alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1
 
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
 
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report of Cavalry Bancorp, Inc., (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Ed C. Loughry, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
 
 
 
 Date: May 6, 2004
by:Ed C. Loughry, Jr.Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer
<PAGE>
                                                                    Exhibit 99.2


INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS' REPORT

To the Board of Directors
Navistar Financial Retail Receivables Corporation:

We have examined management's assertion that Navistar Financial Corporation (the
"Company") has complied as of and for the year ended October 31, 2004, with its
established minimum servicing standards described in the accompanying
Management's Assertion Concerning Compliance dated January 31, 2005, for the
servicing of the receivables for the Navistar Financial 2003-A Owner Trust.  The
Company's management is responsible for compliance with those minimum servicing
standards.  Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's
assertion about the Company's compliance based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards
established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and,
accordingly, included examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company's
compliance with its minimum servicing standards and performing such other
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.  We believe that our
examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.  Our examination does
not provide a legal determination on the Company's compliance with its minimum
servicing standards.

Our examination disclosed the following material noncompliance with the
Company's minimum servicing standards.  The Company was noncompliant with the
requirement that custodial bank accounts and related bank clearing accounts are
reconciled within 45 days after the cutoff date as specified in item I.1.b in
the minimum servicing standards.

In our opinion, except for the noncompliance described in the preceding
paragraph, management's assertion that the Company complied with the
aforementioned minimum servicing standards as of and for the year ended October
31, 2004 is fairly stated, in all material respects based on the criteria set
forth in Appendix I.



/s/ DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP
    Deloitte & Touche LLP
    Chicago, IL


January 31, 2005
AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

__________ District of __________

)

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff

v. Civil Action No.

Defendant

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To:

(Name of the plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint,

two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you. 

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case. 

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service. 

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within

60 days from , the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the

United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date:

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Printed name of party waiving service of summons Printed name

Address

E-mail address

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons

and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in

the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff

and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

1,66$102725$&&(37$1&(&25325$7,21(48,)$;,1)250$7,216(59,&(6//&

(;3(5,$1,1)250$7,2162/87,216,1&DQG75$1681,21//&

 Northern District of Illinois

NATELLA A. SOLOMON

1:20-cv-02624

Joseph S. Davidson

05/07/2020

05/11/2020

TRANSUNION LLC

/s/ Sandra Davis Jansen

Sandra Davis Jansen, Esq

SCHUCKIT & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

4545 Northwestern Drive

Zionsville, Indiana 46077

sjansen@schuckitlaw.com

(317) 363-2400

Case: 1:20-cv-02624 Document #: 11 Filed: 05/11/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:42
The State of TexasAppellee/s



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

August 19, 2014

N o. 04

- 14

- 00498

- CR

Benjamin ELIAS

, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 12, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 427052

Honorable Scott Roberts, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

The Appellant ’ s Motion for Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal is hereby

GRANTED.

_________________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 19th day of August, 2014

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### J. M. Lester *v.*Thomas C. Winfrey.

Judgment — Interlocutory Judgment May Be Disregarded by Court.

A judgment can not be final merely because it decides some question of law or fact relating even to final relief, not merely because it decides wbat are the rights of the parties as to such relief. An interlocutory judgment may be- entirely disregarded by tlhe cóurt when the final judgment is rendered.

APPEAL PROM CUMBERLAND CIRCUIT COURT.

October 31, 1871.

*613
      *Garnett, Winfrey, for appellant.*

*James, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Pryor :

There has been no such final order or judgment rendered in this case by the court below, as will authorize an appeal to this court.

•The order or judgment appealed from is merely an opinion expressed by the court to the effect that the appellee is in a condition to make the appellant a good title. The title has not been made or required to be accepted by the appellant, and no judgment rendered against him for any of the purchase money. “A judgment can not be final merely because it decides some question of law or fact relating even to final relief, not merely because it decides what are the rights of the parties as to such relief.” *Bonderant v. Appersom,*4 *Metcalf*30. The order from which this appeal is prayed may be entirely disregarded by the court when the final judgment is rendered. The appeal for the reason given is dismissed.
[Federal Register Volume 79, Number 219 (Thursday, November 13, 2014)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Page 68091]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2014-27105]



[[Page 68089]]

Vol. 79

Thursday,

No. 219

November 13, 2014

Part V





The President





-----------------------------------------------------------------------



Notice of November 12, 2014--Continuation of the National Emergency 
With Respect to Iran


                        Presidential Documents 



Federal Register / Vol. 79 , No. 219 / Thursday, November 13, 2014 / 
Presidential Documents

___________________________________________________________________

Title 3--
The President

[[Page 68091]]

                Notice of November 12, 2014

                
Continuation of the National Emergency With 
                Respect to Iran

                On November 14, 1979, by Executive Order 12170, the 
                President declared a national emergency with respect to 
                Iran and, pursuant to the International Emergency 
                Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706), took related 
                steps to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat 
                to the national security, foreign policy, and economy 
                of the United States constituted by the situation in 
                Iran. Because our relations with Iran have not yet 
                returned to normal, and the process of implementing the 
                agreements with Iran, dated January 19, 1981, is still 
                under way, the national emergency declared on November 
                14, 1979, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 
                2014. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of 
                the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am 
                continuing for 1 year the national emergency with 
                respect to Iran declared in Executive Order 12170.

                This notice shall be published in the Federal Register 
                and transmitted to the Congress.
                <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
                
                    (Presidential Sig.)

                THE WHITE HOUSE,

                    November 12, 2014.

[FR Doc. 2014-27105
Filed 11-12-14; 12:00 pm]
Billing code 3295-F5
Exhibit I

(Filed Under Seal )

Case: 1:20-cv-00390 Document #: 156-9 Filed: 05/23/23 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:1349
##### 



Exhibit 32.2
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15 (d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and(2)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for
the periods covered in the Report.
  /s/ Eric W. FinlaysonEric W. FinlaysonSenior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RANDALL FONTANA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

CITY OF AUBURN et al.,

 Defendants,

 and

SGT. JAMES NORDENGER,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-35784

D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00245-JCC

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 7, 2017** 

Seattle, Washington

Before: GRABER, IKUTA, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

FILED

MAR 09 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

*

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Plaintiff Randall Fontana timely appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Defendant Sergeant James Nordenger on Plaintiff’s

42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution. Reviewing

de novo the district court’s ruling that Nordenger is entitled to qualified immunity

and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Reza v. Pearce, 806

F.3d 497, 502 (9th Cir. 2015), we affirm.

1

1. The district court correctly held that Nordenger is entitled to qualified

immunity on the unlawful arrest claim. Given the facts known to

Nordenger—including the threatening nature of Plaintiff’s statements, their

proximity in time to the Lakewood killings, the reliability of the named citizen

informant who was interviewed by officers, and the reports of Plaintiff’s poststatement conduct—it was "reasonably arguable that there was probable cause for

arrest." Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (per

curiam) (emphasis omitted).

1

 Because the district court correctly ruled on qualified immunity, we need

not and do not address the court’s alternative ground for granting summary

judgment—issue preclusion. Also, because Plaintiff’s opening brief challenges the

summary judgment only as to Nordenger, we do not address the summary

judgment in favor of the other Defendants. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045,

1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that arguments not raised in a party’s opening brief

generally are waived).

2
2. The district court correctly held that Nordenger is entitled to qualified

immunity on the malicious prosecution claim. The evidence does not disclose

"wrongful motives or reckless disregard of" Plaintiff’s rights. State v. Chenoweth,

158 P.3d 595, 602 (Wash. 2007). Plaintiff has not overcome the ordinary

presumption that the decision to file criminal charges "result[ed] from an

independent determination on the part of the prosecutor, [which] precludes liability

for those who participated in the investigation or filed a report that resulted in the

initiation of proceedings." Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th

Cir. 2004).

AFFIRMED.

3
H. Res. 2

In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

January 7, 1997.

Resolved, That the Senate be informed that a quorum of

the House of Representatives has assembled; that Newt

Gingrich, a Representative from the State of Georgia, has

been elected Speaker; and Robin H. Carle, a citizen of the

Commonwealth of Virginia, has been elected Clerk of the

House of Representatives of the One Hundred Fifth

Congress.

Attest:

Clerk.
Reinstated and Order filed March 6, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-12-00655-CV

____________

KEVIN MATTHEW HALL, Appellant

V.

REBECCA MACCORKLE HALL, Appellee

On Appeal from the 308th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2010-63670

ORDER

On August 1, 2012, this court received notice that appellant had petitioned 

for voluntary bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 

Southern District of Texas, under case number 12-33310. Because a stay is 

automatically effected by Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, we issued an 

abatement order staying all proceedings in the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 8.2. 
2

On January 21, 2014, appellant filed a notice that appellant’s bankruptcy has

been discharged and requested that the appeal be reinstated. On February 27, 2014, 

appellant filed a copy of the bankruptcy court’s discharge order, as required by 

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 8.3(a). 

Appellant’s request is granted. Accordingly, the appeal is ordered 

REINSTATED and placed on the court’s active docket. The appellate record has 

not been filed. Accordingly, the clerk’s record and reporter’s record are due to be 

filed with the clerk of this court on or before April 7, 2014.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jamison and Wise.
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 4.12

                     BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY FINANCE CORPORATION

                                OFFER TO EXCHANGE

       $200,000,000 PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF ITS 4.625% SENIOR NOTES DUE 2013
     UNCONDITIONALLY GUARANTEED BY BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., WHICH HAVE BEEN
   REGISTERED UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, FOR ANY AND ALL 4.625% SENIOR
NOTES DUE 2013, UNCONDITIONALLY GUARANTEED BY BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., ISSUED ON
                                 MARCH 16, 2004

Instructions from Beneficial Owner

         The undersigned acknowledge(s) receipt of your letter and the enclosed
Prospectus and the related Letter of Transmittal in connection with the offer by
the Company to exchange the Exchange Notes for Outstanding Notes.

         This will instruct you to tender the principal amount of Outstanding
Notes indicated below held by you for the account of the undersigned, upon the
terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Prospectus and the related
Letter of Transmittal.

         The undersigned represents that (i) the Exchange Notes acquired
pursuant to the Exchange Offer are being obtained in the ordinary course of the
undersigned's business, (ii) the undersigned is not engaging, does not intend to
engage, and has no arrangement or understanding with any person to participate
in the distribution of such Exchange Notes, (iii) the undersigned is not an
"affiliate," as defined under Rule 405 of the Securities Act, of the Company and
(iv) the undersigned is not acting on behalf of any person or entity that could
not truthfully make these statements. If the undersigned is a broker-dealer, it
acknowledges that it will deliver a copy of the Prospectus in connection with
any resale of the Exchange Notes.

                                                         Sign Here

                                           _____________________________________
                                                       Signatures(s)

<PAGE>

Securities which are to be tendered:

Tender all of the Outstanding Notes

         Aggregate Principal Amount*

[ ]      Outstanding Notes ____________

________________________________________________
            Name(s) (Please Print)

________________________________________________
                   Address

________________________________________________
                   Zip Code

________________________________________________
         Area Code and Telephone No.

Dated:__________________, 2004

______________
* Unless otherwise indicated, it will be assumed that all of the Outstanding
Notes listed are to be tendered.

                                       2
CFTC Ex. 274

Case: 1:20-cv-03758 Document #: 77-9 Filed: 11/05/21 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:1070
Case: 1:20-cv-03758 Document #: 77-9 Filed: 11/05/21 Page 2 of 4 PageID #:1071
Case: 1:20-cv-03758 Document #: 77-9 Filed: 11/05/21 Page 3 of 4 PageID #:1072
To: James Hatzigiannis[jhatzigiannis@longleaftrading.com]; Ryan Dillman[rdillman@longleaftrading.com]; Alexander 

Stemper[astemper@longleaftrading.com]; Nicholas Gunther[ngunther@longleaftrading.com]

Cc: Andrew Nelson[anelson@longleaftrading.com]; Scott Gecas[sgecas@longleaftrading.com]

From: Jim Donelson[jdonelson@longleaftrading.com]

Sent: Fri 7/27/2018 11:02:04 AM (UTC-04:00)

Subject: Clean up of InsideSales

All,

Today I am cleaning up InsideSales. From this day forward, I will be transferring better leads based on effort. If you are not dialing, 

you will not be getting leads transferred to you. Effort equates to success and the effort over the last two weeks hasn’t been there. 

I am keeping my eye on the statistics today so I know where everyone is.

Case: 1:20-cv-03758 Document #: 77-9 Filed: 11/05/21 Page 4 of 4 PageID #:1073
#### James G. Portman v. State Board of Fish Commissioners.

*Superintendent of fisheries.*

The superintendent of fisheries is not an officer within the meaning of the Oonstitutiun and laws of the State, but is an employee of the State Board of Eish Commissioners and is removable at their pleasure.

Mandamus will not lie against a public board at the suit of an employee thereof, for redress for a breach of contract, but he may have a claim for damages.

Mandamus.

Submitted Feb. 27.

Denied Feb. 27.

Belator, being Superintendent of Fisheries for the State of Michigan, was removed from that position by the State Board of Fish Commissioners. He remained in charge of one of the fish hatcheries, though the Board refused to recognize his right to do so, and he applied for a mandamus to require the Board to rescind its action discharging him; to expunge from its records the‘minute of this action; to treat him as Superintendent, having all rights pertaining to that position; to surrender to him a certain note which he had executed and indorsed in his individual capacity as Superintendent, for the purpose of raising money to pay for lands which the Board wished to acquire, which note was not used for that purpose, but was paid by the Board after maturity and held by- them; and to certify his salary bills for the period succeeding his removal.

*.James JEL. Campbell*for relator.

*259
      *John H. Bissell, Otto Kirclmer*and Attorney General *Jacob J. Van Riper*for respondent.

Legislation relating to the State Fish Commission is in Acts 124 of 1873, 71 and 117 of 1875, and 3 of 1882; an office is usually held at the will of either party to the appointment unless otherwise expressed in the appointment or implied by the nature of the office or ancient usage: *Avery v. Tyringham*3 Mass. 177; *Exp. Hennen*13 Pet. 260; *Lehman, v. Sutherland*3 S. *&*R. 145 ; a mere employment can be ended at any time in the absence of an express yearly hiring: *Mining Co. v. Harris*24 Mich. 112.

Marston, J.

We are of opinion that the Superintendent of Fisheries is not an officer within'the meaning of the Constitution and laws of this State ; that he is an employee of the Board, subject to their orders and directions, and that they have power to terminate at any time the contract relations existing between the Board and Superintendent. This is absolutely necessary to the efficiency of the work which the Board was created to perform, and any other view would render the Board to a great extent subservient to the will of the Superintendent. If there has been a breach of contract relator may have a claim for damages, but mandamus would not be the proper remedy.

It follows that the relief prayed for must be denied.

Graves, C. J. and Cooley, J. concurred.