IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ROSY MORALES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 20 C 2175

)

NORTHSHORE UNIVERSITY )

HEALTHSYSTEM,

1 )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

Rosy Morales has sued her former employer NorthShore University 

HealthSystem for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Illinois 

Human Rights Act (IHRA). She alleges that, while working for NorthShore, she was 

discriminated against, subjected to a hostile working environment, and retaliated against 

for reporting this mistreatment to her supervisors. NorthShore has moved for summary 

judgment on all counts, and Morales has moved for partial summary judgment as to 

liability and one of NorthShore's affirmative defenses. For the reasons stated below, the 

Court denies both sides' motions.

Background

NorthShore operates a healthcare delivery system comprising six hospitals in 

1 The complaint originally named other defendants, but they were dropped in the 

amended complaint. The Court dismissed these defendants in an order dated July 25, 

2020.

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the Chicago-land area. Morales is a woman of Mexican descent residing in Cook 

County, Illinois. From July 2014 through April 2018, Morales worked for NorthShore as 

a patient support associate, first at its Glenview location before transferring to its Skokie 

location in August 2016.

Morales contends, in her deposition and briefings, that she was subject to 

consistent "bullying, harassment, and discrimination" at both the Glenview and Skokie 

locations. Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. at 2. According to Morales, her coworkers at the 

Glenview location "constantly name call[ed] [her] and insult[ed] her Mexican heritage,"

calling her "negra" and the department slave. Pl.'s Local Rule 56.1 Stat. ¶ 22. She 

says that her Glenview coworkers joked that she drove her father's pickup truck to work 

because she was there to pick up scrap metal and that they made comments comparing 

her to cleaning and kitchen staff. Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Local Rule 56.1 Stat. at 10–11

("She was identified as the 'Mexican who worked probably like a drug lord, who 

probably had a tunnel in the basement'; she was told she was 'probably treated better in 

the kitchen than she was in the department' . . . .").

This alleged discrimination and harassment continued, Morales contends, after 

her transfer to the Skokie location. For example, Morales's new coworkers called her 

an idiot, told her that only Latinas and Mexicans did the dirty work, and suggested that 

she had an escape tunnel in the basement, like the drug lord El Chapo. One surgical 

scheduler with whom Morales worked "repeatedly harassed and bullied [her] to hurry up 

her work" and "told [her] that if she was Mexican, she could work a little harder when 

she needed things done quickly." Id. at 10–12. In addition to these comments, Morales 

contends that she was given a workload heavier than those of white and non-Mexican 

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patient support associates.

The parties dispute whether Morales reported the alleged discrimination and 

harassment to her supervisors or other NorthShore employees. At the Glenview 

location, Morales was supervised by Olga Madorsky from her start date through 

approximately October 2015, then by Kathy Rosanova from approximately October 

2015 through approximately August 2016. At the Skokie location, Morales was 

supervised by Christina Herrington from August 2016 through approximately September 

2016; then by Herrington and Heather Mintz from approximately September 2016 

through January 2017; then by Mintz from January 2017 through June 2017; then by 

Mintz and Katie Schmid from June 2017 through April 2018. NorthShore does not 

dispute that Morales approached Mintz and Schmid about her heavy workload at the 

Skokie location, but it denies that she reported any discrimination or harassment on the 

basis of color or national origin to any of her supervisors.

In March 2018, NorthShore Human Resources informed Schmid that Morales 

had been accused of timecard fraud, specifically, that she was consistently parking her 

car in front of the building to swipe in to work before parking her car in the parking lot. 

Schmid investigated the matter and determined that, between January 2, 2018 and 

early March 2018, Morales logged in to her computer more than fifteen minutes after 

she swiped in to work. Schmid also claims to have reviewed video footage of Morales

swiping in to work and subsequently leaving the building. On March 23, 2018, 

NorthShore suspended Morales. The company terminated her employment several 

weeks later, on April 19, 2018. On the same day, NorthShore terminated her coworker 

Kanella Roumeliotis, also for claimed timecard falsification.

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On March 27, 2018, Morales filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois 

Department of Humans Rights (IDHR), alleging discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, 

sexual harassment, and retaliation. The IDHR issued her a notice of right to sue, and 

Morales then sued NorthShore in state court, asserting claims under Title VII and the 

IHRA. Northshore removed the case to this district on the basis of federal question 

jurisdiction. As indicated earlier, both sides have now moved for summary judgment.

Discussion

Summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is a genuine issue of 

material fact if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party." Hanover Ins. Co. v. N. Bldg. Co., 751 F.3d 788, 791 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). When parties file 

cross-motions for summary judgment, courts "construe all inferences in favor of the 

party against whom the motion under consideration is made." Cremation Soc'y of Ill., 

Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 727, 869 F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation 

omitted).

A. Timeliness

A plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination within 300 days of an alleged act of 

discrimination, or she is barred from filing suit on the alleged act. See Kuhn v. United 

Airlines, Inc., 640 F. App'x 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2016); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 

775 ILCS 5/7A-102(A)(1). NorthShore argues that Morales cannot bring any claims 

premised on acts occurring before May 31, 2017, 300 days before her March 27, 2018 

IDHR charge. Morales argues that her claims are not time-barred based on the 

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continuing violation doctrine.2

The continuing violation doctrine "is usually invoked to defeat a statute of 

limitations bar for conduct that falls outside the relevant period." Vance v. Ball State 

Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 2011). But this doctrine applies only to hostile work 

environment claims. Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720, 730 (7th Cir. 2013); 

see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). "A Title VII 

plaintiff seeking redress for a series of discrete discriminatory acts cannot avoid the 

effect of the limitations period by arguing that the discrete acts are 'plausibly or 

sufficiently related.'" Id. (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 111–14). Counts 2, 3, 6, and 7 of 

the amended complaint allege discrimination on the basis of national origin or color. In 

assessing these claims, the Court considers only alleged acts of discrimination 

occurring after May 31, 2017.3

In contrast, the Supreme Court has stated that hostile environment claims by 

"[t]heir very nature involve[] repeated conduct." Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. Thus "a 

hostile-work-environment charge is timely as long as 'any act falls within the statutory 

time period,' even if the charge encompasses events occurring prior to the statutory 

time period." Adams, 742 F.3d at 730 (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 120) (emphasis in 

the original). NorthShore cites a couple of pre-Morgan cases to argue that the 

continuing violation doctrine does not apply because Morales transferred to a different 

2 The continuing violation doctrine analysis is the same for Morales's federal and state

claims. Illinois state courts look to Title VII cases for guidance regarding the continuing 

violation doctrine. See Graves v. Chief Legal Couns. of Ill. Dep't of Hum. Rts., 327 Ill. 

App. 3d 293, 297, 762 N.E.2d 722, 725 (2002).

3 Morales also asserts retaliation claims. These claims are solely predicated on her 

suspension and termination, which are undeniably within the statutory period.

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location and her supervisors and coworkers were different during her time at the Skokie

location. The Court overrules NorthShore's argument because it is inconsistent with the 

Supreme Court's holding in Morgan. The Court thus considers all alleged acts of 

harassment in evaluating Morales's hostile work environment claims.

B. Scope of charge

NorthShore also argues that Morales's termination and color discrimination 

claims are outside the scope of her IDHR charge. It contends that these claims are 

barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Fort Bend County v. Davis, 

139 S. Ct. 1843, 1851 (2019). The Court disagrees. It is well-settled that an 

employment-discrimination plaintiff may bring claims outside her charge if they are "like 

or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such 

allegations." See Geldon v. S. Milwaukee Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2005); 

see also Ford v. Marion Cty. Sheriff's Off., 942 F.3d 839, 857 n.11 (7th Cir. 2019). 

