J-S32035-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: B.S., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.S.-W., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 253 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered December 20, 2017

in the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County 

Orphans’ Court at No.: 18-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., NICHOLS, J., and PLATT*, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED AUGUST 20, 2018

A.S.-W. (Mother) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas 

of Mifflin County (trial court), entered December 20, 2017, which involuntarily 

terminated her parental rights to her son, B.S. (Child) (born 8/08).1

Mifflin County Children and Youth Services (CYS) took Child into 

emergency custody on March 16, 2016. The trial court adjudicated Child 

dependent on April 11, 2016, based on allegations that Mother abused drugs 

and alcohol, and she was unable to care for Child. Child has remained in the 

legal custody of CYS ever since. 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court confirmed the consent to termination of the parental rights 

of Child’s natural father, J.P. (Father), in an order entered on December 8, 

2017. 
J-S32035-18

- 2 -

The trial court held permanency review hearings on September 1, 2016, 

February 3, 2017, and June 12, 2017, at each of which it found that Mother 

had not complied with the goals and objectives set forth for her in her child 

permanency plan.

CYS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on August 23, 

2017. The trial court held a hearing on that petition on December 8, 2017. 

The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent Child.

At the hearing, Mother testified she was incarcerated and had been since 

June 12, 2017. (See N.T. Hearing, 12/08/17, at 68).

2

 

Mother testified that she left Child in the care of S.S. (Putative Father) 

in 2013 when she entered rehab, despite several PFAs she had entered against 

him. (See id. at 76-77, 97). Mother testified that she only saw Child two 

times in 2014. (See id. at 99). Mother was incarcerated for three and one 

half months in the spring of 2015, after which she moved back in with Putative 

Father and Child for two weeks. (See id. at 99-100). Mother testified she 

did not see Child much in the remainder of 2015 other than a trip to the beach 

in August of that year, and for Thanksgiving and Christmas. (See id. at 100-

01). During this time, Mother lived with various friends. (See id. at 101). 

 

2 Mother was incarcerated at SCI Cambridge Springs at the time of the 

termination hearing. Mother’s incarceration was not a material factor in her 

failure to correct the conditions that led to Child’s removal from her care.
J-S32035-18

- 3 -

By her own admission, Mother had no contact with Child during 2016, and she 

was again using heroin. (See id. at 102-03).

Mother admitted that she did nothing to preserve her relationship with 

Child from the time of placement in March of 2016, through her incarceration 

in the spring of 2017, because she was on the run from an outstanding warrant 

and not capable of caring for Child. (See id. at 107). She admitted to not 

giving her address to CYS because of the same outstanding warrant. (See id.

at 103-04).

Mother has provided no financial support for Child while Child has been 

in placement. (See id. at 105). Mother acknowledged that she never got a 

mental health evaluation, never went to rehab and did not have stable housing 

as provided for in the child permanency plans. (See id. at 108).

Nicole Patkalitsky, Child’s caseworker at CYS, testified that there is no 

evidence of any bond between Mother and Child, and that Child has never 

asked to see Mother. (See id. at 42). When asked if the termination of 

Mother’s parental rights would have any negative impact on Child, Ms. 

Patkalitsky answered, “None whatsoever.” (Id.). Ms. Patalinsky testified that 

Child looks to his pre-adoptive foster mother, “for everything.” (Id. at 41). 

Ms. Patkalitsky opined that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would 

be in Child’s best interests. (See id. at 42). 

The trial court entered its order involuntarily terminating Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b) on 
J-S32035-18

- 4 -

December 20, 2017. Mother filed her notice of appeal and concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal on January 22, 2018.

Mother raises the following question on appeal:

1. Whether the orphans’ court committed an abuse of discretion 

or error of law when it concluded that [CYS] established grounds 

for termination of parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2), 

(a)(5), and (a)(8)?

(Mother’s Brief, at 5).

Our standard of review is as follows:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our scope 

of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 

presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Further, we have stated:

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court 

even though the record could support an opposite result. 

We are bound by the findings of the trial court 

which have adequate support in the record so long as 

the findings do not evidence capricious disregard for 

competent and credible evidence. The trial court is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. 

Though we are not bound by the trial court’s 

inferences and deductions, we may reject its 

conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are 

clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s 

sustainable findings.
J-S32035-18

- 5 -

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the termination 

of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). 

Requests to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are 

governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard 

to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on 

any of the following grounds:

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of 

the parent by the court or under a voluntary 

agreement with an agency, 12 months or more 

have elapsed from the date of removal or 

placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist and termination of parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis 

of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found 

to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect 

to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) 
J-S32035-18

- 6 -

or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of 

notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(8) and (b). 

With regard to Section 2511(a)(8), in order to terminate 

parental rights, an agency must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that (1) that the child has been removed from the care 

of the parent for at least twelve (12) months; (2) that the 

conditions which had led to the removal or placement of the child 

still exist; and (3) that termination of parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the child.

In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Further, 

[a] parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness 

in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parentchild relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for 

a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her 

physical and emotional needs. 

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted).
J-S32035-18

- 7 -

The Adoption Act provides that a trial court “shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make specific 

reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child but our case 

law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 

484 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court is not 

required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation 

performed by an expert. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 

2008).

We have examined the record and are satisfied that it contains sufficient 

credible evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). 

Child was removed from Mother’s care in March of 2016 and has been 

in foster care continuously since then. The conditions that led to Child’s 

placement, Mother’s abuse of drugs and her inability to care for Child, exist in 

that Mother admits to heroin use and has failed to meet any of the goals of 

her child permanency plan. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion 

when it terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to subsection (a)(8). 

Although Mother did not challenge the termination of her parental rights 

under subsection (b), our review of the record reveals sufficient evidence to 

terminate her parental rights under that section. 
J-S32035-18

- 8 -

Ms. Patkalitsy’s testimony makes clear that there is no bond between 

Mother and Child and that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would 

have no detrimental effect on Child. Child is in a pre-adoptive foster home 

where his foster parent provides for all his needs. The trial court did not abuse 

its discretion when it terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

subsection (b). 

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin

County that terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§

2511(a)(8) and (b). 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 08/20/2018