THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

SYMBRIA, INC., et al., 

Plaintiffs, Case No. 1:20-cv-4084 

Hon. Mary M. Rowland 

Hon. M. David Weisman 

v. 

JOHN R. CALLEN, et al.,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT CHICAGO 

REHABILITATION COLLECTIVE’S MOTION FOR DISCOVERY SANCTIONS 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 1 of 24 PageID #:24242
i 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. i 

Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................................ ii

Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1

A. Plaintiffs’ Compliance with this Court’s April 4, 2022 Discovery 

Order. .......................................................................................................... 1

B. CRC’s Failure to Timely Raise its Dissatisfaction and Plaintiffs’ 

Good Faith Efforts. ..................................................................................... 4

C. Plaintiffs’ Repeated Amendments to Address CRC’s Complaints. ............ 5

STANDARD ................................................................................................................................... 7

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 7

I. Plaintiffs’ Answers Complied with the Court’s April 4 Discovery Order. ............. 8

A. Plaintiffs’ Trade Secrets and Copyright Charts Are Sufficiently 

Detailed at this Early Stage in the Litigation. ............................................. 8

B. Plaintiffs’ Have Not Violated this Court’s Order Based on 

Confidentiality Designations, Technology Difficulties, or Reliance 

on Actions of CRC Employees Occurring Prior to CRC’s 

Formation. ................................................................................................. 10

II. A Motion for Discovery Sanctions is Not the Appropriate Vehicle to 

Resolve CRC’s Arguments About Plaintiffs’ Claims on the Merits. ................... 13

III. CRC Waived Its Right to Bring a Motion for Sanctions. ..................................... 15

IV. The Severe Sanctions of Dismissal and Prohibition of Evidence Are Not 

Warranted. ............................................................................................................. 17

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 18

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 2 of 24 PageID #:24243
ii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Page(s) 

CASES

ABC Acquisition Co., LLC v. AIP Prod. Corp., 

No. 18 CV 8420, 2020 WL 4607247 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2020) ..............................................14 

Barnes v. City of Chi., 

2000 WL 1745180 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2000) ..........................................................................17 

Barnhill v. U.S., 

11 F.3d 1360 (7th Cir. 1993) ...............................................................................................7, 18 

Behrens v. Ca. Cartage Co., Inc., 

373 Ill. App. 3d 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) ...........................................................................12, 14 

Brandt v. Vulcan, Inc., 

30 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 1994) ...............................................................................................15, 16 

Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 

962 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1992) .................................................................................................14 

Dotson v. Bravo, 

321 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................................7 

Freeman v. Augustine’s, Inc., 

360 N.E.2d 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) ......................................................................................15 

FTC v. Lifewatch Inc., 

176 F. Supp. 3d 757 (N.D. Ill. 2016) .......................................................................................15 

Greyer v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, 

933 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2019) .....................................................................................................7 

IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 

285 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2002) ...................................................................................................14 

JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 

482 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2007) .............................................................................................12, 15 

Jt. Comm’n on Accreditation of Healthcare Org. v. Fortis Bus. Media LLC, 

No. 14 C 10225, 2017 WL 3895593 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2017) ...........................................12, 15 

Ladien v. Astrachan, 

128 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................................7 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 3 of 24 PageID #:24244
iii 

Lair for Est. of Lair v. Reyes, 

2020 WL 9718813 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2020) ...........................................................................18 

Langley by Langley v. Union Elec. Co., 

107 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 1997) ...................................................................................................18 

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ecowater Sys., Inc., 

2004 WL 1073687 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2004) ...........................................................................18 

LKQ Corp. v. Gen. Motors Co., 

No. 20 C 02753, 2022 WL 14634800 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2022) .............................................10 

Lynchval Sys., Inc. v. Chi. Consulting Actuaries, Inc., 

1996 WL 735586 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1996) .............................................................................10 

M.H. Eby, Inc. v. Timpte Indus., Inc., 

No. CV 19-386, 2019 WL 6910153 (E.D. Pa. 2019)...............................................................15 

Master Tech Prods., Inc. v. Prism Enters., Inc., 

No. 00 C 4599, 2002 WL 475192 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2002) ...................................................15 

McCarthy v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 

2018 WL 3831530 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2018) ............................................................................9 

Moss Holdings Co. v. Fuller, 

No. 20-CV-01043, 2020 WL 1081730 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2020) ........................................12, 15 

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Total Prop. Care Inc., 

2018 WL 2356214 (N.D. Ind. May 24, 2018) .........................................................................18 

Nationwide Sales & Servs., Inc. v. Envirocare Techs. Int’l, Ltd., 

2018 WL 2436969 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2018) ...........................................................................9 

Newson v. Oakton Cmty. Coll., 

2022 WL 2874801 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2022) ..............................................................................7 

Ramirez v. T&H Lemont, Inc., 

845 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2016) .....................................................................................................7 

Segerdahl Corp. v. Feruzza, 

No. 17-CV-3015, 2019 WL 77426 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2019) ...............................................12, 15 

Sperl v. Henry, 

124 N.E.3d 936 (Ill. 2018) .......................................................................................................15 

TNS Media Research, LLC v. Tivo Research & Analytics, Inc., 

629 Fed. Appx. 916 (Fed. Cir. 2015) .........................................................................................9 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 4 of 24 PageID #:24245
iv 

U.S. v. Stinson, 

No. 614CV1534, 2016 WL 8488241 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2016) ............................................17 

Walrus Brands, LLC v. Peaches Uniforms, Inc., 

No. 12 C 4892, 2018 WL 11453554 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2018) ..................................................17 

STATUTES

765 ILCS 1065/2(b)(1)-(2) ............................................................................................................14 

18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(A)-(B) .....................................................................................................12, 14 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 5 of 24 PageID #:24246
1 

This Court should deny CRC’s motion for discovery sanctions. CRC employs five former 

Symbria employees, several of whom absconded with valuable intellectual property of Symbria 

that is now being used unlawfully to benefit their new employer, CRC, and the other defendants. 

