UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

MISH INT’L MONETARY INC.,

on behalf of itself and 

All others similarly situated,

v.

VEGA CAPITAL LONDON, LTD.

And JOHN DOES 1-100

Case No. 20-cv-04577

Judge Gary S. Feinerman

Magistrate Judge Jeffrey T. Gilbert

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION

TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS THE

SECOND AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

FILED UNDER SEAL

CORREDTED COPY

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Errata

Corrected Table of Contents and Table of Authorities

Changed “Vega, served” to “Vega while also serving” 7

Deleted parenthetical 11

Revised footnote for accuracy Fn. 6

Revised parenthetical Fn. 7

Changed “Plaintiff newly alleges expressly that Vega had profit sharing 

interests in the profits” to “Plaintiff newly alleges expressly the relative 

magnitude of Vega’s share of the profits”

17

Changed “ Sub-Account funding” to be “1. Fragment And 

Sub-Account Funding”

18

Changed “fee splitting” to “profit splitting” 19

Replaced “independent contractors” with “employees” 26

Replaced “GH Financials” with “ ” 26

Changed “agreement or anywhere else” to agreement” “or elsewhere” (compare 

Vega- Agreement 6.2)

26

Changed “nothing else” to “nothing ‘anywhere else’” 26

Changed “scope of the office” to “scope of [their] .... Office” 27

Changed “its” to “the”, and “agents” to “agent” 30

Deleted comma, and deleted “’s” 30

Changed “continued to breach” to “continued to monitor but breached” 33

Inserted SAC citations 33

Changed “repeatedly engaged” to “repeatedly observed the VTDs engage” 34

Changed “Instead follow” to “Instead, they followed” 35

Changed “provide access” to “provide a green light, including access” and 

changed “plausibly” to “plausible”

Fn. 13

Changed “their obligations” to “their ‘monitoring/viewing’ obligations” 36

Changed “ ” to “ ” 40

Changed “under Mish to” to “under Mish now suffice to” 43

Changed “with supervising Defendant” to “with an additional supervisory duty 

over Defendants ”, changed “(and only Defendant )” to “which did 

not apply to other VTDs”, and inserted citation.

43

Trader 8 Trader 8 Trader 7 Trader 7

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. The Motion By Vega And Should Be Denied............................................3

A. Defendants Vega And 

.....................................................................................4

B. Vega/ Agreed To Be Familiar With The Manipulation Alarms Under

The Market Abuse Regime, And Impliedly Agreed To Take Reasonable 

Steps To Prevent And Avoid Engaging In Such Manipulative Conduct.............5

C. During At Least 2019-2020, The SVD’s Repeatedly Engaged At Vega

In Conduct To Manipulate Prices, Including On The Penultimate

Trading Day Of Various WTI Futures Contracts........................................7

1. The SVD’s Conduct Repeatedly Set Off MAR Manipulation

Alarms................................................................................7

2. Non-Award Winning New Articles Have Repeatedly Provided

One Part Of The Plausible Bases For Allegations Of Misconduct

And Knowledge Thereof..........................................................13

D. During 2019-2020, Vega/ Repeatedly Observed The SVD’s At

Least “Potentially Manipulative Trading Activities” Especially On 

The Penultimate Days Of Trading In WTI Contracts And In Other

Contracts In Which There Was Potentially Low Volume Of Trading..............14

E. Vega/ Repeatedly Committed Breaches Of Their Responsibility

To “Identify” And Prevent The SVDs Potentially Manipulative Trading

Which Set Off MAR Manipulation Alarms............................................15

F. Because Of Vega’s Substantial Profit Interest In The Outcome Of 

Vega Traders’ Trading, Vega And Made Substantial Profits

By Repeatedly Breaching Their Duty To Identify And Prevent

The SVDs’ Manipulative Trading.......................................................17

1. Fragment And Sub-Account Funding...............................18

G. The Long Relations And Interchanging Roles Of The Principals

Of Vega And , Further Plausibly Indicate That Vega and 

Intentionally Helped The SVDs Manipulate Prices...................................20

H. Separately, Plaintiffs’ New Allegations Also Show That Vega Is

Additionally Responsible For The VTDs’ Conduct On April 20

Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Trader 8

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ii

(And Before) Because Vega Was The Principal And

The VTDs Were Acting For Vega In Committing Such Conduct....................22

1. Under The Vega-GH Financial Agreement, Vega Was The

Principal And The VTDs Were Acting As Vega’s Agents..................22

2. Under The Vega- Agreement, Vega Was The Principal

And The VTDs Were Independent Contractors................................23

I. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Section 2(a)(1)(B) Claims Against Vega And 

........................................................................................26

J. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Section 6(c )(1) Manipulation Claims

Against Vega And ..................................................................31

K. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Aiding And Abetting Claims Against Vega

And ...................................................................................33

L. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Section 9(a)(2) Manipulation Claims 

Against Vega and ...................................................................35

M. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleged Unjust Enrichment Against Vega And 

.........................................................................................36

II. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Sherman Act, CEA and Unjust Enrichment

Claims Against Defendant .................................................................36

III. Plaintiff Can Plausibly Allege Sherman Act, CEA and Unjust Enrichment

Claims Against Defendant ..............................................................39

IV. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Section 2(a)(1)(B) Claims Against All VTDs...................41

V. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Sherman Act, CEA and Unjust Enrichment Claims

Against Defendant ..........................................................................42

VI. Conclusion...........................................................................................43

Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Trader 7 Trader 11 Trader 8

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iii

Table of Authorities

Cases Page(s)

Bian v. MG Fin., LLC, No. R,

2009 WL 3863292 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 28, 2009)................................30

Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc.,

799 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2015), reh’g denied, 807 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2015) cert denied,

------ U.S. -----, 136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016)....................................14

Bogard v. Abraham–Reitz & Co. West, Inc.,

1984 WL 48236 (C.F.T.C. July 5, 1984)..................................29

Brian Hunter,

130 FERC ¶ 63004, 2010 WL 232835 (FERC Jan. 22, 2010).....................12

Carbone, et al. v. Brown University, et al., 

 2022 WL 3377249 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2022) ...............................14

Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc.,

758 F.3d 819) (7th Cir. July 2014).......................................4

CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, LLC,

523 F.Supp.2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).....................................12

Coyle Nissan, LLC v. Nissan North America, Inc.,

2020 WL 1469830 (S.D. Ind. March 26, 2020)..............................14

Gaines v. Chicago Board of Education,

2020 WL 1182767 (N.D. Ill. 2020)......................................13

In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commod. Litig.,

587 F.Supp.2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).....................................12

In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig.,

630 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2010)...........................................3

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iv

Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC,

244 F.R.D. 469 (N.D. Ill. 2007)........................................36

Lobb v. J.T. McKerr & Co.,

1989 WL 242384 (Dec. 14, 1989).......................................30

Mervyn v. Nelson Westerberg, Inc.,

2012 WL 6568338 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2012)..............................1, 25

Mish Int'l Monetary Inc. v. Vega Cap. London, Ltd.,

2022 WL 1202679 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2022).............................Passim

Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265 (1986)................................................14

Simpson v. Ferry,

202 F. Supp. 3d 444 (E.D. Pa. 2016).....................................14

Swanson v. Citibank, N.A.,

614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010) ..........................................4

U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Com’n v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C.,

 554 F.Supp.2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).....................................12

Statutes

7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B).............................................Passim

7 U.S.C. § 13c(a)...................................................33

7 U.S.C. § 9(1)....................................................31

7 U.S.C. § 9(a)(2) and 6(c)(1)........................................Passim

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Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)..................................................3

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)...........................................1, 27, 30

Regulations

17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1), (3)............................................31

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Plaintiff Mish International Monetary Inc. (“Plaintiff”) respectfully submits this 

Consolidated Memorandum and the accompanying Opposition Declaration of Christopher 

McGrath, Esq., (“McGrath.Decl.”)1in order to demonstrate that this Court should deny 

Defendants’ motions (ECF 135, 140, 143, and 146) to dismiss claims in the Second Amended 

Complaint (“SAC”) (ECF130).

As this Court has previously held:

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the truth of the complaint's wellpleaded factual allegations but not its legal conclusions. See Munson v. Gaetz, 673 

F.3d 630, 632 (7th Cir.2012); Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat'l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 

763 (7th Cir.2010). The court must construe those facts in the light most favorable 

to Mervyn, the party opposing dismissal. See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 864 

(7th Cir.2012). The court must also consider “documents attached to the 

complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and 

information that is subject to proper judicial notice,” along with additional facts 

set forth in Mervyn's brief opposing dismissal, so long as those facts “are 

consistent with the pleadings.” Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n. 

1 (7th Cir.2012). The following facts are set forth as favorably to Mervyn as 

permitted by the complaint and the other materials that must be considered on a 

Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Mervyn v. Nelson Westerberg, Inc., No. 11 C 6594, 2012 WL 6568338, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 

2012) (Feinerman, J) (“Mervyn”); see ECF 93 pp. 12-13. Plaintiff alleges that the Vega Trading 

Defendants2combined, conspired and agreed to manipulatively depress the prices of the May 

2020 NYMEX West Texas Intermediate (“WTI”) Light Sweet Crude Oil futures contract (“May 

1 The McGrath.Decl. attaches documents newly produced by Defendants Vega Capital London Ltd., and 

Defendant on July 28, 2022, i.e., well after Plaintiff filed the SAC and even after 

Defendants made their motions to dismiss. Plaintiff utilizes the newly produced documents in the context 

of argument below.

2 The Vega Trading Defendants are Defendants (“ ”), 

(“ ”), (“ ”), (“ ”), 

(“ ”), (“ ”), (“ ”), (“ ”), 

(“ ”), (“ ”), (“ ”), and 

(“ ”).

