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Trinette G. Kent (State Bar No. 025180) 

Kent Law Offices 

10645 N. Tatum Blvd., Ste. 200-192 

Phoenix, AZ 85028 

Telephone: 480-247-9644 

Fax: 480-717-4781 

Phillip A. Bock (pro hac vice to be submitted) 

Tod A. Lewis (pro hac vice to be submitted) 

James M. Smith (pro hac vice to be submitted) 

BOCK & HATCH, LLC 

134 N. La Salle St., Ste. 1000 

Chicago, IL 60602 

Telephone: (312) 658-5500 

Fax: (312) 658-5555 

Attorneys for Plaintiff, John Herrick, 

individually and as the representative 

of a class of similarly-situated persons 

 

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

 

JOHN HERRICK, individually and 

as the representative of a class of 

similarly-situated persons, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

GODADDY.COM, LLC 

Defendant. 

Case No. 

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

 

 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

Case 2:16-cv-00254-DJH Document 1 Filed 01/28/16 Page 1 of 18
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Plaintiff, John Herrick (“Plaintiff”), brings this class action complaint 

against Defendant, GoDaddy.com, LLC (“Defendant”), to stop its practice of 

sending unsolicited text messages in violation of the Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (“TCPA”), and to recover statutory damages 

and other relief for those who received such text messages. Plaintiff’s 

allegations are based on information and belief and the investigation of his 

counsel, except those pertaining to his own actions, which are based on 

personal knowledge. 

INTRODUCTION

1. This case challenges Defendant’s practice of sending commercial 

text messages without prior, written consent and without providing the 

proper disclosures in violation of federal law. 

2. On behalf of himself and all others similarly-situated, Plaintiff 

seeks statutory damages for each violation of the TCPA. 

3. According to a 2012 study by the Pew Research Center, 69% of 

cellular users who use text messaging receive unwanted text message spam, 

and “[o]f those texters, 25% face problems with spam/unwanted texts at 

least weekly.” (Source: http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/08/02/mobilephone-problems (last visited: November 20, 2015.)) Plaintiff is such a person 

who receives unwanted text messages. 

Case 2:16-cv-00254-DJH Document 1 Filed 01/28/16 Page 2 of 18
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4. As part of an effort to promote its business, Defendant engaged 

in an especially aggressive and deleterious form of marketing: the 

transmission of unauthorized advertisements in the form of “text message” 

calls to the cellular telephones of consumers throughout the nation. 

5. Defendant’s practice caused consumers actual harm, not only 

because the consumers were subjected to the aggravation that necessarily 

accompanies mobile spam, but also because consumers frequently have to 

pay their cell phone service providers for the receipt of such spam, and such 

messages diminish battery life, waste data storage capacity, and are an 

intrusion upon privacy and seclusion. 

6. In order to redress these injuries, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself 

and the Class of similarly situated individuals described below, brings this 

suit under the TCPA, which specifically prohibits unsolicited calls to cell 

phones. 

7. As will be discussed, Defendant has sent text messages to 

consumers without their prior express written consent to receive such text 

messages, without providing the disclosures required by the TCPA, and in a 

manner that violates the privacy rights of Plaintiff and members of the 

Class. 

Case 2:16-cv-00254-DJH Document 1 Filed 01/28/16 Page 3 of 18
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8. The TCPA was designed to prevent calls and messages like the 

ones described within this Complaint, and to protect the privacy of citizens 

like Plaintiff. 

9. On behalf of the Class, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring 

Defendant to cease all unlawful text messages and Plaintiff seeks an award 

of statutory damages for himself and all other Class members, together with 

costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

10. Subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 

because Plaintiff’s claims arise under the TCPA, a federal statute. 

11. Personal jurisdiction exists in Arizona because Defendant has its 

principal place of business and has transacted business and made or 

performed contracts substantially connected with the State. 

12. Venue is proper in the District of Arizona because Defendant 

resides in this District and a significant portion of the events took place 

here. 

PARTIES

13. Plaintiff is an individual who resides in Troy, Michigan. 

14. Upon information and belief, Defendant is a Delaware 

corporation with its principal place of business in Scottsdale, Arizona. 

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FACTS

15. Short Message Service (“SMS”), more commonly know as “text 

messaging,” is a popular means for communicating among cellular/wireless 

subscribers. 

16. The most common form of texting is person-to-person messaging. 

However, text messages may also be used by automated systems to 

facilitate the ordering of products and services from cellular phones or for 

participating in contests or other marketing programs. 

17. Businesses continually seek cost-effective ways to mass market 

their goods and services. The popularity of cellular phones and texting has 

created a marketing opportunity for businesses whose telemarketing efforts 

are limited by restrictions on telephone, facsimile, and email solicitations. 

18. Unlike conventional advertising, text message advertising 

requires the use of technology (cellular phones) owned and paid for by the 

text message recipients. Text message recipients often incur a charge for 

each incoming text message regardless of whether the message was 

authorized. 

19. At issue here, Defendant transmitted text messages to cellular 

phone users—including Plaintiff and the other members of the putative 

Class—to promote Defendant’s products. 

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20. Defendant holds itself out as “the world’s largest technology 

provider dedicated to small business.” 

https://aboutus.godaddy.net/newsroom/fact-sheet/default.aspx. Among its 

services, Defendant states that it “provide[s] the world’s largest domain 

marketplace,” and that it also “provide[s] website creation, hosting & 

design, ecommerce for small business, security & domains.” Id. 

21. In June 2011, Plaintiff created an account with Defendant to 

register a domain name and to host the website for his business on 

Defendant’s servers. 

22. As part of creating his account, Defendant did not ask Plaintiff’s 

permission, or provide the required disclosures in order to send him text 

messages. 

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23. On or about December 15, 2015, Plaintiff received the following 

text message from Defendant: 

24. Defendant’s text message purportedly originated from telephone 

number, 33898. This telephone number is known as a “short code,” which is 

a special type of number commonly used in advertisements and in 

connection with automated services. 

25. Plaintiff did not expressly consent to receive Defendant’s 

autodialed telemarketing calls to his cell phone within the meaning of the 

TCPA. 

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26. Further, Defendant never clearly and conspicuously disclosed to 

Plaintiff that he was consenting to receiving automated text calls and that 

he was not required to consent to such calls in order to purchase 

Defendant’s property, goods, or services. 

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

27. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of himself 

and all other similarly-situated persons (the “Class”). The Class is initially 

defined as follows: “All persons in the United States who received one or 

more unsolicited text messages sent by or on behalf of GoDaddy after 

October 15, 2013.” (Plaintiff reserves the right to change the class definition 

during this litigation.) Specifically excluded from the Class are the following 

persons: (a) Defendant and its respective affiliates, employees, officers, 

directors, agents, and representatives and their immediate family members; 

(b) Class Counsel, including all of their employees; and (c) the judges who 

preside over this litigation, including the members of their immediate 

families. 

28. This action is brought and may properly be maintained as a class 

action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. This action satisfies the numerosity, 

commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements under Rule 23 (a). 

Additionally, prosecution of Plaintiff’s claims separately from the Class’s 

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claims would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications under 

Rule 23 (b) (1) (A). Furthermore, the questions of law or fact that are 

common in this action predominate over any individual questions of law or 

fact making class representation the superior method to adjudicate this 

controversy under Rule 23 (b) (3). 

29. Numerosity/Impracticality of Joinder: On information and belief, 

the Class is so numerous that joinder of all Class members is impracticable. 

The precise number of Class members and their addresses are unknown to 

Plaintiff, but can be obtained from Defendant’s records or the records of 

third parties. On information and belief, the Class includes thousands of 

persons nationwide. 

30. Ascertainability: The Class is clearly defined based on objective 

criteria, permitting Class members to be identified. On information and 

belief, the members of the Class may be identified from Defendant’s records 

or the records of third parties. 

