The Honorable George F. Gunn, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern 1 District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

____________ No. 96-2808

____________

United States of America, *
* Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the
* Eastern District of Missouri Lynn Truman Crawford, *
* Appellant. *

____________ Submitted: November 18, 1996
Filed: June 23, 1997

____________ Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

____________ McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.

Lynn Tru man Crawford appeals from a final judgment entered in the Unite d Stat es District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, following a bench trial , 1 finding him guilty on one count of violating the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992-2-

(CSRA), 18 U.S.C. § 228, and sentencing him to six months imprisonment an d ordering hi m to pay a special assessment of $25.00 and restitution in the amount o f $91,547.14 plus post-judgment interest. United States v. Crawford , No. 4:96CR4 2 (E.D. Mo. July 2, 1996) (judgment). For reversal, Crawford argues that the distric t

cou rt erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on grounds that: (1) th e CSRA exceeds Congress's regulatory powers under the commerce clause; (2) th e CSRA violates the Tenth Amendment; (3) his rights under the ex post facto clause have been violated; and (4) venue in the Eastern District of Missouri is improper. I n addition, Crawford argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support hi s conviction. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Background
The underlying facts are not i n dispute. Crawford, a physician who specializes in emergency medicine, married Mona Tague on September 1, 1984, in the state o f Missouri. Shortly thereafter, the couple moved to Texas. While in Texas, they had two daughters, born in 1985 and 1986. The coupl e separated in February 1988, and Tague retained custody of the two children.

On March 23, 1988, a Texas state court issued a temporary order whic h required Craw ford to make payments of $1000 per month in child support, to be paid through the Dallas County Child Support Office in Dallas, Texas. Crawford made the monthly payments until November 1988, when he terminated the payments. One year later, in November 1989, the Texas state court found that Crawford owed over $12,000 in child support and held him in contempt. The fo llowing year, in November 1990, the T e xas state court issued a final divorce decree, which confirmed Crawford's monthly child support obligation.

Meanwhile, Tague and the two children had moved from Texas to Missouri , where they have resided ever since. From the time of the couple's separation untilThe CSRA provides in pertinent parts: 2
Whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support o bligation with respe ct to a child who resides in another State shall b e punished as provided in subsection (b).

. . . . As used in this section-- (1) the term "past due support obligation" means any amount--

(A) dete rmined under a court order or an order of a n administrative process pursuant to the law of a State to be du e from a person for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living; and (B) that has rem ained unpaid for a period longer than one year, or is greater than $5,000.
18 U.S.C. § 228(a),(d). The CSRA became effective on October 25, 1992. 3
-3- Crawford' s arrest in February 1996, Crawford continued to reside in Texas an d Louisiana and had no significant contact with the state of Missour i. In that time period, he earned at least $230,000.

On Februar y 15, 1996, Crawford was indicted in the Eastern District o f Missou ri on one count of violating the CSRA from October 31, 1992, throug h 2 February 14, 1996. A warrant was issued for his arrest. On February 26, 1996 , 3 Craw fordwas arrested in Louisiana, and his initial appearance was held in Unite d States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The same day, Crawford filed in the Western District of Louisiana a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing, among other things, that the CS RA is unconstitutional under the commerce clause and the Tenth Amendment, that his rights under the ex post facto clause were beingThe Honorable Thomas C. Mummert, III, United States Magistrate Judge for the 4 Eastern District of Missouri.
The government apparently made no recommendation regarding the amount o f 5 restitution.
-4- violated, and that venue was improper in the Eastern District of M issouri. He also filed

a motion t o transfer the case from the Eastern District of Missouri to the Wester n District of

Louisiana. On February 28, 1996, following a detention hearing in th e We stern District of Louisiana, Crawford was ordered detained without bond. Th e Louisiana district court did not rule on Crawford's pendi ng motions. Thereafter, before the Eastern District of Mi ssouri, Crawford withdrew his motion to transfer the case to the Western District of Louisiana. Crawford's outstanding motion to dismiss th e indi ctment was assigned to a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of Missouri for 4 a report and recommendation.

The m agistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and thereafter recommended denial of Crawford's motion to dismi ss the indictment. Id. (Apr. 26, 1996) (report and

recom mendation). The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report an d recommendation and, accordingly, denied the motion. Id. (May 30, 19 96) (order). The

case pro ceeded to trial. Following a one-day bench trial, the district court foun d Crawford guilty on one count of violating the CSRA (the only count in the indictment). Craw fordwas sentenced to six months imprisonment and ordered to pay a specia l assessment

of $25.00 and restitution in the amount of $91,547.14 plus interest. Id

. 5 (July 2, 1996) (judgment). This appeal followed.-5- Discussion

Commerce clause
Crawford first argues that Congress, in e nacting the CSRA, exceeded its power "to regulate Commerce . . . amo ng the several States," as granted under the commerce cla use of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Crawfor d maintains, and we agree, that analysis of this constitution al issue is governed by United States v. Lopez , 514 U.S. 549, ___, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629-30 (1995) ( Lop ez ), in which the Supreme Court identified and discussed three broad categories of permissibl e regulation under Con gress's commerce power: (1) regulation of the use of channels of interstate commerce; (2) regula tion and protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in i nterstate commerce; and (3) regulation of activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.

Crawford maintains that the CSRA does not fit within any of these categories. Crawford argues that the payment of child support is incidental to divorce and entirely unrela ted to interstate commerce. He contends "[t]he only nexus to interstat e
commerce in this case is the fact that the parties reside in different states"; that, h e argues, is "not sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction and should not be hel d sy nonymous with 'interstate commerce.'" Brief for Appellant at 7. Crawfor d additionally argues that the enforcement of the CSRA in the present case is particularly onerous beca

use it was his former wife (the custodial parent), not he, who moved out of state and created the circumstances permitting application of the CSRA. W e disagree. We review questions involving the constitutionalit y of a federal statute de novo

. Unit ed States v. McMasters , 90 F.3d 1394, 1397 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied , 11 7 S. Ct. 718 (1997). Upon de novo review, we conclude that the CSRA is not a n unconstitutional exercise of Cong ress's regulatory powers under the commerce clause.For similar reasons, we agree with the magistrate judge's analysis in which h e 6 concludedthat the CSRA fits within the third Lopez category and therefore does not violate the commerce clause. United States v. Crawford , No. 4:96CR42 , slip op. at 6-9 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 1996) (magistrate judge's report and recommendation).
-6- Acco rd United States v. Johnson , No. 96-4323, 1997 WL 283447, at *2-3 (4th Cir

. May 30, 1997) ( John son ); United States v. Parker , 108 F.3d 28, 29-31 (3d Cir. 1997) ( Park er ); United States v. Bongiorno , 106 F.3d 1027, 1030-33 (1st Cir. 1997 ) ( Bongio rno ); United States v. Hampshire , 95 F.3d 999, 1001-04 (10th Cir. 1996 ) ( Hampsh ire ), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 753 (1997); United States v. Mussari , 95 F.3 d 787, 7 90-91 (9th Cir. 1996) ( Mussari ), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 1567 (1997); Unite d States v. Sage , 92 F.3d 101, 104-07 (2d Cir. 1996) ( S age ), cert. denied , 117 S. Ct. 784 (1 997). Contrary to Crawford's contentions, the constitutionality of the CSRA under the com merce clause does not rely solely upon the fact that, in each instance, th e parent-defe ndant

and the child-victim reside in different states. A payment of chil d support on behalf of an out-of-state child is, by definition, a type of tran saction in which money must cross s tate lines and, moreover, the money must change hands outside of a single household. Such payments, or the debts resultin g from nonpayment, are things in, or having a substantial relation to, interstate co mmerce. We therefore conclude that enactment o f the CSRA was a constitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power within either the second or the third category of regulations recognized in Lopez . As the Supre me Court observed in Wickard v. Filburn , 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942 ) ( Wickard ), although one's contribution to interstate commerce may be "trivial by itself," that will not remove his or her activities from the scope of federal regulation where that

co ntribution, "taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far fro m tr ivial." Cf. Lopez , 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-33 (holding that the activity

