IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

WILL COUNTY, JOLIET, ILLINOIS

NICHOLAS MARQUEZ, ) 

individually and on behalf of all others ) Case No. 

similarly situated, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) 

GOOGLE, LLC. ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Nicholas Marquez (“Plaintiff) 

brings this Class Action Complaint against Google LLC (“Google”) for violation of Illinois’ 

Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq., and alleges as follows 

based on personal knowledge as to himself, on the investigation of his counsel and the advice 

and consultation of certain third-party agents as to technical matters, and on information and 

belief as to other matters, and demands trial by jury. 

NATURE OF THE ACTION 

1. Plaintiff brings this action for damages and other legal and equitable remedies 

resulting from the illegal actions of Google in collecting, storing, and using his and other 

similarly situated individuals’ biometric identifiers1

 and biometric information2 (referred to 

collectively as “biometrics”) without informed written consent, in direct violation of the BIPA. 

 

1

 A “biometric identifier” is any personal feature that is unique to an individual, including 

fingerprints, iris scans, DNA and “face geometry,” among others. 

2

 “Biometric information” is any information captured, converted, stored, or shared based on a 

person’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual. 

07/13/2020 9:00

Andrea Lynn Chasteen

Will County Circuit Clerk

Twelfth Judicial Circuit Court

Electronically Filed

20CH500

Filed Date: 3/23/2020 12:55 PM

Envelope: 8937024

Clerk: JH

20CH500

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2. The Illinois Legislature has found that “[b]iometrics are unlike other unique 

identifiers that are used to access finances or other sensitive information.” 740 ILCS 14/5(c). 

“For example, social security numbers, when compromised, can be changed. Biometrics, 

however, are biologically unique to the individual; therefore, once compromised, the individual 

has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometricfacilitated transactions.” Id.

3. In recognition of these concerns over the security of individuals’ biometrics – 

particularly in the City of Chicago, which was recently selected by major national corporations 

as a “pilot testing site[] for new applications of biometric-facilitated financial transactions, 

including finger-scan technologies at grocery stores, gas stations, and school cafeterias” (740 

ILCS 14/5(b)) – the Illinois Legislature enacted the BIPA, which provides, inter alia, that a 

private entity like Google may not obtain and/or possess an individual’s biometrics unless it: (1) 

informs that person in writing that biometric identifiers or information will be collected or 

stored, see id.; (2) informs that person in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for 

which such biometric identifiers or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used, 

see id.; (3) receives a written release from the person for the collection of her biometric 

identifiers or information, see id.; and (4) publishes publically available written retention 

schedules and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric 

information, 740 ILCS 14/15(a). 

4. In direct violation of each of the foregoing provisions of § 15(a) and § 15(b) of 

the BIPA, Google is actively collecting, storing, and using – without providing notice, obtaining 

informed written consent, or publishing data retention policies – the biometrics of all individuals 

who appear in photographs uploaded to Google Photos in Illinois. 

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5. Specifically, Google has created, collected, and stored, in conjunction with its 

cloud-based “Google Photos” service, the “face templates” (or “face prints”) – highly detailed 

geometric maps of the face – of millions of users of the Google Photos service and hundreds of 

thousands of individuals who are not even enrolled in the Google Photos service. Google creates 

these templates using sophisticated facial recognition technology that extracts and analyzes data 

from the points and contours of faces that appear in photos taken on Google “Droid” devices and 

uploaded to the cloud-based Google Photos service. Each face template that Google extracts is 

unique to a particular individual, in the same way that a fingerprint or voiceprint uniquely 

identifies one and only one person. 

6. Plaintiff brings this action to stop Google from further violating his privacy rights 

and the privacy rights of other individuals appearing in photographs uploaded to Google Photos 

in Illinois, and to recover statutory damages for Google’s unauthorized collection, storage, and 

use of his biometrics and the biometrics of all others similarly situated in violation of the BIPA. 

PARTIES 

7. Plaintiff Marquez is, and has been at all relevant times, a resident and citizen of 

Peotone, Illinois. Plaintiff Marquez is an owner and user of a Google Android device and is an 

account holder and user of the Google Photos service. 

8. Google is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters at 1600 Amphitheatre 

Parkway, Mountain View, California 94043. Accordingly, Google is a citizen of the states of 

Delaware and California. Google is also registered to do business in Illinois (No. 65161605). 

JURSDICTION AND VENUE 

9. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Google because there are millions of 

individuals who use Google Photos and whose faces appeared in photographs uploaded to 

Google Photos from within Illinois, which Google used to extract scans of their facial geometry 

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and create and collect their face templates and face models, while they were residing in Illinois, 

and because the photos of Plaintiff giving rise to his claims alleged herein were uploaded to 

Google Photos from within Will County, Illinois and thereafter immediately used by Google to 

extract scans of his facial geometry and collect templates and models of his face while he was 

residing in Will County, Illinois, such that the claims alleged herein arose in substantial part 

within Will County, Illinois. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

I. Biometric Technology Implicates Consumer Privacy Concerns 

10. “Biometrics” refers to unique physical characteristics used to identify an 

individual. One of the most prevalent uses of biometrics is in facial recognition technology, 

which works by scanning a human face or an image thereof, extracting facial feature data based 

on specific “biometric identifiers” (i.e., details about the face’s geometry as determined by facial 

points and contours), and comparing the resulting “face template” (or “faceprint”) against the 

face templates stored in a “face template database.” If a database match is found, an individual 

can be identified. 

11. The use of facial recognition technology in the commercial context presents 

numerous consumer privacy concerns. During a 2012 hearing before the United States Senate 

Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law, U.S. Senator Al Franken stated that “there 

is nothing inherently right or wrong with [facial recognition technology, but] if we do not stop 

and carefully consider the way we use [it], it may also be abused in ways that could threaten 

basic aspects of our privacy and civil liberties.”3

 Senator Franken noted, for example, that facial 

 

3

 What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing Before 

the Subcomm. on Privacy, Tech. & the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 

(2012), available at https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/jenniferlynch_eff-senate-testimonyface_recognition.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 

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recognition technology could be “abused to not only identify protesters at political events and 

rallies, but to target them for selective jailing and prosecution.”4

12. The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has raised similar concerns, and recently 

released a “Best Practices” guide for companies using facial recognition technology.5 In the 

guide, the Commission underscores the importance of companies’ obtaining affirmative consent 

from consumers before extracting and collecting their biometric identifiers and biometric 

information from digital photographs. 

13. As explained below, Google failed to obtain consent from anyone when it 

introduced its facial recognition technology. Not only do the actions of Google fly in the face of 

FTC guidelines, they also violate the right to privacy conferred by the BIPA. 

II. Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act 

14. In 2008, Illinois enacted the BIPA due to the “very serious need [for] protections 

for the citizens of Illinois when it [comes to their] biometric information.” Illinois House 

Transcript, 2008 Reg. Sess. No. 276. The BIPA makes it unlawful for a company to, inter alia, 

“collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s 

biometric identifiers6

 or biometric information, unless it first: 

(l) informs the subject . . . in writing that a biometric identifier or 

biometric information is being collected or stored; 

 

4

 Id. 

5

 Facing Facts: Best Practices for Common Uses of Facial Recognition Technologies, Federal 

Trade Commission (Oct. 2012), available at

http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/facing-facts-best-practices-commonuses-facial-recognition-technologies/121022facialtechrpt.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2020). 

6

 BIPA’s definition of “biometric identifier” expressly includes information collected about the 

geometry of the face (i.e., facial data obtained through facial recognition technology). See 740 

ILCS 14/10. 

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(2) informs the subject . . . in writing of the specific purpose and 

length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric 

information is being collected, stored, and used; and 

(3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the 

biometric identifier or biometric information or the subject’s 

legally authorized representative.” 

740 ILCS 14/15 (b). 

15. Section 15(a) of the BIPA also provides: 

A private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric 

information must develop a written policy, made available to the 

public, establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for 

permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric 

information when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining 

such identifiers or information has been satisfied or within 3 years 

of the individual’s last interaction with the private entity, 

whichever occurs first. 

740 ILCS 14/15(a). 

16. As alleged below, Google’s practices of collecting, storing and using biometric 

identifiers and information from photographs in Illinois without the requisite informed written 

consent violate all three prongs of § 15(b) of the BIPA. Google’s failure to provide a publicly 

available written policy regarding its schedule and guidelines for the retention and permanent 

destruction of individuals’ biometrics also violates § 15(a) of the BIPA. 

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III. Google Violates Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act 

17. In 2011, Google’s then-CEO Eric Schmidt discussed the company’s past 

development of facial recognition technology, and explained that he had put the brakes on the 

program due to the profound implications he believed the technology would have on individuals’ 

privacy rights. Characterizing facial recognition technology as “crossing the creepy line,” Mr. 

Schmidt said at the time “that [Google] would not build a database capable of recognizing 

individual faces even though it is increasingly possible.” Warman, Matt, “Google warns against 

facial recognition database,” The Telegraph, May 18, 2011, available at 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/8522574/Google-warns-against-facialrecognition-technology.html. Nonetheless, Mr. Schmidt predicted that “some company by the 

way is going to cross that line.” Id.

18. In 2013, Mr. Schmidt wrote a piece for The Wall Street Journal, titled “The Dark 

Side of the Digital Revolution,” in which he again cautioned against the collection of Americans’ 

biometric data and advocated in favor of regulating the collection and use of such data in this 

country, writing in pertinent part: 

Today's facial-recognition systems use a camera to zoom in on an 

individual's eyes, mouth and nose, and extract a "feature vector," a 

set of numbers that describes key aspects of the image, such as the 

precise distance between the eyes. (Remember, in the end, digital 

images are just numbers.) Those numbers can be fed back into a 

large database of faces in search of a match. The accuracy of this 

software is limited today (by, among other things, pictures shot in 

profile), but the progress in this field is remarkable. A team at 

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Carnegie Mellon demonstrated in a 2011 study that the 

combination of "off-the-shelf" facial recognition software and 

publicly available online data (such as social network profiles) can 

match a large number of faces very quickly. With cloud 

computing, it takes just seconds to compare millions of faces. The 

accuracy improves with people who have many pictures of 

themselves available online—which, in the age of Facebook, is 

practically everyone. 

By indexing our biometric signatures, some governments will try 

to track our every move and word, both physically and digitally. 

That's why we need to fight hard not just for our own privacy and 

security, but also for those who are not equipped to do so 

themselves. We can regulate biometric data at home in democratic 

countries, which helps. 

Schmidt, Eric, “The Dark Side of the Digital Revolution,” The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 19, 

2013, available at: 

https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324030704578424650479285218. 

19. Ironically, the company that Google’s CEO predicted in 2011 would one day 

“cross that line” by diving into the consumer facial recognition turned out to be Google itself. 

20. In May 2015, Google announced the release of its web- and mobile app-based 

photo sharing and storage service called Google Photos. Users of Google Photos immediately 

began uploading millions of photos per day through the service, and Google in turn began using 

its “FaceNet”-powered facial recognition technology to extract, collect, store, and catalog the 

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biometric data of everyone whose faces appeared in all of those uploaded photographs, in real 

time.7

21. The Google Photos service uses web- and app-based APIs developed and 

maintained by Google that are powered by Google’s proprietary “FaceNet” architecture. 

Increasingly, Google has licensed its Google Photos APIs, including APIs that enable the use of 

its facial recognition technology, to mobile application developers who develop consumer-facing 

mobile applications for use in various contexts. Google sells licenses to its APIs to these third 

parties for money, and derives substantial commercial profit from such sales. Thus, less than 

four years after warning of the immense dangers posed by facial recognition technology, Google 

unleashed that very technology on the world’s citizens in pursuit of greater corporate profits. 

22. The Google Photos app, which comes pre-installed on all Google Android 

devices, is set by default to automatically upload all photos taken by the Droid device user to the 

cloud-based Google Photos service. Users can also connect other devices to Google Photos to 

upload to and access photos on the cloud-based service. 

23. Unbeknownst to the average consumer, and in direct violation of § 15(b)(1) of the 

BIPA, Google’s proprietary facial recognition technology scans each and every photo uploaded 

to the cloud-based Google Photos service for faces, extracts geometric data relating to the unique 

 

7

 A research paper released by Google engineers at around the same time as the release of 

Google Photos describes FaceNet as “a unified system for face verification (is this the same 

person), recognition (who is this person) and clustering (find common people among these 

faces).” Schroff, Florian, et al., “FaceNet: A Unified Embedding for Face Recognition and 

Clustering,” June 7, 2015, available at https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7298682. 

