### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00728- CV

Vi c to r ia F ount ain , A ppe lla nt

v. Scott F ountain , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 250TH JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. FM 2015 87, H ONO RAB LE SCOTT H. JENKI NS, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
This is an appea l from a post-a nswer de fault judg ment of divorce that the trial cour t enter ed in favor of Scott Founta in (“Scott”) a g ainst Victoria F ountain (“V ictoria” ). In her f irst point of er ror, Vic toria conte nds that the trial cour t abused its discretion when it ove rruled her motion for
ne w tri a l. I

n h e r r e ma ini ngpo int , V ic tor ia c la ims the tr ia l court a lso a bu se d its d isc re tio n w he n it g rante d Scott leave to file an untimely response and af fidavit over he r objec tion. W e will aff irm the jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND I n 2002, Scott filed for divorc e fr om Victoria, a nd Victoria c ountersued f or divorce
. Both pa rties contende d that the other w as g uilty of committing family violence. I n April 2003, the2

court e ntere d a tempora

ry order that g rante d both pa rties joint custody of their daug hter. The divorce proce eding was set f

or later that y ear . Five da y s befor e the divorc e proc eedingwas set, the trial court appr oved Victor ia’s motion for withdrawa l of counsel, but in the order the court reminded Victoria that the proce eding would never

theless occ ur five da

y s later. Vic toria did not retain c ounsel befor e the pr ocee ding. Victoria c laims that, on the ni g ht befor e the proce eding was sche duled, Scott called her, thre atene d her, r eminded her that he wa s an ex -police office r, and stated that Victoria was “ not g oin g to lik e wh a t [he wa s] g oin g to do .” Al so , Vi c tor ia a sse rt s that sh e he ard Sc ott ’s g ir lf

ri e nd in the ba c kg ro un d thr e a te nin g to c a ll the po lic e and a sse rt s that Sc ott ha d the po lic e c ome to h e r h ou se on sevente en prior oc casions for frivolous rea sons. Furthe r, Victoria contends that twe nty

minutes afte r the phone call fr om Scott, the police arr ived at her house and ar rested he r for

possession of a wh ipp e d- c re a m in fl a tor , w hic h c an b e us e d to inha le nit ro us oxide . V ic tor ia

c la ims sh e wa s in

ja il on the day of the F ountains’ divorce proce eding
. I n addition, Victoria insists Scott was awar e of the fa c t th a t sh e wa s in c arc e rate d at th e tim e of the tr ia l. Scott denies ca lling the police or threatening Victoria. F urther Scott con t ends that when the police wer e ca lled to Victoria’s r esidenc e in the past, it wa s Victoria’ s and Scott’s daug hter wh o c a lle d the po lic e be c a us e Vi c tor ia wa s a

bu sin g nit ro us oxide . In a dd iti on , Sc ott c la ims Vi c tor ia stated she intended to de lay the trial by either hiringanother

lawy er to postpone the pr ocee dings or by no t sh ow ingup fo r t

ri a l. Be cause Victoria’ s attorney had withdra

wn from the c ase f

ive day s prior to the proce eding and bec ause V ictoria ha d not r etained ne w counse l, Victoria wa s not repre sented at the3

divorce proce eding
. Consequently , the trial court g rante d a defa ult judg ment and entered a f i nal decr ee of divorce
. After the divorce decr ee wa s en tere d, Victoria r etained ne w counse l who filed a motion to s et aside the defa ult judgment and a

motion for new trial. The motion was acc ompanied by Victoria’ s aff

idavit. A hear ing was set to r ule on Victoria’ s motion, and Victoria ’s counsel attended the hear ing, but Vic toria did not.