6 being reg ulated by the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 (i.e., knowing possession of a fi rearm in a school zone) did not substantially affect interstate commerce, eve n when viewed in the aggregate). Furthermore, pay ment of child support on behalf of an out-of-state child requires the use of channels of interstate commerce, which rendersIn United States v. Mussari , 95 F.3d 787, 790- 91 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied , 117 7 S. C t. 1567 (1997), the Ninth Circuit rejected a similar hypothetical argument a s follows:

It is objected that the statute could come into play by the child m oving out of state rather than the parent doing so. Thi s hypothetical will not support a facial challenge to the statute as it is applied in this case. But if the hypothetical is entertained, i t constitutes no objection to the constitutionality of the statute. It doesn't matter whether the interstate character of the transaction is create d by the parent or the child. What matters is that a n oblig ation, already imposed by state law, comes to wear a n interst ate face. Then, and only then, does the CSRA interven e and forbid frustration of the obligation's satisfaction.
-7- the CSRA constitutional under the first Lopez category as well. Finally, Congress' s power to regulate such activities is not precluded merely where, as here, the chil d

m o ved away while the parent-defendant remained in the same location at all relevant times. The constitutionality of the CSRA is based upon the relationship between the regulated activity and interstate commerce, irrespective of the fact that the parent

defendant's own performance, or nonperformance, has re mained locally confined. See, e.g. , Wickard , 317 U.S. at 125 ("even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatev er its nature, be reached by Congress if it e xerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce") (quoted in Lopez , 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S. Ct. at 1628). Accordingly, we hold that the district court did 7
not err in denying Crawford's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the CSRA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power.

Tenth Amendment and abstention doctrines

Crawford also contends that the CSRA runs afoul of the Tenth Amendment's declaration that "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, norYounger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 8
-8- prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X. Crawford defines this issue as "[w]hether the district cour t

err ed in failing to find that [the CSRA] violated the Tenth Amendment principles o f federalism and comity pursuant to the ' Younger absten tion doctrine' and the 'domestic [8]

re lations exception.'" Brief for Appellant at 23-24. In other words, he is urging thi s court eithe r to hold the CSRA unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment or t o abs tain from enforcing it based upon principles of federalism and comity because the CSRA interferes with the states' traditional sovereignty over matters involving domestic relations and enforcement of their criminal laws. We decline to do so.

The Tenth Amendment reserves for the states or the people those powers no t delegated to the United States by the Constitu tion. In New York v. United States , 505 U.S. 14 4, 156 (1992), the Supreme Court explained "[i]f a power is delegated t o Cong ress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims an y reservation of that power to the States. " As we have already held, Congress exercised

an e numerated power under the commerce clause when it enacted the CSRA

. Therefore, upon de novo review, we concl ude that the CSRA does not run afoul of the T e nth Amendment. Accord Johnson , 1997 WL 283447, at *3-5; Parker , 108 F.3d at 31; Bongiorno , 106 F.3d at 1033-34; Hamp shire , 95 F.3d at 1004; Mussari , 95 F.3d at 791; Sage , 92 F.3d at 107. Thus, we hold that the district court did not err in denying Crawford's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the CSRA violates the Tenth Amendment. To the extent Crawford suggests that the CSRA interferes with the states ' traditional sovereignty over dome stic relations and enforcement of their criminal laws, we agree with the government' s counter-argument that the CSRA in no way interferes wi thstate laws or judicial proceedings. The CSRA does not regulate domesti c relations but, rather, serves to assist the states in enforcing their judgments and orders.-9-

" The [CSRA] accepts the validity of the State court judgment and the family policies that judgment embodies. It seeks merely to implement those State policies when the parent and the child live in different States and the judgment has been wi llfully flouted." Sage , 92 F.3d at 107. Moreover, Crawford's reliance upon the "domestic relation s exception" is misplaced. In Ankenbrandt v. Richards , 504 U.S. 689, 701-04 (1992), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the "domestic relations exception" i n diversity cases, but specifically limited application of that exception to divorce an d alim ony decrees and child custody orders. That exception is irrelevant to federa l prosecutions under the CSRA because the district courts' jurisdiction in such cases does not rest upon diversity, but rather is based upon 18 U.S.C. § 3231 ("The district courts of the Unit ed States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of th e States, of a ll offenses against the laws of the United States."). Furthermore, th e policies underlying the domestic relations exception do not support abstention in CSRA prosecutions bec ause, as noted above, the CSRA is designed to enhance enforcement of st ate laws and decrees. "Respect for the competency of the states in matters o f domestic relations is not disparaged but manifested when the s tates are confronted with interstate impediments to the fulfil lment of domestic duties that the courts of the states have imposed, and the states f ind themselves, if not helpless, at least gravely impaired in pur suing the delinquent debts." Mussari , 95 F.3d at 791. Similarly, contrary t o Crawfo rd's argument based upon the Younger abstention doctrine, we discern n o interference with the states' abilities to apply and enforce their criminal laws. "[T]he CSRA does not displace any ap proach taken by the state in addressing the problem of delinquent parents but rather supplements such state initiatives by fortifying la w enforcement efforts and existing state penalties." Hampshire , 95 F.3d at 1004. In sum, the district court correctly rejected Crawford's argument that principles of federalism and comity compel abs tention. Accord Johnson , 1997 WL 283447, at *3-5 (rejecting substan tially the same arguments). We therefore hold that the district court appropriately declined to abstain.See United States v. Hamps hire , 95 F.3d 999, 1005 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied , 9 117 S. Ct. 753 (1997) (“[t]he defendant’s ex post facto challenge presents a question of law that we review de novo ”).
-10- Ex post facto clause

In the pres ent case, the Texas state court initially ordered Crawford to mak e mont hly child support payments in March 1988. Thereafter, Crawford made som e payments, but stopped in November 1988. The final divorce decree, confirming hi s monthly support obligation, was entered in the Texas state court in November 1990

. The CS RA became effective October 25, 1992. Crawford was indicted o n Februa ry 15, 1996, on one count of violating the CSRA from October 31, 1992 , through February 14, 1996. At sentencing, he was ordered to pay restitution covering the full amount of child support owed, including amounts that were due prior to th e effective date of the CSRA. In light of this history, Crawford advances two arguments to challeng e his conviction and sentence as violations of the ex post facto clause , U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. First, he argues that the CSRA may only be used t o enforce judicial decrees rendered after October 25, 1992, the effective date of th e CSRA, and therefore the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss th e indic tment

on that basis. Second, and alternatively, he contends that the restitutio n
or der imposed at sentencing violates the ex post facto clause insofar as it include s
amoun ts that came due prior to the effective date of the CSRA. We reject both arguments.
Upon de novo review, we hold that the ex po st facto clause does not invalidate 9 the government's prosecution of Crawford, even though the CSRA went into ef fect after Crawford was ordered by the Texas state court to pay child support. The CSR A imposes puni shment for the willful failure to pay a past due child support obligatio n with respect to a child residing in another state.We have examined the trial transcript and conclude, contrary to Crawford' s 10 assertion, that the government did not "basically stipulate[]" that the district court "[could ] not go behind the date of the statute, namely: October 25, 1992 . . . fo r purposes of order

ing restitution." Brief for Appellant at 34 (citing Trial Transcript, at 11, lines 13-19; 31-35).
-11-

The ex post facto prohibi tion forbids the Congress and the St ates to enact any law "which imposes a punishment for an ac t which was not punishable at the time it was committed; o r imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed." Through this prohibition, the Framers sought to assure that legislative Acts g i ve fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed.

