NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 11a0073n.06 No. 08-4494 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT M ARK E. SM ITH , P etitioner -Appellant,

v. ERNIE L. MOORE, WARDEN, Respondent-Appellee. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

BEF OR E: SUH RH EIN RI CH , C LA Y, and R OG ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s. CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. P et i t i o n er M ark E

. S m i t h , p ro ce ed i n g pr o s e , a pp e als fr om a jud g me nt e nte re d o n Augus t 19 , 2 00 8 b y the dis tr ic t cou rt , de nying Pe tit ion e r’ s app lic a tio n f or a wr it of habe as cor

pus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the rea sons stated below, we RE VE RSE the district court’s de cision. I. STA TEM EN T OF F AC TS A. F ac tu al Bac kgr ound On Octobe r 19, 2004 Petitioner robbe d the Marion C o mmunity Credit Union in Marion, Ohio. When Petiti oner e ntere d the cr edit union there w ere three employ ees pr esent, b u t no customers. Petitioner order ed the three employ ees pr esent to g et on the g round, and took a total ofNo. 08-4494

2 $9,4 8 0 f r o m o n e o f

th e te ll e r s . O nD e c e mb e r 9 , 2 0 0 4 p o li c e ar

r e s te d Pe ti ti o n e r

in B r o o ksville, Florida for the Ma

rion, Ohio robber

y . B. P roce dural Hi story On Dec em b er 22, 2004 an Ohio state g rand jury indicted Petitioner for one count of

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry , a fi rs t cla ss fe lony un de r Oh io law, thr e e c ounts of kid na pp ing , a se c on d c la ss fe lony un de r O hio law, and

fi re arm sp e c if ic a tio ns fo r e a c h o f t

he fo ur c ount s. P eti ti one r’ s c a se proce eded to trial in Ohio state court, and on April 11, 2005 a jury convicted Petitioner of

one count of ag g ravated robbe ry , and thre e counts of kidna pping. T he ju ry ac quitted Petiti oner of all four firea rm specif ications. The trial judg e sente nced Petitioner pur suant to the Ohio sentenc ing statute in eff ect at the time, O.R.C. § 2929.14. W hen the Ohio c ourt sentenc ed Petitioner, O.R.C. § 2929.14 stated:

(A) E x cept a s provided in div i s i on (C) of this section, if the c ourt imp os inga

se nte nc e up on

an o ff e nd e r f or a fe lony e lects or

is re qu ir e d to imp os e a

pr iso n te rm

on the of fe nd e r p ur su ant t o th is chapte r, the c ourt shall impose a def inite prison term that shall be one of the fo llo wi ng : (1) F or a f

elony of the fir st deg ree , the prison term shall be three , four, f

ive, six , seven, eig ht, nine or ten y ear s. (2) F or a f elony of t he second deg ree , the prison term shall be two, t h re e, four, five, six , seven or eig ht y ear s. (B ) [I ]f the court imposing a sente nce upon a n offe nder f

or a f elony elec ts or is require d to impose a prison term on the of fende r, the c ourt sh a ll im po se th e sh or

te st p ri so n te rm

a uth or ize d f

or the of fe ns e pursuant to div i s i o n (A ) of this section, unless one or more of the fo llo wi nga

pp lie s:No. 08-4494

3 (1 ) T he of fe nd e r wa s se rv ing a pr iso n te rm a t th e tim e of the off ense, or the offe nder pr evious l y had ser ved a pr iso n te rm . (2 ) T h e c o u rtf

i n d s o nt h e r e c o r d

t h a tt h e s h o rt e st prison term wi l l d emea n the seriousne ss of the offe nder’ s conduct or w ill not adequately protec t the pu bli c fr om f

utu re c ri me by

the of fe nd e r o r o the rs . The trial judge sentenc ed Petitioner to nine y ear s of imprisonment for the a g g ravated robbe ry conviction , an d

to f o u r y e ar s o f im p r is o n me n t f

o r e a c h o f th e k id n a p in g c o n v ic ti o n s . E a c h o f the four y ear terms wer e to be se rved concur rently with e ach other, and consec utively with the nine y ear te rm s. Pe tit ion e r’ s se nte nc e tot a le d th ir te e n y e ars of

imp ri so nme nt. On direc t appea l, Petiti oner a rg ued that his convictions wer e b a s e d u p o n in s u f f ic ient evidenc e, and ag ainst the manifest we ight o f t h e evidence. T he Ohio interme diate appe llate cour t sustained Petitioner’s convictions. Petitioner then filed a pr o s e dis c re tio na ry a pp e a l to the Oh io S up re me Court ra isi ngse ve ra l g ro un ds fo r the a pp e a l. Th e se inc lud e d th a t th e re wa s in su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to

su pp or t hi s convic tio n, that his co nv ic tio ns we re a g a ins t the manif e st we ig ht of the e vid e nc e , that hi s appellate counsel wa s ineffe ctive, and that his sente nce a bove the statutory

minimum was e nhance d ba se d on jud ic ia lly -f

ound fa c ts, and thu s vio late d his Sixth Am e ndme nt ri g ht to a jur y tr ia l. Th e Oh io Supreme Court dec lined to reviewthe merits, and dismissed the appe al. On Octobe r 24, 2005, af

ter his direc t appea l culminated, Petitioner filed a pr o s e petition for post-conviction re lief in Ohio state cour t pursuant to O.R.C. §§ 2953.21 and 2953.23. On collater al attack, Petitioner c halleng ed his convictions and se ntence , asser ting inef fec tive assi stance of trial

c ouns e l du e to c ouns e l’ s fa ilure to ob je c t to Pe tit ion e r’ s se nte nc e , a nd tha t hi s se nte nc e vio late d h is S i x t h Am en dm en tri gh tt o a j u ry t ri al as ex p l i ca t edb y t h e S u p re m e C o u rt i ns ev er al ca s es , i n cl u d i n g,No. 08-4494

4 Uni ted States v. Book

er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), Blakely v. W ashington , 5 4 2 U

. S. 2 96 (2004), a nd Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000). On November 30, 2005 the Ohio state c ourt dismissed Petitioner’s collater al attac k without reviewingthe merits. After exhausting his state cour

t remedie s, Petiti oner f

iled a pr o s e petition for habe as cor pus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United S t at es Di strict Court for the Nor thern District of O hio. I n his habea s petition, P etitioner ra ised three g rounds for r elief: (1) that Pet i t i o ner w as depr ived of due proc ess o f l aw by

a convic tion not supported by sufficie nt evidence ; (2) that Petitioner wa s deprive d eff

ective a ssistance of a

ppellate c ounsel due to a p p el l at e counsel’s f ailure to a

rg ue that Petitioner’s sentenc e violated the Sixt h Amendment to the United States Constituti on; and (3) that Pe tit ion e r w a s den ie d due pr oc e ss an d his Sixth Ame ndme nt ri g ht to a ju ry tr ia l w he n th e Oh io s tate court trial judg e enha

nced Petitioner’ s sentence based on judicia lly -found f acts. The district cour

t refe rre d Petitioner’s habe as petition to a mag istrate judg e for a re port and

rec ommendation (“R & R”). In his R & R, the mag istrate judg e found that Petiti oner’ s claims wer e not proce durally

barr ed, and w ere proper ly befor e the district c ourt. The mag istrate judge conclude d that Pe tit ion e r’ s su ff

ic ie nc y of th e e vid e nc e , a

nd ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of a pp e llate c ouns e l c la ims

wer e mer itless. However , the mag istrate judg e found that Petiti oner’ s Six th A mendment claim was

me ri tor iou s a s th e se nte nc ingjud g e e nh anc e d Pe tit ion e r’ s sent e nc e ba se d o n ju dic ia lly -f ound fa c ts in violation of the Supreme Court’s expli cation of the Six th Amendment in Blakely v. W ashington

. The district cour

t declined to adopt this portion of t he R& R, a nd denied Petitioner’s pe tition in toto , fi n d i n g that any

Six th Amendment violation in Petit ioner’s se ntence was ha rmless err or.No. 08-4494

5 Howeve r, the district court g rante d Petitioner a ce rtificate of appe alability on the Six th Amendment jury trial issue. Petitioner timely appea led. II. DI SCU SSIO N A. Stand ard of Review I n revie wing a district cour t’s denial of a

petition for a wr it of habea s corpus, this Court revie ws finding of fac ts f or clea r err or and questions of law de novo

. Ha liy m v . M itc he ll , 492 F.3d 680, 689 (6th Cir. 2007). B. Ana lys is 1. P r oc e dur al D e fault Pr ior to a dd

re ssi ng the me ri ts of Pe tit ion e r’ s c la im, thi s Court mus t de te rm ine that th e c la im is properly

befor e it, and has not be en proc edura lly defa ulted. “Unde r the proc edura l defa ult doctrine, a fe dera l court is g ener ally barr ed from consideringan issue of f eder al law a

rising f rom the judg ment of a state c ourt if the state jud g me nt re sts on a state -l aw g ro un d th a t is bo th i nd e pe nd e nt o f t he me ri ts of the fe dera l claim and an a dequate basis for the state cour t’s decision.” M

u n s o n v . Kap tur e , 384 F.3d 310, 313- 14 (6th Cir. 2004). We eng ag e in a f

our-step inquiry

to de termine whether a cla im was proce durally defa ulted. F ir st, the c ourt mus t det e rm ine that the re is a s tate pr oc e dura l r ule that is a

pp lic a ble to the petitioner’s c laim and that th e p et i t i o n er failed to comply with the rule . . . . Second, the court must decide whether courts ac tually

enfor ced the state proc edura l sanc tio n . . . . Th ir d, the c ourt mus t de c ide wh e the r t he state pr oc e dura l f

or fe iture is an a de qu a te and

ind e pe nd e nt stat e grou

nd on wh ic h th e state c an r e ly

to f or e c los e re vie w o f a

fe de ra l c on sti tut ion a l c la im .

. . . O nce th e cou rt de te rm ine s th a t a state proce dural rule was not complied wi t h an d that the rule w as an a dequate and independe nt state g round, then the pe titioner must demonstrate . . . t h at there was cause for him not to follow the proce dural rule and that he w as ac tually prejudice d by the alleg ed constitutional err or.No. 08-4494

6 Ma up in v . S

mi th , 785 F.2d 135, 138 ( 6th Cir. 1986). I n our proce dural defa ult inquiry , we look to the “last explained state cour t j u d gm ent,” to determine whe ther the state court judg ment bars r elief on proce dural g rounds. Munson , 384 F.3d at 314. Re sp on dent c on ten dedbefo re t he d is tr ict cou rtth at P eti ti on er pr ocedural ly defa ul ted hi s S ix th Am e ndme nt j ur

y tr ia l c la im by fa ili ng to ra ise it on dir e c t a pp e a l. Re sp on de nt’ s p ro c e dura l de fa ult argument fails for two r easons. I t is tr ue tha t Pe tit ion e r f

a ile d to ra ise his jur

y tr ia l c la im o n d ir e c t a

pp e a l, a nd that th e Oh io int e rm e diate a

pp e llate c ourt

did no t a dd re ss t he c la im on its me ri ts. Or din ari ly thi s w ou ld c on sti tut e

wa i v er o nap p ea l , s at i s fy i n g Ma up in ’s first prong . Howeve r, following the Supreme Court’s de cision in Blakely

v. W ashington , h o l d i n g t h at t h e S i x t h Am en dm en tp ro h i b i t s a j u d ge f ro m i mp o s i n g a sentenc e higher than t he one supported by the j ury ’s findi ng of fa ct, the Ohio Supreme Court revisited its sentencing scheme . I n S tate v. Foster , 845 N.E.2d 470 (Ohio 2006) , the Ohio Supreme Court deter mined that its sentencing s ch em e wa s unconstitutional accor ding to Blak e ly . As a re medial

