An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-984

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 15 April 2014

MOLLY DREW DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Davidson County

No. 10 CVD 3929

MICHAEL R. DAVIS,

Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgment and order entered 5 

February 2013 by Judge Mary F. Covington in Davidson County 

District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8 January 2014.

Molly Brown Davis, pro se, plaintiff-appellee.

The Law Offices of Lee M. Cecil, by Lee M. Cecil for 

defendant-appellant.

DAVIS, Judge.

Michael R. Davis (“Defendant”) appeals from the trial 

court’s equitable distribution judgment and alimony order. On 

appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred (1) in its 

valuation and distribution of 500 shares of stock in a closelyheld corporation; and (2) by failing to make adequate findings 
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of fact to support the amount and duration of the alimony 

awarded. After careful review, we vacate and remand.

Factual Background

Molly Drew Davis (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant were married 

on 14 October 1989, separated on 15 September 2009, and divorced 

on 11 February 2011. Two children were born during the parties’ 

marriage, one of whom is still a minor. On 8 November 2010, 

Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking absolute divorce, child 

custody and support, post-separation support, permanent alimony, 

equitable distribution, and attorneys’ fees. Defendant filed an 

answer and counterclaims for child custody and support, 

equitable distribution, and absolute divorce.

The trial court heard the parties’ claims for equitable 

distribution and Plaintiff’s claim for alimony on 11 October 

2012. The trial court entered its judgment and order on 5 

February 2013 that provided for (1) an equal division of the 

marital property; and (2) monthly alimony payments of $1,000.00

from Defendant to Plaintiff until 1 January 2032. Defendant 

gave timely notice of appeal to this Court.

Analysis

I. Equitable Distribution

We review a trial court’s order of equitable distribution 
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under an abuse of discretion standard. Wieneck-Adams v. Adams, 

331 N.C. 688, 691, 417 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1992). “Only a finding 

that the judgment was unsupported by reason and could not have 

been a result of competent inquiry or a finding that the trial 

judge failed to comply with the statute will establish an abuse 

of discretion.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

In his first argument on appeal, Defendant asserts that the 

trial court erred in its valuation and subsequent distribution 

of 500 shares of stock in American Auto Supply, Inc., a closelyheld corporation founded by Defendant’s grandfather. Defendant 

contends that the trial court’s valuation of the shares is not 

supported by competent evidence. Defendant further asserts that 

because there was insufficient evidence offered at trial 

concerning the valuation of the 500 shares of American Auto 

Supply, Inc., the shares should be removed and excluded from the 

distribution scheme.

“In valuing a marital interest in a business, the task of 

the trial court is to arrive at a date of separation value which 

reasonably approximates the net value of the business interest.” 

Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 161 N.C. App. 414, 419, 588 S.E.2d 

517, 521 (2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In 

Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C. App. 414, 331 S.E.2d 266, disc. review 
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denied, 314 N.C. 543, 335 S.E.2d 316 (1985), this Court 

explained that

[i]n ordering a distribution of marital 

property, a court should make specific 

findings regarding the value of a spouse’s 

professional practice and the existence and 

value of its goodwill, and should clearly 

indicate the evidence on which its 

valuations are based, preferably noting the 

valuation method or methods on which it 

relied. On appeal, if it appears that the 

trial court reasonably approximated the net 

value of the practice and its goodwill, if 

any, based on competent evidence and on a 

sound valuation method or methods, the 

valuation will not be disturbed.

Id. at 422, 331 S.E.2d at 272.

Our Supreme Court has made clear that the standard 

articulated in Poore — requiring specific findings concerning 

the trial court’s valuation of a business and the methods it 

used to arrive at that valuation — is also applicable to the 

valuation of a marital interest in a closely-held corporation. 

See Patton v. Patton, 318 N.C. 404, 406, 348 S.E.2d 593, 595 

(1986) (“[T]he requirement of specific findings is no less 

applicable in an equitable distribution order involving a 

spouse’s interest in a closely-held corporation.”).

Here, the only finding made by the trial court regarding 

the valuation of the American Auto Supply, Inc. shares is 

contained in finding of fact 8 and states:
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The Court finds that the shares of stock are 

marital, having been purchased with funds 

during the course of the marriage; however, 

the Court finds that $20,000.00 is the value 

of the 500 shares based on the fact that the 

parties separated two years prior to the 

date of the final accounting along with the 

state of the market at the time of the 

separation.