Individual A Trader 7 Trader 10 Trader 5 Trader 9 Trader 11

Trader 8

Trader 3 Trader 4 Trader 6

Trader 12

Trader 1 Trader 2

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Contract”) on April 20, 2020. SAC ¶1. 

In its initial Memorandum Opinion and Order, Mish Int'l Monetary Inc. v. Vega Cap. 

London, Ltd., No. 20 C 4577, 2022 WL 1202679, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2022) (“Mish”), this 

Court ruled that Plaintiff had plausibly stated all but one of its claims against eight Vega Trading 

Defendants: , , , , 

, , , and . These eight Defendants are 

sometimes referred to as the Senior Vega Defendants (“SVDs”).

This Court also ruled that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under Section 2(a)(1) of the 

Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §2(a)(1)(B), against the SVDs (Id. at *13-14), and did not 

state any claim against six Defendants: Vega Capital London, Ltd. (“Vega”), 

(“ ”), , , , . Id. at *12. The 

Court granted Plaintiff leave to replead. Id. at *14. Plaintiff filed its operative SAC on May 19, 

2022, ECF 130.

Regarding the SVDs’, this Court previously found:

- “The content of their [the SVDs] communications, along with the high degree of 

correlative trading among most of them, give rise to a highly plausible inference of an 

agreement among them.” Id. at *17. (Emphasis added).

- Plaintiff’s “eminently plausible” allegations of parallel conduct by the SVDs, in 

combination with “sufficiently alleged plus factors,” further support the inference of conspiracy. 

Id. at *8 (Emphasis added).

- Plaintiff “sufficiently alleged plus factors” against the SVDs to further support the 

inference of conspiracy. Id. at *9.

- Plaintiff stated “a viable [CEA] Section 9(a)(2) price manipulation claim” against 

the SVD. Id. at *10.

- Plaintiff’s fact allegations were “sufficient at the pleadings stage to allege the 

Individual A Trader 10 Trader 7 Trader 5 Trader 9 Trader 11 Trader 8 Trader 3 Trader 4 Trader 6

Trader 12

Trader 2 Trader 1 

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existence of an artificial price”. Id. at *10. 

- Plaintiff “plausibly allege[d] that Trading Defendants’ trading behavior caused 

the artificial price”. Id. at *11.

- The SVDs’ alleged communications “evidence[d] a concerted effort” by the 

SVDs to impact the market and, significantly, an effort to conceal the nature of their actions. Id. 

at *11. 

- Plaintiff stated a plausible Section 6(c)(1) manipulative conduct claim against the 

SVDs, satisfying even FRCP 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. Id. at *12.

- Plaintiff “plausibly” alleged that the SVDs acted “intentionally or recklessly” in 

violation of CFTC Regulation 180.1. Id. at *13. 

- Plaintiff “plausibly alleged” that the SVDs “knew of each other's intent to violate 

the CEA, intended to further those violations, and acted in furtherance of their common scheme” 

thereby establishing a viable Section 13 aiding and abetting CEA violation claim). Id. at *13. 

- Plaintiff plausibly alleged communications among the SVDs on April 20, 2020

that reflected “real-time trade coordination” and were “strongly indicative of coordination”. Id. at 

*9.

Among the communications that the Court found were “strongly indicative of 

coordination”, was the admission by shortly after trading closed on April 20, 2020, 

that: “

”. Id. [emphasis added].

I. The Motion By Vega And Should Be Denied 

Defendant above quoted statement, which the Court found to be one of the 

statements that was “strongly indicative of coordination”, likely (or at least plausibly) states or 

means that the SVDs had “ ” to develop/coordinate their 

trading together to blitz/move prices. See In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 

629 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.) (plausibility need not rise to the level of a “preponderance” but 

Individual A Trader 9 Trader 9's

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4

“must establish a nonnegligible probability”).

3

Consistent with this obvious (or at least plausible) interpretation of Defendant 

statement, Plaintiff has now alleged numerous new facts. These facts --- along with the new 

documents belatedly produced by Vega/ (McGrath.Decl. Ex. 10) --- gives rise to the 

reasonable inference that the VTDs traded together at Vega to blitz / move prices during at least 

2019-2020, including on the penultimate days of trading on WTI futures contracts. See infra; 

SAC e.g., ¶¶234, 255-61, 262-275, 281, 282, 284-85, 287, 298-99; see below (recounting 

reflected in 

the recent production). 

A. Defendants Vega And 

.

Defendants Vega and 

. SAC ¶ 281 [emphasis added]. Vega and 

 foregoing responsibility was not limited to only “completed and actual manipulations”. 

SAC ¶ 280. On the contrary, their responsibility was to “identify” any even “potential

manipulative trading activities”. Id. [emphasis added]. Merriam-Webster’s defines 

“potentially” as “in a potential or possible state or condition —used to describe the possible 

results or effects of something.” [emphasis added] https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/potentially Merriam-Webster’s defines “potential” as “existing in 

3 See also Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 826-27) (7th Cir. July 2014) (Citing Swanson v. 

Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2010) reversing and remanding the districts court’s 

dismissal and holding that plaintiff must include “enough details about the subject-matter of the case to 

present a story that holds together” at the pleadings stage to plausibly argue that the alleged events “could 

[ ] have happened, not did they happen”)).

Individual A's Individual A Individual A Individual A Trader 9's

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possibility: capable of development into actuality” or “expressing possibility”.

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/potential.

B. Vega / Agreed To Be Familiar With The Manipulation Alarms Under The 

Market Abuse Regulation, And Impliedly Agreed To Take Reasonable Steps To 

Prevent And Avoid Engaging In Such Manipulative Conduct 

Plaintiff newly alleges that Vega entered two agreements with its CME clearing member, 

GH Financials. SAC ¶¶243, 249. One agreement was the “GH FINANCIALS LIMITED 

TERMS OF BUSINESS FOR EXCHANGE TRADED FUTURES AND OPTIONS 

BUSINESS” (“2016 TOB”) (Version 15.1) dated July 12, 2016”. SAC ¶243; McGrath.Decl. Ex. 

1. The second agreement was the “Terms of Business for Exchange Traded Futures and Options 

Business” dated November 16, 2017. SAC ¶249; McGrath.Decl. Ex. 2. Section 27 of the 2016 

TOB required that Vega “

4

” (TOB §27 [ 

]). [Emphasis added] McGrath.Decl. Ex. 1 p. 11.

The “market abuse regime” referred to the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct 

Authority (FCA) Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). SAC ¶¶224-227. The MAR provided 

examples of market abuse conduct that serve, in effect, as alarms that actual or potential

manipulation has occurred/is occurring. Id. Plaintiff specifically alleges that various alarms 

4 TOB §46 [ ] provides 

. McGrath.Decl. Ex. 1 (TOB 

§46).

Individual A

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provided by the Market Abuse Regulation apply to 

(a) the SVDs’ abuse of the Trade-At-Settlement (“TAS”), compare UK MAR Annex 

1A(g) with SAC ¶¶86, 276-77, 227;

(b) the SVDs’ buildup of a substantial net selling pressure position that would be

liquidated based on the price established by the TAS, compare UK MAR Annex 1A(a) and 

1A(g) with SAC ¶¶276-77, 227;

(c) the SVDs’ intentional explosions in the amounts and frequencies of their sales late in 

the day around the time the TAS approached, compare UK MAR Annex 1A(b) and 1A(g) with 

SAC ¶¶276-77, 227;

(d) the SVDs’ success in significantly moving prices through a high volume of trading 

during the time leading up to the fixing of the TAS, compare UK MAR Annex 1A(b) and 1A(g) 

with SAC ¶¶276-77, 227; and

(e) the significant bounce back of prices on the trading days following the removal from 

the market of the SVDs’ manipulative conduct. Compare UK MAR Annex 1A(e) with SAC 

¶227; 277.

Specifically, the MAR manipulation alarms include:

(a) the extent to which orders to trade given or transactions undertaken represent a 

significant proportion of the daily volume of transactions in the relevant financial 

instrument ..., in particular when those activities lead to a significant change in their 

prices;

(b) the extent to which orders to trade given or transactions undertaken by persons with a 

significant buying or selling position in a financial instrument..., lead to significant 

changes in the price of that financial instrument, related spot commodity contract, or 

auctioned product based on emission allowances; 

****

(e) the extent to which orders to trade given or transactions undertaken are concentrated 

within a short time span in the trading session and lead to a price change which is 

subsequently reversed;

****

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(g) the extent to which orders to trade are given or transactions are undertaken at or 

around a specific time when reference prices, settlement prices and valuations are 

calculated and lead to price changes which have an effect on such prices and valuations.

SAC ¶227, quoting Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) (“UK 

MAR”) Annex IA. (Indicators of manipulative behavior relating to false or misleading signals 

and to price securing).

Based on Vega/ “responsibility” to identify potentially manipulative trading 

activities as well as Vega’s explicit contract duty to be familiar with the MAR, and status 

as a registered representative of Starmark and as sole owner and principal of Vega while also

serving as a daily active part of Vega’s risk management team, Vega/ were required to 

prevent and avoid manipulative conduct, including the recurrence of conduct that set off MAR 

manipulation alarms.

C. During At Least 2019-2020, The SVDs Repeatedly Engaged At Vega In Conduct

To Manipulate Prices, Including On The Penultimate Trading Day Of Various 

WTI Futures Contracts.

1. The SVDs’ Conduct Repeatedly Set Off MAR Manipulation Alarms

Consistent with the plain (or at least plausible) meaning of Defendant admission

(quoted at p. 4 above), Plaintiff now plausibly alleges that:

a. the SVDs not only manipulated the May Contract on its penultimate trading day

but also manipulated the CME April 2020 WTI futures contract (“April Contract”) on its 

penultimate trading day, March 19, 2020. SAC ¶¶262-275. 

b.

SAC ¶¶ 26, 266-67.

c. The SVDs’ manipulative conduct on the penultimate trading day of the April 

Contract was almost identical to their conduct in the May Contract on April 20, except that the 

Individual A's Individual A's Individual A Trader 9's

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amount of trading was approximately only one half as much (that is, the VTDs’ were continuing 

to practice and improve their coordinated blitzing of futures contracts). Compare ¶264 (the 

amount of April Contract trading by each SVD during each time window on March 19) with

¶138 (the amount of May Contract trading by each SVD on April 20th).

d. The VTDs’ trading on other days amounted to hunting for thinly traded contracts 

which would prove to be sufficiently thinly traded that Defendants could use their coordinated 

blitzing to manipulate prices in those contracts. SAC ¶¶288-292. 

e. Scrupulously sourced journalism which Plaintiff earlier cited, has now won 

prestigious awards. SAC ¶¶ 255-58, 282; SAC Ex. 1, 2. Such award-winning journalism reports, 

based on a substantial variety of well-placed sources:

- “U.S. authorities and investigators from [CME subsidiary] NYMEX trawled through 

trading data for insights into who exactly was driving the action on April 20.

According to people familiar with their thinking, they were shocked to discover that 

the firm that appeared to have had the biggest impact on prices that afternoon

was... Vega Capital London Ltd.” [Emphasis added] SAC Ex. 1, p. 1, (“The Essex 

Boys: How Nine Traders Hit a Gusher With Negative Oil,” Bloomberg, Liam 

Vaughan, (December 10, 2020)).

- “Defendants’ aggressive selling of oil on April 20th is a tactic Vega’s traders used 

regularly, according to another person familiar with the firm’s strategy.” SAC

Ex. 2 [emphasis added] (Bloomberg, August 4, 2020, “London Traders Hit $500 

Million Jackpot When Oil Went Negative”).

- “trading records and people who worked alongside them [the VTDs] indicate they 

[the VTDs] frequently operated in a similar fashion, buying or selling in the same 

direction at key moments.” [Emphasis added] SAC Ex. 1, p. 3.

Also consistent with the plain meaning of Defendant “ ” admission, 

Plaintiff further newly alleges in detail that the SVDs manipulated the WTI April Contract on 

March 19, 2020. E.g.:

264. On March 19, 2020, the Vega Trading Defendants sold approximately 

 April 2020 contracts, purchased approximately May 2020 contracts, 

purchased approximately April 2020 contracts via TAS and sold 

Trader 9's

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9

approximately May 2020 contracts via TAS. Specifically, the Vega 

Trading Defendants traded the April and May 2020 NYMEX WTI crude oil 

futures contracts in the following volumes. 

265. The foregoing short April and long May “spread” positions, along with the

corresponding TAS orders to buy the April contract and sell May contract at their 

respective settlement prices, gave each of the above Vega Trading Defendants 

an incentive to depress the price of the April contract relative to the price of the 

May contract.

SAC ¶¶264-65 [emphasis added]. Plaintiff then makes detailed allegations of how much the 

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SVDs’ sold within each time period on March 19 and the resulting effect on prices. SAC ¶¶268-

275.

Plaintiff’s foregoing allegations reflect numerous similarities between the SVDs’ conduct 

and its effects on March 19, and the SVDs’ conduct and its effects on April 20th.

5 First, the 

SVDs engaged in a sell sell sell and don’t buy strategy in which they injected substantial net 

selling pressure into the April Contract. Compare SAC ¶¶264, 284 (April Contract) with ¶¶144, 

162 (May Contract) and Mish at *2 (this Court notes the price depressive effects of net selling 

pressure). Second, the SVDs sold at a rate between 8:00 am and 12:29 pm that averaged 

approximately April contracts per minute for a total sale of April Contracts during the 

8:00 am and 12:29 pm portion of March 19th. ¶¶264, 272. 

Third, after gradually building up this net selling pressure on the April Contract and 

developing a substantial financial motive in the outcome of the TAS price, the SVDs then greatly 

ramped up their rate of selling to approximately contracts per minute between 12:30pm and 

the close of trading at 1:30 pm. That is, the SVDs sold at a rate that was times higher during 

the last hour of trading then their rate during the first four and a half hours of the day. Compare

¶272 with ¶¶128-144 (Defendants also sold at a much higher rate per minute during the last 30 

minutes of trading on April 20 in the May Contract than their rate of selling prior to the last 30 

minutes) and Mish, *4, 11. Fourth, during the last half hour of trading on March 19, the Vega 

traders ramped up their April Contract sales to a rate of contracts per minute (SAC ¶270) 

which was times their rate of selling during the first four and a half hours of trading. See 

5 Plaintiff did not receive production of the same level of detail for the April Contract as for the trading by 

the SVDs in the May Contract; accordingly, Plaintiff could not allege numerous additional facts, such as 

the minute to minute trading correlation, for which they had sufficient information to allege as to the May 

Contract.

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11

SAC ¶264; see Mish at *4, 11.

During the last two minutes of trading on March 19th, the SVDs further accelerated their 

sales to a rate of contracts per minute (SAC ¶271) which was times the rate of their 

selling during the first 81% of the trading day, i.e., 8am - 12:30pm. SAC ¶264. The above

trading activity, as well as the percentage that the SVDs’ trading constituted of the entire 

market’s trading are summarized below:

Mar 19, 2020 Sale Apr % of market volume Sales per minute

Whole day 

Final hour 

Last 1/2 hour 

Last 2 minutes 

By selling April contracts and buying May contracts in the thin trading on March 19, 

the SVDs put substantial pressure on the April-to-May price spread. Bloomberg reports the 

spread between those contracts stood at -0.46 (minus 46 cents) at the close of trading on March 

18, 2020. By 12:30 pm on March 19, that spread stood at -0.53. ¶269. It declined to -0.65 by 

1:28 pm and fell again in the final two minutes of trading to settle at -0.69 at 1:30 pm. ¶271. This 

extraordinary closing spread price was four standard deviations from the mean for that spread 

during the prior year. ¶273; compare SAC ¶135 (the May Contract closing price on April 20 

constituted an all-time record low). 

The following day, March 20, the selling April/buying May pressure from the SVDs was 

removed from the market for April Contracts. With the removal of such manipulative pressure, 

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the April May spread posted an enormous rebound to settle at -0.20. ¶274.6 This strongly 

indicates that, on March 19, 2020, the SVDs manipulatively depressed the price of the April 

Contract relative to the price of the May Contract, and that prices bounced back to nonmanipulated level after the SVDs trading was removed from the market.

More important, the SVDs manipulated the market through the same manipulative 

trading pattern which the SVDs’ used in the May Contract, and had been developing “ ”

(according to Defendant ). SAC ¶260. However, the SVDs approximately doubled the size 

of their selling and caused a much greater amount of price distortion in the May Contract than 

even the substantial distortion they caused in the April Contract. SAC ¶¶298-99. Also, the SVDs 

made significant profits on March 19 (SAC ¶275) and the percentage that the SVDs’ total trading

in the April Contract constituted of the total April Contract volume that day, is consistent with 

the percentages of trading in other energy contracts which were found to be manipulative.

7

Plaintiff does not have any records of Vega’s trading sufficient to understand what Vega 

was doing prior to March 19, 2020. That is, the only two penultimate days of trading in a 

NYMEX WTI contract for which Plaintiff had records sufficient to permit inferences, are March 

19 and April 20, 2020. These records overwhelmingly show that the SVDs engaged in essentially 

the exact same coordinated blitzing in the April Contract as the May Contract. Albeit, the 

6 Though not alleged in the SAC, based on Bloomberg trading data for the 55 trading days prior to March 

19, the 0.49 change from Mar 19 to Mar 20 is more than 11 standard deviations from the mean daily 

change of -0.016 for that period. Moreover, this 49 cent movement in the April May spread was its

highest daily change for the 300 trading days going back to January 2019. 

7 E.g., Brian Hunter, 130 FERC ¶ 63004, 2010 WL 232835 (FERC Jan. 22, 2010) (finding --- based on 

the same facts as were at issue in CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, LLC, 523 F.Supp.2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), 

reconsideration denied, 554 F.Supp.2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) and In re Amaranth Nat. Gas Commod. 

Litig., 587 F.Supp.2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) --- that the alleged manipulators’ trades constituted at 

least 14.4% of the trading volume during the closing period, which was sufficient to sustain three 

separate manipulations of natural gas futures contracts). 

Trader 9

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expanded size of the SVDs’ trading in the May Contract greatly increased the amount of the 

manipulative pressure on prices on April 20th. 

Finally, based on the recent production by Defendants and Plaintiff’s continuing 

investigation, Plaintiff has good grounds to believe and would allege in an amended complaint 

that production of the SVDs’ trading records at Vega for 2019-2020 (especially in the NYMEX 

WTI contract on the penultimate day) will reveal further examples of the SVDs’ “pushing one 

another so hard ... to blitz the market” through making rapid trades in unison or at similar times.

Although Plaintiff has not had access to any such records, the sources in two award-winning

articles, “The Essex Boys: How Nine Traders Hit a Gusher With Negative Oil” and “The Day Oil 

Went Negative, These Unlikely Traders Made $660 Million”, did have access to extensive

information. These two articles have now received the 2021 British Journalism Awards for 

Crime and Legal Affairs Journalism. SAC ¶¶257-58; SAC Ex. 1, and 2. Specifically, these nowaward winning articles: (a) carefully disclosed that the reporters had based their statements upon 

information from various sources who either had seen the Vega traders’ “trading records”, were 

“people who worked alongside” the Vega Trading Defendants, or included “a person familiar 

with the firm’s strategy” (Id. ¶¶255-56, 258-61); and (b) reported, based upon such authoritative 

sources, that the Vega traders “regularly” or “frequently” traded in “unison” (at Vega), “buying 

or selling in the same direction at key moments.” Id.

2. Non-Award Winning News Articles Have Repeatedly Provided One Part Of 

The Plausible Bases For Allegations Of Misconduct And Knowledge Thereof

Non-award winning news articles and reports have repeatedly provided one part of the 

plausible bases for allegations of misconduct and knowledge thereof.8 Here, Plaintiff relies on 

8

e.g., Gaines v. Chicago Board of Education, 2020 WL 1182767, *3 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (court finds claims 

of constitutional deprivations involving beating of student at school were sufficiently alleged and 

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14

the combination of all the foregoing items, including Defendant admission; the extensive 

allegations of the March 19 blitzing of the market; the 

explicit contract duty of Vega/ to identify the trading activity here as at least “potentially” 

manipulative because it triggered all four MAR red flags quoted above; and the other facts 

developed above. In that context, and given admission that strongly indicates the VTDs 

engaged in this conduct “ ”, the award-winning articles’ strongly sourced reporting that 

the VTDs regularly engaged in trading in unison or trading rapidly together at key times to move 

prices, at least plausibly indicates that there were many more instances of VTD blitzing at Vega 

which Vega and witnessed.

D. During 2019-2020, Vega / Repeatedly Observed The SVDs’ At Least 

“Potentially Manipulative Trading Activities” Especially On The Penultimate 

Days Of Trading In WTI Contracts And In Other Contracts In Which There 

Was Potentially Low Volume Of Trading.

In carrying out their responsibility to view trading activity in Vega’s accounts for the 

purposes of identifying “potentially manipulative trading activities”, Vega and were 

obligated to “continuously monitor” Vega’s trades. SAC ¶¶278-280. Through such monitoring, 

supported not only by assertions of de facto policy of failing to investigate or discipline staff regarding 

student beatings but also through complaint’s reference to a 2009 investigative report documenting many 

sustained allegations of similar school beatings at Chicago Public Schools and noting that relatively few 

staff were terminated in response); Simpson v. Ferry, 202 F. Supp. 3d 444, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (relying 

partly on news articles attached to the complaint to conclude that a Monell claimant had plausibly alleged 

a municipal custom of tolerating excessive force.”); Coyle Nissan, LLC v. Nissan North America, Inc.,

2020 WL 1469830 (S.D. Ind. March 26, 2020) (sustains amended complaint on motion to dismiss and 

notes that plaintiff, operating a Nissan car dealership first became aware of the “ Illegal Incentive 

Program” for certain car dealers being alleged in its complaint through a news article detailing another 

Nissan dealer's involvement in said illegal program and a similar lawsuit); Carbone, et al. v. Brown 

University, et al., 2022 WL 3357249, *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2022) (court upholds Sherman Act, Section 1 

antitrust complaint and finds plausible plaintiffs’ definition of a relevant market that is derived from U.S.

World & News Report rankings of certain elite private national universities from 2001 to 2021); see also

Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 639-640, n.1 (7th Cir. 2015) (“no reason why 

[plaintiff] may not also add [to amended complaint] even non-evidentiary materials (such as newspaper 

articles) to illustrate what she plans to prove...”), reh'g denied, 807 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 

––– U.S. ––––, 136 S. Ct. 1607 (2016); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 269, n.1 (1986)(in reviewing 

complaint court is not precluded “from taking notice of items in the public record”).

Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Trader 9's Trader 9's

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Vega and observed (a) The SVDs behavior on March 19, 2020 (SAC ¶¶264, 269-271, 

275); (b) The SVDs behavior on a larger scale on April 20, 2020 (SAC ¶¶137-144, 159-163, 

202); (c) The strong similarity in the SVDs’ conduct on the penultimate days of the April 

Contract and the May Contract (SAC ¶¶137-144, 202, 262-275, 284-286); (d) The SVDs’ 

hunting for thin contracts in which to trade and potentially manipulate (SAC ¶¶138, 144, 264, 

269, 27); and (e) All the other times during the prior years when the SVDs worked together to 

blitz markets. SAC ¶¶7, 178, 260-61; see above.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, it is at least very plausible that Defendants 

Vega and repeatedly watched the SVDs engage at Vega in “potentially manipulative 

activities” that managed to set off all four MAR manipulation alarms quoted above. But

Defendants Vega and did nothing to “identify” this potentially manipulative activity. Only 

because of this were the SVDs able to ramp up their manipulative trading activities to its highest 

levels on April 20 to “blitz” and overwhelm the May Contract. Defendant was registered 

with the FCA as an appointed representative of both Starmark and Vega. SAC ¶38. Defendant 

 had top roles in compliance, including at for at least a dozen years prior to 

April 20, 2020. SAC ¶293. Defendant well knew the MAR manipulation alarms. Despite 

the fact that four separate alarms were simultaneously ringing after the VTDs’ March 19 blitz of 

the April Contract on its penultimate day, Vega and still did not identify any potentially 

manipulative trading by the SVDs. 

E. Vega / Repeatedly Committed Breaches Of Their Responsibility To 

“Identify” And Prevent The SVDs Potentially Manipulative Trading Which Set 

Off MAR Manipulation Alarms

The trading activities by the SVDs on March 19 and April 20 constitute potentially 

manipulative trading activities under not just one but all four of the MAR provisions quoted 

Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A

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above. First, the SVDs’ transactions represent a “significant portion of the volume” in the 

respective contracts (SAC ¶272(e) of the April Contract on March 19 (during the final 30 

minutes of trading) and ¶144(e) of the May Contract on April 20 (during the last 

approximately 22 minutes of trading)). Compare UK MAR, Annex I (a) (quoted at SAC ¶227) 

with SAC ¶¶128-144, 154-163, 262-275. Second, the SVDs clearly had a “significant buying or 

selling position” in the respective contracts, and their end of day trades did “lead to significant 

changes in the price” of that contract. Compare UK MAR, Annex I (b) (quoted at SAC ¶227) 

with SAC ¶¶128-144, 154-163, 262-275. Third, the SVDs did “concentrate” a large amount of 

their trades within a short time span in the trading session which led to a price change which was 

subsequently reversed. Compare UK MAR, Annex I (e) (quoted at SAC ¶227) with SAC ¶¶13-

15, 128-144, 154-163, 203-208, 262-275, 284. Fourth, the increase in the SVDs’ trading during 

the last 30 minutes and 60 minutes on March 19 and April 20 occurred “around a specific time 

when reference prices, settlement prices and valuations are calculated”. Compare UK MAR, 

Annex I (g) (quoted at SAC ¶227) with SAC ¶¶41-58, 81, 86, 90, 143-144, 163, 195-202, 269-

274, 288. Fifth, the large changes in prices caused by the SVDs specifically led to price changes 

which had a substantial “effect on such prices and valuations” of the TAS determinant of such 

Defendants’ financial outcome. Compare UK MAR, Annex I (g) (quoted at SAC ¶227) with

SAC ¶¶2, 86-91, 106-112, 127-144, 201-202, 262-275. Sixth, the price change caused by the 

SVDs’ manipulative trading was “subsequently reversed” on the very next trading day 

notwithstanding the fact that supply and demand remained similar. Compare UK MAR, Annex I

(e) (quoted at SAC ¶227) with SAC ¶¶12-15, 273-274, 284, 359-360.

Despite the fact that all four MAR manipulation alarms were simultaneously ringing, 

Vega/ still failed to identify and prevent “potentially manipulative trading activities”.

Individual A

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F. Because Of Vega’s Substantial Profit Interest In The Outcome Of Vega Traders’ 

Trading, Vega And Made Substantial Profits By Repeatedly Breaching 

Their Duty To Identify And Prevent The SVDs’ Manipulative Trading.

Plaintiff newly alleges expressly the relative magnitude of Vega’s share of the profits of 

Vega Trading Defendants and . SAC ¶¶36, 122. Plaintiff further alleged that if 

Vega had a or a interest in such profits in the May Contract on April 20th, Vega’s 

profit interests would be between times and times more than total commissions that 

Vega made that day on the VTDs trading in the May Contract. SAC ¶¶217-221. This strong 

profit interest in the successful and completed manipulation provided Vega with a financial 

motive not to “identify” the potentially manipulative trading activities. Id.

Such large profit interest strongly further supports a finding that Vega and 

repeatedly saw potentially manipulative trading but failed to identify same. 

Defendants point out that in the SAC, Plaintiff described the initial funding of the Vega

Sub-Accounts as: “ 

” 

(SAC ¶239(g)). ECF 148 p.7. But Plaintiff did not correctly quote language 

 (the Vega- (“ ”) Agreement, McGrath.Decl. Ex 

3, §1.1) 

Individual A Individual A

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 (Vega- agreement, 

McGrath.Decl. Ex 3, §§6.1- 6.3 [ ])

 (Vegaagreement, McGrath.Decl. Ex 3, §3 [ ]) 

 (Vega- agreement, 

McGrath.Decl. Ex 3, §5 [ ])

Accordingly, the actual language of the Vega- agreement (McGrath.Decl. Ex 3) 

contradicts Vega’s following statements (which, again, are heavily based on Plaintiff’s slight 

misquote in the SAC of the agreement’s language): “ 

 cited by Mish in paragraphs 239 and 240-242 of its second amended complaint was 

” (ECF 148 p.7), and “the customers were using their own funds and 

their own discretion to make trades while using Vega’s subaccounts to do so.” Id. p.8). 

1. Fragment And Sub-Account Funding

For the first time Plaintiff has received in the most recent discovery production 

, in 

Trader 8

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this case for , based on two fragmentary WhatsApp communications between 

 and . ( Fragment Vega_Mish_000043353 and 

Fragment Vega_Mish_000043355)

In the communication, 

 ( Fragment,

McGrath.Decl. Ex.9).

While the fragment produced is not sufficiently comprehensive to ascertain what amounts 

were contributed by whom to activate the , Plaintiff’s interpretation is that:

 ( 

Fragment, McGrath.Decl. Ex.9) Again, Plaintiff’s interpretation is that these references to 

different splits at various account funding levels show or strongly indicate that had an 

ongoing profit-sharing arrangement with Vega and perhaps .

Thus, under the correct language of the Vega- Agreement and the newly produced 

profit splitting document (which was produced after Vega filed its motion to dismiss), 

Plaintiff’s interpretation is that Vega did fund or may have funded other VTD sub-accounts. To 

that extent, Vega would also have had further profit-sharing agreements with the VTDs (in 

addition to Vega’s profit-sharing rights as to Defendants and ). 

Trader 11 Trader 8 Trader 8 Trader 8 Trader 8 Trader 8 Trader 8 Trader 8 Trader 8 Trader 4 Trader 4 Trader 12 Trader 8

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G. The Long Relations And Interchanging Roles Of The Principals Of Vega And 

, Further Plausibly Indicate That Vega And Intentionally Helped The 

SVDs Manipulate Prices.

 and Defendant worked together for many years beginning in 2007

at (“ ”). ¶¶116, 234, 293. On May 13, 2016, the business 

partner of Defendant , , incorporated Vega Capital London Ltd. SAC 

¶30. On July 12, 2016, executed, for Vega, its agreement with GH Financials. Id. ¶243. 

In Autumn 2017, Vega, per and , per , executed a 

. SAC ¶238. The agreement was made between and among 

. Id. 

Until April 1, 2021, was owned 25% by Defendant , 25% by 

 (believed to be ), and 50% by who was 

another trader and FCA approved representative of Starmark. SAC ¶210.

On April 1, 2021, filing with the Companies House disclosed for the first time that 

Defendant was also a person with a significant interest and, in fact, control of . SAC 

¶211. The filing disclosed that “holds, directly or indirectly, 75% or more of the voting 

rights in the company”, and that and were removed as 

directors of . Id.

On March 1, 2022, was dissolved pursuant to an application co-signed by 

Defendants and , and no further information was provided. Id. 212. That is, the 

sole owner of Vega, assumed voting control of before it was dissolved. SAC ¶¶210-212.

Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Trader 1 Trader 1 Trader 1 Trader 1 Trader 1 Trader 1's

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On November 9, 2018, , and incorporated 

 as a private limited company (Company No. ). SAC ¶233.

According to Companies House records, resigned as Director on October 7, 2019 and 

was replaced the same day by , identified as “Derivatives Trader.” Id.

Vega went through four owners in the three years ending 2020. SAC ¶34. By February 3, 

2020, was the sole owner of Vega. SAC ¶236. But , who founded Vega, 

maintains a residence in Dubai. On April 20, a communicated with

. McGrath.Decl. Ex. 8, VEGA_MISH_000000021. In this text exchange, 

said to Defendant “

”. Id. If discovery shows that is , then the founder 

of Vega 

. 

Earlier on April 20, former business partner and 

 were . McGrath.Decl. Ex. 4. 

 Id.

As of May 31, 2020, Vega was holding in excess of $ . McGrath Decl. Ex. 6. 

As of May 31, 2021, Vega had roughly $ . Id. Ex. 7. Although Vega 

, Defendant as the sole owner of Vega 

caused Vega to release roughly $ from Vega. Because the Vega traders profits were 

believed to be in excess of $ , it is not known how much of the transfers went to Vega 

traders and how much went to Defendant . 

Individual A Individual A Individual A Trader 5 Trader 5 Trader 4 Trader 1 Trader 1

Trader 2

Trader 2

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H. Separately, Plaintiffs’ New Allegations Also Show That Vega Is Additionally 

Responsible For The VTDs’ Conduct On April 20 (And Before) Because Vega 

Was The Principal And The VTDs Were Acting For Vega In Committing Such 

Conduct.

1. Under The Vega-GH Financials Agreement, Vega Was The Principal And 

The VTDs Were Acting As Vega’s Agents.

Plaintiff has newly quoted at length from the agreement which Vega made with its 

Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”) clearing broker, GH Financials, dated July 12th, 2016. 

SAC ¶¶243-248.

243. Pursuant to a “GH FINANCIALS LIMITED TERMS OF BUSINESS FOR 

EXCHANGE TRADED FUTURES AND OPTIONS BUSINESS” (“TOB”) (Version 

15.1) dated July 12, 2016, and signed by on behalf of Vega Capital 

London Ltd., Vega agreed in entering its relationship with GH Financials that: (f) 

 TOB ¶27 (f). 

 [Emphasis added.]

244. Vega Expressly Agreed That Trades In Its Accounts Would Be Made On Vega’s 

Behalf By Authorized Persons. Pursuant to Vega’s agreement with GH Financials, only 

“ ” of Vega were permitted to perform acts on behalf of Vega. 

 TOB ¶9 [Emphasis added]. 

245. Plaintiff alleges that an “act” under ¶9 of Vega’s Agreement with GH Financials 

quoted above, included the placing of “orders”, and the holding of orders that were 

“executed” as trades.

246. Each Vega Trading Defendant typically placed “orders” for its subaccount which 

were “executed” by GH Financials. 

247. As such, pursuant to Vega’s TOB with GH Financials, ¶9, each Vega Trading 

Defendant was acting either as Vega’s “officer, employee, or agent” or had otherwise 

been granted “authority” by Vega to “act on ... behalf” of Vega to enter trades, or had 

otherwise been granted authority by Vega in its trades. 

248. Plaintiff further alleges that, pursuant to TOB ¶9, Vega was the “principal” for all 

trades made by each Vega Trading Defendant.

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SAC ¶¶243-248.

Thus, Vega clearly agreed with GH Financials that Vega’s trades in its accounts with GH 

Financials were made by Vega acting as “principal” and sole beneficial owner (but not as trustee 

where you have full authority from the sole beneficial owner)”. SAC ¶243 quoting the Vega GH 

Financial Terms of Business ¶27. Vega also agreed that the persons (like the Vega traders) who 

entered orders for Vega were acting as Vega’s “officers, employees, or agents”. SAC ¶244 

quoting TOB ¶9. Because the Vega traders were not officers or employees of Vega, then, under 

the Vega-GH Financials agreement, the Vega traders were acting as Vega’s “agents” in entering 

their orders for Vega. Id.

Vega/ argue that the language in TOB ¶27(f) that provides “(or you have full 

authority from the beneficial owner)” supposedly is applicable to Vega’s fact situation with the 

VTDs which, accordingly, means that Plaintiff’s interpretation that Vega was acting as a 

principal cannot be plausible. ECF 147 p. 11. However, with full knowledge of the agreement 

that Vega had made with GH Financials, Vega then turned around approximately 15 months later 

and entered an agreement with (“ ”). SAC ¶238. This 

agreement was dated “ ”, and was open to and subscribed by those Vega Trading Defendants 

which agreed to its terms. Id. Nowhere in the Vega- Agreement was there any provision that 

the Vega traders were the “sole beneficial owners” of the trades or the sub-accounts Vega 

provided for them. McGrath.Decl.Ex.3 (the agreement) passim; SAC ¶¶238-239. 

2. Under The Vega- Agreement, Vega Was The Principal And The VTDs 

Were Independent Contractors.

On the contrary, the Vega- Agreement provided as follows:

Individual A

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SAC ¶239. 

Thus, Vega was the principal which retained and the “ ” to perform services 

on behalf of Vega. SAC ¶239(a)-(c). But the Vega traders were not the “ ” of 

the sub-accounts or the trades therein. On the contrary, the sub-accounts would “ 

” of the agreement, “ 

” else whether contained in the Agreement “ ”. SAC¶239 (h) quoting from 

Section 6.2 of the agreement. Therefore, Vega/ argument that the controlling language of 

the Vega-GH Financials agreement is the “ ” 

parenthetical phrase in TOB ¶27(f), is directly contrary to the Vega- agreement. That 

agreement provides that 

. SAC¶239(h). Further, the VTDs’ rights were dumbed down solely to 

rights to withdraw profits in certain situations in which the definition of profits could be 

satisfied. SAC¶239(n). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations that Vega was the “ ” under 

the Vega-GH Financials agreement is at least plausible (and in fact is the only possible 

construction, given the Vega- agreement’s provision that Vega was the principal which 

retained and engaged the VTDs). Mervyn v. Nelson Westerberg, Inc., No. 11 C 6594, 2012 WL 

6568338, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2012) (Feinerman, J.) (Feinerman, J) (the Court assumes the 

truth of the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations and must construe those facts in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing dismissal).

Although the Vega traders were independent contractors under the Vega- agreement, 

they were acting as “ ” of Vega in entering the orders into the market and under the terms 

of the market facing agreement between Vega and GH Financials. Thus, the VegaIndividual A's

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agreement carefully provided that “nothing in this agreement” would make the VTDs into agents 

or employees. Agreement Section 20.1, quoted in SAC ¶239(f). But, unlike other provisions in 

the Vega- Agreement, the language did not specify that “nothing in this agreement” “or 

elsewhere” (compare Vega- Agreement 6.2) would make the VTDs into agents of Vega.

In sum, both the Vega-GH Financials agreement and the Vega- Agreement make 

clear that Vega is the principal. But whereas the Vega-GH Financials agreement states that the 

VTDs are acting as “agents” in entering their trades, the Vega- agreement states that they 

were “acting as independent contractors” and, moreover, “nothing in this agreement” would 

make them into agents. Again, the Vega agreement did not specify that nothing “anywhere 

else” would make the VTDs into agents. Accordingly, reading the two agreements together, 

when the VTDs placed their orders and held their positions in the respective sub-accounts at 

Vega, Vega was the principal and the Vega traders were acting for Vega as agents. Solely for 

purposes of the Vega- agreement, the VTDs acted as independent contractors.

I. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Section 2(a)(1)(B) Claims Against Vega and 

Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Commodity Exchange Act provides:

The act, omission, or failure of any official, agent, or other person acting for any 

individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust within the scope of his 

employment or office shall be deemed the act, omission, or failure of such 

individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust, as well as of such official, 

agent, or other person. 

7 U.S.C. §2(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).

Under a literalist interpretation of the foregoing language, Plaintiff need only show (1)

that the VTDs were “persons acting for” Vega and (2) that the VTD’s act was “within the 

scope... of his office”. If those showings are made, then the VTD’s act “shall be deemed the 

act” of Vega.

Individual A

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Vega does not contest that, in entering the orders for Vega, the VTDs were acting on 

behalf of Vega. Nor does Vega contend that the VTDs were not acting “within the scope...of the 

office” for Vega when the VTDs made their trades. ECF 148 passim. In the Vegaagreement, Vega retained and engaged the Vega traders exactly in order to perform the 

“services” of making trades in “futures or options” on behalf of Vega. SAC ¶239(a)- (n) (quoting 

contract language). Similarly, under the Vega-GH Financials TOB agreement, the VTDs were 

agents acting on behalf of the principal, Vega, when the VTDs entered orders. Thus, under the 

plain meaning of the statutory language, and the plain meanings of the language in both the 

Vega-GH Financials agreement and the Vega- agreement, the VTDs were acting within the 

“scope of [their] ... office” for Vega when they made and held their transactions. See “H.1” and 

“H.2” above. 

Vega’s motion does not even mention much less challenge Plaintiff’s new allegations 

concerning these portions of Vega’s operative agreements. Compare ECF 148, passim. Unable to 

meaningfully challenge Plaintiff’s new allegations concerning Vega’s own written agreements, 

Vega and rehash the same arguments they previously asserted in its prior Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion. ECF No. 148, pp. 18-21. Each of Vega’s arguments fails. None of them is sufficient to 

demonstrate Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Vega and are liable under Section 

2(a)(1)(B). 

First, Vega argues that Plaintiff is “making the same fundamental allegations as it did in 

the amended complaint.” ECF No. 148, p. 19. This is wholly incorrect. Unlike the amended 

complaint, Plaintiff now alleges Vega agreed in writing to act as principal for each transaction in 

its accounts and further agreed that persons trading in Vega’s accounts would be acting on its 

behalf. SAC, ¶¶243-244. The SAC also now alleges that the Vega Agreement 

Individual A Individual A

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provided that Vega was in the business of trading futures and that Vega engaged the VTDs to 

provide “services” of trading futures and options for Vega. See SAC ¶239. Vega has failed to 

address virtually all of these new allegations (except Vega’s incorrect “sole beneficial owner”

challenge, which Plaintiff addressed in “H” above).

Second, Vega points to the Vega- Agreement and asserts that the VTDs were 

responsible for making their own trading decisions and supposedly traded their own money.9

ECF 148, p. 20. But agents or persons acting on behalf of a “proprietary trading firm” (i.e.,

Vega) under an agreement such as the Vega- agreement have been retained by the 

proprietary trading firm to make trades on its behalf. The first step is when the VTD makes the 

trade. It is then “acting for Vega” within the meaning of Section 2(a)(1)(B) both because Vega 

has retained the VTD to provide this service of making trades, and because, under the Vega-GH 

Financials agreement, . See Section “H.1” and “H.2”. Step two

is when the VTD holds the trade in the sub-account (absent special permission, trades were not 

to be held overnight). Because each Vega sub-account “notwithstanding anything else” was the 

property of Vega, such step of “holding” the trade was also taken on behalf of Vega. SAC 

¶239(h). Step three is the sale of the contract which, again, the VTD does as the agent for Vega 

(under the GH Financials agreement) or acting for Vega under the Vega- agreement.

Accordingly, to the fullest extent that the VTDs made their own trading decisions, they were 

“acting for” Vega in doing so.

Vega’s foregoing argument also runs into the responsibility of Vega and “for 

viewing trading activity in Vega’s accounts for the purpose of identifying potentially 

9 As Plaintiff previously explained, the actual language of the Vega- agreement provided that 

. See “F” above. Accordingly, the money in the 

VTDs’ accounts may have come from the VTDs, Vega, or some combination. 

Individual A

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manipulative trading activities”. SAC ¶280. Vega and were themselves responsible to 

make decisions to stop and prevent MAR abuses and other “potentially manipulative trading 

activities”. Thus, whenever the VTDs made decisions to engage in “potentially manipulative 

trading”, those decisions overlapped with the decision of Vega and to prevent and avoid 

such conduct. That is, decisions relating to manipulative trading in Vega’s sub-accounts had to 

be made by both the VTD and Vega and in their supervisory roles in order for the trading 

activity to remain in place. Vega’s “control” of the VTDs, including control of its trading 

decisions, is not an element of or required for Section 2(a)(1)(B) liability. But Vega and 

did have such “control” over manipulative trading and “potentially manipulative trading”.

Third, Vega points to the Vega- Agreement and asserts that the VTDS were 

“independent contractors” and not employees, agents or partners of Vega. ECF No. 148, p. 20. 

However, Vega ignores that its agreement with GH Financials (which was entered into before

the Vega- Agreement) provides that Vega would act as principal for all transactions and that, 

in effect, the VTDs were “ ” of Vega in entering trades. See “H” above.

Moreover, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has rejected attempts 

(like Vega’s here) to manufacture a situation whereby it can enjoy the benefits of the VTDs’

manipulative trading in Vega’s accounts, yet take no responsibility for the VTDs’ manipulative 

conduct in those same accounts. Bogard v. Abraham–Reitz & Co. West, Inc., No. R 77–315, 

1984 WL 48236, at *4 (C.F.T.C. July 5, 1984) (rejecting situation whereby principal could 

obtain benefits of alleged person’s services yet take no responsibility for his fraud and holding 

that “even if Abraham were an independent contractor whose conduct in the performance of the 

services undertaken was not controlled by Shearson [the purported principal], that status would 

Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A

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not itself preclude his being Shearson’s agent”).10 

Additionally, Vega was specifically charged with monitoring all the trades made by these 

independent contractors and explicitly charged with watching for and identifying and preventing 

“potentially manipulative trading” which set off MAR manipulation alarms. See “B” supra.

Fourth, pointing to the GH Agreement, Vega asserts that the VTDs placed orders in the 

sub-accounts which were executed by GH Financials. ECF No. 148, p. 20. But the same GH 

Agreement on which Vega relies provides that Vega agreed to act as principal for such orders 

and that the persons placing such orders (the VTDs) were doing so on Vega’s behalf. SAC, 

¶244; described in “H” above. Fifth, Vega asserts that Plaintiff has made a “new allegation” that 

GH Financials is an agent of Vega. ECF No. 148, p. 20. However, this same allegation 

appeared in the prior amended complaint. Compare ECF No. 41, ¶65 with SAC, ¶64. But Vega 

failed to raise it in its prior Rule 12(b)(6) motion. To the extent the Court considers this 

argument, it should be rejected. Vega argues that because Plaintiff has alleged that GH 

Financials is Vega’s agent, that renders Plaintiff’s allegation that Vega was the principal for the 

VTDs “implausible.” ECF No. 148, pp. 20-21. This is simply wrong. Vega, as the principal, 

authorized its agents (the VTDs) to transmit its orders to GH Financial for execution on the 

exchange on behalf of Vega. Once the VTD, who was acting as Vega’s agent transmitted the 

order to GH Financials, then GH Financials (also as Vega’s agent), executed the transaction for

10 See also Bian v. MG Fin., LLC, No. R 08–17, 2009 WL 3863292, at *9 (C.F.T.C. Oct. 28, 2009) (“The 

reference to ‘other person acting for’ another person or entity [in section 2(a)(1)(B) ] implies that 

respondeat superior under the Act applies to persons who act for others, but who do not fall within the 

usual definition of ‘agent.’”); Lobb v. J.T. McKerr & Co., No. R85–185, 1989 WL 242384, at *12 n. 13 

(C.F.T.C Dec. 14, 1989) (“The category of relationships covered by Section [2(a)(1)(B) ] not only 

includes agents but also any ‘official ... or other person acting for any individual, association, partnership, 

corporation or trust.’ Our reference in this opinion to the term ‘agent’ should be understood as a shorthand reference to the complete statutory category rather than an implicit limitation of the category to 

common-law agents.”).

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Vega as principal.

