IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CARLY M.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 2995

Magistrate Judge Beth W. Jantz

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Carly M.’s application for child’s insurance 

benefits and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The parties have consented to the 

jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). For the reasons 

that follow, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. 19, Pl.’s Mot.] is granted in part. The 

Court reverses and remands the decision of the Commissioner for further proceedings. 

1 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22, Privacy in Social Security Opinions, the 

Court refers to Plaintiff by her first name and the first initial of her last name.

2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for her

predecessor.

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BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

On August 31, 2015, Plaintiff filed a claim for SSI, alleging disability since September 

10, 2010, due to bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, and irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”).

[Dkt. 18-2, R. 115.] Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and again upon reconsideration, and 

Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). [R. 126, 146.] On 

December 8, 2017, Plaintiff then filed a claim for child’s insurance benefits,3 which was 

escalated to the hearing level. [R. 326.] The hearing before the ALJ on both claims was held on

March 22, 2018. [R. 49-101.] Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was 

represented by counsel. [R. 49, 55-88.] Medical expert (“ME”) Dr. Michael Cremerius and 

vocational expert (“VE”) Leida Woodham also testified. [R. 88-100.] On May 10, 2018, the 

ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding her not disabled under the Social Security Act. 

[R. 20-39.] The Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for 

review, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. [R. 1-3.] 

II. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claim in accordance with the Social Security

Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process. [R. 17-27.] The ALJ found at step one 

that Plaintiff had not attained the age of 22 by and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since her alleged onset date of September 10, 2010. [R. 22-23.] At step two, the ALJ concluded 

that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder, generalized 

anxiety disorder, irritable bowel syndrome, and fibromyalgia. [R. 23.] The ALJ concluded at 

3 These benefits are available if the claimant is 18 years old or older and has a disability that 

began before attaining the age of 22. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350(a)(5).

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step three that her impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal one of 

the Social Security Administration’s listings of impairments (a “Listing”). [R. 23-27.] Before 

step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 

perform light work with the following additional limitations: she can understand, remember, and 

carry out simple, routine tasks, make simple work-related decisions, and adapt to routine 

workplace changes; and she can work in proximity to others, including handling occasional 

interaction with supervisors and co-workers and brief and incidental contact with the general 

public. [R. 27-37.] At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have any past relevant 

work. [R. 37.] At step five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform jobs existing in significant 

numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding thatshe is not disabled under the Social 

Security Act. [R. 37-38.] 

DISCUSSION

I. Judicial Review

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she is unable “to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To 

determine disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the ALJ conducts a five-step 

inquiry, asking whether: (1) the claimant has performed any substantial gainful activity during 

the period for which she claims disability; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment or 

combination of impairments; (3) the claimant’s impairment meets or equals any listed 

impairment; (4) the claimant retains the RFC to perform her past relevant work; and (5) the 

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claimant is able to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the national 

economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). “A finding of disability requires an affirmative answer at 

either step three or step five.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 352 (7th Cir. 

2005). “The claimant bears the burden of proof atsteps one through four, after which 

at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner.” Id. 

Because the Appeals Council denied review, the ALJ’s decision became the final 

decision of the Commissioner and is reviewable by this Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cullinan v. 

Berryhill, 878 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2017). The Court plays an “extremely limited” role in 

reviewing the ALJ’s decision. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). Judicial 

review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to determining whether it adequately discusses the issues 

and is based upon substantial evidence and the proper legal criteria. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 

558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009). “Substantial evidence” is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 

1154 (2019) (internal quotation omitted). “To determine whether substantial evidence exists, the 

court reviews the record as a whole but does not attempt to substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s 

by reweighing the evidence, resolving material conflicts, or reconsidering facts or the credibility 

of witnesses.” Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 836-37 (7th Cir. 2014). While this review is 

deferential, “it is not intended to be a rubber-stamp” on the ALJ’s decision. Stephens v. 

Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court will reverse the ALJ’s finding “if it is

not supported by substantial evidence or if it is the result of an error of law.” Id. at 327.

The ALJ has a basic obligation both to develop a full and fair record and to “build an 

accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result [so as] to afford the claimant 

meaningful judicial review of the administrative findings.” Beardsley, 758 F.3d at 837. 

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Although the ALJ is not required to mention every piece of evidence in the record, the ALJ’s 

analysis “must provide some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” 

Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001); accord Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 

(7th Cir. 2008). The ALJ “must explain [the ALJ’s] analysis of the evidence with enough detail 

and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.” Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 695 (7th 

Cir. 2014) (quoting Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 351). Thus, even if reasonable minds could differ as to 

whether the claimant is disabled, courts will affirm a decision if the ALJ's opinion is adequately 

explained and supported by substantial evidence. Elder, 529 F.3d at 413. 

II. Analysis

In asking for a remand for a direct award of benefits, Plaintiff raises two overarching 

arguments: (1) that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions concerning her mental 

RFC, and (2) that the ALJ erred in finding Plaintiff’s subjective symptom statements “. . .out of 

proportion with the symptoms, signs[,] and limitations demonstrated in the record.” [Dkt. 20, 

Pl.’s Mem. at 8-15 (alteration in original); see also dkt. 26, Pl.’s Reply at 1-4.] The

Commissioner responds that the ALJ appropriately explained her reasons for assigning the 

weight she did to the doctors’ opinions, and that the ALJ’s finding at step three that Plaintiff did 

not meet a Listing was supported by substantial evidence overall. [Dkt. 25, Def.’s Resp. at 2-

11.] And the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s subjective 

symptom statements, and substantial evidence supported her ultimate RFC determination. [Id. at 

11-13.] Finally, the Commissioner argues that if the Court does find Plaintiff’s arguments 

warrant remand, the appropriate remedy is a remand for further proceedings, not an award of 

benefits. [Id. at 13-14.]

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After reviewing the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, this Court agrees with 

Plaintiff that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinions when determining Plaintiff’s 

mental RFC and that remand therefore is warranted, but the Court declines to direct an award of 

benefits. Further, because the failure to properly weigh the doctors’ opinions alone warrants 

remand, the Court does not separately address Plaintiff’s other arguments.

A. The ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinions regarding Plaintiff’s mental RFC. 

The ALJ must evaluate “every medical opinion” in the record and assign a treating 

physician’s opinion controlling weight if it is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical 

and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” 

in the record. 4 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); see Gerstner v. Berryhill, 879 F.3d 257, 261 (7th Cir. 

2018). Generally, more weight is given to the opinions of treating physicians because they are 

most familiar with the claimant’s conditions and circumstances. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); Israel 

v. Colvin, 840 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, the ALJ “must offer good reasons for 

discounting the opinion of a treating physician.” Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 

2011) (internal quotation omitted). If a treating physician’s opinion is not given controlling 

weight, the ALJ must then determine what weight the assessment merits. Campbell v. Astrue, 

627 F.3d 299, 308 (7th Cir. 2010). In that instance, the ALJ evaluates all medical opinions 

according to the following factors: (1) whether there was an examining or treating relationship;

4 The Social Security Administration has modified the treating-physician rule to eliminate the

“controlling weight” instruction. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (“We will not defer or give any

specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) . . . , 

including those from your medical sources.”). However, the new regulations apply only to

disability applications filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (“For claims

filed (see § 404.614) before March 27, 2017, the rules in this section apply.”). As the

Commissioner notes, Plaintiff’s application for SSI was filed in 2015, and it remained open when

she filed her application for child’sinsurance benefits in December 2017, and so the treatingphysician rule still applies to both claims here. [Def.’s Mem. at 6 n.2.]

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(2) the length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) the frequency of examination; 

(4) the consistency and supportability of the physician’s opinion; and (5) the physician’s 

specialty. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Here, two treating physicians opined about Plaintiff’s 

mental RFC and three non-treating physicians also rendered opinions, which the Court addresses 

in turn.

1. Dr. Syed Amanullah

 Dr. Syed Amanullah, a psychiatrist at the Institute for Personal Development, rendered 

multiple opinions on forms that covered many areas of Plaintiff’s mental functional abilities, and

the Court recounts only the most salient information from those opinions. [SeeR. 934-42; 1156-

61; 1162-76.] In a mental RFC questionnaire dated March 15, 2016, Dr. Amanullah reported 

that he started seeing Plaintiff for monthly visits that lasted 30 minutes each in October 2014. 

[R. 935.] He explained that although Plaintiff had tried many medications and psychotherapy, 

she still suffered from “extreme anxiety, mood swings and thoughts of hopelessness.” [Id.] He 

opined that Plaintiff’s ability to interact appropriately with the general public, maintain 

appropriate behavior, and adhere to basic standards of neatness were seriously limited because 

she had “extreme anxiety around others,” was “unable to cope with stress,” and would “shut 

down if criticized.” [R. 937.] Dr. Amanullah also opined that she would miss more than 4 days 

of work a month because of her impairments. [R. 940.]

On May 24, 2017, Dr. Amanullah completed another mental RFC questionnaire (on a 

different form), reporting that he now saw Plaintiff every 6-8 weeks for 30-minute visits.5 

[R. 1157.] According to Dr. Amanullah, Plaintiff continued “to struggle with depression and 

5 Although the form appears to have been filled out by Dr. Amanullah, it was also signed by 

Dr. Scavo. [See R. 1161.] As Plaintiff does not argue it should be considered Dr. Scavo’s 

opinion, however, the Court does not again address it in the section concerning Dr. Scavo. 

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anxiety” and “minor stress [for her] leads to emotional breakdowns and self-destructive 

behavior.” [Id.] Dr. Amanullah opined that Plaintiff would have a greater than 20% of the 

workday impairment (the highest impairment level) in several areas, including maintaining 

regular attendance, performing at a consistent pace without unreasonable rest periods, accepting 

instructions and responding to criticism from supervisors, and getting along with co-workers or 

peers. [R. 1159.] Again, Dr. Amanullah opined that Plaintiff would miss more than 4 days of 

work every month. [R. 1161.]

On June 7, 2017, Dr. Amanullah also filled out an agency form entitled “psychiatric 

review technique,” in which he concluded that Plaintiff met the criteria for Listings 12.04 

(depressive, bipolar and related disorders) and 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive 

disorders). [R. 1163, 1166, 1168.] Additionally, Dr. Amanullah opined that Plaintiff would 

have a mild limitation in understanding, remembering, and applying information, an extreme 

limitation in interacting with others, a marked limitation in concentrating, persisting, or 

maintaining pace, and a marked limitation in adapting or managing herself. [R. 1175.]

The ALJ assigned “little weight” to treating psychiatrist Dr. Amanullah’s opinions. 

[R. 35.] First, the ALJ discounted the nature and extent of the treating relationship and the 

frequency of examination by explaining that “the evidence shows that he only sees [Plaintiff] 

periodically and briefly for medication management services and not as often as alleged.” [Id.] 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(i), (ii). But the ALJ is factually incorrect about the frequency of 

visits. Dr. Amanullah reported initially in 2015 that he saw Plaintiff monthly, which switched to 

every 6 to 8 weeks by the time of his opinions in 2017. [R. 935, 1157.] And indeed, the 

treatment notes reflect regular visits just as he reported. [See R. 620, 625, 632, 635, 638, 641,

644, 651, 657, 662, 847, 852, 854, 948, 956, 963, 1036, 1045, 1052, 1059, 1064 1067, 1075, 

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1081, 1204, 1210, 1221.]6 Over the course of the 2.5 years before he rendered his last opinion, 

from October 2014 to June 2017, it appears that Dr. Amanullah saw Plaintiff on about 25 

occasions, which averages to one visit about every month or month and a half. [See id.] Thus, 

the ALJ’s reasoning in this respect cannot be considered sound and is not a “good reason” to 

discount Dr. Amanullah’s opinion. Scott, 647 F.3d at 739. 

Next, the ALJ did not address the length of the treating relationship. See 20 C.F.R. 

§404.1527(c)(i). Generally, the longer a treating source has treated a plaintiff and the more times 

a treating source has seen a plaintiff, “the more weight” the ALJ will give the source’s medical 

opinion. Id. As previously outlined, Dr. Amanullah saw Plaintiff on a near-monthly basis over 

the course of 2.5 years, amounting to 25 visits during that time. The ALJ did not acknowledge 

this substantial treating relationship when determining that Dr. Amanullah’s opinion warranted 

“little weight.” [See R. 35.]

Third, the ALJ highlighted numerous purported issueswith respect to the supportability 

and consistency of Dr. Amanullah’s opinions. [R. 35.] See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3, 4). The 

ALJ stated that Dr. Amanullah’s treatment records did not document his comment that Plaintiff 

has “extreme anxiety with others.” [R. 35.] But in his very first treatment note, Dr. Amanullah

reported that Plaintiff’s anxiety was “bad around a group of people,” [R. 641], and it is not clear 

whether the ALJ is faulting Dr. Amanullah for not reporting objective signs of anxiousness 

during office visits, of which in any case there are multiple examples of Plaintiff’s mood being 

reported as “anxious” in his colleague Dr. Scavo’s treatment notes, [see, e.g., R. 946, 1197-1201, 

6 The visit dates, in chronological order, are as follows: 10/15/14, 11/13/14, 1/9/15, 2/12/15, 

2/20/15, 3/13/15, 4/2/15, 4/10/15, 5/7/15, 7/6/15, 8/20/15, 9/3/15, 9/30/15, 12/10/15, 2/4/16, 

3/15/16, 5/31/16, 7/7/16, 8/24/16, 9/6/16, 10/4/16, 11/22/16, 1/16/17, 2/28/17, 6/7/17, 8/8/17, 

and 9/5/17.

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1568]. The ALJ also mentioned that Dr. Amanullah had not addressed how Plaintiff had been 

able “to travel out of the state so regularly” despite her symptoms and limitations nor how she 

was “able to secure marijuana illicitly from dealers prior to obtaining a medical marijuana card,” 

both of which the ALJ repeatedly emphasized throughout her opinion. [R. 35; see R. 26, 32-33.] 

Not specifically discussing these facts, however, hardly renders unpersuasive Dr. Amanullah’s 

opinions about the limitations Plaintiff would face in doing work; Plaintiff’s ability to go on 

vacation and to obtain marijuana from a dealer does not equate to an ability to maintain a job or 

necessarily undermine the anxiety and stress Dr. Amanullah opined she would feel at work. 

See Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 817 (7th Cir. 2014); Hughes v. Astrue, 705 F. 3d 276 (7th 

Cir. 2013).

In any event, the primary reason the ALJ assigned Dr. Amanullah’s opinion little weight 

appears to be that his treatment notes reflected Plaintiff “to be stable with essentially normal 

findings on examination and show that [Plaintiff] has been doing well.” [R. 35.] And the ALJ 

thought that those “normal” findings were corroborated by (1) other mental status examinations 

in the record that “have been generally benign,” and thus do not support “the severe symptoms 

and functional” limitations Dr. Amanullah assessed, and (2) Plaintiff’s lack of emergency care or 

hospitalization for her conditions. [Id.] In citing to the record in support of these facts, the ALJ 

references 7 pages of records, each with a mental status examination (none of which are 

Dr. Amanullah’s treatment notes). [See R. 35 (citing R. 946, 947, 950, 955, 958, 1201, 1568, 

1819).] Although those notes are reflective of those in the wider record and do largely report 

that Plaintiff had good insight and judgment, that her memory and concentration were intact, and 

that her thoughts were linear and goal-directed, it is not clear why the ALJ believed those 

findings during visits with mental-health professionals were inconsistent with Dr. Amanullah’s 

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opinions and reports that, among other things, Plaintiff struggled with extreme anxiety around 

others, had mood swings, would not respond well to stress or criticism, and would need to miss 

more than 4 days of work a month. [See R. 934-42; 1156-61; 1162-76.] Indeed, all of the

records cited by the ALJ contain reports that Plaintiff was struggling with her mood—it is 

described as either anxious, tired, depressed, or irritable. [R. 946, 947, 950, 955, 958, 1201, 

1567-68, 1819.] Additionally, Dr. Amanullah’s ongoing treatment of Plaintiff belies the ALJ’s 

assessment that Plaintiff was “stable” and “doing well”; Dr. Amanullah frequently adjusted 

Plaintiff’s medications in an attempt to improvemanagement of her ongoing symptoms. 

[See R. 620-21, 632-33, 638-39, 641-42, 644-45, 651-52, 948-49, 1036-37, 1045-46, 1081-82.]

Overall, the problem with the ALJ’s assessment of the supportability and consistency of 

Dr. Amanullah’s opinions is a broader discounting across the ALJ’s decision of Plaintiff’s 

depression and anxiety. The ALJ’s review of the treatment notes focuses on Plaintiff’s mental 

state during structured sessions and the activities of daily living that she participates in when she 

feels well enough. [See R. 30-37.] As a general matter, however, “a person who suffers from a 

mental illness will have better days and worse days, so a snapshot of any single moment says 

little about her overall condition.” Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 2011). Even if 

Plaintiff would be able to work on some days, that does not necessarily mean she would be able 

to perform and maintain full-time employment. See Bauer v. Astrue, 532 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 

2008). Thus, the ALJ’s conclusions that Dr. Amanullah’s opinions are not supported by the 

“benign” mental status exams and Plaintiff’s “stable” state, [R. 35], are not supported by 

substantial evidence in the record.

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2. Dr. Corrin Scavo

Dr. Corrin Scavo, a licensed clinical psychologist at the Institute for Personal 

Development, wrote a letter dated September 28, 2017, that stated thatshe had been seeing 

Plaintiff as a patient for about 3 years, since September 18, 2014. [R. 1178.] Dr. Scavo 

explained that Plaintiff had been unable to work since Dr. Scavo had known her, and although 

“the progress notes appear to demonstrate improvement in some of her symptoms,” it had not 

been significant enough to allow her to “be functional at employment”; Plaintiff had been 

“unable to decrease her symptoms, especially her anxiety, enough to be an effective employee.” 

[Id.] When she had tried to unsuccessfully to seek out employment, there were frequent 

absences because of medical issues and “overwhelming anxiety which caused panic attacks.” 

[Id.] Plaintiff then experienced “significant distress and depression” when she did not follow 

through on tasks thatshe thoughtshe should be able to do. [Id.] Recognizing that Plaintiff 

“would be unable to make it on her own” without the “financial help of her parents,” Dr. Scavo 

concluded that “[i]t would be beneficial for [Plaintiff] to receive disability to allow her to be able 

to focus on her recovery and her overall health.” [Id.]

The ALJ gave “no weight” to treating psychologist Dr. Scavo’s September 2017 opinion

for three reasons. The ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Scavo was a licensed clinical psychologist 

but explained that Dr. Scavo’s opinion contained “very general statements” and mostly related to 

the ultimate question of whether Plaintiff was able to work, which is an issue that is reserved for 

the Commissioner to decide. [R. 35-36.] The ALJ was correct that she need not give any weight 

to Dr. Scavo’s assertion that Plaintiff was unable to work, see 20 C.F.R. § 1527(e)(1), however,

Dr. Scavo’s opinion also commented on Plaintiff’s frequent work absences due to panic attacks 

and medical issues and her increased depression after unsuccessful work attempts, [R. 1178], 

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which the ALJ could not just immediately disregard without weighing. See 20 C.F.R. § 1527(c), 

(d)(1); Lambert v. Berryhill, 896 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2018). At most, the ALJ addressed 

these opinions by saying that Dr. Scavo’s notes also reflected “repeatedly normal and stable 

findings on exam.” [R. 36.] But again, for the reasons described when discussing the 

supportability and consistency of Dr. Amanullah’s opinion, these findings are not necessarily 

inconsistent with Dr. Scavo’s assertion that, despite the improved progress notes, Plaintiff’s 

anxiety is still too severe to sustain full-time work. [R. 1178.] 

As to the length, frequency, extent, and nature of the treating relationship, the ALJ 

questioned whether Dr. Scavo “has completed any formal therapy” with Plaintiff—despite

treating her since 2014—because Dr. Scavo opined that Plaintiff “needs a source of income so 

she can focus on her recovery and overall health,” even though Plaintiff was supported by her 

parents throughout this period. [R. 35-36.] This query by the ALJ is puzzling. The record 

reflects an entire swath of treatment notes of therapy sessions with Dr. Scavo,

7 and the ALJ does 

not explain what she means by “formal therapy.” [R. 35-36.] Further, the ALJ seemed to 

question the treating relationship because Dr. Scavo did not know that Plaintiff was financially 

supported by her parents, but this is a misreading of Dr. Scavo’s letter. [See R. 35-36.] 

Dr. Scavo explicitly recognized that “[w]ithout the [ ] financial help of her parents, [Plaintiff] 

would be unable to make it on her own,” before she opined that “it would be beneficial for 

[Plaintiff] to receive disability [benefits] to allow her to be able to focus on her recovery and her 

7 The following are Dr. Scavo’s treatment notes: R. 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 622, 623, 624, 627, 

629, 631, 634, 637, 640, 643, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 653, 654, 656, 659, 660, 661, 664, 843, 

845, 846, 849, 850, 851, 856, 946, 947, 950, 951, 952, 954, 955, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 965, 

1034, 1035, 1039, 1040, 1041, 1042, 1043, 1044, 1047, 1048, 1049, 1051, 1054, 1055, 1056, 

1057, 1058, 1061, 1062, 1063, 1065, 1066, 1069, 1070, 1072, 1074, 1077, 1078, 1080, 1083, 

1084, 1085, 1086, 1088, 1089, 1197, 1198, 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1203, 1206, 1207, 1208, 

1212, 1213, 1214, 1215, 1216, 1218, 1219, 1220, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1228.

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overall health.” [R. 1178.] Thus, Dr. Scavo clearly knew the fact that the ALJ faulted her for 

not knowing, and it follows that her statement about Plaintiff receiving benefits was not based on 

a purely financial perspective. [Id.] The ALJ’s questioning of Dr. Scavo’s long-term, extensive 

treatment of Plaintiff on this basis therefore is unavailing. “The longer a treating source has 

treated [Plaintiff] and the more times you have been seen by a treating source, the more weight 

[the agency] will give to the source’s medical opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2). Here, the 

ALJ failed to acknowledge just how extensive Dr. Scavo’s treatment of Plaintiff was—about 

weekly sessions over the span of three years. See supra n.7. Accordingly, for all of these 

reasons, the ALJ did not adequately weigh Dr. Scavo’s September 2017 opinion.

* * * * *

In sum, the ALJ did not sufficiently address the regulatory factors in determining what 

weight to give Dr. Amanullah’s and Dr. Scavo’s opinions, and remand is warranted on this 

ground. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). 

3. Non-treating physicians

Although the ALJ’s failure to give “good reasons” for weighing the treating physicians’ 

opinions warrants remand on its own, the Court briefly addresses the ALJ’s weighing of the 

ME’s and state agency psychological consultants’ opinions. 

The ALJ afforded “some but limited weight” to the opinion of the independent ME who 

testified at the hearing, Dr. Michael Cremerius, and specifically rejected his conclusions that 

Plaintiff met Listing 12.06 (which concerns anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders) and 

that she had marked limitations in social functioning and concentrating, persisting, or 

maintaining pace. [R. 24, 36.] Although the ALJ noted that Dr. Cremerius opined that Plaintiff 

would be “unable to function due to panic attacks and symptoms related to [IBS],” the ALJ 

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seemingly found that opinion unpersuasive because “the record is not clear as to how much of 

[Plaintiff’s] poor functioning is due to poor motivation versus her mental disorders.” [R. 24.] 

The ALJ again relied on the same benign mental status examinations that she focused on in 

discounting Dr. Amanullah’s and Dr. Scavo’s opinions, [R. 24 (citingR. 946, 947, 950, 955, 

958, 1201, 1568, 1819)], and Plaintiff’s activities of daily living to grant Dr. Cremerius’s opinion 

only “some but limited weight.” [R. 24-25, 36.]

In contrast, the ALJ assigned “significant weight” to consulting physician Dr. Richard 

Hamersma’s opinion from May 31, 2016, that Plaintiff had mild to moderate mental functional 

limitations. [R. 36.] The ALJ explained that Dr. Hamersma’s opinion was in his specialty area 

and “well reasoned and largely [relied] on the evidence of record.” [Id.] And the ALJ gave 

“significant weight” to psychiatric medical consultant Dr. Russell Taylor’s opinion at the initial 

level as to Plaintiff’s functional abilities. [Id.] In assigning these opinions significant weight, 

the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s mental conditions have not worsened since their opinions. [Id.] 

When considering whether Plaintiff met a Listing, the ALJ said that the state agency consultants 

and Dr. Cremerius had “reviewed the same evidence.” [R. 24.]

The ALJ committed many of the same flaws in her reasoning in weighing these doctors’ 

opinions as that for the treating physicians, repeatedly relying on some stable findings in order to 

credit the state agency doctors’ opinions over that of Dr. Cremerius and the treating physicians. 

[R. 35-36.] Additionally, the ALJ seemed to think that Dr. Cremerius and the state agency 

consultants had reached different conclusions based on the same evidence. [R. 24, 35-36.] But 

Dr. Cremerius actually considered more evidence: in addition to reviewing the record, 

Dr. Cremerius attended the March 2018 hearing and therefore was able to consider Plaintiff’s 

testimony in rendering his opinion, as well. [See R. 49-101.] Accordingly, the ALJ should also 

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reevaluate on remand the opinions of the non-treating physicians, in accordance with 20 C.F.R. 

§ 1527(c).

B. The Court declines to remand for an award of benefits.

Plaintiff asks the Court to remand this case to the Commissioner for an award of benefits, 

maintaining that once Dr. Amanullah’s and Dr. Scavo’s opinions receive controlling weight 

pursuant to the treating-physician rule, the record supports no other finding but that Plaintiff is 

disabled. [Pl.’s Mem. at 15; Pl.’s Reply at 1-2.] But “[t]hat remedy is a marked departure from 

our typical practice of remanding to the agency for further proceedings.” Martin v. Saul, 

950 F.3d 369, 376 (7th Cir. 2020). “[A]n award of benefits is appropriate only if all factual 

issues have been resolved and the record supports a finding of disability.” Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 

356.

The Court is not concluding here that these opinions of the treating physicians are indeed 

entitled to controlling weight; rather, the Court merely finds that it was error for the ALJ not to 

weigh these opinions in accordance with the Social Security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c). It will be for the ALJ to decide on remand what weight to give to all of the

doctors’ opinions after consideration of the enumerated factors. See, e.g., Allord v. Astrue, 

631 F.3d 411, 417 (7th Cir. 2011) (declining to award benefits where district court remanded for 

further consideration of treating physician’s opinion). Because a finding of disability is not 

compelled at this stage, the Court determines that an award of benefits is not warranted at this 

point, and instead remands for further proceedings.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [dkt. 19] is granted

in part. The Commissioner’s decision is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

SO ORDERED. 

Date: June 22, 2022

BETH W. JANTZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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