IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

JORGE GONZALEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

RICHELIEU FOODS, INC.,

Defendant.

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Case No. Click to type

Hon. Judge Click to type

Magistrate Judge Click to type

NOTICE OF REMOVAL

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Defendant Richelieu Foods, Inc. (“Richelieu”) hereby 

removes the state court action entitled Jorge Gonzalez, on behalf of himself and all other persons 

similarly situated, known and known v. Richelieu Foods, Inc., Case No.2020CH04468, filed in the 

Circuit Court of Cook County, to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446.

This Court has jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a) and 1332(d), on the 

grounds that: (1) complete diversity exists between all parties under § 1332(a), (2) minimal 

diversity exists under § 1332(d)(2)(A), (3) the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000,

exclusive of interests and costs, and (4) the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $5,000,000 

under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). In support of removal, Richelieu states as follows:

I. STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

1. On June 5, 2020, Plaintiff Jorge Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint (the 

“Complaint”) against Richelieu in the Circuit Court of Cook County bearing the case number 

2020CH04468. A copy of the Complaint is attached as Exhibit 1.

2. The Complaint consists of three counts, each alleging violations of the Biometric 

Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15.

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3. Richelieu first received notice of the Complaint when Richelieu was served through 

its registered agent, CT Corporation, on June 25, 2020. A copy of such notice is attached as 

Exhibit 2.

4. No other pleadings or motions have been served on or by Richelieu in the state 

court action.

II. GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL

5. This action is removable to this Court under 28 U.S.C § 1441(a) because it is “civil 

action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original 

jurisdiction.” 

6. Federal original jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because the suit 

meets complete diversity and amount in controversy requirements: it is between “citizens of 

different States” and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs. 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

7. Federal original jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). Under 

CAFA, codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), federal subject matter jurisdiction exists 

over a putative class action if: (a) there are no fewer than 100 members in the proposed class; (b) 

there is “minimal diversity,” which means that at least one class member (named or unnamed) 

must be a citizen of a state that is different than the state of citizenship of any defendant; and (c) 

the case involves an aggregate amount in controversy greater than the sum or value of $5,000,000, 

exclusive of interests and costs. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2)(A), (d)(5)(B), (d)(6). The requirements

for jurisdiction under CAFA are satisfied here.

A. Diversity of Citizenship.

8. Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Illinois. Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiff’s alleged 

domicile is the State of Illinois. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 19 F.3d 514, 520 (10th 

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Cir. 1994) (“the place of residence is prima facie the domicile.”) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff 

is therefore a citizen of Illinois for diversity of citizenship purposes.

9. Defendant, Richelieu Foods, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the 

State of Delaware with its principal office in Braintree, Massachusetts. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18. 

Defendant is therefore a citizen of the States of Delaware and Massachusetts for diversity of 

citizenship purposes.

10. Therefore, because Plaintiff is a citizen of Illinois and Richelieu is not, complete 

diversity of citizenship exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and minimal diversity is present under 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). That satisfies 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)’s statutory diversity of citizenship 

requirements. See Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 84 (2005) (“Defendants may remove 

an action on the basis of diversity of citizenship if there is complete diversity between all named 

plaintiffs and all named defendants.”). Furthermore, CAFA permits removal of a proposed class 

action to federal court as long as there is minimal diversity, meaning just one member of the 

plaintiff class needs to be a citizen of a state different from any one defendant. Dancel v. Groupon, 

Inc., 940 F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A)). Therefore, diversity 

of citizenship is also satisfied under the requirements of CAFA.

B. The Amount in Controversy Exceeds $75,000.

11. Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, liquidated damages for violations of the Biometric 

Information Privacy Act. See e.g., Compl. ¶ 55.A.

12. Plaintiff claims that Richelieu violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act by 

capturing, collecting, and/or disclosing his biometric information, namely his fingerprint. Compl. 

¶¶ 45-47, 60.

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13. Plaintiff alleges that Richelieu captured, stored, and disclosed his fingerprint when 

he scanned his fingerprint to clock in and out of work. Compl. ¶¶ 24-25.

14. Plaintiff alleges that he was required to scan his fingerprints each time he started 

and finished working from February 2019 through May 2020. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 5.

15. Plaintiff alleges that he scanned his fingerprint to clock in and out of work at 

Richelieu from February 2019 through May 2020. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 24-25, 29.

16. Accordingly, the Complaint can plausibly be read to suggest that a violation 

occurred every time Plaintiff clocked in and out of work. Peatry v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., 393 

F. Supp. 3d 766, 769 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (finding BIPA claims involving on biometric timeclocks can 

plausibly be read to suggest a violation allegedly occurred every time Plaintiff clocked in and out 

of work). 

