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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

---oOo---

________________________________________________________________

RAYMOND GURROBAT,

individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, 

Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

vs.

HTH CORPORATION; PACIFIC BEACH CORPORATION, 

Respondents/Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

________________________________________________________________

SCAP-12-0000764

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT

(CAAP-12-0000764; CIV NO. 08-1-2528-12)

MARCH 27, 2015

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, MCKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.

I. Introduction

Following the publication of our opinion in Gurrobat v. HTH 

Corp., 133 Hawaii 1, 323 P.3d 792 (2014), PlaintiffAppellee/Cross-Appellant Raymond Gurrobat (“Gurrobat”), 

individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated 

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCAP-12-0000764

27-MAR-2015

09:00 AM
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persons, requested that we award him attorneys’ fees and costs 

for his appeal and cross-appeal, and provide for interest on the 

judgment. Gurrobat bases his request for fees and costs on 

Hawaii Rules of Appellate Procedure (“HRAP”) Rule 39 (2007), and 

on the fee shifting provisions found in Hawaii Revised Statutes 

(“HRS”) §§ 388-11(c) (Supp. 1999) and 480-13(a) (2008). He 

bases his request for interest on HRAP Rule 37 (2000). In 

total, Gurrobat requests an award of attorneys’ fees based on a 

lodestar of $90,422.50 and enhanced based on a multiplier to be 

determined by the court, 4.712% general excise tax on the 

awarded fees, $535.55 in costs,1 and an award of post judgment 

interest on the damages affirmed in our opinion.

Defendants-Appellants/Cross-Appellees HTH Corp. and Pacific 

Beach Corp. (“Defendants”) acknowledge that Gurrobat is entitled 

to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under HRS § 388-11(c) 

for prevailing on their appeal, but contend he is not entitled 

to fees and costs under HRS § 480-13(a)(1) for his successful 

cross-appeal. In addition, Defendants oppose many individual 

time entries in Gurrobat’s fee request as being vague and/or 

block billed. Defendants also claim that any fees awarded 

should be subject to a downward adjustment of thirty percent 

 

1 Gurrobat initially requested $555.45 in costs, but withdrew 

entries totaling $19.90 in his reply memorandum; Gurrobat also put his

requested costs at $589.25 at one point, but this appears to be a 

typographical error. 
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because the key issue underlying Defendants’ appeal was largely 

decided by this court in Villon v. Marriott Hotel Services, 

Inc., 130 Hawaii 130, 306 P.3d 175 (2013). Defendants oppose 

all but $18.85 of Gurrobat’s costs requested on various grounds. 

Finally, Defendants assert that an award of interest should be 

denied as premature, and is better left to the discretion of the 

trial court. 

We hold that Gurrobat is entitled to attorneys’ fees for 

both the appeal and cross-appeal, in the amount of $84,032.50, 

plus $3,959.61 in general excise tax. We also award costs in 

the amount of $435.55. In addition, we hold Defendants jointly 

and severally liable for the payment of Gurrobat’s attorneys’ 

fees and costs. Finally, we hold that post judgment interest is 

not appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

II. Background

Gurrobat filed a class action complaint in the Circuit 

Court of the First Circuit (“circuit court”), asserting claims 

for damages under both Hawaii’s wage laws, HRS §§ 388-6 (1993) 

and 388-10 (Supp. 1999), and under Hawaii’s unfair methods of 

competition (“UMOC”) provisions, HRS §§ 480-2(e) (2008) and 480-

13(a). Gurrobat, 133 Hawaii at 3, 323 P.3d at 794. The lawsuit 

was based on Defendants’ violations of HRS § 481B-14 (2008) for

charging customers of the Pacific Beach Hotel and the Pagoda 

Hotel service charges without fully disclosing to customers that 
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the charges were not entirely being distributed to nonmanagerial service employees. Id.

The circuit court ultimately granted summary judgment for

Gurrobat on the wage law claims, awarded $1,678,783 in damages, 

and held Defendants jointly and severally liable for the 

damages. 133 Hawaii at 10, 323 P.3d at 801. The circuit court, 

however, granted summary judgment for Defendants on the UMOC 

claims. 133 Hawaii at 3, 323 P.3d at 794. Defendants appealed 

the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment on the wage law 

claims; Gurrobat cross-appealed the circuit court’s grant of 

summary judgment on the UMOC claims. 133 Hawaii at 4, 323 P.3d 

at 795. 

This court accepted a discretionary transfer from the 

Intermediate Court of Appeals pursuant to HRS § 602-58(b)(1) 

(Supp. 2011). On February 25, 2014, we issued our opinion in 

Gurrobat, 133 Hawaii 1, 323 P.3d 792 (“Opinion”). The Opinion 

(1) affirmed the circuit court’s order granting Gurrobat’s

motion for class certification; (2) affirmed the circuit court’s 

grant of summary judgment as to the unpaid wages under HRS 

Chapter 388; and (3) affirmed in part the award of damages as to 

the HRS Chapter 388 claim. 133 Hawaii at 23, 323 P.3d at 814.

We vacated, however, the portion of the grant of summary 

judgment as to damages under HRS Chapter 388 that imposed joint 
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and several liability on Defendants and remanded for further 

proceedings to properly apportion damages between Defendants.2 

Id. The Opinion further held that the circuit court erred in 

granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the UMOC

claims, and that Gurrobat had established the necessary elements 

to recover damages under HRS §§ 480-2 and 480-13 for violations 

of HRS § 481B-14. 133 Hawaii at 23-24, 323 P.3d at 814-15. We

therefore vacated the circuit court’s order granting Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment on Gurrobat’s UMOC claim, and 

remanded the claim to the circuit court for further proceedings 

consistent with the Opinion. 133 Hawaii at 24, 323 P.3d at 815.

Gurrobat then timely filed a “Motion for Attorneys’ Fees 

and Costs and Provision of Interest.” Defendants filed a 

Memorandum in Opposition; Gurrobat filed a Reply. We denied the 

motion without prejudice because it did not substantially comply 

with HRAP Form 8. Gurrobat then filed a compliant First Amended 

Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and Provision of Interest

(“Motion”). Following a substitution of counsel, Defendants 

filed a new Memorandum in Opposition (“Opposition”) on July 28, 

 

2 One of the two defendants, HTH Corporation, operated both hotels 

where service charges were unlawfully withheld from service employees; the 

other defendant, Pacific Beach Corporation, only operated one of the two 

hotels, and therefore could only be held liable for injuries to employees at 

that hotel.
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2014 that raised objections not found in the prior opposition.3

Gurrobat then filed a new Reply Memorandum (“Reply”).

III. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

A. Availability of Attorneys’ Fees 

The “American Rule” provides that each party is normally 

responsible for paying his or her attorneys’ fees. Schefke v. 

Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96 Hawaii 408, 444, 32 P.3d 

52, 88 (2001). Attorneys’ fees are only, therefore, “chargeable 

against the opposing party when so authorized by statute, rule 

of court, agreement, stipulation, or precedent.” Lee v. Aiu, 85 

Hawaii 19, 32, 936 P.2d 655, 668 (1997) (citation omitted).

Gurrobat’s attorneys’ fees request is based on several

statutes. Gurrobat asserted claims based on Defendants’ 

violation of Hawaii’s hotel or restaurant service charge law, 

HRS § 481B-14. HRS § 481B-4 deems violations of Chapter 481B to 

be “unfair method[s] of competition . . . within the meaning of 

section 480-2.” HRS 480-13(a), in turn, provides a private 

cause of action for those injured by violations of Chapter 480. 

 

3 In his Reply, Gurrobat questions the appropriateness of 

Defendants raising new substantive arguments in response to what he

characterizes as a “non-substantive filing made to meet form requirements.” 

Reply at 9. While Gurrobat styles the Motion as a “First Amended Motion,” it 

was filed after the original motion was denied without prejudice, and is 

therefore better considered as a new motion rather than an amended one. See 

generally 5 Wright & Miller Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1194 

(“In theory, a motion may be amended at any time before the judge has acted 

upon the request. . . .”) (emphasis added). We will therefore consider only 

the July 28, 2014 filing as the Opposition to this motion. 
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In addition, we have held that employees harmed by violations of 

HRS § 481B-4 may bring actions to enforce their rights and seek 

remedies under HRS § 388-11. See Villon, 130 Hawaii at 132-33,

306 P.3d at 177-78.

Gurrobat therefore bases his request for attorneys’ fees on 

the statutory fee shifting provisions found in HRS §§ 388-11(c) 

and 480-13(a). Defendants acknowledge that Gurrobat is entitled 

to fees under the former, but claim that fees are not available 

under the latter under the circumstances of this case. 

Defendants’ objections are based on their reading of the 

text of these two statutes, so we begin with a comparison.

HRS § 388-11(c) reads, in relevant part:

The court in any action brought under this section shall, 

in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or 

plaintiffs, allow interest of six per cent per year from 

the date the wages were due, costs of action, including 

costs of fees of any nature, and reasonable attorney’s 

fees, to be paid by the defendant. . . .

HRS § 480-13(a)(1) reads, in relevant part:

[A]ny person who is injured in the person’s business or 

property by reason of anything forbidden or declared 

unlawful by this chapter . . . [m]ay sue for damages 

sustained by the person, and, if the judgment is for the 

plaintiff, the plaintiff shall be awarded a sum not less 

than $1,000 or threefold damages by the plaintiff 

sustained, whichever sum is the greater, and reasonable 

attorney’s fees together with the costs of suit . . . .

Defendants essentially argue that HRS § 480-13(a) allows 

for attorneys’ fees on appeal only when the trial court decision 

appealed from resulted in a final judgment for the plaintiff. 

The circuit court issued a judgment that was for Gurrobat on his
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HRS Chapter 388 claims, but which was against him on his HRS 

Chapter 480 claims. Therefore, Defendants assert, the 

“judgment” required under HRS § 480-13(a)(1) is absent and 

Gurrobat cannot recover fees for hours expended on his crossappeal of the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment for 

Defendants on the Chapter 480 claim.

In support of their argument, Defendants cite to our 

decision in Nelson v. University of Hawaii, 99 Hawaii 262, 

54 P.3d 433 (2002). In Nelson, plaintiffs requested attorneys’ 

fees following a successful appeal that vacated a trial court 

judgment in favor of defendants and remanded the case for a new 

trial. 99 Hawaii at 264, 54 P.3d 435. Plaintiffs in that case 

based their fee request on HRS § 378-5(c), a fee shifting 

statute that provides:

In any action brought under this part, the court, in 

addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or 

plaintiffs, shall allow costs of action, including costs of

fees of any nature and reasonable attorney’s fees, to be 

paid by the defendant. 

99 Hawaii at 265, 54 P.3d at 436.

This court denied Nelson’s request for fees without 

prejudice, finding that the award of fees was inappropriate, as 

Nelson’s appellate victory “merely vacate[d] a trial court 

judgment unfavorable to the plaintiff, and place[d] the 

plaintiff back where the plaintiff started.” 99 Hawaii at 266, 

54 P.3d at 437. Defendants therefore claim that Nelson bars an 
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award of attorneys’ fees on appeal if this court has not issued 

a judgment awarding damages to the plaintiff. We disagree. 

When interpreting a statute, we follow well established 

principles:

First, the fundamental starting point for statutory 

interpretation is the language of the statute itself. 

Second, where the statutory language is plain and 

unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain 

and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of 

statutory construction is our foremost obligation to

ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 

legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the 

language contained in the statute itself. Fourth, when 

there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness 

or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an 

ambiguity exists. And fifth, in construing an ambiguous 

statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought 

by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, 

phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to 

ascertain their true meaning.

State v. Silver, 125 Hawaii 1, 4, 249 P.3d 1141, 1144 (2011) 

(citations omitted).

The word “judgment” may be defined as “a court’s final 

determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a 

case.” Black’s Law Dictionary 858 (8th ed. 2004). A judgment 

on appeal meets this definition. In Nelson, this court 

addressed the question of whether a judgment on appeal could be 

a judgment for the purposes of an award of fees. 99 Hawaii at 

265, 54 P.3d at 436. In that case, we held that attorneys’ fees 

were potentially available on appeal given the relevant 

statutory language in HRS § 378-5(c), which reads: “[T]he 

court, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff . . 
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. shall allow costs of action, including . . . reasonable 

attorney’s fees, to be paid by the defendant.” Id. 

The relevant language in HRS § 480-13(a)(1) is similar, but 

not identical: “[I]f the judgment is for the plaintiff, the 

plaintiff shall be awarded a sum not less than $1,000 or 

threefold damages by the plaintiff sustained, whichever sum is 

the greater, and reasonable attorney’s fees together with the 

costs of suit . . . .” The only difference of note between 

these provisions is that HRS § 378-5(c) uses the term “any 

judgment,” while HRS § 480-13(a)(1) uses “the judgment.” In 

context, the two phrases convey similar meanings, but there 

could be some uncertainty as to whether the words have different 

meanings. Silver, 125 Hawaii at 4, 249 P.3d at 1144. Confronted 

with this ambiguity, we will “consider ‘the reason and spirit of 

the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it 

. . . to discover its true meaning.’” 125 Hawaii at 4-5, 249 

P.3d at 1144-45 (citation and brackets omitted). 

The language of the fee shifting provision in HRS 

§ 480-13(a)(1) dates back to the initial passage of Hawaii’s 

antitrust laws. 1961 Haw. Sess. Laws 313. The passage of 

Hawaii’s antitrust statutes was part of the transition to 

statehood, and was intended to prevent “a void in the regulation 

of business practices which may cause practices destructive of 

competition to prevail.” H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 97, in 1961 
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House Journal, at 687. Private rights of action providing for 

treble damages and fee awards are not unique to Hawaii’s 

antitrust statutes; they are also a common feature of federal 

antitrust laws:

Where the interests of individuals or private groups or 

those who bear a special relation to the prohibition of a 

statute are identical with the public interest in having a 

statute enforced, it is not uncommon to permit them to 

invoke sanctions. This stimulates one set of private 

interest to combat transgressions by another without resort 

to governmental enforcement agencies. . . . It is clear 

Congress intended to use private self-interest as a means 

of enforcement and to arm injured persons with private 

means to retribution when it gave to any injured party a 

private cause of action in which his damages are to be made 

good threefold, with costs of suit and reasonable 

attorney’s fee.

Bruce’s Juices v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947) 

(discussing Robinson-Patman Act). 

The provisions of HRS § 480-13 are similar to the language 

of section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a).4 See Davis 

v. Four Seasons Hotel, Ltd., 122 Hawaii 423, 427-28, 228 P.3d 

303, 307-08 (2010). The private right of action provisions of 

the Clayton Act were “intended to help persons of small means 

who are injured in their property or business by combinations or 

corporations violating the antitrust laws.” Minnesota Mining & 

 

4 Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2009), provides

in relevant part:

(a) Amount of recovery; prejudgment interest: Except as provided in 

subsection (b) of this section, any person who shall be injured in his 

business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws 

may sue therefor . . . , and shall recover threefold the damages by him 

sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. . . .
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Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 319 

(1965) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting legislative 

history of Clayton Antitrust Act). The attorney fee provisions 

in federal antitrust statutes are an important part of the 

private right of action. See Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. 

Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 88 (1st Cir. 1969) (rejecting 

argument that attorneys’ fees could not be awarded unless 

actually paid by plaintiff because such a holding “would leave 

private antitrust enforcement to the independently wealthy.”).

The fee shifting provision in HRS § 480-13(a)(1) is thus 

akin to fee shifting provisions found in federal antitrust laws. 

HRS § 480-3 (2008) specifically provides that “[t]his chapter 

shall be construed in accordance with judicial interpretations 

of similar federal antitrust statutes . . . .” We therefore

look to federal law for guidance in interpreting HRS § 480-13, 

and turn, as we did in Nelson and in Schefke, to federal case 

law interpreting the similar federal statutes. See Nelson, 99 

Hawaii at 266, 54 P.3d at 437; Schefke, 96 Hawaii at 444-45, 32 

P.3d at 88-89.

The language of the Clayton Act’s fee shifting provisions 

is similar to the language of Hawaii’s law. HRS § 480-13(a)(1) 

provides that the award of treble damages, costs, and fees will 

occur “if the judgment is for the plaintiff.” The federal 

statute omits the “if the judgment” language, and simply 
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provides that “any person who shall be injured . . . shall 

recover” treble damages, costs and fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). 

Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits the recovery of fees for 

expenses incurred on appeal; the United States Supreme Court has 

held that the language and purpose of the Clayton Act make it 

clear that appellate fees are available. See Perkins v. 

Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 399 U.S. 222, 223 (1970) (per curiam). 

The fee shifting provisions of the Clayton Act are present to 

ensure that the plaintiff’s treble damages recovery is not 

reduced by the fees incurred on appeal. See Perkins v. Standard 

Oil Co. of Cal., 474 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1973), supplemented 

by, 487 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1973). 

As in Nelson, the question before this court is not, 

therefore, whether a judgment on appeal can serve as a basis for 

an award of attorneys’ fees, but whether the outcome of the 

appeal was sufficient to constitute a judgment for the 

plaintiff. In Nelson, we looked to federal case law 

interpreting federal civil rights statutes permitting 

“prevailing parties” to recover attorneys’ fees. 99 Hawaii at 

266-67, 54 P.3d at 437-38. We found that “an appellate judgment 

that affirms or directs a partial victory for plaintiff, while 

at the same time remanding the case for further proceedings, 

could serve as the basis for a fees award” provided that the 

judgment on appeal “creat[es] at least a ‘material alteration of 
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the legal relationship of the parties . . . .’” 99 Hawaii at 

267, 54 P.3d at 438.

In Nelson, fees were not awarded because the case was 

remanded for a new trial, placing plaintiff “in the same 

position as she was before trial.” Id. We held, however, that 

Nelson would be entitled to recover appellate fees if she 

eventually prevailed in the trial court. 99 Hawaii at 269, 54 

P.3d at 440. Nelson’s fee request was therefore denied without 

prejudice, and the trial court was specifically instructed that 

it could provide for fees for work done on the appeal if Nelson 

eventually obtained “a judgment . . . that represents a material 

alteration of the legal relationship between herself and UH.” 

Id.

The circumstances in this case differ from those in Nelson. 

In this case, we concluded that Gurrobat “presented sufficient 

evidence, there being no issues with respect to the first and 

third elements, to satisfy the second element required for 

recovery on Plaintiffs’ UMOC claim.” Gurrobat, 133 Hawaii at 

24, 323 P.3d at 815. This determination did not merely return 

Gurrobat to the position he was in when the case was filed, as 

in Nelson. In holding that Gurrobat had satisfied the remaining 

element required for recovery on the UMOC claim, this court 

materially altered the legal relationship of the parties, as the 
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only task remaining for the circuit court on remand is the 

determination of the amount of damages. Gurrobat is therefore 

entitled to attorneys’ fees for time expended on his crossappeal of the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor 

of Defendants on Gurrobat’s UMOC claim.

B. Challenged Hours

Having determined that Gurrobat may recover fees for work 

done on both the appeal and cross-appeal, we now turn to what 

constitutes reasonable attorneys’ fees in this case. 

Gurrobat has submitted itemized timesheets detailing the 

hours that his three attorneys (John Perkin, James Bickerton, 

and Brandee Faria) expended on the appeal in this case. 

Defendants have objected to most of the individual time 

entries in the documentation submitted by Gurrobat. Defendants 

grouped their objections into three categories: objections to 

time spent on the cross-appeal, which we have already addressed; 

objections to entries they view as “block billed”; and 

objections to entries they view as “vaguely generic.” We 

therefore turn now to Defendants’ block billing and vagueness 

objections.

1. Alleged Block Billing

Block billing has been defined as “the time-keeping method 

by which each lawyer and legal assistant enters the total daily 

time spent working on a case, rather than itemizing the time 
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expended on specific tasks.” Hawaii Ventures, LLC v. Otaka, 

Inc., 116 Hawaii 465, 475, 173 P.3d 1122, 1132 (2007) (quoting

Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1284 n.9 (10th Cir. 

1998)). Block billing may also be defined as the practice of 

lumping multiple tasks into a single time entry. Id.

Block billing is a disfavored method of documenting time 

spent for the purposes of supporting a motion for attorneys’ 

fees. See, e.g., Hawaii Ventures, 116 Hawaii at 475, 173 P.3d 

at 1132. Parties seeking attorneys’ fees bear the burden of 

demonstrating that the fees requested are reasonable. See Sharp 

v. Hui Wahine, 49 Hawaii 241, 246, 413 P.2d 242, 247 (1966). As 

we have noted, the issue with block billing is that it “can make 

it impossible for the court to determine the reasonableness of 

the hours spent on each task.” Hawaii Ventures, 116 Hawaii at 

475, 173 P.3d at 1132. Block billing is problematic because it 

makes it more difficult for the party requesting fees to 

demonstrate the reasonableness of the billed hours; a party 

requesting attorneys’ fees block bills at its own risk. See, 

e.g., Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 

2007) (approving of a 20% reduction applied to specific block

billed entries).

Defendants request that we deny recovery of fees for all 

block billed time, asserting that “it is basically accepted as a 
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matter of law that ‘block billing’ is totally unacceptable and a 

rejected means of seeking an award of fees, no matter the 

context for the request.” (Opposition at 14). In support of 

this assertion, Defendants cite to a number of cases, the most 

recent from 1999, from a range of jurisdictions. Id.

Defendants’ reliance on these cases is, however, misplaced.

Neither current Hawaii law nor the recent practice of 

American courts suggest that block billing is categorically 

unacceptable, or that block billing should normally result in 

denial of the block billed entries. If anything, it appears 

generally accepted that block billing should not automatically 

lead to the rejection of block billed entries. See, e.g., 

Mendez v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 

2008) (“[T]he use of block billing does not justify an acrossthe-board reduction or rejection of all hours.”) (emphasis in 

original), overruled on other grounds by Arizona v. ASARCO LLC, 

773 F.3d 1050, 1058 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014); Thompson, Inc. v. Ins.

Co. of N.Am., 11 N.E.3d 982, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (Indiana 

cases expressly permit block billing); Maddox v. Greene Cnty. 

Children Servs. Bd. of Dirs., 12 N.E.3d 476, 498 (Ohio Ct. App. 

2014) (holding that the trial court was not required to deny 

fees altogether for block billed entries); 546-552 W. 146th St.

LLC v. Arfa, 99 A.D.3d 117, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (holding 
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that block billing does not render a fee request per se 

unreasonable).

Block billing may lead to the exclusion of the block billed 

hours where the practice makes it impossible to distinguish 

between compensable and non-compensable tasks. See Hawaii 

Ventures, 116 Hawaii at 476, 173 P.3d at 1132. Where this is 

not the case, courts may still reduce the portion of the fee 

request that was block billed by a percentage to account for the 

increased difficulty in determining the reasonableness of hours 

billed in this format. See, e.g., Welch, 480 F.3d at 948 

(holding that courts may apply a percentage reduction, but only 

to hours actually block billed).

With the foregoing in mind, we turn to Defendants’ specific 

block billing objections. Defendants present a list of 103

separate time entries that they object to on the grounds that 

the entries are “block billed.” In 79 of these 103 entries,

Gurrobat’s counsel billed less than one hour; in 56 of the 

objected-to entries, counsel billed 0.1 hour. 

One-tenth of one hour (0.1 hour) is the shortest generally 

accepted unit of attorney time for billing purposes. It is

possible to block bill even such a short period of time, in that 

an attorney can accomplish and bill multiple compensable tasks 

within one six minute block. As long as the billed tasks are 
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compensable, the six minute block may represent a reasonable 

expenditure of time.

In addition, block billing can only occur where multiple 

tasks are lumped together into a single billing entry. In order 

to determine if multiple tasks are actually being claimed in a 

single block, a certain degree of common-sense is required; the 

mere inclusion of the word “and” in a billing entry is certainly 

not determinative. For example, “reviewing and drafting” a 

document, “reviewing and revising” a document, “drafting and 

finalizing” a document, and other such descriptions all involve 

the single task of “working on” a document.5 See, e.g., Wise v. 

Kelly, 620 F.Supp. 2d 435, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Similarly, 

tasks such as drafting a document and making a follow-up 

telephone call related to the same document can be viewed as 

part of the single task of working on the document. See id. 

Billing descriptions that merely detail the types of activities 

that make up a single general task will not normally support a 

block billing objection, provided the court can determine the 

reasonableness of the hours expended on the general task.

Upon examination, none of the allegedly block billed 

entries includes more than one general task, and all of the 

 

5 We note that when counsel actually recorded a task as “work on 

answering brief,” Defendants objected to the entry as being too vague to 

support a claim for fees. See Opposition at 18.
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billing entries are reasonable. Defendants’ block billing 

objections are therefore rejected. 

2. Alleged Vagueness

Defendants object to numerous time entries on the grounds 

that the entries are “vaguely generic.” The majority of these 

objections appear to cover time entries where it is not clear to 

Defendants whether the task detailed related to the appeal or 

cross-appeal. Fees cannot be awarded if it is impossible to 

distinguish between compensable and non-compensable claims. See

Hawaii Ventures, 116 Hawaii at 478, 173 P.3d at 1135. Here, 

because we have held that fees are available for both 

Defendants’ appeal and Gurrobat’s cross-appeal, this issue does 

not arise. 

Defendants also state that “some of the time entries are so 

vaguely generic, that it is impossible to discern whether the 

hours expended for the task were reasonable . . . .” Defendants 

identify only two specific time entries as falling into this 

group within the brief: one time entry for 3.6 hours for 

“[p]repare Answering Brief” and one from the same attorney for 

0.4 hours for “[w]ork on answering brief.” (Opposition at 18). 

It is true that these two time descriptions lack the specificity 

seen in many of the entries that appear on Defendants’ list of 

block billing objections. Nevertheless, the total time spent on 

the answering brief appears reasonable. 
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Although such time entries are not excessively descriptive, 

they are not so vague as to warrant rejection. Defendants’ 

vagueness objections are therefore rejected.

3. Excluded Tasks

We now turn to Gurrobat’s itemized fee request. For the 

most part, the listed items are adequately described and clearly 

relate to appellate work. Some of the time entries, however,

relate to tasks that are not appropriately considered part of 

the appeal.

In particular, Gurrobat includes time spent on work done at 

the trial court in order to address issues related to the final 

judgment. The time entries in question refer to work done at 

the trial court on a Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60 

motion, and on an Amended Final Judgment.6 As the trial court is 

better able to determine the reasonableness of time expended on 

this issue, and as we have remanded the case to the trial court 

for further proceedings, we deny the portions of the fee request 

attributable to the revised judgment without prejudice to 

Gurrobat requesting these fees at the trial court on remand. 

 

6 In total, Gurrobat documents 19.2 hours of work by attorney 

Faria, 2.5 hours by attorney Perkin, and 0.7 hours by attorney Bickerton that 

are attributable to matters related to procuring the trial court’s final 

judgment.
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Specifically, we deny without prejudice the following 

requested hours:

For attorney Faria:

Date Tasks7 Total 

Hours

04/10/2012 Review Final Judgment; review and draft 

emails with co-counsel regarding [Review 

Final Judgment]

0.1

04/11/2012 Review and draft emails with co-counsel 

regarding Final Judgment

0.1

04/12/2012 Review and draft emails with co-counsel 

regarding Application to Transfer and Final 

Judgment

0.1

04/24/2012 Review and draft emails with associate 

regarding Final Judgment Under Jenkins

Research Motion for Rule 60 Relief

Draft Motion for Rule 60 Relief

2.1

04/25/2012 Research Rule 60 Motion

Draft Rule 60 Motion

5.0

04/26/2012 Research Rule 60 Motion

Draft Rule 60 Motion

3.5

04/27/2012 Research Rule 60 Motion

Further changes made on Motion for Relief 

(Circuit Court format) (x2) and locate 

citing.