CRC contrived the legal fiction of “leasing” those employees to do the work of other defendants, 

such as MedRehab Alliance, MedRehab Alliance Interstate (both owned in part by UMHS), and 

Joint & Neuro and Joint & Neuro of Chicago. CRC’s “leased” employees even have titles and 

email addresses with MedRehab Alliance and Joint & Neuro and are managed by John Callen. 

Now, with oral discovery barely underway, CRC asks the Court to take the draconian step 

of dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims because their interrogatory answers are supposedly insufficient. 

But CRC’s motion is factually and legally baseless. As detailed below, contrary to CRC’s 

characterizations, Plaintiffs have, in fact, complied with its discovery obligations and this Court’s 

orders. CRC’s sanctions motion therefore is nothing more than a procedurally flawed attempt to 

subvert the merits and secure a favorable judgment while insulating its conduct from scrutiny. To 

be clear, CRC makes challenges more suitable for summary judgment or trial, such as whether 

Plaintiffs have “identified any facts or any evidence” supporting their agency, alter ego, and 

misappropriation claims. Yet, a motion for discovery sanctions is not the place to resolve such 

questions, particularly where Plaintiffs have not even had the benefit of completing discovery 

into the very facts at issue. CRC also has unreasonably delayed raising any of these issues. 

Accordingly, this Court should not entertain CRC’s flawed arguments and should deny its motion. 

BACKGROUND 

A. Plaintiffs’ Compliance with this Court’s April 4, 2022 Discovery Order. 

Plaintiffs responded to CRC’s First Set of Interrogatories on November 1, 2021. (See Mot. 

Ex. C.) After a dispute arose, this Court issued an order on April 4, 2022, requiring Plaintiffs to 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 6 of 24 PageID #:24247
2 

“answer” Interrogatories 2 and 3 directed to identifying Plaintiffs’ trade secrets, their provenance, 

and CRC’s misappropriation by bates number for CRC to “understand the bases for plaintiffs’ 

claims.” (Mot. Ex. A. at 1-2.) Plaintiffs were further directed to “answer” Interrogatory 9 relating 

to identifying Plaintiffs’ registered copyrighted works and CRC’s infringement, including 

describing how CRC improperly used or copied those works. (Id. at 3.). This Court also ordered 

Plaintiffs to simply “answer” Interrogatories 10 and 11 regarding the factual basis for their 

allegations that Christos Dilmas and Christine Irvine were acting as CRC’s agents. (Id. at 3-4.) 

Plaintiffs timely complied with the Order by serving their amended answers on May 4, 

2022. (See Mot. Ex. D.) Plaintiffs’ amended answer to Interrogatories 2 and 3 included a chart, 

Exhibit A, identifying 121 misappropriated documents by bates number, detailing for each a 

paragraph-long description of CRC’s role in the misappropriation, the date the trade secret was 

created, the author of the trade secret, the sources used to create the trade secret, and the 

individuals with access to the trade secret (“Trade Secrets Chart”). (Id. at 2-4 & Ex. A.) Plaintiffs 

also directed CRC to a 32-page document, Exhibit B, identifying individual Symbria employees 

with access to the identified trade secrets by categories to assist CRC in understanding the roles 

of the individuals referenced on the Trade Secrets Chart (the “Employee List”). (Id. at 4 & Ex. 

B.) Together, the Trade Secret Chart and Employee List identify the existence of Plaintiffs’ trade 

secrets, note the efforts to create them, identify those with access to them, and detail how they 

were misappropriated—all essential elements of Plaintiffs’ claims. (See Mot. Ex. D at Ex. A & 

B.) These documents comply with this Court’s directive that Plaintiffs provide answers that help 

CRC to “understand the bases for plaintiffs’ claims.” (See Mot. Ex. A, at 1-2.) 

Plaintiffs also complied with the Court’s directive regarding Interrogatory 9 (copyright 

infringement) by attaching another exhaustive chart identifying 34 of Plaintiffs’ registered 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 7 of 24 PageID #:24248
3 

copyrighted works by bates number and containing a detailed description of CRC’s infringement 

(“Copyright Chart”). (Id. at 11-13 & Ex. C.) 

Finally, Plaintiffs complied with this Court’s order with respect to Interrogatories 10 and 

11 by explaining how Dilmas and Irvine acted as CRC’s agents when they “emailed Symbria 

information to [their] personal email account(s) while employed by Symbria Rehab because 

[they] knew that [they were] going to later work for a company controlled and managed by John 

Callen and/or a company that would benefit John Callen, and that such company or companies 

may . . . benefit from the possession and/or use of that information.” (Id. at 13-16.) Plaintiffs 

further explain how Dilmas and Irvine were linked to CRC by virtue of Dilmas being a CRC 

employee and through Irvine’s work for other Callen companies, such as Joint & Neuro, and by 

supervising CRC’s employees. (Id.) 

Finally, Plaintiffs advised that their investigation continued and they would supplement 

as necessary. (Id. at 2-4, 13-16.) Given that written discovery was not (and is not) complete and 

that only one deposition had taken place, Plaintiffs had provided as much detail about CRC’s 

misappropriation, infringement, and connections to the various Callen companies, Dilmas, and 

Irvine, that they possibly could at this stage of the case. Additional details are in the possession 

of other parties and subject to discovery in the ordinary course. 

Nevertheless, on May 11, 2022, CRC complained to Plaintiffs that their amended answer 

to Interrogatory 3 was supposedly insufficient because the Trade Secrets Chart did not identify 

each page of the 121 documents containing a trade secret, the person who created the trade secrets 

inside each document (versus the entire document), and the date the trade secrets inside the 

documents were created (versus the document creation date). (See Mot. Ex. G at 1.) CRC further 

complained that the Employee List did not list employees that formerly worked at Symbria or 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 8 of 24 PageID #:24249
4 

every former therapist Plaintiffs have ever employed. (Id.) CRC raised no issues with Plaintiffs’ 

answers to Interrogatories 2, 9, 10, or 11. Before this issue could be resolved, on June 3, 2022, 

this Court ordered a stay of discovery. (Dkt. 563.) 

