Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 65715 

DATES: The comment period for the draft 

EIS (79 FR 49820; August 22, 2014) has 

been extended to December 6, 2014. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments 

by any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2014–0149. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–287–3422; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, 

Office of Administration, Mail Stop: 

3WFN–06–A44M, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001. 

For additional direction on obtaining 

information and submitting comments, 

see ‘‘Obtaining Information and 

Submitting Comments’’ in the 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of 

this document. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Allen Fetter, Office of New Reactors, 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone: 

301–415–8556, email: Allen.Fetter@

nrc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Obtaining Information and 

Submitting Comments 

A. Obtaining Information 

Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2014– 

0149, when contacting the NRC about 

the availability of information regarding 

this document. You may obtain 

publicly-available information related to 

this action by the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for NRC Docket ID NRC–2014–0149. 

• NRC’S Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): 

You may obtain publicly-available 

documents online in the ADAMS Public 

Documents collection at http://www.nrc.

gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin 

the search, select ‘‘ADAMS Public 

Documents’’ and then select ‘‘Begin 

Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For 

problems with ADAMS, please contact 

the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) 

reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301– 

415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@

nrc.gov. The draft EIS and an 

accompanying reader’s guide are 

available in ADAMS under Accession 

No. ML14219A304. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

• Project Web site: The draft EIS can 

be accessed online at the PSEG ESP 

specific Web page at http://www.nrc.

gov/reactors/new-reactors/esp/

pseg.html. 

• Salem Free Public Library: The draft 

EIS is available for public inspection at 

112 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey, 

08079. 

B. Submitting Comments 

Please include Docket ID NRC–2014– 

0149 in the subject line of your 

comment submission, in order to ensure 

that the NRC is able to make your 

comment submission available to the 

public in this docket. 

The NRC cautions you not to include 

identifying or contact information in 

comment submissions that you do not 

want to be publicly disclosed in your 

comment submission. The NRC will 

post all comment submissions at 

http://www.regulations.gov as well as 

enter the comment submissions into 

ADAMS, and the NRC does not 

routinely edit comment submissions to 

remove identifying or contact 

information. 

If you are requesting or aggregating 

comments from other persons for 

submission to the NRC, then you should 

inform those persons not to include 

identifying or contact information that 

they do not want to be publicly 

disclosed in their comment submission. 

Your request should state that the NRC 

does not routinely edit comment 

submissions to remove such information 

before making the comment 

submissions available to the public or 

entering the comment submissions into 

ADAMS. 

II. Discussion 

The application submitted by PSEG 

Power, LLC, and PSEG Nuclear, LLC 

(PSEG), for an ESP was submitted by 

letter dated May 25, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML101480484), pursuant 

to Part 52 of Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations. A notice of receipt 

and availability of the application, 

which included the environmental 

report, was published in the Federal 

Register on June 18, 2010 (75 FR 34794). 

A notice of acceptance for docketing of 

the ESP application was published in 

the Federal Register on August 13, 2010 

(75 FR 49539). A notice of intent to 

prepare a draft environmental impact 

statement (EIS) and to conduct the 

scoping process was published in the 

Federal Register on October 15, 2010 

(75 FR 63521). On August 22, 2014, the 

NRC and USACE published for public 

comment the draft EIS in the Federal 

Register (79 FR 49820). The purpose of 

this solicitation was to obtain public 

comments on the draft EIS for NRC staff 

to consider in preparing the final EIS. 

The public comment period was to have 

ended on November 6, 2014. Extensions 

to the 75-day comment period may be 

provided at the discretion of the NRC 

staff if special circumstances are 

present. The NRC staff has determined 

that special circumstances exist that 

support extending this comment period. 

Those special circumstances include the 

recent identification of some 

individuals and organizations with 

special knowledge and expertise in the 

area of environmental justice that had 

not been aware of the original notice 

and other outreach efforts. In order to 

gain additional information on any 

minority or low-income populations 

that might be disproportionately 

affected, the NRC has determined that it 

is prudent, in this instance, to extend 

the public comment period on this 

document until December 6, 2014, to 

allow more time for members of the 

public to submit their comments. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day 

of October, 2014. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Frank Akstulewicz, 

Director, Division of New Reactor Licensing, 

Office of New Reactors. 

[FR Doc. 2014–26301 Filed 11–4–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

[Docket No. 50–305; NRC–2014–0219] 

Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.; 

Kewaunee Power Station 

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

ACTION: Exemption; issuance. 

SUMMARY: Kewaunee Power Station 

(KPS) is a decommissioning nuclear 

power reactor that permanently shut 

down on May 7, 2013, and permanently 

defueled on May 14, 2013. In response 

to a request from Dominion Energy 

Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK or the licensee), 

the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) is granting 

exemptions from certain emergency 

planning (EP) requirements. The 

exemptions will eliminate the 

requirements to maintain offsite 

radiological emergency plans and 

reduce the scope of the onsite 

emergency planning activities at the 

Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) based 

on the reduced risks of accidents that 

could result in an offsite radiological 

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65716 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 

release when compared to operating 

power reactors. The exemptions will 

continue to maintain requirements for 

onsite radiological emergency planning 

and include provisions for capabilities 

to communicate and coordinate with 

offsite response authorities. The NRC 

staff has concluded that the exemptions 

being granted by this action will 

maintain an acceptable level of 

emergency preparedness at KPS given 

its permanently shutdown and defueled 

status, and that there is reasonable 

assurance that adequate offsite 

protective measures can and will be 

taken by State and local government 

agencies, if needed, in the event of a 

radiological emergency at the KPS 

facility. 

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID 

NRC–2014–0219 when contacting the 

NRC about the availability of 

information regarding this document. 

You may obtain publicly-available 

information related to this document 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and search 

for Docket ID NRC–2014–0219. Address 

questions about NRC dockets to Carol 

Gallagher; telephone: 301–287–3422; 

email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For 

technical questions, contact the 

individual listed in the FOR FURTHER

INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 

document. 

• NRC’s Agencywide Documents 

Access and Management System 

(ADAMS): You may access publicly 

available documents online in the NRC 

Library at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/adams.html. To begin the search, 

select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and 

then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS 

Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, 

please contact the NRC’s Public 

Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 

1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by 

email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 

ADAMS Accession number for each 

document referenced in this document 

(if that document is available in 

ADAMS) is provided the first time that 

a document is referenced. 

• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and 

purchase copies of public documents at 

the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One 

White Flint North, 11555 Rockville 

Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

William Huffman, Office of Nuclear 

Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, Washington, 

DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415– 

2046; email: William.Huffman@nrc.gov. 

I. Background 

The KPS facility is a 

decommissioning power reactor located 

on approximately 900 acres in Carlton 

(Kewaunee County), Wisconsin, 27 

miles southeast of Green Bay, 

Wisconsin. The licensee, DEK, is the 

holder of KPS Renewed Facility 

Operating License No. DPR–43. The 

license provides, among other things, 

that the facility is subject to all rules, 

regulations, and orders of the NRC now 

or hereafter in effect. 

By letter dated February 25, 2013 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13058A065), 

DEK submitted a certification to the 

NRC indicating it would permanently 

cease power operations at KPS on May 

7, 2013. On May 7, 2013, DEK 

permanently shut down the KPS reactor. 

