1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

NICHOLAS MARQUEZ, ) 

individually and on behalf of all others ) Case No.: 1:20-cv-4454 

similarly situated, ) 

 ) Judge: Hon. Virginia Kendall 

 Plaintiff, ) Magistrate: Hon. M. David Weisman 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

GOOGLE, LLC. ) 

 ) 

Defendant. )

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR REMAND AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 

INTRODUCTION 

In this action, Plaintiff Nicholas Marquez alleges that Defendant Google LLC (“Google”) 

violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq. (“BIPA”). More 

specifically, Plaintiff alleges Google violated BIPA § 15(b) by “collecting, storing and using 

biometric identifiers and information from photographs in Illinois without the requisite informed 

written consent”; and § 15(a) by “fail[ing] to provide a publicly available written policy 

regarding its schedule and guidelines for the retention and permanent destruction of individuals’ 

biometrics.” Compl. ¶ 16. 

Google removed this action from the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois, on July 29, 

2020. However, under controlling Seventh Circuit precedent, this Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim under BIPA § 15(a). See Bryant v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 

958 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, that claim must be severed and remanded to 

state court. 

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ARGUMENT 

Before a federal court can adjudicate the merits of a case, it must satisfy itself that it has 

jurisdiction over the claims and parties that appear before it. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 

526 U.S. 574, 577, 119 S.Ct. 1563, 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999). A federal court has subject matter 

jurisdiction only if the plaintiff has Article III standing. MAO-MSO Recovery II, LLC v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 935 F.3d 573, 581 (7th Cir. 2019). 

Bryant concerned an appeal from this Court’s decision to remand another BIPA case. 

The Seventh Circuit reversed remand of the BIPA claims for lack of Article III standing in that 

case, with the exception of Bryant’s claims under BIPA §15(a) “requiring development of a 

‘written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for 

permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information,’ not under the provision 

requiring compliance with the established retention schedule and destruction guidelines.” Id. at 

626 (as amended). 

Marquez advances the same type of § 15(a) violation in this case as did the plaintiff in 

Bryant. See Compl. ¶ 16 (“Google’s failure to provide a publicly available written policy 

regarding its schedule and guidelines for the retention and permanent destruction of individuals’ 

biometrics . . . violates § 15(a) of the BIPA”); id. ¶ 26 (“In direct violation of § 15(a) of the 

BIPA, Google does not have written, publicly available policies identifying their retention 

schedules, or guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers or information.”); id. ¶ 

53 (“Google does not publicly provide a retention schedule or guidelines for permanently 

destroying the ‘biometric identifiers’ and ‘biometric information’ of Plaintiff or the Class 

members, as required by the BIPA. See 740 ILCS 14/15(a).”). 

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In Figueroa v. Kronos Inc., No. 19 C 1306, 2020 WL 4273995 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2020), 

the court raised subject matter jurisdiction over a similar BIPA § 15(a) claim sua sponte and, 

after the parties briefed the issue, applied Bryant to hold that, while the court had subject matter 

jurisdiction over plaintiff's § 15(b) claim, it lacked jurisdiction over the § 15(a) claim. 

Accordingly, the Figueroa court “severed [that §15(a) claim] under Civil Rule 21 from the rest 

of the suit and remanded [it] to state court,” retaining the rest of the action. Id. at *5; see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“The court may . . . sever any claim against a party.”). 

Similarly, in Stauffer v. Innovative Heights Fairview Heights, LLC, No. 3:20-CV-00046-

MAB, 2020 WL 4815960 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2020), the district court applied Bryant to sever 

plaintiff’s BIPA § 15(a) claim from her § 15 (b) claim, and remanded the § 15(a) claim to state 

court. See id. at *8. 

CONCLUSION 

As in Bryant, Figueroa, and Stauffer, this Court should sever and remand Plaintiff 

Marquez’s claims under § 15(a) in this case. 

Dated: August 28, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Carl V. Malmstrom .

WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER 

 FREEMAN & HERZ LLC 

Carl V. Malmstrom 

111 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 1700 

Chicago, IL 60604 

Tel: (312) 391-5059 

malmstrom@whafh.com

Local Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class

HEDIN HALL LLP 

Frank S. Hedin 

David W. Hall* 

1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1140 

Miami, Florida 33131 

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Tel: (305) 357-2107 

Fax: (305) 200-8801 

fhedin@hedinhall.com

dhall@hedinhall.com

BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. 

Joseph Marchese 

Philip L. Fraietta* 

888 Seventh Avenue 

New York, NY 10019 

Tel: (646) 837-7150 

Fax: (212) 989-9163 

jmarchese@bursor.com

pfraietta@bursor.com

 

*Pro Hac Vice Application Forthcoming 

Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class 

 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on August 28, 2020, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 

document was served by CM/ECF to the parties registered to the Court’s CM/ECF system. 

/s/Carl V. Malmstrom 

Carl V. Malmstrom 

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