17. Plaintiff seeks inter alia money damages under Section 20(1)-(2) of the Biometric 

Information Privacy Act. See Compl. ¶ 55.A.

18. Section 20(2) of the Biometric Information Privacy Act provides for liquidated 

damages in the amount of $5,000 for each reckless violation. 740 ILCS 14/20(2).

19. Plaintiff claims that Richelieu’s alleged violations of the Biometric Information 

Privacy Act were reckless. Compl. ¶ 55.

20. Therefore, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 because Plaintiff seeks a 

statutory penalty of $5,000 for “each violation” which Plaintiff alleges occurred each time

Richelieu captured, collected and/or disclosed his fingerprint (Compl. ¶¶ 45-47, 60). Plaintiff 

alleges that Richelieu captured, collect and/or disclosed his fingerprint each time Plaintiff scanned 

his fingerprint. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-25).

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21. Plaintiff would have only needed to scan his fingerprint sixteen times (i.e., eight 

days of work) in the more than one year he allegedly worked for Richelieu. Accordingly, it is 

plausible that Plaintiff scanned his fingerprint more than sixteen times thereby exceeding the 

$75,000 threshold. Peatry v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 766, 769 (N.D. Ill. 2019) 

(finding amount in controversy threshold met for removal of BIPA claim where plaintiff alleged 

she worked for defendant for more than thirty months and was required to scan her fingerprint 

each time she clocked in and out of work).

22. Accordingly, Richelieu has a “good faith, minimally reasonable belief” that the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Normand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 193 F.3d 

908, 910 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Meridian Secs. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski , 441 F.3d 536, 543 (7th 

Cir. 2006) (“Only if it is ‘legally certain’ that the recovery . . . will be less than the jurisdictional 

floor may the case be dismissed.”).

23. Removal is therefore proper. See Fernandez v. Kerry, Inc., No. 17 C 8971, 2020 

WL 1820521, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2020) (finding removal of BIPA claims based on biometric 

timeclocks proper because plaintiffs have not shown it is legally impossible to recover an amount 

greater than $75,000); Peatry, 393 F. Supp.3d at 770 (“[B]ecause [plaintiff] has not shown that it 

is legally impossible for her to recover $5,000 per fingerprint scan, a position plaintiff should be 

loath to take in light of the undecided interpretation of BIPA’s damages provision, the Court leaves 

that determination to another day. At this stage, such recovery, although uncertain, remains 

plausible based on [plaintiff’s] allegations and an expansive reading of BIPA’s damages 

provisions.”)

C. The Amount in Controversy Exceeds $5,000,000 and there are Substantially 

More than 100 Members in the Proposed Class.

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24. Plaintiff, along with the proposed class, seek, inter alia, liquidated damages for 

violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act. See e.g., Compl. ¶ 55.A.

25. Plaintiff claims that Richelieu violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act by 

capturing, collecting, and/or disclosing his biometric information, as well as the biometric 

information of the proposed class, namely their fingerprints. Compl. ¶¶ 29-30, 45-47, 60.

26. Plaintiff alleges that Richelieu captured, stored, and disclosed his fingerprint, along 

with those of the proposed class, when they scanned their fingerprints to clock in and out of work. 

Compl. ¶¶ 24-25, 29-30.

27. Plaintiff alleges that he seeks to represent a proposed class of Richelieu’s workers 

who scanned their fingerprints in Richelieu’s biometric time clock system each time they started 

and finished work between June 5, 2015 and the present. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 5, 29-30.

28. Accordingly, the Complaint can plausibly be read to suggest that a violation 

occurred every time a member of the proposed class clocked in and out of work. Peatry, 393 F. 

Supp. 3d at 769.

29. Plaintiff, on behalf of the proposed class, seeks inter alia money damages under 

Section 20(1)-(2) of the Biometric Information Privacy Act. See Compl. ¶ 55.A.

30. Section 20(2) of the Biometric Information Privacy Act provides for liquidated 

damages in the amount of $5,000 for each reckless violation. 740 ILCS 14/20(2).

31. Plaintiff claims that Richelieu’s alleged violations of the Biometric Information 

Privacy Act were reckless. Compl. ¶ 55.

32. Therefore, the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 because Plaintiff seeks a 

statutory penalty of $5,000 for “each violation” which Plaintiff alleges occurred each time

Richelieu captured, collected and/or disclosed the fingerprints of the proposed class (Compl. ¶¶ 

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29-30, 45-47, 60). Plaintiff alleges that Richelieu captured, collect and/or disclosed his fingerprint 

each time Plaintiff and the proposed class scanned their fingerprint. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-25, 29-30).

