1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), we

have substituted the current Attorney General of the United

States, Alberto R. Gonzales, as the named respondent.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965

YULIA FIRMANSJAH,

Petitioner,

v.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES,

1

Respondent.

____________

On Petitions for Review of Orders

of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A75 979 022

____________

ARGUED JUNE 17, 2004—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 16, 2005

____________

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and MANION and WILLIAMS,

Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Yulia Firmansjah, a citizen

of Indonesia, entered the United States as a student and

overstayed her visa. She subsequently filed an application

for asylum and withholding of removal. After a hearing, the

immigration judge denied Firmansjah’s asylum request on

the ground that Firmansjah was firmly resettled in Singapore prior to her arrival in the United States. The immigra-
2 Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965

tion judge also denied her request for withholding of

removal, reasoning that she had not shown a clear probability that she would be persecuted if removed to Indonesia.

The Bureau of Immigration Affairs affirmed without

discussion, and Firmansjah appeals. For the reasons that

follow, we find that substantial evidence supports the

immigration judge’s determinations and deny the petitions

for review.

I. BACKGROUND

Yulia Firmansjah was born in Indonesia and is an

Indonesian citizen. She is ethnically Chinese. At her asylum

hearing, she recounted that in 1986, when she was twelve

years old, she and her family moved from their home in

Jakarta, Indonesia to the western outskirts of Jakarta in an

effort to avoid anti-Chinese violence in the city. In 1988, at

the age of sixteen, she moved with her family to Singapore,

where she attended high school for four years. She lived

with her family in Singapore from 1988 to 1992 when, at

the age of nineteen, she entered the United States on a

student visa. She studied at the University of Dayton,

where she received a bachelor’s degree in environmental

engineering technology and a master’s degree in business

administration.

Firmansjah testified that in approximately 1990, her

father removed all his money from Singapore and reinvested it in business in Indonesia. In 1995 or 1996, after

her siblings finished high school and she was already living

in the United States, her parents moved back to Indonesia.

In 1998, as a result of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia,

her parents twice left Indonesia and headed to Singapore.

She testified that as of December 2000, her parents lived in

Indonesia but retained their residency in Singapore.

Firmansjah’s most recent visa expired on December 26,

1997, and she acknowledged that she stayed in the United
Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965 3

States beyond her visa’s expiration. She stated that at

the time of her graduation from college, she had planned to

return to Indonesia. However, after riots in Indonesia

in May 1998 during which ethnic Chinese persons were

harmed, her parents advised her not to do so. Instead, she

completed an application for asylum. On her application for

asylum dated September 16, 1998, she stated that she had

a “Singapore residence permit” and was “entitled to return

to Singapore for residence reasons.” At her hearing, she

testified that although her parents were still Singapore

residents, she no longer had “residency” in Singapore

because it had expired in March of 2000.

Firmansjah asserted that if returned to Indonesia, she

feared persecution based on her ethnicity (Chinese), religion

(Catholic), and status as a young westernized Chinese

woman. She expressed fear that the government was unable

to control violence towards Christians or Chinese in

Indonesia. She also testified that she did not know anyone

personally who had been the victim of anti-Chinese violence

in Indonesia.

The immigration judge denied Firmansjah’s request

for asylum on the ground that she had firmly resettled

in Singapore prior to entering the United States. The

immigration judge also denied her request for withholding of removal, reasoning that she had not established a

clear probability that she would face persecution if returned

to Indonesia. Her request for voluntary departure was

granted, with an alternative order of removal to Indonesia.

Firmansjah appealed the immigration judge’s decision to

the Board of Immigration Appeals, which summarily

affirmed the immigration judge’s decision without opinion.

II. ANALYSIS

Firmansjah raises two issues in her petition for review. First, she contends that the immigration judge erred
4 Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965

2 This provision applies to aliens who, like Firmansjah, file

asylum applications on or after April 1, 1997. See Pub. Law No.

