NO. 00-456 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

2001 MT 72 

AUTO PARTS OF BOZEMAN, 

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS DIVISION 

UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND, 

APR 2 6 2009 

APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court 

For the State of Montana 

The Honorable Mike McCarter, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Dennis E. Lind, Datsopoulos, MacDonald & Lind, Missoula, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Mark Cadwallader, Special Assistant Attorney General, Department of 

Labor and Industry, Helena, Montana 

For Amicus Curiae: 

Curtis E. Larson, Special Assistant Attorney General, Montana State 

Fund, Helena, Montana; Charles G. Adams, Jacqueline T. Lenmark, Keller, 

Reynolds, Drake, Johnson & Gillespie, Helena, Montana (American Insurance 

Association) 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: January 18, 2001 

Decided: April 26,2001 
Justice Patricia Cotter delivered the Opinion of tl~e Court. 

71 Appellant Auto Parts of Bozeman (Auto Parts) cai-ried workers' compensation 

insurance with Montana State Fund (State Fund). State Fund canceled Auto Parts' coverage 

for failure to pay a premium. Thereafter, the Uninsured Employers' Fund (UEF), assessed 

a penalty against Auto Parts for failure to carry workers' compensation insurance. 

Following a contested hearing, the Workers' Colnpensation Court found that the Department 

of Labor and Industry (DLI) elred by not allowing Auto Parts to defend the UEF claim on 

the basis that State Fund had improperly canceled its policy. The court found that DL1 had 

i~nproperly sl~ifted the burden of proof from UEF to Auto Parts, thus denying Auto Parts its 

right to due process of law. UEF appeals the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court. 

The Montana State Fund and the Ameiican Insul-ance Association have filed arlzicus curiae 

briefs with the Court. We reverse and remand. 

72 The UEF raises the following issues on appeal: 

73 1. Whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred when it ruled that the UEF 

failed to meet its burden of proving that Auto Parts was an uninsured employer because 

it did not present evidence that the purported cancellation was proper as a matter of 

law. 

74 2. Whether the Workers' Compensation Court erred in determining that the 

issue of jurisdiction was not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

75 3. Whether it was error to give DL1 jurisdiction to adjudicate a contract dispute 

of the propriety of cancellation. 
Factual and Procedural History 

76 Auto Parts carried a workers' coinpensation insurance policy with the State Fund. 

Following non-payment of an advance premium, the State Fund sent a notice to Auto Parts 

in January, 1996, warning that the policy would be canceled if the advance premium, due 

Januaiy 1, was not received by February 1. The "Cancellation Notice" sent by the State Fund 

reads as follows: 

We will cancel your policy at 12:Ol a.m. on the pending cancellation date(s) 

shown below unless each item is received by its respective pending 

cancellation date. We will not accept claims occurring on or after the pending 

cancellation date(s) unless we receive each item by its pending cancellation 

date. 

... 

Once your coverage is canceled, we must re[c]eive all delinquent reports, 

amounts due, a new application, and sufficient advance premium or deposit to 

initiate new coverage. THERE WILL BE A LAPSE OF COVERAGE FROM 

THE CANCELLATION DATE TO THE NEW POLICY EFFECTIVE DATE. 

The Department of Labor and Industry's Uninsured Employer's Fund receives 

information concerning all cancellations of coverage. You are subject to fines, 

penalties and court action if you have not complied with coverage 

requirements under the Workers' Compensation Act. (Emphasis in original.) 

77 Auto Parts issued a check for the premium, but did not mail it to the State Fund until 

soilletime duiing the month of February. The State Fund marked it as received on February 

2 1, 1996. The check was cashed and the amount was applied by the State Fund to the unpaid 

poltion of the policy. The President of Auto Parts testified he believed that since the check 

for the premium had been cashed by State Fund, the policy had not been canceled and 

coverage continued. The State Fund, however, maintained that the policy was riglitfully 
canceled and that the payment was applied not as an advance premium, but instead against 

amounts still owed by Auto Parts for the unpaid period prior to cancellation. According to 

the State Fund, the policy was canceled as of February 1 and the cancellation was reported 

to the appropriate databases. A status report reflecting this was sent to Auto Parts by the 

State Fund, but it is not clear whether it was received. 

78 Auto Parts claims it was unaware of the cancellation of its policy when in April, 1996, 

one of its employees was injured in an on-the-job accident. Auto Parts submitted a first 

report of injury to the State Fund. At that point, the State Fund again informed Auto Parts 

of tlie previous cancellation and sent them an application to re-enroll. Auto Parts paid the 

necessary premium to re-enroll, and coverage became effective April 23, 1996. 

79 Auto Parts requested a "customer service review" by the State Fund to determine if 

State Fund had failed to abide by its internal policies or made a mistake when tlie first policy 

was canceled. After a review, the State Fund determined that it had complied with the terms 

of the contract and that coverage had properly been canceled. The State Fund refused to 

back-date the new policy. 

710 Because it had determined that the original Auto Parts policy was not in effect at the 

time of the work-related accident , the injury report filed by Auto Parts was forwarded by tlie 

State Fund to the UEF. As a result, an auditor for the UEF investigated Auto Parts' workers' 

compensation insurance coverage, checking both the State Fund database and the National 

Workers' Compensation Insurance Database. The UEF determined, based on this 
information, that Auto Parts was uninsured for the period between February 2,1996 and April 

23, 1996. The UEF therefore paid the medical bills for the injured employee, assessed a 

penalty against Auto Parts for the period of non-coverage, and presented a claim for 

indemnification for the medical bills paid by UEF for the injured worker. 

71 1 Facing a UEF penalty and indemnification claim, Auto Parts requested a contested 

hearing before the DLI. (Auto Parts v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, Policy No. 3- 

119389-3). Auto Parts argued that the State Fund had acted improperly in canceling the 

policy. On February 4, 1998, the hearing officer issued an order dismissing the hearing 

request on the grounds that DL1 lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the contract dispute. 

The hearing officer reasoned: 

Procedures governing payments from the insured and cancellation are set forth 

in the contract of insurance between the parties. The contract specified that the 

District Court, Lewis and Clark County, has jurisdiction to hear any suits 

brought under the policy. This matter is one in which Petitioner seeks a 

remedy or the enforcement of a right founded in the contract or insurance law. 

Ultimately, the matter was dismissed by the department: 

The Department of Labor and Industry does not have jurisdiction over contract 

disputes between an insurance carrier and its policyholder. This is purely a 

contract dispute over how a policyl-lolder's payment is applied by the insurance 

company when that policy has been canceled. 

The order noted that either party could appeal within 30 days to the Workers' Compensation 

Court. Auto Parts did not appeal this order. 

712 Auto Parts then requested a contested case hearing from the DL1 to challenge UEF's 

determination that Auto Parts was an uninsured employer. (Auto Parts v. Employment 
Relations Division, Uninsured Employers' Fund, UEF Case No. 9258). Auto Parts contested 

the penalty assessed by the UEF, and raised two other issues relating to the propriety of State 

Fund's cancellation of the insurance policy. The hearing officer again refused to consider 

Auto Parts' contention that it believed it was insured by the State Fund on the date of the 

employee's injury. The hearing officer based his refusal on Auto Parts' failure to appeal the 

previous DL1 order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the contract dispute 

between the insurer and the insured: 

Crucial to the instant case is the appellant's failure to appeal Mr. Gerke's 

February 4, 1998 order to the Montana Workers' Compensation Court, in 

keeping with the appeal rights set out in that order. Accordingly, the appellant 

cannot now claim a denial of due process, when it failed to utilize its dulyauthorized forum before the Workers' Compensation Court to challenge 

hearing officer Gerke's order regarding any dispute Bozeman Auto Parts had 

with the State Fund. Moreover, it appears that the UEF held off pursuing the 

instant case to permit the appellant to pursue District Court action against the 

State Fund, which it failed to take. 

At the hearing, testimony was presented by a Compliance Specialist for the UEF. She 

testified that in her investigation of Auto Parts, she reviewed the National Council of 

Coiiipensation Insurance Database as well as the State Fund's database. Both databases 

confirmed that the State Fund had canceled Auto Parts' workers' compensation policy on 

February 1, 1996. Auto Parts did not present any evidence indicating that another policy was 

in place during the period in question. On the basis of this evidence, the hearing officer 

concluded that the UEF had met its burden of proof that Auto Parts was uninsured, and that 
Auto Parts was therefore liable for the penalty and benefits paid to the employee. Formal 

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Final Order were issued on May 25, 1999. 

713 Auto Parts appealed this order to the Workers' Compensation Court. The court 

reversed the determination of the hearing officer, saying that in order to meet its burden of 

proof, the UEF needed to prove not only the fact that the insurance was canceled, but also 

that the State Fund's cancellation of the policy was legally correct. The court said that 

visitation of this issue was not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the initial 

order had only determined that the DL1 did not have jurisdiction to resolve a separate action 

regarding the propriety of the State Fund's cancellation of the policy. The court said that the 

initial order did not address the issue raised in the second hearing, as it did not "determine 

that the Department lacked jurisdiction to determine coverage in a Department proceeding 

seeking a penalty and indemnification." 

114 According to the Workers Compensation Court, the DL1 did have jurisdiction to 

1-esolve the dispute over whether the State Fund rigl~tfully canceled Auto Parts' policy for 

failure to pay premiums. The Workers' Compensation Court reasoned that the DL1 has 

quasi-judicial power and, as a result, may exercise jurisdiction over any issue in front of it. 

Furthermore, it determined that the hearing officer had improperly shifted the burden of 

proof froin the UEF to Auto Parts. The court relied on C. Lorzey Concrete v. Ernployl~zerzt 

Rel. Div., 1998 MT 230,291 Mont. 41,964 P.2d 777, for the proposition that the UEF bears 

the burden of proving all elements of its case. According to the court, the shift in the burden 
of proof resulted in a violation of Auto Parts' statutory due process rights to contest the 

allegation that it was uninsured, "cutting off its opportunity to prove the lack of an essential 

element of the case against it." 

115 The Workers' Compensation Court accordingly reversed the decision of the DLI, 

finding that because the UEF failed to present evidence that the purported policy cancellation 

was proper as a matter of law, it failed to prove that Auto Parts was an uninsured employer. 

This appeal follows. 

Standard of Review 

116 When this Court reviews the Workers' Compensation Court's conclusions of law, it 

does so to determine whether the Workers' Compensation Court's interpretation of the law 

is correct. Thayer v. Uninsured Employers 'Fund, 1999 MT 304,l 12,297 Mont. 179, q12, 

991 P.2d 447,712. 

Discussion 

Issue I 

717 Did the Workers' Compensation Court err when it ruled that the UEF failed to 

prove that Auto Parts was an uninsured employer because it did not present evidence 

that the purported cancellation was proper as a matter of law? 

11 8 Employers are required by the Workers' Compensation Act to obtain and maintain 

Workers' Compensation Insurance for their employees under a choice of three plans, one of 

which is available through tlie State Fund. Section 39-71-401, MCA. 
719 The UEF is authorized to assess a penalty against employers who are not properly 

enrolled in one of these three plans. Section 39-71-504(l), MCA (1995), provides in relevant 

part: 

The department may require that the uninsured employer pay to the fund a 

penalty of either up to double the premium amount the employer would have 

paid on the payroll of the employer's workers in this state if the employer had 

been enrolled . . . or $200, whichever is greater . . . 

An uninsured employer is defined by the Workers' Compensation Act as, "an employer who 

has not properly complied with the provisions of 39-7 1-40 1 ." Section 39-7 1-50 1, MCA 

(1995). An employer who "has not properly complied," is one that is not covered by one of 

the three approved plans. 

720 The Workers' Colnpensation Court determined that in order to ineet its burden of 

proof, the UEF needed to prove not only that there was an absence of coverage during the 

time frame at issue, but also that the State Fund's cancellation of the policy was legally 

correct. We disagree with the analysis of the court on this issue. We agree instead with the 

hearing officer, who concluded that the UEF meets its burden of proof by establishing that 

Auto Parts was not insured by the State Fund or any other insurer on the date of the accident. 

The responsibility of sorting through the claims and defenses between an employer and its 

insurer relative to their contract dispute does not fall on the UEF. Rather, it is the 

responsibility of the employer, as a party to the contract, to resolve disputes with the 

~nsui-ance carrier. 
721 To require the UEF to litigate the merits of an employer's dispute with its insurance 

carrier would defeat the purpose of the Workers' Coinpensation system. The advantage of 

the system is that workers are guaranteed a no-fault recovery while industry, in turn, is 

relieved of the possibility of enormous recoveries in the toi-t system. Workers' compensatioii 

statutes are soinetimes described as a quid pr-o quo exchange of rights and remedies. 

Buerkley v. Asperz Meadows Ltd. Partrzer-slzip, 1999 MT 97,l 16, 294 Mont. 263,v 16, 980 

P.2d 1046, 1 16. In order for the system to work, however, employers must maintain 

insurance in compliance with the statutes. 

1122 Because not all employers comply with the statutory requirement to carry insurance 

on their employees, the UEF was created to provide an injured employee of an uninsured 

employer with the same benefits which the employee would have received had the employer 

been properly enrolled in a workers' colnpensation plan. See 5 39-71-502, MCA (1991). 

Zenzpel v. Unirzsured Enzployer*~ 'Furzd (1997), 282 Mont. 424,43 1, 938 P.2d 658, 663. The 

UEF is a legislatively created fund, the payments from which are intended to minimize the 

hardships imposed when an injured worker is unable to get workers' compensation benefits 

as a result of the employer's failure to provide coverage. Thayer-, '1[ 21. The UEF is not an 

insurer, but merely a safety net. Tlzayev 7 24. In order for the benefits of the UEF to be 

available to the worker, it must merely be established that the employer is uninsured, which 

the UEF established here. Any more onerous requirement on the UEF, such as the Workers' 

Compensation Court imposed, would frustrate the intent of the UEF, which is simply to 
deliver benefits to the injured employee of an uninsured employer. Section 39-71-502, 

MCA; Zempel, 282 Mont. at 431, 938 P.2d at 663. 

123 Auto Parts could have pursued a separate claim in district court against the State Fund 

for breach of contract. It elected not to do so. We will not address the merits of the propriety 

of State Fund's cancellation of Auto Parts' insurance policy. The merits of that dispute are 

simply not germane to the sole issue before the UEF when this case began, which was 

whether or not Auto Parts was an insured employer at the time of its employee's injury. 

Having confirmed through the State Fund and National Workers' Compensation Insurance 

Database that Auto Parts was uninsured at that time, UEF had a statutory duty to pay the 

injured employee the same benefits he would have received had Auto Parts been insured. 

It was not obligated by statute or otherwise to do more. 

124 In the process of maintaining workers' compensation insurance coverage, an employer 

is often called upon to address and resolve disputes with its insurer. It is not enough for Auto 

Parts to now say that it thought or assumed it was insured, when it was not. Auto Parts had 

a duty to its employees to ensure that the insurance covering them in the event of an injury 

did not lapse for any reason. Allowing an employer to interpose its unresolved disputes with 

its insurance carrier as a defense against attempts by the UEF to collect statutory penalties 

and reimbursement for payments it made to an injured worker, would be contrary to public 

policy. 
125 Because it was not incumbent upon UEF to sort through and resolve the insurance 

coverage disputes between Auto Parts and the State Fund, and because UEF met its burden 

of proving an absence of insurance coverage on the date of Auto Parts' employee's injury, 

we hold that the Workers' Compensation Court erred in its determination that the UEF failed 

to prove that Auto Parts was an uninsured employer. 

Issue 2. 

126 Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in determining that the issue of 

jurisdiction was not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel? 

127 The Workers' Compensation Court concluded that the DL1 should have allowed Auto 

Parts to raise the argument that the State Fund had improperly canceled its policy, as a 

defense to UEF's claim for assessments and penalties. However, Auto Parts had 

participated in an earlier hearing in which the hearing officer determined that the DL1 did not 

have jurisdiction over contract disputes between an insurance carrier and its policyholder. 

Auto Parts did not appeal this order. UEF argues that this failure to appeal precludes Auto 

Parts from raising the contractual issues as a defense in a second hearing, under the doctrine 

of collateral estoppel. We agree. 

728 The doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case are all based on 

judicial policy favoring a definite end to litigation. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Anderpsorz, 

1999 MT 288,l 58, 297 Mont. 33,Y 58, 991 P.2d 915,158. The doctrine of res judicata 

prevents a party from relitigating a matter that the party has already had an opportunity to 

litigate. Federated, 7 58. 

12 
129 Collateral estoppel, sometimes referred to as issue preclusion, is a form of t-es 

judicata. While res judicata bars parties from relitigating claims in subsequent proceedings 

arising out of the same cause of action, collateral estoppel bars the reopening of an issue in 

a second cause of action that has been litigated and determined in a prior suit. Holtman v. 

4-G's Plumbing & Heating, Inc. (1994), 264 Mont. 432,439, 872 P.2d 318, 322. 

130 This Court applies a three-part test to determine if collateral estoppel bars relitigation 

of an issue. Haines Pipeline Const. v. Montana Power (1994), 265 Mont. 282,288,876 P.2d 

632, 636. The test requires these inquiries: first, whether the issue decided in the prior 

adjudication was identical with the one presented in the action in question; second, whether 

there was a final judgment on the merits; and third, whether the party in question was a party 

to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. Haines Pipeline, 265 Mont at 288, 876 

P.2d at 636. In re Raymond W. George Trust, 1999 MT 223,Y 42,296 Mont. 56,T 42, 986 

P.2d 427, 42. 

13 1 It is clear that the second and third prongs have been met. Auto Parts brought both 

actions, and did not appeal the order terminating the first action within the time period 

allotted, making the order final. Satisfaction of the first prong, however, is the most 

important element of collateral estoppel. Holtman, 264 Mont. at 439, 872 P.2d at 322. In 

order to satisfy this prong, the identical issue or "precise question must have been litigated 

in the prior action." Holtman, 264 Mont. at 439, 872 P.2d at 322. We compare the 
pleadings, evidence, and circumstances of the two actions to determine whether the issues 

are identical. Fadness v. Cody (1997), 287 Mont. 89,96, 951 P.2d 584, 589. 

732 Collateral estoppel extends to all questions essential to the judgment and actively 

determined by a prior valid judgment. Haines Pipeline, 265 Mont. at 288, 876 P. 2d at 636. 

It bars the relitigation of determinative facts which were actually or necessarily decided in 

a prior action. Haines Pipeline, 265 Mont. at 288, 876 P. 2d at 636. See also, Rafanelli v. 

Dale, 1998 MT 331, 7 12,292 Mont. 277,Y 12, 971 P.2d 371,l 12. 

733 The Workers' Compensation Court concluded that consideration of the issue of 

jurisdiction was not barred by collateral estoppel because the issues in the two matters were 

not identical. It reasoned that while the order in the initial hearing addressed whether the 

DL1 had jurisdiction to reach the contractual issues between Auto Parts and the State Fund 

in a separate hearing, it did not say that the DL1 did not have jurisdiction to reach these issues 

where the employer was challenging the UEF's ability to assess a fee. We disagree. 

734 On February 4,1998, a hearing officer of the DL1 determined that the Department did 

not have subject matter jurisdiction over the contractual dispute between the State Fund and 

Auto Parts. The hearing officer noted that adjudication of such a dispute would be proper 

in the District Court. The DL1 has only the jurisdiction granted to it by statute, and 

adjudication of insurance contracts does not fall within its jurisdiction. 

735 Auto Parts' failure to appeal the issue following the first hearing precludes it from 

making the argument that the DL1 did have jurisdiction over this dispute in the second 
hearing. We therefore hold that all three prongs of the test were met, and that relitigation in 

the second proceeding of the issue of DL1 jurisdiction over the contract dispute between Auto 

Parts and the State Fund was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

Issue 3. 

7/36 Whether it was error to give DL1 jurisdiction to adjudicate a contract dispute 

regarding the propriety of cancellation. 

7/37 In its order, the Workers' Compensation Court further concluded that the DL1 tribunal 

did have jurisdiction to address the contract dispute between the State Fund and Auto Parts 

because it was operating in a quasi-judicial power. The court reasoned that the DL1 tribunal 

was acting as a court, which allowed the hearing officer the power to address all issues and 

facets of the case. Although we need not reach this issue in light of our rulings above, we 

deem it necessary to lay to rest the question of DL1 jurisdiction over substantive coverage 

disputes between an employer and its insurer 

738 While an administrative body acting as a tribunal has quasi-judicial power, it does not 

follow that its power is equal to the power of a district court to hear all facets of a case. 

Jurisdiction in an administrative hearing, contrary to a District Court's jurisdiction, is strictly 

limited by statute. "It is a basic rule of law that . . . an administrative agency, has only those 

powers specifically conferred upon it by the legislature . . ." City of Polson v. Public Service 

Corn 'n (1970), 155 Mont. 464,469,473 P.2d 508, 51 1, Gwynn v. Town of Eureka (1978), 

178 Mont. 191, 193, 582 P.2d 1262, 1263. An administrative agency may not assume 
jurisdiction without express delegation by the legislature. City of Billings v. Public Service 

Com'n of Montana (1981)' 193 Mont. 358,369, 63 1 P.2d 1295, 1303. 

739 There is no statutory delegation of authority to the DL1 to adjudicate the merits of 

contract disputes between parties. Regulation of insurance contracts is governed by the 

insurance commissioner and the relevant statutory provisions relating to insurance disputes. 

Fui-ther, it appears from the record that the contract between the State Fund and Auto Pai-ts 

specified that the forum for adjudicating disputes arising under the contract was the District 

Court. The DL1 cannot and should not be adjudicating disputes between insurance 

companies and employers. The problems with holding otherwise are obvious. Primarily, the 

State Fund would not be a party to these matters and would not be bound by a DL1 decision 

on coverage. More to the point, an adjudication of coverage questions by the DL1 would 

leave the UEF without a method to collect fines or amounts it has paid to the employees of 

the uninsured employer. This would render the UEF system "safety net" unworkable, to the 

detriment of en~ployees of uninsured employers. 

740 We also disagree with the Workers' Compensation Court's conclusion that Auto Pal-ts 

was deprived of a due process right when it was prevented from presenting evidence relating 

to the contract dispute between itself and the State Fund. Auto Parts had the opportunity to 

appeal the initial order of the DL1 to the Workers' Compensation Court but it failed to do so. 

Furthermore, it had the opportunity to pursue its remedies against the State Fund in district 

court, and it appears from the record that the UEF delayed collection of the penalty to give 
Auto Parts additional time to pursue that opportunity. Again, however, it failed to do so. 

There is no denial of due process where a party fails to pursue the remedies provided. 

741 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Workers' Compensation 

Court, and affirm the DL1 finding that Auto Parts was an uninsured employer at the time of 

it's employee's injury, and that Auto Parts is therefore liable to the UEF as determined in the 

DL1 Final Order of May 26, 1999. 

We Concur: 

Chief Justice 
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 

742 I concur entirely in the Court's opinion on issues one and two. I respectfully dissent 

from the inclusion of issue three, whether it was error to give DL1 jurisdiction to adjudicate 

a contract dispute regarding the propriety of cancellation, in that opinion. 

743 The Court candidly--and correctly--admits that "we need not reach this issue in light 

of our rulings above. . . ." Having conceded that to be true, the Court's opinion should end 

after issue two. 

744 Obiter dictum is a Latin phrase meaning "something said in passing." It is defined as 

"[a] judicial comment made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that 

is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential.'' BLACK'S LAW 

DICTIONARY 1 100 (7th ed. 1999). The analysis and determination advanced by the Court in 

issue three is--clearly and merely--obiter dictum in that it is unnecessary to the decision in 

the case, by the Court's own admission. In my view, we should not intentionally include 

obiter dictum in our opinions, which are intended to be precedential statements of the law by 

this Court. While there may be many issues in cases before us--or in the more abstract 

universe surrounding us--which might benefit for practical or policy reasons by an expression 

of this Court's thoughts on the matter, it is my opinion that doing so is not this Court's job. 

Our job is to resolve the dispositive issues in a case before us and then to move on to another 

case, of which plenty await our attention. 
745 In addition, the Court's discussion of the dispositive issues in this case makes its 

thoughts sufficiently clear on whether contract disputes between an employer and its carrier 

are within the purview of administrative proceedings. For example, the Court states at 7 21 

that "[tlo require the UEF to litigate the merits of an employer's dispute with its insurance 

carrier would defeat the purpose of the Workers' Compensation system." The Court also 

states, at 7 23, that "Auto Parts could have pursued a separate claim in district court against 

the State Fund for breach of contract" but "elected not to do so." Finally, and most clearly 

and concretely, the Court states at 7 34 that "[tlhe DL1 has only the jurisdiction granted to 

it by statute, and adjudication of insurance contracts does not fall within its jurisdiction." 

746 I dissent from the Court's inclusion of issue three, which is obiter dictum in its 

entirety, in the opinion in this case. 

A