UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ANTHONY B.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,

 ACTING COMMISSIONER OF

 SOCIAL SECURITY,

1

Defendant.

Case No. 20 CV 2525

Magistrate Judge McShain

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Anthony B. brings this action for judicial review of the Social Security 

Administration’s (SSA) decision denying his application for benefits. For the following 

reasons, plaintiff’s request to reverse and remand the SSA’s decision [15]

2 is denied, 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment [18] is granted, and the SSA’s decision 

denying plaintiff’s application is affirmed.

Background

A. Procedural Background

In January 2017, plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability 

and disability insurance benefits, alleging a disability onset of September 15, 2015, 

based on his degenerative disc disease, sarcoidosis, and obesity. [14-1] 13, 178-79. 

Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. [Id.] 13. Plaintiff 

requested a hearing, which was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ) on 

November 9, 2018. [Id.] 30-81. In a decision dated February 13, 2019, the ALJ found 

that plaintiff was not disabled and denied his application. [Id.] 13-25. The Appeals 

Council denied review on February 20, 2020 [id.] 1-6, making the ALJ’s decision the 

agency’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955 & 404.981. Plaintiff timely appealed 

1 In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Kilolo Kijakazi, the Acting Commissioner of Social 

Security, is substituted as the defendant in this case in place of the former Commissioner of 

Social Security, Andrew Saul.

2 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers 

are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings, except for citations to the 

administrative record [14], which refer to the page numbers in the bottom right corner of 

each page.

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to this Court [1], and the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to review the Acting 

Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).3

B. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ reviewed plaintiff’s disability claim in accordance with the SSA’s fivestep sequential evaluation process. At step one of her decision, the ALJ found that 

plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful employment since his alleged onset 

date. [14-1] 16. At step two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s degenerative disc 

disease and sarcoidosis were non-severe impairments. [Id.]. At step three, the ALJ 

ruled that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

met or equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. [Id.] 16-17. Before 

turning to step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff has the residual functional capacity 

(RFC) to perform sedentary work, except that plaintiff (1) could not climb ladders, 

ropes, or scaffolds; (2) could only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, kneel, crouch, 

and crawl; (3) could have occasional exposure to humidity, odors, dust, fumes, gases, 

and other pulmonary irritants; (4) cannot be exposed to heights or hazardous 

machinery; and (5) should have a sit and stand option where he would need to change 

positions every thirty minutes or so while remaining on task. [Id.] 17-22. At step four, 

the ALJ determined that plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work. [Id.] 23. 

At step five, the ALJ ruled that significant numbers of jobs existed in the national 

economy that plaintiff could perform: charge account clerk (66,065 jobs), assembler 

(23,491 jobs), and order clerk, food and beverage (63,095 jobs).

Legal Standard

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage 

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical 

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted 

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ conducts a sequential 

five-step inquiry: (1) whether the claimant is unemployed; (2) whether the claimant 

has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the claimant’s 

impairment meets or equals any listed impairments; (4) whether the claimant is 

unable to perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant is unable to 

perform any other available work in light of her age, education, and work experience. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) & 416.920(a). “An affirmative answer leads either to 

the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A 

negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a 

3 The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction in this case by a United States 

Magistrate Judge. [7].

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determination that a claimant is not disabled.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 

(7th Cir. 2000). 

The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially to determine if it is 

supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “not a 

high threshold: it means only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 

2021) (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019)). But the standard 

“is not entirely uncritical. Where the Commissioner’s decision lacks evidentiary 

support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be 

remanded.” Brett D. v. Saul, No. 19 C 8352, 2021 WL 2660753, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 

29, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Discussion

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed for three reasons. 

First, plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by refusing to admit into the record a pain 

report from one of his treating doctors because it was not submitted at least five 

business days before the hearing. [15] 8-10. Second, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s 

subjective symptom analysis was patently erroneous. [Id.] 10-13. Third, plaintiff 

argues that the ALJ did not incorporate all his limitations into the RFC 

determination. [Id.] 13-15.

A. The ALJ’s Refusal To Consider The Untimely Medical Source 

Statement Was Not Error.

At the start of the November 9, 2018 hearing before the ALJ, plaintiff’s 

attorney advised the ALJ that plaintiff had just given him “a pain report from his 

doctor . . . that we were not expecting.” [14-1] 34. Counsel was referring to a “Pain 

Report” that was completed on November 1, 2018 by Dr. Leon Huddleston, plaintiff’s 

treating pain specialist. See [15-1] 1-2. Counsel acknowledged that the pain report 

had not been included in plaintiff’s “five day letter,” and the ALJ responded that she 

was “not going to admit” Dr. Huddleston’s statement into evidence because “it wasn’t 

part of the five day letter[.]” [Id.] 35. Plaintiff’s attorney made no further comment or 

argument in favor of admitting the report into evidence. In her written decision, the 

ALJ explained that, if a claimant wishes that written evidence be considered at the 

hearing, the claimant has an obligation to “submit or inform the [ALJ] about the 

evidence no later than five business days before the date of the scheduled hearing.” 

[Id.] 13. The ALJ also recognized that, under 20 C.F.R. § 404.935, she could consider

evidence that was not timely submitted if “some other unusual, unexpected, or 

unavoidable circumstance beyond the claimant’s control prevented the claimant from 

submitting or informing the [ALJ] about the evidence earlier.” [Id.]. But the ALJ 

found that plaintiff had not “actively or diligently sought” the pain report and that 

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none of the exceptions provided by § 404.935(b) had been satisfied and refused to 

admit the report. The Court finds no error in the ALJ’s handling of this issue.

Applicable SSA regulations provide that a claimant “must make every effort to 

ensure that the [ALJ] receives all of the evidence and must inform [the ALJ] about or 

submit any written evidence . . . no later than 5 business days before the date of the 

scheduled hearing.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.935(a). “If a claimant fails to comply with the 

five-business-day deadline, the ALJ ‘may decline to consider or obtain the evidence’

subject to certain exceptions set forth at § 404.935(b).” Janisha C. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-

cv-381, 2023 WL 5017943, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2023) (quoting 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.935(a)). Plaintiff relies on the following exception:

(b) If you have evidence required under § 404.1512 but you have missed 

the deadline described in paragraph (a) of this section, the 

administrative law judge will accept the evidence if he or she has not yet 

issued a decision and you did not inform us about or submit the evidence 

before the deadline because:

* * *

(3) Some other unusual, unexpected, or unavoidable circumstance 

beyond your control prevented you from informing us about or 

submitting the evidence earlier. Examples include, but are not 

limited to:

* * *

(iv) You actively and diligently sought evidence from a source and 

the evidence was not received or was received less than 5 business 

days prior to the hearing.

20 C.F.R. § 404.935(b)(3)(iv).

The Court agrees with the ALJ that plaintiff has not carried his burden to 

demonstrate that the ALJ should have admitted Dr. Huddleston’s report under this 

exception. See Odis W. M. v. Saul, Civil No. 20-311 (DSD/BRT), 2020 WL 8713688, at 

*3 (D. Minn. Nov. 30, 2020) (“When a plaintiff attempts to submit late evidence, the 

plaintiff has the burden of proving why one of the exceptions to the five day rule 

applies.”); Nino v. Berryhill, No. 3-18-82-CRW-SBJ, 2019 WL 3491929, at *1-2 (S.D. 

Iowa Apr. 11, 2019) (same).

There is no dispute that plaintiff did not submit or inform the ALJ about Dr. 

Huddleston’s pain report at least five business days before the hearing. As the ALJ 

observed, plaintiff did not mention this evidence in the “five day letter” he submitted 

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to the ALJ on November 2, 2018, which informed the ALJ about other medical 

evidence that plaintiff was attempting to obtain but had yet to receive. See [14-1] 428. 

Rather, the report was first mentioned at the start of the hearing and thus was 

untimely. Moreover, there is essentially no evidence in the record that would have 

permitted–let alone required–the ALJ to find that plaintiff had “actively and 

diligently sought to obtain” Dr. Huddleston’s pain report, but received it fewer than 

five business days before the hearing.4 Indeed, plaintiff (who was represented by 

counsel at the hearing) made no effort to explain the circumstances surrounding his 

receipt of the pain report: he did not tell the ALJ when he first requested the 

statement, he did not explain why (or whether) the statement could not have been 

received sooner, and he did not explain why it was being offered only moments before 

the hearing began. These are critical–and inexplicable–omissions, given that Dr. 

Huddleston had treated plaintiff since August 3, 2015 and was thus an obvious source 

of evidence to support plaintiff’s disability claim.

Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. Plaintiff contends that the 

ALJ never inquired why Dr. Huddleston’s report was not submitted in a timely 

fashion. [15] 9. But the ALJ’s written decision itself, which focused on plaintiff’s 

failure to mention the evidence in the “five day letter” and addressed whether 

plaintiff had “actively and diligently” sought the evidence, refutes this argument. See

[14-1] 13. In any event, it was not the ALJ’s duty to determine whether there was any

conceivable basis on which to admit Dr. Huddleston’s report and only then exclude it 

from the record. Instead, it was plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that the untimely

evidence should have been admitted under § 404.935(b)(3)(iv) or another exception, 

but plaintiff has not met his burden to do so. This observation also disposes of 

plaintiff’s argument, see [15] 9, that the ALJ’s duty to develop a full and fair record 

required her to explore in more detail plaintiff’s reasons for failing to timely submit 

or inform the ALJ of Dr. Huddleston’s report. Finally, plaintiff suggests that the ALJ 

should have admitted the report because it was presented at the hearing itself and

any delay in submitting it was essentially harmless. But nothing in § 404.935(b) 

carves out an exception to the five-business-day rule for evidence that is proffered at 

the hearing itself or where the ALJ finds the delay to be harmless.

For these reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in excluding Dr. 

Huddleston’s pain report from the record.

4 It appears that courts reviewing an ALJ’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under 

§ 404.935(b) apply an abuse-of-discretion standard. See, e.g., Janisha C., 2023 WL 5107943, 

at *3 (“If this Court were in the ALJ’s position, it may well have exercised its discretion . . . 

and considered [untimely] evidence,” but “[h]ow this Court might have exercised discretion 

is immaterial”); Haight v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-1364, 2023 WL 3467042, at *1 (6th Cir. 

Jan. 18, 2023) (reviewing ALJ’s exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion). The Court need 

not definitively decide which standard of review applies because, even under the standard 

most favorable to plaintiff–de novo review–the Court agrees with the ALJ that there was no 

basis to find that the report was admissible under § 404.935(b)(3)(iv).

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B. The ALJ’s Subjective Symptom Analysis Was Not Patently 

Erroneous.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating whether his subjective 

allegations about the severity of the limitations caused by his impairments were not 

credible. [15] 10-12. More specifically, plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred by 

concluding that (1) plaintiff’s allegations were not fully supported by the objective 

record; (2) plaintiff’s allegations about his back pain were not corroborated by 

objective evidence; and (3) there was no support for plaintiff’s allegations regarding 

the disabling symptoms he experienced due to sarcoidosis. 

“When assessing a claimant’s subjective symptom allegations, an ALJ must 

consider several factors, including the objective medical evidence, the claimant’s daily 

activities, his level of pain or symptoms, aggravating factors, medication, course of 

treatment, and functional limitations.” Charles B. v. Saul, Case No. 19 C 1980, 2020 

WL 6134986, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2020). “[T]he ALJ must explain her subjective 

symptom evaluation in such a way that allows the Court to determine whether she 

reached her decision in a rational manner, logically based on her specific findings and 

the evidence in the record.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “The 

Court will overturn an ALJ’s evaluation of a claimant’s subjective symptom 

allegations only if it is patently wrong.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[F]laws in the ALJ’s reasoning are not enough to undermine the ALJ’s decision that 

[plaintiff] was exaggerating her symptoms. Not all of the ALJ’s reasons must be valid 

as long as enough of them are.” Halsell v. Astrue, 357 F. App’x 717, 722 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(emphasis in original).

