UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

IQRA AMEER,

Plaintiff,

v. 

ANDREW SCHOFER, et al., 

Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-03066 (TNM)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Iqra Ameer, a Pakistani citizen, applied for a non-immigrant visa to teach computer 

science at Pennsylvania State University. Although Ameer submitted a complete visa 

application and interviewed with a consular officer, she claims her application has languished in 

“administrative processing” for several months now. To nudge this process along, Ameer sued

Deputy Chief of Mission Andrew Schofer and Secretary of State Antony Blinken (collectively, 

State). She contends that State has “unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed” a final 

determination on her visa application and seeks to compel State to process her visa within fifteen 

days or “as soon as reasonably possible.” State moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 

12(b)(6). That motion is ripe. And the Court will grant it because Ameer fails to state a claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6). 

I.

Plaintiff Iqra Ameer was hired by Penn State as an Assistant Professor of Computer 

Science. Pet. for Writ of Mandamus & Compl. (Compl.) ¶ 3, ECF No. 1. In May 2023, she filed 

a completed application for an H-1B nonimmigrant visa, which permits foreign nationals to work 

temporarily in certain specialty occupations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H). That month, U.S. 
2 

Citizenship and Immigration Services approved the university’s H-1B sponsorship petition. 

Compl. ¶ 12; see 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1) (describing employer petition requirement for H-1B 

visas).

In June 2023, Ameer was interviewed by a consular officer at the U.S. Embassy in 

Pakistan. Compl. ¶ 13. Following the interview, the consular officer refused Ameer’s 

application, citing Section 221(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). See Mot. to 

Dismiss (MTD) at 7, ECF No. 8; Opp’n to MTD (Opp’n) at 14–15, ECF No. 11. Section 221(g) 

provides that a consular officer must refuse to issue a visa if it appears “from statements in the 

application, or in the papers submitted therewith” that the alien is ineligible for a visa under any 

“provision of law” or if the “officer knows or has reason to believe that such alien is ineligible to 

receive a visa.” 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g). Upon refusing her application, the consular officer 

informed Ameer that her application would be placed in “administrative processing.” Compl. 

¶ 14. 

Ameer’s application remains in “administrative processing” to this day. And despite 

making several inquiries with State as to the status of her application, she has received no 

meaningful responses. Id. ¶ 15. With no visa in hand, Ameer has been forced to teach her 

classes at Penn State “remotely.” Id. ¶ 3. And if she does not obtain a visa soon, she fears that 

her position will be terminated. Id. 

In October 2023, Ameer sued State, claiming that it has unreasonably delayed 

adjudicating her visa application in violation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b) and 706(1). Compl. ¶¶ 12–

32. She seeks injunctive relief compelling State to “process [her] visa application within fifteen 

(15) days . . . or as soon as reasonably possible.” Id. ¶ 33. State now moves to dismiss the 

Complaint. 
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II.

State argues that dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). So two standards 

apply. 

To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, Ameer “bears the burden of establishing 

jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bagherian v. Pompeo, 442 F. Supp. 3d 87, 91 

(D.D.C. 2020) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). This includes 

“establishing the elements of standing.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). At 

this stage, the Court “assume[s] the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and 

construe[s] the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff[s] the benefit of all inferences that can be

derived from the facts alleged.” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 

2011) (cleaned up). 

And to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plausibly 

“state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 552 

(2007). While “detailed factual allegations” are unnecessary, the “complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). In short, the facts alleged in the 

complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555. 

III.

State advances several grounds for dismissal. It argues that Ameer lacks standing; that 

State has no duty to act on her visa application; that judicial review of visa adjudications is 

barred by consular nonreviewability; and that, in any case, Ameer’s claims fail on the merits 

because a delay of twelve months is not unreasonable. The Court addressed similar arguments at 
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length in a recent opinion. See Yaghoubnezhad, et al. v. Stufft, et al., 2024 WL 2077551 (D.D.C. 