B. CRC’s Failure to Timely Raise its Dissatisfaction and Plaintiffs’ Good Faith 

Efforts. 

When the Court lifted the stay five months later on November 3, 2022, it ordered that 

“[a]ny motions by any of the defendants as to pending discovery requests and/or previously issued 

judicial orders as to discovery production must be filed by 12/2/22.” (Dkt. 594.) CRC then sat on 

its hands for a month before raising any new issue with Plaintiffs’ amended answers.1

 (See Ex. 

A, Nov. 17 E-mail Chain, at 4-9.) 

In particular, on December 2, the deadline for discovery motions, Defendants moved to 

extend this deadline until January 6, 2023, arguing that they needed more time to review recently 

produced documents. (Dkt. 613 at 2-3.) The Magistrate Judge granted the extension, but only as 

to issues related to the document productions. (Dkt. 619; Ex. B, Dec. 8, 2022 Tr. of Proceedings, 

at 31:15-25.) The next day, CRC emailed Plaintiffs with complaints for the first time about 

Plaintiffs’ amended answers to Interrogatories 2 and 9. (Ex. A, Nov. 17 E-mail Chain, at 1-3.) 

According to CRC, the amended answers were insufficient because Plaintiffs’ Trade 

Secrets Chart (which identifies documents specifically by bates number) required Defendants to 

“dig up each of the 121 documents,” and “once those documents are found, try to guess what 

information (if any) within those documents might be considered by one or more of the Plaintiff 

to constitute a trade secret.” (Id. at 2.) CRC also complained that the Trade Secrets Chart made 

references to electronic documents with “hidden content,” that it could not access (even though 

those documents were produced by Defendant Callen—not Plaintiffs—and the “hidden content” 

 

1

 CRC omitted from Exhibit H to its motion the full e-mail chain reflecting this correspondence. 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 9 of 24 PageID #:24250
5 

is easily accessed through e-discovery software).2 See id. CRC further argued that some of the 

documents Plaintiffs identified did not actually qualify as trade secrets on the merits and that 

including them on the Trade Secrets Chart somehow violated the discovery order. (Id. at 2-3.) 

CRC further complained that the misappropriation descriptions were insufficient because they 

relied on alter ego, single business enterprise, and agency theories—again, a disputed legal issue 

that goes to the merits. (Id. at 3.) CRC also claimed for the first time that Plaintiffs’ amended 

answer to Interrogatory 9 did not comply with the April 4 Order because the Copyright Chart’s 

detailed infringement descriptions referenced other Defendants’ actions and relied on agency and 

alter ego theories that CRC argues are legally inapplicable—another merits argument. (Id. at 3.) 

Despite CRC’s delay in raising these new issues, Plaintiffs’ counsel promptly met and 

conferred with CRC. (Ex. D, Dec. 13 E-mail at 2.) In a good faith effort, Plaintiffs agreed to 

amend the Trade Secrets and Copyright Charts, in attempt to assist CRC in better understanding 

Plaintiffs’ claims. (Id.; Mot. at Ex. I.) At no time during any of these communications did CRC 

mention that it had any issue with Plaintiffs’ amended answers to Interrogatories 10 and 11. 

C. Plaintiffs’ Repeated Amendments to Address CRC’s Complaints. 

Two weeks later, Plaintiffs served their second amended answers to Interrogatories 2, 3, 

and 9. (Mot. Ex. E.) In the amendment, for each of the 121 documents previously identified, 

Plaintiffs provide a description of the trade secrets therein, the trade secret category, and, for each 

category, the misappropriation occurring. In addition, for each document, Plaintiffs provide 

further details about the misappropriation, including identifying specific bates numbers showing 

 

2

 CRC complains that Plaintiffs did not re-produce these native documents to CRC, which makes no sense. 

As Plaintiffs’ counsel explained: “Because Callen and the MedRehab Entities produced them, you can ask 

them to produce them to you again or ask them how to use the technology to make the content appear. Your 

IT department or a hired vendor or consultant likewise should be able to help you.” (Ex. C, Jan. 6 E-mail 

Chain, at 1.) CRC omits this correspondence from its motion. 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 10 of 24 PageID #:24251
6 

possession of the trade secrets by certain individuals. (Id. at Ex. A.) The amended Chart also 

makes clear Plaintiffs’ position that the format itself of many documents constitutes a trade secret. 

(Id.) Plaintiffs also supplemented the Copyright Chart with columns naming the copyrighted 

documents, classifying them by type, and additional details about infringement. (Id. at Ex. C.) 

Nevertheless, CRC advised shortly thereafter that it planned to file a motion for discovery 

sanctions. (Ex. E, Jan. 4 E-mail Chain, at 3.) After a two-hour in-person conference held January 

5, 2023, Plaintiffs agreed to again amend the Trade Secrets Chart in a good faith attempt to 

address CRC’s complaints and avoid unnecessary motion practice. 

 CRC filed its sanctions motion anyway. Plaintiffs, however, continued to work with CRC 

in good faith, serving their third amended answers to Interrogatories 2, 3, and 5, which included 

an amended Trade Secrets Chart. (Ex. F, Jan. 24, 2023 Amended Answers, at 1-3, Ex. A.) The 

amended chart identifies a total of 66 discrete trade secrets, in 13 categories, providing additional 

information about each secret. (See id. at Ex. A.) Plaintiffs also provide further details about their 

alter-ego theory of CRC’s misappropriation.3

 On February 2, CRC advised it was still unsatisfied, 

identifying merits-related disputes and complaining about the supposedly “hidden content” in 

certain documents produced by other Defendants. (Ex. G, Feb. 3 E-mail Chain at 1-3). 

