IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL K.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 4437

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Michael K.’s claims for 

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate 

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion 

to reverse the Commissioner’s decision [Doc. No. 21] is granted in part, and the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 22] is denied.

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security 

Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by his first name and the first initial of his last 

name.

2

 Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(d).

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BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 20, 2016, Plaintiff filed claims for DIB and SSI, alleging disability 

since December 31, 2014. The claims were denied initially and upon 

reconsideration, after which he timely requested a hearing before an Administrative 

Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on January 10, 2019. Plaintiff personally 

appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel. A vocational 

expert (“VE”) also testified.

On June 26, 2019, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claims for benefits, finding him

not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration 

Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s 

decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the 

District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 

(7th Cir. 2005). 

II. ALJ DECISION

Plaintiff’s claims were analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential 

evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of December 31, 2014. At 

step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

degenerative disc disease; left upper extremity (shoulder) disorder; right upper 

extremity (elbow) disorder; and lower extremity neuropathy. The ALJ concluded at 

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step three that Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or 

medically equal a listed impairment.

Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with the following additional 

limitations: occasional sue of an assistive device (cane) for ambulation; can 

occasionally climb stairs or ramps; can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; has 

unlimited balance; can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; can frequently 

reach, including overhead with the left upper extremity; unlimited bilateral 

handling, fingering, and feeling; can occasionally push or pull with the left lower 

extremity and frequently push or pull with the right lower extremity; and must 

avoid all exposure to workplace hazards, including moving machinery and 

unprotected heights.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be unable to perform his 

past relevant work as a salesperson, door assembler, cashier, repossessor, auto 

salesman, waiter, bartender, final assembler, construction worker, tow truck driver, 

prep cook, kitchen helper, or grounds keeper. However, at step five, based upon the 

VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff can perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national 

economy, leading to a finding that he is not disabled under the Social Security Act.

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DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a plaintiff is 

disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff

presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does 

the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform her former 

occupation? and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4). 

An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that 

the plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 

389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, 

precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 

one to four. Id. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the 

burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.

 

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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even 

in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of 

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not 

high. Substantial evidence is . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and 

means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019)

(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in 

evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also 

Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision 

must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is 

adequately supported”) (citation omitted).

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However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved 

of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838 

F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has 

adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every 

piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide 

some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. 

Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to 

a plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 

conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate 

the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful 

appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 

2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to 

fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately 

articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 

1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).

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III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons, 

including: (1) the ALJ incorrectly assessed Plaintiff’s symptoms and limitations;

and (2) the ALJ incorrectly assessed Plaintiff’s RFC.

In advancing his first argument, Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that the ALJ 

failed to sufficiently account for Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling pain. In her 

decision, the ALJ briefly noted Plaintiff’s testimony that “[h]e has back pain and 

wears a back brace and uses a cane which was not prescribed.” (R. 20.) In fact, 

Plaintiff’s complaints of pain were far more involved. As summarized by Plaintiff:

Mr. Karol had [a] significantly limited ability to perform activities of 

daily living. His pain limited walking and standing to 30-to-40 minutes. 

(AR 51.) He could not lift more than ten pounds with his left arm without 

experiencing “really bad” pain. Id. His pain limited his right arm lifting 

to 20 pounds. (AR 51.) Sometimes his shoulder popped while performing 

activities of daily living and cause[d] pain. (AR 371.) He had difficulty 

navigating stairs. (AR 52.) He relied on his fiancée to do chores due to 

this pain. Id. Mr. Karol reported being able to help with chores for 10-

to-15 minutes before being indisposed for the day. (AR 53.) His impaired 

ability to reach and stoop impaired his ability to get dressed and groom. 

(AR 266, 363.) He needed help to cook and to get up from the toilet. Id. 

Due to pain he avoided showering, could only cook for five-to-ten 

minutes before needing to sit or lie down, and could only do laundry and 

dishes [for] limited periods. (AR 52, 267-68, 304.)

(Pl.’s Br. at 7.)

Further, Plaintiff’s reported pain symptoms are consistent with the objective 

medical evidence in the record. Plaintiff summarizes that evidence as follows:

Mr. Karol injured his head, back, and shoulders in 2014. (AR 36, 46, 307, 

363, 367, 371, 673.) . . . Treating providers observed limited and painful 

back and shoulders range of motion. (AR 358, 364, 371, 452-53, 759, 787, 

1146, 1527, 1537, 1792, 1802, 1807, 1812.) . . . Straight leg testing 

recreated back pain. (AR 376, 454, 1091.) Treating providers observed 

painful cervical spine range of motion (AR 452) and back tenderness (AR 

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712). . . . Treating providers observed shoulder and lumbar spine 

tenderness with painful limited range of motion. (AR 378, 759, 1146, 

1807, 1812.) In late 2018, doctors observed limited lumbar range of 

motion and that he shook upon exertion. (AR 1527, 1537.) In June 2017, 

he had spine surgery (AR 36, 1497, 1574) and in November 2018 (AR 

1540) shoulder surgery. (AR 778, 1517, 1776). After his surgeries [he] 

reported severe pain. (AR 1200) and persistent shoulder pain (AR 1817). 

Treating providers observed he still needed a cane to walk and could not 

walk more than 200 feet without pain. (AR 1208.) Mr. Karol reported 

continued low back pain that radiated to his legs and caused weakness. 

(AR 1016, 1066, 1497, 1505, 1524, 1527, 1537, 1766.) In July 2018 he 

developed new unrelated swelling and pain in his legs. (AR 1646.) 

Treating providers observed leg weakness due to pain and a straight leg 

raise test recreated the pain. (AR 1091. . . . 

Mr. Karol was prescribed a regimen of over 20 milligrams daily of 

Dilaudid for his pain AR 272, 944, 1145). Dilaudid is hydromorphone, 

an opioid medication typically reserved for severe trauma and cancer 

pain, four to seven times more potent than morphine. (AR 272, 944, 

1145.) . . . Physicians were cautious about prescribing this opioid 

because of its powerful effects, but other pain medications such as Norco 

and Percocet were ineffective at treating his pain and he was allergic to 

others. (AR 1775.) Mr. Karol’s treating pain management [specialist]

drafted a letter to Mr. Karol’s prescription manager encouraging them 

[to] approve the daily use of 24 milligrams of hydromorphone, as it “has 

been the most beneficial for this patient and it is needed at this daily 

dosing.” Id. Furthermore, Mr. Karol had a multitude of steroid injections 

in an attempt to control his pain, but those injections offered no relief or 

minimal temporary relief. (AR 374, 376, 378, 429, 431, 435, 442, 445, 

448-49, 758, 778.) His treating pain management specialist insisted Mr. 

Karol be prescribed high daily doses of hydromorphone to manage pain 

after noting that so far six injections failed to manage pain. (AR 1775.)

(Pl.’s Br. at 6-9.)

Pertinent to Plaintiff’s argument concerning his pain symptoms, an ALJ 

must “fully engage[] with the evidence supporting [the claimant’s] claim of disabling 

pain.” Plessinger v. Berryhill, 900 F.3d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 2018). Further, an ALJ 

“must always articulate her reasons for rejecting a plaintiff’s complaints of pain.” 

Gordon v. Saul, No. 18 C 07096, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5157, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 

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11, 2021) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The ALJ did not do so here.

Instead, the ALJ only generically stated that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely 

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the 

reasons explained in this decision.” (R. 20.) The problem is that the ALJ provided no 

specific explanation of how Plaintiff’s reported pain symptoms were inconsistent 

with the medical evidence in the record. For instance, while the ALJ noted that in 

2014 Plaintiff “had a steady gait” and “intact motor and sensory function” (id. at

21), she did not provide any explanation of how those findings supported or

undermined Plaintiff’s complaints of pain. Similarly, while the ALJ noted that in 

2017 Plaintiff was reported to have “normal balance” and “normal reflexes, 

sensation, coordination, and motor strength” (id. at 22), she again provided no

explanation of whether and how those findings were consistent or inconsistent with 

Plaintiff’s subjective pain symptoms.

In failing to articulate her reasons for apparently rejecting Plaintiff’s 

complaints of pain, the ALJ did not build the requisite logical bridge from the 

evidence to her conclusion that Plaintiff could work despite his reported pain 

symptoms. See Megan B. v. Saul, 18 C 1836, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101344, at *12 

(N.D. Ill. June 10, 2020) (“By failing to give adequate reasons for finding Plaintiff’s 

subjective allegations of pain to be incredible, the ALJ did not build a logical bridge 

between the evidence and his conclusions that could be evaluated by this Court.”) 

(citation omitted). Given the lack of any specific explanation provided by the ALJ, 

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remand is required because it is impossible for this Court to properly evaluate the 

ALJ’s credibility determination as to Plaintiff’s pain symptoms. See Gilkey v. 

Barnhart, 417 F. Supp. 2d 949, 964 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (remanding where it was 

“unclear whether the ALJ found [claimant’s] allegations with respect to . . . her 

allegations of pain to be credible”); Allen v. Astrue, 869 F. Supp. 2d 924, 940 (N.D. 

Ill. 2012) (“When faced with a claimant alleging subjective pain symptoms, an ALJ 

must evaluate the credibility of a claimant’s testimony about his pain.”) (citation 

omitted). Ultimately, this matter must be remanded because the ALJ’s implied 

findings as to Plaintiff’s complaints of pain “lack[] any explanation or support.” 

Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

Based on its conclusion that remand is necessary for the above reasons, the 

Court need not explore in detail the remaining errors claimed by Plaintiff. The 

Court emphasizes that the Commissioner should not assume these issues were 

omitted from the opinion because no error was found. Indeed, the Court admonishes 

the Commissioner that, on remand, special care should be taken to ensure that all 

of Plaintiff’s symptoms are properly evaluated and Plaintiff’s RFC is properly 

assessed.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s 

decision [Doc. No. 21] is granted in part, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment [Doc. No. 22] is denied. The Court finds that this matter should 

be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this 

Order.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

DATE: January 31, 2022 ________________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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