IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

TEKWAY, INC.,

 Plaintiff,

v.

AT&T SERVICES, INC.,

 Defendant.

Case No. 20-cv-04095

Honorable Thomas M. Durkin

Magistrate Judge Gabriel A. Fuentes 

DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN 

SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Kathryn E. Siegel

One of Its Attorneys

Kathryn E. Siegel

Shanthi V. Gaur

Jenna Kim

LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C.

321 North Clark Street, Suite 1100

Chicago, IL 60654

312.372.5520

ksiegel@littler.com

sgaur@littler.com

jekim@littler.com

Dated: September 28, 2020

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I. INTRODUCTION

The gravamen of Tekway, Inc.’s (“Tekway”) claim is that AT&T Services, Inc. 

(“AT&T”) interfered with (1) contracts between Tekway and Pinnacle Technical 

Resources, Inc. (“Pinnacle”) based in Texas; and (2) contracts between Tekway and 

some of its former employees (two of whom reside in Illinois, one in Colorado, and 

one in New Jersey). The impetus for this dispute is Tekway’s mistreatment of its 

former employees, specifically Gopi Potla and Sandeep Davuluri (based in Illinois) 

causing them to reach out to an AT&T supervisor (Denise Perez) (in Virginia) to 

express their unwillingness to continue working for Tekway. Ms. Perez reached out 

to Pinnacle (in Texas) to look into the situation. The ensuing communications were 

between Pinnacle personnel (in Texas) and AT&T personnel (in New Jersey, 

Virginia, and Texas, where AT&T is based).

The Court should dismiss Tekway’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction 

over AT&T because neither general nor specific jurisdiction exists. In addition, the 

Court should dismiss the claims based on Tekway’s agreement with Pinnacle and 

Tekway’s employment agreements with its former employees pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because Tekway cannot make colorable claims against AT&T for 

tortious interference with those agreements or state a claim for conspiracy.

II. BACKGROUND

Tekway is an IT staffing firm headquartered in Illinois that Pinnacle engaged

to provide IT resources to Pinnacle’s clients, including AT&T. See Complaint 

[“Compl.”] at ¶¶ 2, 15. Through Pinnacle, Tekway supplied employees to AT&T, 

including former Tekway employees: Gopi Potla, Sandeep Davuluri, Kruthika 

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Agarwal and Vishal Burra. Id. at ¶ 21. Each of these former Tekway employees 

signed an employment contract with Tekway. Id. at ¶¶ 112, 121, 129, and 137; see 

Exhibit A.1

The terms and conditions of the services Tekway provides to Pinnacle are set 

out in their Supplier Subcontracting Agreement (the “Pinnacle/Tekway 

Agreement”). See Exhibit B. AT&T is a third-party beneficiary of the 

Pinnacle/Tekway Agreement. See Compl. at ¶17. 

For jurisdictional purposes, AT&T is a citizen of Delaware (state of 

incorporation) and Texas (principal place of business). Id. at ¶3. Pinnacle is a citizen 

of Texas (state of incorporation and principal place of business). See Exhibit C at ¶ 

2. Both entities are headquartered in Dallas, Texas. Id.; see Compl. at ¶ 3. 

Directly related to this dispute are three (3) other lawsuits in which Tekway 

brings claims/counterclaims on the same underlying facts.

A. The DuPage Lawsuit (Now Dismissed).

Tekway sued Mr. Potla and Mr. Davuluri in the Circuit Court of the 

Eighteenth Judicial Circuit in DuPage County, Illinois on September 10, 2019 (the 

“DuPage Lawsuit”),2 and filed for a temporary restraining order (the “First TRO”) to 

prohibit them from providing services to AT&T. See Tekway, Inc. v. Gopi Polta3, 

 1 “[D]ocuments attached to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are 

referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to his claim.’” Am. Postal Workers Union, 

O'Hare Midway "T" Local 7011 v. Am. Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 62 F. Supp. 3d 690, 700 

(N.D. Ill. 2014). 2 Courts can take judicial notice of other proceedings that “have a direct relation to [the] matters at 

issue.” Opoka v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that courts have an “obligation” to 

take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts, “if the proceedings have a direct relation to 

matters at issue”).