measure , the Ohio Supreme Court seve red the portions of the statute mandating im p osition of a specific sentenc e abse nt additional judicial fac t finding, a nd cabiningthe sentencing judge ’s discretion. Id . at 497. I n the wake of Foster , t h e O h i o S u p re m e C o u rt re m an d ed nu m er o u s ca s es fo r r e- s en t en ci n g, reg ardle ss of def

endants’ w aiver

of their Blakely arguments. See, e .g., State v. Pay ne , 873 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Ohio 2007). The ref ore, w aiver

on appea l of a Blakely challeng e is not a procedura l bar thatNo. 08-4494

I n Thompson v. W

arden , 598 F.3d 281, 285 (6th Cir. 2010), we found that the petitioner’s 1 “Blak e ly c la im [w a s] pr oc e dura lly de fa ult e d” as it was “ ra ise d f or the fi rs t ti me in [p e tit ion e r’ s] pe tit ion to t he Oh io S up re me Cou

rt , wh ic h d e nie d le a ve to a pp e a l w ith ou t c omm e nt. ” Ho we ve r, in that case , the Maupin analy sis was not addre ssed, wherea s here both the mag istrate judg e, and the district court addr essed Ma up in ’s applicability . The Ma up in analy sis thus gover ns whether Pe tit ion e r’ s c la im w a s p ro pe rl y pr e se rv e d f

or our r e vie w o n h a

be a s c or pu s. 7 the state of O hio regularly enfor ced. A ccor ding to Ma up in ’s se c on d pr on g , Pe titio ner’ s S ix th Am e ndme nt j ur

y tr ia l c la im w a s n ot p ro c e dura lly de fa ult e d, and is p ro pe rl y

be fo re thi s Co ur

t. 1 F ur the rm or e , Re sp on de nt did no t ar g ue on a pp e a l tha t Peti tio ne r pr oc e dura lly de fa ult e d th is g ro un d f or re lie f. A re sp on de nt fa ili ngto r a ise his pr oc e dura l de fa ult c ha lle ng e wa ive s it . “ Th e state may waive a defe nse,” including pr ocedur al def ault, “by not asserting it.” Baze v. Parker , 371 F.3d 310, 320 (6th Cir. 2004). To the e xten t th a t Pe tit ion e r d e fa ult e d th e iss ue , Re sp on den t w a ive d it s defe nse. 2. Sixth Ame ndme nt Violation Petitioner filed his petition for a wr it of habea s corpus a fter the eff ecti v e date of the An tit e rr or ism

and Ef fe c tiv e De a th P e na lty Ac t (“ AE DPA ” ) a me ndme nts to 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 54 . H is petition is t hus g overne d by AEDPA. As a me nd e d b y

AE DPA , 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 54 (d ) s tate s: [a] n application for a writ of habe as cor pus on behalf of

a per son in custody

pursuant to the judgme nt of a State court shall not be g rante d with respec t to any claim that was adjudicate d on the merits in Stat e co u rt p roceeding s unless the adjudication of the c la im ( 1) re su lte d in

a de c isi on that w a s c ontr ary to , or i nv olv e d a n unr e a so na

ble application of, clea

rly established F eder al law, a s determined by the Supreme Court of the Un ite d St a te s; o r ( 2) re su lte d in a de c isi on that wa s ba se d on

a n unr e a so na

ble deter mination of the fac ts in li g ht of t h e ev i d en ce pr esente d in the State court proce eding

.No. 08-4494

8 A dec ision is “contrary

to .
. . clea

rly established fe dera l law” pur suant to section 2254(d)( 1) if “the state court a

rrive[d] at a conclusion opposite to that rea ched by the S u p re m e C ourt on a question of law or

if the state court decide [d] a ca se diffe rently than the Supreme Court on a set of materia lly

indisti ng uishable fa cts.” Lun dg re n v . M itc he ll , 440 F.3d 754, 762 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting W illiams v. Taylor , 52 9 U .S. 36 2, 41 3 ( 20 00 )) . Astate c ourt de c isi on “ inv olv e d a

n unr e a so na

ble application of c lear ly

established Feder al l aw” pursuant to § 2254(d)( 1) if “the state cour t identifie[d] the cor rec t gove rnin g l ega l p rinciple but unre asonably applie[d] that principle to the fa cts of the prisoner’ s case . Clearly

established F eder al law, a s determined by the Supreme Court of the United State s, re fe rs to t

he ho ldi ng s, a s o pp os e d to the dic ta , o f the Sup re me Court ’s de c isi on s a s o f t he tim e of the re l ev an t state-c ourt dec ision.” Id

