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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

NICOLE LURRY, as Special Administrator )

of the Estate of Eric Lurry, Jr., deceased, )

) Case No. 20 CV 4545

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

City of Joliet and Joliet Police Officers May (Star ) Judge Virginia Kendall 

#056), McCue (Star #118), Tellez (Star #311), and )

Lt. Harrison (Star #039), )

)

Defendants. )

FIRST AMENDED CIVIL COMPLAINT

NOW COMES Plaintiff, NICOLE LURRY, by and through her attorneys, Bakos & 

Maisuria Law Group, complaining against Defendants City of Joliet, and Joliet Police Officers 

May, McCue, Tellez, and Harrison, individually, as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. This action, arising out of the death of Plaintiff’s husband, Eric Lurry, is brought pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to address deprivations of Mr. Lurry’s rights under the Constitution of 

the United States.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2. This Court has jurisdiction of the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 

and venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). On information and belief, all parties reside 

in this judicial district, and the events giving rise to the claims asserted herein occurred 

within the district.

THE PARTIES

3. The Plaintiff, Nicole Lurry, is the wife of the deceased, Eric Lurry. Nicole Lurry resides in 

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the Northern District of Illinois and has been appointed Special Administrator of Eric

Lurry's estate.

4. Decedent Eric Lurry was 37 years old at the time of his death on January 29, 2020.

5. Defendant City of Joliet is a municipal corporation duly incorporated under the laws of the

State of Illinois and is the employer and principal of Defendant Officers.

6. Defendant Joliet Police Officers May, McCue, Tellez, and Harrison were at all relevant times 

duly appointed police officers of the City of Joliet acting within the scope of their

employment and under color of law. They are being sued in their individual capacities.

FACTS

7. On or about January 28, 2020, at approximately 3:12 p.m., Eric Lurry and Keenan Kinney

were pulled over by Joliet Police Officer Wietting near the intersection of S. Briggs Street

and E. Washington Street in Joliet, Illinois.

8. Defendants McCue and Tellez arrived on-scene shortly thereafter.

9. Defendant McCue performed a pat-down search of Mr. Lurry and found $1,380.00 in the

front pockets of Mr. Lurry's pants.

10. During that search, Defendant McCue recovered no contraband or weapons of any kind

on Eric Lurry's person or within Eric Lurry's immediate vicinity.

11. Defendant McCue's search of Mr. Lurry's person did not produce any evidence that Mr.

Lurry had committed or was in the process of committing a crime.

12. After confirming Mr. Lurry's identity, one of the Defendants retrieved an iphone from

Kinney's vehicle, gave it to Mr. Lurry, returned the money to Mr. Lurry and then allowed

Mr. Lurry to leave the scene.

13. While Mr. Lurry was walking away from the scene, Defendant Tellez re-initiated contact

with Mr. Lurry and asked Mr. Lurry to return the iphone.

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14. After Mr. Lurry returned the phone, Defendant Tellez retrieved and seized the currency

from Lurry's front pant pockets and then proceeded to perform another pat-down search of

Mr. Lurry’s.

15. Defendant Tellez did not have probable cause to believe that Mr. Lurry committed any

crimes either immediately prior to or during the second pat-down search.

16. Defendant Tellez did not have probable cause to believe that Mr. Lurry committed any

crimes at any time on the day of the incident prior to the second pat-down search.

17. Defendant Tellez did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Lurry had committed

any crimes either immediately prior to or during the second pat-down search.

18. Defendant Tellez did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Lurry had committed 

any crimes at any time on the day of the incident prior to the second pat-downsearch.

19. Defendant Tellez did not have any legal justification for performing the second pat-down

search of Mr. Lurry.

20. Defendant Tellez did not have any legal justification for seizing Mr. Lurry's money.

21. Following the pat-down search, Mr. Lurry was taken into custody by Defendants,

handcuffed behind his back, placed in the back of Defendant McCue's squad car and

transported to the Joliet Police Station.

22. While in the backseat of the squad car, Mr. Lurry was breathing heavily and chewing on 

something. 

23. Defendant Tellez stated something to the effect that he believed Mr. Lurry may have put “a 

bunch” of the drugs he had on him in his mouth. Tellez later adds “he’s got some in his 

mouth. I don’t know how much, but he’s still got some in there.” 

24. Defendant Tellez and/or Defendant McCue witnessed Mr. Lurry making chewing motions 

while in the back seat of the squad car enroute to the Joliet Police Station. 

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25. Defendant Tellez and Defendant McCue did not transport Mr. Lurry to the hospital from the 

scene of Mr. Lurry’s arrest. 

26. Defendant Tellez and Defendant McCue did not activate the lights or sirens during their 

transport of Eric Lurry to the Joliet Police Station.

27. Neither Defendant Tellez nor Defendant McCue called for medical assistance/emergency 

medical aid for Mr. Lurry either at the scene of Mr. Lurry’s arrest or enroute to the Joliet 

Police Station. 

28. When they arrived at the station, Lieutenant Harrison approached McCue's squad car to

assess and monitor the situation.

29. On that date, Lieutenant Harrison was Defendant May, McCue and Tellez's supervisor.

30. Upon arriving at the station, Defendant McCue gave verbal direction to Mr. Lurry to exit 

the squad car. Mr. Lurry did not physically or verbally respond to that direction. 

31. At the direction of Defendant Harrison, Defendant May entered the rear of McCue's

squad car where Mr. Lurry was seated and still handcuffed behind his back.

32. At that time, Defendants McCue, Tellez, May and Harrison immediately recognized that

Mr. Lurry was in medical distress and not fully conscious.

33. Specifically, Defendants McCue, Tellez, May and Harrison recognized that Mr. Lurry’s 

eyes were rolling back into his head, that his breathing was shallow, and that he was not 

physically or verbally responding to Defendant McCue or Defendant May’s verbal 

direction. 

34. Despite Mr. Lurry’s obvious objectively serious medical needs, no Defendant

summoned medical attention for Mr. Lurry at that time.

35. Instead, Defendants May and McCue attempted to retrieve bags containing narcotics

from Mr. Lurry's mouth while Defendants Harrison and Tellez looked on. 

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36. In doing so, Defendant May pinched Mr. Lurry's nose for close to two-minutes and 

grabbed him around his throat to intentionally restrict Mr. Lurry’s breathing in an effort to 

get Mr. Lurry to open his mouth. 

37. Defendant May also slapped Mr. Lurry in the face while saying, "Wake up, bitch!"

38. At this time, Defendant May knew that Mr. Lurry was no longer conscious and was in need 

of immediate medical assistance. 

39. At this time, Defendants McCue, Harrison, and Tellez knew that Mr. Lurry was in need of 

immediate medical assistance. 

40. Despite this, at that time, Defendants May, McCue, Harrison and Tellez did not call for 

medical assistance for Mr. Lurry or direct anyone else to do so. 

41. At the same time, at the direction of Defendant Harrison, Defendant McCue inserted a

baton in Mr. Lurry's mouth, obstructing his airway.

42. It is against Joliet Police Department’s policy to intentionally restrict an arrestee’s breathing 

in an effort to force the arrestee to open his mouth in order to remove evidence therefrom

and/or to extract drugs from an arrestee’s mouth for the purpose rendering medical aid. 

43. Joliet Police Department has a policy that requires medical professionals to be immediately 

called if an arrestee is known to have or is believed to have inserted drugs into his mouth 

for the purpose of hiding evidence during the course of an arrest. 

44. Joliet Police Department has a policy that requires that medical professionals be 

immediately called if an arrestee is known to have or is believed to have ingested narcotics 

during the course of an arrest. 

45. It is against Joliet Police Department’s policy to attempt to remove drugs from an arrestee’s 

mouth without a medical professional’s assistance or the arrestee’s consent. 

46. Defendant McCue then reached in Mr. Lurry’s mouth to retrieve the narcotics and removed

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part of a plastic bag.

47. Defendant McCue and May's conduct caused Mr. Lurry to ingest narcotics and suffocate.

48. Mr. Lurry was pronounced dead in the early morning hours of January 29, 2020.

49. The same day, Joliet Police Department Lieutenant Chris Botzum, issued a statement to the

media indicating only that Eric Lurry swallowed a bag of cocaine while in custody and

that Mr. Lurry later died at AMITA Health St. Joseph Medical Center.

50. Defendant McCue's squad car was equipped with an operable video camera on January 28, 

2020.

51. Defendant McCue's squad car was equipped with an operable audio system on January 28, 

2020.

52. Defendants' interactions with Mr. Lurry in the back of Defendant McCue's squad car, as set 

forth herein, were captured and recorded by the squad car video camera and audio system.

53. One or more Defendants edited, tampered with and/or destroyed the audio and/or video

footage from the squad car video related to Mr. Lurry's arrest and detention in an attempt to 

destroy and conceal evidence of wrongdoing.

54. During the subject incident, while in the parking lot of the Joliet Police Station and while 

Mr. Lurry was still seated in the rear of Defendant McCue’s squad car, Defendant Tellez 

intentionally turned off the squad car’s audio recording capabilities. 

55. In turning off the squad car’s audio recording capabilities, Defendant Tellez and/or McCue 

violated Joliet Police Department’s policies. 

56. Additional cameras in and around the perimeter of the Joliet Police Station parking lot

recorded portions of the incident set forth herein.

57. These recordings captured relevant, material evidence related to the death of Mr. Lurry and

were not preserved by anyone at the Joliet Police Department.

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58. Sgt. Esqueda, a 27-year veteran of the Joliet Police Department, viewed and then obtained 

a copy of the squad car video and shared it with various news outlets because he was

disturbed by Defendant May and McCue's conduct.

59. Sgt. Esqueda also obtained and shared the video with various news outlets because he

believed that the City of Joliet and/or employees of the Joliet Police Department, including 

Defendants, attempted to and/or had in fact destroyed incriminating material evidence

related to the death of Eric Lurry.

60. In describing what he observed on the squad car video, Sgt. Esqueda said, "It was almost

like the supervisor looks off and says something to somebody, and then you hear the sound 

cut out. That's what alerted me that possibly [the Joliet Police Department] were trying to

get rid of evidence."

61. When asked if he believed that there was a deliberate, initial act to turn off the audio or get

rid of the audio, Sgt. Esqueda said, "There had to be. There's no way that can

happen."