31. Commonality and Predominance: There is a well-defined 

community of interest among the Class members and common questions of 

law and fact predominate over any questions affecting only individual 

members of the Class. These common legal and factual questions, which do 

not vary from one Class member to another and may be determined without 

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reference to the individual circumstances of any Class member, include, but 

are not limited to the following: 

a. Whether Defendant violated the TCPA by sending 

unauthorized text messages to Plaintiff and the other members 

of the Class; 

b. Whether the equipment Defendant used to send the text 

messages in question was an automatic telephone dialing system 

as defined by the TCPA; 

c. Whether such messages were sent to telephone numbers 

assigned to cellular telephones; 

d. Whether the means by which Defendant acquired Class 

members’ cellular phone numbers was in a written agreement, 

bearing the signature of the person called; 

e. Whether the means by which Defendant acquired Class 

members’ cellular phone numbers clearly and conspicuously 

informed Class members they may receive advertisements or 

telemarketing messages by means of an automatic telephone 

dialing system; 

f. Whether the means by which Defendant acquired Class 

members’ cellular phone numbers clearly and conspicuously 

Case 2:16-cv-00254-DJH Document 1 Filed 01/28/16 Page 10 of 18
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informed Class members that they were not required to sign or 

enter into the agreement as a condition of purchasing any 

property, goods, or services; 

g. Whether Plaintiff and the other members of the Class are 

entitled to statutory damages under the TCPA; 

h. Whether Defendant’s actions were knowing or willful and, 

if so, whether the Court should treble the statutory damages 

awarded to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class; and 

i. Whether Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to 

equitable relief, including but not limited to injunctive relief. 

32. Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class 

because Plaintiff and all Class members were injured by the same wrongful 

practices. Plaintiff and the other Class members received text messages 

from Defendant without providing their express written consent and 

without receiving the proper disclosures required by the TCPA. Under the 

facts of this case, because the focus is on Defendant’s conduct, if Plaintiff 

prevails on his claims, then the other Class members must necessarily 

prevail as well. 

33. Adequacy of Representation: Plaintiff is an adequate 

representative of the Class because his interests do not conflict with those of 

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the Class members he seeks to represent. Plaintiff has retained financially 

able attorneys who are competent and experienced in complex class action 

litigation and Plaintiff intends to vigorously prosecute this action. Plaintiff 

and his counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 

34. Superiority: A class action is the superior method for the fair and 

efficient adjudication of this lawsuit because individual litigation of each 

Class members’ claims would be economically infeasible and procedurally 

impracticable. The individual damages incurred by each Class member as a 

result of Defendant’s wrongful conduct are too small to warrant the 

expenses of individual suits. The likelihood of individual Class members 

prosecuting separate claims is remote, and even if every Class member 

could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly 

burdened by individual litigation of such cases. Individual Class members 

do not have a significant interest in controlling the prosecution of separate 

actions. Furthermore, individualized litigation would create the potential 

for varying, inconsistent, or contradictory judgments and would magnify the 

delay and expense to all parties and to the court system resulting from 

multiple trials of the same factual issues. Plaintiff foresees no difficulty in 

the management of this action as a class action. The Class members and 

Case 2:16-cv-00254-DJH Document 1 Filed 01/28/16 Page 12 of 18
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their damages may be determined based upon information maintained by or 

available to Defendant. 

 

COUNT I - VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE 

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ. 

 

35. Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully 

alleged herein. 

36. The TCPA provides in pertinent part as follows: 

(b) Restrictions on use of automated telephone equipment 

(1) Prohibitions 

It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States, or 

any person outside the United States if the recipient is within 

the United States – 

(A) to make any call (other than a call made for emergency 

purposes or made with the prior express consent of the 

called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system 

or an artificial or prerecorded voice – 

. . . 

(iii) to any telephone number assigned to a paging 

service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile 

radio service, or other radio common carrier service, 

or any service for which the called party is charged 

for the call .... 

47 U.S.C. § 227 (b) (1) (A) (iii). 

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37. The TCPA defines “telemarketing call,” or “telephone 

solicitation,” as “the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose 

of encouraging the purchase or rental of ... goods, or services, which is 

transmitted to any person.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4). 

38. The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” as 

“equipment which has the capacity (A) to store or produce telephone 

numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and 

(B) to dial such numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). 

39. Before sending a text message, the party sending the text 

message must obtain “prior express consent” from the called party. “Prior 

express consent” must: 

 Be in the form of an agreement in writing, bearing the 

written or electronic signature of the person providing 

consent; 

 Specify the telephone number to which the person is 

consenting to be called; 

 Clearly and conspicuously authorize the company to call 

the person using an auto-dialer system or prerecorded 

message for telemarketing purposes; and 

 Clearly and conspicuously disclose that consent is not a 

condition of purchasing goods or services. 

