Present: All the Justices 

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY 

v. Record No. 941263 OPINION BY JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 

 June 9, 1995 

MARY ELLEN HAINES, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY 

Kenneth E. Trabue, Judge 

 In this appeal in a declaratory judgment action, we consider 

the effect of an admission obtained under Rule 4:11 upon the 

party making the admission and upon other parties to the action. 

 In August 1990, Mary Ellen Haines (Haines) bought a 1984 

Subaru station wagon for the use of her daughter Jennifer. 

Haines took title to the Subaru and added it to her State Farm 

Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) liability 

policy, with Haines shown as the named insured and Jennifer as 

the primary driver. Jennifer made the down payment on the 

vehicle and paid half of the deferred monthly payments, as well 

as that portion of Haines's insurance premiums attributable to 

the Subaru. 

 No restrictions were placed on Jennifer's use of the Subaru 

when it was purchased or two months later when she took it with 

her and moved into an apartment with Daniel Todd Walton (Walton), 

to whom she was married shortly thereafter. However, after 

seeing Walton driving the Subaru, Haines told Walton and Jennifer 

that Walton could not drive it because his driver's license had 

been suspended for one year. Haines told Walton and Jennifer 

that Walton had to be a licensed driver and have insurance "to 

drive the car." 
 -2- 

 On February 8, 1991, Walton was driving the Subaru when he 

ran off Interstate Highway 64 in Allegheny County, killing one 

passenger, Paul A. Thurston, Jr., and injuring two other 

passengers, Lorie A. Forbes and Karen R. Vance. State Farm was 

notified by representatives of the three passengers of their 

intent to assert claims against Walton arising from his allegedly 

negligent operation of the Subaru. As pertinent here, State 

Farm's liability insurance policy provided coverage to Walton if 

his operation of the Subaru was "with the permission of the named 

insured, provided his actual operation . . . is within the scope 

of such permission." 

 State Farm filed this declaratory judgment proceeding 

against Haines, Walton, Jennifer, Paul A. Thurston, Sr., 

administrator of the estate of Paul A. Thurston, Jr. (the 

administrator), Forbes, Vance, and other insurance companies 

whose liabilities might be affected by a ruling upon State Farm's 

liability under its policy. In paragraph 9 of its original and 

amended motion for declaratory judgment, State Farm alleged that: 

 At the time of the accident, Daniel T. Walton had 

no license to operate a motor vehicle and had been 

expressly forbidden by Mary Ellen Haines from operating 

the Haines automobile. This prohibition had been 

directly communicated to both Daniel T. Walton and 

Jennifer Haines Walton prior to the accident. 

Haines admitted these allegations in her answer to the amended 

motion for declaratory judgment filed on October 2, 1991. 

 On May 4, 1992, Haines unequivocally admitted the following 

of State Farm's requests for admissions: 
 -3- 

 7. At the time of the accident, Daniel T. Walton 

had no license to operate a motor vehicle and had been 

expressly forbidden by Mary Ellen Haines from operating 

the 1984 Subaru automobile referred to above. This 

prohibition had been directly communicated to both 

Daniel T. Walton and Jennifer Haines Walton by Mary 

Ellen Haines prior to the accident. 

 RESPONSE: Admit 

 8. At the time of the accident, Daniel T. Walton 

did not have permission from Mary Ellen Haines to be 

operating the 1984 Subaru automobile. 

 RESPONSE: Admit 

 At a jury trial on December 2, 1993, the parties agreed that 

the defendants had the risk of nonpersuasion on their claim that 

Haines had given Walton permission to operate the Subaru. Haines 

was the defendants' only witness who testified on the issue 

whether she had given permission to Walton to operate the Subaru. 

 Haines's testimony was introduced over the objection of State 

Farm, which asserted that she was bound by her responses to the 

above requests for admission and could not testify to the 

contrary either in her own behalf or on behalf of the other 

defendants. 

 Haines testified that the reason she prohibited Walton's 

operation of the Subaru was (1) that she thought his driver's 

license suspension would continue until he further contacted the 

court and recovered actual possession of his license, and (2) 

that she thought Walton would not be insured under her State Farm 

policy unless he was "placed on the policy that I had." Haines 

further testified that "[i]f [Walton] is licensed and has 
 -4- 

insurance, yes, he may drive [the Subaru]." On its 

cross-examination of Haines, State Farm read into evidence 

numbers seven and eight of the requests for admission and 

Haines's responses thereto. 

 The defendants also introduced into evidence a record of the 

Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of Allegheny 

County showing that Walton's "privilege to operate a motor 

vehicle is suspended for 12 months [effective February 2, 1990]." 

 The trial court ruled that he again became a licensed driver on 

February 2, 1991, six days before the accident. 

 Overruling State Farm's motions to strike the defendants' 

evidence at the conclusion of their case and again at the 

conclusion of State Farm's case, the court submitted the 

permission issue to a jury. The jury found that Walton had 

Haines's express or implied permission to operate the Subaru, and 

the court entered judgment on the verdict. State Farm appeals. 

