STATE OF ILLINOIS

ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

LOCAL PANEL

Erik Slater, )

 )

Charging Party, )

 )

and ) Case No. L-CA-16-017

 )

Chicago Transit Authority, )

 )

Respondent. )

DECISION AND ORDER OF THE ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 

LOCAL PANEL

On September 18, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Anna Hamburg-Gal (ALJ HamburgGal) issued her Recommended Decision and Order (RDO), finding the Chicago Transit Authority 

(CTA or Respondent) engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 10(a)(2) 

and (1) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, 5 ILCS 315 (2014), as amended (Act). 

The RDO includes recommendations on various issues regarding whether Respondent 

engaged in unfair labor practice when it allegedly: (i) ordered ATU Local 241 to vacate the office 

space that it had used for approximately five months; (ii) removed postings and flyers concerning 

the Union from all areas of the garage; (iii) postponed all grievances and hearings involving Slater 

and hearings where Slater was to be the Union representative for unit members; (iv) told Slater he 

did not have permission to speak at a meeting and threatened to charge Slater with insubordination 

when he began to speak out on safety issues on behalf of union members; (v) informed Slater that 

no union discussions could take place on CTA property, including discussions regarding the 

Chicago Teachers’ Union strike, without prior approval by management and that a manager needed 

to be present; and (vi) threatened Slater with discipline for making photocopies for the Union on 

CTA copy machines. The ALJ determined Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in several, 

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but not all, of these instances, including the denial of the use of offices space and the directive not 

to discuss the CTU strike on CTA property.

The Respondent filed twenty-one separate exceptions to the RDO, the majority of these 

relating to the elimination of the Union’s use of the office space and Respondent’s directive that 

Charging Party may not discuss the CTU strike on CTA property. Charging Party timely 

responded to Respondent’s exceptions.

After reviewing the RDO, the Respondent’s exceptions, the Charging Party’s response, 

and the record, we adopt the ALJ’s recommendations for the reasons stated in the RDO except for 

her recommendations regarding Respondent’s denial of the use of office space which we reject as 

discussed below:

Charging Party, Erik Slater, is employed by the Respondent as a Bus Operator assigned to 

its North Park Garage (Garage). The Respondent’s Bus Operators are represented by the 

Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241 (Union). Slater was elected to the Union’s Executive 

Board on January 27, 2015.1

 

The Union had use of an office space in the Garage beginning in December of 2014. The 

Union did not use the office on a daily basis and would ask the CTA for permission to use the 

office, as they did not have keys to it. The Union used the office space to speak to membership in 

private, interview grievant, and store records. The CTA occasionally used the office to conduct 

picks of bus runs, which occur approximately six times a year, with each pick taking several days 

to complete, and as storage. 

At some point in early 2015, a CTA Facilities Maintenance Manager asked Gilberto 

Hernandez (Hernandez), the Administrative Manager at the Garage, for office space closer to his 

 1 The Union President subsequently removed Slater on March 19, 2015, but reinstated him three weeks later. 

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area of responsibility, which included the area in which the Garage was located. Almost 

immediately after Slater was reinstated to his position on the Union’s Executive Board on April 6, 

2015, Hernandez approached Slater, who was in the Union office, and informed him that the Union 

could no longer use the office. 

ALJ Hamburg-Gal found that Respondent CTA violated 10(a)(1) when it removed the 

Union from the office it had occupied for several months in retaliation for Slater’s protected

activity at the March 7, 2015 rap session, as well as due to Slater’s status of Union Executive 

Board member, both protected activity under the Act. The ALJ found these instances of protected 

activity were known by the Respondent, that the removal of the office was an adverse employment 

action, and that it was motivated by Slater’s protected activity due to the timing of the removal 

and shifting reasons for the removal provided by Hernandez. She likewise concluded that the CTA 

purported legitimate business reason for removal of the office—that it was needed for a Facilities 

Maintenance Manager—was a pretextual, post-hoc justification. 

ALJ Hamburg-Gal also found that the CTA violated Section 10(a)(2) and, derivatively, 

Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it revoked access to the Union office, for substantially the same 

reasons as the 10(a)(1) violation, but additionally concluding that such was done to discourage 

support for the Union, since the action was taken almost immediately after Slater resumed his 

position on the Union’s Executive Board. 

With respect to the office space issue, the Respondent excepts to the ALJ’s 

recommendations, contending it was not obligated to grant the Union use of the office space in the 

first place, that the Union’s use of the office was short-lived, and that the RDO now effectively 

grants the Union use of the office space into perpetuity. It further asserts that the elimination of 

the Union office was not an adverse action, that the timing and shifting reasons were insufficient 

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to justify a finding of retaliation, and that it has advanced a legitimate business reason for removing 

the office—it needed the space for its Facilities Maintenance initiative. With respect to the finding 

such violated 10(a)(2), it asserts that the evidence used to conclude that the CTA acted with 

specific intent to discourage union support was insufficient, as it was simply a regurgitation of the 

same reasons which supported the 10(a)(1) finding. Further, it asserts that it had no obligation to 

communicate to either Slater or Mormon, or any Union, why the CTA needed full-time use of its 

office space. Finally, it takes exception to several of the ALJ’s credibility determinations with 

respect to the office space, including not crediting Hernandez’s testimony.

We find the CTA’s exceptions to be persuasive and reject the ALJ’s findings and 

recommendations regarding the use of office space. We agree with the Respondent’s exceptions 

and find that its elimination of the Union’s use of office space is not an adverse action. 

The ALJ erred in equating the Respondent’s grant of permission to use the empty office 

with giving the Union a designated office. Contrary to the ALJ’s findings, the record indicates 

the Union and, consequently, Slater, had no proprietary interest in the office space. The office 

space in question cannot be characterized as belonging to the Union. The Union’s use of the 

office was temporary and permission to use it was given at the convenience of CTA 

management. The record indicates CTA management kept the key to the office in question and 

it was management that unlocked the door to let in Union representatives and then locked the 

office when the Union was finished using the office. The record also indicates the Union did not 

have exclusive use of the office as CTA management conducted its picks out of that office. 

Moreover, the cases cited by ALJ and Charging Party his response finding the removal or 

relocation of union offices to be an unfair labor practice, are distinguishable in that they all 

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involved instances where the union had a proprietary interest in a designated office. See, e.g., 

Chicago Transit Authority, 30 PERI ¶ 9 (IL LRB-LP 2013). 

Because we find that the Respondent’s denial of the use of the office space in question is 

not an adverse action, we need not address the remainder of the ALJ’s determinations regarding 

the office space allegations. Accordingly, we reject the ALJ’s findings and conclusions

regarding the establishment of Charging Party’s prima facie for the Sections 10(a)(1) and 

10(a)(2) and find the Respondent did not engage in unfair labor practices within the meaning of 

Section 10(a)(1) and Sections 10(a)(2) and 10(a)(1) when it eliminated the Union’s use of the

office space in question. 

BY THE LOCAL PANEL OF THE ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

/s/ Robert M. Gierut 

Robert M. Gierut, Chairman

/s/ Charles E. Anderson

Charles E. Anderson, Member

/s/ Angela Thomas ______

Angela Thomas, Member

 

Decision made at the Local Panel’s public meeting held in Chicago, Illinois, on March 6, 2018; 

written decision approved at Local Panel’s public meeting held in Chicago, Illinois, on April 17, 

2018, and issued on April 17, 2018.

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NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

FROM THE

ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

One Natural Resources Way, First Floor

Springfield, Illinois 62702

(217) 785-3155

160 North LaSalle Street, Suite S-400

Chicago, Illinois 60601-3103

(312) 793-6400

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT NOTICE

AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED.

Case No. L-CA-16-017

The Illinois Labor Relations Board, Local Panel, has found that the Chicago Transit Authority has violated the 

Illinois Public Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post this Notice. We hereby notify you that the Illinois 

Public Labor Relations Act (Act) gives you, as an employee, these rights:

• To engage in self-organization

• To form, join or assist unions

• To bargain collectively through a representative of your own choosing 

• To act together with other employees to bargain collectively or for other mutual aid and protection

• To refrain from these activities

Accordingly, we assure you that: 

WE WILL cease and desist from interfering with, restraining or coercing our employees in the exercise 

of the rights guaranteed them in the Act.

WE WILL cease and desist from threatening the Charging Party, Erek Slater, for engaging in protected, 

concerted activity. 

WE WILL cease and desist from limiting Union postings to the Union bulletin Board while barring them 

from other areas specifically designated for personal and commercial postings.

WE WILL cease and desist from instructing the Charging Party, Erek Slater, to not discuss the Chicago 

Teachers Union on CTA property. 

WE WILL cease and desist from, in any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining or coercing 

our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in the Act.

DATE ____________ _________________________

 Chicago Transit Authority

 (Employer)

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STATE OF ILLINOIS

ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

LOCAL PANEL

Erek Slater, )

)

Charging Party, )

)

and ) Case No. L-CA-16-017 

)

Chicago Transit Authority, )

)

Respondent )

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S RECOMMENDED DECISION AND ORDER

On September 4, 2015, Erek Slater (Charging Party or Slater) filed a charge with the Illinois 

Labor Relations Board’s Local Panel (Board) alleging that the Chicago Transit Authority 

(Respondent or CTA) engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 10(a)(2)

and (1) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) 5 ILCS 315 (2014), as amended. The 

charge was investigated in accordance with Section 11 of the Act. On January 20, 2016, the 

Board’s Executive Director issued a Complaint for Hearing. 

A hearing was conducted on April 10 and 12, and on May 10 and 23, 2017, in Chicago, 

Illinois, at which time the Charging Party presented evidence in support of the allegations and all 

parties were given an opportunity to participate, to adduce relevant evidence, to examine 

witnesses, to argue orally, and to file written briefs. After full consideration of the parties’ 

stipulations, evidence, arguments, and briefs, and upon the entire record of the case, I recommend 

the following:

I. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

The parties stipulate and I find that:

1. At all times material, the Respondent has been a unit of local government under the 

jurisdiction of the Local Panel of the Board, pursuant to Section 5(b) of the Act. 

2. At all times material, the Respondent has been a public employer within the meaning 

of Section 3(o) of the Act. 

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3. At all times material, the Charging Party has been employed by the Respondent as a 

bus driver and has been a public employee within the meaning of Section 3(n) of the 

Act. 

4. The Amalgamated Transit Union Local 241 (Union) is the exclusive representative of 

a bargaining unit (Unit) comprised of certain employees employed by the Respondent, 

including employees in the title of Bus Driver. 

5. At all times material, the Charging Party has been a member of the Union, an executive 

board member, and a business agent. 

II. ISSUES AND CONTENTIONS

The first set of issues in this case is whether the Respondent violated Sections 10(a)(2) and 

(1) of the Act when it allegedly (i) ordered ATU Local 241 to vacate the office space that it had 

used for approximately five months, (ii) removed postings and flyers concerning the Union from 

all areas of the garage, and (iii) postponed all grievances and hearings involving Slater and hearings 

where Slater was to be the Union representative for unit members. The second set of issues is 

whether the Respondent independently violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act by that same conduct, 

alleged above. The third set of issues is whether the Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the 

Act when (i) the General Manager allegedly told Slater he did not have permission to speak at a 

meeting and threatened to charge Slater with insubordination when he began to speak out on safety 

issues on behalf of union members, when (ii) Manager Jiaro Naranjo allegedly informed Slater 

that no union discussions could take place on CTA property without prior approval by management 

and that a manager needed to be present, and when (iii) Naranjo alleged threatened Slater with 

discipline for making photocopies for the Union on CTA copy machines.1 

First, Slater argues that the Respondent’s eviction of the Union from its office violated 

Section 10(a)(1) of the Act because it diminished the Union’s capacity to represent bus drivers. 

Slater reasons that the Respondent thereby also violated Section 10(a)(2) of the Act because it 

removed the Union’s office to retaliate against Slater for engaging in protected activities. The 

 

1 The Complaint contains the additional allegation that the Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act 

when General Manager Elizabeth Williams contacted the Union President and stated that the Charging 

Party would be fired if he was not removed from his union duties. However, the Charging Party does not 

present any argument on this alleged violation on brief and offered no evidence in support of the claim that 

Williams made such statements to the Union President. Accordingly, this allegation is not addressed below. 

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Respondent counters that it did not violate the Act by evicting the Union from its space because 

Slater suffered no adverse employment action and because the Respondent needed the space for a 

facilities maintenance manager’s office. 

Second, Slater contends that the Respondent violated Sections 10(a)(1) and (2) of the Act 

when its agents removed Union flyers from the garage walls because the Respondent thereby 

applied its posting policy in a discriminatory manner. The Respondent denies that it applied its 

policy in a discriminatory manner. It also asserts that it did not violate the Act when it removed 

Union flyers from the garage walls because Slater did not engage in protected activity when he 

posted the flyers and also did not suffer an adverse employment action. The Respondent 

additionally notes that it removed the flyers to further its legitimate business need of safety and 

maintaining smooth operations. 

Third, Slater argues that the Respondent violated Sections 10(a)(2) and (1) of the Act when 

the Respondent postponed a grievance hearing, at which he represented a fellow employee, 

because it undermined Slater’s reliability in the eyes of his coworkers. The Respondent denies 

that the postponement violated the Act, arguing that it was not an adverse employment action 

against Slater. The Respondent further notes that it harbored no illegal motive and that it canceled 

the meeting for the legitimate business reason that Manager Naranjo believed Slater was recording 

or transmitting the meeting to a third party without consent. 

Fourth, Slater suggests that the Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when 

General Manager Williams threatened Slater with discipline for raising safety issues during an 

employee rap session. Slater notes that his conduct at the meeting retained the protections of the 

Act because he used no profanity and violated no rules. The Respondent denies that Slater’s 

conduct at the meeting was concerted or protected. Even if it was, it lost the protections of the Act 

because Slater disrupted a safety meeting. The Respondent also notes that Slater suffered no 

adverse action and that the Respondent had a legitimate business for threatening Slater and 

instructing him to remain quiet because he was disrupting a safety meeting. In the alternative, the 

Respondent denies that the General Manager’s instruction to remain quiet had any coercive effect 

where it contained no prospective threat that would chill a reasonable employees’ future protected 

activity.

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Fifth, Slater argues that the Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when Naranjo

ordered him not to discuss the Chicago Teachers Union (CTU) strike on CTA property.2 Slater 

contends that he engaged in concerted activity when he attempted to encourage drivers to support 

CTU. He reasons that the Respondent had no overriding property interest in prohibiting his speech 

to off-duty employees in the breakroom and that the Respondent’s prohibition of such discussion 

was overly broad, and motivated by union animus. The Respondent counters that Slater’s 

discussions were not protected because Slater was not speaking on behalf of union members. In 

addition, the Respondent notes that Slater suffered no adverse employment action from Naranjo’s 

directive. The Respondent denies that Naranjo’s instructions were motivated by animus towards 

the Union and notes, instead, that Naranjo did not want Slater to disturb operators before their 

shifts. In the alternative, the Respondent contends that Naranjo’s instruction did not have a 

reasonable tendency to interfere, restrain, or coerce reasonable employees in the exercise of their 

protected rights because Naranjo gave a narrow instruction that barred Slater’s discussion of CTU 

only for the rest of that day. 

Finally, Slater contends that the Respondent violated Sections 10(a)(1) and (2) of the Act 

when it discriminatorily denied Slater copying privileges because it acted in contravention of its 

past practices and a grievance settlement agreement. The Respondent counters that Slater’s use of 

the copier was not protected activity because it was excessive. It similarly contends that it had a 

legitimate business reason for making the threat since Slater was tying up the Respondent’s 

resources. In the alternative, the Respondent argues that Naranjo threatened Slater for his 

insubordinate refusal to leave the copy area and making a disturbance, not for making copies on 

behalf of the Union. 

III. FINDINGS OF FACT

Gilberto Hernandez was the Administrative Manager at North Park Garage between 2012 

or 2013 and May 2015. During that time, he also sometimes served as Acting General Manager. 

At all times material, Andrew Berry was a Transportation Manager I at the North Park Garage. 

 

2 Slater moves to amend the Complaint to add this more specific allegation because the Complaint includes 

only the more general allegation that Naranjo unlawfully prohibited Slater from engaging in “union 

discussions without prior approval by management,” and without a manager present. The motion is 

granted, and the Complaint is hereby amended to conform to the evidence presented at hearing. 80 Ill. 

Adm. Code 1220.50(f). 

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Jiaro Naranjo was Senior Manager of the North Park Garage from June 2015 to April 2017. At all 

times material, Katharine Lunde was the Director of Labor Relations for the CTA. Erek Slater is 

a bus operator assigned to the North Park Garage. 

The Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241 (“ATU Local 241” or “Union”) represents the 

bus operators employed by the CTA. 

In January 2015, Slater campaigned for the position of Executive Board member for ATU 

Local 241. During the campaign season, the District Manager3called Slater into his office to 

review Slater’s Union campaign literature. He noted that he did not have a problem with most of 

the literature, but that he did have a problem with Slater’s promise to turn the Union into a “battlehardened organization” that was “able to defend the interest the interests of the 200,000 families” 

that the Union represents. 

On January 27, 2015, the North Park Garage union members elected Slater as Executive 

Board member for ATU Local 241.4 

1. March 7, 2015 Rap Session 

On March 7, 2015, the CTA held a rap session. Approximately 30 to 50 bus operators 

attended the rap session.5 The purpose of the rap sessions was to address safety issues and facility 

maintenance issues. CTA Safety Representative Marcus Patrick gave a 40-minute PowerPoint 

presentation on the CTA’s safety management system. Facility Improvements Project Manager 

Patrick Cimarusti, then gave a presentation on the CTA’s new facilities maintenance initiative. 

General Manager Liz Williams was also present on behalf of management.6 Gilberto Hernandez 

was in the vicinity, but did not participate in the meeting.

After Cimarusti finished his presentation, he opened the floor for discussion and asked for 

questions. A number of operators asked safety-related questions. Then Slater spoke. He 

introduced himself as the elected Executive Board member of North Board Garage. He then stated

that he disputed the CTA’s characterization of its safety policy as a change, and asserted that 

 

3 The identity of the District Manager in January 2015 is unclear. However, in June 2015, the North District

Manager was Jason Kierna. 

4 Slater was sworn in as an Executive Board member on March 10, 2015. 

5 The witnesses give different estimations of the number of bus operators in attendance. 

6

Jim Guidone arrived towards the end of the meeting. His title does not appear in the record. 

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management was not in fact introducing any changes. Bus drivers Melvin Williams and Baseemah 

Dear-Townsend confirmed that Slater’s comments were safety-related.7 

 As Slater spoke, he moved to the front of the room, where the presenters were standing. 

Cimarusti perceived Slater’s tone as confrontational. Williams interrupted Slater and informed 

him that his comments were off topic. Gil Hernandez similarly explained that this rap session was 

not the proper forum for the issues that Slater was raising. Williams spoke over Slater, but and 

Slater continued to speak, despite General Manager Williams’s interruption and directive to stop. 

Slater stated that it was his right to speak and that Williams could not tell him to be quiet. He 

asked the operators whether they wanted him to continue to speak, to present the position of their 

union, and they responded affirmatively. 

I credit bus driver Melvin Williams’s testimony that the General Manager raised her voice 

at Slater, when she interrupted him, and that Slater then responded by raising his voice. Slater did 

not use any vulgar language. Williams then ordered Slater to be silent and made a formal threat 

of insubordination and termination. Slater did not speak further. However, other bus drivers then 

joined in to complain about CTA’s past practices.

General Manager Williams cancelled the meeting because management lost control of it. 

According to Operator Melvin Williams, the General Manager threatened to call the Union 

President. Slater, Cimarusti and Operator Williams all confirm that General Manager Williams 

took out her phone after the meeting and made a call. However, there is no evidence that she in 

fact spoke to the Union President. 

After Williams canceled the meeting, Cimarusti walked around the room to discuss issues 

with drivers in small groups at their tables. During these conversations, drivers raised issues of 

driver fatigue.

On March 19, 2015, the Union President removed Slater from his position at Executive 

Board member, but reinstated him three weeks later. 

2. CTA’s Removal of the Union Office 

 

7 Cimarusti denied that Slater raised safety issues and claimed that Slater instructed the drivers not to listen 

to management, but I do not credit this testimony because Cimarusti’s account of the meeting lacked 

reliability in other respects. Most notably, Cimarusti contradicted his own claim that Slater interrupted his 

presentation by admitting that Slater spoke only after he opened the floor to questions.

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The North Park Garage is relatively small. There are approximately eight offices at North 

Park Garage. Five or six transportation managers use two of the offices, but the five or six 

managers do not occupy the office at the same time. 

The Union had use of office space at North Park Garage beginning in December 2014. The 

Union did not use the office every day during the months it had access to it. The door to the office 

was always locked and Union representatives did not have keys to the office. They needed to ask 

the CTA’s permission to use it. Union stewards and Executive Board members used the office to 

speak to the membership in private, to interview grievants, and to store records. 

Slater understood that the identified space was the Union office because Union trustees 

Johnny Cole and Michael Morman had previously used that space and trained him there in January 

or February 2015. In addition, General Manager Liz Williams pointed out that space as the union 

office, when Slater was first elected as Executive Board member.8 

The Union never had exclusive use of the office. Rather, the CTA used the office to 

conduct picks of bus runs, during which operators would select their assignments, and it also kept 

furniture and a computer there.9 Hernandez testified that he informed Slater that the Union could 

use the office while it was empty, but that the CTA reserved the first right to use the office if the 

need for it arose. No member of CTA management ever informed Slater that the office space 

permanently belonged to the Union.

Sometime in early 2015, a facilities maintenance manager asked Hernandez for office 

space at the North Park Garage. The CTA created the position of facilities maintenance manager 

as part of a new facilities maintenance initiative. It assigned each facilities maintenance manager 

responsibility for a different sector of the city so that facilities issues could be addressed more 

efficiently. The facilities maintenance manager responsible for the area that included the North 

Park Garage was searching for an office that was closer to his area of responsibility. When he 

made the request, his office was located on the west side of the city. 

As noted above, Slater spoke out at a rap session on March 7, 2015. The Union president 

removed him from his duties on March 19, 2015. On April 6, 2015, the Union’s Executive Board 

reinstated Slater to his position as Executive Board member, over the president’s objections.

 

8 Slater testified that he could not recall whether Williams expressly said that “this is the Union office.”

9 The CTA conducts picks approximately six times a year, and each pick takes several days to complete. 

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 Shortly after April 6, 2015, “almost immediately” after Slater returned to his Executive 

Board member duties, Hernandez approached Slater in the Union office and informed him that the 

Union could no longer use the space. Around this time, Hernandez separately informed Morman

that the Union could no longer use the office. 

I credit Slater’s claim that Hernandez did not inform him why the Respondent needed the 

office space at the time Hernandez instructed Slater to vacate it. Although Hernandez claims he 

“believed” he told Slater that the Respondent needed the space for a facilities maintenance 

manager’s office, Hernandez’s memory of the interaction was hazy, and therefore not as reliable 

as Slater’s. Hernandez’s use of the word “believe” suggests that he was uncertain about what he 

told Slater. This uncertainty is underscored by the fact that he could not remember when he told 

Slater that the Union could no longer use the office space, where in the North Park Garage the 

conversation took place, or who else was present for the conversation. By contrast, Slater gave a 

more precise timeframe for when the interaction occurred, and he was also able to specify the 

location at which it took place. 

For similar reasons, I credit Morman’s description of his conversation with Hernandez. 

Morman testified in an earnest manner that Hernandez told him that the CTA needed to use the 

room because they were “moving the safety guys from the back to the front.” He likewise asserted 

that Hernandez made no mention of a facilities maintenance initiative at the time. By contrast, 

Hernandez’s impaired memory of a related conversation with Slater and his failure to provide a 

detailed account of his conversation with Morman weighs against crediting his claims to the 

contrary. 

Sometime later, Slater learned that the Respondent decided to give the office space to a 

facilities maintenance manager. General Manager Williams made the decision, but Hernandez had 

influence over it.10 Hernandez claims Williams decided to give the facilities maintenance manager 

the office space before Hernandez informed Slater that the Union could no longer have use of the 

office, but I do not credit this testimony. Had Williams already decided how to make use of the 

Union’s office, when Hernandez told Slater to vacate it, Hernandez likely would have conveyed 

that reason to Slater and he would have conveyed the same reason to Morman. Yet, Hernandez 

did not offer Slater a reason when he instructed the Union to vacate its space. Moreover, 

 

10 The Union could not share the space with the facilities maintenance manager because the facilities 

manager handled confidential documents.

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Hernandez would not have given Morman a different justification for needing the space if 

Williams had already informed him that the Respondent planned to use the space for the facilities 

maintenance manager’s office. 

The witnesses dispute whether there was any vacant office space at the North Park Garage 

in April 2015, when Hernandez ordered the Union to leave the office it had previously used. I 

credit the testimony of Hernandez and Berry, that there was no vacant office space, because 

Hernandez and Berry corroborated each other. Hernandez testified that there was no vacant office 

space at North Park Garage in April 2015. Berry similarly testified, albeit more broadly, that to 

his knowledge there was no vacant office space in 2015. Although Hernandez conceded that office 

space sometimes becomes available for a short time, it quickly becomes occupied again. 

While Slater testified that the credit union was vacant in April 2015, the reliability of this 

testimony is called into question by Slater’s broader claim that the office had been vacant since 

January 2015, and that it remained vacant for the two years that preceded the hearing in this case.11 

Naranjo directly contradicted Slater’s broader claim by stating that the credit union office had in 

fact been his office during his tenure as North Park Senior Manager, which extend from June 2015 

to at least December 2016. Notably, Slater did not attempt to impeach Naranjo’s testimony and 

instead took it at face value when questioning Naranjo, referring to the credit union office as “your 

office.” 12

At all times material to this case, the Union had access to a separate Union-rented space at 

20 South Clark Street. I take administrative notice of the fact that the Union’s rented space is 

approximately 9-10 miles away from the North Park Garage, by car, and approximately an hour 

away, by public transportation during business hours. 

3. Copier Incident 

The CTA allows employees to use the CTA copier to make copies of union-related 

documents, but the evidence indicates that the CTA does not permit employees to make an 

unlimited number copies. For example, Bus Operator Morman stated that he understood that he 

could not make one hundred copies of documents using the copier. In addition, Transportation 

 

11 See Tr. P. 626. 

12 Slater also identified other areas that were vacant at times, but not when they were vacant or how long 

they remained vacant.

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Manager Berry instructed Slater that he could make a few copies on the CTA copier, but not 

hundreds. 

Sometime in September 2015, Naranjo and Slater had an interaction by the CTA copier, 

while Slater was using the machine. It undisputed that Naranjo instructed Slater to stop making 

copies and that at the end of the interaction, Naranjo threatened Slater with discipline for 

insubordination. The witnesses dispute the remaining details of the interaction including (1) the 

number of copies that Slater was making and (2) the particular impetus for Naranjo’s threat. 

I credit Naranjo’s claim that Slater was making over a hundred copies of a document, and 

that he was not merely making copies of two, one-page information requests,13 as Slater contends. 

In addition, I credit Naranjo’s claim that he threatened Slater with discipline after Slater became 

angry and refused to leave the area. Although Naranjo’s testimony on a related matter was 

inconsistent,14 his testimony on the number of copies is more credible on the whole than Slater’s 

for the following reasons. See In Re Daikichi Corp., 335 NLRB 622 (2001) (there is 

“nothing...more common in all kinds of judicial decisions than to believe some and not all of a 

witness’s testimony”).

