IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JENNIFER S.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 2785

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Jennifer S.’s claim for

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction 

of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the 

reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s decision [Doc. 

No. 18] is granted in part, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment [Doc. No. 22] is denied.

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security 

Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by her first name and the first initial of her last 

name.

2

 Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(d).

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BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 4, 2017, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB, alleging disability since April 

1, 2013. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which she

timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was 

held on November 7, 2018. Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the hearing

and was represented by counsel. A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified.

On March 14, 2019, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding her

not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration 

Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s 

decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the 

District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 

(7th Cir. 2005). 

II. ALJ DECISION

Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential 

evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of April 1, 

2013 through her date last insured of December 31, 2018. At step two, the ALJ 

concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: multiple sclerosis; 

obesity; migraine headaches; fibromyalgia; diabetes mellitus; irritable bowel 

syndrome/colitis; obstructive sleep apnea; restless legal syndrome; malignant 

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neoplasm of the anal canal; dysthymic disorder; and anxiety disorder. The ALJ 

concluded at step three that Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in combination, do not 

meet or medically equal a listed impairment. 

Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with the following additional 

limitations: can have no work around unprotected heights, open flames, or 

unprotected dangerous machinery; can occasionally balance, stoop, and climb ramps 

and stairs; can never kneel, crouch, crawl, or climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can 

have no concentrated exposure to extremes of cold or heat; can have no work 

requiring telephone communication, but can communicate in person; can frequently 

handle and finger; can work in an environment with moderate noise levels such as 

an office level of noise; and has the ability to understand, remember, and carry out 

simple instructions.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be unable to perform her 

past relevant work as a school bus driver, teacher’s aide, industrial truck driver, 

shipping clerk, glass inspector, or strapping machine operator. At step five, based 

upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, 

the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in 

the national economy, leading to a finding that she is not disabled under the Social 

Security Act.

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DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a plaintiff is 

disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff

presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does 

the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform her former 

occupation? and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4). 

An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that 

the plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 

389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, 

precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 

one to four. Id. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the 

burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even 

in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of 

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not 

high. Substantial evidence is . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and 

means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019)

(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in 

evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also 

Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision 

must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is 

adequately supported”) (citation omitted).

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However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved 

of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838 

F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has 

adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every 

piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide 

some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. 

Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to 

a plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 

conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate 

the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful 

appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 

2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to 

fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately 

articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 

1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). 

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III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons, 

including: (1) the ALJ failed to account for all of Plaintiff’s impairments in her RFC 

assessment; (2) the ALJ incorrectly analyzed the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating 

physician; and (3) the ALJ incorrectly analyzed Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms.

In advancing her first argument, Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that the ALJ 

failed to account for Plaintiff’s bowel incontinence in her RFC assessment. Pertinent 

to that topic, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s testimony that she had issues with bowel 

incontinence since 2014 and that “she began having major bowel incontinence when 

she began taking medication for multiple sclerosis.” (R. 25-26.) The ALJ further 

noted that “[i]n December 2015, [Plaintiff] continued to complain of diarrhea with 

fecal incontinence as well as nocturnal incontinence.” (Id. at 29.) The ALJ also noted 

that “[i]n January 2017, it was expressed that some of [Plaintiff’s] gastrointestinal 

problems could be due to gastroparesis, which could be diabetic in nature.” (Id.)

Based upon Plaintiff’s allegations and this medical evidence, the ALJ ultimately 

concluded that Plaintiff’s irritable bowel syndrome and colitis constituted severe 

impairments.

However, as argued by Plaintiff, despite finding these severe impairments, 

the ALJ failed to account for Plaintiff’s irritable bowel syndrome and colitis 

whatsoever in her RFC assessment. For instance, the ALJ did not provide any 

work-related limitation accounting for the number of bathroom breaks Plaintiff 

would need to take throughout the workday, which she was required to do. See 

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Jacob D. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-0554, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156869, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 

Aug. 19, 2021) (“Not only does the ALJ fail to explain how she came to the 

conclusion these limitations would be sufficient to accommodate IBS, the ALJ 

erroneously failed to account for any bathroom breaks Plaintiff would need.”); 

Manker v. Berryhill, No. 16 C 10704, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211022, at *9 (N.D. Ill. 

Dec. 22, 2017) (“Despite this evidence and testimony [regarding Claimant’s irritable 

bowel syndrome], the ALJ failed to account for Claimant’s potential need to take 

such frequent and unscheduled breaks in formulating the RFC or to further develop 

Claimant’s testimony to determine the length of such bathroom breaks.”); 

Rasmussen v. Astrue, No. 10 C 2344, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48988, at *34 (N.D. Ill. 

May 6, 2011) (“Here, the ALJ failed to construct a logical bridge between the 

evidence and the RFC. With regard to Plaintiff’s IBS and colitis, the ALJ concluded 

that these impairments require her to ‘have access to a bathroom.’ Beyond this 

general statement, however, the ALJ did not determine the frequency or length of 

time Plaintiff would have to spend in the bathroom as a result of these 

impairments.”).

Ultimately, having found that Plaintiff’s irritable bowel syndrome and 

incontinence constituted severe impairments, it was incumbent on the ALJ to 

account for those impairments in her RFC assessment. See Maureen J. v. Kijakazi, 

No. 18 C 5660, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159690, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2021) (“The 

ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff suffers from incontinence and fibromyalgia, and 

Plaintiff testified about her limitations from those conditions. The ALJ was thus 

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required to give a narrative explanation as to how the RFC accommodated all of 

Plaintiff’s impairments.”); Bay v. Berryhill, No. 16 C 9525, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

13977, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2018) (“[T]he ALJ erred in failing to account for any 

limitations arising out of plaintiff’s incontinence.”). The ALJ’s failure to account for 

Plaintiff’s irritable bowel syndrome and colitis requires that this matter be 

remanded. See Gray v. Colvin, No. 14 C 7101, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45179, at *10 

(N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2016) (“Since the ALJ did not discuss Plaintiff’s incontinence at all 

in his RFC determination . . . the issue is remanded for further consideration.”); 

Jacob D. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-0554, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156869, at *7-8 (N.D. 

Ill. Aug. 19, 2021) (“The Court must remand on the ALJ’s failure to properly 

accommodate Plaintiff’s IBS.”); Erwin v. Astrue, No. 11 CV 1555, 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 123657, at *36 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2012) (“On remand, the ALJ should 

consider whether – and if so, how – Erwin’s incontinence and obesity impact his 

ability to function in the workplace.”).

Based on its conclusion that remand is necessary for the above reasons, the 

Court need not explore in detail the remaining errors claimed by Plaintiff. The 

Court emphasizes that the Commissioner should not assume these issues were 

omitted from the opinion because no error was found. Indeed, the Court admonishes 

the Commissioner that, on remand, special care should be taken to ensure that the 

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians are properly evaluated and Plaintiff’s 

alleged symptoms are properly assessed.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s 

decision [Doc. No. 18] is granted in part, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment [Doc. No. 22] is denied. The Court finds that this matter should 

be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this 

Order.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

DATE: January 5, 2022 ___________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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