3 Gopi Potla is incorrectly referred to as “Polta” in the DuPage Lawsuit. 

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Sandeep Daluvuri4, Case No. 2019CH001044 (the “DuPage Lawsuit”). Tekway 

sought to enforce one year non-compete restrictions against Mr. Potla and Mr. 

Davuluri. The First TRO was denied on September 12, 2019. See Exhibit D. On 

September 12, 2019, Tekway filed for a second temporary restraining order (the 

“Second TRO”) also to prohibit Mr. Potla and Mr. Davuluri from providing services 

to AT&T. The Second TRO was denied on September 17, 2019. See Exhibit E.

On September 20, 2019, Tekway amended the DuPage Lawsuit to add AT&T 

as a party. In January 2020, the DuPage Lawsuit was stayed pending the outcome 

of litigation between Pinnacle and Tekway in Dallas, Texas. Tekway filed a 

voluntary dismissal of the DuPage Lawsuit on July 14, 2020, dismissing its claims 

against Mr. Potla, Mr. Davuluri, and AT&T, which was granted. See Exhibit F.

B. The Texas Lawsuit (Summary Judgment Pending).

On September 11, 2019, Pinnacle terminated the Pinnacle/Tekway 

Agreement with Tekway for cause for failing to comply with the audit provisions of 

the Agreement and sued Tekway in Dallas County District Court. See Pinnacle 

Technical Resources, Inc. v. Tekway, Inc., Case No. DC-19-14497 (“the Texas 

Lawsuit”). Pinnacle’s lawsuit sought declaratory judgment that Tekway was 

prohibited from enforcing any non-compete restrictions against Mr. Potla and Mr. 

Davuluri that would limit them from providing services through Pinnacle for AT&T, 

because the Supplier Subcontracting Agreement Section 2 states, “If Pinnacle 

terminates for cause...Supplier agrees to release the Contractors [Mr. Potla and Mr. 

Davuluri] from non-competition agreements that would prevent or limit Contractors 

 4 Sandeep Davuluri is incorrectly referred to as “Daluvuri” in the DuPage Lawsuit. 

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from working for Client [AT&T] or Pinnacle.” See Exhibit B. This lawsuit (the 

“Texas Lawsuit”) is still pending.

In response, Tekway brought counterclaims against Pinnacle, including 

claims of: (1) breach of contract (based on the Pinnacle/Tekway Agreement and 

Purchase Orders (“P.O.s”) issued for Tekway employees); (2) civil conspiracy; and (3) 

tortious interference with contracts (based on Tekway’s employment contracts with 

Tekway employees). These are nearly identical to the same claims Tekway has 

brought against AT&T in the “Present Lawsuit.” Pinnacle has filed two motions for 

partial summary judgment, specifically directed to Tekway’s counterclaims. These 

motions remain pending.

C. The Agarwal Lawsuit (Motion to Dismiss Pending).

On October 8, 2019, Tekway sued another former employee, Kruthika 

Agarwal, (the “Agarwal Lawsuit”) and filed for a temporary restraining order and 

preliminary injunction in DuPage County Circuit Court. See Tekway, Inc. v. 

Vskruthika Agarwal, Case No. 19 CH 001156. The Agarwal Lawsuit was removed 

on the basis of diversity jurisdiction to the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division on October 10, 2019. See Tekway, Inc. 

v. Vskruthika Agarwal, Case No. 19 C 6867, N.D. Ill. 2019 (Honorable Steven C. 

Seeger). The Agarwal Lawsuit seeks to enforce a one-year non-compete against her. 

A motion to dismiss has been pending in the Agarwal Lawsuit since December 16, 

2019.

D. Present Lawsuit 

Tekway filed the instant lawsuit against AT&T on July 10, 2020, asserting 

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nearly identical claims to those that it dismissed in the DuPage Lawsuit.

III. ARGUMENT

A. Tekway Has Failed To Allege Sufficient Facts To Establish 

That AT&T Is Subject To Personal Jurisdiction In Illinois.

