IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 20-00247-KSM

MEMORANDUM

MARSTON, J. March 31, 2020

Plaintiff Victor Orndorff, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, alleges 

that Defendant Ford Motor Company breached its express and implied warranties and violated 

the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer 

Protection Law. (Doc. No. 1.) The Plaintiff also asserts claims against the Defendant for 

negligence and unjust enrichment. (Id.) 

The parties filed a Joint Motion to Transfer Venue, arguing that the case should be 

transferred to the Northern District of Illinois, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Doc. No. 12.)

Under section 1404(a), a district court may for the convenience of the parties and 

witnesses and in the interest of justice “transfer any civil action to any other district or division 

where it may have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have 

consented.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Without addressing the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, the 

Court finds that transfer is appropriate in this case.

Section 1404(a) governs transfer here because the original venue is proper. See Atl. 

Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the W. Dist. of Tex., 571 U.S. 49, 59 (2013). The 

VICTOR M. ORNDORFF, on behalf of 

himself and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY,

Defendant.
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Plaintiff’s filing of this action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was proper based on 

diversity jurisdiction. Venue is proper in the Eastern District because the Defendant regularly 

manufactured, marketed, distributed, sold, and leased vehicles within the District. (Doc. Nos. 1, 

12.) See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c); Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995) 

(“Venue is also proper . . . where the defendant transacts business and is therefore subject to

personal jurisdiction.”). 

Here, the parties have consented to transfer to the Northern District of Illinois. (Doc. No. 

12.) See § 1404(a); Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 571 U.S. at 59 (noting that § 1404(a) “permits 

transfer to any district where venue is also proper . . . or to any other district to which the parties 

have agreed by contract or stipulation”); Dawson v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 3:19-cv-08680, 2020 

WL 953713, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2020) (“In any case, Plaintiffs have consented to the 

proposed transfer, thereby satisfying the threshold inquiry mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).”); 

Jermano v. Graco Children’s Prods., Inc., Civil Action No. 12-5905, 2013 WL 12156081, at *1 

(E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2013) (granting a motion to transfer and noting that “[v]enue in the Eastern 

District of Michigan is also proper because it is any district or division to which all parties have 

consented” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

A review of the private and public interest factors shows that transfer to the Northern 

District of Illinois is also in the interest of justice and will be more convenient for the parties and 

witnesses. See Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 (outlining the public and private interest factors that must 

be considered before a case is transferred pursuant to § 1404(a)); see also White v. ABCO Eng’g 
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Corp., 199 F.3d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 1999) (requiring a case specific determination that transfer is 

proper even when transfer has been stipulated to by all the parties in the case). 

For the private interest factors, although the Plaintiff’s original forum preference was the 

Eastern District (see Doc. No. 1), the parties have stated a preference for the Northern District of 

Illinois. (Doc. No. 12.) A similar action is currently pending in the Northern District (O’Connor 

v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:19-cv-05045 (N.D. Ill.)), and two other similar actions were recently 

transferred to the Northern District (Marino v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:20-cv-10048 (D. Mass); 

Smith, et al. v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5:20-cv-00211 (N.D. Cal.)). (Doc. No. 12; Marino Doc. 

Nos. 13, 14; Smith Doc. No. 19.) The parties have agreed to seek consolidation of all the actions. 

(Doc. No. 12.) Other courts in this District have held that “[t]he presence of a related case in a 

transferee forum is a powerful reason to grant a change of venue.” Palagano v. NVIDIA Corp., 

Civil Action No. 15-1248, 2015 WL 5025469, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2015) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted); see also Villari Brandes & Kline, P.C. v. Plainfield Specialty 

Holdings II, Inc., Civil Action No. 09-2552, 2009 WL 1845236, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2009) 

(“[C]ourts in our district have held that where there is a strong likelihood of consolidation with a 

related action, a transfer of venue is warranted.”). The Northern District is a more convenient 

forum for the Defendant because it reduces the burden on its witnesses who would otherwise 

have to give duplicative testimony. (Doc. No. 12.) The Northern District is also substantially 

closer to the Defendant’s principal place of business in Michigan. (Id.) The location of books 

and records is a neutral factor because the documentary evidence can be submitted electronically. 

See Panitch v. Quaker Oats Co., Civ. No. 16-4586, 2017 WL 1333285, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 

2017) (“Today, with digitization, many documents exist in electronic format, which can be sent 

over the Internet.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Doc. No. 12 (“The Parties 
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expect that virtually all of the documentary evidence in this action is likely to be electronically 

stored and readily accessible from any location.”). The proximity of non-party witnesses that 

may be needed for trial is also a neutral factor. See Palagano, 2015 WL 5025469, at *6 (noting 

that “the convenience of non-party witnesses is the main focus of this Jumara factor” (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted)); Doc. No. 12 (noting that “there is no indication that any 

non-party witness would refuse to testify at trial in either forum”).