62. Less than three weeks after Sgt. Esqueda's brave reporting of his fellow officers’

misconduct, on July 6, 2020, Joliet Police Chief Al Roechner stripped Sgt. Esqueda of his

police powers and placed him on administrative desk duty and initiated a criminal and

internal investigation into his actions. Sgt. Esqueda has since been indicted on criminal 

charges and is facing prison time related to his courageous release of this video and his 

attempt to shut down the cover-up by the Joliet Police Department of Mr. Lurry’s death. 

63. Defendant May, who pinched Mr. Lurry’s nose shut thereby restricting his breathing for 

almost two minutes and slapped and cursed at him as he was losing consciousness, was not 

placed on desk duty until five months after the incident, and only after the video was leaked 

to the public.

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64. Defendant Tellez drafted an initial report of the incident omitting from that report the fact 

that Defendant May slapped Mr. Lurry, that Defendant May did anything to restrict Mr. 

Lurry’s breathing, that Defendant McCue put a baton in Mr. Lurry’s mouth, or that Eric 

Lurry died. 

65. Defendant Tellez’s report was not supplemented until weeks after the incident to include 

this information. 

COUNT I: WILLFUL AND WANTON CONDUCT

(Against all Individual Defendant Officers)

66. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

67. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Officers engaged in a course of action which showed 

an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, showed utter 

indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others.

68. The acts of Defendant Officers were willful, wanton, and executed with a conscious disregard

for the safety of others.

69. In violation of their duty, Defendant Officers recklessly committed without limitation the

following willful and wanton acts or omissions when they knew or should have reasonably

known that Mr. Lurry’s life was in danger:

a. Failing to transport Mr. Lurry to a medical facility or immediately call for 

paramedics upon recognizing that Mr. Lurry had drugs in his mouth so medical

personnel could safely remove the toxic items from his mouth;

b. Failing to immediately summon medical attention for Mr. Lurry after observing

him to be in significant distress and going in and out of consciousness;

c. Performing an unreasonable search by attempting to remove toxic items from 

Lurry’s mouth thereby causing Mr. Lurry to ingest the toxic substance;

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d. Slapping Mr. Lurry in the face while observing him to be in significant distress and 

going in and out of consciousness;

e. Holding Mr. Lurry's nose closed to restrict his breathing knowing him to be in 

significant medical distress; and

f. Prying Mr. Lurry's mouth open with a baton and inserting said baton in his mouth.

70. As a direct and proximate result of the aforementioned willful and wanton acts and reckless

conduct of Defendant Officers, Eric Lurry died.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant Officers, jointly and 

severally, for an award of reasonable compensatory and punitive damages, plus costs.

COUNT II: WRONGFUL DEATH (State-law claim)

(Against All Individual Defendant Officers)

71. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

72. As set forth above, Defendant Officers caused the wrongful death of Eric Lurry, in violation

of ILCS 740 180/1 et seq.

73. Defendant Officers actions proximately caused Mr. Lurry to suffer injuries, including without

limitation great bodily harm and death as well as pain and suffering.

74. Under state law, this claim is considered to be an independent action by the administrator of

Eric Lurry's estate, Nicole Lurry, to compensate the Estate for loss of society (including loss

of companionship and loss of affection, love and support), burial and funeral expenses, 

and the Estate’s grief, sorrow, including but not limited to the loss of a twin pregnancy and mental 

suffering as well as all direct economic losses stemming from Mr. Lurry's wrongful death.

75. As a result of Defendant Officers’ conduct, the Estate has suffered injury, including without 

limitation medical and/or funeral expenses, loss of society, grief, sorrow, mental suffering

and other economic losses.

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WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant Officers, jointly and 

severally, for an award of reasonable compensatory and punitive damages, plus costs.

COUNT III: SURVIVAL ACTION (state law claim)

(Against All Individual Defendant Officers)

76. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

77. After Defendants ultimately caused Mr. Lurry’s death by their use of force, restriction of Mr. 

Lurry’s breathing, and their inexcusable and unjustified failure to timely procure the 

necessary medical attention, Mr. Lurry survived for a period of time during which he

experienced conscious pain and suffering.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant Officers, jointly and 

severally, for an award of reasonable compensatory and punitive damages, plus costs.

COUNT IV: BATTERY (state law claim)

(Against Defendants McCue and May)

78. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

79. As set forth above, Defendant Officers McCue and May intentionally made physical contact

with Mr. Lurry without just cause. The physical contact was offensive and harmful.

80. The actions of the Defendant Officers were intentional, willful, and wanton.

81. The misconduct set forth herein was undertaken with intentional disregard for Mr.

Lurry’s rights.

82. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant McCue and May's misconduct, Mr. Lurry

sustained damages including pain and suffering before his death.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants McCue and May, 

jointly and severally, for an award of reasonable compensatory and punitive damages, plus costs.

COUNT V: Replevin (state law claim)

(Against Defendant Tellez)

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83. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

84. Defendant Tellez unlawfully seized Mr. Lurry's money in the amount of $1,380.00.

85. The Estate of Eric Lurry is the rightful owner of such property and lawfully entitled to the 

immediate possession thereof.

86. Defendant Tellez has not returned Mr. Lurry's money to the Estate and as such, Defendant

Tellez has intentionally and wrongfully detained it.

87. The money at issue has not been taken for any tax, assessment, or fine levied by virtue of any 

law of this state, against the property of plaintiff, or against the plaintiff individually, nor 

seized under any lawful process against the goods and chattels of plaintiff subject to any 

lawful process. The money is not held by virtue of any order for replevin against plaintiff.

88. As a result of Defendant Tellez's conduct, the Estate has been injured and deprived of its use

and enjoyment of the money.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant Officer Tellez for an

award of reasonable compensatory and punitive damages, plus costs.

COUNT VI: SPOLIATION (state law claim)

(Against All Defendants)

89. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

90. At the time of the individual Defendants' encounter with Eric Lurry, the audio and video of

Defendant McCue's squad car camera were operable and recording.

91. At the time of the individual Defendants’ encounter with Eric Lurry, the video camera affixed 

to the outside of the police station and pointed in the direction of Defendant McCue’s squad 

car, was operable and recording. 

92. The video and audio of Defendant McCue's squad car camera captured the individual

Defendants' interaction with Mr. Lurry while Mr. Lurry was in the rear of that squad car.

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93. The video of the parking lot of the Joliet Police Station captured Defendants’ interactions 

with Mr. Lurry. 

94. Portions of the audio recording from the squad car video were edited, tampered with and/or

deleted by an employee or employees of the Joliet Police Department

95. Portions of the audio recording from the squad car video were edited, tampered with and/or

deleted by one or more individual Defendants.

96. Portions of the video recording from the squad car video were edited, tampered with and/or

deleted by an employee or employees of the Joliet Police Department.

97. Portions of the video recording from the squad car video were edited, tampered with and/or

deleted by one or more individual Defendants.

98. The surveillance video from the camera that was affixed to the outside of the Joliet Police 

Department building that depicted portions of the subject incident was intentionally 

destroyed for the purpose of hiding incriminating evidence. 

99. All individual Defendants, all employees of the Joliet Police Department, and the City of

Joliet have an obligation to preserve and maintain the integrity of all evidence that may

be reasonably related to any ongoing or potential legal action.

100. The video evidence at issue from the surveillance camera and from Defendant McCue's

squad car video constitutes material evidence supporting Plaintiff's underlying claims in 

this action.

101. In the event that the finder of fact in this case is unable to determine whether or not

Defendants acted lawfully during their interactions with Eric Lurry or finds againstPlaintiff 

on Plaintiff's underlying claims, Plaintiff pleads in the alternative to the prior underlying 

counts that such loss of evidence proximately caused her inability to prove her underlying

claims.

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WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against all Defendants, jointly and

severally, for an award of compensatory and punitive damages (punitive damages against the

individual Defendants only), plus attorney's fees and costs.

COUNT VII: 1983 FOURTH AMENDMENT - UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND

SEIZURE FOR DEFENDANT TELLEZ'S ON-SCENE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF

LURRY'S PERSON AND SEIZURE OF CURRENCY

(Against Defendant Tellez)

102. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein. At all times

relevant herein, Eric Lurry was vested with, possessed and was guaranteed by the Fourth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution the right to be free from an unlawful search

and seizure.

103. Defendant Officer Tellez, acting under the color of law, caused Mr. Lurry to be seized when

he stopped Mr. Lurry from walking away from the scene.

104. Defendant Tellez invaded Mr. Lurry's privacy by searching his person via a "pat-down"

search.

105. Defendant Tellez did not have probable cause to believe that Mr. Lurry had committed a

crime when Tellez searched and seized Mr. Lurry.

106. Defendant Tellez did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Lurry had or was

about to commit a crime when he searched and seized Mr. Lurry.

107. Defendant Tellez had no lawful justification for seizing or searching Mr. Lurry's person.

108. Such actions constitute deliberate indifference to Mr. Lurry's rights under the United States

Constitution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

109. Defendant Tellez's conduct in unlawfully seizing and searching Mr. Lurry was undertaken

with malice, willfulness and reckless indifference to Mr. Lurry's rights.

110. Acting under the color of law, Defendant Tellez also seized Mr. Lurry's money without

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probable cause or any other legal justification.

111. Defendant Tellez's conduct constituted an illegal seizure of property in violation of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.

112. Defendant Tellez's conduct was objectively unreasonable and undertaken intentionally with

willful and wanton indifference to Mr. Lurry's constitutional rights.

113. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful actions of Defendant Tellez, Mr. Lurry

suffered loss of liberty, emotional distress, and loss of the use and enjoyment of his property.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant Officer Tellez for an

award of reasonable compensatory and punitive damages, plus attorneys’ fees and costs.

COUNT VIII: 1983 FOURTH AMENDMENT - UNREASONABLE SEARCH OF

LURRY'S PERSON

(Against Defendants McCue and May)

114. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

115. At all times relevant herein the Decedent, Eric Lurry, was vested with, possessed and was

guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution the right to be free

from an unreasonable search.

116. Defendants McCue and May deprived Mr. Lurry of this Fourth Amendment right by

using unreasonable methods to retrieve narcotics from Mr. Lurry's mouth.

117. Defendant McCue deprived Mr. Lurry of this Fourth Amendment right by forcing a baton 

into Mr. Lurry's mouth to retrieve narcotics without medical assistance and while Mr. Lurry 

was handcuffed behind his back in obvious distress and in need of immediate medical

attention.

