J-A05025-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AARON KING 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 657 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 21, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0000905-2010

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

AARON KING 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 660 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 21, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0000906-2010

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: APRIL 9, 2021

Appellant Aaron King appeals from the judgments of sentence imposed 

following his resentencing for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI)—

forcible compulsion, IDSI—person less than thirteen, aggravated indecent 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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assault—less than thirteen, and two counts each of unlawful contact with a 

minor, sexual assault, indecent assault—person less than thirteen, corruption 

of minors, and statutory sexual assault.

1 Appellant challenges the reporting 

and registration requirements applicable to him under the Sexual Registration 

and Notification Act2 (SORNA II) and his designation as a sexually violent 

predator (SVP). He also claims that the aggregate sentence of twenty to forty 

years of incarceration was manifestly unreasonable. For the following 

reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence but remand to the trial court to 

notify Appellant of his registration requirements as an SVP. 

This Court summarized the facts underlying Appellant’s convictions as 

follows:

In 2006, [the victims, S.C. and her cousin K.R.], then ten (10) 

years old, resided at the home of their aunt, [C.C.], Appellant, and 

several others, at 1334 Pike Street, Philadelphia, PA. [S.C.] 

testified that at some point during that year, she went into the 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3123(a)(1), 3123(a)(6), 3125(a)(7), 6318(a)(1), 3124.1, 

3126(a)(7), 6301(a)(1), and 3122.1, respectively.

Although not raised by the parties in this or Appellant’s prior appeal, we 

observe that the Commonwealth charged Appellant with IDSI with a child, but 

listed the offense as a violation of Section 3123(a)(6). Section 3123(a)(6), 

was repealed and replaced with IDSI with a child at Section 3123(b) effective 

February 14, 2003, prior to the offense and conviction in this matter. The 

definition of the offense and the elements of IDSI of a child remain the same 

in former Section 3126(a)(6) and current Section 3126(b). Further, there is 

no indication that Appellant suffered any prejudice at trial, sentencing, and his 

designation of as a sex offender and SVP due this error. Therefore, we remand 

to the trial court to correct the record and ensure that it specifies the correct 

Crimes Code section. 

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.51-9799.75.
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bedroom her aunt shared with Appellant to get some clothes 

stored there, whereupon Appellant asked her to get some whipped 

cream for him. When she returned with the whipped cream, 

Appellant was sitting on the bed with his robe open. Appellant 

then forced the minor [victim] to fellate him after he applied the 

whipped cream to his penis. Appellant then instructed [S.C.] to 

tell [K.R.] to come to the bedroom. [K.R.] testified that when she 

came into the room she observed Appellant sitting on the bed and 

[S.C.] fellating him. Appellant then directed [K.R.] to put her 

mouth on his penis to fellate him and she complied.

[S.C.] testified of another occasion when she was thirteen (13) 

years of age during which Appellant sexually abused her. [S.C.] 

stated that she was in her bedroom after taking a shower when 

Appellant came in, locked the door behind him, pushed her down 

onto a couch, and inserted his penis into her vagina. [S.C.] also 

testified of a third incident in her aunt’s bedroom where Appellant 

pulled her onto the bed, removed her pants, and inserted his penis 

into her vagina.

[K.R.] described several additional incidents during which

Appellant had sexual contact with her. [K.R.] stated that on one

occasion she and [S.C.] were getting dressed in their bedroom

when Appellant entered the room and fingered both of their

vaginas. When [K.R.] told Appellant that he was hurting her, he 

stopped and left the room. Another incident occurred while she

was bent over a bin attempting to retrieve detergent when

Appellant came behind her, pushed her head and torso into the

bin, pulled down her under garment, and inserted his penis into

her vagina. She testified as to yet another incident while she was 

asleep on the living room couch and her Aunt [C.C.] instructed 

Appellant to wake her. Appellant then began rubbing her legs and 

touching her in a sexual way. [K.R.] told her aunt what occurred 

and she then yelled at Appellant.

Finally, both [victims] testified of an incident that took place in the 

kitchen when [K.R.] was 14 years old. While bent over the sink 

Appellant came behind [K.R.] and forced himself onto her. [S.C.] 

testified that she entered the kitchen and left after she observed 

Appellant with his penis out and [K.R.] with her pants down. 

During that incident Appellant pulled [K.R.’s] skirt up, pulled her 

underpants down, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After 

the incident[,] [K.R.] left the kitchen crying and [K.R.] told [S.C.] 

what happened. Andrew Collins, who the children referred to as 

Mr. Drew and who lived in the house at the time, was nearby and 
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inquired about what had occurred whereupon [S.C.] described 

what she had seen in the kitchen. Collins threatened to report 

this to the girls’ uncle, however, they persuaded him otherwise, 

arguing that their uncle would do something harmful to Appellant 

which would cause [their uncle] trouble.

Throughout their ordeal, [the victims] wrote letters describing the 

incidents of sexual contact with Appellant. They placed the letters 

in a shoebox and left it at a location in the living room of their 

grandmother’s home which was located across from their Aunt 

[C.C.’s] house, hoping the box would be found. Y.R., [K.R.’s] 

mother, found and read the letters. The police were then 

contacted and [the victims] gave a formal statement to 

detectives.

The defense presented the testimony of Andrew Collins who stated 

that he did not recall having a conversation with either [the 

victims] about their being sexually assaulted and stated that they 

did not tell him that Appellant raped them.

The defense also presented the testimony of Stephanie, [C.C.’s] 

daughter, who stated that Appellant and her mother argued about 

[the victims]’ constant presence at [the] house and that Appellant 

accused the children of being disrespectful to him. Appellant told 

[C.C.] that he did not want to be around them. Eventually 

Appellant moved out of the house and, in a[n] effort to appease 

Appellant, [C.C.] limited the [victims]’ visits.

Commonwealth v. King, 2263 EDA 2013 at 2-3 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 17, 

2014) (unpublished memorandum) (record citation and footnote omitted).

On July 30, 2012, the jury convicted Appellant of IDSI—forcible 

compulsion, IDSI—person less than thirteen, aggravated indecent assault—

less than thirteen, and two counts each of unlawful contact with a minor, 

sexual assault, indecent assault—person less than thirteen, corruption of 

minors, and statutory sexual assault. 

On July 12, 2013, the trial court conducted an SVP and sentencing 

hearing. Following the hearing, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate 
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sentence of twenty to forty years of imprisonment, designated him an SVP,

and informed him that he would be subject to lifetime registration under

SORNA I.

3

 On October 17, 2014, this Court affirmed the judgment of 

sentence. 

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3 At the time of Appellant’s original SVP and sentencing hearing, SORNA I was 

in effect. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41 (subsequently amended 2018). 

On July 19, 2017, our Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Muniz, 

164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017). The Muniz Court held that SORNA I’s registration 

requirements were “punitive in effect[.]” Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1218. As such, 

the Court concluded that SORNA I violated ex post facto principles when 

applied to individuals who, like Appellant, committed a sexual offense before 

December 20, 2012, the effective date of SORNA I. See id. at 1223; see 

also Commonwealth v. Lippincott, 208 A.3d 143, 150 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(en banc). 

Furthermore, in Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(Butler I), rev'd 226 A.3d 972 (Pa. 2020), this Court declared 

unconstitutional 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(e) in SORNA I, which identified the trial 

court as factfinder and specified a clear and convincing evidence burden of 

proof to designate a defendant an SVP. See Butler I, 173 A.3d at 1217-18

(applying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Alleyne v. 

United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), based on Muniz’s holding that SORNA I 

was punitive). The General Assembly thereafter amended SORNA I and 

passed SORNA II, in part to address Muniz and Butler I. SORNA II divides 

sex offender registrants into two distinct subchapters—Subchapter H and 

Subchapter I. Subchapter H includes individuals who were convicted for an 

offense that occurred on or after December 20, 2012, and whose registration 

requirements had not yet expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(c). Subchapter 

I includes individuals who were convicted for an offense that occurred “on or 

after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012,” or who were required to 

register under a former sexual offender registration law on or after April 22, 

1996, but before December 20, 2012, and whose registration requirements 

had not yet expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.52. 

On March 26, 2020, while this appeal was pending, our Supreme Court 

reversed this Court’s holding in Butler I, and held that the registration, 

notification, and reporting requirements applicable to SVPs “do not constitute 
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On April 18, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se petition pursuant to the PostConviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, which raised various 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Appointed counsel filed amended 

petitions adding additional claims with respect to the imposition of illegal 

mandatory minimum sentences and arguing that Appellant’s designation as 

an SVP and the reporting requirements imposed pursuant to SORNA I were 

unconstitutional.4 

On August 24, 2018, in its motion to dismiss the PCRA petition, the 

Commonwealth conceded that Appellant’s mandatory minimum sentences 

were illegal and that the judgments of sentence should be vacated. The 

Commonwealth also noted that Appellant’s status as an SVP may be illegal in 

light of Butler I, but asked the PCRA court to stay its decision—and 

resentencing in general—pending the resolution of Butler II and Lacombe. 

____________________________________________

criminal punishment.” Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972, 993 (Pa. 

2020) (Butler II). On July 21, 2020, our Supreme Court held that Subchapter 

I “is nonpunitive and does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex 

post facto laws.” Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 605-06 (Pa. 

2020). 

4 Specifically, Appellant filed a counseled supplemental amended PCRA 

petition on February 12, 2018, in which he claimed that his designation as an

SVP with the mandatory life-long reporting requirement was unconstitutional 

pursuant to Butler I and Alleyne. On July 23, 2018, Appellant filed a fourth 

supplemental amended petition arguing that the imposition of two minimum 

mandatory sentences was also illegal and unconstitutional pursuant to 

Alleyne. We note that Appellant also filed several pro se amendments to his 

PCRA petition. However, because Appellant was counseled at the time, we 

have not considered those amendments. See Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 

108 A.3d 739, 762 (Pa. 2014) (stating that “no defendant has a constitutional 

right to hybrid representation, either at trial or on appeal”).
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The trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) and a 

mental health evaluation for the purpose of resentencing. Appellant also filed 

a pre-sentence memorandum asserting, in part, that (1) Appellant’s 

designation as an SVP was unconstitutional in light of Muniz and Butler I, 

(2) the reporting requirements violated his due process and reputational 

rights, and (3) the “new Megan’s law statute” could not be applied 

retroactively because it was an unconstitutional ex post facto law. Appellant’s 

Pre-Sentence Mem., 9/9/19, at 2. Appellant requested that the court vacate 

any sexual offender registration requirement. Id. at 1-2. 

On January 21, 2020, the parties appeared before the trial court. The 

parties and the court initially discussed whether SORNA was at issue. 

Specifically, when the Commonwealth asserted that Appellant was still subject 

to lifetime registration, Appellant’s counsel objected and claimed that the 

registration period was fifteen years. The court indicated that “under the 

current state” of the law, it should “take away” the SVP designation. N.T. 

Resentencing Hr’g, 1/21/20, at 11. In response, the Commonwealth 

reiterated its request for a stay of that determination pending the decision in 

Butler II. Ultimately, the court granted Appellant’s PCRA petition in part, 

stating: “PCRA relief is granted as to sentencing by agreement, original 

sentence vacated, and we are now here at sentencing for the resentencing 

where there was an illegal mandatory imposed on two of the charges, 

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and aggravated indecent assault.” Id.

at 16. Immediately before the court announced its order, Appellant’s counsel 
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confirmed that the hearing following the grant of PCRA relief was limited “just 

to resentencing.” Id. at 15. 

The trial court then heard from the Commonwealth and defense counsel 

regarding the sentencing guidelines and Appellant’s offense gravity and prior 

record score. The court also heard from Appellant’s counsel concerning 

Appellant’s behavior in prison and completion of various prison programs and 

classes. See id. at 16-17. The Commonwealth reread the victim statements 

at the request of the victims. See id. at 19-23. The court also considered 

the PSI, statements made by defense mitigation witnesses, and all other 

evidence that had been introduced at the 2013 sentencing. 

The trial court then stated its reasons for the sentence imposed:

I’m going to reimpose the sentence that was originally imposed 

on July 12th of 2013. That sentence is consistent with the 

guidelines. In fact, as to some of the charges, it’s below the 

standard guideline sentencing range. I think the 20 to 40 years[’] 

incarceration is appropriate given that there were two victims and 

the circumstances of this case. The court takes into account as it 

previously did the arguments by counsel, any witnesses that 

appeared at the preliminary hearing, incorporates all that into this 

resentencing. So I’m incorporating everything from the July 12, 

2013 sentencing except any reference to the mandatory. These 

are clearly guideline sentences.

Id. at 31.

At the conclusion of resentencing, the trial court denied all of Appellant’s 

remaining PCRA claims. See id. at 36. The trial court did not alter its original 

designation of Appellant as an SVP. However, the trial court stated that it 

would “stay any decision on the [SVP] status given that it’s currently in our 
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appellate courts.” Id. at 33-34. The Commonwealth then notified Appellant 

that his “sex offender registration requirements have changed slightly since 

you were sentenced back in 2013 . . . you will only have to report to the state 

police once a year instead of four times a year . . . .”5 Id. at 35. Upon further 

prompting by the Commonwealth, Appellant stated he understood that he was 

subject to a lifetime reporting requirement. Id. 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging his 

registration requirements, SVP designation, and the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence, which the trial court denied on February 14, 2020. Appellant 

timely appealed by filing a separate notice of appeal in the above-captioned 

cases,6 and complied with the trial court’s order to submit a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement. The trial court filed a responsive opinion.

Appellant raises two issues on appeal:

1. Was the sentence of the trial court of [lifetime] 

registration/reporting to the state police under Megan’s 

law/SORNA illegal and unconstitutional because it was an ex 

post facto law and it violated [A]ppellant’s due process right 

and [A]ppellant’s right to reputation under the [Pennsylvania] 

Constitution?

2. Is [Appellant] entitled to a new sentence hearing because the 

trial court’s sentence of 20 to 40 years in prison was excessive 

and an abuse of discretion because the record does not show 

that [Appellant] was beyond rehabilitation?

____________________________________________

5 The Commonwealth did not explicitly refer to Subchapter I and apparently 

discussed the annual reporting requirement applicable to non-SVP offenders, 

not the quarterly verification requirements applicable to an SVP. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.60(a)-(b). 

6 See Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). 
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Appellant’s Brief at 2.

In his first issue, Appellant contends that “[t]he imposition of 

registration/reporting requirements with the State Police under 42 Pa.[C.S. §] 

9799.55(b) is a punishment and punitive and as applied to [Appellant] is an 

ex post facto law.” Id. at 10. Additionally, Appellant asserts that his SVP 

designation is unconstitutional because “this finding was not made by a jury 

beyond a reasonable doubt as is required by Alleyne . . . .” Id. at 11. 

Appellant acknowledges Butler II, but he asserts that it does not control 

because he committed the underlying sexual offenses in 2006. See id. 

Appellant adds that “there are studies that find a majority of sex offenders will 

not reoffend and that the sexual offender registration laws are ineffective in 

preventing re-offense.” Id. Finally, Appellant asserts that he is entitled to a 

“due process hearing to show” that he did not pose a high risk of recidivism 

to protect his reputational rights under the Pennsylvania constitution. Id. at 

11-12. 

As a preliminary matter, we consider whether Appellant’s brief conforms

with the briefing requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2114-2119 (addressing the specific requirements 

of each part of a brief on appeal). Where an appellant fails to raise or develop 

his or her issues on appeal properly, this Court will not consider the merits of 

the claims raised on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d 732, 

748 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that an appellant’s failure to cite legal 

authority in support of his argument results in waiver); see also Pa.R.A.P. 
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2119(a) (requiring that an argument section contain discussion and citation 

of pertinent authorities); Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (stating that “if the defects are in the 

brief . . . are substantial, the appeal or . . . may be quashed or dismissed”).

Here, Appellant’s brief fails to develop a proper challenge to the 

reporting requirements imposed by SORNA II and his designation as an SVP. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 10-12. Other than boilerplate statements collected 

from a patchwork of law, Appellant generally does not cite pertinent legal 

authority. See id. at 11-12. Instead, Appellant largely refers to cases decided 

under SORNA I, such as Muniz and Taylor v. Pennsylvania State Police, 

132 A.3d 590 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc). Appellant’s only discussion of

case law addressing SORNA II involves an attempt to distinguish his case from 

Butler II by asserting that his offenses occurred in 2006. See id. at 11. 

Similarly, Appellant fails to address any important distinctions between 

Subchapter H and I, or the registration requirements applicable to an SVP 

versus sex offenders generally. Accordingly, because Appellant has failed to 

develop his issue in any meaningful fashion capable of review, it is waived. 

See Knox, 50 A.3d at 748; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2101. 

Moreover, even if we addressed Appellant’s arguments, no relief is due. 

Although not discussed by Appellant, we note that Lacombe and Butler II

respectively held that Subchapter I and the heightened registration and 

notification requirements applicable to an SVP are not punitive. Read 

together, Lacombe and Butler II belie Appellant’s assertion that Butler II

is distinguishable because Subchapter I applies to an individual who 
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committed an offense in 2006.

7

 Therefore, in light of our Supreme Court’s 

holdings in Lacombe and Butler II, Appellant is not entitled to relief from his 

designation as an SVP. See Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 626-27; Butler II, 226 

A.3d at 993.

We recognize that at Appellant’s resentencing, there was considerable 

uncertainty regarding the outcomes in Lacombe and Butler II, and that the 

trial court chose to stay its decision on Appellant’s SVP claims pending the 

Supreme Court’s decisions. Therefore, the most prudent course is to remand 

the matter to the trial court to address and notify Appellant of any additional 

reporting requirements related to his SVP status under Subchapter I.

In his second issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. Appellant contends that the sentence imposed by the trial court 

was manifestly unreasonable and an abuse of discretion because the court 

“solely based [the sentence] on the victim impact and [Appellant’s] alleged 

course of conduct.” Appellant’s Brief, at 13. He claims that the decision to 

impose consecutive sentences, resulting in an aggregate sentence of twenty 

____________________________________________

7 Although Appellant briefly refers to violations of his due process and 

reputational rights, he does not properly support or develop these claims. See 

Knox, 50 A.3d at 748. Further, we note that the trial court conducted an SVP 

hearing to determine whether Appellant suffered a mental abnormality that 

made him more likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses. 

Therefore, absent evidence to support his contention that a majority of sexual 

offenders will not reoffend or that the registration requirements are ineffective 

in preventing re-offense, he is not entitled to relief. Cf. Commonwealth v. 

Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567, 587-88, 596 (Pa. 2020) (remanding for 

development of the record where the appellant presented evidence 

contradicting the presumption that all sex offenders posed a high risk of 

recidivism). 
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to forty years’ incarceration results in an excessive sentence given that “the 

trial court found [Appellant] to be a caring person and in light of [Appellant’s] 

good conduct in prison.” Id. at 14. Appellant argues that “[t]he protection 

of the public, the needs of the community and the protection of the 

complainants do not require such a draconian sentence.” Id. at 14-15. 

Finally, Appellant asserts that the trial court did not consider his age, family 

history, or rehabilitative needs. See id. at 15.

The Commonwealth argues that the trial court’s sentence of twenty to 

forty years of imprisonment for Appellant’s repeated sexual abuse of two 

minor girls was a proper exercise of its discretion. See Commonwealth’s Brief 

at 11. The Commonwealth notes that the trial court had the benefit of a PSI; 

therefore, it is presumed the court was aware of all appropriate sentencing 

factors. See id. The Commonwealth also states that the trial court 

incorporated the evidence from the initial sentencing, which included expert 

testimony that Appellant’s actions demonstrated a long-term sexual interest 

in children. See id. at 12. Finally, the Commonwealth notes that the trial 

court’s imposition of consecutive sentences was within the court’s discretion. 

See id. at 13 (citing Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. 

Super. 1995) (an appellant is not entitled to a “volume discount” by having 

sentences run concurrently)).

In reviewing a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, we 

are guided by the following principles:
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Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant challenging 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s 

jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved 

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's 

brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed 

from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9781(b).

Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally 

waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a 

motion to modify the sentence imposed. 

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must 

be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. A substantial question 

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument 

that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent 

with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary 

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some 

citations and quotation marks omitted).

Instantly, the record reflects that Appellant preserved his sentencing 

challenge in a post sentence motion. He also filed a timely appeal and raised 

the issue in his Rule 2119(f) statement. See Appellant’s Brief at 3-4. Further, 

his claim presents a substantial question for our review. See 

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en 

banc) (noting that “[t]his Court has also held that an excessive sentence 

claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider 
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mitigating factors—raises a substantial question” (citations and quotation 

marks omitted)). Therefore, we will consider the merits of his issue.

Our review of a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence 

considers whether the trial court has abused its discretion. We observe:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Id. (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

Pursuant to Section 9721(b):

the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence 

imposed should call for total confinement that is consistent with . 

. . the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it 

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the

community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). 

“[T]he trial court is required to consider the particular circumstances of 

the offense and the character of the defendant,” including the defendant’s 

“prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for 

rehabilitation.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. 

Super. 2009) (citations omitted). Although “[a] sentencing court need not 

undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence, . . . the 

record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s consideration of the facts 
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of the crime and character of the offender.” See Commonwealth v. Crump, 

995 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Further, this Court has held that “where the sentencing judge had the 

benefit of a [PSI report], it will be presumed that he or she was aware of the 

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those 

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Ventura, 975 A.2d

at 1135 (citation omitted). This Court may only disturb a standard range 

sentence if we find that the circumstances of the case rendered the application 

of the guidelines “clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2).

Here, at sentencing, the trial court considered the PSI, sentencing 

guidelines, offense gravity score, Appellant’s prior record, testimony from the 

victims, mitigating testimony from Appellant’s friends, and the arguments of 

counsel. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 7/12/13, at 55-70. At resentencing, the 

court incorporated the evidence and testimony from the July 12, 2013 

sentencing hearing. See N.T. Resentencing Hr’g, at 31. The court considered 

Appellant’s inmate progress reports and the programs in which Appellant is 

involved at the prison, as well as updated PSI and psychiatric reports. See 

id. at 14, 35-36. 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:

The aggregate sentence of 20 to 40 years of incarceration for the 

multiple instances of sexual assault against two children victims 

is, as the [c]ourt noted at sentencing, within the recommended 

guidelines. Further, [] Appellant’s age, family history and 

rehabilitative needs were all disclosed at sentencing, through the 

testimony of a psychologist, the argument of defense counsel and 

testimony of a friend. Evidence of Appellant’s conduct in prison in 
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the nine years he has been incarcerated was presented at his 

resentencing. 

Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6 (record citations omitted).

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court. See Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 770. The trial court had the benefit 

of a PSI and considered the appropriate sentencing factors and mitigating 

evidence as stated at both the sentencing hearing and resentencing hearing. 

Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1135. The trial court ultimately concluded that an 

aggregate sentence of twenty to forty years’ incarceration was necessary in 

light of the impact of Appellant’s crimes and in order to protect the public. 

Appellant has failed to demonstrate that this sentence was clearly 

unreasonable. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Case remanded to trial court to advise 

Appellant of his current reporting and registration requirements and to correct 

the record.

8

 Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/9/21

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8 See note 1, supra.