1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

N.T. and L.T., minors, by and 

through their guardian, Darcy 

Tellone, individually and on behalf 

of all other similarly situated, and

S.P., J.P., K.P., G.P., minors, by and 

through their guardian, Katie 

Patterman, individually and on 

behalf of all other similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

TIKTOK INC. and BYTEDANCE, 

INC.,

Defendants.

Case No.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs N.T., L.T., S.P., J.P., K.P., and G.P., minors, by and through their guardians,

individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, bring their complaint against 

Defendants TikTok Inc. (“TikTok”) (successor to Musical.ly, Inc.) and ByteDance, Inc. 

(“ByteDance”) (collectively, “Defendants”), and allege as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. TikTok is a popular smartphone application (“app”) that allows its users to create

and share short videos. TikTok offers a number of audio and visual features and effects that can 

be applied to users’ videos—including popular song clips, moments from TV shows, stickers,

animations, face filters, and face trackers (which automatically zoom in on a user’s face when 

the camera lens detects it).

2. However, in connection with certain visual features and effects, Defendants

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surreptitiously collect, use, and store users’ facial geometry, which is private, legally protected

biometric information. Defendants fail to disclose or obtain consent for this collection, use, or 

storage. And they further fail to disclose why they collect, use, and store Defendants’ biometric 

data, who has access to the data, or how long the data will be retained—all of which is required 

by law.

3. As recognized in the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 

ILCS 14/1, et seq:

Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers that are used to access 

finances or other sensitive information. For example, social security 

numbers, when compromised, can be changed. Biometrics, however, are 

biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once compromised, the

individual has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity theft, and 

is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated transactions.

740 ILCS § 14/5(c) (emphasis added).

4. Nevertheless, Defendants collect this private, biometric, identifying information 

even for minor children.

5. Plaintiffs bring this class action against TikTok and its owner, ByteDance, 

individually and on behalf of the proposed class, seeking damages and injunctive relief for 

Defendants’ privacy violations.

II. JURISDICTION

6. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness 

Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), because this is a class action in which the matter in 

controversy exceeds the sum of $5,000,000 and Defendants are citizens of a state different from 

that of at least one class member. This Court also has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(a) because all claims alleged herein form part of the same case or controversy. 

7. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because the allegations in 

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this complaint arise from Defendants’ misconduct occurring within this state and which harmed 

residents of this state. Defendants collected, stored, and used the biometric identifiers and 

information of class members located in this state, including Plaintiffs. Both Defendants 

maintain offices and conduct business in this state.

8. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because a substantial 

part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this District and Defendants 

conduct business in this District.

III. PARTIES

A. Plaintiffs

9. Plaintiffs N.T. and L.T. are minors. Darcy Tellone is the guardian of her minor 

children, N.T. and L.T. Ms. Tellone and her children reside in Yorkville, Illinois. N.T. and L.T.

each began using the TikTok app when it was originally known as Musical.ly and they continue 

to use TikTok as of the time of the filing of this complaint. N.T. and L.T. used TikTok to record 

personal videos, some of which were intended to be kept private and others which were to be 

uploaded to the platform. Neither Ms. Tellone nor her children recall seeing or reviewing the

terms of service, privacy policy, or privacy policy for younger users upon creating their TikTok

accounts. Nor does Ms. Tellone or either of her children recall any notifications concerning 

updates or changes to the terms of service, privacy policy, or privacy policy for younger users.

10. Plaintiffs S.P., J.P., K.P., and G.P. are minors. Katie Patterman is the guardian 

of her minor children, S.P., J.P., K.P., and G.P. Ms. Patterman and her children reside in

Yorkville, Illinois. J.P. began using the TikTok app when it was originally known as Musical.ly; 

S.P., K.P., and G.P. signed up in approximately 2020; and all four children continue to use 

TikTok as of the time of the filing of this complaint. S.P., J.P., K.P., and G.P. used TikTok to 

record personal videos, some of which were intended to be kept private and others which were to 

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be uploaded to the platform. Neither Ms. Patterman nor her children recall seeing or reviewing 

the terms of service, privacy policy, or privacy policy for younger users upon creating their 

TikTok accounts. Nor does Ms. Patterman or her children recall any notifications concerning 

updates or changes to the terms of service, privacy policy, or privacy policy for younger users.

11. None of the Plaintiffs or their guardians received notice from Defendants: that 

Defendants would collect, store, or use their biometric identifiers or biometric information; 

regarding the time that Defendants would retain such information; or of the purpose of 

Defendants’ collection of such information. Neither the Plaintiffs, nor their guardians, gave 

consent for Defendants to collect, store, or use Plaintiffs’ biometric identifiers or biometric 

information. Moreover, Plaintiffs, as minors, could not legally consent to Defendants’ collection, 

storage, or use of their biometric identifiers or biometric information.

B. Defendants

12. Defendant TikTok, Inc. f/k/a Musical.ly, Inc. (“TikTok”) is a California 

corporation with its principal place of business in Culver City, California. Defendant TikTok 

maintains offices throughout the United States, including in Chicago, Illinois. In August 2018, 

Musical.ly, Inc. merged into TikTok, and in May 2019, Musical.ly, Inc. changed its name to 

TikTok, Inc.1 TikTok is a wholly owned subsidiary of TikTok, LLC, which in turn is a wholly

owned subsidiary of TikTok, Ltd. And TikTok, Ltd. – like Defendant ByteDance, Inc. – is a 

wholly owned subsidiary of ByteDance, Ltd. 

