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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

WHAM-O HOLDING, LTD. and INTERSPORT 

CORP. d/b/a WHAM-O,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED 

ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE “A”,

Defendants.

Case No.: 1:20-cv-04196

ANSWER AND DEFENSES

ANSWER OF SHANTAN TO COMPLAINT

NOW COME the Defendant Shantan by and through its attorney, and in answer to the 

Complaint filed by the Plaintiffs, state as follows:

IN ANSWER TO THE ALLEGATIONS OF JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. Defendant admits the allegations in paragraph 1.

2. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 2.

3. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 3.

IN ANSWER TO THE ALLEGATIONS OF INTRODUCTION

4. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 4, and accordingly denies.

5. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 5, and accordingly denies.

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6. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 6, and accordingly denies.

7. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 7, and accordingly denies.

8. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 8, and accordingly denies.

9. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 9, and accordingly denies.

10. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 10, and accordingly denies.

11. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 11, and accordingly denies.

12. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 12.

IN ANSWER TO THE GENERAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE PLAINTIFFS

13. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 13, and accordingly denies.

14. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 14, and accordingly denies.

15. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 15, and accordingly denies.

16. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 16, and accordingly denies.

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17. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 17, and accordingly denies.

IN ANSWER TO THE GENERAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE DEFENDANT

18. Defendant admits that Defendant is individual and business entities reside in the People’s 

Republic of China. Defendant denies the rest of allegations in paragraph 18.

IN ANSWER TO THE GENERAL ALLEGATIONS OF 

THE DEFENDANT’S UNLAWFUL CONDUCT

19. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 19, and accordingly denies.

20. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 20.

21. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 21.

22. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 22.

23. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 23, and accordingly denies.

24. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 24.

25. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 25.

26. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 26.

27. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 27.

28. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 28.

29. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 29.

30. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 30.

31. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 31, and accordingly denies.

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IN ANSWER TO COUNT I

TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND COUNTERFEITING (15 U.S.C. § 1114)

32. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 32.

33. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 33.

34. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 34.

35. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 35.

36. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 36.

37. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 37, and accordingly denies.

38. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 38, and accordingly denies.

IN ANSWER TO COUNT II

FALSE DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))

39. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 39.

40. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 40.

41. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 41.

42. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 42.

43. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 43, and accordingly denies.

IN ANSWER TO COUNT III

VIOLATION OF ILLINOIS UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT 

(815 ILCS § 510, et seq.)

44. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 44.

45. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 45.

46. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 46.

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47. Defendant lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the 

allegation of paragraph 47, and accordingly denies.

IN ANSWER TO COUNT IV

CIVIL CONSPIRACY

48. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 48.

49. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 49.

50. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 50.

51. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 51.

52. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 52.

DEFENSES

Northern District of Illinois Lacks Personal Jurisdiction

53. This Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant only if it is proper under Illinois’s 

long arm statute and comports with the requirements of the Due Process Clause. United Airlines, 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56982, at *8 (citing Hemi, 622 F.3d at 756-57).

54. The Seventh Circuit has adopted the familiar personal jurisdiction standard as follows:

[T]he defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state such that the 

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice. Those contacts may not be fortuitous. Instead, the defendant 

must have purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum State 

before personal jurisdiction will be found to be reasonable and fair. Crucial to the 

minimum contacts analysis is a showing that the defendant should reasonably 

anticipate being haled into court in the forum State, because the defendant has 

purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities there. Hemi, 622 

F.3d at 757. 

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55. General jurisdiction is proper only when the defendant has “continuous and systematic general 

business contacts” with the forum state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 

U.S. 408, 416 (1984). Specific jurisdiction is proper only when the defendant has “purposefully 

availed” himself of the benefits and protections of conducting activities in the forum state, see 

Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Houston Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 

440, 444 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)), in a suit “arising 

out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8. 

(emphasis added). As the Supreme Court recently clarifies, “[f]or a State to exercise [specific] 

jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a 

substantial connection with the forum State.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) 

(emphasis added).

56. When deciding whether defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Illinois, the 

Seventh Circuit applies the “express aiming” test, which specifically asks “whether the defendant 

intentionally aimed its conduct at the forum state, rather than on the possibly incidental and

constitutionally irrelevant effects of that conduct on the plaintiff.” Mobile, 623 F.3d at 444-45, 

445 n.1 (emphasis added) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984)). Defendant’s

contact must also satisfy at least three requirements to be relevant: (1) the contacts are created by 

Defendant himself; (2) the contact is targeted at the forum state (as opposed to persons who 

reside there); and (3) the contact bears on the substantive legal dispute. See United, 2015 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 56982 at *10 (citing Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122-23; Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 

801-03; GCIU-Employer Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2009); 

RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (7th Cir. 1997)).

