1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

WILLIAM FAULKNER, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) Case No. 1:20-CV-4206 

 ) 

v. ) Judge Robert W. Gettleman

 ) 

THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal ) 

Corporation; Chicago Police Detective ) 

ELIZABETH RYAN, Star. No. 21825; ) 

Chicago Police Detective HEATHER SCHERR, ) 

Star No. 21827; and Chicago Police Officer ) 

WILMER HERNANDEZ, Star No. 11216, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

 Plaintiff William Faulkner brings the instant three-count third amended complaint 

against defendants the City of Chicago (“the City”), Detective Elizabeth Ryan (“Detective 

Ryan”), Detective Heather Scherr (“Detective Scherr”), and Officer Wilmer Hernandez (“Officer 

Hernandez”) (collectively, “defendants”). Count I alleges deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights under the Fourth Amendment due to his allegedly wrongful arrest pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983; Count II alleges deprivation of his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment due 

to his allegedly unlawful pretrial detention pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and Count III seeks 

indemnification against the City under Illinois law. Defendants move for summary judgment in 

their favor on all counts (Doc. 80). For the reasons discussed below, the court grants defendants’ 

motion. 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff was arrested and charged with attempted first-degree murder, among other 

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things, in connection with the shooting of Marlo Phillips (“Phillips”). Phillips, who was 

seriously injured, identified plaintiff in a photo array as the individual who shot him, and his 

identification was a key piece of evidence against plaintiff. On July 24, 2019, the government 

dismissed the charges against plaintiff as nolle prosequi. Plaintiff is now suing defendants for 

violating his Fourth Amendment rights. According to plaintiff, Detective Ryan, Detective

Scherr, and Officer Hernandez lacked probable cause to arrest and detain him.1

 

 The shooting occurred on November 3, 2018, between 2:40‒2:50 p.m., while Phillips 

walked home from the grocery store. Phillips remembers a man running toward him with a 

firearm, and their interaction was captured on a Ring doorbell camera at 12011 South Stewart 

Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. The video shows Phillips pleading with the individual before the 

man shot him multiple times at close range and fled. Detectives Ryan and Scherr investigated 

the shooting and learned from neighbors that the shooter was a heavy-set black male. 

The detectives moved their investigation to the hospital where Phillips was being treated. 

They interviewed Phillips’ mother, Ungelique Franklin (“Franklin”), who was not present for the 

shooting but told the detectives that she was receiving information about the identity of her son’s 

shooter. The parties dispute how Franklin received this information: whether from individuals in 

the neighborhood, her telephone, or social media. Franklin lived in Wisconsin at the time and 

was not familiar with the south side of Chicago. The detectives also interviewed Phillips, who 

told them that he did not know the shooter or the shooter’s motive, but “could never forget his 

face.” 

Later that day, Franklin sent Detective Ryan a text message containing a Facebook 

photograph of a potential suspect in her son’s shooting. Detective Ryan asked Franklin how she 

1 The officers are all employed by the City of Chicago, which is a municipal corporation of the State of Illinois. 

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obtained the photograph, and the parties dispute how she responded. According to defendants, 

Franklin refused to provide additional details about how she obtained the photograph. 

Conversely, in her deposition, Franklin testified that she told Detective Ryan that her second 

cousin, Eric Washington (also known as “Monty”), gave her information about the shooter, 

leading her to conduct her own social media investigation. Franklin stated that Monty overheard 

a conversation at his trade school in which his classmates were “bragging about how their friend 

had just shot up a boy on 120th and Stewart,” which he and Franklin understood to refer to

Phillips. In his deposition, Eric Washington denied overhearing this conversation and discussing

Phillips’s shooting with Franklin, although he visited Phillips at the hospital. 