104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). Effective October 1, 1990, the

Immigration and Naturalization Service amended its regulations

to provide that a finding of firm resettlement mandated the denial

(continued...)

when he determined that she had firmly resettled in

Singapore prior to her arrival in the United States. In

addition, she maintains that the immigration judge’s

finding that she was not entitled to withholding of removal

was not supported by substantial evidence. Where, as here,

the Board of Immigration Appeals affirms the immigration judge’s decision without opinion, we review the decision

of the immigration judge as the “final agency determination.” Rashiah v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir.

2004).

A. Asylum

To be eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum, an

applicant must establish that she is a “refugee” within

the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1); Jamal-Daoud v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d

918, 922 (7th Cir. 2005). The Act defines a “refugee” as one

who is unable or unwilling to return to her native country

“because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in

a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(42)(A). The petitioner carries the burden of establishing eligibility for asylum. Jamal-Daoud, 403 F.3d at

922; 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a).

Although it has not always been the case, under the

current statute, an alien is not eligible for asylum if she

was “firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in

the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi);2 see Abdille
Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965 5

2 (...continued)

of asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(2) (1991); see also 8 C.F.R. §

202.13(c)(2)(i)(B) (2000) (stating that for asylum applications filed

before April 1, 1997, an immigration or asylum officer shall not

grant asylum to any alien who “[h]as been firmly resettled.”). In

1996, Congress codified this mandatory bar at 8 U.S.C. §

1158(b)(2)(A)(vi).

v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483 n.4 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing

history of firm resettlement and noting that prior to 1990,

firm resettlement was only one factor for immigration judge

to consider in deciding whether to grant asylum); see also

Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 692 n.4, 693 (7th Cir.

2004). Here, the immigration judge found that Firmansjah

had firmly resettled in Singapore prior to entering the

United States and denied her asylum request on that basis.

Firmansjah maintains that this finding was erroneous.

“A finding of firm resettlement is a factual determination.” Diallo, 381 F.3d at 695. Therefore, we will review the

immigration judge’s decision only to determine whether

substantial evidence supports it. Id. The finding that

Firmansjah was firmly resettled “must be upheld if it is

supported ‘by reasonable, substantial, and probative

evidence on the record considered as a whole,’ ” and we

will reverse only if a reasonable fact-finder would be

compelled to reach a different conclusion. Id. (citations

omitted).

We considered the firm resettlement provision in the

current statute for the first time in Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381

F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2004). There, we observed that the

statute does not define the term “firm resettlement” or

provide guidance for how to determine whether a refugee

was firmly resettled. 381 F.3d at 692. The regulations,

however, provide that:

[a]n alien is considered to be firmly resettled if,

prior to arrival in the United States, he or she
6 Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965

3 The regulation further provides that an applicant will not be

considered firmly resettled if he or she establishes:

(a) That his or her entry into that country was a necessary consequence of his or her flight from persecution,

that he or she remained in that nation only as long as

was necessary to arrange onward travel, and that he or

she did not establish significant ties in that country; or

(b) That the conditions of his or her residence were

so substantially and consciously restricted by the authority of the country of refuge that he or she was not in fact

resettled.

8 C.F.R. § 208.15. Firmansjah does not contend that either

exception applies.

entered into another country with, or while in that

country received, an offer of permanent resident

status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent

resettlement . . . .

8 C.F.R. § 208.15.3

We decided in Diallo, after examining the text of the

statute, that “the primary and most important inquiry

in any analysis of firm resettlement is whether or not

the stopover country has made some type of offer of permanent resettlement.” Id. at 693-94. Not all circuits take this

approach, as some employ a “totality of the circumstances”

test that also examines non-offer based elements such as an

applicant’s length of stay and social and economic ties in

the third country. See, e.g., Mussie v. U.S. I.N.S., 172 F.3d

329, 332 (4th Cir. 1999); Cheo v. I.N.S., 162 F.3d 1227, 1229

(9th Cir. 1998). Although we recognized in Diallo that

“ ‘circumstances may arise in which the INS may not be

able to secure direct evidence of a formal government offer

of some type of permanent resettlement,’ ” we made clear

that our initial inquiry asks whether the third country

extended an offer of permanent resettlement. 381 F.3d at

694 (citing Abdille, 242 F.3d at 486-87).
Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965 7

4 The transcript states:

(continued...)

The government has the initial burden of demonstrating that an applicant was firmly resettled in a third country

prior to entering the United States. Diallo, 381 F.3d at 693.

If the government satisfies its burden, the applicant may

rebut the presumption by presenting evidence to the

contrary. Id.

Firmansjah argues that the only evidence the government

produced in its attempt to demonstrate her permanent

residence in Singapore was a stamp on her Indonesian

passport. The stamp, dated March 14, 1995, states it is a

“multiple-journey visa for Singapore” valid until March 14,

2000. Firmansjah contends that there is no evidence that

this time-limited stamp granted her “permanent” residency

in Singapore.

Firmansjah’s focus on the five-year nature of her

visa stamp ignores significant other evidence in the record. In support of its position that it met its initial burden

of demonstrating that Firmansjah was firmly resettled prior

to entering the United States, the government points to

Firmansjah’s statements on her asylum application and her

testimony at the hearing. First, in answer to a question on

the asylum application that asked, “Do you . . . now hold, or

have you ever held, permanent residence, other permanent

status, or citizenship, in any country other than the one

from which you are now claiming asylum?”, Firmansjah

checked “Yes” and typed, “I do have a Singapore permanent

resident permit.” In addition, she stated elsewhere on her

application that she was “entitled to return to Singapore for

residence purposes.” At the hearing, she confirmed the

answers she had provided on her asylum application. She

testified that she received a Singapore permanent resident

card in 1988.4

 In addition, she testified that at the time of
8 Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965

4 (...continued)

Q. What type of status was your family given in Singapore? Permanent resident statue [sic], or?

A. Because we, we, we do, we have an investment,

yeah, they did give us (indiscernible).

Q. So, did you get permanent resident cards?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And that was in 1988?

A. Yes.

(A.R. 135.)

her application in 1998, she still maintained her residency

in Singapore.

We agree with the government that Firmansjah’s admission in both her written application and oral testimony that

she had received permanent resident status in Singapore

satisfied the government’s initial burden of producing

evidence indicating that Firmansjah had resettled in a third

country. The burden then shifted to Firmansjah to show

that she was not firmly resettled.

Firmansjah points to the five year entry stamp on her

passport that expired in March 2000, contending that its

limited nature demonstrates it did not confer “permanent”

status on her. In addition, she contends, the expiration date

of her visa coincides with the time that she testified her

permanent residency expired. It is possible that Firmansjah

was mistaken as to her real status in Singapore, and it

would have helped us if the government had introduced

evidence of what “permanent resident” status or its equivalent entails under Singapore law. Cf. Abdille, 242 F.3d at

490-92 (concluding that party seeking to rely on foreign law

bears burden of establishing its content). However, although represented by counsel at her hearing, she introduced no evidence and offered no explanation of why she
Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965 9

consistently maintained on both her asylum application and

in her testimony that she had permanent resident status in

Singapore at the time of her application and had obtained

that status in 1988, if she did not in fact have this status.

Firmansjah also contends that her Singapore residency

should be disregarded because her parents may have

fraudulently obtained their permanent resident status, thus

rendering their status “null and void.” She admitted,

however, that her parents still maintain their residency

in Singapore, and she did not indicate that Singapore

officials had ever attempted to revoke their status.

Firmansjah offered no evidence other than her own speculation to support her assertion that her parents may have

obtained their status illegally. The bottom line is

that according to her own testimony, Singapore still

considers her parents permanent residents. Therefore,

Firmansjah’s conjecture that her family may have obtained their permanent residency status improperly does

not help her. See Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 611 (8th

Cir. 2004) (rejecting argument that Israeli citizenship

invalid because applicants were practicing Christians,

where Israel had offered applicants permanent resettlement

under its Law of Return and issued certificates evidencing

citizenship, and there was no evidence that Israel had ever

revoked such a citizenship offer upon learning of conversion

to Christianity); Salazar v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 45, 51 (1st

Cir. 2004) (holding that alien’s testimony that he paid

another person to obtain residence stamp did not require

immigration judge to discount its facial validity).

In addition, the expiration of her permanent residency

status prior to the hearing in this case does not preclude a

finding that Firmansjah had firmly resettled in Singapore.

Firmansjah testified that by the time of the December 2000

hearing, she no longer had her residency in Singapore and

believed it had expired in March of that year. She testified

that at the time she filed for asylum, however, she still
10 Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965

5 We note that a finding that an applicant firmly resettled in

a third country does not preclude the applicant from establishing that events after resettlement constitute past persecution

or create a well-founded fear of future persecution, thereby

entitling the applicant to asylum from the country of resettlement.

See Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 612 (8th Cir. 2004).

maintained permanent residency status in Singapore. She

explained that maintaining her residency status in Singapore required her to return to Singapore to obtain an

extension. However, she had not done so.

The text of the statute provides that firm resettlement is

determined by asking whether the applicant was firmly

resettled “prior to” arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. §

1158(b)(2). In Abdalla v. I.N.S., 43 F.3d 1397 (10th Cir.

1994), the Tenth Circuit held that a firm resettlement

finding is not “affected by the possibility that by terminating his [third country] residence permit . . . petitioner

may have jeopardized his entitlement to resume residence in that country through his extended (and illegal)

stay in the United States.” 43 F.3d at 1400. This rule

prohibits an alien from “bootstrapping an asylum claim

simply by unilaterally severing his existing ties to a third

country.” Id.; see also Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143,

1152 (10th Cir. 2004); Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591, 595-96 (6th

Cir. 2001); Vang v. I.N.S., 146 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir.

1998). Here, there is ample evidence that Firmansjah had

permanent resident status in Singapore prior to her arrival

in the United States, but apparently she let that status

expire. Moreover, Firmansjah testified that at the time she

filed her asylum application, she still retained her residency

status in Singapore.5

 Keeping in mind our deferential

standard of review, we cannot say that the immigration

judge’s finding was unsupported by substantial evidence.

Firmansjah also argues, without case citation, that

her due process rights were violated because the immigra-
Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965 11

tion judge did not make clear that he would “base the thrust

of his decision” on a firm resettlement finding. We disagree.

Firmansjah’s counsel addressed the firm resettlement issue

in her closing argument, and the parties had a colloquy

with the court following the arguments on this issue.

Moreover, in order to prevail on a due process claim, an

applicant must show prejudice. Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d

1075, 1087 (7th Cir. 2004). Firmansjah has not demonstrated prejudice, as she has not suggested what evidence

she would have produced had she received more notice that

firm resettlement, an explicit statutory bar to asylum,

would be an issue.

B. Withholding of removal

Although a finding of firm resettlement is, by statute, a

bar to eligibility for asylum, no statute or regulation

bars the grant of withholding of removal upon a finding

that an applicant firmly resettled in a third country prior to

entering the United States. We will therefore consider the

withholding of removal claim separately from the barred

asylum claim, as have other circuits. Madjakpor

v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1040, 1046 (8th Cir. 2005); Rife,

374 F.3d at 613; Salazar, 359 F.3d at 52; Vang, 146 F.3d at

1116-17; Abdalla, 43 F.3d at 1399. When we review the

denial of an application for withholding of removal, we

will uphold the decision if it is supported by substantial

evidence. Zheng v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir.

2005).

Unlike the decision to grant asylum, which is discretionary even if the criteria for asylum are met, the Attorney

General must withhold deportation if he determines “that

the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened . . . because

of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A). The applicant bears the burden of establish-
12 Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965

ing entitlement to withholding of removal. Zheng, 409 F.3d

at 809. To meet this burden, the applicant must demonstrate a “clear probability” that he or she will face persecution in the country to which he or she will be removed. Id.

The “clear probability” standard requires an applicant to

show that it is “more likely than not” that she will be

subject to persecution if returned to her native country, a

more stringent test than the standard for establishing

eligibility for asylum. Id.

Although withholding of removal is based on the likelihood of future persecution, if an applicant demonstrates

that she suffered past persecution in the proposed country

of removal, “it shall be presumed that the applicant’s life or

freedom would be threatened in the future in the country of

removal on the basis of the original claim.” 8 C.F.R. §

1208.16(b)(1); see also Zaidi v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 678, 681

(7th Cir. 2004). The government can rebut this presumption

by demonstrating either a fundamental change in circumstances or that the applicant could avoid persecution by

relocating to another part of the proposed country of

removal. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i).

We first address Firmansjah’s contention that she

established past persecution, which, if true, would entitle

her to a presumption of future persecution. Although she

testified that neither she nor any member of her family was

ever threatened or harmed in Indonesia, Firmansjah

contends her testimony that her parents changed their

Chinese names to other names pursuant to Indonesian law

establishes that she was persecuted. She maintains that the

United States would not consider the requirement to change

one’s name on account of ethnicity legitimate, and, therefore, she has demonstrated her past persecution in Indonesia.

Although requiring a name change solely based on one’s

ethnicity is reprehensible, we do not agree that her parents’
Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965 13

name change establishes that Firmansjah was persecuted.

First, as the government points out, Firmansjah was not

required to change her name, and we have rejected claims

of “derivative persecution.” See, e.g., Ciorba v. Ashcroft, 323

F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2003); Tamas-Mercea v. Reno, 222

F.3d 417, 424 (7th Cir. 2000). We do recognize, however,

that Firmansjah testified that while in Indonesia, she

cannot use the Chinese name her family also gave her. In

any event, the name change does not rise to the level of

persecution. “ ‘[P]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even

unlawful or unconstitutional.’ ” Sharif v. I.N.S., 87 F.3d 932,

935 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Instead, we have

stated that persecution means “punishment or the infliction

of harm for political, religious, or other reasons that this

country does not recognize as legitimate.” Bace v. Ashcroft,

352 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 (7th Cir. 2003). We have emphasized that “persecution” means “more than harassment” and

have held it to include such actions as “ ‘detention, arrest,

interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches,

confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, or torture.’”

Toptchev v. I.N.S., 295 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted). Although actions need not be lifethreatening to constitute “persecution,” we have stated the

term could include such non-life-threatening actions as

economic deprivation only “if the resulting conditions are

sufficiently severe.” Capric, 355 F.3d at 1084.

A requirement to change one’s name, without more, does

not rise to the level of punishment or harm necessary to

constitute persecution under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Firmansjah did not testify that she or her parents

were ever threatened with any consequence had they not

changed their names. Cf. Popova v. I.N.S., 273 F.3d 1251,

1258 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting evidence that petitioner was

fired when she refused to change her last name supported

a finding of past persecution). Instead, a law requiring a
14 Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965

name change based on one’s ethnicity more closely resembles circumstances that we have recognized our society

would regard as unfair or unjust, but that does not constitute “persecution” allowing the applicant to asylum or

withholding of removal relief. See, e.g., Yadegar-Sargis v.

I.N.S., 297 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding no persecution

where woman in Iran was “confronted by police because her

dress did not conform to the requirements imposed by the

dominant religion, interrogated concerning her son and

forced to the end of rationing lines. However, [the applicant]

never was detained; she was not physically assaulted; she

did not suffer extreme economic deprivation; nor was she

the direct subject of a physical threat.”). Firmansjah did not

establish that she suffered from past persecution in Indonesia.

Although she was unable to demonstrate past persecution

in Indonesia, Firmansjah is entitled to withholding of

removal if she can establish a clear probability of future

persecution if returned to Indonesia on account of her “race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social

group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).

Firmansjah contends that she demonstrated a clear probability of future prosecution on account of her status as a

Catholic, ethnic Chinese woman who has been westernized.

Although we are not unsympathetic to the applicant, we

cannot say the immigration judge’s finding—that

Firmansjah did not demonstrate it was “more likely than

not” that she would be persecuted upon a return to

Indonesia—was unsupported by substantial evidence.

Firmansjah first argues that the immigration judge

improperly rejected her claim that she was a member of a

discrete and cognizable group of Roman Catholic women of

Chinese ethnicity who have been westernized. The immigration judge did not base his decision on whether she was

a member of a “social group,” however. Rather, the immigration judge stated that while he did not believe that
Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965 15

Christian ethnic Chinese women who had studied in the

United States constituted a cognizable “particular social

group,” Firmansjah failed to show this group had been

targeted by the government or by groups the government is

unable or unwilling to control.

Next, Firmansjah challenges the finding that she did not

establish it was “more likely than not” that she would be

persecuted if returned to Indonesia. The record contains

numerous documents concerning conditions in Indonesia,

including newspaper articles, reports by human rights

organizations, and State Department reports. This documentary evidence corroborates Firmansjah’s testimony

of a history of anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia, as

well as civil unrest and anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia

in 1998. In May 1998, rioting broke out in Indonesia

following the shooting of students by police snipers, and

anti-Chinese sentiment led to widespread attacks on

Chinese-owned businesses. According to the 1999 State

Department report, at least 85 instances of violence against

ethnic Chinese women, including 66 rapes, were verified

during the 1998 riots. In addition, Firmansjah testified that

although she was then residing in the United States, her

parents twice left Indonesia in 1998 to escape rioting.

The immigration judge properly recognized the “religious

and ethnic strife” that continued to exist in Indonesia at the

time of his decision. As the immigration judge observed,

however, the 1998 riots resulted in the overthrow of the

existing government. The next year, a democratically

elected parliament elected a new president. The 1999 State

Department Report found that “Racially motivated attacks

against ethnic Chinese citizens dropped sharply during

[1999],” and newspaper articles in the record discussed

steps taken by the government to attempt to control the

ethnic and religious tension. E.g., A.R. 610. In reaching his

conclusion, the immigration judge also pointed to
16 Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965

6 For similar reasons, the Third Circuit held that two Indonesian

citizens failed to meet even the lower threshold of a well-founded

fear of future persecution in Indonesia because of their status

as ethnic Chinese Christians. Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530 (3d

Cir. 2005). In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Sael v. Ashcroft, 386

F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2004) ruled that an ethnically Chinese Indone-

(continued...)

Firmansjah’s testimony that her family continued to reside

in Indonesia and has never been harmed there. We have

recognized before that the absence of any evidence of harm

to family members undermines an applicant’s claim of a

fear of future persecution. See Bhatt v. Reno, 172 F.3d 978,

982 (7th Cir. 1999). Firmansjah also admitted that she did

not personally know anyone who had been the victim of

anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia, and she testified that

neither she nor anyone she knew had ever been threatened

by the Indonesian government.

Unlike her family members, however, Firmansjah studied

in the United States, a factor she contends contributes to

the likelihood of her persecution. The immigration judge

recognized that bomb threats and demonstrations had

forced the United States Embassy in Jakarta to close down.

However, the judge noted, these threats were actions

directed against the United States government. Firmansjah

does not direct us to any evidence of the mistreatment of

Indonesians who had studied or lived in western countries

by other Indonesians. Keeping in mind our deferential

standard of review, we find that substantial evidence

supports the immigration judge’s determination that

Firmansjah failed to carry her burden of demonstrating it

would be “more likely than not” that she would be subject

to persecution if returned to Indonesia, “a much more

demanding burden” than necessary to establish a wellfounded fear of future persecution. Capric, 355 F.3d at

1095.6
Nos. 03-3111 & 03-3965 17

6 (...continued)

sian citizen had established a well-founded fear of persecution in

Indonesia. The Sael court concluded that “ethnic Chinese [were]

significantly disfavored in Indonesia,” and then required the

applicant to demonstrate a “ ‘comparatively low’ level” of risk in

order to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. 386

F.3d at 927.

Sael does not aid Firmansjah. First, unlike the withholding

of removal claim at issue before us, Sael considered whether an

applicant met the less stringent standard of a well-founded fear

of persecution. Not only was Sael considering a standard that was

less stringent on its face, but Sael required an even lower level of

individualized risk after finding that the applicants

were members of a “disfavored group.” This circuit has not

recognized a lower threshold of proof based on membership in

a “disfavored group.” Cf. Lie, 396 F.3d at 538 n.4 (rejecting

establishment of a “disfavored group” category and disagreeing

with Sael’s use of a lower standard). In addition, the Ninth Circuit

found that the applicant in Sael established a well-founded fear

of persecution based on past threats and violence directed towards

her. Sael, 386 F.3d at 927. Firmansjah, however, testified that no

threats were ever directed towards her or her family.

USCA-02-C-0072—9-16-05

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Firmansjah’s petitions for

review are DENIED.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit