alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF NextGen 1.7.1.1

Eastern Division

Jenny H. Conviser, et al.

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:20−cv−03094

Honorable Franklin U. Valderrama

DePaul University

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Monday, July 1, 2024:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert: At the Court's instance,

the status hearing set for 7/2/24 is stricken. The parties shall file a joint status report by

8/7/24 that indicates whether the parties have resolved the case and, if not, then the report

shall include a proposed schedule for the completion of fact discovery and for Rule

26(a)(2) disclosures and expert depositions. Mailed notice (ber, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cv-03094 Document #: 142 Filed: 07/01/24 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:914
H. Res. 344

In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

February 4, 1998.

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule

XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the

Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of

the bill (H.R. 2625) to redesignate Washington National Airport as ‘‘Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport’’. The

first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one

hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and

ranking minority member of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. After general debate the bill shall

be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule for

a period not to exceed two hours. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under

the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Transportation

and Infrastructure now printed in the bill. The committee

amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered
2

•HRES 344 EH

as read. During consideration of the bill for amendment, the

Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may accord priority

in recognition on the basis of whether the Member offering

an amendment has caused it to be printed in the portion of

the Congressional Record designated for that purpose in

clause 6 of rule XXIII. Amendments so printed shall be considered as read. The Chairman of the Committee of the

Whole may: (1) postpone until a time during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded vote on any amendment; and (2) reduce to five minutes the minimum time for electronic voting on any postponed question that follows another electronic vote without

intervening business, provided that the minimum time for

electronic voting on the first in any series of questions shall

be fifteen minutes. At the conclusion of consideration of the

bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the

bill to the House with such amendments as may have been

adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the

House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the

Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final
3

•HRES 344 EH

passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.

Attest:

Clerk.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-4506

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

CHRIS L. ADKINS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District Judge.

(CR-98-325)

Submitted: February 15, 2000 Decided: March 17, 2000

Before WILKINS and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Charles A. Gavin, WHITE, BLACKBURN & CONTE, P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Stephen

W. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Chris Adkins appeals the district court’s order denying his

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Adkins argues that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea and requests that the case be remanded to the

district court for a trial by jury.

We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion

and find no reversible error. We conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Adkins’ motion to withdraw.

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e); United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245,

248 (4th Cir. 1991).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
9404.

#### Johnson Lumber Company *v.*Weems.

Decided March 14, 1918.

Complaint; from city court of LaG-range—Judge Moon. September term, 1917.

*M. U. Mooty,*for plaintiff.

*E. A.*Jones, *Hatton Lovejoy,*for defendant.

Broyles, P. J.

1. The suit was for the purchase-price of building materials alleged to have been bought by the defendant on an open account. The plaintiff’s proof showed that the materials were sold, not to the defendant, but to her contractor, arid that after the sale the defendant made an oral promise to pay for them. Under such circumstances the court did not err in excluding, on motion of the defendant, the evidence relating to her promise to pay for the materials, on the ground that such evidence was at variance with and not authorized by the allegations of the petition.

2. The plaintiff’s evidence did not sustain the material allegations of the petition, and the court did not err in awarding a nonsuit.

3. The rulings in the preceding notes being controlling in the case, it is unnecessary to consider the assignments of error in the exceptions pendente lite filed by the defendant.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bloodworth, J., concurs. Harwell, J., disqualified.*
DISMISS; Opinion Filed February 12, 2014.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-13-00412-CV

PINE CREEK MEDICAL CENTER, Appellant

V.

MARGARET HIGHTOWER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-12-06105-D

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Bridges, Fillmore, and Lewis 

Opinion by Justice Lewis

The Court has before it appellant’s January 17, 2014 unopposed motion to dismiss the 

appeal. In the motion, appellant states that appellee filed a notice of nonsuit with prejudice as to 

all claims against appellant in the trial court. Accordingly, we GRANT appellant’s motion and 

DISMISS this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a).

130412F.P05

/David Lewis/

DAVID LEWIS

JUSTICE
–2–

Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

PINE CREEK MEDICAL CENTER, 

Appellant

No. 05-13-00412-CV V.

MARGARET HIGHTOWER, Appellee

On Appeal from the 95th Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. DC-12-06105-D.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lewis. 

Justices Bridges and Fillmore participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED.

It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal, unless the parties have 

agreed otherwise.

Judgment entered this 12th day of February, 2014.

/David Lewis/

DAVID LEWIS

JUSTICE
QuickLinks
 -- Click here to rapidly navigate through this document

 
 

EXHIBIT 10.12    
    


 
 

AMENDED SCHEDULE TO EXHIBIT 10.11    
    


        The persons listed on the table below have, as of the date indicated, each entered into an agreement with the Company that is substantially identical to the Form
of Indemnification Agreement previously filed and referenced in Exhibit 10.11, except (i) with respect to the position held, the gender and the name and address of the indemnitee and
(ii) Section 7.5 thereof is only included in agreements entered into with directors. 



	INDEMNITEE
 
	 	POSITION
 
	 	EFFECTIVE DATE
 

	Joe R. Davis	 	Chief Executive Officer and Director	 	May 1, 1994
	Larry J. Alexander	 	Director	 	May 30, 1995
	Brady F. Carruth	 	Director	 	May 1, 1994
	Gary L. Forbes	 	Director	 	May 1, 1994
	James H. Limmer	 	Director	 	May 1, 1994
	Hugh N. West	 	Director	 	May 1, 1994














QuickLinks



EXHIBIT 10.12


AMENDED SCHEDULE TO EXHIBIT 10.11
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000             SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000             MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                         781,894                   4,901
<SECURITIES>                                         0                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   14,985                       0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0                       0
<INVENTORY>                                          0                       0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               817,730                   8,401
<PP&E>                                          61,176                  13,415
<DEPRECIATION>                                   8,861                   4,023
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 943,082                  29,792
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          445,172                 515,487
<BONDS>                                              0                       0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0                       0
<PREFERRED>                                          0                       0
<COMMON>                                         2,037                   2,008
<OTHER-SE>                                           0                       0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   943,082                  29,792
<SALES>                                              0                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0                       0
<CGS>                                                0                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  123,907                  86,777
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,564                    (16)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (4,377)                   5,322
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (122,094)                (92,083)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (122,094)                (92,083)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0                       0
<CHANGES>                                            0                       0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (122,094)                (92,083)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.006)                 (0.005)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.006)                 (0.005)


</TABLE>
January 23, 2015 

### No

. 01

- 14

- 00355

- CR In the Court of Appeals for the

F irst District of Texas, at Houston



Cause No

. 1360915

In the District Court for the 182 nd District Court, Harris County, Texas





### CURCY ANDREW RIDEAU

Appellant



### v.

THE STATE OF TE XAS

Appellee



STATE’S WAIVER OF OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO APPELLANT’S ANDERS BRIEF



TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
Comes now the State of Texas, by the undersigned assistant district attorney, and
respectfully waives the opportunity to file a brief in response to the Anders brief filed by the
appellant’s counsel. The State would respectfully show the Court the following:

I.
In keeping with the requirements of Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct.
1396 (1967), appointed counsel for the appellant has filed a brief containing the conclusion
that this appeal is frivolous. The appellant has been notified of his right to review the
appellate record and to file a pro se brief.

II.
A review of the appellant’s brie f reveals no question of constitutional dimension or
other issue requiring review in the interest of justice. ACCEPTED 01-14-00355-CR FIRST COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS 1/23/2015 3:44:05 PM CHRISTOPHER PRINE

CLERKJanuary 23, 2015 III.

A copy of this instrument will be served on counsel for the appellant through

eFile.txcourts.gov

, on the date of the filing of this instrument with t he clerk of this court

.

THEREFORE , the State of Texas waives the opportunity to file a response to the

Anders brief filed by the appellant’s attorney, and moves the Court to affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

DEVON ANDERSON District Attorne y Harris County, Texas

/s/ Alan Curry

ALAN CURRY Assistant District Attorney Harris County, Texas 1201 Franklin, Suite 600 Houston, Texas 77002 (713) 755

- 5826 TBC No. 05263700 curry_alan@dao.hctx.net
EXHIBIT 32.2




        Certification of Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350
----------------------------------------------------------------------

In connection with the annual report on Form 10-KSB/A of Thai One On,
Inc. (Registrant), as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Au E-Mun, Chief
Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer of Registrant,
hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to
the best of my knowledge and belief:

   (1)  the annual report fully complies with the requirements
        of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
        1934; and

   (2)  the information contained in the annual report fairly
        presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
        results of operations of Registrant.


Date:  June 16, 2005          /s/ Au E-Mun
                              ----------------------------------
                              Chief Executive Officer of
                              Thai One On, Inc., Registrant
H. Res. 242

In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

September 25, 1997.

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall

be in order to consider the conference report to accompany

the bill (H.R. 2266) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30,

1998, and for other purposes. All points of order against the

conference report and against its consideration are waived.

The conference report shall be considered as read.

Attest:

Clerk.
#### J. W. Henry *v.*Anderson W. Jones, Etc.

Judicial Sales — Right of Heir to Redeem — Statute of Limitation.

Tlie right to redeem the land was secured to his wife as well as to Pagett, and if she died before the expiration of the term, leaving her only heir an infant, the right passed to the heir, and her infancy saved the running of the statute. So even if it was a conditional sale, the appellee had a right to redeem the land, as it is alleged— and not denied in the answer — that Mrs. Jones was a minor when the suit was brought. The statute of limitations is no bar on account of the non-age of Mrs. Jones.

APPEAL FROM HARRISON CIRCUIT COURT.

May 25, 1871.