As for the public interest factors, although Plaintiff’s alleged injury arose from his 

purchase of a vehicle marketed, manufactured, and sold in the Eastern District, the Eastern 

District’s interest in the case is limited. See Palagano, 2015 WL 5025469, at *5 (noting that “in 

the context of claims based on misrepresentations or omissions [such as breach of warranty], 

misrepresentations and omissions are deemed to occur in the district where they were 

transmitted, or withheld, not where they were received,” and holding that although the putative 

class members’ suffered their injury by purchasing a product in Pennsylvania, the defendant’s 

representations and warranties regarding the product occurred at the defendant’s headquarters). 

Federal judges sitting in the Eastern District may be more familiar with the Plaintiff’s 

Pennsylvania state law claims, but “[f]ederal district courts are regularly called upon to interpret 

the laws of jurisdictions outside of the states in which they sit.” Id. at *7 (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). There is no likelihood of an enforcement problem in the Northern 

District of Illinois as opposed to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and no clear difference in 

policy preferences for the two locales. The parties agree that there is no substantial difference in 

administrative difficulty arising from court congestion. (Doc. No. 12.) At bottom, the existence 

of other related litigations in the Northern District, and the potential for consolidation, are 

significant “practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive,”
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and weigh heavily in favor of transfer to the Northern District. See Panitch, 2017 WL 1333285, 

at *7 (“To permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely the same issues are 

simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to the wastefulness of time, energy and 

money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent.”) (quoting Cont’l Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 

364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960)).

Upon consideration of all the factors together, the Court finds that the balance of those 

factors weighs in favor of transfer.

Transfer to the Northern District of Illinois is also appropriate under the “first-filed” rule. 

Under the first-filed rule, in cases of concurrent federal jurisdiction, “the court which first has 

possession of the subject must decide it.” E.E.O.C. v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir. 

1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “The first-filed rule permits courts to 

consolidate similar cases by transferring later-filed cases for consolidation with the first-filed 

case.” Palagano, 2015 WL 5025469, at *1 (citations omitted). 

Courts within this district have found substantial similarity sufficient to trigger 

application of the first-filed rule. See, e.g., Panitch, 2017 WL 1333285, at *2, *4; Palagano, 

2015 WL 5025469, at *2, *4 (concluding that, with respect to the degree of similarity required 

among the actions, a “flexible approach” is more “proper because it is more consistent with the 

purposes of the first-filed rule”); Villari, 2009 WL 1845236, at *6 (“The applicability of the firstfiled rule is not limited to mirror image cases where the parties and the issues perfectly align. 

Rather, the principles underlying the rule support its application where the subject matter of the 

later filed case substantially overlaps with that of the earlier one.”); accord. Catanese v. 

Unilever, 774 F. Supp. 2d 684, 689 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2011) (rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument 

that the first-filed rule is inapplicable where the actions seek to apply different state law and 
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finding “that the differences in the causes of action and remedies sought are insufficiently 

material to prevent application of the first-filed rule. The factual allegations underlying these 

claims are exactly the same . . . [O]verlapping subject matter is key; exact identity of claims is 

not required.”). Palagano is instructive. In Palagano, the court applied the first-filed rule 

where the plaintiff’s claims were substantially similar to the other twelve lawsuits consolidated 

in another district and arose from the exact same conduct, and where the witnesses and evidence 

would be exactly the same. 2015 WL 5025469, at *4. 

Likewise, here, the Plaintiff’s claims are substantially similar to the claims in the related 

actions (albeit invoking different states’ laws). (See Doc. No. 12; compare Doc. No. 1 with

O’Connor Doc. No. 1, Marino Doc. No. 1, and Smith Doc. No. 1.) Specifically, in each of the 

four actions, the plaintiffs seek to represent state classes of consumers alleging that Ford 

improperly manufactured, marketed, and sold Ford Model Year 2017-2020 F-150 vehicles with 

purportedly defective 10R80 transmissions, and each lawsuit involves similar claims, such as 

breach of express warranty, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and breach of 

applicable state consumer protection statutes. (See id.) All of the claims arise from the same 

conduct and would involve the same witnesses and evidence. (Doc. No. 12.) Therefore, the 

Court finds that the first-filed rule supports its decision to transfer the case to the Northern 

District, where O’Connor was first filed on July 26, 2019. (O’Connor Doc. No. 1.)

An appropriate order follows.

/s/KAREN SPENCER MARSTON

____________________________________

KAREN SPENCER MARSTON, J.