11

J. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Section 6(c)(1) Manipulation Claims Against Vega 

and 

Section 6(c)(1) of the CEA prohibits the use of “any manipulative or deceptive device or 

contrivance” in violation of CFTC regulations. Mish, at *12 citing 7 U.S.C. § 9(1). CFTC 

Regulation 180.1 prohibits the intentional or reckless use of “any manipulative device, scheme, 

or artifice to defraud,” as well as intentionally or recklessly “[e]ngag[ing], or attempt[ing] to 

engage, in any act, practice, or course of business, which operates or would operate as a fraud or 

deceit upon any person.” Id. citing 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a)(1), (3). A plaintiff may plead intentional 

or reckless conduct by alleging facts showing “an extreme departure from the standards of 

ordinary care which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the 

defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.” Id. The Court previously 

held that Plaintiff’s allegations in the amended complaint did not give rise to a plausible 

inference of intent or recklessness by Vega or because Vega and were not alleged 

to have engaged in any conduct on April 20. Mish, at *13.

The SAC now alleges that Vega and engaged in conduct on April 20 and such 

11 The basis for Vega’s argument is that Vega’s relationship to the VTDs is supposedly the same as GH 

Financials’ relationship with Vega. This is contrary to the SAC’s allegations. There are many key 

differences in the Vega- Agreement and the Vega-GH Financials Agreement. For example, the VegaAgreement provides that 

. McGrath Declaration, Ex. 3. The 

GH Agreement 

. Id., Ex. 1. The Agreement provides that 

. Id., Ex. 3. The GH 

Agreement . Id., 

Ex. 1. The Agreement provides that, 

. Id., Ex. 3. The GH Agreement 

. Id., Ex. 1. 

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conduct was reckless. Specifically, 

 Just four weeks prior to April 20, eight of the VTDs 

(including ) engaged in (manipulative) conduct that was virtually identical to that 

which occurred on April 20. SAC, ¶¶262-275. 

Specifically, very similar to April 20, the SVDs conduct on March 19 had numerous 

hallmarks of manipulation. See “C” above. Such hallmarks of manipulative trading included: (a) 

sell sell sell and don’t buy strategy in which they injected substantial net selling pressure via 

TAS; (b) the SVDs slowly put net selling pressure into the contract until 12:30 pm; (c) the large 

long TAS position gave each of the SVDs a large financial incentive to depress the price of the 

expiring April contract and the April May spread; (d) the SVDs then greatly ramped up their rate 

at which hthey sold prior to 12:30; (e) more than of their sales on March 19 occurred during 

the final hour of trading; (f) the SVDs sales of April contracts were a substantial portion ( ) 

of the total volume of sales in the last hour of trading; (g) the expiring spread price settled at an 

extremely low that was more than four standard deviations away from the average price of the 

prior year of trading; and (h) the price of the contract substantially rebounded the following 

Trader 5

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trading day after the SVDs’ manipulative trading pressure had been removed from the market. 

Id.

The above conduct on March 19, 2020 would later be repeated (with substantially greater 

trading volume) on April 20. The VTDs highly unusual trading on both March 19 and April 20 

occurred in the context of Vega and having undertaken the duty to monitor and supervise 

the VTDs’ trading in Vega’s accounts, including to prevent manipulation. SAC, ¶¶280-281. In 

the foregoing context, Vega/ request to substantially increase the trading limits for 

 and Vega on April 20th either was specifically intended to help the manipulation of 

the May Contract succeed or was, at best, reckless. 

Vega argues that Vega and “are still not alleged to have engaged in any conduct on 

April 20.” ECF No. 148, p. 17. This is false. As detailed above, Vega and (a) 

, and (b) Vega 

itself made all the trades on April 20 acting through its agents because the VTDs were retained to 

act for Vega and did act for Vega in entering those trades. Third, Vega further “acted” in 

connection with those trades because Vega and continued to monitor but breached their 

responsibility to identify and prevent even potentially manipulative trading activities. SAC 

¶¶164, 175, 258-259(a)-(l), 283, 297-309. Vega’s foregoing and other conduct on April 20th was 

at least “reckless” and/or intentional. SAC ¶309.

K. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Aiding and Abetting Claims Against Vega and 

Section 13 of the CEA, 7 U.S.C. §13c(a), prohibits aiding and abetting CEA violations 

committed by others. Mish, at *13. To state a claim for aiding and abetting, there must first be 

an underlying violation of the CEA. Id. Here, the Court has sustained Section 9(a) and 6(c)(1) 

CEA manipulation claims against eight VTDs. Id. at *10-13. An aiding and abetting claim also 

Individual A's Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Individual A Trader 5

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requires plausible allegations that the aider and abettor “(1) had knowledge of the principal’s 

intent to commit a violation of the CEA...; (2) had the intent to further the violation; and (3) 

committed some act in furtherance of the scheme.” Id. at *13. The SAC and its new allegations 

plausibly allege each of these elements as to Vega and .

Knowledge. The SAC alleges that Vega and had an affirmative duty to 

“continuously” monitor the trading of the VTDs for potential manipulation and also had a duty to 

otherwise prevent manipulation in Vega’s trading accounts. SAC, ¶¶280-281. The SAC alleges 

that Vega and had access to numerous analytical tools, including real time tools, to 

monitor the trading in the Vega’s accounts. Id., ¶259. As Plaintiff has previously demonstrated, 

Defendants Vega and repeatedly observed the VTDs engage in trading together to commit 

TAS manipulations, including on March 19. See supra; ¶¶262-275.12

Acts in Furtherance and Intent to Further. As set forth at pp.4-7 above, Vega and 

 repeatedly committed breaches of their duty to identify potentially manipulative trading, 

12 That is, just four weeks prior to the plausibly alleged manipulative ammo and TAS trading scheme on 

April 20, eight of the same VTDs engaged in virtually identical manipulative conduct in the preceding 

WTI futures contract. Id. The manipulative trading on March 19 included multiple hallmarks of 

manipulation that Vega was contractually required to be aware of, such as high a high volume of 

transactions undertaken in a short period of time that led to a price change that is subsequently reversed. 

SAC, ¶¶227, 284. The SAC also alleges that persons with much more limited knowledge and access to 

the VTDs’ trading concluded that the VTDs frequently bought and sold in the same direction at key 

moments. Id., ¶¶255-259. 

As detailed below, Vega and knowledge of the VTDs’ intent to manipulate prices on 

April 20 is further supported by the SAC’s allegations that Vega and 

 SAC, ¶¶293-299. 

 The SAC plausibly alleges Vega and had knowledge of the VTDs’ 

intent to manipulate WTI futures prices on April 20.

Vega and correctly point out that the communication involving “ ” is 

more plausibly attributed to Defendant than Defendant . Compare SAC 311-313 with ECF 

148 pp. 8-9.

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and detect MAR abuses. See “B” and “C”. Instead, they followed their profit interest and

allowed the VTDs’ “blitzing” of the market to continue. See “F”.

13

L. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Section 9(a)(2) Manipulation Claims Against Vega 

and 

A claim for manipulation in violation of Section 9(a)(2) of the CEA requires: (1) the 

ability to influence prices; (2) an artificial price; (3) causation of the artificial price; and (4) 

13 Also, the SAC alleges that Vega and took numerous steps to further, and intended to further, the 

VTDs’ manipulative trading on April 20. SAC, ¶¶293-314. Such acts included 

 Id. 

 Id. 

 Fourth, Defendant trading on March 

19, and the trading of the other seven VTDs, had multiple hallmarks of manipulation. SAC, ¶284. Again, 

Vega and had a duty to monitor the trading in Vega’s accounts for potential manipulation. Instead 

of investigating conduct, Vega and gave him more ammunition. Fifth, 

 These 

same acts also plausibly reflect an intent to further the manipulation, including an intent to provide access 

to additional “ammo” on the very same day that the VTDs engaged in substantial volumes of ammo 

selling.

 It is even more plausible because 

such increases came just weeks after eight of the same VTDs engaged in virtually identical ammo trading 

on March 19.

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manipulative intent. Mish, 2022 WL 1202679, at *10. The Court previously held that Plaintiff 

had plausibly alleged the first three elements. Id., at *10-12. However, the Court held that 

Plaintiff had not plausibly alleged manipulative intent as to Vega or including because 

Plaintiff had not alleged that Vega or engaged in any conduct on April 20. Mish at *11-

12. Vega and argue that the SAC does not allege that Vega and did “anything on 

April 20” to plausibly suggest they intended to manipulate WTI futures prices. ECF No. 148, p. 

16. 

Contrary to such argument, Vega and engaged in extensive affirmative conduct. 

They , affirmatively continued to violate their 

“monitoring/viewing” obligations to identify and prevent potentially manipulative trading 

activities that set off four different MAR manipulation alarms simultaneously, and continued to 

follow their 

. See “B”, 

“F”, and “J”; SAC ¶¶217-221; Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC, 244 F.R.D. 469, 484 (N.D. Ill. 

2007), aff’d 571 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2009) (motive is probative of manipulative intent). 

M. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Unjust Enrichment Against Vega /

Having now plausibly alleged the CEA violation against Vega and Plaintiff has 

also stated a claim for unjust enrichment against them.

II. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Sherman Act, CEA and Unjust Enrichment 

Claims Against Defendant 

Plaintiff now makes the same types of incriminating communication and high minute to 

minute correlation allegations against , which previously sufficed to sustain Plaintiff’s 

claims against the SVD. Compare SAC ¶¶328-333 with Mish at *1-11. First, Defendant 

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had an extraordinarily high degree ( ) text communications during an period on 

April 20th with Defendant . SAC ¶¶216, 330(a), 330(b), 330(c), and 328-333 

generally. This Court has already upheld the Sherman Act, CEA, and unjust enrichment claims

against Defendant . Mish at *1, 8-10, 14.