Al mos t an h our a ft e r t

he he ari ngon

the mot ion

be g an, Sc ott

fi le d a nd se rv e d h is
answe r to Victoria’ s motion for a new trial. At the hear ing, Victoria’ s counsel objec ted to the trial court g ranting Scott leave to file h i s untimely response . The c ourt overr uled the objec tion. After hear ing or al ar g ument, the t rial court denied Victoria’s mot ion to set aside the defa ult judgment and he r m oti on

fo r a ne w tri a l. Vi c tor ia no w a pp e a ls the tr ia l c ourt ’s a llo wi ng Sc ott to f ile his re sp on se
and its or de r d e nying

he r m oti on

fo r n e w tri a l.
DI SCU SSIO N Motion for New Trial

Trial courts possess broad discretion in ruling on motions for ne w trial. Champion In t’ l Co rp . v . Twe lft

h Co ur t of Ap pe als , 762 S.W .2d 898, 899 (Tex. 1988). When review ing matters committed to the trial court’s discretion, a court of appeals m ay not substit ute its own judgme nt for the trial cour

t’s judgme nt. W

alker v . Gutierrez , 111 S.W .3d 56, 63 (Tex. 2004). We review a denia l of a motion for new tria l for an a buse of discr etion. Clif

f v. Huggins , 7 2 4 S. W. 2 d 7 7 8 , 7 7 8
- 7 9 ( T e x.4

19 87 ); Li m es to n e Co n s tr
. , I n c . v . S u m m it Co m m e r c ia l I

n d u s . P r o p s ., Inc. , 1 4 3 S.W .3d 538, 542 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet. h.). A t rial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitra rily or
unrea sonably

and without reg ard to gu i d i ng rules or pr inciples. Merc edes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne , 925 S.W .2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996). I n o rd e r f or a mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l to be g ra

nte d, the fo llo wi ng th ree r e qu ir e me nts must b e p r e s e n t: ( 1 ) th e f

a il u r e o f a p arty to a p p e ar f o r tr ia l m u s t n o t h a v e b e e nin te n ti o n a l o r the result of c onscious indiffer ence on the party ’s part but due to a mistake or a ccide nt, (2) the motion for a new trial must set up a meritorious defe nse, and (3) the g ranting of a new tria l must not have
cause d the other pa

rty delay or otherw ise work a

n injury to him. Cra dd

oc k v . S un sh ineBu s Lin es, Inc. , 133 S.W .2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939)
. When all three e lements of the Craddock te st a re me t, i t is an abuse of discre tion not to g rant a new trial. Bank One

, Texas, N.A. v. Moody , 830 S.W .2d 81, 85 (Tex. 1992)
. The Craddock test applies t o post-answe r def ault judgme nts, see W

iseman v. Lev inthal , 82 1 S. W.2 d 4 39 , 4 41 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st Di st. ] 1 99 1, no pe t.) , w hic h o c c ur s w he n, a s in thi s
case , the defe ndant has filed an answe r but does not appe ar at trial. Stoner v. Thompson , 578 S.W .2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979).

Victoria c ontends that her f ailure to a

ppear at the divorc e proc ee d i n g was not t he
re su lt of int e nti on a l c on du c t or c on sc iou s ind if fe re nc e on he r p art ; r a the r, sh e a sse rt s, he r f a ilure to appear wa s a m istake bec ause she was inca rce rate d at the time of the pr ocee ding. T he issue of wh e the r t he re wa s a

mis take or

a c c ide nt i s c on sid e re d o nly wh e n a n a c c ide nt or mis take may ne g a te in te n ti o n a l o r

c o n s c io u s ly

in d if f e r e n t conduct. Moody , 830 S.W .2d at 84. The de termination of whether a fa ilure to appe ar is intentional or is the re sult of conscious indiffer ence tur n s on the5

knowledg e and acts of the def endant, Strac k

br e in v . P re witt , 671 S.W .2d 37, 38-39 (Tex. 1984), and wh e the r the e xcu se s fa ll sh or t of wh a t a pe rs on of re a so na ble se ns ibi lit ie s wo uld

do un de r t

he same or similar circ umstances. O’ Con ne ll v . O ’C on ne ll , 843 S.W .2d 212, 218 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, no writ). I n this case, Vic toria knew and wa s provided with notice f rom the trial cour

t in the order g ranting the withdraw al of c ounsel that the proc eedingwould g o forwa rd on September

2, 2003, but she did not r etain counse l in the intervening five da y s. See O’Connell, 843 S.W .2d at 218 (consc ious indiff

er ence re quirement not met whe n awa re tria l set, when a

war e counse l had withdrawn, and made no attempt to obta in ne w counsel). Fur ther, there is no indication in the recor d that, afte r her

arr est, Victoria attempted to contact he r pre vious attorney , a new attorney , or any ind ivi du a l to re pr e se nt h e r a t th e div or c e pr oc e e din gor to i nf or m the c ourt of

he r s itu a tio n. Th e se actions fa ll short of w h at a pe rson of re asonable sensibiliti es would do under the same or

simil ar
c ir c ums tanc e s. We c annot conclude that the trial court acte d arbitra rily or unrea sonably and without reg ard to guiding rules or principles e specia lly when, a s here , there was no doc umentary evidenc e prese nted to the trial cour

t that V ictoria had actua lly been a rre sted or inca

rce rate d during the divorce proce eding and bec ause Scott denie d any involvement in the arr est. We find that Victoria ha s not met the first re quirement of Craddock beca use she has fa iled to establish that her fa ilure to appe ar was not intentional or the result of conscious indiffer ence on her part. As a re sult, it is unnece ssary for us to c onsider whether Victoria met the other Craddock requisites. We find that the trial cour t6

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in de nying Vi c tor ia ’s mot ion fo r n e w tri a l and ov e rr ule Vi c tor ia ’s fi rs t po int
. Untim ely Response and Af fi davit I n her f inal point of err or, Victoria claims the trial cour t abused its discretion whe n it g r an te d Sc o tt le a v e to f

il e an u n ti me ly r e s p o n s e an d a f f id a v it a f te r V ic to r ia ti me ly o b je c te d
. We
re vie w a de te rm inatio n b y

a tria l c ourt

to e ith e r g ra

nt o r r e fu se to g ra

nt l e a ve to f

ile un tim e ly resp o n ses and a ffidavits under an abuse of discre tion standard. See W hite v. Inde

pendenc e Bank

, N.A., 794 S.W .2d 895, 900 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1990, pet. denied) . The trial c ourt’s ruling will not be disturbed unless the rec ord shows a clea r abuse of discretion. See id. An

a bu se of discre tion standard is a fle x ible standard, see id. , meaning trial courts ar e g iven sig nificant lee way to determine w hether to g rant leave to file an untimely response . Compare Majestic Bldg. Corp. v. McClelland , 5 59 S.W. 2d

88 3, 88 4 (T e x. Civ
. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st Di st. ] 1 97 7, no wr it) (n ot an a bu se of discretion to c onsider response s and aff idavits filed late) with Y

ates v. Equit able General Ins. Co. , 672 S.W .2d 822, 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] ), aff’d. , 84 S.W .2d 669 (Tex. 1984) (not an abuse of discretion to re fuse a

n untimely

response ). We h a ve re vie we d Sc ott ’s re sp on se to V ic tor ia ’s mot ion fo r n e w tri a l and

his
acc ompanying affidavit. Wit h the ex ception of a claim for attorney ’s fees i ncurr ed in preparing the
re sp on se , n e ith e r o f t

he se do c ume nts a dd

re ss iss ue s n ot a lr e a dy

ra ise d. Th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its discret i o n b y all owing Scott to file the untimely response and af

fidavit. Ther efor e, Victor ia’s second point of e rror

is overrule d.7 CO NC LU SION Be cause we overr

ule all of Victoria’ s issues on appea l, we af firm the judg ment of the tr ia l c ourt
.

__________________________________________ Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Affir med Filed: January

21, 2005