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points and contours (i.e., biometric identifiers) of each face, and then uses that data to create and 

store a template of each face – all without ever informing anyone of this practice.8

24. These unique face templates are not only collected and used by Google to identify 

individuals by name, but also to recognize their gender, age, and location. Accordingly, Google 

also collects “biometric information” from individuals appearing in photographs uploaded to 

Google Photos. See 740 ILCS 14/10. 

25. In direct violation of §§ 15(b)(2) and 15(b)(3) of the BIPA, Google never 

informed its users who had their face templates collected of the specific purpose and length of 

term for which their biometric identifiers or information would be collected, stored, and used, 

nor did Google obtain a written release from any of these individuals. 

26. In direct violation of § 15(a) of the BIPA, Google does not have written, publicly 

available policies identifying their retention schedules, or guidelines for permanently destroying 

biometric identifiers or information. 

27. The cloud-based Google Photos service uses these face templates to organize and 

group together photos based upon the particular individuals appearing in the photos. This 

technology works by comparing the face templates of individuals who appear in newly-uploaded 

photos with the facial templates already saved in Google’s face database. Specifically, when a 

Google Photos user uploads a new photo, Google’s sophisticated facial recognition technology 

creates a template for each face depicted therein, and then compares each template against 

Google’s database of face templates. If there is a match, then Google groups the photo from 

which the newly-uploaded face template was derived with the previously uploaded photos 

 

8

 Google holds several patents covering its facial recognition technology that detail its 

illegal process of scanning photos for biometric identifiers and storing face templates in its 

database without obtaining informed written consent. 

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depicting that individual, and further refines its accuracy by storing and grouping the 

corresponding face template with other previously collected and stored templates pertaining to 

the same person’s face, in order to generate a more sophisticated, uniquely identifying “face 

model” corresponding to each person’s facial geometry. 

28. Google also uses its FaceNet-powered facial recognition technology to power the 

facial recognition capabilities of its Nest Cam, a consumer home-security product that is able to 

recognize and identify individuals whose faces are detected in the video feed of the camera. To 

comply with BIPA in Illinois, Google has chosen not to apply its facial recognition technology to 

the faces of individuals who appear on its Nest Cams in the state of Illinois; Google refrains from 

scanning the facial geometry of people who appear on its Nest Cams in Illinois by using the IP 

addresses and other geolocation identifiers associated with its Nest Cams to disable its facial 

recognition technology on those devices being operated within the state of Illinois’s boundaries. 

29. Google could have refrained from applying its facial recognition technology to 

photographs uploaded to Google Photos in Illinois in the same way that it refrained from 

applying its facial recognition technology to the video feeds generated by its Nest Cams in 

Illinois. Indeed, as long ago as late 2017, Google was able to program its facial recognition 

technology to refrain from collecting scans of facial geometry, or from creating face templates, 

from photographs uploaded to Google’s “Webb” mobile application (which compares faces to 

historical paintings) from within Illinois and Texas, in order to comply with BIPA and a similar 

Texas law that governs companies’ collection and storage of biometrics. By using the IP 

addresses and other geolocation identifiers associated with the devices on which the “Webb” app 

is installed, Google was able to refrain from applying its facial recognition technology to 

photographs uploaded from devices using the application in Illinois and Texas. Despite 

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possessing the technological wherewithal to bring Google Photos in compliance with BIPA in 

Illinois, in the same way it did with “Webb,” Google has chosen not to make Google Photos 

compliant with BIPA. Over the past five years, Google has instead chosen to systematically 

create and store face templates, en masse, for every person (including everyone in Illinois) whose 

face appears in a photograph uploaded to Google Photos, without asking for much less obtaining 

the requisite prior informed written consent to engage in these practices. 

30. Moreover, Google has also limited its collection of scans of face geometry to 

photographs uploaded from certain countries (beginning with the United States, with gradual 

expansion elsewhere) by using IP addresses to determine the geographical locations of incoming 

photographs. See James Vincent, “Facebook’s New Photo App Won’t Launch In Europe 

Because of Facial Recognition,” The Verge, 

http://www.theverge.com/2015/6/19/8811617/facebook-moments-facial-recognition-europe 

(June 19, 2015) (“Google’s recently-launched Google Photos app — which uses facial 

recognition to sort snaps by who’s in them — also limits its use of the technology to the US.”); 

Google LLC, “Updates & Announcements for Oct. 28, 2015, Google Photos,” 

https://plus.google.com/+GooglePhotos/posts/EPjgwrsrRyF (“Rolling out on all platforms, 

here’s what’s new: ... Face grouping will be available in Latin America, Canada, the Caribbean, 

Australia, and New Zealand. It will also be available in parts of Asia, the Middle East, and 

Africa.”); Jason Bouwmeester, “HOW TO; Enable the ‘Group Similar Faces’ People Function in 

Google Photos,” Techaeris, http://techaeris.com/2015/05/31/how-to-enable-the-group-similarfaces-people-function-in-google-photos/ (May 31, 2015) (explaining that Google Photos facial 

recognition technology is only available on devices that have “a U.S. IP address”). 

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31. In sum, BIPA clearly prohibits what Google has done, Google has been fully 

aware of that since the day it launched Google Photos, and Google has made no efforts to come 

into compliance with BIPA at any time in the five years since (be it by obtaining the requisite 

signed written release from its users in Illinois or turning the technology off in Illinois 

altogether). 

IV. Plaintiff Marquez’s Experience 

32. During the time period relevant to this action, Plaintiff Marquez purchased a 

Google Android device from a retail location in Illinois and, using that device, enrolled his preexisting Google account in the Google Photos service, which then became automatically linked 

to his Android device. 

33. Since purchasing his Google Android device up until the present, Plaintiff 

Marquez has at all times resided in Illinois. While residing in Peotone, Illinois, Plaintiff 

Marquez has used his Google Android device to take numerous of photos of himself, depicting 

his face, in the state of Illinois. Upon taking these photos, his Android device automatically 

uploaded the photos to his cloud-based Google Photos account. These photos were all uploaded 

to the cloud-based Google Photos service while the Google Android device was located in the 

state of Illinois and assigned an Illinois-based IP address. 

34. Immediately upon upload to the cloud-based Google Photos storage service, 

Google analyzed these photos, automatically located and scanned Plaintiff Marquez’s face, 

extracted geometric data relating to the contours of his face and the distances between his eyes, 

nose, and ears, and then used that data pertaining to his facial geometry to create a unique 

template of his face. 

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35. The resulting “face templates” created by Google were unique to Plaintiff 

Marquez. 

36. Plaintiff Marquez’s face template was also used by Google to recognize Plaintiff 

Marquez’s gender, age, race, and location. 

37. Google therafter compiled its collection of the various “face templates” that it had 

created from the facial geometry it had extracted from the various photographs of Plaintiff 

Marquez’s face in order to create and store an even more sophisticated and detailed “face model” 

of Plaintiff Marquez’s facial geometry. As with the “face models” that Google created and 

stored for all other members of the proposed Class, the “face model” that Google created and 

stored for Plaintiff Marquez is associated with Plaintiff Marquez’s name and his Google Photos 

account, uniquely identifies Plaintiff Marquez by his face in the same way that a fingerprint 

identifies one and only one person, and is used by Google to locate and group together all photos 

depicting Plaintiff Marquez for organizational purposes. 

38. Neither Plaintiff Marquez nor any member of the proposed Class received a 

disclosure from Google that it would collect, capture, otherwise obtain, or store their unique 

biometric identifiers or biometric information from photographs, and neither Plaintiff Marquez 

nor any member of the proposed Class ever consented, agreed or gave permission – via a written 

release or otherwise – to authorize or permit Google to collect, capture, otherwise obtain, or store 

their unique biometric identifiers or biometric information in this way. 

39. Likewise, Google never provided Plaintiff Marquez or any other member of the 

Class with an opportunity to prohibit or prevent the collection, storage, or use of their unique 

biometric identifiers or biometric information. 

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40. Nevertheless, when photos of Plaintiff Marquez and the unnamed members of the 

Class were automatically uploaded to Google Photos from within the state of Illinois, Google 

located Plaintiff Marquez’s and the unnamed Class members’ faces in the photos, scanned each 

of their facial geometry, and created unique “face templates” and even more detailed “face 

models” corresponding to Plaintiff Marquez and each member of the proposed Class, all in direct 

violation of the BIPA. 