27 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(8). 

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40. Defendant made telephone solicitations, including but not 

limited to the text message shown above (¶23), to the wireless telephone 

numbers of Plaintiff and other members of the Class. 

41. Defendant sent unsolicited commercial text calls to Plaintiff and 

the other members of the Class using an automated telephone dialing 

system. 

42. Defendant sent these text calls without first obtaining the called 

parties’ prior express, written consent. 

43. Defendant knew or should have known that it lacked the 

recipients’ express, written consent to send these text calls. 

44. Defendant sent these text calls without first clearly and 

conspicuously disclosing to the recipients that they were providing consent 

to receive calls using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial 

prerecorded voice and that such consent was not required to purchase 

Defendant’s property, goods, or services. 

45. Defendant violated the TCPA by sending these text calls to 

Plaintiff and the Class without first obtaining their prior express consent. 

46. Defendant violated the TCPA by not providing the required clear 

and conspicuous disclosures to Plaintiff and the Class. 

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47. Defendant has harmed consumers by sending these text 

messages, not only because consumers were subjected to the aggravation 

that accompanies unsolicited wireless spam, but also because many 

consumers pay to receive text messages. 

48. The text messages sent to Plaintiff and the Class members were 

sent using equipment that had the capacity to store telephone numbers 

retrieved from Defendant’s database and to dial such numbers. The 

equipment can also be programmed to generate and dial random or 

sequential numbers. By using such equipment, Defendant was able to send 

text messages simultaneously to thousands of wireless telephone numbers 

en masse without human intervention. 

49. The text calls were made through the use of a short code dialing 

service and without the prior express written consent of Plaintiff and the 

Class members and without first providing the required disclosures. 

50. Defendant’s conduct in sending such text messages violates 47 

U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 

51. Defendant’s conduct in sending these text messages was a 

knowing and willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227. 

52. As a result of Defendant’s violation, the members of the Class 

suffered actual damages by, inter alia, having to pay their respective 

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wireless carriers for the text messages where applicable and, under 47 

U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in 

statutory damages for each violation of the TCPA, and up to $1,500.00 for 

each if Defendant’s violations of the TCPA are determined to be knowing or 

willful. 

53. The Court should enjoin Defendant from sending future text 

messages without the written consent of the called party. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others 

similarly-situated, demands judgment in favor of the Class and against 

Defendant as follows: 

a. That the Court find that this case may be maintained as a class 

action, appoint Plaintiff as the class representative, and appoint Plaintiff’s 

counsel as counsel for the class; 

b. That the unlawful conduct alleged herein be declared to be 

illegal and in violation of the TCPA; 

c. That the Court award $500.00 in statutory damages for each 

violation of the TCPA; 

d. That the Court treble the statutory damages if it concludes that 

Defendant’s violations were willful or knowing; 

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e. That the Court enter an injunction prohibiting Defendant from 

engaging in the same or similar practices alleged herein; 

f. That the Court enter judgment against Defendant and in favor of 

Plaintiff and members of the Class; 

g. That Plaintiff and members of the Class recover their costs of 

the suit, and attorneys’ fees as allowed by law; and 

h. That the Court award all other relief allowed by law or equity. 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

Pursuant to Rule 38 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable. 

Respectfully submitted, 

JOHN HERRICK, individually and 

as the representative of a class of 

similarly-situated persons, 

By: /s/ Trinette G. Kent 

Phillip A. Bock 

Tod A. Lewis 

James M. Smith 

BOCK & HATCH, LLC 

134 N. La Salle St., Ste. 1000 

Chicago, IL 60602 

Tel: (312) 658-5500 

Fax: (312) 658-5555 

Trinette G. Kent 

Kent Law Offices 

10645 N. Tatum Blvd., Ste. 200-

192 

Phoenix, AZ 85028 

Telephone: 480-247-9644 

Fax: 480-717-4781 

Case 2:16-cv-00254-DJH Document 1 Filed 01/28/16 Page 18 of 18