Weaver v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (footnote and citations omitted). Clearly, the CSRA, on its face, does not violate the ex post facto clause insofar as it imposes punishment upon a person who, after October 25, 1992, willfull y fails to pay a past due child sup port obligation. In the present case, the government alleged, and the district court found bey ond a reasonable doubt, that Crawford willfully failed to pay past due child support obligations during the time frame charged in the indictment, which postdated the effective date of the statute. The CSRA gave Crawford fair warning of it s effect should he not pay past due child support obligations after its effective date, and yet he chose not to pay. Consequently, Cr awford's prosecution does not violate the ex post fact o clause because he was punished in accordance with the law as it existed at the tim e of his offense. See, e.g. , United States v. Allen , 886 F.2d 143, 146 (8th Cir. 1989) ("So long as the actual crime for which a defendant is being sentenced occurred after the effective date of the new statute, there is no ex post facto violation.").
We also reject Crawford's alter native challenge to the district court's restitution order, wh ich included in its calculations monthly obligations that accrued before th e effective date of the CSRA. Upon de nov o review, we agree with the Tenth Circuit's 10The definition of "past due support obligation" is separately defined in 18 U.S.C. 11 § 228(d)(1).
Crawford describes this issue as "whether the district court erred in finding that 12 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri was the prope r jurisdic tionand/or venue over the person of [Crawford]." Brief for Appellant at 34

. However, we confine our discussion to the issue of venue only, as Crawford has not
-12- conc lusionthat this argument is legally foreclosed because restitution is no t "punishment" within the meaning of the ex post facto clause. Hampshire , 95 F.3d at 1006 (restitution order under CSRA does not implicate the ex post fac to clause because it does not in flict punishment but rather seeks to compensate the child for the parent's failure to pay past due support ob ligations). In any event, the CSRA provides "[u]pon a conviction under this sectio n, the court shall order restitution . . . in an amount equal to the past due support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing ." 18 U.S.C

. § 228(c) (emphasis added). Therefore, e ven if we were to assume that the restitution 11 order is punishment within the meaning of the ex post facto clause, Crawford is no t being punis hed for acts that were innocent at the time they were committed, a s discussed above, nor is the punishment greater than that which was authorized at the time th e offense occurred. The CSRA gives fair warning that the district court shal l order restit ution in the full amount due at the time of sentencing. No ex post fact o violati on has occurred. Accord Hampshire , 95 F.3d at 1006 ("even if we conside r restitution to be punishment, there is no ex post facto problem"). In sum, upo n consideration of Crawford's ex post facto argum ents, we hold that the district court did not err in denying Crawford's motion to dismiss the indictment or in orderin g him to pay full restitution.

Venue

Crawford a lso argues that the district court erred in failing to dismiss th e indictment on grounds of improper venue. No federal court of appeals has addressed 12ra ised an issue of jurisdiction. The statute to which Crawford refers in his brief, 1 8

U.S.C. § 3237, is a venuestatute. Moreover, to the extent that his arguments are also based upon the Constitution and Fed. R. Crim. P. 18, h e is asserting a venue challenge, not a jurisdictional challenge. See, e.g. , United States v. Meade , 110 F.3d 190, 20 0 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The C onstitution and Rule 18 protect a criminal defendant's venue -- not jurisdi ctional -- rights. . . . [T]he constitutional and statutory venue provisions are not restrictions on the court's jurisdiction.").
The facts in Murphy v. United States , 934 F. Supp. 736, 737-38 (W.D. Va. 1996), 13
were as fol lows. The defendant and his wife had married in Oklahoma. They live d toget her in Oklahoma where they had a daughter and then subsequently divorced. In the final divorce decree issued by an Oklahoma state court, the defendant was ordered t o make child support payments to the Oklahoma state court. Following the divorce, the de fendant's former wife and child moved to Virginia, and the defendant moved to Texas and, later, to Florida. After the defendant's first move to Texa s, the child support order was transferred from Oklahoma to Texas pursuant to those states' reciprocit y pro visions. Accordingly, the defendant was thereafter under orders to make chil d support pay ments to the Texas Attorney General. After he moved from Texas t o F l orida, he was indicted in Virginia, where his former wife and child were living. At that time, he w as still required to make payments to the Texas Attorney General even though he was living in Florida. The defendant was tried and found guilty by a United States magistrate judg e in the Western District of Virginia, whereupon he appealed to the district court in the Western District of Virginia.
Uni ted States v. Murphy , 893 F. Supp. 614 (W.D. Va. 1995), vacated , 93 4 14 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Va. 1996).
-13- the issue of wh ether, in a CSRA case, venue is proper in a district with which th e defendant has no connection other than the fact that the child, w ith respect to whom the defendant owes support, resides there. The only reported case directly addressing such