In addition to disputing what Franklin told Detective Ryan about the source of the 

photograph, the parties dispute whether Franklin sent additional photographs to Detective Ryan, 

and whether these photographs contained people other than plaintiff. Neither Franklin, Ryan, 

nor Phillips knew the identity of the individual(s) in the photograph(s) at that time.2

Detective Ryan printed the initial photograph and distributed copies among the tactical 

team. On November 9, 2018, Officer Hernandez saw the photograph on his sergeant’s desk and 

recognized the depicted individual as plaintiff. According to his deposition testimony, he 

informed Detective Ryan of plaintiff’s identity, which he knew from seeing plaintiff around the 

neighborhood. He also gave Ryan an “Individual Record” (“IR”) number that was assigned to 

plaintiff from a prior arrest, although Hernandez testified that he himself had not arrested or 

otherwise interacted with plaintiff previously. Officer Hernandez testified that plaintiff had gang 

affiliations, although plaintiff’s arrest report shows no gang affiliations and plaintiff testified that 

2 Plaintiff does not dispute that he is the individual depicted in the initial photograph. Franklin identified another 

individual named “Cody” in a later photograph, whom she indicated in her deposition was one of the shooter’s 

“close buddies.”

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he was never in a gang. Plaintiff then became the primary suspect of this investigation.

On November 10, 2018, Detective Ryan created a six-person photo array for Phillips with 

a photograph from plaintiff’s driver’s license. Detective Steven Kelnosky independently 

administered the photo array, with no knowledge of the suspect’s identity or location in the 

array. Phillips identified plaintiff as the person who shot him on November 3, 2018, noting that 

he will “never forget that face.” After Phillips identified plaintiff, “an investigative alert was 

issued with probable cause for his arrest.” Detective Ryan testified that Phillips’s identification 

of plaintiff in the photo array was the basis for probable cause. 

The parties dispute whether, prior to viewing the photo array, anyone showed Phillips a 

photograph of plaintiff or told him who the shooter was. Detective Kelnosky indicated in his 

deposition that he did not coach, pressure, threaten, coerce, or otherwise suggest to Phillips who 

he should identify in the array. Further, Phillips testified in his deposition that no one, including 

Franklin, sent him or showed him a picture of his shooter, or told him who the shooter was. 

Detective Ryan testified that she did not know if Phillips saw any pictures of plaintiff prior to 

viewing the photo array or if Franklin said anything to Phillips about plaintiff’s identity. 

Detective Scherr denied that Franklin did so. On the other hand, Franklin testified in her 

deposition that she showed Phillips a photograph of plaintiff before texting it to Detective Ryan, 

telling Phillips that plaintiff was the shooter.3

 Her text messages show that she told Detective 

Ryan that, “He said this is the boy that shot him. The last picture I sent you.” Moreover, 

according to Franklin’s testimony, Phillips came out of the photo array and indicated to Franklin

3 Franklin stated that “I think I showed Marlo [(Phillips)] the photograph before I showed the detective. Before I 

showed it to the detectives. . . . He was in the hospital and I was mad, screaming and yelling at him telling him don’t 

deny it. He knows that’s who shot him and he told me the truth.” When asked if Franklin asked Phillips if the 

individual in the photograph was the person who shot him, Franklin responded, “No. I didn’t ask him. I told him.” 

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that he identified plaintiff because of her actions.4

 Defendants interpret Franklin’s testimony to 

say that Phillips identified plaintiff based on his face.

Regardless of why Phillips identified plaintiff as the shooter, Officer Hernandez began 

searching for plaintiff in response to the investigative alert. He discovered that plaintiff was a 

student at Eastern Illinois University (“EIU”) and a resident of a dormitory on campus. The 

parties dispute the driving distance between EIU and the scene of the shooting, with defendants 

asserting that EIU is two hours and 40 minutes from the scene of the shooting and plaintiff 

asserting that the distance is closer to three hours. 