"Claims are like or reasonably related when (1) there is a reasonable relationship 

between the allegations in the charge and the claims in the complaint and (2) the claim 

in the complaint can reasonably be expected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of 

the allegations in the charge." Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 

2019) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Morales's color discrimination claims involve the same allegedly discriminatory 

acts as her national origin claims. The only difference between the claims is the alleged 

basis on which NorthShore discriminated against her, and in this case there's a readily 

apparent relationship between the two (Mexican national origin and color). The claims 

are reasonably related, and the color discrimination claims reasonably would be 

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expected to be discovered in the course of an investigation into Morales's national origin 

discrimination claims. 

Morales's termination claims are also within the scope of her charge. Although 

Morales filed her IDHR charge before she was terminated, her termination directly 

followed from her suspension, which she referenced in her charge. The two adverse 

actions involved the same people, the same facts, and were interrelated. Additionally, 

the termination claims could reasonably be expected to grow out of an investigation into 

her allegations involved in her suspension claims. Thus neither of Morales's claims are 

barred for failure to exhaust.

C. Discrimination claims

Counts 2, 3, 6, and 7 of the amended complaint allege discrimination on the 

basis of national origin and color. "When a defendant moves for summary judgment, 

the 'singular question' for the district court is whether the plaintiff has introduced 

evidence that would 'permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff's race, 

ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse 

employment action.'" Purtue v. Wis. Dep't of Corrections, 963 F.3d 598, 602 (7th Cir. 

2020) (quoting Johnson v. Advocate Health Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 

2018)). Regardless of "[w]hether a plaintiff offers direct or circumstantial evidence of 

discrimination," "all evidence belongs in a single pile and must be evaluated as a 

whole." Igasaki v. Ill. Dep't of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 938, 957 (7th Cir. 2021) 

(citing Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016)).

One way to prove employment discrimination is through the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting framework. Logan v. City of Chicago, 4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021) 

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(citation omitted); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 

Under this method, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden 

shifts to the employer to provide a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its actions. 

Id. Once the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to present 

evidence that the stated reason is pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804.

1. Prima facie case

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must show: "(1)

she is a member of a protected class, (2) her job performance met [the employer's] 

legitimate expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) 

another similarly situated individual who was not in the protected class was treated 

more favorably than the plaintiff." Burks v. Wis. Dep't of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 750–51 

(7th Cir. 2006). It is undisputed that Morales falls into a protected class for both her 

color and national origin discrimination claims. It is also undisputed that suspension 

and termination are adverse employment actions. Thus the Court focuses its analysis 

on the second and fourth elements of the prima facie case.

a. NorthShore's legitimate expectations

Although courts must typically address the prima facie case before the pretext 

issue, see Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 327 (7th Cir. 2002), 

"sometimes the analysis of the legitimate expectations inquiry merges with the pretext 

analysis." Smiley v. Columbia Coll. Chi., 714 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 2013). In such 

cases, the question that the court must address is "whether the employer's stated 

nondiscriminatory ground for the action . . . is the true ground of the employer's action 

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rather than being a pretext for a decision based on some other, undisclosed ground." 

Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 417 (7th Cir. 2006). 

NorthShore argues that Morales failed to meet its legitimate expectations 

because she violated its timekeeping policies. Morales admits that, on various 

occasions, she would badge in to work before parking her car, but she maintains that 

such action is not a violation of NorthShore's legitimate expectations because

"NorthShore selectively enforces its policies in a discriminatory manner." Pl.'s Resp. to 

Def.'s Mot. at 5. She contends that other employees violated similar policies and were 

not terminated and that NorthShore's investigation into her supposed timekeeping 

violations was deficient in several ways.

There is a genuine factual dispute on this point that precludes summary 

judgment. As discussed in more detail below, Morales presents evidence indicating that 

NorthShore did not terminate other employees for similar violations of company policy. 

Specifically, there is evidence that such employees were given warnings and allowed to 

continue working. In contrast, NorthShore fired Morales without warning after it 

discovered her alleged timekeeping violations. The Seventh Circuit has held that "when 

a plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to raise an inference that an employer applied its 

legitimate expectations in a disparate manner . . . the second and fourth prongs 

merge—allowing plaintiffs to . . . proceed to the pretext inquiry." Elkhatib v. Dunkin 

Donuts, Inc., 493 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Additionally, the 

Seventh Circuit has held that evidence of a faulty or improper investigation resulting in 

termination can create a genuine dispute of fact. See Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare 

Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 916 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that summary judgment was not 

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appropriate because of the "unusual way" in which the decision to terminate the plaintiff 

was reached). 

b. Similarly situated employee

NorthShore argues that the similarly-situated-employee element of the prima 

facie case is not met because it treated Morales and Roumeliotis (white and European) 

the same by firing both of them on the same day for the same misconduct. Morales 

disputes that Roumeliotis was treated equally. She testified that Roumeliotis was fired 

only after Morales notified NorthShore that other employees violated the same policy 

and that she was being inappropriately "singled out." Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. at 5. If 

true, the fact that Roumeliotis was fired after Morales suggested that NorthShore was 

engaging in unequal treatment could persuade a reasonable jury that NorthShore 

treated similarly situated employees outside of Morales's protected class better than it 

treated her. This dispute is sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

That aside, Morales also points to several employees who received second 

chances after violating NorthShore policies. NorthShore argues that these employees 

are not similarly situated because their misconduct was not similar to Morales's. There 

is a genuine factual dispute on this point. Although the other employees violated 

different company policies, the Seventh Circuit has stated that comparators "need not 

be identical in every conceivable way." Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th 

Cir. 2012). "So long as the distinctions between the plaintiff and the proposed 

comparators are not 'so significant that they render the comparison effectively useless,' 

the similarly-situated requirement is satisfied." Id. There are a number of similarities 

between Morales and the employees she references: they had the same job and the 

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same supervisor, and they all are claimed to have violated company policies. The 

differences between the timekeeping policy that Morales allegedly violated and the 

policies that the proposed comparators violated—for example, parking in patient parking 

lots, improper badging in, spending working hours on the internet—arguably are not so 

great as to render the comparison between Morales and these individuals "effectively 

useless." The point should be decided after a trial.

2. Pretext

For the reasons discussed in the "legitimate expectation" section, there is a 

genuine factual dispute regarding whether NorthShore's reason for terminating Morales 

was pretextual.

D. Hostile work environment claims

In counts 1 and 5 of the amended complaint, Morales asserts hostile work 

environment claims under Title VII and the IHRA. There are four elements of a hostile 

work environment claim: (1) the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) 

based on protected classifications; (3) that was so severe or pervasive that it altered the 

conditions of employment and created a hostile or abusive working environment; and 

(4) there is a basis to hold the employer liable. Smith v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 936 F.3d 

554, 560 (7th Cir. 2019). The third element involves both subjective and objective 

components. Id. at 561. "In other words, [the plaintiff] must show not only that a 

reasonable person would find the workplace hostile or abusive . . . but also that he 

himself perceived it that way." Id. In assessing this element, courts "look at all of the 

circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, how offensive a 

reasonable person would deem it to be, whether it is physically threatening or 

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humiliating conduct as opposed to verbal abuse, whether it unreasonably interferes with

an employee's work performance, and whether it was directed at the victim." Lambert v. 

Peri Formworks Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2013). Finally, an employer is 

liable for a hostile work environment created by the plaintiff's coworkers when the 

employer was negligent in discovering or remedying the harassment. Velez v. City of 

Chicago, 442 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 2006).

NorthShore contends that there is no genuine factual dispute regarding the third 

element. Specifically, it argues that Morales alleges only "off-color comments, isolated 

incidents, teasing, and other unpleasantries that are, unfortunately, not uncommon in 

the workplace." Def.'s Mot. at 13 (quoting Melgoza v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 17 C 

6819, 2020 WL 6565235, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2020)). NorthShore further contends 

that there is no basis for holding it liable for the conduct of Morales's coworkers. To this 

end, it contends that the evidence demonstrates that Morales never reported any of the 

alleged harassment by her coworkers to her supervisors.