118. Defendant Officer May deprived Mr. Lurry of this Fourth Amendment right by pinching

Mr. Lurry's nose closed thereby restricting his ability to take in oxygen for almost two

minutes to retrieve narcotics, without medical assistance and while Mr. Lurry was

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handcuffed behind his back in obvious distress and in need of immediate medical attention.

119. Defendant Officer May deprived Mr. Lurry of this Fourth Amendment right by slapping

Mr. Lurry in his face and saying "Wake up, bitch" in an effort to retrieve narcotics from

Mr. Lurry's mouth without medical assistance and while Mr. Lurry was handcuffed

behind his back in obvious distress and in need of immediate medical attention.

120. Defendants' conduct was objectively unreasonable and undertaken intentionally with

willful and wanton indifference to Mr. Lurry's constitutional rights.

121. As a result of Defendants’ conduct, Eric Lurry died.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants McCue and May,

jointly and severally, for an award of reasonable compensatory and punitive damages, plus

attorneys’ fees and costs.

COUNT IX: 1983 FOURTH AMENDMENT - EXCESSIVE FORCE

(Against Defendants McCue and May)

122. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

123. At all times relevant herein the Decedent, Eric Lurry, was vested with, possessed and was 

guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution the right to be free 

from unreasonable, unjustifiable and excessive force.

124. Defendant Officer McCue deprived Mr. Lurry of this Fourth Amendment right by forcing

a baton into Mr. Lurry's mouth to retrieve narcotics without medical assistance and while 

Mr. Lurry was handcuffed behind his back in obvious distress and in need of immediate

medical attention.

125. Defendant Officer May deprived Mr. Lurry of this Fourth Amendment right by pinching 

Mr. Lurry's nose closed thereby restricting his ability to take in oxygen for almost two 

minutes to retrieve narcotics, without medical assistance and while Mr. Lurry was 

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handcuffed behind his back in obvious distress and in need of immediate medical attention.

126. Defendant Officer May deprived Mr. Lurry of this Fourth Amendment right by slapping 

Mr. Lurry in his face and saying "Wake up, bitch" in an effort to retrieve narcotics from 

Mr. Lurry's mouth without medical assistance and while Mr. Lurry was handcuffed behind 

his back in obvious distress and in need of immediate medical attention.

127. The actions of Defendant Officers were willful, intentional and malicious and/or done with

reckless indifference to and callous disregard for Plaintiffs' rights.

128. As a result of Defendant Officers’ conduct, Eric Lurry died.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant Officers McCue and

May, jointly and severally, for an award of reasonable compensatory and punitive damages, plus

attorneys’ fees and costs.

COUNT X: 1983 SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS - FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEDICAL

ATTENTION/STATE-CREATED DANGER

(Against All Individual Defendants)

129. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

130. At all relevant times, Defendants were acting under color of law. 

131. At all times relevant herein the Decedent, Eric Lurry, was vested with, possessed and was 

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution the substantive

due process right to life, liberty and personal security.

132. Defendants’ conduct violated Plaintiff’s substantive due process right to be free from a statecreated danger. 

133. Eric Lurry was in Defendants' custody at the time of the subject incident.

134. As such, Defendants had a duty to protect and provide medical services to Mr. Lurry who 

was in obvious need of such services.

135. Between the time Defendant Tellez was first recorded on the dash-cam video saying that he 

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believed Mr. Lurry ingested drugs and the time they arrived at the police station, Defendants 

left Mr. Lurry in the backseat for at least 11 minutes. 

136. While Mr. Lurry was in the backseat of the squad car enroute to the Joliet Police Station,

Defendant McCue and/or Defendant Tellez observed Mr. Lurry chewing and proceeded to 

the Joliet Police Station instead of transporting him to the hospital immediately or calling 

for medical assistance immediately.

137. By the time the Defendants and Mr. Lurry reached the precinct parking lot, Mr. Lurry was 

barely conscious and was in serious, obvious medical distress requiring immediate medical 

attention. 

138. This objectively serious medical need was evinced by Eric Lurry’s heavy breathing, the 

Defendants’ observations and knowledge that he was chewing on something, the 

Defendants’ observations and knowledge that he had drugs in his mouth and had swallowed 

drugs, Eric Lurry’s inability to understand, comprehend and comply with the Defendants’

directives, Eric Lurry’s eyes rolling back into his head, Eric Lurry’s inability to stay alert,

and his inability to speak.

139. Defendants knew that Eric Lurry had an objectively serious medical need because they 

observed the behavior set forth in Paragraphs 136-138 and were deliberately indifferent to 

that need.

140. Further, when Defendant May acted intentionally to hinder Eric Lurry’s breathing to extract 

drugs from his mouth for the purpose of obtaining evidence to secure criminal charges 

against Mr. Lurry for possession of narcotics and with the knowledge that Mr. Lurry was in 

need of immediate medical attention, Defendant May created and/or increased the risk that 

Mr. Lurry faced - namely, death. 

141. When Defendant McCue acted intentionally inserting an asp into Eric Lurry’s mouth at the 

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direction of Defendant Harrison, for the purpose of extracting drugs from Mr. Lurry’s mouth 

to obtain evidence to secure criminal charges against Mr. Lurry for possession of narcotics

and with the knowledge that Mr. Lurry was in need of immediate medical attention, 

Defendant McCue created and/or increased the danger that Mr. Lurry faced - namely, death. 