On December 5, 2018, Officer Hernandez and two other officers arrested plaintiff in his 

dormitory at EIU and transported him to Chicago, where Detectives Ryan and Scherr 

interviewed him. Plaintiff denied involvement in the shooting and claimed that he was at his 

dormitory the entire weekend. He ate in the dining hall on Saturday night. Additional 

investigation resulted in still pictures from surveillance footage from EIU and a log of activity 

from plaintiff’s student identification card. Plaintiff’s card was swiped at an EIU dining hall on 

November 3, 2018, at 5:58 p.m., which is, at most, three hours and 18 minutes after the Phillips

shooting.5

 

On December 6, 2018, Assistant State’s Attorney Christopher Moss (“ASA Moss”), from 

the Cook County felony review unit, spoke with the detectives about their investigation. He 

independently reviewed the police reports, photo array, Ring doorbell video, and plaintiff’s 

electronically recorded interview, in addition to re-interviewing Phillips at the hospital. Phillips 

reaffirmed that plaintiff was the individual who shot him. ASA Moss approved felony charges 

4 Franklin testified that Phillips “came out of the room in a couple of seconds and he was like I identified them, 

momma, because I had showed him the picture.”

5 Plaintiff, who argues that his arrest report shows that the shooting occurred at 2:50 p.m., indicates that he swiped

into the dining hall only three hours and eight minutes after the shooting. 

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against plaintiff. The parties dispute whether ASA Moss, in approving felony charges against 

plaintiff, was fully apprised of the nature of Franklin’s “civilian investigation” using social 

media. According to defendants, ASA Moss “had no reason to believe that [Franklin’s]

investigation was an issue.” Plaintiff counters that ASA Moss testified that “he believed the 

mother got the name of an individual, went on social media, got a photo of the individual, and 

gave it to detectives,” which is inconsistent with the facts as Franklin presents them. 

After ASA Moss approved charges against plaintiff, Phillips signed a criminal complaint 

charging him, and on December 7, 2018, a Cook County judge found probable cause to detain 

him. Later in December, a grand jury returned a twelve-count indictment against plaintiff after 

hearing testimony from Detective Ryan, who indicated that there was video surveillance footage 

of the incident and that her investigation revealed that plaintiff shot Phillips. 

The investigation continued after plaintiff’s indictment. In January 2019, plaintiff’s 

defense attorneys received video surveillance footage from EIU, showing plaintiff swiping his 

card at the dining hall at 2:06 p.m. on November 2, 2018, the day before the shooting.6

 It also 

showed plaintiff walking through Lawson Hall at 5:56 p.m. and entering Andrews Hall at 5:58 

p.m. on November 3, 2018 (the day of the shooting). On June 11, 2019, plaintiff’s defense 

attorneys produced statements from three alibi witnesses, including two witnesses who said that 

they were with plaintiff throughout the day on November 3, playing video games in plaintiff’s 

room. These witnesses indicate that the only time they were not with plaintiff was when they left 

to go to Walmart. 

On July 24, 2019, the state dropped its charges against plaintiff after reviewing his 

6 Defendants argue that plaintiff lacks foundation to introduce the swipe card information because, as Detective 

Ryan indicated in her deposition, “anybody can use his card.” There is no evidence that anyone except plaintiff used 

plaintiff’s card that weekend. 

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criminal file, and he was released after spending over seven months in custody. The state 

indicated that it did not believe that it could meet its burden of proof at trial. Franklin told the 

assistant state’s attorney that Phillips was in federal prison in North Carolina, and he was 

unwilling to testify at plaintiff’s trial—although in his deposition, Phillips testified that no one 

from the state’s attorney’s office reached out to him, and he would have cooperated if someone 

had asked. Moreover, the state indicated that “[t]he doorbell video does not appear to show the 

[plaintiff]” because “[t]he stature of the [plaintiff] does not match the man on the video.”7

 The 

state was concerned with the “tight timeline,” and that Phillips “saw Defendant’s Facebook 

photo before photo array.” 

 Plaintiff filed the instant action on July 16, 2020, for violations of his constitutional rights 

under the Fourth Amendment. He argues that his arrest and pretrial detention were not supported 

by probable cause. Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment, arguing that no 

reasonable jury could find in favor of plaintiff because plaintiff raises no genuine dispute of 

material fact. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). The movant bears the burden to show that there is no genuine dispute of material fact 

preventing the entry of judgment in its favor as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The Supreme Court has determined that a fact is “material” when it 

may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law and the dispute is “genuine” when 

7 Detective Ryan testified that she could not tell if plaintiff looked like the individual in the video because the video 

was distorted. The parties dispute Detective Scherr’s testimony regarding whether plaintiff looked like the 

individual in the video. Officer Hernandez could not recognize the individual in the video because it was “grainy.” 

