Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed March 29, 2023.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D22-1495

Lower Tribunal No. 18-31604

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SC Mota Associates Limited Partnership, et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

Mota Pizza Rustica Corp.,

Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Maria de 

Jesus Santovenia, Judge.

Slusher & Rosenblum, P.A., and Jeremy E. Slusher, and Jonathan S. 

Glickman (West Palm Beach), for appellants.

Ayala Law, P.A., and Eduardo A. Maura, for appellee.

Before EMAS, SCALES, and LINDSEY, JJ. 

LINDSEY, J.
2

Appellants SC Mota Associates Limited Partnership and Sterling Retail 

Services, Inc., appeal from two orders denying two motions for sanctions. 

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm one of the orders but reverse the 

other order and remand for the trial court to consider the merits of the 

sanctions motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case began as a simple eviction action. Appellee Mota Pizza 

Rustica Corp. (the “Tenant”) leased commercial space in the Mall of 

Americas from SC Mota (the “Landlord”). After the Landlord filed an eviction 

action for failure to pay rent, the Tenant filed a separate putative class action 

against the Landlord and Sterling Retail Services (the “Property Manager”).1 

The Tenant primarily alleged that the Landlord mismanaged the Mall and 

that the Property Manager was liable under an alter ego theory. 

Relevant here are two motions for sanctions pursuant to § 57.105 that 

the Landlord and Property Manager filed in the Tenant’s class action. First, 

at the inception of the Tenant’s action, the Property Manager moved for 

sanctions arguing that the Tenant’s alter ego claim was not supported by the 

material facts (the “Alter Ego Sanctions Motion”). Following discovery, the 

1 The Landlord’s eviction action and the Tenant’s class action were 

consolidated below.
3

Landlord and Property Manager filed the second motion for sanctions at 

issue in this appeal, which asserted that evidence uncovered during 

discovery conclusively showed that the Tenant did not have standing to bring 

the class action (the “Standing Sanctions Motion”).

Before ruling on the sanctions motions, the trial court held a hearing 

on the Tenant’s motion for class certification and subsequently denied class 

certification.2 The Tenant appealed. In the interlocutory appeal, the 

Landlord and Property Manager sought appellate attorney’s fees pursuant 

to the parties’ lease agreement and as a sanction pursuant to Florida Rule 

of Appellate Procedure 9.410. This Court per curiam affirmed the trial court’s 

denial of class certification. Mota Pizza Rustica Corp. v. Sterling Retail 

Servs., Inc., 317 So. 3d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). This Court also 

conditionally granted the Landlord and Property Manager’s motion for 

appellate attorney’s fees pursuant to the parties’ lease agreement, and 

denied, without elaboration, the Landlord and Property Manager’s motion for 

appellate attorney’s fees as a sanction.

On remand, the Tenant voluntarily dismissed the class action. The 

pending sanctions motions were referred to a magistrate. Despite this 

2 The court did not address the merits of the sanctions motions in its class 

certification order.
4

Court’s unelaborated denial of sanctions, counsel for the Tenant told the 

magistrate that this Court “specifically addressed each one of the same 

arguments counsel is making here.”

The magistrate issued a detailed, eight-page report and 

recommendation on the Alter Ego Sanctions Motion. In its report and 

recommendation, the magistrate concluded that the alter ego count “was not 

so completely devoid of merit on the facts and law . . . .” 

The magistrate issued a separate report and recommendation denying 

the Standing Sanctions Motion, which relied on this Court’s unelaborated 

denial of sanctions in the interlocutory class action certification appeal:

While the . . . Motion presents a close case in 

favor of §57.105 sanctions, the Tenant voluntarily 

dismissed the action . . . one day following the Third 

District’s Order. The [magistrate] finds that the 

appellate court’s . . . Order that ruled on the same 

record and the same arguments is dispositive of this 

issue and, therefore, denies the . . . Motion.

In support of this conclusion, the magistrate cited case law invoking the law 

of the case doctrine. See Fla. Diversified Films, Inc. v. Simon Roofing & 

Sheet Metal Corp., 118 So. 3d 240, 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“This doctrine 

‘requires that questions of law actually decided on appeal must govern the 

case in the same court and the trial court, through all subsequent stages of 
5

the proceedings.’” (quoting Fla. Dept. of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 

105 (Fla. 2001))). 

The Landlord and Property Manager filed exceptions to the reports and 

recommendations. The trial court overruled the exceptions and ratified the 

magistrate’s denial of sanctions. The Landlord and Property Manager timely 

appealed.3

II. ANALYSIS

We review orders ratifying a magistrate’s report and recommendation 

under the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard.4 See Vargas v. 

Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 104 So. 3d 1156, 1165 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012). 

“When a trial court is vested with broad discretion, an appellate court can 

reverse only where the trial court’s decision is completely unreasonable.” 

Fils-Aime v. Roberson, 273 So. 3d 1112, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). 

Based on the record before us and the magistrate’s detailed report and 

recommendation on the Alter Ego Sanctions Motion, we conclude that the 

3 The two orders ratifying the magistrate’s reports and recommendations 

were rendered after a final judgment was entered below. We therefore have 

jurisdiction. See Yampol v. Turnberry Isle S. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 250 So. 3d 

835, 837 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (“A post-judgment order denying a party’s claim 

for entitlement to attorney’s fees . . . is an appealable final order.”).

4 This is the same standard we employ to review orders denying attorney’s 

fees as sanctions pursuant to § 57.105. See Fils-Aime v. Roberson, 273 So. 

3d 1112, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019).
6

trial court did not abuse its discretion in ratifying the magistrate’s denial of 

that motion. We therefore affirm the order ratifying the report and 

recommendation on the Alter Ego Sanctions Motion without further 

discussion.

With respect to the denial of the Standing Sanctions Motion, the 

Landlord and Property Manager argue that the magistrate erred in relying on 

the law of the case doctrine when she denied sanctions based on this Court’s 

unelaborated denial of sanctions in the interlocutory appeal of the class 

certification order. “Whether the law of the case doctrine applies is a 

question of law, and therefore our standard of review is de novo.” Pompano 

Masonry Corp. v. Anastasi, 125 So. 3d 210, 212 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

The Florida Supreme Court has explained the scope of the law of the 

case doctrine as follows: “the doctrine is ‘limited to rulings on questions of 

law actually presented and considered on a former appeal.’” Fla. Dep’t of 

Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 106 (Fla. 2001) (quoting U.S. Concrete 

Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Fla. 1983)). “A corollary of the 

law of the case doctrine is that a lower court is not precluded from passing 

on issues that ‘have not necessarily been determined and become law of the 

case.’” Id. (quoting Greene v. Massey, 384 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. 1980)); see 

also Philip J. Padovano, 2 Fla. Prac., Appellate Practice § 20:12 (2023 ed.)
7

(“The preclusive effect of the law of the case doctrine applies only to points 

that were decided in a previous appellate proceeding.” (footnotes omitted)).

Here, this Court’s unelaborated denial of sanctions in an interlocutory 

appeal did not decide one way or the other the merits of the Standing 

Sanctions Motion pending before the trial court.5 Despite the Tenant’s 

representations below to the contrary, this Court did not specifically address 

any of the arguments raised by the Landlord or the Property Manager in the 

per curiam affirmance or in the unelaborated order denying sanctions. 

Consequently, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable. We therefore 

reverse the order denying the Standing Sanctions Motion and remand for the 

trial court to rule on the merits of the Motion.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.

5 This Court’s “grant or denial of attorney’s fees as a sanction under rule 

9.410 is a discretionary decision.” Fla. Wellness & Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. Mark 

J. Feldman, P.A., 276 So. 3d 884, 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). As such, this 

Court could have exercised its discretion to deny the sanctions motion 

without deciding whether the interlocutory appeal was frivolous.