May 9, 2024). And it finds no reason why this case should not be resolved on the same grounds. 

A.

Consider first whether Ameer has standing. To satisfy Article III’s constitutional 

standing requirements, she must show “(1) an ‘injury in fact’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ 

as well as ‘actual or imminent’; (2) a ‘causal connection’ between the injury and the challenged 

conduct; and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, ‘that the injury will be redressed 

by a favorable decision.’” Ark Initiative v. Tidwell, 749 F.3d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 

1. 

State argues that the procedural harm of delay and the ultimate harm of denied entry do 

not support standing here. Not so. 

To satisfy Article III, a procedural harm “must be tethered to some concrete interest 

adversely affected by the procedural deprivation.” WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 

298, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Ameer plausibly alleges that her procedural injury—delay in 

processing her visa—has caused cognizable downstream harms. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572. 

Because of the delay, she has been forced to take “unpaid leave” and faces “termination if her 

visa is not obtained soon.” Compl. ¶¶ 2–3. As several cases from this district illustrate, these 

injuries are concrete enough to constitute an injury-in-fact. See Khan v. Blome, 2022 WL 

17262219, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 2022) (finding plaintiff had “concrete financial and other 

interests in attending his residency program or pursuing other options”); Rahman v. Blinken, 

2023 WL 196428, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2023) (similar). 
5 

State glosses over these alleged concrete harms and instead insists that Ameer lacks 

standing because she has no legally protected interest in obtaining the requested visa. See MTD 

at 7–13; Reply to Opp’n (Reply) at 3, ECF No. 12. Citing a bevy of seemingly conclusive 

authorities, State asserts that Ameer’s alleged substantive harm—her inability to obtain a visa for 

admission to the United States—is “not one recognized at common law, by statute, or in the 

Constitution.” MTD at 7. In its view, this should dispense with Ameer’s claim to injury-in-fact.

But State’s “long line of cases” regarding a statutory or constitutional right to entry does 

not directly bear on Article III standing. See, e.g., Pourabdollah v. Blinken, 2024 WL 474523, at 

*4 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2024); Yaghoubnezhad, 2024 WL 2077551, at *4. To be sure, the Supreme 

Court has held that “an unadmitted and nonresident alien[] ha[s] no constitutional right of entry.” 

Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972); see also Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 670 

(2018) (explaining that “[f]oreign nationals seeking admission have no constitutional right to 

entry”). Yet those cases addressed the merits of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims—not whether 

plaintiffs had suffered legally cognizable injuries that satisfy Article III. See Pourabdollah, 2024 

WL 474523, at *4. 

Although aliens seeking visa adjudications can assert no constitutional injuries, “harms 

specified by the Constitution itself” are not the only means to establish Article III standing. 

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021). Plaintiffs may also plead “traditional 

tangible harms, such as physical harms and monetary harms” or “[v]arious intangible harms . . . 

with a close relationship to harms traditionally recognized.” Id. Since Ameer has pled that she 
6 

suffers from “job instability” and lost income because of the delay in processing, she satisfies the 

injury-in-fact requirement. See Compl. ¶ 3; Opp’n at 7. 

State also points to courts’ general practice of refusing to review consular visa 

determinations as proof of Ameer’s lack of a legally cognizable injury. See MTD at 12. But just 

like the existence of a right of entry, State’s consular nonreviewability arguments go to the 

merits and not to standing. Baan Rao Thai Rest. v. Pompeo, 985 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 

2021) (explaining that consular nonreviewability is “a merits disposition under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”); see also Matushkina v. Nielsen, 877 F.3d 289, 294 n.2 (7th Cir. 

2017) (“We treat the doctrine of consular nonreviewability as a matter of a case’s merits rather 

than the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.”); Allen v. Milas, 896 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th 

Cir. 2018) (same). Though consular nonreviewability is an important issue here, its relevance is 

on the merits—which is where the Court will address it. Accord Yaghoubnezhad, 2024 WL 

2077551, at *4. 

