IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 27,367 4 YOLANDA CANDELARIA, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 7 John Dean, District Judge 8 Gary K. King, Attorney General 9 Katherine Zinn, Assistant Attorney General 10 Santa Fe, NM 11 for Appellee 12 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 13 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellant 16 MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 VIGIL, Judge. 18 Convicted of receiving stolen property with a value over $2500, contrary to 19 NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-11(A), (G) ( 1987) (amended 2006), Defendant appeals. 20 She asserts: (1) there was insufficient evid ence to prove that she knew or believed the 21 property to be stolen or that the value of the property exceeded $2500; (2) there was 222 fundamental error in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of “market value”; 1 and (3) there was abuse of discretion in denying her moti on for a new trial based on 2 newly discovered evidence. We affirm. 3 BACKGROUND 4 Victim’s camper trailer was stolen fro m his property in July 2005. A police 5 detective discovered the trailer on De fendant’s property the following month. 6 Defendant was charged with one count of receiving stolen property, and the jury 7 found her guilty. Defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 8 evidence was then denied and this appeal followed. 9 DISCUSSION 10 1. Sufficiency of the Evidence 11 Defendant asserts that insufficient evidence was presented to prove two 12 essential elements: (1) that Defendant knew or believed that the trailer was stolen; and 13 (2) that the market value of the trailer was over $2500. The State bears the burden of 14 offering “sufficient evidence to prove eachelement of the crime charged, beyond a 15 reasonable doubt.” State v. Baca , 1997-NMSC-059, ¶ 13, 124 N.M. 333, 950 P.2d 16 776. “The evidentiary burden imposed on the State as a matter of due process is the 17 production of evidence into the record, fro m which a rational fact-finder could find 18 the facts necessary to support each element of the crime charged.” Id. “In reviewing 19 the sufficiency of evidence us ed to support a conviction, we resolve all disputed facts 203 in favor of the State, indulge all reasonabl e inferences in support of the verdict, and 1 disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary.” State v. Rojo , 1999-NMSC2 001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. 3 (A) Knowledge of Stolen Property 4 “A person has knowledge of stolen property if he or she either (1) actually 5 knows the property is stolen, (2) believes the property is stolen, or (3) has his or her 6 suspicions definitely aroused and refuses to investigate for fear of discovering that the 7 property is stolen.” State v. Sizemore , 115 N.M. 753, 757, 858 P.2d 420, 424 (Ct. 8 App. 1993). “Unless a defendant admits knowledge of the fact that goods he has 9 received are stolen, this knowledge of necess ity must be established by circumstantial 10 evidence.” State v. Lindsey , 81 N.M. 173, 177, 464 P.2d 903, 907 (Ct. App. 1969). 11 We do not summarize all the evidence introduced at trial, as we deem the 12 following sufficient. Defendant said she received the trailer from her stepbrother, who 13 brought it to her property and told her she could have it without paying for it. 14 Defendant said she had her stepbrother sign a bill of sale for the trailer but when the 15 police found the trailer on her property, sh e was not able to produce it. Defendant 16 acknowledged that her stepbrother was “not a perfect person,” and that she had 17 suspicions that the trailer might be stolen . Defendant was experienced in purchasing 18 trailers and was familiar w ith how titles were changed at the motor vehicle division, 19 as well as how to check at the motor vehi cle division who is the registered owner. 204 However, she never went to the motor vehicle division to find out who the registered 1 owner was or to change title into her own name. When the trailer was discovered by 2 the police on Defendant’s property, the li cense plate and eave with the “Wilderness” 3 logo had been removed. 4 While Defendant presented evidence favorab le to her case, “[c]ontrary evidence 5 supporting acquittal does not provide a basis fo r reversal because the jury is free to 6 reject Defendant’s version of the facts.” Rojo , 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19. Viewing the 7 evidence in the light most favorable to th e verdict, and resolving all conflicts and 8 indulging all reasonabl e inferences in favor of the verdict, id. , we hold that the 9 circumstantial evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a rational jury’s 10 determination that Defendant knew or believed the trailer to be stolen. 