UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

GWENDOLYN P.,

 Plaintiff,

 Case No. 20 C 3339

 v.

 Magistrate Judge Sunil R. Harjani

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Gwendolyn P. challenges the ALJ’s denial of her application for Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act. Because the ALJ’s decision is supported 

by substantial evidence, the Court denies Gwendolyn’s motion for summary judgment [22] and 

grants the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [26].

BACKGROUND

Gwendolyn applied for DIB on June 20, 2017, alleging disability due to rheumatoid 

arthritis, osteoarthritis in both knees, degenerative arthritis in her cervical and lumbar spine, 

diabetes, high blood pressure, bulging disc in her cervical and lumbar spine, and left vocal cord 

paralysis since March 28, 2017. She is also obese and suffers from fibromyalgia and 

hypothyroidism. Gwendolyn was born on September 12, 1959 and was 59 years-old at the time 

of her administrative hearing. She completed high school and has past relevant work as a quality 

assurance manager. Gwendolyn last worked on March 28, 2017, when she was laid off.

On May 28, 2019, ALJ Luke Woltering issued a decision denying Gwendolyn’s

application. (R. 18-32). ALJ Woltering found that Gwendolyn’s rheumatoid arthritis in the 

bilateral hands, degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, degenerative joint 

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disease of the right shoulder, degenerative joint disease of the bilateral knees, fibromyalgia, and 

obesity were severe impairments, but they do not meet or medically equal the severity of any of 

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. at 17-19. The ALJ 

determined that Gwendolyn retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a limited 

range of sedentary work except that she can frequently balance; occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, 

crawl and climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps, and stairs; frequently push and pull with the 

bilateral upper extremities; occasionally overhead reach with the dominant right upper extremity; 

needs a cane for standing and walking; cannot work around hazards such as unprotected heights 

and exposed moving mechanical parts; and can frequently handle and finger with the bilateral 

upper extremities. Id. at 19-23. Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Gwendolyn is 

able to perform her past relevant work as a user support analyst as generally performed. Id. at 24. 

As a result, the ALJ found that Gwendolyn was not disabled from March 28, 2017 through the 

date of the decision. Id.

DISCUSSION

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether 

a claimant is disabled, the ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry: (1) whether the claimant is currently 

unemployed; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant’s 

impairment meets or equals any of the listings found in the regulations, see 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. 

P, App. 1 (2004); (4) whether the claimant is unable to perform her former occupation; and (5) 

whether the claimant is unable to perform any other available work in light of her age, education, 

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and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 

2000). These steps are to be performed sequentially. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). “An affirmative 

answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. 

A negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a determination 

that a claimant is not disabled.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868 (quoting Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 

160, 162 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985)).

Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings 

are supported by substantial evidence or based upon a legal error. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 

936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence “means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence 

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 

S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 US 197, 229 (1938)). 

“Although this standard is generous, it is not entirely uncritical.” Steele, 290 F.3d at 940. Where 

the Commissioner’s decision “lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent

meaningful review, the case must be remanded.” Id.

Gwendolyn raises three challenges to the ALJ’s decision: (1) the ALJ’s finding that her 

inflammatory arthritis does not satisfy the requirements of Listing 14.09D is not supported by 

substantial evidence; (2) substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision to find her 

treating physicians’ opinions unpersuasive; and (3) the ALJ erred in concluding that Gwendolyn 

could perform her past relevant work as a user support analyst. Because the ALJ’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence, which is only “more than a mere scintilla,” it does not require 

reversal or remand. Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154.

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A. Listing 14.09D - Inflammatory Arthritis

The ALJ found at step three that Gwendolyn’s impairments did not meet or equal Listing 

14.09 for inflammatory arthritis. “At step three, an ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s 

impairments are ‘severe enough’ to be presumptively disabling—that is, so severe that they 

prevent a person from doing any gainful activity and make further inquiry into whether the person 

can work unnecessary.” Jeske v. Saul 955 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2020). In considering whether 

a claimant meets or equals a listed impairment, “the ALJ ‘must discuss the listing by name and 

offer more than a perfunctory analysis of the listing.’” Id. The claimant bears the burden of 

showing that her impairments meet all the criteria of a listing. Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 

583 (7th Cir. 2006).

Gwendolyn contends that the ALJ erred at step three by failing to find her impairments 

meet Listing 14.09D.1

 Listing 14.09D requires: (1) repeated manifestations of inflammatory 

arthritis, (2) with at least two of the constitutional symptoms or signs (severe fatigue, fever, 

malaise, or involuntary weight loss) and (3) marked limitation of activities of daily living, social 

functioning, or completing tasks in a timely manner due to deficiencies in concentration, 

persistence, or pace. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 14.09D. The ALJ found that the 

record fails to reflect repeated manifestations of inflammatory arthritis, with at least two of the 

following: severe fatigue, fever, malaise, or involuntary weight loss. (R. 19). The ALJ stated 

Gwendolyn’s “treatment notes consistently reflect no fatigue, fever, weight loss, or depression.” 

Id. Last, the ALJ found that the record does not demonstrate a “marked limitation in activities of 

daily living, maintaining social functioning, or completing tasks in a timely manner due to 

deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace.” Id. The ALJ explained that Gwendolyn 

1 Gwendolyn does not argue that her impairments meet sections A, B, or C of Listing 14.09.

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“testified at the hearing and reported numerous activities that she conducts unassisted and family 

members she interacts with, and [she] has stated she takes care of her mother.” Id. Gwendolyn 

contends that the record shows repeated manifestations of inflammatory arthritis with severe 

fatigue and malaise with a marked limitation in completing tasks in a timely manner due to 

deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace.

The Court finds that no reversible error occurred at step three. Gwendolyn first disputes 

the ALJ’s finding that she did not experience “repeated” manifestations of inflammatory arthritis. 

(R. 19).2 The ALJ offered no separate analysis to support his conclusion that Gwendolyn has not 

experienced repeated manifestations of inflammatory arthritis. Id. But regardless of whether the 

initial durational requirement of Listing 14.09D is met, substantial evidence does not support the 

additional findings of constitutional symptoms and a marked limitation required to meet Listing 

14.09D. 

As to the constitutional symptoms, Gwendolyn does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that 

the record shows no fever or involuntary weight loss but argues that she suffers from severe fatigue 

and malaise. “Severe fatigue” is defined as “a frequent sense of exhaustion that results in 

significantly reduced physical activity or mental function.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 

Listing 14.00(C)(2). The ALJ noted that the treatment records consistently reflect no fatigue. (R. 

19). Specifically, the ALJ cited treatment notes on June 18, 2018, July 13, 2018, August 29, 2018, 

October 3, 2018, and January 25, 2019, in which Gwendolyn’s rheumatologist Daniel Torres, 

M.D., wrote that she “reports no fatigue.” Id. at 19, 1012, 1015, 1018, 1022, 1025. Gwendolyn 

2 Under the regulations, the term “repeated” means “the manifestations occur on an average of three 

times a year, or once every 4 months, each lasting 2 weeks or more; or the manifestations do not last for 2 

weeks but occur substantially more frequently than three times in a year or once every 4 months; or they 

occur less frequently than an average of three times a year or once every 4 months but last substantially 

longer than 2 weeks.” . 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 14.00(I)(3).

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concedes that the ALJ correctly noted instances where she reported no fatigue to Dr. Torres but 

claims that the record shows a “greater number of times when [she] complained of severe fatigue.” 

Doc. 21 at 6. Gwendolyn cites only three instances after her alleged onset date, when she reported 

fatigue to her physicians, none of which was severe fatigue, and one documented complaint of 

“feel[ing] tired most of the time,” which she attributed to new medication she was taking for 

fibromyalgia. (R. 737, 869, 875, 980). Gwendolyn also notes that in an Adult Function Report 

dated August 2, 2017, she reported to the agency: “I will try [to] clean a little but I get fatigue and 

that stops me.” Id. at 205 She further notes that in her Disability Report – Appeal filed on October 

23, 2017,she stated: “I’m severely fatigued.” Id. at 221. The record as a whole belies Gwendolyn’s 

assertion of a great number of references in the record to severe fatigue. In fact, the medical 

evidence indicates a far greater number of instances in which Gwendolyn did not report any 

fatigue. In addition to the five instances the ALJ cited, Gwendolyn denied fatigue on 18 occasions 

between April 11, 2017 and January 25, 2019. Id. at 481, 485, 563, 567, 572, 576, 642, 646, 651, 

819, 824, 998, 1012, 1015, 1018, 1022, 1025, 1029. Moreover, the ALJ did not fully credit 

Gwendolyn’s own statements—a conclusion Gwendolyn does not contest. Therefore, the ALJ’s 

determination that Gwendolyn did not experience severe fatigue is supported by the lack of fatigue 

repeatedly noted in the treatment record.

Gwendolyn also contends the record shows she suffered from malaise. Malaise means

“frequent feelings of illness, bodily discomfort, or lack of well-being that result in significantly 

reduced physical activity or mental function.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing

14.00(C)(2). Gwendolyn acknowledges that her physicians’ treatment notes do not explicitly 

mention malaise. Doc. 21 at 6. Gwendolyn points, however, to “joint stiffness, muscle aches, and 

swollen and painful joints” and side effects of medication including dizziness, nausea, and 

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drowsiness as evidence of discomfort and lack of well-being to establish malaise. Id. at 6-7. The 

Commissioner responds that those findings are related to fibromyalgia and/or rheumatoid arthritis 

and do not meet the definition of malaise. Even if Gwendolyn’s joint stiffness, muscle aches, 

swollen, painful joints, and medication side effects could support her claim that she exhibits the 

constitutional symptom of malaise, the Court would nonetheless find that her arthritis did not meet 

Listing 14.09D. Malaise is only one of the two required symptoms for Listing 14.09D, and there 

is certainly more than a mere scintilla of evidence to support the ALJ’s determination that 

Gwendolyn did not suffer from severe fatigue. Thus, Gwendolyn cannot establish the presence of 

“at least two of the constitutional symptoms or signs.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing

14.09D.