The Court disagrees. There are genuine disputes regarding (1) whether the 

alleged harassment was sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to be actionable and (2) 

whether Morales reported the harassment to her supervisors, thus providing a basis for 

employer negligence. With respect to the former, Morales testified to dozens of 

abusive, inappropriate, and racially insensitive comments and actions directed at her by 

her coworkers during her employment at NorthShore. A reasonable jury could find that 

the conduct went far beyond "unpleasantries" that are "common in the workplace." She 

alleges almost sixty instances of coworker harassment over the course of four years, 

including several months with more than four instances of harassment. A reasonable 

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jury could find that this conduct—which, according to Morales, included referring to her 

as a "negra" and the "department slave," invoking negative stereotypes of persons of 

Mexican origin, and suggesting that as a Mexican-American she was likely conducting 

menial labor—would be offensive to a reasonable person in a way that altered the 

conditions of employment. Many of these incidents occurred in front of others and 

would reasonably have caused the recipient considerable embarrassment. Although 

Morales was able to continue performing her job satisfactorily, this does not foreclose 

the possibility that the alleged actions and statements by her coworkers would be 

considered, from an objective standpoint, to interfere with a reasonable employee's 

work performance. Indeed, Morales claims she experienced depression, anxiety, and 

severe stress resulting in two miscarriages. 

On the second issue argued by NorthShore, the parties present competing 

evidence regarding whether Morales reported the harassment to her supervisors. 

Morales says she did; NorthShore cites the testimony of her former supervisors who say 

she didn't. Deciding between these competing narratives involves a credibility 

determination that a court cannot appropriately conduct on summary judgment. The 

matter must be decided after a trial.

E. Retaliation claims

Counts 4 and 8 of the amended complaint present Morales's retaliation claims. 

To establish a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in a 

protected activity, such as reporting unlawful harassment or discrimination; (2) the 

employer took a materially adverse action against her; and (3) there is a causal link 

between the protected activity and the adverse action. Poullard v. McDonald, 829 F.3d 

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844, 856 (7th Cir. 2016). NorthShore states that there is no genuine dispute of material

fact regarding the first and third elements. Not so. As explained above, there is a 

genuine factual dispute regarding the first element, namely, whether Morales reported 

the harassment she claims to have experienced. 

Additionally, the Court finds that there is a genuine dispute regarding the third 

element. Morales testified that she reported the unlawful harassment and discrimination 

to Schmid in February 2018, only a month before her suspension. Sweeney v. West, 

149 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the nexus requirement is met when "the 

employer's adverse action follows fairly soon after the employee's protected 

expression"). NorthShore argues that Morales cannot show a causal link between her 

alleged reporting and her suspension and termination because the adverse actions 

were premised on her timekeeping violations. But, as previously discussed, there is a 

genuine dispute regarding whether this justification for suspension and termination was 

pretextual. Thus the Court finds that there is a genuine dispute regarding whether 

Morales's reporting was the cause of her suspension and termination.

F. Partial summary judgment regarding liability

Morales filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding NorthShore's

negligence in failing to prevent or correct any discrimination, harassment, or retaliation 

against her. Because there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether 

Morales reported the alleged coworker harassment to her supervisors at NorthShore, 

the Court denies Morales's motion for partial summary judgment.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies both parties' motions for summary 

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judgment [dkt. nos. 40 & 49]. The case is set for a telephonic status hearing on 

February 8, 2022 at 9:30 a.m. for the purpose of setting a trial date and discussing the 

possibility of settlement. The following call-in number will be used: 888-684-8852, 

access code 746-1053. Counsel should wait for the case to be called before 

announcing themselves.

________________________________

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY

 United States District Judge

Date: February 2, 2022

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