IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

BRABUS GmbH, )

) Case No.: 20-cv-3720

Plaintiff, ) 

) Judge Charles R. Norgle, Sr.

v. )

)

THE INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS, )

LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, )

PARTNERSHIPS AND UNINCORPORATED )

ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED ON SCHEDULE A )

HERETO, )

)

Defendants. )

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF 

DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST 

THE DEFENDANTS IDENTIFIED IN AMENDED SCHEDULE A

Plaintiff BRABUS GmbH (“BRABUS”) submits the following memorandum in support 

of its Motion for Entry of Default and Default Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 against the 

Defendants listed in Amended Schedule A (collectively, the “Defaulting Defendants”). 

The Defaulting Defendants, as set forth in the Complaint, have been charged with 

trademark infringement and counterfeiting, false designation of origin and violation of the 

Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Excluded from this motion are defendants who

have settled with Plaintiff.

BRABUS GmbH takes pride in its products which are emblematic of its mission to

provide high quality products. Since the initial launch of the original BRABUS brand products, 

the BRABUS trademark is and has been the subject of substantial and continuous marketing and 

promotion by Plaintiff. Plaintiff has and continues to widely market and promote the BRABUS

brand in the industry and to consumers. Plaintiff’s promotional efforts include — by way of 

example, but not limitation — substantial print media, the BRABUS websites and social media

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sites, and point of sale materials. [Complaint, Dkt. 1 at ¶ 9.] Long before Defendants’ acts

described herein, Plaintiff launched the BRABUS brand products. Plaintiff BRABUS GmbH is 

the owner of the BRABUS Trademark registrations. [Complaint, Dkt. 1 at ¶ 7.] The BRABUS

Trademarks qualify as famous marks and have been continuously used and never abandoned. 

[Complaint, Dkt. 1 at ¶ 11.]

On information and belief, Defaulting Defendants are an interrelated group of

counterfeiters working in active concert to knowingly and willfully manufacture, import, 

distribute, offer for sale, and sell products bearing infringing and/or counterfeit versions of the 

BRABUS Trademarks (the “Counterfeit/Infringing Products”) in the same transaction, 

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Id. at ¶ 13. Defaulting Defendants conduct 

business throughout the United States, including within the State of Illinois and this Judicial 

District, through the operation of fully interactive commercial websites and online marketplaces 

operating under the Defendant Domain Names and Online Marketplace Accounts (collectively, 

the “Defendant Internet Stores”) identified in Amended Schedule A. Id. Each Defaulting 

Defendant targets the United States, including Illinois, and has offered to sell, and on information 

and belief, has sold and continues to sell Counterfeit BRABUS Products to consumers within the

United States, including the State of Illinois. Id. Additional factual assertions applicable to

Defaulting Defendants are found in Paragraphs 14-24 of the Complaint and are incorporated 

herein. Id. at ¶¶ 14-24.

Plaintiff filed this action on June 25, 2020 alleging, among other claims, federal 

trademark infringement and seeks statutory damages and injunctive relief. [Dkt. 1]. On July 

24, 2020, this Court granted Plaintiff’ Ex Parte Motion for Entry of a Temporary Restraining 

Order (the “TRO”) [Dkt. 22].

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Paragraph 13 of the TRO permitted Plaintiff to complete service of process to 

Defendants by electronic publication at the Defendant Domain Names which were transferred to

Plaintiff’s control, or by sending an e-mail to the e-mail addresses identified in Exhibit 1 of the 

Hosters Declaration and any e-mail addresses provided for Defendants by third parties. The 

Defendants identified in Amended Schedule A were properly served on August 17, 2020. [Dkt. 

No. 39]. None of the Defaulting Defendants has entered an appearance or otherwise defended 

this action. See Declaration of Michael A. Hierl (the “Hierl Declaration”) at ¶ 2.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) and (b)(2), Plaintiff now moves this 

Court for an Order entering default and default judgment finding that Defaulting Defendants are 

liable on Counts I-III of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) and (b)(2). Plaintiff further 

seeks an award of statutory damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2) for willful 

trademark counterfeiting against each of the Defaulting Defendants for use of infringing and 

counterfeit BRABUS Trademarks in connection with products sold through each of the 

Defendant Internet Stores. Plaintiff also seeks entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting 

Defaulting Defendants from selling Counterfeit/Infringing Products, an Order that the domain 

names used by Defaulting Defendants to sell Counterfeit BRABUS Products be permanently 

transferred to Plaintiff, and that all assets in Defaulting Defendants’ financial accounts operated

by Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”), DHgate, PayPal, Inc. (“PayPal”) and eBay, as well as any 

newly discovered assets, be transferred to Plaintiff.

ARGUMENT 

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ARE PROPER IN THIS COURT

This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over the claims in this action pursuant 

to the provisions of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)-(b) and 28 

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U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and this Court may 

properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants since each of the Defendants directly 

targets business activities toward consumers in Illinois and causes harm to Plaintiff’s business 

within this Judicial District. See [Complaint, Dkt. 1, at ¶ 5;] uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc. 

623 F.3d 421, 423-24 (7th Cir. 2010) (without benefit of an evidentiary hearing, plaintiff bears 

only the burden of making a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction; all of plaintiff's asserted 

facts should be accepted as true and any factual determinations should be resolved in its favor).

Through at least the fully interactive commercial Internet websites and online

marketplace accounts operating under the Defendant Internet Stores, each of the Defaulting 

Defendants has targeted sales from Illinois residents by operating websites and/or online 

marketplace accounts that offer shipping to the United States, including Illinois and, on 

information and belief, has sold Counterfeit/Infringing Products to residents within the United 

States, including Illinois. Many of the websites look sophisticated and accept payment in U.S. 

Dollars via credit cards, Amazon, DHgate and PayPal. [Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 15]. As such, personal 

jurisdiction is proper since each of the Defaulting Defendants is committing tortious acts in

Illinois, is engaging in interstate commerce and has wrongfully caused Plaintiff substantial injury 

in the State of Illinois. See Estee Lauder Cosmetics Ltd. & Make-up Art Cosmetics Inc. v. AliBeauties Store Store, et al., No. 1:19-cv-04579 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2019) (unpublished) (Dkt. No. 

49); Bose Corp. v. Amilineinc, et al., No. 1:19-cv-05347 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2019) (unpublished) 

(Dkt No. 44); Eye Safety Systems, Inc. v. 1CN7085, et al., No. 1:19-cv-06005 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 

2019) (unpublished) (Dkt No. 49); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Acinth Girl Hy Store, et al., No. 1:19-

cv-06200 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2019) (unpublished) (Dkt No. 48).

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II. PLAINTIFF HAS MET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

Pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “when a party against 

whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and

that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 55(a). On June 25, 2020 Plaintiff filed its Complaint alleging, among other claims, 

trademark infringement and counterfeiting, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (Count I); false designation of

origin, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Count II); and violation of Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade 

Practices Act, 815 ILCS § 510/1, et. seq. (Count III). The Defendants were properly served on 

August 17, 2020. [Dkt. 39]. Despite having been served with process, the Defaulting 

Defendants have ignored these proceedings and failed to plead or otherwise defend this action. 

Hierl Declaration at ¶ 2. Accordingly, Plaintiff ask for entry of default and default judgment 

against the Defaulting Defendants.

III. PLAINTIFF HAS MET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTRY OF 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a court-ordered 

default judgment. A default judgment establishes, as a matter of law, that defendants are liable 

to plaintiff on each cause of action alleged in the complaint. United States v. Di Mucci, 879 

F.2d 1488, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989). When the Court determines that a defendant is in default, the 

factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true and may not be challenged, and the 

defendants are liable as a matter of law as to each cause of action alleged in the complaint. 

Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1399 (7th Cir. 1994).

More than twenty-one (21) days have passed since Defendants were served, and no 

answer or other responsive pleading has been filed by any of the Defaulting Defendants

identified in Amended Schedule A. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A). Accordingly, default 

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judgment is appropriate, and consistent with previous similar cases in front of this Court, 

Plaintiff request an award of statutory damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2) for 

willful trademark infringement and counterfeiting against each of the Defaulting Defendants for 

use of infringing and counterfeit imitations of Plaintiff’s Trademarks in connection with 

products sold through the Defendant Internet Stores. Plaintiff also seeks entry of a permanent 

injunction prohibiting Defaulting Defendants from selling Counterfeit/Infringing Products, an 

order that domain names used by Defaulting Defendants to sell Counterfeit BRABUS Products 

be permanently transferred to Plaintiff, and that all assets in Defaulting Defendants’ financial 

accounts operated by Amazon, DHgate, eBay and PayPal and any newly identified accounts be 

transferred to Plaintiff.

A. False Designation of Origin

A plaintiff bringing a false designation of origin claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) must 

show that: (1) the plaintiff has a protectable trademark; and (2) a likelihood of confusion will 

exist as to the origin of plaintiff’s products. All Star Championship Racing, Inc. v. O’Reilly 

Auto. Stores, Inc., 2013 WL 1701871, *10 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2013) (citing Johnny Blastoff, Inc. 

v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., 188 F. 3d 427, 436 (7th Cir. 1999)). This is the same test that 

is used for bringing a trademark infringement claim under the Lanham Act. See Neopost, 403 F. 

Supp. 2d at 684.

Plaintiff alleged in its Complaint that Defaulting Defendants are using the federally 

registered BRABUS Trademarks without authorization on the Counterfeit/Infringing Products.

This creates a likelihood of confusion, mistake, and deception among the general public as to 

the affiliation, connection, or association with Plaintiff or the origin, sponsorship, or approval 

of Defaulting Defendants’ Counterfeit/Infringing Products by Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 32-36. 

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Furthermore, by using the BRABUS Trademarks on the Counterfeit/Infringing Products, 

Defaulting Defendants create a false designation of origin and a misleading representation of 

fact as to the origin and sponsorship of the Counterfeit Counterfeit/Infringing Products. Id. As a 

result, Plaintiff requests entry of judgment with respect to Count II for willful false designation 

of origin against the Defaulting Defendants.

B. Violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act

In Illinois, courts resolve unfair competition and deceptive trade practices claims 

“according to the principles set forth in the Lanham Act.” Spex, Inc. v. The Joy of Spex, Inc., 

847 F.Supp. 567, 579 (N.D. Ill. 1994). Illinois courts look to federal case law and apply the 

same analysis to state infringement claims. Id. (citation omitted). As such, the determination as 

to whether there is a likelihood of confusion under the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade 

Practices Act is similar to the Lanham Act analysis. Am. Broad. Co. v. Maljack Prods., Inc., 34 

F. Supp. 2d 665, 681 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 

Plaintiff alleged in its Complaint that Defaulting Defendants have engaged in acts 

violating Illinois law including, but not limited to, passing off their products as those of

Plaintiff, causing likelihood of confusion and/or misunderstanding as to the source of their

goods, causing a likelihood of confusion and/or misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, 

or association with Plaintiff’s genuine products, representing that their counterfeit products have 

Plaintiff’s approval when they do not, and engaging in other couduct which creates a likelihood 

of confusion or misunderstanding among the public. [Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 37-40]. Plaintiff, therefore, 

requests entry of judgment with respect to Count III of its Complaint for willful violation of the

Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act against Defaulting Defendants. 

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IV. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO MONETARY DAMAGES AND 

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 

The awarding of statutory damages serves dual interests in that it is remedial in nature,

but also intended to protect an important public interest. Given the broader economic losses and 

harm to the job market caused by counterfeiting, coupled with the possible dangers to 

consumers who are tricked into purchasing low quality, counterfeit products over the Internet, it 

is important to both penalize defendants and try to deter future violations.

Plaintiff advertises throughout the world and spends considerable resources marketing 

and protecting its trademark and associated products. Plaintiff’s promotional efforts include

website and social media sites. [Dkt. 1 at ¶ 9]. 

A. Statutory Damages Are Appropriate in this Case

Pursuant to the statutory damages provision of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), a

plaintiff in a case involving the use of a counterfeit mark may elect to receive “not less than

$1,000 or more than $200,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered 

for sale, or distributed, as the court considers just.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1). When the 

counterfeiting is found to be willful, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2) provides for statutory damages of 

up to “$2,000,000 per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale, or

distributed, as the court considers just.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2).

Although 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) contains the dollar range for possible statutory damage 

awards, the only guidance provided by the statute for how to determine a damage award within 

the statutory dollar range is “as the court considers just.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). Courts 

interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) have analogized case law applying the statutory damage 

provision of the Copyright Act contained in 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). See Lorillard Tobacco Co., 

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22563, *10; Sara Lee v. Bags of New York, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 161, 

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166 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). In Sara Lee, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 170, the court awarded statutory damages 

in the amount of $750,000 after estimating the defendants' ill-gotten gains and trebling them to 

"deter and punish a willful continuous course of infringements and defiance of the judicial 

process." The Sara Lee analysis included seven factors: (1) the profits made by the defendants; 

(2) the revenues lost by plaintiff; (3) the value of the mark; (4) the deterrent effect on others; 

(5) whether the conduct was innocent or wilful; (6) whether a defendant has cooperated in 

providing records; and (7) the deterrent effect on the defendant.

The USPTO’s Office of Policy and International Affairs and the National 

Telecommunications and Information Administration (“NTIA”) together working as part of the 

Department of Commerce’s Internet Policy Task Force conducted a review of the relationship 

between the availability and protection of online copyrighted works and innovation in the 

Internet economy. The Internet Policy Task Force’s White Paper on Remixes, First Sale, and 

Statutory Damages (White Paper) was published on January 28, 2016 (See Exhibit 2), which 

recognizes in copyright law that reduced damages may be warranted to avoid impeding new 

creative works, e.g., remixes -- works created through changing and combining existing works 

to produce something new and creative -- as part of a trend of user generated content. 

However, regarding straight-out counterfeiting where impeding creativity is not a concern, The 

Office of the U. S. Trade Representative issued findings of the Special 301 Out-of-Cycle 

Review of Notorious Markets for 2015, December 2015 (See Exhibit 3), highlighting

disturbing trends in the marketing and distribution of counterfeit goods online, with escalating 

levels of counterfeit sales online including an increase in the services that support such 

operations. With an estimated 15% increase in online sales of counterfeit goods, the economic 

toll of counterfeiting on governments, businesses, and consumers is disturbing.

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Accordingly, a significant consideration should be whether infringing sales were made 

over the Internet, the rationale being that sales over the Internet increase the amount of an 

award because use of the Internet made the infringement widely available.

The lack of information regarding Defaulting Defendants’ sales and profits makes 

statutory damages particularly appropriate for default cases like the instant case. See Petmed 

Express, Inc. v. medpets.com, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1220 (S.D. Fla. 2004). Likewise, 

Courts have recognized that statutory damages should be awarded without requiring an 

evidentiary hearing. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Montrose Wholesale Candies & Sundries, 

Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31761, *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2008).

B. Defendants’ Counterfeiting Was Willful

As alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defaulting Defendants facilitate sales by designing 

the Defendant Internet Stores so that they appear to unknowing consumers to be authorized 

online retailers, outlet stores, or wholesalers selling genuine Plaintiff’s products. [Dkt. 1 at ¶ 14].

Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(e), a counterfeiting violation is presumed willful “for 

purposes of determining relief if the violator ... knowingly provided ... materially false contact 

information to a domain name registrar....” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(e). Many of the Defaulting 

Defendants Internet Stores look sophisticated and often include images and design elements that 

make it very difficult for consumers to distinguish the counterfeit sites from the authorized 

website. [Dkt. 1 at ¶ 14]. Thus, willfulness is presumed in the present case under 15 U.S.C. § 

1117(e).

Even without the statutory presumption, it is clear that Defaulting Defendants’ 

counterfeiting was willful. “Willful infringement may be attributed to the defendant’s actions 

where he had knowledge that his conduct constituted infringement or where he showed a 

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reckless disregard for the owner’s rights.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. S & M Cent. Serv. Corp., 

2004 LEXIS 22563, *19-20 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005). As such, knowledge need not be proven 

directly, but can be inferred from a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 20. In the present case, Defaulting 

Defendants clearly had knowledge that their activities constituted infringement or at least a 

reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s rights in the BRABUS Trademarks, especially given Plaintiff’s

extensive promotional efforts discussed above. After all, the Defendants were taking great pains 

to conceal their identities to try to avoid being held accountable for their counterfeiting activities. 

[Dkt. 1 at ¶ 4, ¶ 18]. 

Finally, District Courts have deemed counterfeiting willful when defendants default. See

Estee Lauder Cosmetics Ltd. & Make-up Art Cosmetics Inc. v. Ali-Beauties Store Store, et al., No. 

1:19-cv-04579 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2019) (unpublished) (Dkt. No. 49); Bose Corp. v. Amilineinc, et 

al., No. 1:19-cv-05347 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2019) (unpublished) (Dkt No. 44); Eye Safety Systems, 

Inc. v. 1CN7085, et al., No. 1:19-cv-06005 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2019) (unpublished) (Dkt No. 49);

Levi Strauss & Co. v. Acinth Girl Hy Store, et al., No. 1:19-cv-06200 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2019)

(unpublished) (Dkt No. 48).

C. A High Statutory Damages Award Is Appropriate and Just

Courts have awarded high damage amounts where a defendant’s counterfeiting activities 

attracted wide market exposure through Internet traffic or advertisement. See Coach, Inc. v. 

Ocean Point Gifts, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59003, *15-16 (D.N.J. Jun. 14, 2010) (high damage 

awards in counterfeit cases were “due in part to the wide market exposure that the Internet can 

provide”); Burberry Ltd. v. Designers Imports, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3605, *28-29 

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2010) (damages amount based, in part, on “Defendant's ability to reach a 

vast customer base through internet advertising”). Courts in this district have also considered 

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the significant value of a plaintiff’s brand and the efforts taken to protect, promote and enhance 

that brand in determining the appropriate dollar figure for the award. Lorillard Tobacco Co.,

2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22563, *16.

In similar cases involving willful Internet-based counterfeiting, Courts in this district 

have awarded significant damages, including up to the maximum provided by law, to the 

plaintiff to serve the purposes of: (1) deterring the defendant and others situated like him from 

bringing into commerce counterfeit goods, (2) compensating the plaintiff for damages caused by 

defendant’s infringement, and (3) punishing the defendant appropriately for his counterfeiting 

activities. See, e.g., Burberry Limited, et al. v. The Partnerships And Unincorporated 

Associations Identified On Schedule “A”, No. 1:14-cv-04824 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 25, 2014) 

(unpublished) (Docket No. 38) (awarding $2,000,000 in statutory damages per defendant);

Calvin Klein Trademark Trust et al. v. Chen Xiao Dong, et al., No. 15-cv-2224 (N.D. Ill. May 

12, 2015) (unpublished) (Docket No. 45) (awarding $2,000,000 in statutory damages per

defendant.) Given the Court’s clear discretion in determining the appropriate amount of the

statutory damages award within the statutory limits of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c), Plaintiff

respectfully request the Court’s entry of an award of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000)

per Defaulting Defendant.

Additionally, the remedy imposed under the statute must provide a sufficient deterrent 

effect to ensure that the guilty party will not engage in further infringing conduct. Sands, 

Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1348 (7th Cir. 1994). For example, in 

Phillip Morris USA Inc. v. Marlboro Express, the Court stated that due to “the size of the 

potential profit given the quantities of [counterfeit goods] involved, and the need for a 

substantial deterrent to future misconduct by defendants and other counterfeit traffickers ... 

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plaintiff is entitled to the maximum statutory award under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2).” 2005 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 40359, *28 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2005).

Finally, in determining an appropriate damage award, this Court should be guided by the 

Lorillard case and consider the “significant value of [the Plaintiff] brand and the efforts taken 

to protect, promote and enhance that brand.” Lorillard Tobacco Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

22563, *16. Thus, Plaintiff’s request for statutory damages award should be given favorable 

consideration in light of Plaintiff’s effort to protect, promote and enhance the BRABUS brand.

D. Plaintiff is Entitled to Permanent Injunctive Relief

In addition to the foregoing relief, Plaintiff respectfully requests entry of a permanent 

injunction enjoining Defaulting Defendants from infringing or otherwise violating Plaintiff’s

registered trademark rights in the BRABUS Trademarks, including at least all injunctive relief 

previously awarded by this Court to Plaintiff in the TRO and Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff is

also entitled to injunctive relief so it can quickly take action against any new websites and online 

marketplace accounts that are identified, found to be linked to Defaulting Defendants, and selling 

Counterfeit Plaintiff’s Products. See Estee Lauder Cosmetics Ltd. & Make-up Art Cosmetics Inc. 

v. Ali-Beauties Store Store, et al., No. 1:19-cv-04579 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2019) (unpublished)

(Dkt. No. 49); Bose Corp. v. Amilineinc, et al., No. 1:19-cv-05347 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2019)

(unpublished) (Dkt No. 44); Eye Safety Systems, Inc. v. 1CN7085, et al., No. 1:19-cv-06005 (N.D. 

Ill. Nov. 19, 2019) (unpublished) (Dkt No. 49); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Acinth Girl Hy Store, et al., 

No. 1:19-cv-06200 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2019) (unpublished) (Dkt No. 48).

V. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court enter default and default judgment against 

each Defaulting Defendant, award statutory damages in the amount of one hundred thousand

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dollars ($100,000) per Defaulting Defendant pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) and enter a 

permanent injunction order prohibiting Defaulting Defendants from selling 

Counterfeit/Infringing Products, permanently transferring the domain names used by Defaulting

Defendants to sell Counterfeit/Infringing Products to Plaintiff, and transferring all assets in 

Defaulting Defendants’ financial accounts operated by Amazon, DHgate, eBay and PayPal to 

BRABUS GmbH.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: November 18, 2020

By: s/Michael A. Hierl _

Michael A. Hierl (Bar No. 3128021)

William B. Kalbac (Bar No. 6301771)

Hughes Socol Piers Resnick & Dym, Ltd.

Three First National Plaza

70 W. Madison Street, Suite 4000

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 580-0100 Telephone

mhierl@hsplegal.com

wkalbac@hsplegal.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

THOSE CHARACTERS FROM 

CLEVELAND, LLC.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned attorney hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing Memorandum was filed electronically with the Clerk of the Court and served on 

all counsel of record and interested parties via the CM/ECF system on November 18, 2020.

/s/ Michael A. Hierl

Michael A. Hierl

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