SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0628-17T2

ROBERT J. TRIFFIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND

GAS COMPANY, (d/b/a) PSE&G,

Defendant-Respondent,

and

TIENNA MOORE, STEPHANIE JUSTE and

NADIYAH KNOLTON,

Defendants.

_____________________________________

Argued October 2, 2018 – Decided October 15, 2018

Before Judges Fisher and Firko.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Docket No. DC-010038-14.

Robert J. Triffin, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-0628-17T2

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff appeals from the trial court order denying costs and postjudgment interest. We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the oral 

opinion rendered by Judge Deborah M. Gross-Quatrone.

The parties are familiar with the procedural history and facts of this 

case, and, therefore, they will not be repeated in detail here.1

Plaintiff sought "appellate costs" in the sum of $1,024.33. In her 

decision, the judge found that:

Plaintiff did not - - contrary to [p]laintiff's assertion - -

derive any benefit from the appeal. Plaintiff's benefit, 

if any, came by way of the trial court's decision. He's 

woefully defeated in the Appellate Division. To 

follow [p]laintiff's arguments to a logical conclusion, 

every plaintiff who had recovered something at the 

trial level - - and here inclusive of the defendants in 

this case . . . would be a prevailing party and would be 

permitted then to bring an appeal virtually free of cost, 

even if they ultimately lose the appeal.

The judge concluded that plaintiff was not the "prevailing party on 

appeal."

In his brief on appeal, plaintiff argues:

 

1 The chronology is set forth in this court's unpublished opinion entered on 

October 5, 2016 in which we remanded and directed the trial court to make a 

determination of court costs. We incorporate, by reference, the facts stated in 

our prior opinion to the extent they are consistent with those developed on 

remand.
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POINT ONE

MOTION JUDGE GROSS-QUATRONE 

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN SHE 

MISAPPREHENDED THE NEW JERSEY 

STANDARDS FOR A PARTY TO RECOVER 

HIS/HER COURT COSTS UNDER COURT RULE

4:42-8.

POINT TWO

MOTION JUDGE GROSS-QUATRONE 

PREJUDICIALLY ABUSED HER DISCRETION 

AND COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN 

SHE DENIED TRIFFIN'S REQUEST UNDER RULE

4:42-11 TO RECOVER STATUTORY POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST AND APPELLATE 

EXPENSES.

We review costs and interest determinations for an abuse of discretion 

and same will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions. See, e.g., Rendine 

v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995). "Unless otherwise provided by law . . . 

costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party." TWC Realty 

P'ship v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Edison, 321 N.J. Super. 216, 

217 (App. Div. 1999) (citing R. 4:42:8(a)); see also Gallo v. Salesian Soc'y 

Inc., 290 N.J. Super. 616, 659-60 (App. Div. 1996); Regino v. Aetna Cas. & 

Sur. Co., 200 N.J. Super. 94, 100 (App. Div. 1985). A "high threshold" is 

imposed "for exercise of the court's limited discretion respecting cost . . . ." 

TWC Realty P'ship., 321 N.J. Super. at 217.
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Rule 4:42-8(a) provides as follows: "Unless otherwise provided by law,

these rules or court order, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 

party." Plaintiff argues that the judge's interpretation of Rule 4:42-8(a) is not 

entitled to any deference when reviewed by this court. We reject plaintiff's 

argument because a trial court's ruling on discretionary matters will not be 

reversed on appeal absent a "clear error in judgment." In re Estate of Hope, 

390 N.J. Super. 533, 541 (App. Div. 2007).

Our New Jersey Supreme Court has also adopted a definition of 

"prevailing party" status, holding:

Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly 

benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement 

. . . [A] plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief on the 

merits of his [or her] claim materially alters the legal 

relationship between the parties by modifying the 

defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the 

plaintiff.

Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70, 86 (2004) (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 

111-12 (1992)); see also Warrington v. Village Supermarket, Inc., 328 N.J. 

Super. 410, 421 (App. Div. 2000) (applying the Third Circuit's "prevailing 

party" standard, which focuses on whether a "plaintiff succeeds in 'moving the 

defendant to do more than it was already committed to do . . . .'" (citing Ashley 

v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 794 F.2d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 1986))).
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There is ample support in the record for the judge's determination that 

plaintiff is not a prevailing party as defined by Rule 4:42-8(a). 

Plaintiff's remaining argument, including his claim for post-judgment 

interest, is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A) and (E).

Affirmed.