EXHIBIT A

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 1 of 70 PageID #:6


EXHIBIT B

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 4 of 70 PageID #:9
Return Date: No return date scheduled 

Hearing Date: 4/1512020 9:30 AM - 9:30 AM 

Courtroom Number: 2308 

Location: District 1 Court 

Cook County, IL 

·• .. 

'• ... 

FILED 

12/18/2019 11:43 AM 

DOROTHY BROWN 

CIRCUIT CLERK 

COOK COUNTY, IL 

2019CH14479 

7TT8671 

2120 - Served 

2220 - Not Served 

2320 - Served By Mail 

2420 - Served By Publication 

Summons - Alfas Summons 

2121 - Served 

2221 - Not Served 

2321 - Served By Mail 

2421 - Served By Publication 

(08/01/18) CCG 0001 A 

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 

DA \X'N MEEGAN 

(Name all parties) 

v. 

NFl lNDUSTRlES, INC. 

Case No. 20!9CHl-1479 

0 SUMMONS O ALIAS SUMMONS 

To each Defendant NFI Industries - Serve: Tóad1828 Centre, 2 Cooper Street, Camden, NJ 08102 

YOU ,\RE SUMMONED and required 10 fiJe an answer 10 tite complaint in this case, a copy of 

which is hereto attached, or otherwise 6Je )'Our app=nce and pay the required fee within thirty 

(30) days after service of this Summons, not counting the day of service. To file your answer or 

appc:uancc you need access to the internet. Picase ,·isit ww\\,cookcountvclerkofcourr.or¡, to initiate 

dus process. Kiosks with internet access arc available at all Clerk's Office locations. Picase refer to 

the lasr page of this document for location information. 

If you fail 10 do so, a judgment by default may be entered against you for the relief 

requested in the complaint. 

To the Officer: 

This Summons must be returned by the officer or other person to whom ir was given for service, 

with endorsement of service and fees, if any, immediately after service, If service cannot be made, 

this Summons shall be rerurned so endorsed. This Summons m:iy not be served later than thirty (30) 

days after its dare. 

Dorothy Brown, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois 

cookcounryclcrkofcourr.org 

r~ 1 oí; 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 5 of 70 PageID #:10
Summons • Alias Summons (08/01/18) CCG 0001 B 

E•fill.ng is now mandatory for documents in c,:Ï\;I cases with limiccd exemptions. To e-ûle, you must fiNt 

create an account with :t0 c--íaling service provider. Vi$it hup://cfilc.illínoiscouru.go,.-/sct\"ÌCc•prn,•idc.rs.1um 

to tearn more aud co select ::a service provider. If you need :addition:zl help or bave trouble e-filing, ,isic Imp:// 

www.illinoiscourœ.gov /FAQ/ gethefp.asp, or tulk with your loc:.I circuir e.Ier k's office. 

6

,,,.8 Atty. No.: _-_t.:> _ 

Atty Name: ßr:indon M. Wisc 

Atty. for. DAWN MEEGAN _ 

Address: 818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 2 

City: Sr. Louis 

SL1te: MO Zip: 63104 

Telephone: (31-1) 833--1825 

Primary Email: bwise@pwcklcg:ù.com 

W 12/18/2019 11:43 AM DOROTHY BROWN itness: _ 

DOROTHY BRO 'ourr 

Date of Service: _ 

(To be inserted by officer on copy left with 

Defendant or other person}: 

Dorothy Brown, Clerk of tbc Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois 

cookcounrycìcrkofcourr.org 

P~-clo( l 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 6 of 70 PageID #:11
CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY OFFICE LOCATIONS 

r Richard J Daley Center n Domestic Relations Division 

O> 

... .. 50 W W:islúng1on Richard J D:ùe)' Center 

~ 

:,: Chicago, u, 60602 50 W W:tShington, Rm 802 

g ,· District 2 • Skokie Chicago, [L 60602 

0 

N Hours: 8:30 am • 4:30 p·m 5600 Old Orchard Rd 

~ Skokie, IL 60077 o Civil Appeals 

M 

"· District 3 - Rolling Meadows Richard J Daley Cc111<:r 

!:! ' 2121 Euclid 50 \'i/ \Xl:islúngton, Rm SO 1 

0 Chicago, IL 60602 ~ RoUiag Meadows, [L 60008 

¡:¡ 

r- District. ·I • ì\b¡-wood 

Hours: 8:30 om • -1:30 pm 

f:! 1500 Maybrook Ave 

í) Criminal Department 

<( 

o Maywood, TL 60153 Richard J D:ùcy Center o 

w 

~ 50 \'il Waslúng1on, Rm 1006 

¡¡; r, District 5 - Bridgeview Chicago, n, 60602 

10220 S 76th Aw:. Hours: 8:30 am - 4:30 pm 

Bridgeview, IL 60455 

o County Division 

e District 6 • Markham Richard J Daley Center 

1650 I S Kcdzic Pkwy 50 W Washington, Rm 1202 

1' larkham, TL 604 28 Chicago, IL 60602 

e Domestic Violence Court Hours: 8:30 am - 4:30 pm 

555 W Harrison iJ Probate Division 

Chicago, IL 60607 Richard J Daley Center 

e Juvenile Center Building 50 W \"'3sbington, Rm 1202 

2245 \'il Ogden ,\1•e, Rm 13 Chicago, IL 60602 

Chicago, 1L 60602 Hours: 8:30 am - 4:30 pm 

e Criruin:ù Court Building o Law Division 

2650 S California A1·c, Rm 526 Richard J Daley Center 

Chicago, IL 60608 50 \'i/ \v'.1shington, Rm 801 

Chicago, IL 60602 

Daley Center Divisions/Departments Hours: 8:30 om - 4:30 pm 

(" Civil Division o Traffic Division 

Richard J Daley Center Richard J D:ùcy Center 

50 \'i/ Wnshingtoo. Rm 601 50 W W:ishington, Lower Level 

Chicago, IL 60602 Chicago, IL 60602 

Hours: 8:30 am · 4:30 pm Hours: 8:30 am • •1:30 pm 

ti Chancery Division 

Richard J Dale)' Center 

50 \'i/ Wnshington, Rm 802 

Chicago, IL 60602 

Hours: 8:30 am • -1:30 pm 

Dorothy Brown, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois 

cookcouuryclcrkofcourt.org 

r.a~Jof J 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 7 of 70 PageID #:12
Ch:int'CI')' Divùion Ci,'ll Co,u SIJ«t 

. Gc11.crol Cl¡ulll«rv Sceue r 1 o (5/2G/ 16) CCCH 0G23 

Heanf!9:¥!1~ AM 9;30.AM 

Courtroom Number: 2308 

Location: District 1~íf,l-lE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 

Cook County, ICOUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHA1"1CERY DMSION 

Dawn Me&gan 

Puintifí 

NFI lndustJles, Inc. 

O,fcnd..tm 

FILED 

12/16/2019 5:09 PM 

DOROTHY BROWN 

CIRCUIT CLERK 

COOK COUNTY, IL 

2019CH14479 

TT52407 

2019CH14479 

No. _ 

CHANCERYDMSlON ClVIL COVERSHEET 

GENERAL CHANCERY SECrION 

A Chancery Division Civil Cover Sheet - General Chancery Section shall be filed wich the initial complaint 

in all actions filed in che General Chancer)' Section of Chancery Division. The informarion contained herein is for 

adminlsrrarive purposes only, Picase check che box in frone of the appropriate c.1ccgory which best chnracrcrizes rour 

action being filed. 

0005 o Administrative Review 

0001 il Class i\càon 

0002 o Declaratory judgment 

0004 o Injunction 

0007 o General Chancery 

0010 o Accounting 

0011 o Arbitration 

0012 o Certiorari 

0013 o Dissolution of Corporation 

0014 o Dissolution of Partnership 

0015 o Equitable Lien 

0016 o Inrcrpleader 

0017 o Mandamus 

0018 o Ne Exeat 

0019 o Partirion 

0020 o Quicclìdc 

0021 o Quo \'ílarranco 

0022 o Redempdon Rights 

0023 o Reformation of a Contract 

0024 o Rescission of a Contract 

0025 o Specific Performance 

0026 o Trust Construction 

o Ocher (specify) 

By: Brandon M. Wise 

il Any. No.: 62258 O Pro .1<: 99500 

Name: Brandon M. Wise 

Atty. for: _P_la_in_t_lf i _ 

Address: 818 Lafayette Ave .• Floor 2 

Cicy/Su,c/Zi¡,: S1. Louis, MO 63104 

Telephone: (314) 833-4827 

Primary Ernail: bwíse@pwcklegal.com 

Second.try Em,il: azika@pwcklcgal.com 

Tertiary Em:ail: _ 

Pro Sc Only; O I have rend and agree co che terms of 

che Clerk's Office Electronic Notice Policy and choose 

10 ope in to electronic notice from die Clerk's Office 

for chis case ne this Email address: 

DOROTHY BRO\VN, CLERK OF THE ClRCUlT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, CLLTNOIS 

l'ai,< lofl 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 8 of 70 PageID #:13
IN THE ClRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 

COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CH.ANCERY DlVJS!ON 

O:\ WN ME.EGAN, individually, and on behalf of all) 

others similarly situated, ) 

) 

P/tJi111fff, ) 

) 

~ ) 

) 

NFl 11'.'DUSTRJES, INC., ) 

) 

Dif,11dt1nl. ) 

c~eNo~019CH14479 

CLASS ACTION COMPuUNT 

Named Plaintiff Dawa Meegan (''Meegan" or "Plaindff"), by nod through ber anocncys, 

individually and on behalf of :i.Il others similarly situated (the "Class"), beings tbc following Class 

Action Complaint (''Compl:tint'î pursuant to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS §§ 5/2· 

801 and 2-80,2, ng:ùnst Defendant NFI Industries, Inc. ("Ní'I" or "Defendant"), ics subsidiaries and 

afûliatcs, to redress and curtail Defendant's unlawful collection, use, storngc, and disclosure of 

Plaintif t's sensitive biometric data. Plaintiff alleges !IS foUows upon personal knowledge !IS 10 

themselves, their own acts and experiences and, !IS to all other matters, upon information nod belief, 

including investigation conducted by her anorncys. 

NATURE OF THE ACTION 

I. Defendant Ní'I is !I warehouse and distribution center that provides transit, 

warehousing, brokerage, and real estate services 10 clients. Ní'l has locations throughout the 

Chicagoland arca, 

2. While r=y employers use conventional methods for tracking time worked (such ns 

ID badge swipes or punch clocks), Defendant's and its offilintcd facilities' employees are required co 

have their 6ngerptints scanned by• biometric timekeeping device. 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 9 of 70 PageID #:14
3. Biometrics are not relegated to esoteric corners of commerce. Many businesses - sucb 

as Defcndaru - and financial instirutions have iocorporated biometric applications iato their 

workplace in the foan of biometric rímcclocks, and into consumer products, including such 

ubiquitous consumer products as checking accounts and cell phones. 

4. Unlike ID badges or cime cards - which can be changed or replaced if stolen or 

compromised - fingerprints arc unique, permanent biometric identifiers associated with each 

employee. This exposes NFI employees 10 serious and irreversible privacy risks. l'or example, if a 

database containing fingerprints or other sensitive, proprietary biometric dota is hacked, breached, or 

otherwise exposed - like in the recent Yahoo, cßay, Equifax, Uber, Home Depot, Myl'ìtnessP:tl, 

Panera, Whole Foods, Chipode, Omni Hotels & Resorts, Trump Hotels, Facebook/Cambridgc 

Annlytica, and Suprema data breaches or misuses - employees have 1JQ means by wbich to prcvem 

identity tbefr. unauthorized tr.tckiog or other unlawful or improper use of this highly personal and 

private inforronóon. 

5. In 2015, a darn breach at the United SL,tCS Office of Personnel 11-bnogcmcnt exposed 

the personal identification information, including biometric dam, of over 21.5 million fcder:tl 

employees, comractors, and job applicants. U.S. Off. of Personnel MgmL, Çybmrrmi!J I11ridtn1J (2018), 

t11V1ilt1bl, "' l1ttps://www.opm.go\'/cybcrsccurity/9·bcrsccuricy-incidents. 

6. Ao illegal market already exists for biometric dam. Hackers and idenriry thieves bave 

targeted Aadhnar, the largest biometric database in the world, which contains the personal and 

biometric data - including fingerprints, iris scans, and a facial photograph - of over a billion Indian 

citizens. Sa Vidhi Doshi, A S"uri!J ßm1rh in India J-1,11 1.~Jt a ßillio11 J>,opl, al Risk of /d,nti[J Tlxji, 11,e 

W<ishington Post Qan. -1, 2018), amiloblr o/ 

Imps://www.w:tShingtoopost.com/ news/ woddviews/' wp /2018/ O I /04 / a-securiry-brcach-in-iudiabns-Ic fr-a-billion-people-a t-risk-of-idcntiry-thc ft/ ?uun_tcrm=.b3c 702591138. I o J:mu.-uy 2018, an 

2 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 10 of 70 PageID #:15
lodino ncwspnpcr reported Ù13r the inforrnation housed io Aadhnar was available for purchase for less 

than SS and io ns little ns 10 minutes. Rachna Khairn, R.r 500, 10 Min11fu, ami You Hm, Attui lo Billion 

./lfJdhaar D,tai!,, TI1c Tribune O•n. 4, 2018), m'<lilablt Ill 

http://www.tribuncindin.com/ news/ nation/ rs - 500- I 0-minutcs-nnd-you-h:wc-nccess- to-billionandhanr-dcciilsj' 523361.html. 

7. ln the United States, law enforcement, including clic Federal Bureau of Invesdgorion 

and ímmigrarion and Customs Enforcement, have attempted to tum states' Department of Motor 

Vehicles databases into biometric data goldmines, using facial recognition technology to scan the faces 

of thousands of citizens, all without their notice or consent. Drew Harwell, l"BI, ICE Find S1,,1, Dmer': 

Umm P/~101 Arr a Gold Mim for F,uù1/.RJrog,1ifio11 s,,m-Jxs, The WnsWngton Post Quly 7, 2019), ,m,ib,b/, 

al hrrps://wv.w.w:islùngtonposuom/ tcchnology/2019/07 /07 /fbi-icc-lind-statc•drivcrs-liccnscphotos-arc-gold-minc•faci:ù-rccogniùon-sc:uchcs/?norcdirccr-on&uun_tcrm=.d~9•fb2472a9. 

8. This practice has been criticized by lawmakers. Some states, including Illinois. hove 

refused 10 comply with law enforccrnenr's invasive requests. Stau D"!)'În_g F,1fli1I Rtro.g11ifion Rît¡lftJIJ, 

Jacksonville journal-Courier Quly 9, 2019), amik,bl, /J/ 

brrps://www.myjoum:ùcouòcr.com/ news/ ardclc/Sme-dcnyiog- fncinl-rccogni tion-rcques ts14081967.php. 

