IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

PEDRO CADENAS, 

a/k/a PEDRO CARDENAS,

Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 36690-1-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — Pedro Cadenas appeals after being convicted of first 

degree murder, second degree unlawful possession of a firearm, and attempted theft of a 

motor vehicle. We affirm his convictions and sentence, but remand for the trial court to 

exercise its discretion whether to waive community custody supervision fees. 

FACTS

Manual Molina was shot and killed by someone who tried to steal his sport utility 

vehicle. A police investigation concluded that Mr. Molina’s assailant was Pedro 

Cadenas, then 17 years old. The State charged Cadenas with first degree murder, or 

alternatively second degree murder, second degree unlawful possession of a firearm, and 

FILED

DECEMBER 22, 2020

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 36690-1-III

State v. Cadenas

2

attempted theft of a motor vehicle. In addition, the State alleged the firearm enhancement 

with respect to the murder charges. 

The matter proceeded to trial. During jury selection, defense counsel questioned 

venire juror 6 about something disclosed on his juror questionnaire. 

Q. . . . We noticed in the questionnaire . . . that there was

some trauma in the past with your mother being murdered and raped. 

That’s pretty serious. That’s why we’re asking you questions outside of the 

jury . . . . We’re just wondering how has that affected, you, and would it 

affect you to go through a murder-type trial?

A. Well . . . I don’t know for sure. You know, since yesterday 

[I] certainly have been reflecting on that period of time in my life. But, you 

know, I don’t know how emotional or whatever I’d get about it, but I think 

I’d be relatively stable.

Q. So you don’t feel like it would distract you in any way?

A. Well, that’s the part that I’m not really clear on if—if, yeah. I 

don’t think it would, but you never know. 

Q. If it did distract you, would you be willing to bring it to the 

Court’s attention? 

A. Sure. 

. . . .

Q. And then you also indicated in your questionnaire that you 

feel like you could not be fair and impartial in this case regarding your 

history with your mother’s trauma and those types of things. So to balance 

that out obviously you thought about it last night. Has your opinion 

changed? 

A. Well, I can’t say it’s changed. It’s basically—I put that down 

just as a flag, if nothing else, because I think it would be OK, but, you 

know, I don’t want to go with the pretense that—I’ll definitely, you know, 

be fine and wouldn’t have some, you know, it wouldn’t affect me. I don’t 

think it would, but, you know, I don’t know for sure. 

Report of Proceedings (RP) (Nov. 14, 2018) at 42-43.
No. 36690-1-III

State v. Cadenas

3

In response to a question from the State, the venire juror disclosed that his 

mother had been raped and murdered in 1980. After the parties said they had no 

further questions, the trial court excused the prospective juror from the courtroom.

Defense counsel challenged venire juror 6 for cause. The trial court denied 

the challenge. It explained, “Listening to the statements, the testimony of the 

prospective juror this morning, the Court does not believe that it’s been 

established that he could not be fair and impartial in this case.” RP (Nov. 14, 

2018) at 45-46. Ultimately, defense counsel exercised only four of the allowed 

eight peremptory challenges and permitted venire juror 6 to serve on the jury. 

The trial concluded with the jury finding Cadenas guilty of first degree murder, 

second degree unlawful firearm possession, and attempted theft of a motor vehicle. It 

also found that Cadenas was armed with a firearm during the commission of the murder. 

At sentencing, the trial court considered the risk assessment report from a 

community corrections officer (CCO), two statements by the victim’s family members, a 

letter from Cadenas’s mother, and the parties’ arguments. The CCO’s report discussed 

Cadenas’s uncooperative attitude and his extreme disruptive behavior throughout his 

incarceration. The mother’s letter discussed her son’s grievous childhood, including how 

her own incarceration and deportation left her then five-year-old son without a parent 

when his father was killed. 
No. 36690-1-III

State v. Cadenas

4

The State acknowledged that Cadenas’s youth normally would be a mitigating 

factor, but urged the court to sentence him to the upper end of the standard range. In 

making its argument, the State focused on Cadenas’s lack of remorse and behavior during 

incarceration. The State argued these factors signaled that Cadenas lacked an 

amenability to change. 

Defense counsel urged the court to sentence Cadenas to the bottom end of the 

standard range. Counsel emphasized the many hardships faced by Cadenas throughout 

his life. He discussed scientific literature that explained that teenagers did not have fully 

formed brains, resulting in an inability to engage in adult decision making. He also 

discussed how Cadenas might mature and behave more responsibly once he was given 

the structure and rehabilitative programs at the Department of Corrections. 

Defense counsel did not discuss the court’s authority, when sentencing a defendant 

who committed a crime as a juvenile, to sentence below the standard range or to waive 

the 60-month firearm enhancement. 

The court noted it “had a chance to consider this matter with some length,” and 

noted it had “certainly taken into consideration” Cadenas’s youth. RP (Mar. 19, 2019) at 

40-41. The court also noted “there is a great deal of research regarding adolescent brain 

development, and the lack thereof, and how that impacts an individual’s abilities to make 
No. 36690-1-III

State v. Cadenas

5

decisions and impulse control, things of that nature. So that’s given me a great deal of 

pause as to what is the appropriate sentence” in this case. RP (Mar. 19, 2019) at 41.

The court noted that Cadenas, during trial and sentencing, showed a “smugness” 

and “almost a total absence of any remorse.” RP (Mar. 19, 2019) at 41. The trial court 

imposed a sentence of 434 months, which was the top of the standard range. It also 

found Cadenas indigent for purposes of appeal and waived all discretionary costs. 

Cadenas timely appealed to this court. 

ANALYSIS

Cadenas makes four arguments on appeal. We address them in order.

1. JUROR BIAS

Cadenas contends the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury. He argues 

venire juror 6 was biased and should have been removed for cause. 

“Criminal defendants have a federal and state constitutional right to a fair and 

impartial jury.” State v. Irby, 187 Wn. App. 183, 192, 347 P.3d 1103 (2015). Allowing a 

juror who is biased to sit on the jury violates this right. Id. at 193. Actual bias means 

“the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the action, or to 

either party, which satisfies the court that the challenged person cannot try the issue 

impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging.” 

RCW 4.44.170(2). 
No. 36690-1-III

State v. Cadenas

6

Where a defendant fails to use all peremptory challenges and allows a purportedly 

biased juror to be seated on the jury, the defendant waives any error relating to the trial 

court’s refusal to remove the juror for cause. State v. Munzanreder, 199 Wn. App. 162, 

179-80, 398 P.3d 1160 (2017). Here, Cadenas retained four of his eight preemptory 

challenges at the end of jury selection. He chose not to use any of his remaining 

challenges and permitted venire juror 6 to be seated on the jury. Because of this, he 

waived any challenge to the trial court’s refusal to remove juror 6 for cause.

2. FAILURE TO MEANINGFULLY CONSIDER YOUTH AT SENTENCING

Citing In re Personal Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 474 P.3d 507 (2020), 

Cadenas contends the trial court erred by not taking into account his youth at sentencing. 

We disagree. The trial court explicitly noted its authority to take Cadenas’s youth into 

account. 

Citing State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 358 P.3d 359 (2015) and other authorities, 

Cadenas argues the trial court was required to meaningfully consider youth as a 

mitigating circumstance. We agree. 

Cadenas then argues that a meaningful consideration requires an on-the-record 

discussion and application of three youthful characteristics—(1) impetuousness and 

underdeveloped sense of responsibility, (2) increased susceptibility to negative external 

influences, and (3) unformed character and statistically higher prospects of report. We 
No. 36690-1-III

State v. Cadenas

7

disagree that O’Dell requires this. Rather, O’Dell says that “a trial court should consider 

[lay testimony] in evaluating whether youth diminished a defendant’s culpability.” Id. at 

697. 

This is what the trial court did. Both sides offered lay testimony on how youth 

contributed to Cadenas’s crimes, and the trial court considered this evidence. It 

nevertheless imposed a top of the standard range sentence. 

3. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Cadenas argues his trial counsel was ineffective for not citing O’Dell and other 

controlling authorities that authorize the trial court to sentence him below the standard 

range and even waive the otherwise mandatory firearm enhancement. 

To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that 

(1) counsel’s representation was deficient and (2) the deficiency was prejudicial. State v. 

McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). We need not address both 

deficient performance and resulting prejudice if a defendant makes an insufficient 

showing on either prong. State v. Gomez Cervantes, 169 Wn. App. 428, 434-35, 282 

P.3d 98 (2012). 

The trial court did not indicate any confusion about the law or its own authority to 

impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range. In fact, the trial court 

acknowledged its authority to impose a lesser sentence on account of Cadenas’s youth 
No. 36690-1-III

State v. Cadenas

8

and discussed considerations expressed in O’Dell. We presume the trial court was 

familiar with O’Dell and similar authorities and knew it could even waive the 60-month 

firearm enhancement. 

Despite knowing that it could impose a lesser sentence on account of Cadenas’s 

youth, it imposed the top of the standard range sentence. We are confident that defense 

counsel’s failure to cite cases and discuss the law, which the trial court presumably 

understood, did not prejudice Cadenas. Our conclusion might be different had the trial 

court imposed a bottom of the standard range sentence.

4. DISCRETIONARY SUPERVISION FEES

Cadenas contends the trial court erred in ordering him to pay supervisory fees for 

community custody. He argues these fees are a discretionary cost that may not be 

imposed on an indigent defendant such as himself. We disagree.

In State v. Spaulding, No. 53253-1-II, slip op. at 8-9 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 

2020), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2053253-1-II%20Published%

20Opinion.pdf, Division Two of this court held that a sentencing court is not 

prohibited by RCW 10.01.160(3) from imposing community supervision fees on an 

indigent defendant. Spaulding recognizes that RCW 10.01.160(3) prohibits discretionary 

costs from being imposed on an indigent defendant. Spaulding then notes that 

RCW 10.01.160(2) defines “cost” as an expense incurred by the State to prosecute a 
No. 36690-1-III 

State v. Cadenas 

defendant, to administer a deferred prosecution program, or to administer pretrial 

supervision. Id. at 9. Spaulding correctly concludes that community supervision fees do 

not qualify as a "cost" under that definition. Id. 

Nevertheless, RCW 9.94A.703(2)(d) explicitly permits a trial court to waive 

community custody supervision fees. Here, the trial court expressed its desire to waive 

all discretionary costs. Yet the aspect of the sentence that orders payment of community 

custody supervision fees is buried in the middle of a list of conditions in preprinted text. 

We suspect the trial court intended to waive these fees and remand to allow the trial court 

to do so at its discretion. 

Affirmed, but remanded to consider waiving community custody supervision fees. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

Lawrence-Berrey, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

Fearing, J. 

9