2. 

Next, State argues that any order compelling further adjudication of Ameer’s visa will not 

redress her alleged injuries. MTD at 13. According to State, a consular officer has already 

“refused” Ameer’s visa. Id. And though her application is now in “administrative processing,” 

Ameer has not pled facts establishing that further adjudication would lead to any different result. 

Id. The Court is unpersuaded. It is no secret that refused applications placed in administrative 

processing are sometimes granted. See Yaghoubnezhad, 2024 WL 2077551, at *1 n.1. And at 

this early stage, the Court finds that an order requiring State to speed up this process would 

plausibly redress Ameer’s injuries. Khazaei v. Blinken, 2023 WL 6065095, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 

18, 2023). 
7 

3. 

Last, State contends that the Secretary cannot provide the relief requested and should be 

dismissed. The Court agrees. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a), the Secretary is granted broad control 

over “the administration and the enforcement of . . . immigration and nationality laws.” But he is 

expressly precluded from “the administration and the enforcement of . . . those powers, duties, 

and functions conferred upon the consular officers relating to the granting or refusal of visas.” 

Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the Secretary is precluded not only from “controlling 

[consular officers’] [visa] determinations,” Baan Rao, 985 F.3d at 1024, but also from 

administering or enforcing duties that merely “relate[]” to those determinations, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1104(a). This would include providing guidance for the completion of administrative 

processing. See Yaghoubnezhad, 2024 WL 2077551, at *5. So the Secretary is not a proper 

defendant. 

The Deputy Chief of Mission presents a different question. Nothing in § 1104(a) 

purports to limit the Deputy’s authority in the administration and enforcement of “duties . . . 

relating to the granting or refusal of visas.” So at this initial stage, the Court concludes that an 

order directed to him might redress Ameer’s injuries. Accord Logan v. Blinken, 2022 WL 

3715798, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022) (dismissing DHS Secretary and USCIS Director but not 

Deputy Chief of Mission on standing grounds). Ameer thus has standing to sue one of the 

named Defendants here.

B.

Now consider whether the Court can compel State to act on Ameer’s visa application.

Under § 706(1) of the APA, a court may “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or 

unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). This provision generally applies when an agency 
8 

fails to take an action required by law. Yet courts’ authority to compel action under § 706(1) is 

limited. A § 706(1) claim “can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to 

take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 

U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004). To merit relief, Ameer must show that State is subject to a “legal duty” 

that is “ministerial or nondiscretionary” and amounts to “a specific, unequivocal command.” W.

Org. of Res. Councils v. Zinke, 892 F.3d 1234, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). The 

standards for granting mandamus relief “are essentially the same.” Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. 

Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 659 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

Ameer seeks § 706(1) and mandamus relief on the grounds that State has a discrete and 

nondiscretionary duty to adjudicate her visa application within a reasonable time. See Compl. ¶¶

12–32. This duty arises from the INA and its implementing regulations. The INA requires that

“[a]ll nonimmigrant visa applications shall be reviewed and adjudicated by a consular officer.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1202(d). And the INA’s implementing regulations dictate that once “a visa application 

has been properly completed and executed . . . the consular officer must issue the visa, refuse the 

visa, or . . . discontinue granting the visa.” 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(a).

As this Court and others have concluded, these provisions establish a discrete duty for 

State to adjudicate visa applications. See Yaghoubnezhad, 2024 WL 2077551, at *7; Vulupala v. 

Barr, 438 F. Supp. 3d 93, 100 (D.D.C. 2020); Khazaei, 2023 WL 6065095, at *6 (same). 

Judicial review under § 706(1) or mandamus relief is therefore appropriate if a consular officer 

has indefinitely delayed “issu[ing] or refus[ing] [a] visa.” 22 C.F.R. § 41.121(a).

Ameer claims that State has shirked its duty to either “issue” or “refuse” her visa 

application by casting it into a purgatory of “administrative processing.” But, as with most cases 

of this type, this is not the full story. In its Motion to Dismiss, State contends that a consular 
9 

officer has, in fact, “refused” Ameer’s application under INA § 221(g), thereby discharging its

duty to adjudicate Ameer’s applications. See MTD at 23. Ameer’s Complaint does not indicate

that her application was first refused under § 221(g). But she concedes so much in her 

Opposition. See Opp’n at 15. 

Still, the parties disagree about the legal significance of the § 221(g) refusal. Because her 

application remains in “administrative processing,” Ameer contends that her § 221(g) refusal 

was not “final.” See Opp’n at 17–19. And, according to Ameer, State discharges its duty only 

when it either issues a “final” refusal or grants the visa. Meanwhile, State argues that once it has 

issued a § 221(g) refusal it has no statutory or regulatory obligation to take any further action. 

Opp’n at 23. 

The Court addressed this issue at length in Yaghoubnezhad. 2024 WL 2077551, at *8–9. 

And it concluded that neither the INA nor its implementing regulations impose a duty on State to 

complete “administrative processing” once it has already refused a visa under § 221(g). Id. The 

same analysis applies here. By refusing Ameer’s application under § 221(g) following a 

consular interview, State complied with the regulations governing visa adjudications. For the 

Court to require anything more would be to “impose a duty that has no basis in the INA or its 

implementing regulations.” Id. at 9. And judicial review of Ameer’s refused application would 

“clash[] with the longstanding assumption that aliens residing abroad are ‘barred from 

challenging consular visa decisions in federal court unless legislation specifically permitted such 

actions.’” Id. (quoting Saavedra Bruno v. Albright, 197 F.3d 1153, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 

(emphasis added)). Without “a specific, unequivocal command” from Congress requiring State 

to complete administrative processing following a visa refusal, State has not “unlawfully 

withheld” any action that the Court can compel by mandamus or under the APA. See id. 
10 

C. 

State also raises consular nonreviewability as a merits bar to Ameer’s claims. “Th[is]

doctrine holds that a consular official’s decision to issue or withhold a visa is not subject to 

judicial review, at least unless Congress says otherwise.” Saavedra Bruno, 197 F.3d at 1159. 

Ameer argues that consular nonreviewability does not bar review when State has failed to issue a 

final decision on a visa application. See Opp’n at 14–19. 

But recall that Ameer concedes her visa application was refused under § 221(g). The 

Court is barred from reviewing this decision under consular nonreviewability. See 

Yaghoubnezhad, 2024 WL 2077551, at *10–11. Were the Court to order State to complete 

administrative processing, it would, in effect, be ordering State to re-adjudicate its initial 

refusal—which necessarily entails a reexamination of that refusal’s substance. Id. at 11. This 

kind of review is precisely what consular nonreviewability counsels against. Id. 

The Court does not doubt that it can “compel the agency to issue a decision—up or 

down—on a long-pending application.” Al-Gharawy v. DHS, 617 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 

2022). But once an agency has issued a decision, the Court must “steer clear of the substance of 

the decision.” Id. In this case, that means refraining from ordering additional processing of a 

refused visa application. 

D.

The Court has already given two independent grounds for dismissal: lack of a 

nondiscretionary duty and consular nonreviewability. Nor can Ameer succeed on the merits.

To evaluate whether an agency’s delay is unreasonable, the Court applies the six-factor 

test from Telecommunications Research & Action Center (TRAC) v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. 

Cir. 1984). The TRAC factors are: 
11 

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of 

reason;

(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with 

which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory 

scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; 

(3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less 

tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake;

(4) the Court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency 

activities of a higher or competing priority; 

(5) the Court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests 

prejudiced by delay; and

(6) the Court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in 

order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed. 

In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 

(quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80) (cleaned up). 

Ameer argues that a TRAC analysis is “inappropriate” at the motion-to-dismiss stage and 

“useless” in the visa adjudication context. MTD at 28–32. This assertion is belied by the 

Circuit’s recent decision in Da Costa v. Immigration Investor Program Office, 80 F.4th 330, 340 

(D.C. Cir. 2023), affirming a district court’s dismissal of a visa adjudication case on TRAC

factors. This is not to mention the dozens of similar cases in this district granting Rule 12(b)(6) 

motions following a TRAC analysis. See, e.g., Bega v. Jaddou, 2022 WL 17403123 (D.D.C. 

Dec. 2, 2022) (“[A]pplication of the TRAC factors is appropriate at the motion-to-dismiss stage 

when the facts alleged do not support a plausible claim of unreasonable delay.”). As in those 

cases, the record here provides sufficient undisputed facts—namely, the short length of the 

delay—to determine whether Ameer has pled a “plausible claim for unreasonable administrative 

delay” under TRAC. See Mokkapati v. Mayorkas, 2022 WL 2817840, at *4 n.4 (D.D.C. July 19, 

2022) (collecting cases). So a TRAC analysis is appropriate. 
12 

Courts typically consider TRAC factors one and two together. Dastagir v. Blinken, 557 F. 

Supp. 3d 160, 165 (D.D.C. 2021). These factors “strongly favor” State because “Congress has 

not supplied a rule of reason” or “statutory deadline” for processing non-immigrant H-1B visa 

applications. See Yaghoubnezhad, 2024 WL 2077551, at *12. “To the contrary, Congress has 

given the agencies wide discretion in the area of immigration processing.” Skalka v. Kelly, 246 

F. Supp. 3d 147, 153–54 (D.D.C. 2017). 

Ameer argues that Congress set a timeframe for adjudication in 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b), 

which states that “[i]t is the sense of Congress that the processing of an immigration benefit 

application should be completed not later than 180 days after the initial filing of the application.” 

But several courts have held that the “sense of Congress” language reflects that the provision is 

“precatory” and not binding on the agency. Palakuru v. Renaud, 521 F. Supp. 3d 46, 51 (D.D.C. 

2021); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 529 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting the 

First, Third, and Ninth Circuits, have treated similar language as “precatory”). And, in any case, 

courts have regularly found far longer delays insufficient to support an unreasonable delay claim. 

Yaghoubnezhad, 2024 WL 2077551, at *11 (collecting cases). 

The fourth factor likewise “strongly disfavors” Ameer, because granting her application 

would enable “line jumping,” putting her application “ahead of longer-pending petitions.” Da 

Costa, 80 F.4th at 343. Ameer disclaims that any order from the Court would have such effect. 

Opp’n at 37. But the relief Ameer seeks—expedited adjudication—would “necessarily 

reshuffle[] the queue of other applicants also waiting for adjudication of their cases.” Dastagir, 

557 F. Supp. 3d at 167. More, since Ameer does not allege any impropriety by State in its 

processing of her application, Opp’n at 39, the sixth factor does not help her either. 
13 

Factors three and five—“the interests prejudiced by delay” and its effects on “human 

health and welfare”—weigh slightly in favor of Ameer. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. Ameer alleges 

that because of the delay in visa processing she faces “the possibility of termination” from her 

position at Penn State. Compl. ¶ 3. This would put her in a position where she “may not be able 

to provide for her family.” Id. Though these disruptions are undoubtedly frustrating for Ameer, 

many other visa applicants face similar circumstances. See Palakuru, 521 F. Supp. 3d at 53. 

In short, Plaintiff’s hardships cannot “tip the scales” when weighed against the other four 

factors. Da Costa, 80 F.4th at 344. All told, Ameer loses under TRAC. 

IV.

For these reasons, State’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted. While the desire to work 

and teach in the United States is a worthy one, visa-related matters are particularly within the 

grace of the Executive Branch, and this is not one of the exceedingly rare situations where 

judicial oversight is allowed. A separate Order will issue today. 

 

Dated: June 4, 2024 TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.