************************************************

The “officially released” date that appears near the 

beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be 

published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it 

is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the 

beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. 

All opinions are subject to modification and technical 

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut 

Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event 

of discrepancies between the advance release version of 

an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut 

Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest 

version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying 

an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or 

Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the 

Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may 

not be reproduced or distributed without the express 

written permission of the Commission on Official Legal 

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 , 0 0 Conn. 0

MULLINS, J., with whom ROBINSON, C. J., joins, dissenting. The trial court denied the motion to open filed

by the defendants, Aniello Dizenzo and 1188 Stratford

Avenue, LLC, because ‘‘[it was] untimely, and it ha[d]

no basis.’’ (Emphasis added.) This ruling can be read

in one of two ways. As the majority contends, it could

mean that the court believed that the motion was untimely,

and, because it was untimely, the court applied (or at

least was required to apply) its inherent, common-law

authority to review the untimely motion solely for fraud,

duress, or mutual mistake. Another plausible meaning,

though, is that the court denied the motion on two

distinct, alternative bases: because it was untimely and

also because it had no basis, i.e., it failed on its merits

under General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 52-212.1 In my

view, this second reading is not only plausible but the

far better reading, given that the trial court never once

mentioned, or questioned the parties on, the elements

needed to prevail on an untimely motion to open. Rather,

it focused exclusively on the elements necessary to

prevail under § 52-212.

Although I believe that the trial court’s ruling rests

on two separate bases, at worst, the ruling is unclear.

Consequently, I believe that reversal is irreconcilable

with our well established, highly deferential standard

of review. There has been no motion for articulation to

clarify which of these two readings the court intended.

Under such circumstances, we typically presume that

the trial court was correct and affirm the judgment if

there is any legitimate basis for doing so. Here, there

is such a legitimate basis: nothing in Dizenzo’s affidavit

in support of the defendants’ motion to open established

with particularity, as the defendants must under § 52-

212, that they were prevented by mistake from raising

a valid defense. And, after a hearing at which the trial

1 All references to § 52-212 are to the 2019 revision of the statute.

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. 0 , 0 3

court focused on the issue of whether the defendants’

alleged mistake was a valid one that prevented them

from appearing, the court concluded that the motion

‘‘ha[d] no basis.’’ Because the defendants failed to provide a reasonable justification for their failure to appear

and defend, and because the Appellate Court majority

properly applied well established law, I must respectfully dissent.

Although the majority aptly lays out the facts, a few

are worth highlighting to illuminate my position. Dizenzo

leased the subject vehicle in November, 2012, using

funds provided by the plaintiff finance company, Mercedes-Benz Financial. He drove the vehicle and made

his monthly payments under the lease/financing agreement for fifteen months, through February, 2014. At

that point, when the dealership was unable to provide

service that he deemed satisfactory, Dizenzo unilaterally declared that the agreement was void, simply left

the car at the dealership, and ceased making payments

to the plaintiff.

In February, 2017, when the defendants undisputedly

received notice of this action, they did not file an appearance. They also filed no appearance six months later,

in August, 2017, when the defendants received notice

of the plaintiff’s motion for default; or the following

month, in September, 2017, when the defendants received

notice that they had been defaulted;2 or in May, 2019,

when the defendants received notice of the plaintiff’s

motion for judgment; or in June, 2019, when the defendants received notice that the trial court rendered a

default judgment. The defendants did not enter an

appearance, engage counsel, or take any measures to

defend the action until July, 2019, when they were

2 The notice on the default for failing to appear specifically informed the

defendants that, ‘‘[i]f you file an appearance in this case before the judgment

is entered against you, the default for failure to appear will automatically

be set aside by the clerk. Practice Book [§] 17-20 [d].’’

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 , 0 0 Conn. 0

served with postjudgment discovery. In the defendants’

motion to open and Dizenzo’s supporting affidavit, the

only explanation offered for this ongoing failure to

appear and defend the suit was the assertion that,

‘‘when he was sued in 2017, [Dizenzo] mistakenly

thought this matter was resolved . . . .’’ The affidavit

does not indicate why Dizenzo continued to hold that

belief after he was sued, as he received a series of

notices that the plaintiff was pursuing a default and,

later, a default judgment.