Opinion by

Judge Peters :

Waiving the consideration of the question of the sufficiency of Mrs. Pagett’s acknowledgment of the deed to pass her inheritance, we are satisfied that the transaction between Wm. Pagett and appellant was a contrivance of the latter to secure an enormous rate of interest feu.' the loan of two hundred dollars by requiring four hundred dollars to be repaid within two years for the redemption of the land, and that the conveyance should be treated as a mortgage.

Two hundred dollars were advanced when the contract was entered into, to-wit, the 15th of January, 1851, and the privilege of redeeming the land was secured to Pagett in the writing by paying to Henry four hundred dollars at any time within two years, and if Pagett failed to pay the four hundred dollars within the two years, Henry was to pay him one hundred dollars more and have the land.

Before the time expired for the redemption of the land Mrs. Pagett died, and her husband then had at most but a life estate *379if he redeemed it, and at his death the land would pass to appellee, Louisa, the only child, and heir at law of his wife. The motive' therefore to redeem with him might have been greatly weakened, and the chance to get to himself a hundred dollars more may have been an inducement to abondon the right to redeem altogether. His child and heir of his wife was an infant of tender years. She could not redeem although the right to do so was in her if her father failed to do it.

*Hodges, for appellant.*

*A. H. Ward, J. S. Boyd, for appellee.*

It is insisted that the price paid for the land at the date of the transaction was a fair and full consideration. If that be so why were four hundred dollars exacted as the price of redemption? There is but one solution of the question, and that is, appellant was determined to secure to himself an enormous rate of interest for his money, or hold the land.

The right to redeem the land was secured to his wife as well as to Pagett, and if she died before the expiration of the term, leaving her only heir, an infant, the right passed to the heir, and her infancy saved the running of the statute. So that even if it were a conditional sale the appellees had a right to redeem the land as it is alleged and not denied in the answer that Mrs. Jones was a minor when the suit was brought. So that in either aspect of the case the right of appellee is clear. The statute of limitation is no bar on account of the non-age of Mrs. Jones.

Wherefore the judgment is affirmed.
#### Jas. H. Cummins *v.*B. T. Whaley’s Administrator.

Deed — Reservation—Consent of Vendor to Sale.

When, a deed contains the provision that no sale of the land shall be made without the consent of the grantor it is notice to the world of the reservations and conditions therein made.

Judgments — Consolidated Actions Binding on All Parties.

• Where causes are consolidated the judgment rendered therein is binding on all the parties served with process in either action.

APPEAL PROM HARRISON CIRCUIT COURT.

October 18, 1871.

*Trimble, for appellant.*

*A. H. Ward, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

The deed from Benjamin Whaley to Benjamin T. Whaley was of record in the clerk’s office of the Harrison county court at the time of the purchase of the land by both Whaley and the appellant Cummins. This deed cbntained the provision that no sale of the land could be made without the consent of the grantors Benjamin Whaley and his wife, and was notice to the world of the reservations and conditions therein made. Henry, under whose title the appellant claims, had notice of the lien of Benjamin Whaley on the land, and set it up as a defense to the suit against him to enforce the lien for the purchase money by Minor and claimed in hjs answer to be a party to the suit of Benjamin Whaley as his son, in which an effort was being made to annul the deed under which Henry claimed to have derived title. The case of *Minn v. Henry*was also consolidated with the suit of *Benjamin Whaley v. Mary Whaley, etc.,*and the judgment therein rendered was binding when all the parties had been served with process in either action.

Neither Henry nor the appellant Cummins can be regarded as innocent purchasers. There is no proof of any such consent by Benjamin Whaley as would authorize this court to divest him or his heirs of the title to this land, but on the contrary the evidence shows that he refused to sign the deed when. called on for that purpose. We perceive no error in the judgment of the court below, and the same is now affirmed.
H. Res. 337

In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

January 27, 1998.

Resolved, That unless otherwise ordered, before Monday,

May 18, 1998, the hour of daily meeting of the House shall

be 2:00 p.m. on Mondays; 11:00 a.m. on Tuesdays; and

10:00 a.m. on all other days of the week; and from Monday,

May 18, 1998, until the end of the second session, the hour

of daily meeting of the House shall be noon on Mondays;

10:00 a.m. on Tuesdays, Wednesdays, and Thursdays; and

9:00 a.m. on all other days of the week.

Attest:

Clerk.
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

*CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350*

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofGranite City Food & Brewery Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 10-QSB for thequarterly period ended March 30, 2003, as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Monica A. Underwood,Interim Chief Financial Officer and Corporate Controller of the Company,certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.                                       theReport fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.                                       theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

A signed original of this written statementrequired by Section 906 has been provided to Granite City Food &Brewery Ltd. and will be retained by Granite City Food & Brewery Ltd. andfurnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 
| Dated: December 21, 2004 |   | By     |   | /s/ Monica A. Underwood                                   |   |
|-------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                          |   |   |   | Monica A. Underwood                                       |
|                          |   |   |   | Interim Chief Financial Officer  and Corporate Controller |

 

----