On May 14, 2013, DEK certified that it 

had permanently defueled the KPS 

reactor vessel (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13135A209). As a permanently 

shutdown and defueled facility, and in 

accordance with § 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 

of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 

CFR), KPS is no longer authorized to 

operate the reactor or emplace nuclear 

fuel into the reactor vessel. Kewaunee 

Power Station is still authorized to 

possess and store irradiated nuclear 

fuel. Irradiated fuel is currently being 

stored onsite in a spent fuel pool (SFP) 

and in Independent Spent Fuel Storage 

Installation (ISFSI) dry casks. 

During normal power reactor 

operations, the forced flow of water 

through the reactor coolant system 

(RCS) removes heat generated by the 

reactor. The RCS, operating at high 

temperatures and pressures, transfers 

this heat through the steam generator 

tubes converting non-radioactive 

feedwater to steam, which then flows to 

the main turbine generator to produce 

electricity. Many of the accident 

scenarios postulated in the updated 

safety analysis reports (USARs) for 

operating power reactors involve 

failures or malfunctions of systems 

which could affect the fuel in the 

reactor core, which in the most severe 

postulated accidents, would involve the 

release of large quantities of fission 

products. With the permanent cessation 

of reactor operations at KPS and the 

permanent removal of the fuel from the 

reactor core, such accidents are no 

longer possible. The reactor, RCS, and 

supporting systems are no longer in 

operation and have no function related 

to the storage of the irradiated fuel. 

Therefore, postulated accidents 

involving failure or malfunction of the 

reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are 

no longer applicable. 

Since KPS is permanently shutdown 

and defueled, the only design basis 

accident that could potentially result in 

an offsite radiological release at KPS is 

the fuel handling accident. Analysis 

performed by DEK showed that 90 days 

after KPS permanently shutdown, the 

radiological consequence of the fuel 

handling accident would not exceed the 

limits established by the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency’s 

(EPA’s) Protective Action Guidelines 

(PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary. 

Based on the time that KPS has been 

permanently shutdown (approximately 

17 months), there is no longer any 

possibility of an offsite radiological 

release from a design basis-accident that 

could exceed the EPA PAGs. 

The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, 

‘‘Emergency plans,’’ and Appendix E to 

10 CFR Part 50, ‘‘Emergency Planning 

and Preparedness for Production and 

Utilization Facilities,’’ continue to apply 

to nuclear power reactors that have 

permanently ceased operation and have 

removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. 

There are no explicit regulatory 

provisions distinguishing EP 

requirements for a power reactor that is 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

from a reactor that is authorized to 

operate. In order for DEK to modify the 

KPS emergency plan to reflect the 

reduced risk associated with the 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

condition of KPS, certain exemptions 

from the EP regulations must be 

obtained before the KPS emergency plan 

can be amended. 

II. Request/Action 

By letter dated July 31, 2013, 

‘‘Request for Exemptions from Portions 

of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix E’’ (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML13221A182), DEK requested 

exemptions from certain EP 

requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 for KPS. 

More specifically, DEK requested 

exemptions from certain planning 

standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding 

onsite and offsite radiological 

emergency plans for nuclear power 

reactors; from certain requirements in 

10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require 

establishment of plume exposure and 

ingestion pathway emergency planning 

zones for nuclear power reactors; and 

from certain requirements in 10 CFR 

Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV, which 

establishes the elements that make up 

the content of emergency plans. In a 

letter dated December 11, 2013 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13351A040), DEK 

provided responses to the NRC staff’s 

request for additional information (RAI) 

concerning the proposed exemptions. In 

a letter dated January 10, 2014, DEK 

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provided a supplemental response to 

the RAI (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14016A078), which contained 

information applicable to the SFP 

inventory makeup strategies for 

mitigating the potential loss of water 

inventory due to a beyond design-basis 

accident. The information provided by 

DEK included justifications for each 

exemption requested. The exemptions 

requested by DEK will eliminate the 

requirements to maintain offsite 

radiological emergency plans, reviewed 

by the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) under the requirements 

of 44 CFR Part 350, and reduce the 

scope of onsite emergency planning 

activities. DEK stated that application of 

all of the standards and requirements in 

10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c) and 10 

CFR Part 50, Appendix E is not needed 

for adequate emergency response 

capability based on the reduced risks at 

the permanently shutdown and 

defueled facility. If offsite protective 

actions where needed for a very 

unlikely accident that could challenge 

the safe storage of spent fuel at KPS, 

provisions exist for offsite agencies to 

take protective actions using a 

comprehensive emergency management 

plan (CEMP) under the National 

Preparedness System to protect the 

health and safety of the public. A CEMP 

in this context, also referred to as an 

emergency operations plan (EOP), is 

addressed in FEMA Comprehensive 

Preparedness Guide 101, ‘‘Developing 

and Maintaining Emergency Operations 

Plans.’’ Comprehensive Preparedness 

Guide 101 is the foundation for State, 

territorial, Tribal, and local emergency 

planning in the United States. It 

promotes a common understanding of 

the fundamentals of risk-informed 

planning and decision making and 

helps planners at all levels of 

government in their efforts to develop 

and maintain viable, all-hazards, allthreats emergency plans. An EOP is 

flexible enough for use in all 

emergencies. It describes how people 

and property will be protected; details 

who is responsible for carrying out 

specific actions; identifies the 

personnel, equipment, facilities, 

supplies and other resources available; 

and outlines how all actions will be 

coordinated. A comprehensive 

emergency management plan is often 

referred to as a synonym for ‘‘all hazards 

planning.’’ 

III. Discussion 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, 

‘‘Specific exemptions,’’ the Commission 

may, upon application by any interested 

person or upon its own initiative, grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR Part 50 when: (1) The exemptions 

are authorized by law, will not present 

an undue risk to public health or safety, 

and are consistent with the common 

defense and security; and (2) any of the 

special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2) are present. These special 

circumstances include, among other 

things, that the application of the 

regulation in the particular 

circumstances would not serve the 

underlying purpose of the rule or is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. 

As noted previously, the current EP 

regulations contained in 10 CFR 

50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 

50 apply to both operating and 

shutdown power reactors. The NRC has 

consistently acknowledged that the risk 

of an offsite radiological release at a 

power reactor that has permanently 

ceased operations and removed fuel 

from the reactor vessel is significantly 

lower, and the types of possible 

accidents are significantly fewer, than at 

an operating power reactor. However, 

EP regulations are silent with regard to 

the fact that once a power reactor 

permanently ceases operation, the 

consequences of credible emergency 

accident scenarios are reduced. The 

reduced risks generally relate to a 

decrease in the potential for any 

significant offsite radiological release 

based on the preclusion of accidents 

applicable to an operating power reactor 

and on the reduced decay heat, and the 

decay of short-lived radionuclides as 

spent fuel ages. NUREG–1738, 

‘‘Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool 

Accident Risk at Decommissioning 

Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated February 

2001 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML010430066), confirmed that for 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

power reactors bounded by the 

assumptions and conditions in the 

report, the risk of offsite radiological 

release is significantly less than for an 

operating power reactor. 

Similar to the EP exemptions 

requested by DEK, prior EP exemptions 

granted to permanently shutdown and 

defueled power reactors did not relieve 

the licensees of all EP requirements. 