First, Naranjo explained the impetus for his threat of insubordination, whereas Slater did 

not sufficiently explain the events that led up to the threat. Naranjo testified that he observed 

Slater making hundreds of copies, and asked him to stop. He explained that Slater then started 

shouting and telling the clerks, who were present at the time, that they were witnesses to Naranjo’s

illegal action. Naranjo further explained that he asked Slater to leave because he was being 

disruptive, and that when Slater refused, Naranjo threatened him with insubordination. 

By contrast, Slater simply stated that Naranjo threatened him with discipline for using the 

photocopier to copy requests for information submitted to the CTA on behalf of union members. 

Although Slater did not deny that Naranjo gave him some directive during their interaction, Slater 

did not identify the directive that Naranjo claims he failed to immediately follow. Notably, Slater 

also did not contradict Naranjo’s claim that Naranjo directed him to leave the area. 

Second, Naranjo’s claim that Slater was making excessive copies is more plausible than 

Slater’s claim that he was making just two. Naranjo would have had no time to observe Slater’s 

 

13 The information request form submitted into evidence is one page long. 

14 Naranjo initially testified that stopped Slater from copying a Union information request. He later claimed 

that that the materials appeared to be personal because they did not have a union logo on them. 

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conduct, issue repeated instructions, and then threaten insubordination had Slater simply attempted 

to copy two documents. Rather, the copies would have been complete within less than a minute 

of having started, and there would have been no time for the interaction to take place. Slater would 

not have had occasion to defy any instructions; he simply would have left because his copy job 

would have been completed. 

4. CTA’s Removal of Union Flyers In and After June 2015 

Throughout 2015, Slater regularly posted union flyers in the men’s bathroom, on the front 

and back door, on the walls around the south doors, on the bulletin board next to the Union board, 

and on the Union bulletin board itself. 

It is undisputed that prior to June 2015, flyers were commonly posted all over the walls, 

doors and the bathrooms at the North Park Garage. These included commercial flyers from 

corporations such as Walmart,15 and personal announcements for parties and events. 

In June, Naranjo became Senior Manager of North Park Garage. He transferred to North 

Park Garage from a different garage, where he held a similar position. 

It is undisputed that at some point, following Naranjo’s arrival at North Park Garage, he 

implemented a policy set forth in an email from CTA Vice President George Cavelle. Cavelle 

addressed the policy to the General Manager and Senior Management Staff, months earlier, on 

October 20, 2014. It stated the following in relevant part: “please insure that all paper signage, 

i.e., party reminders, ‘quotes of the day,’ department events, etc., [are] posted only on designated 

bulletin boards.”

To implement the policy, Naranjo designated areas at the North Park Garages for certain 

types of postings. Naranjo testified that the North Park Garage has designated posting areas for 

reroutes, route terminal matters, OSHA compliance documents, and standard operating 

procedures. Bus driver Dear-Townsend testified that commercial and personal flyers remained 

posted in North Park Garage, but that those flyers were confined to their own, designated spaces. 

She explained that after the CTA changed its policy, the CTA still allowed employees to post 

personal flyers and advertisements, but that the CTA was simply “giving [employees] a certain 

area to post [their] flyers.” The Union bulletin board is the designated location for union postings. 

 

15 Commercial corporations sometimes obtain permission from the CTA to post on the CTA walls.

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The Union bulletin board is behind glass and is kept locked. Naranjo confirmed that he told Slater 

many times to confine his postings to the Union bulletin board, the area designated for Union 

postings. 

Managers perform security checks once a day and remove any postings that do not appear 

in their correct, designated areas. They remove flyers or postings from the garage walls if they are 

not CTA-related. While employees still sometimes post commercial and personal flyers outside 

the designated areas, the CTA swiftly removes them. 

Naranjo explained that the CTA enforces its posting rules in part to ensure driver safety. 

The CTA posts notices about reroutes, which a driver may not see if he is distracted by other 

postings. If a driver proceeds on his customary route, without regard to the reroute, the driver 

could have an accident. Furthermore, if such notices are posted in designated areas, then drivers 

know where to find them. 

The witnesses provided contradictory testimony regarding the date on which Naranjo 

began enforcing this policy. However, I credit Naranjo’s testimony that he began enforcing the 

policy in June 2015, upon his arrival at North Park Garage. While Slater denied that the CTA 

began applying that policy in June, even Slater’s own witness, bus operator Dear-Townsend, 

initially corroborated Naranjo’s claim. She volunteered testimony that it was around May or June 

2015 that “the CTA started...giving you a certain area to post your fliers and stuff like that...so a 

lot of flyers [were] moved to the front area...--by the management office.”16 In addition, Slater 

admitted that Naranjo informed him some time in 2015 that postings belonged in designated 

locations. In turn, it is reasonable to infer that Naranjo gave Slater these instructions as he removed 

the Union flyers from the men’s bathroom and south interior doorway, sometime between June 

and September 2015. The photographs provided by Slater showing flyers on the walls are not 

helpful because Slater admits he took the photographs in April and May, before the CTA began 

enforcing its posting policy at North Park Garage. Indeed, they raise the question of why Slater 

did not take photographs of flyers on CTA walls in June, the month in which Naranjo allegedly 

removed Union flyers but left other non-union flyers posted. 

 

16 On redirect by Slater’s attorney Kreitman, Dear-Townsend later claimed that the CTA changed its policy 

only after Slater filed his charge in this case in “summer of 2015,” but Kreitman did not lay a foundation 

to show that Dear-Townsend knew when Slater filed his charge and he also did not provide her with the 

precise date Slater filed it. Accordingly, Dear-Townsend’s subsequent testimony is of less value than her 

earlier, volunteered admission. 

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5. Slater’s June 10, 2015 Conversation with Naranjo 

It is undisputed that, on June 10, 2015, Naranjo instructed Slater that he could not discuss 

the CTU strike on CTA property.17 However, the witnesses dispute the impetus for the 

conversation and other specifics of the interaction. 

I credit Naranjo’s account of how the June 10, 2015, interaction began and Naranjo’s 

impressions of the bus operators’ demeanor because these matters are corroborated by other 

witness testimony. Naranjo claims that he approached Slater because he heard a commotion in the 

breakroom. Operator Morman’s testimony similarly suggests that Naranjo approached Slater 

rather than the other way around, as Slater claims, because Attorney Kreitman characterized the 

interaction in that manner and Morman never disputed it.18 Although Slater contends that he 

approached Naranjo in advance, out of courtesy, such conduct seems incongruent with Slater’s 

other interactions with management, which were less courteous. 

I also credit Naranjo claim that he saw approximately 10 to 20 bus operators gathered in 

the breakroom on an unpaid break19 and that the operators seemed upset. Operator DearTownsend’s general testimony about Slater’s interactions with bus operators regarding CTU 

matters lends weight to this claim, although it is unclear whether she was describing the June 10, 

2015 interaction in particular. She recalled at least two occasions on which operators became 

upset with Slater because he was spending more time on CTU matters than on Local 241 issues. 

Slater denied that any operator had ever voiced their disagreement with him or told him that he 

should express more support for Local 241 Union members than CTU members, but this testimony 

is incredible because his own witness, Dear-Townsend, contradicted him. 

Naranjo then instructed Slater that he could not discuss the CTU strike on CTA property. 

At hearing, Naranjo claimed that he was concerned that operators would forget their defensive 

driving habits if they were upset when they returned to their runs, but he did not mention this 

concern to the operators. Indeed, CTA’s answer suggests that it offered a different reason for this 

 

17 The CTA’s answer states the following: “CTA admits that after the incident referenced in paragraph 15, 

Mr. Naranjo instructed Charging Party not to discuss the Chicago Teachers Union strike on CTA property.” 

18 Q [Attorney Kreitman]: Regarding the discussion with Mr. Naranjo coming to tell Erek to stop talking 

about Teachers Union activities, were you off duty at that time, or were you on duty?

A [Morman]: Yes. I was off duty. 

19 The CTA admits that the employees were on an unpaid break. 

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directive because it asserted that its agent20 told Slater that “his actions were a violation of CTA 

Rule 14(b),” which prohibits employees from leading fellow employees into a wildcat strike, work 

slowdown, or other impermissible job action. At hearing Naranjo testified that he could not 

remember whether he referenced that rule when addressing Slater. 

However, I do not credit Naranjo’s claim that he limited the prohibition on CTU 

discussions to one day only. To that end, I rely on the CTA’s broad admission that “Naranjo 

instructed [Slater] not to discuss the Chicago Teachers Union strike on CTA property,” which

references no such limitation on Naranjo’s instruction. 

Nevertheless, I do not credit Slater’s account of Naranjo’s statements by default, despite 

Naranjo’s less than forthright testimony, outlined above, because one of Slater’s own witnesses 

corroborated Naranjo’s claims. In the Complaint, Slater claims that Naranjo told him that no union 

discussions could take place without prior approval of management and that a manager needed to 

be present for Union discussions. Naranjo denied making these statements, and operator Michael 

Morman, who was also present at the June 10 meeting, likewise testified that he did not remember 

Naranjo telling Slater that no union discussions could take place on CTA property. 

The meeting dispersed, and Slater and his coworkers then met at McDonald’s to discuss 

CTU-related matters. Only five operators attended the meeting at McDonalds, but Slater expected 

that 20 would have come had the Union held the meeting at the garage. 

Following the incident described above, Slater still spoke to union members about the CTU 

on CTA property one-on-one. He was not required to obtain permission to conduct these 

discussions and he was not required to hold these discussions in the presence of CTA management. 

6. Bus Operator Walter Tidwell’s October 2015 Disciplinary Hearing 

In October 1, 2015, the CTA held a disciplinary hearing for bus operator Walter Tidwell. 

Slater, Tidwell, and Naranjo attended the hearing. Slater appeared on behalf of the Union to 

represent Tidwell. Naranjo appeared on behalf of the CTA. 

Slater arrived at the meeting with his phone on. Shortly after the meeting began, a voice 

emanated from his phone. Naranjo told Slater that he had not given him his consent to be on a call 

with anyone else. Naranjo became upset and asked Slater whether he was recording him. Slater 

denied he was recording Naranjo. Naranjo then ended the meeting. 

 

20 The CTA’s answer does not identify the speaker.

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Although Slater claimed he informed Naranjo when the meeting began that he was on hold

with First Vice President Valerie Matthews, this testimony is not credible. Matthews’ voice on 

the phone would not have triggered Naranjo’s decision to end the meeting, had Slater given 

Naranjo advance notice that he was on hold and that Matthews might therefore come back on the 

line at some point. Moreover, had Naranjo simply been “paranoid” that Slater was recording him, 

as Slater contends, surely Naranjo would have inquired about his phone and Slater’s intent to 

record before the voice emanated from it. Slater’s testimony on this matter is further impaired by 

his less than credible claim that he muted his side of the phone call. There would have been little 

reason for Slater to have muted his side of the call if he was simply on hold because there would 

have been no one on the line to hear his side of the conversation. 

By contrast, Naranjo credibly testified that he ended the meeting shortly after it began 

because he believed Slater was using his phone to either record the hearing and/or to transmit it to 

a third party.21 Naranjo testified had heard rumors from other members of CTA management that 

Slater liked to record conversations with management, and the existence of such rumors cannot be 

reasonably disputed. Two other members of CTA management testified that they likewise 

believed that Slater had tried to record them.

22

 Slater himself admitted that several CTA managers 

had previously instructed him not to record them during disciplinary hearings, though he denied 

that he had ever recorded anyone without their consent. Naranjo further explained the basis for 

his belief that Slater was recording him in this case, noting that Slater was surprised that the voice 

came out of the phone and tried to shut it off. 

Immediately after Tidwell’s disciplinary hearing, Slater emailed Naranjo and Union 

officials stated that “all hearings were unilaterally postponed by the Snr. Manager [Naranjo].” In 

fact, Naranjo and Union Vice President Valerie Mathews agreed to a “notice of further 

investigation,” which allowed the parties to reschedule the hearing to a later date while adhering 

 

21 The CTA does not allow anyone to record disciplinary hearings of its employees because such recording 

is prohibited by Illinois law without the consent of both parties. In addition, it is an invasion of privacy, 

and audio recordings can be easily manipulated. 

22 Acting General Manager Hernandez likewise testified that, when Slater first became a Union 

representative, he tried to record an interview of a bargaining unit member by management using a micro 

recorder. He placed the recorder on the table and stated that he wanted to record the meeting. Hernandez 

explained that Slater could not record the meeting. Slater denied that he had ever tried to record Hernandez 

and he likewise denied owning a micro recorder. Transportation Manager Berry testified that he believed 

Slater has tried to record him. Berry based his belief on the manner in which Slater held up his phone--

chest high, flat in his hand, with the screen up. Slater likewise denied recording Berry. 

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to contractual timelines for disciplinary action.23 Bus Operator Michael Morman signed the 

document on the Union’s behalf, at First Vice President Matthews’s direction. 

Naranjo has conducted approximately 20 disciplinary hearings in which Slater represented 

unit employees as on behalf of the Union. Naranjo credibly testified that the CTA did not postpone 

any other disciplinary hearings in which Slater represented unit employees as a Union Executive 

Board Member. He similarly testified that Tidwell’s grievance hearing was the only hearing that 

the CTA postponed. Although Slater claimed in an email, dated October 1, 2015, that Naranjo 

informed him that “all hearings were unilaterally postponed by the Snr. Manager,” Slater did offer 

testimony to this effect. Accordingly, Naranjo’s testimony is afforded greater weight here. 

IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

1. Section 10(a)(1) Allegations

The Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it (i) threatened the Charging 

Party with discipline on March 7, 2015, if he continued to speak at the rap session, (ii) limited

Union postings to the Union bulletin Board while barring them from other areas specifically 

designated for personal and commercial postings,24 (iii) removed the Union from the office it had 

occupied for several months, and (iv) instructed Slater that he could not discuss the Chicago 

Teachers Union strike on CTA property. However, the Respondent did not violate Section 

10(a)(1) of the Act when it (i) removed Union flyers from the walls in June 2015, (ii) postponed a 

single grievance hearing at which Slater represented a union member, (iii) threated the Charging 

Party with insubordination if he did not leave the copy area; and (iv) purportedly instructed the 

Charging Party that he could not have union discussions on CTA property without approval of 

management and without a manager present. 

A respondent violates Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it engages in conduct which 

reasonably tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights protected 

by the Act. City of Lake Forest, 29 PERI ¶ 52 (IL LRB-SP 2012); City of Mattoon, 11 PERI ¶ 

2016 (IL SLRB 1995); Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook Cnty., 7 PERI ¶ 2019 (IL SLRB 

 

23 The contract provides that the CTA has 15 days from the date of an infraction to notify an employee of 

potential discipline. The CTA then has 10 days from the notification to execute the discipline. The Notice 

of Further Investigation is a document that the Union and CTA management sign to extend the timeline. 

24 As discussed below, the Complaint is amended to add this allegation because doing so conforms the 

pleadings to evidence presented. 

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1991); Ill., Dep’t. of Cent. Mgmt. Servs. (Dept. of Conservation), 2 PERI ¶ 2032 (IL SLRB 1986); 

City of Chi., 3 PERI ¶ 3011 (IL LLRB 1987). Generally, a showing of illegal motive is not 

required to prove a violation of Section 10(a)(1) of the Act. City of Mattoon, 11 PERI ¶ 2016; Ill., 

Dep’t. of Cent. Mgmt. Servs. (Dept. of Conservation), 2 PERI ¶ 2032. Instead, the test is whether 

the employer’s conduct, viewed objectively from the standpoint of a reasonable employee, had a 

tendency to interfere with, restrain or coerce the employee in the exercise of a right guaranteed by 

the Act. Clerk of the Circuit Court, 7 PERI ¶ 2019; Ill., Dep’t. of Cent. Mgmt. Servs. (Dept. of 

Conservation), 2 PERI ¶ 2032. 

However, where a charging party alleges that the employer violated Section 10(a)(1) of the 

Act by taking an alleged adverse employment action against him because of, and in retaliation for, 

the exercise of protected rights, the analysis must track the one used in cases arising under Section 

10(a)(2) of the Act. Vill. of Oak Park, 18 PERI ¶ 2019 (IL SLRB 2002); Vill. of Schiller Park, 13 

PERI ¶ 2047 (IL SLRB 1997). Accordingly, in such cases, the charging party must prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that he engaged in protected activity, that respondent knew of that 

activity, and that the respondent took adverse action against him as a result of his involvement in 

that activity. Vill. of Schiller Park, 13 PERI ¶ 2047 (IL SLRB 1997) (citing Gale and Chicago 

Housing Authority, 1 PERI ¶ 3010 (IL LLRB 1985)).

There is no merit to the Respondent’s claim that the 10(a)(2)-type analysis applies to every 

alleged violation of Section 10(a)(1) set forth in the Complaint. While the Section 10(a)(2)-type 

analysis applies to the Respondent’s allegedly unlawful removal of the union office, the reasonable 

employee test applies to the remaining Section 10(a)(1) allegations.

Two of the Section 10(a)(1) allegations address threats, to which the reasonable employee 

test unquestionably applies. See Clerk of the Court of Cook County, 7 PERI ¶ 2019. The 

Respondent argues that the threats at issue in this case require proof of unlawful motive because 

Slater alleges that the Respondent made the threats in retaliation for his protected activity, but this 

is incorrect. In fact, the same analysis applies to threats irrespective of whether the they constitute 

a retaliatory response to an employee’s past protected activity or instead foreshadow consequences 

for protected activity that employees might undertake in the future. In either event, the analysis 

considers whether the statement, when viewed objectively from the standpoint of a reasonable 

employee, has a tendency to interfere with, restrain or coerce the employee in the exercise of a 

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right guaranteed by the Act.25 Compare Chicago Transit Auth. v. Illinois Labor Relations Bd., 386 

Ill. App. 3d 556, 573 (1st Dist. 2008) (applying reasonable employee test to employer’s threat, 

made in response to employees who engaged in protected handbill distribution, that announced 

intent to impose discipline for similar conduct) and Township of Worth, 3 PERI ¶ 2019 (IL SLRB 

1987) (applying reasonably employee test to supervisor’s threat of imposing wage cut in response 

to news of unionization efforts) with City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department (Kostro), 3 

PERI ¶ 3028 (IL LLRB 1987) (applying reasonable employee test applied to threat by supervisor 

that he would change employee’s schedule if employee filed a grievance).

Notably, the Respondent cites to no case in which the Board declined to apply the 

“reasonable employee” analysis to a threat on the grounds that the threat constituted retaliation for 

protected activity. In fact, every case cited by the Respondent in support of this claim reinforces 

the conclusion—advanced in this RDO above—that the Board applies the Section 10(a)(2)-type

analysis to alleged retaliatory adverse employment actions arising under Section 10(a)(1), and not 

alleged retaliatory threats. Pace Suburban Bus Div. of Reg'l Transp. Auth. v. Illinois Labor 

Relations Bd., 406 Ill. App. 3d 484, 494-95 (1st Dist. 2010) (Section 10(a)(2)-type analysis applied 

to alleged retaliatory termination arising under Section 10(a)(1)); State of Ill, Dept. of Cent. Mgmt 

Servs. (State Police), 30 PERI 70 (IL LRB-SP 2013) (Section 10(a)(2)-type analysis applied to 

alleged retaliatory suspension); Chicago Hous. Auth., 6 PERI 3013 (IL LLRB 1990) (Section 

10(a)(2)-type analysis applied to allegedly discriminatory denial of promotion and involuntary 

transfer) (emphasis added); Neponset Comm. Unit. School Dist. No. 307, 13 PERI 1089 (IELRB 

1997)(“we must determine what test should be applied to alleged violations of Section 14(a)(1) of 

the Act which consist of adverse employment action because of protected activity”)(emphasis 

added).

Similarly, two of the other Section 10(a)(1) allegations pertain to union solicitation and/or 

distribution of union materials on the Employer’s premises, likewise analyzed under the reasonable 

employee test. See cases infra. 

The remaining Section 10(a)(1) allegation, related to the Respondent’s alleged 

postponement of grievance hearings, similarly does not mandate a Section 10(a)(2)-type analysis, 

 

25 There is no difference between a “retaliatory threat” and a “prospective threat” for purposes of the Section 

10(a)(1) analysis, as the Respondent contends on brief. All threats are prospective, by definition, because 

they communicate an intent to take some future action that is adverse to the listener, its subject.

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given the Complaint’s language and the Board’s policies. The Complaint sets forth an independent 

Section 10(a)(1) allegation, which simply alleges that the Respondent interfered with, coerced, and 

restrained the Charging Party’s exercise of protected rights by postponing the Charging Party’s 

grievance hearings and hearings at which the Charging Party represented unit members. It does 

not claim that the Respondent took an adverse action against the Charging Party in retaliation for 

his protected activity. 

The Respondent contends that this Section 10(a)(1) claim, and the others, are in fact 

derivative of the Section 10(a)(2) allegations, such that the 10(a)(2) analysis must apply, but the 

Complaint does not support the Respondent’s assertion. A Section 10(a)(1) allegation is derivative 

when it arises as a result of another violation of the Act and stems from the same conduct. City of 

Chicago, 31 PERI ¶ 129 (IL LRB-SP 2015). The Board’s complaints traditionally indicate a 

derivative Section 10(a)(1) allegation by stating the primary allegation and following it with the 

phrase “and (1),” e.g. “Section 10(a)(2) and (1).” Lincolnway Police Communications Center, 25 

PERI ¶ 67 n. 13 (IL LRB-LP ALJ 2009). In cases where the Section 10(a)(1) claim is derivative, 

the Board finds a violation of Section 10(a)(1) only if the Board sustains the violation on which it 

is based. City of Chicago, 31 PERI ¶ 129. 

Here, the Section 10(a)(1) allegation is distinct from the Section 10(a)(2) allegation 

because it appears in a different paragraph and separately alleges that the Respondent restrained 

or coerced public employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed under the Act. It does not allege 

that the Respondent took the identified conduct to retaliate against public employees to discourage 

membership in or support for the Union, as does the Section 10(a)(2) allegation. The separate 

nature of the independent26 Section 10(a)(1) allegation is rendered even clearer, here, because the 

Executive Director also included a derivative27 Section 10(a)(1) allegation in the Complaint, and 

the two types of Section 10(a)(1) allegations are easily juxtaposed. Had the Executive Director 

intended the all of the Section 10(a)(1) allegations to be derivative, she would not have placed 

 

26 The independent Section 10(a)(1) allegation provides that, “[b]y its acts and conduct as described in 

paragraphs 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17 and 18 the Respondent restrained or coerced public employee in the exercise 

of rights guaranteed under the Act, in violation of Section 10(a)(1) of the Act.” 

27 The derivative Section 10(a)(1) allegation (paragraph 20) is clearly linked to the Section 10(a)(2) 

allegation and provides that, “[b]y its act and conduct as referenced in paragraph 13, 14, and 18, the 

Respondent has discriminated against public employees in order to discourage membership in or support 

for the Union, in violation of Sections 10(a)(2) and (1) of the Act.”

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some of them in a separate paragraph and rendered them distinct from, and independent of, the 

Section 10(a)(2) allegations. 

Finally, there is no merit to the Respondent’s assertion that the 10(a)(2)-type analysis 

applies to all the 10(a)(1) claims that arise from the same conduct as the Section 10(a)(2) claims. 

There are some circumstances in which the Board has declined to apply both a “reasonable 

employee test” and the motive-based test to the same instance of alleged misconduct, but those 

circumstances are not presented here. The Board does not apply the Section 10(a)(1) “reasonable 

employee” analysis where a respondent has taken adverse action against a charging party for 

legitimate and necessary reasons. City of Elmhurst, 17 PERI 2040 n. 5 (IL LRB-SP 2001). Yet 

in this case, as discussed below, the Respondent has taken no adverse employment actions against 

Slater for legitimate and necessary reasons. Accordingly, application of the reasonable employee 

test in this case would not “inevitably deprive the Employer of its right to take legitimate and 

necessary employment actions for fear that its conduct would be construed as retaliatory by 

employees....” Cf. City of Elmhurst, 17 PERI 2040 n. 5 (“an employer’s bad faith motive is 

determinative when an employer takes adverse action against employees”).28 By extension, the 

presence of both 10(a)(2) and 10(a)(1) allegations in the complaint should not automatically 

foreclose application of the only analytical framework that has any potential for success, even 

though there is some overlap in the conduct that supports the two separate claims. See Ill., Dep’t. 

of Cent. Mgmt. Servs. (Dept. of Conservation), 2 PERI ¶ 2032 (applying independent Section 

10(a)(1) analysis to posted schedule change, which was later withdrawn, where Section 10(a)(2) 

analysis failed for want of an adverse employment action). 

Each alleged violation of Section 10(a)(1) of the Act is addressed below, applying the 

principles set forth above. 

1. General Manager Williams’s Directive that Slater Refrain from Speaking at the 

March 7, 2015 meeting and her Threat of Discipline if he Continued, 10(a)(1)

The Respondent violated the Act when General Manager Williams told Slater to stop 

speaking at the March 7, 2015 meeting and threatened him with discipline if he continued. 

 

28 The Board has also held that in cases where employers have withheld scheduled wage increases or 

benefits because of the pendency of representative proceedings, an employer’s motive is irrelevant. City of 

Chicago, 3 PERI 3011 (IL LLRB 1987). Clearly, the facts of this case are different and this exception does 

not apply. 

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General Manager Williams’s threat had a tendency to interfere with, restrain or coerce a reasonable 

employee in the exercise of protected rights under the Act because her threat issued in direct 

response to Slater’s protected activity—Slater’s complaints about workplace safety, made during 

a group meeting. 

As a preliminary matter, Slater engaged in protected, concerted activity on March 7, 2015 

when he attempted to bring safety concerns to the attention of management at a group meeting. 

Concerted activity “encompasses those circumstances where individual employees seek to initiate 

or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well as individual employees bringing truly group 

complaints to the attention of management.” Bd. of Educ. of Schaumburg Comm. Consolidated 

School Dist. 54 v. Ill. Educ. Labor Rel. Bd., 247 Ill. App. 3d 439, 455 (1st Dist. 1993) (addressing 

similar language under the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, 115 ILCS 5) (citing Meyers 

II, 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986)). In determining whether activity is concerted, the National 

Labor Relations Board considers additional factors including “(1) whether the comments involved 

a common concern regarding conditions of employment, and was the issue framed as a common 

concern; and (2) the context under which the alleged concerted activity occurred—did the 

employer address the employees as a group.” In Re Air Contact Transp., Inc., 340 NLRB 688, 

695 (2003), enforcement granted sub nom. N.L.R.B. v. Air Contact Transp. Inc., 403 F.3d 206

(4th Cir. 2005).

Here, Slater raised concerns about work place safety, which is undoubtedly a common 

concern regarding employees’ conditions of employment. Specifically, Slater sought to raise 

management’s attention to the fact that the CTA’s “new” safety initiatives were not in fact new. 

The inescapable implication of his comments was that management had not adequately addressed 

safety concerns in the past, and that it was merely paying lip service to employees’ safety concerns 

by couching an old, ineffective approach as something new. Accordingly, Slater’s comments 

cannot simply be viewed as empty criticisms of management or griping, devoid of constructive 

aim, as the Respondent suggests, but rather an attempt to get management to address safety 

concerns that they had not adequately remedied in the past. Lou’s Transp., Inc., 361 NLRB No. 

158 (2014)(work place safety is a matter of “fundamental concern” to employees); St. Bernard 

Hospital and Health Care Center, 360 NLRB No. 12, slip op. at 9 (2013) (“an employee who raises 

safety issues with his employer is engaged in concerted activity that is protected”); cf. Mushroom 

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Transp. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 330 F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964) (employee’s individual conversations 

with other employees were “mere griping” because it “look[ed] forward to no action at all”). 

Moreover, the context of Slater’s statements also weighs in favor of finding that his actions 

were concerted. Slater raised his concerns about employee safety at a group meeting geared 

towards safety issues, during which other employees endorsed his comments and then joined the 

discussion he initiated. An employee engages in concerted activity when he or she acts with or on 

the authority of other employees. Bd. of Educ. of Schaumburg Comm. Consolidated School Dist. 

54, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 455. But even a single “employee who protests publicly in a group meeting

is engaged in initiating group action.” Wyndham Resort Development Corp., 356 NLRB 765, 766 

(2011) (single employee’s protest of change in dress code in group meeting was concerted and 

protected). It is clear that Slater’s comments sought to initiate group action and that he also acted 

with other employees. While Slater started speaking without any pre-approved plan by the 

employee group, he garnered the support of other employees as he continued, and explicitly asked 

them whether they wanted him to keep speaking—they said they did. Although Slater ultimately 

stopped speaking after General Manager Williams threatened him with discipline, other employees 

chimed in, and Slater’s initiation of group action is therefore undeniable. 

The Respondent suggests that Slater’s activity was not concerted because the employees 

did not agree in advance that Slater would be their spokesman at the meeting; however, the NLRB 

has “found concerted activity when a second employee joins an individual employee's protest 

without requiring evidence of a previous plan to act in concert.” Wyndham Resort Development 

Corp., 356 NLRB 765, 766 (2011). That rationale applies here, where other employees joined 

Slater’s protest by raising similar concerns after he made his statements.

29

 While employees in 

this case were not protesting a unilateral change, as were the employees in Wyndham, they were 

protesting what they viewed to be an ineffective response to safety concerns. 

Moreover, Slater’s conduct remained protected given the place of the discussion, its subject 

matter, and the manner in which Slater conveyed his message. The Illinois Labor Relations Board 

has adopted the NLRB’s approach to determining whether direct communications, face-to-face in 

the workplace, between an employee and a manager or supervisor constitutes conduct so 

 

29 Although the precise nature of employees’ subsequent statements does not appear in the record, there is 

sufficient evidence that they were in the same vein as Slater’s. Had they simply agreed with management’s 

position that the safety initiates were new, or otherwise adequate, then Williams would have seen no need 

to end the meeting. 

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opprobrious that the employee loses the protection of the Act. Chicago Hous. Auth., 1 PERI ¶ 

3010 (employee lost the protections of the Act where he physically assaulted supervisor) (citing

Atlantic Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814 (1979). An employee does not lose the protection of the Act 

unless his misconduct is so violent or of such character as to render the employee unfit for further 

service. Chicago Transit Auth., 30 PERI 9 (IL LRB-LP 2013). Accordingly, “the rights of 

employees to engage in protected activity should prevail unless the employer can demonstrate 

special circumstances indicating a restriction on activity is necessary for the maintenance of safety, 

efficiency or discipline.” Chicago Transit Auth., 30 PERI 9 citing Village of Bensenville, 10 PERI 

¶ 2009 (IL SLRB 1993) (internal quotes omitted). 

The NLRB has set forth four factors to help determine whether an employee’s conduct 

loses the protections of the Act.30 These include (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject 

matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of the employee's outburst; and (4) whether the outburst 

was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice. Atlantic Steel, 245 NLRB 816 

(1979). These factors are considered in turn below. 

First, the location of the safety discussion weighs in favor of finding that Slater’s comments 

retained the protections of the Act. Slater made his comments in an employee meeting, in the 

transportation breakroom. Datwyler Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 350 NLRB 669, 670 

(2007)(breakroom meeting location weighed in favor of protection). Although there were other 

employees present, they were there to attend the meeting and Slater’s comments therefore did not 

entail the risk of disrupting CTA’s business. Datwyler Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 350 NLRB at 670. 

The Respondent contends that Slater did disrupt CTA’s business by interrupting a 

presentation on safety, but there is no merit to this claim. First, although the meeting was to some 

extent related to CTA’s business—as is any work meeting—employees at the meeting were not 

engaged in driving buses, or otherwise furthering the CTA’s primary function of providing public 

transportation. Second, Slater did not in fact interrupt the safety presentation and instead reserved 

his comments until the Respondent opened the floor to questions, at which point the Respondent 

expected feedback and dialogue. Id. (place of discussion weighed in favor of protection where it 

occurred during employee meeting where employees were “free to raise workplace issues”).

 

30 The Illinois Labor Relations Board has considered these factors though it has not expressly listed them. 

See Chicago Transit Auth., 30 PERI 9.

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Second, the subject matter of the discussion likewise weighs in favor of protection. Slater 

sought to speak on safety issues, which are matters of fundamental concern to employees. Lou’s 

Transp., Inc., 361 NLRB No. 158 (“complaints about...serious perceived workplace safety hazards 

are a fundamental matter of concern to employees”). The Respondent contends that Slater did not 

sufficiently articulate his position or advocate for change, but to the extent that is true, it is because 

Williams immediately interrupted him and threatened to discipline him if he continued. The 

Respondent also suggests that Slater’s comments were off topic, but two bargaining unit members, 

who have no stake in this case, confirmed that Slater asked questions and made comments about 

employee safety. These witnesses are inherently credible on this issue because they testified 

adversely to their current employer. In Re Caval Tool Div., 331 NLRB 858, 862 (2000). 

Third, the nature of Slater’s outburst also weighs in favor of protection because it was mild. 

Slater simply raised his voice and began moving to the front of the room. He did not use profanity 

and he did not otherwise insult a manager. Noble Metal Processing, 346 NLRB 795, 800 (2006) 

(affirming finding that lack of profanity favors protection); Goya Foods, Inc. & Dewys Taveras, 

356 NLRB 476, 478 (2011) (“speaking loudly does not, by itself result in a loss of protection.”).

Slater’s movement towards the front of the room does not demonstrate that he engaged in 

threatening conduct where the content of his speech was measured and where he did not make any 

threatening gestures. In Re Kiewit Power Constructors Co., 355 NLRB 708, 710 (2010) (a 

purported physical threat must be unambiguous to fall outside the protections of the Act). At 

most, Slater engaged in behavior that may be characterized as rude or defiant, when he kept 

speaking after Williams, a supervisor, interrupted him and instructed him to stop, but such behavior 

does not lose the protections of the Act. Goya Foods, Inc., 356 NLRB at 478. Indeed, he ultimately 

followed the General Manager’s directive. Id. (employee who initially resisted directive but later 

complied was not engaged in insubordination that lost protections of the Act). 

The only factor that weighs against protection is the last one because Slater’s decision to 

speak at the meeting was not provoked by any unfair labor practice committed by the Respondent.

Nevertheless, the initial three factors justify the finding that Slater’s conduct warrants the 

continued protections of the Act, even in the absence of employer provocation. Noble Metal 

Processing, Inc., 346 NLRB at 795 fn. 2 (finding employee’s activity protected where first three 

factors were met even though there was no employer provocation). 

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Thus, the Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when General Manager Williams 

threatened Slater with discipline when he spoke out about safety issues at an employee meeting. 

2. Respondent’s Removal of the Union Office, 10(a)(1)

The Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it ordered Slater to vacate the

space that it the Union had used as an office for the preceding six months. Slater satisfied his 

prima facie burden to prove that the Respondent thereby retaliated against him for engaging in 

protected activity, and the Respondent has failed to present a legitimate business explanation for 

taking such action. 

The Board has not previously determined which legal framework should apply to an 

employer’s allegedly retaliatory removal of a union’s office. However, one non-precedential ALJ 

decision suggests such a case should be analyzed under the Section 10(a)(2)-type framework, set 

forth above, and that analysis follows. See Ill. Dep’t of Cent. Mgmt Serv., 17 PERI ¶ 2014 (IL 

LRB-SP ALJ 2001).

First, Slater engaged in protected activity when he obtained the position of Union 

Executive Board member on January 27, 2015, and was sworn in as such on March 10, 2015. In 

addition, Slater engaged in protected, concerted activity when he spoke out at the March 7, 2015 

rap session on safety issues, as discussed above. Slater again engaged in protected concerted 

activity when he resumed his union duties on April 6, 2015, after the Union President suspended 

his duties on March 19, 2015.

Second, there is no question that the Respondent knew of Slater’s protected activity. 

General Manager Williams knew Slater was an executive Board member shortly after the 

membership elected him because she showed him the Union office at around that time. Moreover, 

both Hernandez and General Manager Williams were present when Slater spoke up at the March 

7, 2015 rap session. Finally, Hernandez viewed Slater occupying the Union office, and spoke to 

him as a Union agent, when he informed the Slater that the Union needed to vacate the space. 

Third, the Respondent took an adverse employment action against Slater when it eliminated 

the Union office. The Board has not previously determined whether an employer’s removal of the 

Union office constitutes an adverse action. However, in one case a Board ALJ implicitly found 

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that an employer’s relocation of a union office does constitute an adverse employment action.31 

Dep' t of Cent. Mgmt Serv., 17 PERI ¶ 2014. By extension, an employer’s complete removal of 

the Union office, at issue here, is likewise an adverse employment action. 

The Respondent contends that Slater has not demonstrated that he himself experienced any 

qualitative change in his terms and conditions of employment, but his testimony concerning the 

action’s impact on others, reasonably demonstrates that the action had an impact on him too. 

Slater need only demonstrate some qualitative change in terms and conditions of employment, and 

the Board has previously held that an employer effects such a change when it eliminates a union’s 

access to its office. Chicago Transit Authority, 30 PERI ¶ 9 (IL LRB-LP 2013). Such removal 

of a union’s office impairs employees’ ability to confidentially communicate with their bargaining 

representative concerning the terms and conditions of their employment. Chicago Transit 

Authority, 30 PERI ¶ 9. Indeed, it is evident that the Respondent’s removal of the Union office 

in this case did in fact impair employees’ ability to communicate confidentially with the Union. 

Slater testified that the CTA’s removal of the Union office made it more difficult for him to discuss 

private work-related disciplinary, medical, or family issues with the Union’s membership. 

Steward Morman also noted that there were times, after the Respondent removed the Union’s 

office, when he wished to have confidential union discussions, but could not do so. By extension, 

Slater himself would necessarily have more difficulty speaking with a union steward who might 

represent him in a disciplinary matter. 

Fourth, Slater demonstrated that the Respondent acted in retaliation for Slater’s protected 

activity when it removed the Union’s office because the timing of the Respondent’s decision is 

suspect, and the Respondent offered shifting reasons for its decision. First, the timing is suspect 

because the Respondent decided to remove the Union’s office just one month after Slater’s most 

recent, vocal instance of protected activity, his attempt to raise safety issues with management at 

the March 7, 2015 rap session. In addition, the Respondent made its decision “almost 

immediately” following Slater’s return to Executive Board member duties on April 6, 2015. Vill. 

of Calumet Park, 23 PERI ¶108 (IL LRB-SP 2007) (three weeks found suspicious); Sarah P. 

Culbertson Memorial Hosp., 25 PERI ¶11 (IL LRB-SP 2009) (“few weeks” found suspicious). 

 

31 The ALJ in that case did not discuss this issue extensively and instead dismissed the Section 10(a)(1) 

allegation, finding that the respondent had a legitimate business reason for its actions and did not move the 

office in response to any protected, concerted activity by employees. 

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Next, the Respondent offered shifting reasons for removing the Union’s office. Hernandez 

told Union Steward Morman that the Respondent needed the office space to move the “safety guys 

from the back to the front.” Hernandez thereby suggested that the Respondent wished relocate 

individuals who were already based at the North Park Garage, and not to provide space for the 

facilities maintenance manager, who was then located elsewhere. Hernandez later claimed that 

that the Respondent needed the space for the facilities maintenance manager, whose office was 

then located on the City’s west side. 

Accordingly, Slater has established that the Respondent eliminated the Union office at least 

in part because of his protected activity, and the Respondent must therefore demonstrate that it had 

a legitimate reason to eliminate the union office, on which it relied. City of Burbank, 128 Ill. 2d at

346. If that reason is pretextual, then the Respondent violated the Act. However, if the Respondent 

did rely on the reason, at least in part, then the case is one of dual motive. Id. In such dual motive 

cases, the Respondent must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have 

taken the adverse employment action, even if the Charging Party had not engaged in protected 

activity. Id.

However, the Respondent has not offered a legitimate business reason for removing the 

Union office. The Respondent’s claimed need to make room for the facilities maintenance 

manager’s office is not a reason upon which the Respondent relied at the time it evicted the Union 

from its space. Rather, the evidence strongly demonstrates that the Respondent seized on the 

facilities maintenance manager’s early request for office space to disguise its true retaliatory 

motive for removing the Union’s access to its office. The close proximity between Slater’s 

protected activity and the removal of the Union’s office—one month after he spoke out at the 

March 7, 2015 meeting and mere days after he resumed his Executive Board member duties—is 

strong evidence of retaliatory motive where Respondent did not explain its significantly delayed 

response to the facilities manager’s request for office space. See County of DuPage and DuPage 

County Sheriff, 30 PERI ¶ 115 (IL LRB-SP 2013). Specifically, the Respondent has not explained 

why it waited until April 2015 to provide the facilities maintenance manager with space at North 

Park Garage, even though he asked for space months earlier (i.e., “early 2015”). Conversely, the 

Respondent has not explained its rush to provide the facilities maintenance manager with the space 

formerly occupied by the union, so soon after Slater engaged in protected activity when there was 

no pressing need for the office before. County of DuPage and DuPage County Sheriff, 30 PERI 

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¶ 115 (reason for adverse action found pretextual where the Respondent did not explain its delay 

to take action against employee misconduct and where employee’s protected activity intervened 

between his alleged misconduct and the date of the adverse action).

The fact that the Respondent ultimately provided the Union’s space to the facilities 

maintenance manager does not demonstrate that his need for the space spurred the Respondent’s 

decision to remove the Union from its office. To the contrary, the facilities maintenance manager’s 

needs did not spring to Hernandez’s mind when he told Morman why the Union needed to vacate 

the space. Instead, he told Morman that the office would go to “safety guys” already located at 

North Park Garage, and that the Respondent was simply moving them from “the back to the front.” 

Under these circumstances, the Respondent’s later reliance on the facilities maintenance 

manager’s need for the office was simply a post hoc justification, intended to mask the 

Respondent’s true motives. Accordingly, the Respondent has failed to rebut the Charging Party’s 

prima facie case. 

Thus, the Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it removed the Union 

from its office. 

3. Respondent’s Removal of Union Flyers, 10(a)(1)

The Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it removed Union flyers 

from the walls in June 2015. However, it applied its posting policy in a discriminatory manner by 

limiting Union postings to the Union bulletin Board and barring them from other areas specifically 

designated for personal and commercial postings. 

“Rulings of the [National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts[,] when these 

bodies construe the [NLRA][,] are persuasive authority for similar provisions in the 

[Act].” American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Illinois State Labor 

Relations Board,190 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264 (1st Dist. 1989); State of Illinois, Departments of Central 

Management Services and Corrections., 25 PERI ¶ 12 (IL LRB-SP 2009). Sections 6 and 10(a)(1)

of the Act are analogous, respectively, to Sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations 

Act (NLRA). Accordingly, the NLRB’s decisions addressing Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA are 

persuasive authority in analyzing situations arising under Section 10(a)(1) of the Act. 

An employer has a property right to “regulate and restrict employee use of company 

property.” Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort, 359 NLRB 740, 747 (2013), vacated (2014), aff'd, 361 

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NLRB No. 73 (2014), aff'd sub nom. Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort v. N.L.R.B., 791 F.3d 648

(6th Cir. 2015) (citing, Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 714 F.2d 657, 663-664 (6th Cir. 1983) and 

Eaton Technologies, 322 NLRB 848, 853 (1997)). Employers generally may restrict employee use 

of company property, but may not promulgate or enforce these restrictions in a discriminatory 

manner. Container Corp. of America, 244 NLRB 318 (1979); Allied Stores Corp., 308 NLRB 184 

(1992).

The NLRB has applied these principles to employer bulletin boards, holding that there is 

no statutory right of employees or a union to use an employer’s bulletin board. Eaton 

Technologies, 322 NLRB 848, 853 (1997); Honeywell, Inc., 262 NLRB 1402, 1402-3 (1982) enfd.

722 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1983). Yet, “where an employer permits its employees to utilize its bulletin 

boards for the posting of notices relating to personal items such as social or religious affairs, sales 

of personal property, cards, thank you notes, articles, and cartoons, commercial notices and 

advertisements, or, in general, any non[-]work[-] related matters, it may not validly discriminate 

against notices of union meetings which employees also posted.” Honeywell, Inc., 262 NLRB 

1402 (1982) (internal quotes omitted. When an “employer permits, by formal rule or otherwise, 

employees and a union to post personal and official union notices on its bulletin boards, the 

employees’ and union's right to use the bulletin board receives the protection of the Act to the 

extent that the employer may not remove notices, or discriminate against an employee who posts 

notices, which meet the employer's rule or standard but which the employer finds distasteful.” 

Container Corporation of America, 244 NLRB 318, fn. 2. An employer’s motive in such cases is 

irrelevant, “no matter how well meant.” Honeywell, Inc., 262 NLRB at 1402. 

Here, the CTA did not violate the Act by removing Union postings from the walls because 

the CTA uniformly removed all postings from the walls/doors/windows and established designated 

posting locations instead. Naranjo testified that he implemented and applied a posting policy in 

June 2015, when he became Senior Manager at North Park Garage, which barred employees from 

posting on windows, doors, and walls. He also designated specific areas for different types of 

postings. Naranjo removed the Union’s postings from the doors and bathroom walls in accordance 

with that policy. Although postings still sometimes appeared in non-designated areas, the CTA 

removed them swiftly and their presence does not undermine the finding that the CTA applied its 

stated policy. Naranjo’s testimony makes clear that the Respondent no longer tolerates such 

postings and removes them shortly after they appear on the walls and doors. 

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Nevertheless, the policy itself was, in part, unlawfully applied because the CTA designated 

spots for personal and commercial postings, but did not allow union postings at those same 

locations. Dear-Townsend credibly testified that personal and commercial flyers remained posted 

at North Park garage after CTA began enforcing the policy. The CTA simply grouped those 

postings and designated an area in which employees could post them.32 This designated area was 

not the Union bulletin board because Dear Townsend’s testimony strongly suggests that the 

designated area spot for commercial and personal postings was accessible to employees, whereas 

the Union board was kept locked by the Union. Furthermore, all CTA witnesses affirmed that 

Union matters were confined to the Union bulletin Board. Thus, the CTA necessarily excluded 

Union postings from the areas designated by the CTA for commercial and personal postings.

The CTA’s conduct, relegating Union postings to the Union board while allowing personal 

and commercial postings in a different designated space, is unlawful irrespective of the CTA’s 

motives. If an employer allows employees space or furnishes space to post items of interest, as 

the CTA did here, it may not impose content-based restrictions that discriminate between posting 

of Union-related matters and other postings. Vons Grocery Co., 320 NLRB 53, 55 (1995);

Amelio’s, 301 NLRB 182 (1991); and Central Vermont Hospital, 288 NLRB 514 (1988). 

Moreover, the CTA’s prohibition against Union postings in areas separately designated for 

commercial and personal flyers violates the Act, even though CTA provide a bulletin board for the 

Union’s exclusive use. Vons Grocery Co., 320 NLRB 53, 54-5 (1995) (existence of separate union 

bulletin board was irrelevant where employer restricted union postings on employee board 

designated for personal matters). 

The CTA’s posting policy is distinguishable from the one found lawful in Guardian 

Industries Cor., v. NLRB,

33 cited by the Respondent on brief. There, the Employer had opened its 

company bulletin board solely to small for-sale signs, and its refusal to post notices of union 

meetings did not constitute discrimination because it did not allow the posting of any meeting 

announcements. Here, by contrast, the CTA has established no content restrictions on postings

 

32 Tellingly, no CTA witness denied Dear-Townsend’s claim the CTA still allowed personal and 

commercial postings in a certain designated area. Indeed, the email policy that Naranjo relied upon in 

removing postings contemplated the designation of areas for posting personal matters because it referenced 

“party reminders,” as a type of paper signage that should be posted only on designated bulletin boards, and 

distinguished such reminders from notices advertising “department events.” 

33 Guardian Industries Cor., v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 1995).

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placed in the space designated for personal and commercial flyers other than its restriction on 

union-related postings. Cf. Guardian Industries Cor., v. NLRB, 49 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 1995). 

Thus, the CTA violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it prohibited the posting of Union 

flyers in areas designated for commercial and personal flyers. However, it did not violate Section 

10(a)(1) of the Act by removing Union postings from the bathroom and the south walls because it 

non-discriminatorily barred and removed all material posted to those areas. 

4. Respondent’s Alleged Postponement of Hearings on Slater’s Grievances, and 

All Grievance Hearings at Which Slater Represented Union Members, 10(a)(1)

The Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act by postponing hearings on 

Slater’s grievances or on all hearings at which Slater represented union members because Slater 

has not proven that the Respondent engaged in such conduct. Slater presented insufficient 

evidence that the Respondent postponed hearings on any of his own grievances, as alleged in the 

complaint. He similarly presented insufficient evidence that the Respondent postponed each and 

every grievance hearing at which Slater represented union members, as likewise alleged in the 

complaint. Naranjo credibly testified that the Respondent only postponed one grievance hearing, 

that of bus operator Tidwell, and Slater offered no testimony to the contrary. In fact, Slater does 

not argue on brief that the Respondent postponed his own grievances or that it postponed all 

grievances at which Slater represented union members. 

Turning to the evidence presented, there is insufficient basis on which to find that the 

Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act by postponing Tidwell’s grievance hearing. 

Slater contends that the Respondent thereby undermined him and the Union in the eyes of the 

membership, but the Respondent’s conduct did not reasonably have such an impact.

An employer’s disparaging remarks about a union agent’s honesty and competence can 

interfere with, restrain, and coerce employees in the exercise of employees’ protected activity, 

when made in the context of other coercive statements, especially those that convey to employees 

the futility of their efforts to have the union as their collective-bargaining representative. Future 

Ambulette, 293 NLRB 884 (1989), enfd. 903 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1990); cf. Sears, Roebuck and 

Co., 305 NLRB 193 (1991) (disparaging statements standing alone do not interfere with, restrain, 

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or coerce employees’ in the exercise of protected activity).34 Similarly, an employer violates 

section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it seizes upon an incident as a pretext to disparage and undermine 

the Union in the eyes of employees. Hth Corp., 361 NLRB No. 65 (2014) (applying rationale to 

alleged violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, which is analogous to 

Section 10(a)(1) of the IPLRA), enforcement granted in part, denied in part sub nom. HTH Corp. 

v. N.L.R.B., 823 F.3d 668 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

However, it is difficult to find that Naranjo undermined the union in the eyes of employees 

when he postponed Tidwell’s hearing because CTA promptly rescheduled the hearing, with the 

Union’s consent, and thereby demonstrated the union’s efficacy.

Moreover, Naranjo did not seize on the incident with Slater as a pretext to undermine 

Slater, a vocal union supporter. Rather, Naranjo had a good faith belief that Slater was acting in 

contravention of CTA policy by recording or transmitting the hearing to a third party. Naranjo 

heard a voice emanating from Slater’s phone during the hearing, but Slater never announced that 

he would be on the line with a third party. Although Slater denied that he was recording the 

hearing, Naranjo justifiably disbelieved him. He had heard rumors that Slater liked to record 

members of management, and testimony from both Slater and other members of management 

confirms the existence of these rumors. Slater admitted that several CTA managers had instructed 

him not to record them during disciplinary hearings, and both Transportation Manager Berry and 

Acting General Manager Hernandez stated that they believed Slater had attempted to record them. 

Arguably, Naranjo could have instructed Slater to turn off his phone and could have then continued 

the meeting, but his failure to do so is reasonably justified by the disturbance and the loss of trust 

that the incident engendered. 

In addition, Naranjo’s failure to take this more moderate action does not warrant a finding 

of unlawful conduct where Naranjo’s decision to postpone the hearing was an isolated incident. 

Indeed, Slater represented employees at 20 different grievance hearings where Naranjo served as 

the CTA counterpart, and all but one proceeded without incident. Thus, Naranjo’s cancellation of 

 

34 This case overruled Future Ambulette, 293 NLRB 884, cited supra, to the extent that it “suggests that a 

violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) may he predicated on disparaging remarks alone.” Sears, Roebuck & Co., 305 

NLRB 193, 194 n. 5. (1991).

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a single hearing does not have a reasonable tendency to undermine employees’ faith in the Union 

or Slater, more particularly. 

In sum, the Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act by postponing hearings 

on Slater’s grievances, postponing all grievance hearings at which Slater represented union 

members, or postponing bus operator Tidwell’s grievance. 

5. Naranjo’s Threat to Slater Related to Slater’s Use of the Copier, 10(a)(1)

The Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when Naranjo threatened Slater 

with discipline for insubordination when he failed to follow Naranjo’s directive to leave the copier 

area, after attempting to make hundreds of copies on the Respondent’s copy machine.

As a preliminary matter, Slater was not engaged in protected, concerted activity when he 

was using the copier on the date Naranjo issued him the directive to leave the copier area. The 

Board typically takes a “broad view of what constitutes protected activity within the meaning of 

the Act,” but the Board also acknowledges that there are “limits to even that broad view,” in cases 

involving an employer’s property rights. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 30 PERI ¶ 72 (IL LRB-SP 2013). 

In such cases, the Board balances the right of employees to engage in protected, concerted activity, 

with the Employer’s property rights, and it has relied on federal sector case law in finding the 

correct balance. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 30 PERI ¶ 72 (considering whether employees had a right to 

hang union banners on fire house and union decals on fire trucks). Accordingly, NLRB case law 

is instructive here, and is considered below.

An employer has the “basic right to regulate and restrict employee use of [its] property,” 

and this right extends to the employer’s copy machines. Champion International Corp., 303 NLRB 

102, 109 (1991). Nevertheless, an employer cannot apply its rules discriminatorily, by invoking 

them to restrict union activity, while freely permitting use of its property for non-business related 

reasons. Champion International Corp., 303 NLRB at 109 (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 

714 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1983).

Applying these principles, Slater was not engaged in protected activity when he attempted 

to make over 100 copies on the Respondent’s copy machine, even if those copies were related to 

union matters, because the Respondent does not permit such excessive use of the copier by any 

employee for any reason. Although the Respondent has a past practice of permitting the Union to 

make limited use of its copier for union matters, it does not allow the Union to make more than a 

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hundred copies. The existence of this unwritten limitation is clear. Bus operator and union steward 

Morman testified that he knew of it. Transportation Manager Berry stated that he once informed 

Slater that he could not make more than 100 copies on the CTA’s machine.35 Naranjo himself 

indicated to Slater that he could make a limited number copies, but that his attempt to make 

hundreds, at issue in this case, was an “abus[e]... of the privilege.” Indeed, there is no evidence 

in the record that the Respondent has ever allowed the Union to have unlimited use of the 

Respondent’s copier. In addition, there is also no evidence that the Respondent allows employees 

to make any personal copies using the Respondent’s copier, let alone over 100 copies of personal 

documents. Cf. Champion International Corp., 303 NLRB at 109 (employer that had a practice 

of allowing personal use of copier could not rely on its rule restricting employee use of copier to 

justify discipline of employee who copied union material). 

Turning to the allegation at issue, Naranjo’s threat that Slater would be subject to discipline 

if he did not leave the copy area does not interfere with, restrain, or coerce a reasonable employee 

in the exercise of protected rights. A reasonable employee would not view the threat as an attempt 

to prohibit the use of the Respondent’s copier to duplicate union-related materials. Rather, a 

reasonable employee would view it as a directive to stop making excessive copies, which a 

reasonable employee would likewise know was not permitted. 

Thus, the Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when Naranjo threated 

to discipline Slater for insubordination after their interaction by the copy machine. 

6. Naranjo’s Alleged Directive to Slater that he could have no Union Discussions 

on CTA Property Without Prior Approval of Management and Without a 

Manager Present, 10(a)(1)

The Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act by informing Slater he could 

have no Union discussions on CTA property without prior approval of management and without a 

manager present because Slater has not proven that Naranjo made such statements. However, the 

Respondent did violate the Act by instructing Slater that he could not discuss the CTU strike on 

CTA property.

 

35 It is unclear whether Berry informed Slater of this rule before or after Slater’s incident with Naranjo, at 

issue here. However, the timing of Berry’s directive is of little relevance where there is no evidence that 

the Respondent ever allowed the Union to make over 100 copies on its copier.

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An employer’s no-solicitation rule on working time is presumptively valid in the absence 

of evidence that it was adopted or enforced in a discriminatory manner. Republic Aviation Corp. 

v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Our Way, Inc., 268 NLRB 394, 402 (1983); Peyton Packing Co., 

49 NLRB 828 (1943)). However, employees generally have a right to solicit on company property 

during their non-working time. Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962); Republic 

Aviation, 324 U.S. 793, 803 fn. 10 (1945); Peyton Packing Co., 49 828, 843-844 (1943), enfd, 142 

F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 323 U.S. 730 (1944).

36

 Notably an employer’s authority to enact 

rules against solicitation (oral communication) is narrower than its authority to enact rules against 

distribution (written communication) because the free time of employees on plant property is “the 

very time and place uniquely appropriate” for oral solicitation. Republic Aviation, 51 NLRB 1186, 

1195 (1943), aff'd. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793.

Nevertheless, an employer may restrict protected activity “if the employer demonstrates an 

overriding interest in prohibiting it.” City of Evanston, 6 PERI ¶ 2034 (IL SLRB 1990) (citing 

Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962)). The employer may demonstrate an overriding 

interest if it can show that special circumstances make the restriction necessary to maintain 

production or discipline. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n. 10; Union 

Carbide Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 714 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1983); Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 

NLRB 615 (1962). 

Turning to the allegations, Slater has not proven that Naranjo barred Slater’s Union 

discussions on CTA property without prior approval of management and without a manager 

present, as alleged in the Complaint. Naranjo denied making such statements, and the testimony 

of bus operator Morman lends weight to his testimony. On cross examination, Morman stated that 

he did not remember Naranjo informing anyone on June 10, 2015, that no union discussions could 

take place on CTA property. Although Slater claims that Naranjo informed him that he could not 

have a union rap session without authorization from management and that he could not have a 

union rap session without a manager present, Morman’s failure to recall any similar statement 

 

36 See also NLRB v. Pneu Electric, Inc., 309 F.3d 843 (5th Cir. 2002) (employer generally may not issue a 

blanket statement against solicitation by employees at a worksite, even during nonworking time); Our Way, 

Inc., 268 NLRB 394 (1983) (rules prohibiting union solicitation or activities during an employee's break 

times or other nonworking periods are overly broad and presumptively invalid because they could 

reasonably be construed as prohibiting solicitation at any time). 

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undermines Slater’s credibility on this point. Slater called Morman as his own witness and 

reasonably expected him provide testimony favorable to him. 

Nevertheless, the Respondent did violate the Act by instructing Slater that he could not 

discuss the CTU strike on CTA property. The Respondent thereby prohibited activity protected 

under Section 6 of the Act and it has not proven that its restriction was necessary to “maintain 

production or discipline.” 

Section 6 of the Act protects “concerted activities not otherwise prohibited by law for the 

purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 5 ILCS 315/6. Accordingly, 

to obtain the Act's protection, employee activity must be both concerted and protected. Cnty. of 

Cook (Cook Cnty. Hosp.), 10 PERI ¶ 3029 (IL LLRB 1994).

An individual engages in concerted activity when he invokes a right contained in a 

collective bargaining agreement. Pace West Division, 13 PERI ¶2027 (IL SLRB 1997). In cases 

that do not involve a right contained in a collective bargaining agreement, an employee engages 

in concerted activity when he or she acts with or on the authority of other employees, but not 

when the employee acts solely on his own behalf. Bd. of Educ. of Schaumburg Comm. 

Consolidated School Dist. 54, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 455 (addressing similar language under the 

Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, 115 ILCS 5) (emphasis added); Pace West Division, 13 

PERI ¶2027 (IL SLRB 1997). This concerted activity standard “encompasses those circumstances 

where individual employees seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as well as 

individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the attention of management.” Id. (citing 

Meyers II, 281 N.L.R.B. at 887); see also Oak Brook Park District, 31 PERI ¶ 193 (IL LRB-SP 

2015) (acknowledging that the Illinois labor Relations Board takes the same approach as the 

Illinois Education Labor Relation Board’s approach, reviewed by the Court in Schaumburg supra).

Concerted activity is also protected if it is for the purpose of collective bargaining or for 

“other mutual aid or protection.” County of Cook (Cook County Hosp.), 10 PERI ¶ 3029. 

Employees’ concerted activity is protected under the “mutual aid or protection” clause even “when 

they seek to improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as 

employees through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship.” Eastex., 

Inc. v. NLRB, 437 US 556, 556 (1978) (emphasis added). 

However, not all concerted activity is protected. Concerted activity that is too attenuated 

from “employees’ interests as employees” will not be “deemed to come within the ‘mutual aid or 

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protection’ clause.” Eastex., Inc., 437 US 556; Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University 

at Edwardsville, 20 PERI ¶ 54 (IELRB 2004). In addition, concerted activity will lose the 

protections of the Act if it if the employee’s “actions cross the lines of acceptability so that they 

can be characterized as ‘disloyal’ to the employer” or if “the manner in which the conduct 

...exercised renders the otherwise protected activity unprotected.” Chicago Transit Auth., 386 Ill. 

App. 3d at 573 (second quote); County of Macon and Macon County Sheriff, 8 PERI ¶ 2020 (IL 

SLRB 1992)(first quote).

Here, Slater’s attempt to discuss the CTU with a group of employees on June 10, 2015

constituted concerted activity because he acted in his capacity as an Executive Board member of 

ATU to report on his union’s activities at the CTU rally that took place the day before. Department 

of Central Management Services (State Police), 30 PERI ¶ 70 (IL LRB-SP 2013) (union activity 

is concerted activity). In addition, he sought to garner additional support for the CTU, on behalf 

of his Union in furtherance of its well-publicized goals to help members of another public-sector 

union, the CTU. 

Moreover, his discussions regarding the CTU were also protected because they were for 

the purpose of mutual aid and protection. The United States Supreme Court held that the phrase 

“mutual aid and protection” includes employees’ “proper concerted activities in support of 

employees of employers other than their own.” Eastex, Inc., 437 U.S. 556 (1978)(relying on 

definition of “employee” in the National Labor Relations Act); see Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 

NLRB 1545, 1546-1547 (1962), enf’d sub nom. Teamsters v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (1963), cert. 

denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964) (employees engaged in protected concerted activity when they 

respected a picket line established another employer’s employees) and Gen. Elec. Co., 169 NLRB 

1101 (1968)(employees engaged in protected activity when they solicited funds on behalf of 

agricultural laborers employed elsewhere), enforced sub nom. N.L.R.B. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 411 

F.2d 750 (9th Cir. 1969). Although the language of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act 

(IPLRA) is not the same as the language of the NLRA, on which the Supreme Court in Eastex Inc.

in part relied,

37 there is nothing in the IPLRA that expressly limits the phrase “mutual aid and 

protection” to concerted activities undertaken by employees of the same employer. 

 

37 The jurisdictions of the ILRB and the NLRB are different and these differences are reflected in the 

enabling statutes’ definitions of “employee” and “public employee.” Compare 5 ILCS 315/3(n) (definition 

of “public employee”) and 29 U.S.C.A. § 152 (3) (definition of “employee”). 

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Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s reasoning extends to this case, where one public-sector 

union encourages its members to show support for another public-sector union, and then keeps its 

members apprised of the other union’s contract dispute. Indeed, the connection between ATU and 

the CTU is particularly close where the City’s Mayor necessarily exercises his influence over the 

members of both unions. Accordingly, ATU’s concern for the “plight of other employees,” in this 

case CTU members engaged in a contract dispute with the City of Chicago, might help the ATU 

later gain support from the CTU when the ATU’s members have a dispute with their employer, 

the Chicago Transit Authority, an arm of the same public entity. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S

(affirming similar reasoning in finding certain political activity protected) (internal quotes 

omitted); see also Gen. Elec. Co., 169 NLRB 1101 (quoting Judge Learned Hand in N.L.R.B. v. 

Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., Inc., 130 F.2d 503, 505 (2nd Cir. 1942).

Notably, Slater’s discussions about the CTU constituted protected activity even if some 

bus operators were not receptive to Slater’s message. It is the content of the speech, not the way 

it is received by union members that establishes it protected nature. “When an individual 

employee solicits other employees to engage in group action, even where such solicitations are 

rejected, the inability to sway coworkers does not change the concerted nature of the activity.” 

Detroit Legal News Co., 354 NLRB 283, 287 (2009) (citing Circle K Corp., 305 NLRB 932, 935 

(1991)).

Moreover, Naranjo’s directive was an unlawfully broad prohibition on union-related 

discussions, irrespective of his claim at hearing that he issued the directive to maintain driver and 

public safety. First, there is insufficient evidence that the drivers’ state of mind in fact created an 

“unusual circumstance” that justified a restriction on employees’ Section 6 rights. Naranjo 

admitted that he prohibited Slater’s discussion preemptively, “before it got to that point” that the 

drivers’ state of mind became a safety concern. Indeed, there is no indication that the Respondent 

had ever prohibited discussion of non-union-related subjects under similar circumstances, when 

management believed drivers would become too upset to drive safely if discussion continued. In 

Re Jensen Enterprises, Inc., 339 NLRB 877, 887 (2003) (counseling of employee for union 

discussion was not response to harassment complaint employer offered no evidence that it issued 

similar counseling where the subject of the complaint concerned something other than the Union). 

 

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Second, the evidence indicates that Naranjo’s concern that employees would forget their 

defensive driving skills was a post hoc justification for his directive, rather than a factor he relied 

upon. Naranjo did not offer this justification to Slater or to employees when he instructed Slater 

that he could not discuss the CTU on CTA property. The CTA did not offer this explanation in its 

answer and instead, appeared to justify Naranjo’s conduct on the grounds that Slater’s conduct was 

a violation of the CTA rule 14b, which prohibits employees from leading fellow employees into a 

wildcat strike, work slowdown, or other impermissible job action. The CTA stated, “[a]nswering 

further, CTA states the Charging party was informed that his actions were a violation of CTA Rule 

14b.” Although the CTA does not expressly state that the alleged rule violation justified Naranjo’s 

statement, the CTA’s reference to the rule must be construed as a defense to the Complaint because 

it would have no relevance otherwise. Permanent Label Corp., 248 NLRB 118. 130 and 142 n. 12 

(1980), enforcement granted in part and remanded sub nom. N.L.R.B. v. Permanent Label Corp., 

1981 WL 15486 (3d Cir. Jan. 8, 1981), on reargument, 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981), and enforced 

sub nom. N.L.R.B. v. Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981) (employer did not 

establish that its stated safety concern was in fact the basis for is prohibition on union solicitation 

where evidence indicated that employer did not rely on it). 

Third, Naranjo’s directive was overly broad even if the drivers’ state of mind did raise 

safety concerns on June 10, 2015, as the CTA now claims. Naranjo prohibited all future 

discussions of CTU by Slater, on CTA property at all times, irrespective of how drivers may have 

reacted. Naranjo’s directive had no time limit, no end date, and no exceptions for calm, measured, 

discussions about CTU that employees may have welcomed. Aroostook County Ophthalmology 

Center, 317 NLRB 218 (1995) (rule prohibiting discussion of grievances “within earshot of 

patients,” with no limitations as to time or place, was an overly broad restriction on employees' 

statutory right to engage in protected concerted activity).

Notably, Naranjo’s directive was unlawful even if Slater did not abide by it and later 

continued to speak to operators about CTU individually on CTA property because there is no 

requirement of proof that the employees were actually coerced in order to establish a violation of 

section 10(a)(1) of the Act. Vill. of Calumet Park, 23 PERI ¶ 108 (ILRB-SP 2007). 

In sum, the CTA violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when Naranjo instructed Slater that 

he could not discuss the Chicago Teachers Union on CTA property. However, the CTA did not 

violate the Act by informing Slater stating that no union discussions could take place without 

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management approval and without the presence of management because there is insufficient 

evidence that any CTA agent made such statements.

 

2. Section 10(a)(2) Allegations – Removal of Union Office, Removal of Union Flyers, 

Postponement of Grievance Hearings 

The Respondent violated Section 10(a)(2) of the Act when it removed the Union office. 

However, the Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(2) of the Act when it removed union flyers 

from the walls and postponed one grievance hearing at which Slater represented a unit member.

The derivative Section 10(a)(1) allegation based on these latter claims is therefore also dismissed. 

Section 10(a)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “to discriminate in regard 

to hire or tenure of employment * * * in order to encourage or discourage membership in or other 

support for any labor organization.” 5 ILCS 315/10(a)(2).