Plaintiffs have long since complied with this Court’s April 4 order and have nonetheless 

continued to work in good faith to address CRC’s demands for the production of information in 

Defendants’ possession. The only disputes remaining involve issues of law regarding the viability 

 

3

 Plaintiffs detail how CRC provides benefits to MedRehab Alliance’s agents, CRC employees work for 

MedRehab Entities, there is a lack of corporate formalities, there is overlapping management and 

ownership, Callen is an agent of CRC, and CRC is the alter ego of the MedRehab Entities and Callen. (Ex. 

F) Plaintiffs noted that their “investigation continues” through “court-ordered alter-ego written discovery 

responses and depositions.” (Id.) 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 11 of 24 PageID #:24252
7 

of Plaintiffs’ agency, alter ego, and misappropriation theories and the facts yet to be developed 

in discovery relating to them. 

STANDARD 

“Although this Court’s power to dismiss as a sanction under Rule 37 is well established, 

dismissal is a severe sanction that is only appropriate in extreme cases.” Newson v. Oakton Cmty. 

Coll., 2022 WL 2874801, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2022); see also Greyer v. Ill. Dep’t of 

Corrections, 933 F.3d 871, 877 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Courts must also evaluate the appropriateness of 

any given sanction, especially the ‘draconian’ sanction of dismissal with prejudice”); Barnhill v. 

U.S., 11 F.3d 1360, 1367 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that “the particular sanction of dismissal with 

prejudice or judgment is ‘draconian,’” and “must be infrequently resorted to by district courts”). 

The Seventh Circuit expressly has stated that Rule 37(b) dismissals “should be employed sparingly 

and only when there is a record of delay, contumacious conduct, or when other, less drastic 

sanctions prove unavailing.” Dotson v. Bravo, 321 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Dismissals therefore are reserved for only the most egregious instances. See Ramirez v. 

T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 782-83 (7th Cir. 2016) (relied on by CRC but finding dismissal 

was appropriate where plaintiff engaged in witness tampering by offering money for false 

testimony); Ladien v. Astrachan, 128 F.3d 1051, 1057 (7th Cir. 1997) (dismissal appropriate where 

plaintiff “on many occasions, abused the discovery process and violated the court’s clearly 

articulated orders” and the court “repeatedly cautioned” that “his conduct was inappropriate and 

that it was coming dangerously close to warranting dismissal” and noting that dismissal “for a 

single act of violative conduct” would not be appropriate). This is not one of those instances. 

ARGUMENT 

 CRC’s motion for sanctions should be denied for three reasons. First, Plaintiffs fully 

complied with this Court’s order to “answer” Interrogatories 2, 3, 9, 10, and 11. Second, CRC’s 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 12 of 24 PageID #:24253
8 

motion is a procedurally improper attempt to procure a dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims on the 

merits before discovery is complete. Third, CRC unreasonably delayed in bringing this motion. 

Therefore, no sanctions are warranted under these facts, much less the draconian sanctions sought. 

I. Plaintiffs’ Answers Complied with the Court’s April 4 Discovery Order. 

CRC’s argument that Plaintiffs have violated the April 4 order rests on an erroneous 

premise. CRC argues that Plaintiffs have violated this Court’s April 4 order by not providing 

sufficiently specific identifications of meritorious trade secrets, by not providing legally adequate 

examples of CRC’s misappropriation and infringement, and by not providing a legally sound 

factual basis supporting their agency claims for Dilmas and Irvine. However, this Court ordered 

only that Plaintiffs “answer” the previously objected to interrogatories to describe how Chicago 

Rehab [improperly copied or used Plaintiffs’ Registered Copyright Work,]” and help CRC to 

“understand the bases for plaintiffs’ claims,” and Plaintiffs did this. (Mot. Ex. A, at 1-4.) 

A. Plaintiffs’ Trade Secrets and Copyright Charts Are Sufficiently Detailed at 

this Early Stage in the Litigation. 

To be sure, Plaintiffs have provided sufficiently detailed answers to CRC’s questions 

about the trade secrets it misappropriated and copyrights it infringed. On this subject, the court’s 

reasoning PeopleFlo Manufacturing, Inc. v. Sundyne is instructive. 2022 WL 1450382, at *4 (N.D. 

Ill. May 9, 2022). There, the Court issued an order requiring the plaintiff to identify its trade 

secrets, the plaintiff provided supplemental answers, and the defendants claimed the supplemental 

responses were insufficient and moved for sanctions. See id. *3. Denying the motion, the court 

observed that the plaintiff had provided answers as the court ordered and although the defendant 

“may not like [the plaintiff’s] answers, . . . they did receive them.” Id. at *4.

The court reasoned that these sorts of clashes are typical in trade secrets cases and are not 

characteristic of sanctionable conduct: 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 13 of 24 PageID #:24254
9 

In trade secret cases “parties often clash, and courts disagree” about when and to 

what extent trade secrets must be identified. . . . A plaintiff may attempt to delay 

articulating with particularity its trade secrets to avoid limiting the scope of its 

claim, while a defendant may seek an early, detailed identification to pinpoint the 

trade secret information being asserted. . . . The parties here are engaged in this 

clash, and through written discovery and motions to compel, [defendants] have 

sought, and pursuant to court orders received, supplemental responses from 

[plaintiff] with more specificity regarding the subject trade secrets. . . . While [the 

defendants] are not satisfied with the responses secured, they have not 

demonstrated that [the plaintiff] disobeyed any court orders in violation of Rule 

37(b)(2)(A). 

Id. at *3 (cleaned up). 