 As pertinent, Rule 4:11(a) provides that "[a] party may 

serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, 

for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any 

matters within the scope of Rule 4:1(b)." As relevant here, Rule 

4:1(b) provides that parties may obtain discovery of "any matter, 

not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved 

in the pending action." Rule 4:11(b) provides in pertinent part 

that: 

 Any matter admitted under this Rule is 

conclusively established unless the court on motion 

permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. . . . 
 -5- 

 Any admission made by a party under this Rule is for 

the purpose of the pending action only and is not an 

admission by him for any other purpose nor may it be 

used against him in any other proceeding. 

The defendants never moved the court to permit Haines's 

admissions to be withdrawn or amended. 

 The defendants argue that Haines's admissions do not bind 

her or them. First they contend that State Farm's use of the 

requests for admission was one "inconsistent with the spirit of 

the rules as described by this Court," since the purpose of Rule 

4:11 is to relieve a litigant of the burden of proving undisputed 

facts. And the defendants note that the question of permission 

is "the sole issue in dispute." The defendants cite TransiLift 

Equip., Ltd. v. Cunningham, 234 Va. 84, 90, 360 S.E.2d 183, 

186-87 (1987), DeRyder v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 206 Va. 

602, 611, 145 S.E.2d 177, 183 (1965), and General Accident Fire 

and Life Assurance Corp. v. Cohen, 203 Va. 810, 813, 127 S.E.2d 

399, 401 (1962), in support. We find no merit in this 

contention. 

 The flaw in this contention is that the issue of permission 

was not in dispute between State Farm and Haines when the 

requests for admission were made. This was not the situation in 

Cohen, in which a litigant failing to answer a request for 

admission had denied the facts contained in the request in a 

previously filed pleading. Here, Haines's answer to the motion 

for declaratory judgment indicated that the issue of permission 

was not in dispute, and when the requests for admission were 
 -6- 

filed later, she agreed that she had not given permission and had 

forbidden Walton's operation of the Subaru. 

 Nor was an undue hardship being imposed upon Haines that 

would have justified her refusal to establish the opposing 

litigant's case, as in DeRyder, 206 Va. at 611-12, 145 S.E.2d at 

183-84. Haines was simply requested to admit a fact within her 

own knowledge. 

 We did not decide whether a request for admission was proper 

in TransiLift. Instead, since the admissions were not introduced 

into evidence, we held that they were not binding upon the 

litigant who made the admissions. 234 Va. at 92, 360 S.E.2d at 

188. 

 Next, the defendants claim that the requests for admission 

"did not conform to the required standards of clarity and 

fairness." According to the defendants, the request that Haines 

admit that "Walton had no license to operate a motor vehicle" was 

confusing because it could have meant that Walton "did not have a 

license with him, that he was not eligible for a license or that 

the DMV had never issued him a license." Additionally, the 

defendants contend that the request for admission asked Haines to 

admit something "which the evidence at trial showed to be untrue 

[since] [t]he trial court found, as a matter of law, that Danny 

Walton had a valid driver's license." 

 We need not consider this argument since the balance of 

request number seven clearly asked for an admission that at the 
 -7- 

time of the accident, "Walton . . . had been expressly forbidden 

by Mary Ellen Haines from operating the [Haines automobile]." 

And request number eight was equally clear in asking that Haines 

admit that "[a]t the time of the accident, Daniel T. Walton did 

not have permission from Mary Ellen Haines to be operating the 

1984 Subaru automobile." These were requests for an admission of 

matters within Haines's knowledge. And she admitted 

unequivocally that, at the time of the accident, not only had she 

not given permission for Walton's operation of the Subaru, but 

she had expressly forbidden him to do so. 

 Since State Farm's request for Haines's admission regarding 

permission was clear and fair, we find no merit in the 

defendants' first contention. Accordingly, we hold that Haines's 

responses "conclusively established" that she had not only not 

given Walton permission to operate the Subaru, but had forbidden 

him to do so. Rule 4:11(b). Because those responses were 

judicial admissions that bind Haines in this proceeding, the 

trial court erred in admitting her testimony to the contrary in 

support of the defendants' case. 

 Finally, the other defendants contend that even if Haines is 

bound by her admissions, they are not. We agree that Haines's 

admissions would not preclude the defendants from introducing 

evidence other than Haines's testimony to show that she had given 

permission to Walton. However, these defendants did not do so; 

instead, they relied solely upon Haines's testimony, which was 
 -8- 

inadmissible. Since there was no other evidence from which the 

jury could have found that Haines had given permission to Walton 

to operate the Subaru, the trial court erred in failing to 

sustain State Farm's motions to strike the defendants' evidence. 

 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the trial 

court. We will also enter a final judgment for State Farm that 

it is not obligated under its insurance contract to provide a 

defense and coverage to Walton with respect to the claims of the 

administrator, Forbes, or Vance. We will remand the case for 

further proceedings upon Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 

Company's cross-motion for declaratory judgment against Vance, 

which was stayed by the court pending this appeal. 

 Reversed, 

 final judgment in part, 

and remanded in part.