9. In August 2019, it was widely reported thnt Suprema, a security company responsible 

for a web-based biometrics lock system that uses fingerprints and facial geometry scans io 1.5 million 

locations around the world, maintained biometric darn and other personal information on n publicly 

accessible, unencrypted database, i'vlqjor Bmnb Fo111:d ir: Bionutria Syttm, Used by ßonks., UK po/ir, and 

Def,nu Fin111, The Guardino (Aug. 14, 2019), t111tJil,1b!, 

Imps:/ /www.thcguMdian.com/ technology /2019 /nug/14/ mnjor-brcncb-found-in-biomctricssystcm-used-by-bonks-uk-policc•nnd•dcfcncc-firms. 

3 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 11 of 70 PageID #:16
10. Recogni;,;ing the need to protect its citizens from situations like these, Illinois enacted 

the Biometric lnformation Privacy Act ("Bl PA"), 7-10 ILCS J.1/ 1, ,, m¡., specifically to regulare 

companies that collect and store Illinois citizens' biometrics. such as fingerpriots. 

11. Notwithstanding tbc clear and unequivocal requirements of the law, Defendant 

disregards employees' statutorily protected privacy eights and unlawfully collects, stores, disseminates, 

and uses irs employees' biometric data in violation of ßTI>A. Specifically, Defendant has violated and 

continues 10 violate BIP,\ because it did not and continues not to: 

a. Properly inform Plaintiff and others simil:uly situated in writing oí the specific purpose 

and length of cime for which their fingerprints were being collected, stored, and used, 

as required by ßTP A; 

b. Receive a written release from Plaintiff and others similarly situated to collect, store, 

or otherwise use their fingerprints, ns required by BrPA; 

c. Develop nod adhere to :1 publicly available retention schedule and guidelines for 

pcrmancndy destroying Pl:ùnáff's and other sinúlarly-siruared individuals' ûngcrprinrs, 

ns required by BlP :\; and 

d. Obtain consent from Plaintiff and others similarly situated to disclose, rcdisclose, or 

otherwise disseminate their fingcrpcints to a third p:trty as required b)' BIPA. 

12. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks an Order: (I) declaring that Defendant's conduct violares 

BIPA; (2) requiring Defendnn< 10 cease the unlawful activities discussed herein; and (3) awarding 

statutory damages 10 Plninùffs and the proposed Class. 

PARTIES 

13. Plaintiff Dawn Meegan is :t natural pe.rsoo and a citizen of the State of Ulinois. 

14. Defendant NF! is n limited liability corporation existing under tbc laws of the State of 

New Jersey, with its principal pince of business in Cherry Hill, New Jersey. NFI is registered \\~Ù1 tbc 

Illinois Secretary of State nod conducts business in the State of Illinois, including Cook County. 

4 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 12 of 70 PageID #:17
JURlSDICTION AND VENUE 

15. This Court has jurisdiction over Defendant pursu,nt to 735 lLCS 5/2-209 because it 

conducts business transactions in Illinois, commirted st:trutory violations and tortious acts in Illinois, 

and is registered to conduct business in lllioois. 

I 6. Venue is proper u, Cook County because Pl:ùnâfi resides u1 Cook Councy and the 

st.1rutory violations alleged herein occurred io Cook County. 

~ 

< o 

o 

w 

J 

¡¡; 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

l. The Biometric Information Privacy Acr 

17. ln the early 2000s, major national corpornaons started using Chicago and other 

locations in Illinois to test "new applications of biometric-facilirnted financial transactions, including 

fingcr-sc:tn technologies >1 gr-occry stores, g:ts stations, and school cafeterias." 740 Il.CS § 14/S(c). 

Given its relative infancy, an overwhelming portion of tbc public became w:try of this dien-growing 

yet unregulated technology. Su 740 lLCS § 14/5. 

18. lu late 2007, :t biometrics company called Pay by Touch, which provided major 

retailers throughour the State of IUinois with fingerprint scanners to facilitate consumer transactions, 

filed for bankruptcy. That bankruptcy was alarrning to the Illinois L:gisbture because suddenly there 

was • serious risk that millions of fingerprint records - which, like other unique biometric ideaci fiers, 

can be linked to people's sensitive financial and personal data - could oow be sold, distributed, or 

otherwise shared through tbc bankruptcy proceedings without adequate protections for lllioois 

citizens. The bankruptcy :ùso bighliglncd the fact thnr most consumers who used the company's 

fingerprint scanners were completely unaware that the scanners were not ncrually œansminiog 

ûegerprinr datn to tbc retailer who deployed the scanner, but rarher to the now-bankrupt company, 

and thar their unique biometric identifiers could now be sold to unknown third parties. 

5 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 13 of 70 PageID #:18
19. Recognizing the "very serious need [for] protections for the citizens of Illinois when 

il [come to their] biometricinfonruùon," Illinois enacted B!PA in 2008. Sa Illinois House Transcript, 

2008 Reg. Scss, No. 276; 740 ILCS § 14/5. 

20. Additionally, LO ensure compliance, BIP:\ provides ù1n1, for sash violation, the 

prevailing pony m,iy recover S 1,000 or actual damages, whichever is grcntcr, for negligent violations 

and S5,000, or actual damages, whichever is greater, for intentional or reckless violntious. 740 ILCS 

14/20. 

21. ßrP:\ is an infonncd consent statute which achieves its gonl by making it unlawful for 

• company to, nmong other things, collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise 

obrain a person's or a customer's biometric identifiers or biometric information, unless it first: 

n. Informs the subject in writing thnt a biometric identifier or biometric information is 

being collected, stored and used; 

b. I nforms the subject in writing of tbc specific purpose and length of term for which • 

biometric identifier or biometric informntion is being collected, stored, and used; and 

c. Receives • written release executed by tbc subject of the biometric idendfier or 

biometric information. 

Su740 TLCS § 14/lS(b). 

2.2. BíP ,\ specifically applies 10 employees who work in the State of Illinois. BIP,\ defines 

• "wriuen release" specifically "io the context of ernploymem [•s) • release executed by on employee 

ns a condition of employment," 740 ILCS l-l/10. 

r _.,_ Biometric identifiers include retina and iris scans, voiceprints, scons of bond and face 

geometry, nod - most imporrantly bere - fingerpeiors. Su 740 ILCS § 1-1/10. Biometric information 

is separately defined co include ,ny information based on an individual's biometric identifier that is 

used to identify an individual. Id. 

24. BTPA also establishes standards for how companies must handle Illinois citizens' 

biometric identifiers and biometric information. s,,, ,.g .• 7·10 ILCS § 14/IS(c)-(d). For example, ß[P,\ 

6 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 14 of 70 PageID #:19
prohibits privare entities from disclosing a person's or customer's biomeu:ic identifier or biometric 

informauon without ûrsr obtaining consent foc such disclosure. S" 7-10 Il.CS§ H/l5(d)(l). 

25. ß[P ,\ also prohibits selling, leasing, œadiog, or otherwise profiting from a person's 

biometric identifiers or biometric information (7·10 ILCS § 1-1/IS(c)) and requires companies to 

develop and comply with a written policy - made available ro the public - establishing a retention 

schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information 

when the initial purpose for collecting such identifiers or information hos been satisfied or within 

three years of the individual's lost interaction with the company, whichever occurs first. 7-10 ILCS § 

1-1/IS(a). 

26. Tbc Illinois legislnmre enacted BIP,\ duc to the increasing use of biometric data in 

financial and security seniogs, the geneml public's hesitation ro use biometric information, and - most 

significandy - the unknown ramifications of biometric technology. Biometrics arc biologically unique 

10 the individual and, once compromised, an individual is at heightened risk for identity rhefr and left 

without any recourse .. 

27. BIP,\ provides individuals with a private òght of action, protecting their right to 

privacy regarding their biometrics as well as protecting their rights to know the precise nature for 

which their biometrics arc used and how they arc being stored and ultimately destroyed. Unlike other 

statutes ù1at only creare a right of action if there is :t qualifying data breach. DíPA strictly regulates the 

manner in which entities may collect, store, use, and disseminate biometrics and creares :t private àgbt 

of action for lack of s1nru.tory compliance. 

28. Pb.inriff, like the Illinois legislature, recognizes how imperative it is to keep biometric 

information secure. Biometric information, unlike other personal identifiers such as n social security 

number, cannot be changed or replaced if hacked or stolen. 

7 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 15 of 70 PageID #:20
II. Defendant Violates Lite Bíornctric Information Privacy Act. 

29. ßy the rime Bl'PA passed duougb the Illinois legislarurc in rnid-200S, most companies 

who had cxpcrirucnted using employees' biometric data ns an authentication method stopped doing 

'50. 

30. However, Defendant failed to take note of the shift in Illinois law governing the 

collection and use of biometric dntn, As • result, Defendant continues to collect, store, use, and 

disseminate employees' biometric data in violation of BfP A. 

31. Specifically, when employees nrc hired by NF!, Lhcy arc required to have their 

ûngerprims captured and stored ro enroll them in iLS Kronos employee database(s). 

32. NFL uses an employee cime Lrackiog system supplied by Kronos tha; requires 

employees to use their fingerprint as :t means of authentication. Unlike a traditional timeclock, all NF! 

employees must use their fingcrpriots to "punch" io and out of work. 

33. Upon information and belief, N Fl fails to inform its employees thnr it discloses their 

fingc:rprint data 10 at least one out-of-state third-party vendor, Kronos; fail$ to infonn its employees 

that it discloses their fingerprint dam to other, currently unknown third parties, which host the 

biometric data in their data centers; fails to inform iLS employees of the purposes and dumtion foc 

which it collects their sensitive biometric data; and fails to obtain written releases from employees 

before collectíng their fingcrpdnrs. 

3,1. Furthermore, Defendant failed to develop nnd adhere ton written, publicly available 

policy identifying ÍIS rercndon schedule and guidelines for pcrrnancntly destroying employees' 

fingerprints when the initial purpose for collecúng or obtaining their. fingerprinLS is no longer relevant, 

as required by BIP,\. 

35. 11,e Pay by Touch bankruptcy, which Lriggercd the passage of Bl PA, highliglus why 

such conduct - where individuals are aware thar they arc providing a fiogcrprim bue are not aware co 

8 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 16 of 70 PageID #:21
whom or for wb>{ purposes they ore doing so - is d,ngerous. This bankruptcy spurred Illinois citizens 

and legislators into re:ùizing that it is crucial for individuals to understand when providing biometric 

identifiers such os n tingerprinr, who exactly is collecting their biometric dnta, where ir will be 

transmitted, for what purposes it will be traosmincd, and for how long. Defendant disregards these 

obliguíons and their employees' starutory rights nod instead unlawfully collects. stores, uses, and 

disseminates employees' biometric identifiers and infonnation. without ever receiving the individual's 

informed written consent required by BIPA. 

36. Upon information and belief, Defendant lacks retention schedules nnd guidelines for 

pcemancutly destroying Plnintiff's and other similarly-situated individuals' biometric darn and has not 

and will not destroy Plaintiff's and other sirnilarly-siruntcd individuals' biometric dam when the initial 

purpose for collecting or obtaining such dat:i has been satisfied or within three yars of the employee's 

last interaction with each comp,ny. 

37. NFl employees arc not told wlu; might hoppen to their biometric dnta if and wbeo 

Defendant merges with auothcr comp,ay or worse, if and when Defendant's business folds, or when 

the other third parties' thnr have received their biometric darn businesses fold. 

38. Since Defendant neither publishes ßfPA•mand:itcd dnta retention policies nor 

discloses the purposes for their collection of biometric dam, N Fl employees have no ideo whether 

Defendant sells, discloses, re-discloses, or otherwise disseminates their biometric dam. Moreover, 

Plaintiff and others similarly situarcd arc not told to whom Defendant currently discloses their 

biometric doro to, or what might hoppen ro their biometric data in the event of • merger or a 

bankruptcy, 

39. These violations have raised • material risk tl1•t Plaintiff's and other sirnilnrly-situntcd 

individuals' biometric data will be unlnwfully accessed by third parties. 

9 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 17 of 70 PageID #:22
-10. Br and through the actions derailed above, Defendant dísregnrdcd Plaintiff's and other 

similarly-situated individuals' leg.il rights Í11 violntion of BIPA 

lll. Plaintiff Dawn Mccgan's Experience 

-11. PL-timi ff Dawn Meegan wor.ked as n \X'orcbouse Associate from Mny 2016 until August 

2016. 

-12. ,\s • condition of employment, Plaintiff was required to scan her finserprims so 

Defendant could use ic ,s ,n nuthcnticarion method to track her time, 

-13. Defendant subsequendy scored Plaintiff's fingerprint dat:1 in ics Kronos darabasejs]. 

44. Plaintiff was required to scan her fingerprints each time she clocked in for work and 

clocked out of work. 

-15. Plaintiff has never been informed of the specific limited purposes or length of time 

for which Defendant collected, stored, used, and/or disseminated her biomcu:ic dom. 

-16. Plainriff is unaware of of :ioy written, publicly available biometric data retention policy 

developed by Defendanr, nor has she ever been informed whether Defendant will ever permanently 

delete her biometric d,~1. 

•17. Plaintiff h» never been provided with nor ever signed • written release allowiog 

Oc fendant 10 collect, store, use, or disseminate ber biometric dmn, 

-18. Plaintiff has condnuously and repeatedly been exposed to the risks and h:umful 

conditions created by Defendant's violacions of BIPA alleged bercio. 

49. No amount of time or money can compeosme Plaintiff if her biometric data is 

compromised by the bx procedures through which Defendant captured, stored, used, and 

disseminated hers and other sirnilarly-siruarcd individuals' biometrics. Moreover, Plaintiff would not 

hnve provided her biometric dato to Defendant if she had known thar it would retain such information 

for an inde fini cc period of time without her consent. 

10 

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50. ,\ showing of ncmal damages is not ncccss:tq in order ro state :t claim under BIPA 

S" R1m11b,uh ,,. Six F/,,g¡ E111. Corp., 20\ 9 lL 123 I 86, 140 ("[A]n individual need not allege some acrual 

injury or adverse effect, beyond violation of his or her ògbcs under the Act, in order co qualify os an 

"nggricvcd" person and be entidcd to seek liquidated damages and injunctive relief pursuant co the 

,\cr''). 

51. Nonetheless, Plaintiff is aggrieved because she suffered an injury-in-fact based on 

Defendant's violations of ber leg:ù right,;. Defendant hos intentionally interfered wich PL~incifrs right 

co possess and control her own sensitive biometric data. Additionally, Plaintiff suffered an invasion of 

:t leg:tlly protected interest when Defendnnr secured her personal and private biometric data at • time 

when it had no right 10 do so,« gross invasion o( ber eight 10 privacy, BIP:\ protect,; consumers like 

Flores from ÛIÎs precise conduce. Defendant bod no lawful right 10 secure this doL~ or shore ir with 

third porties absent • spe ci 5c legislative license co do so. 

52. Plaintiff's biometric data is economically valuable, and such value will increase os the 

commercialization of biometrics conunues to grow. 

53. Pi:ùntiff also suffered an injury in fact because Defendant has iropropcdy disseminated 

her biometric identifiers and/or biometric information 10 ar least one third p:trcy, Kronos. without her 

consent, in violation of ß[P ,\. 

5,1. Plnìntiff also suffered on informational injury because Defendant bes foiled to provide 

her wich information to which she was entitled by statute. Through BTP,\, the Illinois legislature has 

created a right: on individual's right to receive certain information prior ro n company securing his or 

her highlr personal, private, and proprictnry biometric dora; and on injury- not receiving this extremely 

critical information. 

SS. Pursuant to 7~0 LLCS § 14/15(b), Plaintiff was entitled co receive certain information 

prior co Defendant securing ber biometric dato; namely, infocmaáoo advising bec of the specific 

11 

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limited purpose(s) and length of rime for which Defendant collects. stores, uses and disseminates her 

private biometric data; information regarding Defendant's biometric retention policy; and a written 

release allowiog Defendant to collect, score, use, and disseminate her private biometric data. By 

depriving Plaintiff of this inforrnarion, Defendant injured her. PJtbfù Cüi:._m ,,. U.S. D,purr11u111 oj JtJlif<, 

491 U.S. 4-IO, -149 (1989): Federa! EINtio11 Co111111ùJio11 , •• Ak.i,11, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 

56. Plaintiff has plausibly inferred acrual and ongoing harm in che fonn of monetary 

damages for the value of the collccrion and retention of ber biometric data; in che form of monct.1<)' 

damages by nm obtaining compensation as n result of being denied access 10 material information 

about Defendant's policies and practices; in the form of che uuaurhorizcd disclosure of ber 

confidencial biometric dnm 10 third parties; in the form of interference with her ri¡¡ht to control and 

possess her ccnfidential biometric data; and, in the form of the exposure 10 substantial and irreversible 

loss of privacy. 

57. ,\s Plnintiff is nor required 10 allege or prove ncrual damages in order 10 state a claim 

under BIP,\, she seeks starutory dam.1gcs under BIP,\ as compensnòoa for the injuries caused by 

Defendant. Ril!(nbarb, 201 9 IL 12.3 186, ~ 40. 

CLASS ALLEGATIONS 

58. Pursuant 10 the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 ILCS 5/2-801, Pl:ùntiff brings 

claims on her own behalf and as a representative of all other similarly-situated individuals 10 recover 

smtutory penalties, prejudgment interest, attorneys' fees and costs, and other damages owed under 

BlPA, 740 lLCS § 14/1, ,1 m¡. 

59. :\s discussed 1,,prü, Section 14/15(6) of BIP:\ prohibits a company from, among other 

things, collecdng, capturing, purchasing, receiving through trade, or otherwise obmining a person's or 

n customer's biometric identifiers or biometric information. unless it fuse (1) informs the individual in 

writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored; (2) informs 

12 

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the individual in writing of the specific purpose and length of time for which :t biometric identifier or 

biometric informnâon is being collected, stored, nnd used; and (3) receives o written release executed 

by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information. 740 ILCS § 1·1/ 15. 

60. Plaintiff seeks class certification under the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 735 § 11.CS 

5/2-801 for the following dass of similnrly-siruatcd individuals under ßfPA: 

All individuals working for Defendant or :my of its ,ffi~oted facilities in the State of 

Illinois who had their fingcrprintS collected, captured, received, obtained, maintained, 

stored, or disclosed by Defendant during the applicable statutory period. 

61. This action is properly mairuaincd as a class action under 735 ILCS § 5/2-801 because: 

A 111c doss is so numerous that joindcr of .U members is impracticable; 

B. There arc questions of law or fnct that arc common to the class; 

C. The claims of the Pl:ùntiff ore cypicnl of the claims of the class; and, 

D. 11,e Plainâff will fairly and adequately protect che interests of the class. 

Numero!iity 

62. 11,e total number of putative class members exceeds fifcy (50) individuals. 11,e exact 

number of class members can cosily be determined from NF!'s payroll records. 

Commonnlity 

63. There is a well-defined commonality of interest in the substantial questions o flow and 

foct concerning and a ffcccing tbc Closs in that Plainri ff and all mero bers of che Closs have been harmed 

by Defendant's failure 10 comply with ßfP A The common questions of low and fact include, bur ore 

not Limited 10 the following: 

,\. \'vhethcr Defendant collected, captured or otherwise obtained Plaintiff's and 

the Class's biometric identifiers or biometric informmion: 

B. \'vhecher Defendant properly informed Pl:ùnùff and che Class of its purposes 

for collecting, using, scoring and disseminating their biometric identifiers or 

biometric information: 

C. \'\'11echcr Defendnnc obtained a written release (os defined in 7~0 11.CS § 

13 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 21 of 70 PageID #:26
1-1/10) to collect. use, store nnd disseminate Plaintiff's and the Class's 

biometric identifiers or biometric information; 

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Whether Defendant has disclosed oc re-disclosed Plnintiff's and the Class's 

biometric identifiers or biometric infocruntion; 

Whether Defendant has sold, leased, traded, or otherwise profited from 

Plaintiff's nod the Class's biometric identifiers or biometric informntion; 

Whether Defendant developed a wdncn policy, made available to the public, 

establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for perrnnncntly destroying 

biometric identifiers and biometric information when the inicial purpose for 

collecting or obr:ûning such identifiers or information has been satisfied or 

within three years of their last interaction with the individual, whichever occurs 

first; 

Whether Defendant complies with any such weinen policy (if one exists); 

Whether Dcfendnnt used Pl:ùnúJf's and the Class's fingerpdnrs to identify 

them: 

\v'hetber Defcndnnr's violations of BIPA have raised n material risk dint 

Plainriff's biometric dam will be unlawfully accessed by third parties; 

Whether the violntions of BIPA were committed ncgligcnùy: and 

Whether the violntions of BIP,\ were committed intentionally and/or 

recklessly. 

64. Plaintiff nnticiparcs Û1>t Defendant will raise defenses thnr are common to the class, 

Adequacy 

65. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of all members of the class, and 

there ure no known conûicts o( ioteresr between Pl:ùnáff and class members. Plaintiff, moreover, has 

retained experienced counsel that arc competent in the prosecution of complex liàg:1àoo and wbo 

have extensive experience ncàog as class counsel. 

T}l)iç:ility 

66. TI,e claims asserted by Plaintiff arc typical of the class members she seeks to rcprcsenL 

Plaintiff has the some interests and suffers from the same unbwful practices as the class members. 

6ï. Upon informntion and belief, there arc no other class members who have an interest 

14 

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individually comrolling the prosecution of his or her individual claims, especially in light of the 

relatively small value of each chum and the difficulties involved io bringing individual lnignrion agninst 

one's employer. However, if any such class member should become known, be or she can "opt out" 

of chis action pursuant to 735 ILCS § 5/2-801. 

Prçdomjnancç nad S11pçriorüy 

68. The common questions identified above predominate over any individual issues, 

which will relace solei)' to che quantum of relief duc co individual class members. ,\ class acdon is 

superior to other available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of chis controversy because 

individual joindcr of the parties is impracticable. Class action treatment will allow a lnrge numbcc of 

similndy-siruntcd persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, 

efficiently and without the uonccessary duplication of effort nnd c:_,pensc if these claims were brought 

individually, Moreover, as the damages suffered by each class member arc relntivcly small in the sense 

pertinent to clnss action analysis, che expenses and burden of individual litigation would make ic 

difficult for individual class members to vindicate their daims. 

69. Additionally, important public interests will be served by addressing che motter os a 

class action, 11,c cost to tbc court system and the public for the ndjudication of individunl litig,,tion 

and daims would be substnntinlly more ù1011 if claims are treated as a doss action. Prosecution of 

separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of inconsistent and varying 

adjudications, establish incompatible standards of conduce for defendants and/or substantially impair 

or impede che ability of class members co protect their interests. 111c issues in this acdon can be 

decided by means of common, clnss-widc proof. ln addition, if appropriate, the Court can and is 

empowered to fashion methods to efficiently m.,nagc this action as a class action. 

15 

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FIRST CAUSE OF AO'JON 

Violation of740 ILCS § 14/LS(a): Failure to Institute, Maintain and Adhere to a Written, 

Publicly-Available Retention Schedule 

70. Phintiff incorporates the foregoing :illeg:itions as if fully sec forth herein. 

ì I. Bl PA mandates that companies in possession of biometric data establish and rnainrnin 

n satisfactory biometric data retention - and, importantly, deletion - policy. Specifically, those 

companies musc (Q make publicly available a wriuen policy establishing a retention schedule and 

guidelines for permanent deletion o( biometric data (at most, three )'t-:lr.i afte, tite company's last 

interaction with the individual); and (u) ncrually adhere to that retention schedule and actually delete 

the biometric infocmntioo. Su 740 ILCS § 14/IS(a). 

72. Defendant fails to comply with these BIPA mandates. 

7 3. Defendant N Fl is a corporation registered to do business m Illinois during the 

statutory period and thus qualifies as a "private entity" under BIPA. Su 7•10 TLCS I •I/ 10. 

7-1. Plaintiff and the Class arc individuals who have had their "biometric identifiers" 

collected by Dcfendnnt (io the form of their fingerprints), as explained in detnil in Sections U and UI, 

supra. Su140 Il.CS§ H/10. 

75. Plaintiffs and the Class's biometric identifiers were used to identify them and, 

therefore, constitute "biometric information" as defined br 131PA. Su 7-10 ILCS § 1-1/10. 

76. Defendant failed 10 publish , publicly available retention schedule or guidelines for 

permanendy destroying biometric identifiers and biometric informntion :ts Specified b¡· BIPA. Su 7-10 

LLCS § 1-1/15(0). 

77. Upon information and belief, Defendant lacks retention schedules and guidelines for 

pcanancmìy destroying Plainriff's and the Class's biometric data and has not and will not destroy 

Plaintiff's and che Class's biometric data when the initial purpose for collcctiog or obtaining such data 

hos been satisfied or within three years of the individual's last interaction with the company. 

16 

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i8. On behalf of herself and the Class, Plaintiff seeks: (I) declaratory relief; (2) injunctive 

and equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Pbinùffs and the Class by rcquicing 

Defendnm to comply with BIPA's requirements for the collection, storage, and use of biometric 

identifiers und biometric information os described herein; (3) SL1tutOC)' damages of S5,000 for £aQJ 

intcntionnl ond/or reckless violarion of BIPA pursuant to 7-10 ILCS 1'1/20(2) or, in the alternative, 

storutory damages of S 1,000 for c,ch negligent violation of BIPA pursuant to 740 JLCS 14/20(1); and 

(4) reasonable auorncys' fees and costs and other lidgadoo e.~pcoscs pursu:iot to 740 LLCS 14/20(3). 

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 

Violnrion of740 lLCS § 14/15(1>): Failure to Obtain Informed Written Consent and Release 

Before Obtaining Biometric Identifiers or Information 

79. Plninùff incorporares the foregoing allegations os if fully set forth herein. 

80. 1311',\ requires companies to obtain informed written consent from employees before 

acquiring their biometric data. Specifically, ßíP,\ makes it unlawful for nny privare enûty to "collect, 

c1pture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain 3 person's or a customer's biometric 

idcntiûcrs or biometric information unless [the cnriry] first: (1) informs the subject ... in writing ùiot a 

biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored; (2) informs the subject ... in 

writing of the specific purpose and length of tenn for which o biometric identifier or biometric 

information is being collected, stored, nnd used: and (3) receives • written release executed b¡- the 

subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information ... " 7-10 í[.CS 14/ I 5(b) (emphasis added). 

Sl. Defendant fails to comply with these BIP,\ mandates. 

82. Defendant is • corporation registered to do business io Illinois during tbc statutory 

period nod thus qualifies as a "privare entity" under BIPt\. Su 740 lLCS 14/10. 

S3. Plninùff and the Class arc individuals who hove bad their "biometric identifiers" 

collected by Defendant (io clic form of their fingcrpeiuts), os explained in detail in Sections li and lii, 

supra. Su NO U.CS§ 1-1/10. 

17 

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S.I. Plninriff's and the Class's biometric identifiers were used to idcnàfy them :111d. 

therefore, constitute "biometric information" 3S defined by BIP:\. Su 7-10 LLCS § 14/ 10. 

85. Defendant systematically and automntically collected, captured, purchased, received 

through trade, or otherwise obtained Plaintiff's and the Class's biometric identifiers nod/or biometric 

information without first obminiog the wriuen release required by 740 Il.CS H/l5(b)(3). 

86. Defendant never informed Plaintiff and the Class in writing that their biometric 

identifiers 0<1d/ or biometric information were being collected, captured, purchnsed, received through 

trade, or otherwise obtained, nor did Defendant inforni Plaintiff and the Class in writing of the specific 

purposc(s) :111d length of term for which their biometric identifiers and/ or biometric information were 

being collected, captured, purchased, received through trade, or otherwise obtained as required by 7 40 

ILCS 1-1/IS(b)(l)-(2). 

87, By collecting, capturing, purchasing, receiving dirough trade, or otherwise obtaining 

Pbinàit's and the Class's biometric identifiers and biometric informadon as described herein, 

Defendant violated Plnintiff's and the Class's righ1S to privacy io their biometric identifiers nnd/or 

biometric informntion as sci forth in ß!PA. Sa 7-10 fLCS 14/ I, ,u,tJ. 

88. On behalf of herself and the Class, Plaintiff seeks: (I) declaratory relief (2) injunctive 

and equitable relief as is necessary 10 pcoteet the interests of Pl:tlnùff :111d the Class by requiring 

Defendant to comply with BIPA's requirements for the collection, storage, use :111d disseminarion of 

biometric identifiers and biometric information as described herein; (3) statutory damages of SS,000 

for sash intention:ù nnd/or reckless violation of ßlPA pursuant to 7-10 Il.CS 1-1/20(2) or, in the 

alternative, starutory damages of St,000 for sash negligcnr violation of ßfP,\ pursuant 10 740 ILCS 

14/20(1); and (4) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs and other liògaúon expenses pursuant co 7-10 

ILCS 14/20(3) 

18 

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THIRD CAUSE Of ACTION 

Violation of740 ILCS § 14/JS(d): Disclosure of Biometrie Identifiers and Information 

Before Obtaining Consent 

89. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing :ùleg:itions os if fully set forth herein, 

90. B11' • .\ prohibits private entities from disclosing o person's or customer's biometric 

identifier or biometric information without first obtaining consent. for 1.h.11. disclosure. Su HO lLCS 

14/IS(d)(I). 

91. 

92. 

Defendant fails to comply with this Brr A mandate. 

Defendant is o corporation registered 10 do business in lllinois during the sr.arutocy 

period md thus qualifies ns a "privare cntiry" under BJI>A Su 740 lLCS 14/10. 

93. Plaintiff nnd the Class are individuals who hnve had their "biometric identifiers" 

collected by Defcndnoc (ìn the form of their fingerprints), !lS explained in derail in Sections II nnd lii. 

11,prt,. Su 7-10 U.CS§ 14/10. 

9,1. Pbindff's and the Class's biometric identifiers were used 10 identify them and, 

therefore, constitute "biometric iafoanaùon" as defined by BIP:\. Su7•10 lLCS § 14/10. 

95. Defendant systematically and autornarically disclosed, rcdisclosed. or otherwise 

disseminated Plaintiffs and che Class's biometric identifiers and/or biometric information without 

first obtaining tbc consent required by 7-10 ILCS 1 •I/ 1 S(d)(I). 

96. By disclosing, rcdisclosing, or otherwise disseminating Pbintifrs and the Class's 

biometric identifiers and biometric införmation ns described herein, Dcfendnnt violated Plaintiff's and 

the Class's rights to privacy in their biometric identifiers and/or biometric information ns set forth in 

BfP,\. Su 7-10 rLCS l•l/1, ,11tt¡. 

97. On behalf of herself and tbc Class, Plaintiff seeks: (1) declaratory relief; (2) injunctive 

and equitable relief os is necessary 10 protect the interests of Plaintiff and the Class by requiring 

Defendant to comply with BIPt\'s requirements for the collection, s10rngc, use and dissemination of 

19 

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biometric identifiers and biometric information as described hercio; (3) SL1rutory damages of SS,000 

for~ intentional and/or reckless violation of BIPA pursu.,nt 10 740 LLCS § 14/20(2) or, io tbc 

alternative, starutory damages of S 1,000 for sash negligent violation of BIPA pursu.10t ro 740 ILCS § 

14/20(1); and (4) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs and oilier litigation expenses pursuanr 10 740 

ILCS § 14/20(3). 

PRAYER FOR RELfEF 

\Xllicrcfore, Plaintiff Dawn Meegan respectfully requests that chis Court enter •n Order: 

:\. Ccnifying this case as n doss action on behalf of the Class defined above, appointing 

Plaintiff Dnwn i\lccg:tn ns Class Representative, and appointing Peiffer Wolf Corr & 

Kane, ,\PLC, as Class Counsel; 

B. Declaring that Defendant's actions, as ser forth above, violate BIP,\: 

C. Awarding stannory damages of S5,000 for ,mh intentional and/ or reckless violation of 

BIP:\ pursU:tOt ro 740 ILCS § 14/20(2) or, in the alternative, statutory damages of 

SI ,000 founrh negligent violntion of BIPA pursu,uu 10 ì-10 [LCS § 14/20(1); 

D. Declaring that Defendanr's actions, as set forth above, were intentional or reckless; 

E. Awarding injunctive and other equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests 

of Plaioóff and the Class, including an Order requiring Defendant 10 collect, store, 

use, destroy, and disseminate biometric identifiers and/or biometric information in 

compliance with BíPA; 

F. Awarding Plaintiff and tbc Class their reasonable artorneys' fees and costs and ornee 

litigation expenses pursuant to 7-10 LLCS § 1-1/20(3); 

G. Awarding Plaintiff and tbc CL-tss pre- and post-judgment intcrcsr, 10 the extent 

allowable; and, 

H. Awarding such other and further relief ns equity nod justice may require. 

Dnre: December 16, 2019 Respectfully Submirtcd, 

/¡/ Brn11dnt1 M, IVirt 

Brandon 1'1. Wisc-IL Bar# 6319580 

Paul ,\. Lesko - TL Bar# 62888-06 

PELFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC 

818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 2 

SL Louis, MO 63 iO+ 

Ph: 31-1-833-1825 

20 

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Email: bwis<@pwckJc¡,:il.com 

Email: plcsko@pwcklcg:tl.coin 

Cook County Atty# 62258 

An·oRNEYS FOR PL-UNTIFF 

AND THE PllíATJVE CLASS 

21 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 29 of 70 PageID #:34
Return Dale: No return date scheduled 

Hearing Dale: 4/15/2020 9:30 AM • 9:30 AM 

Courtroom Number: 2308 

Location: District 1 Court 

Cook County, IL 

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M 

FILED 

12/18/2019 ·11:13 AM 

DOROTHY BROWN 

CIRCUIT CLERK 

COOK COUNTY, IL 

2019CH14479 

7777629 

EXHIBIT A 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 30 of 70 PageID #:35
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 

TWENTIETH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 

ST. CLAIR COUNTY, ILLINOIS 

SAROYA ROBERSON, individually and on 

behalf of all others simìlarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SYMPHONY POST ACUTE CARE 

NETWORK; SYMPHONY SYCAMORE 

LLC; SYMPHONY HEALTHCARE LLC; 

SYMPHONY M.L. LLC; SYMPHONY 

MONARCH HOLDINGS, LLC; and DOE 

DEFENDANTS 1-100, 

Case No. 17 -L- 733 

FILED 

ST. CLAIR COUNTY 

MAR I 2 2019 

35 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

r 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

ON CLASS CERTIFICATION 

The case comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification ("Motion"). 

The issues have been briefed and argued by the parties.' The Court hereby ORDERS: 

I. NATURE OF THE CASE ANO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION. 

Plaintiff Saroya Roberson worked at a nursing home in Swansea, Illinois. Plaintiff alleges 

that as part of timekeeping while she worked at this location, Defendants and others captured 

her biometric Information or biometric identifiers (a palm scan) within the meaning of the 

Illinois Biometric Privacy Information Act, 740 ILCS 14/1 ("BIPA"). Defendants' opposition brief 

does not dispute Roberson's biometric information or biometric identifiers were so captured. 

BIPA manlfe.sts the Illinois General Assembly's findings that: 

'Arguments were heard on December 20, 2018 before ludae Julla R. Gomrlc. On February 8, 2019, after hearing. 

but before Judge Gomric ruled on the pending Motion lor dass cerurteauen, the court granted Symphony 

Sycamore LLC's Motion for Substitution as a Matter of Rlght, and this case was subsequently assigned to the 

undersigned. The court has reviewed the court file and report of proceedings held on December 20, 2018 and Is 

ready to proceed without the need for additional hearing. 

1 

·--- - ·- ·--- ----- - -- -- - ···-· ··------ 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 31 of 70 PageID #:36
(1) Biometrics are uniquely sensitive identifiers. "Biometrics are unlike 

other unique identifiers ... (and] are biologically unique to the individuai; 

therefore, once compromised, the Individual has no recourse, Is at heightened 

risk for Identity theft, and Is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated 

trensactlçns." 740 ILCS § 14/S{c). 

(2) Biometric technology Is a new frontier subject to unpredictable 

developments. "The full ramlfìcatìons of biometric technology are not fully 

known." Id. at § 14/S(f). 

(3) People are apprehensive of transactions involving their biometrics. 

The "overwhelming majority of members of the public are weary of the use oí 

biometrics when such information is tied to finances and other personal 

information" and are "deterred from partaking In biometric identifier-facilitated 

transactions." Id. at§ 14/S(d)-(e). 

(4) Regulation of biometric collection, use, and storage serves the public 

interest. The "public welfare, security and safety will be served by regulating the 

collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of 

biometric Identifiers and informatìon." Id. at § 14/S(g). 

Accordingly, BIPA puts certain requirements on parties dealing with biometric Identifiers 

or biometric information, including: 

(b) No private ent-ity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through 

trade, or otherwise obtain a person's or a customer's biometríc identifier 

or biometric information, unless it first: 

(1) informs the subject or the subject's legally authorized 

representative In writing that a biometric identifier or biometric 

information is being collected or stored; 

(2) informs the subject or the subject's legally authorized 

representative in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for 

which a biometric Identifier or biometric information is being collected, 

stored, and used; and 

(3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the 

biometric identifier or biometric information or the subject's legally 

authorized representative. 

740 ILCS 14/S(b) {2018). 

2 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 32 of 70 PageID #:37
Plaintiff alleges none of these requirements were met when capturing her biometric 

information. Defendants' opposition to the Motion does not dispute this. 

BIPA further provides a right of action for violations of its requirements: 

Sec. 20. Right of actlon. Any person aggrieved by a violation of this Act 

shall have a right of action in a State circuit court .•. against an offending 

party. A prevailing party may recover for each violation: 

(1) against a private entity that negligently violates a provlslon of this Act, 

liquidated damages of $1,000 or actual damages, whichever ls greater; 

(2) against a private entity that intentionally violates a provision of this 

Act, liquidated damages of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is 

greater; .... 

740 ILCS 14/20 (2018). Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to these and other provisions of 

BIPA. 

Plaintiff alleges the Swansea, Illinois location where her biometric Identifiers were 

captured is part of a network, the Symphony Post Acute Network ("SPAN" or the "Network"). 

She seeks to certify a class of Illinois citizens who had their biometric information or biometric 

identifiers captured, collected, etc. at any Illinois location In the Network (and associated 

subclasses discussed below): 

All llllnols citizens whose biometric Information was collected, captured, purchased, 

received through trade, or otherwise obtained in llllnois at any location associated with 

the Symphony Post Acute Care Network, a/k/a Symphony Post Acute Network, as set 

forth in the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/S er seq. 

Excluded from the proposed Class are employees, officers, directors, subsidiaries and 

affiliates of any person or business associated with the Symphony Post Acute Care 

Network, a/k/a Symphony Post Acute Network, the judge or any officer of the court 

presiding over this action. 

II. LAW REGARDING A DETERMINATION OF CLASS CERTIFICATION. 

"In determining whether to certify a proposed class, the trial court ... should avoid 

3 

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Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 33 of 70 PageID #:38
deciding the underlying merits of the case or resolving unsettled legal questions." CE Design 

Ltd. v. C & T Pizza, tnc., 2015 Il App (1st) 131465 (2015), ,i 9. "In making its decision as to 

whether to certify a class, the court may consider any matters of fact or law properly presented 

by the record, which includes the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, 

and any evidence that may be adduced at the hearings." Bueker, 2016 IL App (5th) 150282 at ,i 

22. "To determine whether the proposed class should be certified, the court accepts the 

allegations of the complaint as true." Clark, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 544-45. See also CD Design, 

2015 Il App (1st) 131465 at ,i 9 ("In determining whether to certify a proposed class, the trial 

court accepts the allegations of the complaint as true •... "); 537 Mgmt., 2011 Il App {1st) 

102496 at ,i 15 (same). 

The factors which the Court must consider on a motion for class certification are the 

familiar framework establìshed by statute. For a suit to proceed as a class action in Illinois, the 

Court must find that: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 

(2) there are questions of fact or law common to the class, which predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual members; (3) the representative parties will fairly and 

adequately protect the interests of the class; and (4) a class action is an appropriate method for 

the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 735 llCS 5/2-801 (2018). See o/so e.g. 

Clark, et of. v. TAP Pharm. Prods., tnc., et o/., 343 Ill. App. 3d 538, 544.45 {5th Dist. 2003). 

Ill. FIRST FACTOR: NUMEROSITY {735 ILCS 5-2/801(1)). 

Section 801(1) requires not only that the number of plaintiffs be numerous, but also 

that joinder of plaintiffs in one individual action be impractical. 735 llCS 5/2-801(1). Where 

there are a number of potential ctaìmants, and the Individual amount claimed by each ls small, 

4 

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Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 34 of 70 PageID #:39
making redress on an individual level difficult, ií not impossible, Illinois courts have been 

particularly receptive to proceeding on a class action basis. Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 111.2d 7 

{1981). Avoiding unnecessary burdens on the courts themselves is also a legitimate concern. 

"Affirming the trial court's class certification order will avoid the filing of numerous, repetitive 

cases placing a burden on the court." Fakhoury v. Pappas, 395 Ill. App. 3d 302, 316 {1st Dist. 

2009). 

Plaintiff states that Defendants have identified, at a minimum, 552 workers who would 

be members of the class from the Swansea, Illinois location alone. Defendants' opposition to 

the Motion does not dispute this; in Fact, Defendants' opposition does not mention numerosity 

at all. Accordingly, the Court finds that the numeroslty factor Is satisfied. See Wood River Area 

Dev. Corp. v. Germania Fed. Sav. and Loon Ass'n, 198 Ill. App. 3d 445 (5th Dist. 1990). 

IV. SECOND FACTOR: COMMON AND PREDOMINANT ISSUES OF FACT OR LAW (735 ILCS 5- 

2/801(2)). 

Section 801(2) requires "questions oí fact or law common to the class." 735 ILCS 5/2- 

801(2) (2018). As the statute is phrased In the alternative, certiíication requires "only that 

there be either a predominating common issue of Jaw or fact, not both." Martin v. Heinold 

Commodities, Inc., 117111.2d 67, 81 (1994). 

Plaintiff suggests that a case presents common Issues when defendants have engaged in 

the same or slrnilar course of conduct, and that this is particularly true where - as here - the 

claims are based predominantly upon the application of a single statute or statutory scheme. 

"A common question may be shown when the claims of the individual class members are based 

upon the common application of a statute .... " Clark, 343 111. App. 3d at 548. See also ëueker, 

2016 IL App (5th) 150282, ,i 27 ("With regard to the commonality requirement, a common issue 

5 

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Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 35 of 70 PageID #:40
may be shown where the claims of the individuai class members are based upon the common 

application of a statute or where the proposed class members are aggrieved by the same or 

similar conduct or pattern of conduct."); Holl, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 831 (same).' Deíendants' 

opposition to the Motion did not dispute this general premise. 

Thus, according to Plaintiff, "Examination quickly establishes that commonality Is easily 

satisfied In this case. All class members are citizens of Illinois. All are proceeding principally 

under a single Illinois statute, BIPA. Each was subjected to an identical course of conduct by 

defendants: The capture of their biometric Information." 

Plaintiff further goes on to enumerate specific questions of law or fact which she states 

will predominate: 

a. Whether the Defendants captured, collected, stored or used the 

biometric information of the Plaintiff and the Class? 

b. If the Defendants captured, collected, stored or used the biometric 

information of the Plaintiff and the Class, did the Defendants inform the 

Plaintiff and the Class In writing that a biometric Identifier or biometric 

information was being collected or stored? 

c. If the Defendants captured, collected, stored or used the biometric 

information of the Plaintiff and the Class, did the Defendants inform the 

Plaintiff and the Class in writìng of the specific purpose and length of 

term for which a biometric identifier or biometric information was being 

collected, stored, and used? 

d. If the Defendants captured, collected, stored or used the biometric 

information of the Plaintiff and the Class, did the Defendants receive a 

written release executed by the Plaintiff and the Class of the biometric 

identifier or biometric information or the Plaintiff's or Class' legally 

' Bearing In mind that the court does not ccnslder the merits at this stage, see supra, the Court also does not 

consider which class members wlll ultimately prevail. "That some members ol the class are not entitled to relief 

because o! .some particular Iacter will not bar the class action." Clark, 343111. App. 3d at S49. See also Holl, 376 Ill. 

App. 3d at 831·32 ("That some members of the class arc not entitled to relief wlll not bar the class action."). 

6 

---·--- 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 36 of 70 PageID #:41
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authorized representative? 

If the Defendants captured, collected, stored or used the biometric 

information of the Plaintiff and the Class, did the Defendants develop a 

written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention 

schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers 

and biometric Information when the initial purpose for collecting or 

obtaining such identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 

years of the Individual's last interaction with the private entity, whichever 

occurs first? 

f. Whether Defendants' violations of BIPA were negligent, or instead, 

intentional or reckless, within the meaning of 740 ILCS 14/20? 

Thus, Plaintiff summarizes: "Defendants' compliance with the requirements of BIPA - a single 

statutory scheme - is the central question in this case. This same question will predominate for 

each and every class member." 

Defendants argue that common questions do not predominate In this case. Defendants 

assert that "The purpose of the predominance requirement Is to ensure that the proposed 

class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation .. .' Smith v. Illinois Cent. 

R.R. Co., 223 Ill. 2d 441, 448 (2006)." According to Defendants, to satisfy this predominance 

requirement, a plaintiff must show that "successful adjudication of the class representative's 

individual claim 'will establish a right of recovery in other class members' such that 'all that 

should remain is for other class members to file proof of their claim., Id. (quotation omitted); 

see o/so Masha/ v. City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112341, 1133 (same)." 

Defendants then go on to provide a list of Issues they claim defeat commonality and 

predominance In this case: 

a. whether a class member used the same type of "finger or hand print 

reader/scanner" that Roberson used, 

7 

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Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 37 of 70 PageID #:42
b. whether a class member has suffered a sufficient injury to invoke BIPA's 

private right of action, 

c. 

d. 

e. 

f. 

whether a class member has suffered actual injury such that actual 

damages could be recovered in excess of the BIPA's liquidated damages, 

whether that Injury exceeds the liquidated damages provision in BIPA, 

whether that injury was suffered at the hands of any person or business 

that is in fact "associated with the Symphony Post-Acute Care Network, 

a/k/a Symphony Post-Acute Network," 

whether that entity acted negligently or willfully with respect to that 

particular class member, 

g. whether that class member's claim is subject to any affirmative defenses, 

like consent or ratlflcatton, 

First, since the hearing on Plaintíff's Motion on December 20, 2018, the Supreme Court 

of Illinois has ruled that "an individual need not allege some injury or adverse effect, beyond 

violation of this or her right under [BIPA], in order to qualify as an 'aggrieved' person and be 

entitled to seek liquidated damages and injunctive relief pursuant to the Act." Rosenbach v. Six 

Flogs Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186, slip op. at p.13 (Ill. Jan. 25, 2019). As such, many of 

the arguments raised above are moot. 

Moreover, it is well-established that by themselves, such issues do not defeat class 

certification. "Individual questions of injury and damages do not defeat class certification." 

Clark, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 549. See also Holl, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 832 (same). At most, if damage 

questions do present significant issues, they can be handled in ancillary proceedings. "it is 

appropriate to litigate the questions of law or fact common to all members of the class and, 

after the determination of the common questions, to determine in an ancillary proceeding or 

proceedings the questions that may be peculiar to individual class members." Clark, 343 Ill. 

8 

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Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 38 of 70 PageID #:43
App. 3d at 548 (internal quotations omitted). In fact, Defendants' own cited authority 

establishes that these differences (if true) are generally not grounds to defeat class 

certification. Walczak v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 365 Ill. App. 3d 664, 679 (2nd Dist. 2006). 

("Moreover, we note that, generally, individuai counterclaims or defenses do not render a case 

unsuitable for class action,") 

More broadly, Defendants' characterization of the common issues in this case, and 

which of them will predominate, is questionable. Smith was a toxic tort case involving a train 

derailment, and then a resulting chemical spill, with all the attenuated questions as to 

proximate causation of bodily injury resulting from a complicated serles of events, Smith, 233 

111.2d 442-58. This is not that case. This case Involves a single statutory scheme - BIPA - and 

the issues presented can be summarized in a straightforward way: Did the Network capture 

biometric information from members of the class, and íf so, did they comply with BIPA while 

doing so? These questions are what will consume "the bulk of the time at trial." Smith, 233 

111.2d at 458. 

That BIPA's straightforward, statutory requirements may have been met in some cases, 

but not others, does not preclude class certification, as Defendants suggest. First, this invites 

the Court to determine the merits of the case, which the Court does not do at thts stage, as has 

already been established. 

Second, the fact that some class members may recover, but not all, is no impediment to 

class certification. "That some members of the class are not entitled to relief because of some 

particular factor will not bar the class actlon." Clark, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 549. See o/so Holl, 376 

lii. App. 3d at 831-32 ("That some members of the dass are not entitled to relief will not bar the 

9 

-·------ - - --- ------ ··--------------- 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 39 of 70 PageID #:44
class action."). 

Third, the ílexibílity of the class action procedure ensures that even if the issues 

Defendants raise do become significant at some future point in time, the Court has the ability 

to address such matters then. "If individual damage determinations are necessary, the court 

can utilize various procedures to determine damages, including the creation of subclasses." 

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Bueker, 2016 Il App (5th), 11 31 (citing Holl, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 832). "Furthermore, if the class 

becomes unmanageable at some later time in the litigation, the court always has the option to 

set aside the class certification or a portion of it." Id. (citing Purcell & Wordrope Chtd. v. Hertz 

Corp., 175 III.App.3d 1069, 1075 (1st Dist. 1988)). 

Finally, while the Court finds that common questions of fact or law will predominate this 

case as a whole, it alternately finds that issue certification would be appropriate as well. Even 

In cases involving the most complex questions of Injury or damages - and again, this Is not that 

case, as it arises under a single simple statute - classes may be certìfied as to issues, such as 

legal Issues, or the issue of liability. Even the cases Defendants themselves cite recognize this. 

See e.q. Smith, 223 111.2d at 457 ("the trial court in this case did not limit class certìfication to 

the issue of liability .... "); Bueker, 2016 Il App {5th) 150282, 11 34 {courts have the ability to 

limit certification for liability purposes only). Thus, in the alternative, the commonality and 

predominance of legal and liability issues in this case demonstrate it is also appropriately suited 

for certification as to common legal issues, and to Issues concerning liability. 

V. THIRD FACTOR: ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION OF THE INTERESTS OF THE CLASS {735 

ucs 5-2/801(3)). 

Section 801(3) requires that the "representative parties will fairly and adequately 

protect the interests of the class." 735 llCS 5/2-801(2) (2018). Adequate representation has 

10 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 40 of 70 PageID #:45
two components: (1) adequacy of the named Plaintiff; and (2) adequacy of the named 

Plaintiff's attorneys. See Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 111.2d 7 (1981). As Defendant posits, "[tlhe 

purpose of the adequate representation requirement is to ensure that all class members will 

receive proper, efficient, and appropriate protection of their Interests In the presentation of the 

daim. Walczak, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 678. 

Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff's attorneys are inadequate. Accordingly, the 

Court accepts that they will provide proper, efficient, and appropriate protection of the 

Interests of the class In presenting the claims. 

Defendants do, however, challenge the adequacy of Plaintiff Roberson. The principal 

argument made by Defendants is that the interests of Roberson are antagonistic to those of the 

class, as class members may want to seek a monetary award, and that (according to 

Defendants) during her deposition Roberson disclaimed any intention of seeking a monetary 

recovery. 

This ls wholly unpersuasive. Plaintiff, by way of her pleadings, discovery responses, 

statements of her attorneys, and otherwise, has made it abundantly clear on multiple occasions 

that she seeks a monetary recovery In this action, not only on her own behalf, but also on 

behalf of the other class members. Her deposition responses did not contradict that. In fact, 

Plaintiff stated she wants the law (BIPA) enforced, and BIPA expressly provides for monetary 

awards. 

The rest of Defendants' adequacy arguments are much in the same vein. Quizzing 

Plaintiff on what she understands about Defendants' corporate structure, or how the law 

Interprets "injury'' or "damages," does nothing to demonstrate Plaintiffs Inadequacy as a class 

11 

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Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 41 of 70 PageID #:46
representative, as it does nothing to show that Plaintiff is either antagonistic to the class or will 

fail to properly pursue the interests of the class. It merely demonstrates that Plaintiff, a 

layperson, does not understand the intricacies of the law or lawsuits. But that is why a 

representative is - not only encouraged, but outright required- to hire effective legal counsel. 

In short, the quantum of understanding necessary on the part of a representative is not 

nearly as complex as Defendants would have It. "The plaintiff class representative need only 

have a marginai familiarity with the facts of his case and does not need to understand the legal 

theories upon which his case is based to a greater extent." Clark, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 550·51 

(internal quotations omitted}. The Court finds that the adequacy of representation requirement 

is fulfilled In this case. 

VI. FOURTH FACTOR: THE CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE IS THE APPROPRIATE METHOD FOR 

THE FAIR AND EFFICIENT ADJUDICATION OF THE CONTROVERSY {735 ILCS 5·2/801{4)}. 

Finally, the fourth statutory factor requires the Court to consider whether "[t]he class 

action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." 735 

ILCS S/2·801(d} (2018). The balance of Defendants' remaining arguments are entered on this 

factor. 

One of these arguments centers around who was Plaintiffs employer. Defendants seem 

to Invest this with independent legal significance. But this was already addressed in the context 

of Defendants' § 2·615 motion to dismiss. The terms "employer" and "employee" appear 

nowhere in BIPA, nor do any related terms. In fact, BIPA expressly contemplates many 

circumstances well outside the employment context, such as "finger-scan technologies at 

grocery stores, gas stations, and school cafeterias." 740 ILCS 14-S(b} (2018). 

Accordingly, dividing the world up into "Employer Defendants" and "Non-Employer 

12 

----···--····· 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 42 of 70 PageID #:47
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Defendants" is meaningless for purposes of BIPA lìabìlity, which applies to any "private entity" 

(740 ILCS 14/10·15 (2018)) who constitutes an "offending party" (740 ILCS 14-20 (2018)). 

To the extent Defendants' argument asks this Court to first construe those terms, and 

then to apply them to the facts of this case, the Court must decline. This involves disputed 

issues of fact, going to the merits of the case, and/or unsettled legal issues. As previously 

established, it is not thé province of the Court to decide these Issues on a motion to certify a 

class. Nor will the Court render an advisory opinion. Indeed, Issues like this weigh affirmatively 

in favor of class certification, as they will be common questions to which any affected class 

member will seek an answer - no matter what that answer may be. 

Much the same is true for Defendants' other arguments, which may be broadly 

classified as "corporate liability.• Defendants claim each Network location is independently 

owned and operated, and argue that only some defendants wìll be lìable as to some class 

members, mentioning ln passing things such as the statutes regarding limited liabilities. 

Defendants make a further argument that they cannot be held liable for anything other than 

events occurring In Swansea. Defendants even go so far as to as to argue there are 

"constitutional concerns" as to the rights of any non-party entities. Defendants do not provide 

any explanation, however, as to how Defendants would have standing to raise any such 

concerns on behalf of entities with whom they also disavow any connection. 

For her part, Plaintiff points out that she has pleaded from the outset of the case a 

variety of theories assessing mutual liability of the Network. Those theories include topics such 

as respondeot superior, alter ego, agency, joint enterprise, civil conspiracy, etc. Plaintiff points 

out any assertion by Defendants as to who did or did not operate any given Network location 

13 

----·· .,, 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 43 of 70 PageID #:48
simply begs the questions this lawsuit will answer. Plaintiff further contends that the fact 

Defendants raise these common questions shows all the more strongly why this case should 

proceed as a class action. 

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Both sides have presented discovery responses, discovery productions, public 

documents, Network documents, etc. in support: of their positions. The Court has reviewed all 

of these materials. The Court finds that none of these materials conclusively resolves such 

issues either way. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the parties have legitimate disputes of material 

facts over these issues, and those issues Intersect In several Instances with unresolved 

questions of law. The Court further finds that many of these arguments go to the merits of the 

case. As such, the Court will not resolve them on a motion for class certification. Nor will the 

Court issue an advisory opinion. 

Once again, the presence of such sweeping Issues - essentially, "who is liable for what, 

and to whom" - argues In favor of class certification, not against It. Seeking the answers to 

these questions - questions applicable across the class, and the common answers which will be 

generated - makes proceeding on a class basis an appropriate method for the fair and efficient 

adjudication of these controversies. 

VII. ORDER ANO FINDINGS. 

Pursuant to the foregoing analysis, the Court finds the case is proper to proceed as a 

class action In accordance with 735 ILCS 5/2-801 (2018). The Court hereby certifies the 

following class: 

All Illinois citizens whose biometric Information was collected, captured, purchased, 

received through trade, or otherwise obtained in Illinois at any location associated with 

14 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 44 of 70 PageID #:49
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the Symphony Post Acute Care Network, a/k/a Symphony Post Acute Network, as set 

forth ln the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/S et seq. 

Excluded from the proposed Class are employees, officers, directors, subsidiaries and 

affiliates of any person or business associated with the Symphony Post Acute Care 

Network, a/k/a Symphony Post Acute Network, the judge or any officer of the court 

presiding over this action. 

The Court also finds It appropriate to certify the following subclass: 

All Illinois citizens whose biometric information was collected, captured, purchased, 

received through trade, or otherwise obtained In Illinois at the Symphony Post Acute 

Care Network, a/k/a Symphony Post Acute Network location in Swansea, Illinois, as set 

forth in the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/5 et seq . 

Excluded from the proposed Class are employees, officers, directors, subsidiaries and 

affiliates of any person or business associated with the Symphony Post Acute Care 

Network, a/k/a Symphony Post Acute Network, the judge or any officer of the court 

presiding over this action. 

The Court finds it appropriate to certify each of these classes as to all issues in this case. The 

Court further finds it appropriate to certify these classes as to legal and factual issues 

concerning the liability of the Network and those associated with it. The Court reserves 

jurisdiction to certify further subclasses or otherwise amend these certifications as 

circumstances warrant. 

SO ORDERED: 

DATE: March 12, 2019. 

Hon. Kevin T. Hoerner 

15 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 45 of 70 PageID #:50
Return Dale: No return dale scheduled 

Hearing Date: 4/15/2020 9:30 AM - 9:30 AM 

Courtroom Number. 2308 

Locallon: District 1 Court 

Cook County, Il 

FILED 

12/18/2019 11:13 AM 

DOROTHY BROWN 

CIRCUIT CLERK 

COOK COUNTY, Il 

2019CH14479 

7777629 

GROUP 

EXHIBITB 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 46 of 70 PageID #:51
PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC 

Peiffer \',1olf Carr & Kane, APLC ("PWCK") was founded in 2013. Joseph Peiffer, 

PWCK's managing partner, previously was a litigation partner at Fishman Haygood, 

LLP in New Orleans. PWCK handles a wide variety of cases, including a variety of 

collective, dass, and mass actions. Since its inception, PWCK has acquired talented 

attorneys from coast to coast, becoming a national litigation firm. 

MAIN OFFICE 

201 St. Charles Avenue, Suite 4314 

New Orleans, LA 70170 

Phone: 50,1-523-2434 

ST. LOUIS OFFICE 

818 l/\F /\ vrrrs AVE., FLOOR 2 

St. louis, MO 63104 

Phone: 314-833-1827 

CU:VEL\ND OFFICE 

1422 Euclid Avenue, Suite 1610 

Cleveland, OH 44115 

Phone: 216-589-9280 

LOS ANGELES OFFICE 

5042 Wilshire Blvd. #304 

los Angeles, CA 90036 

Phone: 415-766-3545 

SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE 

4 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1400 

San Francisco, CA 94111 

Phone: 415-766-3544 

ROCHESTER OFFICE 

1150-J Pittsford-Victor Road, 1st floor 

Pittsford, NY 14-534 

Phone: 585-310-5140 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 47 of 70 PageID #:52
ATTORNEY PROFILES 

Brandon Wisc joined the firm after managing his own solo practice that focus on 

class, collective, and employment matters. Brandon has successfully litigated collective 

and class action cases in St. Louis, Southern Illinois-, and Central Illinois. Brandon has 

served as class or collective coUJ1Se! in the following resolved collective and class matters: 

Volz, el al. v. Provider Plus, lnc., el al., a Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") 

collective action involving 45 collective action members. The confidential 

settlement agreement was approved by Judge Mummert within hours of its 

submission to the court. 

Carver, el al. v. Foresight Energy LP, el al., WARN Act litigation brought on behalf 

of a class of former coal miners. Mr. Wise secured the first reported decision, a 

significant legal victory, regarding the WAR.t'-1 Act's "natural disaster" exception. 

2016 vVL 3812376 (Opinion entered July 12, 2016). After the defendants' motion 

to dismiss was denied, the parties reached a class-wide settlement of 5550,000 for 

a class of 75 employees. 

Volz v. Tricorp mnnagesnent Company, el al., a Fl.SA collective in class action where 

Mr. Wise was appointed Class Counsel. The parties reached a $350,000 

settlement for bartenders, servers, hosts, and other tipped employees of the 

largestT.G.J. Friday's franchisee in the Midwest, 

Morris v. fmperinl Towers Condomi11i11111 Assu., Biometric Information Privacy Act 

("BrPA") class action settlement approved naming Brandon Wise as Class 

Counsel. The 5120,000 settlement for 60 class members is one of the highest BlPA 

class settlements per class member in the country. 

Brancion currently serves as class or putative class counsel in other matters, as well. 

Paul Lesko joined PWCK in August of 2016, co-founding the St. Louis office of the 

firn, with Brandon Wise. His practice consists of representing individuals, startups, and 

small companies that have been harmed by larger corporations. With his biotech 

background, Paul focuses on prosecuting complex technological cases, including patent 

and dass actions. Paul has specific experience litigating GMO crop cases as well as cases 

focusing on pesticide and herbicide technologies. 

Joseph Peiffer is the managing member of PWCK. His practices consist of 

representing individuals and institutions that have been harmed by investment banks 

and brokerage firms, prosecuting ERJSA class actions, and representing victims of labor 

trafficking and those who have suffered catastrophic injury. He has co-authored a 

2 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 48 of 70 PageID #:53
treatise Lítígatíng Business and Commercial Tort Cases, which is published by 

Thompson \Nest. 

Joe has also taught and lectured extensively. He co-created and taught a dass entitled 

Storytelling and Advocacy at Loyola Law School. Also, at Loyola Law School, he has 

taught a course entitled "The Basics of Arbitration" and he also serves as an adjunct 

professor teaching Trial Advocacy. He has ¡,uest lectured at Tulane Law School in its 

Securities Regulations dass and Syracuse Law School on securities arbitration. He has 

spoken at many national conventions on a variety of topics including prosecuting large, 

multi-client daims, broker's deficient advice to retire and FLNRA arbitration. 

Joe has represented hundreds of individual retirees against their brokers in HNRA 

arbitration. The hìghlìghts of this practice include representing 32 Exxon retirees in a 

90-day FINRA arbitration against Securities America that resulted in a S22 million 

verdict - one of the largest ever awarded by a FINRA arbitration panel. He has also 

represented hundreds of Xerox and Kodak retirees against their broker resulting from 

the broker's fraudulent advice to retire and subsequent unsuitable investments. He has 

represented hundreds of famìlìes in cases involving private placements and Ponzi 

schemes. 

His financial services fraud practice also includes representing hospitals and 

municipalities around lhe country in cases involving their issuance of auction rate 

securities. He also serves as co-lead counsel on several ERISA class actions against large 

Iinancial services firms alleging that they did not prudently invest retirement money 

and had conflicts of interest. He also is on the plaintiffs' steering committee in a 

nationwide antitrust class action involving the illegal tying of cable set- top boxes to 

the provision of premium cable services. Joe also currently represents hundreds of 

clients in cases involving serious injuries sustained by pharmaceutical products. 

Finally, he represents victims of human trafficking and labor exploitation. In one sudi 

case, the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendants have failed to pay overtime, 

improperly deducted for employee housing, and held the plaintiffs passports while in 

the United States. He has travelled extensively to the Philippines for this case and 

another one involving a rig explosion where two of his clients working on a rig owned 

by Black Elk exploded. 

Joe was one of three Louisiana lawyers ranked by Chambers USA for securities 

litigation in 2011. He has been named a 2013 Rislng Star by his peers in tile Class Action 

Administration organization. He has been quoted by USA Today, Wall Street Journal, 

the Associated Press, New York Times, New York Daily News, The Los Angeles Times, 

Business Week, Investment News, and many other publications. Mr. Pciffor has also 

appeared on CNN. He was named as one of the fifty Leaders in Law by New Orleans 

City Business Magazine. 

3 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 49 of 70 PageID #:54
He has also successfully risen into the leadership of several national bar associations. 

He twice served as the chairman of the Business Torts Section of the American 

Association for Justice. He currently serves as President of PIABA - a nationwide bar 

association of lawyers that represent individuals and institutions in arbitrations to 

recover money lost by investment banks and brokerage firms. 

Joe graduated from Tulane School of Law, cum laude, in 1999. While at Tulane, he 

served on the Tulane Law Review and was involved with the Tulane Legal Assistance 

Program. Prior to attending Tulane, he graduated from Bowling Green State University 

in 1996 with a degree in communications. 

Adam Wolf has developed a national reputation as a leading appellate, 

complex litigation, and civil rights litigator. He successfully argued a case in the United 

States Supreme Court, Safford U11ified School Disti-ici No.1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 36'1 (2009), 

that defined the scope of the Fourth Amendment regarding strip searches in public 

schools. The Court's opinion in Sn fjord marked the first time in forty years that the 

Supreme Court ruled in favor of a student who claimed that her school violated her 

constitutional rights. For his efforts in this case, Mr. Wolf was named Attorney of the 

Year in California by California Lawyer Magazine. 

Mr. Wolf has argued in numerous federal and state courts of appeals, in addition to the 

United States Supreme Court He has represented groups and individuals whose 

constitutional rights have been violated, organizations who seek to vindicare their 

rights, and governmental entities who were harmed by corporate misconduct 

Mr. Wolf has lectured around the country regarding constitutional law and civil rights. 

He has been quoted in hundreds of domestic and international newspapers, íncludìng 

the New York Times, \<\1ashi.ngton Post, Los Angeles Times, USA Today, and Wall Street 

Journal Additionally, Mr. Wolf has appeared on numerous television and radio 

programs, including Good Morning America, CBS Evening News, ABC World News, 

NBC Nightly News, CNN Headline News, National Public Radio, and the BBC 

Mr. Wolf has been appointed to leadership positions in numerous class actions and mass 

actions throughout tile country. 

Daniel Carr represents a diverse client base in a variety of commercial disputes, 

complex litigation, and arbitration. Daniel handles numerous state and federal lawsuits 

for individuals and businesses, and he currently represents investors, and 

municipalities in FI NRA arbitration proceedings. Together with Joe Peiffer, Daniel also 

serves as co-counsel in several ERISA and antitrust class action lawsuits and represents 

individuals in litigation involving pharmaceutical products, labor exploitation, 

fraudulent investments, and wrongful death. 

4 

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Daniel is a member of several nationwide bar associations, including PIABA (Public 

Investors Arbitration Bar Association), and he previously served on the board of 

directors of the Business Torts Section of the American Association for Justice. 

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Daniel received his law degree from Tulane School of Law, summa cum laude, in 2006. 

While at Tulane, he was elected Senior Articles Editor for the Tulane Law Review, and 

he worked as a fellow in the Legal Analysis Program. Following Jaw school, Daniel was 

privileged to serve as a law clerk to Judge Jacques L Wiener, Jr., on the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 

Jason Kane is a securities attorney practicing out of the firm's Upstate New York 

office. He has extensive experience representing investors in Financial Industry 

Regulatory Authority arbitrations and New York State Courts. 

Jason graduated from the State University of New York at Geneseo in 2004 having earned 

his B.A. in Economics. Thereafter, Jason attended the Syracuse University College of Law, 

and received his Juris Doctorate, Cum Laude, in 2007. 

Whìle attending the Syracuse University College of Law, Jason served as a form and 

accuracy editor for the Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce. He also 

gained valuable experience as a student law clerk for Magistrate Judge George H. Lowe 

and served as a volunteer at the United States Attorney's Office in the Northern District 

of New York where he assisted the Assistant United States Attorneys prosecute their 

cases. 

Jason has represented hundreds of investors in Upstate New York and around the 

country in some of the highest profile securities cases originating out of Upstate New 

York. He has recovered millions of dollars in FINRA arbitration and mediation while 

representing individuals against their former brokers and brokerage firms. He often 

assists his victimized clients through the regulatory investigations that result from the 

large scale scams perpetrated by their unscrupulous brokers. 

REPRESENTATIVE CASES 

PWCK attorneys were appointed class counsel or serve as counsel in numerous 

class and collective actions, including: 

Whitley, /!I ni. v. J.P. Morgn11 C/z115e & Co., el nl., a class action lawsuit on behalf of 

retirement investors against J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and various oilier J.P. Morgan 

entities over the sale and administration of the JP Morgan Stable Value Fund. Received 

preliminary approval for a class wide settlement of $75 million. 

5 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 51 of 70 PageID #:56
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Volz, cl ni. v. Provider Pl11s, Iuc., el al., a Fair Labor Standards Act("FLSA") collective 

action involving •15 collective action members. The confidential settlement agreement 

was approved by Judge Mummert 

Neuarez v. Forty Niners Football Co111pn11y, a certified class action, on behalf of nearly 

5,000 class members with mobility disabilities who were denied equal access to Levi's 

Stadium in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 

Baricunrto, et ni. v. lndnstritü Personneú 1111d Mmwge111e11/ Services, Ille. el al., a human 

trafficking case that required extensive travel and litigation in the Philippines, and 

resulted in a multi-million dollar settlement 

/11 re Pacific Fertilíbj Center Litigoìion, a putative class action on behalf of nearly 

1,000 people whose embryos were compromised in a freezer tank at a fertility center. 

Amador v. Califarnin C111i1111ry Academy, representing a certified class of former 

students of for-profit school California Culinary Academy regarding class members' 

student loans. 

Bilewicz v. FMR LLC, a case brought on behalf of current and former employees 

of Fidelity Investments, alleging that Fidelity violated ERISA by offering exclusively 

high-fee Fidelity mutual fund products in its retirement plan and by repeatedly adding 

funds to the plan with little or no track record. Plaintiffs further alleged that the Fidelity 

plan's fees are very high for a multi- billion dollar plan, and Fidelity has failed to follow 

sound fiduciary practices for multi-billion dollar plans. This case was successfully 

settled, and PWCK was approved as co-class counsel in that action. 

Caroer, el ni. ,,. Foresight Energi] LP, et al., WA.RN Act litigation brought on behalf 

of a class of former coal miners, PWCK secured the first reported decision, a significant 

legal victory, regarding the \<VARN Act's "natural disaster" exception. 2016 \NL 3812376 

(Opinion entered July 12, 2016). After the defendants' motion to dismiss was denied, the 

parties reached a proposed class-wide settlement of $550,000 for a class of 75 employees. 

Volz v. Tricorp 111m1nge111e11t Co111pn11y, et ni., a Fl.SA collective in class action where 

PRW Legal attorney was appointed class counsel. Settled for $350,000, for bartenders, 

servers, hosts, and other tipped employees of the largest T.G.l. Friday's franchisee in the 

Midwest. 

Hanson v. Berthe/ Fisher & Company Fi11m1cinl Services, Inc., et 111., a securities class 

action filed on behalf of investors in a real estate investment program that raised 

approximately S26 million from U1c investing public. Claims were predicated upon U1e role 

played by Berthe! Fisher, the managing broker-dealer of the program that allegedly organized 

and oversaw the securities offering by the Program while aware of misrepresentations and 

6 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 52 of 70 PageID #:57
omissions in the Program's offering documents. 

Booth el ni. 11. Strategic Realty Trust, Inc., el al., a securities class action where 

plaintiffs contended that throughout the offering period, the Strategic Realty Trust 

offering materials contained materially inaccurate and incomplete statements about the 

company's investment strategy, internal controls, and governance mechanisms. 

Plaintiffs alleged that their investments lost value as a result of defendants' acts and 

omissions, 

Thieriot v. Celtic Ins. Co., a certified class action where settlement was approved on 

behalf of a dass of people who were overcharged by a health insurer in violation of state 

law. 

PWCK currently serves as counsel for plaintiffs in numerous other dass and mass 

actions, including: 

/11 re: FedLom, Sh1de11/ Lonn Servicing Litigatìon, 2:18-md-02883 (E.D. Penn.) 

consolidated multi-district litigation involving one of the nation's largest student loan 

servicers. Attorney Brandon Wise was appointed to the Plaintiffs' Executive Committee. 

111 re: Dicnmbn Herbicides Litignlio11, 1:1S-md-02820-SNLJ (E.D. Mo), consolidated 

multi-district litigation involving the alleged unlawful release of a genetically modified 

seed and herbicide system. 

Albers, el ni. v. Dclìoite & Touche LLP, el al., a mass securities action where PWCK 

represents over 100 investors with claims exceeding $JOO million in action alleging 

violations of state securities laws. 

Y no-Yi Li11 el ni. v. vVi/111i11gto11 Trust Co111pm1y, a class action lawsuit on behalf of 

investors of a fraudulent scheme against Wilmington Trust alleging that Wilmington 

Trust breached its duties as an escrow agent and aided the perpetrators of the scheme, 

111 re Plnli11u111 n11d Pallndi11111 A11lilr11sl Litigation, a case involving claims against 

BASF Metals, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, and Standard Bank. Plaìntíïfs allege that 

Defendants were involved in an unlawful price-setting process of platinum and 

palladium in violation of tile Sherman Act 

Fouls v. Bank of Nova Seo/in, New York Agency el al., a class action filed on behalf of 

holders of debt with interest rates linked to tile US Treasuries auction rates, alleging 

violations of the federal antitrust and commodities laws arising from manipulation of 

the prices of Treasury securities and related financial instruments through collusion by 

the primary dealers of U.S. Treasury Department securities. 

7 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 53 of 70 PageID #:58
/11 re Fide/i/y ER/SA Flon/ Liligalio11, a case involving claims brought by 

participants in various ERISA plans administered by Fidelity, on behalf of those plans, 

alleging that Fidelity violated ERISA by improperly using "float" income received as 

interest on plan assets to pay itself fees and failing to crediting the amount of that float 

income to the plans or their participants. 

Americn11 Chemicoìs & Eq11ip111e11/ Ille. 401(1<) Retirement Plan v. Principaì 

Ma11age111e11I Corpornlio11, el al., a case involving claims brought by ACE 401(k) Plan, on 

behalf of the shareholders of six mutual funds, against the investment advisors for those 

funds. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants breached their statutory fiduciary duty under 

Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("!CA"), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b), by 

charging unfair and excessive focs for their advisory services and retaining excess profits 

derived from economics of scale. 

Je1111ifer Roth v. Life Time Fitness, luc., a dass action lawsuit filed on behalf of fitness 

instructors seeking unpaid wages for work that was required by Defendants. Plaintiff 

alleges that fitness instructors were not compensated for the work they performed 

before and after fitness classes. 

Carol Prock v. Thompson Nntio11a/ Properties, LLC, et nl., a securities dass action filed 

on behalf of investors in the TNP 6700 Santa Monica Boulevard, a real estate investment 

program that raised approximately S17 million from the investing public. Claims are 

predicated upon alleged material misrepresentations and omissions in the program's 

offering documents by its sponsor and officers and directors of the sponsor. 

/11 re! Dc11/a/ Supplies A11lilrusl Lítigalio11, a class action lawsuit filed on behalf of 

dental practices, orthodontic practices, and dental laboratories alleging that the 

country's three largest distributors of dental supplies and equipment agreed not to 

compete on price and caused injury lo plaintiffs in the form of artificially inflated prices. 

Mnllhcw Fero el al. v. Excellus Health Plau lnc., a class action lawsuit filed on behalf 

of plaintiffs whose personal information was compromised as a result of a data breach 

that is alleged to have gone undetected for a 600-day period. 

8 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 54 of 70 PageID #:59
JONATHAN T. NESSLER 

536 North Bruns Lane, Suite I 

Springfield, Illinois 62702 

Telep/Jonc: (217) 698-0202 

Ccli Phone: (217) 899-5158 

Facsimile: (217) 698--0103 

i 1orsslcr@n11omcvoc~~1cc com 

CHRRICHI ,UM VITAE 

EDUCATION: 

Bachelor of Science -Agricultural and Environmental Communications 

and Education 

University of Illinois, 2004 

Juris Doctorale 

University of Illinois, 2007 

MElVIBERSBIPS: 

Lllinois State Bar Association 

American Bar Association 

Illinois Trial Lawyers' Association 

TI1e Association For The Advancement Of Artificial Intelligence 

ADMITTED TO PRACTICE: 

Supreme Court oflllinois 

Supreme Court of the United States of America 

United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois 

United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois 

United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 55 of 70 PageID #:60
PR<\CTICE E!VlPHASIS: 

My practice is primarily focused on the areas of personal injury, premises 

liability, automobile negligence, nursing home abuse, medical malpractice, 

and catastrophic injuries. 

I also write and regularly speak with lawyers and business owners about 

how technology is changing the practice of law and law limi management. 

I am currently focusing my efforts in this regard on technological 

advancements like Blockchain, Artificial Intelligence. and other emerging 

technologies that many experts predict will disrupt the legal profession in 

an unprecedented way. 

PROFESSIONALACBJEVEM.ENTS: 

Barrister member of Lincoln-Douglas American Inn of Court 

November 2011 - Present 

Vice Chair - Law Practice Management Committee -American Bar 

Association, Young Lawyers Division - 2011 

Chair - Law Practice Manage meni Committee - American Bar Association, 

Young Lawyers Division - August 2013 -August 2014 

The National Trial Lawyers: "Top 100 Trial Lawyers"-2014- Present 

The National Trial Lawyers: "Top 40 Under 40" - 2015 - Present 

American Society of Legal Advocates: "Top Litigation Lawyer Under 40 in 

the State of lii inois - 2016 

Law Bulletin Publishing Company's Leading Lawyers Division: "Emerging 

Lawyer" - 2015 - Present 

The American Society of Legal Advocates: "Top 40 Under 40 Litigation 

lawyers in the State of Illinois" - 2016 - Present 

Member of ISBA Assembly- Illinois State Bar Association-Elected 2016 

for a Three Year Temi 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 56 of 70 PageID #:61
Member of ISBA Standing Com mince on Law Office Management & 

Economics, 2017 - Present 

SPEAKlNG EVENTS AND PUBLISHED ARTICLES 

Speaker at the "Transportation Law Seminar" presented by the Illinois Trial 

Lawyers Association Education Fund, March 27, 20 I O 

Speaker at the '·Motor Vehicle Crashes from Occurrence to Trial - Plaintiff 

and Defense Perspectives," February 15, 2012 

Speaker at the "UCLE Pre-Trial Preparation in Civil Practice Seminar - 

Requests to Admit or Deny," March 30, 2012 

Moderator and Speaker at the "Advanced Evidentiary Issues at Trial," 

January 31, 2013 

Speaker at the "lTLA Workers' Compensation Seminar- Traveling 

Employees & Venture-Newberg. Perini, Stone & Webster v. IWCC," 

November 2, 20 I 3 

Speaker at the "Shotgun Seminar" Prcscrucd by the Ulinois Trial Lawyers 

Association Education Fund in St. Louis, Missouri - "Common Carrier 

Liability," September 25,2015 

"Lawyers in Small firms and Solo Practice Must Understand Technology 

that Impacts the Practice of Law," Published in The Bottom Linc, 

Publication for the Illinois State Bar Association's Section on Law Office 

Manage mcm & Economics in September of 2017 

Speaker at the "Medical Evidence for Lawyers" Presented by the Illinois 

Institute for Continuing Legal Education - "Securing Medical Records and 

Opinions, Conducting Discovery, Disclosure Requirements and HIPAA 

Issues," November 3, 2017 

Speaker al the Lincoln-Douglas Inn of Court - "How Technologies Like 

Artificial Intelligence and Blockchain are Disrupting the Practice of Law 

and \Vhy lawyers Should Care," November 15, 20 I 7 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 57 of 70 PageID #:62
Speaker and Moderator for "Ethics institute: Legal Tech'. Presented by 

UCLE - "Emerging Technologies that arc Predicted to Disrupt the Legal 

Profession," June 6, 2018 

"What E wry Lawyer Lawyer Should Know About the lnternet of Things," 

Published in The Bottom Line, Publication for the Illinois State Bar 

Association's Section on Law Office Management & Economics in June 

2019 

REPRESENTATIVE CASES: 

Veni/Ire-Newberg Perini Stone & Webs1er v. Illinois Workers· Compensation 

Comm ·11, 20 I 3 IL 115728 

Prime Ins. Syndicate, /11c. v. Woods, 406 lll. App. 3d 1225, 998 N.E.2d 722, 

2011 lii. App. Unpub. LEXIS 154, 376 lii. Dec. I 80, 2011 \VL 110660 I I 

(111. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2011) (Rule 23 Order) 

Farris v. S11/liva11, 2013 IL App (4ù1) 120753-U, 2013 Ill. App. Unpub. 

LEXIS 1142, 2013 WL 2387716 (lii. App. Ct. 4ù1 Dist. 2013) (Rule 23 

Order) 

Crim v. Dietrich, 2016 lLApp (4th) 150843 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 58 of 70 PageID #:63
Retum Date: No return date scheduled 

Hearing Date: 4/15/2020 9:30 AM - 9:30 AM 

Courtroom Number: 2308 

Location: District 1 Court 

Cook County, IL 

L'< TRE CCRCUlT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 

COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY OIVJSION 

DA \VN MEEGAN, 

INDIVIOUALL Y AND ON BEIIALF OF 

ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUA TED, 

Plaintiff, 

v. Case No.: 2019CM 14479 

NF! INDUSTRIES, INC .. Judge: Neil l·I. Cohen 

Defe11da111. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FILED 

12/18/201911:13 AM 

DOROTHY BROWN 

CIRCUIT CLERK 

COOK COUNTY, IL 

2019CH14479 

7ï77629 

PLAINTíFF'S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND REQUEST FOR 

DISCOVERY ON CERTIFICATION ISSUES 

In this case, Plaintiff Dawn Meegan ("Plaintiff') alleges that Defendant NF! Industries, 

Inc. (''Defendant") systematically violated the Biometric Informatlon Privacy Aci ("BIPA"), 740 

ILCS 14/1. ct seq. This case is well suited for class certification pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-801. 

Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to certify a class consisting of several hundred or more individuals 

who hnd their biometrics collected, captured, ond/or stored by Defendant in the State of Illinois 

during the applicable statutory period in violmion of BlPA. The question of liability is a legal 

question that can be answered in one fell swoop. As Plaintiff's claims and the claims of similarlysituated individuals all arise from Defendant's uniform policies and practices, they satisfy the 

requirement of 735 ILCS 512°801 and should be certified. Notably, 10 Plaintiffs Counsels' 

knowledge, the only BIPA class certification decisions issued to date have granted class 

certification. Sec, In re Facebook Biome/rie /11/0. Privacy Litig., 326 F.R.D. 535 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 

(granting class certification) aff'd Patel v. Facebook, /11c., 932 F.3d 1264 (9ù, Cir. 2019); and Ex. 

A. Mcm. and Order. Roberson v. Symphony Post Acute Core Network, el al., 17-L-733 (St. Clair 

County) (same). 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 59 of 70 PageID #:64
Plaintiff moves for class certification to protect members of the proposed class, individuals 

whose proprietary and legally protected personal and private biometric data was invaded by 

Defendant. Plaintiff believes that the evidence and argumentation submitted with this motion arc 

sufficient to allow the class to be certified now. However, in the event the Court (or Defendant) 

wishes for the parties to undertake formal discovery prior to the Court's consideration oí this 

motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court allow Plaintiff to supplement her briefing and defer the 

response and reply deadlines. 

J. RELEVANT BACKGROUND 

A. The Biometric lnform:Hion Pl'i\':lc\l Act 

Major national corporations started using Chicago and other locations in Illinois in the 

early 2000s to test "new [consumer] applicarions of biometric-facilitated financial transactions, 

including finger-scan technologies at grocery stores, gas stations, and school cafeterias." 740 ILCS 

14/S(c). Given its relative infancy, an overwhelming portion oí the public became wary oí this 

then-growing, yet unregulated, technology. See 740 ILCS I 4/5. 

The Biometric lnformation Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq. was enacted in 2008, 

arising from concerns that these experimental uses oí finger-scan technologies created o "very 

serious need of protections for the citizens of Illinois when it comes to biometric information," 

Illinois House Transcript, 2008 Reg. Sess, No. 276. Under the Act, it is unlawful for a private 

entity to, among other things, "collect, capture, purchase. receive through trade, or otherwise 

obtain a person's or a customer's biometric identifiers or biometric information unless it first: 

(I) Informs the subject ... in writing that a biometric identifier or 

biometric information is being collected or stored; 

(2) Informs the subject ... in writing of the specific purpose nad length 

of temi for which a biometric identifier or biometric infommtion is 

being collected, stored, and used; and 

2 

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(3) Receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric 

identifier or biometric informaiion." 

740 ILCS l 4/l 5(b). 

Although there may be benefits with using biometrics, there arc also serious risks. Unlike 

lD badges or time cards-which can be changed or replaced if stolen or compromised- biometrics, 

including fingerprints, arc unique, permanent biometric identifiers associated with each individual. 

These biometrics arc biologically unique 10 the individual; once compromised. the individual has 

110 means by which to prevent identity theft, unauthorized tracking. or other unlawful or improper 

use of this infommtion. This exposes individuals to serious and irreversible privacy risks. For 

example, if a biometric database is hacked, breached, or otherwise exposed - as in the recent 

Equifax and Uber data breaches - individuals have no means to prevent the misappropriation and 

theft of their proprietary biometric makeup. Thus, recognizing the need to protect its citizens from 

harms like these, Illinois enacted BIPA specifically to regulate the collection, use. safeguarding, 

handling, storage, retention. and destruction of biometric identifiers and informaticn. 

B. Factual Allegations 

Plaintiff filed titis class action against Defendant on December 16, 2019, to redress 

Defendant's unlawful collection, use, storage, and disclosure of biometric infonnntion of Illinois 

citizens under BLPA. In his Class Action Complaint, Plaintifîprovidcd allegations that Defendant 

has and continues to violate BLPA through the collection of fingerprint-based biometrics without: 

(I) informing individuals in writing of the purpose and length of time for which fingerprint(s) were 

being collected, stored and used¡ (2) providing a publicly available rétention schedule or guidelines 

for pcrmancru destruction of the data; and (3) obtaining n written release, ns required by BIPA. 

See Complaint ("Compi.") at~~ 2-4, 28-57, 70-97. 

3 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 61 of 70 PageID #:66
Accordingly, Defendant's practices violated BIPA. As a result of Defendant's violmions, 

Plaintiff and similarly-situated individuals were subject to Defendant's uniform policies and 

practices and were victims of its scheme to unlawfully collect, store, and use individuals' biometric 

data in direct violation ofßlPA. 

Plaintiff now seeks class certification for the following similarly-situated individuals, 

defined as: 

1\1I individuals working for Defendant oran y of its affilintcd facilities in the State of Illinois 

who had their fingerprints collected, captured, received, obtained, maintained, stored, or 

disclosed by Defendant during the applicable statutory period. 

Id. at~ 60. 

Given Defendant's standard practices defined above and the straightforward and common 

legal questions presented in this case, Plaintiff now moves for class certification. Notably, this 

motion is being filed shortly after the Complaint was filed and before the Defendant has responded. 

For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff's request should be granted. 

II. STANDARD FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION 

"The basic purpose of a class action is the efficiency and cconomyof'Hrigarion." CE Design 

Lid. v. C & T Pizza, Inc., 2015 n, App. (Ist) 131465, ~ 9 (Ill. App. Ct. May 8, 2015) (citing Miner 

v. Gil/eue Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 14 (1981)). "In determining whether to certify a proposed class, the 

trial court accepts the allegations of the complaint ns truc and should err in favor of maintaining 

class certification." CE Design Ltd., 2015 LL App. (Ist) 1311165, ~ 9 (citing Ramire: 11. Midway 

Moving & Storage, Inc .. 378111. App. 3d 51, 53 (2007)). Under Section 2-801 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure, a class may be certified if the following four requirements arc met: 

(I) the class is so numerous that a joindcr of all members is impracticable; 

(2) there arc questions of fact or law common to the class that predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual members; 

4 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 62 of 70 PageID #:67
(3) the representative panics will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class; and 

(4) the class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 

controversy. 

See Smith, .. Illinois Cent, JlR. Co .. 223 111. 2d 441,447 (2006)(citing 735 ILCS sn-801). Notably. 

''[a] trial court has broad discretion in determining whether a proposed class meets the 

requirements for class certification." CE Design Ltd., 2015 IL App. (1st) 131465, ~ 9 (citing 

Ramirez, 378 Ill. App. 3d m 53). Here, the allegations and facts in this case amply demonstrate 

that the four certification factors arc met. 

m. ARGUMENT 

Plaintiff's claims here arc especially suited for class ccnificatìon because Defendant treated 

all class members identically for the purposes of applying BIPA. All ofthe putative class members 

in this case were unifonnly subjected to the same illegal and unlawful collection, storage, and use 

of their biometric data by Defendant throughout the class period. Plaintiff meets each of the 

statutory requirements for maintenance of this suit as a class action. TI1us, the class action device 

is ideally suited and is far superior to burdening the Court with many individual lawsuits to address 

the same issues, undertake the same discovery, and rely on the same testimony. 

A. The Class ls So Numerous That Joindcr of All Members Is lmpraclicable. 

Numcrosiry is not dependent on a plaintiff setting forth a precise number of class members 

or a listing of their names. See Cruz v. Unilock Chicago, 383 Ill. App, 3d 752, 771 (2d Dist. 2008) 

("Of course, plaintiffs need 1101 demonstrate n precise figure for the class size, because a goodfaith, nonspeculativc estimate will suffice: rather, plaintiffs need demonstrate only ù1a1 the class is 

sufficiently numerous 10 make joindcr of all of the members impracticable,") (internal citerions 

omitted): Haynu v. Arby's, Inc., 99111. App. 3d 700, 7L0-J I (Ist Dist. 1981) ("It is not necessary 

5 

Case: 1:20-cv-00465 Document #: 1-1 Filed: 01/21/20 Page 63 of 70 PageID #:68
thal the class representative name the specific individuals who nrc possibly members of rhc 

class."). Courts in Illinois generally und numcrosity when the class is comprised of at least 40 

members. See Wood River Area Dev. Corp. v. Germania Feti. Sav. Loan Ass '11, 198 Ill. App. 3d 

445. 450 (Sût Dist. 1990). 

In the present case, there can be no serious dispute that Plaintiff meets the numerosity 

requirement. The class of potential plaintiffs is sufficicmly large 10 make joinder impracticable. 

As result of Defendant's violations of ßlPA, Plaintiff and all similar-situated individuals were 

subject to Defendant's uniform policies and practices and were victims of Defendant's schemes to 

unlawfully collect, store and use their extremely personal and private biometric data in direct 

violation ofBIPA. The precise number in the class cannot be determined until discovery records 

arc obtained from Defendant. Nevertheless, class membership can be easily determined by 

reviewing Defendant's records. A review of Defendant's files regarding the collection, storage and 

use of biometric data performed during the class period is all thnt is needed 10 determine 

membership in Plaintiffs proposed classes. See e.g .. Chultem v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 401 Ill. App. 

3d 226, 233 (Ist Dist. 2010) (reversing Circuit Court's denial of class certiflcnrion and holding 

that class was certifiable over defendants' objection that "the proposed class was not ascertainable, 

because the process of reviewing defendants' rmnsacrion files 10 determine class membership 

would be burdensome"); l'ozmg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 539-40 (6th Cir. 2012)

1 

(rejecting the argument thnt manual review of files should defeat certification agreeing with district 

court's reasoning timt, if manual review was a bar, "defendants against whom claims of wrongful 

"Section 2-80 I is patterned after Ruic 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and. 

because of this close relationship between the state and federal provision. 'federal decisions 

interpreting Ruic 23 arc persuasive authority with regard to questions of class certification in 

Illinois."' Cruz, 383 111. App. 3d at 761 (quoting Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile /11s11ra11ce 

Co., 216 111.2d I 00, 125 (2005)). 

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conduct have been made could escape class-wide review duc solely to the size of their businesses 

or the manner in which their business records were maintained," and citing numerous courts that 

arc in agreement, including Perez v. First .-Im. Title Ins. Co., 2009 WL 2486003. at •7 (D. Ariz. 

Aug. 12. 2009) (''Even ifit takes a substantial amount of time 10 review files and determine who 

is eligible for the (denied) discount, that work can be donc through discovery"). Once Defendant's 

record's arc obtained, the Court will know the precise number of persons affected. 

Absent ccniñcarlon of this class action. putative class members may never know that their 

legni rights have been violated and as a result may never obtain the redress to which they arc 

entitled under BLPA. Illinois courts have noted that denial of class certification where members of 

the putative class have no knowledge of the lawsuit may be the "equivalent of closing the door of 

justice" on the victims. Wood River Area Dcv. Corp. v. Germania Fed. Sav. & loan Assn., 198 

lll.App.3d 445, 452 (51h Dist. 1990). Further, recognizing the need to protect its citizens from 

harms such as identity theft. Illinois enacted BIPA specifically to regulate the collection, use, 

safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and 

information. A class action would help ensure that Plaintiff and all other similarly-situated 

individuals have a means of redress against Defendant for its widespread violations of BfPA. 

B. Common Oul.'.~tions Of Law And Fact Exist That Prcdomínalc Over Anv 

Ouestíons Solch• Affecting In<livi<lu:1I Members Of The Class. 

Courts analyze commonality and predominance under Section 2-80 I by identifying the 

substantive issues tha; will control the outcome of the case. See Bemis v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 

407 Ill. App. 3d I 164, 1167 (5th Dist. 2011); Cruz; 383 111. App. 3d nt 773. The question then 

becomes whether those issues will predominale and whether they arc common 10 the class, 

meaning that "favorable adjudication of the claims of'the named plaintiffs will establish a right of 

recovery in other class members." Cruz, 383 Ill. App. 3d al 773. As stated by the Court of Appeals, 

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the question is will "common ... issues be the subject of the majority of the efforts of the litigants 

and the coun[?J" Bemis, 407 Ill. App, 3d at 1168. The answer here is .. yes." 

Al the heart of this litigation is the culpable conduct of the Dcfcndaut under BIPA. The 

issues arc simple and sunigbuorward legal questions that plainly lend themselves to class-wide 

resolution. Notwithstanding the clear and unequivocal requirements of the law, Defendant 

disregarded Plairuiff's and other similarly-situated individuals' starutorily-prorcctcd privacy rights 

and unlawfully collected, stored, and used their biometric data in direct vio lm ion of BLP ,\. 

Specifically, Defendant has violated Bil' A because it failed 10: {I) inform Plaintiff or the putative 

class in writing of the specific purpose and length of time for which their biometrics were being 

collected, Stored, and used. as required by Bl.PA; (2) provide a publicly available retention 

schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying Plaintiff's and the putative class's biometrics, 

as required by BIPA; and (3) receive a written release from Plaintiff or the putative class 10 collect. 

capture, or otherwise obtain their biometrics, as required by BIPA. Defendant treated the entire 

proposed class in precisely the same manner, resulting in identical violations of BIPA. These 

common biometric-collection practices create common issues of law and foc t. ln fact, the legality 

of Defendant's collection, storage, and use of biometric data is the focus of this litigation. 

Indeed. once this Court determines whether Defendant's practice of collecting, storing, and 

using individuals' biometric data without adhering to the specific requirements of BIP,\ constitutes 

violations thereof, liability for the claims of class members will be determined in one stroke. The 

material facts and issues of law arc substantially the same for the members of the class, and 

therefore these common issues could be tried such that proof as to one claimant would be proof as 

10 all members of the class. This alone establishes predominance. The only remaining questions 

will be whether Defendant's violations caused members of the class 10 suffer damages and the 

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proper measure of damages and injunctive relief, which in and of themselves arc questions 

common to the class. Accordingly, n favorable adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims in this cnse 

will establish a right of recovery to all other class members, and thus the commonality and 

predominance requirements weigh in favor of certification of the class. 

C. The Named Plnintiff and Class Counsel Arc Adeguate Rcprc.~cntntivcs of The 

Cluss. 

When evaluating adequacy, courts look to whether tl1c named plaintiff has the same 

interests as those of the class and whether he or she will fairly represent them. See CE Design Ltd., 

2015 IL App. (Ist) 131465, ~ 16. In this case, Plaintiff's interest arises from statute. TI1e class 

rcprcscmarive. Dawn Meegan, is a member of the proposed class and will fairly and adequately 

protect the class's interests. Plaintiff was required to scan her fingerprint to enable Defendant to 

use it ns an autheruication method to track her time. Defendant subsequently stored Plaintiff's 

biometrics in its dntabasc(s). Each time Plaintiff began and ended her workday, he was required to 

scan her finger. Plaintiff has never been informed of the specific limited purposes (if any) of length 

of time for which Defendant collected, stored, or used her fingerprints. Plaintiff has never been 

informed of any biometric data recent ion policy developed by Defendant, nor has she ever been 

informed of whether Defendant will ever permanently delete any scored biometrics. Finally, 

Plaintiff has never been provided nor did she ever sign a written release allowing Defendant to 

collect, store, or use her biometrics. Thus. Plaintiff was a victim of the sume uniform policies and 

practices of Defendant as the individuals she seeks to represent and is not seeking any relief that 

is potentially antagonistic to other members of the class. What is more, Plaintiff has the interests 

of those class members in mind, as demonstrated by her willingness to suc on a class-wide basis 

and step forward ns the class representative, which subjects Plaintiff to discovery. This qualifies 

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Plaintiff as a conscientious representative plaintiff and satisfies the adequacy of representation 

requirement. 

Proposed Class Counsel, Peiffer Wolf Carr & Kane, APLC ("'P\VCK"). will also fairly and 

adequately represent the class. Proposed Class Counsel arc highly qualified and experienced 

auomeys. (See Exhibit B - PWCK Fimi Resume). PWCK attorneys, arc recognized attorneys in 

class action lawsuits and have been designated as class counsel in numerous class actions in state 

and federal courts. (id.). Thus, proposed Class Counsel, too, arc adequate and have the ability and 

resources to manage this lawsuit. 

D. A Cl!L"-~ Action Is The Aporopriate Method For Fair And Efficient 

Adjudic:1tion Of This Controvcrsv. 

Finally, a class action is the most appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication 

of this controversy, rather than bringing individual suits which could result in inconsistent 

determinations and unjust results. "It is proper to allow a class action where a defendant is alleged 

to have acted wrongfully in the same basic manner toward an entire class." P . .J. ·s Concrete 

Pumping Service, Inc. v. Nextel West Corportnion, 345 Ill. App. 3d 992, 1003 (2d Dist. 2004). 

"The purported class representative must establish that a successful adjudication of its individual 

claims will establish a right of recovery or resolve a central issue on behalf of the class members." 

Id. 

Here, Plaintiffs claim sterns from Defendant's common and uniform policies and 

practices, resulting in common violations of BIPA for all members or the class. Thus. class 

certification will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent 

judgments concerning Defendant's practices. Wem/Jo/dv. AT&TTec/1110/ogies, Inc., 142111. App. 

3d 612 (Ist Dist. 1986). Wiùiout a class, the Court would have to hear dozens or additional 

individual cases raising identical questions of liability. Moreover, class members arc better served 

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by pooling resources rather than attempting to litigate individually. CE Design Ltd., 2015 IL App. 

(Ist) 131465, ~~ 28-30 (certifying TCPA class where statutory damages were alleged and rejecting 

arguments that individual lawsuits would be superior). ln the interests of justice and judicial 

efficiency, it is desirable 10 concentrate the litigation of all class members· claims in a single forum. 

For all of these reasons, the class action is the most appropriate mechanism to adjudicate the claims 

in this case. 

E. ln The E\'cnt The Court Or Defendant Seeks More Fnctu:il ínfornmtion 

Regarding This Motion. The Court Should Allow SuoplemcntnJ And 

Deferred Briefing Following Discovcrv. 

There is no meaningful need for discovery for the Court to certify a class in this mauer; 

Defendant's practices and policies arc uniform. If, however. the Court wishes for the Parties 10 

engage in discovery, the Court should keep the instant motion pending during the discovery period, 

allow Plaintiff a supplemental brief, and defer Defendant's response and Plaintiff's reply. Plaintiff 

is moving as early as possible for class ccnìfication in part 10 avoid the "buy-o IT problem," which 

occurs when a defendant seeks to seule with a class representative on individual ternis in an effort 

to moot the class claims asserted by the class representative. Plaintiff is also moving for class 

certification now because the class should be certified. and because no meaningful discovery is 

necessary to establish that fact. The instant motion is far more than a placeholder or barebones 

memorandum. Rather, Plaintiff's full arguments arc set forth based on the facts known 3l this 

extremely early stage of litigation. Should the Court wish for more detailed factual information, 

the briefing schedule should be extended. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order: 

(I) certifying Plaintiff's claims as a class action; (2) appointing Plaintiff as Class Representative; 

(3) appointing Peiffer Wolf Carr & Knnc as Class Counsel: and (4) authorizing court-facilitated 

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notice of this class action to the class. In the alternative, this Court should allow discovery, allow 

Plaintiff to supplement this briefing, and defer response and reply briefs. 

Date: December IS, 2019 Respectfully Submitted, 

By: Isl Bra11do11 ,\,f. Wise 

Brandon M. Wisc - #6319580 

Paul A. Lesko- #6288806 

PEIFFER WOLS CARR & K.ANE, Al'LC 

818 Lafayeuc Ave., Floor 2 

St. Louis, Missouri 63104 

314.833.4825 

bwisc@pwcklcgal.com 

plcsko@pwcklegal.com 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this date, I filed the foregoing document with the clerk of the Court 

using the Illinois E-Piling System, which should further distribute a truc and accurate copy of the 

foregoing to all counsel of record. 

Isl Brandon M. Wise 

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