The H o n o r a b le Sa n d r a S. B e c kw it

h , Ch ie f Ju d g e , U n it e d

St a te s D is tr ic t C o u rt f

o r the * Southern District of Ohio, sitting by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0652n.06 F iled: Septem ber 5 , 2007 No. 05-1929 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Appellee , v. EA RL B RA DL EY B OO KE R, Ap pe lla nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE WES TERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : GI BB ONS and SUTTON, Circ uit J udg es; BE CKWI TH, District Judge. * SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. A f eder al jury co n v icted Ea

rl Booke r of violating the fe lon-inpossession-of-a -g un statute, see 18 U.S
. C. § 922(g )(1) , and ac quitted him of a drug -possession
c ha rg e . B e c a us e B oo ke r’ s c ha lle ng e s to his c on vic tio n a nd se nte nc e a re un c on vin c ing , w e a ff ir m.
I.
On the e ve nin g of July 11 , 200 4, Ea rl B ra dle y B oo ke r dr ov e his fathe r’ s car t o p ic k u p h is friend A nthony

Webb to attend a par

ty in Moline, Michiga

n. On t he way to the party , Booke r and W e b b p i c k e d

u p M o r g a n H o ye , o n e o f

W e b b ’ s g i r l f

r i e n d s . A f

t e r s p e n d i n g s o m e t i m e a tt h e p a rt y, the g roup we nt to a local bar
.No. 05-1929

United States v. Book

er

- 2 - Booke r, Webb and Ho y e l eft the ba r in the ea

rly morning hours of July

12, with Booke r driving and Webb and Hoy e sitting togethe r i n the back. Whil e st opped at a red lig ht, Webb opened his door and vomited, dra wing the attention of Of

fice r Timothy

Pols who was on patrol. Webb
c los e d th e do or

a ft e r the lig ht ch a ng e d g re e n, a nd B oo ke r pul le d the c a r int o a nea rb y pa rk inglot to chec k on Webb. Office r Pols followed him while turning on his ove rhea d lights.
At that point, Webb asked Booke r, “Do y ou know wher e the g un is at? ” and B ooker tossed the handg un on to th e f

lo o r o f th e b a c k s e a t. JA 1 5 2
. Wh e n O f f ic e r Po ls r e a c h e d th e c a r , h e saw “bee r ca ns . . . scatter ed throug ho u t t h e re ar se at of the ve hicle” a nd a “shor

t-barr eled r evolver ” (“silver with a black ha

ndle”) on the ca

r floor n ea r W ebb. JA 212. Office r Pols “drew[hi s] own
wea pon,” re turned to his cruiser and ra dioed for ba ckup. JA 213.
Meanw hile, Webb returne d the g un to B ooker, who put it in the g love box, l ocked the g love box and thre w the key s toward the back seat. When Offic er Pol s returne d to the car, he or dere d the three to place the ir hands on the c eiling of t h e ca r and secured the m in handcuff s after backup office rs ar rived. Of fice r Pols sear ched the vehicle, r ecove ring the handg un and some c rac k coca ine from the locke d g love box.
A fe dera l grand jury

indicted B ooker f

or possessing a fire arm a fter ha ving be en convic ted of a f elony , see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1), and for possessing c rac k coca ine, see 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Booke r plea ded not g uilty to both charg es and r equeste d a jury trial. The jury

convicted B ooker of the fe lon-in-possession char g e and a cquitted him of the drug -possession cha rg e.No. 05-1929

United States v. Book

er

- 3 - The district cour

t calculated a guidelines rang e of 77–96 months, reje cted B ooker’ s motion for a depar

ture under S entenc ing Guideline § 5K2.0 and rec og nized that it had to “determine w hether Section 3553(a) sentenc ing fac tors dictate a sentenc e differ ent from the advisory g uideline ra

ng e.” J A 295. Rely ing on, a

mong othe r fa ctors, B ooker’ s 14 convictions within the s pan of 7 y ear s and the “ un sp ok e n de mand to pr ote c t the pu bli c fr om s ome bo dy

lik e [B oo ke r] w ho re pe a te dly c omm its the same c ri me ,” JA 31 0, the dis tr ic t c ourt se nte nc e d B oo ke r t o 8 8 mo nth s’ imp ri so nme nt.
II. Claiming that t he evidence does not show that he possessed the g un, Booke r ar g ues that the evidenc e does n o t s upport the ver dict. When viewed “ in the light most favor able to the g overnme nt,” howeve r, the e vidence would allow a r easona ble jury to find otherw i s e b ey ond a
rea sonable doubt. See Un ite d S tat es v . A rn old , 486 F.3d 177, 180 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (en ba nc). Hoy e testified that, when Offic er Pols followed the trio into the pa rking lot, Booker

tossed the handg un to Webb and that, once Offic er Pols re turned to his vehicle, Webb tossed the g un back to Booke r, who locke d it in the glove box. Webb testified t hat he ha d seen the g un in the g love box
e a r l i e r i n t h e e v e n i n g , t h a t h e t o s s e d t h e g u n t o B o o k e r a n d t o l d h i m t o “ p u t i t i n t h e g l o v e b o x, ” JA 18 3, a nd that B oo ke r d id s o. Of

fi c e r Pols c on fi rm e d tha t, af te r se e ing the g un be ne a th Web b’ s f e e t, he found the g un in the locked g love box and that neither Webb nor Hoy e lea ned over the front se at while he r adioed f

or help, whic h would have been necessa ry if either of them had ac cesse d the g love box from the ba ck seat.No. 05-1929

United States v. Book

er

- 4 - Booke r counte rs that the jury sho u ld ha ve re jected the “incr edible testimony of the g un-toting Webb and his lover” Hoy e, whose “testimony was im peac hed over and over ag ain.” B r. at 47. B ut t h e r e a l i t y i s t h a tt h e j u r y a p p a r e n t l y did

c re dit the a c c ounts of

Web b a nd Ho y e —a nd did so permissibly , as these a ccounts we re inter nally coher ent and consistent with the t estimony of Off icer Pols. As much as Booker would like us to function as a thirtee nth juror, that is not our place
. See J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319–20 (1979) (A court should not “ask itself w hether it believes that the evidence at the trial” w as suffic ient, but instead if “ any rational trier of fac t c ould have f ound the essential e lements of the c rime bey ond a rea sonable doubt.”) (interna l quotation marks omitted).
Booke r next contends that the jury venire “excluded member s of distinct g roups” and did not “rep re sent[] a fa ir cross se ction of the c ommunity ”—par ticularly Afric an Amer icans a

nd Hispanics—in violation of the Equal Pr o te ction Clause, the Six th Amendment and the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. B r. a t 15 ; see Du re n v . M iss ou ri , 439 U.S. 357, 36 3– 70 (1 97 9) . T o e sta

bli sha pr ima fa c ie vio la tio n o f t

he fa ir -c ro ss- sectio n r ig ht, B oo ke r “ mus t show (1) that the g roup alleg ed to be e x cluded is a ‘distinctive’ g roup in the community ; ( 2) that the
re pr e se ntatio n o f t

his g ro up in v e nir e s . . . is n ot f air and reas on a

ble
. . . ; a

nd (3 ) t ha t th is underr epre sentation is due to sy stematic exclusion of the g roup i n t h e j ury -selec tion process.” Duren , 43 9 U. S. at 364; se e als o 28 U. S.C. § 1 86 2; Un ite d S tat es v . O v all e , 136 F.3d 1092, 1099 (6t h Ci r. 1998 ) ( “ Ty

pic a lly , c ha lle ng e s b ro ug ht u nd e r t he JSSA are re vie we d und e r t he same standard a s a Six th Amendment claim of de nial of a jury repr esenting a fa ir cross se ction of the community

. . . .”).No. 05-1929

United States v. Book

er

- 5 - Booke r ca

nnot satisfy

these re quirements. He has not s h o wn, for starters, that the repr esentation of either g roup wa s not “fair and re asonable ,” Duren , 4 3 9 U
. S
. a t 3 6 4 , w h i c h i s t o s a y, t h at either

of these g roups was “ substantially underr epre sented” in the jury whee l, Ca staneda v. Partida , 430 U.S. 482, 495 n.14 (1977). The numbers tell the story : 7.6% of the potential jury pool was Af r ic a n A me r ic a n , w h il e 4
. 9 7 % o f th e ju r y w h e e l w a s A f

r ic a n A me r ic a n . T w o p e r cent of potential jurors in Michig an ar e Hispanic , see U.S. Census Bur eau, Voting a nd Reg istration in the Election of November 2004, tbl.4c, available at http:// www.c ensus.g ov/population/www/socdemo/
vo tin g /c ps 20 04 .h tml , w hil e 1. 64 % o f t he jur or s o n th e wh e e l r e po rt e d th e mse lve s to be Hi sp anic (3 5% did no t id e nti fy

wh e the r t

he y we re Hi sp a nic or

no t) . T he se nu mbe rs —s ug g est in g a t mo st a 2.63% disparity

for Af rica n Americ ans and a 0.36% disparity for Hispa nics—are a fa

r cr y from the
sub s ta n ti a l d is p a r it ie s f

o u n d to c o n s ti tute a v io lati o n o f th e f a ir

- c r o s s - s e c ti o n r e qu ir e me nt in the lead i ng case s. See Duren , 4 39 U. S. at 36 4– 66 (h old ingthat a 38 % d isp a ri ty

wa s a “ g ro ss discrepa ncy ” sug g esting that “women w ere not fairly repr esente d” whe n women comprised 54% of the po pu lac e but on ly

15 % o f t he jur y ve nir e ); Castaneda , 4 3 0 U
. S
. a t4 8 6

– 8 7 ( 4 0 % d i s p a r i t y— Mexi can A merica

ns made up 79.1% of potential g rand jurors but only 39% of actua l g rand juror s); Taylor v. Louisiana , 419 U.S. 522, 524 (1975) (43% di sparity —“53% of the per sons eligible f or jury service . . . wer e fe male, and . . . no mor e than 10% of the pe rsons on t h e j u ry wheel . . . were
wo me n” ); Turner v. Fouche , 396 U.S. 346, 349, 359 (1970) ( 23% disparity —Afric an Amer icans made up 60% of the population a nd only 37% of the list fr om w hich the g rand jury was d ra wn); W hit us v . G e or

gia , 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967) (18% disparity —Afric an Americ ans made up 27.1% of l ocal tax pay ers but only 9.1% of the gra nd jury venire ). Com

pa re Jefferson v. Morgan , 962 F.2dNo. 05-1929

United States v. Book

er

- 6 - 1185, 1189 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that a 12.6% dispar ity , with Africa n Americ ans comprising 18.5% of the popula ce but only 5.9% of g rand jurors, was “suff iciently larg e” to establish unlawful discrimination), with F

o r d v . S e a b old , 8 4 1 F.2d 677, 688 ( 6th Cir. 1988) (sug g esting that a 4% disparity , with “nonwhites” comprising “9% of the persons living in the county ” and 5% of a ctual jurors, wa s constitutionally “insig nificant” ).
Booke r also has not shown that any disparity stems from “sy stematic exclusion” rathe r than happensta nce. Duren , 439 U.S. at 366. The dispar ity is not so larg e that “it is unlikely that it is due solely to c hance or ac cident,” Castaneda , 4 3 0 U. S
. at 4 9 4 n . 1 3 , an d h e h as n o t s h o wn t h at “a l ar ge discrepa ncy occur red not just occa sionally but in ever y wee kly venire for a period of nea rly a y ear ,” Duren , 4 39 U. S. at 36 6. No r ha s he sh ow n that the sy ste m of jur y se le c tio n in

the dis tr ic t f

a c ia lly targ ets one of the underr epre sented gro u p s , i s “hig hly subjective” or is “susce ptible of abuse a s applied.” Castaneda , 430 U.S. at 497.
Booke r re sponds that the sy stem discriminates ag ainst Afric an Amer icans a nd Hispanics by relying on vote r-r eg istration rolls beca use “black and Hispanic people r eg ister to vote at leve ls below that of whites.” Br
. at 26. But Booke r ignor es the statutory require ment that juror-se lection plans use such lists, see 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) ( The plan must “spec ify whether the names of prospec tive jurors shall be se lected f rom the voter r eg istration list s or the lists of actua l voters
. . . .”), a require ment that he cha lleng ed neither below nor on appea l. Perhaps more importantly , the jurorse le c tio n p lan atte mpt s to mit ig a te a ny su c h d isp a ri tie s b y

dr a wi ng name s f

ro m st a te dr ive r’ s li c e ns e and i d en tification rec ords, see 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(2) ( “The plan shall presc ribe some otherNo. 05-1929

United States v. Book

er

- 7 - source . . . of name s in addition to vot er lists where nece ssary to foster the policy

and prote ct the ri g hts se c ur e d b y

[se c tio ns 18 61 a nd

18 62 of the Ac t].” )— a fe a tur e of the pla n th a t is c on sis te nt w ith sy stematic inclusion rathe r than e x clusion.
To t h e e xt e n t B o o k e r a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt “ c o mp l e t e l y e xc l u d e d ” e lde rl y citizens a n d

s tu d e n ts f

r o m t h e ju r y v e n ir e in v io lati o n o f

B o o k e r ’ s F if

th a n d Si xth A me n dment ri g hts , B r. a t 19 , h e mis re a ds the re c or d. Whil e the d istri c t c ourt sa id t hat it “ a uto ma tic a lly exclude[d] any

body that’s over 70” as w ell as “f ull-time students,” it did so i n the context of
e xpla ini ng ho w it ha

nd le d “ re qu e sts fo r dis mis sa l.” JA 11 6. B oo ke r, a t a ny rate , ne ve r ra ise d th is
o b j ection below, limi ting us to plain-e rror revie w. See F e d
. R. Cr im
. P. 5 2 ( b )
. B o oker ha s not shown that citizens eng ag ed in full-time study or citizens over 70 y ear s o l d repr esent distinct communities of interests, c f. Taylor , 4 19 U. S. at 53 1, no r s ho wn that e ith e r g ro up is s ub sta nti a lly underr epre sented on jury venire s, nor shown that g ranting these dismis s al requests broac hes the prohibitions of the J ury

Selection and Ser

vice Ac t. He thus has not shown t hat the district cour t
e rr e d, muc h le ss sh ow n that the a lle g e d e rr or wa s “ pla in” or that it “ se ri ou sly a ff e c t[e d] th e fa ir

ne ss, integ rity , or public reputation of judicial proce eding s.” Johnson v. U nited States , 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997).
Booke r next alleg es that the district cour t made two er

rors in instructing the jury : first when it denied his “flee ting possession” instruc tion, then when it instructed the jury reg arding Booke r’s prior fe lony

conviction. The district c ourt must “fairly and ade quately ” ins t ruct the jury on “the issues and applica

ble law,” United States v. W illiams , 952 F.2d 1504, 1512 (6th Cir. 1991), and “ mayNo. 05-1929

United States v. Book

er

- 8 - not char g e th e ju

r y u p o n a s u p p o s e d o r c o n je c tu r a l s tate o f

f a c ts , o f w h ic h n o e v id e n c e h a s b e en offe red,” Querc ia v
. United States , 2 89 U. S. 4 66 , 4 70 (1 93 3) (i nte rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) ; see United St ates v. Jam es , 819 F.2d 674, 675 (6th Cir. 1987)
. I f a party asks for a jury instruction, the dis tr ic t c ourt

mus t g ive it i f i t is le g a lly pr op e r, is “ no t su

bs tanti a lly

c ov e re d b y

the c ha rg e a c tua lly de liv e re d to the jur

y ” a nd “con cern s a

po int so imp or

tant i n th e tr ia l th a t th e fa ilure to g ive it substantially

impairs the def

endant’ s defe nse.” W

illiams , 95 2 F .2 d a t 15 12 ; se e als o United States v. Newcomb , 6 F.3d 1129, 1132 ( 6th Cir. 1993).
B oo ke r a sk e d th e dis tr ic t c ourt to i ns tr uc t th e jur

y that, “ [i]f y ou fi nd

that Mr . B oo ke r o nly
mom e nta ri ly po sse sse d th e gun wi th ou t kn ow le dg e that it wa s a g un or wi tho ut c ri min a l in te nt t o possess it, y ou must find him not gu i l t y on Count I .” JA 19. Even if we a ssume for the sa ke of argument that this inst ruction is a prope r one, see United St ates v. Hargrove , 4 16 F .3 d 4 86 , 4 89 (6 th Cir. 2005) (noting that “a de fenda nt in a prosec ution f

or possession of a firea

rm as a fe lon may

asser t the de fe ns e of ne c e ssi ty or jus tif ic a tio n” bu t “ on ly

in r a re sit uatio ns ” be c a

us e su c h a de fe ns e “ sh ou ld be construed very narr owly ”), the fa ct re mains that Booke r neve r introduce d any evidenc e to support it. Base d on the testimony of Off icer Pols, whose vera city

Booke r does not cha lleng e, we know that when the of

fice r first arr ived t he gun was in the back seat, that the gun was e ventually found locke d in t he c a r’ s g lov e bo x an d th a t ne ith e r We bb no r H oy e (w ho we re bo th s ittingin t he ba c k s e a t)
rea ched ove r the fr ont seat to ac cess t h e gl o v e box in the meantime. The only possible infere nce fr om the se fa c ts is tha t Bo ok e r him se lf pla c e d (and loc ke d) the g un in t he g lov e bo x, wh ic h s ug g e sts that B oo ke r k

ne w that th e gun was in fact a g un a nd that he did

no t w a nt O ff

ic e r P ols to f

ind it.No. 05-1929

United States v. Book

er

- 9 - Whil e B ooker on a

ppeal trie s to avoid this inferenc e by sug g esting that he “was under an unlawf ul and imminent threat of de ath,” Br. at 29, he placed no evide nce to that e ffe ct bef ore the jury . The district court did not err

in rejec ting this instruction. Also unavailing is Booker ’s complaint—raised for the first time on appea l—that the district
c ourt e rr e d in ins tr uc tin g the jury th at “[t]he lawy e rs have a g re e d th a t [B oo ke r w a s p re vio us ly convicted of

a felony ], so there is nothing for y ou to f ind .
. . [and] nothing to a

rg ue about.” J A 251. He contends that this inst ruction re moved the g overnme nt’s burden of proving ever

y element of

the offe nse. Read in c ontext , howeve r, the jury instructions did no such thing . The c ourt instructed the jury that it “must be convinced [ that] the gover nment has proven eac h and every one of the following
e le me nts be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t” to c on vic t B oo ke r o f be ing a fe lon -i n- po sse ssi on , that th e “ fi rs t element is that the de fenda nt has been convicted in any court of a cr ime punishable by imprisonment for a term of one y ear ,” and that “[i] f y ou have a rea sonable doubt a

bout a ny of these e lements, y ou must find the defe ndant not g uilty of t h[e] char g e.” JA 251–52. At most, the objected-to instruction
mere ly informed the jury that Booke r had alre ady stipulated to this element of the c rime. See J A 21 (stipulation proposed by

Booke r: “The parties have ag ree d that Mr. B ooker ha s a prior f elony conviction.”) ; J A 98–99 (Court: “You’ ve ag ree d y ou have a felony conviction and the g overnme nt do e sn ’t have to pr ov e that, i s th a t tr ue ? ” B oo ke r: “ Ye s. ” ); se e als o Old Chief v. United States , 519 U. S. 1 72 , 1 86 (1 99 7) (“ [De fe nd a nt’ s] pr of fe re d a dmi ssi on

wo uld , in

fa c t, h a ve be e n n ot mere ly rele vant but seeming ly

conclusive e vidence of the e lement.”) . Perhaps more importantly , Booke r did not object to this i nstructio n at trial (pr eventing the district court fr om curing any potentialNo. 05-1929

United States v. Book

er

- 10 - confusion), a

nd we h av e repe atedly

declined to r evive a

defe ndant’s for feited obje ction in such circ umstances. See United States v. J ones , 1 08 F .3 d 6 68 , 6 73 (6t h Ci r. 1997 ) ( e n b a nc ); United States v. Casey , No. 99-1585, 2000 WL1721055, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) ( per c uriam).
Booke r make s essentially

three complaints about his sentence , none of which war rants re lief. He c omplains that the dis t ri ct court should not have e nhance d his guide lines calc ulation for possessing a

stolen wea

pon, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1( b)(4) , beca use he ne ver kne w the g un was stolen. But be cause the g uideline does not conta in a mens re a requirement, as he ac knowledg es, see Br . at 38 ; se e als o U.S. S .G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.19 (“ The e nhance ment under subse ction (b)( 4) for a stolen firea rm . . . applies whe ther or not the defe ndant knew or had re ason to believe that the fire arm wa s stolen . . . .”), a

nd beca use he a cknowledg es that the g un was in fa ct a s t o l en wea pon, the district
c ourt did no t e rr in a pp lyingthe e nh a nc e me nt.
He c omp la ins that th e dis tr ic t c ourt un re a so na bly a pp lie d 18 U.S. C. § 35 53 in s e nte nc inghim to 8 8 mo nth s’ imp ri so nme nt. To the e xten t he a rgue s tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt imp ro pe rl y

de c lin e d to depar t from the advisory

sentenc ing r ang e under t h e gu i delines, eve n though it re alized it had authority to do so, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, we do not have jurisdiction to hear his claim, see United S t a t es v . S mi th , 2 7 8 F.3d 605, 609 ( 6th Cir. 2002). To the extent he argues that the district cour t improperly denied him a varianc e, we note that the district cour t’s choice of an 88- month sentence falls within the range d ee m ed appropr iate by the SentencingCommi ssion (g iving the se ntence a presumption of re asonable ness), see Rita v. United States , 127 S. Ct
. 2 4 5 6 , 2 4 6 2 (2007), that Booke r’s sente nce le ft substantial room for the sentenc ing of worse felon-in-posse ssion offende rsNo. 05-1929

United States v. Book

er

- 11 - (the statutory maxi mum is 120 m onths), ac c or d United States v. Poy nter , No. 05-6508, __ F .3d ___, 2007 WL 2127353, at *6 (6th Cir. J uly 26, 2007), and tha t, as the district c ourt noted, a substantial sentenc e is the only way to fulfill the “unspoken de mand to protec t the public” fr om someone “w ho
re pe a te dly

c omm its the same c ri me ” a nd ha s ama sse d “1 4 co nv ic tio ns in se ve n y e a rs ,” JA 31 0; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (C). De spite Booke r’s prese nt c ontention to the contra ry , the district court thoroug hly

revie wed th e fa ct o rs of sec tion 3553(a), c onsidered B ooker’ s arg uments for a lower sentenc e and r ejec ted them and r ejec ted B ooker’ s complaint that Webb rece ived a s ig n if ic a n tl y lower
s e n te n c e in s tate c o u rt. Se n te n c in g c o u rts a r e e n ti tl e d to s u b s ta n ti a l d is c r e ti o n under B o o ker , and
we c annot say

the district court a

bused that discre tio n here
. See Ri ta , 127 S. Ct . at 2469 (“ Where
a m at t er i s . . . co n ce p tu al l y

s i m p l e . . . an d

t h e r ec o rd m ak es cl ea r t h at t h e s en t en ci n g j u d ge considere d the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law r equire s the judg e to write more extensively .”).
B oo ke r a lso c omp la ins that th e a pp lic a tio n of the a dv iso ry g uid e lin e s to his c on du c t a mou nts to an e xpo st f ac to punishment beca

use he c ommitt ed his crime be fore the C o u rt decide d United States v. Booke r , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The defe ndant in Booke r its e lf , ho wev er, c omm itt e d h is crime be fore that decision, and y et the Court instructed the lower co u rt s to apply the advisory g uidelines on rema

nd. See id. a t 26 8. I f t

hat w e re no t e no ug h, our o wn c ir c uit ha s r e je c te d th is argument befor e, see Un ite d S tat es v . S he ph e rd , 453 F.3d 702, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2006), as ha s ever y circ uit that has confr onted the question, see id. (citing case s).No. 05-1929

United States v. Book

er

- 12 - III
. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.