2010 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-16-2010

USA v. John Doe

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 09-2615

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. John Doe" (2010). 2010 Decisions. Paper 671.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/671
Honorable J. William Ditter, Jr., Senior United States *

District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by

designation.

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 09-2615

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JOHN DOE,

 Appellant

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1-05-cr-00043-1)

District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.

 

Argued April 14, 2010

Before: FISHER and COWEN, Circuit Judges,

and DITTER, District Judge.

*
2

(Filed: August 16, 2010 )

Candace Cain (Argued)

Office of Federal Public Defender

1001 Liberty Avenue

1500 Liberty Center

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Thomas W. Patton

Office of Federal Public Defender

1001 State Street

1111 Renaissance Centre

Erie, PA 16501

Counsel for Appellant

Robert L. Eberhardt

Laura S. Irwin (Argued)

Office of the United States Attorney

700 Grant Street, Suite 4000

Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Marshall J. Piccinini

Office of United States Attorney

17 South Park Row, Room A330

Erie, PA 16501

Counsel for Appellee

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 
The defendant’s name has been changed to protect his 1

identity.

3

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

This appeal asks whether 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a), which

forbids a district court from imposing a term of imprisonment at

initial sentencing for the purpose of drug rehabilitation, restricts

a district court from considering medical and rehabilitative

needs when revoking a defendant’s supervised release and

requiring the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in

prison. The District Court sentenced the defendant, John Doe,

to 24 months of imprisonment upon revocation of his supervised

release with the objective of helping him recover from his

cocaine addiction. On appeal, Doe challenges the procedural

and substantive reasonableness of that sentence. Because we

hold that the plain language of § 3583(e) governing

discretionary revocation of supervised release expressly requires

consideration of medical needs, we will affirm.

I.

Doe was indicted on September 13, 2005 for possession 1

with intent to deliver five grams or more of crack cocaine under

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(iii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Doe

entered a guilty plea. On August 28, 2006, the District Court

sentenced Doe to 30 months of imprisonment followed by 4

years of supervised release. Doe’s initial sentence was a

significant reduction from the Guidelines Range of 60 to 65
Under Guidelines § 5K1.1, the government may file a 2

motion for reduced sentence in circumstances where the

defendant “provided substantial assistance” to the government

in an investigation.

4

months of imprisonment and was based in large part upon Doe’s

cooperation with law enforcement in other investigations, as

expressed by the Government in a 5K motion.2

At the sentencing hearing, both the District Court and the

prosecutor acknowledged that Doe had a severe addiction to

cocaine. In the Judgment and Commitment Order, the District

Court recommended Doe be assigned to the 500-hour drug

rehabilitation program conducted by the Bureau of Prisons. In

addition, the District Court ordered that, while on supervised

release, Doe must not unlawfully possess or use a controlled

substance and that he must submit to drug testing within 15 days

of release from incarceration and at least two other times

thereafter. The Order further required that Doe “participate in

a program of testing and, if necessary, treatment for substance

abuse as directed by the probation officer until such time as the

defendant is released from the program by the probation

officer,” and “contribute to the cost of services for any such

treatment.” (App. 4.) Doe was resentenced pursuant to a sealed

Rule 35(b) motion on August 1, 2007, to 12 months of

imprisonment, which amounted to time served, and his 4 years

of supervised release began on August 7.

While on supervised release, Doe enrolled in the TriState Business Institute’s Academy of Cosmetology to learn to
5

be a barber. In a letter to Doe’s probation officer, a school

administrator described Doe as “a great student” who was “very

dedicated” and had made the Dean’s list. (Sealed App. 36.)

Throughout his supervised release, Doe kept his appointments

with his probation officer and participated in a mental health

treatment program for his drug addiction.

Despite these positive efforts, Doe was not successful in

refraining from the use of cocaine. On February 27, April 7, and

April 10 of 2008, Doe submitted urine samples to his probation

officer that tested positive for cocaine. In an effort to aid his

rehabilitation, Doe was offered the option to waive a hearing on

these violations in exchange for modification of the terms of his

supervised release. He accepted this waiver, and his release was

modified to include 180 days of home confinement with

electronic monitoring and participation in a mental health

treatment program approved by the probation officer.