The ALJ concluded that plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with 

the medical evidence and other evidence in the record[.]” [14-1] 18. In support, the 

ALJ found that (1) plaintiff’s allegations were not fully supported by the objective 

record”; (2) plaintiff had “only conservative treatment” after undergoing a 

laminotomy, partial facetectomy, foraminotomoy, and discectomy in December 2015; 

(3) plaintiff “often reported the medication he was taking was helping” or that his 

“pain was resolved”; and (4) plaintiff was able to perform certain activities of daily 

living (ADLs). [Id.] 21-22.

1. Consistency With Objective Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision on this score was patently erroneous 

because the ALJ “cherry-picked” the evidence that was unfavorable to plaintiff’s 

disability claim and ignored the evidence that was consistent with his allegations. 

[15] 11. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred by insisting that objective evidence 

corroborate his allegations of severe pain. [Id.] 12. Finally, plaintiff maintains that 

the ALJ misunderstood the nature of, and the disabling limitations caused by, his 

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sarcoidosis. [Id.] 12-13. Having reviewed the ALJ’s decision as a whole and the 

evidence on which it rests, see Winsted v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2019) 

(“The court applies a common-sense reading to the entirety of an ALJ’s decision.”),

the Court finds that the ALJ’s subjective symptom analysis had a substantial 

evidentiary basis and was not patently erroneous. 

First, “the ALJ was entitled to, and did, consider the extent to which 

[plaintiff’s] allegations were consistent with the objective medical evidence.” Denise 

E. v. Kijakazi, No. 21 C 1211, 2023 WL 3792261, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 2, 2023). The 

ALJ recounted in adequate detail the objective medical evidence that, in her view, 

was inconsistent with plaintiff’s allegations of disabling back pain. She first observed 

that an MRI taken in December 2016, one year after plaintiff’s back surgery, “showed 

no evidence of a recurrent L4-5 disc herniation and no neural foraminal narrowing or 

spinal stenosis.” [14-1] 21 (citing [id.] 393-94). Rather, the MRI showed only “[m]ild 

L5-S1 degenerative disc disease with a small annular tear.” [Id.] 394. The ALJ also 

relied on a report from plaintiff’s September 8, 2017 visit with his primary care 

physician, Dr. Prem Rupani. [14-1] 20. As the ALJ noted, while plaintiff complained 

of “numbness in extremity” and back pain at this time, Dr. Rupani’s physical exam 

“failed to document any abnormalities with the claimant’s musculoskeletal or 

neurological system.” [Id.] (citing [id.] 423). The ALJ was entitled to consider these 

“mild” and “normal” findings in concluding that plaintiff’s pain symptoms were not 

as severe as alleged. Denise E., 2023 WL 3792261, at *5. And while plaintiff accuses 

the ALJ of cherry-picking the evidence to reach a preordained result, plaintiff notably 

fails to cite any objective medical evidence favorable to his case that the ALJ failed 

to discuss. See [15] 11. Plaintiff points only to a March 17, 2016 exam report 

indicating that “he has decreased rotation due to pain” and gross motor strength of 

“4+/5” [14-1] 404, and a finding from the April 2017 consultative exam that plaintiff 

had decreased flexion in the lumbar spine, [id.] 373. But the ALJ discussed both 

reports and the specific parts of the reports that plaintiff emphasizes. See [id.] 19 

(discussing March 17, 2016 exam with Dr. Huddleston); [id.] 20 (discussing April 19, 

2017 consultative exam). Furthermore, the ALJ never suggested that plaintiff’s 

allegations had no basis in any objective evidence. To the contrary, the ALJ agreed 

that plaintiff “has diagnostic evidence to support his lumbar degenerative disc 

disease,” and she accepted that plaintiff’s severe impairments caused him to 

experience “pain” and other limitations. [14-1] 21. The ALJ merely concluded that, 

because the objective signs and indicators associated with plaintiff’s back impairment 

were relatively mild, she could not credit plaintiff’s allegations regarding the severity 

of the back pain he experienced.

Nor is there merit to plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ insisted that plaintiff’s 

complaints about pain be corroborated by objective evidence, or that she rejected his

complaints as incredible solely because they were not supported by objective evidence. 

