Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1503-JT-156 | December 10, 2015 Page 1 of 20

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David W. Stone IV

Anderson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the matter of the termination 

of the of the parent-child 

relationship of:

A.H. & B.H. (Minor Children)

And

G.H. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

December 10, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

48A02-1503-JT-156

Appeal from the Madison Circuit 

Court

The Honorable G. George Pancol, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

48C02-1409-JT-58 & 48C02-1409-

JT-59
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Riley, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Respondent, G.H. (Mother), appeals the trial court’s Order 

terminating her parental rights to her minor children, B.H. and A.H.

(collectively, Children).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Mother raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows: 

(1) Whether the trial court erred by adopting the Department of Child Services’ 

(DCS) proposed findings verbatim; and 

(2) Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the termination of

Mother’s parental rights.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Mother and M.H. (Father)1 are the biological parents of B.H., born June 30, 

2005, and A.H., born July 16, 2008. On January 5, 2012, the DCS in Madison 

County, Indiana, received a report that Father was on the run because there 

was a warrant for his arrest. In light of that report, a law enforcement officer 

was sent to Mother’s and Father’s home to conduct a welfare check. When the 

 

1 On February 19, 2015, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the Children. Father is not a 

party to this appeal, although facts relating to him are included where appropriate.
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officer arrived, he found Mother unresponsive, and there was an unidentified 

adult male taking drugs intravenously in the bathroom. Mother was 

transported to the St. Vincent Mercy Hospital in Elwood, Indiana. Because 

Father’s whereabouts were unknown, the Children were released to Mother’s 

sister, M.G., (Aunty). 

[5] The following day, Family Case Manager Matthew DeLong (FCM DeLong) 

and a law enforcement officer of the Elwood Police Department went to visit 

Mother at the hospital. Mother claimed that she could not recall the events of 

the previous day but stated that she had intentionally overdosed with Zanex, 

Opana, and Morphine in an attempt to end her life. Mother claimed that she 

could not remember the Children being present at the time. On the same day, 

FCM DeLong spoke with Mother’s relatives who explained that Mother 

suffered from depression, and that she had in the past attempted to commit 

suicide. Also, FCM DeLong interviewed the Children. The Children stated 

that they were present when the officer arrived at their home, and they were 

scared because Mother was unresponsive and had to go to the hospital. After 

the interview, FCM DeLong explained to the Children that they were going to 

stay with their maternal grandmother (Grandmother). 

[6] On January 9, 2012, DCS filed separate petitions alleging that B.H. and A.H. 

were children in need of services (CHINS) based on Mother’s attempt to 

commit suicide and the lack of a secondary care giver in the home to ensure the 

safety of the Children at the time. The next day, the trial court held a 

detention/initial hearing where it continued the Children’s removal from 
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Mother’s care. On January 25, 2012, both Mother and Father attended an 

additional initial hearing and subsequently admitted the allegations contained 

in the CHINS petitions. As a result, the trial court maintained placement of the 

Children with Grandmother.2

 

[7] On February 15, 2012, the trial court held a dispositional hearing at which 

Mother and Father were ordered to participate in counseling, visit the Children, 

enroll in programs recommended by DCS, keep all appointments, complete 

substance abuse assessment, submit to random drug screens, abstain from use 

of illegal drugs, and maintain consistent contact with DCS. On July 25, 2012, 

the trial court found both parents uncooperative with the Children’s case plans.

That they had not enhanced their ability to fulfil their parental obligations or 

alleviated the conditions leading to the Children’s placement outside their 

home. The trial court then set the permanency hearing date for both Children 

on January 8, 2013. On January 30, 2013, the trial court issued a permanency 

review order finding that Mother and Father had displayed some progress;

nonetheless, the order stated that parents had failed to attend a family team 

meeting that was intended to discuss the implementation of a reunification 

permanency plan for the Children. Based on that fact, the trial court continued 

placement of the Children with Grandmother and set a joint periodic 

review/permanency hearing for both Children on July 3, 2013.

 

2

 Around that time, FCM Christin Myers (FCM Myers) replaced FCM DeLong. 
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[8] On February 25, 2013, DCS filed motions for change of placement alleging that 

transferring the Children from their relative placement with Grandmother to 

foster care was necessary due to frequent moves, utilities being turned off, and 

that there were other people—who had not been cleared by DCS—living in 

Grandmother’s home. On the same day, the trial court granted that motion. 

On July 3, 2013, the trial court found that Mother and Father were still not 

participating in the services and set a permanency hearing for B.H. on 

December 11, 2013, and for A.H. on January 15, 2014.

[9] On August 21, 2013, DCS filed separate termination petitions with respect to 

each child, and for the closure of its services. In the modification report dated 

August 26, 2013, it stated that the Children were progressing well in foster care. 

The report also stated that Mother had not complied with home-based services, 

and FCM Myers had been unable to schedule a family team meeting since 

Father had recently been incarcerated. 

[10] On September 17, 2013, the trial court found that Mother had not made enough 

progress to be reunited with the Children, whereas Father had participated 

minimally since he was incarcerated. As such, the trial court granted DCS’ 

request to terminate its services. The record shows that the termination 

petitions filed on August 21, 2013, were later dismissed on October 31, 2013,

due to Mother’s improved participation with the services, and that DCS 

intended to give Mother more time to complete the services.
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[11] On December 11, 2013, the trial court found that Mother was participating in 

home-based services, counseling sessions, parental classes, substance abuse 

counseling, and was visiting with the Children. An additional report dated 

June 17, 2014, indicated that Mother was visiting with the Children and had 

completed a substance abuse treatment program. Despite Mother’s progress, 

the report stated that Mother was not regularly meeting with her home-based 

case worker and that she needed to seek employment. As for Father, the report 

noted that his whereabouts were unknown after his release from prison, and he 

had failed to visit with the Children or participate in any of the services. Due to 

the parents’ continued noncompliance, on September 26, 2014, DCS filed yet 

another petition seeking to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, and

for the cessation of all its services. On December 10, 2014, the trial court 

changed the permanency plan from reunification to adoption. 

[12] An evidentiary hearing was held on January 27, 2015. Mother was present 

with counsel; however, Father failed to appear in person, choosing to appear 

only by Mother’s counsel. DCS’ attorney, FCM Myers, and the Children’s 

court-appointed special advocate (CASA) were also in attendance. FCM Myers 

stated that she was concerned since Mother could not remain sober for 

sustained periods as she had relapsed to using drugs during the pendency of the 

CHINS case. With regards to Father, FCM Myers testified that he had not 

completed any of the services offered by DCS, his sobriety was an issue, and so 

were his incarcerations. In addition, FCM Myers indicated that Father had not 

visited with the Children throughout the entire CHINS proceedings. As such, 
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FCM Myers recommended the termination of parental rights. The CASA also 

stated that she was concerned about Mother’s sobriety, as well as Mother’s 

potential pending incarceration since Mother had violated her probation for 

using non-prescribed drugs. Likewise, the CASA recommended that it would 

be in the Children’s best interests to terminate parental rights. On February 19, 

2015, adopting DCS’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial 

court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. 

[13] Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review 

[14] In reviewing the termination of a parent’s rights, it is a long-settled tenet of this 

court that the trial court is entitled to considerable deference. In re D.B., 942 

N.E.2d 867, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Our court does not reweigh evidence or 

assess the credibility of witnesses. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 

2009), reh’g denied. Rather, we will consider only the evidence, and any 

inferences reasonably derived therefrom, most favorable to the trial court’s 

judgment. Id. In addition, Indiana Code section 31-37-14-2 requires that a 

finding in a termination proceeding “be based upon clear and convincing 

evidence.” Accordingly, in reviewing whether the trial court’s findings or 

judgment are clearly erroneous, we must determine “whether the evidence 

clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and 
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convincingly support the judgment.” In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 

2010).