The new conditions did not, however, have any

substantial effect on Doe’s cocaine use. On May 12, May 19,

and June 3 of 2008, Doe again submitted urine samples that

tested positive for cocaine. On July 2, 2008, Doe’s probation

officer filed a petition on supervised release in the District Court

noting that Doe had submitted six cocaine-positive urine

samples since the beginning of his supervised release. At the

request of the probation officer, the District Court entered an

order on July 7, 2008, modifying Doe’s supervised release to

again include 180 days of home confinement with electronic

monitoring and participation in a mental health treatment

program approved by the probation officer.
6

Again, the modifications did not deter Doe from his drug

use. On November 4, 2008, Doe’s probation officer filed a

second petition on supervised release, noting Doe had submitted

six more urine samples that tested positive for cocaine: July 8,

September 30, October 3, October 7, October 14, and

October 21 of 2008. The petition catalogs the utter failure of

Doe’s rehabilitative efforts:

During the course of the defendant’s supervision,

he has been positive for cocaine on 18 different

occasions. He has been given the opportunity of

inpatient and outpatient drug treatment, and local

social services of outpatient mental health, and

housing assistance. The defendant was placed on

the electronic monitor on July 15, 2008, which did

not curb his illegal drug usage . . .

(App. 47.) The probation officer requested an order that Doe

appear and show cause why his supervised release should not be

revoked.

At the show cause hearing, Doe requested one more

opportunity to comply with the terms of his supervised release.

The government agreed, on the condition that “this is his last

chance.” (Sealed App. 39.) On November 24, 2008, the District

Court revoked Doe’s supervised release and imposed a new term

of supervised release of 36 months, and placed him on electronic

monitoring for six months, to run consecutively with his

ongoing term of monitoring from the prior modification. (Id. at

40.)
7

Doe’s “last chance” proved to be another failure. On

May 6, 2009, Doe’s probation officer filed a third petition on

supervised release based on two more urine samples that tested

positive for cocaine and Doe’s admission on April 13, 2009, that

he had used cocaine during the preceding weekend. The District

Court again convened a show cause hearing at which Doe

admitted the violations. At sentencing, the government initially

argued that Doe was making “a laughing stock of our supervised

release system” and that he should serve 36 months

incarceration with no supervised release. (Id. at 46-47). Doe’s

counsel suggested a sentencing range of 4 to 10 months, or in

any event no greater than 18 months, of incarceration followed

by additional supervised release.

The District Court then revoked Doe’s supervised release

and imposed a sentence of 24 months of incarceration. In doing

so, the judge explained:

Well, what I am going to do here is, I am going to

impose a sentence of 24 months with no

supervision. I am not doing it because you – so

much because you violated the law, but I am

doing it in an attempt to protect you from

yourself. You know, a serious addiction like that

can only have one final result, and we don’t want

it to happen with you.

(Id. at 53.) Doe objected to this reasoning, noting “[t]here is

Third Circuit case law that I believe stands for the proposition

that you can’t incarcerate someone for treatment purposes.”

(Id.)
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 3

§ 3231. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

18 U.S.C. §§ 3742(a)(1)-(2).

8

The government then modified its request and asked that

12 months supervised release be imposed following the 24

months of incarceration and that the judge make “clear that you

are not sentencing him for the purpose of keeping him clean, but

in response to the violations which he committed[.]” (Id. at 55.)

The District Court modified the sentence to include supervised

release but did not substantially retreat from its rationale for the

sentence, responding, “I can’t say no because the sentence is

certainly intended for, in part to keep him clean. But again, he

wouldn’t be here [] if he hadn’t violated the law. So, for that

dual reason, we are imposing sentence.” (Id. at 55-56.) The

District Court then imposed a 24 month sentence of

imprisonment followed by 12 months of supervised release.

This timely appeal followed.3

II.

This Court reviews the procedural and substantive

reasonableness of a district court’s sentence upon revocation of

supervised release for abuse of discretion. See United States v.

Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007). Procedurally, the

sentencing court must give “rational and meaningful

consideration” to the relevant § 3553(a) factors. United States

v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). Where

procedural reasonableness turns on a question of statutory

interpretation, we conduct plenary review of the meaning of the
9

statute. See United States v. Coleman, 451 F.3d 154, 156 (3d

Cir. 2006). If a sentencing court followed the appropriate

procedures in imposing the sentence, we then look to whether

the sentence itself was substantively reasonable. See United

States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2006). Substantive

reasonableness inquires into “whether the final sentence,

wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was

premised upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the

relevant factors.” United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197,

204 (3d Cir. 2006). Absent procedural error, we will affirm the

sentencing court “unless no reasonable sentencing court would

have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for

the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko,

562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009).

III.

Doe’s claims of procedural and substantive

unreasonableness stem from essentially the same contention –

that the District Court erred by considering Doe’s need for drug

rehabilitation in setting the length of his post-revocation

imprisonment. We will address his arguments in turn.

A. Procedural Reasonableness

Doe contends that his sentence is procedurally

unreasonable because the District Court is forbidden under 18

U.S.C. § 3582(a), 28 U.S.C. § 994(k), and our holding in United

States v. Manzella, 475 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2007), from

considering his need for drug rehabilitation in imposing a postrevocation term of imprisonment. Because we hold that the
10

plain language and operation of the statute governing postrevocation sentencing, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) and (g), permits a

district court to consider medical and rehabilitative needs in

imposing a term of post-revocation imprisonment, we will

affirm the sentence as procedurally reasonable.

This case turns on certain pivotal distinctions between the

statutes governing post-conviction sentencing and those

governing post-revocation sentencing. During post-conviction

sentencing, the district court sets both the term of imprisonment

and the subsequent period, if any, of supervised release. 18

U.S.C. §§ 3581(a), 3583(a). The district court is directed to

consider a variety of factors in imposing an appropriate postconviction sentence, including “the need . . . to provide the

defendant with needed educational or vocational training,

medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most

effective manner.” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). However, postconviction imprisonment is also limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a),

under which sentencing courts are instructed:

The court, in determining whether to impose a

term of imprisonment, and, if a term of

imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the

length of the term, shall consider the factors set

forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are

applicable, recognizing that imprisonment is not

an appropriate means of promoting correction

and rehabilitation.
This mirrors the mandate of § 994(k), which instructs the 4

Sentencing Commission to “insure that the guidelines reflect the

inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of

imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or

providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational

training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.” 28

U.S.C. § 994(k); see also Manzella, 475 F.3d at 158 n.2

(“§ 994(k) is a directive to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, not

to sentencing courts.”).

11

(emphasis added).4

In Manzella, we were asked to resolve the apparent

conflict between a district court’s obligation to consider medical

and rehabilitative needs under § 3553(a)(2)(D) and the

prohibition on sentences of imprisonment for those same

purposes under § 3582(a). 475 F.3d at 156-58. The district

court in Manzella had imposed a post-conviction sentence of 30

months – nearly four times the maximum Guidelines range – for

the express purpose of qualifying the defendant for the Bureau

of Prisons 500-hour drug treatment program, pursuant to

§ 3553(a)(2)(D). Id. at 155. Considering whether this violated

the limitations of § 3582(a), we held that the words “sentence”

in § 3553(a) and “imprisonment” in § 3582(a) were not

coterminous – “imprisonment” is merely one form of

sentencing, whereas a “sentence” might include other things

such as fines, restitution, or supervised release. Id. at 158.

Thus, we held that “courts must consider a defendant’s need for

rehabilitation when devising an appropriate sentence (pursuant

to § 3553(a)(2)(D)), but may not carry out that goal by
In light of this concession, we need not probe whether 5

the District Court’s reasoning clearly evinces an intent to

imprison Doe for purposes of rehabilitation. We will assume, as

the parties agree, that it does.

12

imprisonment (pursuant to § 3582(a)).” Id. We therefore read

§ 3582(a) to mean that, at initial sentencing, “defendants [may]

not be sent to prison or held there for a specific length of time

for the sole purpose of rehabilitation.” Id. at 161. Because the

district court in Manzella extended the duration of the

defendant’s imprisonment for the express purpose of drug

rehabilitation, the post-conviction sentence violated the mandate

of § 3582(a) and was therefore procedurally unreasonable. Id.

The government concedes that, if this had been Doe’s

initial sentencing hearing, the sentence would be unquestionably

flawed under Manzella. (See Govt. Br. 15 (noting that, if

Manzella applied to these facts, “it is unlikely that any argument

could overcome the District Court’s statements of Doe’s need

for rehabilitation”).) However, the government argues that the 5

statutory restriction on extending imprisonment for purposes of

rehabilitation that directed the outcome in Manzella does not

apply in sentencing on revocation of supervised release. We

agree that, although Manzella clearly forbade imprisonment for

purposes of drug rehabilitation in post-conviction sentencing, it

did not resolve the question presently before this Court. We

observed in Manzella, in a footnote, that post-revocation

sentencing “is an issue entirely different from determining what

an initial sentence should be, as the revocation of supervised

release is governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) and (g), which
We do not adopt the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit 6

opinion in United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091, 1096-97

(5th Cir. 1994), to the extent that it conflicts with our holding in

Manzella. The court in Giddings looked to the legislative

history of § 3582(a) to conclude that its restrictions were only

meant to prevent the imposition of sentence based on

rehabilitation, as opposed to the duration of sentence. Id. at

1096 & n.17. We clearly disagreed with this approach in

Manzella, where we held that “defendants [may] not be sent to

prison or held there for a specific length of time for the sole

purpose of rehabilitation.” 475 F.3d at 161 (emphasis added).

Thus, to the extent Giddings relies on an interpretation of

§ 3582(a) that we rejected in Manzella, it is not persuasive law

13

mandate consideration of § 3553(a), but not of § 3582(a).” See

id. at 160 n.4. Thus we postulated, without deciding, that postrevocation sentences might be treated differently under the

statute. We now have an opportunity to resolve this question

left open by Manzella, and, in doing so, to join our sister circuits

who have held that “district courts may give weight to a

defendant’s rehabilitative needs when revoking a term of

supervised release and then subsequently requiring a defendant

to serve part or all of his new and potentially extended term of

supervised release in prison.” United States v. Tsosie, 376 F.3d

1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Brown, 224

F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Thornell, 128

F.3d 687, 688 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d

874, 879-80 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d

1091, 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Anderson, 15

F.3d 278, 282 (2d Cir. 1994)).6
in this circuit.

14

We begin our analysis with the language of the statute

governing revocation of supervised release. Under 18 U.S.C.

§§ 3583(e)(3) and (g), a district court may revoke a defendant’s

supervised release and sentence that defendant to serve part or

all of the remainder of his sentence in prison. Revocation takes

two forms: discretionary and mandatory. Section 3583(e)

governs discretionary revocation. A district court may choose,

“after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1),

(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7),”

to “revoke a term of supervised release, and require the

defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised

release authorized by statute for the [underlying] offense.” Id.

§ 3583(e)(3) (emphasis added). Section 3553(a)(2)(D), which

Congress expressly incorporated into post-revocation sentencing

considerations, permits a sentencing court to consider the need

“to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational

training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the

most effective manner.” Id. at § 3553(a)(2)(D).

Section 3583(g), on the other hand, governs mandatory

revocation in the event the defendant commits one of the

specified offenses, including possession of a controlled

substance or failing a drug test more than three times in one

year. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(g)(1), (4). In such case, “the court

shall revoke the term of supervised release and require the

defendant to serve a term of imprisonment not to exceed the

maximum term of imprisonment authorized [by statute for the

underlying offense].” Id. While § 3583(g) does not expressly
The District Court prefaced the show cause hearing by 7

stating, “Under 18 United States Code, Section 3583(e)(3), a

Court may revoke the term of supervised release if it be found

by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated

a condition of his supervised release. And, of course, here he

has admitted these violations so the preponderance standard is

satisfied.” (Sealed App. 45.)

15

require consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, it does not

prohibit the sentencing court from doing so.