CLASS ALLEGATIONS 

41. Proposed Class Definition: Plaintiff Marquez brings this action pursuant to 735 

ILCS 5/2-801 on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, defined as follows (the 

“Class”): 

All Google Photos users located in Illinois for whom Google 

created and stored a face template after May 28, 2015. 

42. Numerosity: Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-801(1), the number of persons within the 

Class is substantial, believed to amount to millions of persons. It is, therefore, impractical to join 

each member of the Class as a named plaintiff. Further, the size and relatively modest value of 

the claims of the individual members of the Class renders joinder impractical. Accordingly, 

utilization of the class action mechanism is the most economically feasible means of determining 

and adjudicating the merits of this litigation. 

43. Commonality and Predominance: Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-801(2), there are 

well-defined common questions of fact and law that exist as to all members of the Class and that 

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. These common 

legal and factual questions, which do not vary from member to member of each respective Class, 

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and which may be determined without reference to the individual circumstances of any member 

of either Class, include but are not limited to the following: 

a) whether Google collected, captured, or otherwise obtained Plaintiff’s and 

the Class’s “biometric identifiers” or “biometric information”; 

b) whether Google stored Plaintiff’s and the Class’s “biometric identifiers” 

or “biometric information”; 

c) whether Google properly informed Plaintiff and the Class that it would 

collect, capture, otherwise obtain and then store their “biometric identifiers” or “biometric 

information”; 

d) whether Google obtained a written release (as defined in 740 ILCS 14/10) 

prior to collecting, capturing, or otherwise obtaining, and then storing, Plaintiff’s and the Class’s 

“biometric identifiers” or “biometric information”; 

e) whether Google developed a written policy, made available to the public, 

establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying “biometric 

identifiers” and “biometric information” when the initial purpose for collecting, capturing, or 

otherwise obtaining these “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” has been satisfied 

or within 3 years of their last interaction with Plaintiff and members of the Class, whichever 

occurs first; 

f) whether Google used Plaintiff’s and the Class’s “biometric information” 

to identify them; 

g) whether Google’s violations of the BIPA were committed negligently; and 

h) whether Google’s violations of the BIPA were committed intentionally or 

recklessly; 

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44. Adequate Representation: Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-801(3), Plaintiff has 

retained and is represented by qualified and competent counsel who are highly experienced in 

complex consumer class action litigation. Plaintiff and his counsel are committed to vigorously 

prosecuting this class action. Neither Plaintiff, nor any of his counsel, have any interest adverse 

to, or in conflict with, the interests of the absent members of the Class. Plaintiff is able to fairly 

and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff has raised viable 

statutory claims of the type reasonably expected to be raised by members of the Class, and will 

vigorously pursue those claims. If necessary, Plaintiff may seek leave of this Court to amend 

this Complaint to include additional Class representatives to represent the Class or additional 

claims as may be appropriate. 

45. Superiority: Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-801(4), a class action is superior to other 

available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual 

litigation of the claims of all members of the Class is impracticable. Even if every member of 

the Class could afford to pursue individual litigation, the Court system could not. It would be 

unduly burdensome to the courts in which individual litigation of numerous cases would 

proceed. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying, inconsistent or 

contradictory judgments, and would magnify the delay and expense to all parties and to the court 

system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. By contrast, the maintenance of 

this action as a class action, with respect to some or all of the issues presented herein, presents 

few management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of the court system and 

protects the rights of each member of the Class. Plaintiff anticipates no difficulty in the 

management of this action as a class action. Class-wide relief is essential to compel compliance 

with the BIPA. 

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SOLE CAUSE OF ACTION 

Violation of 740 ILCS 14/1, et seq. 

(On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class) 

46. Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 

47. The BIPA makes it unlawful for any private entity to, among other things, 

“collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s 

biometric identifiers or biometric information, unless it first: (1) informs the subject . . . in 

writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored; (2) 

informs the subject . . . in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a 

biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and (3) 

receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric 

information . . . .” 740 ILCS 14/15(b). 

48. Google is a corporation and thus qualifies as a “private entity” under the BIPA. 

See 740 ILCS 14/10. 

