2024 IL App (4th) 240756-U 

NO. 4-24-0756 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re G.B., a Minor

(The People of the State of Illinois, 

Petitioner-Appellee,

v. 

Alexandra B., 

Respondent-Appellant). 

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 Appeal from the

 Circuit Court of 

 Sangamon County 

 No. 21JA77 

 Honorable 

 Christopher G. Perrin, 

 Judge Presiding. 

 JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. 

 Justices Doherty and DeArmond concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s termination of respondent’s 

 parental rights because the court’s fitness and best-interest findings were 

 not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

 

¶ 1 Respondent, Alexandra B., is the mother of G.B. (born April 2021). (We note that 

the father of G.B. is not a party to this appeal.) In February 2024, the trial court found respondent 

was an unfit parent, and in June 2024, it found termination of respondent’s parental rights would 

be in the minor’s best interest. Respondent appeals, arguing that the court’s (1) fitness and 

(2) best-interest determinations were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree

and affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 A. Procedural History 

¶ 4 In May 2021, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging G.B. 

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 

FILED

October 4, 2024 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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was neglected in that (1) he was not receiving the proper care for his well-being due to his 

mother’s failure to “make a proper care plan” and “cooperate fully with intact services” (705 

ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a) (West 2020)) and (2) his environment was injurious to his welfare due to his 

mother’s mental illness (id. § 2-3(1)(b)). That same month, the trial court conducted a shelter 

care hearing and placed temporary custody and guardianship of G.B. with the guardianship 

administrator of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

¶ 5 In January 2022, the trial court adjudicated G.B. a neglected minor as alleged in 

the petition. 

¶ 6 In February 2022, the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing, at the 

conclusion of which it entered a written order finding (1) respondent “unfit, unable or unwilling” 

for reasons other than financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train, educate, supervise, 

or discipline G.B. and (2) facts at adjudication established the need for life skills, mental health 

counseling, stable housing, and cooperation with services. The court also (1) adjudicated G.B. a 

ward of the court, (2) placed guardianship and custody of G.B. with the guardianship 

administrator of DCFS, and (3) admonished respondent that she “must cooperate with DCFS, 

comply with the terms of the service plan, and correct the conditions that required G.B. to be in 

care, or risk termination of her parental rights.” 

¶ 7 B. The Termination Hearing

¶ 8 In August 2023, the State filed a supplemental motion for termination of parental 

rights, alleging that respondent was an unfit parent because she (1) abandoned G.B (750 ILCS 

50/1(D)(a) (West 2022)); (2) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or 

responsibility as to G.B.’s welfare (id. § 1(D)(b)); (3) deserted G.B. for more than three months 

preceding the commencement of the termination proceedings (id. § 1(D)(c)); (4) failed to make 
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reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of G.B. from 

respondent within the nine-month periods of January 13, 2022, to October 13, 2022, and October 

13, 2022, to July 13, 2023 (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); (5) failed to make reasonable progress toward the 

return of G.B. to respondent during the same nine-month periods (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)); and 

(6) demonstrated an inability to discharge parental responsibilities, as supported by competent 

evidence from a clinical psychologist of mental impairment, and there existed sufficient 

justification to believe that the inability would exceed a reasonable period of time (id. § 1(D)(p)).

¶ 9 1. The Fitness Proceedings

¶ 10 On separate dates in January and February 2024, the trial court conducted the 

fitness portion of the termination proceedings. At the State’s request, the court took judicial 

notice of the adjudicatory and dispositional orders. Also at the State’s request, the court admitted 

into evidence seven service plans, dated April 2021 through November 2023. 

¶ 11 a. Dr. Judy Osgood 

¶ 12 The State called Dr. Judy Osgood, a licensed clinical psychologist, who 

conducted a psychological evaluation of respondent at the request of DCFS in May 2022. Prior 

to interviewing respondent, Osgood received background information on respondent’s case from 

DCFS, including the July 2021 service plan. 

¶ 13 Osgood testified that during her interview of respondent, Osgood addressed 

respondent’s childhood history, personal history, psychological functioning, education, 

employment, and DCFS involvement. Osgood also administered (1) an IQ test and (2) four 

separate psychological tests. Based on the testing, Osgood determined respondent’s “full scale 

IQ” to be 70, which was “consistent with an intellectual disability.” Osgood further testified that, 

as part of her evaluation, she had the caseworker complete an “adaptive assessment,” which is a 
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standardized assessment that (1) is completed by someone who knows the test subject and 

(2) provides a comprehensive assessment of the subject’s day-to-day functioning. The 

assessment measured respondent’s “depth of functioning [as] extremely low in all major areas.” 

