[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-12949

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 5:04-cr-00017-RS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MIKEL STEPHEN CARROLL, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

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(November 13, 2013)

Before HULL, MARCUS and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Mikel Carroll appeals a special condition of his supervised release, imposed 

upon his sentencing and revocation of a previous term of supervised release, 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(e). Carroll contends the special condition of supervised release—

requiring him to undergo a mental health evaluation with a view toward sex 

offenses and complete any recommended mental health or sex offender treatment 

program—is an improper delegation of judicial authority in violation of Article III 

of the United States Constitution.1

 

Normally, we review the terms of a supervised release for abuse of 

discretion and review constitutional issues de novo. United States v. Nash, 438 

F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006). To preserve an issue for appeal, however, an 

appellant “must raise an objection that is sufficient to apprise the trial court and the 

opposing party of the particular grounds upon which appellate relief will later be 

sought.” United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th Cir. 2007). Because 

Carroll objected to the special condition of his supervised release on statutory and 

reasonableness grounds only, he did not adequately preserve the constitutional 

issue for appeal. 

Where an issue is not preserved below, we review for plain error. See Nash, 

438 F.3d at 1304. To satisfy the plain-error standard, we must find that (1) the 

 1 Carroll also argues the special condition was unreasonable because it “appears to 

require a second evaluation at Carroll’s own expense.” Carroll cites no authority for this 

assertion, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by attaching this special condition to 

Carroll’s supervised release.

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district court committed error, (2) the error was plain or obvious, and (3) the error 

affects substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). 

An error is not plain “unless the error is clear under current law.” Id. at 1777. 

“To determine if a court improperly delegated the judicial authority of 

sentencing, we have drawn a distinction between the delegation to a probation 

officer of ‘a ministerial act or support service’ and ‘the ultimate responsibility’ of 

imposing the sentence. Nash, 438 F.3d at 1304-05. Article III courts may not 

delegate the ultimate responsibility of judicial functions to probation officers, but 

courts may delegate the ministerial function of how, when, and where the 

defendant must participate. Id. at 1306. 

The district court ordered that Carroll “shall” be evaluated for mental health 

treatment with a view towards sex offenses and that he “shall” complete “any 

recommended” mental health or sex offender treatment program. Like in Nash, 

although the condition states that Carroll “shall” participate in a mental health or 

sex offender treatment program, this order is subject to the conditional phrase that 

the program be “any recommended” one. See Nash, 438 F.3d at 1306. Unlike in 

Nash, however, the effect of this conditional phrase is a matter of interpretation, 

especially because it makes no specific mention of the probation officer. This 

condition can be read to leave no discretion to the probation officer: Carroll shall 

complete whatever mental health or sex offender treatment program is 

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recommended by his mental health evaluation. Given this interpretation of the 

language, it is not “plain” or “obvious” under current law that Carroll’s special 

condition of supervised release improperly delegates judicial authority. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED. 

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