The court in PeopleFlo relied in part on TNS Media Research, LLC v. Tivo Research & 

Analytics, Inc., 629 Fed. Appx. 916 (Fed. Cir. 2015), where the Federal Circuit rejected a similar 

request for sanctions. There, the plaintiff in identifying its trade secrets “merely listed several 

hundred documents, without explaining how these documents demonstrated the existence of trade 

secrets.” Id. at 928. The court found “no indication that [the plaintiff] purposefully shirked its 

discovery obligations” or otherwise violated an order by not narrowing the description of its trade 

secrets until after discovery concluded. Id. at 929-30; see Nationwide Sales & Servs., Inc. v. 

Envirocare Techs. Int’l, Ltd., 2018 WL 2436969, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2018) (explaining the 

need to “exercise . . . caution before . . . impos[ing] the extreme sanction of dismissal based on a 

failure to adequately identify trade secrets”); McCarthy v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 2018 WL 

3831530, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 2018) (finding the record did not support a finding of 

willfulness or bad faith on plaintiff’s part to warrant dismissal and that an award of fees and costs 

was also inappropriate because plaintiff had substantially complied with the court’s order). 

Here, as in PeopleFlo and TNS, Plaintiffs have complied with this Court’s order by 

providing the detailed Trade Secrets Chart, Employee List, and Copyright Chart. Indeed, the charts 

identify the specific trade secrets (now by category and including specific trade secret items inside 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 14 of 24 PageID #:24255
10 

particular documents), identify each Registered Copyrighted Work, describe Plaintiffs’ theories 

of how CRC misappropriated those trade secrets and copied Plaintiffs’ Registered and 

Copyrighted Work, contain information on the creation and authorship of the trade secrets, and 

include the bates numbers of the relevant evidence of all of the above. Moreover, in May, 

Plaintiffs “answered” Interrogatories 10 and 11 instead of relying on objections, just as this Court 

ordered. Even a brief perusal of Plaintiffs’ answers demonstrate that Plaintiffs have complied 

with this Court’s order and indeed gone above and beyond in making a concerted and good faith 

effort to address CRC’s repeated demands for more detail (despite the fact that much of the 

information is not in Plaintiffs’ possession and has not yet been revealed in discovery). Further 

details about the nature of the misappropriation and Plaintiffs’ alter ego and agency theories is 

currently in the possession of Defendants and their representatives and employees whose 

depositions have yet to take place. See LKQ Corp. v. Gen. Motors Co., 2022 WL 14634800, at *4 

(N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2022) (denying Rule 37(b) motion for sanctions and explaining the court’s 

“Order does not require [the defendant] to produce documents it cannot find”). 

B. Plaintiffs’ Have Not Violated this Court’s Order Based on Confidentiality 

Designations, Technology Difficulties, or Reliance on Actions of CRC 

Employees Occurring Prior to CRC’s Formation. 

Sanctions are not appropriate here because Plaintiffs fully complied with this Court’s order 

to simply “answer” the previously objected to responses, describe how Chicago Rehab 

[improperly copied or used Plaintiffs’ Registered Copyright Work,]” and help CRC to 

“understand the bases for plaintiffs’ claims.” Lynchval Sys., Inc. v. Chi. Consulting Actuaries, 

Inc., 1996 WL 735586, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1996) (“Rule 37(b)(2) only authorizes a court to 

impose a sanction if the party fails to comply with a discovery order.”); (Mot. Ex. A, at 1-4.) 

Despite this, CRC argues for sanctions stating, that “the fact that Plaintiffs do not even 

mark the Trade Secret Chart as confidential,” is somehow dispositive of whether the Chart 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 15 of 24 PageID #:24256
11 

contains trade secrets as a matter of law. (Mot. at 8.) Of course, whether a document or 

information is labeled confidential for the purposes of complying with the confidentiality order 

that governs this litigation is not determinative of its trade secret status.4 (See Dkt. 51 at § 3(a) 

(“Applying the marking ‘CONFIDENTIAL . . .’ to a document does not mean that the document 

has any status or protection by statute or otherwise except to the extent and for the purposes of 

this Order”). After all, the Trade Secrets Chart is a summary and does not comprise the many 

thousands of pages of information that CRC’s agents misappropriated from Plaintiffs. 

CRC next argues that Plaintiffs violated this Court’s order by referencing documents that 

defendant Callen and the MedRehab Entities produced that supposedly contain “hidden content.” 

(Mot. at 9-10.) However, Plaintiffs have repeatedly explained to CRC that this hidden content is 

easily viewable by using ubiquitous e-discovery software and suggested that CRC’s counsel work 

with their IT staff, an e-discovery vendor, or Callen himself to address any remaining confusion. 

(Ex. C, Jan. 6 E-mail Chain, at 1; Ex. G, Feb. 3 E-mail Chain at 1.) These are very reasonable 

solutions for documents produced by other Defendants.5

 

Also meritless are CRC’s arguments that the Trade Secrets and Copyright Charts are 

insufficient because they reference instances of misappropriation and infringement by CRC 

employees who were “leased” to other entities and occurring prior to CRC’s formation are 

incorrect because those merits-based arguments fail under the law. (Mot. at 13-18.) The notion 

that CRC should be absolved from liability because of the legal fiction that it “leased” its 

 

4

 In any event, Plaintiffs have since explained what information in the Second Amended Trade Secrets 

Chart—which did not include a document production of the trade secrets—are confidential and should not 

be published. (Ex. G, Feb. 3 E-mail Chain at 1.) 

5

 CRC’s counsel, like all counsel practicing in this court, are obligated to have a basic understanding of 

relevant technology. See N.D. Ill. L.R. 83.50; ABA Mod. Rules Prof. Cond. § 1.1 cmt. 8 (“To maintain 

the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, 

including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology[.]”); Ill. RPC Rule 1.1 cmt. 8 (same). 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 16 of 24 PageID #:24257
12 

employees to other defendants is a merits dispute, inappropriate to raise in its discovery motion. 

CRC’s reliance on Behrens v. California Cartage Co. also is misplaced. That case addressed 

liability for payment of compensation benefits under the statutory language of the Workers 

Compensation Act and analyzed at summary judgment the “right-to-control” test to determine 

issues of respondeat superior of a staffing agency. Behrens, 870 N.E.2d at 850-52. Contrary to 

what CRC assumes, the case does not establish a bright-line rule that a party may not be liable 

for the actions of individuals “leased” to another company and did not address trade secret or 

copyright liability in the context of the sufficiency of discovery responses. See id. 

Similarly, CRC provides no support for its (merits) claim that it cannot be liable for 

misappropriation and infringement prior to the formation of CRC as a limited liability company. 

The statutory definition of misappropriation is not limited to the moment of first misappropriation 

and courts have repeatedly found misappropriation where an individual sent information from 

their work to personal e-mail accounts before they began working for the new employer. See 18 

U.S.C. § 1839(5)(A)-(B) (“[T]he term ‘misappropriation’ means-- (A) acquisition of a trade secret 

of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by 

improper means; or (B) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied 

consent . . .”); Moss Holdings, 2020 WL 1081730, at *7; Segerdahl, 2019 WL 77426, at *3. 

Likewise, all that needs to be shown for a copyright infringement claim is access to the 

copyrighted work and that the accused work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work. See 

JCW Invs., Inc., 482 F.3d at 915; Jt. Comm’n on Accreditation of Healthcare Org., 2017 WL 

3895593, at *2. The Copyright Chart sets forth how CRC employees had access to Symbria’s 

Registered Copyrighted Works through Dilmas and Irvine—who obtained those documents while 

employed by Symbria—and that CRC’s employees later used the works to create similar 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 17 of 24 PageID #:24258
13 

documents. (See Mot. at Ex. C to Ex. E.). Discovery—which is still underway—may unearth 

further details, and Plaintiffs will supplement accordingly. 

II. A Motion for Discovery Sanctions is Not the Appropriate Vehicle to Resolve CRC’s 

Arguments About Plaintiffs’ Claims on the Merits. 

As explained above, Plaintiffs have not violated this Court’s April 4 order. As such, there 

is no reasonable discovery dispute and only CRC’s request to engage in a merits dispute remains. 

This motion therefore also should be denied as a procedurally improper summary judgment motion 

in disguise. It is well established—especially in the context of a trade secrets dispute—that “a 

sanctions motion is not the proper vehicle to resolve the substantive merits of the case—including 

what information, if any, relating to [Plaintiffs’] asserted trade secrets is protectible.” PeopleFlo, 

2022 WL 1450382, at *4. Yet CRC’s motion is laden with substantive arguments about Plaintiffs’ 

ability to meet its evidentiary burden at trial. 

For example, CRC claims that Plaintiffs violated this Court’s order because contents of the 

amended Trade Secrets and Copyright Charts do not contain the legal elements necessary to sustain 

Plaintiffs’ claim. (Mot. at 8-14, 16-18.) CRC further argues that, because some of the trade secrets 

Plaintiffs identified “facially cannot constitute trade secrets” for various asserted reasons, 

dismissal is appropriate. (Id. at 8-10.) CRC also seeks dismissal because (i) Plaintiffs’ 

misappropriation descriptions supposedly do not demonstrate “use” in CRC’s business or 

disclosure (which CRC claims is required); (ii) the use by CRC employees leased to other 

companies supposedly does not constitute “use” as a matter of law; and (iii) Plaintiffs’ reliance on 

alter ego and agency theories is supposedly insufficient as a matter of law. (Id. at 12-13, 16-18.)6

 

6

 “Misappropriation of trade secrets” has a statutory definition that is much broader than simply “use,” 

including (1) acquisition by a person who has reason to know that the information was acquired by unlawful 

means, (2) disclosure, (3) acquisition by improper means, and (4) when at the time of disclosure or use, the 

defendant knew or had reason to know that the information was derived using improper means, or acquired 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 18 of 24 PageID #:24259
14 

CRC further argues that Plaintiffs’ answers are in bad faith because the amended Copyright Chart 

relies on the actions of CRC employees “leased” to other companies, which CRC apparently 

contends is not relevant to its liability, and because CRC takes issue with the legal soundness of 

Plaintiffs’ agency allegations regarding Dilmas and Irvine. (Id. at 14-15.) These issues—which 

Plaintiffs hotly dispute—are not properly resolved in the context of a discovery dispute. 

The district court’s reasoning in PeopleFlo again is illustrative. There, the defendants filed 

a motion for sanctions using the same arguments advanced by CRC—namely that the plaintiff had 

failed to comply with a court order requiring it to identify its trade secrets because its 

identifications remained unclear and the trade secrets identified were allegedly not protectible 

under the law (being based on publicly available information). 2022 WL 1450382, at *4. The court 

denied the defendants’ motion, explaining that the case was “still in the fact discovery stage,” and 

that “key depositions on these issues have not yet occurred.” Id. The court emphasized that it would 

be “premature” and “inappropriate” in response to a sanctions motions to “wade into the merits as 

to the protectability of the trade secrets.” Id. 

The same reasoning applies here: CRC’s motion seeking the sanction of dismissal based 

on the merits of Plaintiffs’ articulations of misappropriation and infringement in its Trade Secrets 

and Copyright Charts is both premature and inappropriate. CRC’s cited cases are not to the 

contrary. Instead of relying on cases addressing Rule 37(b), CRC relies on cases arising in the 

context of summary judgment and other merits-related motions.7

 

under circumstances giving rise to a duty to protect its secrecy, or derived from a person who had a duty to 

the plaintiff to maintain secrecy. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5)(A)-(B); 765 ILCS 1065/2(b)(1)-(2). 

7 See Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1992) (appeal of 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict); IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 2002) 

(summary judgment); ABC Acquisition Co., LLC v. AIP Prod. Corp., No. 18 CV 8420, 2020 WL 4607247 

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2020) (summary judgment); Behrens v. Ca. Cartage Co., Inc., 373 Ill. App. 3d 860 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 2007) (summary judgment). Plaintiffs need not address the merits at this premature juncture in 

responding to a discovery sanctions motion before party depositions have even begun. See PeopleFlo, 2022 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 19 of 24 PageID #:24260
15 

Suffice it to say that Plaintiffs’ vehemently disagree with CRC’s various merits challenges 

to Plaintiffs’ misappropriation, copyright, agency, and alter ego claims, and its characterizations 

of the law.8 But regardless a motion for discovery sanctions is not the place to resolve these issues. 

Instead, this Court should reject CRC’s attempt to resolve merits disputes through a discovery 

motion, and to deny CRC’s motion. 

III. CRC Waived Its Right to Bring a Motion for Sanctions. 

Even if CRC’s motion was directed to an actual discovery dispute (which it is not), it would 

be barred as not timely raised. Where a party unreasonably delays in bringing a motion for 

discovery sanctions, the motion should be denied. See Brandt v. Vulcan, Inc., 30 F.3d 752, 756 

(7th Cir. 1994) (affirming denial of sanctions motion in part because of unreasonable delay by the 

movant in seeking the sanctions). The Seventh Circuit has stressed that a party in possession of 

 

WL 1450382, at *4; M.H. Eby, Inc. v. Timpte Indus., Inc., No. CV 19-386, 2019 WL 6910153, at *8 (E.D. 

Pa. 2019) (declining to address whether alleged “know-how” qualified as trade secret because to rule on 

such issues “at an early stage . . . would require the court to wade into the substantive merits of the parties’ 

dispute”). 

8

 For example, on what may constitute a trade secret, see Master Tech Prods., Inc. v. Prism Enters., Inc., 

No. 00 C 4599, 2002 WL 475192, *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2002) (finding a trade secret “may include a 

compilation of confidential business and financial information”). On trade secret misappropriation, see, 

e.g., Moss Holdings Co. v. Fuller, No. 20-CV-01043, 2020 WL 1081730, *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2020) 

(finding misappropriation when employees sent non-public client and project information to their personal 

Gmail accounts); Segerdahl Corp. v. Feruzza, No. 17-CV-3015, 2019 WL 77426, *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2019) 

(denying motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged that defendant sent trade secret documents to his 

personal email). On copyright infringement, see JCW Invs., Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 915 (7th 

Cir. 2007) (explaining copying can be shown through direct evidence of copying or indirect evidence 

“where [the individual] had access to the copyrighted work and the accused work is substantially similar to 

the copyrighted work”); Jt. Comm’n on Accreditation of Healthcare Org. v. Fortis Bus. Media LLC, No. 

14 C 10225, 2017 WL 3895593, *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2017) (explaining a plaintiff can establish copying 

indirectly where the defendants had “the opportunity to copy the original (often called ‘access’) and that 

two works are ‘substantially similar,’ thus permitting an inference that the defendant actually did copy the 

original”). With respect to agency, see Sperl v. Henry, 124 N.E.3d 936, 944-45 (Ill. 2018) (multiple 

principals can be held equally or simultaneously liable for the act of a single agent); FTC v. Lifewatch Inc., 

176 F. Supp. 3d 757, 776 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (agents can serve multiple principals, even competing ones); 

Freeman v. Augustine’s, Inc., 360 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (analyzing whether an employee 

is truly leased to another organization and stating “the loaned employee relationship must generally be of a 

temporary nature. To speak of a ‘permanently loaned employee’ is self-contradictory”). 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 20 of 24 PageID #:24261
16 

information sufficient to assess whether discovery responses are complete cannot sit on its hands 

for months and must bring any issues to the court’s attention in a timely fashion. See id. at 756-57. 

But that is what CRC did here. When Defendants moved to extend the December 2 deadline 

for filing motions as to pending discovery requests and existing discovery orders, they did so only 

with respect to issues arising from Plaintiffs’ document productions from May and November 

2022. They claimed that they needed a “full opportunity to identify deficiencies in the production 

or to meet and confer with Plaintiffs about resolving them without court intervention.” (Dkt. 613 

at 2-3.) At a hearing on this motion, the Magistrate Judge noted: “You missed the December 2nd 

deadline, but I’m not sure why that happened, given the circumstance and the import of the issue.” 

(Ex. B, Dec. 8, 2022 Tr. of Proceedings, at 22:2-4.) The Court went on to grant the extension in 

part stating, “The Court will permit Defendants to file motions as to pending discovery requests 

and/or previously issued orders as to discovery productions through 1/6/23. However, depending 

on the substance of the motions, the Court may not consider the motions timely (based on the 

factors the Court explained on record).” (Dkt. 619.) The Court made clear it would not be inclined 

to take on motions that “could have been raised without reviewing the documents”—such as 

written responses to interrogatories. (Ex. B, Dec. 8, 2022 Tr. of Proceedings, at 31:15-25.) 

Accordingly, this Court granted an extension until January 6 so Defendants had an 

opportunity to review Plaintiffs’ document productions, not to allow CRC to belatedly raise issues 

with Plaintiffs’ six-month-old amended answers to Interrogatories 2, 3, 9, 10, and 11. Any 

discovery motion relating to those amended answers must have been brought by December 2. 

Despite the fact that it now claims to be unsatisfied with Plaintiffs’ May 2022 amended 

answer to Interrogatory 3, CRC did not raise the issue after the discovery stay was lifted or bring 

its motion for sanctions by December 2. (See Mot. Ex. G.) In fact, it was not until December 9—

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 21 of 24 PageID #:24262
17 

a week after the deadline—that CRC complained in writing of Plaintiffs’ amended answers to 

Interrogatories 2 and 9—without mentioning any remaining issues with Interrogatory 3. (See Ex. 

A, Nov. 17 E-mail Chain, at 1-3.) Moreover, CRC has never previously complained about 

Plaintiffs’ amended answers to Interrogatories 10 and 11.9 

 In not abiding by this Court’s deadline, CRC unreasonably delayed in bringing its motion. 

