UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4141

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

GREGORY DONEARL EASTERLING, a/k/a Smoke, a/k/a Dion A. 

Foster,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, 

Chief District Judge. (3:12-cr-00013-1)

Submitted: November 25, 2013 Decided: March 24, 2014

Before AGEE, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas J. Gillooly, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. 

Richard Gregory McVey, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Huntington, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Gregory Donearl Easterling appeals the eighty-fourmonth sentence imposed by the district court following his 

guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute heroin, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2012), and possession of a

firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). In accordance with 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Easterling’s counsel 

has filed a brief certifying that there are no meritorious 

grounds for appeal but questioning whether the evidence before 

the district court was sufficient to sustain its determination 

that one of Easterling’s prior convictions properly counted 

toward the calculation of Easterling’s criminal history 

category. Easterling has filed a supplemental brief in which he 

echoes and supplements counsel’s arguments. Finding no error, 

we affirm. 

We review Easterling’s sentence for reasonableness, 

using an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 

552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We must first review for “significant 

procedural error[s],” including improperly calculating the 

Guidelines range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

(2012) factors, sentencing under clearly erroneous facts, or 

failing to adequately explain the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 

51; United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008).
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Only if we find a sentence procedurally reasonable may we 

consider its substantive reasonableness. United States v. 

Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). Because Easterling 

properly preserved the issue, we review for clear error the 

district court’s findings of fact underlying its calculation of 

Easterling’s criminal history category. United States v. 

McManus, 23 F.3d 878, 882 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. 

Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 880 (4th Cir. 1992).

A bit of background information is necessary. 

Easterling was convicted of a Michigan narcotics offense in June 

1995 and received an eighteen-month to twenty-year sentence 

(“1995 offense”). Easterling was paroled in November 1996. He

absconded from parole in April 1997 and committed a second 

Michigan narcotics offense in September 1997 (“1997 offense”), 

for which he was sentenced to one to four years of imprisonment. 

Easterling was again paroled in September 1998. Thereafter, 

Easterling’s parole was revoked in February 2000, and he 

remained incarcerated until January 2003. Easterling remained 

on parole until July 2010, at which point he was unconditionally 

discharged. 

However, the Michigan state records detailing 

Easterling’s incarceration history were unclear regarding which 

of his two sentences supported Easterling’s approximate threeyear incarceration following the revocation of his parole in 
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February 2000. Attempting to explain the ambiguity, Easterling 

suggested that the sentence for his 1995 offense was discharged 

as part of the plea to his 1997 offense, thus leaving the 

sentence for his 1997 offense as the sole basis for his 

subsequent incarceration. Therefore, Easterling argued, his 

1995 offense fell outside the applicable fifteen-year window. 

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 4A1.2(e)(1) (2012). 

Although failing to produce supporting records, Easterling 

argued that, under typical sentencing practices, this was a 

logical explanation of the seemingly unclear Michigan state 

records. An examination of Michigan’s sentencing and parole 

scheme, however, indicates otherwise. 

The maximum term of imprisonment or period of parole 

Easterling could have served for his 1997 offense was four 

years, meaning that, if in fact the sentence for his 1995 

offense was discharged as part of a plea agreement, Easterling 

would have been subject to unconditional release from the 

Michigan penal system in 2001. See Shaya v. Holder, 586 F.3d 

401, 408 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that, in Michigan, “there 

is no guarantee that an incarcerated person will be released 

from prison after the person has completed his or her minimum 

sentence [because] the parole board retains the discretion to 

keep a person incarcerated up to the maximum sentence authorized 

by the jury’s verdict”) (internal quotation marks and alteration 
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omitted); People v. Matelic, 641 N.W.2d 252, 264 (Mich. Ct. App. 

2001), overruled in part on other grounds by People v. Stewart, 

698 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 2005). However, the state records clearly 

indicate that, following the revocation of his parole in 

February 2000, Easterling remained incarcerated until January 

2003, necessarily indicating that Easterling was incarcerated 

pursuant to the sentence for his 1995 offense following 

conviction for his 1997 offense. This conclusion is further 

confirmed by Michigan court records indicating that the sentence 

for Easterling’s 1997 offense was imposed to run consecutively 

to the sentence for his 1995 offense, as Michigan law dictates. 

See People v. Idziak, 773 N.W.2d 616, 621-22 (Mich. 2009)

(Michigan requires consecutive sentencing for parolees who 

reoffend while released). Accordingly, we conclude that there 

is no clear error in the district court’s calculation of 

Easterling’s criminal history category. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We 

therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We also decline 

to address, in this appeal, Easterling’s claim regarding 

problems with the prison’s mail system, a civil matter not 

properly addressed in this criminal appeal, or his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, as the record does not 

conclusively demonstrate any deficiencies in counsel’s 
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performance. This court requires that counsel inform 

Easterling, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme 

Court of the United States for further review. If Easterling 

requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that 

such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this 

court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s 

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Easterling. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED