### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00009- CR

Cha r le s M c Kinle y, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 147TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 50203 67, H ONO RAB LE WILF ORD F LOW ERS, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury convicted Cha

rles McK inley

of m anslaug hter. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.04 (West 2003). After

McKinley

pleade d true to the e nhance ment al l egation, the jury assessed punishment at life imprisonment. McKinley complains on appe al that h e re ce i v ed inef fec tive assistance from counse l beca use counse l failed to question, challeng e for cause , or use a

pere mptory challeng e on a venire person who stated duringthe State’s voir dire examination that he could not be fa ir and impartial in this ty pe of case . Although the venire person was sele cted f or the jury , for the re a so ns that f

oll ow , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
. BACK GR OUND OnM ay 3 0 , 2 0 0 2 , a t a

p p r o xim a te ly

n o o n , M c K in le y

w a s dr iv in g a

g r e e nM ustang northbound on Dessa

u Road in northea st Austin. As the M ustang approa ched a curve on a hill near2

the intersec tion of Appleg ate L ane and Dessau Road, McKinley lost control of the ca

r. The c ar struck the concr ete median, bec ame a irborne, a nd struck a ve hicle traveling in the opposite direction on Dessau Roa d. When police arrived at the s cene , McKinley was sti ll posit ioned in the driver ’s seat
o f th e M u s ta

n g w it h h is s e a tb e lt s e c u r e d ar o u n d h im

. T h e dr iv e r o f th e o th e r v e h ic le , Hea ther Strihan, died at the sce ne of the cra sh.

Severa l witnesses to the ac cident testified that the Mustangwas traveling at an excessive rate of spee d and wa s weaving in a nd out of traf

fic in an e rratic an d rec kless manner

. No ne of the se wi tne sse s n oti c e d a ny oth e r v e hic le that mi g ht h a ve c ontr ibute d to the a c c ide nt. B ill y Tr ott e r, Mc Ki nle y ’s pa sse ng e r at the tim e of

the a c c ide nt, te sti fi e d th a t a wh ite four- door ca

r wa s to the rig ht of their vehic le as they wer e drivingdown Dess au Road. He state d he saw t h e wh i t e car

“jer k,” and a s he beg an to aler t McKinley , the ac cident occ urre d. Trotter testified that McKinley

was not driving fa st and that McKinley was a cting normally

the morning of the colli s i o n . Trotter a lso testified that around midnig ht the night be fore the ac cident, he a nd McKinley

had smoked a

cig are tte dipped in phencyclidine (PCP). McKinley ’s m edica l rec ords, i ntroduce d during trial, included the results of a urine drugscre en administere d afte r the c ollisi on. The test showed the pr esenc e of PCP, cocaine , and an opiate. Th e jury

fou ndMcK in ley

guil ty of m ans lau ghter

anddet erm in ed tha

t he us e d a de a dly
we a po n, his mot or

ve hic le , in

the c omm iss ion

of the of fe ns e . M c Ki nle y

e le c te d to su

bmi t hi s c a se to the jury

for se ntencing . He pled tr ue to the e n h an cement alleg ation that he had be en convic ted of possession of a c ontrolled substance on Fe bruar y 27, 2001.3 Duringthe punishment phase of the trial, the State introduce d more of Mc Kinley ’s criminal history , including a 1998 conviction for unauthorized use of a motor vehic le, 1999 and 2001 convictions for posse ssion of a controlled substanc e (c ocaine ), and a 2001 conviction for dr iving while intox icated.

The State a lso presente d evidenc e of Mc Kinley ’s enc ounters with law enf orce ment since t h e i n ci d ent i n question. The State esta blished that in September 2002, appr ox imately four months after the collision that killed Heather S trihan, t he poli ce stopped McKinley for r unning a stop sig n. Mc Ki nle y g a ve the arr e sti ng of fi c e r a fa lse na me and fa ile d to pr e se nt a

va lid dr ive r’ s li c e ns e or proof of insuranc e. In additi o n , h e ad m itted to the arre sting off icer that “he ha d just finished smoking a

joint.” Additional evidence established that in Novembe r 2002, McKinley was pulled over f or driving 89 miles per hour in a 60 mile-per -hour zone. He ag ain g ave the arr esting office r
a fa lse name and

wa s arr e ste d f

or po sse ssi on

of a c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e . M c Ki nle y

ha d in his possession a drink that conta ined the nar cotic prome t h az i n e, wh ich contains c odeine, a substance t h at ca ni mp ai r d ri v i n g.

Following prese ntation of thi s evidenc e, the jury assessed Mc Kinley ’s punishment

a t li fe imp ri so nme nt.
DI SCU SSIO N

I n hi s s o l e p o i n to f

e r r o r , M c K i n l e y

ar g u e s t h a to n e o f

h i s t r i a l a t t o r

n e y s , C r a ig Sandling, r ender ed inef

fec tive assistance during voir dire by failing to question, challeng e for cause , o r e x e r c i s e a

p e r e mp t o r

y s t r i k e a g a i n s tv e n i r e p e r s o nJ e r e m y S t o b i e , w h o s e r v e d o nt h e j u r

y.4 Duringthe S tate’s voir dire examination, the prosecutingattorney asked the potential jurors if they

could offe r an e x ample of a rec kless act. Ve nire pe rson Stobie volu n t ee red the following : “I

know somebody

else mentioned it, but if y ou drive a vehicle while y ou are intox icated, wh e the r i t be a lc oh ol o r s ome oth e r c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e , e ve n p res cripti on

me dic ine Ithi nk

is
rec k le s s . ” L a te r in v o ir d ir e , th e p r o s e c u to r a s k e d th e p an e l if an y o n e h a d b e e n involved in an automobile acc ident wher e the other person wa s at fault. Stobie responde d:
Ye s. Ihave been hi t tw ice. O nc e wh e n I wa s a pe de str ian c ro ssi ngCon g re ss Avenue . A drunk drive r ra n a re d ligh t an dhit me. And then once [I ] got hit, rear ended a nd Ig uess down the side of my car by another drunk driver. So Idon’t have a lot of re spect for

people who use alcohol and dr ive a ve hicle.
When asked whe ther he thought these drivers should have been he ld responsible for what they

did, Stobie replied, “Absolutely .”

The prose cutor then a sked the prospe ctive jurors if the ir experience s would aff ect t h ei r ab i l i t y

t o b e f ai r a n d i mp ar t i al i nt h i s ca s e. S t o b i e r es p o n d edfi rs tb y s t at i n g:
Ithink so, to be honest with y ou. I think that by virtue of somebody

being int oxic a te d, the y are be ing re c kle ss. I do n’ t thi nk if [sic ] that’ s n ot b e ingimp art ia l, but Ithink if y ou have proven that, then y our def inition i s substantiated, the first one. Ido n’ t th ink

the re c ou ld b e any

oth e r c ir cum st ances that c ou ld e xist th a t w ou ld su pp or t th a t argume nt. Duringthe def

ense’ s voir dire ex amination, Sandling directed questions to t he entire panel a nd t o specific individuals. He stated, “Alot of the things that I was g oing to a sk y ou [t he prosec utor] has alrea dy

asked you. So a g ain I am not goingto take this longe r than we should take it. . . . [M] ost of the questions I would have a sked we re a lrea dy asked.” Sandling did not direc t any5

questions specific ally at S tobie nor did he c halleng e him for c ause. The rec ord re flec ts that Sandling exercised a ll ten of appe llant’s pere mptory challeng es but did not use one on Stobie. McKinley

argues that Sandling ’s conduc t amounts to ineffec tive assistance and that tr ia l c ouns e l’ s a c tio ns duri ngvo ir dir e de pr ive d M c Ki nle y

of a fa ir tr ia l. I n order to pr e v a ilo n

a n in e f f e c ti ve assistanc e of c ounsel claim, a c onvicted def endant must satisfy

the two-prongtest established by the United St at es S u preme Court in Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted in Texas in He rn an de z v. S tate , 726 S.W .2d 53, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). First, the de fenda nt must show that counsel ’s p er fo rm ance was defic ient, which re quires showingthat counsel made err ors so serious t h at counsel’s pe rfor mance fell below a

n obj ec t i v e standard of

rea sonablene ss. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687-88; Thompson v. Sta te , 9 S.W .3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Second, the defe ndant must show that counsel’s defic ient perf

ormanc e pre

judiced the de fenda

nt. Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 68 7- 88 ; Th o mpson , 9 S.W. 3d a t 81 2. Th is p re

jud ic e is d e mon str a te d w he n th e a pp e lla nt s ho ws “ a

re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional e rror s, the result of the proce eding would have be en diffe rent.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694. Appellant’s f ail u re to demonstrate e ither def icient per formanc e or sufficie nt prejudice defe ats the ineff ectivene ss claim. Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 813. When determining if co u n sel’s trial per formanc e wa s deficie nt, there is a strong presumption that trial counsel’ s conduct fell within the rang e of r easona ble profe ssional assistance. Bl e v ins v . S

tate , 18 S.W.3 d 266 , 271 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 00 , n o p e t.) ; see Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 813. On appe al, the def endant be ars the bur den of ove rcomingthis strong pre sumption and p r e s e n t i n g a

r e c o r d d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t c o u n s e l ’ s p e r f o r m an c e w a s n o t b a s e d o ns o u n d t r i a l s t r a t e g y.6

See Strick land , 466 U. S. at 6 89 ; Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 813. An alleg ation of ineff ective a ssistance must be firmly founded in the rec ord, and the rec ord must itself aff irmatively

demonstrate the alleg ed ineffe ctiveness. Thompson , 9 S.W. 3d a t 81 3. Whe n th e re c or d is sil e nt a s to p os sib le tr ia l strate g ie s, the cour t will not s peculate as to why cou n s el ac ted in a par

ticular wa

y . J ac k so n v . S tate , 877 S.W. 2d 76 8, 77 1 (Tex . Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ); Ma y hu e v . S

tate , 9 6 9 S. W. 2 d

5 0 3 , 5 1 1 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). Any judicial revie w of a defe ndant’s claim of ineff ective a ssistance must be highly

defe rential to trial counse l. Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 813. I f there is no e videntiary hear ing on the issue of counse l’s eff ectivene ss, the defe ndant’s burde n is difficult to m ee t , an d counsel’s e ffor ts will rarely

be dee med ineff

ective. Blevins , 18 S.W .3d at 271-72 (c itin g T h o mpson , 9 S.W. 3d

a t 81 3) . U nd e r n or

ma l c ir c ums tanc e s, the re cord on dire ct appe al will not be sufficie nt to de monstrate that trial c ounsel’s re prese ntation was so def

icient and lac king in tac tical or strategi c decision-makingas to overc ome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was rea sonable and profe ssional. Bo nev . S tate , 77 S.W .3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

Th ou g h it is p os sib le that a

sin g le e rr or

or omi ssion by c ouns e l c ou ld c on sti tut e ineffe ctive assistanc e, an a ppellate co u rt l ooks to the “totality of the re prese ntation” in assessing
co u n s el ’s ef

fe ct i v eness. Th ompson , 9 S.W .3d at 813. In addition, counsel’s e ffe ctiveness is asse ssed from the perspe ctive at trial, not in hindsight. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689; Mayhue , 969 S.W .2d at 510. The Court of Criminal Appe al s has held that trial c ounsel’s fa ilure to cha lleng e a venire person who ha s voiced h i s l ac k of impartiality does not constitute ineffe ctive assistanc e of7

counsel. See J

ackson , 8 77 S.W. 2d

a t 77 1; De lri o v . S

tate , 840 S.W .2d 443, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). In Jack

son , a venir e per son in a robber y case stated that he ha d been a robber y victim in the past and c ould not be impartial. Def en d ant’s trial counsel did not challeng e the ve nire pe rson for
c a u s e o r u s e a p e r e m p t o r

y c h a l l e n g e a g a i n s th i m . A s a r e s u l t , t h e v e n i r e p e r s o ns a to nt h e j u r y. Be cause the re cord c ontained no re ason or strateg y for c ounsel’s fa ilure to cha lleng e t h e venire person, the court was unable to c onclude that tria l counsel’s pe rfor mance was de ficient. Jack son , 877 S.W .2d at 771. S imilarly , in De lri o , venire person Johnny Martinez told the trial court that he knew the de fenda

nt, who was on trial f

or a drugoffe nse, fr om Martinez’s work a s an ex-narc otics office r. Mar

tinez then stated th at h e co uld not be impartial in the defe ndant’s trial. De fenda nt’s counsel fa iled to challeng e Mar tinez for cause or use a pere mptory strike aga inst him, and Martinez

w a s s e a t e d

o nt h e j u r

y. T h e c o u rth e l d

t h a tb e c a u s e t h e r e c o r d

w a s s i l e n ta s t o c o u n s e l ’ s s t r a t e g y, the re cord w as insufficie nt to rebut the strongpresumption in favor of eff ective a ssistance. De lri o , 840 S.W .2d at 447. The court noted it must “pre sume that trial counse l is better positioned than the appellate court to judg e the pr ag matism of the parti cu l ar case , and that he ‘ made a ll significa nt decisions i n the ex erc ise of re asonable profe ssional judgment.’ ” Id. (quoting Strickland , 4 66 U. S. at 690). The court stated that though “ we would c erta inly expect the occ asion to be rare, w e ca nnot say . . . that under no c ircumstance s could defe nse counse l justi fiably fail to exercise a

challeng e for
cause or peremptory strike aga inst a venireman who deeme d himself incapa ble of serving on the jury in a fa ir and impartial manne r.” Id. at 446.

L ike Jack son an d De lri o , t h e record in this ca se conta ins no evidence as to trial counsel’s r easoningi n ch o o s i n g not to question, challeng e for cause , or use a

pere mptory

strike8

ag ainst Stobi e. I f the rec ord lacks evidenc e conce rning trial counsel’s strateg y during voir dire, the court will not deter

mine counsel’s pe rfor

mance to be def

icient under Strickland

in t his ty pe of c la im. See J ackson , 877 S.W .2d at 771. McKinley

asks the cour

t to rely on Sta te v . G ar

za , 143 S.W .3d 144 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. ref

’d) in orde r to d et er m i n e that counse l’s repr esentation in thi s case was ineffe ctive. In Ga rza , v e nir e pe rs on Ke ithAd a ms r e sp on de d d ur ingvo ir dir e that he c ou ld n ot s it fairly in a ca se in wh i ch t h e defenda nt was cha

rg ed with ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild. He also answe red that he was in lawenfor ceme nt and that ther e were “othe r re asons” why he did not want to sit on the jury . Def endant’ s trial co u n s el did not challeng e Adams for ca use or use a p e r e mp to r

y s tr ik e a g a in s t h im , an d A d a ms w a s s e a te d o n th e ju r y . F o ll o w in g h is c o n v ic ti o n , G ar za filed a motion for ne w trial in which he alleg ed inef fec tive assistance due to tr ial counsel’s f ailure to strike Adams. At the evidentiar y hear ing, G arza’s c ounsel testified that he w as distrac ted during
vo ir dir e by ne ws tha t hi s w if e ha d b e e n d ia g no se d w it h cance r. He stat e d th a t he fa ile d in his
re sp on sib ili ty

by no t c on du c tin g ind ivi du a l voir dir e and that, ha d he no t bee n d istra c te d, he wo uld have c halleng ed Ad am s fo r ca use or use d a per emptory strike ag ainst him. He confir med that leaving Adams on the jury was not his intent a nd was a mistake. The trial court g rante d Ga rz a’s motion, finding that trial counse l’s failure to strike Adams amounted to inef fec tive assistance . The State appea led, but the appe llate cour t upheld the trial court’s finding of ineff ective a ssistance a s the
re co rdco n t ai n edco u n s el ’s ex p l i ci tt es t i m o n y t h at h i s fa i l u re t o s t ri k e A d am s wa s n o tt ri al s t ra t egy but a mistake. Ga rza , 143 S.W .3d at 150.9 Ga rza does not c ontrol this c ase beca use McKinley

has not produce d a re cord similar to that p resented by

Gar za. Wi th no evidentiary hear ing or

other e vidence on the re cord de mon str a tin g tr ia l c ouns e l’ s la c k o f a re a so na ble str a te g y , M c Ki nle y

is una ble to d e mon str a te defic ient perf

ormanc e. Ga rza is a lso unhe lpf ul t o McK inl e y ’s c la im be c a us e , c on tr ary

to t he re su lt in that case , h e seeks r ever sal of the tria l court’s judg ment. As the appe llate cour t give s strong defe renc e to the trial c o u rt , the Ga rza appellate court’s a ffirma nce of the trial cour

t’s finding of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel does not compel us to find ineffec tive assistance in the absenc e of
su c h a fi nd ingby

the tr ia l c ourt
. McKinley

has not satisfied the first prongof the Strickland t es ti nt h i s ca s e. Al t h o u gh McKinley

filed a motion for ne w trial, he did not include a claim of ineffec tive assistance , and the tr ia l c ourt did no t c on du c t an e vid e nti ary he ari ng . Witho ut an e vid e nti a ry he ari ng on

the iss ue , it

is
e xtr e m e l y d i f f i c u l tf o r M c K i n l e y

t o o v e r c o m e t h e p r e s u mp t i o nt h a tc o u n s e l ’ s c o n d u c tw a s w i t h in the rang e of rea sonable professional assistance

. See B levins , 18 S.W. 3d a t 27 1- 27 2. Th e re c or d is silent a s to c ounsel’s motives in choosing not to que stion, challeng e for cause , or use a

pere mptory strike aga inst Stobie. We will not speculate a s to counsel’s re asoning

. See M ayhue , 969 S.W .2d at 511. We must presume trial counsel was better positioned to judg e the pr ag matism of the particula r
case and make nece ssary

decisions in the exercise of rea sonable prof

essional judg ment. Se e De lri o , 840 S.W .2d at 447. Wit hout a rec ord to the contra

ry , we a re una ble to conclude that trial counsel’ s perf ormanc e wa s d ef

i ci ent. As McKinley

did not satisfy

the first prongof the Strickland test, we need not e x amine the se cond prong in order to de termine whe ther trial c ounsel’s conduc t prejudice d the de fe nd ant.10 CO NC LU SION We hold that, without a

ny evidenc e in the rec ord as to trial c ounsel’s strate g y or lac k there of duringvoir dire, the r ecor d on this direc t appea l does not overc ome the strongpresumption that trial counsel a cted within the ra ng e of rea sonable profe ssional a ssistance. B eca use McKinley does not satisfy

the first prongof the Strickland te s t, h e c an n o t e s ta

b li s h th a t h is r ig h t t o e f

f e c tive

a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l w a s v iol a te d. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.

__________________________________________ Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pury ear Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 17, 2005 Do No t Pu

bli sh