V and erbil t U ni vers i t y f i l ed a res p o nsi ve p l ead i ng co nt end i ng in te r a lia tha t “th e n a m e d d e fen d a n t, V a n d e rb ilt 1 B i l l W i l kers o n C ent er, is no t a l egal ent i t y
. ” In i t s M em o randum and O rder, t he t ri al co urt hel d t hat i t “ d o es not be l i eve t hat t hi s mi s nomer i s of i mp ort anc e a nd t he C our t i n t hi s order ha s added ‘ T he V ander bi l t U ni ver s i t y ’ as t he corr ect p a rty.” 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 7, 200 5
MA RTY KEN DA LL v. VA ND ERB ILT BILL WILKER SON CE NTE R

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 04C-8 Walte r C. K urtz, Judge

No. M2004- 00993-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Jun e 13, 2005

Plaintiff appea ls the dismis sal of her lawsuit as being time barre d. Plaintiff timelyfiled an a ction fo r w ro ng fu l di sc ha

rg e of he r e mpl oyme nt. Sum mon s w a s is su e d b ut n e ve r s e rv e d o n D e fe nd a nt. Plaintiff then took a

voluntary

dismiss al but did not serve, nor attempt to serve, a

copy of the notice of voluntary

dismiss al, the orde r of dismissal or a c opy of the initial complaint on Defe ndant as require d by

T e n n
. R. Ci v
. P. 4 1

. 0 1

. Pl a in ti f f f il e d th is a c ti o n to r e v iv e h e r c laim o f w r o n g ful discharg e within one y ear of the voluntary

dismiss al of her first action but m ore tha n one y ear afte r termination of her employ ment. Def endant filed a Motion to Dismiss conte nding th at P l ai n t i ff’s c la ims we retim e ba

rr e d, wh ic h th e tr ia l c ou rt g rante d. Pla int if

f a pp e a le d. We a ff

ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed
F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., joined.
Jame s L . H arris, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e llant, Ma

rty Ke nd a ll.
J . Davidson Frenc h, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, V ander

bilt Bill W ilkerson Center.
OP IN ION
This is the second of two identical constructive discharg e actions Marty Kenda ll, Pl aintiff, filed ag ainst Vande rbilt Bill Wi lkerson Center, t h e n am ed defenda nt. I n eac h action Plaintiff 1
c on te nd s th a t sh e wa s c on str uc tiv e ly dis c ha rg e d by the Vand e rb ilt B ill WI lke rs on Ce nte r o n A ug us t 24 , 2 00 1. She pr e se nts tw o c la ims : ( 1) a re ta liatory

dis c ha rg e c la im un der th e Te nn e sse e Pub licD av i ds on Coun t y Ci r cu i t Cour t , D ock et N o. 02C- 2352. 2

D av i ds on Coun t y Ci r cu i t Cour t , D ock et N o. 04C- 8. 3
-2- Protection Act, Te nn. Code Ann. § 50-1- 304; and (2) a reta liatory

discharg e claim under the c ommon law of Te nnessee
. Plaintiff timelyfiled her

first complaint on Aug ust 20, 2002. Summons was iss ued but not 2
serve d and no alias summons was r equeste d or i ssued. Thus, the complaint filed i n the first ac tion was n e v e r s e r v e d o n D e f e n d a n t. O n Ja n u ar y 2 4 , 2 0 0 3 , Pl a in ti f f f il e d a V o lu n ta

r y N o tic e of Dismissal under Rule 41.01 and a proposed Or der of

Voluntary

Dismissal. The order

was e ntere d on Ja n u a r y 3 1 , 2 0 0 3

. Pl a in ti f

f f il e d th is , h e r s e c o n d a c ti o n , o n Ja n u ar y 5 , 2 0 0 4 , asser ting the 3 identical cla ims of the first ac tion. Sum mons was issued and se rved on Def endant along with the complaint in the second a ction.
Def endant f il ed a Motion to Dismiss as its responsive pleading to the Complaint i n the second a ction. I t contended that Plainti ff’ s claims wer e barred by the applica ble one- y ear

statutes of limitation, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-21-311 and 28-3-104. The trial court he ld that Plainti ff “ may not rely on the complaint that was f i l ed o n Au gu s t 20, 2002 to toll t he running of the statute of limit ations” bec ause she did not comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P . 3 or 41.01. B eca use the second complaint was filed mor e than one y ear following termination of Plaintiff’s employ ment and the applicable statutes of limitation were one y ear , the trial court dism i s s ed t he ac tion as time barre d. Plaintiff appea led contending that the t rial court’s application of Tenn. R. C iv. P. 3 and 41.01 was err or. No fa ctual disputes are presented. The iss ue presented hinges on the prope r interpr etation of the law to the undisputed fac ts of this case. The ref ore, the trial court’ s resolution of these issues is not entitled to Tenn. R. App. P

. 13(d)’ s presumption of correc tness on appea l. We will review the iss ue s de novo and rea ch our own indepe ndent conc lusions reg arding them. King v. Pope , 91 S.W .3d 314, 318 (Tenn. 2002)

. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 3 s ta te s in pe rt ine nt p art :
I f proc ess re mains unissued for 3 0 d ay s or is not served w ithin 30 day s f ro m is su a nc e , r e g ard le ss o f the re a so n, the plaint if f c a nn ot r e ly upon the orig inal commence ment [of the action] to toll the running of a statute of l i mitations unl ess the plaintiff c ontinues the ac tion by obtaining issuanc e of new proce ss w ithin one y ear from issuance of the pre vious process or , if no proce ss is issued, within one y ear of the fi lin g of thec omp la int

. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01 requires a plaintiff who files a notice of voluntary dismiss al to serve a c op y of the no tic e on a ll p art ie s. I t f urthe r p ro vid e s th a t if

a de fe nd a nt ha s no t be e n s e rv e d w ith“W e co ncl ud e t hat T enn. R

. C i v. P

. 4 1

. 0 1 requi res t hat a nonsui t i ng plai nt i f f , at t he t i m e o f

t he no nsui t , s erve 4

a c o p y o f t h e no tice o f d ism issa l an d a c o p y o f t h e d ism isse d c o m p la int o n a n y d e fen d a n t wh o ha s n o t b e e n p re v io u sly
s er v ed wi t h a s u mmons a n d compl ai n t an d t h at s u ch s er v i ce mu s t c ompl y w i t h t h e r equ i r eme n t s of T en n
. R. Ci v
. P. 5, not wi t h t he r equi r ement s for s er vi ce of proces s un der T enn
. R. Ci v. P

. 4. ” B o o n e v . M o rris , 2004 W L 2254012, at * 6.

-3- thesu mmo ns a ndc omp la int , th e plaint if f mus t a lso se rv e a

c op y of the c omp la int

on the de fe nd a nt. I n such ca ses, howeve r, the plaintiff need not obtain f ormal ser vice of

proce ss on the defe ndant as Te nn . R. Civ . P. 4 r e qu ir e s. Se rv ic e pu rs ua nt t o T e nn . R. Civ . P. 5. 02 is s uf fi c ie nt. See Boone v

.

4 Mo rri s , No. M2002-0306-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 2254012, at *6 (Te nn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2004).
Te nn . R. Civ . P. 41 .0 1 .

. . re qu ir e s “se rv ing ” a c op y of the no tic e of

dis mis sa l ona ll parties. In addition, it requires the plaintiff t o “serve” a copy of t he complaint on any party who has not alre ady been serve d with a summons and complaint.

. . . [S ]ervice under Rule 5 is all that is require d. . . . [D] elivery of the notice of dismissal and the orig inal complaint is intended to provide the defe ndants with notice of the orig inal action and its dismissal and notice that the plaintiff may commencean o t h er action within one y ear ; the purpose is not to require the defendant to appea r and answer the dismiss ed compl ai n t

. The Rules of Civil Procedure do not require that notices be se rv e d li ke pr oc e ss; the y

se rv e dif fe re nt f un c tio ns
. Boone, 2004 WL

2254012, at *6.
Th e imp ortanc e of a de fe nd a nt be ing a wa re that a c ivi l a c tio n ha s be e n f ile d a ndvo lun tari ly dismiss ed is also s tated in the 1991 Advisory Commi ssion Comment to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 41.01(1). Th e Ad vis ory

Com mis sio n in fo rm s u s th a t: Rule 41.01(1 ) [ wa s ] amende d to require service of both the written notice of nonsuit and a

copy of the c omplaint on other parties. Such a re quirement he lps cure the injusti ce of a plaintiff filing a complaint and summons under Rule 3 and immediate ly taking a nonsui t. I f the saving s statute ap p l ies, the plaintiff would g et the bene fit of tolling a statute of limitatio n s without the defe ndant knowing of any litigation. B ut see Lee v. Crenshaw , 562 F.2d 380 (6 Cir. 1976), 622 th F.2d 202 ( 6 Cir. 1980), indic at i n g t h at such a ploy would not stop th theru nn ing of

thestatut e of

lim itatio ns
. A plaintiff who fa iled to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P . 3 or 41.01 cannot rely on the filing date of theorig ina l c omp la int

f o r p u rp os e s o f s a tis fying the app lic able on e -y e ar s ta tut e of lim itatio ns
. Fr y e v . Blu e Ri dg e Ne uros c ie nc e Ce nte r, P. C. , 70 S.W .3d 710, 716-717 (Te nn. 2002). “[A]bsent serviceof the Notice of Voluntary Dismissal a nd the complaint at the time of taking the nonsuit, a plaint if f w ho ha s f

a ile d to se rv e pr oc e ss p ri or to the takin g of

the no ns uit

in a c c or da nc e wi th R ule 3 may not rely upon the bene fit of the one-y ear tolling period of t he saving statute to avoid the bar of the statute of

limit ations.” Id.-4-

Plaintiff never serve d a copy of t he Notice of Dism issal, the Order of Voluntary Dismissal or theComplaint

in the ini tia l a c tio n on De fe nd a nt. Mo re ov e r, there c or d r e ve a ls that Plaint if f d id not even attempt to serve a c opy of the notice or order with the complaint. As the trial court noted in its Memorandum and Orde r, the c ertificate of service for the Notice of Dismissal and the Orde r of Voluntary

Dismissal stated: “I

here by certify that a copy of t he foreg oing doc ument has not bee n serve d upon the def

endant and there fore notice is not nece ssary .” (e mphasis added)
Pla int if f’ s claims , all of

wh ic h a reba se d u po n a n a lle g e d c on str uc tiv e dis c ha

rg e on Au g us t 24, 2001, are subject to one-y ea r s t atutes of limitations. P laintiff filed the se cond of he r two identical ac tions on J anuary 5, 2004, more than two y ear s afte r her alleg ed construc tive discharg e. Since Plaintiff did not satisfy the condition prec edent r equire d in Frye , s he do e s n ot h a ve the be ne fi t of the saving statute. Thus, her c laims are time ba rre d. The judg ment of the trial court is a ffirme d and this matter is remanded with costs of a ppeal a sse sse d a g a ins t app e lla nt, Ma rty Ke nd a ll.

___________________________________

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR ., J UDGE