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the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is limited to 

determining whether the parties have provided sufficient evidence to support a factual dispute 

that warrants submission to a jury for resolution at trial. See id. at 249. The court must view all 

facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in his

favor. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). But the 

nonmovant must do more than raise “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at

586. Rather, the nonmovant “must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly 

supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 

(1986). 

DISCUSSION

 Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on all counts.8 They argue 

that Detectives Ryan and Scherr and Officer Hernandez are entitled to summary judgment on 

plaintiff’s claims of false arrest (Count I) and unlawful pretrial detention (Count II) for three 

reasons: (1) the undisputed material facts demonstrate that they had probable cause to arrest and 

detain plaintiff; (2) their alleged misconduct was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries; 

and (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity. Without claims against the individual officers, a 

jury cannot find the City to be liable on plaintiff’s state-law indemnification claim (Count III), so 

defendants argue that they are also entitled to summary judgment on that claim. The court 

agrees that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all counts. 

8 The court acknowledges defendants’ argument that plaintiff violates L.R. 56.1 and the court’s admonishment in 

Portis v. City of Chicago, 510 F. Supp. 2d 461 (N.D. Ill. 2007), to separate facts among paragraphs when filing a 

statement of material facts. As the court noted in Portis, not all technically noncompliant filings fail to abide with 

the spirit of the rule, such as filings that group facts in a logical manner, as here. Id. at 463. 

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The court begins by agreeing with plaintiff that a reasonable jury could find that 

defendants did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff. Defendants correctly note that 

probable cause is a complete defense to claims for false arrest and wrongful pretrial detention, 

and the threshold to establish probable cause is low. See Norris v. Serrato, 761 Fed. App’x 612, 

615 (7th Cir. 2019). An officer has probable cause to seize (i.e., arrest or detain) an individual if 

the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to permit a reasonably 

prudent person to believe that the suspect had committed or is committing an offense. See

Coleman v. City of Peoria, 935 F.3d 336, 350 (7th Cir. 2019). Probable cause is based on an 

objective, common-sense evaluation of the totality of the evidence at the time. See Hart v. 

Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 587 (7th Cir. 2015). Moreover, certain determinations of probable cause 

are entitled to a presumption of validity, such as when a court has determined that there is

probable cause, Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019), or when a grand 

jury issues an indictment. See Coleman, 935 F.3d at 351. 

Defendants argue that in this case, a Cook County judge found probable cause to detain 

plaintiff and a grand jury indicted plaintiff, resulting in a presumption of probable cause. 

Further, defendants argue that regardless of whether the court presumes probable cause, no 

reasonable jury could find that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest and detain plaintiff 

because Phillips reliably identified plaintiff in the photo array. Even a single identification from 

a credible eyewitness is enough to establish probable cause. See Phillips v. Allen, 668 F.3d 913, 

915 (7th Cir. 2012). In the instant case, Detective Ryan testified that Phillips’s identification 

formed the basis for probable cause that resulted in plaintiff’s arrest and subsequent detention. 

The court agrees that plaintiff provides no evidence to suggest that defendants coerced or 

manipulated Phillips into identifying plaintiff in the photo array. See id. at 917. 

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Plaintiff counters that there is a genuine dispute whether defendants acted reasonably in 

relying upon Franklin’s conversation with her cousin about the shooter, as well as her social 

media investigation. According to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the detectives knew 

that Franklin’s story was not credible and/or fabricated. The court agrees. Plaintiff also argues, 

and the court agrees, that a reasonable jury could find that Phillips’s identification was unreliable 

because defendants allegedly knew that Franklin had shown Phillips a photograph of plaintiff 

and told him to identify plaintiff.