142. Despite their observations of Mr. Lurry and their knowledge that he had an objectively 

serious medical need, Defendants failed to summon immediate medical attention as required

for Mr. Lurry.

143. Despite their observations of Mr. Lurry and their knowledge that he had an objectively 

serious medical need, Defendants used excessive and unlawful force against Mr. Lurry, 

thereby exacerbating his condition and causing his death. 

144. Defendants' conduct as set forth above constitutes deliberate indifference as the conduct was 

intentional, willful, and wanton and committed with reckless disregard to Mr. Lurry’s rights,

thereby shocking the conscience. 

145. As a direct result of the Defendants’ misconduct, Eric Lurry died.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant Officers, jointly and

severally, for an award of reasonable compensatory and punitive damages, plus attorneys’ fees and 

costs.

COUNT XI: 1983- FAILURE TO INTERVENE

(Against All Individual Defendants)

146. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

147. Defendants Tellez and Harrison had a reasonable opportunity to prevent Defendant McCue 

and May's (1) unreasonable search of Mr. Lurry's person and (2) excessive force against Mr.

Lurry, but failed to do so.

148. Defendants McCue and May had a reasonable opportunity to prevent each other’s

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unreasonable search of Mr. Lurry’s person and excessive force against Mr. Lurry, but failed

to do so.

149. Defendant McCue had a reasonable opportunity to prevent Defendant Tellez's unlawful

seizure and unlawful pat-down search of Mr. Lurry's person as well as Defendant Tellez's

unlawful seizure of Mr. Lurry's money, but failed to do so.

150. All Defendants had a reasonable opportunity to prevent one another from violating Mr.

Lurry's substantive due process right receive immediate medical attention and to secure Mr. 

Lurry’s right to be free from a state-created danger, but failed to do so.

151. As a result of the Defendant Officers' failure to intervene, Mr. Lurry suffered physical and 

emotional injuries as well as loss of liberty, loss of the use and enjoyment of his property,

and death.

152. Defendant Officers' misconduct was objectively unreasonable and was undertaken

intentionally with malice, willfulness and reckless indifference to Mr. Lurry’s rights.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant Officers, jointly and

severally, for an award of reasonable compensatory and punitive damages, plus attorneys’ fees and 

costs.

COUNT XII: 1983- SUPERVISORY LIABILITY

(Against Defendant Harrison)

153. Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

154. At all relevant times, Defendant Harrison was the supervisor of Defendants May, McCue 

and Tellez.

155. Defendant Harrison was personally involved in depriving Mr. Lurry of his constitutional 

rights in that he facilitated, approved of, and condoned the unreasonable force used against 

Mr. Lurry by Defendants May and McCue as set forth in Count IX of this Complaint.

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156. Defendant Harrison was personally involved in depriving Mr. Lurry of his constitutional

rights in that facilitated, approved of, and condoned the conduct ofDefendants May, McCue 

and Tellez in their failure to provide immediate medical attention to Mr. Lurry despite Mr. 

Lurry’s objectively serious medical needs.

157. Defendant Harrison's conduct was undertaken intentionally with malice, willfulness, and

reckless indifference to Mr. Lurry's rights.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant Harrison for an award

of reasonable compensatory and punitive damages, plus attorneys’ fees and costs.

COUNT XIII—MONELL

(Against City of Joliet)

158. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

159. The Joliet Police Department (the "Department") is a subsidiary division of Defendant City 

of Joliet. The City maintains and exercises exclusive control over the Department, its policies 

and procedures, as well as the conduct of all of its employees, including all the individual 

Defendants, their fellow officers, and their supervisors.

160. Defendant City of Joliet, through its subsidiary the Joliet Police Department, has established 

certain de facto policies, practices, and/or customs which were adopted and promulgated 

through the actions and inactions of senior and intermediate supervising employees of the 

Joliet Police Department and were thereby ratified by the City.

161. The actions of the individual Defendants were done pursuant to one or more of the following 

de facto policies, practices and/or customs of the City that are so pervasive that they carry the 

force and effect of law.

162. The Defendant City of Joliet maintains a de facto policy, practice, and custom of failing to 

adequately train, supervise, discipline, and control its police officers. As a matter of both 

policy and practice, Defendant City of Joliet facilitates the very type of misconduct at issue 

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here by failing to adequately investigate, punish and discipline prior instances of similar 

misconduct, thereby leading Joliet Police Officers to believe their actions will not be properly 

scrutinized or result in any significant consequences, and in that way, directly encouraging 

future abuses such as those that resulted in the death of Mr. Lurry. 

163. Specifically, Joliet Police Officers accused of excessive force, unreasonable searches and 

detentions, and deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the citizens they are 

sworn to serve, are aware of and can be confident that: police officers that receive frequent 

citizen complaints remain employed with the Department; that the Department will not 

investigate those accusations in earnest, refusing to find complaints with merit justified or 

recommend discipline even where the officer has engaged in excessive force or other 

misconduct; that the Department aims to exonerate officers involved in misconduct; and that 

the City’s response to citizen complaints of police misconduct is to defend/settle civil suits 

as opposed to disciplining or terminating problem officers. 

164. The City of Joliet has a de facto policy, practice and/or custom of concealing and/or 

suppressing officer misconduct, including the use of unlawful force and deliberate 

indifference to citizens’ constitutional rights, particularly with regards to racial minorities. 

The concealment and suppression of the existence of misconduct includes, but is not limited 

to: failure to sufficiently and timely investigate allegations of misconduct; delaying 

investigations of police misconduct; failure to accept complaints from citizens against police 

officers; failure to promptly record witness statements or preserve evidence; failure to 

promptly interview the suspected officer, including in such circumstances where it would be 

plausible to suspect misconduct on the part of the officer; failure to properly and sufficiently 

discipline an officer, even where the evidence of misconduct is clear and convincing, and 

even where the citizen complaint is either: corroborated by other evidence, or sustained; 

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fabrication of exculpatory evidence or destruction of evidence; failure to prohibit the 

fabrication of exculpatory evidence or destruction of incriminating evidence of police 

misconduct; and, failure to initiate prompt disciplinary procedures related to the alleged 

misconduct, even when the allegation of misconduct is supported by corroborating evidence. 

165. The City has a de facto policy, practice and/or custom in which a “code of silence” is 

pervasive within all aspects of the Department. This code is manifest as a universal practice 

among sworn members of the Department. There is an express or implicit understanding and 

agreement among Joliet police officers which results in a refusal or failure by Joliet police 

officers to intervene to prevent or stop the unnecessary and often gratuitous abuse of citizens 

through the use of excessive force. As part of this code, officers who do wish to report the 

misconduct of their fellow officers know they will face retaliation and adverse employment 

consequences for doing so, as occurred in the instance case with respect to Sgt. Esqueda. The 

code also causes officers to refuse or fail to report or testify against fellow officers regarding 

instances of misconduct of which they are aware, despite their obligation to do so as sworn 

peace officers. 

166. This de facto policy applies to Joliet police officers who remain silent or give false or 

misleading information during official investigations and sworn testimony in criminal cases 

and in related civil litigation involving allegations of misconduct against a fellow officer, in 

order to protect themselves or their fellow officers from discipline, criminal prosecution, or 

to shield them from civil liability.

167. Individually and collectively, the above-described de facto policies, practices and/or 

customs of the City proximately result in the pervasive culture and widespread attitude among 

members of the Joliet Police Department, including the individual Defendants, that they may 

engage in misconduct against the citizenry with impunity, and without fear of official 

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consequence. In every sense of the term, Joliet police officers consider themselves “above 

the law.”

168. In or about June 2020, based upon a request to investigate the circumstances of Mr. Lurry’s 

death, the Illinois Attorney General’s Office began a preliminary review of Joliet Police 

Department records and other information, including over 20,000 records relating to 

interactions between the Joliet police officers and civilians. As a result of concerns raised by 

this preliminary review, on September 8, 2021, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul 

announced a formal investigation into whether the Joliet Police Department has engaged in 

patterns or practices of unconstitutional or unlawful policing, including specifically with 

respect to officers’ use of force, officers’ decisions surrounding searches and detentions, and 

the Department’s investigation of misconduct complaints and its policies regarding 

disciplinary action.

169. The Defendant City of Joliet maintains a de facto policy, practice, and custom of failing to 

adequately train its police officers in (1) how to recognize a drug-related medical 

emergency/overdose; (2) how to administer proper emergency first aid to victims of 

overdose; (3) the proper life-saving procedures to ensure that the arrestee is provided with 

immediate medical care by a certified medical professional; and (4) in proper procedures for

conducting searches of an arrestee’s oral cavity for recovery of contraband so as to prevent 

choking, restricted breathing, asphyxiation, narcotic ingestion, and death.

170. Alternatively, the City of Joliet maintains a de facto policy, practice, and custom whereby 

the City is aware that its officers routinely disregard their training regarding drug-related 

medical emergencies and that they are allowed to do so without any consequence. 

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171. The Defendant City of Joliet maintains a de facto policy, practice, and custom of permitting 

its officers to restrict the breathing of arrestees by holding their nose closed to encourage the 

arrestee to open his mouth so narcotics can be retrieved therefrom. 

172. The Defendant City of Joliet maintains a de facto policy, practice, and custom of permitting 

its officers to slap arrestees in the face who are suspected of suffering from a drug overdose 

to test their pain response and alertness. 

173. Joliet Police Officers are not trained on the physical effects of cocaine, heroin, or fentanyl

among other narcotics despite the fact that Joliet Police Officers respond to drug overdose 

calls 3-4 times per week. These drug overdose calls almost always involve the victim 

consuming high amounts of cocaine, heroin and/or fentanyl.

174. Joliet Police Officers are not required to, and most do not, carry Narcan or any other 

medication that counteracts the effects of narcotics for the purpose of saving the lives of drugoverdose victims/arrestees. 

175. Individually and collectively, the above-described de facto policies, practices and/or 

customs of the City in failing to properly train and implement proper procedures and 

protocols related to narcotics and oral cavity searches as promulgated above, proximately 

results in injury and death that is pervasive and widespread. 

176. Municipal policymakers have long been aware of the City of Joliet’s policy and practice of 

failing to properly train, monitor, and discipline its police officers, but they have not enacted 

appropriate measures to address that failure.

177. The aforementioned de facto policies, practices and/or customs of the City, individually and 

collectively, have been maintained and/or implemented with utter indifference by the City 

which has encouraged and/or motivated the individual Defendants to commit the aforesaid 

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wrongful facts against Mr. Lurry and, therefore, de facto policies, practices and/or customs 

of the City are a direct and proximate cause of the injuries sustained by Mr. Lurry.

178. Plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the policies and practices on the part of 

Defendant City of Joliet for failing to adequately train, supervise, discipline, and control its 

police officers. Indeed, the individual Defendants’ misconduct was undertaken pursuant to 

the City's policy and practice in that: 

a. As a matter of both policy and practice, the City directly encourages and is thereby 

the moving force behind the very type of misconduct at issue here by failing to 

adequately train, supervise, and control its officers, such that its failure to do so 

manifests deliberate indifference; 

b. As a matter of both policy and practice, the City facilitates the very type of misconduct 

at issue here by failing to adequately punish and discipline prior instances of similar 

misconduct, thereby leading Joliet Police Officers to believe their actions will never 

be scrutinized and, in that way, directly encouraging future abuses such as those that 

resulted in the death of Mr. Lurry specifically, Joliet Police Officers accused of 

excessive force and misconduct can be confident that the Department will not 

investigate those accusations in earnest and will refuse to recommend discipline even 

where the officer has engaged in misconduct;

c. As a matter of both policy and practice, the City directly and indirectly encourages, 

condones and facilitates the very type of misconduct at issue here by failing to 

properly train its police officers to recognize drug overdose victims, provide 

emergency first aid treatment to overdose victims including the administration of 

Narcan, and ensure immediate medical care is provided to overdose victims thereby 

causing physical injury and death. 

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d. As a matter of both policy and practice, the City directly and indirectly encourages, 

condones and facilitates the very type of misconduct at issue here by permitting its 

officers to slap and/or otherwise physically harm an overdose victim for the purpose 

of testing his/her pain response and alertness. 

e. As a matter of both policy and practice, the City directly and indirectly encourages, 

condones and facilitates the very type of misconduct at issue here by allowing its 

officers to restrict the breathing of individuals suspected and/or known to have 

narcotics in his/her mouth for the purpose of extracting the narcotics. 

f. Generally, as a matter of widespread practice so prevalent as to comprise municipal 

policy, officers of the Joliet Police Department abuse citizens in a manner similar to 

that alleged by Plaintiff on a frequent basis, yet the Joliet Police Department makes

findings of wrongdoing in a disproportionately small number of cases; 

g. Where citizens complain to the Joliet Police Department that they have been subjected 

to criminal violations by Joliet Police Officers, the Department's policy and practice 

is to affirmatively discourage those persons from pursuing criminal charges against 

the offending police officers; the City's training in that regard is equally deficient. 

This policy and practice and lack of adequate training encourages Joliet Police 

Officers, such as the individual Defendants in this case, to use violence without fear 

of legal consequences. 

h. Municipal policymakers are aware of, and conduct and facilitate by their inaction, a 

“code of silence" in the Joliet Police Department, by which officers fail to report 

misconduct committed by other officers, such as the misconduct at issue in this case; 

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i. The City and the relevant policy makers have failed to act to remedy the patterns of 

abuse described herein, despite actual knowledge of the same, thereby causing the 

types of injuries. 

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant City of Joliet for an

award of reasonable compensatory damages, plus attorney’s fees and costs.

COUNT XIV—INDEMNIFICATION

179. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

180. At all relevant times, Defendant City of Joliet was the employer of the individual

Defendants.

181. The individual Defendants committed the acts alleged above under the color of law and in

the scope of their employment as employees of the City of Joliet.

182. In Illinois, public entities are directed to pay for any tort judgment for compensatory

damages for which employees are liable within the scope of their employment activities.

183. As a proximate cause of the unlawful acts of the individual Defendants, which occurred

within the scope of their employment, Plaintiff was injured.

WHEREFORE, should any of the individual Defendants be found liable on one or more

of the federal claims set forth above, Plaintiff demands, pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102, that

Defendant City of Joliet be found liable for any compensatory judgment Plaintiff obtains against

said individual Defendant(s), plus attorneys’ fees and costs awarded and such other and additional

relief that this Court deems equitable and just.

COUNT XV—RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

184. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all previous paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

185. In committing the acts alleged in the preceding paragraphs, the individual Defendants were

agents of the City of Joliet and were acting at all relevant times within the scope of their 

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employment and under color of law.

186. Defendant City of Joliet is liable as principal for all torts committed by its agents.

WHEREFORE, should any of the individual Defendants be found liable on one or more

of the state claims set forth above, Plaintiff demands that, pursuant to respondeat superior,

Defendant City of Joliet be found liable for any compensatory judgment Plaintiff obtains against

said Defendant(s), as well as costs awarded.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff requests trial by jury.

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT

Please be advised that all rights relating to attorneys’ fees have been assigned to the 

undersigned counsel.

By: /s/ Abby D. Bakos 

One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys

Abby D. Bakos 

BAKOS & MAISURIA LAW GROUP

1755 Park Street., Suite 200-1070

Naperville, Illinois 60563

T: (833) 800-2654

E: abby@bakosmaisuria.com

Website: www.bakosmaisuria.com

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