[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10142

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

THELONIOUS WAYNE KIRBY, 

Defendant- Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cr-00026-TJC-LLL-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-10142

Before NEWSOM, ABUDU, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Thelonious Kirby appeals his conviction for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. He argues that 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment and the Commerce 

Clause. The government has moved for summary affirmance, arguing that, under our binding precedent, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional. After thorough review, we grant the government’s motion 

for summary affirmance.

We review a statute’s constitutionality de novo. United States 

v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 770 (11th Cir. 2010). Summary disposition 

is appropriate if “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as 

a matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to 

the outcome of the case.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 

1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).1 Under our prior panel precedent rule, 

we are bound by our prior published decisions that have not been 

overruled by the Supreme Court or ourselves sitting en banc. 

United States v. Romo-Villalobos, 674 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2012).

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides that: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 

1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we 

adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 

1, 1981.

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24-10142 Opinion of the Court 3

shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. Under federal law, 

a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more 

than one year’s imprisonment may not possess a firearm or ammunition that has moved through interstate or foreign commerce. 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We have held that § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition 

on felon disarmament does not violate the Second Amendment

and that § 922(g)(1) is a valid use of the congressional Commerce 

Clause power. United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389–90 (11th 

Cir. 1996); Rozier, 598 F.3d at 770–71. 

Kirby’s argument -- that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the 

Second Amendment and the Commerce Clause -- is foreclosed by 

our binding precedents. See McAllister, 77 F.3d at 389–90; Rozier, 

598 F.3d at 770–71. Moreover, we recently held that Rozier was not

abrogated by the Supreme Court’s decision in N.Y. State Rifle and 

Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). See United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2024). And we are bound by all 

of our prior published decisions because they have not been overruled by the Supreme Court or ourselves sitting en banc. Romo-Villalobos, 674 F.3d at 1251. Accordingly, we grant the government’s 

motion for summary disposition, since it is “clearly right as a matter of law” that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional. See Groendyke Transp., 

406 F.2d at 1162. 

AFFIRMED.

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