II. Adoption of DCS’ Proposed Findings of Fact

[15] Mother first argues that the trial court’s verbatim adoption of DCS’ proposed 

findings was error. Trial Rule 52(C) encourages trial courts to request that 

parties submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and it is not 

uncommon or per se improper for a trial court to enter findings that are verbatim 

reproductions of submissions by the prevailing party. Clark v. Crowe, 778 

N.E.2d 835, 841 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citing A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of 

Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). 

When a party prepares proposed findings, he or she “should take great care to 

insure that the findings are sufficient to form a proper factual basis for the 

ultimate conclusions of the trial court.” Marathon Oil Co. v. Collins, 744 N.E.2d 

474, 477 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Maloblocki v. Maloblocki, 646 N.E.2d 

358, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)). Moreover, “the trial court should remember 

that when it signs one party’s findings, it is ultimately responsible for their 

correctness.” Id. As noted by this court in Clark, we urge trial courts to 

scrutinize parties’ submissions for mischaracterized testimony and legal 

argument rather than the findings of fact and conclusions of law as 

contemplated by the rule. 778 N.E.2d at 841 n.3. 

[16] We encourage such scrutiny for good reason. As our supreme court has 

observed, the practice of accepting verbatim a party’s proposed findings of fact 

“weakens our confidence as an appellate court that the findings are the result of 
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considered judgment by the trial court.” Cook v. Whitsell-Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 

271, 273 n.1 (Ind. 2003) (citing Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 708-09 (Ind.

2001)). However, as the court also noted, verbatim reproductions of a party’s 

submissions are not uncommon, as “[t]he trial courts of this state are faced with 

an enormous volume of cases and few have the law clerks and other resources 

that would be available in a more perfect world to help craft more elegant trial 

court findings and legal reasoning.” Prowell, 741 N.E.2d at 708. The need to 

keep the docket moving is properly a high priority for our trial bench. Id. at 

709. For this reason, the practice of adopting a party’s proposed findings is not 

prohibited. Id. Thus, although we by no means encourage the wholesale 

adoption of a party’s proposed findings and conclusions, the critical inquiry is 

whether such findings, as adopted by the court, are clearly erroneous. See Saylor 

v. State, 765 N.E.2d 535, 565 (Ind. 2002) (citing Woods v. State, 701 N.E.2d 

1208, 1210 (Ind. 1998)).

[17] Mother concedes that the wholesale adoption of one party’s proposed findings 

of fact is not error per se. However, Mother contends that the trial court’s 

admission of the following findings relating to the initial removal of the Children 

from her care was error:

3

Finding 8 b: Remaining in the home would be contrary to the 

welfare of the child because of Mother’s and Father’s inability, 

refusal, or neglect to provide shelter, care and/or supervision at 

 

3

 Mother also contends that the trial court erred in adopting Findings 14 p., 14 r., and 16 e. We decline to 

review those findings as they relate to Father.
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the time;

Finding 8 c: Reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate removal 

of the Child were made by DCS as set forth in the pleadings, 

documents, of DCS and/or all other service providers. 

(Appellant’s App pp. 7, 8). 4

 Mother maintains that the above findings are

factually inaccurate. We note that Mother has sparsely developed this

argument, thereby waiving it on appeal. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). 

Waiver notwithstanding, we find that the admission of the above findings was 

not error. With respect to Finding 8 b, the record shows that the Children were 

removed from Mother’s care when she attempted to end her life and the only 

other adult present was taking drugs intravenously in the bathroom. As for 

Finding 8 c, DCS argues that it took reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate 

removal of the Children from Mother’s care. Specifically, DCS notes that the 

Children were only removed from Mother’s care after DCS assessed the 

situation, i.e., Mother was unavailable since she had been admitted to the

hospital due to a drug overdose, and Father’s whereabouts were unknown.

Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the admission of the above findings.

[18] In addition, Mother challenges two findings relating to the Children’s continued 

removal from her care:

 

4

 As noted in the forgoing, the trial court entered separate findings of facts and conclusion of law terminating 

Mother’s parental rights for B.H. and A.H. Findings 8 b., 8c., 14, and 18 are identical as to each child. 
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Finding 14: Mother participated in supervised visits with the 

Child but providers raised concerns with her level of intoxication 

during visitations;

Finding 18: Mother has not maintained stable housing in the past 

three (3) years. 

(Appellant’s App. pp. 15, 16). With regards to Finding 14, Mother argues that 

she “had been groggy at one visit because she had not had any sleep the night 

before because she had been . . . cleaning houses.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 7). At 

the termination hearing, FCM Myers testified that visitations never advanced to 

being unsupervised due to “ongoing concerns of [Mother’s] sobriety.” (Tr. p. 

18). Specifically, FCM Myers stated that “the visit supervisor would notice that 

Mother would be very tired or . . . seemed like she was falling asleep or under 

the influence of something.” (Tr. pp. 18-19). Similarly, the evidence on record 

supports that finding. 

[19] Lastly, with respect to Finding 18, Mother claims that “she had resided with a 

good friend . . . for a little over a year.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8). Mother 

contends that “staying with a friend of the family does not show a failure to 

maintain stable housing and has no relevance as to whether she should lose her 

parental rights . . .” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8). The record reveals that at the time of 

the termination hearing, Mother lived with an older gentleman, T.S. Mother 

claimed that T.S. was a family friend. Although Mother did not pay rent, she 

stated that she assisted T.S. with house chores and paid some of the bills. 

Mother indicated that prior to living with T.S., she had lived with friends.
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[20] In support of her argument, Mother relies on Tipton v. Marion Cnty. Dep’t. of 

Public Welfare, 629 N.E.2d 1262, 1267–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), and Bester v. 

Lake Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 151 (Ind. 2005). In 

Tipton, in terminating a father’s parental rights, the trial court found, among 

other things, that the father failed to demonstrate that he maintained stable 

housing. Tipton, 629 N.E.2d at 1267. The record showed that since the child’s 

birth—a period of a little over four years—father had lived at three different 

residences, all belonging to family members. Id. Three persons including father 

lived at his grandmother’s house which had four bedrooms. Id. Four people 

including father lived at his aunt’s home which had three bedrooms. Id. Father 

paid rent when he lived at those places. Id. And at the time of the termination 

hearing, father was living with his brother in a four-bedroom house with five 

other people, including the child’s cousins. Id. Reversing the judgment of the 

trial court, this court determined that the notion that father’s living arrangement 

justified terminating his parental rights, “reflect[ed] a class or cultural judgment 

. . . .” Id. [Instead], “[p]arental unfitness must be established on the basis of 

individualized proof.” Id. at 1268. Noting that the trial court “did not 

conclude that [father] could not provide his child with an adequate home 

because he moved too frequently or that these places were not suitable for a 

child,” this court concluded, “[t]he evidence offered on the matter of housing 

does not support a reasonable inference that [father’s] living arrangements pose 

or have ever posed a threat to the well-being of his child.” Id. at 1267-68. In 

fact, the court observed that father’s living arrangement with his extended 

family provided the child a “safety net.” Id. at 1268. 
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[21] In Bester, father lived with his parents for most of his life. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 

151. At the time of his child’s birth, father lived with mother in Indiana, and 

shortly thereafter, he moved back to his parents’ house in East Hazel Crest, 

Illinois. Id. Father resided with his parents until a home study was conducted. 

Id. At that point, the family case manager informed father that, as a result of 

the home study, he could no longer reside in his parent’s home if the child was

going to be placed there. Id. Father left and moved in with a friend for about 

two months. Id. Thereafter, he moved to Chicago, Illinois to live with an aunt,

where he paid rent. Id. Our supreme court in this case found Tipton was 

instructive, and it reversed the trial court since father had complied with all 

DCS services and there was no evidence that the father’s “living arrangements 

and his alleged lack of independence pose or have ever posed a threat to the 

well-being of the child.” Id.