This finding merely references (1) “the state of the market 

at the time”; and (2) a final accounting of Defendant’s mother’s 

estate that took place two years after the date of the parties’ 

separation and valued 233 shares of American Auto Supply, Inc. 

at $16,500.00. In light of the lack of clarity and specificity 

of this finding, we believe that the judgment fails to “state 

specifically how the court arrived at its valuation.” Offerman 

v. Offerman, 137 N.C. App. 289, 296, 527 S.E.2d 684, 688 (2000); 

see Locklear v. Locklear, 92 N.C. App. 299, 302, 374 S.E.2d 406, 

407-08 (1988) (“A mere recitation of the factors the trial court 

considered in its valuation of the corporation is not 

sufficient; the trial court must also indicate the value it 

attaches to each of the enumerated factors.”), disc. review

allowed, 324 N.C. 336, 378 S.E.2d 794 (1989).

However, while the trial court’s findings are insufficient, 

we must determine whether the parties offered sufficient 

evidence at trial that would have allowed the trial court to 
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make appropriate findings on the issue containing the requisite

level of specificity. It is well established that the trial 

court’s “obligation to make specific findings regarding the 

value of any property classified as marital, including any 

business owned by one of the parties . . . . exists only when 

there is credible evidence supporting the value of the asset.” 

Grasty v. Grasty, 125 N.C. App. 736, 738-39, 482 S.E.2d 752, 754 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted), disc. review 

denied, 346 N.C. 278, 487 S.E.2d 545 (1997); see Miller v. 

Miller, 97 N.C. App. 77, 80, 387 S.E.2d 181, 184 (1990) (“The 

requirements that the trial court (1) classify and value all 

property of the parties, both separate and marital, (2) consider 

the separate property in making a distribution of the marital 

property, and (3) distribute the marital property, necessarily 

exist only when evidence is presented to the trial court which 

supports the claimed classification, valuation and 

distribution.”).

In the present case, neither party offered any evidence of 

the value of the 500 shares of stock at the date of separation. 

Indeed, at the equitable distribution hearing, the trial court 

expressed its frustration at the absence of evidence upon which 

to value the shares, asking the parties’ attorneys: “So we don’t 
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have the value of that stock as of the date of separation?” and 

“We’re supposed to pull that number out of my robe, is that what 

I’m being told?”

Because the parties failed to offer evidence at the 

equitable distribution hearing regarding the value of the 500 

shares of American Auto Supply, Inc. stock as of the date of 

separation, we remand to the trial court for the entry of a new 

equitable distribution judgment removing the shares from the 

distribution scheme. The parties had “ample opportunity to 

present evidence [of the shares’ value] and have failed to do 

so.” Miller, 97 N.C. App. at 80, 387 S.E.2d at 184. Thus, 

“remanding the matter for the taking of new evidence, in essence 

granting . . . a second opportunity to present evidence, would 

only protract the litigation and clog the trial courts with 

issues which should have been disposed of at the initial 

hearing.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

II. Alimony

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by 

awarding Plaintiff a monthly alimony award of $1,000.00 until 1 

January 2032 without making sufficient findings of fact 

regarding the amount and duration of the award. We agree.
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.3A provides, in pertinent part, 

that the trial court “shall set forth the reasons for its award 

or denial of alimony, and if making an award, the reasons for 

its amount, duration, and manner of payment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

50-16.3A(c) (2013). In making an alimony award, the trial court 

is to consider all relevant factors, including:

(1) The marital misconduct of either of the 

spouses. Nothing herein shall prevent a 

court from considering incidents of post 

date-of-separation marital misconduct as 

corroborating evidence supporting other 

evidence that marital misconduct occurred 

during the marriage and prior to [the] date 

of separation;

(2) The relative earnings and earning 

capacities of the spouses;

(3) The ages and the physical, mental, and 

emotional conditions of the spouses;

(4) The amount and sources of earned and 

unearned income of both spouses, including, 

but not limited to, earnings, dividends, and 

benefits such as medical, retirement, 

insurance, social security, or others;

(5) The duration of the marriage;

(6) The contribution by one spouse to the 

education, training, or increased earning 

power of the other spouse;

(7) The extent to which the earning power, 

expenses, or financial obligations of a 

spouse will be affected by reason of serving 

as the custodian of a minor child;
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(8) The standard of living of the spouses 

established during the marriage;

(9) The relative education of the spouses 

and the time necessary to acquire sufficient 

education or training to enable the spouse 

seeking alimony to find employment to meet 

his or her reasonable economic needs;

(10) The relative assets and liabilities of 

the spouses and the relative debt service 

requirements of the spouses, including legal 

obligations of support;

(11) The property brought to the marriage by 

either spouse;

(12) The contribution of a spouse as 

homemaker;

(13) The relative needs of the spouses;

(14) The federal, State, and local tax 

ramifications of the alimony award;

(15) Any other factor relating to the 

economic circumstances of the parties that 

the court finds to be just and proper.

(16) The fact that income received by either 

party was previously considered by the court 

in determining the value of a marital or 

divisible asset in an equitable distribution 

of the parties' marital or divisible 

property.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.3A(b).

Here, although the trial court made findings regarding 

several of the above-quoted factors in its order, it failed to 

articulate how these findings might support a monthly award in 
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the amount of $1,000.00 until 1 January 2032. Indeed, the trial 

court’s findings of fact regarding the amount and duration of 

the alimony award state in full:

35. The Defendant testified that he received 

a substantial inheritance from both his 

mother and father’s estates. The Defendant 

will have substantial resources from which, 

not only to pay his monthly living expenses, 

but also a monthly alimony award to the 

Plaintiff.

36. Other than the limited income as set 

forth above, the Plaintiff has no other 

source of income or support and is 

substantially in need of support from the 

Defendant and as such is the dependent 

spouse of the Defendant.

37. Due to the Defendant’s income, the 

Plaintiff’s limited income and the expenses 

of the parties, the Defendant is the 

supporting spouse of the Plaintiff as 

defined in N.C.G.S. § 50-16.3[A].

38. Considering the respective estates, 

earnings, conditions and accustomed standard 

of living of the parties and the ability of

the Defendant to pay monthly alimony, 

$1,000.00 represents a reasonable sum of 

monthly alimony.

39. Said payments shall begin January 1, 

2013. The Court finds that this Order is 

made retroactive from the date of the end of 

Plaintiff’s post separation support which 

was in April, 2012. The Court orders that 

the Defendant shall pay an additional 

$500.00 per month until those have been 

paid. The Defendant’s accumulated arrearage 

is $8,000.00 (namely from May, 2012 through 

December, 2012).
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40. The alimony payments in the amount of 

$1,000.00 will terminate on January 1, 2032. 

The Defendant may elect to pay the Plaintiff 

the sum of $400,000.00 (Four Hundred 

Thousand and No/100 Dollars) in lieu of his 

monthly alimony obligation.

In the decretal portion of the order, the trial court 

further noted that, in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-

16.9, alimony will terminate at the occurrence of (1) 

Plaintiff’s remarriage; (2) Plaintiff’s death; (3) Defendant’s 

death; or (4) Plaintiff’s cohabitation as defined by N.C. Gen. 

Stat. § 50-16.9(b) – assuming if any of these events occur 

before 1 January 2032.

We do not believe that these findings sufficiently 

articulate the trial court’s “reasons for its amount, duration, 

and manner of payment” as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-

16.3A(c). In Hartsell v. Hartsell, 189 N.C. App. 65, 76, 657 

S.E.2d 724, 731 (2008), we determined that the findings 

regarding the amount of the alimony award were inadequate where 

“the trial court made only a finding that [the] plaintiff had 

the ability to pay that amount, but provided no explanation as 

to why it had concluded that [the] defendant was entitled to 

that specific amount.”

The same is true here. Though the trial court references 
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the “respective estates, earnings, conditions and accustomed 

standard of living of the parties” in its finding determining 

that $1,000.00 is “a reasonable sum of monthly alimony,” this 

cursory discussion does not provide proper insight into the 

trial court’s reasoning. See Lucas v. Lucas, 209 N.C. App. 492, 

501, 706 S.E.2d 270, 276 (2011) (concluding that trial court’s 

findings regarding alimony were “too meager to enable the 

reviewing court to determine whether the trial judge exercised 

proper discretion in deciding what defendant was to pay 

plaintiff” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Likewise, 

when the trial court concluded that Defendant could make a onetime payment of $400,000.00 to Plaintiff in lieu of the monthly 

alimony payments, it provided no rationale as to why this

particular amount and this alternative manner of payment would 

be appropriate.

Additionally, the trial court failed to set forth the 

reason for its determination that Plaintiff was entitled to 

receive alimony from Defendant until 1 January 2032. “[T]his 

Court has repeatedly held that an alimony order is inadequate 

when it contains no findings explaining the reason for the 

duration chosen . . . .” Id. at 502, 706 S.E.2d at 277. 

Therefore, we must remand this matter to the trial court so that 
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it may make specific findings of fact explaining its reasoning 

regarding the amount and duration of the alimony award. See 

Works v. Works, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 719 S.E.2d 218, 220 

(2011) (remanding “with instructions that [the trial court] make 

specific findings with respect to its reasons for the specified 

duration of its alimony award”); Hartsell, 189 N.C. App. at 76-

77, 657 S.E.2d at 731 (remanding “for further findings of fact 

regarding the basis for the amount and duration of the alimony 

award”).

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, we vacate the trial court’s 

equitable distribution judgment and alimony order and remand the 

case for further proceedings as set out herein.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

Judges STEELMAN and STEPHENS concur. 

Report per Rule 30(e).