. at 7 6 3 (q u o t i n g W illiams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. at 412). Finally , pursuant to AEDPA, “the fac tual finding s of a state court a re pr esumed to be c orre ct and c an only be contr avene d if [ p ] etitioner ca n show by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that they are

err oneous.” Id . (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ). The Supreme Court held in Blakely that, the rule we e x presse d in Apprendi v. New Je rsey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000) [was,] [ o]t her th an t h e f a c t o f a p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n , an y f a c t t h a t i n c r e a s e s t h e p e n a l t y fo r ac ri me bey ond the pre scribed s t at u t o ry maxi mum must be submitted to a jury , and prove d bey ond a re asonable doubt . . . . Our pre cede nts make clear . . . that the statutory maxi mum for Apprendipurp os e s is the ma ximum se nte nc e a jud g e may

imp os e so le ly on the basis of the f

acts re flec ted i n the jury

verdic t or admitted by

the def endant . . . . I n other wor ds, the rele v an t statutory maxi mum is not the maxim um sentence a jud g e may

imp os e a ft e r f

ind inga dd iti on a l f

a c ts, bu t the max imum h e may imp os e without any

additional finding s. 542 U.S. at 301-04. The Supre me Court thus proscribed judicia l fac t fi n d i n g fo r dete rmining

se nte nc e s’ le ng ths

.No. 08-4494

9 Howeve r, in Oregon v . Ice , 555 U.S. 160, 129 S. Ct. 711, 714-15 (2009) , the Supreme Court

ex p re s s l y upheld re quiring judicial fac t finding in imposing c onsecutive r ather than conc urre nt sentenc es. Ice , 555 U.S. 160, 129 S. Ct. at 714-15. Both statutory scheme s providing f

or unfe ttered jud ic ia l di sc re tio n, and tho se c a bin ingjud ic ia l di sc re tio n b y re qu ir ingjud ic ia l f

a c t f ind ingpr ior

to imposing consec utive rathe r than concur rent sente nces, a

re pe rmitted by

the Six th Amendment. Id

. Petitioner argues that as he was sentenc ed af ter Blak e ly , his se nte nc e is g ov e rn e d by , an d in violation of, the standar d enunciated in Blak e ly . Petitioner was sente nced to a total of thirteen y ear s i n ca rc er at i o nfo r o n e c o u n to f a ggra v at edro b b ery , a f i rs tcl as s fe l o n y , an d

t h re e c o u n t s o f k i dn ap i n g,

a sec ond class fe lony

. Acc ording to the Ohio sentenc ing statute under w hich Petitioner was se ntence d, the c ourt sh a ll i mpo se the sh or

te st p ri so n ter

m autho ri zed fo r the of

fe ns e purs ua

nt t o division (A) of this section, unless . . . (1) The offe nder was servinga prison ter m at the time of the off

ense, or the off ender previously

had ser ved a pr ison term. (2 ) T he c ourt

fi nd s o n th e re c or d th at th e sh or te st p riso n ter

m w ill demea n the seriousne ss of the off ender ’s c o n d uct or will not adequa tely protec t the public from future c rime by the offe nder or oth e rs . O.R.C. § 2929.14(B)

. Absent a prior convic tion, or additional judicial fac t finding, O hio law re quired a judg e to impose the shortest ter m of imprisonment authorized by the s tatute. Under the statute, the

s h o rt e s t p r i s o nt e r m s w e r e t h r e e ye ar s f

o r a f i r s t c l a s s f e l o n y, an d

t w o ye ar s f

o r a s e c o n d c l a s s f e l o n y. Id . § 2929.14(A). As a pp lie d to Pe tit ion e r, a

bs e nt j ud ic ia l fa c t fi nd ing , Pe tit ion e r c ou ld have be e n se nte nc e d to a maximum of one thre e y ear term of imprisonment for the ag g ravated robbery conviction, and thre eNo. 08-4494