To establish a prima facie case that the employer violated Section 10(a)(2) of the Act, the 

charging party must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) that an employee engaged 

in union or protected, concerted activity, (2) the employer was aware of that activity, and (3) the 

employer took adverse action against the employee in whole or in part because of union animus or 

protected activity, with the intent to discourage or encourage union support. City of Burbank v. 

Ill. State Labor Rel. Bd., 128 Ill. 2d 335, 345 (1989); Sarah D. Culbertson Memorial Hospital, 21 

PERI ¶ 6 (IL LRB-SP 2005); Macon Cnty. Highway Dept., 4 PERI ¶ 2018 (IL SLRB 1988); Macon 

Cnty. Highway Dept., 4 PERI ¶ 2018 (IL SLRB 1988). The charging party may demonstrate the 

employer’s animus through circumstantial or direct evidence including expressions of hostility 

toward union activity, together with knowledge of the employee's union activities; timing; 

disparate treatment or targeting of union supporters; inconsistencies in the reasons offered by the 

employer for the adverse action; and shifting explanations for the adverse action. City of Burbank, 

128 Ill. 2d at 345.

Once the charging party establishes a prima facie case, the employer can avoid a finding 

that it violated the Act by demonstrating that it would have taken the adverse action for a legitimate 

business reason, notwithstanding the employer’s union animus. Id. Merely proffering a legitimate 

business reason for the adverse employment action does not end the inquiry, as it must be 

determined whether the proffered reason is bona fide or pretextual. Id. If the proffered reasons are 

merely litigation figments or were not in fact relied upon, then the employer’s reasons are 

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pretextual and the inquiry ends. Id. However, when legitimate reasons for the adverse 

employment action are advanced, and are found to be relied upon at least in part, then the case 

may be characterized as a “dual motive” case, and the employer must establish, by a preponderance 

of the evidence, that it would have taken the action notwithstanding the employee’s union activity.

Id.

3. Removal of the Union’s Office, 10(a)(2)

The Respondent violated Section 10(a)(2) and (1) of the Act when it removed the Union’s 

office. 

As noted above, the analysis of this issue is substantially the same under Section 10(a)(2) 

as it is under Section 10(a)(1), analyzed above, except that the Charging Party must demonstrate 

that the Respondent took the complained-of action with the specific unlawful intent of 

discouraging union support. Macon Cnty. Bd. and Macon Cnty. Highway Dep't, 4 PERI ¶ 2018 

(IL SLRB 1988). The Charging Party has satisfied that burden here. 

Slater engaged in union activity when ran for Union office in later January 2015 and when 

the membership elected him in February 2015. He also engaged in union activity when he spoke 

out at the March 7, 2015 rap session on safety issue because he identified himself as the Union’s 

elected Executive Board member, when he spoke. As discussed above, Slater’s protected, 

concerted activities at the rap session did not lose the protections of the Act. See discussion supra.

In addition, Slater again engaged in union activity when he resumed his union duties as Executive 

Board member on April 6, 2015, after the Union president had suspended them on March 19, 2015. 

The Respondent’s decision-makers, Williams and Hernandez, knew of Slater’s union 

activities. Williams knew that Slater won the election for the position of Executive Board member 

because she showed him the Union office shortly after he won. In addition, Williams and 

Hernandez were both present at the March 7, 2015 meeting when Slater announced that he was 

the Union’s elected Executive Board member. Next, Hernandez reasonably knew that Slater had 

resumed his Executive Board member duties on or about April 6, 2015 when he told Slater to 

vacate the Union’s office space. Slater was using the Union’s office at the time Hernandez 

conveyed his message. In addition, Hernandez’s directive to Slater, that the Union must vacate 

this space, indicates that he knew that Slater was then a union agent, authorized to act on the 

Union’s behalf. 

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As discussed above, the Respondent took adverse action against Slater when General 

Manager Williams, with Hernandez’s input, decided to remove the Union’s office. 

Finally, the close proximity of the Respondent’s adverse action to Slater’s union activity, 

particularly his resumption of Union duties, combined with the Respondent’s shifting and 

pretextual justifications for its action demonstrates that the Respondent removed the office to 

discourage support for the Union.38 Chicago Transit Authority, 19 PERI ¶ 34 (IL LRB-LP 2003)

(suspicious timing, shifting explanations, and pretextual reasons for adverse action evidence 

specific unlawful intent to retaliate against employee because of his union activity); Village of 

Summit, 20 PERI ¶ 27 (IL LRB-SP 2004) (ALJ noted that the circumstantial evidence, standing 

alone, would have supported his finding that the respondent violated Section 10(a)(2) of the Act, 

though he did also find direct evidence of union animus); cf. Macon Cnty. Bd. and Macon Cnty. 

Highway Dep't, 4 PERI ¶ 2018 (IL SLRB 1988) (close proximity of adverse action to union activity 

did not demonstrate unlawful motive where employer provided a legitimate business reason for its 

decision, and where union provided no other evidence of union animus).

Thus, the Respondent violated Section 10(a)(2) and (1) of the Act when it removed the 

Union’s office. 

4. Removal of Union Flyers and Postponement of Grievance Hearings

The Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)2) and (1) of the Act when the Respondent 

removed union flyers from the walls and postponed one unit member’s grievance hearing. 

As a threshold matter, the Respondent’s removal of union flyers and postponement of 

another unit member’s grievance hearing do not constitute adverse employment actions against 

Slater, and the Section 10(a)(2) allegations arising from this conduct therefore lack merit. An 

action need not have a tangible adverse result or adverse financial consequences to qualify as an 

adverse employment action that satisfies the third prong of the 10(a)(2) analysis. City of Chicago 

v. Ill. Local Labor Rel. Bd., 182 Ill. App. 3d 588, 594-95 (1st Dist. 1988). Nevertheless, while the 

definition of an adverse employment action is generous a charging party must show some

 

38 The Charging Party asserts that the District Manager’s statements about Slater’s union campaign 

constitute direct evidence of union animus, but the District manager’s statements are not relevant absent 

evidence that he took part in the decision to remove the Union’s office, at issue here. See Macon Cnty. Bd. 

and Macon Cnty. Highway Dep't, 4 PERI ¶ 2018 (union animus must be imputed to the decision maker). 

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qualitative change in his terms or conditions of employment or some sort of real harm. City of 

Lake Forest, 29 PERI ¶ 52 (IL LRB-SP 2012) (employee suffered no adverse employment action 

from negative comments made by management). Significantly, there can be no violation of 

Section 10(a)(2) of the Act absent evidence that the charging party suffered an adverse

employment action. Rockford Metro. Exposition Auditorium & Office Bldg. Auth. v. Illinois State 

Labor Relations Bd., 224 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1016 (2d Dist. 1992). 

The Respondent’s removal of Union flyers from the garage walls does not qualify as an 

adverse employment action. There is no evidence in the record that the Respondent’s removal of 

Union flyers made any change to Slater’s terms and conditions of employment at all, and Slater 

raises no such argument on brief. 

Next, the Respondent’s postponement of another bus operator’s grievance hearing had no 

impact on Slater’s terms and conditions of employment, even though Slater served as that 

operator’s union representative at the time. Although the Board has held that an employer’s 

removal of significant responsibilities, coupled with a loss of prestige may constitute an adverse 

action, the Respondent’s postponement of another employees’ disciplinary hearing does not have 

the same impact. Cf. County of DuPage and DuPage County Sheriff, 30 PERI ¶ 115 (IL LRBSP 2013) (employee suffered adverse action when employer removed him from special operations 

unit, which in addition to reducing his opportunity to earn overtime/comp time, also reduced his 

responsibility and caused a loss of prestige).

Thus, the Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(2) and (1) of the Act when it removed 

union flyers from the walls and postponed one employee’s grievance hearing, at which Slater 

represented the employee. 

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it threatened the Charging Party 

with discipline on March 7, 2015 if he continued to speak at the rap session. 

2. The Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it limited Union postings to the 

Union bulletin Board while barring them from other areas specifically designated for 

personal and commercial postings.

3. The Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it instructed Slater that he could 

not discuss the Chicago Teachers Union strike on CTA property. 

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4. The Respondent violated Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it removed the Union from the 

office it had occupied for several months.

5. The Respondent violated Section 10(a)(2) and (1) of the Act when it removed the Union 

from its office. 

6. The Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it removed Union flyers 

from the walls in June 2015. 

7. The Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it postponed a single 

grievance hearing at which Slater represented a union member.

8. The Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it threated the Charging 

Party with insubordination if he did not leave the copy area.

9. The Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when it purportedly instructed 

the Charging Party that he could not have union discussions on CTA property without 

approval of management and without a manager present. 

10. The Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(1) of the Act when General Manager 

Elizabeth Williams purportedly contacted the Union President and stated that the Charging 

Party would be fired if he was not removed from his union duties. 

11. The Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(2) and (1) of the Act when it removed union 

flyers from the walls in June 2015.

12. The Respondent did not violate Section 10(a)(2) and (1) of the Act when it postponed one 

grievance hearing at which Slater represented a unit member. 

VI. RECOMMENDED ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent, its officers and agents, shall:

1) Cease and desist from: 

a. Interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights 

guaranteed them in the Act.

b. Threatening the Charging Party for engaging in protected, concerted activity. 

c. Limiting Union postings to the Union bulletin Board while barring them from other 

areas specifically designated for personal and commercial postings.

d. Instructing the Charging Party to not discuss the Chicago Teachers Union on CTA 

property. 

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2) Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:

a. Provide the Union with use of office space, on the same terms the Respondent 

initially provided it.39

b. Post, at all places where notices to employees are normally posted, copies of the 

Notice attached to this document. Copies of this Notice shall be posted, after being 

duly signed, in conspicuous places, and be maintained for a period of 60 

consecutive days. The Respondent will take reasonable efforts to ensure that the 

notices are not altered, defaced or covered by any other material.

c. Notify the Board in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Decision, of the 

steps the Respondent has taken to comply with this order.

VII. EXCEPTIONS

Pursuant to Section 1200.135 of the Board’s Rules, parties may file exceptions to the 

Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Decision and Order and briefs in support of those 

exceptions no later than 30 days after service of this Recommendation. Parties may file responses 

to exceptions and briefs in support of the responses no later than 15 days after service of the 

exceptions. In such responses, parties that have not previously filed exceptions may include crossexceptions to any portion of the Administrative Law Judge’s Recommendation. Within seven days 

from the filing of cross-exceptions, parties may file cross-responses to the cross-exceptions. 

Exceptions, responses, cross-exceptions and cross responses must be filed with the Board’s 

General Counsel, at 160 North LaSalle Street, Suite S-400, Chicago, Illinois 60601-3103, or to the 

Board's designated email address for electronic filings, at ILRB.Filing@Illinois.gov. All filing 

 

39 The Respondent’s ability to comply with this order is a matter for compliance proceedings. If the 

Respondent does not comply, the Charging Party can initiate compliance proceedings, and the Respondent 

will then have the opportunity to prove that compliance is impossible or unduly burdensome. First 

Transit/River Valley Metro, 26 PERI ¶ 38 (IL LRB-SP 2010) (any alleged difficulties that might arise in 

complying with ALJ’s order, advanced by the respondent, could be considered in compliance proceedings) 

aff’d by unpub. ord., Docket No. 3-10-0435 (3d Dist. 2011); City of Markham, 28 PERI ¶ 124 (IL LRB-SP 

2012) (employer raised impossibility of compliance in compliance proceedings); see also E.I. Du Pont De 

Nemours, 364 NLRB No. 113 n. 33 (2016)(allowing the respondent to litigate in compliance whether it 

would be impossible or unduly or unfairly burdensome to adhere to the NLRB’s order). 

 

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must be served on all other parties. Exceptions, responses, cross-exceptions and cross-responses 

will not be accepted at the Board’s Springfield office. The exceptions and/or cross-exceptions sent 

to the Board must contain a statement of listing the other parties to the case and verifying that the 

exceptions and/or cross-exceptions have been provided to them. The exceptions and/or crossexceptions will not be considered without this statement. If no exceptions have been filed within 

the 30-day period, the parties will be deemed to have waived their exceptions.

 

Issued at Chicago, Illinois this 18th day of September, 2017

STATE OF ILLINOIS

ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

LOCAL PANEL 

/S/ Anna Hamburg-Gal

Anna Hamburg-Gal

Administrative Law Judge

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NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

FROM THE

ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

ILLINOIS LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

One Natural Resources Way, First Floor

Springfield, Illinois 62702

(217) 785-3155

160 North LaSalle Street, Suite S-400

Chicago, Illinois 60601-3103

(312) 793-6400

THIS IS AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT NOTICE

AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED.

 

 

Case No. L-CA-16-017

The Illinois Labor Relations Board, Local Panel, has found that the Chicago Transit Authority has violated the 

Illinois Public Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post this Notice. We hereby notify you that the 

Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) gives you, as an employee, these rights:

• To engage in self-organization

• To form, join or assist unions

• To bargain collectively through a representative of your own choosing 

• To act together with other employees to bargain collectively or for other mutual aid and protection

• To refrain from these activities

Accordingly, we assure you that: 

WE WILL cease and desist from interfering with, restraining or coercing our employees in the exercise 

of the rights guaranteed them in the Act.

WE WILL cease and desist from threatening the Charging Party, Erek Slater, for engaging in protected, 

concerted activity. 

WE WILL cease and desist from limiting Union postings to the Union bulletin Board while barring them 

from other areas specifically designated for personal and commercial postings.

WE WILL cease and desist from instructing the Charging Party, Erek Slater, to not discuss the Chicago 

Teachers Union on CTA property. 

WE WILL cease and desist from, in any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining or coercing 

our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in the Act.

WE WILL provide the Union with use of office space on the same terms we initially provided it.

DATE ____________ _________________________

 Chicago Transit Authority

 (Employer)

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