As the Seventh Circuit has explained, “a lack of objective support from physical 

examinations and test results is relevant” in assessing a claimant’s allegations of 

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disabling pain, “but an ALJ may not discredit pain complaints solely because they 

lack objective corroboration.” Lambert v. Berryhill, 896 F.3d 768, 778 (7th Cir. 2018). 

Nowhere in the ALJ’s decision in this case did the ALJ insist that plaintiff provide 

objective evidence corroborating his claim to be in disabling pain, nor did she discount 

the allegations solely because they were not completely supported by objective. 

Rather, as the remainder of the ALJ’s subjective symptom analysis makes clear, this 

was but one factor that the ALJ considered in assessing the credibility of plaintiff’s 

allegations.

2. Conservative Nature Of Treatment

Second, “[a]n ALJ is permitted to consider routine and conservative treatment 

in assessing the severity of a claimant’s subjective symptoms.” Angela G. v. Berryhill, 

No. 1:17-cv-1788-JRS-DLP, 2019 WL 1055096, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2019). Here, 

the ALJ determined that, after undergoing surgery in December 2015, plaintiff “only 

had conservative treatment” to address his back pain. [14-1] 21. Reasonable minds 

might debate the accuracy of that conclusion as it related to the pain caused by 

plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease: the record shows that plaintiff took many

medications, including prescription pain-killers, and received at least one epidural 

injection to treat his back pain. But the ALJ’s conclusion was not unreasonable in the 

sense that (1) plaintiff did not undergo (and was not recommended to undergo) 

additional surgeries, and (2) the record did not reflect that plaintiff was receiving 

lumbar injections on a regular or recurring basis after his December 2015 surgery. In 

any event, whether to characterize the course of plaintiff’s treatment as conservative 

or in some other fashion, and the weight to be given to that course of treatment, were 

decisions for the ALJ to make, and this Court has no authority to second-guess them. 

See Spring W. v. Saul, Case No. 20 C 1864, 2021 WL 2529615, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 

21, 2021) (“In reviewing an ALJ’s decision, the Court may not reweigh the evidence, 

resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for 

that of the ALJ.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

3. Efficacy Of Pain Medications

Third, the ALJ was entitled to consider “[t]he type, dosage, effectiveness, and 

side effects of any medication [plaintiff has] taken to alleviate [his] pain or other 

symptoms.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *8 (Oct. 25, 2017); see also 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.929(c)(3). Here, substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ’s 

determination that plaintiff’s medications helped with and occasionally resolved his 

pain. [14-1] 22. In December 2016, for example, plaintiff told Dr. Huddleston that 

Lyrica “helps with joint pain” and that, after he had begun taking Lyrica, his pain 

was “tolerable.” [Id.] 401-02. At a March 27, 2017 appointment with his primary care 

doctor, plaintiff denied experiencing pain even though he was not taking pain 

medication at that time. [Id.] 415. In May 2017, plaintiff reported to Dr. Huddleston 

that “Lyrica helps with the pain during the day” and that he was “also taking Motrin 

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800 mg, which helps.” [Id.] 400. And, as the ALJ also observed, plaintiff reported to 

Dr. Martin Luken, the neurologist who performed his back surgery, that he “still 

takes an occasional dose of hydrocodone and cyclobenzaprine for some residual lower 

back aching, with some ‘tightness’ of his right calf,” but he was “vastly more 

comfortable than he was before surgery.” [Id.] 342. In this case, “the ALJ properly 

considered the effectiveness of medication [plaintiff] has taken to alleviate [his]

symptoms.” Amanda L.S. v. Kijakazi, Case No. 21 C 5775, 2023 WL 2711663, at *5 

(N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2023).

4. Symptoms Of Sarcoidosis

“Sarcoidosis is the growth of tiny collections of inflammatory cells in different 

parts of the body.” Jones v. Colvin, No. 13 C 3712, 2014 WL 3536803, at *1 n.3 (N.D. 

Ill. Jul. 15, 2014). “Sarcoidosis may cause fatigue; swollen lymph nodes; lung 

symptoms such as shortness of breath, coughing, and chest pain; skin rashes or 

lesions; and eye symptoms including blurred vision, eye pain, redness, and light 

sensitivity.” Id.

As plaintiff observes, the ALJ did not credit his allegations about the 

limitations caused by his sarcoidosis because his “examinations repeatedly indicated 

lungs were clear to auscultation with no wheezes, rales, or rhonci, and that there 

were no emergency room visits for shortness of breath.” [15] 12. Plaintiff maintains, 

however, that the ALJ “appears to have been confusing sarcoidosis with asthma, or 

some similar breathing problems.” [Id.]. This was error, plaintiff contends, because 

he was diagnosed with sarcoidosis after experiencing squeezing chest pain and 

bilateral hand numbness. [Id.]. As a result, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly 

“undermin[ed]” his sarcoidosis symptoms and “fail[ed] to consider what effect his 

symptoms of ‘squeezing’ chest pain and bilateral hand numbness would have on his 

ability to function.” [Id.] 12-13. Plaintiff’s argument contradicts his own testimony at 

the hearing. When the ALJ asked plaintiff how sarcoidosis affected him, plaintiff 

responded that “[t]he breathing part is – in dusty areas it is getting to be a problem 

for me.” [14-1] 70. Plaintiff also testified that his symptoms had been worse over the

recent summer, and that he had been advised that this was due to “[t]he allergens in 

the air.” [Id.]. He never testified that sarcoidosis caused him to experience squeezing 

chest pain or numbness in the hands. Considering plaintiff’s own testimony that his 

sarcoidosis made it difficult for him to breathe, the ALJ did not err by focusing on

that testimony and weighing it against other evidence in the record indicating that 

plaintiff generally had clear lungs, no wheezing, and no indications of difficulty 

breathing. See [id.] 20-21.

* * *

Because the ALJ’s “evaluation of [plaintiff’s] symptom description [was] 

logically based on specific findings and evidence in the record,” the Court finds no 

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patent error warranting a remand. Joyce C. v. Kijakazi, No. 19 CV 8514, 2021 WL 

4264274, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2021).

C. The ALJ’s RFC Determination Accounted For All Of Plaintiff’s 

Limitations.

Plaintiff’s final argument is that the ALJ did not account for all his functional 

limitation when determining his RFC. More specifically, plaintiff contends that the 

ALJ (1) did not include any limitations resulting from his sarcoidosis; (2) arbitrarily 

determined that a sit-stand option that allowed plaintiff to change positions every 

thirty minutes would accommodate his need to get up; (3) failed to consider how his 

pain would impair his ability to concentrate, persist, and maintain pace; and (4) did 

not consider how plaintiff’s obesity exacerbated his symptoms. [15] 13-15.

A claimant’s RFC “is an administrative assessment of the extent to which an 

individual’s medically determinable impairment(s), including any related symptoms, 

such as pain, may cause physical or mental limitations or restrictions that may affect 

his or her capacity to do work-related physical and mental activities.” SSR 96-8p, 

1996 WL 374184, at *4 (Jul. 2, 1996). The claimant’s RFC “describes the maximum 

she can do in a work setting despite her mental and physical limitations.” Thomas v. 

Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir. 2014). In determining the claimant’s RFC, the 

ALJ must evaluate “the claimant’s ability to do physical and mental work activities 

on a regular and continuing basis despite limitations from her impairments.” Moore 

v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 2014). “An ALJ must evaluate all relevant 

evidence when determining an applicant’s RFC[.]” Arnett v. Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591 

(7th Cir. 2012).