a venue chal lenge is Murphy v. United States , 934 F. Supp. 736 (W.D. Va. 1996 ) ( Murphy ). In Murphy , the District Court for the Western District of Virgini a

13 revi ewed a judgment of conviction under the CSRA which had been entered by a mag istrate judge, and vacated the judgment on grounds of improper venue. Th e 14 district court in Murphy

reasoned "[t]he operative verb phrase in the statute is 'willfullyFollowing the district court's dismissal in Murphy v. United States , 934 F. Supp. 15 736 (W.D. Va. 1996), the government did not appeal to the Fourth Circuit. Since then, the Fourth Circuit has decided United States v. Johnson , No. 96-4323, 1997 W L 283447 (4th Cir. May 30, 1997) ( Johnso n ), affirming a conviction under the CSRA on grounds that the CSRA does not violate the commerce clause or the Tent h Amendment; however, venue was not at issue in Johnson

. -14- fails to pay,'" and therefore the proper place for venue is where the defendant i s requiredto make his or her payments, not the victim's location. 934 F. Supp. at 739. The district court in Murphy also opined "the legislative history [of th e CSRA] suggests that the statute

was aimed at parents who moved out of state to avoid making support pa yments." Id. at 740. Thus, the district court concluded, "[t]o affix venue in an y jurisdiction where the child happens to be present when support paym ents are not made would contravene the historic policy considerations of the statutory and constitutional venue provisions. Venue cannot be that unpredictable." Id. 15

By contrast, in the present case, t he magistrate judge concluded that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Missouri because the children, the victims of th e offense, reside in that district. The mag istrate judge noted that, under federal statutory law, "'[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, any offense against the United States begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in whic h such offense was begun, continued or completed.'" United States v. Crawford , slip op. at 13 (Apr. 26, 1996) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3237 ). The magistrate judge also noted, as

a general rule, that courts are to determine the "locus delicti" from the nature of th e crime alleged and the locati on of the acts constituting it. Id. (quoting Travis v. United States , 364 U.S. 631, 635 (1961) ( Travis )). The magist rate judge then reasoned: "[t]he venue requirement is as to the location of the offense and not the 'personal presence' of the defend ant. . . . [V]enue in the instant case is proper in the Eastern District o f Missouri." Id. at 14 (citation omitted).-15-

Crawford argues on appeal that his venue rights have been violated because he has not begun, continued, or completed any offense in the Eastern District of Missouri,

as al l of his relevant acts (or omissions, as the case may be) occurred in Texas o r Louisiana

. He highlights the undisputed facts that: at all relevant times, he had n o conta cts with the state of Missouri; the court order setting forth his child suppor t obligation was entered b y the state court in Texas; and he was specifically ordered by the Texas state court to make monthly child support payments "through the Dalla s Count y Child Support Office" in Dallas, Texas. He argues that Travis i s distinguishable from the present case because the Supreme Court held in Travis that, insofar as the defendant, a union officer, was being prose cuted for filing false affidavits wi ththe National Labor Relations Board, venue was proper only in the District o f Columbia; however, the affidavits were required by law to be on file in the District of Columbia. 364 U.S. at 635-37. By contras t, in the present case, Crawford argues, the Texas state court had ordered him to make his payments in Texa s. Thus, he concludes,

venue is impr oper in the Eastern District of Missouri, and the district court erred i n denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on that basis.
In response, the government obs erves "[v]enue for a crime is not limited to one district , and may be found even where the defendant is not present. . . . [V]enu e properly lies in any district that satisfies either the 'active verb' test or the 'nature and

e f fects' test." Brief for Appellee at 28 (citations omitted). Acknowledging Murphy 's contrary outc ome, the government maintains that Murphy was wrongly decided. The governmen t

argues that the analysis in Murphy is flawed because the district cour t failed to take into account the continuing nature of a CSRA offense. The government argu es that the CSRA's language as a whole, including the words "with respect to a child who resides in another state," contemplates not onl y the defendant's failure to pay at a particular loc ation, but also the unfulfilled promise or expectation experienced by the child wit h respect to whom the payment was to be made. On this basis, th e government contends that the magistrate judge correctly concluded that the unfulfilled-16-

expectat ionwhich Crawford's children experienced in Missouri was part of a continuing offense within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). We agree.

A c riminal defendant's venue rights are protected by Article III, § 2, and th e Sixth Amendment, of the Consti tution. Both of these constitutional provisions require th ata defendant's trial take place where "the crime shall have been committed. " Simil arly, Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states "[e]xcept a s oth erwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the prosecution shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed." However, as to the determination o f where a crime was committed for venue purposes, the United States Code provides:

Exce pt as otherwise expressly provided by enactment o f Congres s, any offense against the United States begun in on e district and co mpleted in another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in an y district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.

18 U.S.C. § 3237(a).

T he issue of whether Crawford’s constitutional and statutory rights have been violated as a result o f venue being based upon the place of his children’s residence is

a question of law which we review de novo . Upon de novo review, we hold tha t C r awford's venue rights have not been violated. We disagree with the reasoning and

co nclusionin Murphy because, in our opinion, the CSRA describes a continuin g offense which may be prosecuted where the parent-defendant resides, where the parentdefendant i s required to make payments, or where the child-victim resides. Applying the "active verb" or "key verb" test, we fir st note that the key verb phrase in 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) is "fails to pay" and, to the extent that a failure to do something can occur in

a p articular place, it need not necessarily occur in only one place. Accord Unite d States v. Angotti , 105 F.3d 539, 543 (9th Cir. 1997) ( Angotti ) ("[w]e reject [the-17-

defendant's] argument, for it erroneously assumes that a key verb can describe conduct occurring in only one venue").
Althoug h the Ninth Circuit's decision in Angotti did not concern a prosecution under the CSRA, its reasoning on the venue issue is highly instructive in the presen t

case. In An gotti , the defendant had been prosecuted and convicted in the Centra l District of California on six counts, inclu ding two counts of making false statements to

a f ederally-insured financial institution in an application for a $480,000 bank loan , which he used to purchase a condominium unit in Northern California. Id. at 541. The defendant had submitted the original loan application to an innocent middle agent, a mortgage company located in the Northern District of Califo rnia, which in turn restated the fals e information (not knowing it to be false) to a savings and loan association' s local branch office also located in the Northern District of California. Id. However, after the local branch office conditionally approved the application, it sent th e application to its company headquarters, located in the Central District of California, for a final decision. Id. The defendant in Angotti challenged venue on th e
co rresponding false statement counts (among others). As in the present case, th e substantive criminal statute "d[id] not indicate a method for determining the locatio n of th e crime for the purpose of establishing venue." Id. at 542. The Ninth Circui t

reason ed that the false statement counts were properly prosecuted in the Centra l District of California because the defenda nt's false statements, as originally set forth in the loan application, each constituted a continuing offense that could be prosecute d where the crime was begun, continued, or completed. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)). The Ninth Circuit noted that the defendant's false statements were "made for th e purpose of influencing the bank official who had the power to approve his loan." Id. at 5 43. "His act of 'making' the false statements continued until the statements wer e received by the person whom they were ultimately intended to influence." Id. It i s "irrelevant," the Ninth Circuit commented, that the defendant subjec tively may not have known the identity or location of the person whom the defendant ultimately intended to influence. Id. The Ninth Circuit further explained:-18- There is no question that a c rime was committed once [the defenda nt's] statements reached the bank office in the Norther n Dist rict; the statement did not have to reach their intende d destination in

order to constitute a crime. But the documents did reach the Central District. . . . [E]ven though a crime may hav e bee n completed earlier, "it does not follow that the crime the n terminated, and that what transpired [in the district where officials acted upon the false statement] was irrelevant for venu e purposes."

