IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2015-CA-01788-SCT
TY LER EDMONDS a/k/a TY LER W. EDMONDS

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/04/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LEE SORRELS COLEMAN COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: OKTIBBEHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: JIM W AIDE VICTOR ISRAEL FLEITAS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: W ILSON DOUGLAS MINOR NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 06/29/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC. COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In July 2004, an Oktibbeha County jury f ound Ty ler Edm onds guilty of the m urder of Joey Fulgham , who was his half -sister’s husband. In M a y 2007, the Mississippi Suprem e Court reversed Edm onds’s conviction a n d rem anded the case to the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court f

or a new trial due to evidentiary errors. A t his new trial in 2008, a jury f ound Edm onds not guilty

. ¶2. T h e p r e s e n t a p p e a l s t e ms f r o m E d m o n d s ’ s s u i t a g a i n s t t h e S t a t e u n d e r t h e Com pensation to Victims o f Wr ongf ul Conviction and Im

prisonm ent statutes c odif ied inMississippi C ode Sections 11-44-1 to 11-44-15, which p erm i t a person wrongf ully c onvicted and i m prisoned to recover $50,000 f or every y ear of wrongf

ul in carceration. The circuit

court concluded that Edm onds w a s n o t entitled to com pensation b ecause he m ade a f alse conf ession to p o lice of

f icers regarding his involvem ent with the m urder, which e quated to a f abrication of e vidence. Edm o nds appeals, and we reverse the judgm ent and rem and the case to the circuit court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶3. In 2003, E dm onds conf essed that h e, with the help of his half

- sister Kristi Fulgham , shot J o ey Fulgham

. At the tim e, Joey was m arried to K r isti. I nitially , Edm onds and his

m other voluntarily went to t he police station, and Edm onds claim ed that h e did not know
any thing a bout the m

u r d e r . However, Edm onds’s m other was rem oved f rom the room , Edm onds was inf

orm ed t hat Kristi had im

plicated him in the m

urder, a nd Kristi, who was already at the police station, w as brought i nto t he room w ith Edm onds. She held Edm onds’s hand and told him

that she had told the truth and that he should tell the truth too. Af ter his brief m eeting with Kristi, Edm onds gave a con f e s s i o n that he and K

risti had killed Joey

. Several day s l ater, Edm o nds r ecanted his conf ession and stated that Kristi had acted alone in shooting Joey

. ¶4. Following trial, the jury c onvicted Edm onds of m urder, and the court sentenced him

to lif e in the custody of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections. Edm onds appealed, and the Court of Appeals af

f irm ed his sentence and conviction. Edm onds v. State , 955 So. 2d 864, 900 (¶¶ 120-1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). The Suprem e Court granted Edm onds’s petition

2f

or w rit of certiorari review. Edm onds v. State , 955 So. 2d 7 87, 790 (¶ 2) (Miss. 2007). The Court concluded that Edm onds d i d n o t r eceive a f air trial f or a variety of r easons, so the Court reversed the circuit court’s and Court of Appeals’ judgm ents and rem anded the case f or a new trial. Id. at 798-9 (¶¶ 29-33). ¶5. Edm o nds ’ s s e c o n d t r i a l r e s u l t e d i n a n o t

- g u ilty verdict. Upon the return of the not-guilty verdict, E dm onds f iled the present action seeking com pensation pursuant to Section 11-44-1 f

or the y ears he spent in custody

. Edm onds’s b ench trial resulted in a determ ination by the circuit court that Edm onds’s conf ession was f

abricated evidence; thus, he could not recover u nder the C o mp e nsation to Victim s of W rongf ul Conviction and
Im prisonm ent statutes. Edm onds appeals and raises the f ollowing issues:
I. W hether the circuit court erred in concluding that Edm onds f abricated evidence.
II. W hether the circuit court’s f ailure to g ive Edm onds a f air trial at his f irst crim inal trial was a superseding c ause of E dm onds’s conviction, such that the f

alse conf ession was not a legal cause of his conviction.
III. W hether t h e circuit court should have granted Edm o nds’s request to have a jury

trial. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6. As has been explained, the present appeal stem s f ro m t h e c i r c u i t c ourt’s judgm ent f ollowing a b e n c h t rial. I t is w ell-settled that the C ourt def ers to the f

actual f indings and determ inations of a trial judge sitting as the f inder of f act at a bench trial; theref ore, we will

not disturb such f

indings if they are supported by substantial evidence and the trial court did

not abuse its discretion, was n o t ma n i f e s tly wrong, was not clearly erroneous, and did not

3a p p l y a n e r r o n eous l egal standard. Covington County v. G.W. , 767 S o. 2d 187, 189 (¶ 4 )

(Miss. 2 000) (quoting Church of God Pentecostal, I n c. v. F reewill Pentecostal Church of God, Inc. , 716 S o. 2 d 2 0 0, 204 (¶ 15) (Miss. 1998)). A s i s c u s t o ma r y , the C ourt reviews questions of law, including statutory interpretation, de novo. Tellus Operating Group, LLC

v. Texas Petroleum Inv. Co. , 105 So. 3d 274, 2 77-8 (¶ 9) (Miss. 2012) (quoting Laurel Ford Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Blakeney , 81 So. 3d 1123, 1125 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2012)). ANALYSIS ¶7. F o r p urposes of ou r a n a l y s i s , t h e f i r s t t w o i s s u e s r a i s e d b y E d mo n d s c a n b e consolidated into o ne issue: the appropriate interpretation and application of Section 11-44-
7 (1)(c), which p rovides that a plaintif f under the Com

pensation to Victim s of Wr o n g f u l Conviction and Im

prisonm ent Act (“W rongf u l Conviction a n d Im

prisonm ent Act”) m

ust show he did not “f

abricate evidence to bring about his conviction.” See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-48-7(1)(c) (Rev. 2012). The second prim ary issue bef o r e us i s whether Edm onds’s request f or a jury t r i a l s h ould have been granted. O n both issues, we hold in f avor of Edm onds.
I. S e ction 11-44-7(1)(c) includes an e lem ent of intent to bring a b o u t one’s conviction w hen fabricating evidence and therefore, an issue of m aterial fact rem ains as to Edm onds’s intent. ¶8. According to Section 11-44-1, the reason f o r the p assage of the W rongf ul Conviction and Im prisonm ent statutes was to provide m o netary com p ensation to “innocent persons who have been wrongly convicted o f f elony crim e s and subsequently im prisoned” because they

“ h a ve been uniquely victim ized, h ave distinct problem s reentering society , and sho u l d b e

4com

pensated.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-1 (R e v. 2012). Com pensation i s provided if a claim ant proves by a p reponderance of the evidence that “ [ h ]e was convicted of one or m ore f elonies and subsequently sentenced to a term of im prisonm ent, a nd h as served all or any part of t h e s e n t e n c e ; a n d

. . . his judgm ent of conviction was reversed or vacated and

. . . [ i]f a

new trial was ordered, h e was f ound not guilty at the n ew trial

. . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 11- 44-7(1)(a)(ii)(2) (Rev. 2012). Further, the claim ant m ust prove that “[ h ]e did not com m it the f elony o r f elonies f or which he was sentenced and w hich are the g rounds f or the c om

plaint,

or the acts or om issions f

or which he was sentenced did not c onstitute a f elony .” M iss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7(1)(b). Finally , and m ost relevant to t he p resent case, the claim ant m ust prove that “[ h]e did n ot com m it or suborn p e r jury , or f abricate evidence t o bring about his conviction.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7(1)(c). ¶9. The crux of Edm onds’s position is that t he circuit court erred in f i nding that his f

alse conf ession p rohibits h im f

r om recovery pursuant to S ection 11-44-7(1)(c). In support of his position, Edm onds outlines several f acts that led to his conf

e ssion, which include: his y oung age, his desire to help his half

- s ister avoid the death penalty , and the police allowing his half

sister to speak to him without his m other present. Essentially , Edm onds’s argum ent is twof old: (1) the statute requires an elem ent o f i n t e n t t o f abricate evidence, and (2) an issue of

m aterial f

act exists a s t o the nature of E dm ond’s intent. The State, o n the other hand, contends that the “to bring about” la n g u a g e i s m erely causative and lacks any connotation of intent. W e agree with Edm onds on both points.