¶ 14 Osgood testified that respondent had “significant deficits in both her intellectual 

and adaptive functioning” and that “she met the criteria for intellectual disability.” Osgood 

believed that respondent “was not able to benefit from or learn adaptive services given her 

[cognitive] weaknesses.” Osgood diagnosed respondent with (1) “intellectual disability,” 

(2) “depressive disorder,” (3) “personal risk factors” (which Osgood explained included 

intellectual disability, lifestyle, lack of independence, and impaired judgment), and 

(4) “parent/child relational problems.” As an example of impaired judgment, Osgood described 

one occasion when respondent was sick with COVID-19 but nonetheless visited five-month-old 

G.B., causing G.B. to contract COVID-19 as well.

¶ 15 When asked whether respondent would ever be able to overcome her limitations 

and parent G.B., Osgood answered, “no,” and explained as follows: 

“Based upon the extensive treatment and services she was provided and 

the assistance and even dependency on others, she wasn’t able to overcome those 

risk limitations. She wasn’t able to really make progress, never demonstrated an 

ability to safely care for her son and never seemed to understand how to do that.” 

¶ 16 Osgood further opined that respondent (1) was “unable to discharge minimal 

parenting standards” and (2) “would not benefit from additional services.” Osgood explained her 

conclusion that respondent would not benefit from additional services as follows: 

“I didn’t recommend a parent capacity assessment for all the reasons I explained 

about her risk factors, her intellectual disability, and the fact that at the time I did 
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the evaluation she wasn’t even meeting with her son; that she wasn’t visiting him, 

and that she just didn’t even understand some basic parenting skills such as not 

visiting her son when she was sick and getting—contracting [COVID-19]; and 

just her dependency on others. It was my conclusion she was unable to really 

develop or meet those minimal parenting skills.” 

¶ 17 b. McKenzie Vorreyer

¶ 18 The State called McKenzie Vorreyer, who testified that she was employed by 

DCFS and was respondent’s caseworker from June 2021 to May 2023. Vorreyer testified that she 

authored six of the seven service plans that had been admitted into evidence. Each of those six 

service plans were “rated unsatisfactory.” She explained that a service plan is reviewed 

approximately every six months at an administrative case review. 

¶ 19 Vorreyer testified that respondent was required to complete the following 

services: (1) parenting skills, (2) habilitation services (to obtain housing and employment), 

(3) substance abuse (including drug tests), and (4) mental health counseling. Vorreyer reviewed 

with respondent what services were required of her “many, many times” through text messages 

and at “child and family team meetings.” 

¶ 20 Respondent did not successfully complete any of the required services. Although 

she attended all of her parenting classes, respondent did not pass the parenting test that was 

administered at the end of the course. Vorreyer did not make a second referral to repeat the 

classes because “there was no need for her to even do parenting [classes] because she didn’t 

comprehend the material.”

¶ 21 Respondent received parenting coaching along with the parenting classes; 

however, respondent was “dropped from parenting coaching.” The parenting coach reported to 
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Vorreyer that respondent couldn’t make a bottle, was not bonding with the child, and did not 

understand milestones, such as when G.B. should be talking or reading. Respondent attempted to 

change a diaper and put G.B.’s clothes back on without a new diaper. The parenting coaching 

was discontinued around November 2021. 

¶ 22 Vorreyer testified that respondent “was suppose[d] to be doing [mental health 

counseling] through Memorial Mental Health.” Although respondent completed an evaluation, 

she “never followed up with it.” Vorreyer testified that, “at one point, [respondent] told me she 

was doing [mental health counseling] through SIU [Medicine],” but Vorreyer learned they had 

“no report of her showing up or being there.” 

¶ 23 Respondent was not required to do substance abuse counseling, but she was 

required to complete random drug tests. Vorreyer testified that respondent did not appear for 

most of her drug tests, although DCFS provided her transportation assistance. When she did 

appear for testing, she tested negative. 

¶ 24 Regarding habilitation services, workers came to respondent’s home and found it 

to be “extremely filthy” and infested with bed bugs. Due to the condition of the house, 

respondent was supposed to meet with the habilitation worker at a new location. Vorreyer 

testified, “That never happened and so services were dropped.” 

¶ 25 Regarding visitation with G.B., Vorreyer testified that in the beginning of the 

case, respondent was offered visits twice a week for two hours. Later, when the permanency goal 

was changed to substitute care (in approximately March 2023), visitation frequency changed to 

one hour once a month. However, Vorreyer testified that, “[for] the entirety of the case, I think 

she attended possibly 10 visits.” Vorreyer stated that “a lot of times,” respondent missed visits 

because she slept through them. Vorreyer also testified that the agency even sent transportation 
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to respondent’s house to pick her up and “she wouldn’t come to the door numerous different 

times.”

¶ 26 Vorreyer stated that the agency provided transportation not just for visits, but for 

all services. She said that initially, transportation was provided through a company called 

“Addus,” but “[t]hey would no longer transport her because of her actions, the way she acted.” 

Then, she was given bus passes, but she refused to take the bus because “she said that she got 

anxiety on the bus.” 

¶ 27 During Vorreyer’s time on the case, respondent was employed for only one week 

at a gambling facility before she was fired. Respondent had no independent income, relying 

solely on her mother. 

¶ 28 The State asked Vorreyer about her communication with respondent. Vorreyer 

stated, “She was normally always very argumentative and had a very hard time understanding 

what she needed to do even though it was continuously stated to her over and over again that was 

always a big—that was a major problem when we would discuss her not understanding.” 

Vorreyer also testified that respondent would never allow Vorreyer to enter her home. Vorreyer 

stated that she explained to respondent that it was a necessary part of her job to visit respondent 

at home so she could see if the home was an appropriate place for G.B. to return to live. In 

response, respondent told Vorreyer she would need a court order. 

¶ 29 Vorreyer decided to make the referral for a psychological evaluation in 

approximately April 2022. Respondent initially refused to do it, then the appointment was 

cancelled “a couple of times,” which delayed the process, but respondent eventually attended an 

appointment with Dr. Osgood. Vorreyer provided Osgood with the service plans and told her that 

her biggest concern was respondent “not comprehending the information when she was given 
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that information.” Vorreyer explained that the purpose of the evaluation was for Osgood to 

assess whether respondent could actually parent G.B. Osgood performed the evaluation and 

opined that respondent would not be able to parent G.B. and could not live on her own, instead 

needing to rely on others. 

¶ 30 The State asked Vorreyer if there was ever a time that she was close to returning 

G.B. back to respondent, and Vorreyer answered, “No.” When asked why not, Vorreyer 

answered that respondent was not doing the services that were required of her and had not 

corrected the conditions that led G.B. to be taken from her care. 

¶ 31 c. Jenny Metzroth 

¶ 32 The State called Jenny Metzroth, who testified that she was employed by DCFS 

and was the caseworker on respondent’s case for a three-month period while Vorreyer was on 

maternity leave, from approximately October 2021 to January 2022. During that time, Metzroth 

continued to implement the service plan that was in place, without adding or removing any 

required services.

¶ 33 Metzroth testified that respondent attended visits with G.B. four times in the 13 

weeks that Metzroth was on the case. Metzroth observed each of the four visits and, when asked 

what she observed of respondent’s parenting skills during those visits, answered, “I don’t believe 

I saw her feeding or changing him during a visit.” During Metzroth’s time as the caseworker, 

respondent had not completed any services. Metzroth testified that there was no time during that 

period that she was close to returning G.B. to respondent’s care and Metzroth herself, in 

November 2021, rated the July 2021 service plan “unsatisfactory.” 

¶ 34 Metzroth also testified that she asked respondent to complete three drug tests. 

Respondent attended one test in December 2021, which was negative for drugs, but she failed to 
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appear for the other two. 

¶ 35 Metzroth testified that respondent was supposed to be attending mental health 

counseling at Memorial Behavioral Health. She talked to respondent’s counselor in December 

2021, who reported that respondent was sporadically attending some appointments but was not 

making any progress. Metzroth testified that, according to the counselor, respondent “was more 

focused on DCFS’s fault in all of the situation she was in and not in actually dealing with her 

own anxiety and [posttraumatic stress disorder] and mental health struggles.” 

¶ 36 Metzroth testified that, prior to her involvement, respondent had been referred 

twice to The Parent Place for parenting classes and was discharged for missing too many classes. 

Metzroth referred her a third time, and respondent was discharged again. The Parent Place 

advised Metzroth that respondent could not be rereferred until July 2022 due to three 

unsatisfactory discharges in a short period of time. 

¶ 37 When asked to describe respondent’s level of cooperation, Metzroth answered 

that, although respondent communicated with her, she did not follow through with Metzroth’s 

recommendations. For instance, Metzroth told respondent that the drug tests were part of the 

service plan and expected by the trial court, but respondent answered that her boyfriend told her 

that she did not have to do a drug screen without a court order. When Metzroth told respondent 

that she needed to enter her home to do “home visits,” respondent answered that “her boyfriend 

told her and the internet told her that [Metzroth] couldn’t come in without a warrant.” Metzroth 

said she had such conversations with respondent “numerous times.” 

¶ 38 Metzroth testified that she believed respondent understood what she needed to do 

to complete her services but chose not to engage in them. 

¶ 39 d. Christina White 
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¶ 40 The State called Christina White, who testified that she was employed by DCFS 

and was the caseworker on respondent’s case from September 2023 to December 2023. 

¶ 41 When White took over the case, “there were no services [required of respondent] 

because the goals had already changed [(to substitute care pending determination on termination 

of parental rights)],” but White “did offer her parenting [classes] again” because respondent had 

another child who had come into care. White testified that she discussed with respondent “[w]hat 

the services were that she was supposed to be doing, over and over.” White was never close to 

returning G.B. to respondent during her time on the case. 

¶ 42 During White’s time as respondent’s caseworker, respondent did not have a 

visitation schedule. White explained, “There was a visitation [schedule], but then it changed to 

there were no visits and she should stop and then there was a critical decision made because she 

wanted to start up visits when I became the case worker.” White stated that the “critical 

decision” that was made was not to resume visitation because “[i]t had been over a year or so 

since [respondent] had contact with [G.B.] and it would not be in his best interest.” 

¶ 43 e. Jewel Waddy

¶ 44 Jewel Waddy testified that she was employed by DCFS and was the current 

caseworker, having taken the case over from White in December 2023. During Waddy’s time on 

the case, she had contact with respondent, but no visitation between respondent and G.B. 

occurred. Respondent was not required to do any services because the goal had been changed to 

substitute care pending a determination on termination of parental rights. Waddy testified that 

there was no time since she has been on the case that she was close to returning G.B. to 

respondent’s care. 

¶ 45 Waddy further testified that she was working with respondent regarding her other 
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child that had come into care, but services were not directed toward G.B. because of the change 

in goal. When respondent communicated with Waddy, respondent asked about her other child in 

care but did not ask about G.B. Respondent was engaged in parenting and counseling services 

but had not successfully completed them. 

¶ 46 f. Valerie B.

¶ 47 Respondent called Valerie B., who was the mother of respondent and 

grandmother of G.B. Valerie testified that respondent had lived with her for most of respondent’s 

life. She stated that there was a period of time in the beginning of the case during which “we did 

not want [DCFS employees] in [the house] because we were trying to work on the inside of the 

house.” Valerie stated, however, that respondent “told them later that they were welcome to 

come, if I remember correctly.” She testified that, although there were “some things that we 

needed to touch up to get dealt with on the inside of the house,” she believed the home was an 

“adequate” environment for G.B.

¶ 48 Regarding visitation with G.B., Valerie testified that respondent “was visiting 

with [G.B.] all she could, I believe.” She explained that respondent “was sick a couple of times 

or whatever.” She testified that she “believe[d] [respondent] was doing everything she could as a 

mother and a human being would do for their child.” 

¶ 49 On cross-examination by the State, Valerie testified that respondent had never 

lived on her own or held a steady job. The prosecutor asked Valerie if she would “agree that 

[respondent] relies on others for money, for her housing, for her care,” and she answered, “Well, 

I mean, at this time until she gets her own income, she really just doesn’t have a choice.” Valerie

explained that respondent had applied for disability. 

¶ 50 On cross-examination by the guardian ad litem (GAL), when asked if her 
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daughter had an intellectual disability, Valerie answered, “I don’t know what that is.” The GAL 

then asked if respondent could function on her own, and Valerie answered that respondent was 

physically and mentally capable of raising a child and she believed respondent could care for 

G.B. without her support. 

¶ 51 The trial court asked Valerie what disability respondent had that would entitle her 

to disability income, and she said she was “not completely sure.”

¶ 52 g. Respondent 

¶ 53 Respondent testified on her own behalf. She stated that she completed parenting 

classes at Mini O’Beirne Crisis Nursery “yesterday” and the trial court admitted into evidence, at 

her attorney’s request, a certificate of completion (which was dated February 28, 2024—the day 

before respondent testified). Respondent stated that she learned “[s]tuff like morals, stuff like 

discipline, *** how to love a child, pretty much how to raise [a child].” She also testified that, 

prior to that class, she completed a 16-week class at The Parent Place through Zoom. 

¶ 54 Respondent testified that she does not use drugs or alcohol. She was asked to do 

drug tests and she “did five or six of them.” She stated that she missed three of them due to not 

having transportation and another because the caseworker notified her “at the last minute” before 

the testing facility was closing.

¶ 55 Respondent also testified that she attended a psychological assessment and 

attended mental health counseling. She stated, “I did do, I think, mental health sessions briefly 

with counselors over the phone through, like, Memorial Behavioral Health and Central Counties 

[Health Centers (Central Counties)] and for once or twice at Springfield Clinic.” Respondent’s 

attorney handed her an exhibit she identified as a letter from Central Counties dated October 16, 

2023, stating that respondent had engaged in counseling services. Respondent stated she started 
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those services on October 16, 2023, and was attending one session a month by phone. She stated 

that she started these services “around the time” her other child was taken into care.

¶ 56 Respondent said that before Central Counties, she attended counseling at 

Memorial Behavior Health. She then explained, “[S]ome of the reasons I didn’t attend sessions 

was because I didn’t have a car, DCFS was messing around with me with bus tokens,” and, 

although she had a phone, she did not have access to the Internet, so “it was kind of hard to get 

phone services *** for my counseling appointments.” She also did one or two mental health 

counseling sessions at Springfield Clinic in February 2022. 

¶ 57 Respondent testified that, since G.B. was born, she lived with her mother and was 

never employed. She was in the process of “trying to get [Supplemental Security Income]” for a 

“[gastrointestinal] problem with my bowels where my bowels don’t want to move forward and 

whatnot.” 

¶ 58 Respondent also testified that she cooperated with DCFS and explained that there 

were times she did not let them into the house because “they lied and said my mom’s house ha[d] 

bed bugs.” Respondent continued, “We have had a bug problem, but DCFS did not give any 

help.” She also explained that her mother was trying to remodel the house. 

¶ 59 Respondent’s attorney asked her whether she attended her visits with G.B., and 

respondent answered as follows: 

 “My visits with [G.B.], I didn’t go to. I went to, like, a lot of them. Just 

didn’t go to all of them. And I didn’t go to all of them, like I said. One, I had no 

help with the father. Two, it was also hurting me to be ripped from my son 

from—going for two hours and I just felt like it was causing me and my child 

trauma. Three, there were times I was contagious and I didn’t want to pass 
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anything [to] my son to get him sick.” 

¶ 60 On cross-examination by the State, respondent testified that (1) although she 

completed the classes at The Parent Place, she failed the test and did not receive a certificate of 

completion and (2) she started the parenting classes at Mini O’Beirne Crisis Nursery in October 

2023 after her other child was born and taken into care by DCFS. She also testified that she was 

employed for a week at a video poker establishment and received financial support and housing 

from other people. 

¶ 61 On cross-examination by the GAL, respondent testified that “DCFS lies a lot,” 

particularly about her house being unlivable. The GAL asked her how many visits she attended 

in 2022, and she answered, “[A]ltogether I know I had 11, but I’m not sure if that was in 2022 or 

2021.” She did not attend any visits in 2023 because DCFS suspended visitation. She 

acknowledged that she last visited with G.B. “somewhere in the year of 2022.” 

¶ 62 h. The Trial Court’s Findings 

¶ 63 The trial court found that the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence 

each of the allegations in the supplemental motion for termination of parental rights. 

Specifically, the court found that, although it appeared that “since October of last year, 

[respondent] may have started to work toward some of the things that were requested of [her] 

back in early 2021,” the evidence of her noncompliance with services was “overwhelming.” The 

court explained as follows: 

“You didn’t cooperate with DCFS. You did not cooperate with habilitation 

services. You had little to no visits with your son. When you did visit with him, 

the evidence was that you sat in the chair and the child was on a blanket on the 

floor. You didn’t engage with him. You did not complete your mental health 
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services. You missed at least three toxicology tests. 

Additionally, you did not have an income or a stable place to live. You 

have not demonstrated an ability to adequately care for your son, [G.B.] 

Moreover, Dr. Judy Osgood provided us with a psychological assessment 

that says that you do not have the ability to parent your child. Moreover, she said 

you do not have the ability to function on your own. 

Additionally, there’s no evidence of completion of any services. There are 

at least seven service plans and all of them are unsatisfactory.

So for all the time periods listed, I am finding that the State has met its 

burden by clear and convincing evidence regarding each and every paragraph in 

the petition, including regarding the reasonable efforts and reasonable progress. 

*** 

*** [Respondent] has not engaged in services. She doesn’t follow through. 

There’s no reasonable progress. And she—most importantly, this child is three 

years old and she doesn’t visit with her son.” 

¶ 64 2. The Best-Interest Proceedings

¶ 65 In May 2024, the trial court conducted the best-interest portion of the termination 

proceedings. At the State’s request, the court took judicial notice of “the unfitness findings, the 

orders and the hearing[s] that were held [in January and February 2024].” 

¶ 66 a. Jewel Waddy

¶ 67 The State again called Waddy, who testified that she was G.B.’s caseworker until 

March 2024, when she handed that responsibility to Jennifer Power. Waddy testified that G.B.

had just turned three years old and was living with foster parents “Mike and Molly,” who 
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specialized in behavioral issues. She stated that G.B. was initially placed with Mike and Molly 

for six months, then went to live with a great-aunt for approximately nine months, then returned 

to Mike and Molly, who were his current foster parents. Waddy testified that the great-aunt 

“ended up moving” and could not care for G.B. any longer. 

¶ 68 Waddy testified that in his current foster home, G.B. had “made a lot of progress 

behaviorally” and that his medical, educational, emotional, and social needs were being met. She 

stated that G.B. was in daycare and participated in occupational therapy. He also had asthma and 

“has to have a pump when needed.” She stated that Mike and Molly “are really good with that.” 

¶ 69 Waddy testified that G.B. was bonded to his foster parents, calling them “Mommy 

and Daddy.” Mike and Molly wished to adopt G.B. Waddy also testified that she observed 

G.B.’s bond with Mike and Molly, as well as the other individuals living in the foster home, 

which included two older children and Molly’s mother. G.B. had not seen his biological mother 

in well over a year.

¶ 70 On cross-examination by respondent’s attorney, Waddy testified that the other 

two children in the home were the foster parents’ biological children. Molly’s mother was “very 

active,” and G.B. called her “Gammy.” She stated that G.B. “always wants to be around her” and 

went to her when Waddy visited the home. She also testified that the foster parents “expressed 

that they wouldn’t mind keeping in touch and letting [respondent] see [G.B.]” 

¶ 71 b. Jennifer Power 

¶ 72 Jennifer Power testified that she was the caseworker for G.B. from mid-March 

2024 to the present. She visited the foster home twice a month since receiving the case. G.B. was 

receiving speech therapy, occupational therapy, and behavioral therapy. She had also referred 

him for early intervention rehabilitation services. Power testified that G.B. was well cared for 
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and happy in his foster home. His foster parents used appropriate discipline, such as timeouts and 

redirecting him. Powers stated that “there’s definitely a bond there.” 

¶ 73 She also testified that G.B. reached out for his foster parents when he wanted

comfort and called them “mom and dad.” She believed that G.B. was progressing in his foster 

home, which was an adoptive placement. 

¶ 74 On cross-examination by respondent’s attorney, Power stated that she had never 

met or spoken with respondent. Power explained that she was responsible for adoptions and 

received the case after respondent was found unfit. 

¶ 75 c. Valerie B.

¶ 76 Respondent called Valerie B., who testified that respondent was a “wonderful 

mother,” who “loved both of her children dearly” and “crie[d] every day without her kids.” She 

stated that when G.B. lived in her home prior to being taken into custody, respondent changed 

G.B.’s diapers. She described one day when she left G.B. with respondent and her boyfriend. 

Valerie stated she “was actually very amazed when I came home, and they had a new diaper on 

him. They had a new outfit on him, and they were feeding him.” 

¶ 77 Valerie believed it was in G.B.’s best interest to live with respondent, who would 

be living in Valerie’s home, along with respondent’s boyfriend. She stated that respondent was 

unemployed and would be able to care for G.B. all day. 

¶ 78 d. Respondent 

¶ 79 Respondent testified that she currently lived at her mother’s house with her 

boyfriend and her mother’s boyfriend. Respondent’s attorney asked the reason why G.B. was 

taken away from her, and respondent answered, “I found out that it had been neglect, that the 

allegation was neglect.” Her attorney asked, “Okay, so do you know in what way you were being 
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alleged to have neglect[ed] him?” Respondent answered, “Not fully, no.” 

¶ 80 Respondent testified that, if G.B. came to live with her, he would have his own 

room, and she would get him to his medical and therapy appointments. She acknowledged that 

neither she nor her mother drive and have had transportation problems in the past, but they take 

cabs and buses. She said, “There should be no issue with not getting him to his appointments.” 

¶ 81 Respondent’s attorney asked what specific reasons she had to believe that she was 

the best person for G.B. to live with, and respondent answered as follows: 

 “I am his mother, you know, just knowing that I am his God-given blood 

mother, and I was innocent in all of this. It really just eats me alive, and I love my 

child to death. I would never harm my kids. DCFS put down I’m a danger around 

children. I’ve never harmed anyone else’s children or my own children. I know 

that it’s in the best interest as his mother that his mother helps him to everything 

that are his needs, things that can help him grow and become a successful adult.” 

¶ 82 On cross-examination by the GAL, respondent testified that she had 10 or 15 

visits with her son before they were stopped. The GAL asked, “Okay, there are many months, 

though, without visits with your son, right?” Respondent answered affirmatively but explained, 

“They messed around with me with transportation periodically in the beginning, and then they 

finally didn’t give me bus tokens until February of 2022.” The GAL asked whether her failure to 

see her son for many months was “all based on transportation issues,” and respondent answered, 

“Yes.”

¶ 83 e. The Trial Court’s Findings 

¶ 84 The trial court found that it was in G.B.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s 

parental rights. When ruling, the court first noted that G.B. had been taken into care when he was 
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five weeks old and was now three years old. The court then stated as follows: 

 “[G.B.] has special needs, and based on the testimony here today, all of his 

needs are currently being met by the foster parents. I heard that he is thriving in 

this situation.

 The main issue for me is progress. I look at the period of time this case has 

gone on, and *** this is a three-year-old case this month. 

I look at the best interest factors in the statute, and I am to consider the 

safety and welfare of the child, the development of his identity, his background 

ties, his sense of attachments. I look at the person he looks to day in and day out 

for his care. Who is the one who puts him to bed. Who is the one that gets him up 

in the morning. Who bathes him. Who clothes him. Who feeds him. Who takes 

him to occupational speech therapy. Who takes care of him when he is sick. In 

answer to that, it’s not [respondent]. The answer to that [is] the foster parents.

 I am to look at the child’s sense of security and sense of familiarity, the 

continuity of affection for the child. What is the least disruptive placement 

alternative. The child is not old enough to have long-term wishes. His community 

ties have all been with someone else.

 I look for the need for permanence and the risks attendant to being in 

substitute care. The fact of the matter is that this is a three-year old child who has 

spent his entire life in a foster home. What I have to look at is what is in the best 

interest of [G.B.] I believe that [G.B.] should no longer have to linger in foster 

care any longer.

At this time, given all the best interest factors and clearly by a 
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preponderance of the evidence, I do find that it is in the best interest of [G.B.] that 

the parental rights of [respondent] be terminated.” 

¶ 85 This appeal followed. 

¶ 86 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 87 Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court’s (1) fitness and (2) best-interest 

determinations were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm.

¶ 88 A. Respondent’s Brief 

¶ 89 As an initial matter, we note that the State has argued that respondent, who is 

represented by counsel, has forfeited her arguments on appeal because she has failed to (1) cite 

the trial court’s findings, (2) cite relevant authority as to each of the court’s findings of unfitness, 

and (3) provide an analysis of the issues raised, all in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). 

¶ 90 Rule 341(h)(7) requires that an appellant’s brief shall contain an argument 

section, “which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with 

citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

¶ 91 We agree with the State that appellant’s brief is deficient in the manners alleged 

and violates the mandates of Rule 341(h)(7). Nonetheless, we are able to ascertain respondent’s 

contentions on appeal and choose to address them on their merits. 

¶ 92 However, we caution respondent’s counsel that any future violation of Rule 341 

could result in his brief being stricken. 

¶ 93 B. The Fitness Determination

¶ 94 Respondent argues the trial court’s finding that she was unfit was against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. It is well settled that “[b]ecause each of the statutory grounds of 
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unfitness is independent, the trial court’s finding may be affirmed where the evidence supports a 

finding of unfitness as to any one of the alleged grounds.” In re Adoption of P.J.H., 2019 IL App 

(5th) 190089, ¶ 11, 143 N.E.3d 805. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the 

court’s findings that respondent failed to make reasonable progress within the nine-month 

periods of (1) January 2022 to October 2022 and (2) October 2022 to July 2023 were not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we discuss only those findings. 

¶ 95 1. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 96 The State must prove unfitness as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act 

(750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)) by clear and convincing evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, 

¶ 28, 115 N.E.3d 102. Section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act defines an unfit person as a 

parent who fails to make “reasonable progress toward the return of the child” during any 

nine-month period following an adjudication of neglect or abuse. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 

2018). Reasonable progress is an objective view of the steps the parent has taken toward the goal 

of reunification and examines the demonstrability and quality of those steps. In re Ta. T., 2021 

IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 51, 187 N.E.3d 763. Additionally, the Illinois Supreme Court has held, 

“the benchmark for measuring a parent’s ‘progress toward the return of the child’ under section 

1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act encompasses the parent’s compliance with the service plans.” In re 

C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 216, 752 N.E.2d 1030, 1050 (2001). Reasonable progress exists when the 

trial court can conclude that, in the near future, it will be able to order the children returned to 

parental custody. Ta. T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 51. 

¶ 97 A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility 

determinations that the trial court is in the best position to make. In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, 

¶ 21, 77 N.E.3d 69. Accordingly, a trial court’s finding of parental unfitness will not be reversed 
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unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29. A decision 

is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. 

Id.

¶ 98 2. This Case

¶ 99 The evidence in this case amply supports the trial court’s finding that respondent 

failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of G.B. during either of the nine-month 

periods alleged in the motion for termination of parental rights. Vorreyer was the caseworker for 

nearly the entirety of those periods, and she testified that (1) none of the service plans were rated 

satisfactory, (2) respondent did not successfully complete any of the services required of her, 

(3) respondent was offered 2 visits a week and attended only 11, and (4) at no time was Vorreyer 

close to returning G.B. to respondent’s care. 

¶ 100 Vorreyer’s assessment of respondent’s lack of progress toward G.B.’s return was 

supported by Osgood’s opinion that respondent was “unable to discharge minimal parenting 

standards” and “would not benefit from additional services.” 

¶ 101 Although respondent maintained contact with DCFS and attended some services, 

she made no objective, measurable progress toward G.B.’s return to her care. The parenting 

coach reported that respondent could not perform necessary skills, such as preparing a bottle or 

changing a diaper. The mental health counselor reported that respondent spent more time in 

sessions focused on blaming DCFS for her situation than addressing her own issues. During her 

own testimony, respondent blamed her failure to complete services on a lack of transportation, 

despite evidence that DCFS provided transportation for her. Respondent also demonstrated a 

lack of understanding as to why G.B. was even taken into care in the first place. 

¶ 102 Most critically, respondent failed to perform even the most fundamental of tasks, 
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such as (1) developing a bond with her child by spending time with him at visits or (2) allowing 

DCFS into her home to determine whether it was a safe environment for G.B. 

¶ 103 For these reasons, we agree with Vorreyer’s assessment that respondent made no 

progress towards returning G.B. to her care. 

¶ 104 C. The Best-Interest Determination

¶ 105 1. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 106 At the best-interest stage of a termination proceeding, the State bears the burden 

of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child’s 

best interest. In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71, 145 N.E.3d 605. In reaching a 

best-interest determination, the trial court must consider, within the context of the child’s age and 

developmental needs, the following factors: 

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s 

identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties; 

(4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, 

continuity of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the 

child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s 

need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of 

relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family 

and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the 

person available to care for the child.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re 

J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 32, 147 N.E.3d 953. 

See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022).

¶ 107 A reviewing court affords great deference to a trial court’s best-interest finding 
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because the trial court is in a superior position to view the witnesses and judge their credibility.

C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71. An appellate court “will not disturb the trial court’s 

decision regarding a child’s best interests *** unless it is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence.” Id. ¶ 68. A best-interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence 

only when the opposite conclusion is clearly the proper result. Id.

¶ 108 2. This Case

¶ 109 The evidence in this case also amply supports the trial court’s finding that it was 

in G.B.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 110 G.B. was taken into care as a newborn and spent the majority of his life in the 

home of his foster family. G.B. has bonded with his foster parents, foster siblings, and foster 

grandmother. In addition, G.B.’s foster parents have (1) provided a loving, stable home, where 

all of G.B.’s social, educational, and developmental needs are met and (2) committed to adopting 

G.B.

¶ 111 In contrast, G.B. has never lived with or bonded with respondent, who attended 

supervised visits with G.B. only 11 times in his three years of life. Respondent has demonstrated 

an inability to meet minimal parenting skills, let alone G.B.’s special medical and therapeutic 

needs.

¶ 112 Accordingly, we conclude the trial court’s finding that termination was in G.B.’s 

best interest was well supported by the record. 

¶ 113 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 114 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 115 Affirmed.