[Cite as State v. Coats, 2009-Ohio-3534.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MERCER COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 10-09-04 

 v. 

DOUGLAS N. COATS, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 10-09-05 

 v. 

DOUGLAS N. COATS, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Mercer County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 05-CRM-077 

Trial Court No. 05-CRM-078 

Judgments Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Cause Remanded 

Date of Decision: July 20, 2009 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Douglas Coats, Appellant 

Matthew K. Fox for Appellee 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-2-

ROGERS, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Douglas Coats, appeals the judgments of the 

Mercer County Court of Common Pleas denying his Crim.R. 32.1 motions to 

withdraw his guilty pleas. On appeal, Coats argues that the trial court erred in 

denying his motions because it failed to advise him prior to accepting his guilty 

pleas of the mandatory term of postrelease control and that it was not bound by the 

State’s sentencing recommendation; and, because the trial court failed to conduct a 

proper inquiry into whether his pleas were voluntarily given after he informed the 

trial court that he was on anti-depressant medication. Finding that Coats’ claims 

are barred by res judicata, but that his sentence is void, we affirm in part, and 

reverse in part, the judgments of the trial court. 

{¶2} This case comes before us as a consolidated appeal of trial court 

cases numbered 05-CRM-077 and 05-CRM-078.1

 In June 2005, in trial court case 

number 05-CRM-077, the Mercer County Grand Jury indicted Coats on thirteen 

counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), felonies of 

the third degree, and, in trial court case number 05-CRM-078, the Mercer County 

Grand Jury indicted Coats on one additional count of gross sexual imposition in 

violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), also a felony of the third degree. 

 

1

 We note that appellate case number 10-09-04 corresponds to trial court case number 05-CRM-077, and 

appellate case number 10-09-05 corresponds to trial court case number 05-CRM-078. 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-3-

{¶3} In August 2005, Coats entered pleas of not guilty to all counts in 

both indictments. 

{¶4} In September 2005, pursuant to a plea agreement, Coats withdrew 

his not guilty pleas and entered a plea of guilty to counts one, seven, and thirteen 

of the indictment in trial court case number 05-CRM-077, and entered a plea of 

guilty to the one count indictment in trial court case number 05-CRM-078. The 

State then entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining counts. Additionally, as part 

of the plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend a three-year prison term on 

each count in case number 05-CRM-077, to be served consecutively to each other, 

and a three-year prison term in case number 05-CRM-078, to be served 

concurrently to the sentence in 05-CRM-077, for an aggregate nine-year prison 

term. Prior to accepting Coats’ guilty pleas, the trial court conducted a full 

Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy, specifically stating: 

[Trial Court]: Despite the jointly recommended plea agreement, 

I need to advise you of the maximum penalty that the court 

could impose. For each charge of gross sexual imposition, a 

felony of the third degree, you could be sentenced to five years in 

prison and be fined $10,000. Do you understand that? 

[Coats]: Yes, your Honor. 

[Trial Court]: So the maximum penalty for these four charges, 

three in Case No. 77 and one in Case No. 78, would be four times 

that or twenty years in prison plus a fine of $40,000. Do you 

understand that? 

[Coats]: Yes, your Honor. 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-4-

* * * 

[Trial Court]: Are you now under the influence of any kind of 

medication, drugs, alcohol, or anything that would cause you not 

to understand what we’re doing here today? 

[Coats]: No, your Honor. 

* * * 

[Coats]: They’ve got me on some anti-depressant medicine, but 

that’s not what you’re talking about now. Right? 

[Trial Court]: If that doesn’t have any affect on you 

understanding what we’re doing here today. 

[Coats]: Okay. 

(Sept. 2005 Change of Plea Hearing, pp. 7-11). At no time did the trial court 

advise Coats on the record that he would be subject to a mandatory term of 

postrelease control at the conclusion of his prison sentence. However, prior to the 

change of plea hearing, Coats signed a waiver of constitutional rights which 

provided, in part: 

That if the Defendant is being sentenced for a felony of the first 

degree, or a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex offense, 

as defined in Section 2967.28 of the Revised Code, or for a felony 

of the third degree that is not a felony sex offense and in the 

commission of which the Defendant caused or threatened to 

cause physical harm to a person, that a period of post-release 

control pursuant to Section 2967.28 of the Revised Code will be 

imposed following the Defendant’s release from prison. 

(Sept. 2005 Waiver of Constitutional Rights, p. 2). 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-5-

{¶5} Additionally, prior to the change of plea hearing, Coats signed a 

negotiated plea agreement which provided: 

POST RELEASE CONTROL. In addition, a period of 

supervision by the Adult Parole Authority after release from 

prison may be mandatory in this case. If I am sentenced to 

prison for a felony 1 or felony sex offense, after my release from 

prison I will have a mandatory 5 years of post release control 

under conditions determined by the Parole Board. 

