IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MIGUEL GAMA, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 20 C 3449

)

v. )

) Judge Robert W. Gettleman

THOMAS DART, Sheriff of Cook County, )

COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Miguel Gama has sued defendants Thomas Dart, the Sheriff of Cook County, 

Illinois, and Cook County, seeking damages for injuries he allegedly sustained while he was a 

pretrial detainee at Cook County Jail (“CCJ”). Although inartfully drafted, the complaint 

apparently alleges two separate claims, one for subjecting plaintiff to unconstitutional conditions 

of confinement, and another for using excessive force. Dart is sued in both his official and 

individual capacities.1 Cook County is sued only under Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 

324 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2003). Defendants have moved to dismiss the entire complaint under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.2 For the reasons described below, the 

motion is granted in part and denied in part.

1 Although not clear from the complaint, plaintiff’s brief reveals that he is asserting individual 

liability against Dart on the excessive force claim only.

2 Defendants also moved to stay the instant proceedings pending the Seventh Circuit’s decision 

in Mays v. Dart, No. 20-1792. The Seventh Circuit issued its decision on September 8, 2020. 

Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 2020). Consequently, the motion to stay [Doc. 11] is 

denied as moot.

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges the following facts, which are presumed true for purposes of 

evaluating the motion to dismiss. In a 2017 incident unrelated to the instant case, plaintiff 

received a gunshot wound, resulting in a portion of his intestine protruding from his chest. He 

also developed a serious bedsore. He is “medically fragile.”

Despite those chronic injuries, he was arrested for new criminal offenses and processed 

into CCJ on July 12, 2019. He was housed in Tier 3C of the Residential Treatment Unit 

(“RTU”), which is a dorm-style living unit that holds approximately 38 detainees and provides a 

heightened level of medical care. Tier 3C is a “conglomerate housing setting” with the inmates 

sharing showers, bathrooms, and a dayroom. Plaintiff was assigned to this unit because of his 

serious medical conditions, including a need for daily changes of a fecal collection bag.

According to plaintiff, since January 2020 defendants have been aware that the novel 

coronavirus poses a significant risk to the health of inmates at the jail, and of the need to adhere 

to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) guidelines for preventing the spread 

of the virus. Despite this knowledge, defendants allegedly failed to take reasonable measures to 

protect the medically fragile inmates housed in Tier 3C from contracting the virus. In particular, 

plaintiff alleges that defendants kept the inmates housed in large group settings where social 

distancing was impossible, failed to distribute facemasks, and failed to provide readily available 

disinfectants or soap.

By mid-March several Tier 3C inmates had developed symptoms of coronavirus. 

Despite the obvious signs that inmates in Tier 3C were ill, defendants failed to take reasonable 

actions to protect plaintiff from the virus. On March 20, 2020, plaintiff was among a large 

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group of inmates taken to the Skokie courthouse. At the courthouse he was held in a bullpen 

with approximately 8 other inmates. After court, plaintiff was returned to Tier 3C, which was 

placed on lock-down. Five detainees had been taken to the hospital because of the virus. As a 

result of the lockdown correctional officers stopped entering the unit and the nursing staff 

stopped performing wound care. In lieu of nursing care for his fecal collector bag, plaintiff was 

provided supplies to change the bag on his own, which he was required to do in front of the 

entire dorm. While changing his bag, plaintiff ripped a portion of his intestine. The following 

day plaintiff became sick with virus symptoms and was taken to the hospital.

At the hospital plaintiff had one hand and one foot shackled to his bed. According to 

plaintiff this was done pursuant to Dart’s instructions that whenever an inmate is hospitalized 

outside the jailed the inmate should be so restrained. Plaintiff alleges that Dart has personal 

knowledge of the widespread practice of correctional offices to shackle seriously ill inmates to 

their hospital beds.

Plaintiff was released from the hospital on April 11, 2020. He claims that shackling him 

was excessive and caused gratuitous pain and reopened his bedsore.

DISCUSSION

Defendants have moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The purpose of 

such a motion is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to judge the merits of the case. 

Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). When considering the motion, 

the court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences 

in plaintiff's favor. McMillan v. Collection Professionals Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 

2006). The complaint must plead sufficient facts to plausibly suggest that plaintiff has a right to 

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relief and raise that possibility above the “speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Plaintiff’s first claim is that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of 

confinement that led to his contracting the coronavirus. This claim is governed by an objective 

reasonableness standard. See McCann v. Ogle County, Ill., 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018). 

To state a claim plaintiff must allege that: 1) defendants “acted purposefully, knowingly, or 

perhaps even recklessly”; and 2) defendants’ conduct was objectively unreasonable. Id. (citing 

Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353-54 (7th Cir. 2018). Whether a defendant’s conduct 

was objectively unreasonable “turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case,” and 

the court must consider the “legitimate interests that stem from the government’s need to manage 

the facility in which the individual is detained, appropriately deferring to policies and practices 

that in the judgment of jail officials are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to 

maintain institutional security.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (internal 

quotations omitted). The objective standard protects officers who act in good faith. “We 

recognize that running a prison is an ordinately difficult undertaking, and that safety and order at 

these institutions requires the expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial 

discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face.” Id. at 399 (internal 

quotations omitted). 

In the instant case, plaintiff has alleged that defendants failed to take reasonable actions 

to prevent the most medically susceptible inmates from contracting the virus, including failing to

provide disinfectant, soap, and facemasks. He also alleges that defendants failed to regularly 

sanitize common areas such as bathrooms and showers. Defendants argues that these 

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allegations are insufficient to suggest a constitutional violation, and simply present plaintiff’s 

wish list of what he thinks should have been done. In support of their motion, defendants’ argue 

that the court should take judicial notice of Judge Kennelly’s findings in Mays that defendants 

had taken significant steps to stem the spread of the virus, and that he was satisfied that Sheriff 

Dart and his staff had acted in good faith, with the goal of protecting people placed in his 

custody. Mays v. Dart, 456 F.Supp.3d 966, 1002, (N.D. Ill 2020). 

The court rejects defendants’ position that it should rely on Judge Kennelly’s findings in 

Mays, which he made when ruling on a motion for preliminary relief and which, by definition, 

are not final. Moreover, the issues in the instant case are far more limited than in Mays. The 

instant case involves only whether the defendants’ actions to protect the most medically 

vulnerable inmates were constitutionally sufficient. It is entirely plausible that the actions taken 

may have been reasonable to protect the general population but insufficient to protect the 

medically vulnerable. Consequently, the court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff’s second claim is that he was subjected to excessive force when he was shackled 

to his hospital bed. He alleges that this was done pursuant to a widespread practice, of which 

Dart was aware, of shackling seriously ill inmates at outlying hospitals. He alleges that “nearly 

all inmates hospitalized for coronavirus are shackled to their bed.” He claims that the 

continuous restraint of his hand and foot caused significant pain and resulted in the reopening of 

a bedsore. He brings this claim against Sheriff Dart in both his official and individual 

capacities.

Defendants move to dismiss this claim arguing the there is nothing objectively 

unreasonable with a policy of shackling detainees while they are at the hospital. See May v. 

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Sheahan 226 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Certainly, shackling all hospital detainees reduces 

the risk of a breach of security and thus furthers a legitimate non-punitive government 

purpose.”). Plaintiff does not disagree with the notion that the shackling policy is rationally 

related to a non-punitive purpose. He simply argues that the policy may still violate due process 

if applied in a manner that is excessive in relation to its escape-prevention purpose. For 

example, in May, the court stated, “it is hard to see how shackling an AIDS patient to his or her 

bed around the clock, despite the presence of an armed guard, is an appropriate policy for 

carrying out this purpose. Such a policy is plainly excessive in the absence of any indication 

that the detainee poses some sort of security risk.” Id.

The problem with plaintiff’s argument, as defendants point out, is that the complaint 

contains no factual allegations to suggest that he was not a security risk, or that there was an 

armed guard present during his hospital stay. The complaint does not allege that he was not 

ambulatory or otherwise incapable of simply walking out of his hospital room. And, because he 

had the coronavirus he was an immediate danger to anyone with whom he came into contact. 

Without any such allegation the court cannot infer that shackling plaintiff was objectively 

unreasonable.

Recognizing the complaint’s deficiencies, plaintiff attempts to supplement his complaint 

in his response to the motion by indicating that he has nerve damage in his leg and cannot 

ambulate without a cane. He also indicates that “it was challenging for [him] to breath[sic] and 

he was very weak,” that there were at least two armed guards watching him at all times, and that 

on at least two separate occasions the nursing staff requested the guards to remove the restraints 

while they treated plaintiff. The guards refused.

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None of these facts were alleged in the complaint, and courts generally look only to the 

matters within the four corners of the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Bruno v. Global Experience Specialists, Inc., 2020 WL 5253139 at *3 

(N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2020) (citing Burke v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, L.L.C., 714 F.3d 501, 506 (7th

Cir. 2013)).

There is an exception to the four corner rule. In Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 

743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012), the court noted that a plaintiff opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion may 

elaborate on his factual allegations “so long as the new elaborations are consistent with the 

pleadings.” Plaintiff relies on Geinosky to present the new facts, but most of the new facts, such 

as his need for a cane to ambulate and the presence of the two armed officers, are not 

“elaborations” consistent with facts already alleged, but are new factual allegations that should 

have been presented in an amended complaint. The elaboration that he had difficulty breathing 

and that he was very weak is consistent, however, with his allegation that he had coronavirus, 

and that allegation is sufficient to infer that he was not a security risk and did not require 

shackling. He also alleges that the shackling caused him unnecessary pain and resulted in the 

reopening of a bedsore. Consequently, the court concludes that plaintiff states a claim that he 

was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

The court agrees with defendants, however, that the complaint fails to state a claim 

against Sheriff Dart in his individual capacity. To be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an 

individual defendant must have caused or participated in the constitutional violation. Pepper v. 

Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2005). Supervisory officials cannot be held 

liable for the conduct of their subordinates based on respondeat superior. Perkins v. Lawson, 

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312 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2002). The complaint contains no allegation against Dart except that 

he was aware of the widespread policy of shackling detainees while at the hospital. Those 

allegations are sufficient to support a claim against Dart in his official capacity under Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). But the policy is not inherently 

unconstitutional, and thus to hold Dart liable for how it was applied to plaintiff requires 

allegations that Dart personally participated in that application. There are no such allegations. 

Consequently, the court grants defendants’ motion to dismiss the individual claims against Dart.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, defendants’ motion to dismiss [Doc. 10] is granted as to 

the individual claim against Sheriff Dart and denied in all other respects. Defendants motion to 

stay [Doc. 11] is denied as moot. Defendants are directed to answer the complaint by

December 21, 2020. The parties are directed to file a joint status report on the court’s form by 

January 4, 2021.

ENTER: November 19, 2020

__________________________________________

Robert W. Gettleman

United States District Judge

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