J-S36041-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

CARLOS OCASIO

Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 3965 EDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order November 21, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0701691-1995

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., DUBOW, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED July 20, 2018

Appellant, Carlos Ocasio, appeals pro se from the order entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed as untimely his 

serial petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On November 19, 1996, a jury convicted Appellant 

of first-degree murder, three counts of aggravated assault, conspiracy, 

possessing instruments of crime, and carrying firearms in public streets in 

Philadelphia. The court sentenced Appellant on March 3, 1997, to life 

imprisonment for the murder conviction and imposed lesser terms of 

imprisonment for the remaining crimes. This Court affirmed the judgment of 

sentence on June 16, 1999, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of 

appeal on October 18, 1999. See Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 742 A.2d 208 

(Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 723, 745 A.2d 1220 (1999). 
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On October 4, 2000, Appellant timely filed a counseled first PCRA 

petition. Following appropriate notice per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the court denied 

relief on January 17, 2002. This Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief on 

March 22, 2004. See Commonwealth v. Ocasio, 850 A.2d 11 (Pa.Super. 

2004). 

Appellant filed the current serial pro se PCRA petition on March 25, 2016. 

The court issued Rule 907 notice on October 11, 2017, and denied PCRA relief 

on November 21, 2017. Appellant timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on 

December 6, 2017. No Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement was ordered or filed. 

Preliminarily, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional 

requisite. Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 148 A.3d 849 (Pa.Super. 2016). A 

PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within 

one year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is deemed final “at the 

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme 

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the 

expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The 

statutory exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow for very limited circumstances 

under which the late filing of a petition will be excused; a petitioner asserting 

a timeliness exception must file a petition within 60 days of when the claim 

could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1-2). 

Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on January 16, 
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2000, upon expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari with 

the U.S. Supreme Court. See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Appellant filed the current 

PCRA petition on March 25, 2016, which is patently untimely. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant attempts to invoke the “new constitutional 

right” exception to the statutory time-bar per Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), claiming 

he is entitled to relief under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 

2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (holding sentence of mandatory life 

imprisonment without possibility of parole, for those under age of 18 at time 

of their crimes, violates Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 

punishments) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 718, 

193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) (holding Miller applies retroactively to cases on state 

collateral review). Nevertheless, Appellant concedes he was over 18 years old 

at the time of the offenses at issue. Thus, Miller and Montgomery do not 

apply. Furthermore, this Court has previously rejected the controversial 

argument that relief under Miller and Montgomery should be extended to 

individuals under 25 years old because the brain is not developed fully until 

that age. See Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(holding appellant who was 19 years old at time of offenses was not entitled 

to relief under Miller and Montgomery on collateral review; rejecting 

“technical juvenile” argument). Therefore, the court properly dismissed 

Appellant’s petition as untimely.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/20/2018