[22] Here, DCS maintains that Tipton and Bester are distinguishable from the present 

case. We agree. Although we agree with Mother that DCS offered no kind of 

particularized evidence that living with friends refutes her ability to maintain a 

stable home for the Children, or that T.S.’s home was unclean or ever posed a 

threat to the well-being of the Children, DCS offered evidence that they were 

concerned about Mother being kicked out of T.S.’s home. The record shows 

that Mother struggled with drugs, and T.S. had informed DCS that he would 

kick her out if he found her using drugs. Shortly before the termination 

hearing, Mother had relapsed. Based on that fact, DCS argued Mother’s 

housing arrangement remained unstable. Equally, we find that the record 
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supports Finding 18, and we therefore find no error in the admission of that 

finding.

II. Termination of Parental Rights

[23] The traditional right of parents to direct the care, custody, and control of their 

“children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” In re G.Y., 

904 N.E.2d at 1259 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). The 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents the State 

from unduly interfering with parents’ decisions regarding the upbringing of their 

children. C.A. v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 85, 93 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014). However, parental rights are not absolute; in fact, they are “subordinate . 

. . to the children’s interests when the children’s emotional and physical 

development is threatened.” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 861 

N.E.2d 366, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

[24] A court may terminate parental rights “when parties are unable or unwilling to 

meet their responsibility as parents.” In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 805 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005), trans. denied. Because the termination of parental rights 

permanently severs the parent-child relationship, it is an extreme sanction that 

“is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts 

have failed.” C.A., 15 N.E.3d at 92. The purpose of termination is to protect 

the children, not to punish the parents. Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 371. In such cases, 

Indiana law stipulates that DCS must establish, in part,
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(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) 

months under a dispositional decree.

* * * *

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove each statutory element by clear 

and convincing evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014).

A. Reasonable Probability That Conditions Will Not Be Remedied5

[25] Mother contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s 

conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in 

the Children’s initial removal and placement in foster care will not be remedied.

 

5 We note that the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive and requires proof of only one 

of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35–2-4(b)(2)(B). Because we find it to be dispositive 

under the facts of this case, we limit our review to whether DCS established that there was a reasonable 

probability that the conditions resulting in the removal or reasons for placement of Children outside the 

home will not be remedied. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i).
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In making this determination, a trial court should assess the “parent’s fitness to 

care for his children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into 

consideration evidence of changed conditions.” In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. This entails an evaluation of “the parent’s 

habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or 

deprivation of the child.” Id. The trial court “may properly consider evidence 

of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, 

failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment[,]” as 

well as the parent’s response to any services offered by DCS. McBride v. Monroe 

Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 

[26] Initially, DCS intervened and removed the Children due to Mother’s suicide 

attempt. Mother claims that it is mere speculation that she might undertake 

another suicide attempt. We note that subsection (b)(2)(B)(i) of the termination 

statute requires that DCS must establish a reasonable probability that “the 

conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside 

the home of the parents will not be remedied.” I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis 

added). “This language clarifies that it is not just the basis for the initial 

removal of the child that may be considered for purposes of determining 

whether a parent’s rights should be terminated, but also those bases resulting in 

the continued placement outside of the home.” In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d at 806.