49. Plaintiff and the Class members are Google Photos users located in Illinois who 

had their “biometric identifiers,” including scans of face geometry, collected, captured, received, 

or otherwise obtained by Google from photographs that were uploaded to Google Photos after 

May 28, 2015, which Google used to create and store millions of “face templates” that uniquely 

identify Plaintiff and each member of the Class. See 740 ILCS 14/10. 

50. Plaintiff and the Class members are individuals who had their “biometric 

information” collected by Google (in the form of their gender, age, and location) through 

Google’s collection and use of information derived from their “biometric identifiers” that is used 

to identify them. 

51. Google systematically and automatically collected, captured, or otherwise 

obtained Plaintiff Marquez’s and the Class members’ “biometric identifiers” (which it used to 

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create and store their uniquely identifying “face templates”) and “biometric information” without 

first obtaining signed written releases, as required by 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(3), from any of them. 

52. In fact, Google failed to properly inform Plaintiff or the Class in writing that their 

“biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” were being “collected or stored” on Google 

Photos, nor did Google inform Plaintiff or the Class members in writing of the specific purpose 

and length of term for which their “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” were 

being “collected, stored and used” as required by 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(1)-(2). 

53. In addition, Google does not publicly provide a retention schedule or guidelines 

for permanently destroying the “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” of Plaintiff or 

the Class members, as required by the BIPA. See 740 ILCS 14/15(a). 

54. By collecting, storing, and using Plaintiff’s and the Class’s “biometric identifiers” 

and “biometric information” as described herein, Google recklessly or intentionally violated 

each of BIPA’s requirements, and infringed the rights of Plaintiff and each Class member to keep 

private this sensitive, immutable, and uniquely identifying biometric data. 

55. On behalf of himself and the proposed Class members, Plaintiff seeks: (1) 

injunctive and equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiff and the Class by 

requiring Google to comply with the BIPA’s requirements for the collection, capture, and storage 

of “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information” as described herein; (2) statutory damages 

of $1,000.00 pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20 for each negligent violation of BIPA committed by 

Google; (3) statutory damages of $5,000.00 pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20 for each intentional or 

reckless violation of BIPA committed by Google; and (4) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 

and other litigation expenses pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(3). 

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, seeks 

judgment against Defendant, as follows: 

A. Certifying this case as a class action on behalf of the Class defined above, 

appointing Plaintiff as representative of the Class, and appointing his counsel as Class Counsel 

of the Class; 

B. Declaring that Google’s actions, as set out above, violate the BIPA, 740 ILCS 

l4/1, et seq., with respect to Plaintiff and members of the Class; 

C. Awarding statutory damages to Plaintiff and the Class members of $1,000.00 

pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(1) for each violation of BIPA committed negligently, and $5,000.00 

pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(2) for each violation of BIPA committed intentionally or recklessly; 

D. Awarding injunctive and other equitable relief as is necessary to protect the 

interests of Plaintiff and members of the Class, including, inter alia, an order requiring Google to 

collect, store, and use biometric identifiers or biometric information in compliance with the 

BIPA; 

E. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class their reasonable litigation expenses and 

attorneys’ fees pursuant to BIPA; 

F. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent 

allowable; 

G. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class such other and further relief as equity and justice 

may require. 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

On behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff demands a trial by jury. 

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Dated: March 23, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Carl V. Malmstrom .

WOLF HALDENSTEIN ADLER 

FREEMAN & HERZ LLC 

Carl V. Malmstrom 

111 W. Jackson Street, Suite 1700 

Chicago, IL 60604 

Tel: (312) 984-0000 

Fax: (212) 686-0114 

E-mail: malmstrom@whafh.com 

Local Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class

HEDIN HALL LLP 

Frank S. Hedin* 

David W. Hall* 

1395 Brickell Avenue, Ste 1140 

Miami, Florida 33131 

Tel: (305) 357-2107 

Fax: (305) 200-8801 

E-mail: fhedin@hedinhall.com 

 dhall@hedinhall.com 

BURSOR & FISHER, P.A. 

Joseph I. Marchese* 

Philip L. Fraietta* 

888 Seventh Avenue 

New York, NY 10019 

Tel: (646) 837-7150 

Fax: (212) 989-9163 

E-Mail: jmarchese@bursor.com 

 pfraietta@bursor.com 

*Pro Hac Vice Application Forthcoming 

Counsel for Plaintiff and the Putative Class 

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