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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Estate of 

ALBERTA BAIDOO.

EMMANUEL K. BAIDOO, 

Appellant,

v.

TRUDY SUSAN BAIDOO,

Respondent.

No. 80552-5-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

CHUN, J. — Trudy Baidoo admitted decedent Alberta Baidoo’s will to 

probate. Over a year later, Emmanuel Baidoo, Trudy’s father and Alberta’s 

husband, filed a Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act1(TEDRA) petition. 

Emmanuel’s2 petition requested “an Order that [Emmanuel] shall take from the 

Estate and [Trudy], jointly and severally, the amounts that would have flowed to 

him had he (a) hired counsel to challenge the Will and (b) succeeded in said 

challenge.” Apparently determining that Emmanuel’s petition constituted a will 

contest, the trial court dismissed it as time-barred by RCW 11.24.010’s fourmonth limitations period. Because Emmanuel’s petition would have required the 

trial court to determine issues affecting the validity of Alberta’s will, we affirm.

 

1 Chapter 11.96A RCW.

2 For clarity, we refer to the Baidoos by their first names. We intend no 

disrespect.
No. 80552-5-I/2

2

I. BACKGROUND

Trudy admitted Alberta’s will to probate. The probate court appointed her 

as personal representative for the estate.

Nearly 14 months later, Emmanuel filed a TEDRA petition, alleging as

follows: Alberta suffered from cancer. Weeks before her passing, members of 

Trudy’s family “flew in from around the world in order to pressure [Alberta] 

(against her wishes) to execute” a “death bed will” disinheriting Emmanuel. After 

his wife’s passing, Emmanuel told Trudy that “he did not believe that the death 

bed Will was, in any way, a reflection of what [Alberta] wanted.” Trudy 

responded that she would “ensure that [Emmanuel] would be able to maintain 

[Alberta’s] assets and that only upon [Emmanuel’s] death would those assets be 

split up.” But Trudy was misleading Emmanuel, and providing inaccurate legal 

advice, so that he would not obtain legal counsel in time to challenge the will. 

Emmanuel asserted that the conduct he alleged constituted a breach of the 

fiduciary duty Trudy owed to him as the personal representative of Alberta’s 

estate.

Trudy moved to dismiss Emmanuel’s petition as time-barred under 

RCW 11.24.010. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The 

court also awarded Trudy $3,500 in costs and attorney fees. Emmanuel appeals.
No. 80552-5-I/3

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Statute of Limitations

Emmanuel asserts that RCW 11.24.010’s four-month limitation period 

does not bar his TEDRA petition because he is not contesting the will. We 

disagree.

We review de novo a trial court’s interpretation of a probate statute. In re 

Estate of Jones, 152 Wn.2d 1, 8-9, 93 P.3d 147 (2004).

RCW 11.24.010 requires a party to file a will contest within four months 

following probate. “A will contest is the proceeding in which a court determines 

issues ‘affecting the validity of the will.’” Cassell v. Portelance, 172 Wn. App. 

156, 162, 294 P.3d 1 (2012) (citing RCW 11.24.010). “A court may treat a 

motion as a will contest, even where the petitioner styles it otherwise.” Cassell, 

172 Wn. App. at 162 (citing In re Estates of Palmer, 146 Wn. App. 132, 137-38, 

189 P.3d 230 (2008)).

Here, Emmanuel argues that his petition does not constitute a will contest 

because, “[r]ather than challenge any will, [Emmanuel’s] petition alleges various 

breaches of fiduciary duty by [Trudy] in her role as personal representative of 

[Emmanuel’s] wife’s estate.” Though Emmanuel couched his petition in terms of 

violations of fiduciary duty, he clearly seeks to contest Alberta’s will. For 

instance, the facts section of Emmanuel’s petition refers to Alberta’s will as a 

“death bed Will,” claims that Alberta executed the will “mere weeks before her 

passing,” and asserts that Alberta’s family members “flew in from around the 
No. 80552-5-I/4

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world to pressure [Alberta] (against her wishes) to execute a will disinheriting 

[Emmanuel].” It states that Emmanuel “did not believe that the death bed Will 

was, in any way, a reflection of what [Alberta] wanted.” It requests “an Order that 

[Emmanuel] shall take from the Estate and [Trudy], jointly and severally, the 

amounts that would have flowed to him had he (a) hired counsel to challenge the 

Will and (b) succeeded in said challenge.”

Thus, to resolve Emmanuel’s petition, the court would have had to 

determine whether he would have succeeded in a will contest had he timely filed 

one. To do so, the court would have determined whether lack of capacity or 

undue influence affected the validity of Alberta’s will. Because Emmanuel’s 

petition would have required the court to consider issues affecting the validity of 

Alberta’s will, it constituted a will contest. Accordingly, Emmanuel needed to file 

his petition within four months of the date Trudy opened the will for probate. 

Emmanuel, however, did not file his petition until over a year had passed. The 

trial court did not err by dismissing the petition as time-barred.3

 

3 Trudy offers an alternative argument supporting affirmance. She says 

Emmanuel’s breach of fiduciary duty claims fail because the lower court, in another 

case, denied Emmanuel’s motion for an order to show cause pursuant to 

RCW 11.68.070 based on the same allegations of breach of fiduciary duty as made in 

his TEDRA petition. She asserts that this shows the court determined that Emmanuel

failed to establish any ground under RCW 11.28.250 to remove her as personal 

representative of Alberta’s estate. To support this argument, Trudy moved to 

supplement the record in this case. Because we determine the trial court properly 

dismissed Emmanuel’s TEDRA petition as time-barred, we do not address Trudy’s 

alternative argument. Thus, we deny her motion to supplement the record.
No. 80552-5-I/5

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B. Attorney Fees Below

Emmanuel contends that because the court incorrectly determined that his 

petition was time-barred, it abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees to 

Trudy. In light of our conclusion above, we disagree.

RCW 11.96A.150 provides that a court has the discretion to order costs, 

including reasonable attorney’s fees, to any party. “We review a trial court's fee 

decision under this statute for abuse of discretion, meaning we will uphold the 

court's decision unless it is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable 

grounds or reasons.” Bale v. Allison, 173 Wn. App. 435, 461, 294 P.3d 789 

(2013).

Here, Trudy successfully moved to dismiss Emmanuel’s petition as timebarred. Given that Emmanuel filed his petition around ten months after the 

limitations period had expired, it was not unreasonable to award Trudy her 

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Emmanuel does not challenge the amount 

of the award as unreasonable. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

awarding Trudy her reasonable fees and costs.

C. Attorney Fees on Appeal

In the conclusion of her response brief, Trudy “requests attorney fees and 

costs for having to defend this appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1 and 14.2.” A 

separate section addressing fees issues is mandatory under RAP 18.1(b). 

Wilson Court Ltd. P’ship v. Tony Maroni’s, Inc., 134 Wn.2d 692, 710 n.4, 952 
No. 80552-5-I/6

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P.2d 590 (1998). Because Trudy fails to properly brief her request for fees on 

appeal, we decline to award them.4

We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

 

4 Emmanuel also asks us to award him his attorney fees and costs on appeal 

under RCW 11.24.050, which gives courts the discretion to award fees and costs “[i]f the 

probate be revoked or the will annulled.” Because we do not revoke the probate or 

annul Alberta’s will, we decline to award Emmanuel his attorney fees and costs on 

appeal.