[27] The record indicates that this was not Mother’s first contemplated suicide. At 

the start of the CHINS case, Mother’s relatives stated that Mother suffered from 

depression, and she had made prior attempts to end her life. At the termination 
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hearing, Mother stated that her depression triggered her drug relapse. We note 

that Mother’s drug addiction predates her early teenage years, and when DCS 

became involved, it recommended Mother for substance abuse treatment. In 

the fall of 2013, Mother successfully completed a drug treatment program at 

Aspire. In March 2014, Mother self-referred herself for treatment. FCM Myers 

stated that it was unclear why Mother enrolled herself into that clinic. After

only two months, Mother was discharged from the clinic after testing positive 

for Xanax and marijuana. Mother had lied to FCM Myers about why she had 

been dismissed from the clinic. In August 2014, DCS referred Mother back to 

treatment. There is no indication of Mother ever resuming treatment, but there 

is evidence that Mother was on probation for an unrelated matter. In October 

2014, Mother violated her probation after testing positive for Benzodiazepines 

and Buprenorphine and was incarcerated for about a month. Shortly before 

Mother’s termination hearing, Mother had once again violated her probation by 

testing positive for drugs in November 2014 and in December 2014. 

[28] “Where there are only temporary improvements and the pattern of conduct 

shows no overall progress, the court might reasonably find that under the 

circumstances, the problematic situation will not improve.” In re A.H., 832 

N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). FCM Myers stated that Mother would 

be consistent for a couple of months and then relapse. Here, we find that 

Mother’s continued use of drugs does not bode well for her prospects of 

successfully parenting the Children. Mother had numerous opportunities to 

show that she could change her life around through treatment, but she has 
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failed to follow through. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that DCS 

presented clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s findings and 

ultimate determination that there is a reasonable probability the conditions 

resulting in the Children’s removal and continued placement outside Mother’s 

care will not be remedied. Mother’s arguments to the contrary, including her 

arguments that she would not attempt to take her life again, or that she is 

currently on medication for her depression, amounts to an invitation to reweigh 

the evidence. See In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260.

B. Best Interests

[29] Lastly, Mother argues that that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial 

court’s conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the 

Children’s best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, 

the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.F., 762 

N.E.2d at 1253. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the 

parent to those of the child involved. Id. The court need not wait until a child 

is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. 

Recommendations by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate 

parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal 

will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination is in a child’s best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs., 987 

N.E.2d 1150, 1158–1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[30] Mother argues that she had subpoenaed her counselor to testify at the 

termination hearing, but the counselor failed to appear. Mother further 
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contends that the counselor’s testimony would have corroborated her recent 

depression treatment, which would, in turn, show that a drug relapse was 

unlikely. The trial court heard Mother’s testimony in this regard, and Mother’s 

current argument is merely an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence. See In 

re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260. 

[31] Turning to the facts of this case, both FCM Myers and the CASA testified that, 

in their opinions, termination was in the Children’s best interests. See A.D.S., 

987 N.E.2d at 1158. FCM Myers stated, “I think [B.H.] and [A.H.] deserve to 

be in a structured environment and stable environment that is drug free. And at 

this point I do not believe that [Mother] would be able to provide that on a 

consistent basis . . . due to multiple relapses.” (Tr. p. 24). Despite Mother’s 

claim that she worked odd jobs and got paid under the table, FCM Myers 

testified that Mother had failed to verify her income. As for housing, FCM 

Myers stated that T.S. had threatened to eject Mother if he found her using 

drugs. The record also reflects that the Children had suffered from a lack of 

permanency, but had improved while residing with their current, pre-adoptive 

caregivers since February 2013. In support, FCM Myers stated that the 

Children were active in school, enjoyed their after-school activities, loved their 

neighborhood, and appeared to be more relaxed in their current placement. In 

addition, the CASA recommended the termination of Mother’s parental rights 

due to Mother’s sobriety issues, drug issues, as well as Mother’s potential 

pending incarceration for probation violations. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1503-JT-156 | December 10, 2015 Page 20 of 20

[32] Based on the totality of the evidence, coupled with the testimony from FCM 

Myers and the CASA recommending termination of Mother’s parental rights, 

we conclude that there is ample evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion 

that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. 

CONCLUSION

[33] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that (1) there was no error in the adoption 

of DCS’ findings, and (2) there was clear and convincing evidence to support 

the termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

[34] Affirmed.

[35] Brown, J. and Altice, J. concur