048029/20908/MHW/REN/SLB 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

CASSIDY GREEN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

TIMOTHY CLARK, "JOHN" 

RUTHERFORD, "JOHN" HOFFMAN, 

KERRY VON RUDEN, NURSE RHONDA 

"DOE", 

Defendants.

Case Number 20cv2859 

Hon. Judge Franklin U. Valderrama 

DEFENDANT, RHONDA DUNNE’S, FEDERAL RULE OF PROCEDURE 12(B)(6) 

MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT 

Defendant, RHONDA DUNNE (“Ms. Dunne”), by and through her attorneys, Matthew 

H. Weller, Ronald E. Neroda and Sandra L. Byrd of CASSIDAY SCHADE LLP, and for her 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, states as 

follows: 

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Cassidy Green, is an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of 

Corrections. At the time of the events giving rise to the instant action, Plaintiff was a detainee in 

the LaSalle County Jail. Plaintiff has a filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“§1983”) 

in which he alleges he was injured by correctional staff at the LaSalle County Jail. [Dkt. #1]. 

Plaintiff further alleges that after sustaining injuries inflicted by the correctional staff he was 

seen at the nurses station in the jail by “Nurse Rhonda” who Plaintiff alleges examined his wrist 

and stated that she did not see anything other than some redness.[Dkt. #1, ¶¶ 13 & 16]. 

According to Plaintiff he was then “forcefully” removed from the nurses’ station by correctional 

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staff. [Dkt. #1, ¶17]. Plaintiff’s allegations against Ms. Dunne are insufficient to state a claim for 

which relief can be granted pursuant to §1983. As such, Plaintiff’s allegations against Ms. Dunne 

should be dismissed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Court reviews a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) to determine whether the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a cause of 

action upon which relief can be granted. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). The well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are taken as true, and all reasonable 

inferences from those allegations are construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Ray v. City of Chicago, 629 F.3d 660, 662 (7th Cir. 2011); Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550 F.3d 

632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008). 

The question presented in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is whether the plaintiff has 

alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 570). In order to satisfy 

the plausibility standard, a plaintiff must plead specific facts that support the legal claims 

asserted in the complaint. Id. In other words, the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to “raise a 

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence supporting the plaintiff’s allegations.” 

Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009), (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 

556). 

While a plaintiff is not typically required to plead detailed factual allegations, the law 

demands more than an unadorned, “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, at 678. In order for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it must contain sufficient 

factual allegations “which states a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.

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ARGUMENT

Liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983 requires direct and personal involvement in the situation 

that causes injury to an inmate. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability that is predicated upon fault. 

Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005). Thus, “to be liable under 

Section 1983, the individual defendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional 

deprivation.” Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the Seventh Circuit has held that Section 1983 

liability arises only from direct and individual wrongdoing. Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 

273 (7th Cir. 1986), (emphasis added). 

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the defendant’s personal responsibility for a 

claimed deprivation of a constitutional right. Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 

1981). “In essence, this standard requires proof of causation, i.e., that the individual defendant 

actually caused the Plaintiff’s injury through his own conduct.” Volk v. Coler, 638 F.Supp. 1540, 

1547. (C.D. Ill. 1986) (emphasis in original), affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded by

Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988). The burden is on the plaintiff to establish personal 

involvement through pleadings and evidence. Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 

1989). Failure to take corrective action in and of itself cannot violate §1983. Soderback v. 

Burnett County, Wis., 752 F.2d 285, 293 (7th Cir. 1985). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not indicate if Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or a convicted 

offender at the time of the alleged incident described in his Complaint. If Plaintiff was a pretrial 

detainee at the time his alleged claim arose, his claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment 

objective unreasonableness standard articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Miranda v. Cty. of 

Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018). If he was being held at the LaSalle County Jail as a 

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convicted criminal, his claims are governed by the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference 

standard. Sloat v. Benzing, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186556 (S.D. Ill. 2020). Under either analysis, 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Ms. Dunne fail and should be dismissed. 

The Fourteenth Amendment Miranda test is a two-part inquiry: whether the defendant 

“acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even recklessly when they considered the 

consequences of their handling of [Plaintiff’s] case,” and an objective inquiry into the 

reasonableness of defendant’s conduct. Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d at 353-354. The 

Miranda standard “‘requires courts to focus on the totality of the facts and circumstances faced 

by the individual alleged to have provided inadequate medical care and to gauge objectively—

without regard to any subjective belief held by the individual—whether the response was 

reasonable.’” Swisher v. Porter Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., 761 Fed.Appx. 616, 620 (7th Cir. 2019), 

citing McCann v. Ogle Cty., 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018). It is insufficient for a pretrial 

detainee to plead only negligence or gross negligence. Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d at 353. 

Here, the extent of Plaintiff’s allegations against Ms. Dunne is that she examined his 

wrist, indicated that she saw some redness and then Plaintiff was “forcefully” removed by 

correctional officers from the area in which he was being examined by Ms. Dunne. [Dkt. #1, ¶¶ 

13, 14, 16 & 17]. In other words, Plaintiff has alleged that Ms. Dunne conducted an examination 

of his alleged wrist injury and that Ms. Dunne was prohibited from taking any further action 

because Plaintiff was forcibly removed from the area by someone other than Ms. Dunne. 

Plaintiff has not made any allegations that Ms. Dunne was involved in the decision to remove 

him from Ms. Dunne’s care or that Ms. Dunne in anyway directed the correctional officials to 

remove Plaintiff from Ms. Dunne’s care. Thus, Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate that 

Ms. Dunne’s actions were the purposeful, knowing or reckless cause of Plaintiff’s alleged 

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injuries. In fact, Plaintiff has not alleged any injuries that occurred during or following his 

contact with Ms. Dunne. Instead he has alleged that he was injured prior to any contact with Ms. 

Dunne. Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Ms. Dunne’s response to his alleged injuries 

was unreasonable. These allegations fail the Mirada “objective reasonableness” test, as such they 

should be dismissed. Walls v. Montoya, 2020 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 191925 (E.D. Wis. 2020). 

Likewise, under an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference analysis an inmate must 

have an objectively serious medical need and the defendant must be subjectively aware of and 

consciously disregard the inmate’s medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) 

(emphasis added). “In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions 

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106. (1976). 

Plaintiff’s allegations fail this standard as well. Assuming for purposes of this motion 

only that Plaintiff was suffering from an objectively serious medical need, Plaintiff has still 

failed to plead facts sufficient to meet the second prong of the deliberate indifference test—that 

Ms. Dunne was aware of the objectively serious medical need and chose to disregard it. Instead, 

Plaintiff has pleaded facts that, if taken as true, establish that Ms. Dunne observed redness on 

Plaintiff’s wrist and then Plaintiff was forcibly removed from Ms. Dunne’s care by other 

individuals. Under this factual scenario, it is impossible for Plaintiff to establish that Ms. Dunne 

made the conscious choice to disregard Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Instead, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint establishes that Ms. Dunne was prevented by the actions of others from taking any 

further steps to treat Plaintiff. 

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Thus, under either the Eighth Amendment analysis or the Fourteenth Amendment 

analysis, Plaintiff’s claims against Ms. Dunne pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are insufficient as a 

matter of law and cannot stand. 

WHEREFORE, Defendant, RHONDA DUNNE, respectfully requests that this Honorable 

Court enter an Order dismissing her with prejudice and for such other and further relief as this 

Court deems fair and just. 

Respectfully submitted, 

RHONDA DUNNE 

By: Sandra L. Byrd 

Matthew H. Weller, ARDC No. 

Ronald E. Neroda, ARDC No. 

Sandra L. Byrd, ARDC No. 6237865 

CASSIDAY SCHADE LLP 

222 West Adams Street, Suite 2900 

Chicago, IL 60606 

(312) 641-3100 

(312) 444-1669 – Fax 

mweller@cassiday.com 

rneroda@cassiday.com 

sbyrd@cassiday.com 

Attorneys for Defendant, Rhonda Dunne

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on April 12, 2021 I electronically filed the foregoing document with 

the clerk of the court for Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, using the electronic case 

filing system of the court. The electronic case filing system sent a “Notice of E-Filing” to the 

attorneys of record in this case. 

/s/ Sandra L. Byrd 

9804199 SBYRD;SBYRD 

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