Tekway’s Complaint now must be dismissed because it fails to allege facts 

that would support subjecting AT&T to personal jurisdiction in Illinois. AT&T is a 

Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. See Compl. at ¶

3. Given that AT&T is neither incorporated in nor has its principal place of business 

in Illinois, Tekway has the burden to establish personal jurisdiction, which it has 

failed to do.

Under Rule 12(b)(2), Tekway must show that this Court has personal 

jurisdiction over AT&T and provide specific facts, not conclusory assertions, to 

support jurisdiction. Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2010). There 

are “two types of personal jurisdiction: ‘general’ (sometimes called ‘all-purpose’) 

jurisdiction and ‘specific’ (sometimes called ‘case-linked’) jurisdiction.” Bristol-Myers 

Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 

1780 (2017).

In Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), the Supreme Court “raised 

the bar” for establishing general personal jurisdiction. Kipp v. Ski Enter. Corp., 783 

F.3d 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2015). Under Daimler’s “stringent” standard, a corporation is 

subject to general jurisdiction only in “the state of [its] principal place of business 

and the state of its incorporation.” Id. Daimler cautioned that a defendant may be 

deemed “at home” in a jurisdiction other than its state of incorporation and 

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principal place of business only in a truly “exceptional case” – e.g., when its de facto

principal place of business and its formal headquarters are in different jurisdictions. 

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755–58 & n.8. Even a “substantial, continuous, and 

systematic course of business” is not enough to render a defendant at home in a 

forum, because “[a] corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be 

deemed at home in all of them.” Id. at 761–62 & n.20 (quotation marks omitted); see 

also Denton v. Air & Liquid Systems Corporations, No. 13–cv–1243, 2015 WL 

738659, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2015) (defendant “undoubtedly has a presence in 

Illinois. However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the mere presence of a 

defendant in the forum does not subject it to all-purpose jurisdiction in that 

forum.”). 

Here, in support of asserting personal jurisdiction over AT&T in Illinois, 

Tekway only alleges that “AT&T has sufficient contacts with the State of Illinois.” 

This falls short of meeting Tekway’s burden to establish an “exceptional case,” i.e. 

that AT&T has a de facto principal place of business or formal headquarters in 

Illinois. See Price v. Schlee & Stillman, LLC, No. 16 C 8020, 2017 WL 2311229, at 

*2 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2017) (Durkin, J.) (holding that general jurisdiction over the 

defendant was lacking where the defendant was not incorporated or headquartered 

in Illinois and the Plaintiff failed to allege any systematic or continuous affiliation 

with Illinois); Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755–58 & n.8. Thus, Tekway has failed to plead 

facts that would establish general jurisdiction over AT&T in Illinois. 

Tekway also has not established that there is specific personal jurisdiction 

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over AT&T. Again, “[f]or the court to exercise specific jurisdiction over [AT&T] ... 

[Tekway’s] claims must arise out of [AT&T’s] contacts with Illinois.” See Price, 2017 

WL 2311229, at *3 (declining to exercise personal jurisdiction where the cause of 

action arose from activities outside the state of Illinois); Shanghai Daisy LLC v. 

PositivEnergy, Inc., No. 19 C 5901, 2020 WL 4365883, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 

2020) (Durkin, J.) (declining to find specific jurisdiction and holding that “the 

proper question ‘is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect 

but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful 

way’”); Monco v. Zoltek Corp., 342 F. Supp. 3d 829, 835-37 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (Durkin, 

J.) (the fact that the defendant allegedly intentionally inflicted an injury on an 

Illinois-connected business relationship based on actions taken outside Illinois does 

not evidence any suit-specific contacts by the defendant with Illinois itself). 

Significantly, the Complaint is devoid of allegations connecting AT&T to 

Illinois with respect to the alleged tortious interference claims or civil conspiracy 

claims.5 Tekway merely alleges, in conclusory fashion, that AT&T does business 

and has employees in this judicial district and has sufficient contacts with Illinois to 

satisfy the minimum constitutional requirements. See Compl. at ¶ 6. Tekway makes 

no attempt to explain: (1) who acted on behalf of AT&T; (2) where such person was 

located; (3) where the alleged tortious acts occurred; (4) where the alleged tortious 

acts were directed; or (5) any other substantive fact that indicates personal 

jurisdiction is proper in Illinois. As explained above, these conclusory statements 

 5 Indeed, the word “Illinois” is not used one time in the factual section of the Complaint. See Compl. 

at ¶¶15-58. 

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cannot establish personal jurisdiction over AT&T. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755–58 

& n.8. Because Tekway has failed to meet its burden to establish that this Court 

has personal jurisdiction (either general or specific) over AT&T, the Court should 

dismiss Tekway’s Complaint based on this fatal deficiency. 

B. Tekway Cannot Maintain Its Claims For Tortious Interference 

Or Conspiracy.

Based on the above, Tekway’s Complaint should be dismissed for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. However, even if the Court were to analyze the claims at 

issue, all of Tekway’s claims against AT&T are subject to dismissal because Tekway 

fails to state a claim for relief. 

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual 

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If the plaintiff “cannot unilaterally set forth the 

necessary allegations that entitle him to recovery,” then “judgment should be 

[entered] for the defending party” and “there is no need to continue the suit.” Gomez 

v. Illinois State Bd. of Ed., 811 F.2d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir. 1987). Tekway has not 

satisfied these pleading requirements.

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1. Tekway Cannot Establish A Tortious Inference With 

Contract Claim Based On The Pinnacle/Tekway 

Agreement (Counts I-IV).

Tekway cannot maintain its tortious interference of contract claims based on 

the Pinnacle/Tekway Agreement because there is nothing in the Agreement or 

Pinnacle P.O.s that prevent a Tekway employee from transferring elsewhere. 

Tekway’s tortious interference claims based on the Pinnacle/Tekway 

Agreement and P.O.s are premised on the allegation that AT&T participated in a 

scheme to transfer Mr. Potla, Mr. Davuluri, Mr. Burra and Ms. Agarwal away from 

their employment with Tekway. Compl. at ¶¶ 40, 55, 60-110. However, Tekway fails 

to point to any language in the Agreement or P.O. that prevents such a transfer. 

A claim for tortious interference with contract requires “(1) the existence of a 

valid contract between [the plaintiff] and another; (2) defendant’s awareness of the 

contract; (3) defendant’s intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of the 

contract; (4) an actual breach of the contract; and (5) damages.” ATC Healthcare 

Services, Inc. v. RCM Techs., Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 943, 958 (N.D. Ill. 2016). 

“A necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of an action for tortious 

interference with contract is a defendant’s intentional and unjustified inducement 

of a breach of contract .... [A]nd in order to establish that tort there must be 

evidence of a breach of contract caused by the defendant.” Webb v. Frawley, 906 

F.3d 569, 579 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Strosberg v. Brauvin Realty Services, Inc., 295 

Ill.App.3d 17 (1st Dist. 1998)). “Only a duty imposed by the terms of a contract can 

give rise to a breach.” TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Engine Co., 491 F.3d 625, 631 

(7th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Boyd Grp. (U.S.) Inc. v. 

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D'Orazio, No. 14 CV 7751, 2015 WL 3463625, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2015) 

(dismissing breach of contract claims where the alleged breaches were not tied to 

any duty imposed under the contract).6 

Here, Tekway fails to point to any clause in the Pinnacle/Tekway Agreement 

or in the P.O.s which prevented Pinnacle from transferring any of the former 

employees. That is because there is no provision in the Pinnacle/Tekway Agreement 

or P.O.s that barred the transfer of the former employees. See Exhibits B & G. To 

the contrary, the Pinnacle/Tekway Agreement expressly allows AT&T and Pinnacle 

to hire the former employees. Id. at ¶ 8. Thus, Tekway’s tortious interference claims 

based on the Pinnacle/Tekway Agreement must be dismissed as Tekway has failed 

to allege the necessary elements for such a claim. 

2. Tekway Cannot State A Claim For Tortious Interference 

Based On The Tekway-Employee Agreements (Counts VIX).

Additionally, Tekway alleges claims that AT&T tortiously interfered with the 

Tekway-Employee Agreements and with prospective advantage or business 

relationship (based on AT&T allegedly inducing the former employees to breach 

their business relationship with Tekway). Such claims fail for a number of reasons. 

