UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

KEITH R., 1 ) 

) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

) No. 20 C 3691 

v. ) 

) Magistrate Judge Gabriel A. Fuentes 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting ) 

Commissioner of Social Security,2

 ) 

) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER3

Before the Court is Plaintiff Keith R.’s motion seeking remand of the Administrative Law 

Judge’s (“ALJ”) opinion denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) (D.E. 

21), and the Commissioner’s cross motion to affirm that decision. (D.E. 25). 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his claim for DIB on February 16, 2017, alleging he has been disabled due

to liver problems since August 7, 2014; his date last insured (“DLI”) was December 31, 2015. (R. 

106, 107, 109.) On November 15, 2018, Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, testified at a 

hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified at 

1

 Plaintiff’s surname has been omitted from this opinion in compliance with the Court’s Internal Operating 

Procedure No. 22. 

2

 The Court substitutes Kilolo Kijakazi for her predecessor, Andrew Saul, as the proper defendant in this 

action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) (a public officer’s successor is automatically 

substituted as a party). 

3

 On August 31, 2020, by consent of the parties and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 73.1, 

this case was reassigned to this Court for all proceedings, including entry of final judgment. (D.E. 12.)

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2 

the hearing. On April 30, 2019, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding him not 

disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. 12.) 4 This appeal followed. 

II. ALJ’s DECISION

 The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claim in accordance with the Social Security Administration’s 

five-step sequential evaluation process. (R. 15-42.) The ALJ found at Step One that Plaintiff had 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date. (R. 15.) At Step Two, the 

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder, 

anxiety, substance abuse disorder, ascites (excess abdominal fluid related to liver disease), 

cirrhosis of the liver, and obesity, and that Plaintiff’s fatigue, insomnia, anemia, ventral hernia, 

altered mental state/seizures, hypothyroidism, esophageal lesion and thrombocytopenia (low 

platelet count) were not severe. (R. 17-18.) The ALJ concluded at Step Three that Plaintiff’s 

impairments, alone or in combination, did not meet or medically equal one of the Social Security 

Administration’s listings of impairments (a “Listing”). (R. 18.) Before Step Four, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that he could occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl 

and never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and have occasional interaction with co-workers and 

supervisors. (R. 26.)5

 At Step Five, the ALJ concluded that based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, 

education, work experience, and RFC, Plaintiff could perform jobs existing in significant numbers 

4

 The Appeals Council (“AC”) subsequently denied review of the opinion (R. 1-6), making the ALJ’s 

decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2021). 

5

 Social Security regulations define “light work” as “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent 

lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds . . . the full range of light work requires standing or 

walking, on and off, or a total of approximately six hours in an eight-hour workday.” SSR 83-10 (ssa.gov), 

last visited on May 22, 2023. 

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in the national economy, leading to a finding that he is not disabled under the Social Security Act 

prior to his DLI. (R. 42.) 

III. ANALYSIS 

 A. Legal Standard 

An ALJ’s decision will be affirmed if it is supported by “substantial evidence,” which 

means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, – U.S. –, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). “[T]he threshold for such 

evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Id. The Court “will not reweigh the evidence, resolve 

debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine credibility, or substitute our judgment for the ALJ’s 

determination. Rather, this court asks whether the ALJ’s decision reflects an adequate logical 

bridge from the evidence to the conclusions.” Reynolds v. Kijakazi, 25 F.4th 470, 473 (7th Cir. 

2022) (citations and quotations omitted). The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through 

four of the five-step sequential process for determining disability. See Mandrell v. Kijakazi, 25 

F.4th 514, 516 (7th Cir. 2022). At Step Five, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner of 

Social Security to show that the claimant can adjust to other work existing in “a 

significant number of jobs...in the national economy.” See Brace v. Saul, 970 F.3d 818, 820 (7th 

Cir. 2020). 

 The ALJ also has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record, and to “build an 

accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result to afford the claimant meaningful 

judicial review of the administrative findings.” Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 773 (7th 

Cir. 2022). Although the ALJ is not required to mention every piece of evidence in the record, the 

ALJ’s analysis “must provide some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny 

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benefits.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001); accord Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 

668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiff makes two arguments in favor of remand: (1) the ALJ did not evaluate Plaintiff’s 

physical RFC in accordance with SSR 96-8p and (2) the ALJ did not evaluate Plaintiff’s allegations 

in accordance with SSR 16-3p. (Pl. Mem. in Support of Sum. J. at 2, 11). We will address each 

allegation in turn, starting with Plaintiff’s second assignment of error because the ALJ’s 

consideration of the severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms bears on her RFC determination. In reaching 

our conclusion, we recognize that while the ALJ also discussed evidence from 2016 and beyond, 

she properly focused her determination on Plaintiff’s condition and ability to work prior to his DLI 

of December 31, 2015. 

A. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptoms. 

 Social Security Regulation 16-3p guides an ALJ about how to evaluate the intensity and 

persistence of a claimant’s subjective symptoms so that he or she can determine how those 

symptoms might limit the claimant’s ability to perform work-related activities.6 As the ALJ 

explained, the question “is not whether such symptoms exist, but whether they occur with such 

frequency, duration, or severity as to reduce the claimant’s residual functional capacity or to 

preclude all work activity on a continuing and regular basis.” (R. 38.) 

 The regulations also state that when complaints of pain are reported in excess of what 

would be expected by the medical evidence, the ALJ should examine the claimant’s work record, 

observations of treating doctors and others regarding the nature of the claimant’s symptoms, 

precipitating and aggravating factors, the use of medication and other treatment to relieve 

symptoms, functional restrictions, and daily activities. 20 CFR § 404.1529, SSR 16-3p. An ALJ 

6

 SSR 16-3p (ssa.gov), last visited on May 26, 2023. 

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need not discuss every detail in the record as it relates to every factor. Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 

893, 903 (7th Cir. 2021). Summaries of medical evidence, while definitionally “partial and 

selective,” are appropriate. Id. at 901. Still, although ALJs do not need to address every piece of 

evidence in the record, ALJs may not ignore an entire line of evidence contrary to their ruling. 

Reinaas v. Saul, 953 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 2020). As long as an ALJ gives specific reasons 

supported by the record, we will not overturn a credibility determination unless it is patently 

wrong. Grotts v. Kijakazi, 27 F.4th 1273, 1278–79 (7th Cir. 2022). 

 In finding that Plaintiff’s statements about the intensity and severity of his symptoms were 

not entirely consistent with the medical evidence, the ALJ first acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony 

about his symptoms, specifically that he was unable to work full time because he was easily 

fatigued, he was able to sit for three hours at a time, and he could stand for two hours before 

experiencing lower abdominal pain, which he alleviated by walking around. The ALJ noted that 

Plaintiff also testified that he could walk four blocks at a time, lift 25 pounds, and needed a cane 

to lean on. (R. 27.) 

 After next discussing Plaintiff’s medical history in considerable detail, the ALJ explained 

why the evidence did not support Plaintiff’s testimony about the severity of his pain and other 

symptoms. Specifically, the ALJ noted the following medical evidence that was inconsistent with 

Plaintiff’s claims that his abdominal pain and fatigue were disabling: 

 Although Plaintiff had cirrhosis of the liver and was symptomatic with ascites, after having 

fluid drained from his abdomen in August 2014, these issues were generally controlled 

with diuretics and abstention from alcohol. (R. 28-32, 38.) 

 While acknowledging Plaintiff’s complaints of fatigue and abdominal pain, the ALJ 

pointed to numerous medical reports throughout the relevant period where Plaintiff was 

assessed as doing well, including evidence that in March 2015 he reported feeling good 

and that in August 2015, despite appearing “malnourished, anxious, moderately ill, and 

tired appearing,” all of his labs looked good and he reported to one of his doctors that he 

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was able to walk up to a mile and climb three flights of stairs before becoming tired; 

additionally, his exercise tolerance was greater than 4 METS. (R. 29, 30, 38.)7

 In September 2015, although Plaintiff was diagnosed with Stage 1 encephalopathy, it was 

only “mildly active,” and in October a doctor assessed him as looking “malnourished, 

anxiety (sic) and severely ill.” (Id.) However, in 2016 (which the ALJ noted was after 

Plaintiff’s DLI), his encephalopathy resolved with medication. (Id.) 

 There is no evidence that Plaintiff was using his cane prior to his DLI and thus the ALJ did 

not consider it in her RFC assessment. (Id.) 

 The ALJ also acknowledged that Plaintiff complained of fatigue for a month in September 

2014 and then again on an ongoing basis between May and October 2015, but that 

Plaintiff’s doctors never discovered the source of the fatigue, which could have been 

caused by his ascites, anemia, insomnia, and depression. The ALJ noted that during the 

same time he was complaining of fatigue, Plaintiff also reported feeling good, and 

concluded that Plaintiff’s fatigue on its own caused no more than minimal impact on his 

ability to function. (R. 18.) 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not do enough to explain why and how she weighed 

Plaintiff’s symptoms and how she analyzed the evidence as it supported (or did not support) those 

symptoms; however, his “evidence” of the ALJ’s error is little more than a repetitive listing of his 

various diagnoses and symptoms. (Pl. Mem. at 4, 9, 10, 11).8 As far as we can tell, Plaintiff is 

implying that the ALJ must not have considered Plaintiff’s limitations enough because it is 

unlikely or impossible that someone with those diagnoses would be able to work. But a diagnosis 

or symptom on its own does not establish the severity of an individual’s impairment or function 

as proof that the ALJ erred in deciding that Plaintiff’s allegations were not supported by substantial 

evidence. Gladney v. Saul, 857 Fed.Appx. 235, 238 (7th Cir. 2021), citing Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 

F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir. 2005) (“conditions must not be confused with disabilities”). And, contrary 

7

 METs stands for “metabolic equivalent of task;” work of moderate intensity uses from 3.0 to 6.0 METs 

and includes activities such as walking briskly, vacuuming, or raking leaves. Staying Active | The Nutrition 

Source | Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, last visited on May 19, 2023. 

8

Plaintiff states that he “had thrombocytopenia, abdominal hernia, pitting edema, cecal thickening, 

hepatosplenomegaly, visible pain, abdominal drainage surgery, ascites, and cholelithiasis.” 

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to Plaintiff’s contention, the ALJ plainly considered both the evidence that supported Plaintiff’s 

allegations and the evidence that did not, and the ALJ identified the reasons she did not find that 

Plaintiff’s testimony supported a finding that he was entirely unable to work. To that end, we also 

disagree with Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ failed to evaluate Plaintiff’s treatment history as 

it relates to his allegations; the ALJ provided an in-depth analysis of Plaintiff’s various treatments 

including drainage of his ascites and how it plus a regular diuretic improved his condition, his 

hernia repair surgery, and his medication regimen, as well as their successes and failures, and that 

he still had abdominal pain at times which he was able to alleviate by walking around. 

 Finally, there is no error in the ALJ finding that Plaintiff’s allegations about the severity of 

his symptoms were not entirely consistent with the evidence, and in the ALJ accepting Plaintiff’s 

testimony that he could lift up to 25 pounds. The ALJ did not deny Plaintiff’s pain and symptoms 

in their entirety, but only the degree to which they affect his ability to work at the RFC the ALJ 

determined. Instead, the ALJ weighed the medical evidence and noted where it was inconsistent 

with Plaintiff’s testimony, particularly with respect to his ability to walk and stand; the fact that 

the ALJ may have accepted some of Plaintiff’s testimony does not alter the ALJ’s overall 

determination, particularly where Plaintiff does not point to contradictory evidence (other than his 

own unsubstantiated testimony) establishing greater limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) 

(“[S]tatements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled.”). 

The ALJ’s subjective symptom analysis was not patently wrong and thus we will not disturb it.9

9

 We also find no error in the ALJ’s failure to consider whether Plaintiff’s prior work history was relevant 

to his allegations about the severity of his symptoms. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff worked 

consistently until 2010 as a landscaper or that he was not able to perform landscape work during the relevant 

time period. However, neither of these facts bear on whether Plaintiff was able to perform work at the 

assigned light RFC level. Moreover, the ALJ’s failure to discuss Plaintiff’s work history when evaluating 

his symptoms is not grounds for remand. Loveless v. Colvin, 801 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2016) (prior work 

history does not entitle claimant to presumption of credibility). 

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Murphy v. Colvin, 750 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Bates v. Colvin, 736 F.3d 1093, 

1098 (7th Cir. 2013) (court’s review of ALJ’s symptom evaluation is “extremely deferential”). 

B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Physical RFC 

 Plaintiff makes a number of allegations that the ALJ’s RFC determination was deficient. 

First, he argues that the RFC determination was inadequate because the ALJ only stated that 

Plaintiff could “perform light work as defined in 20 CFR § 404.1567(b)” but “did not describe the 

maximum amount of standing, sitting, walking and arm and leg control operation that Plaintiff 

could do” and did not provide a “basis in the record” for the RFC. (Pl. Mem. at 2-4). We disagree. 

 A claimant’s RFC is the maximum work that she can perform despite any limitations. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2. And although 

the regulations emphasize that the ALJ must identify an individual’s functional limitations before 

expressing the RFC in terms of exertional levels (i.e., sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very 

heavy), the Seventh Circuit has made it clear that “a decision lacking a seven-part function-byfunction written account of the claimant’s exertional capacity does not necessarily require remand 

[if the court] can tell that the ALJ considered the claimant’s ability to perform all seven functions.”

Jeske v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2020).10 Moreover, as Jeske explains, an ALJ need not 

specifically mention every function if the claimant has not alleged a particular limitation and the 

record lacks information that one exists, or if the ALJ finds the claimant’s allegations about a 

limitation not credible. Id. In this case, we find that the ALJ supported with substantial evidence 

her consideration of Plaintiff’s ability to undertake each of the seven functions that made up his 

RFC. The ALJ acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony that he was able to lift 25 pounds as well as 

10 The seven functions are standing, sitting, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling. 

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evidence that he was able to walk up to a mile and climb three flights of stairs before becoming 

tired, and that his exercise tolerance was greater than 4 METS. (R. 38, 30.)

 Plaintiff makes no allegations that he was limited in his ability to push or pull, and the 

medical record reflects no such limitations either; therefore the ALJ’s omission of them from the 

RFC is not grounds for remand.11 Like the Jeske court explained, “[b]ecause the ALJ overtly 

inspected this evidence [on Plaintiff’s ability to perform strength functions],” we are confident that 

the ALJ considered those functions when assigning Plaintiff an RFC for light work with additional 

limitations.” Id. at 595. And while Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have better explained how 

his various diagnoses impacted specific RFC limitations, he points to no evidence that any 

particular symptom, diagnosis, or impairment caused any limitation greater than those in the RFC. 

See Weaver v. Berryhill, 746 F. App'x 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that the claimant must 

“establish not just the existence of [her] conditions, but ... that they support specific limitations 

affecting her capacity to work”).12 

To this specific point, we again note that Plaintiff spends a considerable amount of his 

argument conflating his diagnoses with the limitations he argues stem from those diagnoses. (Pl. 

Mem. at 4, 7; Reply at 1-2). Yet he fails to point out how or where the medical evidence supports 

11After considerable leading from the ALJ, Plaintiff eventually testified that he could sit for three hours 

before experiencing pain in his lower abdomen. (R. 65-66.) It is unclear how long he needed to be in another 

position before being able to sit again; he testified variously that he would “refill my water and get me some 

more fruit” after sitting, and that he’d just begun stretching to alleviate the pain. (Id.). After testifying that 

he could stand for two hours before experiencing pain, Plaintiff said that he would “get up and walk around” 

to help the pain; it is not clear if he was referring to walking around after two hours of standing or some 

other activity. (Id.) In any event, Plaintiff points to no evidence in the record to support his testimony about 

the limits in his ability to sit or stand. 

12 Plaintiff also contends that he is not asking the Court to reweigh the evidence, but to remand because the 

ALJ has not explained how she weighed the evidence in the first place. We disagree. As we explained 

above, throughout her opinion, the ALJ describes both the medical evidence that supports Plaintiff’s claims 

as well as that which undermines his contention that he is disabled, including the evidence that specifically 

supported her finding that Plaintiff was able to perform work at the light exertional level despite his 

impairments. There is no error.

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limitations beyond those assessed by the RFC. For example, in his reply brief, Plaintiff contends 

that his “abdominal pain and tenderness to palpitation, hernias, and inflammation and enlargement 

of organs within the abdomen” would make it difficult to lift because lifting causes abdominal 

pressure if the lifted item comes in contact with the abdomen. (Reply at 2.) But Plaintiff points to 

no evidence to support his speculation that his ability to lift was affected by his symptoms and 

diagnoses and he fails to show that his ability to lift or perform other functional activities were 

more affected by a particular diagnosis beyond the limits determined by the ALJ, which limitations 

were based on Plaintiff’s own testimony about his ability to lift. 

 Next, Plaintiff contends that because there is no medical opinion setting forth the specific 

limitations in the RFC, the RFC assessed by the ALJ represents an impermissible independent 

medical determination, citing Garcia v. Colvin, 741 F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2013). But Garcia is 

distinguishable. In Garcia, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded an ALJ opinion that 

discounted two medical opinions that were both based on extensive medical records and the 

doctors’ own examinations of the claimant’s significant and extensive health problems, and whom 

the appeals court described as “one of the most seriously disabled applicants . . . we’ve encountered 

in many years.” Id. at 762. Notably, the claimant in Garcia suffered from some of the same 

impairments as Plaintiff here – cirrhosis due to alcoholism and resultant abdominal pain, and low 

platelet count – but to an extent so severe that while he needed a liver transplant, he was judged 

too sick to undergo one, and another doctor described his condition as “chronic and terminal.” Id. 

at 759. The Seventh Circuit’s decision to remand rested less on the fact that the ALJ made his own 

independent medical decision and much more on the fact that the Court could not understand how 

the ALJ came to reject the opinions of the two doctors in the first place. 

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 In contrast, Plaintiff’s medical records and even his own testimony describe impairments 

that are much less severe, and there is no medical opinion that Plaintiff was too sick to work. 

Indeed, one of his doctors opined that Plaintiff’s liver numbers had improved enough that he likely 

would not need a transplant, and although his platelet count was low, it never caused him any 

problems or required any treatment. The ALJ further discussed evidence that Plaintiff’s ascites 

was controlled with diuretics and that his cirrhosis improved when he abstained from alcohol. (R. 

28-29.) She noted that throughout the relevant period, Plaintiff’s blood work generally looked 

good and that although he developed encephalopathy in late 2015, it was only mildly active. (Id.) 

 More importantly, even absent a doctor’s opinion setting forth functional limitations, we 

are able to trace the medical evidence to the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was able to perform 

light work. In this case, the only medical opinions in the record are from state agency doctors who 

did not have enough information at the time evaluate Plaintiff’s claim; the ALJ gave these opinions 

no weight because they did not account for medical evidence after the date they were rendered and 

thus did not consider limitations from Plaintiff’s cirrhosis and hernia. But contrary to Plaintiff’s 

argument, the ALJ did not substitute his own lay opinion for that of a medical expert. Specifically, 

as described above, the ALJ relied upon evidence in the record that Plaintiff could lift 25 pounds, 

walk for up to a mile, climb three flights of stairs, and exercise at a level of 4 METS, all of which 

are consistent with work at the light exertional level. See, Suide v. Astrue, 371 Fed.Appx. 684, 690 

(7th Cir. 2010) (where ALJ rejects all medical opinions, remainder of the record must support 

RFC). Thus, we find that the RFC was supported by substantial evidence. 

 Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider his non-severe fatigue in combination 

with his other impairments before determining his RFC, suggesting that his testimony about his 

fatigue along with his low platelet count support a finding that he would be off-task for 10 percent 

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of the workday.13 But as we discuss above, the ALJ acknowledged the two time periods when 

Plaintiff complained of fatigue and then noted that even Plaintiff’s doctors were unable to 

determine the source of that fatigue; the ALJ also specifically explained why the evidence showed 

that Plaintiff’s low platelet count did not cause any limitations. Moreover, the ALJ also determined 

that regardless of the source of Plaintiff’s fatigue (which the ALJ noted could have been caused 

by Plaintiff’s ascites, insomnia, anemia, or depression), as a symptom it caused no more than 

minimal limitations on his ability to work. Therefore, we find that the ALJ supported with 

substantial evidence her consideration of Plaintiff’s fatigue. 

 Finally, we find that the ALJ’s consideration of Plaintiff’s obesity was supported by 

substantial evidence. Specifically, the ALJ explained that in assigning Plaintiff an RFC, she took 

into account the fact that obesity can affect the cardiovascular systems and that it may limit an 

individual’s ability to sustain activity on a regular and continuing basis, and considered this when 

assigning Plaintiff a light RFC with additional postural limitations. In response, Plaintiff argues 

that the ALJ needed to better explain how she considered Plaintiff’s obesity in combination with 

his other impairments. (Pl. Reply at 6). Although we acknowledge that the ALJ’s commentary on 

Plaintiff’s obesity is not extensive, the burden remains on Plaintiff to “identify any evidence in the 

record that suggests greater limitations from her obesity than those identified by the 

ALJ.” Shumaker v. Colvin, 632 F. App’x 861, 867 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that claimant must 

13 Plaintiff contends that the evidence establishes that he testified “that he was quickly fatigued and napped 

for three hours daily.” (Pl. Reply at 5). AlthoughPlaintiff did testify about his fatigue, the only notation in 

the record about his napping is from a function report he completed in August 2017, in which he stated that 

he napped for three hours in the afternoon but also described insomnia that kept him awake at night until 4 

a.m. (R. 243.) Not only is it unclear if Plaintiff was describing his napping habits at the time he completed 

the function report or from during the relevant time period [before his DLI], his description of his sleep 

habits suggest that his fatigue during the day was a function of his staying awake at night. The ALJ 

specifically acknowledged that Plaintiff’s insomnia might be a source of his fatigue before determining that 

it did not cause more than minimal limitations. 

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“explain how her obesity exacerbated her underlying impairments,” cited in, Marcine H. v. 

Kijakazi, No. 22 C 730, 2023 WL 2631624, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2023). But instead of pointing 

to limitations supported by the medical record, once again Plaintiff merely lists his diagnoses and 

argues that they are “evidence” of additional limitations that the ALJ needed to address. Plaintiff’s 

objections amount to little more than a disagreement about how the ALJ weighed that evidence, 

which we will not do. Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 900.14

The fact that Plaintiff may wish that the ALJ described her findings differently or in more 

detail, or explained how she considered every piece of evidence, does not disturb our finding. In 

looking at the ALJ’s opinion as a whole, we can trace an accurate and logical bridge from the 

evidence to her conclusion that Plaintiff’s symptoms were not as severe as he alleged and did not 

support a finding that he was disabled. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. (D.E. 21) 

and grants Defendant’s motion. (D.E. 25). 

ENTER: 

________________________________ 

GABRIEL A. FUENTES 

United States Magistrate Judge 

DATED: June 9, 2023 

14 Plaintiff makes a similar argument with respect to the ALJ’s failure to address off-task time in the 

decision, contending that the fact of his low platelet count and fatigue were “evidence” that he would be 

off-task more than 10 percent of the workday; again, diagnoses are not evidence of limitations and Plaintiff 

identifies no evidence to support greater limitations than the ones the ALJ identified in her RFC 

determination. 

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