Further, far more than a mere scintilla of evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that 

Gwendolyn did not meet Listing 14.09D because she had no “marked” limitation in completing 

tasks in a timely manner due to deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace.3 A “marked” 

limitation means that the symptoms of an immune system disorder “seriously interferes with [a 

claimant’s] ability to function independently, appropriately, and effectively.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, 

Subpt. P, App. 1, Listing 14.00(I)(5). Gwendolyn asserts that her subjective statements at the 

hearing and in her Adult Function Report and Disability Report – Appeal forms support a finding 

of marked limitation in her ability to complete tasks in a timely manner due to deficiencies in 

concentration, persistence, or pace. The ALJ acknowledged Gwendolyn’s testimony that “her 

memory had worsened due to pain and she was no longer able to remember information needed 

for her job.” (R. 19, 41-42). The ALJ found, however, that Gwendolyn’s subjective symptom 

3 The ALJ’s findings that Gwendolyn did not have a marked limitation in activities of daily living or 

maintaining of social functioning are not challenged by Gwendolyn.

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statements were not entirely consistent with the medical and other evidence of record.4 With 

regard to Gwendolyn’s memory, the record supports the ALJ’s conclusion. On one occasion in 

September 2017, Gwendolyn’s treating physician Dr. Premesh Malapati assessed memory loss,

and in September and November 2017, Gwendolyn complained of forgetfulness. Id. at 737-38, 

824, 875. But on six occasions thereafter, Gwendolyn denied memory loss. Id. at 841, 846, 853, 

860, 983, 999. And at all other appointments, Dr. Malapati did not assess any memory loss. Id. at 

818-19, 837, 842, 847, 855, 861, 985, 1002.

The ALJ further considered the opinions of Drs. Torres and Malapati who respectively 

opined that Gwendolyn would be off task 15% and 25% or more of a typical workday due to 

arthritis symptoms severe enough to interfere with the attention and concentration needed to 

perform even simple work tasks. (R. 23). However, as discussed below, the ALJ legitimately 

concluded that the treating opinion evidence was not persuasive. In discounting Drs. Torres’s and 

Malapati’s opinions, the ALJ found that Gwendolyn’s rheumatoid arthritis had improved and her 

tender points had decreased with medication and the record did not reflect that her impairments

resulted in time off-task. Id. Drs. Torres’s and Malapati’s treatment records do not include any 

indication that Gwendolyn’s impairments caused a concentration, persistence, or pace limitation. 

Rather, their treatment records show that she consistently appeared alert and fully oriented Id. at 

482, 485, 564, 568, 573, 577, 634, 643, 647, 651, 655, 659, 737, 837, 855, 861, 869, 872, 876, 

985, 1002, 1012, 1015, 1018, 1022, 1025, 1029. Likewise, in December 2017, the consultative 

examiner Dr. Dilip Patel found that Gwendolyn was oriented and had normal memory, behavior, 

concentration, and ability to relate. Id. at 768. Finally, state agency reviewing physicians Drs. 

Marion Panepinto and Colleen Ryan, whose opinions the ALJ found persuasive, found that 

4 Gwendolyn does not contest the ALJ’s subjective symptom finding.

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Gwendolyn could perform a limited range of sedentary work with no limitation on her ability to 

concentrate, persist, or maintain pace on a sustained and full-time basis.5 These are all legitimate 

considerations and the ALJ reasonably concluded that the record as a whole does not demonstrate 

a marked limitation in completing tasks in a timely manner due to deficiencies in concentration, 

persistence, or pace.

Gwendolyn also points out that she reported and testified to limitations in her ability to 

perform daily activities which purportedly show she is markedly limited in completing tasks in a 

timely manner due to concentration, persistence, or pace deficits. Doc. 21 at 7-8. The ALJ 

analyzed Gwendolyn’s daily activities and considered her reported limitations in carrying out her 

activities of daily living. (R. 19-20, 22). In that regard, the ALJ noted that Gwendolyn testified 

that “she has someone go with her to the store to carry groceries, and her daughter helps her with 

household chores.” Id. at 20. The ALJ also pointed out that Gwendolyn testified that “her pain 

medications put her to sleep, and she needs to lay down two or three times per day.” Id. The ALJ 

noted, however, that Gwendolyn’s testimony and written reports showed “numerous activities that 

she conducts unassisted.” Id. at 19. For example, Gwendolyn wrote that she was independent with 

showering, dressing, feeding, and cooking and that she did laundry once a week and washed dishes 

daily, although her daughter helped with more substantial housecleaning. Id. at 205-06. She also 

reported that she took care of her parents, drove, attended church weekly and her grandson’s games 

and school events, and shopped in stores for groceries two or three times monthly. Id. at 205, 207-

08. Gwendolyn also told her treating physician in November 2018 that she was caring for her 

mother. Id. at 980. At the hearing, Gwendolyn clarified that she does not help her mother with 

anything other than cooking and she no longer goes to church because it is hard for her to get 

5 Gwendolyn does not contest the ALJ’s finding that the state agency physicians’ opinions were 

persuasive.

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ready. Id. at 55-57. Based on this evidence, the ALJ reasonably found that Gwendolyn does have 

“some limitation” in performing her activities of daily living but concluded that her daily activities, 

taken together with the other evidence of record, suggest that she can perform work within the 

parameters of the RFC on a sustained and continuous basis. Id. at 22. In other words, the ALJ 

properly analyzed Gwendolyn’s daily activities in the light of the limitations she described but 

reasonably found that they do not evidence a marked limitation in completing tasks in a timely 

manner due to deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace.

More generally, Gwendolyn argues that the ALJ erred at step three by failing to specifically 

address evidence regarding the symptoms of her rheumatoid arthritis in her shoulders, feet, elbows, 

and hips. The ALJ identified inflammatory arthritis in Gwendolyn’s hands. (R. 21). As for her 

shoulders and feet, Gwendolyn correctly notes that the consultative examiner Dr. Patel offered a 

diagnosis of tenosynovitis or rheumatoid arthritis of the shoulders, and her treating physician Dr. 

Malapati assessed rheumatoid arthritis involving both feet. (R. 769, 855). But Gwendolyn having 

received these additional diagnoses does not mean that she meets the criteria of a listing. Weaver

v. Berryhill, 746 F. App'x 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2018) (“It was [the plaintiff's] burden to establish not 

just the existence of the conditions, but to provide evidence that they support specific limitations 

affecting her capacity to work.”); Sims v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 3701968, at * (S.D. July 28, 2017) 

(“A diagnosis alone is insufficient to establish a listing has been met.”). And critically, Gwendolyn 

does not explain how factoring in additional diagnoses of the shoulders and feet would have led to 

a different outcome with regard to Listing 14.09D at step three.

Moreover, the ALJ expressly considered Gwendolyn’s degenerative joint disease of her 

right shoulder in assessing her RFC. (R. 20). The ALJ cited a September 2016 x-ray of 

Gwendolyn’s right shoulder which showed moderate degenerative bony changes. Id. at 20, 378. 

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However, citing Dr. Malapati’s records where Gwendolyn reported “some soreness” in her neck 

and shoulders on September 20, 2017, continued shoulder pain on November 9, 2017, and then 

shoulder pain improved with medication on January 9, 2018, the ALJ noted that Gwendolyn has 

generally shown only mild to moderate soreness in her neck and shoulders. Id. at 20, 822, 834, 

844. The ALJ also noted the findings of the consultative examiner in December 2017 which 

showed normal, pain-free range of movements in her neck, only moderate stiffness in her 

shoulders, and only mild to moderate shoulder pain, though she did exhibit reduced range of 

motion in her shoulders. Id. at 20, 22, 768. As a result of her cervical spine and right shoulder 

impairments, the ALJ limited Gwendolyn to only occasional overhead reaching with her dominant 

right upper extremity and frequent pushing and pulling with her bilateral upper extremities. Id. at 

19, 20.

Although the ALJ did not expressly mention Dr. Malapati’s diagnosis of rheumatoid 

arthritis in Gwendolyn’s feet by name, he cited to portions of the record at which Dr. Malapati 

noted Gwendolyn complained of pain in her feet, reported pain in her feet improved with 

medication, and x-rays of her feet revealed only minor degenerative changes, demonstrating the 

ALJ adequately considered the condition of Gwendolyn’s feet. Id. at 20 (citing id. at 834, 844); id. 

at 21 (citing id. at 869). Moreover, when Gwendolyn’s rheumatologist Dr. Torres opined about 

Gwendolyn’s functioning in an Arthritis Medical Source Statement, he indicated that the only 

joints affected by Gwendolyn’s arthritis were the small joints of her hands and not her feet. Id. at 

967. Further, in evaluating Gwendolyn’s RFC, the ALJ explicitly considered that Gwendolyn 

repeatedly exhibited normal ambulation, which suggests that the rheumatoid arthritis in her feet 

does not impose significant functional limitations. Id. at 21 (citing id. at 869, 1012, 1015, 1029); 

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see also id. at 872, 1018, 1022, 1025. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by failing to explicitly 

mention Dr. Malapati’s rheumatoid arthritis diagnosis in his decision.

Gwendolyn also complains that the ALJ did not address symptoms related to her elbows 

and hips at step three. While the ALJ did not specifically discuss Gwendolyn’s elbows and hips, 

the ALJ was not required to “discuss every piece of evidence in the record and is prohibited only 

from ignoring an entire line of evidence that supports a finding of disability.” Deborah M. v. Saul, 

994 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 2021). Any error in the ALJ’s failure to mention evidence of 

Gwendolyn’s swelling and tenderness in her elbows and tenderness in her hips was harmless under 

the circumstances. First, the ALJ did not ignore an entire line of evidence contradicting his

decision at step three. The ALJ cited Dr. Malapati’s November 9, 2017 treatment record, which 

evidences Gwendolyn’s report of hip pain (R. 834) and his finding of swelling and tenderness in 

Gwendolyn’s elbows as well as tenderness in both hips (id. at 837). Id. at 20, 21. This establishes 

the ALJ’s awareness of these symptoms. Second, the ALJ considered the report of consultative 

examiner Dr. Patel on December 14, 2017, who found Gwendolyn’s elbows and hips normal on 

examination. Id. at 20-21, 768. Third, the ALJ considered and found persuasive the findings of 

state agency medical consultants Drs. Panepinto and Ryan, who reviewed the record on December 

20, 2017 and July 30, 2018, respectively, and opined that Gwendolyn could perform a reduced 

range of sedentary work. Id. at 72-84, 974. Fourth, Gwendolyn does not explain how the evidence 

of swelling and tenderness in her elbows and tenderness and pain in her hips should have led to a 

different result at step three. Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2021). Specifically, she 

has not addressed how this evidence supports a finding that she meets the requisite constitutional 

symptoms or a marked limitation of Listing 14.09D, and she “had the burden of proving disability 

at step three.” Deloney v. Saul, 840 F. App’x 1, 5 (7th Cir. 2020).

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For all these reasons, the Court rejects Gwendolyn’s step three challenge.

B. Treating Physicians’ Opinions

Regarding the ALJ’s weighing of the medical opinion evidence, Gwendolyn challenges 

only the ALJ’s assessment of the opinions of her rheumatologist Dr. Torres and her primary care 

physician Dr. Malapati. In March 2018, Dr. Torres completed an Arthritis Medical Source 

Statement and checked boxes to indicate that Gwendolyn could lift and carry ten pounds rarely 

and less than ten pounds occasionally, walk two city blocks without rest or severe pain, stand 

fifteen minutes, sit 30 minutes at a time but less than two hours in an eight-hour workday, use her 

arms, hands, and fingers without limitations, occasionally twist, rarely stoop or climb stairs, and 

never crouch or climb ladders. (R. 968-70). Dr. Torres also opined that Gwendolyn would need 

to shift positions at will, would need to walk for five minutes every half-hour, would not require 

unscheduled breaks or require an assistive device, was capable of low stress work, was likely to 

be off task 15% of the time, and would likely be absent about three days per month. Id.

That same month and using the same mainly check-box form, Dr. Malapati opined that 

Gwendolyn could lift and carry less than ten pounds rarely, walk one city block, sit and stand each 

for 20 minutes at a time but each for less than two hours total in an eight-hour workday, rarely 

twist, stoop, or climb stairs, and never crouch or climb ladders. (R. 976-77). Dr. Malapati also 

opined that Gwendolyn could use her arms, hands, and fingers only 40% of the time, would need 

to shift positions at will but would not need to walk around during the workday, should avoid cold 

temperatures, would sometimes need unscheduled breaks to lie down, was likely to be off task 

25% or more of the time, was incapable of even low stress work, and would likely be absent more 

than four days per month. Id. at 976-79.

Given Gwendolyn’s filing date, the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinion evidence was 

subject to new regulations pertaining to claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. 20 C.F.R. § 

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404.1520c (2017). Under the new regulations, the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific 

evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative 

medical finding(s), including those from [a claimant’s] medical sources.” Id. at § 404.1520c(a). 

The regulations direct the ALJ to consider medical opinions and prior administrative medical 

findings using several listed factors, including supportability, consistency, relationship with the 

claimant, specialization, and other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical opinion or 

prior administrative medical finding. Id. at § 404.1520c(a), (c). Supportability and consistency are 

the two most important factors. Id. at § 404.1520c(a). In assessing supportability, “[t]he more 

relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source 

are to support his or her medical opinion(s) . . . the more persuasive the medical opinions . . . will 

be.” Id. at C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). As to consistency, “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion 

. . . is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more 

persuasive the medical opinion(s) . . . will be.” Id. at C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2). In the decision, 

the ALJ must articulate “how persuasive [he] find[s] all of the medical opinions and all of the prior 

administrative medical findings in [a claimant’s] case record.” Id. at § 404.1520c(b). 

The ALJ found the opinions of Drs. Torres and Malapati unpersuasive. (R 23). He 

explained that their opinions lacked supportability and consistency with the record. Id. The ALJ 

found that despite performing in-person examinations, the doctors provided little explanation for 

how Gwendolyn’s impairments caused the opined limitations. Id. Moreover, their opinions that 

Gwendolyn needed the ability to switch between sitting and standing at will during an eight-hour 

workday and her impairments would cause her to be off task 15% and 25% or more of the workday 

were inconsistent with medical imaging showing only mild back and knee problems and the record 

which showed that her RA had improved and her tender points had decreased with medication. Id. 

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The ALJ further discredited the opinions of Drs. Torres and Malapati because Gwendolyn had 

identified numerous activities of daily living she could do herself. Id.

The ALJ provided sufficient reasons supported by the record for his conclusion that Drs. 

Torres’s and Malapati’s opinions were not persuasive. The ALJ permissibly discounted the 

Arthritis Medical Source Statements which consist largely of checked boxes with little explanation 

for the bases of their conclusions. A “[c]heck-box form[], unexplained, [is] generally weak 

evidence,” taking on greater significance only when “it is supported by medical records.”

Winkelman v. Saul, 835 F. App’x 889, 892 (7th Cir. 2021); Larson v. Astrue, 615 F.3d 744, 751 

(7th Cir. 2010). But here, the ALJ found that Drs. Torres’s and Malapati’s opinions were not 

consistent with or supported by the medical record. (R. 23). As the ALJ first correctly noted,

imaging showed only mild back and knee problems. Id. at 23, 869, 938, 950, 953 962, 964. 

Second, treatment notes from Dr. Torres, cited by the ALJ, showed improvement in Gwendolyn’s 

rheumatoid arthritis and her tender points decreased with medication. Id. at 21-23. Indeed, 

between September 2017 and January 2019, Dr. Torres repeatedly noted few or no tender points 

and assessed Gwendolyn’s rheumatoid arthritis as stable. Id. at 737, 869-70, 873, 876, 1013, 1016, 

1019, 1022-23, 1026, 1029-30. And as the ALJ recognized, as of March 2017 and on subsequent 

exams, Dr. Torres’s notes stated that Gwendolyn showed no joint tenderness or swelling and 

normal range of motion. Id. at 21, 479, 482, 485, 737, 876, 1013, 1016, 1019, 1022, 1026, 1029.

Further, Dr. Malapati noted on several occasions that Gwendolyn’s rheumatoid arthritis 

was controlled or improved on medication despite some variable symptoms. Id. at 818 (7/28/2017:

“RA controlled with MTX [methotrexate].”); id. at 822, 824 (9/20/2017: “Doing well”; “RA 

controlled with MTX”; “RA-hands and feet, improved and less warmth.”); id. at 844 (1/9/2018: 

“RA in hands, jaw and shoulders and knees and feet – improved with meds.”); Id. at 851 (2/6/2018: 

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“RA in hands, jaw and shoulders and knees and feet – improved with meds.”); id. at 996 (5/1/2018: 

“had R knee steroid injection and pain improved” and “feels better – RA symptoms improved.”). 

The ALJ was entitled to discount Drs. Torres’s and Malapati’s opinions due to lack of support in 

their own records. Pavlicek v. Saul, 994 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2021) (an ALJ may decline to 

credit a treating physician’s opinion “when the opinion is inconsistent with the physician’s 

treatment notes.”); Recha v. Saul, 843 F. App’x 1, 5 (7th Cir 2021). Finally, the ALJ permissibly

discounted Drs. Torres’ and Malapati’s assessment of Gwendolyn’s limitations based on their 

inconsistency with her reported ability to independently manage numerous activities of daily 

living, such as preparing her own meals, doing laundry and dishes, driving, handling her own 

finances, decorating her home, and attending her grandson’s games and school events. Id. at 22,

23, 46-47, 50, 206-08; Gebauer v. Saul, 801 F. App’x 404, 410-11 (7th Cir. 2020) (ALJ properly 

discounted treating physician’s opinions which conflicted with claimant’s daily activities).

Gwendolyn does not argue that the ALJ erred in relying on any of the cited facts. Instead, 

Gwendolyn points again to her diagnoses of bilateral shoulder and foot rheumatoid arthritis and 

evidence of tenderness of her feet, knees, and hips, pain in the balls of her feet, and swelling of her 

big toes and argues the ALJ ignored this significant medical evidence. But as discussed previously, 

a diagnosis alone is insufficient to establish the existence of specific functional limitations. 

Richards v. Berryhill, 743 F. App'x 26, 30 (7th Cir. 2018); Collins v. Barnhart, 114 F. App’x 229, 

234 (7th Cir. 2004)) (“[T]he existence of these conditions alone does not prove that the conditions 

so functionally limited [the claimant] as to render her completely disabled during the relevant 

period.”).

As noted above, the ALJ explicitly considered Gwendolyn’s shoulder condition. (R. 20). 

The ALJ also expressly considered evidence pertaining to Gwendolyn’s knees. Id. at 20-21. He 

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acknowledged that Gwendolyn complained of knee pain and expressly examined the impact of her 

degenerative joint disease of her knees on her RFC. Id. The ALJ cited to Gwendolyn’s x-rays 

demonstrating only minimal degenerative changes and joint space loss of the left knee and minimal 

degenerative changes and mild joint space loss of the right knee. Id. at 20, 21, 372, 375, 950. The 

ALJ explained that on recent physical examinations, Gwendolyn showed normal ambulation with 

no acute distress. Id. at 21, 869, 872, 1012, 1015, 1018, 1022, 1025, 1029. The ALJ found that 

Gwendolyn’s knee impairments caused certain postural and environmental limitations as well as 

her need for a cane in standing and walking and contributed to her sedentary exertional limitations. 

Id. at 21. Additionally, as detailed above, while the ALJ did not explicitly discuss Gwendolyn’s 

hips and feet symptoms, he specifically referenced treatment notes indicating Gwendolyn 

complained of pain in her feet, reported pain in her feet improved with medication, and x-rays of 

her feet revealed only minor degenerative changes. Id. at 20 (citing id. at 834, 844); id. at 21 (citing

id. at 869). As part of his RFC analysis, the ALJ also cited Dr. Malapati’s November 9, 2017 

treatment record, which evidences Gwendolyn’s report of hip pain, and considered the report of 

consultative examiner Dr. Patel who found Gwendolyn’s hips normal on examination. Id. at 20-

21, 768, 834.

In discounting her treating physicians’ opinions, Gwendolyn relatedly argues that the ALJ 

improperly “ignored evidence of multiple occasions” in which her symptoms were heightened or 

not well controlled by medication. Doc. 21 at 11-12. She claims these additional symptoms and 

findings support her allegation that she is unable to maintain a sitting or standing position for 

prolonged periods.6 Both Dr. Torres and Dr. Malapati found that Gwendolyn had limitations in 

6 In fact, one treatment note Gwendolyn cites from May 2018 reflects Gwendolyn reported “feel[ing] 

better” and her rheumatoid arthritis “symptoms improved. (R. 996). On another occasion when Gwendolyn 

reported “slightly worsening of generalized pain as well as pain in her hands,” she has been off prednisone 

for five weeks. Id. at 875.

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her ability to sit and stand for prolonged periods. (R. 968, 976). It is true that the ALJ’s decision 

did not mention every piece of evidence Gwendolyn cites, but it did not need to. Deborah M., 994 

F.3d at 788. “And the presence of contradictory evidence and arguments does not mean the ALJ’s 

determination is not supported by substantial evidence.” Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 903 (7th

Cir. 2021).

In any event, the ALJ did cite some of the exact pages of the record that Gwendolyn 

contends were ignored. (R. 19, 20, 21, 23, 822, 834, 839, 869, 1012, 1018, 1022). The ALJ also 

cited Dr. Patel’s December 2017 report, the same report Gwendolyn claims establishes that she 

cannot sit for prolonged periods. Id. at 20-21. Consistent with the ALJ’s description, the 

consultative examination results reflect that Gwendolyn became uncomfortable after sitting in a 

chair for only five minutes, exhibited significant stiffness in her knees and moderate stiffness in 

her back with “excruciating” pain in her knees, could not stand with her feet together, walked with 

an unsteady gait, took excessive time to stand from a seated position, and was unable to perform 

heel or toe walking, squat and arise, get on and off the examination table, or walk 50 feet without 

her cane. Id. at 20-21, 767-68, 770. However, for his RFC finding, the ALJ relied in part on state 

agency physicians Drs. Panepinto’s and Ryan’s opinions. Id. 22-23. Drs. Panepinto and Ryan 

expressly considered the results of the Dr. Patel’s consultative examination findings in assessing 

Gwendolyn’s functional limitations and nevertheless concluded that she was capable of a reduced 

range of sedentary work. Id. at 77, 79-82, 973-74. Specifically, Dr. Ryan found that the 

“[e]xhibited findings at the [consultative examination] regarding severity of knee pain and gait 

appear disproportionate to the remainder of the [medical evidence record].” Id. at 974. The ALJ 

was entitled to rely on these opinions and reasonably found that aside from the consultative 

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examination, Gwendolyn’s knee and back impairments have generally had mild to moderate 

symptoms. Id. at 22.

Finally, Gwendolyn criticizes the ALJ for failing to consider that Drs. Torres’s and 

Malapati’s opinions with respect to her sitting limitation, were consistent with each other and the 

observations of Dr. Patel and with respect to her staying on task limitation, were consistent with 

each, suggesting that these similarities bolster their persuasiveness. In evaluating the opinions, the 

ALJ acknowledged that Drs. Torres’s and Malapati’s opinions concurred with respect to a need 

for a sit/stand option and being off task 15% or more of a workday. (R. 23). “However, the fact 

that those three opinions are purportedly consistent with each other does not, in and of itself, 

establish that any of the opinions were entitled to greater weight or that the ALJ erred.” Gunder v. 

Saul, 2021 WL 2350063, at *11 (E.D. Wis. June 9, 2021). The regulations require the ALJ to 

assess how consistent an opinion is with the entire record as a whole, not only with another opinion. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2). Because the ALJ provided sufficient reasons supported by the record 

for discounting Dr. Torres’s and Dr. Malapati’s opinions, including inconsistencies with the

medical and other evidence of record, the ALJ did not err in evaluating the treating opinion 

evidence.

C. Past Relevant Work

Gwendolyn lastly argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in finding her capable of 

performing her past relevant work. To determine whether a claimant is “physically capable of 

returning to her former work, the administrative law judge . . . must ascertain the demands of that 

work in relation to the claimant’s present physical capacities.” Strittmatter v. Schweiker, 729 F.2d 

507, 509 (7th Cir. 1984). At step four, a “claimant is not disabled if he can do his past relevant 

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work either in the manner he performed it before the impairment or in the manner it is generally 

performed in the national economy.” Ray v. Berryhill, 915 F.3d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 2019).

Relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ found at step four that 

Gwendolyn could perform her past relevant work as a user support analyst as generally performed. 

(R. 24, 58-59). Gwendolyn argues that the ALJ’s finding that she can do her past user support 

analyst work as generally performed is not supported by substantial evidence because the job

requires constant speaking and she is limited in her speaking ability. An ALJ “is required only to 

incorporate into his hypotheticals those impairments and limitations that he accepts as 

credible.” Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 846 (7th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s failure to include a speaking limitation in the RFC and hypothetical. Gwendolyn points to 

January and August 2017 treatment notes from otolaryngologist J. Ortega, M.D., but this evidence 

does not establish any speaking limitations beyond August 2017. The record reflects that 

Gwendolyn underwent a thyroidectomy in October 2016 and immediately reported problems with 

her voice. (R. 641). Gwendolyn was referred to Dr. Ortega after experiencing hoarseness, inability 

to sing, and fullness in her throat. Id. at 706. Between January and August 2017, Gwendolyn saw 

Dr. Ortega five times. Id. at 641-714. During her last visit with Dr. Ortega on August 4, 2017, 

Gwendolyn reported continued improvement with her voice and described her voice as becoming 

“somewhat hoarse and weak” with speaking for long periods of time. Id. at 641. Dr. Ortega 

assessed a “very slight weakness to the left vocal cord” but found Gwendolyn had “essentially a 

normal voice.” Id. at 644. Dr. Ortega advised Gwendolyn that she may be sensitive to overuse of 

her voice as well as allergies and reflux but recommended the use of medications if she experiences 

these problems. Id. Dr. Ortega advised Gwendolyn to return for a follow-up in 6 months because 

“she [was] doing so well.” Id. Notably, Gwendolyn did not return to Dr. Ortega or seek further 

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treatment from any provider for her left vocal cord. In fact, on six occasions between November 

2017 and November 2018, Gwendolyn denied difficulty speaking. Id. at 841, 846, 853, 860, 983, 

999.

To support her claim of a speaking limitation, Gwendolyn also notes that in December 

2017 and at the reconsideration level, state agency physician Dr. Panepinto concluded that 

Gwendolyn was limited to occasional speaking. (R. 80). However, in September 2017, the initial 

reviewing physician Dr. Bilinsky did not find any speaking limitation, nor did reviewing physician 

Dr. Ryan in July 2018. Id. at 68, 973-74. All three reviewers noted that Gwendolyn’s throat 

surgery “appears to have only affected her ability to sing, not speak.” Id. at 68, 79, 972. The ALJ 

found the prior administrative medical findings somewhat supportable and consistent with the 

record. Id. at 22. In assessing Gwendolyn’s RFC, the ALJ relied on them in part in crafting an 

RFC determination for a reduced range of sedentary work without a speaking limitation. Id. at 22-

23. The ALJ was not required to adopt Dr. Panepinto’s prior administrative medical finding in its 

entirety. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); Schmidt, 496 F.3d at 845 (“an ALJ must consider the entire 

record, but the ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular physician’s opinion . . . .”). With 

no treatment records showing Gwendolyn experienced speaking difficulties during the period after 

August 2017, the ALJ’s refusal to include a speaking limitation in the RFC is substantially 

supported. Ultimately, Gwendolyn bore the burden of proving the existence and severity of 

limitations caused by her left vocal cord condition, but she has failed to carry her burden of 

showing any speaking difficulties or limitations after August 2017. Weaver, 746 F. App’x at 579. 

As a result, the ALJ’s decision to accept the VE’s testimony that Gwendolyn can perform her past 

relevant work as a user support analyst as the work is generally performed is supported by 

substantial evidence.

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Gwendolyn also argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she can perform the user support 

analyst work as she actually performed it. Contrary to Gwendolyn’s assertion, the ALJ clearly 

found that she could perform her past relevant work “as generally performed” not as actually 

performed. (R. 24). In any event, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Gwendolyn 

can perform her past relevant work as generally performed and the “ability to work a past job as it 

is generally performed is all that it needed to satisfy Step Four.” Joseph M. v. Saul, 2019 WL 

6918281, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2019). Accordingly, there is no error in the ALJ’s step four 

analysis and his findings are supported by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [22] is denied, the 

Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment [26] is granted, and the ALJ’s decision is 

affirmed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Acting Commissioner and against 

Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 9, 2021 ______________________________

Sunil R. Harjani

United States Magistrate Judge

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