(Sept. 2005 Negotiated Plea Agreement, p. 3). 

{¶6} In November 2005, the trial court sentenced Coats to a three-year 

prison term on each of the counts in cases numbered 05-CRM-077 and 05-CRM078, all to be served consecutively to each other, for a total twelve-year prison 

term. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court also advised Coats that he would 

be subject to five years of postrelease control upon the conclusion of his prison 

sentence. However, the trial court’s sentencing entry failed to include the term of 

postrelease control. 

{¶7} In July 2006, Coats filed a motion for resentencing, arguing that his 

sentence was void because the trial court failed to advise him of the mandatory 

term of postrelease control at sentencing. However, in August 2006, Coats 

withdrew the motion. 

{¶8} In April 2007, Coats appealed to this Court; however, we 

subsequently denied his appeal as being untimely and for failing to set forth 

sufficient reasons for a delayed appeal pursuant to App.R. 5(A). 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-6-

{¶9} In July 2008, Coats filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas 

pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, arguing that his pleas were not knowingly, voluntarily, 

and intelligently entered because the trial court failed to advise him that it was not 

bound by the State’s sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement, and 

because it failed to advise him that he would be subject to a mandatory term of 

postrelease control upon the conclusion of his prison term. 

{¶10} In January 2009, the trial court denied Coats’ Crim.R. 32.1 motion, 

finding the motion to be an untimely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to 

R.C. 2953.21; that his claims were barred by res judicata because he failed to raise 

them prior or subsequent to sentencing or on direct appeal; and, that he was aware 

that the trial court was not bound by the State’s sentencing recommendation in the 

plea agreement. 

{¶11} It is from the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty 

pleas that Coats appeals, presenting the following pro se assignment of error for 

our review. 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT A 

PROPER MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF PLEA, 

CONTRARY TO LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL 

GAURANTEES. [SIC] 

{¶12} In his only assignment of error, Coats argues that the trial court erred 

in failing to grant his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to Crim.R. 

32.1. Specifically, Coats argues that he should have been permitted to withdraw 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-7-

his guilty pleas because the trial court failed to advise him that he was subject to a 

mandatory term of postrelease control, as required by State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio 

St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, and that it was not required to follow the State’s 

sentencing recommendation in the plea agreement, and because the trial court 

failed to properly inquire into whether his pleas were knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent after he advised the trial court that he was taking prescription 

medications at the time of the pleas. 

{¶13} Appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a 

guilty plea pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nathan

(1995), 99 Ohio App.3d 722, 725, citing State v. Smith (1977), 49 Ohio St.2d 261. 

An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment and 

implies that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably. 

State v. Nagle (2000), 11th Dist. No. 99-L-089, 2000 WL 777835, citing 

Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219. When applying an abuse 

of discretion standard, a reviewing court may not simply substitute its judgment 

for that of the trial court. Id. 

{¶14} Crim.R. 32.1 provides that: 

A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made 

only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice 

the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction 

and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea. 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-8-

{¶15} A Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw a guilty plea will be considered 

a presentence motion where the defendant filed the motion after the imposition of 

a void sentence. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, at ¶9. A presentence motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea is to be freely and liberally granted. State v. Ramsey, 3d 

Dist. No. 1-06-01, 2006-Ohio-2795, ¶5; State v. Xie (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 

526. However, the right to withdraw a plea is not absolute. State v. Fell, 3d Dist. 

No. 13-03-74, 2004-Ohio-1853, ¶4, citing Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, at paragraph 

one of the syllabus. 

{¶16} Furthermore, “under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of 

conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from 

raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any 

defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been 

raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, 

or on an appeal from that judgment.” State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 1996-

Ohio-337, syllabus. Accordingly, res judicata will serve to bar all claims raised in 

a Crim. R. 32.1 motion that were raised or could have been raised in a prior 

proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 3d Dist. No. 4-06-31, 2007-Ohio-218, ¶18; State v. 

McDonald, 11th Dist. No. 2003-L-155, 2004-Ohio-6332, ¶22, citing State v. 

Young, 4th Dist. No. 03CA782, 2004-Ohio-2711. 