5¶10. First, the issue hinges upon the Court’s interpretation of the f ollowin g l a

n g u a g e w ithin the statute: “ [ The Claim ant] did not

. . . f abricate evidence to bring a b o u t h i s conviction.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7(1)(c). “W hen interpreting a statute that is not am biguous, this Court will apply the p l ain m eaning of the statu t e . ” P i t alo v. GPCH-GP, Inc. , 933 So. 2d 927, 9 29 ( ¶ 5) (Miss. 2006). To determ ine t he p lain m e a ning, “we m ust look at the words of the statute.” Adam s v. Baptist Mem ’l Hosp.-DeSoto, Inc. , 9 6 5 So. 2d 6 52, 656 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2007). ¶11. The word “f

abricate” has no elem ent of i ntent indicating u ltim ate purpose o r m otive f or t he f a brication em

bedded within its plain m eaning; however, the phrase “to b ring about” d o e s . The word “to” c arries m any def initions, one of which is “ u sed f or e xpressing aim,
purpose, or i ntention.” To , R andom House W ebster’s Unabridged Dictionary 1989 (2d ed. 2001). The phrase “to bring a bout” ref lects the f unction of the word “to” as expressing “aim , purpose, o r intention,” as in “[ The Claim ant] did not

. . . f abricate evidence [ with the “aim , purpose, or intention” o f bringing] about h is conviction.” As it m eans “[ s]om ething, esp[ ecially ] willf

u l desire, that leads one to a c t,” Motive , Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), the word “m otive” also would be appropriate to describe t he requirem ent at issue. In

m ore t e c hnical term s , the phrase “to b ring about” p roduces an a d verbial inf initive that

m odif ies and directs the verb “f abricate.” Adverbial inf

i nitives f requently are em

ploy ed to
express intent or m otive behind a p articular action, e.g. , “I w en t to th e sto re to b u y g ro ceries ” ( i.e. , I w en t to th e sto re w ith in ten t, an d th at i n ten t w as to b u y g ro c eries ); “H e ran f

o r o f f ice

to b rin g a b o u t ch a n g e ” ( i.e. , h e ran f o r o f f ice w ith in ten t, an d th at in ten t w as to b rin g a b o u t

6ch a n g e ). Turning the statute into a question sim plif i es the t echnical understanding: W hy did the claim ant f

a bricate evidence? T o bring about h is conviction. In other words, the claim ant f abricated evidence in o rder t o bring about his conviction, which denotes intention, purpose,

or m otive. Moreover, no other understanding of t he word “to” f its within t he context of the phrase “to bring about,” and, theref ore, a plain reading of the statute engenders an elem ent of intent under subsection (1)(c). ¶12. In his dissent, Justice Cham berlin eschews the analy sis of the stat u t o r y language as
unnecessary . Our law r equires that we analy ze the “words of the s tatute.” Adam s , 965 So. 2d at 656 (¶ 21). “The f

unction of the Court is not to d ecide what a statute should provide, but to determ i ne what it does provide.” Lawson v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. , 75 So. 3d 1024, 1027 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2011). The sim ple principle that Justice Cham b erlin would announce, to the ef f e c t that, “If y o u c o n f

e s s a c r i m e, and that conf ession is n ot coerced o r o therwise induced by law e nf

orcem ent or som e s tate actor, then y ou cannot recover under the statute,”

m ay very well be better policy

. However, the statute wholly excludes any m ention of state actors or law enf

orcem ent. ¶13. Presiding Justice Randolph takes the position that our interpretation is absurd because he “can f athom no o ne who would f alsely conf

ess to a crim e with the a im , intent, or purpose of being i m

prisoned.” W e decline to attem pt t o divine the f

ull range of m otivations hum an beings m i ght have to give f alse conf e ssions to o r o t h e r f

alse e vidence i ndicating the

com m ission of crim es, but we disagree that our interpretation i s absurd. C ertainly , if people actually com m it crim es m otivated by a desire to be separate f rom t heir spouses, f

or exam ple,

7then a person m ight f abricate evidence to be convicted of a crim e he or s he did not com m it f or the sam e or a sim ilar reason. Travis M. A ndrews, “Rather be in jail”: 7 0-year-old man robs bank to get arrested and a way from w ife, police say , The W a shington Post (Septem ber 8, 2016). The unpredictable m otivations of our f ellow hum ans aside, our interpretation of the statute allows the hy

pothetical, wrongly convicted person w ho f alsif ied a conf

ession under coercion the opportunity to p rove that he did not f a bricate the evidence of the conf ession t o bring about his conviction but, r ather, b ecause h e w as coerced. If the statutory language r equires causation in f act only , a s urged by Justice Beam , then e ven coerced f alse conf essions would be f

atal to ef f orts to recover. ¶14. W e f

u rther suggest that not all perso n s m a k i n g fa l s e c onf essions would recover sim ply by claim ing they had a m otive other than getting them s elves convicted. For a hy pothetical

exam ple, if a f ather wer e to plead guilty to a crim e he did not com m it in order t o keep his guilty child f rom prison, then getting convicted is t he intent of the f ather. If such were the evidence, he w ould not have proven that he did not f abr i c a t e e v i d e n c e to bring about his conviction, because bringing about his conviction w as a necessary com pone n t of also

m isguidedly protecting his child. By c ontrast, Edm onds’s testim ony below was that he had

no appreciation f

o r the possibility that he would go to jail. F or t he above r easons, we are unpersuaded that our interpretation of the statute is absurd. ¶15. In response to a concern raised by Justice Beam ’ s dissent, we pause to m a ke it clear that we agree that, in a ddition to the aim , intent, a nd purpose requir e me n t , S e c tion 11-44- 7(1)(c) requires that t he f alse evidence cause the convict i o n . It is not t he Court’s intent to

8ignore t hat the statute p lainly r equires that the f alsif i ed evidence bring about the conviction. However, as t h e dispute between the State and Edm o nds is whether Section 11-44-7(1)(c) contains a requ i r e m ent that t he f a brication be m otivated by or intended to bring about the conviction, we address w hat, if any thing, the language has to say o n the contested issue rather than an issue as to which, as Justice Beam points out, all parties agree. W e isolate nothing when w e consider the Legislature’s purpose in choosing the phrase “ to bring about” instead of a ny other phrase f

r om a range o f alternative verbiage including, e.g. , “that b rings about.” Rather, we are striving, as we m ust, to give e f

f ect to the entire statute. DePriest v. Barber , 798 So. 2d 456, 458 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2001) (“The prim a ry rule of construction is t o ascertain the intent of the legis l a t u r e f

r o m the s tatute as a whole and f rom the l anguage used therein.”). Had the Legislature intended to p reclude recovery f or c laim ants who f

abricated evidence that caused their convictions no m atter t he reason it was f abricated, then i t e a s i l y could have chosen dif

f ere n t l a nguage. F or exam ple, t he L egislature c o uld have substituted the words “wh i c h b rings” f

or the phrase “to bring.” However, the Legislature did not s o choose and

we are constrained to consider the words it did em ploy

. “The d

uty of t h is Court is to interpret the statutes as written.” Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc. , 931 So. 2d 1274, 1276 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2006). ¶16. Since w e hold Section 11-44-7(1)(c) does provide f or an elem ent of

intent, purpose,

or m o tive, f

or f abricating evidence, a n i s s ue o f m aterial f act still exists as to whether Edm onds conf

essed with the intent, purpose, or m otive of bringing a bout his own conviction.
II. Edm o nds produced evidence that h e confe s s e d w i t h t h e i ntent to help his sister and w ith no intention to be incarcerated.