See U.S. v. Stinson, No. 614CV1534, 2016 WL 8488241, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2016) (finding 

motion for sanctions untimely when filed after the discovery deadline to bring the issue to the 

Court’s attention); Barnes v. City of Chi., 2000 WL 1745180, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27, 2000) 

(finding plaintiff waived right to bring Rule 37 motion due to her own two-year inaction where 

plaintiff “could have and should have taken action earlier than now”); Walrus Brands, LLC v. 

Peaches Uniforms, Inc., No. 12 C 4892, 2018 WL 11453554, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2018) (finding 

motion for sanctions was untimely where movant “sat on its rights”). This gives the Court yet 

another reason to deny CRC’s motion for sanctions. 

IV. The Severe Sanctions of Dismissal and Prohibition of Evidence Are Not Warranted. 

CRC has not come close to meeting the standard for sanctions here, much less the ultimate 

sanction of dismissal. Since this Court’s April 4 order, Plaintiffs have acted promptly in making 

substantial additions and supplementations to the Trade Secrets and Copyright Charts. Discovery 

is still underway, no party depositions have taken place, and Plaintiffs have still provided CRC 

 

9

 Although CRC argued in a December 9 e-mail that Plaintiffs’ amended answers to Interrogatories 2 and 

9—namely the Trade Secrets and Copyright Charts—were insufficient in part because they “merely state 

that Christos Dilmas or Christine Irvine emailed the document to themselves while employed by Symbria[]” 

and claim that “Irvine (who is no longer even a Defendant in this action), or Dilmas emailed certain of the 

[copyrighted] Works to themselves while they were employed by Symbria Rehab[,]” CRC did not raise any 

issues with Plaintiffs’ written responses to Interrogatories 10 and 11 before bringing this motion. (See Ex. 

A, Nov. 17 E-mail Chain, at 1-3.) Contrary to CRC’s assertions, Plaintiffs did not discuss amending 

Interrogatories 10 or 11, but only agreed to provide greater detail in the Trade Secrets and Copyright Charts 

relating to agency generally. Thus, in no e-mails and at no meet-and-confer did CRC raise concerns relating 

to Interrogatories 10 and 11. 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 22 of 24 PageID #:24263
18 

with ample information. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Total Prop. Care Inc., 2018 WL 

2356214, at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 24, 2018) (finding preclusion of evidence would be premature 

where additional discovery could be had); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ecowater Sys., Inc., 2004 WL 

1073687, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 2004) (noting the sanction of preclusion of evidence is 

unwarranted where other discovery going to same issue was available). Sanctions—particularly 

the sanction of dismissal—are inappropriate under such circumstances. See Barnhill, 11 F.3d at 

1368 (“[D]ismissal . . . is such a serious sanction that it should not be invoked without first 

considering what effect—if any—the challenged conduct has had on the course of the litigation”). 

CRC’s request in the alternative to bar Plaintiffs from providing evidence that CRC 

misappropriated trade secrets is also not appropriate. (Mot. at 19-20.) No less than a dismissal, 

this would effectively doom Plaintiffs’ trade secrets claims. Courts are hesitant to impose such 

sanctions as “the interests of justice are best served by resolving cases on their merits.” Lair for 

Est. of Lair v. Reyes, 2020 WL 9718813, at *14 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2020) (refusing to prohibit 

defendants from presenting evidence or arguments at trial where it would be outcome 

determinative). CRC cites no case that would warrant sanctions under the circumstances here. 

Unlike in Langley, Plaintiffs have not failed to produce evidence after admonition. See Langley 

by Langley v. Union Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 510, 513-16 (7th Cir. 1997) (barring evidence after 

plaintiff was ordered to produce evidence on threat of sanctions, plaintiff failed to do so, and 

plaintiff provided no explanation for its failure). Accordingly, this Court should deny CRC’s 

request for any type of sanctions and deny its motion in its entirety. 

CONCLUSION 

 Plaintiffs have not violated this Court’s April 4 order. CRC’s motion for sanctions seeking 

dismissal is unfounded, untimely, and an inappropriate use of Rule 37(b). For all of the forgoing 

reasons, the Court should deny CRC’s motion for discovery sanctions. 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 23 of 24 PageID #:24264
19 

DATED: February 10, 2023 Respectfully submitted, 

SYMBRIA, INC., SYMBRIA REHAB, INC., 

ALLIANCE REHAB OF CONNECTICUT, 

LLC, and ALLIANCE REHAB HVA, L.L.C., 

GREATBANC TRUST COMPANY, IN ITS 

CAPACITY AS TRUSTEE OF THE 

SYMBRIA, INC. EMPLOYEE STOCK 

OWNERSHIP TRUST, and THE SYMBRIA, 

INC. EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP 

TRUST 

By: /s/ Matthew J. O’Hara 

One of Their Attorneys 

Matthew J. O’Hara (Ill. ARDC No. 6237795) 

Terrence J. Sheahan (Ill. ARDC No. 6257646) 

Gia F. Colunga (Ill. ARDC No. 6282679) 

Katie D. Krysan (Ill. ARDC No. 6323797) 

Lillian G. Lamphere (Ill. ARDC No. 6340044) 

FREEBORN & PETERS LLP 

311 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3000 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

(312) 360-6000 

mohara@freeborn.com 

tsheahan@freeborn.com

gcolunga@freeborn.com

kkrysan@freeborn.com 

llamphere@freeborn.com 

Jason P. Stearns (Fla. Bar No. 059550) 

FREEBORN & PETERS LLP 

201 North Franklin Street, Suite 3550 

Tampa, Florida 33602 

(813) 488-2920

jstearns@freeborn.com 

Case: 1:20-cv-04084 Document #: 692 Filed: 02/10/23 Page 24 of 24 PageID #:24265