Id. (citatio ns omitted). In response to the dissent's observation that "a result of thi s analysis is that venue will often be possible in districts with which the defendant had

no personal connection, and which may occasionally be distant from where th e defendant originated th e actions constituting the offense," the majority opined that the appropriate remedy is not to restrict venue but, rather, to permit easy transfer. Id. at 543-44.

Simila rly, Crawford's crime under the CSRA of failing to pay past due chil d support obligations constituted a continuing of fense which could have been prosecuted where the crime was begun, continued, or completed. For obvious reasons, it i s difficult to conceptualize or to describe the place where a crime was begun, continued, or completed when

the crime itself was an omission or failure to act. Nevertheless, if the crime of failing to pay child support obligations occurs anywhere, it is fair to say tha t it occurs where there is an absence of the required payment. Thus, the crim e occurs not only at the place where the pa yment was to be deposited, but also the place where it was ultimately to be received by the would-be inte nded recipient. Thus, in the present case, even though Crawford has had no personal contacts with the Easter n Distr ict of Missouri, venue was proper in that district because that is the place o f residen ce of the children and custodial parent to whom he owes support -- the plac e where the money would have been received by the intended recipients.As a separat e matter, insofar as Crawford may have been inconvenienced by this 16 choice of venue, his remedy was to seek a transfer, which he specifically chose not to do when he voluntarily dismissed his motion for a transfer to the Western District of Louisiana.
-19- Moreover, t o the extent that the "nature and effects" test may be mor e appropriate for evaluating venue issues under the CSRA, our holding today comports with th at standard as well. See Angotti , 105 F.3d at 544 (key verb test is not th e exclusive test for determining venue) (citin g cases). The CSRA expressly criminalizes the willfu l failure to make support payments "with respect to a child who resides i n another State." 18 U.S.C. § 228(a). Because the CSRA, by definition, presuppose s that the de fendant and the child reside in different states, the residence of the chil d clearly co ntributes to the nature of the crime. Moreover, the place where the chil d resides is the place where there is the greatest effect on the victim of the crime, and it is one of the places where interstate commerce is affected. Cf. United States v

. Brimbe rry , 779 F.2d 1339, 1343 (8th Cir. 1985) (venue for bankruptcy frau d prosecuti on is proper in district where the bankruptcy proceeding was held and th e fraud had its impact, even

though the defendant's fraudulent acts occurred elsewhere). Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in denying Crawford's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that venue was improper in the Eastern District of Missouri. 16

Sufficiency of the evidence
Finally, Crawford appeals his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insuff icient to support the inference that he acted willfully in failing to make his child suppor t payments. Under our well-established standard for reviewing claims o f insufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences; we ma y overturn the verdict only if the evidence is such that a reasonable-minded factfinder-20-

must have entertained reasonable doubt as to the government's proof of an essentia l element of the offense. United States v. Johnson , 18 F.3d 641, 645-46 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding a conviction upon a trial by the court). In the present case, the evidenc e showed that Crawford knew he had children and knew he was required to mak e support payments on their behalf pursuant to the T exas state court's orders. Moreover, the government demonstrated at trial that Crawford earned over $230,000 during the relevant time period. There was ample evidence to support the inf erence that Crawford voluntarily and intentionally violated a kn own legal duty to pay past due child support. The evi dence was therefore legally sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact t o conclude beyond a reasonabl e doubt that the government had proved willfulness. See Cheek v. United States , 498 U.S. 192, 200 (1991) (standard for statutory willfulness is voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty). Accordingly, we rejec t Crawford's sufficiency of the evidence argument.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.