UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

In the Matter of the Search of: )

)

Information Stored at Premises Controlled ) Case No. 20 M 297

by Google, as further described in )

Attachment A ) Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman

SEALED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the government’s application for a geofence warrant. For the following 

reasons, the Court denies the warrant application. 

Background

The government has submitted an application for a geofence warrant to Google, that is a 

warrant to obtain cellular phone data generated in a designated geographic area, during three fortyfive minute periods of time on three different dates. The government seeks the warrant to further 

its investigation into the theft and resale of certain pharmaceuticals. 

As to the first geofence request, the government has probable cause to believe that the 

suspect received the stolen pharmaceuticals from a commercial enterprise located within the 

designated geofence area during the designated forty-five minute interval in the early afternoon 

hours on the day of the first geofence request. The geofence, which has a 100-meter radius, is in 

a densely populated city, and the area contains restaurants, various commercial establishments,

and at least one large residential complex, complete with a swimming pool, workout facilities, and 

other amenities associated with upscale urban living.1

The second and third geofence requests focus on the same commercial enterprise2 where 

the government has probable cause to believe that the suspect shipped some of the stolen 

pharmaceuticals to a buyer, who purchased the pharmaceuticals from the suspect at the 

government’s direction. Again, the government’s requested geofence is a 100-meter radius area 

extending from the commercial establishment where the suspect shipped the pharmaceuticals and 

covers two separate dates for forty-five minute intervals in the early afternoon hours. This 

geofence includes medical offices and other single and multi-floor commercial establishments that 

are likely to have multiple patrons during the early afternoon hours. 

1 As evidence that Google applications are ubiquitously used, the Court relied on Google Maps and Google 

to gather information about the residential structures within the proposed geofence. 

2 For clarity’ssake, the first geofence uses one business as its center point in defining the geofence. The second 

and third geofences use a different business as their center point, and that business is the same business for the second 

and third geofences. 

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The warrant application contemplates that the information will be obtained in three stages: 

(1) Google will be required to disclose to the government an anonymized list of devices that 

specifies information including the corresponding unique device ID, timestamp, coordinates, and 

data source, if available, of the devices that reported their location within the geofence during the 

forty-five minute periods; (2) the government will then review the list to prioritize the devices 

about which it wishes to obtain associated information; and (3) Google will then be required to 

disclose to the government the information identifying the Google account(s) for those devices 

about which the government further inquires. The warrant application includes no criteria or 

limitations as to which cellular telephones government agents can seek additional information. 

Further, the warrant application describes the items to be seized as follows:

All information described above in Section I that constitutes evidence or 

instrumentalities of violations of the dispensing of a controlled substance by means 

of the internet without a valid prescription, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 829(e)(1); 

the theft of medical products, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 670; mail fraud, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, that 

have been committed on or about [Date 1], [Date 2], and [Date 3], involving one or 

more unknown persons. 

Discussion

The Fourth Amendment states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 

seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

[T]wo distinct constitutional protections [are] served by the warrant requirement. 

First, the magistrate’s scrutiny is intended to eliminate altogether searches not 

based on probable cause. The premise here is that any intrusion in the way of search 

or seizure is an evil, so that no intrusion at all is justified without a careful prior 

determination of necessity. The second, distinct objective is that those searches 

deemed necessary should be as limited as possible. Here, the specific evil is the 

‘general warrant’ abhorred by the colonists, and the problem is not that of intrusion 

per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings. The 

warrant accomplishes this second objective by requiring a ‘particular description’ 

of the things to be seized.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (internal citations omitted). 

Though “a search warrant [must] describe the objects of the search with reasonable 

specificity, it need not be elaborately detailed.” United States v. Somers, 950 F.2d 1279, 1285 (7th 

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Cir. 1991). “The level of specificity must be such, however, that the officers executing the warrant 

are ‘able to identify the things to be seized with reasonable certainty.’” United States v. Sleet, 54 

F.3d 303, 307 n.1 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 277 (7th Cir. 

1992)); see also United States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[A] 

warrant must explicate the items to be seized only as precisely as the circumstances and the nature 

of the alleged crime permit.”). 

