IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

MELISSA THORNLEY, et al., ) 

 ) Case No. 20-cv-3843 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman 

 v. ) 

 ) 

CLEARVIEW AI, INC., ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

 On May 27, 2020, plaintiffs brought this putative class action lawsuit in the Circuit Court of 

Cook County, Illinois, Chancery Division, after which Defendant Clearview AI, Inc. removed it to 

this Court based on the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C .§ 1332(d). Before the Court is 

plaintiffs’ motion to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). For the reasons stated below, the 

Court grants plaintiffs’ motion and remands this lawsuit to the Circuit Court of Cook County. 

Background 

 Plaintiffs bring a one-count putative class action complaint under the Illinois Biometric 

Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq. (“BIPA”), a consumer privacy statute. In their 

complaint, plaintiffs allege that Clearview is an artificial intelligence company that secretly created a 

database of over three billion facial scans. Clearview created a facial recognition application by 

scraping photographs posted on social media platforms, among other sources. 

 Unlike plaintiffs in other recent lawsuits against Clearview,1

 the present plaintiffs do not seek 

damages based on actual injury for violations of 740 ILCS 14/15(b). Instead, plaintiffs bring their 

lawsuit under 740 ILCS 14/15(c) that provides: “No private entity in possession of a biometric 

identifier or biometric information may sell, lease, trade, or otherwise profit from a person’s or a 

1 See Mutnick v. Clearview AI, Inc., et al., 20-cv-0512. 

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customer’s biometric identifier or biometric information.” More specifically, Plaintiffs do not base 

their lawsuit on Clearview scraping their photographs from public sources, converting their 

photographs into biometric facial scans, and disclosing biometric facial scans, which would have 

required certain disclosures and plaintiffs’ consent under BIPA § 15(b). Rather, they are seeking 

only statutory damages and attorney’s fees for the sale of their biometric information. 

Discussion 

In their motion to remand, plaintiffs argue that the Court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction over their lawsuit based on the lack of Article III standing. As the proponent of subject 

matter jurisdiction, Clearview must establish: (1) plaintiffs suffered an actual or imminent, concrete 

and particularized injury-in-fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged 

conduct; and (3) the likelihood the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Speech First, Inc. v. 

Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 638 (7th Cir. 2020).

Plaintiffs argue that Clearview cannot establish they suffered an injury-in-fact because “a 

bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm,” does not “satisfy the injury-in-fact 

requirement of Article III.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016). Plaintiffs point to a 

recent Seventh Circuit decision discussing BIPA and Article III standing, see Bryant v. Compass Group 

USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2020), to support their argument. 

 In Bryant, the Seventh Circuit considered whether the plaintiff had standing to bring claims 

under §§ 15(a) and 15(b) of BIPA. In doing so, the Bryant court first held that the plaintiff had 

alleged sufficient factual details of a concrete, particularized injury-in-fact satisfying Article III 

standing concerning her § 15(b) claim based on defendant’s failure to make the required disclosures 

and failure to obtain plaintiff’s informed written consent before collecting her biometric data. The 

Seventh Circuit concluded that by failing to comply with these requirements, defendant “inflicted 

the concrete injury BIPA intended to protect against, i.e. a consumer’s loss of the power and ability 

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to make informed decisions about the collection, storage, and use of her biometric information.” Id.

at 627. As to plaintiff’s allegations under BIPA § 15(a), namely, that defendant failed to publicize a 

data-retention policy and guidelines for destroying biometric information, the Seventh Circuit 

concluded this duty is not owed to the plaintiff, but to the general public. Id. at 626. The Bryant

panel thus concluded that plaintiff did not suffer a concrete or particularized injury-in-fact under § 

15(a). Id. 

 With this guidance in mind, the Court’s inquiry is whether the present plaintiffs alleged 

Clearview’s sale of their biometric information under BIPA § 15(c) caused them a concrete, 

particularized harm, which is a fact-specific analysis. See Diedrich v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 839 

F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2016). In their complaint, plaintiffs purposely narrowed their claim by 

setting a class period from January 1, 2016 to January 17, 2020, specifically stating that that the class 

members did not suffer any injury under § 15(c) “other than statutory aggrievement.” Class 

members are citizens of Illinois and seek only statutory damages and attorney’s fees – not actual 

damages. Plaintiffs’ § 15(c) allegations fit under BIPA’s statutory scheme, especially in light of the 

Illinois Supreme Court’s holding that “an individual need not allege some actual injury or adverse 

effect, beyond violation of his or her rights under the Act, in order to qualify as an ‘aggrieved’ 

person.” Rosenbach v. Six Flags Enter. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207, 432 Ill.Dec. 654, 664 (Ill. 2019). 

 Despite Clearview’s arguments that plaintiffs are attempting to manipulate their claims, as 

with all lawsuits, a plaintiff is the master of her own complaint. Plaintiffs purposely narrowed their 

claim to the general prohibition of Clearview selling and profiting from plaintiffs’ biometric data and 

filed their lawsuit in state court where such actions are allowed without the constraints of Article III 

standing. Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., 971 F.3d 722, 731 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Article III 

does not apply to the states, so ‘state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or 

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controversy or other federal rules of justiciability.’”) (citation omitted). In the end, plaintiffs did not 

allege an injury-in-fact, and thus Clearview has failed to establish Article III standing. 

Conclusion

 Based on the foregoing, the Court grants plaintiffs’ motion to remand to the Circuit Court 

of Cook County, Illinois, Chancery Division. [27] Civil case terminated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Date: 10/23/2020 

 Entered: _____________________________ 

 SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN 

 United States District Judge 

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