0.7

04/28/2012 Conference call with co-counsel regarding 

revision of Final Judgment

0.3

04/30/2012 Meeting with partner regarding Final 

Judgment; telephone call with P. Alston 

regarding same.

Research regarding Rule 60 Motion

Review and draft emails with co-counsel and 

partner regarding Rule 60 Motion

Review and draft emails with staff regarding 

finalization of Rule 60 Motion

0.6

05/01/2012 Review and draft emails with co-counsel and 

partner regarding Rule 60 Motion

Review Motion for Relief Order regarding 

HRCP 60

0.9

 

7 For convenience and readability, we have blocked the individual 

time entries by date.
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05/02/2012 Review and draft emails with co-counsel and 

staff regarding filing Final Judgment in the 

Bureau of Conveyances

0.1

05/07/2012 Review and draft emails with co-counsel 

regarding Final Judgment

0.1

05/18/2012 Review and draft emails with co-counsel 

regarding Motion to Modify the Judgment

0.1

06/28/2012 Review and make changes to amended final 

judgment.

Review and draft emails with co-counsel 

regarding Amended Final Judgment

1.4

07/18/2012 Review and respond to emails to and from P. 

Alston regarding Amended Final Judgment

Review and make changes to Amended Final 

Judgment

Research on Amended Final Judgment

1.5

07/23/2012 Review and respond to emails regarding 

revised Final Judgment

Review revised Final Judgment; make changes

Research regarding Final Judgment

1.9

07/31/2012 Review Defendant’s letter of objection to 

Plaintiff’s Amended Final Judgment submitted 

to judge on 7/24/2012, proposed Amended 

Final Judgment, Certificate of Service

0.1

08/08/2012 Review and draft emails with associate 

regarding Pacific Beach’s state tax 

identification number

Review and draft emails with co-counsel 

regarding Pacific Beach’s federal 

identification number to record Amended 

Judgment

0.3

08/09/2012 Review and draft emails with co-counsel 

regarding Garnishee Summons

0.1

08/13/2012 Review and draft emails with co-counsel 

regarding Amended Final Judgment filed in 

the Bureau of Conveyances

0.1

08/18/2012 Review and draft emails with partner and cocounsel regarding Final Judgment and Bond0.1

GRAND TOTAL: 19.2

For attorney Bickerton:

Date Tasks Total 

Hours

08/07/2012 Call with team members re strategy for 

collection, superseadeas [sic] bond, and 

0.4
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settlement issues

08/08/2012 Work on application for garnishee summons 

and recording of judgment at BOC

0.3

GRAND TOTAL 0.7

For attorney Perkin:

Date Tasks Total 

Hours

04/23/2012 Research and draft Amended Final Judgment 0.1

04/30/2012 Meeting with partner regarding Final 

Judgment and Jenkins issue

0.4

05/01/2012 Review and draft emails with co-counsel and 

partner regarding Rule 60 Motion

0.1

05/02/2012 Review and draft emails with co-counsel 

regarding Final Judgment and Supersedeas 

Bond

0.1

07/10/2012 Email correspondence with partner regarding 

Final Judgment and settlement

0.2

7/19/2012 Email correspondence regarding Amended Final 

Judgment

0.2

07/24/2012 Draft and review letter to Judge Sakamoto 

regarding amended judgment

0.3

08/01/2102 Final edits on letter to judge

Review and make changes to drafted letter to 

judge

0.3

08/07/2012 Review and draft emails with partner and cocounsel regarding Amended Final Judgment

Email correspondence with co-counsel 

regarding Amended Final Judgment

0.4

08/08/2012 Email to Paul Alston regarding Amended Final 

Judgment

0.4

GRAND TOTAL 2.5

C. Lodestar Hours and Rates

Courts determine a reasonable attorneys’ fee using the 

lodestar method, in which the number of hours reasonably 

expended are multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. See

Kaleikini v. Yoshioka, 129 Hawaii 454, 469, 304 P.3d 252, 267 
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(2013). This method is generally considered to be “[t]he most 

useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable 

fee . . . .” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

The lodestar approach is strongly presumed to yield a reasonable 

fee. See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992).

Gurrobat submitted requests for 150.2 hours of work by 

attorney Brandee Faria, 25.4 hours by attorney John Perkin, and 

85.3 hours by attorney James Bickerton. After considering 

Defendants’ specific objections and excluding time attributable 

to work done at the trial court level, as noted above, we find 

that the lodestar should be calculated based on 131.0 hours of 

work by attorney Faria (150.2 hours requested less 19.2 hours 

disallowed for trial court work), 22.9 hours by attorney Perkin

(25.4 hours requested less 2.5 hours disallowed for trial court 

work), and 84.6 hours by attorney Bickerton (85.3 hours 

requested less 0.7 hours disallowed for trial court work).

Gurrobat requests that we set the fee at the 2011 billing 

rates of $425 per hour for Mr. Perkin, $375 per hour for Mr. 

Bickerton, and $325 per hour for Ms. Faria. Gurrobat states

that he is setting these rates at 2011 levels in part to “take 

advantage of the (unappealed) law of the case establishing those 

rates as reasonable.” Gurrobat’s reliance on “law of the case”

is misplaced. The “law of the case” doctrine provides that 

“[u]nless cogent reasons support the second court’s action, any 
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modification of a prior ruling of another court of equal and 

concurrent jurisdiction will be deemed an abuse of discretion.” 

Wong v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 66 Haw. 389, 396, 

665 P.2d 157, 162 (1983) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

Thus, with respect to the reasonableness of appellate fees, the 

doctrine is not triggered by a trial court determination.

In any event, Gurrobat’s requested rates are adequately 

supported by documentation demonstrating that the rates fall 

within current market rates. Defendants do not challenge the 

requested hourly rate. This court therefore approves Gurrobat’s

requested rates. 

Applying these rates to the hours we determine were 

reasonably expended, we arrive at a final lodestar of 

$84,032.50.

8

D. Lodestar Modification

Both Gurrobat and Defendants request that this court adjust 

the lodestar award. Gurrobat requests an upward modification. 

Defendants assert that an upward modification is inappropriate, 

and that the lodestar should be adjusted downward. 

Our analysis begins, as it must, with the “‘strong 

presumption’ that the lodestar represents the reasonable fee.” 

 

8 131.0 hours at $325 per hour for Ms. Faria = $42,575.00; 84.6 

hours at $375 per hour for Mr. Bickerton = $31,725.00; 22.9 hours at $425 per 

hour for Mr. Perkin = $9,732.50. 
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Kaleikini, 129 Hawaii at 475, 304 P.3d at 273 (2013) (citations 

omitted). Where attorneys’ fees are requested under fee 

shifting statutes that provide for the recovery of reasonable 

attorneys’ fees, as is the case here, the party requesting a 

lodestar adjustment must show that the unmodified lodestar would 

lead to an unreasonable fee. See id. 

This court’s decision in Schefke makes it clear that upward 

modification of the lodestar may be warranted in fee shifting 

cases. Gurrobat argues that consideration of each of the twelve 

lodestar adjustment factors first set forth in the Fifth 

Circuit’s opinion in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 

488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds by

Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 91-94 (1989), and 

subsequently adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Kerr v. Screen 

Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), abrogated 

in part by Davis v. City & Cnty. Of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 

1536, 1546 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds on 

denial of reh’g by 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993), demonstrates 

that an upward adjustment should be awarded in this case. It is 

clear that Gurrobat’s counsel obtained favorable results;

counsels’ acceptance of this case on a contingent fee basis 

played a vital role in the vindication of the rights of the 

class, and litigating this issue served a public purpose. See

Nelson, 99 Hawaii at 266, 54 p.3d at 437 (noting that civil 
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rights fee shifting statutes serve a public purpose); Schefke, 

96 Hawaii at 452-454, 32 P.3d at 96-98 (holding that Hawaii

courts have discretion to enhance lodestar when attorneys have 

accepted a case on a contingent fee basis). Nevertheless, we 

decline a fee enhancement in this case. 

Upward modification of the lodestar is warranted when 

necessary to “achieve a ‘reasonable’ award of fees.” Schefke, 

96 Hawaii at 452, 32 P.3d at 96 (emphasis added). As we start 

with the presumption that application of the lodestar is 

sufficient to determine a reasonable fee, see Kaleikini, 129 

Hawaii at 475, 304 P.3d at 273, it is necessary to enhance the 

lodestar only if it does not result in a reasonable fee.

Here, Gurrobat argues that a lodestar enhancement could 

result in a reasonable fee, but does not argue that the lodestar 

alone does not result in a reasonable fee. It is insufficient

for Gurrobat to demonstrate that the fee will remain within the 

range of the reasonable fees after application of a multiplier; 

he must also show that the lodestar does not provide for a 

reasonable fee. See id. (rejecting enhancement when party

seeking fees failed to “establish that the lodestar is 

unreasonable, or that enhancement is necessary to achieve a 

reasonable fee”). 
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Gurrobat’s only explicit effort to rebut the presumption 

that the lodestar was reasonable is an argument in his Reply 

that the election to seek compensation at below market rates 

demonstrates that the lodestar was unreasonable. Gurrobat’s 

counsel, however, suggested their rates and stated that the 

rates are “well within the range of what is reasonable and 

appropriate in this market.” (Faria Decl. at ¶ 10). Even if we 

treat the statement contained within the Reply as a 

clarification of Gurrobat’s initial argument rather than a new 

argument raised for the first time in the Reply, see Taomae v. 

Lingle, 110 Hawaii 327, 333 n.14, 132 P.3d 1238, 1244 n.14 

(2006) (declining to consider matters raised for the first time 

in the reply memorandum when considering whether to award 

attorneys’ fees), Gurrobat has not successfully rebutted the 

presumption that the requested rates are reasonable. 

By the same token, Defendants’ arguments for a downward 

modification are similarly unavailing. We have already 

discussed Defendants’ specific challenges to the claimed hours, 

and Defendants do not argue that the proposed hourly rates are 

unreasonable. Defendants also object to the unaltered lodestar, 

however, on the grounds that Gurrobat did not obtain an 

unqualified victory. Although Gurrobat did not completely

prevail on appeal, he did prevail on all but one of the issues 

raised in the appeal and cross-appeal. This court’s remand on 
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the matter of joint and several liability does not alter the 

fact that Gurrobat prevailed, and his attorneys should recover a 

fully sufficient compensatory fee. Schefke, 96 Hawaii at 444, 

32 P.3d at 88.

Defendants also argue that the lodestar should be reduced 

because the central issue in Defendants’ appeal was effectively 

decided by this court’s intervening decision in Villon, 130 

Hawaii 130, 306 P.3d 175. As Gurrobat notes, however, Villon

was not published until very late in the course of this appeal.9

The reasonableness of attorneys’ fees is measured based on the 

point in time when the work was performed, and not based on 

hindsight. See Woolridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 

1169, 1177 (6th Cir. 1990).

As neither Gurrobat nor Defendants have rebutted the 

presumption that the lodestar results in a reasonable fee, we 

will not apply either an upward or downward modification to the 

lodestar in this case. Gurrobat is therefore awarded attorneys’ 

fees in the lodestar amount of $84,032.50, plus an additional 

$3,959.61 (4.712% of the total) for general excise tax. See

Cnty. of Hawaii v. C & J Coupe Family Ltd. P’ship, 120 Hawaii 

400, 409-10, 208 P.3d 713, 722-23 (2009) (“[I]t is common 

 

9 Our opinion in Villon was released on July 15, 2013, almost one 

month after the final brief had been submitted to this court, and just one 

week before we issued our order setting the case for oral argument. 
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practice in this jurisdiction to include an excise tax in the 

amount of the fee award.”).

E. Costs

Gurrobat seeks costs in the sum of $535.55.10 Defendants 

have objected to all but $18.85 of this request. Most of 

Defendants’ objections stem from their argument that costs and 

fees are not available for Gurrobat’s cross-appeal. Based on 

our previous analysis, Gurrobat is entitled to these costs.

Some of the requested costs, however, pertain to obtaining 

an amended final judgment from the trial court. As noted 

earlier, costs and fees for work done at the trial court are 

best addressed there. We therefore deny Gurrobat’s request for 

the cost of copies of the Rule 60 motion ($94.20) and his

request for “Copies Opp To Proposed Final Judgment Opp” [sic] 

($5.80) without prejudice.

Gurrobat is therefore awarded costs in the amount of 

$435.55. 

F. Apportionment of Fees and Costs

In our earlier opinion in this case, we reversed the 

portion of the circuit court’s judgment that held defendants

jointly and severally liable for damages, and remanded the case 

for apportionment of damages. Gurrobat, 133 Hawaii at 18-19, 

 

10 Gurrobat initially requested $555.45, but withdrew two entries in 

his Reply. 
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323 P.3d at 809-10. Neither party addressed the question of 

apportionment of attorneys’ fees in their briefing. Therefore, 

it appears Defendants concede joint and several liability.

We note in any event that Defendants elected to present a 

joint defense throughout the proceedings, and that there is 

nothing in the record that would provide a court with any basis 

for apportioning liability for fees and costs. The question of 

whether defendants may be held jointly and severally liable for 

attorneys’ fees in a case where defendants are not jointly and 

severally liable for damages is one of first impression in this 

jurisdiction. Other jurisdictions, however, have had cause to 

examine this issue, and have held that the circumstances of a 

case may render attorneys’ fees indivisible, and that joint and 

several liability for fees can be appropriate in such cases even 

in the absence of joint and several liability for damages. See, 

e.g., Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 605 (7th Cir. 2000) (joint 

and several award of fees appropriate in case where the issues 

against the two defendants “were the same or similar.”); Walker 

v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 99 F.3d 761, 773 (5th 

Cir. 1996) (joint and several fee award appropriate where 

defendants presented joint defense and shared experts); CR-RSC 

Tower I, LLC, v. RSC Tower I, LLC, 56 A.3d 170, 218 (Md. 2012) 

(imposing joint and several liability for fees and costs when 
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claims centered on common issues and attributable to all 

defendants). 

In this case, Defendants proceeded jointly throughout the 

entirety of the proceedings. Defendants were represented by the 

same counsel, and submitted a single set of briefs. Although 

liability for the damage award can and will be divided between 

the Defendants on remand, the work that Gurrobat’s counsel put 

in to the case cannot readily be divided. See Jones v. 

Southpeak Interactive Corp. of Delaware, -- F.3d --, 2015 WL 

309626, at *16 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 2015). We therefore hold

Defendants jointly and severally liable for the payment of

appellate fees and costs. We emphasize, however, that this has 

no bearing on our prior determination that Defendants are not 

jointly and severally liable for the damage award itself. 

IV. Interest

Gurrobat requests that this court award interest on the 

portions of the circuit court judgment that were affirmed. 

Gurrobat bases this request on the post judgment interest 

provisions of HRS § 478-3 (2000), which provides for 10% per 

annum interest on judgments, and on HRAP Rule 37, which 

provides:

Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money 

in a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is allowed 

by law shall be payable from the date the judgment was 

entered in the circuit or district court. If the judgment 

is modified or vacated with a direction that a judgment for 

money be entered in the circuit or district court, the 
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notice and judgment on appeal shall contain instructions 

with respect to allowance of interest. 

In this case, we did not remand the case with an explicit 

direction regarding an amount of money to be entered on appeal. 

Instead, we remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this court’s holdings that: (1) the imposition of joint and 

several liability on Defendants was inappropriate; and (2) that 

Gurrobat presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the 

requirements to recover treble damages under HRS § 480-13. 

Gurrobat, 133 Hawaii at 24-25, 323 P.3d at 814-15. 

While remand will still result in a judgment awarding money 

damages to Gurrobat, the judgment will likely not be in the 

amount initially awarded. Under the circumstances, therefore,

an award of post judgment interest under HRS § 478-3 is not 

appropriate. 

V. Conclusion

We hold that Gurrobat is entitled to attorneys’ fees for 

both his appeal and cross-appeal, in the amount of $84,032.50

plus $3,959.61 in general excise tax. We award costs in the 

amount of $435.55. We hold Defendants jointly and severally 

liable for payment of both attorneys’ fees and costs. We deny, 

however, that portion of Gurrobat’s request that relates to work 

done to obtain an amended final judgment from the trial court 

without prejudice to Gurrobat seeking such costs and fees in the 
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trial court. Finally, we hold that post judgment interest is 

not appropriate under the circumstances.

James J. Bickerton /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

and Stephen M. Tannenbaum

for petitioner /s/ Paula A. Nakayama

Jeffrey H.K. Sia, /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna 

Diane W. Wong, and 

Brandon H. Ito /s/ Richard W. Pollack

for respondents

/s/ Michael D. Wilson