[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-15025

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D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cr-14096-JEM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAVINDRANAUTH ROOPNARINE,

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

_______________________

(December 1, 2017)

Before JORDAN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and DUFFEY,

* District Judge.

 * Honorable William S. Duffey, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District of 

Georgia, sitting by designation. 

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PER CURIAM:

Ravindranauth Roopnarine (“Appellant”) appeals his convictions and 

sentence after a jury found him guilty of one count of conspiring to commit mail 

fraud and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, one count of wire fraud, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one count of mail fraud, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1341. Appellant asserts several issues on appeal, which we address in 

turn. After reviewing the extensive trial record and with the benefit of oral 

argument, we affirm Appellant’s conviction and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2006, Appellant developed a scheme to acquire more than 181 residential 

properties in Florida using “straw buyers” to secure mortgages. The scheme 

included Appellant directing other scheme participants to incorporate three Florida 

corporations for use in facilitating purchases of the homes: (1) DKR Florida; 

(2) Vero Lakes New Home Center; and (3) Century Star Realty Group/Sunrise 

New Homes. 

Appellant’s scheme generally involved a “straw buyer” purchasing a home 

from a homebuilder who agreed with Appellant to sell homes for a price below the

home’s fair market value. Appellant gave the straw buyer $10,000 to serve as the 

home purchaser. The straw buyer applied to a mortgage lender for a loan to 

purchase the home. The straw buyer applied for a loan in the amount of the fair 

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market value purchase price of the home, not the discounted price for which the 

homebuilder agreed with Appellant to sell the home. The straw buyer used his 

own credit information to secure the loan. 

Appellant received that portion of the mortgage loan represented by the 

difference between the discounted home purchase price and the amount of the loan 

based on the home’s fair market price. Appellant promised the straw buyers that 

he would make the mortgage loan payments with monies he received in renting the 

homes. Appellant also told straw buyers that when Appellant sold a home for a 

price greater than the purchase price mortgage, he would split the excess sale funds 

with the straw buyer. Mortgage lenders were not told of these financial 

arrangements to which Appellant and his straw buyers agreed. 

 Soon after the straw purchases commenced, Appellant had difficulty 

covering mortgage payments because he could not rent the homes and because he 

used the loan proceeds for personal expenses. To sustain the mortgages he 

sometimes used loan proceeds from new loans to make payments on existing 

mortgages. Of the 181 homes that Appellant convinced straw buyers to purchase, 

all but seven were foreclosed on by mortgage lenders. 

In 2008, Ikramul Azam Hosein, one of Appellant’s straw buyers, and his 

wife, reported Appellant to the FBI after Appellant stopped making mortgage 

payments on Hosein’s home and the bank foreclosed on the property. 

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On December 9, 2010, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of 

Florida returned an 11-count indictment against Appellant, which included charges 

for wire fraud, under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, mail fraud, under 18 U.S.C. § 1341,

conspiracy to commit wire fraud, mail fraud, and bank fraud, under 

18 U.S.C. § 1349, money laundering, under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a), and conspiracy to 

commit money laundering, under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). On March 7, 2016, 

Appellant’s jury trial began. Upon the government’s motion, the District Court

dismissed certain of the counts. The jury ultimately convicted Appellant of mail 

fraud, wire fraud, and conspiring to commit mail fraud and wire fraud. On 

July 14, 2016, the District Court sentenced Appellant to 262 months imprisonment, 

and ordered him to pay more than $9 million in restitution.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases 

de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” 

United States v. Dominguez, 661 F.3d 1051, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011); see also

United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1244 (11th Cir. 2008). The district 

court’s “evidentiary rulings” are reviewed “for a clear abuse of discretion.” United 

States v. Dodds, 347 F.3d 893, 897 (11th Cir. 2003). Jury instructions challenged 

in the district court are reviewed “de novo to determine whether the instructions 

misstated the law or misled the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” 

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United States v. House, 684 F.3d 1173, 1196 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting United 

States v. Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1342 (11th Cir. 2009)). We review de novo the 

interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines, but we review the 

underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d

1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2013). 

III. DISCUSSION

Appellant challenges his conviction on the following grounds: (1) the 

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the district court erred in its 

evidentiary rulings, including (i) limiting defense counsel’s cross-examination of 

government witness Jose Cadena and (ii) allowing an undercover government 

agent to testify without disclosing his true name; (3) the district court erred by 

giving a Pinkerton and deliberate ignorance instruction; and (4) the district court 

wrongfully calculated the loss amount and gross receipts under the sentencing 

guidelines.

A.

Appellant challenges whether the evidence was sufficient to support his 

substantive convictions of mail fraud and wire fraud and his conviction of 

conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud. At issue is whether a reasonable 

fact-finder could have determined that the evidence proved the defendant’s guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th 

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Cir. 2011); see also United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006). 

We will not disturb the verdict unless no reasonable trier of fact could find guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Lee, 603 F.3d 904, 912 (11th Cir. 

2010). “[C]ircumstantial evidence may be used to establish an element of a crime, 

even if the jury could draw more than one reasonable inference from the 

circumstantial evidence, and in judging sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the 

same standard whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.” Langford, 

647 F.3d at 1319. 

To establish that Appellant committed wire fraud, the government must 

prove that he: (1) intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud; and (2) used 

wire communications to further that scheme. 18 U.S.C. § 1343; see Belt v. United 

States, 868 F.2d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 1989). In order to establish that Appellant

committed mail fraud, the government must prove that he: (1) intentionally 

participated in a scheme to defraud; and (2) used the mails to further that scheme. 

18 U.S.C. § 1341; see United States v. Wingate, 997 F.2d 1429, 1432 (11th Cir.

1993). Because the elements of wire fraud are analogous to those of mail fraud, 

the statutes generally are interpreted similarly. Belt, 868 F.2d at 1211 (“The wire 

fraud statute tracks the language of the mail fraud statute . . . [and] [t]he statutes 

are given a similar construction and are subject to the same substantive analysis.”); 

see also Langford, 647 F.3d at 1320.

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1. Wire Fraud

Appellant’s wire fraud conviction involved the transfer of $171,000, on or 

about October 12, 2007, from Washington Mutual Bank to an escrow account for 

the purchase of a property at 373 N.E. 26th Place, Unit 102, Homestead, Florida 

(the “26th Place Property”). The record reveals that Ikramul Azam Hosein 

(“Hosein”), one of Appellant’s straw buyers, testified at trial that he signed a 

fraudulent mortgage loan application for the property. Hosein admitted that he 

signed the loan documents for the purchase of the property, that his gross monthly 

income of $15,000 stated on the documents was false, and that he did not pay the 

amount stated on the documents for the closing of the property. Hosein also 

identified documents establishing that the principal amount loaned for the property 

was $171,000, and that the loan proceeds were wired from Washington Mutual 

Bank to an escrow agent in Florida. 

The record includes testimony from Washington Mutual Bank underwriter 

Jose Cadena, who testified during trial that he reviewed the loan file for the 

26th Place Property, and would have considered “[i]ncome, credit, assets, the 

collateral, and the down payment” in making the underwriting determination. Tr. 

Transcript at 108-09 (Doc. 360). The testimony included the following exchange 

regarding the materiality of who provided the down payment for the property:

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Q: So if an underwriter learned that the down payment was not 

coming from the borrower, would that be significant and 

material? 

A: Yes, it would. 

Q: Why is that? 

A: The borrower has nothing in the transaction, no risk. The bank 

is putting up all the risk and it would have been potentially 

ineligible if we knew where it came from. Gifts are allowed 

from family members, but not from nonfamily members. 

. . .

That way they have something to lose. Right now if they have 

nothing in the transaction, they’ve really lost nothing if there is 

a loss on the property and the bank takes all the risk. 

Q: And if an underwriter were to learn that the source of a down 

payment was not coming from the borrower but from 

somewhere or someone else, another company for example, 

would that be material? 

A: Yes. 

Tr. Transcript at 112-13 (Doc. 360). The record shows the evidence was sufficient 

to support Appellant’s wire fraud conviction, and we find that a reasonable factfinder could have determined that the evidence proved Appellant’s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

2. Mail Fraud

Appellant’s mail fraud conviction, according to the government’s 

indictment, is based on a mailing, on or about October 12, 2007, of a warranty 

deed and mortgage for a property located at 2730 N.E. 4th Street, Unit 205, 

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Bldg. 19, Homestead, Florida (the “4th Street Property”). Hosein, the straw buyer, 

testified about this property.1

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the mailing 

element of the offense, claiming there is no evidence the mail was used to transmit

documents received by the Miami-Dade Office of the County Recorder, as alleged 

in the indictment. The government has consistently argued that loan instruments 

and checks were sent from Ascendant Title Services, Inc. (“Ascendant”) to the 

Miami-Dade Office of the County Recorder by mail.

The indictment reads, in relevant part, “Miami-Dade County clerk received 

from Ascendant Title Services, Inc., via U.P.S. a warranty deed and mortgage.” 

Indictment at 14 (Doc. 7). The government, during trial, in its brief, and in oral 

argument, relied upon Government Exhibit 6 (“GX6”), and specifically 

Government Exhibit 6A (“GX6A”), to support the mailing element of the charged 

conduct. GX6, according to the government’s exhibit list filed with the district 

court, is the Countrywide Bank Loan File for the property, and includes the 

following three documents: (1) “Miami-Dade Clerk of Court’s certification of 

origin of fax confirming mailing with print screens of clerk’s computer system and 

 1 Hosein admitted that he did not pay the closing costs as stated in the property’s loan 

documents, did not attend the closing, did not receive a key to the house, and did not make 

mortgage payments on the home. 

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recorded documents (composite)” (GX6A); (2) “HUD-1 Buyer Settlement 

Statement” (“GX6B”); and (3) “Uniform Residential Loan Application” 

(“GX6C”). Tr. Ex. List at 2 (Doc. 318). 

During proceedings relating to Appellant’s motions for judgment of 

acquittal, the government argued: 

Count 6, Your Honor, the entire file first of all for that home 

transaction, that real estate transaction, is in evidence. Part of what’s 

in evidence, and I believe it has been attached to an exhibit that was 

talked about in court is a proof of mailing, 6A. 

. . .

[T]here has been direct evidence and proof about a mailing. . . . We 

didn’t bring in a witness to say – it’s true, we didn’t bring in someone 

to say solely the mail was used on this count, this is how, here’s the 

letter, but that exhibit is in evidence, it’s already been admitted, and 

we’re going to refer to it in our closing argument and point the jury to 

it. 

Supp. Tr. Transcript at 5-6 (Doc. 377). In its appellate brief, the government 

argued, “The documents further reflected that they had been ‘received by U.S. 

mail’ by the Miami-Dade County Clerk of the Circuit and County Courts.” In oral 

argument, the government reiterated its position, stating:

What was mailed was . . . some form of deed to the county appraiser’s 

office. That deed had . . . the HUD-1 and the Uniform Residential 

Loan Application attached to it, so it was clear from, I think it was a 

fax or a letter to the County Court saying this is the documentation in 

connection with this property and it says on it “received by mail.” 

And of course, like I said, Hosein authenticated those documents. He 

said, “These are the documents that I originated in connection with 

this transaction.”

See Oral Argument at 17:17- 17:57.

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Upon a careful review of the documents sent from Ascendant, and the record 

generally, we cannot conclude that the documents were mailed to the Clerk of 

Court, rather than some other transmission means. Neither the documents sent by 

Ascendant, the remaining exhibits, nor the trial testimony provide evidence that the 

Miami-Dade Clerk of Court received the warranty deed and mortgage for the 

4th Street Property “via U.S. mail.” There is no record evidence that documents 

were “received” by the Clerk of Court by mail and there is no evidence from which 

a mailing can be inferred. 

What GX6 does include is a Uniform Residential Loan Application for the 

4th Street Property indicating that the application, signed by Hosein, a purchaser 

recruited by Appellant, was received by mail on July 17, 2007 by Kamla 

Seecharan. Ms. Seecharan, a co-conspirator who pleaded guilty in this case, was 

co-owner, together with Appellant, of Century Star Mortgage Group, Inc. 

Seecharan is represented as conducting the Hosein loan application interview. 

Hosein’s testimony appears to corroborate this fact. The following exchange

occurred during trial:

A: And I was presented with closing document for a second 

property. 

Q: Do you recall who gave those to you? 

A: Kamla. 

Q: And how was that delivered to you?

A: I believe by DHL package. 

Tr. Transcript at 75 (Doc. 360). These facts provide substantial evidence from 

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which a reasonable jury could conclude that Appellant caused the mails to be used, 

and that the mailing of the application and loan document was a step in furtherance 

of the fraudulent scheme, in this case the transaction involving the 4th Street 

Property. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954) (“Where one does 

an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course 

of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not 

actually intended, then he ‘causes' the mails to be used.”); see also United States v. 

Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 985 (11th Cir. 1997). The fact that “DHL” was the means 

used to mail the documents, as opposed to the U.S. mail, is irrelevant. United 

States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, n.14 (11th Cir. 2005) (“In 1994, Congress 

expanded the provisions of § 1341to include any ‘matter whatever to be sent or 

delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier.’ Deliveries by DHL are 

covered under the expanded definition.”) (citation omitted).

We further find that any variance between the alleged proof of mailing in the 

indictment and the evidence presented at trial is not grounds for reversal. “The 

standard of review for whether there is a material variance between the allegations 

in the indictment and the facts established at trial is twofold: First, whether a 

material variance did occur, and second, whether the defendant suffered substantial 

prejudice as a result.” United States v. Lander, 668 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir.

2012); United States v. Dennis, 237 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2001). 

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“A ‘variance’ occurs when the evidence at trial establishes facts materially 

different from those alleged in the indictment.” United States v. Caporale, 806 

F.2d 1487, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). Substantial prejudice is present if “the proof at 

trial differed so greatly from the charges that [the defendant] was unfairly surprised 

and was unable to prepare an adequate defense.” United States v. Richardson, 532 

F.3d 1279, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2008).

We conclude that it is not a material variance that Appellant’s co-conspirator

Kamla Seecharan, and not the Miami-Dade Clerk of Court, was the person who 

received by mail documents by which the fraudulent loan was processed. See, e.g., 

United States v. Roberts, 308 F.3d 1147, 1156 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding there was 

no material variance where the date of the offense cited in the indictment was a 

year after the crime was committed, and the proof at trial showed that the offense 

was committed on the earlier date, because the defendant had notice of the charges 

and there was no possibility that he would be prosecuted again for the same 

offense); Thompson v. Nagle, 118 F.3d 1442, 1453 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding there 

was no material variance where evidence suggested cause of death differed from 

indicted charge). Likewise, there is not a material variance that the testimony at 

trial established that DHL, rather than U.P.S., was used. Id. Here, Appellant was 

clearly on notice that he was charged with fraud in connection with the purchase of 

and loan for the 4th Street Property, and that the mails were used to process this 

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fraudulent transaction. The mailing that occurred in this transaction involved the

transmission of documents related to the loan, and evidence of the mailing of the 

document was sent to and received by the Miami-Dade Clerk of Court. The 

variance, even if there was one, was not material.

Even if the difference in proof of mailing constituted a material variance, we 

find that it did not prejudice Appellant. See Caporale, 806 F.2d at 1500 (no 

prejudice where the variance “did not alter the crime charged, the requisite 

elements of proof or the appropriate defenses in a significant manner”); see also

United States v. White, 349 F. App’x 381, 382 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding material 

variance did not prejudice the defendant where the indictment incorrectly stated 

one of the seventeen characters of a VIN number); United States v. Teague, 12 F. 

App’x 759, 766 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Therefore, we hold that despite the technically 

imperfect address given in the indictment to indicate where the crimes occurred, 

the indictment plainly provided [the defendant] with sufficient detail and adequate 

notice of the pending charges and evidence against him.”); cf. Lander, 668 F.3d at 

1295-96 (finding a material variance where “the Government trie[d] to rely on a 

scheme to defraud entirely different from the one alleged in the indictment to 

support” the defendant’s conviction resulting in prejudice to the defendant because 

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“the indictment failed to put [the defendant] on notice of the crime for which he 

was convicted”).2

The indictment was sufficient to put Appellant on notice of the crime for 

which he was charged and convicted. It identified the substantive crime, the 

approximate date on which the crime allegedly occurred, the facts underlying the 

fraudulent scheme, and the property’s address. That the mailing was proved by a 

means other than what was articulated in the indictment, which was nonetheless 

included in the documents received by the Miami-Dade Clerk of Court, did not 

prevent Appellant from preparing his defense. The government’s exhibits were 

provided to Appellant, and GX6C clearly shows that a mailing—although different 

from the one described in the indictment—occurred. 

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support, and a reasonable 

jury could conclude, that Appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of mail 

fraud, including that Appellant caused the mails to be used to further the fraudulent 

purchase of this property. 

2. The Conspiracy 

To sustain a conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1349, the government 

must prove the following elements: “(1) agreement between two or more persons 

 2 We recognize that Federal Appendix decisions are unpublished, and thus not binding on 

the panel. We note, however, that they are helpful in explaining the legal principles that apply.

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to achieve an unlawful objective; (2) knowing and voluntary participation in that 

agreement by the defendant; and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.” 

United States v. Broughton, 689 F.3d 1260, 1277 (11th Cir. 2012); see also United 

States v. Smith, 934 F.2d 270, 275 (11th Cir. 1991). Although an agreement may 

be shown by direct evidence, “[t]he very nature of conspiracy frequently requires 

that [it] be proved by inferences from the conduct of the alleged participants or 

from circumstantial evidence of a scheme.” United States v. Toll, 804 F.3d 1344, 

1355 (11th Cir. 2015). 

The record is fraught with evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that 

would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Appellant participated in a 

conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud. Appellant recruited his co-conspirators

to incorporate real estate companies that he controlled, but on which his identity 

was not disclosed. He directed his co-conspirators how to use the real estate 

companies to further his scheme. He recruited straw buyers by providing funds to 

make down payments on the purchases, promising to pay the payment obligations 

under the mortgage loans, and promising a share of the profits generated upon sale 

of the properties. Testimony from Hosein and other witnesses established that 

Appellant orchestrated, directed, and managed the scheme. Hamewattie 

Balkissoon and Kamla Seecharan, Appellant’s co-conspirators, testified at trial that 

the corporations that processed the fraudulent mortgage loan applications and the 

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bank accounts in which the loan proceeds were deposited were controlled by 

Appellant. Appellant managed and controlled the companies, found the buyers,

and instructed his co-conspirators how to process the loan applications and pay the 

mortgages. Seecharan, for example, stated:

Q: Did [Appellant] have any directions for you as to where and 

when to use his name? 

A: Everybody knew it was Ravi’s company. I mean, there was – it 

was never hidden. He didn’t hide the fact – Ravi tells 

everybody everything. So usually everybody that knows Ravi 

knows that he owns the real estate and mortgage, I’m the 

broker. 

Tr. Transcript at 188 (Doc. 359). Seecharan testified about Appellant’s extensive 

involvement in the mortgage application process, including the review and revision 

of applications. She testified: 

Q: So how regularly did you keep him informed of the details of 

these transactions? 

A: Every day we talked. Whatever is going on on a daily basis in 

the company, he’s fully aware. 

Q: Did you show him documents? 

A: Yes, he have seen documents. 

Q: What kind of documents? 

A: He has seen the HUDS. . . . 

. . .

Q: Did he expect you to share every detail with him? 

A: Yes. If you don’t, he gets angry like you’re hiding something 

from him.

Tr. Transcript at 190 (Doc. 359).

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s 

conspiracy conviction, and the underlying substantive wire and mail fraud 

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convictions. The record includes testimony, loan applications, and other 

documents that would permit a reasonable jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that Appellant committed these offenses.3

B.

Appellant next challenges two of the district court’s evidentiary rulings. 

First, Appellant argues the district court wrongly limited defense counsel’s 

cross-examination of government witness Jose Cadena. Second, Appellant 

contends the district court improperly permitted the government’s undercover 

witness to testify without disclosing his real name.

1. Testimony of Jose Cadena

At trial, the government offered Jose Cadena, an underwriter for Washington 

Mutual Bank, to testify about the review of Hosein’s mortgage loan applications 

and “what would be material to a Washington Mutual underwriter.” Tr. Transcript 

at 109 (Doc. 360). Appellant argues that the district court improperly restricted his

cross-examination of Cadena. The following exchange between defense counsel 

and the district court took place: 

Defense counsel: Judge, if you’re not going to let me cross-examine 

on materiality, then I am finished. 

 3 We reach this conclusion having found, as discussed below, that the district court did not 

err in the evidentiary rulings and instructions to the jury challenged by Appellant. 

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Court: No, I will not let you cross-examine on the alleged 

failure of the bank to do what you think they 

should have done. That, I think the Eleventh

Circuit has spoken on. So govern yourself 

accordingly. 

Tr. Transcript at 143 (Doc. 360). Defense counsel repeatedly attempted to ask 

Cadena questions suggesting the bank was negligent in not investigating the 

income claimed by mortgage applicants. The district court sustained the 

government’s objection to the questions. The district court noted, during

Appellant’s cross-examination of Cadena, that it would instruct the jury that “any 

negligence on the part of the bank is not a defense to this case.” See, e.g., United 

States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A perpetrator of fraud is no 

less guilty of fraud because his victim is also guilty of negligence.”). The district 

court was correct that negligence on the part of the bank has no bearing on whether 

a misrepresentation is material. See id. Therefore, the district court did not err in 

restricting cross-examination of Cadena on alleged shortcomings of Washington 

Mutual’s application review process. 

A careful review of the trial record also shows that defense counsel in fact

extensively cross-examined Cadena. The transcript of defense counsel’s crossexamination continues for approximately ten pages, and it supports that defense 

counsel asked Cadena about matters such as verification of facts disclosed in the 

loan applications, how the HUD-1 is prepared, why Cadena considered certain 

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items material, and whether underwriters rely on brokers for the submission of 

accurate information.

We conclude that the district court did not err in restricting defense 

counsel’s cross-examination, and it properly limited defense counsel’s crossexamination when defense counsel attempted to imply that the negligence of the 

financial institutions in some way negated her client’s intent or culpability. 

2. Testimony of Government’s Undercover Witness

Appellant next contends that the district court improperly permitted the 

government’s undercover witness to testify without disclosing his real name. The 

following exchange occurred at the trial immediately before the undercover 

witness testified: 

Defense counsel: Judge, I just think on the record on – may not be in 

the presence of the jury, but these witnesses need to 

be identified by their true identities and names for 

the record. I think that we’ve agreed, because the 

government has security concerns since they are 

undercover agents, that they can use their 

undercover names in front of the jury. But I still 

think we need to put on the record who they are.

. . .

My understanding was they were going to put on 

the record, outside the jury, and that’s why I 

suggested sidebar, the true name of their witness 

and that we would agree he could use his 

undercover name in front of the jury. But you 

need to identify who this witness is so that in the 

future, if something happens, and let’s say this

man gets arrested for lying or something comes out 

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that, you know, he fabricated all these things, I

don’t know, it’s happened.

Court: You have a continuing responsibility to the court, 

as officers of the court, to let me know if something

like that were to happen.

Government: Correct, Your Honor. Under Giglio and just generally.

Tr. Transcript at 162-63 (Doc. 360).

The record shows that defense counsel agreed to permit the use of the 

witness’s alias during trial. The record also shows that defense counsel objected to 

the government’s withholding of the witness’s true identity because of some future 

need for the identity of the witness to be known. Defense counsel did not argue or 

assert an objection based on some claimed prejudice as a result of withholding the 

witness’s identity.4 The record shows further that defense counsel conducted a 

thorough cross-examination of the undercover witness. Appellant waived his 

objection to the witness’s use of an alias at the trial. Appellant agreed to the use of 

an alias for security reasons, and he cannot now claim this agreed-upon use was 

error. 

On appeal, Appellant contends that the district court erred by allowing the 

witness to testify under an alias before the jury. The argument is waived because 

 4 Appellant’s counsel made a number of objections during the witness’s direct 

examination, such as relevancy and that a question called for speculation. The district ruled on 

each of these. She did not object based on the witness’s use of an alias or on the grounds that 

allowing the witness to use an alias impacted her cross-examination. 

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Appellant’s agreement to the use of the alias also constituted an invitation to the 

district court to allow the use of the alias. “It is a cardinal rule of appellate review 

that a party may not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by 

that party.” United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 988 (11th Cir.1997) (internal 

quotations omitted). “The doctrine of invited error is implicated when a party 

induces or invites the district court into making an error.” United States v. 

Stone, 139 F.3d 822, 838 (11th Cir. 1998). “Where invited error exists, it 

precludes a court from invoking the plain error rule and reversing.” Ford ex rel. 

Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations

omitted).

Although defense counsel objected to the district court’s refusal to have the 

undercover agent state his true name at sidebar, Appellant has not shown that he 

was prejudiced by the denial of this specific request. United States v. Pepe, 747 

F.2d 632, 656 & n.33 (11th Cir. 1984) (requiring showing of “specific prejudice

caused by [] nondisclosure”); see also Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692

(1931) (“Prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in 

his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, 

without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them.”). Appellant’s only stated 

concern was that something may happen “in the future” affecting the agent’s 

credibility. But these hypothetical future events would not have been presented to 

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the jury and Appellant made no argument that he was unable to effectively “place a 

witness in the proper setting” before the jury. United States v. Alston, 460 F.2d 

48, 52 (5th Cir. 1972); see also United States v. Gutierrez de Lopez, 761 F.3d 

1123, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2014) (harmless error where “questioning allowed [the 

defendant] an opportunity to undermine [the witness’s] credibility despite her 

inability to ask about their true identities”). To the contrary, the record reflects a 

thorough cross-examination. 

Appellant agreed to the use of an alias and in doing so waived any objection 

to it. To the extent it was error to allow the alias to be used before the jury, the 

claimed error was invited by Appellant. We conclude that Appellant has not 

shown he suffered any prejudice by the refusal to disclose the agent’s undercover 

alias name to the defense. 

C.

Appellant argues that the district court erred in giving a Pinkerton5 and a 

deliberate ignorance instruction in the district court’s charge. 

We review jury instructions “de novo to determine whether the instructions 

misstated the law or misled the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” 

United States v. Gibson, 708 F.3d 1256, 1275 (11th Cir. 2013); see also United 

States v. Clay, 832 F.3d 1259, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016). We will not reverse a 

 5 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946).

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conviction based on a jury instruction challenge “unless we are ‘left with a 

substantial and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its 

deliberations.’” Gibson, 708 F.3d at 1275. “When the jury instructions, taken 

together, accurately express the law applicable to the case without confusing or 

prejudicing the jury, there is no reason for reversal even though isolated clauses 

may, in fact, be confusing, technically imperfect, or otherwise subject to criticism.”

Id. The Supreme Court has observed that “in reviewing jury instructions, our task 

is also to view the charge itself as part of the whole trial,” noting that “[o]ften 

isolated statements taken from the charge, seemingly prejudicial on their face, are 

not so when considered in the context of the entire record of the trial.” United 

States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674-75 (1975) (internal quotations omitted).

1. The Pinkerton Instruction

Appellant contends that the district court erred when it instructed that, if the 

jury found Appellant guilty of conspiracy, the jury could find him guilty of the 

substantive offenses of mail fraud and wire fraud based on the acts of his coconspirators. The district court, upon the government’s request, and after 

overruling Appellant’s objections at a charge conference, gave the following 

instruction to the jury: 

During a conspiracy, if a conspirator commits a crime to advance the 

conspiracy toward its goals, then in some cases a co-conspirator may 

be guilty of the crime even through the co-conspirator did not 

participate directly in the crime. So, regarding Counts [Three] and 

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[Six], if you have first found the defendant guilty of Count [One], you 

may also find the defendant guilty of any of the crimes charged in 

Counts [Three] and [Six] even though the defendant did not 

personally participate in the crime. To do so, you must find beyond a 

reasonable doubt: 

One, during the conspiracy, a conspirator committed the additional 

crime charged to further the conspiracy’s purpose. 

Two, the defendant was a knowing and willful member of the 

conspiracy when that crime was committed. 

And three, it was reasonably foreseeable that a co-conspirator would 

commit the crime as a consequence of the conspiracy. 

Tr. Transcript at 12-13 (Doc. 362). Appellant does not argue that this instruction 

was defective. Instead, he contends that the district court erred because (1) “[t]he 

evidence did not support giving a Pinkerton instruction”; and (2) the instruction 

“undermined the whole defense theory of the case—that [Appellant] never had 

intent to defraud.” 

As we conclude above, the evidence was more than sufficient to support 

Appellant’s conspiracy conviction. We find that the instructions issued by the 

district court in this case correctly and adequately stated the relevant law that 

applied, including that Appellant could be convicted for reasonably foreseeable 

co-conspirator criminal conduct engaged in to advance the conspiracy towards the 

“goals” of the conspiracy. This specifically includes the criminal conduct in which 

straw buyers engaged. The record here supports that it was appropriate to give the 

Pinkerton charge.

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2. The Deliberate Ignorance Instruction

Appellant next argues that the district court erred in giving a deliberate 

ignorance instruction.6 The district court gave the following instruction to the jury: 

If a defendant’s knowledge of a fact is an essential part of the crime, 

it’s enough that the defendant was aware of a high probability that the 

fact existed, unless the defendant actually believed that the fact did 

not exist.

Tr. Transcript at 14 (Doc. 362). Appellant does not object on the ground that the 

charge is incorrect. He only objects on the ground that the instruction prejudiced 

him because it “basically negate[d] intent,” which in turn allegedly lowered the 

government’s burden to prove his intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The trial court instructed the jury on approximately six occasions that the 

government was required to prove each element of each charge against the 

defendant and that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required. The court 

specifically instructed the jury that the government was required to prove intent to 

defraud beyond a reasonable doubt. The record shows the jury was plainly 

instructed that it was the government’s burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The record also shows there was sufficient evidence to support giving the 

instruction. 

 6 This instruction is sometimes referred to as a “deliberate indifference” instruction. 

“Ignorance” is the more appropriate term, and it is used in this Opinion. 

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We have stated that a “deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate only 

when there is evidence in the record ‘showing the defendant purposely contrived to 

avoid learning the truth.’” United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 937 (11th Cir. 

1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 833 (1994) (citing United States v. Barbee, 968 F.2d 

1026, 1033 (10th Cir. 1992)). We have also cautioned “against instructing juries 

on deliberate ignorance when the evidence only points to either actual knowledge 

or no knowledge on the part of the defendant.” Id. These general principles are 

difficult to apply in a fraud as complex as the one at issue here, where the defense 

was that Appellant’s conduct was simply a commercial venture gone awry because 

of market conditions. The record supports the trial court’s decision to give the 

instruction.

Appellant does not challenge the accuracy of the instruction, but objects that 

it relieved the government of proving Appellant’s intent to commit fraud and to 

enter into the conspiracy.7

 The instruction, as given, stated: “If a defendant’s 

knowledge of a fact is an essential part of the crime, it’s enough that the defendant 

was aware of a high probability that the fact existed.” Tr. Transcript at 14 (Doc. 

362). There was, in this case, an adequate factual basis for the district court to give 

the deliberate ignorance instruction from which the inference could be drawn that 

 7 The instruction given was based on Special Instruction No. 8 from the Eleventh Circuit 

Pattern Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases.

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Appellant engaged in purposeful conduct to avoid knowing essential facts of the 

crime. The defense in this case was that Appellant engaged in ordinary 

commercial transactions and did not intend to defraud lenders. He argued, 

including in this appeal, that the facts showed he engaged in regular, ordinary real 

estate transactions. The government argued that Appellant was fully aware of the 

fraud in which he engaged, but also sought to disguise his involvement in certain 

key transactions by instructing others not to disclose his association with the 

scheme. 

The evidence supports that Appellant attempted to make all or part of the 

scheme appear to be legitimate. Appellant sought to insulate himself from 

knowing the particulars of specific scheme elements, knowing there was a high 

probability that the conduct of his co-conspirators was fraudulent, and that he

could be held criminally accountable for it. 

For example, Appellant recruited and facilitated straw borrowers to apply for 

loans. Appellant was not listed on loan applications or documents and the 

evidence shows that Appellant dispatched straw borrowers to obtain purchase 

money mortgages. Additionally, he directed his co-conspirators to leave his name 

off of documents incorporating his real estate companies. This evidence would 

allow a jury to infer that Appellant, who was knowledgeable of the lending

process, purposely avoided knowing the details of the straw purchases, because not 

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knowing allowed him to maintain his defense that there was no fraud in the 

borrowing activities. A jury in this case was entitled to decide if Appellant chose 

not to know of the details of the fraudulent scheme. These facts, coupled with 

Appellant’s defense, were an appropriate basis to allow the jury to consider 

whether Appellant chose to be deliberately ignorant of essential elements of the 

crime—here, the conduct of straw borrowers.

What we have said before is true in this case—a deliberate ignorance

instruction is “properly given” where “the evidence supports both actual 

knowledge and deliberate ignorance.” United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1143 

(11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations omitted). Viewing the charge and the record 

as a whole, we find no reversible error in the court’s instructions to the jury.8

D.

Appellant argues that the district court improperly calculated loss amount 

and gross receipts in determining the Sentencing Guidelines, and, as a result, 

imposed an inappropriate sentence. 

“[A] district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly 

calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 

 8 We have noted before that even where there was no basis for a deliberate ignorance 

instruction, it was harmless error beyond reasonable doubt to give it where the evidence of actual 

knowledge independently supported a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Griffin v. United 

States, 502 U.S. 46, 58 (1991); Stone, 9 F.3d at 937. Here, there was more than sufficient 

evidence of actual knowledge. 

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49 (2007); see also United States v. Campbell, 765 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 

2014). If “a defendant challenges one of the factual bases of his sentence . . . the 

Government has the burden of establishing the disputed fact by a preponderance of 

the evidence.” Rodriguez, 732 F.3d at 1305. The district court must then, using 

the Guidelines range as the benchmark, weigh all of the factors to determine 

whether they support the sentence requested by a party. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50. 

1. Loss Amount

For crimes involving fraud or deceit, such as this one, the Sentencing 

Guidelines increase the offense level based on the amount of the loss. 

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b) (2015); see also United States v. Wright, 862 F.3d 1265, 1274 

(11th Cir. 2017). The “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A). On July 14, 2016, the district court sentenced 

Appellant to 262 months imprisonment, followed by 60 days of supervised release, 

and ordered him to pay more than $9 million in restitution. The district court 

determined, without specifically adopting a particular loss amount, that the 

government established a loss amount of more than $25 million, which requires 

22 levels to be added to the base level offense. The district court considered, 

however, the impact of sentencing Appellant pursuant to the next lowest category, 

which involves a loss amount of more than $9.5 million but not more than 

$25 million. This loss amount category requires adding 20 levels to the base level 

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offense. The high end of the applicable advisory guideline for a loss amount of 

less than $25 million and the low end of the applicable advisory guideline for a 

loss amount of more than $25 million resulted in the same recommended 

sentence—262 months. As a result, the district court stated the following:

If I went below the $25 million, it would be my intention to sentence 

the defendant at the high end of the guidelines; and if I go above that, 

it would be my intention to sentence him at the low end of the

guidelines. So I don’t think it has any practical difference in this 

matter. I don’t think that you have proven sufficient to get it below 

the $25 million. But even if you did, it would still be at the very high 

end below $25 million. And so I’m ruling against you on your 

objection, not on everything, but on the fact that it doesn’t really make 

any difference because it’s still over $25 million, and if it were to slip 

below $25 million, it would not make any difference to me in my 

evaluation of the sentencing to Mr. Roopnarine.

Tr. Transcript at 47 (Doc. 354). 

The district court thus concluded that it would impose the same sentence 

regardless of the specific loss amount, which was disputed and discussed at length 

during the sentencing proceedings on July 14, 2016. “A Sentencing Guidelines 

miscalculation is harmless if the district court would have imposed the same 

sentence without the error.” United States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th 

Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Scott, 441 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 2006) 

(“Notwithstanding the district court’s error, we are not required to vacate the 

sentence and remand the case if the court would have likely sentenced [the 

defendant] in the same way without the error.”). We conclude, without 

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determining the exact loss amount at issue here, that the district court did not 

clearly err in sentencing Appellant under the guideline for a loss amount of more 

than $25 million and less than $65 million because he would have nevertheless 

sentenced Appellant to 262 months. 

2. Gross Receipts

The Sentencing Guidelines also require the district court to enhance a 

defendant’s base offense by two levels if “the defendant derived more than 

$1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions as a result of 

the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A). Gross receipts include “all property, 

real or personal, tangible or intangible, which is obtained directly or indirectly” as 

a result of the offense. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. n.12(B). 

Appellant argues on appeal that the evidence did not support the district 

court’s finding that he personally received more than $1 million in gross receipts. 

The following exchange between the government and the district court occurred at 

the sentencing proceedings on July 14, 2016: 

Government: First and foremost, we have Government Trial 

Exhibit 1, which is the summary chart presented 

by the defendant to the undercover FBI agents 

laying out in detail the operation and scope of his 

scheme in which the central column was entitled 

Robby’s Take and aggregated over $6 and a half 

million at the bottom of the column. In addition, 

there was preponderance of the evidence in the 

form of testimony by the witnesses at trial 

describing how all proceeds were considered to 

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belong to him and over a million dollars were at 

various times in the aggregate transferred to him 

and his wife. 

Court: My recollection of the testimony is that your client 

claimed far more than a million dollars. Now, he 

might have been lying because, you know what, 

fraudsters do lie sometimes. But I think in this 

case he was lying to his detriment. He clearly 

indicated that he was receiving far more than a 

million dollars.

Tr. Transcript at 46 (Doc. 354). The district court heard testimony on the issue, 

considered it, and concluded that it was reasonable to estimate from the testimony 

and evidence presented during the trial that Appellant took home more than 

$1 million in gross receipts. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err 

in reaching its determination.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant’s conviction and 

sentence.

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