11 (B) Market Value of Stolen Property 12 Defendant argues that the market value of the trailer was never established, 13 arguing that the only evidence presented re garding the value of the trailer was 14 Victim’s testimony that he traded a truck fo r the trailer, and the truck later sold for 15 $3000. Defendant further argues that the value of the trailer at the time she received 16 it was likewise not proved. 17 Defendant relies on State v. Contreras , 1996-NMCA-045, ¶ 9, 121 N.M. 550, 18 915 P.2d 306, for the proposition that “inferences based on conjecture” are an 19 insufficient basis for a determination of value. Defe ndant’s reliance on Contrerasis 205 misplaced. In Contreras , trial testimony implied that the ticket price of a stolen 1 necklace was in a range either above or below the amount required for conviction of 2 the charged crime. Id. Because the evidence equallysupported both hypotheses, the 3 jury had no evidentiary basis upon which toinfer the necklace’s actual value. Id. In 4 contrast, the jury in this case could rationallyinfer that the market value of the trailer 5 was over $2500 based on the Victim’s testimony. 6 Defendant concedes that under New Mexico law, an owner’s testimony as to 7 the value of stolen goods is suffici ent to establish market value. See State v. Hughes , 8 108 N.M. 143, 145-46, 767 P.2d 3 82, 384-85 (Ct. App. 1988) (“It is clear that an 9 owner of personal property may testify concerning the valu e of the property and that 10 such testimony is sufficient to support a jury’s determination of value.”); State v. 11 Zarafonetis , 81 N.M. 674, 677, 472 P.2d 388, 391 (Ct. App. 1970) (“It is a general 12 rule, contrary to [a] defendant’s contenti on, that an owner of chattel property is 13 competent to testify as to the value of his property.”). While Victim did not testify as 14 to the date of the trade, he was asked speci fically what he believe d to be the value of 15 the trailer in the summer of 2005, and heresponded “approximately $3000.” Thus the 16 jury could properly and reasonably infer fro m all the evidence that when the trailer 17 was stolen in July 2005, its value was over $2500. 18 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and indulging 19 all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, we hold that the evidence presented 206 was sufficient to support a rational jury’s determination that the market value of the 1 trailer exceeded $2500. 2 2. Jury Instruction 3 Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the 4 definition of “market value. ” Defendant concedes that she did not object to the 5 omission of this instruction during the trial. Accordingly, our review is limited to 6 determining whether the omission amounted to fundamental error. See State v. 7 Benally , 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134. 8 The jury was instructed on the essential elements of the crime in accordance 9 with UJI 14-1650 NMRA, which required the juryto find, as an element, that the 10 trailer had a market value of over $2500. UJI 14-1602 NMRA defines “market value” 11 and the use note to UJI 14-1602 directs that it is to be used “if market value is in 12 issue.” We therefore first determine if market value was in issue in this case. 13 In this case, Defendant did not present any evidence concerning the value of the 14 trailer, unlike the defendant in State v. Barber , 2004-NMSC-019, ¶¶ 11-12, 135 N.M. 15 621, 92 P.3d 633. The only evidence concerning the value of the trailer was that 16 presented by the State. Victim testified that he estimated the valu e of the trailer to be 17 $3000 because he traded a truck for the trailer, and the truck was subsequently sold 18 for $3000. While Defendant que stioned Victim and the inve stigating officer about the 19 fact that they never ascertained the “Blue Book” value of the trailer, Defendant did not 207 introduce evidence establishing an alternate value for the trailer or that the $3000 1 value was incorrect. Defense counsel’s cross examination about the value of the trailer 2 was simply a challenge to the adequacy of Victim’s opinion about the value of the 3 trailer. No competing evidence was presented placing market value of the trailer “in 4 issue” for the jury to decide. 5 Furthermore, to find fundamental erro r, “we must place all the facts and 6 circumstances under close scrutiny to see whether the missing instruction caused such 7 confusion that the jury could have c onvicted Defendant based upon a deficient 8 understanding of the legal meaning of [the term] as an essential element of the crime.” 