Although we are confident that Doe’s repeated failure of

drug tests qualified him for mandatory revocation under

§ 3583(g), it appears that the District Court proceeded under its

discretionary authority pursuant to § 3583(e)(3). Further there 7

is no dispute that the District Court imposed the period of

incarceration at least in part to “insure [sic] that he comes out

clean.” (Sealed App. 55.) The question before us is therefore

whether the admonition of § 3582(a) that “imprisonment is not

an appropriate means of promoting correction and

rehabilitation” precludes a district court from considering

rehabilitative needs when revoking supervised release and

requiring the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in

prison.

We are not the first court to confront this question. In

United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 1994), the

Second Circuit was faced with a district court’s revocation of

supervised release under § 3583(e) and imposition of a 17

month period of imprisonment based on the district court’s view
The Second Circuit, in an unpublished decision, 8

subsequently reached a different outcome without explanation

or citation to Anderson. See United States v. Yehuda, 238 Fed.

Appx. 712, 713 (2d Cir. 2007) (qualifying defendant for drug

treatment program “is not a permissible basis for increasing . . .

16

that the defendant required “intensive substance abuse and

psychological treatment in a structured environment.” Id. at

279. As here, the defendant claimed that this consideration

violated the mandate of § 3582(a) that imprisonment not be

imposed as a means of rehabilitation. Considering the interplay

of the various provisions, the court reasoned:

[Section 3583] contemplates that a district court

may require a person to serve time in prison equal

to the length of the term of supervised release. In

determining the length of a period of supervised

release, it will be recalled, a district court may

consider such factors [as] the medical and

correctional needs of the offender. Because those

factors may be considered in determining the

length of the period of supervised release and

because a district court may require a person to

serve in prison the period of supervised release,

the statute contemplates that the medical and

correctional needs of the offender will bear on the

length of time an offender serves in prison

following revocation of supervised release.

Id. at 282 (citations omitted).8
a term of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release”

(citing § 3582(a), § 994(k), and Manzella, 475 F.3d at 161)).

17

The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Brown, 224 F.3d

1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000), reached the same conclusion. The

court affirmed a post-revocation sentence of 24 months imposed

for the purpose of qualifying the defendant for the Bureau of

Prisons residential drug treatment program, holding, “a court

may consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs when imposing

a specific incarcerative term following revocation of supervised

release.” Id. The court based its conclusion on the plain

language and operation of § 3583(e)(3):

Section 3583 contemplates that rehabilitative

factors will be considered in determining the

length of supervised release. Section 3583(e)(3)

“expressly contemplates requiring an offender to

serve time in prison equal to his or her period of

supervised release, and a court may consider the

medical and correctional needs of an offender in

determining the length of supervised release.”

Therefore, it logically follows from the plain

language of section 3583(e)(3) that Congress

intended that a court may consider the

correctional needs of a defendant in determining

the length of the defendant’s imprisonment after

revocation of supervised release.
See also United States v. Hergott, 562 F.3d 968 (8th Cir.

9

2009); United States v. Pitre, 504 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2007);

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2006).

18

Id. at 1242 (quoting Anderson, 15 F.3d at 283).

Our reading of § 3583(e), and the deft analysis of our

fellow courts of appeals, leads us to the same conclusion:

Congress intended district courts to consider a defendant’s

medical and rehabilitative needs in determining whether to

revoke supervised release and the duration of imprisonment that

is appropriate upon revocation. This is the most natural reading 9

of a statute that provides for discretionary revocation

conditioned upon a district court’s consideration of a

defendant’s need for “medical care, or other correctional

treatment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D); id. § 3583(e). This

reading also comports with the operation of § 3583(c), which

directs that a district court, when setting the term of supervised

release at initial sentencing, “shall consider the factors set forth

in [section 3553(a)(2)(D)],” including a defendant’s need for

“medical care, or other correctional treatment.” 18 U.S.C.

§§ 3583(c), 3553(a)(2)(D). Discretionary revocation under

§ 3583(e) permits a district court to “require the defendant to

serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release.” It

would thus be an odd contradiction in the statute if § 3583(c)

permitted a court to consider rehabilitation in setting the term of

supervised release at the initial sentencing, but forbade that

same consideration – despite the express inclusion of

§ 3553(a)(2)(D) as a relevant post-revocation factor – once a
We are not persuaded in this regard by Doe’s argument 10

that the Supreme Court’s admonition in Johnson v. United

States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000), that we must “attribute

postrevocation penalties to the original conviction,” requires that

the substantive considerations permitted in post-conviction

sentencing must similarly act as limitations on post-revocation

sentencing. In Johnson, the Supreme Court considered whether

the amendment of § 3583(h), permitting courts to require

additional supervised release after the completion of postrevocation incarceration, could apply retroactively without

violating the ex post facto clause. Thus in noting that

“postrevocation penalties relate to the original offense,” 529

U.S. at 700, the Court was observing that Johnson’s postrevocation sentence cannot exceed the maximum penalty in

place at the time of his underlying offense. The supervised

release statute already provides for protection against the

outcome forbidden by Johnson by restricting post-revocation

incarceration to a term “not to exceed the maximum term of

imprisonment authorized [by statute for the original offense].”

18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(4). Nowhere does Johnson suggest that

limitations on substantive considerations in post-conviction

sentencing – such as the prohibition on imprisonment for

rehabilitation in § 3582(a) – must also apply to post-revocation

sentencing. We do not, therefore, read Johnson to require

incorporation of the restrictions in § 3582(a) into postrevocation sentencing in contravention of the plain language of

§ 3583(e).

19

supervised release is violated and its duration is served in

incarceration.10
20

Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err

in setting the duration of Doe’s post-revocation incarceration

based, in part, on his need for drug rehabilitation. The sentence

was therefore procedurally reasonable.

B. Substantive Reasonableness

Although Doe principally relies on his statutory argument

in challenging his post-revocation sentence, he also argues that

the 24 months post-revocation incarceration and 12 months

supervised release is “wildly disproportionate” and “excessive,”

and therefore substantively unreasonable. (Doe Br. 17.) Our

review for substantive reasonableness is “highly deferential,”

Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543, and Doe bears the burden of

demonstrating that “no reasonable sentencing court would have

imposed the same sentence on [him] for the reasons the district

court provided.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568. He has failed to meet

that burden here, and we will affirm the District Court’s

sentence as substantively reasonable.

The District Court imposed Doe’s post-revocation

sentence of 24 months of incarceration and 12 months of

supervised release based on two principal justifications: Doe’s

repeated violations of the terms of his supervised release, and

Doe’s need for drug rehabilitation. These justifications are a

reasonable application of the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the

particular facts of this case. As discussed above, § 3583(e)

requires consideration of the defendant’s need for “medical care,

or other correctional treatment.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(c),

3553(a)(2)(D). Doe’s repeated violations of his supervised

release, his admitted abuse of controlled substances, and his
21

demonstrated inability to rehabilitate himself through outpatient

drug treatment led the District Court to reasonably conclude that

Doe needed to be kept out of reach of the instruments of his

addiction. Though, as the District Court observed, incarceration

is an imperfect means to that end, it is not an unreasonable one

under the statute.

Finally, we reject Doe’s argument that the sentence itself

is “excessive.” As the District Court acknowledged, the

advisory Guidelines range for Doe’s post-revocation

imprisonment was 4 to 10 months based on his criminal history

category of II and a Grade C violation. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a).

However, the Guidelines provide that “[w]here the original

sentence was the result of a downward departure (e.g. as a

reward for substantial assistance) . . . an upward departure may

be warranted.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, cmt. n.4. Here, Doe’s

Guidelines range sentence of 60 to 65 months was initially

reduced to 30 months for cooperation with the government and

then further reduced to 12 months, which amounted to time

served. His 24 month post-revocation imprisonment was thus

reasonable in light of the earlier leniency he received. The

addition of 12 months of supervised release upon the conclusion

of Doe’s imprisonment brings his post-revocation sentence to

the statutory maximum of three years. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(b)(2) (limiting supervised release for Class C felonies to

three years). Given the egregiousness of Doe’s violations, we

cannot say that no reasonable court would impose the statutory

maximum.

We therefore reject Doe’s challenge based on substantive

reasonableness, and we will affirm the District Court’s sentence.
22

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District

Court’s revocation of Doe’s supervised release and imposition

of a 24 month term of imprisonment followed by a 12 month

term of supervised release.