IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

Jimmie L. Rice, 

 Plaintiff, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

 v. ) 

) 

 No. 20 C 3693 

Dr. Young Kim and Wellpath 

LLC, 

 Defendants. 

) 

)

)

) 

) 

Memorandum Opinion & Order 

 Wellpath, LLC (“Wellpath”) contracts with Will County to 

provide medical services at the Will County Adult Detention 

Facility (“the Jail”). While he was a pretrial detainee at the 

Jail, plaintiff Jimmie Rice received medical care from one of 

Wellpath’s employees, Dr. Young Kim. Rice claims Dr. Kim provided 

him with inadequate medical care in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and that Wellpath is also liable for this violation 

under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New 

York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In addition to these claims brought 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Rice brings a claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress against both defendants. 

Defendants now move for summary judgment. For the reasons explained 

below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. 

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I. 

 Rice entered the Jail as a pretrial detainee on January 5, 

2020. Defs.’ L.R. 56.1 Statement of Material Facts (“DSMF”), ECF 

88 ¶ 1. At 53 years old, Rice had a lengthy history of kidney 

stones. Pl.’s L.R. 56.1(b) Statement of Additional Facts 

(“PSAMF”), ECF 91 ¶ 1. Indeed, over the past 15 months, Rice had 

been hospitalized with kidney stones on five different occasions, 

and just two months prior to his arrival at the Jail a CT scan 

revealed multiple kidney stones in both of his kidneys. Id. ¶ 14. 

Rice reported his history of kidney stones to a nurse at the start 

of his detainment on January 5, 2020. DSMF ¶ 6. At a physical 

assessment conducted by Dr. Kim within 14 days of Rice’s arrival, 

Rice maintains that he also informed Dr. Kim--who was the medical 

director in charge of providing medical care to inmates at the 

Jail, id. ¶ 5--of that history. PSAMF ¶¶ 11–12. Defendants dispute 

that Rice notified Dr. Kim about his history of kidney stones, see 

Defs.’ Resp. to PSAMF, ECF 95 ¶¶ 11–12, but Dr. Kim testified at 

his deposition that, at a medical intake in January 2020, he 

“remember[ed] vaguely that [Rice] didn’t complain too much except 

that he reported that he has a history of kidney stone[s],” Kim 

Dep. Tr., ECF 88-2 at 59:16–20. The parties also dispute whether 

Rice encouraged Dr. Kim to order his past medical records and 

whether Dr. Kim in fact obtained those records. See Defs.’ Resp. 

to PSAMF ¶¶ 12–13. 

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 At the Jail, inmates could submit healthcare requests to be 

evaluated by medical staff. See Kim Dep. Tr. at 30:9–16; see 

generally Rice Med. Recs., ECF 88-3. Rice submitted two such 

requests on January 21, 2020 and January 22, 2020. See Rice Med. 

Recs. at 240–41.1 In the request Rice signed on January 21st, Rice 

wrote that he was “having pain and burning” while urinating and 

requested to see the doctor. Id. at 240. The next day, a staff 

member indicated on the form that Rice refused to appear for 

evaluation, see id., but Rice disputes this, pointing to his 

deposition testimony that he never refused medical care during his 

time at the Jail, see Rice Dep. Tr., ECF 88-4 at 27:23–28:9, 57:17–

58:1. In the request he signed on January 22nd, Rice stated that 

he believed he was passing a kidney stone and wrote “please take 

me to see the doctor ASAP! Please, it’s an emergency!” Rice Med. 

Recs. at 241. A urinalysis was conducted on January 22, 2020, which 

was negative for blood and leukocytes. Id.; DSMF ¶ 11. 

 Rice submitted another healthcare request on January 30, 

2020, reporting “extreme pain” from passing a kidney stone and 

asking for “help ASAP.” DSMF ¶ 13; Rice Med. Recs. at 238. 

According to defendants, he refused to show up to be evaluated and 

relayed that he was “feeling okay,” DSMF ¶ 13, but Rice disputes 

1 It is unclear on what date each was submitted. One is signed by 

Rice on January 21st and marked received on January 22nd, Rice 

Med. Recs. at 240, while the other is signed by Rice on January 

22nd and marked received on January 21st, id. at 241. 

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that he refused to appear, once more pointing to his deposition 

testimony that he never refused to be seen for medical complaints. 

 Yet another healthcare request came on either March 24, 2020 

or March 25, 2020, in which Rice wrote “I am having extreme pain 

in my side and also burning when I urinate. I believe I have a 

kidney stone that is stuck. Please help. Need to see the doctor. 

Also vomiting from the pain.” Id. ¶ 14; Rice Med. Recs. at 235. In 

response, medical staff performed a urinalysis on March 25, 2020, 

which turned up trace ketones, leukocytes, and blood. DSMF ¶ 14; 

Rice Med. Recs. at 56. He was put on antibiotics and Motrin. DSMF 

¶ 15. Another urinalysis performed on April 3, 2020 was negative 

for leukocytes and blood; and a sexually transmitted disease (STD) 

test conducted that day was negative too. Id. ¶ 16; Rice Med. Recs. 

at 52.2 Meeting with medical staff that day, Rice reported he was 

still experiencing pain but that it was “not bad.” DSMF ¶ 16. When 

another urinalysis was performed in response to a healthcare 

request on April 8, 2020, it revealed leukocytes and a “large” 

quantity of blood; Rice was prescribed the antibiotic Ciproflaxin. 

Id. ¶ 17; Rice Med. Recs. at 54. 

 On April 17, 2020, Rice was seen by Dr. Kim pursuant to 

another healthcare request. DSMF ¶ 20. Dr. Kim performed a 

2 Defendants suggest this STD test was conducted on April 17, 2020, 

DSMF ¶ 18, but the exact date of that test is immaterial for 

purposes of this motion. 

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urinalysis and, based on the results, determined that Rice might 

have a recurrent urinary tract infection (UTI), for which he 

prescribed the antibiotic Bactrim, as well as ibuprofen and Flomax 

for pain. Id. 

Rice submitted additional healthcare requests on April 26, 

2020 and April 27, 2020, in which he indicated that the prescribed 

antibiotics had not helped and that he wanted a CT scan and an 

appointment with a urologist. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. Dr. Kim saw Rice on 

April 30, 2020, and ordered an ultrasound of Rice’s kidneys, which 

revealed bilateral kidney stones--including one in the right 

kidney measuring about 1.7 centimeters--and moderate 

hydronephrosis--or swelling of the kidney--in the left kidney. Id.

¶¶ 26–27. At the time, Dr. Kim assumed Rice had a kidney stone, 

and prescribed him Flomax to assist Rice in passing the stone, as 

well as ibuprofen for pain. Id. ¶¶ 27, 42. According to defendants, 

Rice refused to take Ciproflaxin that was also prescribed, but 

Rice disputes that assertion. Id. ¶ 27; Pl.’s Resp. to DSMF, ECF 

90 ¶ 27. Another ultrasound on May 7, 2020 again indicated multiple 

bilateral kidney stones and moderate hydronephrosis of the left 

kidney. DMSF ¶ 28. Rice was instructed to take Tylenol and continue 

taking his other medications. Id. When he was seen again on May 

14, 2020, he reported that he had blood in his urine. Id. ¶ 29. 

Rice was prescribed Naproxen and instructed to alert staff if his 

condition worsened. Id. ¶¶ 29–30. 

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Following the May 7th ultrasound, Dr. Kim referred Rice for 

a CT scan and an appointment with a urologist. Id. ¶ 33. The CT 

scan took place on June 2, 2020, and it showed multiple bilateral 

kidney stones, including one measuring 1.8 centimeters on the left 

side that had moved into the ureter. Id. ¶ 33. A urologist met 

with Rice that day and a cystoscopy and stone manipulation to 

remove the stone in his ureter were scheduled for June 11, 2020. 

Id. ¶ 34. For reasons that are disputed, the Jail canceled the 

scheduled procedure. Compare id. ¶ 35 (noting that the appointment 

was canceled pursuant to Jail policy which prohibits inmates from 

knowing the date of medical appointments), with Pl.’s Resp. to 

DSMF ¶ 35 (citing Dr. Kim’s deposition testimony that this was not 

an example of a time that a scheduled procedure was canceled 

pursuant to this Jail policy). Rice received a prescription for 

Naproxen on June 14, 2020. DSMF ¶ 36. 

On June 18, 2020, the Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court in Will 

County ordered medical staff at the Jail to submit a letter 

explaining Rice’s diagnosis and necessary medical treatment by 

June 20, 2020. PSAMF ¶ 28. The court later found that the Jail’s 

medical unit failed to comply with that order and ordered Rice to 

be released on June 23, 2020. Rice Med. Recs. at 16. The day after 

his release, Rice was admitted to a nearby hospital where he 

underwent a cystoscopy, retrograde pyelogram, laser lithotripsy, 

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and extensive stone extraction; a stent was also inserted because 

Rice’s distal ureter was swollen. PSAMF ¶ 30. 

In addition to relying on Rice’s medical records and the 

deposition testimony of Rice and Dr. Kim, the parties retained 

expert witnesses who opined on the adequacy of the medical care 

Rice received. As relevant to this motion, Rice’s expert witness, 

Dr. Coogan, testified that Dr. Kim’s failure to order imaging by 

March 26, 2020 was a substantial departure from accepted medical 

judgment. Coogan Dep. Tr., 88-5 at 40:7–16; see also Am. Expert 

Report of Dr. Coogan (“Coogan Rep.”), ECF 91-2 at 3–6. Dr. Coogan 

also opined that the evaluation with a urologist should have 

occurred within about one week of the early May ultrasound that 

indicated kidney stones, Coogan Dep. Tr. at 57:17–58:14; Coogan 

Rep. at 6–7, and that Rice could have avoided unnecessary pain had 

Dr. Kim treated Rice in accordance with accepted medical judgment, 

Coogan Rep. at 7. 

II. 

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

A material fact is genuinely in dispute when “the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

In determining whether triable issues exist, I resolve all 

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evidentiary conflicts in Rice’s favor and give him “the benefit of 

all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the record.” 

Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 842 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation 

omitted). 

Defendants do not discuss Rice’s Monell claim against 

Wellpath in their opening brief, but they maintain in their reply 

brief that this claim fails in the event I grant them summary 

judgment on the § 1983 claim against Dr. Kim. Because they offer 

no additional argument for granting summary judgment on the Monell

claim and because, as I discuss below, I largely deny defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment on the § 1983 claim against Dr. Kim, 

defendants’ motion fails as to the Monell claim. Additionally, 

defendants are silent on Rice’s claim for intentional infliction 

of emotional distress, so their motion fails on that claim. 

That leaves Count I, in which Rice asserts a claim against 

Dr. Kim under § 1983 for inadequate medical care in violation of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. During the relevant period, Rice was a 

pretrial detainee, not a convicted prisoner, so it is the 

“objective reasonableness” standard articulated by the Seventh 

Circuit in Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018) 

--and not the Eighth Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” 

standard--that applies to his claim. That standard focuses on two 

questions: (1) “whether the ‘defendants acted purposefully, 

knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly’” when they considered the 

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consequences of their handling of the plaintiff’s case; and (2) 

“whether the defendants’ actions were ‘objectively reasonable.’” 

Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, 970 F.3d 823, 827 

(7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Miranda, 900 F.3d at 353–54). Inherent in 

the second question are the sub-questions whether the plaintiff 

“suffered from an objectively serious medical condition” and 

“whether the medical staff’s response to it was objectively 

reasonable.” Williams v. Ortiz, 937 F.3d 936, 942 (7th Cir. 2019). 

Defendants do not contest that Rice suffered from an 

objectively serious medical condition, nor do they develop 

argument on whether Dr. Kim acted “purposefully, knowingly, or 

recklessly” when he considered the consequences of his handling of 

that condition.3 Instead, they focus on their contention that Dr. 

Kim’s conduct was “objectively reasonable.” 

3 Defendants summarily assert that “[p]laintiff has failed to 

adduce any such evidence to support his allegations that 

[d]efendants acted purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly,” Defs.’ 

Mem., ECF 87 at 4, but fail to adequately develop argument on this 

front. See also id. at 8 (“Plaintiff has identified no evidence of 

recklessness on the part of any [d]efendant.”). For example, 

defendants do not discuss what a plaintiff must show in order to 

demonstrate the requisite mental states, so it is unclear how 

Rice’s evidence falls short. Accordingly, that argument is waived. 

See Weinstein v. Schwartz, 422 F.3d 476, 477 n.1 (7th Cir. 2005) 

(finding undeveloped, unsupported arguments waived). In any event, 

Rice has put forth evidence that Dr. Kim was “aware of” or 

“strongly suspected facts showing” a need for kidney stone 

diagnosis and treatment, which is sufficient for this prong. 

Pittman, 970 F.3d at 827; see, e.g., Kim Dep. Tr. at 96:17–21 

(suggesting Dr. Kim’s awareness of the possibility of kidney stones 

after March 25, 2020 urinalysis). 

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Whether Dr. Kim’s conduct was objectively reasonable depends 

on disputed material facts, so summary judgment is inappropriate. 

Defendants emphasize that Rice was evaluated upon his arrival at 

the Jail, that staff responded to his multiple healthcare requests, 

that he received urinalysis tests, that he was prescribed 

antibiotics and pain management medications, that Dr. Kim ordered 

ultrasounds and referred Rice to a urologist for kidney stone 

treatment, and that Rice ultimately underwent surgery for kidney 

stone removal. Defendants also tender the expert opinions of Dr. 

Tubbs and Dr. Dalton to support their view that Dr. Kim’s treatment 

of Rice was objectively reasonable. The problem for defendants is 

that Rice has put forth evidence from which a reasonable jury could 

conclude that, despite these efforts, Dr. Kim’s response to Rice’s 

complaints was objectively unreasonable. For example, Rice gives 

evidence, in the form of his own testimony and his medical records, 

that he was in pain for months, including sometimes “extreme” pain 

and pain so bad it made him vomit. See, e.g., Rice Dep. Tr. at 

61:5–8, 99:2–13; Rice Med. Recs. at 150, 235, 238, 240. 

And Rice’s expert witness opines that Dr. Kim’s treatment 

departed from accepted medical judgment because Dr. Kim should 

have ordered diagnostic imaging by March 26, 2020, Coogan Rep. at 

3–6; less time should have passed between the ultrasound and Rice’s 

appointment with a urologist, id. at 6–7; and much of Rice’s pain 

could have been avoided had Dr. Kim hewed more closely to accepted 

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medical judgment, id. at 7. Rice also supplies Dr. Kim’s testimony 

supporting that Dr. Kim understood that Rice’s March 25, 2020 

urinalysis suggested a possible kidney stone, Kim Dep. Tr. at 

96:17–21; that the April 9, 2020, and April 17, 2020 urinalyses 

were further consistent with the incidence of kidney stones, id.

at 102:20–105:1; and that Dr. Kim knew of Rice’s history of kidney 

stones as early as January 2020, id. at 59:16–20. A factfinder 

will need to decide which version of events to credit. Disputed 

issues that may inform this decision abound. These include (to 

name a few): when Dr. Kim became aware of Rice’s history of kidney 

stones; the extent of Rice’s pain and whether Rice made that pain 

known to Dr. Kim, either directly or through other medical staff; 

whether Rice refused medical care on certain occasions; and whether 

Rice’s receipt of ultrasounds and a CT scan when he received them 

reflect objectively reasonable conduct on Dr. Kim’s part, or if 

those diagnostic tools should have been deployed earlier. For each 

of these issues, Rice offers evidence that could lead a jury to 

side with him. 

Three additional issues warrant comment. First, defendants 

suggest for the first time in their reply brief that Dr. Coogan is 

not qualified to opine as to the treatment of an inmate in a 

correctional setting. Both because it was raised only in 

defendants’ reply brief and because it is a cursory argument citing 

no case law, that argument is waived. See Carroll v. Lynch, 698 

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F.3d 561, 564 n.2 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding arguments raised for 

the first time in reply brief are ordinarily waived); Weinstein, 

422 F.3d at 477 n.1 (finding undeveloped, unsupported arguments 

waived). 

Next, defendants take issue with Rice’s submission of a 

declaration as an exhibit to his statement of material facts, 

arguing that it is intended to create a “sham issue of fact” over 

whether Rice refused medical treatment on certain occasions. 

Defs.’ Reply, ECF 94 at 7–9. In their argument, defendants assert 

that there is no evidence in the record that could support Rice’s 

contention that he did not refuse medical care. But in fact, as 

noted above, Rice testified at his deposition that he never refused 

medical care while at the Jail. So the sham affidavit rule does 

not apply, since that rule simply “prohibits a party from 

submitting an affidavit that contradicts the party’s prior 

deposition or other sworn testimony.” James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 

316 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Dunn v. Menard, Inc., 880 F.3d 899, 

910 (7th Cir. 2018)). And because the other challenged portions of 

the declaration play no role in my conclusion that summary judgment 

is inappropriate as to Rice’s § 1983 claim against Dr. Kim, I need 

not further resolve defendants’ sham affidavit argument. 

Finally, defendants argue that punitive damages are 

unavailable for Rice’s § 1983 claims because Rice has not provided 

evidence that defendants’ conduct was “motivated by evil motive or 

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intent,” or that it involved “reckless or callous indifference” to 

Rice’s constitutional rights, as required by Supreme Court 

precedent. Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 474 F.3d 437, 453 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (quoting Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Rice 

does not respond to this argument or address punitive damages at 

all. Accordingly, I grant summary judgment to defendants on the 

issue of punitive damages as to the § 1983 claims. 

III. 

 For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment is granted in part on the issue of punitive damages as to 

the § 1983 claims. The motion is otherwise denied. 

ENTER ORDER:

_____________________________ 

 Elaine E. Bucklo

 United States District Judge 

Dated: November 30, 2023 

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