1. Sarcoidosis-Related Limitations

Plaintiff faults the ALJ for failing to factor into the RFC determination his 

“significant chest pain and hand numbness from sarcoidosis.” [15] 13. As already 

discussed, however, plaintiff testified in direct response to the ALJ’s question how 

sarcoidosis affected him that it caused breathing problems, not chest pain or 

numbness in his hands. See [14-1] 70. As part of his application for benefits, moreover, 

plaintiff completed two function reports that asked him to identify what abilities were 

affected by his conditions. See [id.] 221-29 (March 2017 function report); [id.] 240-50

(August 2017 function report). In neither report, however, did plaintiff check the box 

indicating that “Using Hands” was impaired. [Id.] 226, 245. Finally, while plaintiff 

went to the ER in February 2015 with chest pain and hand numbness–which 

ultimately led to the sarcoidosis diagnosis–plaintiff does not cite any evidence 

indicating that these symptoms regularly occurred. To the contrary, the ALJ cited 

and specifically discussed two treatment notes relating to sarcoidosis in which 

plaintiff denied chest pain. See [14-1] 20 (citing [id.] 327 (Dr. Luken’s December 16, 

2015 treatment note reporting that plaintiff “denies any chest pain”) and [id.] 415 

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(Dr. Rupani’s March 17, 2017 treatment note in which plaintiff denied chest pain)).

Given plaintiff’s own testimony, his failure to indicate on the function reports that 

sarcoidosis caused numbness in his hands or chest pain, and the treatment notes in 

which he denied chest pain, the ALJ had a substantial evidentiary basis for not 

including any limitations relating to chest pain and hand numbness.

2. Sit-Stand Option

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ “failed to explain how she arrived at the 

seemingly arbitrary finding that Plaintiff would only need a sit/stand option every 30 

minutes, and that it would not affect his ability to stay on task.” [15] 13. According to

plaintiff, “there is no evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion in the RFC of a sitstand option every 30 minutes.” [Id.]. This argument has no merit.

“When a claimant’s impairments require switching between positions during a 

workday, ‘[t]he RFC assessment must be specific as to the frequency of the 

individual’s need to alternate sitting and standing.” Prater v. Saul, 947 F.3d 479, 481 

(7th Cir. 2020) (quoting SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7 (Jul. 2, 1996)). “[I]f the 

sit-stand option is supported by substantial evidence, there is no error.” Terry W. v. 

Kijakazi, No. 1:21-cv-98-SEB-DML, 2022 WL 6256831, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Jul. 14, 2022).

Plaintiff testified that he could stand comfortably for ten to fifteen minutes and 

sit comfortably for about twenty minutes before needing to get up and walk around. 

[14-1] 61-62. As discussed above, however, the ALJ did not fully credit plaintiff’s 

allegations about the severity of his lumbar degenerative disc disease and the back 

pain it caused. [14-1] 18-22. That finding had a substantial evidentiary basis in the 

record because, inter alia, plaintiff’s allegations were not fully consistent with the 

objective evidence and were in tension with plaintiff’s consistent reports that 

medications helped alleviate his pain. In addition, there was no opinion evidence–

whether from plaintiff’s treaters or from the consultative examiner–that plaintiff 

could not sit or stand for thirty minutes at a time. To the contrary, the consultative 

examiner observed in April 2017 that plaintiff could sit and stand (though the 

examiner did not specify how long plaintiff could do so), see [14-1] 372, and the ALJ 

gave this opinion great weight because it was “based on [the examiner’s] own exam 

findings of a normal gait, sensation, and strength” and because the examiner was 

“familiar with Social Security rules and regulations.” [Id.] 22. At the same time, the 

ALJ made clear that she believed plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease caused pain, 

but that this and plaintiff’s other symptoms could be accommodated by restricting 

plaintiff to sedentary work; limiting his exposure to heights and the frequency with 

which he would need to climb stairs, crouch, and stoop; and allowing him to change 

positions every thirty minutes. Given her adverse credibility determination, the ALJ 

could reasonably have found that plaintiff could sit and stand for longer periods of 

time than plaintiff alleged, and that the thirty-minute sit-stand option would account 

for plaintiff’s difficulties sitting and standing. Because the Court can trace the path 

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of the ALJ’s reasoning, the Court rejects plaintiff’s argument that the sit-stand option 

is arbitrary or lacks a substantial basis in the evidence. Cf. Charles M. v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., Case No. 19-cv-1178-JES-JEH, 2021 WL 779979, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 

2021) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that ALJ failed to explain why thirty-minute sitstand option accounted for his pain, fatigue, and drowsiness because “the ALJ 

supported his sit/stand conclusion with substantial evidence the Court can readily 

trace”).

As for plaintiff’s ability to remain on task while utilizing the sit-stand option, 

the vocational expert (VE) testified that the three sedentary jobs that plaintiff could 

perform allowed for an off-task time of up to ten percent of the day. [14-1] 74. As the 

VE explained, this would afford plaintiff up to “six minutes every hour probably to sit 

and move around and stand and move around,” and these jobs “can still be 

performed.” [Id.] 74-75. The ALJ credited this testimony, to which plaintiff did not 

object. See [id.] Accordingly, the VE’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence for 

the ALJ’s implicit but necessary determination that plaintiff could perform the three 

sedentary jobs at issue even while utilizing a sit-stand option.

3. Limitations In Concentration, Persistence, And 

Maintaining Pace

The ALJ’s RFC finding “must incorporate the totality of a claimant’s 

limitations, including any deficiencies of concentration, persistence and pace.” 

Mischler v. Berryhill, 766 F. App’x 369, 375 (7th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Here, however, plaintiff cites to no evidence in the record to support his 

claim that his back pain limits his ability to concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. 

See [15] 14. Rather, plaintiff’s argument depends entirely on the untimely pain report 

from Dr. Huddleston that the ALJ properly excluded. [Id.]. Given the lack of evidence 

on this issue, the ALJ did not err by omitting from the RFC determination a limitation 

related to plaintiff’s ability to concentrate, persist, and maintain pace.

4. Exacerbating Effects Of Obesity

“[O]besity is no longer a standalone disabling impairment,” but “the ALJ must 

still consider its impact when evaluating the severity of other impairments.” Stephens 

v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 2018). “This is because the combined effects 

of obesity with other impairments may be greater than might be expected without 

obesity.” Tanitria C. v. Saul, No. 19 CV 1884, 2021 WL 1577795, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 

22, 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The ALJ found that plaintiff’s obesity was a non-severe impairment because it 

“does not cause more than a minimal limitation on the claimant’s ability to perform 

basic work activity, neither alone nor in combination with any of the claimant’s severe 

impairments.” [14-1] 20. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to even factor in any 

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exacerbating effects from his obesity.” [15] 14. The Court agrees with plaintiff that, 

after the ALJ determined at step two that plaintiff’s obesity was non-severe, she did 

not discuss his obesity again. However, plaintiff does not cite any evidence that 

suggests, nor did he testify at the hearing, that his obesity exacerbated the effects of 

his degenerative disc disease or sarcoidosis. See [15] 14-15. “[A]n ALJ’s failure to 

explicitly consider an applicant’s obesity is harmless if the applicant did not explain 

how her obesity hampers her ability to work.” Stepp v. Colvin, 795 F.3d 711, 720 (7th 

Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, applicable regulations 

prohibited the ALJ from “mak[ing] assumptions about the severity or functional 

effects of obesity combined with other impairments,” given that “[o]besity in 

combination with another impairment may or may not increase the severity or 

functional limitations of the other impairment.” SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281, at *6

(Sept. 12, 2002). Here, plaintiff had “the burden of providing evidence of h[is] obesity’s 

impact on [his] RFC . . . but [he] failed to do so.” Craig v. Colvin, No. 13 C 8380, 2017 

WL 621757, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2017). Even if the ALJ erred by failing to further 

explain her determination that plaintiff’s obesity did not exacerbate the limitations 

imposed by his severe impairments, that error was harmless because there is 

essentially no evidence that plaintiff’s obesity had such an exacerbating effect. See

Stepp, 795 F.3d at 720; Craig, 2017 WL 621757, at *2; see also Charles M., 2021 WL 

779979, at *4-5 (“The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that any error in 

expressly discussing Plaintiff’s obesity was a harmless error” because “Plaintiff did 

not explain how obesity would have impacted his highly restrictive RFC of sedentary 

work that had additional limitations.”).

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s request to reverse and remand the 

SSA’s decision [15] is denied, defendant’s motion for summary judgment [18] is 

granted, and the SSA’s decision denying plaintiff’s application is affirmed.

_____________________________________

HEATHER K. McSHAIN

United States Magistrate Judge

DATE: November 2, 2023

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