13. Defendant ByteDance, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 

business in Palo Alto, California. ByteDance, Inc. maintains a corporate office and conducts 

1 Unless stated otherwise, Plaintiffs reference the TikTok app collectively with the Musical.ly app in this 

complaint.

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business in Chicago, Illinois. Defendant ByteDance, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of 

ByteDance, Ltd.

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. ByteDance Is One of the Most Influential Tech Companies in the World

14. ByteDance Ltd. was founded in 2012 by Zhang Yiming based upon the notion 

that “smartphones would replace newspapers to become the most important medium of 

information distribution” and artificial intelligence (“AI”) would be the driving force behind this

evolution.

2 “ByteDance regards its platforms as part of an artificial intelligence company 

powered by algorithms that ‘learn’ each user’s interests and preferences through repeat 

interaction.”3

15. ByteDance released its first app in 2012, called Neihan Duanzi. Neihan Duanzi 

was a platform where users shared jokes in the form of short videos, memes, and written posts.

16. ByteDance’s next app was a news aggregator called Jinri Toutiao, which uses Mr. 

Zhang’s AI algorithm to create personal lists of articles and videos tailored to each user based 

upon their reading habits.4 The AI at the heart of Toutiao has been such a success that the app is 

used by over 250 million people in China each month.5

17. In September 2016, ByteDance release a new video-sharing and social-network 

2 https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/Inside-ByteDance-the-75bn-unicorn-behind-TikTok

3 Letter from Senators Charles Schumer and Tom Cotton to Joseph Maguire, Acting Director of National 

Intelligence, dated October 23, 2019. Available at 

https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10232019%20TikTok%20Letter%20-

%20FINAL%20PDF.pdf.

4 https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Cover-Story/Inside-ByteDance-the-75bn-unicorn-behind-TikTok

5

https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/30/tiktok-owner-bytedance-what-to-know-about-the-chinese-techgiant.html#:~:text=What%20is%20ByteDance%3F,by%20Chinese%20censors%20in%202018.

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app, Douyin, which would become one of the most downloaded smartphone apps of all time.6

Douyin allows users to create short dance, lip-sync, comedy, and talent videos. By using 

ByteDance’s AI algorithms, Douyin became one of the top downloaded apps in China and has 

amassed an astounding 400 million daily active users as of January 2020.7

18. Like many popular apps before it, Douyin was not an original idea; rather it 

imitated an app called Musical.ly. Musical.ly was founded in 2014 by two Chinese nationals

from Shanghai, Alex Zhu and Luyu Yang. The video sharing app reportedly had more than 100 

million users, primarily in Europe and the Americas.

8 Unlike Douyin, however, Musical.ly was 

available to U.S. consumers and was building a vast user base around the globe.

B. TikTok Has Become One of the Most Popular Apps of All Time

19. In May 2017, after the explosion in popularity of Douyin, ByteDance launched

TikTok— a nearly identical app—outside of mainland China, including in Japan, Thailand, 

Vietnam, Indonesia, India, and Germany.

20. In November 2017, three months after the release of TikTok, ByteDance 

announced that it entered into a deal to acquire Musical.ly, reported to be worth up to $1 billion.9

With the acquisition of Musical.ly, TikTok now had a foothold in the U.S. market.

21. ByteDance formally merged Musical.ly into TikTok in August 2018. Musical.ly 

was then shut down and its accounts and data were transferred to TikTok.

10

6 https://www.bytedance.com/en/

7 https://techcrunch.com/2020/01/06/douyin-tiktok-app-in-china-hits-400-million-daily-active-users/

8 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bytedance-musically/chinas-bytedance-scrubs-musical-ly-brand-infavor-of-tiktok-idUSKBN1KN0BW

9 https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/10/technology/musically-bytedance-toutiao-china/index.html

10 https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/323111/musically-to-shutdown.html#:~:text=The%20mobile%20video%20app%20M,the%20Chinese%20telecom%20firm%20Byt

edance

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22. The combination of Musical.ly’s lip-syncing platform and ByteDance’s advanced 

technological capabilities has turned TikTok into the most popular app in the United States. 

23. By the end of 2018, TikTok had amassed over 680 million active monthly users—

making it one of the most popular apps of all time.11

24. In April 2020, it was announced that TikTok had achieved a key milestone of

over two billion downloads:

12

25. The popularity of TikTok has led to countless celebrities joining the platform.

13

TikTok counts Will Smith, Britney Spears, Jessica Alba, Alex Rodriguez, and Jennifer Lopez as 

users, each with millions of followers. The app has also created a new generation of young

11 https://wallaroomedia.com/blog/social-media/tiktokstatistics/#:~:text=In%20November%20of%202018%2C%20TikTok,800%20million%20as%20of%20no

w

12 https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/29/tiktok-tops-2-billiondownloads/#:~:text=In%20the%20quarter%20that%20ended,downloads%2C%20amassed%20nearly%20

250%20million

13 https://www.cosmopolitan.com/uk/entertainment/a32028959/celebrities-on-tik-tok/

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celebrities who reached fame through TikTok.

14

26. TikTok monetizes its large user base through at least two avenues: in-app 

purchases of “coins” and traditional online advertising. 

27. TikTok users are able to purchase “coins,” a virtual currency used to “reward” the 

individuals who create videos.15 TikTok content creators are then able to cash out their coins into 

real currency. 

28. TikTok, like YouTube and other social media platforms, also advertises on its 

app.16 TikTok sells video ads that appear in between user-generated content. Each time these 

videos appear on a user’s feed and a user clicks the ad or takes another action, such as 

purchasing the advertiser’s product, TikTok earns a fee. 

29. Within the fourth quarter of 2019, alone, it was reported that TikTok saw its inapp purchase revenue rise 310% on a year-over-year basis, and overall revenue exceeded $50 

million.17

30. The popularity of Jinri Toutiao, Douyin, and TikTok has turned Mr. Zhang’s 

ByteDance into a “unicorn”—valued at $78 billion.18

C. Defendants Begin to Collect Personal Data as Soon as, if Not Before, a 

TikTok Account is Created

31. To use the app, TikTok users are first prompted to create an account by providing 

14 https://www.businessinsider.com/tiktok-most-popular-stars-gen-z-influencers-social-media-app-2019-6

15 https://www.the-sun.com/lifestyle/tech/475150/how-tiktok-tempts-kids-to-spend-hundreds-of-poundson-virtual-coins-to-pay-online-celebs/

16 https://infobeat.com/how-does-tiktok-make-money-overview-of-the-businessmodel/#:~:text=Companies%20are%20using%20TikTok%20to,and%20generate%20money%20from%20

it.

17 https://techcrunch.com/2020/01/03/tiktoks-revenue-said-to-skyrocket-over-300-in-q4/

18 https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/30/tiktok-owner-bytedances-first-half-revenue-better-than-expected-atover-7-billion-sources.html

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their phone number, an email address, or Facebook account information.19

32. After the account is created, users can search for videos based upon categories 

(including comedy, animals, and sports), or search more directly for hashtags or specific users. 

33. The app also searches a user’s phone contacts or social media followers to 

identify friends already on TikTok. 

34. After creating an account, users are then able to record, save, and upload their 

own videos of them lip-synching and dancing to popular songs.

35. If a user finds a video or content creator which they like, the app allows users to 

comment on videos or directly message each other. 

36. TikTok’s current U.S. Privacy Policy20 acknowledges some of personal 

information it collects from its users:

We collect information when you create an account and use the 

Platform. We also collect information you share with us from thirdparty social network providers, and technical and behavioral 

information about your use of the Platform. We also collect 

information contained in the messages you send through our 

Platform and information from your phone book, if you grant us 

access to your phone book on your mobile device.21

37. More specifically, TikTok stores all the personal information data available to it, 

such as a person’s name, age, email address, phone number, social media accounts, payment 

information (such as PayPal account information), and contact list (which is submitted by its 

19 https://www.commonsensemedia.org/blog/parents-ultimate-guide-to-tiktok

20 The privacy policies and terms of service addressed in this complaint were discovered by Plaintiffs’ 

counsel’s pre-filing investigation and were not reviewed by Plaintiffs or their guardians prior to their 

involvement in this case, nor did Plaintiffs or their guardians consent to the terms of such policies.

21 Available at https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en#privacy-us (Updated January 1, 

2020).

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users when creating a TikTok account).

22

38. The app also automatically collects all user content (e.g., videos and photographs 

recorded on its app) and communications, IP addresses, geo-location-related data, device 

identifiers, browsing and search history (both on and off the TikTok app), cookies, metadata, and 

other sensitive personal information.23

39. Senators Christophe Coons and Josh Hawley called location data “among the 

most sensitive personal information that a user can share with a company.” The average 

smartphone used by Americans today tracks more than the street address at which the user is 

located—it is able to identify on which floor in the building the user can found.24

40. In addition to the personal information that users knowingly and unknowingly 

provide to TikTok, the company also collects information about the user from third parties, such 

as Facebook and advertising companies, as well as information provided by other TikTok 

users.25

41. TikTok does not just collect users’ personal information, it “processes,... scan[s] 

and analyz[es]” the information.26

42. TikTok’s Privacy Policy also states that it “may share [a user’s personal] 

22 https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en#privacy-us; https://www.reuters.com/article/usbytedance-tiktok-exclusive/exclusive-chinas-bytedance-moves-to-ringfence-its-tiktok-app-amid-us-probesources-idUSKBN1Y10OH

23 https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en#privacy-us

24 Letter from Senators Christophe Coons and Josh Hawley to Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook, Inc., 

dated November 19, 2019. Available at 

https://www.coons.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/11.19.19%20FB%20Letter%20FINAL%20(signed).pdf

25 https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en#privacy-us

26 https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en#privacy-us

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information with a parent, subsidiary, or other affiliate of [its] corporate group.”27

43. For users under the age of 13, TikTok maintains a separate privacy policy, 

referred to as its “Privacy Policy for Younger Users.”28

44. However, users’ reported ages on TikTok are frequently inaccurate, as “age” is

determined by the unverified date of birth provided upon sign up, see infra.

45. Even for the most vulnerable, young users whose date of birth was correctly 

entered at sign-up, TikTok collects personal information, including users’ birthdays, and “certain 

information automatically from the user’s device, including internet or other network activity 

information such as device ID, IP address, web browser type and version, country-level location, 

as well as certain app activity data, such as video watches, time in the app, and general usage 

data.” And an inaccurate age can subject even TikTok’s youngest users to TikTok’s broader, 

even more invasive data collection and disclosure practices.

46. Further, even for its “Younger Users,” TikTok shares “the information [it] 

collect[s] with [its] corporate group, and with service providers.”

47. Notably, the TikTok app enables users—including minors—to create TikTok 

accounts and use the app without the users or their guardians ever having seen the privacy 

policies or terms of service.

27 https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en#privacy-us. In prior versions of the Privacy 

Policy, TikTok specifically states that it “will” share user information with “any member or affiliate of 

our group, in China[.]” E.g., 

https://web.archive.org/web/20180829183230/http:/www.tiktok.com/i18n/privacy#how-share (last 

updated Aug. 2018)

28 Available at https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy-for-younger-users?lang=en (updated January 

2020).

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D. Defendants Surreptitiously Collect, Store, and Use Plaintiffs’ Biometric 

Information and Biometric Identifiers

48. In addition to the large swaths of private and personally identifiable information 

Defendants collect unnecessarily as described above, Defendants also surreptitiously collect 

TikTok users’ legally protected biometric information and biometric identifiers—and they do so 

without the required disclosure or consent. 

49. Biometrics is a term used to categorize the most personal and identifying features 

for each person. It refers to unique, measurable human biological or behavioral characteristics, 

including fingerprints, voiceprints, and scans of the retina, iris, or face geometry, which are used 

for identification and authentication purposes.

50. Defendants’ technology allows them to capture their users’ biometric data and 

incorporate it into the TikTok app. ByteDance has publicly admitted that it trained its AI 

technology to, among other things, engage in “facial recognition for the filters” and that it has 

“buil[t] intelligent machines that are capable of understanding and analyzing text, images and 

videos using natural language processing and computer vision technology.”29

51. TikTok has even created a feature that allows users to select an individual’s face 

in a video and subsequently use TikTok’s facial recognition technology to identify other videos 

in which that person appears.30

52. Because of the highly sensitive nature of biometric information, in 2008, Illinois 

adopted the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), which, among other things,

requires companies to provide notice that they are collecting biometric information, obtain 

written consent, and make certain disclosures. In addition, companies subject to BIPA are 

29 https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/30/18107732/bytedance-valuation-tiktok-china-startup

30 https://radiichina.com/tiktok-new-video-search-function-is-from-the-future/

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required to develop a written policy establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for 

permanently destroying biometric data.

53. In passing BIPA, the Illinois General Assembly recognized:

Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers that are used to access finances or 

other sensitive information. For example, social security numbers, when 

compromised, can be changed. Biometrics, however, are biologically unique to the 

individual; therefore, once compromised, the individual has no recourse, is at 

heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometricfacilitated transactions.

740 ILCS § 14/5(c).

54. Nevertheless, Defendants collect users’ facial geometry in connection with, for 

example, algorithms used to determine users’ ages and the app’s facial filter and tracking 

features.

E. TikTok Uses Users’ Personal Information and Biometrics—along with its 

Algorithms and AI--to Provide Targeted Content, Features, and Effects

55. TikTok uses the private data it collects to drive app use, user engagement, and 

thus profits.

56. TikTok’s user homepage is titled “For You.” The “For You” page is the first thing 

users see when opening that app, and it is an algorithmic feed that recommends targeted videos 

for each user, even if the user never posted anything, followed anyone, or liked a video.

57. Once active on and engaging with the app, TikTok’s AI algorithm continuously 

records each action users take on the app, including what videos each user watches, how long 

each user watches a particular category of video, and which advertisements a user engages with, 

as well their current location. As a result, “[t]he company has years of data informing it on how 

people think, feel and act, making it an expert on what makes people tick and how to persuade 

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them to watch, share or like certain content.”31

58. As one teenage user explained, the app’s powerful AI is key to keeping users on 

the app for extended periods of time:32

... TikTok still manages to rope us into its addictive videos. 

Because not only is its content addicting, the app itself is designed 

to keep us glued to our screens. With most other social media 

platforms, the majority of content is derived from accounts that you 

follow. And although you can follow and “friend” a lot of accounts 

on Instagram, Facebook, Twitter and Snapchat, there’s eventually a 

point where all the “interesting” content runs dry. With TikTok, that 

isn’t the case.

Its “For You” feature supplies a steady, never-ending pool of 

TikToks specifically catered for you — from creators hailing from 

every cranny of TikTok. Not to mention, the app doesn’t display the 

current time, making it easy to get swept up in the endless feed of 

videos.

Even more, the viral nature of TikTok has produced an entirely new 

generation of youths viewing social media as a performative pursuit. 

Though social media inherently possesses and endorses posturing 

for others online, this app has taken it even further by promoting 

actual performance art — dancing, singing, acting, editing and 

more. It has broadened the definition of what social media is: 

TikTok isn’t merely a social app to share posts and mindlessly scroll 

through. For almost every user, it’s become an activity, a hobby, a 

project, a transactional video dialogue between user and camera.

59. In addition to using its AI to bombard users with addicting streams of content, 

TikTok has developed advanced technological software that allows users to apply effects and 

animations (referred to as “face filters” and trackers) to their videos in real time. TikTok has 

multiple categories of “face filters,” including “Trending” and “Animals,” 33 as well as a face 

31 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2019-10-29/worries-that-tiktok-is-a-threat-to-nationalsecurity-have-merit

32 https://cornellsun.com/2020/02/09/nguyen-the-terrifyingly-tantalizing-trend-thats-tiktok/

33 E.g., https://medium.com/@banuba/how-camera-face-filters-brought-tiktok-millions-of-users4081f885f81c

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tracker effect that tracks and automatically zooms in on the user’s face.

60. The face filters use a smartphone’s or tablet’s camera to scan or map the user’s 

face and other biologically unique features—i.e., users’ biometric identities and biometric 

information.

61. It was reported that TikTok has created a feature that allows users to superimpose 

an individual’s facial features on top of their own and record a video (referred to as “deepfake”

videos).34 The technology that relies on facial recognition capabilities and biometric face scans 

“is often so good that it is hard to tell if the content was manipulated.”

62. There is also significant evidence that TikTok uses its facial recognition 

capabilities to identify and categorize its users’ race, age, and gender. In February 2020, Marc 

Faddoul, an AI researcher at UC Berkeley School of Information, found that TikTok was 

recommending accounts on users’ “For You” page that matched the race, age or facial 

characteristics of the user and the profiles he or she already followed.35 Mr. Faddoul found that 

when he followed the TikTok account of a black woman, the app recommended that he follow 

three more black women. The facial recognition feature was so effective that when Mr. Faddoul 

followed an Asian man with dyed hair, the app recommended three more Asian men with dyed 

hair, and the same thing happened for men with visible disabilities.

34 https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2020/01/07/tiktoks-deepfakes-just-the-latest-security-issuefor-the-video-sharing-app/#30e557a370a2

35 https://www.wired.co.uk/article/tiktok-filter-bubbles

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63. The following chart details some of Mr. Faddoul’s findings:36

64. Notably, while TikTok does not request personal information such as whether a 

man has a beard or dyes his hair, the app was able to identify individuals with those features.

65. It has been reported that TikTok has also implemented voice recognition 

capabilities that can be used to identify speakers and manipulate their words.37

66. On information and belief, TikTok’s ability to recognize age, race, gender, voice, 

and facial features uses the AI technology developed and patented by TikTok’s affiliate Beijing 

ByteDance Network Technology Co Ltd.

67. ByteDance has acknowledged that it collects biometric data in its TikTok clone 

apps around the globe. Vigo Video, owned by TikTok Pte. Ltd, states in its Privacy Policy (Last 

Updated: January 1, 2020), that it “collect[s] and use[s]” a user’s “face landmarks or face 

36 https://twitter.com/MarcFaddoul/status/1232014908536938498

37 https://www.cigionline.org/articles/new-platform-old-problems-how-tiktok-recreates-regulatorychallenges-came-it; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2D29f4-J2mw

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contour[.]”38 Douyin’s Privacy Policy (Last Updated: February 13, 2020) similarly states that it 

uses “face recognition” to “perform real-name authentication.”39

68. TikTok, however, has never adequately disclosed its collection and use of 

biometric information, including facial geometry, let alone disclosed its retention policy for such 

data.

69. These features have been credited with having a “huge impact on user 

involvement and allowed TikTok to grow its audience organically.”40

70. TikTok’s algorithm and features are so successful that the average person spends 

45 minutes per day scrolling through the app.41

F. TikTok Attracts Children to Its Platform and Collects Their Private and 

Legally Protected Data, But Leaves Them Vulnerable and Exploited 

71. Minor children make up a substantial portion of TikTok’s user demographic, and 

thus, Defendants’ profits.

72. In September 2016, the New York Times described Musical.ly as “an app that is 

young in every sense of the word,” noting that the company claimed to have over 100 million 

users, mostly between ages 13 and 20; the Times observed: “What is striking about the app, 

though, is how many of its users appear to be even younger than that.”42

73. In 2019, TikTok reported that approximately 60% of its active users in the United 

38 https://www.vigovideo.net/hotsoon/in_app/privacy_policy/

39 https://www.douyin.com/agreements/?id=6773901168964798477 (translation provided by Google 

Translate)

40 https://medium.com/@banuba/how-camera-face-filters-brought-tiktok-millions-of-users-4081f885f81c

41 https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktoks-videos-are-goofy-its-strategy-to-dominate-social-media-isserious-11561780861

42 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/business/media/a-social-network-frequented-by-children-teststhe-limits-of-online-regulation.html

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States were between the ages of 16 and 24,43 and 28% of users were below the age of 18.44

74. In February 2020, The Wall Street Journal reported that TikTok’s “youthful vibe 

presents a predicament for TikTok because many devotees are under 13.” In particular, the 

article reported that approximately 70% of 10-year-old girls with smartphones in the U.S. 

downloaded and used TikTok in 2019. Moreover, the average 10-year-old girl using TikTok 

spends more than four hours a week on the app, equivalent to more than 1,000 videos.45

75. Indeed, TikTok has designed its “coin” packages to attract children to purchase 

them, with or without parental consent, by making them easy to purchase and including playful 

images such as pandas and rainbows.46

76. TikTok also offers child-friendly features and effects, including song selections 

from Disney movies or regarding school-related subjects. 

77. Even to the extent TikTok purports to limit features or data collection for certain 

ages, there are no meaningful enforcement mechanisms. Any child under the age of 13 or 18 can 

simply provide a fake birthday when logging in and gain access to all of TikTok’s features.47

78. There are public accounts for children as young as four years old.48 An 

investigation by the South China Morning Post identified that “at least 100 local primary school 

43 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tiktok-cfius-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-opens-national-securityinvestigation-into-tiktok-sources-idUSKBN1XB4IL

44 https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-wants-to-grow-up-but-finds-it-tough-to-keep-kids-out11581858006

45 Id.

46 https://www.the-sun.com/lifestyle/tech/475150/how-tiktok-tempts-kids-to-spend-hundreds-of-poundson-virtual-coins-to-pay-online-celebs/

47 E.g., https://commercialfreechildhood.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/tik_tok_complaint.pdf 

(discussing tests of the registration process)

48 https://commercialfreechildhood.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/tik_tok_complaint.pdf; 

https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-47813350?mod=article_inline

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pupils – identified through videos showing them in uniform or their real names or phone 

numbers – are active on the app, having posted between 10 and 500 clips each. More than 40 [of 

those 100] users are between the ages of 10 and 12, according to their bios and confirmed by 

the Post.”49

79. Indeed, it has been reported that sexual predators have adopted TikTok as an ideal 

means to connect with children.50 Over a three-month period, the BBC found hundreds of sexual 

comments posted on videos uploaded by teenagers and children. The BBC’s reporting found that 

many of the sexually explicit comments came from the same accounts who repeatedly attempted 

to contact teenagers. In fact, the BBC uncovered a public message from an adult male offering to 

pay for a child’s airline ticket to Turkey under one such video.

