IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

FREDY SOSA, individually and on behalf of 

all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

ONFIDO, INC., a Delaware corporation, 

Defendant. 

No. ____________________________ 

Honorable _______________________ 

NOTICE OF REMOVAL 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, and 1453, defendant Onfido, Inc. (“Onfido”) 

hereby gives notice of removal of this action from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois to 

the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 

By filing this notice, Onfido does not concede any allegation, assertion, claim, or demand 

for relief in the Complaint of plaintiff Fredy Sosa (“Sosa”), or that any damages exist. Onfido 

expressly denies that it has violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 

14/1, et seq. (“BIPA”), intends to defend this matter vigorously, and reserves all defenses and 

objections to the allegations, assertions, claims, demands for relief, and supposed damages set 

forth in the Complaint. 

I. THE STATE COURT ACTION 

On June 12, 2020, Sosa, on behalf of himself and allegedly similarly situated individuals, 

commenced this action in the Circuit Court for Cook County, Illinois under the caption 

Fredy Sosa v. Onfido, Inc., Case No. 2020CH04554. See Ex. 1 (Complaint). Sosa served 

Onfido’s registered agent with the Summons and Complaint on or about June 18, 2020. 

See Ex. 2 (Summons). 

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Sosa seeks relief based on Onfido’s alleged violations of BIPA. In particular, Sosa 

alleges that Onfido violated Section 15(b) of the statute by failing to “(1) inform[] the subject . . . 

in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored; 

(2) inform[] the subject . . . in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a 

biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and

(3) receive[] a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric 

information.” Ex. 1 ¶¶ 47, 49 (citing 740 ILCS 14/15(b)) (emphasis original). Sosa also alleges 

that Onfido violated Section 15(a) of the statute by failing to “(i) make publicly available a 

written policy establishing a retention schedule and guidelines for permanent deletion of 

biometric data . . . ; and (ii) actually adhere to that retention schedule and actually delete the 

biometric information.” Id. ¶¶ 48, 49 (citing 740 ILCS 14/15(a)). 

Sosa brings this action as a putative class action, seeking to represent an alleged class of 

“[a]ll residents of the State of Illinois who had their biometric identifiers or biometric 

information, including faceprints, collected, captured, received, otherwise obtained, or disclosed 

by Onfido while residing in Illinois.” Id. ¶ 41. He alleges that there are “at least hundreds” of 

members of the proposed class and that “individual joinder is impracticable.” Id. ¶ 42. 

On behalf of himself and each putative class member, Sosa seeks: “statutory damages of 

$5,000 for each willful and/or reckless violation of BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(2) or, in 

the alternative, statutory damages of $1,000 for each negligent violation of BIPA pursuant to 

740 ILCS 14/20(1)”; “injunctive and other equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests 

of the Class, including an Order requiring [Onfido] to collect, store, and use biometric identifiers 

or biometric information in compliance with the BIPA”; “reasonable litigation expenses and 

attorneys’ fees”; “pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent allowable”; and “such other and 

further relief as equity and justice may require.” Id. at 14-15 (“Prayer For Relief”) (emphasis 

original). 

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II. GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL 

A. This Action is Removable Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1) and 1441(b) 

This case is properly removed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1) and 1441(b) because the 

parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 

$75,000, exclusive of costs and interest. See Fernandez v. Kerry, Inc., No. 17 C 8971, 2020 WL 

1820521, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2020). 

1. There is complete diversity of citizenship. 

Sosa, the only named plaintiff, is a citizen of Illinois. See Ex. 1 ¶ 8. Onfido is 

incorporated in Delaware, see id. ¶ 9, and is therefore a citizen of that state, 

see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Sosa alleges that Onfido’s principal place of business is in London, 

see Ex. 1 ¶ 9, which would make Onfido a citizen of the United Kingdom, see 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). In fact, however, Onfido’s principal place of business is in 

San Francisco, California. See Ex. 4 (Declaration of Kevin Trilli) ¶ 3. Thus, the parties are 

completely diverse. See Fernandez, 2020 WL 1820521, at *3.

2. The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 

It is apparent from Sosa’s Complaint that the amount in controversy for his individual 

claim against Onfido exceeds $75,000, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 

 First, Sosa seeks statutory damages. BIPA provides for “liquidated damages of $5,000” 

“for each violation” that is committed “intentionally or recklessly.” 740 ILCS 14/20, 14/20(2). 

Sosa’s Complaint alleges the following with respect to Sosa: 

 Onfido allegedly violated Section 15(b) of BIPA, see Ex. 1 ¶¶ 47, 49; 

 Onfido allegedly violated Section 15(a) of BIPA, see id. ¶¶ 48-49; and 

 Onfido allegedly committed the above violations intentionally or recklessly, see id. ¶ 10 

(alleging that Onfido “is and has been aware that it is collecting biometric data from 

Illinois residents, without complying with BIPA”); id. ¶ 29 (alleging that Onfido failed to 

comply with BIPA even though “Onfido is well aware of Illinois consumers’ privacy 

rights under BIPA”). 

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Accordingly, Sosa alleges that at least $10,000 in statutory damages are in controversy based on 

his individual claim against Onfido (two violations of BIPA multiplied by $5,000 in statutory 

damages for each violation equals $10,000 in statutory damages). 

Second, Sosa seeks attorneys’ fees and costs. See id. at 14-15; see also 740 ILCS 

14/20(3) (prevailing parties may recover “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, including expert 

witness fees and other litigation expenses” under BIPA). “Legal fees may count toward the 

amount in controversy when the prevailing party is entitled to recover them as part of damages.” 

Gardynski-Leschuck v. Ford Motor Co., 142 F.3d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, in calculating 

the amount in controversy, this Court may consider the attorneys’ fees that Sosa has incurred for 

investigating his claims, preparing and filing his Complaint, and other pre-removal tasks. While 

Onfido cannot know precisely the fees incurred, this Court should assume that those fees are 

substantial and potentially in excess of the jurisdictional amount. Cf. Plaintiffs’ Mot. for and 

Mem. of Law in Support of Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses and Incentive Awards at 6, N.P. v. 

Standard Innovation Corp., No 1:16-cv-8655, 2017 WL 3335340 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2017) (Dkt. 

36) (Sosa’s counsel describing extensive pre-suit work undertaken on behalf of different clients 

in a different privacy case, including “thoroughly investigat[ing] Standard Innovation’s We-Vibe 

product line and the ways in which the vibrators interacted with the We-Connect App and used 

their Bluetooth functionality”; “consult[ing] on numerous occasions with” clients; and 

“research[ing] the Defendant company and product line, studying the manner in which Standard 

Innovation markets its We-Vibe line, reviewing the We-Vibe device and We-Connect 

application, and review[ing] consumer Complaints about the device”). 

Third, Sosa seeks broad injunctive relief. See Ex. 1 at 14 (seeking “injunctive and 

equitable relief . . . , including an Order requiring [Onfido] to collect, store, and use biometric 

identifiers or biometric information in compliance with the BIPA”). This Court may consider the 

costs of that relief when calculating the amount in controversy. See Tropp v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 

381 F.3d 591, 595 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the cost a defendant incurs in complying 

with injunctive relief is a legitimate consideration in a jurisdictional inquiry”). And those costs 

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substantially increase the amount in controversy. For example, if this Court determined that 

Onfido is not in compliance with Section 15(b) of BIPA as alleged by Sosa (a contention Onfido 

vigorously denies) and therefore ordered Onfido to re-engineer its services to change the 

interface for end users who interact with Onfido’s technology through third parties, then Onfido 

estimates that it would incur at least $80,000 in computer engineering costs alone. See Ex. 4 ¶ 4. 

In short, it is apparent from Sosa’s Complaint that the amount in controversy for his 

individual claim against Onfido exceeds $75,000. See, e.g., Fernandez, 2020 WL 1820521, at 

*3; see also Hunt v. DaVita, Inc., 680 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 2012); Peatry v. Bimbo Bakeries 

USA, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 766, 770 (N.D. Ill. 2019). 

B. This Action Is Also Removable under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 

 “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 

States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

This action is removable under § 1441 because this Court has original jurisdiction under the 

Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d); see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1453(b) (procedure for removing class actions). 

 Under CAFA, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over any putative class 

action in which (1) the aggregate number of members in the proposed class is 100 or more; 

(2) the matter in controversy “exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and 

costs”; and (3) the parties are minimally diverse—that is, “any member of a class of plaintiffs is 

a citizen of a State different from any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(2)(C); see also 

Roppo v. Travelers Com. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 568, 578 (7th Cir. 2017) (requirements for CAFA 

jurisdiction). Because all of those requirements are met, and because Onfido has met all other 

requirements, this action is removable under CAFA. 

1. This is a putative class action in which the aggregate number of proposed 

class members is 100 or more. 

 This is a putative “class action” under CAFA, which defines “class action” as “any civil 

action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule 

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of judicial procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a 

class action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B). Sosa filed this action under Section 2-801 of the 

Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, which allows “for the maintenance of a class action” when the 

alleged “class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”; “[t]here are 

questions of fact or law common to the class, which common questions predominate over any 

questions affecting only individual members”; “[t]he representative parties will fairly and 

adequately protect the interest of the class”; and “[t]he class action is an appropriate method for 

the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” 735 ILCS 5/2-801(1)-(4). The 

requirements for class certification under Section 2-801 parallel those of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23. Compare 735 ILCS 5/2-801 with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 

Sosa proposes to represent a class of similarly situated individuals who, like him, 

allegedly interacted with Onfido’s identity verification services through third parties. More 

specifically, Sosa seeks to represent a class defined as “[a]ll residents of the State of Illinois who 

had their biometric identifiers or biometric information, including faceprints, collected, captured, 

received, otherwise obtained, or disclosed by Onfido while residing in Illinois.” Ex. 1 ¶ 41 

(emphasis added). Sosa alleges that there are “at least hundreds” of class members, id. ¶ 42, 

therefore satisfying the first element. Moreover, based on Onfido’s preliminary investigation, at 

least 501 individuals who interacted with Onfido’s identity verification services through third 

parties in the last 12 months uploaded a government-issued identity document issued by the State 

of Illinois. See Ex. 4 ¶ 6. Accordingly, while Onfido does not concede that Sosa’s proposed class 

is certifiable, lawful, or otherwise proper, and while Onfido expressly reserves the right to raise 

all arguments and defenses to Sosa’s allegations, including Sosa’s class certification allegations, 

the alleged class, as defined by the allegations of Sosa’s Complaint, numbers at least 501 

individuals. 

2. The amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000. 

 CAFA requires courts to aggregate the claims of putative class members “to determine 

whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest 

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and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6). Thus, a court must “determine whether it has jurisdiction by 

adding up the value of the claim of each person who falls within the . . . proposed class and 

determine whether the resulting sum exceeds $5 million.” Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 

568 U.S. 588, 592 (2013). The amount in controversy “concerns what the plaintiff is 

claiming . . . , not whether plaintiff is likely to win or be awarded everything he seeks.” Brill v. 

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 

 Sosa does not allege a specific amount in controversy. Accordingly, Onfido need only 

make “a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” 

Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014). Here, it is plain that the 

amount in controversy exceeds the $5,000,000 threshold. 

First, Sosa seeks statutory damages on his own behalf and on behalf of each putative 

class member. As noted above, BIPA provides for “liquidated damages of $5,000” “for each 

violation” that is committed “intentionally or recklessly.” 740 ILCS 14/20, 14/20(2). Sosa’s 

Complaint alleges the following with respect to Sosa and each member of the putative class: 

 Onfido violated Section 15(b) of BIPA, see Ex. 1 ¶¶ 47, 49; 

 Onfido violated Section 15(a) of BIPA, see id. ¶¶ 48-49; and 

 Onfido’s violations were intentional or reckless, see id. ¶ 10 (alleging that Onfido “is and 

has been aware that it is collecting biometric data from Illinois residents, without 

complying with BIPA”); id. ¶ 29 (alleging that Onfido failed to comply with BIPA even 

though “Onfido is well aware of Illinois consumers’ privacy rights under BIPA”). 

Further, as explained above, Onfido’s preliminary investigation indicates that at least 501 

individuals who interacted with Onfido’s identity verification services through third parties in the 

last 12 months uploaded a government-issued identity document issued by the State of Illinois. 

See supra Section II.B.1. Accordingly, while Onfido does not concede that Sosa’s proposed class 

is certifiable, lawful, or otherwise proper, and while Onfido expressly reserves the right to raise 

all arguments and defenses to class certification, the proposed class, as defined by the allegations 

of Sosa’s Complaint and based on Onfido’s preliminary investigation, numbers at least 501 

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individuals. As a result, Sosa alleges that at least $5,010,000 in statutory damages are in 

controversy (501 class members multiplied by two violations of BIPA equals 1,002 violations; 

1,002 violations multiplied by $5,000 in statutory damages for each violation equals $5,010,000 

in statutory damages). 

Second, as discussed above, Sosa seeks attorneys’ fees and costs, see supra Section 

II.A.2, and “where attorneys’ fees are recoverable as a matter of law or contract, they may be 

reckoned into the jurisdictional amount.” Stull v. YTB Int’l, Inc., No. 10-600-GPM, 2010 WL 

4008153, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2010). 

Third, as also discussed above, Sosa seeks broad injunctive relief, see supra

Section II.A.2, and this Court may consider the costs of that relief when calculating the amount 

in controversy, see id. 

In short, it is apparent from Sosa’s Complaint that the amount in controversy for purposes 

of CAFA exceeds $5,000,000. See Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., 673 F.3d 609, 

617-18 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Morgan Stanley has provided a good-faith estimate that plausibly 

explains how the stakes exceed $5 million. That is sufficient.”); Blomberg v. Serv. Corp. Int’l., 

639 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Once the proponent of federal jurisdiction has explained 

plausibly how the stakes exceed $5,000,000 . . . the case belongs in federal court unless it is 

legally impossible for the plaintiff to recover that much.”). 

3. The parties are minimally diverse. 

 The parties are minimally diverse, as CAFA requires, because “any member of [the class] 

of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). As 

noted above, Sosa is a citizen of Illinois. See Ex. 1 ¶ 8. Onfido is incorporated in Delaware, see 

id. ¶ 9, and is headquartered in California, see Ex. 4 ¶ 3, and is therefore a citizen of Delaware 

and California, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).

4. None of CAFA’s exceptions bar removal. 

This action does not fall within the exceptions to removal jurisdiction under CAFA. 

Section 1332(d)(4) requires a federal court to decline jurisdiction over a class action when, 

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among other things, “greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in 

the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed,” and at least one 

defendant whose “alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the 

proposed class . . . is a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(d)(4)(A); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (similarly excluding cases where “two thirds 

or more of” the class members and “the primary defendants . . . are citizens of the State in which 

the action was originally filed”). Section 1332(d)(4) does not apply here because Onfido is not a 

citizen of Illinois, where the action was originally filed. Likewise, the discretionary exemptions 

in Section 1332(d)(3) apply only where “the primary defendants are citizens of the State in 

which the action was originally filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3); see also Roppo, 869 F.3d at 585 

(local controversy and discretionary CAFA exceptions do not apply when primary defendant is 

not citizen of state in which action was filed). 

Section 1332(d)(5)(B) requires a court to decline jurisdiction when the number of all 

class members is less than 100. That does not apply here, because Sosa has alleged a class of 

“at least hundreds.” 

 Sections 1332(d)(9) and 1453(d) exempt certain securities and corporate-governance 

cases from CAFA’s broad jurisdictional grant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9) (explaining that 

§ 1332(d)(2) does not apply to cases arising under several sections of the Securities Act of 1933, 

several sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and certain state corporate governance 

laws); see id. § 1453(d) (same). Those provisions do not bar jurisdiction here because Sosa’s 

claims do not arise under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

nor do they involve state-centric corporate governance issues. 

C. Venue and Intra-District Assignment Are Proper 

 The Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division is the proper venue and intra-district 

assignment for this action upon removal because this “district and division embrac[e]” the 

Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, where the Complaint was filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 

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D. Onfido Has Satisfied All Other Requirements 

 Onfido timely filed this Notice of Removal. Onfido was served with a copy of the 

Complaint and Summons on June 18, 2020. See Ex. 1 (Complaint); Ex. 2 (Summons). 

Onfido subsequently filed and served this Notice of Removal within 30 days of said service, as 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 

 Further, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), Onfido has filed with this Notice of Removal 

true and correct copies of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon Onfido in the state-court 

action. The Complaint (Ex. 1) is the only document that has been filed in the state court action. 

A true and correct copy of the state court docket is attached as Exhibit 3. 

 Finally, Onfido will promptly serve on Sosa and file with the Circuit Court a “Notice of 

Removal to Federal Court.” Onfido will also file with this Court a “Certificate of Service of 

Notice to Adverse Party of Removal to Federal Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 5(d). 

III. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS AND DEFENSES 

Onfido expressly reserves all of its defenses and rights, and none of the foregoing shall be 

construed as in any way conceding the truth of any of Sosa’s allegations or waiving any of 

Onfido’s defenses. Onfido also reserves its right to amend or supplement this Notice of Removal. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Onfido respectfully requests that this Court exercise 

jurisdiction over this action and enter orders and grant relief as may be necessary to secure 

removal and to prevent further proceedings in this matter in the Circuit Court of Cook County, 

Illinois. Onfido further requests whatever other relief the Court deems appropriate. 

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Respectfully submitted, 

By: /s/ Kathleen A. Stetsko 

Kathleen A. Stetsko 

PERKINS COIE LLP 

131 S Dearborn Street # 1700 

Telephone: 312.324.8400 

Fax: 312.324.9400 

Email: KStetsko@perkinscoie.com 

James G. Snell 

(pro hac vice application forthcoming) 

Ryan Spear 

(pro hac vice application forthcoming) 

PERKINS COIE LLP 

1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 

Seattle, WA 98101-3099 

Telephone: 206.359.8000 

Fax: 206.359.9000 

Email: JSnell@perkinscoie.com 

Email: RSpear@perkinscoie.com 

Attorneys for defendant Onfido, Inc. 

 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Kathleen A. Stetsko, certify that on July 18, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing 

NOTICE OF REMOVAL with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will 

send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record. 

On this date I further caused to be served on each of the attorneys identified below, via 

the delivery methods indicated below, a copy of the foregoing document: 

Benjamin H. Richman 

brichman@edelson.com 

J. Eli Wade-Scott 

ewadescott@edelson.com 

Schuyler Ufkes 

sufkes@edelson.com 

EDELSON PC 

350 North LaSalle Street, 14th Floor 

Chicago, Illinois 60654 

Tel: 312.589.6370 

Fax: 312.589.6378 

Attorneys for Plaintiff Fredy Sosa 

 X Via the Clerk’s eFiling Application 

___ Via U.S. Mail, 1st Class 

___ Via Overnight Delivery 

___ Via Facsimile 

 X Via Email 

___ Other: ___________________ 

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 

By: /s/ Kathleen A. Stetsko 

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