9¶17. I n dissent, Justice Beam takes the position t hat no issue of m aterial f act exists as t o Edm onds’s m otive f

o r bringing about his conviction. The record dem onstrates oth e r w i s e. At the trial of the i nstant m atter, counsel f or Edm onds asked him several questions regarding his f eelings f or his sister in order to e stabli s h e v i d ence of m o tivations other t han getting him self convicted of the crim e. Edm onds prof f ered his testim ony t o t he ef f ect that, in conf essing, he intended to “help an d p r o t e c t ” h i s sister. He explicitly denied that he had

m ade t he conf

essio n w ith the intention of going to prison. During the trial, the f ollowing exchange took place during the direct exam ination of Edm onds: Q. Ty ler, what w as y our m otive, y our goal, y our desire, in m aking the f irst statem ent? W hat were y ou try ing to do? A. To protect and help m y sister. Q. Now, in y o ur 13-y e ar-old m ind, did that seem l ike what y ou were doing? A. At the tim e, y es. Q. You’re a grown m an now? A. Yes. Q. How does i t seem to y ou, with the benef it of the m a turation as a result of age, experience, and s im ply enough, jus t t h e developm ent of y o ur brain? A. Stupid. Q. Wa s y our p urpose at any tim e in m aking y our f irst statem ent to g o t o prison? A. Absolutely

not. Q. To get sent to jail?

10A. Absolutely not. In addition t o the above-quoted testim o ny , Edm onds of f ered into evidence a handwritten letter f rom his s ister, in which his sister entreated him to stand f irm on his conf

ession. Indeed, the trial j udge noted a nd even, at l east tacitly , f ound the evidence of Edm onds’s inten t credible when he wrote in his judgm ent t hat E dm onds’s conf ession “was m otivated by an attem

pt to shif t at least part of the blam e to him self in the m istaken belief that it would help his half

-sister.” ¶18. To the extent that Justice Beam a rgues that there is no m aterial issue of f act as to the whether Edm o nds’s f

alse conf ession caused his conviction, we need not respond. It is not pertine n t to the issue o f w hether proof exists that, if taken i n a l ight m ost f a v orable to E d mo n d s, shows that his f alse conf ession was m otivated by som e other goal than bein g convicted. As shown above, Edm onds has produced such evidence.
IV. When a statute is silent regarding a plaintiff’s option t o a jury trial, the right shall rem ain available to the litigant. ¶19. Edm o nds argues t hat he was entitled to the jury trial he requested as opposed to the bench trial he received. Article 3, Section 31 of the Mississippi Constitution provides that “[ t]he right of tr i a l by jury shall remain inviolate

. . . .” (Em phasis added.) T he term “rem ain” has been interpreted as specif ically graf t ing t he right o f trial by jury onto com m onlaw causes of action. I

s om v. Mississi

p p i C e n t. R. Co. , 36 Miss. 300, 308 (Miss. 1858) (“The p eculiar phraseology of [ Sec t i on 31] will n aturally s uggest the i dea, t hat it has ref erence to an existing state o f the law securing this right, at the tim e of its adoption. It is

to ‘ r emain inviolate.’”). In ref e rence to the Seventh Am e n dm ent’s right t o a jury trial, the

11United States Suprem e Court h as “ understood ‘suits at com m on l aw’ to ref er ‘not m erely [ to] suits, which the c om m on law recognized am ong its old and settled proceedings, but [ to] suits
in w hich legal r i

ghts were to be a scertained and determined , i n contradistinction to those

w h e r e equitable r ights alone were recognized

. . . .” Feltner v. Colum bia Pict u r e s Television, Inc. , 523 U.S. 340, 3 4 8 , 1 1 8 S. Ct. 1279, 1284, 140 L. E d. 2d 438 (1998) (em phasis added). 1 ¶20. In r e l i a n c e u p o n t h e a b o v e - r e f e r e n ced rules, the S tate argues t he cause of action established under the W r ongf ul Conviction and Im

prisonm ent statutes is not based in

com m on l aw. T he State is c orrect: “At com m o n law, suits

. . . against the State were not availab l e at all, due to sovereign im m unity .” Wells b

y Wells v. Panola Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 6 4 5 So. 2 d 883, 898 (Miss. 1994). However, that Edm onds’s claim is c reated by s t a t u t e rather than the com m on law does not alone determ ine w hether he has a right to a jury trial. The W rongf

ul Conviction and I m

prisonm e nt Act is c om

pletely silent as t o whe t h er a jury trial m ay b e had, a nd pursuant to the f ollowing reasoning, we hold t hat – in a case where the

statutes creating a cause of action against the State a r e silent as to whether the p laintif f has a right to a jury

trial – a jury

trial m ay be had. ¶21. Attem

pting to inf

er legislative intent, the S tate draws the Court’s attention to Section 11-44-7(4), which say s “[ a] claim ant m a y choose to pursue a claim under t his chapter in lieu of pursuing a claim against the State o f Mississippi or a political subdivision thereof under

1 W hile the language f

rom F eltner is instructive, the right to a t rial by jury under the Seventh Am endm ent does not extend to the States t hrough the Fourteenth Am e n dm ent. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Hum anities, Inc. , 518 U.S. 415, 431, 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2221, 135 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1996). 12the Mississippi Tort Claim s Act, Section 11-46-1 et seq. , M ississippi Code of 1972.” Using

the quoted language, t he State c ontends the W rongf ul C onviction and Im

prisonm ent Act acts

as an alternative to t he Mississippi Tort Claim s Act, and, t heref ore, the Legislature intended f or trials under the statute to b e conducted in the sam e m anner as t rials under the Tort Claim s Act. T he text y ields the opposite conclusion. The Tort Claim s Act specif ica l l y b a r s j u ry trials: “The judge of the appropriate court shall hear and d eterm ine, without a jury , any suit f iled under the provisions of this chapter.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-13(1) (Rev. 2012) (em phasis added). N o com parable language is f

ound in the W rongf

ul Conviction and
Im prisonm ent Act, which, according t o the above-quoted language, m ay be u sed in lieu, or instead, of the Tort Claim s Act. C ity of Natchez, M

iss. v. Sullivan , 612 S o. 2d 1087, 1089 (Miss. 1992) (“[ T]he o m ission of la n g u a g e f r o m a sim ilar provision on a sim ilar subject indicates that the l egislature had a dif f erent intent in enacting the p r o v isions, which it

m anif ested by the om ission of

the language.”). ¶22. W e return, then, to the q uestion at hand, which is whether a plaintif f enjoy s the right

to a trial by jury

in the context o f a statutorily c r eated c ause of action against the s overeign when the pertinent statutes are silent on the issue. ¶23. In R iverboat Corporation of Mississippi v. H arrison County B oard of Supervisors , 198 So. 3d 289, 291 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2016), the Court considered “whether there is a right to a jury trial in an appeal of a county ’s ad valorem tax assessm ent.” The issue in R iverboat was the sam e as the issue Edm o nds presents today : “ The s tatute authorizing this suit

. . . is silent regarding the right to a jury trial.” Id. Edm onds’s appeal is distinguish a b l e i n that tax13assessm ent cases have had a “ longstanding use of jury trials,” whereas c a s e s against the

S o v e reign do not have a s im ilar h istory

. Id. a t 2 94 ( ¶ 14). Nevertheless, w e reiterat e d i n Riverboat that “[ t]his Court, on prior occasion a nd wel l b ef o re the adoption o f our 1890 Constitution, addressed t he r ight to trial by j u r y when statutes giving rise to actions were silent as to that right.” Id. at 2 91 (¶ 8). W e have “em phatically declared the right to a jury trial ‘is unquestionably the parties’ right, a n d t he court will not be departing f rom its well established r ules of

practice in granting it, though the statute may be silent on the subject .’” Id. (second em

phasis added). ¶24. Riverboat ref

lects t hat, when f

aced w i t h a silent statute, our historic and custom ary proclivity has been to recognize the right to a jury t rial. W e do so again today

. Our ancestors viewed a jury trial right a s so f undam ental t hat they included it in both our f ederal and state constitutions. T heref

ore, we h old that, in the c ontext of a statutory c l a i m against the Sovereign, whose provisions are silent as to whether or not t he action receives a j ury or not, the p laintif

f continues to enjo y t h e r i g h t to a jury trial. To the extent t hat the Court of Appeals held otherwise in Hym es v. State , 121 So. 3d 938 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), w hich also involved a claim under the Com pensation to Victim s of W rongf u l Conviction and
Im prisonm ent statutes, we today overrule it. CONCLUSION ¶25. Pursuant to the f

oregoing rea s o n i n g , w e r e v e r s e t h e judgm e nt of the Oktibbeha County Circuit Court and rem and the case f or f urther proceedings consistent with the instant opinion. ¶26. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

14WAL L E R , C.J., DICKINSON, P.J., KITCHENS AND KING, JJ., CONCUR.

MAX W ELL, J., C ONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION J OINED BY RANDOLPH, P.J.; BEAM AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., JOIN IN PART. RANDOLPH, P .J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BEAM, J.; MAX WELL AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., JOIN IN PART. BEAM, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE W RITTEN OPINION J OINED IN P A R T B Y R

A N D O LPH, P . J . , M A X

W E L L A N D C H A M B E R L I N , J J . C H A M B E R L I N , J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED B Y R ANDOLPH, P.J., MAX WELL AND BEAM, JJ.

MAX WELL, J USTICE, CONCURRING IN P ART AND DISSENTING IN PART: ¶27. Because the m ajority has decided to reverse and rem and this case, I agree Riverboat 2 entitles Edm onds t o a jury trial o n rem and. But I do not join the m ajority ’s interpretation of Mississippi Code Section 11-44-7(1)(c) or f ind rem and f

or a j ury trial solv e s E d mo n ds’s conf ession-based dilem m a. ¶28. Like Presiding Justice Randolph and Justice Cham berlin, I f ind the c lear language of Section 11-44-7(1)(c) f

orecloses Edm onds’s com pensation claim b ased on his a dm ittedly f alse conf ession. The trial judge believed so too. A nd, a s Justice B eam points out, even if

a jury had been seated f

or E dm onds’s trial, the j udge certainly would have directed a verdict in the State’s f

avor because he correctly believed Edm onds’s adm ittedly f a l s e c o n f ession prevented com

pensation under Mississippi’s wrongf ul-conviction com

pensation law. ¶29. For these reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part. RANDOLPH, P.J., JOINS THIS OPINION. BEAM A ND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART.

2 Riverboat Corp. of

Miss. v. Harrison Cty. Bd. of Supervisors , 198 So. 3d 289 (Miss. 2016). 15RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, DISSENTING:

¶30. W i th all d

ue respect to m y f

ellow justices, the m ajority ’ s interpretation of the statute leads to an absurd result. I cannot f athom that a reasonable person (let alone a person with

an IQ of 119) ( see Justice Beam ’s Dissent at ¶ 45) would f alsely 3 conf

ess to a crim e with the aim , intent, o r purpose of being im prisoned. There are lim itations which t his Court, over the
y ears, has established in the interpretation of our Constitution and statutes. Our law is clear.
W e do not ascribe an absurd result to pronouncem ents by t he Legislature. See USF&G Co.

v. Conservatorship of Melson , 809 So. 2d 647, 660 (Miss. 2002) (“It is our duty to support

a con s t r u ction which would p urge the legislative purpose of any invalidity , absurdity or unjust inequality .”); D rane v. State , 493 So. 2d 294, 298 (Miss. 1986) (“Nor will this Court im p ute an unjust or absurd purpose to the legislature when any other reasonable construction can save it f

rom such an im

putation.”). ¶31. Despite these t ruths, the m ajority reverses the trial-court judgm e nt and rem ands this

case. Since trial a new is to be had, Edm onds also m ust prove, by a preponderance of the

3 Today ’s decision addresses a putative alle g e d “ fa l s e ” c o n fe s s ion, u nder c o ercion, and not a true, voluntary conf ession (if the W ashington Post article is t o be believed) (Maj. Op. at ¶ 13), which is inapplicable to t he issue sub judice

. Edm onds, when a sked by his m other, “W hat is the truth? ” responded, “That m e and Christy did it.” Edm onds v. State , 955 So. 2d 787, 814 (Miss. 2007) (Randolph, P.J., specially concurring). Two day s later, in a phone call to Marcus Sullivan, the f ather of one of his f

riends, “[ Ty ler] asked had I [ Sullivan] heard about Joey and I s aid I had. There was a pause and I asked him , [ d]id y ou do it? He said, [ y ]es sir.” Id. W hether E dm onds’s conf essions were true or f

a lse or m a de u nder c o ercion will be one of the issues f

or a jury to decide. 16evidenc e , e very e lem ent required by the W rongf ul Conviction Act, including actual innocence 4 (which also was not established in the case sub judice ). BEAM, J., JOINS THIS OPINION. MAX WELL AND CHAM B E R L I N , JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART. BEAM, JUSTICE, DISSENTING: ¶32. Our p rincipal d

u t y as Mississippi’s court of l ast r esort is to consider im partially the decisions of the c ou r t s b e l o w and rule on m atters t hrough sound r easoning and com m on

sense. This duty is especially rigid when we review those m atters in light of any a pplicable

statutes. As a rem edy intended f or a select f

ew, the W rongf

ul Conviction Com

pensation Act

was established to provide prom pt assistance to the wrongf ully convicted through m onetary

am ends. In establishing the Act, our Legislature carved out this cause to provide adequate and prom pt justice and restoration to the wrongly convicted, requiring the petitioner to bear the burden of p r o v i n g the elem ents of the Act b y a preponderance of t he evidence. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7 (Rev. 2013). On appeal, it b ecom es “[ o]ur duty [ ] to caref ully review statutory language and apply

its m ost reasonable interpretation and m eaning to the f acts of

a particular case.” Pope v. Brock , 912 So

. 2d 9 35, 937 (Miss. 2 005). I n so doing, we
cannot throw com m on sense to the wind. Instead, we m u st use the established laws and y ears of precedent, coupled with the Court’s wisdom and reason to d eterm ine the legislative intent behind the elem ents of

the Act. ¶33. The r em edy provided by the W r ongf ul C onviction Com

pensation Act is unique in that it recognizes the need to redress the injuries suf f e red by i nnocent individuals languishing in

4 See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7(1)(b) (Rev. 2012). 17prison. Throughout the country , states have established s i mi l a r a cts providing f or

com pensation to f

ac t u a l ly i nnocent people who have been wrongf ully convicted. Mississippi, like our sister s tates , e s t a b l ished the W r ongf ul Conviction Com

p ensation Act with t he intent to rem ove s om e of the f inancial o bstacles i ncurred by the f actually innocent and ease their transition b ack into society

. Miss. Code Ann. § 1 1-44-1 ( Rev. 2012). To that end, w hen strictly construed, the Act was intended to apply to a m inority of select cases. Because I f

ind that Edm o nds f

ailed to m eet the specif

i c criteria to prove he was entitled to

com pensation through the Act, and that no g enuine issue of m aterial f a c t exists as to his intent to bring about his conviction under the statute, I respectf u lly dissent.
I. While M ississippi Code Section 1 1-44-7(1)(c) includes an elem ent of intent as it relates to the fabrication o f e vidence, the Act does not provide for an elem ent of intent as to a claim ant’s effort t o “bring about his conviction.” ¶34. The m a

jority outlines a linguistic argum ent f or the interpretation of a specif ic portion of the statute in question. However, I f ind that this analy sis i s f

lawed i n two distinct areas: the argum ent ignores t he intent requirem ent f ound i n the elem ent o f f

abrication and it im

plies that the clause “to bring about his conviction” lacks causation. This labored d escription of the statutory la n g u a g e results in a technical explanation of what the author views as the overarching question at hand: why did the claim ant f abricate evidence? T his question leads to several responses, all with one com m on them e: to protect his sister Kristi. The m ajority concludes that this denotes i n tent, and as a result, an issue of m aterial f act exists a s to Edm onds’s intent (or lack of intent) to bri n g a b o u t h i s conviction through the f alsif ied conf ession. Reviewing the m ajority opinion, a r eader would i nf er that the circuit court f

ailed

18to consider Edm onds’s reason behind the initial conf ession–m ost notably

questioning why Edm onds wou l d c o n f

ess i f he did not com m it t he crim e. Resultantly , the m ajority would have the Court rem and the question to t he circuit court f or resolution on t hat issue. But, because the circuit court already reviewed and a n swered the question at i ts bench trial on the

m a t t e r

– d i rectly addressing Edm o nds’s reason and m otive behind his a c tions–I s e e n o p u r p o s e in rem anding the cause.

A. Intent to Fabricate ¶35. The m ajority def

i n e s t h e s t a t u t e ’ s p e r t i n e nt language to provide the Court with a “plain r eading” of the l aw. Following t h is suggestion, if we d ivide the applicable section of the statute i nto two elem ents, i t appears that t he a r gum ent the m ajority m akes f or E dm onds is that intent exists in both parts. In the f irst part, the statute provides that “[ h]e did not

. . . f abricate evidence.” Miss. Code Ann. § 1 1-44-7(1)(c) (Rev. 2012)

. T here, the section plainly requires an intent to f abricate–an interpre t a t i o n t o which the circuit court and the parties agreed. A key com ponent of the proceedings under Section 1 1-44-7 is the plaintif f ’s burden to prove the elem ents under the statute bef ore the court can enter a judgm ent in his f avor. M iss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7(1). Im po r t a n t l y , t his required t hat Edm onds prove “a negative” and show by

a preponderance of the evidence that he did not invent or concoct a f alse c onf ession. In an ef

f ort to m eet this burden, Edm onds argued that, a l though he f alsif ied the conf ession which lead to the jury ’s conviction, he lacked the requisite intent t o f abricate that e vidence under the statute. H e then f ram ed his argum ent to s how that he was “ pressured

19to give a f

alse conf ession” b y b o t h his sister and law-enf orcem ent of

f icials, and that this conf ession was not a f

ree and deliberate decision on his part. ¶36. Counsel f

or Edm onds urged the lower court to recognize t h a t , b e c a u s e f a b r i cation requires s o m e ty

pe of intent t o m islead, and because E dm onds’s only m otive was to protect his s ister, he in no way intended his statem ent to bring about his c onviction. His only aim

wa s t o p r otect Kristi. His attorney s claim e d that, under these circum stances, Edm onds’s
motivation to f

abricate should serve as an exception under t he statute, overriding any intent

to deceive. However, throughout the trial, the circuit judge halted questioning and argum ents
to rule on the adm issibility of evidence and to delineate b e t w e e n t h e issues o f m otive to f abricate and i n tent to f

abricate. On the s ubject, t he t rial court held that, while the f abrication requirem ent included an elem e nt of intent, the plaintif f ’s motivation behind his f abrication

w a s not r elevant. According t o the court, while “f abricate” m a y em

brace an e l e me n t o f
intent , it does not involve an elem ent o f motive

. T h e court rul e d t h a t , although E dm onds advocated a coercion exception to the statute, his motive in m a k ing the conf ession was not relevant f or the purpose of the trial, noting t h a t “ b y t he com m on def inition o f the word [ f abricate], it appears that there was a f alse conf ession m ade.” ¶37. Ultim ately , the circuit court f ound that Edm onds h ad f

ailed t o prove that he lacked any intent t o f

abricate evidence. Recognizing t hat our courts “do n o t e n g a ge in statutory interpretation if a statute is plain and unam biguous,” the judge determ ined that Edm onds’s

attem pt to illustrate the f

orm ation of motive through coercion read m ore into the statute than the Legislature i ntended. M iss. Methodist Hosp. & Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v . Mississippi Div. of

20M

e d i c a id , 2 1 So. 3 d 6 00, 607 (Miss. 2009). Because our “[ c]ourts have a duty to give

statutes a practical application consistent with their wording,” t he judge properly dism issed Edm onds’s s uggestion t hat a coercion-based exception exists in the statute. Marx v. Broom , 632 So. 2d 1315, 1 3 18 (Miss. 1 9 94). I f ind no error i n the judge’s interpretation of the f irst part of the statute o r his eve n t u a l r u l i n g t hat Edm onds had f ailed to satisf

y his burden to prove that he did not f

abricate evidence through the f alsif ied conf ession.
B. Intent to Bring About, Cause, or Contribute ¶38. The latter part o f the pertinent subsec t i o n r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e c l aim ant “ did not

. . . f abricate evidence to b ring about his conviction .” Miss. Code A nn. § 11-44-7 ( e mp hasis added). Throughout its analy s is, the m ajority f ails to f ind that the p hrase “to bring about his conviction” plainly indicates an elem ent of causation. Instead, it s uggests that the language

creates a f

actual question a s to the intent to be incarcerated. Ultim ately , the f unction of the Court is to determ ine what the written langu a ge of the statute provides. Lawson v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc ., 75 So. 3d 1 024, 1 027 (Miss. 2011) (citing Russell v. State , 2 31 Miss. 176, 94 So. 2d 916, 917 (1957)). However, “ [ i ]f the words of a statute a r e c l e ar and

unam biguous, t h e C o u r t a pplies the plain m e aning of the statute and ref rains f rom using principles of statutory construction.” Id

. (citing C l ark v. State ex rel. Miss. State Med. Ass’n , 381 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1 980)); see also Gilm e r v. State , 955 So. 2d 829, 833 ( M i ss. 2 007). Here, we m ust not broaden or r estrict legislative acts; rather, w e m u s t g i v e ef f ect to the i ntent of the Legislature through t he plain m eaning o f the s t a t u t e s . Id

. The r e f o r e , I c annot agree with t he m ajority that this s tatute r equires such an elaborate

21dissection, as the words of the Act present clear requirem ents f or a c laim a nt’s burden of proof

. ¶39. In both this appeal and at trial, Edm onds argued that an issue of m a terial f

act exists

as t o h is r eason f

o r f abricating the conf

ession. A s discussed above, he claim s that, because he was c oerced to c onf

e ss b y a host of outside f

orces, t he courts should create a n e xception

to the statute f

or those who conf

ess without “f

ree and deliberate intention.” But the m ajority f ocuses its attention on the claim ant’s f ailure to f abricate evidence with the “aim , purpose,

o r i n t e n tion of b ringing about h is conviction.” Unlike the m ajority , I f ail to see where an issue of f act exists. I t h i nk the better question to be addressed is: if such a claim ant, of a sound and willing m ind, m ade a f alse conf ession under thes e circum s tances without the “aim , purpose, or i ntention of b ringing about his conviction,” what other o utcom e m ight he think

was possible? Are w e t o suggest that, although no one authoritatively t o l d h i m t h at his
y outhf ulness or age did not m a k e him i m m u ne f rom any punishm ent, his naivete i s an adequate excuse a nd he is f ree to receive com

pensation f

rom the State f

or a product of his own error? I think not. ¶40. I n i ts ruling, the circuit court addressed the need f or the f alse co n f e s s i o n t o b r i n g about the conviction by labeling it as “causation.” There, t h e c o urt determ ined that the plaintif f ’s alleged f

alse conf ession caused or contributed to his conviction at his f

irst trial. During the civil trial, the State a rgued that Edm onds’s crim inal conviction was a direct result of his conf

ession: without the conf

ession, the jury in t he f

irst crim inal trial had no other evidence u

pon which to convict. Counsel f or Edmo nds, h owever, f

ocused on t he reasons

22behind his f abrication, creating a narrative about his m o tive rather than his intent. E dm onds argued that, under Kristi’s coercion, he was f ocused on shif

ting blam e f

o r the m urder of f his sister, to h im self

. The court again ruled that m otive was not an elem e n t o f the statute, and
any argum ents regarding his reasons to f alsif y the conf ession were irrelevant. Edm onds then f ailed to present a ny o ther a r g u me n ts that he did n ot f alsif y his c onf ession “to b ring about his conviction.” As a result, the c ourt ruled that Edm onds sim ply had f a i led t o support his b u r d e n t o s how t hat his conviction was not proxim a tely caused o r contributed to by his conf ession. ¶41. The m ajority holds that intent to “bring about” and intent to “cause or contribute” are dif f erent concepts u nder the law. I disagree. The W rongf ul C onviction Com

p ensation Act plainly requires that a plaintif f s how that “[ h]e did not

. . . f abricate evidence to bring about his conviction.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-44-7(1)(c). Therein, the language creates an elem ent of intent, which serves as the causal f actor leadin g t o t h e eventual ef f ect o f the plaintif

f ’s decision. More sim

p ly stated, t he f

abrication of evidence–the cause–brou g h t a bout the conviction–the ef

f ect. ¶42. Though the m ajority m akes a convincing argum ent tha t E d mo n d s m ay have lacked the requisite intent t o be incarcerated, the statute plainly requires intent only a s it relates to f abrication. A party ’s desired outcom e upon f abrication is irrelevant: whether a def endant intended to be incarcerated, f ined, or to evade penalty a l together w as not the Legislature’s

concern when it draf

t ed the Act. Rather, t he clear and unam biguous term s under the statute require that the f

abricated evidence lead to a conviction. It m atters not that the conviction

23included jail tim e, com m unity service, or a f

ine, because the language at the end of the statute

m erely describes the ef

f ect of the plaintif

f ’s actions in f

abricating evidence. As wit h any crim e, conviction was the natural and probable consequence of Edm onds’s f alse conf ession. Theref ore, while intent rem ains a crucial part of t his s tatute, I f i nd t hat it ends at Edm onds’s decision to f

abricate evidence. ¶43. Having determ ined that “to bring a b o u t ” i n v o l v e s a

n e l e m ent of c a

usation, m y

analy s is

turns to the trial c o u r t ’ s f i n d i ngs to address w hether an i ssue of m a t erial f act exists. A reading of the trial t ranscript clearly r e veals one d oes not. Repeatedly throughout the trial, the court and the parties d iscussed the causation requireme n t a nd whether the f abrication brought a b o u t t h e c onviction. Specif ically , counsel f

or t he plaintif

f explained that “the parties are in agreem ent

. . . that the legislature engraf ted a causation requirem ent on the issue of f abrication, which is to say if the f abrication brought about the co n v i c tion.” T he court then explained that “ the c ourt’s view is that if the f a brication of the evidence contributed to the c onviction, t hen in that event it would bar the plaintif f f rom recovery in this case . . . . So the opinion of

the court is, unless y ou can quote m e som e authority dif f erent

. . . to present its

. . . def

ense of f abrication [ the State] wo u ld need o nly to show that [ the f abrication] caused or contributed to [ the conviction].” Moreover, the circuit court provided both parties assistance, i nstructing Edm onds’s attorney that he needed “to persuade the court that his

. .

. conviction was not proxim ately caused or contributed to by the conf ession,” while the State need show only that Edm onds “f abricated evidence which caused or contributed to his being f ound guilty

in the f irst trial.”

24¶44. I n d i s c ussing t he testim o ny and evidence prof f ered by the parties, the lo w e r c o u r t questioned the attorney s at length to ensure all argum ents and elem ents regarding causation

were subm itted to the court bef ore the trial ceased. W ith the c ourt’s questions directed to the State, the f

ollowing discourse took place between the judge and the parties:
BY THE COURT: T he evidence that I ’ve seen that y ou produced in support of that theory is that there was no scientif i c or phy sical evidence or any ey ewitness testim ony

as to his guilt. BY THE STATE: Yeah, the –
BY THE COURT: S o basically his f inding of g u i lty cam e on the – based on the conf e ssion that he m ade?
BY THE STATE: The only d irect evidence against him was that – his o wn creation. His own f

abrication.
BY THE COURT: B ut as f ar as his participation i n it, t here was nothing other than his conf

ession. Am I correct? BY THE STATE: That is correct, Your Honor. Yes, that is correct. BY THE COURT: Am

I correct? BY COUNSEL FOR EDMONDS: Yes, Your Honor. The record m akes it clear t hat the court was diligent in its role a s the f a ctf inder. T he judge asked several specif

ic questions of the parties, reviewed testim ony a nd record evidence, and

m ade a judgm ent based o n t h e requirem ents o f the statute. Substantially supported and wit h o u t e r r o r , the court f ound that Edm onds had f a iled to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he did not f abricate evidence to bring about his conviction. ¶45. Assum ing f

or a m om ent that the m ajority i s correct in its f inding t hat i ntent through “aim or purpose” is crucial to the second half of Section 11-44-7(1)(c), I nevertheless f ind

25no question of f act as to whether Edm onds intended his f alse conf ession to b ring about his conviction. The f

acts as presented to the court clearly indicated that, even at thirteen y ears old, Edm o nds was able to understand the gravity o f the situation bef ore him. T estim ony showed he w as a bright y o ung m an. His m other t estif ied that he had an I Q o f 1 19, which denotes above-average or superior intelligence. He was in the gif ted program at school and

m aintained above-average reading and com prehension skills. Although his sister m ay have convinced him that his status as a mi n o r p r o vided a level of protection f rom eventual
p u nishm e nt, Ty ler testif

ied at the f

irst trial, “I w ould s ay we did it together s o that w a y i t would be helping Kristi, but I was kind of scared a bout getting in trouble too. . . . ” ¶46. The m o st pivotal indication of his int e n t ( a i m o r p u r p o s e ) , t hough, i s f

ound in his conf ession to his neighbor, Marcus Sullivan. Edm onds m ade his f irst conf ession to police

on Sunday , af

ter which he w as arrested and then b ooked into the j ail. B y We d n e s d a y , he

was still in jail and attem pting to get i n t ouch with his m othe r a n d g r a n d m other. Af ter several attem

pts, h e called Marcus Sullivan in hopes that he would pass a long a m essage to his m other. Sullivan t estif ied in t he f

irst trial regarding this call, explaining that “[ Edm onds] asked had I heard about Joey , and I said I had. There was a pause and I asked him , did y ou do it? He said, ‘Yes, sir.’” ¶47. At this point, if

Edm onds lacked the requisite intent, aim , or purpose to b ring about his conviction thr o ugh the f alse conf ession, his presence in jail a n d his im pending arraignm ent would serve as clear notice that his y outh was n ot going to s ave him f rom trial

or a possible conviction. As a mi n o r o f a b o ve-average i ntelligence, w ith gif ted levels of

26reading and com prehension skills, if he did not i ntend to “shif t t he blam e” f

rom his sister by conf essing to a crim e a nd t hen b eing convicted, why would he continue to conf ess with his potential p u n i s h ment so glaringly obvious? He would not. W hether that conviction

am ounted to incarceration, work-release, or a f ine, Edm onds display ed t im e and again that he com prehended the gravity of the situ a t i o n . 5 W ith no argum ent or evidence presented to the contrary , the judge recognized this apparent understanding and ruled accordingly

. ¶48. Related to this d e c i s i o n i s t h e c o n c e r n that publishing the m ajority ’s opinion will

m isconstrue an unam

biguous statute and set a dangerous precedent f or f uture claim s under the W r ongf

ul Conviction Com

p ensation Act. A t issue in t h e crim inal trials and the civil

m atter b ef

ore us was Edm onds’s claim t h a t s e veral f actors created an environm ent of coercion and led to his c hoice t o f abricate the conf

e ssion. He asserted that he conf essed only

to s ave his sister. T hroug h o u t h i s testim ony in the f irst trial, 6 Edm onds explained that his sister had assured h i m that his status as a m inor would p rotect him f rom punishm ent, and that by sharing the blam e, he would be able to help her escape the death penalty

. However, he also indicated a concern f or his own shelter f

rom the authorities if his y outhf ulness did not, in f act, shield him. T h r o u g h his testim ony and his call to Marcus S ullivan, E dm onds

5 The m ajority quotes an im portant part of E dm onds’s t estim ony in which he n otes that his intent w as not to “go to prison” or to “get sent to jail.” ( Maj. O p. ¶ 17). W hile E dm onds m ay not have sought to protect Kristi by being incarcerated him self , his rem a ining testim ony and previous actions clearly indicate that he thought his “conviction” m a y have l ed to other p unishm e n ts, which (in his m ind) m ay not have been serving jail or prison tim e. H i s perception of what sentences m ay have resulted is not relevant, however, as h is conviction and eventual sentence are two separate m atters.

6 The t r anscript f

r om t he f irst trial was subm itt e d b y E dm onds as evidence of the pressure his sister applied to encourage him to conf ess to the m

urder. 27indicated t hat he w as actively try ing to protect Kristi, but that he also was aware of the very

real possibility

that he too would be punished. ¶49. “The duty o f this Court is t o interpret the statutes as written. It i s not the duty of this Court to add language w here we see f it. ‘[ O]ur prim ary

objective when construing statutes is to adopt that interpretation which will m eet the true m eaning of the Legislature.’” Scaggs

v. G PCH GP, Inc. , 931 So. 2d 1274, 1276 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Stockstill v . State , 854 So. 2d 1017, 1022–23 ( M i s s . 2003)). In doing so, we m ust “interpret statutes consistent with

reason and com mon sense,” apply ing the m ost rational m e aning of the words. Dulaney v. Nat’l Pizza Co. , 733 So. 2d 301, 305 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). “Furtherm ore, ‘[ c ]ourts should avoid constructions which w ill render l egislation absurd. Rather, statutes m ust be interpreted in such a m anner as to r ender t heir m eaning rational, sensible, and logical.’” In re Whitaker Constr. Co., Inc. , 411 F.3d 197, 205 (C.A. 5 ( La.) 2005) (quoting State Through Dep’t of Public Safety and Corr., Office of State , 655 So. 2d 292, 302 (La. 1995)). ¶50. Drawing on the Court’s judicial experience and com m o n sense, no rational re a d i n g of the W rongf

ul Conviction C om

pensation Act cr e a t e s a n inf erence that the L e gislature intended a thi r d

- p a r t y , c oercion-based exception to apply

. N or can it be said that the Legislature e m

b edded an exception f

o r t hose convicted by acts o f their own error to receive

com pensation when they never intended “to go to j ail.” Such interpre t a t i o n s b o rder on absurdity and c annot be supported. See Quitm an Cty v. Turner , 18 So. 2d 1 22, 1 24 (Miss.
1 9 4 4 ) ( c i ting R obertson v. Texas Oil Co. , 106 So. 449 (Miss. 1925)). W here it is evi d e n t that the Legislature aim ed only t o com pensate the f

actually innocent when uniquely

28victim ized through an erroneous incarceration, we m ust enf o rce that pur p o s e a n d not read into the statute m ore than t he draf ters intended. “Legislators m ust be presum e d t o be reasonable and s ane m en, ‘and to in t e n d the natural, direct, and probable consequences of their acts, that these s hall not be absurdly or unreasonably construed, and theref ore that they intend to avoid absurdities and nonsense.’” K ennington v. Hem ingway , 101 Miss. 259, 57 So. 809, 810 (1912) (quoting 4 H ughes, Grounds and Rudiments o f t he Law , 1104 (1908)). Plainly stated: statues a re to be i nterpreted logically , with the m ost reasonable interpretation applied. Considering the issue at hand, under what circum stances would saf eguards of this statute apply

if they did not apply

here? ¶51. Although the m ajority is not ruling in f avor of E dm onds by rem anding the cause f or

a f inding o f f

act, i t indicates that the Court would consider af f irm ing a judgm ent in f

avor of

a claim ant who had a “good reason” t o lie about his involvem ent in a crim e, o n l y t o b e exonerated a nd t h en sue the State f or convicting him based on that sam e f a lse conf ession. This ruling would go too f ar, while twisting the w o rds behind t he s tatue. Those who draf ted the Act d id n ot allow f

o r m otive in the statute as a consideration f or com pensation because

a claim ant’s m otive is not relevant. Likewise, the s tatute places no im portance on the reason f or f abrication. It requires only that evidence was not f abric a t ed in a n e f

f o rt t o cause or contribute to the claim ant’s conviction. T heref ore, I suggest the Court ref lect on t he words of the statute and consider the l ikelihood t hat the language “to bring about” is causative in nature and does not require sim p ly that a claim ant intended

to be incarcerated.
II. The plaintiff w as not entitled to a jury trial.

29¶52. I stand by the principle p lainly articulated in our state Constitution that “the right of

trial by j ury shall rem ain inviolate.” M i s s . Const. art. 3, § 31. However, having f ound no question of m aterial f

act e xits in the m atter, I d o not think this case m e rits reversal and

rem and f or a trial by

jury

. ¶53. In its opinion, the m ajority cites several cases acknowledging that, when f aced with

a statute silent o n t h e issue, this Court custom arily has r ecognized the right t o a jury trial.
But because the circuit court judge properly ruled on the m atter, determ ining that the parties had a greed o n the f

acts at issue and the only question rem aining was an i nterpretation of law,

no rational j ury could have f ound that Edm ond s w a s entitled to com pensation through the Act. W ith the f

acts established and the law def ined, t he request f

or a j ury be c om es inconsequential. ¶54. Assum ing arguendo that the circuit judg e e r r e d i n d e n y i n g Edm onds the right to a jury , his decision is o f no c onsequence to resolution of the m a t t e r a n d can be viewed as
not h ing m ore than harm less. For the sake of discussion, to warrant reversal, the judge’s decision to deprive Edm o nds of a jury m u st have “af

f ect[ e d] the f

inal result of the case and work[ ed] adversely

to a substantial right of

the party assigning it.” Bay Point Props., Inc.

v. Mississippi Transp. Com m ’n , 201 So. 3d 1046, 1056 (Miss. 2016) ( c i t i n g Catholic Diocese of

Natchez–Jackson v. Jaquith , 224 S o. 2d 216, 221 (Miss. 1969)). See also Gray

v. State , 799 So. 2d 53, 61 (Miss. 2001). H ere, it is c lear that if the parties had presented their case bef

ore a jury , at the conclusion o f proof and upon p roper m otion, the judge would have arrived at the sam e conclusion, t h e r e a f t er granting the State’s inevitable m otion f or

30d i rected verdict. As discussed supra , the l ower court held t hat, while the f a bricati o n requirem ent in the statute involved an elem ent of intent, the plaintif f ’s motivation behind his f abrication was not relevant. Both parties agreed that, by the c o m m on def i nition of the word “f abricate,” the f

alse conf e ssion was an obviou s f

a b rication of evidence. The discussion leading to this agreem ent served as the only portion of t he h earing which f ocused on disputed issues of f act, leaving no f

actual questions to be answered thereaf ter. ¶55. M o v i n g o n to the second part of the statute, a ttorney s f or b oth the plaintif

f and the State agreed as a m a tter o f f act that, during the plain t i f f ’s f irst trial, only t he plaintif f ’s conf ession linked him to any participat i o n in the killing. However, the p arties dif f ered on their i n t e r p r etation of the law and whether the s tatute required that the f a lse conf ession caused or contributed to his conviction. W hi l e c o u n s e l f or Edm onds argued that his

m otivation to f

abricate was an im

portant f actor f or t he court to c onsider, the j udge reiterated that m otivation was n ot a m aterial elem ent of the statu t e . The State then argued that the elem ent in q u e s t i on was causative in nature and required that Edm onds prove that his conf ession did not cause him to be convicted (i.e., but f or t he a d mi s s i o n o f t he f abricated evidence, he would not have been convicted). Having ruled that Edm onds’s interpretation

o f t h e statute was erroneous and t hat he presented no other argum ents t o the c ontrary , th e j u d g e f ound t hat the p laintif

f ’s conf ession unquestionably c aused o r contributed to his conviction at his f

irst trial. ¶56. Just a f

ter counsel f

or Edm onds concluded its case-in-chief , the representative f

or the State rem arked that “[ n]orm a lly I w ould have a m otion, Your Honor, but this being nonjury ,

31I w i l l n o t.” Here, the def e nse clearly provided that its intent–had there been a jury trial– would be to m ake a Rule 50 m otion f o r directed verdict at t his point. See M.R.C.P. 50. Though, because the judge w as to rule directly on the case with o r without the presentation of e vidence by the State, the r epresentative o pted to prof f er s everal trial-testim ony transcripts f o r t h e c o urt’s review prior to its ruling. The brief introduction of these transcripts into evidence concluded the State’s presentation, af ter which it rested its case. ¶57. A review of the hearing and the evidence subm itted provides that, with o r without a jury , the m atter would c onclude w ith t he sam e resu l t : i n e i ther s cenario, T y ler E dm onds f ails–as a m atter of law–to support his burden to show that his f abrication of

evidence was

not in a n ef

f ort to bring about his conviction. As we have said bef ore, “an error is harm less only when it is apparent on the f ace of the record that a f

air m inded jury could have arrived

at no [ other] v erdict

. . . . ” Gray v. State , 799 So. 2d 53, 61 (Miss. 2001) (citing Forrest v. State , 335 So. 2d 900, 903 (Miss. 1976)). Because Edm onds f ailed to m e et his b urden and the circuit judge properly would have granted t he State’s m otion f or directed v erdict, his decision to conduct a bench trial is of no consequence. Accordingly , I f ind that i f the circuit j udge erred in r equiring a bench trial on the m atter, that error was noth i n g m o r e t h a n harm less and his decision should stand. ¶58. Theref

ore, I respectf

u lly d i s s e n t w i t

h the m ajority opinion and w ould a f f irm the circuit court’s ruling based on the reasoning and caselaw outlined above. RANDOLPH, P.J. , MAX WELL AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ., J OIN THIS OPINION IN PART. CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, DISSENTING:

32¶59. I dissent. However, because I f eel t he opinions have overly com plicated the issue, I write separately

. Do n ot m isunderstand, I enjoy diagram m ing a nd parsing sentences as m uch as the next person. 7 In this case, it is just not necessary . The principle that controls in this

case i s s im

ple. If y ou c onf

ess t o a crim e, a n d t hat conf e ssion is no t c oerced or o therwise induced by law enf

o rcem ent or som e state actor, then y ou cannot recover under the statute. This is the exact situation that t he language “f abricate evidence t o bring about h is conviction” is m e ant to prevent. ¶60. To be clear, a conf

ession t hat is coerced b y law enf orcem ent or som e state actor would

not prohibit a cause of action under the statute. That is because, in such a scenario, the State would be guilty of som e t y pe of wrongdoing. In Edm onds’s c a se, the State has done nothing wrong and logic would dictate it should not be answerable to Edm onds. ¶61. To hold otherwise b asically gives the phrase “f abric a t e e v i d e n c e to bring about his conviction” no m eaning. T here is alway s an ulterior m o tive other than being convicted. It does not take m

uch of a n im agination to think of e gregious results that can o ccur under the

m ajority ’s opinion. ¶62. To conclude, t his i s the exact c ase the language “f abricate evidence to bring about his conviction” is m eant to prohibit, and theref o re, I dissent. RANDOLPH, P.J., MAX WELL AND BEAM, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.

7 Sarcasm is “the use o f words that m ean the opposite of what y o u really want to say .” Sarcasm , Merriam -W e bster’s Dictionary

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