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57. The Seventh Circuit has cautioned that “[c]ourts should be careful in resolving questions about 

personal jurisdiction involving online contacts to ensure that a defendant is not haled into court 

simply because the defendant owns or operates a website that is accessible in the forum state, 

even if that site is ‘interactive.’” be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Hemi, 622 F.3d at 760) (holding that the defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction in

Illinois). Beyond simply operating an interactive website—even a “highly interactive” website—

that is accessible from the forum state, defendant must in some way target the forum state’s 

market before he may be haled into court in that state without offending the Constitutional Due 

Process requirement. Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).

No Minimum Contact with Illinois

58. Under Walden, Advanced Tactical, and be2, defendants have insufficient contacts to be subject 

to this Court’s jurisdiction. Further, while the outcome in Hemi is distinguishable from the case 

at bar, its reasoning is helpful here. In Hemi, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant was 

subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois specifically because its website expressly stated that it 

would not ship to New York residents, which indicated, though indirectly, its willingness to ship 

to Illinois residents. See Hemi, 622 F.3d at 758; cf. United Airlines, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

56982, at *26-27 (holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant after 

distinguishing Hemi on the same grounds). Further, the defendant in Hemi had actually shipped 

the products to Illinois residents. See Hemi, 622 F.3d at 758; United Airlines, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 56982, at *26-27.

59. The Hemi court clarified that it was the defendant’s reaching out to residents of Illinois through 

its website and shipping history, rather than the plaintiff’s inducement to ship, that created the 

minimum contacts. 622 F.3d at 758. There are no such facts here because Defendant was 

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entrapped and enticed, pending future discovery, by Plaintiff or its agents. And such entrapped or 

enticed activity is irrelevant according to the Hemi court.

60. In Original Creations, Inc. v. Ready America, Inc., the Court distinguished Hemi on because the 

website in question did not exclude any particular state, thus removing the implication that it 

expressly targeted other states. 836 F. Supp. 2d. 711 (N.D. Ill. 2011). In addition, the Court 

found that an Internet website alone was insufficient to support personal jurisdiction when the 

only sale to Illinois was to the plaintiff or its agents. Ultimately, this Court found personal 

jurisdiction, but based on a stream-of-commerce theory because the defendant sold through 

distributors located in Illinois. Id. at 716. Other courts hold similar views. See e.g., Sennheiser 

Elec. Corp. v. Evstigneeva, supra at *7-8 (ordering the plaintiff to show cause why the case

should not be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction where the only forum sale was to the 

plaintiff); Boppy Co. v. Luvee Products Corp., 72 U.S.P.Q. 2d. 1577 (D. Colo. 2004) (single sale 

to the plaintiff’s attorney was not a sufficient forum contact to support personal jurisdiction); 

Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F.Supp. 2d 104 (D. Conn. 1998) (“Only those contacts with the 

forum that were created by the defendant, rather than those manufactured by the unilateral, acts 

of the plaintiff, should be considered for due process purposes. To hold otherwise would allow a 

plaintiff to manufacture jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in any forum, regardless of 

how inconvenient, even when the defendant has not purposefully directed any activity toward the 

forum state.”)

61. As the Supreme Court recently restated in Walden, “Due process requires that a defendant be 

haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not based on the 

‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other persons affiliated 

with the State.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 

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462, 475 (1985)). Defendant did nothing to target the forum. Any contact with Illinois, if present 

at all, was de minimis and induced by Plaintiff or its agents. Specific jurisdiction is lacking 

because Plaintiff is the only link between them and Illinois, Id. at 1122, and a small number of 

sales would not be enough where he has not specifically targeted the forum. Advanced Tactical, 

751 F.3d at 801-02. To allow the plaintiffs to hale Defendant online stores into court and freeze 

their assets without even a minimum number of contacts offends Constitutional principles.

62. Thus, this Court should dismiss the complaint against Defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Unreasonable to Exercise Personal Jurisdiction

63. With respect to analysis of reasonableness, the Court asks whether the assertion of personal 

jurisdiction comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”—that is, 

whether it is reasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction under the circumstances of the 

particular case. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The Supreme Court 

evaluates the following factors as part of this “reasonableness” analysis: (1) the burden that the 

exercise of jurisdiction will impose on the defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state in 

adjudicating the case; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) 

the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the 

controversy; and (5) the shared interest of the states in furthering substantive social policies.

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–14, (1987).

64. It is not reasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The burden that the exercise 

of personal jurisdiction on Defendant is very high because Defendant is hobby sellers who reside 

outside the States. The interest of the forum state in adjudicating the case is not high because one

of Plaintiffs, Wham-O Holding, Ltd., is a foreign company having its principal place of business 

in Hong Kong. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1. The other Plaintiff InterSport Corp. has a place of 

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business in California. Id. If there is any country for adjudication, the case should be litigated in 

Hong Kong or China. If there is any state for adjudication, the case should be litigated in 

California. Plaintiffs might have interest in obtaining relief in Illinois court, but even if Plaintiffs

prevail in this case, it is impossible to enforce the judgment because Defendant resides in China, 

with bank accounts in China. It takes significant amount of time and resource to enforce a U.S. 

judgment in China.

First Sale Defense Applies If The Alleged Infringing Product Is Not Counterfeit

65. As a general rule, trademark law does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark 

even though the mark owner does not authorize the sale. Thus, a distributor who resells

trademarked goods without change is not liable for trademark infringement. Polymer Technology 

Corp. v. Mimran, 975 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1992). Importantly, the branded item must be in an 

unchanged state.1 When trademarked goods are materially different from the goods that the

trademark is known to represent, the infringer cannot use the first sale doctrine as a defense.2

66. It is probable that the alleged infringing WHAM-O product is genuine WHAM-O product 

because Plaintiffs do not provide any evidence or conduct any comparison of the alleged 

infringing Frisbee product and the genuine WHAM-O product. Especially Defendant’s online 

storefronts appeared to be selling genuine WHAM-O products. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1. Thus, the 

alleged infringing products might be genuine WHAM-O products, instead of counterfeit.

67. The alleged infringing WHAM-O product is not proven counterfeit by Plaintiffs by the 

preponderance of evidence. Defendant is not liable for infringement solely for the reason that 

Defendant appeared to be selling genuine WHAM-O products on the online store.

1 See Dan-Foam A/S v. Brand Named Beds, LLC, 500 F. Supp. 2d 296, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 2 Id.

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Defendant Lacks Willfulness Even If the Alleged Infringing Product Is Counterfeit

68. Even if there is any alleged infringement of Plaintiffs’ trademark/copyright, Defendant’s act was 

not willful. 

69. Defendant does not have actual or apparent knowledge that the infringing product is possibly 

counterfeit. Defendant is not manufacturer. Defendant uses reasonable care when purchasing 

products because Defendant purchased products from reputable sources. Sellers who sold

WHAM-O products to Defendant guaranteed that the products were genuine. Within 

Defendant’s best knowledge, Defendant could not tell the difference between these products.

70. Defendant did not even have reasonable suspicion about the authenticity of the products because 

the purchase price is reasonable.

No Competition between the Alleged Infringing Products and Plaintiffs’ Products

71. Defendant sells products on third party platform such as amazon.com. Upon believe and 

information, Plaintiffs do not offer for any WHAM-O products on such platforms. Defendant 

cannot be said to compete with Plaintiffs on Amazon because Plaintiffs do not do business on the 

same platform and thus is not even a competitor.

No Damage of Reputation to Plaintiffs

72. Because Defendant’s online storefront appeared to be selling genuine WHAM-O product, 

Defendant was at least selling products with comparable quality with Plaintiffs’ products. 

Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 1. If Defendant alleged infringing products were inferior in terms of 

quality, Defendant would have caused customers to cast doubt on the reputation of Plaintiffs, 

which is not the case in this suit.

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DEFENDANT'S PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that 

1. Plaintiffs take nothing by way of this action; 

2. The Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and judgment entered in favor of Defendant;

3. Defendant be awarded costs of suit, attorneys' fees and any other relief which the Court 

deems proper. 

4. Plaintiffs be awarded only compensation based on Defendant’s profit from sales of the 

alleged infringing products if the Court finds Defendant liable for infringement. 

Date: 09/04/2020

Respectfully Submitted: 

/s/ Tianyu Ju

Tianyu Ju, Esq.

He Cheng, Esq.

Tao Liu, Esq.

Wei Yang, Esq.

Glacier Law PLLC

745 5th Ave., Ste 500

NEW YORK, NY 10015

Attorney for Defendant

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this September 4, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing 

with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, and service was perfected on all counsel of 

record and interested parties through this system, which will deliver a true and correct copy of 

the foregoing documents via CM/ECF.

Date: 09/04/2020

Respectfully Submitted: 

/s/ Tianyu Ju

Tianyu Ju, Esq.

He Cheng, Esq.

Tao Liu, Esq.

Wei Yang, Esq.

Glacier Law PLLC

745 5th Ave., Ste 500

NEW YORK, NY 10015

Attorney for Defendant

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