Tekway’s tortious interference claims based on the Tekway-Employee 

Agreements (of either contract or prospective relationship) are premised on its 

alleged future expectancy that the Former Tekway employees would continue to 

 6 Although the Court does not need to decide choice of law issues at this stage, Texas (the choice of 

law that governs the Pinnacle/Tekway Agreement) requires a defined breach as well. See Farmers 

Ins. Exch. v. Greene, 376 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012), aff'd, 446 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. 2014) 

(“But a breach of contract occurs when a party fails to perform an act that it has expressly or 

impliedly failed to perform. . .. There is no promised performance here. It follows that there can be no 

violation or breach.”).

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work for Tekway pursuant to the Agreements. See Exhibit A. First, Tekway fails to 

mention that Tekway itself terminated the employment of the former Tekway 

employees, not vice versa, as it admits in the counterclaim asserted in the Texas 

Litigation. See Exhibit H at ¶ 23. Thus, Tekway cannot pass the blame for these 

employees ending their employment with Tekway onto AT&T. 

Furthermore, Tekway’s tortious interference claims premised on the TekwayEmployee Agreements also fail as a matter of law because: (1) AT&T could not have 

tortiously interfered with contracts or relationships with the Former Tekway 

employees because they were employed “at-will” by Tekway; and (2) the postemployment restrictions contained in the agreements are unenforceable as a matter 

of law. 

The Tekway-Employee Agreements provide that the Employer or Employee 

can terminate the Employment Contract without assigning any cause with a 

written notice of two weeks after fulfilling 12 consecutive months of employment. 

See Exhibit A. Mr. Potla and Mr. Davuluri executed their contracts with Tekway 

on October 8, 2017 and Tekway terminated their employment respectively on 

August 27, 2019 and August 28, 2019 (22 months after executing the contract). Id. 

Mr. Burra executed his contract with Tekway in September 2018 and Tekway

terminated his employment on October 8, 2019 (13 months after executing the 

contract). Id. Ms. Agarwal executed her contract with Tekway on June 10, 2018 and 

Tekway terminated her employment on October 2, 2019 (15 months after executing 

the contract). Id. Their terminations all occurred before their two-year anniversary. 

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Id.

Accordingly, because each of these Former Tekway Employees had completed 

12 months of employment by August 2019 (when AT&T was alleged to have 

interfered with their Agreements) their employment was at-will. As a matter of law, 

“inducing a third party to cancel an at-will contract does not result in a breach of 

contract.” ATC Healthcare Services, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d at 958. As such, Tekway 

cannot maintain its claims of tortious interference with contracts as a matter of law. 

Furthermore, Tekway’s tortious interference claims (of contract, prospective 

advantage, or business relationship) based on AT&T allegedly inducing the Former 

Tekway employees to violate restrictive covenants likewise cannot proceed because 

the post-employment restrictions are unenforceable as a matter of law. Each of 

these claims are dependent on a valid contract or business relationship. See ATC 

Healthcare Services, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d at 959 (“. . . in order for such a breach to 

be possible, the non-compete clauses would need to be valid . . .”); Pampered Chef v. 

Alexanian, 804 F. Supp. 2d 765, 808 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (“‘In other words, without a 

valid non-solicitation clause there would have been no ‘unjustified tampering,’ [] 

and thus no viable claim for tortious interference with economic advantage.”); Dowd 

& Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 352 Ill.App.3d 365 (1st Dist. 2004) (interference with 

business relationships or expectancy requires “some impropriety.”).7

The Agreements are unenforceable for two independent reasons: (1) they lack 

 7 See also Instant Tech., LLC v. DeFazio, 40 F. Supp. 3d 989, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff’d, 793 F.3d 748 

(7th Cir. 2015) (“As set forth above, Instant failed to satisfy the threshold element: a valid and 

enforceable contract. Since the Restrictive Covenants are not valid or enforceable, they cannot serve 

as the underlying basis for Instant’s tortious interference with contract claim.”). 

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sufficient consideration under Illinois law because the sole consideration provided 

by Tekway to the former employees was continued employment, but none of the 

former employees worked for Tekway for at least two years; and (2) the covenants 

are facially overbroad because they have no geographic restriction and no limitation 

in scope to the job duties that the former employees performed for Tekway, thereby 

preventing the former employees from being employed by a competitor in any 

capacity whatsoever. See Axion RMS, Ltd. v. Booth, 2019 IL App (1st) 180724, ¶ 24 

(holding that there was inadequate consideration under existing case law where the 

only consideration given to the employee was continued employment which lasted 

less than two years) (citing Fifield v. Premier Dealer Services, Inc., 2013 IL App 

(1st) 120327); Instant Tech., LLC v. DeFazio, 40 F. Supp. 3d 989 (N.D. Ill. 2014), 

aff’d, 793 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2015) (Under Illinois law, employment agreements’ 

restrictive covenants for two years post-employment were not supported by 

adequate consideration with respect to three former employees, precluding 

enforcement of covenants against them, where employees had only been employed 

by employer for less than two years, which was not substantial period of time

beyond threat of discharge); see also AssuredPartners, Inc. v. Schmitt, 2015 IL App 

(1st) 141863, ¶¶ 35-36 (non-compete unenforceable for lack of geographic 

restrictions where enforcement of the non-compete “would bar the individual from 

earning a living as a wholesale broker for all professional liability insurance 

products and services in every location within the 50 states and territories of the 

United States”); Medix Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Dumrauf, 2018 WL 1859039, at *3 

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(N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2018) (finding the non-compete unenforceable where the provision 

would prevent the former employee from taking any number of roles at another 

industry player); Texlon v. Hoffman, 720 F. Supp. 657, 664-65 (N.D. Ill. 1989) 

(refusing to enforce a non-compete agreement where the scope of the prohibited 

activities were so broad that the agreement would prevent the former employee’s 

ability to work for a competitor even as a janitor). Thus, Tekway cannot maintain 

its tortious interference claims based on the Tekway-Employee Agreements against 

AT&T. 

3. Tekway Cannot Maintain A Claim For Civil Conspiracy 

Because Its Claims For Tortious Interference Fail 

(COUNT X).

Tekway cannot establish a viable tortious interference claim against AT&T, 

and thus, the conspiracy claim fails because it is a derivative theory of liability and 

not a stand-alone claim. To state a claim for civil conspiracy, Tekway must allege 

facts establishing that: (1) the existence of an agreement between two or more 

people (2) to participate in an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful manner, 

(3) that one of the parties performed an overt act in furtherance of the common 

scheme, and (4) the overt act caused an injury. Mitchell v. Vill. of Matteson, No. 20 

CV 990, 2020 WL 3035965, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2020). Conspiracy is not a 

separate tort in Illinois. Id. (citing Mauvais-Jarvis v. Wong, 2013 IL App (1st) 

120070). Ultimately, “[b]ecause conspiracy is not an independent tort, ‘if a plaintiff 

fails to state an independent cause of action underlying [the] conspiracy allegations, 

the claim for conspiracy also fails.’” Merrilees v. Merrilees, 2013 IL App (1st) 121897, 

¶ 49 (quoting Indeck North American Power Fund, L.P. v. Norweb PLC, 316 Ill. App. 

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3d 416, 432 (2000)). 

Here, Tekway fails to state a claim for tortious interference as discussed 

above. See supra § III(B)(1) and (2). As such, Tekway’s civil conspiracy claim, 

premised on those underlying causes of action necessarily fails. See Mitchell, 2020 

WL 3035965, at *7; Coghlan v. Beck, 2013 IL App (1st) 120891, ¶ 59 (“[T]he 

conspiracy claim fails if the independent cause of action underlying the conspiracy 

allegation fails.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice for the reasons set 

forth above. 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Kathryn Siegel, an attorney, hereby certifies that on September 28, 2020, she 

caused the foregoing Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its 

Motion to Dismiss to be electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court, using the 

court’s CM/ECF system. Notification of such filing will be sent to the following 

party:

DAMON MATHIAS

MATHIAS RAPHAEL PLLC

9 E. Superior, Suite 400

Chicago, IL 60611

312.738.5323 (p)

damon@mrlaw.com

/s/ Kathryn Siegel

Kathryn Siegel

4848-9659-9241.17 056169.1697

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