I

Like the majority, I am troubled by the trial court’s

determination that the defendants’ motion to open was

untimely, after both the defendants’ counsel and court

staff made the court aware that the motion was timely.

Even the court itself acknowledged that the motion was

timely.3 The court’s ruling that the motion was untimely

was clearly erroneous, as the motion was filed two

months after the court rendered judgment. Unlike the

majority, I do not find that that erroneous determination

could not be untethered from the court’s separate determination that the motion also had no basis. Nor do I

find that the untimely designation dictated how the

court actually conducted the hearing.

My analysis centers on the highly deferential standard

by which we review a trial court’s denial of a motion

to open a default judgment. ‘‘Whether proceeding under

the common law or a statute, the action of a trial court

in granting or [denying a motion] to open a judgment

3 During the hearing, the trial court miscounted the months and, as a

result, believed that the defendants had failed to timely file their motion to

open within four months from when judgment was rendered, as § 52-212

(a) requires. Specifically, the court thought that five months, rather than

two, had passed since the judgment was rendered, but it was promptly

corrected by the defendants’ counsel that the motion to open was timely.

Acknowledging that the motion was timely, the court responded: ‘‘All right.

So, we are barely in time.’’

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. 0 , 0 5

is, generally, within the judicial discretion of such court,

and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless

it clearly appears that the trial court has abused its

discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S.

Bank National Assn. v. Rothermel, 339 Conn. 366, 381,

260 A.3d 1187 (2021). ‘‘In determining whether the trial

court abused its discretion, this court must make every

reasonable presumption in favor of its action. . . . The

manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not

be disturbed [as] long as the [trial] court could reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conroy v. Idlibi, 343 Conn. 201, 204, 272 A.3d

1121 (2022). Indeed, we have long recognized that ‘‘the

orderly administration of justice requires that relief

be denied unless the moving party alleges and shows

reasonable cause for relief under the statute.’’ (Emphasis added.) Testa v. Carrolls Hamburger System, Inc.,

154 Conn. 294, 300, 224 A.2d 739 (1966).

In cases in which the record is ambiguous or the

basis for the trial court’s denial of a motion to open is

unclear, and there is no motion for articulation, we

consistently have affirmed the judgment, giving the trial

court the benefit of the doubt and construing the record

in the light most favorable to sustaining the judgment

of default.4 We have deferred to the discretion of the

trial court even when it made inconsistent or erroneous

findings. See, e.g., Jenks v. Jenks, 232 Conn. 750, 754–56,

657 A.2d 1107 (1995) (when supporting record was

4 See, e.g., Priest v. Edmonds, 295 Conn. 132, 139–40, 989 A.2d 588 (2010)

(declining to review defendant’s claim when trial court simply marked defendant’s motion to open ‘‘ ‘denied’ ’’ and could have done so for various

reasons); Flater v. Grace, 291 Conn. 410, 423–24, 969 A.2d 157 (2009) (‘‘[We

must assume] . . . that the trial court understood the defendant’s claim

consistent with the plaintiffs’ objection thereto . . . . [The] order . . .

leaves open the possibility that the trial court sustained the plaintiffs’ objection on the [alternative] ground that the defendant had not demonstrated

that he had been ‘prevented by mistake, accident or other reasonable cause

from prosecuting the action or making the defense.’ ’’ (Footnote omitted.)).

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 , 0 0 Conn. 0

‘‘sparse,’’ trial court made inconsistent findings as to

motion to open, and plaintiff did not seek articulation,

record was construed to support judgment); Kiessling

v. Kiessling, 134 Conn. 564, 567, 59 A.2d 532 (1948)

(‘‘[i]f the default judgment was proper on any of the

grounds alleged, it should stand’’); Genung’s, Inc. v.

Rice, 33 Conn. Supp. 554, 556–59, 362 A.2d 540 (1976)

(subjecting trial court’s erroneous finding to harmless

error analysis and upholding denial of motion to vacate

default judgment on alternative grounds).

In short, the fact that there are two plausible interpretations of the trial court’s order does not give rise to

the clear abuse of discretion necessary to overturn the

judgment, especially in the absence of a motion for

articulation. The only question we must answer is

whether, drawing every reasonable presumption and

construing any ambiguities in favor of upholding the

judgment, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the defendants had failed to satisfy their

burden under at least one prong of § 52-212 (a). See,

e.g., Karanda v. Bradford, 210 Conn. App. 703, 713, 270

A.3d 743 (2022) (describing two prongs of § 52-212 (a)).

I believe it could.

II

A

The majority employs a mechanical approach to the

trial court’s decision that I do not share. It concludes

that the initial timeliness finding is dispositive and necessarily dictates which standard the court applies: § 52-

212 for timely filed motions, or the court’s commonlaw authority to consider untimely motions. This view

leaves no room for the common practice by which a

court issues alternative rulings denying a motion, such

as when a motion is untimely but the defendants also

failed to make the showing necessary to satisfy the

substantive requirements of § 52-212.

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. 0 , 0 7

To start, there is no dispute that the defendants’

motion to open was filed pursuant to § 52-212; although

the motion does not explicitly reference § 52-212, it

invokes the language and legal standard of that statute,

alleging that the defendants ‘‘have good defenses’’ and

that they mistakenly thought that the matter had been

resolved. As such, the defendants had to satisfy all of

§ 52-212’s requirements: (1) the motion must be timely;

General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 52-212 (a); (2) it must

be verified by the oath of the defendants or their attorney; General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 52-212 (c); (3) it

must demonstrate that the defendants had a good cause

of action or defense at the time of judgment; General

Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 52-212 (a); and (4) it must

‘‘particularly set forth’’ how mistake, accident, or other

reasonable cause prevented them from prosecuting or

defending the action. General Statutes (Rev. to 2019)

§ 52-212 (a) and (c). Failure to satisfy any one of these

elements is grounds to deny the motion to open. Accordingly, the trial court, in concluding that § 52-212 was

not satisfied, could have found that any one of these

elements, or any combination thereof, had not been

established. Nothing in the law prevents the court from

denying a motion as untimely and, in the alternative,

denying it because it fails on the merits.

In fact, the very thing that the majority says the trial

court cannot possibly have intended to do—determined

that the motion to open was untimely but proceeded

also to assess whether it satisfied the requirements of

§ 52-212—is precisely what the Appellate Court did in

Lewis v. Bowden, 166 Conn. App. 400, 141 A.3d 998

(2016). In that case, the defaulted father moved to open

a judgment of paternity approximately twenty-seven

years after the trial court rendered judgment. Id., 402.

The Appellate Court observed that ‘‘nearly thirty years

[had] passed before he tried to open the judgment.’’ Id.,

404. Nevertheless, the court stated that ‘‘[a] motion to

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 , 0 0 Conn. 0

open a default judgment is governed by . . . § 52-212’’;

id., 402; it recited the language of that statute establishing the reasonable cause standard, and it proceeded to

assess the merits of the father’s claim according to that

statutory standard. See id., 403–404; cf. Celanese Fiber,

Division of Celanese of Canada, Ltd. v. Pic Yarns, Inc.,

184 Conn. 461, 465–67, 440 A.2d 159 (1981) (with respect

to closely related statute, General Statutes (Rev. to

1979) § 52-212a, governing opening of civil judgments

and decrees, concluding that motion to open was properly denied because it was untimely and there was no

claim of fraud or mistake under common-law standard,

but proceeding to explain that, even assuming arguendo

that motion had been timely filed within four month

limitation period, trial court would have been well

within its discretion to deny motion on merits under

statutory standard).

It is not uncommon for courts to follow this sort

of belt-and-suspenders approach, determining that a

motion, claim, defense, or argument fails on multiple,

alternative grounds, both procedural and substantive.5

Here, the trial court appears to have done just that by

ruling that the defendants’ motion to open was untimely

and that it had no basis. I fail to see why that is not

one plausible reading of the trial court’s decision in this

case. And, if it is, we are bound to adopt it.6

5 See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 338 Conn. 66, 88, 257 A.3d 259 (2021); In re

Angela V., 204 Conn. App. 746, 757–58, 254 A.3d 1042, cert. denied, 337

Conn. 907, 252 A.3d 365 (2021); Henderson v. Commissioner of Correction,

181 Conn. App. 778, 780, 790, 189 A.3d 135, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 911, 186

A.3d 707 (2018); see also, e.g., Priest v. Edmonds, 295 Conn. 132, 139, 989

A.2d 588 (2010). 6 The majority suggests that ‘‘the record does not conclusively establish’’

whether the trial court followed this sort of belt-and-suspenders approach.

But we have never required that the record conclusively establish that the

trial court got it right. Rather, we have said time and again that we must

make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the judgment,

construe ambiguities and gaps in the record against the complainant, in the

absence of an articulation, and then reverse only if it is clear that the trial

court got it wrong. See, e.g., Bell Food Services, Inc. v. Sherbacow, 217

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. 0 , 0 9

As noted, the defendants filed their motion to open

pursuant to § 52-212—the majority concedes as much,

and that is how the parties argued the case. See footnote

1 of the majority opinion and accompanying text. Aside

from the trial court’s erroneous calculation of the timeliness of the motion, when the court conducted the hearing, it focused on determining whether the defendants

had good defenses that they were prevented from raising. There is no mention whatsoever in the motion,

the accompanying affidavit, or the hearing transcript

of fraud, duress, mutual mistake, or anything else that

might invoke, or suggest that the court was applying,

the court’s inherent, common-law authority to consider

untimely motions to open. Again, the majority concedes

as much.

Indeed, the entire hearing was focused on, and all

the questions posed by the trial court were directed at,

the various statutory requirements imposed by § 52-212.

The trial court began by questioning the defendants’

counsel as to the timeliness of the motion to open. The

court then entertained a back-and-forth between the

parties as to the first substantive prong of § 52-212 (a),

the existence of a potentially meritorious defense. See,

e.g., Karanda v. Bradford, supra, 210 Conn. App. 713.

The alleged meritorious defense was that the car was

essentially a lemon, given the repeated problems and

safety issues Dizenzo had experienced. Thus, the defendants’ counsel argued that the defendants had the right

to terminate the lease and would raise this as a part

of their potential counterclaim. The plaintiff’s counsel

countered that this defense was time barred. The court

also pushed the defendants’ counsel on the relevance

of the defendants’ purported claims against the automobile dealership, which is not the plaintiff, given that the

plaintiff finance company is a different entity. During

Conn. 476, 482, 586 A.2d 1157 (1991); see also, e.g., Doe v. Bemer, 215 Conn.

App. 504, 517, 283 A.3d 1074 (2022).

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 , 0 0 Conn. 0

this dialogue, the defendants’ counsel invited the court

to follow the example of a case in which another judge

of the Superior Court had opened a judgment ‘‘within

the four [month]’’ limitation period and allowed the

defaulted party to plead in a potentially meritorious

counterclaim.

As to the second substantive prong of § 52-212 (a),

the trial court pressed on the defendants’ claim that

they were prevented by mistake from asserting a

defense. See, e.g., Karanda v. Bradford, supra, 210

Conn. App. 713. The court questioned both parties about

this prong of the test, seeking any support for the defendants’ purported belief that the plaintiff had not

intended to proceed with the action. The court questioned the defendants’ counsel at length as to the reasonableness of Dizenzo’s mistaken belief that the action

was not going forward and his attendant decision not

to file an appearance or to retain counsel, including the

facts that (1) the affidavit itself made no mention of the

supposed conversations in which the plaintiff allegedly

represented that the action would not proceed, (2)

Dizenzo failed to obtain any written confirmation of

this purported agreement, despite being an experienced

business owner, and (3) any representations that the

dealership made to Dizenzo would be irrelevant insofar

as the finance company was the plaintiff.

When the trial court ended the hearing and denied the

defendants’ motion to open, stating that ‘‘[the motion

is] untimely, and it has no basis,’’ this ruling came

directly on the heels of this discussion, in which the

court had questioned the parties as to both substantive

prongs of § 52-212 (a), and in which the defendants’

counsel had been unable to provide any support for the

mistake theory, other than counsel’s own representations, or any other explanation (aside from negligence)

of how the defendants were prevented from appearing.

There was no discussion of, or reference to, the comMercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. 0 , 0 11

mon-law standard. On the basis of the foregoing, after

the unfounded timeliness determination, the court clearly

applied the § 52-212 standard in denying the motion.

B

The record clearly supports the conclusion that the

defendants had not met their burden of demonstrating

good cause under the second substantive prong of § 52-

212 (a). Under § 52-212 (a), a defaulted party must make

a showing that it ‘‘was prevented by mistake, accident or

other reasonable cause from . . . making the defense.’’

Section 52-212 (c) further requires that the defaulted

party ‘‘particularly set forth the reason why [that party]

failed to appear.’’ (Emphasis added.) In the present

case, the only reason the defendants offered for the

failure to appear is their own mistake. The defendants,

in their motion to open and Dizenzo’s affidavit, alleged

only the conclusory statement that they ‘‘mistakenly

thought this matter was resolved’’ when the plaintiff

filed suit in 2017. That hardly qualifies as the particularized showing required by § 52-212 (c). See, e.g., Eastern

Elevator Co. v. Scalzi, 193 Conn. 128, 132–34, 474 A.2d

456 (1984).

For the sake of argument, however, suppose we set

aside the defendants’ burden of production, look beyond

the conclusory allegation of mistake, and accept the representations of counsel during the hearing that Dizenzo

believed he had the assurances of the plaintiff that the

action would not proceed. The question is whether even

that would qualify as a reasonable mistake under § 52-

212 so as to justify a failure to appear and defend. It

would not.

We have long held that negligence does not qualify

as a ‘‘mistake’’ for purposes of § 52-212 (a). See, e.g.,

Pantlin & Chananie Development Corp. v. Hartford

Cement & Building Supply Co., 196 Conn. 233, 240–41,

492 A.2d 159 (1985) (‘‘[n]egligence is no ground for

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 , 0 0 Conn. 0

vacating a judgment, and it has been consistently held

that the denial of a motion to open a default judgment

should not be held an abuse of discretion [when] the

failure to assert a defense was the result of negligence’’).

When a party receives notice that it has been sued, the

law expects that the party will enter a timely appearance

and take steps to defend the action. See, e.g., Disturco

v. Gates in New Canaan, LLC, 204 Conn. App. 526,

535, 253 A.3d 1033 (2021) (‘‘[§ 52-212] is remedial, but

it cannot be so construed as to authorize relief . . .

[when] a defendant indeed has received proper notice

of the underlying action and the . . . motion for

default yet failed to file an appearance’’ (citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)); Fontaine v.

Thomas, 51 Conn. App. 77, 83, 720 A.2d 264 (1998)

(‘‘[A]lthough the defendant had actual notice of the

pending case . . . he failed to take any action . . . .

[Although] his mistaken perception of what steps he

had to take [may have] prevented him from defending,

his error does not constitute a . . . mistake . . . .’’).

Failure to act born of carelessness, indifference, or

ignorance of the law simply does not excuse default.

See, e.g., 47 Am. Jur. 2d 50–52, Judgments § 659 (2017);

see also, e.g., Dziedzic v. Pine Island Marina, LLC,

143 Conn. App. 644, 652–53, 72 A.3d 406 (2013) (‘‘[t]he

fact that the defendant chose to ignore [the legal] process, and now rues this decision, is not a basis to open

. . . the judgment’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

Importantly, this rule applies even when the defendant fails to appear out of a mistaken belief that the

plaintiff does not intend to prosecute the action. See,

e.g., Giano v. Salvatore, 136 Conn. App. 834, 844, 46

A.3d 996 (‘‘[t]he defendant’s mistaken belief that the

plaintiff would be withdrawing the case is no excuse

for her failure to plead’’), cert. denied, 307 Conn. 926,

55 A.3d 567 (2012); Nelson v. Contracting Group, LLC,

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. 0 , 0 13

127 Conn. App. 45, 49–50, 14 A.3d 1009 (2011) (motion

to open was properly denied when defendant failed

to defend because of mistaken belief that plaintiff’s

counsel would contact him before moving forward with

litigation); Berzins v. Berzins, 105 Conn. App. 648, 652–

53, 938 A.2d 1281 (‘‘even if the defendant had relied on

any statements made by the plaintiff, his subsequent

negligence supersedes his purported reliance . . . [as

he] could have called the court at any point to inquire

about the status of the action’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)), cert. denied, 289 Conn. 932, 958 A.2d 156

(2008); Rino Gnesi Co. v. Sbriglio, 83 Conn. App. 707,

710, 713, 850 A.2d 1118 (2004) (defendants’ alleged misunderstanding following conversation with plaintiff’s

counsel regarding case status was deemed negligent

and, therefore, was not valid justification under § 52-

212).

These principles are illustrated nicely in Pelletier v.

Paradis, 4 Conn. Cir. 396, 232 A.2d 925 (1966), cert.

denied, 154 Conn. 745, 226 A.2d 520 (1967). The defendant in that case moved to open a default judgment,

contending that his attorney had advised him that he

need not defend the suit because the applicable one

year limitation period had expired, and, thus, the plaintiff had no legal claim against him. Id., 398. He further

alleged that, after his attorney offered to discuss the

matter with the plaintiff’s attorney, he heard nothing

more from the plaintiff for nearly one year, and his

attorney then inadvertently forgot to respond to the

summons. See id., 398–99. On the basis of these representations, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion

to open the default judgment. Id., 399.

The Appellate Division of the Circuit Court reversed.

See id., 400. It acknowledged that a trial court has broad

discretion in such matters. See id., 397–98. But it concluded, as a matter of law, that ‘‘[t]he defendant’s failure

to appear and assert his defense . . . was not due to

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 , 0 0 Conn. 0

any mistake, accident or other reasonable cause, unmixed

with negligence or inattention, so as to constitute a

sufficient reason to warrant the opening of the judgment.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 399–400. The Appellate

Division articulated the following rule: ‘‘A party to a

suit in court must give it the care and attention [that]

a man of ordinary prudence usually bestows [on] his

important business. If he fails to do so he cannot obtain

relief from a judgment resulting from his negligent failure to take the proceedings required for his protection.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 399.

The present action fits squarely within the previously

mentioned paradigm. Even if there was an initial agreement not to pursue this action, the plaintiff clearly

became serious enough about the matter to hire counsel, draft a complaint, pay the filing fee, and file suit.

Employees at the Mercedes-Benz dealership may well

have told Dizenzo that they did not believe that the

plaintiff—the finance company—planned to proceed

with the action. The employees might have been mistaken about that. The plaintiff also might have changed

course at some point without informing the dealership

or the defendants. Dizenzo may have simply misunderstood from the outset whether there was an agreement

not to pursue this matter.

The one thing Dizenzo knew for sure, when he received

notice of the lawsuit, was that he had been sued. He

also knew from the filing of the default notice that the

case was moving forward and that, if he simply filed

an appearance, the default would be set aside. The defendants’ reliance on the prior purported agreement with

the plaintiff does not excuse their failure to act, particularly after they had received notice of the action and

the default. At minimum, as the Appellate Court noted

in Berzins v. Berzins, supra, 105 Conn. App. 648, they

‘‘could have called the court at any point to inquire

about the status of the action.’’ Id., 653. Had they taken

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. 0 , 0 15

the minimal, prudent step of filing an appearance, with

or without legal representation, then the defendants

would not have been defaulted. The law deems the

failure to do so negligent, and a mistake arising from

or intermixed with one’s own negligence is not a valid

mistake under § 52-212.

C

The majority says that, even if the trial court did

apply the correct legal standard, its application of that

standard was tainted by its mistaken belief that the

defendants’ motion to open was untimely. This, the

majority contends, is because the inquiry embedded in

the second prong of § 52-212 (a), which asks whether

there was good cause for the default, ‘‘has a temporal

component because . . . depending on the circumstances presented, it may include consideration of the

length of time that the defendants were prevented from

asserting such a defense . . . .’’ The majority suggests

that an evidentiary hearing will be required to resolve

what it calls this ‘‘critical factual dispute . . . .’’ Footnote 5 of the majority opinion.

I disagree for two reasons. First, as I just discussed,

a negligent mistake is not a valid mistake under § 52-

212. Failure to file an appearance after receiving notice

of the lawsuit, and again after receiving notice of

default, was negligent. As the trial court established

through its questioning, even if the plaintiff had expressed

some hesitation to proceed with the action, failure to get

that agreement in writing also was negligent. Because

there was no valid mistake that prevented the defendants from filing an appearance and raising a defense

at the outset, I fail to see how the passage of additional

time could transform what began, and persisted, as a

series of negligent decisions into a reasonable mistake,

so as to mislead the trial court. Nor is there any factual

dispute that could be resolved on remand in a way

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 , 0 0 Conn. 0

that would legitimize the defendants’ ongoing failure

to appear, given our well established law in this area.

Second, the record belies the theory that the trial

court’s analysis was influenced by its belief that the

motion to open was untimely. At the hearing, the parties

raised the question of timing. The plaintiff’s counsel

argued that any defenses relating to the 2012 lease were

by then time barred, while the defendants’ counsel

countered that the plaintiff’s two year delay in prosecuting the action was evidence that it never intended to

prosecute it. But the trial court dismissed the importance of the lengthy delay, stating: ‘‘That’s not proof of

anything.’’ Thus, the court itself appears not to have

put much stock in the passage of time. It never said

that the two year delay influenced its decision, and,

without an articulation, I would not presume that it did.

D

Ultimately, the majority recognizes that it is not

entirely clear whether the trial court’s determination

that the defendants’ motion to open ‘‘ha[d] no basis’’

resulted from its application of the two part legal standard of § 52-212 (a) for timely filed motions or the

common-law legal standard for untimely filed motions.

The majority further recognizes that it would have been

more prudent for the court to have stated the factual

and legal bases for its decision or for the defendants

to have sought clarification through a motion for articulation. See footnote 3 of the majority opinion. Normally,

we require articulation before reading an unclear or

ambiguous order in a manner that would result in reversal. See, e.g., Speer v. Dept. of Agriculture, 183 Conn.

App. 298, 302, 192 A.3d 489 (2018) (when bases for trial

court’s denial of motion to open judgment of nonsuit

were unclear from record, Appellate Court sua sponte

ordered trial court to articulate factual and legal bases

for denial). But the majority resolves that concern by

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. 0 , 0 17

concluding that the application of either standard here

was an error. I would not brush aside the necessity for

an articulation so quickly.

In point of fact, the defendants’ motion to open was

a timely filed motion, and, as I explained, the trial court

clearly applied the statutory standard for timely filed

motions in its questioning during the hearing. Thus, in

my view, the court got the timeliness analysis wrong,

but it got the legal standard right. The majority contends

that, even if it is true that the trial court applied the

correct standard and reached a permissible result, that

discretionary judgment must be reversed because the

court should have used an incorrect standard in order to

be consistent with its own erroneous timeliness finding.

The erroneous timeliness finding was harmless here,

and I am not aware of any case in which this court

or the Appellate Court has reversed a discretionary

judgment of a trial court on such a basis.

In any event, to the extent that the trial court’s timeliness determination makes things at all unclear about

which standard the court applied—one that is correct,

or one that is incorrect—that is not grounds for reversal.

In such cases, we either read the ambiguity to support

the judgment or we give the trial court a fair opportunity

to clarify its ruling. See, e.g., id.7

7 The majority contends that following our established practice and ordering the trial court to articulate the basis for its decision would be of no

avail under the particular circumstances of this case because ‘‘the basis the

trial court provided for its decision was indisputably inaccurate . . . .’’

Footnote 3 of the majority opinion. I disagree. I see no reason to reverse

the judgment and start the process from scratch simply because the trial

court’s error as to timeliness might have infected its analysis of the merits.

Why not just ask? If we were to order an articulation, sua sponte, and the

trial court were to clarify that (1) its determination that the defendants’

motion to open had ‘‘no basis’’ was an independent, alternative basis for

denying the motion under the second prong of § 52-212, and (2) that determination was unrelated to questions of timeliness and was predicated solely

on the court’s determination that the defendants had no valid basis for their

failure to enter an appearance, aside from their own negligence, then I see

no possible grounds for reversing the judgment.

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC
Page 16 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

18 , 0 0 Conn. 0

In sum, although the trial court’s ruling is not a model

of clarity, the majority’s interpretation of that ruling is

certainly not the only, or, in my view, even the best,

interpretation. In the absence of an articulation from

the trial court, we are left with two plausible interpretations. I believe that the interpretation that makes the

most sense and is supported by the record is that the

court ruled alternatively that the defendants’ motion to

open was untimely, which was wrong, but also that the

motion had no basis, which was correct. Because the

mistake the defendants alleged here was not an excusable one under the law, and there was no demonstration

that they were otherwise prevented from raising a valid

defense, there is an adequate independent basis in the

record to affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment upholding the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to

open. Our standard of review dictates that we affirm.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC