UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MARK E. ROBINSON, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 15-0444 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 31 : DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, : : Defendant. : MEMORANDUM OPINION D ENYING D EFENDANT ’ S R ULE 54(b) M OTION F OR R ECONSIDERATION [31] I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Mark Robinson, a Serg eant with the Met ropolitan Polic e Department (“MPD”) worked in the Automated Traffic Enforcement Unit (“ATEU”) full- time starting in 2008. In December 2011, Mr. Robinson was transferred out of the ATEU as part of a civilianization of the Unit. Although MPD asserts thatno sworn officers worked in th e ATEU full-time after 2011, the Overtime Program continued, meaning hundreds of officers we re able to work there outside of their normal assignments. Mr . Robinson’s requests to work o vertime in ATEU, however, were denied. He believes he was transferred out of the ATEU an d denied overtime opportunities because of his race, and thus sues for discrimination. He also believes that his requests for reassignment to the ATEU and overt ime were continuously denied because he previously had complained of discrimination, and thus also sues for retaliatio n. The District of Columbia move d to dismiss his claims, arguing that neither the reassignment from the ATEU nor the denial of overtime opportuni ties constituted sufficiently adverse employment actions to s upport a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 It further argued that it had anondiscriminatory reason for tr ansferring Mr. Robinson—it civilianized the unit, and thus no sworn officer worked in the ATEU on a full-time basis after the transition in 2011. On August 1, 2017, this Court granted in p art and denied in part that motion concluding that civilianizati on of the ATEU was indeed a valid nondiscriminatory reason for Mr. Robinson’s transfer, and Mr. R obinson had not shown any indicat ion that it was not the actual reason that he was transferred. Thus, the Court granted Defend ant summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s claim that his transfer from the ATEU wa s discriminatory or retaliatory. But because Mr. Robinson had shown that he sought out and was d enied a significant amount of overtime work in the ATEU while other sworn officers were allow ed to work in the ATEU Overtime Program, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had shown that he suffered an adverse employment action in the form of loss of significant overtime o pportunities. Thus, the Court denied the District summary judgm ent for that denial of overtim e claim. The District has now moved for r econsideration of the Court’s d enial of summary judgment over Plaintiff’s deni al of overtime claim. Because th e District could have raised its newly refined argument concerni ng adverse employment actions inits prior motion but failed to do so, reconsideration is not mer ited. Nor has the District ot herwise established that it has met the requirements meriting reconsideration under Rule 54. Regar dless, the District’s argument fails to show that there are no mat erial facts in dispute entit ling it to summary judgment on this claim. Consequently, the motion f or summary judgment is denied

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR RECONSIDERATION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) governs situations in whi ch a party seeks reconsideration of an i nterlocutory order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ( “[A]ny order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and3 liabilities of fewer than all the parties doe s not end the acti on as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment a djudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabili ties.”). Relief pursuant to Rul e 54(b) is to be pr ovided “as justice requires,” and may be warranted w hen a court has “patently misunderstood the parties, made a decision beyond the adversarial i ssues presented, made an error in failing to cons ider controlling decisions or data, or where a c ontrolling or significant change in the law has occurred.” U.S. ex rel. Westrick v. Second Chance Body Armor, Inc. , 893 F. Supp. 2d 258, 268 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal citation, quotati on, and alteration omitted); see also Cobell v. Norton , 224 F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C.2004). “These consider ations leave a great deal of room for the court’s discretion and, accordingly, the ‘as justice requires’ standard amounts to determining ‘whether [relief upon] reconsideration is necessary under the relevant circumstances.’ ” Lewis v. District of Columbia , 736 F. Supp. 2d 98, 102 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Cobell , 224 F.R.D. at 272) (alteration in original). At the same time, a court’s disc retion under Rule 54(b) is “lim ited by the law of the case doctrine and subject to the cavea t that where litigants have on ce battled for the court’s decision, they should neither be requi red, nor without good reason permit ted, to battle for it again.” S ingh v. George Washington Univ. , 383 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005) (internal quotations an d citations omitted). Under Rule 54, “[t]he burden is on the mov ing party to show that reconsideration is appropriate and that harm or injustice would result if reconsideration were denied.” Second Chance Body Armor , 893 F.Supp.2d at 268 (citing Husayn v. Gates , 588 F.Supp.2d 7, 10 (D.D.C.2008)). And it is well-established that motions for reconsideration cannot be used as an opportunity t o reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled, nor as a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments th at could have been advanced4 earlier. See Bailey v. U.S. Marshal Serv. , No. 08-cv-0283, 2009 WL 973197, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2009).

III. ANALYSIS The entirety of the District’s motion for reconsideration is pr emised on what appears to be a refinement of its prior ar gument that plaintiff’s denial o f overtime claim fails because he has failed to allege a sufficientl y adverse action on which to prem ise a discrimination or retaliation claim. This refinement also is based on Bell v. Gonzales , 398 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2005), a case the District also cited a nd analyzed in its previous motio n for summary judgment. But as set forth above, motions for rec onsideration cannot be used as an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled, nor as a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been a dvanced earlier. This is exact ly what the District attempts with the instant motion for reconsid eration. On this basis alone, t he motion is properly denied. Nor does the District’s motion for r econsideration alert the Court to new facts or a significant change in the law that could not have b een addressed in its prior moti on. To the contrary, the District’s motion simply attempts to refine its prior arguments based on the same case law it had previously relied upon. 1 Neither does the Dis trict’s motion direct the Court’s attenti on to any instances in which it patently m isunderstood the parties, made a decision beyond the adversarial issues presented, or made an error in failing to consider contr olling decisions or data. In short, the District has failed to provi de the Court with any meritorio us basis upon which to grant it reconsideration.

1 When asked during a status heari ng whether counsel for defenda nt had previously addressed his reconsideration ar gument in the District’s motionfor summary judgment, he responded “Yes. I just gave it rather short shrift.”5 Regardless, even considering anew the District’s recycled argum ent the motion fails. The single point raised in the moti on for reconsideration is that p laintiff’s claim does not amount to an adverse action because, although he alleges that he was not able to obtain as many overtime hours as he used to obtain in the A TEU, he “has not shown (or e ven alleged) that he did not have other overtime opportunities ava ilable to him that, if applied for, would have earned Plaintiff as much or more overtime pay, than he earned before transfer” from the ATEU. Mot. for Reconsideration at 2. Despite rai sing this argument, the Distr ict did not provide any evidence indicating that additi onal overtime hours we re available to pla intiff in the new unit to which he was detailed, the Special Event s Branch (“SEB”), or in any othe r MPD unit other than the ATEU. In response, the plaintiff provides a supplemental affid avit plausibly asserting that he already works as many overtime ho urs as he reasonably can obtai n in the SEB and, if he were allowed to, he would obtain far m ore hours in the ATEU which ha s overtime hours available 24 hours per day, six days per wee k, 52 weeks per year. Aff. of M ark Robinson ¶¶ 3–5, ECF No. 35-1. The District did not file areply brief in response, see mingly conceding the point. Thus, with this dispute of fact, the C ourt is left where it was befor e: “whether Mr. Robinson suffered an adverse employment action and/or a materially adverse employ ment action is a question for the finder of fact.” Mem. Op. at 15, n.4 (Aug. 1, 2017) (citing Ortiz-Diaz v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev ., 831 F.3d 488, 492 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). Accordingly, recon sideration is not justified as justi ce does not require it.6 IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, t he District’s Rule 54(b) Moti on for Reconsideration is DENIED . An order consistent with thi s Memorandum Opinion is separate ly and contemporaneously issued. Dated: February 16, 2018 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge