IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FATIME I., 

 Claimant,

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Respondent.

No. 20 CV 3603

Magistrate Judge Jeffrey T. Gilbert

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Claimant Fatime I.

1 (“Claimant”) seeks review of the final decision of 

Respondent Kilolo Kijakazi,2 Acting Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”), denying Claimant’s application for Disability Insurance Benefits 

(“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“Act”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) 

and Local Rule 73.1, the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States 

Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including entry of final judgment. [ECF No. 6]. 

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), and the 

parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 18, 23] pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons discussed below, Claimant’s 

1 Pursuant to Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 8.1 and Internal Operating Procedure 

22, the Court will identify the non-government party by using his or her full first name and 

the first initial of the last name.

2 Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on July 9, 2021. 

Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has substituted 

Acting Commissioner Kijakazi as the named defendant.

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Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 18] is granted and the Commissioner’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 23] is denied. This matter is remanded to 

the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s 

Memorandum Opinion and Order.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 6, 2017, Claimant protectively filed a Title II application for DIB

alleging disability beginning on July 3, 2016. (R. 145–46). Her claim was denied 

initially and upon reconsideration, after which she requested a hearing before an 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R. 98–102, 103–107, 108–09). On April 3, 2019,

Claimant appeared and testified at a hearing before ALJ Janice M. Bruning. (R. 41–

52, 56–57). ALJ Bruning also heard testimony on that date from impartial vocational 

expert (“VE”) Sara Gibson. (R. 52–56, 58–59). On May 23, 2019, ALJ Bruning denied 

Claimant’s claim for DIB. (R. 17–32).

In finding Claimant not disabled, the ALJ followed the five-step evaluation 

process required by Social Security regulations for individuals over the age of 18. See 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant had 

not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 3, 2016, her alleged onset date. 

(R. 19). At step two, the ALJ found Claimant had a severe impairment or combination 

of impairments as defined by 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c). (R. 19–20). Specifically, Claimant 

has headaches and depression. (R. 19–20). The ALJ also acknowledged several nonsevere impairments – benign hypertension, diabetes mellitus, hyperlipidemia, 

venous disorder, and obesity – and considered the combined effect of those 

impairments in assessing the full extent of Claimant’s limitations. (R. 19–21). 

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At step three, the ALJ determined that Claimant did not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 21–24). In

particular, the ALJ considered listings 11.02, 11.14, 11.18, 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15

and evaluated whether the “paragraph B” or “paragraph C” criteria had been satisfied

for the mental listings. Id. The ALJ determined listing 11.02 did not apply because

the frequency and severity of Claimant’s headaches did not rise to the level required 

by the listing. (R. 21). Nor did listing 11.14 apply, as Claimant did not have the 

significant disorganization of motor function in two extremities resulting in sustained 

disturbance of gross and dexterous movements or gait and station required. (R. 21). 

Listing 11.18 was not met because the evidence did not show Claimant had 

experienced deficits in cognitive functioning, as described in 12.02(A), resulting in 

two marked restrictions under 12.02(B). (R. 21). 

Regarding the mental listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15, the ALJ concluded the 

“paragraph B” criteria had not been satisfied, although Claimant had limitations in 

certain broad areas of functioning. (R. 21). The ALJ noted a mild limitation in 

understanding, remembering, or applying information, moderate limitations in 

interacting with others and concentration, persistence, or pace, and a mild limitation 

in adapting or managing oneself. (R. 23). But, because Claimant’s impairments did 

not cause at least two “marked” limitations or one “extreme limitation,” the ALJ 

concluded that the paragraph B” criteria were not satisfied. (R. 23). As to the 

“paragraph C” criteria, the ALJ concluded the medical evidence of record did not show 

Claimant has been receiving ongoing consistent mental health therapy that 

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diminishes the symptoms of her mental impairments, nor does she live in a highly 

structured setting. (R. 23–24). So, the “paragraph C” criteria were not satisfied. Id. 

The ALJ then found Claimant had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:

“perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except: she can never 

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolding and no more than occasionally climb ramps 

and stairs, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl, bend, or twist. She should avoid 

concentrated exposure to noise at the jackhammer level or louder and work 

hazards, such as unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery. The 

claimant should be allowed to wear compression stockings. She can 

understand, remember and carry out no more than simple routine tasks, with 

no public contact and no more than occasional contact with coworkers and 

supervisors. The claimant cannot perform tasks with strict quotas (not engage 

in work where someone is checking up on the claimant throughout the work 

day to make sure she is on pace with a set goal, quota or with other employees), 

but she can do work where her performance is measured by what is completed 

at the end of the workday. Finally, she cannot perform work where pace is 

determined by a machine.” (R. 24). 

Based on this RFC, the ALJ found at step four that Claimant had past relevant 

work as an electrical assembler. (R. 30). The mental and physical demands of this

work did not exceed Claimant’s residual functional capacity, and so the ALJ 

concluded that Claimant would be able to perform that past relevant work as actually 

or generally performed. (R. 30). The ALJ also concluded at step five that, considering 

Claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity, 

she is capable of performing other work within the national economy and that those 

jobs exist in significant numbers. (R. 30–31). Specifically, the VE’s testimony, on 

which the ALJ relied, identified jobs at the medium exertional level, including 

cleaner, laundry worker, and assembler. Id. The ALJ then found Claimant was not 

under a disability from July 3, 2016 through May 23, 2019, the date of his decision. 

(R. 31). The Appeals Council declined to review the matter on April 24, 2020, (R. 1–

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8), making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, 

reviewable by this Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see, e.g., Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 

1765, 1775 (2019); Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a claimant files an application for disability benefits, he or she bears the 

burden under the Social Security Act of bringing forth evidence that proves his or her 

impairments are so severe that they prevent the performance of any substantial 

gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 147–48

(1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A five-step inquiry controls whether an 

individual is eligible for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, which the 

Seventh Circuit has summarized as follows:

The ALJ must consider whether: (1) the claimant is presently employed; (2) 

the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the 

claimant’s impairment meets or equals any impairment listed in the 

regulations as being so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity; (4) 

the claimant’s residual functional capacity leaves him unable to perform his 

past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is unable to perform any other work 

existing in significant numbers in the national economy.” 

Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. 

Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351–52 (7th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920). 

Claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four, but the burden shifts 

to the Commissioner at step five. Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2021); 

Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644 (7th Cir. 2022). 

A decision by an ALJ becomes the Commissioner’s final decision if the Appeals 

Council denies a request for review. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07 (2000). The 

reviewing court may enter a judgment “affirming, modifying, or reversing the 

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decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause 

for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review is limited to determining whether 

the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the 

ALJ applied the correct legal standards in reaching his or her decision. See Nelms v. 

Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009). Substantial evidence “means – and 

means only – such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal 

quotations omitted); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Fowlkes v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 

5191346, at *2 (7th Cir. 2021). “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other 

contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek, 139 S. 

Ct. at 1154. 

However, even where there is adequate evidence in the record to support the 

decision, the findings will not be upheld if the ALJ does not build a “logical bridge” 

from the evidence to the conclusion. Wilder, 22 F.4th 644 (citing Butler, 4 F.4th at

501). In other words, if the Commissioner’s decision lacks evidentiary support or 

adequate discussion of the issues, it cannot stand. See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 

562 (7th Cir. 2009). Though the standard of review is deferential, a reviewing court 

must “conduct a critical review of the evidence” before affirming the Commissioner’s 

decision. Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations 

omitted). The reviewing court may not, however, “displace the ALJ’s judgment by 

reconsidering facts or evidence, or by making independent credibility 

determinations.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008); see also, Gribben 

v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 59404, at *2 (7th Cir. 2022) (“We do not reweigh the evidence 

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or resolve conflicts in it.”). “[O]nly if the record compels a contrary result” will the 

court reverse the ALJ’s decision. Fowlkes, 2021 WL 5191346, at *2 (quoting Borovsky 

v. Holder, 612 F.3d 917, 921 (7th Cir. 2010)). 

ANALYSIS

I. The Medical Opinion Evidence

Claimant first argues that the ALJ erred by discounting, in whole or in part, 

every medical opinion of record, including those of consultative psychological 

examiner Dr. J.B. Goebel and both state agency consultants. Because Claimant filed 

her claim in August of 2017, the ALJ correctly evaluated the medical opinion evidence 

pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (2017). Under this new regulation, the ALJ “will 

not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any 

medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a 

claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ should

articulate “how persuasive [she] find[s] all of the medical opinions and all 

administrative medical findings in [a claimant’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520c(b). Factors to be considered in this evaluation include supportability, 

consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and other factors that 

tend to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative medical 

finding. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), (c). Supportability and consistency are the two 

most important factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2) (“The 

more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with 

the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the 

more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will 

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be.”). An ALJ’s decision must explain how she considered the factors of supportability 

and consistency, but she is not required to explain how she evaluated the other 

factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). 

Turning first to Dr. Goebel, the ALJ deemed his opinion “unpersuasive” 

because “it is inconsistent.” (R. 29). The Court cannot be sure what this means, 

because the ALJ does not elaborate on what record evidence was purportedly 

inconsistent with Dr. Goebel’s opinion. The Court assumes it is Claimant’s activities 

of daily living because the ALJ goes on to provide examples of activities that 

somewhat address Claimant’s ability to sustain concentration and persistence. (R. 

29) (“For example, Dr. Goebel also found the claimant capable of sustaining 

concentration, persistence, and pace to handle funds. Additionally, the claimant is 

able to maintain concentration and persistence to watch movies, drive, go out alone 

without getting lost, as she attended her appointment with Dr. Goebel alone, thus 

showing she is able to concentrate enough to go to new places.”) (internal citations 

omitted). This comprises the whole of the ALJ’s explanation for discounting Dr. 

Goebel’s opinion.

The ALJ did not provide sufficient reasons for disregarding Dr. Goebel’s 

opinion, making her analysis unsupported by even the low bar of more than a mere 

scintilla of evidence. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154. She does not appear to have

considered whether Dr. Goebel’s opinion was supportable or consistent with the 

record as a whole, which is one of “the most important factors” the ALJ should 

consider in determining the persuasive value of a medical source’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520c(b)(2). She does not cite to a single medical finding in evaluating Dr. 

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Goebel’s opinion, and given that Dr. Goebel reviewed Claimant’s treatment notes, 

interviewed Claimant, and authored a mental status examination during the 

relevant period regarding her limitations, (R. 434–37), more discussion by the ALJ 

was required under the regulations. 

The ALJ also did not address, at least to this Court’s satisfaction, the opinions 

of the state agency consultants, which are now considered prior administrative 

medical findings. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(5). The ALJ rejected the consultants’ 

opinions that Claimant should be restricted to one- to two-step tasks and had 

moderate limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying information 

because they were “not supported by the record.” (R. 28). More discussion of 

Claimant’s activities of daily living followed – namely, Claimant’s ability to drive and 

brush her teeth – after which the ALJ also noted that the state agency consultants’ 

opinions were internally inconsistent because they reported Claimant was mildly 

limited in her ability to interact with others, but moderately limited in public contact. 

Id. No citations to medical findings or objective medical evidence appear in the ALJ’s 

discussion. Id. 

As with a medical source opinion, “the most important factors” in evaluating a 

prior administrative medical finding are supportability and consistency. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520c(b)(2). But the ALJ addressed neither when she rejected the one- to twostep task limitation and moderate limitation in understanding, remembering, and 

applying information both consultants thought was necessary to accommodate 

Claimant’s limitations in the workplace. Simply stating, without elaboration or 

support, that their opinions were “not supported by the record” does not provide this 

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Court an avenue for meaningful review of that conclusion. This error, together with 

the ALJ’s cursory treatment of Dr. Goebel’s opinion, requires remand. Stevens v. 

Kijakazi, 2022 WL 1000598, at *7 (E.D. Wis. 2022) (citing Bonnett v. Kijakazi, 859 F. 

App’x 19, 20 (8th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); Starman v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 4459729, 

(E.D. Mo. 2021)). 

On remand, the ALJ should be careful not to place outsized importance on 

Claimant’s activities of daily living in evaluating the medical opinion evidence,

Claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, and ultimately, in determining Claimant’s 

RFC. (R. 27, 635). Activities of daily living can provide valuable insight into a 

claimant’s functional abilities, but an ALJ must be careful not to go too far and 

“equate the ability to engage in some activities with an ability to work full-time, 

without a recognition that full-time work does not allow for the flexibility to work 

around periods of incapacitation.”Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1126 (7th Cir. 2014)

(citing Roddy v. Astrue, 705 F.3d 631, 639 (7th Cir. 2013); Carradine v. Barnhart, 360 

F.3d 751, 755–56 (7th Cir. 2004); Bjornson v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 

2012)). This is particularly true here, where the nature of the disability alleged

(severe migraines and headaches) might permit entirely symptom-free days on which 

basic activities of daily living might be accomplished. Moore, 743 F.3d at 1126. That 

is, if Claimant has an incapacitating migraine once or twice a week, that still would 

allow her most of the week to complete household chores or the other activities of 

daily living activities the ALJ cited in her opinion. But an employer probably would 

not be so understanding.

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Overall, the persuasiveness of Dr. Goebel’s opinion and the prior 

administrative medical findings were crucial to the ALJ’s decision. Those opinions, 

together with that of Claimant’s treating physician Dr. Boyd, provided the deepest 

insight into Claimant’s limitations and should have helped inform the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment in a meaningful way. Because the ALJ did not address the supportability 

and consistency of those opinions, remand is required.

II. Remaining Issues

The Court is remanding only on the error identified above regarding the ALJ’s 

treatment of the medical opinion evidence. But remanding on this basis is likely to 

affect the other two issues Claimant raises in this case, as the ALJ’s longitudinal view 

of the medical record is intertwined with how Claimant’s limitations – namely, her 

headaches – are ultimately accommodated in the RFC assessment and how the ALJ 

evaluates Claimant’s subjective symptom testimony. The Court, accordingly, sees no 

need to lengthen this Memorandum Opinion and Order by addressing Claimant’s 

other arguments in a case that is being remanded anyway. Nor would the Court’s 

assessment of the other disputes Claimant posits change the result in this case, which 

is to remand for further proceedings and a more fulsome assessment of potential jobs 

available to an individual with Claimant’s limitations. The Commissioner, however, 

should not assume that the Court agrees with the ALJ’s analysis of those issues. 

Claimant should make no assumptions either.

In conclusion, the Court expresses no opinion about the decision to be made on 

remand but encourages the Commissioner to do what is necessary to build a logical 

bridge between the evidence in the record and her ultimate conclusions, whatever 

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those conclusions may be. See, e.g., Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(“On remand, the ALJ should consider all of the evidence in the record, and, if 

necessary, give the parties the opportunity to expand the record so that he may build 

a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions”); Smith v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 

433, 437 (7th Cir. 2000); Luna v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 1994). 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for all these reasons, Claimant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

[ECF No. 18] is granted and the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment

[ECF No. 23] is denied. This matter is remanded to the Social Security 

Administration for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s Memorandum 

Opinion and Order.

It is so ordered.

____________________________

Jeffrey T. Gilbert

United States Magistrate Judge 

Dated: September 30, 2022

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