80. As a result of the concern that TikTok exposes children to sexual predators, 

pornographic content and cyberbullying, a High Court of India and India’s Ministry of 

Electronics and Information Technology ordered the app to be removed from Apple’s and 

Google’s app stores within the country.51

81. On February 27, 2019, the Federal Trade Commission ( “FTC”) announced that 

Musical.ly (now TikTok) violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), 

which requires that websites and online services directed to children obtain parental consent 

before collecting personal information from children under the age of 13.52

49 https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/education/article/2146840/hong-kong-children-expose-theiridentities-thoughts-and

50 https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-47813350?mod=article_inline

51 https://techcrunch.com/2019/04/16/tiktok-india/. The order was reversed after TikTok appealed the 

decision, arguing that it had removed the inappropriate content. 

https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/02/tech/tiktok-ban-india-users/index.html

52 COPPA regulates operators of websites and online services that: 1) are directed to children and collect 

personal information from them, or 2) are directed to a general audience, but have actual knowledge that 

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82. The FTC found that TikTok was “directed to children” based upon, inter alia, the 

app’s “subject matter, visual content, music, and the presence of child celebrities or celebrities 

who appeal to kids.”53 For example, the FTC cited in-app song folders with titles like “Disney” 

(featuring music from movies like Toy Story and The Lion King) and “school” (featuring songs 

about school-related subjects or school-themed TV shows and movies).

83. The FTC further found that the company had “actual knowledge” that it was 

collecting personal information from children. Indeed, many users’ profiles listed children’s 

dates of birth or grade in school. 

84. Further, since its inception in 2014, the FTC noted that Musical.ly received 

thousands of complaints from parents of kids under 13 who were registered users. In fact, within 

a two-week period in September 2016, Musical.ly received over 300 complaints from parents 

attempting to delete their child’s account. 

85. Ultimately, the FTC found that Musical.ly violated COPPA by: (a) failing to 

provide notice on their site of the information they collect online from children, how they use it, 

and their disclosure practices; (b) failing to provide direct notice to parents; (c) Failing to get

consent from parents before collecting personal information from children; (d) failing to honor 

parents’ requests to delete personal information collected from kids; and (e) retaining that 

personal information for longer than reasonably necessary.

86. TikTok agreed to pay a record $5.7 million civil penalty and to change its 

they are collecting personal information from children. If the site or service meets either definition, 

COPPA requires them – among other things – to get parental consent before collecting personal 

information from children under 13. The FTC’s complaint alleges Musical.ly was covered under both 

standards.

53 https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2019/02/largest-ftc-coppa-settlement-requiresmusically-change-its

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practices to ensure COPPA compliance.

87. FTC Chairman Joe Simons stated: “This record penalty should be a reminder to 

all online services and websites that target children: We take enforcement of COPPA very 

seriously, and we will not tolerate companies that flagrantly ignore the law.”

88. Nevertheless, on May 14, 2020, more than a year after TikTok’s record-setting 

FTC COPPA settlement, a group of 20 advocacy groups filed a new FTC complaint54 alleging 

that TikTok is still violating COPPA.55 The complaint alleges, inter alia, that TikTok failed to 

comply with the consent decree in the prior COPPA matter and did not destroy all personal 

information collected from users under age 13, nor did it obtain parental consent for the minors’ 

accounts. The complaint further alleges that TikTok collects information—without consent—that 

goes beyond what would be required to support internal operations, including videos, usage 

history, the content of messages sent on the platform, and geolocation, and shares this 

information with third parties.

G. Defendants Have Faced Broad Scrutiny for Their Inadequate Data 

Protection Practices

89. Compounding the harm caused by the mass collection of personal data and 

biometrics is Defendants’ failure to protect the private user data they collect. 

90. On January 8, 2020, the Israeli cyber security company Check Point issued a 

54 https://commercialfreechildhood.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/tik_tok_complaint.pdf

55 Those groups include: Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood, the Center for Digital Democracy, 

Badass Teachers Association, Berkeley Media Studies Group, Children and Screens: Institute of Digital 

Media and Child Development, Consumer Action, Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Reports, 

Defending the Early Years, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Media Education Foundation, 

Obligation, Inc., Parent Coalition for Student Privacy, Parents Across America, ParentsTogether 

Foundation, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Public Citizen, The Story of Stuff, United Church of Christ, 

and USPIRG.

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report stating that it had discovered “multiple vulnerabilities within the TikTok application.”56

These vulnerabilities could allow attackers to, inter alia, get a hold of TikTok accounts and 

manipulate their content, make private “hidden” videos public, and reveal personal information 

saved on the account such as private email addresses

91. Matthias Eberl, who describes himself as a journalist and educator in the field of 

data protection and multimedia journalism, performed what he called “a detailed privacy check 

of the TikTok app and its corresponding website,” finding multiple transparency and data 

protection concerns.57 In an article he published in or around December 2019, he noted his 

findings, which included, among other concerns, TikTok’s transmission of device information, 

usage time, and a list of watched videos to third parties Appsflyer (a mobile marketing analytics 

and attribution platform with thousands of partners) and Facebook; its transmission of user 

search terms to Facebook; and its use of invasive digital fingerprinting technology.

