract was open-ended and

extended to any closing of a sale of Lots 3A and 3B,

including the February 18, 2011 sale of the property to

Michael Geer.

III

COUNT TWO—CONVERSION AND THEFT

In count two of his complaint, the plaintiff seeks a

judgment of attorney’s fees and treble damages for the

defendants’ alleged conversion and civil theft of $30,000

out of the moneys received from the sale of Lots 3A

and 3B to Michael Geer on February 18, 2011.

Conversion has been defined as ‘‘an unauthorized
assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over

property belonging to another, to the exclusion of the

owner’s rights.’’ Mystic Color Lab, Inc. v. Auctions

Worldwide, LLC, 284 Conn. 408, 418, 934 A.2d 227

(2007). Statutory theft requires an intent to deprive the

owner of his property. Suarez-Negrete v. Trotta, 47

Conn. App. 517, 521, 705 A.2d 215 (1998). Thus, in order

forthe plaintiff to prevail in claims of statutory theft and

conversion, he or she must prove a sufficient property

interest in the item. See Discover Leasing, Inc. v. Murphy, 33 Conn. App. 303, 309, 635 A.2d 843 (1993) (prima

facie case for conversion and statutory theft requires

proof that property in question ‘‘belonged to’’ plaintiff).

‘‘A mere obligation to pay money may not be enforced

by a conversion action . . . and an action in tort is

inappropriate where the basis of the suit is a contract,

either express or implied. . . . Consistent with this

rule, in our case law sustaining a cause of action

wherein money was the subject of the conversion or

theft, the plaintiffs in those cases at one time had possession of, or legal title to, the money.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Deming v.

Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 279 Conn. 745, 772, 905

A.2d 623 (2006). ‘‘Accordingly, a claim for conversion

may be brought when the relationship is one of bailor

and bailee but not when it is one of debtor and creditor.’’

Mystic Color Lab, Inc. v. Auctions Worldwide, LLC,

supra, 419.

The plaintiff in this case has not provided any evidence supporting the conclusion that he at one time

had possession or legal title to the $30,000 he claims

he was promised by the defendants. There is no evidence that the plaintiff ever gave the defendants any

money to hold for him, that he ever had a lien on the

subject property in expectation of the fulfillment of the

contract, or that the plaintiff in any other way had any

ownership of the amount at any time in the transactions.

The contract at issue states that the defendants promised to pay the $30,000 to Robert Chiulli based on a

sale of Lots 3A and 3B ‘‘at the closing for any prior

agreements.’’ A mere promise to pay money is not sufficient to prove ownership of that money, and is not

enough to sustain a claim of statutory theft or conversion. Therefore, the plaintiff has failed to prove his

claims of conversion and statutory theft by a preponderance of the evidence.9

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the court

finds that the plaintiff has failed to sustain his burden

of proving either count one or count two by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, the court hereby

enters judgment in favor of the defendants.

* Affirmed. Chiulli v. Chiulli, 161 Conn. App. 638, A.3d (2015).

1 Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2.

2 At some point in the course of the transactions between the parties Lot

3 was subdivided into Lots 3A and 3B.
3 The notice of assignment is contained in the evidence as Defendants’

Exhibit A. The assignment itself is not in evidence other than by way of the

testimony of Robert Chiulli, Jr., and Chris Chiulli.

4 Documents relating to the 2007 agreement are all contained in Defendants’ Exhibit A. The documents reflect that the plaintiff was informed by

the president of NBP of an environmental issue relating to the property on

or about January 30, 2007.

5 There is no dispute that Eastern Development, LLC, was owned by the

plaintiff and that an assignment by Double ‘‘C’’ and Chris Chiulli of Lots 3A

and 3B was apparently made to the plaintiff before October 8, 2007, when

the notice of assignment (signed by Robert Chiulli, Jr., only), is dated. What

is less clear is to whom the assignment was made, Eastern Development,

LLC, or the plaintiff. The document which purportedly reflects the actual

assignment is unsigned and is contained in Defendants’ Exhibit A. The notice

of assignment, filed on the Newington land records, which is also included

in Exhibit A, lists the assignee as Robert Chiulli, Jr., and is signed by him,

individually. In addition, the release of the assignment, dated February 4,

2008, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, was also executed by the plaintiff individually.

Although the defendants have made much of their claim that the assignment

was actually made to Eastern Development, LLC, a limited liability company

owned by the plaintiff and not the plaintiff, individually, the only evidence

of this is the unsigned ‘‘Assignment and Assumption Agreement,’’ contained

in Defendants’ Exhibit A. As discussed later on in this memorandum, this

is not a valid issue in this case, and therefore, is not a factor in the decision

of the court.

6 The spelling of this name is unclear as neither of the witnesses were

able to give a definitive spelling.

7 The precise wording in the contract is that, ‘‘Double C Construction and

Chris Chiulli agree that if Robert Chiulli signs the February 4, 2008 release

of notice on the Newington Land Records Book 1950 at Page 567 that Robert

Chiulli will receive $30,000 at the closing for any prior agreements.’’

8 The plaintiff offered no evidence concerning the value of Lot 1 and the

defendants had no reason to.

9 The plaintiff cites to the case William Raveis Real Estate, Inc. v. Brancale, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-11-6019722-

S (January 29, 2013) (Sommer, J.), in support of their argument that conversion and statutory theft can properly be pleaded in an action based on a

breach of contract. However, in contrast to the present case, the dispute

in Brancale concerned an unpaid contractual commission for a known and

definite sale that had already occurred.