9 Id. ¶ 25. There is a distinction between jury instructions setting forth essential 10 elements of the crime and jury instructions which simply provide a definition or 11 amplification of an essential element. See State v. Doe , 100 N.M. 481, 483, 672 P.2d 12 654, 656 (1983). Furthermore, definitional instructions are not generally required 13 when the terms are used in their ordinary sense and no error is committed when no 14 instruction is given on a term or word with a common meaning. See State v. 15 Gonzales , 112 N.M. 544, 553, 817 P.2d 1186, 1195 (1991) . A dictionary definition 16 of “market value” is “the price that a comm odity can be expected to bring when sold 17 in a given market.” Webster’s New Wo rld Dictionary (3d Coll. ed. 1994). This 18 conventional understanding parallels the definition cont ained in UJI 14-1602: “the 19 price at which the property could ordinarily be bought or sold at the time” of the 208 alleged criminal act. We therefore conclude that the missing instruction did not cause 1 such confusion that the jury could haveconvicted Defendant based upon a deficient 2 understanding of the meaning of “market valu e.” We hold that no fundamental error 3 occurred when the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the meaning of market value 4 set forth in UJI 14-1602. 5 3. Motion for a New Trial 6 Defendant asserts that the trial court committed error inrefusing to grant a new 7 trial based on newly discovered evidence. State v. Moreland, 2008-NMSC-031, ¶ 9, 8 144 N.M. 192, 185 P.3d 363 directs: 9 Because the trial judge has observed th e demeanor of the witnesses and 10 has heard all the evidence, . . . th e function of passing on motions for 11 new trial belongs naturally and peculiarly to the trial court. [W]e will not 12 disturb a trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying or granting a 13 motion for a new trial unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion. An 14 abuse of discretion occurs when the ru ling is clearly against the logic and 15 effect of the facts and circumstances of the case. We cannot say the trial 16 court abused its discretion by its ru ling unless we can characterize it as 17 clearly untenable or not justified by reason. When there exist reasons 18 both supporting and detracting from a trial court decision, there is no 19 abuse of discretion. 20 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, 21 a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is governed by the 22 factors set forth in State v. Volpato , 102 N.M. 383, 384-85, 696 P.2d 471, 472-73 23 (1985). A new trial is warranted if: 24 the newly-discovered evidence is such that . . . (1) it will probably 259 change the result if a new trial is granted; (2) it must have been 1 discovered since the trial; (3) it c ould not have beendiscovered before 2 the trial by the exercise of due dilig ence; (4) it must be material; (5) it 3 must not be merely cumulative; and (6) it must not be merely 4 impeaching or contradictory. 5 Id. 6 We conclude that the firs t requirement was not satisfied. At the hearing on the 7 motion for a new trial, Defendant’s stepbrother testified that a person named Jason 8 Bizzell asked him to tow the trailer to Defe ndant’s property because he (Bizzell) had 9 heard that Defendant wanted to buy a trailer. Stepbrother also stated that he did not 10 know the trailer was stolen. Stepbrother testified that Defendant offered to pay 11 Bizzell $400, but would only do so when Bi zzell provided her with the title. This 12 testimony directly conflicts with Defendant’s own trial testimony in which she stated 13 that when her stepbrother brought her the trailer, he told her thattheir parents did not 14 have room for it and that she could have it without payment. At the hearing 15 stepbrother also admitted that he had useda variety of drugs extensively, he was 16 currently incarcerated, he had previously been incarcerated for breaking and entering, 17 and he had previously stolen property. Therefore, it was within the realm of discretion 18 for the trial court to conclude that the stepbrother’s contradi ctory testimony would 19 have been given such wei ght by the jury that it woul d probably have changed the 20 outcome of the trial. See State v. Smith , 104 N.M. 329, 333, 721 P.2d 397, 401 (1986) 21 (holding that a trial court did not abus e its discretion in denying the defendant’s 2210 motion for a new trial where the witne ss’s proposed testimony was “so subject to 1 impeachment that a new jury, hearing it along with all the evidence offered at the first 2 trial, would give [the witness’s] statements little weight and probably would not reach 3 a different verdict”) overruled on other grounds by Gallegos v. Citizens Ins. Agency , 4 108 N.M. 722, 731, 779 P.2d 99, 108 (1989). We therefore do not consider the 5 remaining factors in considering whether a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 6 evidence should have been gran ted in the discretion of the trial court. We hold that 7 the trial court did not abuse its discreti on in denying Defendant ’s motion for a new 8 trial. 9 CONCLUSION 10 The judgment and sentence is affirmed. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12

________________________________ 13 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 14 WE CONCUR: 15

__________________________________ 16 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Chief Judge 17

__________________________________ 1811 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 1