9

 

If a jury found that the officers did know that Phillips unreliably identified plaintiff, the 

jury could also find it was unreasonable for defendants to rely upon his identification as the key 

foundation for probable cause to arrest plaintiff.10 While Detective Ryan’s testimony suggests 

that she did not know whether Franklin showed Phillips a picture of plaintiff before the array, or 

whether Franklin told him to identify plaintiff, Franklin’s testimony and her text messages to 

Detective Ryan suggest the opposite. The court does not make credibility determinations or 

weigh conflicting evidence upon summary judgment, and a reasonable jury could find either 

way. See Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 893 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018). 

It is true that a grand jury’s indictment of plaintiff raises a presumption of probable cause, 

as does a judge’s determination of probable cause before detention. The problem for defendants 

is that they arrested plaintiff before his indictment and before a judge found probable cause. 

9 Plaintiff also argues that inconsistencies between Phillips’ description of the shooter (taller than himself at 5’8”) 

and the shooter’s appearance in the Ring doorbell video (arguably taller than Phillips) versus plaintiff’s actual 

stature (at 5’4”) further suggest that defendants’ reliance on Phillips’s identification was unreasonable. The court 

agrees with defendant that these inconsistencies alone are not enough to negate probable cause. See, e.g., Cairel v. 

Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 835 (7th Cir. 2016). 10 The court rejects plaintiff’s argument that defendants disregarded or ignored exculpatory information when 

evaluating probable cause, including the “tight timeline” between the shooting and plaintiff’s swipe history at EIU’s 

campus over 170 miles away, which is corroborated by video surveillance footage. There is no evidence that 

defendants ignored this evidence rather than affording it less weight than plaintiff believes that it deserves. As 

defendants note, officers do not need to investigate a suspect’s alibi before arresting him if there is otherwise 

probable cause for arrest. See Jackson v. City of Peoria, 825 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2016).

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Both the grand jury and the judge found probable cause only after defendants’ investigation 

yielded additional evidence. For example, after plaintiff’s arrest, the totality of the evidence 

necessarily shifted to include defendants’ interview with plaintiff and plaintiff’s swipe card 

history at EIU, in addition to the still pictures from the surveillance footage, which are arguably 

probative. Moreover, plaintiff raises a genuine dispute whether ASA Moss’s understanding of 

the nature of Franklin’s social media investigation was different than defendants’ understanding 

of her investigation, as well as her role in defendants’ decision to name plaintiff as the primary 

suspect. Importantly, the state’s attorney’s office, not defendants, presented the case to the judge 

and grand jury. 

It is more difficult for plaintiff to rebut the presumption of probable cause at the time of 

his detention. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff 

provides no evidence to suggest that defendants caused untruthful evidence to be presented to the 

court. On the other hand, a reasonable jury could find that Detective Ryan made false statements 

before the grand jury when she might have knowingly or with a reckless disregard for the truth 

stated that plaintiff shot Phillips. See Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733, 

742‒43 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A ‘reckless disregard for the truth’ is demonstrated by showing that the 

officers entertained serious doubts as to the truth of their statements, had obvious reasons to 

doubt the accuracy of the information reported, or failed to inform the judicial officer of facts 

they knew would negate probable cause.”). Such a finding would be sufficient for plaintiff to 

avoid summary judgment on Count II (pretrial detention) if he could show that Detective Ryan’s 

false statements were necessary components of the grand jury’s decision that there was probable 

cause. Id. at 743. Plaintiff has provided no such evidence. 

Rather, this court concludes that no reasonable jury could find defendants to be liable for 

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plaintiff’s pretrial detention because plaintiff provides no evidence that defendants were a 

proximate cause of his harm. See Hoffman v. Knoebel, 894 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2018). In 

this case, the grand jury indicted plaintiff after the court determined that there was probable 

cause to detain him, so defendants cannot argue that plaintiff’s indictment broke the chain of 

causation. See Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2017). That being said, 

the court agrees with defendants that no reasonable jury could find that defendants were a

proximate cause of plaintiff’s alleged harm because there is no evidence that their post-arrest 

actions influenced the court’s decision to detain him. See id. Plaintiff has provided no evidence 

that defendants misled or pressured either ASA Moss to approve felony charges or the state to 

bring the case before the court. 

Thus, the court concludes that although a reasonable jury could find that defendants 

lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff (i.e., a reasonable jury could find in favor of plaintiff on 

Count I), no reasonable jury could find that defendants lacked probable cause to detain him (i.e., 

a reasonable jury could not find in favor of plaintiff on Count II). Still, the court grants summary 

judgment on Count I in favor of Officer Hernandez because there is no evidence that Officer 

Hernandez knowingly contributed to plaintiff’s false arrest. To the contrary, there is only 

evidence that he relied on the investigative alert. The Seventh Circuit has determined that an 

officer may, in objective good faith, rely on another officer’s information, “even if the officer 

himself does not have firsthand knowledge of facts that amount to the necessary level of 

suspicion to permit the given action,” under the collective knowledge doctrine. United States v. 

Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2010). As defendants argue, there is no evidence that 

Officer Hernandez unreasonably relied on the information provided by Detectives Ryan and 

Scherr. There is also no evidence that he falsely identified plaintiff in the photograph that 

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Detective Ryan circulated to the tactical team, or that he drafted false police reports with false 

testimony to establish probable cause to arrest plaintiff. 

Defendants’ last argument for summary judgment in their favor is that they are entitled to 

qualified immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from 

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). The Seventh Circuit has determined that 

qualified immunity protects officers whose assessments of probable cause were “reasonable, 

even if mistaken.” Tebbens v. Mushol, 692 F.3d 807, 820 (7th Cir. 2012). Defendants argue 

that Detectives Ryan and Scherr are entitled to qualified immunity because their assessments of 

probable cause, even if mistaken, were reasonable.

11 They argue that it is not contrary to clearly 

established law to rely on an investigative tip from a civilian, even if the tip is questionable. 

To evaluate this argument at summary judgment, the court is guided by two almostcircular determinations: first, whether a reasonable jury could find that the detectives did not 

have probable cause to arrest plaintiff, which entails evaluating the totality of the evidence; and 

second, whether the detectives’ mistaken assessment of probable cause to arrest plaintiff was

reasonable. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2019). As discussed 

above, the court answers the first question in the affirmative: a reasonable jury could find that the 

detectives did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff. The court, however, concludes that 

Detectives Ryan and Scherr are entitled to qualified immunity on Count I because, even if a jury 

11 They argue that Officer Hernandez in particular is entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably relied on 

the other officers’ investigation into plaintiff, and the Seventh Circuit has determined that an arresting officer is 

entitled to qualified immunity, even if the underlying probable cause assessment was incorrect, when the officer

reasonably relies on information from other officers. See Tangwell v. Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510, 517 (7th Cir. 1998). 

The court does not need to decide whether Officer Hernandez is entitled to qualified immunity because it determines 

that, in any event, he is not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s allegedly unconstitutional seizures. 

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were to determine that their assessment of probable cause was mistaken, the detectives’ 

determination that they had probable cause to arrest plaintiff was reasonable. See Tebbens, 692 

F.3d at 821 (“The qualified immunity defense provides ample protection to all but the plainly 

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”). Their assessment was largely based on 

difficult credibility determinations, with contradictory evidence. Consequently, the court grants 

summary judgment for all defendants on Counts I and II. 

In addition, the court concludes that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on 

Count III, or state-law indemnification against the City, because neither Detectives Ryan and 

Scherr nor Officer Hernandez can be found liable to plaintiff for his arrest and pretrial detention 

as a matter of law. Indemnification would allow plaintiff to hold the City liable for its 

employees’ conduct, but in this case, no reasonable jury could find that Officer Hernandez was 

the proximate cause of plaintiff’s allegedly unreasonable seizures. Moreover, no reasonable jury 

could find that defendants lacked probable cause to detain plaintiff before trial. Last, even if a 

reasonable jury found that Detectives Ryan and Scherr lacked probable cause to arrest plaintiff, 

they are entitled to qualified immunity. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court grants defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment on all counts (Doc. 80). 

 ENTER: 

_________________________________________ 

Robert W. Gettleman

United States District Judge

DATE: January 4, 2023

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