IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN LANDING,

 Plaintiff,

v.

TITAN STEEL CORPORATION,

 Defendant.

Case No. 20 C 3659

Judge Harry D. Leinenweber

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Plaintiff, John Landing (“Landing”), was employed by 

Defendant, Titan Steel Corporation (“Titan”), as a second shift 

forklift driver. Landing worked for Titan from July 2018 until 

October 2019 when he was laid off. Prior to his layoff he contends 

that he was victim of unlawful employment practices including 

unlawful discrimination and harassment because of his race and of 

unlawful retaliation for engaging in activities which led to 

unlawful termination. He has filed a four-count Complaint, two 

counts for race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and 

two counts for race discrimination and retaliation under the 

Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”). Titan has moved for summary 

judgment (Dkt. No. 23.) as to all counts. The Motion is granted.

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I. FACTS

Titan is a distributor of tin mill products, hot and cold 

rolled steel coated products, and specially coated products. 

(Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Stmt of Facts (“PSOF”) ¶ 4, Dkt. No. 30.)

Landing, an African American, was a forklift driver on Titan’s 

second shift. (Id. ¶ 10.) On May 8, 2019, Plaintiff reported an 

incident to Titan’s plant manager, Mike Seidel (“Seidel”), where

another employee, Jose Valdez (“Valdez”), had gestured at him using 

a coil strap that Plaintiff interpreted to be a noose symbol. (Id. 

¶¶ 11—12). Seidel immediately summoned Landing, Valdez, and other 

employees into his office to discuss the incident. (Id. ¶14.) At 

the meeting Valdez apologized to Landing. (Id.) Landing does not 

recall whether he asked to have Valdez fired. (Landing Dep. 66:11—

66:16, Def.’s Stmt. Of Facts, Ex. C, Dkt. No. 25-3.) After the 

meeting Landing had no more interactions with Valdez. (PSOF ¶ 15.)

The next day, upon learning of the incident, Mark Hunt

(“Hunt”), Titan’s business manager, consulted with Titan’s 

President and Titan’s legal counsel and decided to suspend Valdez 

without pay while further disciplinary action was contemplated.

(Id. ¶ 16.) After reporting this incident to Titan, Landing 

complained to Hunt that employees were staring or glaring at him, 

which made Landing uncomfortable. (Def.’s Resp. to Pl. Stmt. of 

Facts (“DSOF”) ¶ 16, Dkt. No. 33.) On May 17, 2019, Valdez was 

terminated. (PSOF ¶ 18.) On May 10, 2019, Hunt held a meeting of 

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all of Titan employees to retrain them on Titan’s harassment, 

diversity, inclusion, and mutual respect policies. (Id. ¶ 17.)

According to Landing, on July 15, 2018, he reported to Titan 

that Paul Myczek (“Myczek”), a machine operator, commented to 

Plaintiff that another African American employee who had

dreadlocks “must be your brother because you have the same hair.”

(Id. ¶¶ 20—21.) Titan investigated the incident by interviewing 

Landing, Myczek, and other employees who may have heard the 

comment. (Id. ¶ 22.) Myczek denied making the comment and the other 

employees interviewed denied having heard it. (Id. ¶ 23.)

On October 21, 2019, Titan laid off its entire second shift,

which included Landing and four others. (Id. ¶ 30.) Titan claims 

that the reason for the layoff was due to a shortage of orders.

(Def.’s Answer to Pl.’s Interrogs. No. 5, Def.’s Stmt. Of Facts, 

Ex. G, Dkt. No. 25-7.) Landing was the only laid off employee who 

was African American, the rest were Caucasian and Hispanic. (PSOF 

¶ 34.) On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff received a write-up for attendance 

violations. (Id. ¶ 26.) Between August 2018 and May 2019, Landing 

called off work four times and was tardy twice. (Id. ¶ 27.) Landing 

filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

on December 9, 2019. (EEOC Compl., Def.’s Stmt. Of Facts, Ex. K, 

Dkt. No. 25-11.) The second shift was reinstated on April 13, 2020.

(DSOF ¶ 28.) Two of the five laid off were rehired. (Id. ¶¶ 29-

30). Landing was not asked back. (Id. ¶ 27.) 

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II. DISCUSSION

Landing’s racial harassment claim is based on the two 

incidents: the Valdez noose gesture in May 2019, and the Myczek 

dreadlocks incident in July 2018. The latter incident allegedly 

occurred in July 2018, and therefore was not within 300 days of 

the filing of Landing’s EEOC complaint and cannot be reasonably 

linked together as a single course of conduct. Tinner v. United 

Insurance Co. of America, 308 F.3d 697, 708 (7th Cir. 2002). The 

Myczek incident was of a different type and made by a different 

individual. Even if it was not untimely, it was merely a stray 

comment that clearly would not meet the requirement of objective 

offensiveness that alters the conditions of employment, and it 

would not be a basis for employer liability because the harasser 

was not a supervisor. Vance v. Ball State University, 646 F.3d 

461, 469 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Title VII regulates the conduct of 

employers, not individual employees”). Further, Titan adequately 

investigated Myczek’s remark.

The noose incident is of course exceedingly serious. However 

once again Landing is seeking to hold Titan responsible even though 

Valdez was an employee and not a supervisor. Here Titan took the 

complaint very seriously, held a hearing, suspended Valdez without 

pay, and ultimately fired him so that he never worked for Titan 

again. As the Seventh Circuit in Vance has said, “Prompt 

investigation is the ‘hall mark of reasonable corrective action.’”

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Id. at 473 (quoting Cerros v. Steel Technologies, Inc., 398 F.3d, 

944, 954 (7th Cir. 2005)). Here Titan immediately investigated,

suspended the offender without pay and then fired him without 

reinstatement. To put it mildly this is “prompt corrective action.”

The only other harassment claim is that certain of Titan employees 

who related to Valdez glared or stared at him after the Valdez 

incident. However, the Seventh Circuit has said multiple times 

that Title VII is “not a general civility code.” Ford v. Minteq 

Shapes and Services, Inc., 587 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)).

Landing’s final claim is that Titan retaliated against him 

for complaining about the harassment. He claims that he was laid 

off and not asked to return because of his complaints of racial 

harassment. To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, 

an employee must show that (1) he is a member of a racial category, 

(2) his job performance met the employer’s legitimate 

expectations, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and

(4) another similarly situated employee who was not in his racial 

category was treated more favorably. Burks v. Wisconsin Dep’t of 

Transportation, 464 F.3d 744, 750-751 (7th Cir. 2006). If the 

employer articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment 

action, the employee must show evidence of pretext. Jackson v. 

E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971,983 (7th Cir. 1999). In this case 

Titan has proffered as an explanation for the layoff, a lack of 

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business. Landing, instead of showing some evidence of pretext, 

merely asserts that Titan did not prove the lack of business. 

Landing’s assertion does not meet his burden, as required by the 

Seventh Circuit.

Landing also complains of retaliation because two of the 

second shift employees were rehired, but he was not. Titan points 

out that he did not complain of failure to rehire either in his

EEOC complaint, or his IDHA complaint, or in his District Court

Complaint. It is too late to raise an issue for the first time in 

a summary judgment brief. BRC Rubber I Plastics, Inc. v. 

Continental Carbon Co., 900 F.3d 529, 541 (7th Cir. 2018).

Finally Landing claims that he was retaliated against because 

he was assigned extra work that should have been done by the 

earlier shift. When questioned about this claim at his deposition, 

he testified that he didn’t know if his workload changed after the 

incident with Valdez. He merely said, “it might have.” (Landing 

Dep. 82:7.) When asked if he could recall anything in particular,

his answer was “No.” (Id. 82:9.)

It is clear that Landing has failed to show that Titan failed 

to respond to his legitimate complaint involving the noose by 

investigating and punishing the culprit in a reasonable manner. 

Landing has also failed to show that Titan retaliated against him 

in any manner that would violate either Title VII or the IHRA Act. 

Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Titan’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment is granted. Counts I, II, III, and IV are dismissed with 

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge

United States District Court

Dated: 3/21/2022

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