{¶17} Here, the trial court found Coats’ motion to withdraw his guilty 

pleas to be an untimely petition for postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21. 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-9-

However, as the Supreme Court of Ohio has previously held, a Crim.R. 32.1 

motion to withdraw a guilty plea should not be construed as a petition for 

postconviction relief, as the two exist independently. State v. Bush, 96 Ohio St.3d 

235, 238, 2002-Ohio-3993. See, also, State v. Driskill, 3d Dist. Nos. 10-08-10, 

10-08-11, 2009-Ohio-2100, ¶33. As such, the trial court erred when it categorized 

Coats’ motion as an untimely petition for postconviction relief. However, this 

error alone does not warrant reversal, as untimeliness under R.C. 2953.21 was not 

the only basis for the trial court’s denial of Coats’ motion. See Bonner v. Bonner,

3d Dist. No. 14-05-26, 2005-Ohio-6173, ¶18 (“A judgment by the trial court 

which is correct, but for a different reason, will be affirmed on appeal as there is 

no prejudice to the appellant”). 

{¶18} The trial court also found Coats’ claims in his Crim.R. 32.1 motion 

barred by res judicata, as he failed to raise them prior or subsequent to sentencing, 

or on direct appeal. Coats was fully aware at the time of sentencing that the trial 

court, prior to accepting his plea, did not advise him on the record of the 

mandatory term of postrelease control. Furthermore, Coats was also aware at the 

time of sentencing of his two claimed errors: (1) that the trial court did not advise 

him that it was not bound to accept the State’s sentencing recommendation within 

the plea agreement, and (2) that it did not properly inquire into whether his pleas 

were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent after he informed the trial court that he 

was taking prescription medications at the time of the pleas. 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-10-

{¶19} Accordingly, we find that res judicata operates to bar Coats’ claims 

raised in his Crim.R. 32.1 motion, and, consequently, we find that the trial court 

was correct in denying Coats’ motion on the basis of res judicata. 

{¶20} Although we have found Coats’ claims to be barred by res judicata, 

in the interest of justice, we will summarily address his assignment of error. First, 

we find to be without merit Coats’ argument that the trial court did not thoroughly 

inquire into whether his pleas were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent after he 

informed the court that he was on anti-depressant medication. The trial court 

conducted a thorough Crim.R. 11 colloquy and specifically asked Coats whether 

the anti-depressant medication was affecting his understanding of the plea 

proceedings, to which Coats responded that it was not. Furthermore, the record 

contains no evidence suggesting that Coats did not understand the nature or 

significance of the proceeding or his pleas. Consequently, because ‘“the record 

shows [the trial court] substantially complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 

11(C) and the totality of the circumstances shows the defendant subjectively 

understood the implications of his plea[s],”’ State v. McGuire, 8th Dist. No. 

86608, 2006-Ohio-1330, ¶14, quoting State v. Hyde, 8th Dist. No. 77592, 2001 

WL 30205, we find no error in the trial court’s accepting of the pleas despite 

Coats’ assertion that he was on anti-depressant medication. 

{¶21} Second, we also find to be without merit Coats’ assertion that he 

should have been permitted to withdraw his pleas because the trial court did not 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-11-

inform him that it was not bound by the State’s sentencing recommendation in the 

plea agreement. Although the trial court did not specifically state that it was not 

bound by the sentencing recommendation, which would have been the preferred 

practice, the trial court clearly implied such when it informed Coats of the 

maximum possible penalty, stating that he could be sentenced to five years in 

prison for each count “despite the jointly recommended plea agreement.” (Sept. 

2005 Change of Plea Hearing, p. 7). Moreover, we have previously held that the 

trial court is under no obligation to inform a defendant that it is not bound by a 

sentencing recommendation, State v. Graham, 3d Dist. No. 14-04-28, 2005-Ohio1431, ¶11, and there is no evidence in the record evidencing that Coats’ pleas were 

anything other than voluntary and intelligent. Consequently, we find that the trial 

court did not err in failing to permit Coats to withdraw his guilty pleas because the 

trial court did not specifically inform him that it was not obligated to follow the 

State’s sentencing recommendation. 

{¶22} Finally, we reject Coats’ argument that his pleas were not knowing, 

voluntary, and intelligent because the trial court failed to notify him that he would 

be subject to postrelease control at the conclusion of his prison term. The 

Supreme Court of Ohio held in Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, that a reviewing court 

must vacate a plea and remand to the trial court when the trial court fails to advise 

a defendant during the plea colloquy that he will be subject to a mandatory term of 

postrelease control, as such failure to advise results in a violation of Crim.R. 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-12-

11(C)(2)(a)’s requirement that the defendant be notified of the maximum penalty 

involved. However, we have distinguished from Sarkozy the situation in which a 

defendant did not seek to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing or on direct appeal, 

and where the defendant was provided with actual notice of postrelease control 

through a signed, written plea agreement and a signed, written waiver of 

constitutional rights. See Driskill, 2009-Ohio-2100, at ¶37. In this situation, we 

found that the defendant was properly advised of the maximum penalty involved 

pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), even though the trial court did not notify him 

during the plea colloquy that he would be subject to postrelease control upon the 

conclusion of his prison term. Id. 

{¶23} Here, Coats waited over two years after he was sentenced to seek a 

withdrawal of his plea. Furthermore, although the trial court failed to advise Coats 

prior to accepting his pleas that he would be subject to a term of postrelease 

control, Coats signed both a written plea agreement and a waiver of constitutional 

rights which provided that he would be subject to a term of postrelease control 

following the expiration of his prison term. Consequently, we find that Coats was 

properly informed of the maximum penalty involved as required by Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(a), and that the trial court did not err in denying his motion to withdraw 

his guilty pleas. 

{¶24} Accordingly, we overrule Coats’ assignment of error. 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-13-

{¶25} Although we have overruled Coats’ assignment of error, we also sua 

sponte address the trial court’s failure to impose a term of postrelease control in 

the sentencing entry, even though neither party has addressed the issue on appeal. 

{¶26} It is fundamental that “no court has the authority to substitute a 

different sentence for that which is required by law.” State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio 

St.3d 420, 425, 2008-Ohio-1197, citing Colegrove v. Burns (1964), 175 Ohio St. 

437, 438. Therefore, any sentence imposed that is unauthorized under the law is 

unlawful and, consequently, void. Id. 

{¶27} R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) provides, in part: 

If a court imposes a prison term for a felony of the first degree, 

for a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for 

a felony of the third degree that is not a felony sex offense and in 

the commission of which the offender caused or threatened to 

cause physical harm to a person, it shall include in the sentence a 

requirement that the offender be subject to a period of postrelease control after the offender's release from imprisonment, 

in accordance with that division. * * * Section 2929.191 of the 

Revised Code applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a 

sentence including a prison term of a type described in this 

division and failed to include in the sentence pursuant to this 

division a statement regarding post-release control. 

{¶28} Additionally, R.C. 2967.28(B) provides: 

Each sentence to a prison term for a felony of the first degree, 

for a felony of the second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for 

a felony of the third degree that is not a felony sex offense and in 

the commission of which the offender caused or threatened to 

cause physical harm to a person shall include a requirement that 

the offender be subject to a period of post-release control 

imposed by the parole board after the offender's release from 

imprisonment. * * * Section 2929.191 of the Revised Code 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-14-

applies if, prior to July 11, 2006, a court imposed a sentence 

including a prison term of a type described in this division and 

failed to notify the offender pursuant to division (B)(3)(c) of 

section 2929.19 of the Revised Code regarding post-release 

control or to include in the judgment of conviction entered on 

the journal or in the sentence pursuant to division (F)(1) of 

section 2929.14 of the Revised Code a statement regarding postrelease control. Unless reduced by the parole board pursuant to 

division (D) of this section when authorized under that division, 

a period of post-release control required by this division for an 

offender shall be of one of the following periods: 

(1) For a felony of the first degree or for a felony sex offense, 

five years; 

{¶29} Furthermore, R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c) requires the trial court to notify 

the offender at sentencing if he will be supervised under R.C. 2967.28 after the 

offender serves his prison sentence. Moreover, R.C. 2929.191 authorizes the trial 

court to conduct a resentencing hearing and to correct the judgment of conviction 

to notify the defendant of any term of postrelease control or to include any term of 

postrelease control that should have been imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) 

and R.C. 2967.28(B). 

{¶30} In interpreting both R.C. 2929.14(F) and R.C. 2929.19(B)(3)(c), the 

Supreme Court of Ohio stated in State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio6085, paragraph one of the syllabus, that the trial court must provide notice to the 

defendant of postrelease control both at the sentencing hearing and by 

incorporating it into the sentencing entry. See, also, State v. Watt, 175 Ohio 

App.3d 613, 619, 2008-Ohio-1009. 
Case No. 10-09-04, 05 

-15-

{¶31} Additionally in State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, 577-578, 

2009-Ohio-1577, the Supreme Court held that a trial court’s failure to impose a 

mandatory term of postrelease control in the sentencing entry renders the sentence 

void, requiring a vacation of the sentence and a remand to the trial court for 

resentencing. 

{¶32} Here, Coats pled guilty to four felony sex offenses. As such, R.C. 

2929.14(F)(1) and R.C. 2967.28(B) required the imposition of a term of 

postrelease control. However, even though the trial court advised Coats at the 

sentencing hearing of the term of postrelease control, the trial court failed to 

include the term of postrelease control in the sentencing entry. Consequently, 

pursuant to Boswell, 121 Ohio St.3d 575, and R.C. 2929.191, Coats’ sentence is 

void. 

{¶33} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the 

particulars assigned and argued in his assignment of error, but having found error 

prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the trial court’s failure to include postrelease 

control in the sentencing entry, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the 

cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Judgments Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and Cause Remanded 

WILLAMOWSKI and SHAW, J.J., concur. 

/jnc