Defendant high degree of communications with plausible manipulator, 

, demonstrate that they decided to focus their trading on April 20 in the May 

Contract, discussed how to coordinate and sell the May Contract and buy the TAS, shared 

information that others were selling the May Contract, even shared their positions with one 

another, advised one another on what steps to take, and otherwise coordinated with one another 

their sales of May Contracts and purchases of TAS. SAC, ¶¶328-331.14

As the Court previously held, these allegations of soups to nuts coordination in placing 

the May Contract trades, while discussing that other VTDs were doing likewise give rise to a 

highly plausible inference of an agreement to manipulate prices. Mish, at *8-11. 

Second, as a direct result of this high degree of coordination, Defendant 

14 An example of the high degree of coordination of the May Contract trading by Defendant 

occurred at 9:15am London time on April 20th when Defendant stated to Defendant that 

“ .” Id. at ¶330(a). In other words, they agreed that they were going to trade in the 

May Contract that day. 

, Defendants and 

. Id. at ¶330(b). In other words, 

. 

Further, Defendant shares with Defendant 

. 

SAC ¶¶330-331. 

 Id. 

This goes beyond any previous coordination and sharing of information alleged against the SVDs.

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positions on April 20 in the May Contract had an extraordinarily high minute to minute 

correlation with Defendant positions of .99. SAC ¶319. Also, Defendant 

positions also had very high correlations of .988 to .951 with the positions of 

Defendants , , and . Id.

Additionally, Vega and newly produced documents (received long after Plaintiffs 

filed the SAC) reveal (a) that Defendant 

(McGrath.Decl. Ex. 4 at 

VEGA_MISH_000043304-05); and (b) Defendant 

. McGrath.Decl. Ex. 4 at (VEGA_MISH_000043306)

 That is, while communicating at least with one another, Defendant 

and Defendant 

.

In sum, the extraordinary high degree of specific communication that Defendant 

 and Defendant had about the May Contract and how to trade same, is 

augmented by the facts that they each were having communications with additional VTDs about 

the May Contract.

Sherman Act Claim. The Court previously held that allegations of highly correlated 

trading are sufficient to plausibly allege parallel conduct. Mish, at *8. Plaintiff has now 

plausibly alleged an extraordinarily high minute to minute correlation between positions

and Defendant positions of .99. SAC, ¶319. Defendant also had very high 

correlations with other VTDs. Id. With respect to “plus factors” the Court previously held that 

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communications on April 20 including real-time trade coordination are “strongly indicative of 

coordination.” Mish, at *9. The at least text messages between Defendant and 

Defendant reflect real time trade coordination and virtually constitute an agreement 

to work with one another to conduct their May Contract trading. 

Section 9(a)(2) and 6(c)(1) Claims. With respect to the Section 9(a)(2) and 6(c)(1) 

claims, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged manipulative intent and recklessness as to . The 

Court previously found manipulative intent and recklessness plausibly alleged where the VTDs 

engaged in a high degree of communications, traded the exact same contracts in the same 

direction on the same day, and had a high level of correlation among their trading positions. 

Mish, at *11-13. As detailed above, the SAC includes such allegations as to Defendant . 

Section 13 Claim. For all the same reasons that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged 

conspiracy and manipulation claims against Defendant , Plaintiff has also plausibly 

alleged that knew of the other VTDs’ intent to manipulate, intent to further the 

manipulation and acts in furtherance of the manipulation. Mish, at *13.

Unjust Enrichment Claim. Because Plaintiff has plausibly alleged numerous claims 

against , Plaintiff has also stated an unjust enrichment claim. The SAC alleges 

unlawful conduct generated approximately $2.8 million in illicit profits. SAC, ¶138. 

III. Plaintiff Can Plausibly Allege Sherman Act, CEA and Unjust 

Enrichment Claims Against Defendant 

Newly produced documents by Defendant Vega in July 2022 (after the SAC was filed) 

reveal that 

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.

15

 McGrath Decl., Ex. 4. These 

belatedly produced documents reveal that 

. Id. 

(against whom this Court has already sustained all but 

one claim, Mish *1, 8-10, 14). McGrath Decl., Ex. 9.

16

 Here again, 

. Id.; see fn. 16. Further, 

. Id.

17

In addition to Defendant foregoing extensive communications with Defendant 

 and communications with Defendant , 

Defendant 

. The foregoing real-time communications 

, plausibly suggest that was part of and participated in the agreement 

15 “ 

” McGrath Decl., ¶4

16

17

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to manipulate prices on April 20 through coordinated selling of May contracts with other VTDs.

Defendant motion to dismiss correctly points out that Plaintiff had alleged

in the SAC by and for on April 20. But the communications and other 

documents received after the filing of the SAC reveal that Defendant had a high degree 

of communications on April 20th. Also shown is a transfer on April 21 of $ from 

to . This strongly indicates that made May Contract sales for and shared 

the profits from such sales with . Again, own trading positions were extremely 

highly correlated with numerous other VTDs. SAC, ¶¶ 216, 319, 329, 332. Accordingly, 

Plaintiffs may plausibly allege that recently disclosed $ profit received from 

 resulted from May Contract positions that were highly correlated with the positions of 

other VTDs. This tends to satisfy the correlation prong of the Court’s earlier reasoning. 

In sum, the newly produced documents now permit Plaintiff, for the first time, to make 

important new communication and correlation allegations against Defendant . Such 

allegations should be sufficient under the Court’s prior Order to plausibly allege claims for 

conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act, manipulation in violation of Sections 9(a)(2), 6(c)(1) 

and 13 of the CEA, and unjust enrichment. Mish, at *8, 12. 

IV. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Section 2(a)(1)(B) Claims Against All VTDs

This Court previously held Plaintiff had plausibly alleged a conspiracy among the SVDs

to fix and manipulate May Contract prices on April 20. Mish, at *8-9. Where a co-conspirator 

acts in furtherance of a conspiracy, it is “acting for” the conspiracy. Compare Textor v. Bd. Of 

Regents of N. Illinois Univ., 711 F.2d 1387, 1392 (7th Cir. 1983) (recognizing “time honored 

notion that the acts of [a] conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy may be attributed to the 

other members of the conspiracy.”) with Section 2(a)(1)(B) (strict liability includes persons 

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“acting for” another). 

Here, the VTDs, through their coordinated selling of May Contracts and otherwise each

acted in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, when each of the SVDs engaged in their 

manipulative conduct to depress the May Contract, they were “acting for” the conspiracy of the 

other VTDs. To this extent, each SVD was “acting for” the conspiracy consisting of the seven 

other SVDs. This renders each SVD vicariously liable under Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the CEA

because they were committing manipulative acts while they were “acting for” the conspiracy and 

other individual SVDs.

V. Plaintiff Plausibly Alleges Sherman Act, CEA and Unjust Enrichment 

Claims Against Defendant 

Plaintiff newly alleges that Defendant positions in the May Contract exhibited 

extraordinarily high minute to minute correlations with the May Contract positions of numerous 

VTDs who this Court has ruled were plausibly engaged in a conspiracy to depress May Contract 

prices. Compare SAC ¶¶318-323 with Mish, at *1, 8-10, 14. May contract positions had 

a .989 minute to minute correlation with , .984 correlation with , .0975 

correlation with , .971 with and .944 with . SAC, ¶¶318-323. Many of 

those correlations are higher than the correlations which previously sufficed to show 

coordinated trading. 

Defendant does not mention the extremely high minute to minute correlations of 

his positions with the foregoing plausible manipulators’ positions. 

Plaintiff further alleges that 

. SAC, ¶315. “ ” includes and others at Vega, including the 

VTDs. Id. In fact, E.g., 

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VEGA_MISH_000042617 ( 

) (emphasis supplied); accord

https://www.cftc.gov/LearnAndProtect/AdvisoriesAndArticles/CFTCGlossary/index.htm#L (the 

CFTC Glossary defines a “local” as “An individual with exchange trading privileges who trades 

for his own account, traditionally on an exchange floor, and whose activities provide market 

liquidity. See Floor Trader, E-Local.”18). Apparently unable to respond to the extraordinarily

high correlations, Defendant 

. ECF 136, p. 3. 

, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged, under the common 

usage of the terms locals, that locals includes and others at Vega. may not deny that 

allegation now.

Although has asserted that 

 does not include Defendant Discovery shows that Defendant was 

charged with an additional supervisory duty over Defendant , which did not apply to other 

VTDs. VEGA_MISH_000042979.

Plaintiff respectfully submits that the foregoing allegations and facts under Mish now 

suffice to plausibly allege claims for conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act, claims for 

manipulation under the Sections 9(a)(2), 6(c)(1) and 13 of the CEA and unjust enrichment. 

Mish, at *6-14. 

VI. Conclusion

18 The CFTC then defines the “E-Local” as “A person with trading privileges at an exchange with an 

electronic trading facility who trades electronically (rather than in a pit or ring) for his or her own 

account, often at a trading arcade.” See 

https://www.cftc.gov/LearnAndProtect/AdvisoriesAndArticles/CFTCGlossary/index.htm#elocal

[emphasis added].

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Defendants’ motions to dismiss claims in the SAC should be denied.19

Dated: August 30, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Christopher Lovell

Christopher Lovell

Christopher M. McGrath

LOVELL STEWART HALEBIAN 

JACOBSON LLP

500 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2440

New York, New York 10110

Telephone: (212) 608-1900

Facsimile: (212) 719-4775

Marvin A. Miller

Andy Szot

MILLER LAW LLC

145 S. Wells Street, 18th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60606

Telephone: (312) 332.3400

Attorneys for Plaintiff Mish International

Monetary Inc.

19 Plaintiff acknowledges that the SACs allegations and the materials available to Plaintiffs to oppose the 

motions do not satisfy the test in Mish to state a claim against Defendant .

Trader 10

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