*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

DEC 2 2004

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 03-2091

VICTOR LINDSEY,

Defendant-Appellant.

 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

(D.C. No. CR-01-588-JC)

 

Submitted on the Briefs:*

David C. Iglesias, United States Attorney, and Terri J. Abernathy, Assistant United States

Attorney, Las Cruces, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Victor Lindsey, Terre Haute, Indiana, Pro Se.

 

Before EBEL, BALDOCK, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.

 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

 
1

 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j), Defendant has filed a “Citation of

Supplemental Authorities” belatedly challenging his criminal sentence in light of

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Specifically, Defendant asserts the

district court’s two point obstruction enhancement to his base offense level under

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. We have

previously expressed doubt as to whether a defendant could raise a Blakely claim in a

Rule 28(j) letter. See United States v. Maldonado-Ramires, 384 F.3d 1228, 1230 n.1

(10th Cir. 2004) (“It must be noted, however, that even if this court were to construe

[defendant’s] Rule 28(j) letter as raising a Blakely claim, that claim would fail. Because

[defendant] did not assert before the district court that his sentence must be based only on

those facts set out in the indictment and/or his plea agreement, this court reviews only for

plain error.”). We have also previously refused to consider an issue asserted for the first

time in a Rule 28(j) letter. See United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1138 n.6 (10th

Cir. 2003). Defendant filed neither a Motion for Post-Submission Consideration nor did

he seek permission to file a brief properly raising the Blakely issue. See United States v.

Badilla, 383 F.3d 1137, 1143 n.2 (10th Cir. 2004) (reviewing Blakely claim raised in

Motion for Post-Submission Consideration for plain error); Maldonado-Ramires, 384

F.3d at 1230 n.1 (“[B]ecause [defendant] did not ask to file a brief raising a proper

Blakely challenge, we do not consider the matter further.”). Accordingly, we decline to

consider it here.

2

A jury convicted Defendant Victor Lindsey of various drug and firearm

offenses including carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime,

and conspiracy to commit the same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (o);

and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The

district court sentenced Defendant to 180 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals. On

appeal, Defendant raises three issues.1

 First, Defendant asserts the district court violated

his right to be free from double jeopardy when the court empaneled a second jury after

dismissing the original jury. Second, Defendant asserts he is not a “convicted felon” as

required to sustain his § 922(g)(1) conviction. Third, Defendant asserts the evidence at
2

 The jury also convicted Defendant of the following drug offenses: 

(1) possession with intent to distribute less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D); (2) conspiracy to commit the same, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 846; (3) possession with intent to distribute more than 5 grams of a

substance containing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B); and

(4) possession with intent to distribute less than 500 grams of a substance containing

cocaine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Aside from his double jeopardy

argument, Defendant does not challenge these convictions on appeal.

3

 Appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief suggesting Defendant’s

appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In response,

Defendant filed a motion to waive appellate counsel and proceed pro se. We allowed

Defendant’s motion and counsel withdrew. In the Anders brief, appellate counsel

included an ineffective assistance of trial counsel argument out of an abundance

of caution in order to preserve the issue for collateral review. As we explained in

United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc): “[Ineffective

assistance of counsel] claims brought on direct appeal are presumptively dismissible,

and virtually all will be dismissed. The reasons for this rule are self-evident. . . . A

factual record must be developed in and addressed by the district court in the first

instance for effective review.” (internal citations and footnote omitted). Here,

Defendant’s appellate counsel has not even pointed to specific errors that trial counsel

made, so no way exists for us to review the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

3

trial failed to establish he “carried” a firearm as required under § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (o).2

We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm. We recite the relevant

facts and governing law only as necessary to our discussion of the issues raised.3

I.

We first address Defendant’s challenge to his convictions under the Fifth

Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. U.S. Const. amend. V. The facts relevant

to this issue are that on May 6, 2002, the district court selected a jury for Defendant’s

trial, set to begin on May 20. The court, however, never swore the jury. Rather, the
4

court indicated it would do so on the morning of trial. In the meantime, defense counsel

filed a notice of conflict of interest based on his prior interaction with a government

witness. Following a hearing, the court found counsel had a conflict of interest and

could not provide Defendant “effective assistance of counsel.” The court ordered

new counsel appointed, discharged the jury, and vacated the trial setting. At a pretrial

conference on August 8, 2002, Defendant’s new counsel asked the court to try the case

before the jury selected on May 6. The court denied counsel’s request. On August 19,

a second jury was selected, empaneled and sworn. Trial commenced the same day.

In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches at the earliest when the jury is empaneled and

sworn. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978); United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031,

1038 (10th Cir. 1991). In the district court, Defendant acknowledged the court had not

sworn the jury selected on May 6, but urged the court to make exception to the general

rule: “The danger is that the government can select the prospective jury, go back to the

office and decide that, in retrospect, one or more jurors caused it to have ‘fear that the

jury was likely to acquit the accused.’” Because the court, not the prosecution, decides

when the jury is sworn, Defendant’s concern is more theoretical than real.

Normally, jury selection directly precedes trial. Once the jury is selected, the

district court promptly swears the jury, jeopardy attaches, and trial begins. Circumstances

in this case, however, justified the court’s delay in swearing the jury. Defendant’s trial

occurred in Las Cruces, New Mexico. At the time of the proceedings, Las Cruces had
4

 Because the court did not swear the initial jury, we need not address the question

of whether “manifest necessity” resulting from prior defense counsel’s conflict of interest

required the selection of a second jury. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497,

505 (1978); United States v. Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1275 (10th Cir. 1998).

5

no resident district judge and a bulging criminal docket. Federal judges from the District

of New Mexico traveled to Las Cruces on a rotating basis. Still other Federal Judges

traveled from outside the district to assist. One judge might select a jury, a second might

try the case, and a third might impose sentence. See United States v. Torres-Palma, 290

F.3d 1244, 1245 (10th Cir. 2002). In the interest of efficiency, the presiding judge

on May 6 selected juries for three upcoming criminal trials, including Defendant’s,

but swore none of the juries. Under these circumstances, the district court’s failure

to promptly swear the jury selected on May 6 for Defendant’s May 20 trial is

understandable. Because the jury was not sworn, jeopardy did not attach.

Defendant’s first claim of error thus fails.4

II.

Defendant’s challenge to his status as a convicted felon for purposes of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) similarly fails. Section 924(g)(1) provides “[i]t shall be unlawful for any

person . . . who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate . . . commerce, or

possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition . . . .” A necessary

predicate to a § 922(g)(1) conviction is a prior felony conviction. A prior felony
5

 To establish Defendant did not have the right to transport or possess firearms in

the State of Michigan at the time of his arrest, the Government has moved to supplement

the record on appeal with the Petition and Order for Discharge From Probation, State

v. Watson, No. 95-6671 (Mich. 3d Cir. Ct., September 2, 1998). We allow the motion.

(continued...)

6

conviction is not a predicate for a § 922(g)(1) offense, however, where the jurisdiction

prosecuting the prior felony has restored a defendant’s civil rights “unless such . . .

restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport,

[or] possess . . . firearms.” Id. § 921(a)(20).

At trial Defendant entered into a written stipulation that he previously had

been “convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year”

–carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Michigan state law–“within the meaning

of § 922(g)(1).” Despite that stipulation, Defendant now argues the State of Michigan

restored his civil rights prior to his arrest on February 4, 2001. Because Defendant

failed to raise his argument in the district court, we review only for plain error.

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Whether Michigan had restored Defendant’s civil rights,

including his right to possess firearms, at the time of his arrest for the § 922(g)(1)

offense is a question of fact. We have repeatedly held that “factual disputes not brought

to the attention of the [district] court do not rise to the level of plain error.” United

States v. Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d 916, 927 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing cases). Based

on the record before us, we cannot say the district court plainly erred under such

circumstances.5
5

(...continued)

The discharge order indicates the Michigan state court discharged Defendant Lindsey

from probation on September 2, 1998. Under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f(1),

Defendant could not possess a firearm for three years from that date, or until September

2, 2001. Lindsey committed the instant § 922(g)(1) offense on February 4, 2001.

Thus, Defendant’s argument also appears to fail as a matter of fact.

7

III.

Lastly, Defendant challenges his convictions for carrying a firearm during and

in relation to a drug trafficking crime and conspiracy to commit the same. 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (o). Prior to his arrest, Defendant was traveling as a passenger in a

black Ford Explorer driven by Diana Randolph. The Explorer traveled in tandem with

a U-Haul moving truck driven by Randy Watson. The Explorer passed through a border

checkpoint immediately preceding the U-Haul. When border patrol checkpoint agents

subsequently directed Watson and his U-Haul to secondary inspection, Watson drove

away. Once apprehended, Watson indicated he was traveling with the Explorer. Agents

pursued and stopped the Explorer. Inside the U-Haul, agents found three duffle bags

containing thirteen handguns, several of which were loaded, additional rounds of

ammunition, 47.7 grams of cocaine, 7.6 grams of “crack” cocaine, and 22 pounds of

marijuana. Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to establish he “carried”

a firearm within the meaning of § 924(c)(1)(A). We review the sufficiency of the

evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Government.

United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir. 2004).
8

Section 924(c)(1)(A)(i) establishes a mandatory minimum five year sentence

of imprisonment for “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence

or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm . . . .” The “carry” prong of

§ 924(c)(1)(A) has two elements: (1) possession of the weapon through the exercise

of dominion or control; and (2) transportation of the weapon. United States v. Durham,

139 F.3d 1325, 1335 (10th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court has described § 924(c)’s

basic purpose as an effort to combat the “dangerous combination” of “drugs and guns.”

Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 240 (1993). Consistent with that purpose, the

Court in Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126-27 (1998), held the phrase

“carries a firearm” in § 924(c) is not limited to the carrying of firearms on the person,

but “applies to a person who knowingly possesses and conveys firearms in a vehicle,

including in the locked glove compartment or trunk of a car, which the person

accompanies.”

The evidence presented at trial included a pawn shop video surveillance tape

showing Defendant and a straw purchaser buying firearms in Phoenix, Arizona. 

Defendant left the pawn shop carrying the firearms. The evidence also revealed that

Defendant (1) directed Randolph to rent the U-Haul for him , (2) gave Randolph $800.00

to pay for the U-Haul, and (3) told Watson to drive the U-Haul while he and Randolph

rode in the Explorer. Less than 48 hours after the firearms purchase, border patrol agents

arrested Defendant while he was traveling in tandem with the U-Haul containing those
9

same firearms and illegal drugs. Defendant’s fingerprint was also found on the

wrapping of the crack cocaine seized from the U-Haul.

Randolph testified that Watson was Defendant’s “flunky” who did “whatever

Defendant told him to do.” When the three stopped for gas outside Phoenix, Randolph

saw Defendant get into the back of the U-Haul. A few hours later, the three stopped at

a rest area because Watson wanted to rest. When Randolph asked Defendant why they

had to stop with Watson, Defendant responded “he’s not driving with my shit in there.”

The three continued driving together until Watson and Defendant passed through the

border checkpoint. Randolph testified that while Watson was at the checkpoint,

Defendant was “very nervous” and was saying to himself “come on, come on, got

to make it through, come on.”

The foregoing evidence sufficiently established both the possession and

transportation elements of § 992(c)(1)(A)’s “carry” prong. The evidence showed

Defendant had actual possession of the firearms in Phoenix at the time of purchase.

The evidence further showed Defendant maintained constructive possession of the

firearms while Watson transported them in the U-Haul because he exercised dominion

and control over Watson and the U-Haul. Defendant, although not in actual possession

of the firearms at the time of his arrest, had both the power and the intention at the

relevant time to exercise dominion and control over the firearms, either directly or

through Watson. See United States v. Lopez, 372 F.3d 1207, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004)
10

(“A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and

the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly

or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it.”).

The evidence also supports the inference that Defendant transported the firearms

in the U-Haul, even though he was not physically present inside the vehicle. Defendant

paid for the U-Haul, directed Watson to drive the U-Haul, and insisted the U-Haul travel

in tandem with him at all times. Certainly, Defendant transported and conveyed firearms

in a vehicle he was accompanying. See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126-127. “Accompany”

is defined as “to go along with.” Black’s Law Dictionary 16 (7th ed. 1999). Defendant

undoubtedly went “along with” the U-Haul as he and his cohorts traveled from Phoenix

and into New Mexico. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s

§ 924(c)(1)(A) convictions.

AFFIRMED.