92. At the Social 2030 Conference in February 2020—a conference focused on 

challenges and opportunities for social media—Reddit’s Chief Executive Officer Steve Huffman 

called TikTok “fundamentally parasitic” noting that “it’s always listening, the fingerprinting 

technology that they use is truly terrifying, and I could not bring myself to install an app like that 

on my phone.”58

93. On October 23, 2019, Senators Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas) and Chuck Schumer 

(D-New York) sent a letter to Acting Director of National Intelligence Joseph Maguire, 

requesting that the Intelligence Community formally conduct an assessment of the national 

56 https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/tik-or-tok-is-tiktok-secure-enough/

57 https://rufposten.de/blog/2019/12/05/privacy-analysis-of-tiktoks-app-and-website/

58 https://techcrunch.com/2020/02/26/reddit-ceo-tiktok-is-fundamentally-parasitic/

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security risks posed by TikTok.

94. The Senators noted that ByteDance is required to adhere to the laws of China, 

whose cybersecurity laws compel Chinese companies to support and cooperate with intelligence 

work controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. 

95. In November 2019, it was reported that the Committee on Foreign Investment in 

the United States (“CFIUS”) had initiated an inquiry into how TikTok maintains the personal 

data of its US users and whether it secretly sends user data to China.

59 In particular, the review 

focuses on ByteDance’s acquisition of Musical.ly, and will consider whether to unwind the 

transaction or otherwise for ByteDance to divest TikTok.

96. By January of 2020, each branch of the U.S. military had banned the use of 

TikTok on government-owned phones due to data-safety concerns.60 These decisions followed 

the Defense Information Systems Agency within the U.S. Department of Defense recommended 

that all employees of the Defense Department not use TikTok on their devices. Lt. Col. Robin 

Ochoa, a spokeswoman for the Army, clearly stated that TikTok “is considered a cyber threat.”

97. On March 12, 2020, Senators Josh Hawley and Rick Scott introduced S.3455, 

titled the “No TikTok on Government Devices Act,” which would ban all federal employees 

from using TikTok on any device issued by the United States or a government corporation.

61

Senator Scott noted that the bill was necessary to counteract the national security threat posed by 

TikTok’s data.

59 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bytedance-tiktok-exclusive/exclusive-chinas-bytedance-moves-toringfence-its-tiktok-app-amid-us-probe-sources-idUSKBN1Y10OH; 

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/technology/tiktok-national-security-review.html

60 https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/u-s-army-bans-tiktok-following-guidance-pentagonn1109001

61 https://www.hawley.senate.gov/senators-hawley-scott-introduce-legislation-ban-tiktok-governmentdevices

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98. Given TikTok’s popularity (namely among children) around the globe, foreign 

authorities have announced their own examinations into TikTok’s data privacy practices.

99. In July 2019, the UK Information Commissioner at the Information 

Commissioner’s Office (“ICO”), Elizabeth Denham, revealed to the UK parliament that her 

office had started an investigation into how TikTok maintains and uses the personal data of its 

children.62 Ms. Denham noted that in addition to general private data collection concerns, she

was investigating how TikTok’s open messaging system allows any adult to message any child, 

as this feature may violate the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) which requires 

TikTok to provide different services and different protections for children.

100. On May 8, 2020, the Dutch Data Protection Authority announced that it has 

launched an investigation into TikTok over privacy concerns. The investigation’s focus is 

whether TikTok adequately protects the privacy of children under Dutch law and the European 

Union’s General Data Protection Regulation.63

101. U.S. consumers have also taken notice of TikTok’s improper collection and 

usurpation of their personal data. For example, in October 2018, an individual who tried TikTok 

noticed that TikTok had taken still photos from his “private” videos recorded on the app and 

used it for its own advertisements.

64 The individual only came to learn of TikTok’s use of his 

private videos when he was notified by third parties that his face appeared in TikTok’s

advertisements posted on Facebook.

V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 

102. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiffs seek certification of the 

62 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jul/02/tiktok-under-investigation-over-child-data-use

63 https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/en/news/dutch-data-protection-authority-investigate-tiktok

64 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SDdR8cue4eE

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following class: 

All persons whose biometric information or biometric data was 

captured by the TikTok and/or Musical.ly apps while the person 

resided in Illinois (the Class).

103. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their officers, directors, affiliates, legal 

representatives, employees, successors, subsidiaries, parent companies and assigns, and any 

judicial officers and associated court staff assigned to this case and their immediate family 

members.

104. Numerosity: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1). The members of the 

Class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that individual joinder of all Class members 

is impracticable. Based on information and belief, TikTok currently has tens of millions of users

in the United States, over a quarter of which are minors below the age of 18, making joinder 

impracticable. Those individuals’ names and contact information are available from Defendant’s 

records, and Class members may be notified of the pendency of this action by recognized, Courtapproved notice dissemination methods. 

105. Commonality and Predominance: Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) 

and 23(b)(3). This action involves common questions of law and fact, which predominate over 

any questions affecting individual class members, including:

a. Whether Defendants collected, used, and/or stored Class members’

biometric information or biometric identity through the TikTok and/or 

Musical.ly apps;

b. whether Defendants made the disclosures and obtained the written consent

required by BIPA, before capturing any biometric data;

c. whether Defendants shared any biometric information collected from Class 

members amongst themselves, or with third parties;

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d. whether Defendants established and complied with the retention schedule

and destruction guidelines required by BIPA;

e. whether Defendants’ violations of BIPA were intentional, reckless, or 

negligent;

f. whether Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to declaratory and/or 

injunctive relief to enjoin the unlawful conduct alleged herein; 

g. whether Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to statutory damages 

under BIPA; and

h. Whether Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to actual damages under 

BIPA;

i. Whether Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to attorneys’ fees and 

costs under BIPA;

j. Whether Plaintiffs and Class members are entitled to injunctive or other 

relief under BIPA;

k. whether Plaintiffs and Class members have sustained other damages as a 

result of Defendants’ conduct, and, if so, what is the appropriate measure 

of damages and/or restitution.

106. Typicality: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3). Plaintiffs’ claims are 

typical of other Class members’ claims because Plaintiffs and Class members were subjected to 

the same allegedly unlawful conduct and damaged in the same way.

107. Adequacy of Representation: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4).

Plaintiffs are adequate class representatives because their interests do not conflict with the 

interests of Class members who he seeks to represent, Plaintiffs have retained counsel competent 

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and experienced in complex class action litigation, and Plaintiffs intend to prosecute this action 

vigorously. The Class members’ interests will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiffs

and their counsel. 

108. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).

The prosecution of separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of 

inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class members that would 

establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. Such individual actions would create 

a risk of adjudications that would be dispositive of the interests of other Class members and 

impair their interests. Defendants have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally 

applicable to the Class, making final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief 

appropriate. 

109. Superiority: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). A class action is superior 

to any other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy, and no 

unusual difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action. The 

damages or other financial detriment suffered by Plaintiffs and Class members are relatively 

small compared to the burden and expense that would be required to individually litigate their 

claims against Defendant, so it would be impracticable for Class members to individually seek 

redress for Defendant’s wrongful conduct. Even if Class members could afford litigation, the 

court system could not. Individualized litigation creates a potential for inconsistent or 

contradictory judgments and increases the delay and expense to all parties and the court system. 

By contrast, the class action device presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the 

benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single 

court, especially whether there are tens of millions of Americans affected. 

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VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

COUNT I

VIOLATION OF THE ILLINOIS BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT 

(“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1, ET. SEQ.

(ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFFS AND THE NATIONWIDE CLASS)

110. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth 

herein.

111. Defendants are corporations qualifying as “private entities” as defined by BIPA, 

740 ILCS 14/10.

112. Plaintiffs and class members are individuals whose biometric identifiers and/or 

biometric information was collected, stored, and used by Defendants in violation of BIPA.

113. Defendants failed to make “available to the public” a written policy “establishing 

a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers or biometric 

information” as required by 740 ILCS 14/15(a) (a “retention policy”).

114. Defendants did not inform Plaintiffs or Class members “in writing that [their] 

biometric identifier[s] or biometric information [were] being collected or stored” as required 

under 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(1).

115. Defendants did not inform Plaintiff or Class members “in writing of the specific 

purpose and length of term for which [their] biometric identifier[s] or biometric information 

[were] being collected, stored, and used,” as required under 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(2).

116. Defendants did not obtain Plaintiffs’ or class members’ “written release” as 

required by 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(3).

117. Defendants acted intentionally or recklessly in collecting, storing, and using 

Plaintiffs’ and Class members’ biometric identifiers or biometric information, in not making a 

retention policy publicly available, and in failing to obtain a written release. In the alternative, 

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Defendants acted negligently by failing to ensure Plaintiffs or Class members were informed of 

and consented to Defendants’ collection, storage, and use of their biometric information and 

identifiers, and failing to provide the required data retention information.

118. These violations harmed Plaintiffs and Class members. 

119. Individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed Class, Plaintiffs seek: 

(1) injunctive and equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiffs and the 

members of the Class by requiring Defendants to comply with BIPA, including its requirements 

for collecting, capturing, receiving, otherwise obtaining, storing, and/or using biometric 

identifiers and biometric information, including BIPA’s disclosure, retention, and consent 

requirements; (2) statutory damages of $5,000 for each intentional and reckless violation of 

BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(2) or, alternatively, statutory damages of $1,000 for each 

negligent violation pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(1); and (3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs

and other litigation expenses pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(3).

VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:

a. Certify this action as a class action, proper and maintainable pursuant to Rule 23 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; declare that Plaintiffs are a proper class representatives; 

and appoint Plaintiffs’ counsel as Class Counsel; 

b. Grant permanent injunctive relief to prohibit Defendants from continuing to 

engage in the unlawful acts, omissions, and practices described herein; 

c. Award Plaintiffs and Class members compensatory, consequential, general, and 

nominal damages in an amount to be determined at trial;

d. Award statutory damages, trebled, and punitive or exemplary damages, to the 

extent permitted by law; 

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e. Grant declaratory relief sought herein; 

f. Award to Plaintiffs the costs and disbursements of the action, along with 

reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses; 

g. Award pre- and post-judgment interest at the maximum legal rate; and

h. Grant all such other relief as is just and proper.

VIII. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

Plaintiffs demand a jury trial on all claims so triable.

Dated: June 26, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Elizabeth A. Fegan

Elizabeth A. Fegan

FEGAN SCOTT LLC

150 S. Wacker Dr., 24th Floor

Chicago, IL 60606

Phone: 312.741.1019

Fax: 312.264.0100

beth@feganscott.com

Melissa Ryan Clark (pro hac vice 

application forthcoming)

Jonathan D. Lindenfeld (pro hac vice

application forthcoming)

FEGAN SCOTT LLC

140 Broadway, 46th Floor

New York, NY 10005

Phone: 332.216.2101

Fax: 917.725.9346

melissa@feganscott.com

jonathan@feganscott.com

Counsel for Plaintiffs

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