33. If the number of proposed class members were to be the minimum amount of 100

under CAFA, then each member of the proposed class would have only needed to scan their

fingerprints just ten times (i.e., five days of work). Accordingly, it is plausible that each member 

of the proposed class scanned their fingerprints more than ten times thereby exceeding the 

$5,000,000 threshold. Peatry, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 769 (finding amount in controversy threshold 

met for removal of BIPA claim where plaintiff alleged she worked for defendant for more than 

thirty months and was required to scan her fingerprint each time she clocked in and out of work).

34. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that the proposed class includes more than 50 

members. Compl. ¶ 31. Given that Plaintiff defines the class as workers who scanned their 

fingerprints in Richelieu’s biometric clock system in Illinois between June 5, 2015 and the present 

without first executing a written release, it is plausible that at least 100 workers scanned their 

fingerprints in Richelieu’s biometric clock system over the previous 5 year span. 

35. Accordingly, Richelieu has provided a “good-faith estimate” of the amount in 

controversy that is “plausible and adequately supported by evidence...” 

Robinson v. Avanquest N. Am. Inc., No. 14 C 8015, 2015 WL 196343, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 

2015) (citing Blomberg v. Serv. Corp. Int'l, 639 F.3d 761, 763–64 (7th Cir.2011); see also 

Meridian Secs. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski , 441 F.3d 536, 543 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Only if it is ‘legally 

certain’ that the recovery . . . will be less than the jurisdictional floor may the case be dismissed.”).

36. Removal is therefore proper. See Fernandez, 2020 WL 1820521, at *4 (finding 

removal of BIPA claims based on biometric timeclocks proper because plaintiffs have not shown 

it is legally impossible to recover an amount greater than $75,000); Peatry, 393 F. Supp.3d at 770 

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(“[B]ecause [plaintiff] has not shown that it is legally impossible for her to recover $5,000 per 

fingerprint scan, a position plaintiff should be loath to take in light of the undecided interpretation 

of BIPA’s damages provision, the Court leaves that determination to another day. At this stage, 

such recovery, although uncertain, remains plausible based on [plaintiff’s] allegations and an 

expansive reading of BIPA’s damages provisions.”)

III. DEFENDANTS HAVE SATISFIED THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR 

REMOVAL

37. Richelieu first received copies of the Complaint no earlier than June 25, 2020. 

Supra ¶ 3. This removal is filed within 30 days after receipt of the Complaint. This Notice of 

Removal is therefore timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

38. Richelieu is the only named-defendant therefore all defendant who have been 

properly joined and served consent removal is satisfaction of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).

39. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern 

Division, embraces the county in which the state court action is now pending (Cook County, 

Illinois). Therefore, this action is properly removed to the Northern District of Illinois pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

40. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), Richelieu will promptly file written notice of this 

removal and a copy of the Notice of Removal with the clerk of the state court in which this action 

currently is pending and will serve a copy of this notice on all parties to the removed action.

41. The attached Complaint and Summons are the only process, pleadings, and orders 

served upon Richelieu in the state court proceeding. See Exs. 1 and 2. Thus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1446(a), all process, pleadings, and orders served on Richelieu are attached to this Notice of 

Removal 

* * * * *

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42. By filing this Notice of Removal, Richelieu does not waive, and hereby reserve, 

any right to assert objections and defenses to the Complaint, including but not limited to, all 

objections and defenses related to personal jurisdiction and venue.

WHEREFORE, Defendant Richelieu Foods, Inc. respectfully removes the state court 

action entitled Jorge Gonzalez, on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated, known 

and known v. Richelieu Foods, Inc., Case No.2020CH04468, filed in the Circuit Court of Cook 

County, to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446.

Dated: July 24, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Michael Kozlowski

Christopher J. Esbrook (ARDC No. 6282829)

Michael Kozlowski (ARDC No. 6320950)

ESBROOK LAW LLC

77 W. Wacker Drive Suite 4500

Chicago, Illinois 60601

(312) 319-7680

christopher.esbrook@esbrooklaw.com

michael.kozlowski@esbrooklaw.com

Attorneys for Defendant

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Michael Kozlowski, an attorney, certify that on this date, July 24, 2020, I caused one 

copy of the attached Notice of Removal to be served via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, and via email from the address michael.kozlowski@esbrooklaw.com on the following counsel:

Zachary C. Flowerree

77 W. Washington Street Suite 1402

Chicago, IL 60602

zflowerree@flasalaw.com

/s/ Michael Kozlowski

Michael Kozlowski

Esbrook Law LLC

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