Rather, the exemptions allowed the 

licensees to modify their emergency 

plans commensurate with the credible 

site-specific risks that were consistent 

with a permanently shutdown and 

defueled status. Specifically, precedent 

for the approval of the exemptions from 

certain EP requirements for previous 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

power reactors were based on 

demonstrating that: (1) The radiological 

consequences of design-basis accidents 

would not exceed the limits of the EPA 

PAGs at the exclusion area boundary, 

and; (2) in the unlikely event of a 

beyond design-basis accident resulting 

in a loss of all modes of heat transfer 

from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is 

sufficient time to initiate appropriate 

mitigating actions, and if needed, for 

offsite authorities to implement offsite 

protective actions using a CEMP 

approach to protect the health and 

safety of the public. 

With respect to design-basis accidents 

at KPS, the licensee provided analysis 

demonstrating that 90 days after KPS 

was permanently shutdown, the 

radiological consequences of the only 

remaining design-basis accident with 

potential for offsite radiological release 

(the fuel handling accident) will not 

exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the 

exclusion area boundary. Therefore, 

because KPS has been permanently 

shutdown for approximately 17 months, 

there is no longer any design-basis 

accident that would warrant an offsite 

radiological emergency plan meeting the 

requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. 

With respect to beyond design-basis 

accidents at KPS, the licensee analyzed 

the two bounding beyond design-basis 

accidents that have a potential for a 

significant offsite release. One of these 

beyond design-basis accidents involves 

a complete loss of SFP water inventory, 

where cooling of the spent fuel would 

be primarily accomplished by natural 

circulation of air through the uncovered 

spent fuel assemblies. The licensee’s 

analysis of this accident shows that by 

October 30, 2014, air cooling of the 

spent fuel assemblies will be sufficient 

to keep the fuel within a safe 

temperature range indefinitely without 

fuel damage or offsite radiological 

release. The other beyond design-basis 

accident analysis performed by the 

licensee could not completely rule out 

the possibility of a radiological release 

from a SFP. This more limiting analysis 

assumes an incomplete drain down of 

the SFP water, or some other 

catastrophic event (such as a complete 

drainage of the SFP with rearrangement 

of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the 

addition of rubble to the SFP), that 

would effectively impede any decay 

heat removal through all possible modes 

of cooling. The licensee’s analysis 

demonstrates that as of October 21, 

2014, there would be at least 10 hours 

after the loss of all cooling means 

considered in the analysis for the 

described beyond design-basis accident, 

before the spent fuel cladding would 

reach a temperature where the potential 

for a significant offsite radiological 

release could occur. This analysis 

conservatively does not consider the 

period of time from the initiating event 

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causing a loss of SFP water inventory 

until all cooling means are lost. 

The NRC staff has verified DEK’s 

analyses and its calculations. The 

analyses provide reasonable assurance 

that in granting the requested exemption 

to DEK, there is no design-basis accident 

that will result in an offsite radiological 

release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the 

site boundary. In the unlikely event of 

a beyond design-basis accident affecting 

the SFP that results in a complete loss 

of heat removal via all modes of heat 

transfer, there will be at least 10 hours 

available before an offsite release might 

occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours to 

initiate appropriate mitigating actions to 

restore a means of heat removal to the 

spent fuel. If a radiological release were 

projected to occur under this unlikely 

scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is 

considered sufficient time for offsite 

authorities to implement protective 

actions using a CEMP approach to 

protect the health and safety of the 

public. 

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s 

justification for the requested 

exemptions against the criteria in 10 

CFR 50.12(a), in addition to considering 

the basis for prior EP exemption 

requests as discussed above, to 

determine whether the exemptions 

should be granted. After evaluating the 

exemption requests, the staff 

determined, as described below, that the 

criteria in 10 CFR50.12(a) are met, and 

that the exemptions should be granted. 

Assessment of the DEK EP exemptions 

is described in SECY–14–0066, 

‘‘Request by Dominion Energy 

Kewaunee, Inc. for Exemptions from 

Certain Emergency Planning 

Requirements,’’ dated June 27, 2014 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14072A257). 

The Commission approved the NRC 

staff’s intention to grant the exemptions 

in the staff requirements memorandum 

(SRM) to SECY–14–0066, dated August 

7, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14219A366). Descriptions of the 

specific exemptions being granted to 

DEK, with the NRC staff’s basis for 

granting each exemption, are provided 

in SECY–14–0066 and summarized in a 

table at the end of this document. The 

staff’s detailed review and technical 

basis for the approval of the specific EP 

exemptions being granted to DEK are 

provided in the NRC staff’s safety 

evaluation enclosed in NRC letter dated 

October 27, 2014 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML14261A223). 

A. Authorized by Law 

The licensee has proposed 

exemptions from certain EP 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 

CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV, that would 

allow DEK to revise the KPS Emergency 

Plan to reflect the permanently 

shutdown and defueled condition of the 

station. As stated above, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission 

may, upon application by any interested 

person or upon its own initiative, grant 

exemptions from the requirements of 10 

CFR Part 50. The NRC staff has 

determined that granting of the 

licensee’s proposed exemptions will not 

result in a violation of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the 

Commission’s regulations. Therefore, 

the exemptions are authorized by law. 

B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and 

Safety 

As stated previously, DEK provided 

analyses that show the radiological 

consequences of design-basis accidents 

will not exceed the limits of the EPA 

PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. 

Therefore, offsite radiological 

emergency plans required under 10 CFR 

Part 50 are no longer needed for 

protection of the public beyond the 

exclusion area boundary based on the 

radiological consequences of designbasis accidents still possible at KPS. 

Although very unlikely, there are 

postulated beyond design-basis 

accidents that might result in significant 

offsite radiological releases. However, 

NUREG–1738 confirms that the risk of 

beyond design-basis accidents is greatly 

reduced at permanently shutdown and 

defueled reactors. The staff’s analyses in 

NUREG–1738 concludes that the event 

sequences important to risk at 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

power reactors are limited to large 

earthquakes and cask drop events. For 

EP assessments, this is an important 

difference relative to operating power 

reactors where typically a large number 

of different sequences make significant 

contributions to risk. Per NUREG–1738, 

relaxation of offsite EP requirements 

under 10 CFR Part 50 a few months after 

shutdown resulted in only a small 

change in risk. The report further 

concludes that the change in risk due to 

relaxation of offsite EP requirements is 

small because the overall risk is low, 

and because even under current EP 

requirements for operating power 

reactors, EP was judged to have 

marginal impact on evacuation 

effectiveness in the severe earthquakes 

that dominate SFP risk. All other 

sequences including cask drops (for 

which offsite radiological emergency 

plans are expected to be more effective) 

are too low in likelihood to have a 

significant impact on risk. 

Therefore, granting exemptions 

eliminating the requirements of 10 CFR 

50 to maintain offsite radiological 

emergency plans and reducing the scope 

of onsite emergency planning activities 

will not present an undue risk to the 

public health and safety. 

C. Consistent With the Common Defense 

and Security 

The requested exemptions by DEK 

only involve EP requirements under 10 

CFR Part 50 and will allow DEK to 

revise the KPS Emergency Plan to reflect 

the permanently shutdown and 

defueled condition of the facility. 

Physical security measures at KPS are 

not affected by the requested EP 

exemptions. The discontinuation of 

offsite radiological emergency plans and 

the reduction in scope of the onsite 

emergency planning activities at KPS 

will not adversely affect DEK’s ability to 

physically secure the site or protect 

special nuclear material. Therefore, the 

proposed exemptions are consistent 

with the common defense and security. 

D. Special Circumstances 

Special circumstances, in accordance 

with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present 

whenever application of the regulation 

in the particular circumstances is not 

necessary to achieve the underlying 

purpose of the rule. The underlying 

purpose of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 

50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV, is to provide 

reasonable assurance that adequate 

protective measures can and will be 

taken in the event of a radiological 

emergency, to establish plume exposure 

and ingestion pathway emergency 

planning zones for nuclear power 

plants, and to ensure that licensees 

maintain effective offsite and onsite 

radiological emergency plans. The 

standards and requirements in these 

regulations were developed by 

considering the risks associated with 

operation of a power reactor at its 

licensed full-power level. These risks 

include the potential for a reactor 

accident with offsite radiological dose 

consequences. 

As discussed previously, because KPS 

is permanently shutdown and defueled, 

there is no longer a risk of offsite 

radiological release from a design-basis 

accident and the risk of a significant 

offsite radiological release from a 

beyond design-basis accident is greatly 

reduced when compared to an operating 

power reactor. The NRC staff has 

confirmed the reduced risks at KPS by 

comparing the generic risk assumptions 

in the analyses in NUREG–1738 to site 

specific conditions at KPS and 

determined that the risk values in 

NUREG–1738 bound the risks presented 

by KPS. Furthermore, the staff has 

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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 65719 

recently concluded in NUREG–2161, 

‘‘Consequence Study of a BeyondDesign-Basis Earthquake Affecting the 

Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I 

Boiling Water Reactor,’’ dated 

September 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14255A365), that, consistent with 

earlier research studies, SFPs are robust 

structures that are likely to withstand 

severe earthquakes without leaking 

cooling water and potentially 

uncovering the spent fuel. The NUREG– 

2161 study shows the likelihood of a 

radiological release from the spent fuel 

after the analyzed severe earthquake at 

the reference plant to be about one time 

in 10 million years or lower. 

The licensee has analyzed sitespecific beyond design-basis accidents 

to determine the risk of a significant 

offsite radiological release. In one such 

analysis, DEK determined that if all the 

normal cooling systems used to cool the 

SFP were lost and not restored for the 

duration of the postulated accident, 

then as of September 20, 2014, the SFP 

at the KPS would take 120 hours before 

it would begin to boil and, due to the 

loss of SFP water level from the 

resulting boil off, it would take 26 days 

for the water inventory to lower to a 

level of three feet from the top of the 

fuel. Additionally, DEK analysis shows 

that as of October 30, 2014, in the event 

of a complete SFP drain down due to a 

loss of water inventory, assuming 

natural circulation of air through the 

spent fuel racks was available, then the 

peak fuel clad temperature would 

remain below 1049 °F (565 °C), the 

temperature at which incipient cladding 

failure may occur. Therefore, in this 

postulated accident, fuel cladding 

remains intact and an offsite 

radiological release would not take 

place. 

The only beyond design-basis 

accident analysis that reached a 

condition where a significant offsite 

release might occur involved a scenario 

where the SFP drained in such a way 

that all modes of cooling or heat transfer 

are assumed to be unavailable. This 

results in an adiabatic heat-up of the 

spent fuel. DEK analysis of this beyond 

design-basis accident shows that as of 

October 21, 2014, a minimum of 10 

hours would be available between the 

time the fuel is uncovered (at which 

time adiabatic heat-up begins), until the 

fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 

1652 °F (900 °C), the temperature 

associated with rapid cladding 

oxidation and the potential for a 

significant radiological release. 

Exemptions from the offsite EP 

requirements in 10 CFR 50 have 

previously been approved by the NRC 

when the site-specific analyses show 

that at least 10 hours is available 

following a loss of SFP coolant 

inventory accident with no air cooling 

(or other methods of removing decay 

heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel 

assembly reaches the zirconium rapid 

oxidation temperature. The staff 

concluded in its previously granted 

exemptions, as it does with the DEK 

requested EP exemptions, that if a 

minimum of 10 hours is available to 

initiate mitigative actions consistent 

with plant conditions, or if needed, for 

offsite authorities to implement 

protective actions using a CEMP 

approach, then offsite radiological 

emergency plans, required under 10 

CFR Part 50, are not necessary at 

permanently shutdown and defueled 

power reactor licensees. 

Additionally, DEK committed to 

enhanced SFP makeup strategies in its 

letter to the NRC dated August 23, 2014 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13242A019). 

The multiple strategies for providing 

makeup to the SFP include: Using 

existing plant systems for inventory 

makeup; supplying water through hoses 

to a spool piece connection to the 

existing SFP piping; or using a dieseldriven portable pump to take suction 

from Lake Michigan and provide 

makeup or spray to the SFP. These 

strategies will continue to be required as 

a license condition. DEK further 

provides that the equipment needed to 

perform these actions will continue to 

be located onsite, and that the external 

makeup strategy (using a diesel driven 

portable pump) is capable of being 

deployed within 2 hours. Considering 

the very low probability of beyond 

design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, 

these diverse strategies provide defensein-depth and time to provide makeup or 

spray to the SFP before the onset of any 

postulated offsite radiological release. 

For all the reasons stated above, the 

staff finds that the licensee’s requested 

exemptions to meet the underlying 

purpose of all of the standards in 10 

CFR 50.47(b), and requirements in 10 

CFR 50.47(c)(2) and Appendix E, 

acceptably satisfy the special 

circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) 

in view of the greatly reduced risk of 

offsite radiological consequences 

associated with the permanently 

shutdown and defueled state of the KPS 

facility. 

The NRC staff has concluded that the 

exemptions being granted by this action 

will maintain an acceptable level of 

emergency preparedness at KPS and, if 

needed, that there is reasonable 

assurance that adequate offsite 

protective measures can and will be 

taken by State and local government 

agencies using a CEMP approach in the 

event of a radiological emergency at the 

KPS facility. Since the underlying 

purposes of the rules, as exempted, 

would continue to be achieved, even 

with the elimination of the requirements 

under 10 CFR Part 50 to maintain offsite 

radiological emergency plans and 

reduction in the scope of the onsite 

emergency planning activities at KPS, 

the special circumstances required by 

10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist. 

E. Environmental Considerations 

In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), 

the Commission has determined that the 

granting of this exemption will not have 

a significant effect on the quality of the 

human environment as discussed in the 

NRC staff’s Finding of No Significant 

Impact and associated Environmental 

Assessment published October 7, 2014 

(79 FR 60513). 

V. Conclusions 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a), that DEK’s request for 

exemptions from certain EP 

requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 

CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV, and as 

summarized in the table at the end of 

this document, are authorized by law, 

will not present an undue risk to the 

public health and safety, and are 

consistent with the common defense 

and security. Also, special 

circumstances are present. Therefore, 

the Commission hereby grants DEK 

exemptions from certain EP 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 

CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix E, Section IV, as discussed 

and evaluated in detail in the staff’s 

safety evaluation dated October 27, 

2014. The exemptions are effective as of 

October 30, 2014. 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day 

of October, 2014. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Michele G. Evans, 

Director, Division of Operating Reactor 

Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor 

Regulation. 

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65720 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 

IV—TABLE OF EXEMPTIONS GRANTED TO DEK 

10 CFR 50.47 NRC staff basis for exemption 

10 CFR 50.47(b) .......................................................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require offsite emergency response plans.

In the Statement of Considerations (SOC) for the final rule for emergency planning (EP) requirements for independent spent fuel storage 

installations (ISFSIs) and for monitor retrievable storage installations 

(MRS) (60 Federal Register (FR) 32430; June 22, 1995), the Commission responded to comments concerning offsite EP for ISFSIs or 

an MRS and concluded that, ‘‘the offsite consequences of potential 

accidents at an ISFSI or a MRS would not warrant establishing 

Emergency Planning Zones [EPZ].’’ 

In a nuclear power reactor’s permanently defueled state, the accident 

risks are more similar to an ISFSI or MRS than an operating nuclear 

power plant. The EP program would be similar to that required for an 

ISFSI under Section 72.32(a) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) when fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) has 

more than 5 years of decay time and would not change substantially 

when all the fuel is transferred from the SFP to an onsite ISFSI. Exemptions from offsite EP requirements have previously been approved when the site-specific analyses show that at least 10 hours is 

available from a partial drain-down event where cooling of the spent 

fuel is not effective until the hottest fuel assembly reaches 900 °C. 

The technical basis that underlied the approval of the exemption request is based partly on the analysis of a time period that spent fuel 

stored in the SFP is unlikely to reach the zirconium ignition temperature in less than 10 hours. This time period is based on a heat-up 

calculation which uses several simplifying assumptions. Some of 

these assumptions are conservative (adiabatic conditions), while others are non-conservative (no oxidation below 900 °C). Weighing the 

conservatisms and non-conservatisms, the NRC staff judges that this 

calculation reasonably represents conditions which may occur in the 

event of an SFP accident. The staff concluded that if 10 hours were 

available to initiate mitigative actions, or if needed, offsite protective 

actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan 

(CEMP), formal offsite radiological emergency plans are not necessary for these permanently defueled nuclear power reactor licensees. 

As supported by the licensee’s SFP analysis, the NRC staff believes 

an exemption to the requirements for formal offsite radiological emergency plans is justified for a zirconium fire scenario considering the 

low likelihood of this event together with time available to take mitigative or protective actions between the initiating event and before 

the onset of a postulated fire. 

The Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK) analysis has demonstrated that 90 days after shutdown, the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed the limits of the 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Protective Action 

Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary. These analyses 

also show that after the spent fuel has decayed for 17 months, for 

beyond-design-basis events where the SFP is drained, air cooling 

will prevent the fuel from reaching the lowest temperature where incipient cladding failure may occur (565 °C). In the event that air cooling is not possible, 10 hours is available to take mitigative or, if 

needed, offsite protective actions using a CEMP from the time the 

fuel is uncovered until it reaches the auto-ignition temperature of 

900 °C. 

DEK has also furnished information on its SFP inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the loss of water inventory. The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SPF include: using existing plant 

systems for inventory makeup; supplying water via hoses to a spool 

piece connection to the existing SFP piping; or using a diesel-driven 

portable pump to take suction from Lake Michigan and provide 

makeup or spray to the SFP. DEK also stated that the tools and 

equipment needed to perform these actions are located on site and 

that the external makeup strategy (using a diesel driven portable 

pump) was able to be deployed within 2 hours. DEK believes these 

diverse strategies provide defense-in-depth and ample time to provide makeup or spray to the SFP prior to the onset of zirconium 

cladding ignition when considering very low probability of beyond design-basis events affecting the SFP. 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(1) .................................................................................. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the need for Emergency Planning Zones 

(EPZs). 

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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 65721 

IV—TABLE OF EXEMPTIONS GRANTED TO DEK—Continued 

10 CFR 50.47 NRC staff basis for exemption 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(3) ..................................................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the need for an Emergency Operations Facility.

Decommissioning power reactors present a low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a radiological release together with the time 

available to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective actions 

using a CEMP between the initiating event and before the onset of a 

postulated fire. As such, an emergency operations facility would not 

be required. The ‘‘nuclear island,’’ control room, or other onsite location can provide for the communication and coordination with offsite 

organizations for the level of support required. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) ..................................................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require reference to formal offsite radiological emergency response plans.

Decommissioning power reactors present a low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a radiological release together with the time 

available to take mitigative or if needed, offsite protective actions 

using a CEMP between the initiating event and before the onset of a 

postulated fire. As such, formal offsite radiological emergency response plans are not required. 

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 99–01, ‘‘Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors’’ (Revision 6), was found to be an acceptable method for development of 

emergency action levels (EALs) and was endorsed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in a letter dated March 28, 

2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12346A463). NEI 99–01 provides 

EALs for non-passive operating nuclear power reactors, permanently 

defueled reactors, and ISFSIs. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) .................................................................................. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require early notification of the public and a means 

to provide instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone. 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) .................................................................................. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require prompt communications with the public. 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(7) .................................................................................. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require information to be made available to the public on a periodic basis about how they will be notified and what their 

initial protective actions should be. 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) .................................................................................. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the capability for monitoring offsite consequences. 

10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) ................................................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would reduce the range of protective actions developed for emergency workers and the public. Consideration of evacuation, sheltering, or the use of potassium iodide will no longer be necessary. 

Evacuation times will no longer need to developed or updated. Protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ will not need 

to be developed.

In the unlikely event of an SFP accident, the iodine isotopes, which 

contribute to an off-site dose from an operating reactor accident, are 

not present, so potassium iodide distribution would no longer serve 

as an effective or necessary supplemental protective action. 

The Commission responded to comments in its SOC for the final rule 

for emergency planning requirements for ISFSIs and MRS facilities 

(60 FR 32435), and concluded that, ‘‘the offsite consequences of potential accidents at an ISFSI or an MRS would not warrant establishing Emergency Planning Zones.’’ Additionally, in the SOC for the 

final rule for EP requirements for ISFSIs and for MRS facilities (60 

FR 32430), the Commission responded to comments concerning 

site-specific EP that includes evacuation of surrounding population 

for an ISFSI not at a reactor site, and concluded that, ‘‘The Commission does not agree that as a general matter emergency plans for an 

ISFSI must include evacuation planning.’’ 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) .................................................................................. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the establishment of a 10 mile radius plume 

exposure pathway EPZ and a 50 mile radius ingestion pathway EPZ. 

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65722 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 1 .....................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require onsite protective actions during hostile action.

The EP Rule published in the Federal Register (76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011) amended certain requirements in 10 CFR Part 50. 

Among the changes, the definition of ‘‘hostile action’’ was added as 

an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel. This 

definition is based on the definition of ‘‘hostile action’’ provided in 

NRC Bulletin 2005–02, ‘‘Emergency Preparedness and Response 

Actions for Security-Based Events.’’ NRC Bulletin 2005–02 was not 

applicable to nuclear power reactors that have permanently ceased 

operations and have certified that fuel has been removed from the 

reactor vessel. 

The NRC excluded non-power reactors from the scope of ‘‘hostile action’’ at the time of the rulemaking because, as defined in 10 CFR 

50.2, a non-power reactor is not considered a nuclear power reactor 

and a regulatory basis had not been developed to support the inclusion of non-power reactors within the scope of ‘‘hostile action.’’ Similarly, a decommissioning power reactor or an ISFSI is not a ‘‘nuclear 

reactor’’ as defined in 10 CFR Part 50. A decommissioning power reactor also has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. For all of 

these reasons, the staff concludes that a decommissioning power reactor is not a facility that falls within the scope of ‘‘hostile action.’’ 

Similarly, for security, risk insights can be used to determine which targets are important to protect against sabotage. A level of security 

commensurate with the consequences of a sabotage event is required and is evaluated on a site-specific basis. The severity of the 

consequences declines as fuel ages and, thereby, removes over 

time the underlying concern that a sabotage attack could cause offsite radiological consequences. 

Although, this analysis provides a justification for exempting KPS from 

‘‘hostile action’’ related requirements, some EP requirements for security-based events are maintained. The classification of securitybased events, notification of offsite authorities and coordination with 

offsite agencies under a CEMP concept are still required. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 2 ..................................................... Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language concerning the evacuation time analyses within the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ for the licensee’s initial application 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 3 .....................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require use of NRC-approved evacuation time estimates (ETEs) and updates to State and local governments when developing protective action strategies.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 4 .....................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require licensees to develop evacuation time estimates based on the most recent census data and submit the ETE 

analysis to the NRC prior to providing it to State and local government for developing protective action strategies.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 5 .....................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require licensees to estimate the EPZ permanent 

resident population changes once a year between decennial censuses.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV 6 .....................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the licensee to submit an updated ETE analysis to the NRC based on changes in the resident population that result in exceeding specific evacuation time increase criteria.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.1 ..................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from the word ‘‘operating’’ in the requirement to describe the normal plant organization.

Based on the permanently shutdown and defueled status of the reactor, a decommissioning reactor is not authorized to operate under 10 

CFR 50.82(a). Because the licensee cannot operate the reactors, the 

licensee does not have a ‘‘plant operating organization.’’ 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.3 ..................................................

The NRC is granting exemption to the requirement to describe the licensee’s headquarters personnel sent to the site to augment the onsite emergency response organization.

The number of staff at decommissioning sites is generally small but is 

commensurate with the need to safely store spent fuel at the facility 

in a manner that is protective of public health and safety. Decommissioning sites typically have a level of emergency response that does 

not require response by the licensee’s headquarters personnel. 

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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 65723 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A. 4 ................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the licensee to identify a position and function within its organization which will carry the responsibility for making offsite dose projections.

Although, the likelihood of events that would result in doses in excess 

of the EPA PAGs to the public beyond the owner controlled area 

boundary based on the permanently shutdown and defueled status 

of the reactor is extremely low, the licensee still must be able to determine if a radiological release is occurring. If a release is occurring, 

then the licensee staff should promptly communicate that information 

to offsite authorities for their consideration. The offsite organizations 

are responsible for deciding what, if any, protective actions should 

be taken based on comprehensive emergency planning. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A. 5 ................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement for the licensee 

to identify individuals with special qualifications for coping with emergencies.

The number of staff at decommissioning sites is generally small but 

should be commensurate with the need to operate the facility in a 

manner that is protective of public health and safety. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.7 ..................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require a description of the assistance expected 

from State, local, and Federal agencies for coping with a hostile action.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.8 ..................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement to identify the 

State and local officials for ordering protective actions and evacuations.

Offsite emergency measures are limited to support provided by local 

police, fire departments, and ambulance and hospital services, as 

appropriate. Due to the low probability of design basis accidents or 

other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, protective actions 

such as evacuation should not be required, but could be implemented at the discretion of offsite authorities using a CEMP. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV A.9 ..................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement for the licensee 

to provide an analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel are not 

assigned responsibilities that would prevent them from performing 

their assigned emergency plan functions.

Responsibilities should be well defined in the emergency plan and procedures, regularly tested through drills and exercises audited and inspected by the licensee and the NRC. The duties of the onshift personnel at a decommissioning reactor facility are not as complicated 

and diverse as those for an operating power reactor. 

The NRC staff considered the similarity between the staffing levels at a 

permanently shutdown and defueled reactor and staffing levels at an 

operating power reactor site. The minimal systems and equipment 

needed to maintain the spent nuclear fuel in the SFP or in a dry 

cask storage system in a safe condition requires minimal personnel 

and is governed by Technical Specifications. In the EP final rule published in the Federal Register (76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011), 

the NRC concluded that the staffing analysis requirement was not 

necessary for non-power reactor licensees due to the small staffing 

levels required to operate the facility. 

The NRC staff also examined the actions required to mitigate the very 

low probability beyond design-basis events for the SFP. Additionally, 

DEK also furnished information on its SFP inventory makeup strategies for mitigating the loss of water inventory. The multiple strategies 

for providing makeup to the SFP include: using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; supplying water via hoses to a spool 

piece connection to the existing SFP piping; or using a diesel-driven 

portable pump to take suction from Lake Michigan and provide 

makeup or spray to the SFP. DEK further provided that the tools and 

equipment needed to perform these actions are located on site and 

the external makeup strategy (using a diesel driven portable pump) 

was demonstrated to be capable of being deployed within 2 hours, 

significantly less time than the 10 hours that would be available for 

ad hoc response. DEK believes, and the NRC staff agrees, that 

these diverse strategies provide defense-in-depth and ample time to 

provide makeup or spray to the SFP prior to the onset of zirconium 

cladding ignition when considering very low probability beyond design-basis events affecting the SFP. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV B.1 ..................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require offsite emergency actions levels and offsite 

protective measures and associate offsite monitoring for the emergency conditions.

In addition, the NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule 

language that would otherwise require emergency action levels 

based on hostile action.

NEI 99–01, ‘‘Development of Emergency Action levels for Non-Passive 

Reactors’’ (Revision 6), was found to be an acceptable method for 

development of EALs and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter 

dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12346A463). No 

offsite protective actions are anticipated to be necessary, so classification above the alert level is no longer required, which is consistent with ISFSI facilities. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1. 

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65724 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV C.1 .................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require emergency actions levels based on operating reactor concerns, such as offsite radiation monitoring, pressure 

in containment, and the response of the emergency core cooling system. In addition, the NRC is striking language that would otherwise 

require offsite emergency action levels of a site area emergency and 

a general emergency.

Containment parameters do not provide an indication of the conditions 

at a defueled facility and emergency core cooling systems are no 

longer required. Other indications, such as SFP level or temperature, 

can be used at sites where there is spent fuel in the SFPs. 

In the SOC for the final rule for EP requirements for ISFSIs and MRS) 

facilities (60 FR 32430), the Commission responded to comments 

concerning a general emergency at an ISFSI and an MRS, and concluded that, ‘‘. . . an essential element of a General Emergency is 

that a release can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective 

Action Guidelines exposure levels off site for more than the immediate site area.’’ 

The probability of a condition reaching the level above an emergency 

classification of alert is very low. In the event of an accident at a 

defueled facility that meets the conditions for relaxation of EP requirements, there will be available time for event mitigation and, if 

necessary, implementation of offsite protective actions using a 

CEMP. 

NEI 99–01, ‘‘Development of Emergency Action levels for Non-Passive 

Reactors,’’ (Revision 6) was found to be an acceptable method for 

development of EALs and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter 

dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12346A463). No 

offsite protective actions are anticipated to be necessary, so classification above the alert level is no longer required. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV C.2 .................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the licensee to assess, classify, and declare 

an emergency condition within 15 minutes.

In the EP rule published in the Federal Register (76 FR 72560), nonpower reactor licensees were not required to assess, classify and 

declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes. An SFP and an 

ISFSI are also not nuclear power reactors as defined in the NRC’s 

regulations. A decommissioning power reactor has a low likelihood of 

a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite 

protective measures. For these reasons, the NRC staff concludes 

that a decommissioning power reactor should not be required to assess, classify and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.1 .................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the licensee to reach agreement with local, 

State, and Federal officials and agencies for prompt notification of 

protective measures or evacuations and the associated titles of officials to be notified for each agency within the EPZs.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.2 .................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement for the licensee 

to annually disseminate general information on emergency planning 

and evacuations within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The need 

for signage or other measure to address transient populations is also 

being struck.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.1. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.3 .................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the licensee to have the capability to make 

notifications to State and local government agencies within 15 minutes of declaring an emergency.

While the capability needs to exist for the notification of offsite government agencies within a specified time period, previous exemptions 

have allowed for extending the State and local government agencies’ 

notification time up to 60 minutes based on the site-specific justification provided. 

DEK’s exemption request provides that the KPS will make notifications 

to the State of Wisconsin, to the local county (Kewaunee) and the 

NRC within 60 minutes of declaration of an event. In the permanently defueled condition of the reactor, the rapidly developing scenarios associated with events initiated during reactor power operation are no longer credible. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV D.4 .................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement for the licensee 

to obtain FEMA approval of its backup alert and notification capability.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 regarding the alert and notification system requirements. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.8.a.(i) ..........................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the licensee to have an onsite technical support center and emergency operations facility..

Due to the low probability of design-basis accidents or other credible 

events to exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the available 

time for event mitigation at a decommissioning reactor and, if needed, to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP, an emergency operations facility (EOF) would not be required to support offsite agency response. Onsite actions may be directed from the control room or other location, without the requirements imposed on a 

technical support center (TSC). 

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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 65725 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.8.a.(ii) ..........................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the licensee to have an onsite operational 

support center.

NUREG–0696, ‘‘Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities,’’ provides that the operational support center (OSC) is an onsite 

area separate from the control room and the TSC where licensee 

operations support personnel will assemble in an emergency. For a 

decommissioning power reactor, an OSC is no longer required to 

meet its original purpose of an assembly area for plant logistical support during an emergency. The OSC function can be incorporated 

into another facility. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.8.b. and subpart Sections IV 

E.8.b.(1)–E.8.b.(5).

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements related to an 

offsite emergency operations facility location, space and size, communications capability, access to plant data and radiological information, and access to coping and office supplies. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.8.c. and Sections IV E.8.c.(1)– 

E.8.c.(3).

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements to have an 

emergency operations facility with the capabilities to obtain and display plant data and radiological information; the capability to analyze 

technical information and provide briefings; and the capability to support events occurring at more than one site (if the emergency operations center supports more than one site). 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.8.d ...............................................

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements to have an alternate facility that would be accessible even if the site is under threat 

of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for 

augmentation of emergency response staff.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1 regarding 

hostile action. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.8.e ............................................... Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). 

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement regarding the 

need for the licensee to comply with paragraph 8.b of this section 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.9.a ...............................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the licensee to have communications with 

State and local governments that are within the plume exposure 

pathway EPZ (which is no longer required by the exemption granted 

to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)) but are not contiguous with or bordering on 

the licensee site boundary.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 

Communications with State and local governments that are not contiguous with or bordering the site boundary will no longer be required. 

However, the contiguous State and the local governments in which 

the nuclear facility is located will still need to be informed of events 

and emergencies, so lines of communication must be maintained. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.9.c ...............................................

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements for communication and testing provisions between the control room, the onsite technical support center, State/local emergency operations facilities, and 

field assessment teams.

Because of the low probability of design-basis accidents or other credible events that would be expected to exceed the EPA PAGs and the 

available time for event mitigation and, if needed, implementation of 

offsite protective actions using a CEMP, there is no need for the 

TSC, EOF, or offsite field assessment teams. 

Also refer to justification for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). Communication with 

State and local emergency operation centers is maintained to coordinate assistance on site if required. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV E.9.d ...............................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require provisions for communications from the control room, onsite technical support center, and emergency operations 

facility with NRC Headquarters and appropriate Regional Operations 

Center.

The functions of the control room, EOF, TSC, and OSC may be combined into one or more locations due to the smaller facility staff and 

the greatly reduced required interaction with State and local emergency response facilities. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.1 and Section IV F.1. v.iii ...........

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the licensee to provide training and drills for 

the licensee’s headquarters personnel, Civil Defense personnel, or 

local news media.

Decommissioning power reactor sites typically have a level of emergency response that does not require additional response by the licensee’s headquarters personnel, Civil Defense personnel, or local 

news media. Therefore, the NRC staff considers it reasonable to exempt the licensee from training and drill requirements for these personnel. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2 ..................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require testing of a public alert and notification system.

Because of the low probability of design basis accidents or other credible events that would be expected to exceed the limits of EPA 

PAGs and the available time for event mitigation and offsite protective actions from a CEMP, the public alert and notification system will 

not be used and, therefore, requires no testing. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). 

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65726 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.a. and Section IV F.2.a.(i) 

through IV F.2.a.(iii).

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements for full participation exercises and the submittal of the associated exercise scenarios 

to the NRC.

Due to the low probability of design basis accidents or other credible 

events that would be expected to exceed the limits of EPA PAGs, 

the available time for event mitigation and, if necessary, implementation of offsite protective actions using a CEMP, no formal offsite radiological emergency plans are required. 

The intent of submitting exercise scenarios at an operating power reactor site is to ensure that licensees utilize different scenarios in order 

to prevent the preconditioning of responders at power reactors. For 

decommissioning power reactor sites, there are limited events that 

could occur, and as such, the previously routine progression to general emergency in an operating power reactor site scenario is not applicable. 

The licensee would be exempt from 10 CFR. 

Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.(i)–(iii) because the licensee 

would be exempt from the umbrella provision of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.b ...............................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the licensee to submit scenarios for its biennial exercises of its onsite emergency plan. In addition, the NRC is 

granting exemption from portions of the rule language that requires 

assessment of offsite releases, protective action decision making, 

and reference to the Technical Support Center, Operations Support 

Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. 

The low probability of design basis accidents or other credible events 

that would exceed the EPA PAGs, the available time for event mitigation and, if necessary, implementation of offsite protective actions 

using a CEMP, render a TSC, OSC and EOF unnecessary. The principal functions required by regulation can be performed at an onsite 

location that does not meet the requirements of the TSC, OSC or 

EOF. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.c. and Sections IV F.2.c.(1) 

through F.2.c.(5).

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. 

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements regarding the 

need for the licensee to exercise offsite plans biennially with full participation by each offsite authority having a role under the radiological response plan. The NRC is also granting exemptions from the 

conditions for conducting these exercises (including hostile action exercises) if two different licensees have facilities on the same site or 

on adjacent, contiguous sites, or share most of the elements defining 

co-located licensees. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.d ...............................................

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements to obtain State 

participation in an ingestion pathway exercise and a hostile action 

exercise, with each State that has responsibilities, at least once per 

exercise cycle.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.e ...............................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the licensee to allow participation exercise in 

licensee drills by any State and local Government in the plume exposure pathway EPZ when requested.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.f ................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require FEMA to consult with the NRC on remedial 

exercises. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule 

language that discuss the extent of State and local participation in 

remedial exercises.

The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency is responsible for 

evaluating the adequacy of offsite response during an exercise. No 

action is expected from State or local government organizations in 

response to an event at a decommissioning power reactor site other 

than onsite firefighting, law enforcement and ambulance/medical 

services support. A memorandum of understanding should be in 

place for those services. Offsite response organizations will continue 

to take actions on a comprehensive emergency planning basis to 

protect the health and safety of the public as they would at any other 

industrial site. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.i ................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that 

would otherwise require the licensee to drill and exercise scenarios 

that include a wide spectrum of radiological release events and hostile action.

Due to the low probability of design basis accidents or other credible 

events to exceed the EPA PAGs, the available time for event mitigation and, if needed, implementation of offsite protective actions using 

a CEMP, the previously routine progression to general emergency in 

power reactor site scenarios is not applicable to a decommissioning 

site. Therefore, the licensee is not expected to demonstrate response to a wide spectrum of events. 

Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1 regarding hostile action. 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV F.2.j ................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements regarding the 

need for the licensee’s emergency response organization to demonstrate proficiency in key skills in the principal functional areas of 

emergency response. Additionally, the NRC is granting exemption 

during an eight calendar year exercise cycle, from demonstrating 

proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to such scenarios 

as hostile actions, unplanned minimal radiological release, 

§ 50.54(hh)(2) implementation strategies, and scenarios involving 

rapid escalation to a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. 

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Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 214 / Wednesday, November 5, 2014 / Notices 65727 

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 

10 CFR Part 50, App. E, Section IV I ......................................................

The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements regarding the 

need for the licensee to develop a range of protective action for onsite personnel during hostile actions.

Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.d. 

[FR Doc. 2014–26292 Filed 11–4–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the 

ACRS Subcommittee on Structural 

Analysis; Notice of Meeting 

The ACRS Subcommittee on 

Structural Analysis will hold a meeting 

on November 17, 2014, Room T–2B1, 

11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland. 

The entire meeting will be open to 

public attendance. 

The agenda for the subject meeting 

shall be as follows: 

Monday, November 17, 2014—8:30 a.m. 

Until 12:00 p.m. 

The Subcommittee will review and 

discuss the methodology used for 

uncertainty in seismic hazard curve 

development. The Subcommittee will 

hear presentations by and hold 

discussions with the NRC staff and 

other interested persons regarding this 

matter. The Subcommittee will gather 

information, analyze relevant issues and 

facts, and formulate proposed positions 

and actions, as appropriate, for 

deliberation by the Full Committee. 

Members of the public desiring to 

provide oral statements and/or written 

comments should notify the Designated 

Federal Official (DFO), Maitri Banerjee 

(Telephone 301–415–6973 or Email: 

Maitri.Banerjee@nrc.gov) five days prior 

to the meeting, if possible, so that 

appropriate arrangements can be made. 

Thirty-five hard copies of each 

presentation or handout should be 

provided to the DFO thirty minutes 

before the meeting. In addition, one 

electronic copy of each presentation 

should be emailed to the DFO one day 

before the meeting. If an electronic copy 

cannot be provided within this 

timeframe, presenters should provide 

the DFO with a CD containing each 

presentation at least thirty minutes 

before the meeting. Electronic 

recordings will be permitted only 

during those portions of the meeting 

that are open to the public. Detailed 

procedures for the conduct of and 

participation in ACRS meetings were 

published in the Federal Register on 

October 13, 2014 (79 FR 59307–59308). 

Detailed meeting agendas and meeting 

transcripts are available on the NRC 

Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/acrs. Information 

regarding topics to be discussed, 

changes to the agenda, whether the 

meeting has been canceled or 

rescheduled, and the time allotted to 

present oral statements can be obtained 

from the Web site cited above or by 

contacting the identified DFO. 

Moreover, in view of the possibility that 

the schedule for ACRS meetings may be 

adjusted by the Chairman as necessary 

to facilitate the conduct of the meeting, 

persons planning to attend should check 

with these references if such 

rescheduling would result in a major 

inconvenience. 

If attending this meeting, please enter 

through the One White Flint North 

building, 11555 Rockville Pike, 

Rockville, MD. After registering with 

security, please contact Mr. Theron 

Brown (Telephone 240–888–9835) to be 

escorted to the meeting room. 

Dated: October 29, 2014. 

Cayetano Santos, 

Chief, Technical Support Branch, Advisory 

Committee on Reactor Safeguards. 

[FR Doc. 2014–26291 Filed 11–4–14; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY 

COMMISSION 

Advisory Committee on Reactor 

Safeguards (ACRS); Meeting of the 

ACRS Subcommittee on Reliability & 

PRA; Notice of Meeting 

The ACRS Subcommittee on 

Reliability & PRA will hold a meeting 

on November 19, 2014, Room T–2B1, 

11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 

Maryland. 

The meeting will be open to public 

attendance. 

The agenda for the subject meeting 

shall be as follows: 

Wednesday, November 19, 2014–1:00 

p.m. Until 5:00 p.m. 

The Subcommittee will discuss the 

containment protection and release 

reduction (CPRR) rulemaking risk 

evaluation and scoping study of human 

error probabilities. The Subcommittee 

will hear presentations by and hold 

discussions with the NRC staff and 

other interested persons regarding this 

matter. The Subcommittee will gather 

information, analyze relevant issues and 

facts, and formulate proposed positions 

and actions, as appropriate, for 

deliberation by the Full Committee. 

Members of the public desiring to 

provide oral statements and/or written 

comments should notify the Designated 

Federal Official (DFO), John Lai 

(Telephone 301–415–5197 or Email: 

John.Lai@nrc.gov) five days prior to the 

meeting, if possible, so that appropriate 

arrangements can be made. Thirty-five 

hard copies of each presentation or 

handout should be provided to the DFO 

thirty minutes before the meeting. In 

addition, one electronic copy of each 

presentation should be emailed to the 

DFO one day before the meeting. If an 

electronic copy cannot be provided 

within this timeframe, presenters 

should provide the DFO with a CD 

containing each presentation at least 

thirty minutes before the meeting. 

Electronic recordings will be permitted 

only during those portions of the 

meeting that are open to the public. 

Detailed procedures for the conduct of 

and participation in ACRS meetings 

were published in the Federal Register 

on October 13, 2014 (79 FR 59307– 

59308). 

Detailed meeting agendas and meeting 

transcripts are available on the NRC 

Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/acrs. Information 

regarding topics to be discussed, 

changes to the agenda, whether the 

meeting has been canceled or 

rescheduled, and the time allotted to 

present oral statements can be obtained 

from the Web site cited above or by 

contacting the identified DFO. 

Moreover, in view of the possibility that 

the schedule for ACRS meetings may be 

adjusted by the Chairman as necessary 

to facilitate the conduct of the meeting, 

persons planning to attend should check 

with these references if such 

rescheduling would result in a major 

inconvenience. 

If attending this meeting, please enter 

through the One White Flint North 

building, 11555 Rockville Pike, 

Rockville, MD. After registering with 

security, please contact Mr. Theron 

Brown (Telephone 240–888–9835) to be 

escorted to the meeting room. 

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