A search warrant contains two specificity requirements, which work in tandem. See Archer 

v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 614 (7th Cir. 2017) (a valid search warrant must “describe with 

particularity the things to be seized and the place to be searched”); United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 

966, 973 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[s]pecificity has two aspects: particularity and breadth”). First, the 

place to be searched must be described with particularity. See, e.g., United States v. Nafzger, 965 

F.2d 213, 215-16 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding “Western District of Wisconsin” insufficiently particular 

to meet Fourth Amendment standards). Second, the items to be searched for must be particularly 

described. “To determine whether a specific warrant meets the particularity requirement, a court 

must inquire whether an executing officer reading the description in the warrant would reasonably 

know what items are to be seized.” United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 996 (7th Cir. 1998). “In 

practice, courts have . . . demanded that the executing officers be able to identify the things to be 

seized with reasonable certainty and that the warrant description must be as particular as 

circumstances permit.” United States v. Jones, 54 F.3d 1285, 1290 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting United 

States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991, 996 (7th Cir. 1987)); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 

(2004) (a constitutionally valid search warrant must be based on probable cause, supported by a

sworn affidavit, describe the place to be searched with particularity, and describe the items to be 

seized with particularity). 

The level of particularity required as to what agents can seize is inversely related to the 

quality and breadth of probable cause established in the warrant application. “The Constitution 

requires that the warrant particularly describe the things to be sought and seized, but when there is 

probable cause to seize every business paper on the premises, a warrant saying seize every business 

paper particularly describes the things to be searched for and seized.” United States v. Bentley, 

825 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1987) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Oloyede, 982 

F.2d 133, 140-141 (4th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases for the same proposition); United States v. 

Griffin, No. 11-CR-30, 2011 WL 3348030, at *13 (E.D. Wis. June 22, 2011) (“[h]ow detailed the 

warrant must be follows directly from the nature of the items there is probable cause to seize; detail 

is necessary only to the extent the judicial officer must limit the search and seizure to those items”); 

United States v. Mason, No. 92-CR-1069, 1993 WL 191806, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 1993)

(“[W]here there is probable cause to seize all documents relating to a particular person, place or 

thing, the warrant can be broadly worded because it is unnecessary to distinguish between the 

things that may be taken from those that must be left undisturbed. In such cases, a generic 

description adequately defines the officers’ authority [to search for particular items].”). 

Concerns that a search warrant is overbroad or lacking in particularity can be avoided by 

either properly incorporating an affidavit in a search warrant or, in limited circumstances, by 

having an officer share his knowledge that there is a particular place to be searched with the 

approving magistrate judge at the time the warrant is issued. Nafzger, 965 F.2d at 215; see also 

United States v. Wenzel, 854 F.3d 957, 961 (7th Cir. 2017) (search warrant for items related to 

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hidden-camera recordings satisfied constitutional requirements when several concrete categories 

of items were listed in supporting affidavit and probable cause existed); Jones, 54 F.3d at 1290-92 

(7th Cir. 1995) (upholding a search warrant for “U.S. currency” without any more specifics 

because an unattached affidavit supplied some specific serial numbers the officers were seeking, 

which was known by the officer and the magistrate judge at the time the warrant was issued).

The Government’s Proposed Warrant

The warrant presented in this matter suffers from two obvious constitutional infirmities. 

First, the scope of the search is overbroad, and second, the items to be seized are not particularly 

described. As to the scope of the warrant, the government is seeking all of the data of the cellular 

telephones that accessed Google applications or used Google’s operating system in the three 

requested geofences. In its affidavit, the government asserts that approximately 97% of 

smartphones in the world use Google applications or Google’s operating system.3 Moreover, the 

area covered by each of the geofence applications is large, and the majority of the area sought 

encompasses structures and businesses that would necessarily have cell phone users who are not 

involved in these offenses. Each geofence encompasses 7.7630627 acres of land.4, 5 Despite the 

geographic and practical reach of the geofences, the government’s evidence of probable cause is 

solely focused on one user of a cellular telephone. As to the particularity of the items for which

the government can search, the warrant application is completely devoid of any meaningful 

limitation. The application indicates that agents will be searching for “evidence or 

instrumentalities of” the listed offenses, but nothing more. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 

981, 988 n.5 (1984) (“[t]he uniformly applied rule is that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant 

that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is 

unconstitutional”). 

Because of these apparent constitutional deficiencies, the Court requested that the 

government provide a legal memorandum justifying its warrant application. The government’s 

response did not alleviate the Court’s concerns. 

3 The percentage may not be this high. For example, Apple iPhones do not use Google’s operating system to 

function, so an Apple iPhone would only be implicated by this search warrant if the user also used Google apps such 

as Gmail, Google Maps, Google Chrome and YouTube. And, even an Android phone user (who must use Google’s 

operating system) could avoid coverage of this warrant if the user chose not to use Google location services. But, in 

establishing probable cause, the government asserts a likelihood “that at any given time, a mobile telephone, regardless

of make, is interfacing in some manner with a Google application, service, and/or platform[.]” (Dkt. 3 at 11.) We 

assume this reasonable conclusion to be true, and thus reasonably conclude that likely hundreds of cellphones other 

than the suspect’s cellphone would be included in the requested geofences. 

4 The area of a circle equals radius squared times pi. In this case, the area of the geofence is 31,416 square 

meters. One thousand square meters equal 0.247105 acres. And, of course, this quick calculation does not factor in 

that the areas in question contain multi-story buildings, which only adds to the actual “area” of the search.

5 For purposes of comparison, Wrigley Field encompasses roughly eight acres, Solider Field encompasses 

seven acres, and Guaranteed Rate Field encompasses about twelve acres. See Dayn Perry, The White Sox ballpark in 

Chicago that never was and could have changed history, CBSSPORTS.COM (April 10, 2018),

https://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/the-white-sox-ballpark-in-chicago-that-never-was-and-could-have-changedhistory/#:~:text=New%20Comiskey%2FU.S.%20Cellular%20Field,meantime%2C%20occupies%20about%2012%

20acres.; see also Soldier Field, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soldier_Field (last visited July 8, 2020).

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The Government’s Request for a Search Warrant and Controlling Precedent

The government cites no controlling authority, and this Court has found none, that 

addresses the legal standards to be applied to a geofence warrant. Thus, as reflected supra, we 

apply general principles of Fourth Amendment law that courts have developed in assessing the 

constitutional validity of search warrants. 

Here, the search warrant is directed at Google, and effectively seeks Google’s records 

regarding its customers. In its memorandum, the government notes that “[t]he Supreme Court ‘has 

held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed 

to a third party and conveyed [by the third-party] to Government authorities, even if the 

information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 

confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.’” (Dkt. 3, n.1) (quoting United States v. 

Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). In Miller, the Supreme Court held that the government properly 

obtained the defendant’s bank records through a subpoena, as opposed to securing a search 

warrant, because the subject of the investigation had voluntarily allowed the bank to gather the 

information reflected in the subpoenaed documents. Id. at 443-46.

The government then distinguishes its warrant application from the Supreme Court’s more 

recent holding in United States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) that cell-site records of seven 

days or more are not subject to the “third-party doctrine” memorialized in Miller. The purpose of 

this explication is unclear. If the government believes that the information it seeks from Google 

can be obtained by a grand jury subpoena (or some other process), then it should proceed in that

manner. But the government seeks a search warrant and offers no justification for jettisoning 

traditional standards of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the context of a geofence warrant. 

Therefore, this Court will proceed by applying developed constitutional standards to a newlydeveloped investigative tool. 

The Government’s Response

We start with our only point of agreement with the government’s response. There is 

probable cause to believe that among all the other data this warrant application seeks from Google, 

there is a likelihood that the suspect’s phone data would be included. Probable cause, however, is 

only part of the recipe for a constitutionally valid search warrant. See Groh, 540 U.S at 557. 

The government offers two factual arguments to justify its request for permission to 

identify all cellular phones located in the geofences. First, the government asserts that “[t]he 

identification of devices that were located at or near the [targeted stores] immediately before, 

during, and after the receipt and shipping of the stolen prescription medication is evidence of the 

Subject Offenses, namely, evidence pertaining to the identity of the Unknown Subject and any 

possible co-conspirators.” (Dkt. 3 at 11) (emphasis added). There is no evidence in the 

application’s supporting affidavit that the suspect is conspiring with anyone to commit these 

offenses, and the evidence developed by the government to date does not reasonably suggest there 

are co-conspirators. Simply put, there is not probable cause to believe the government will find 

evidence linking co-conspirators to the described offenses.

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Next, the government argues that “other individuals with cellular devices who were within 

a 100-meter radius of the [targeted stores] during the time periods covered by the proposed Warrant 

would be potential witnesses to the crime” and “[i]nformation identifying one or more of such 

witnesses is evidence.” (Dkt. 3, n.3.) This argument strains credibility.6

 The obvious witnesses 

to these offenses are the employees at the targeted businesses who assisted the suspect in the 

transactions involving the stolen pharmaceuticals. Those individuals can be, and likely have been, 

identified by the government through other means. Moreover, the notion that individuals in the 

area would be witnesses to the offense (thus supporting another basis for probable cause to justify 

the geofence) is not mentioned in the government’s affidavit. The affidavit premises probable 

cause on the identification of the subject of the investigation, not on identification of potential 

witnesses. 

 

The government next posits an unsubstantiated legal argument to address the apparent 

overbreadth of the scope of the warrant. The government asserts “the Search Warrant was 

narrowly tailored based on location, date, and time” (id. at 12) but offers no case law or governing 

Fourth Amendment principles to justify this assertion. While we agree that the date and time are 

sufficiently prescribed, the location clearly is not. As noted supra, the geographic scope of this 

request in a congested urban area encompassing individuals’ residences,7 businesses, and 

healthcare providers is not “narrowly tailored” when the vast majority of cellular telephones likely 

to be identified in this geofence will have nothing whatsoever to do with the offenses under 

investigation. 

Finally, as to the particularity required by the Fourth Amendment, the government’s 

approach fares no better. The government argues:

The Search Warrant included a multi-step execution process that would require 

Google to identify the user of a device only if, based on the location information 

provided by Google, it appears that the device is relevant to the investigation. 

Rather than violating the Fourth Amendment, this multi-step process would allow 

6 The government’s position that it should be able to identify all of the people within these 7.7 acres of land to 

see if any might recall the suspect and be able to identify the suspect is disconcerting at best. These potential witnesses 

would truly be remarkable. They would likely need to possess extremely keen eyesight and perhaps x-ray vision to 

see through the many walls (both interior and exterior) of the structures they inhabited during the time periods at issue. 

Moreover, their memories would have to be of the kind that allows the most mundane events to be seared in their 

memories. Recall, the circumstances of these geofence applications are routine business events. The suspect received 

a mailed package or mailed packages. This is not a protracted bank robbery, a remarkable act of violence, or an 

unusual event of any sort that might conceivably draw bystanders’ attention. 

7 The government’s inclusion of a large apartment complex in one of its geofences raises additional concerns. 

The government’s position that it may obtain location information as to an individual who may be in the privacy of 

their own residence without any showing of probable cause related to that individual or her residence may run afoul 

of Fourth Amendment cases that require a warrant to obtain such information. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 

27, 34 (2001) (“[w]e think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the 

home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, 

constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.”) (quotations 

omitted). But see United States v. Caira, 833 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that obtaining the IP address 

used by the defendant from his house was proper under the third-party doctrine). Because we find the warrant 

application deficient for other reasons, we do not need to resolve whether Kyllo applies to geofencing technology.

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investigators to further protect people’s privacy in the event that investigators 

determined a particular device is likely not associated with the Unknown Subject, 

any possible co-conspirator, or any witness to the Unknown Subject’s receipt or 

shipping of the stolen prescription medication.

(Dkt. 3 at 13) (emphasis added).

This argument fails on multiple levels. First, it is factually untrue. There is no objective 

measure that limits the agents’ discretion in obtaining information as to each cellular telephone in 

the geofence. For example, the warrant does not limit agents to only seeking identifying 

information as to the “five phones located closest to the center point of the geofence,” or some 

similar objective measure of particularity. As already noted, the geographic range coupled with 

the urban nature of the encompassed area ensures an overbroad scope of the identified cellular 

phones. If the warrant did contain objective limits as to which cellular telephones agents could 

seek additional information, or the nature of the probable cause established in the warrant 

application suggested a very limited number of cellular telephones would be identified, the Court’s 

concern with overbreadth and particularity might be satisfied.8

 However, this multi-step process 

simply fails to curtail or define the agents’ discretion in any meaningful way. 

Second, the government cites inapposite legal authority with respect to the particularity 

requirement. The government relies on United States v. McLamb, 880 F.3d 685 (4th Cir. 2018) 

and a series of cases that address the legality of computer searches generated by a cutting-edge 

investigative tool employed by the FBI to identify computers that reached a server on the dark web 

known as Playpen, where users could upload or download child pornography. “In order to access

[the Playpen website], a user [had to] download [a separate encrypted online network] and enter 

the site’s domain name, a 16–character URL consisting of random letters and numbers. Playpen 

was not discoverable on the open web, nor could a search engine like Google route users to it.” 

880 F.3d at 688. The warrant obtained in those cases allowed agents to obtain identifying 

information “of any user or administrator who log[ged] into [Playpen] by entering a username and 

password.” United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 594–95 (E.D. Va. 2016). Courts that 

considered this issue unanimously found that the warrant sufficiently described computers that 

agents could “search.”9 See id. at 609 (because the warrant was based on probable cause that any 

computer that reached Playpen was involved in possessing or trading child pornography, agents’ 

discretion as to which computers were actually searched did not violate constitutional standards). 

The analysis employed in these cases is completely consistent with Fourth Amendment 

standards. The executing officers were able to identify the things to be seized with reasonable 

certainty, and the warrant’s description was as particular as the circumstances permitted. Jones, 

54 F.3d at 1290 (7th Cir. 1995). Agents could only seize identifying information relating to 

computers that tunneled through the dark web to find the Playpen website and, based on the 

8 For example, the government, in an unrelated case, sought a geofence warrant for an almost empty 

commercial parking lot where only one vehicle was located, according to the supporting affidavit. Two occupants of 

the vehicle were observed engaging in a criminal act, and then the vehicle left the parking lot. The nature of the 

probable cause justifying the warrant avoided any overbreadth issue and addressed the particularity requirement 

necessary for a valid warrant.

 

9 The search consisted of acquiring identifying information as to the computer’s location. 

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investigation’s results at the time the warrant was obtained, the agents could not identify the 

offending computers with any greater particularity. The reasonableness of a warrant’s particularity 

is judged based on what agents know and share with the magistrate judge at the time the warrant 

is obtained. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1987); see also Jacobs v. City of Chi., 

215 F.3d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e conclude that although the warrant turned out to be 

overbroad because it did not describe with particularity the place to be searched and encompassed 

a separate dwelling unit, the plaintiffs’ apartment, for which there was no probable cause to 

authorize a search, it was valid at the time it was issued based on the information the officers 

presented to the magistrate.”).

The government argues that the line of reasoning employed in the Playpen cases “similarly 

applies to the multi-step execution process in the Search Warrant at issue here.” (Dkt. 3 at 14.) 

In fact, the Playpen cases do not support the government’s position in the least. In the Playpen 

investigation, for every computer that reached the Playpen cite, there was probable cause to believe 

the computer possessed evidence related to child pornography. The investigating agents could 

only seek identifying information for those computers that entered a website designed to promote 

the exchange of child pornography. The agents’ discretion was limited by an objective standard –

whether the computer logged into the Playpen website – which established probable cause that the 

computer was involved in criminal conduct. That analysis is the complete antithesis of the legal 

underpinning of the government’s application in the instant case. The government has established 

probable cause that one user of a cellular telephone in the geofence area has committed a criminal 

offense. The warrant seeks to gather evidence on potentially all users of phones in the geofence, 

completely at the agents’ discretion. 

Without conceding its error, the government offers a modification to the search warrant 

that spells out in greater detail the type of information that agents could seek from Google. These 

additions do nothing to address the other level of particularity – as to which cellular phones agents 

may seek information. That determination remains solely in the agents’ discretion, which the 

Fourth Amendment will not tolerate. 

Conclusion

The government’s warrant application suffers from overbreadth, lack of particularity, and 

provides no compelling reason to abandon Fourth Amendment principles in this case. See, e.g.,

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223 (allowing that “if law enforcement is confronted with an urgent 

situation, such fact-specific threats will likely justify the warrantless collection of” cell site 

location information even though obtaining such information generally requires a search 

warrant”).10 Most importantly, the government could easily have sought a constitutionally valid 

search warrant if it chose. For example, if the government had constrained the geographic size of 

the geofence and limited the cellular telephone numbers for which agents could seek additional 

information to those numbers that appear in all three defined geofences, the government would 

10 This Court’s citation to Carpenter is not intended to suggest that Carpenter pre-ordains the outcome here. 

Carpenter involved a much longer period of time and greater data as to a particular subject’s movements. This opinion 

is premised on much longer established Fourth Amendment principles that a search warrant must establish probable 

cause to justify the scope of the search requested, and the type of evidence to be seized must be particularly described, 

not left to the agents’ complete discretion. 

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have solved the issues of overbreadth and lack of particularity. But, instead, the government chose 

to defend its position in ways that are not supported by the law and the facts and do not satisfy 

constitutional standards. 

The government’s use of geofences as an investigative tool is increasing exponentially. 

See Denise Lavoie, Geofence Warrants to Be Tested in Virginia Bank Robbery Case, ASSOCIATED

PRESS (July 3, 2020), https://apnews.com/ae0dbee812feefe4f54d3539885f9f54 (Google stated 

that geofence warrant requests have “jumped 1,500% from 2017 to 2018, and another 500% [in 

2019].”) The government’s undisciplined and overuse of this investigative technique in run-ofthe-mill cases that present no urgency or imminent danger poses concerns to our collective sense 

of privacy and trust in law enforcement officials. 

As stated by the Supreme Court:

It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but 

illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, 

by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can 

only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the 

security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal 

construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation 

of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of 

courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any 

stealthy encroachments thereon.

Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 454 (quotation omitted). In short, because the warrant is overbroad both as 

to the scope of the search and the particularity of the items to be seized, and thus fails to comport 

with well-established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court denies the government’s 

request for a warrant. 

SO ORDERED. ENTERED: 

Dated: 7/8/2020 __________________________

M. David Weisman

United States Magistrate Judge

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