Petitioner contends that the se ntencingjudge ’s decision to impose consec utive, rathe r than 2 concur rent sente nces violate d his Si x th Amendment jury trial rig ht under Blak

e ly . Ohio sentenc ing law in ef fec t at the t ime Petitioner was sentenced pe rmitted a judg e to impose consec utive sentenc es if:

nece ssary

to protect the public f

rom future crime or

to punish the offende r and that consec utive sentenc es ar e not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offe nder’ s conduct a nd to the dang er the offe nder poses to the publ ic . . . [and] t hat at lea st one of three more finding s of fa ct must be found: that the offender was a lrea dy

under the control of the c ourt due to an e arlier conviction, that at lea st two of the offe nses wer e committed as part of a course of conduct and the harm was so g reat or unusual that no single prison term ade quately ref lects t he seriousness of the c onduct, or that the offe nder’ s history

of cr iminal conduct demonstrate s that consec utive sentenc es ar e nece ssary to protect the public. Foster , 845 N.E.2d at 490-91 (quoting O.R .C. § 2929.14(E)( 4)). The Ohio Supreme Court found that this s ch em e v i o lates the Six th Amendment under Blak e ly . Howeve r, as discusse d above, the Supreme Court cla

rified in Icethat judicial fac t finding to de termine whe ther to impose conc urre nt or conse cutive sente nces doe s not violate the Six th Amendment jury trial rig ht. Ice , 129 S. Ct . at 714; see also Ev ans v. Hudson , 575 F.3d 560, 566 ( 2009) (st at i n g t hat “[pursuant to Ice ’s h o l d i n g, [pe tit ion e r’ s] un de rl y ingc la im – that hi s sen te nc e to co ns e c uti ve te rm s bas e d on judg e -f ound fa c ts vio la te s Blak

e ly – is m e ri tle ss. ” ). Pe tit ion e r’ s maximum po te nti a l se nte nc e fo r t

he purp os e of

thi s habea s analy sis is t he sum of the f our terms of year s imposed for his four c onvictions.

10 two y ear terms of imprisonment for eac h of the kidnapping convictions. The maximum s entenc e that the trial cour

t could have imposed on Petitioner a bsent unconstitutional judicial fact findingis nine y ea rs . I ni mp o s i n g a t h i rt ee ny ea r t er m o f i m p r i s o n m e n t u p o nP et i t i o n er , t h e s en t en ci n g j u d ge 2

nece ssarily

found fa cts additional to those found by the jury

. T h is Co u rt h a s r e it e r a te d th a t “ [t ]h e r

u le in Bl akelyis clear ly

set forth, a

nd states that the statutory maxi mum for Apprendi purposes is the m axim um sentenc e a judg e may impose solely

on the basis of the f

act s re flec ted in the jury verdic t or admitted by

the def endant.” Villagarcia v. W ar de n, Nob le Cor

r. In st. , 5 9 9 F. 3 d

5 2 9 , 5 3 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 1 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Blak e ly , 5 4 2 U

. S

. a t3 0 3 )

. In Pet i t i o n er ’s ca se, this max imum is nine y ear s. Howeve r, bec ause the sentenc ing judg e sente ncedNo. 08-4494

11 Petit ioner to thirteen y ear s based on a dditional judicially -found f acts, Petitioner’s se ntence was contra ry to, and an unr easona

ble application of, clea

rly established fe dera l law. Id

. 3. Harm less Error Respondent contends that even if Petitioner’ s sentence violates clea rly established fe dera l law

as ar ticulated by

t h e S u p re m e Court in Blakely and Apprendi , this Court shoul d never theless deny Pe tit ion e r a

wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s a s any

e rr or wa s h arm le ss. We have state d that “[h] abea s relief is only appropr iate if the c onstitut ional err or har med the petitioner.” Villagarcia, 599 F.3d at 536. The S upreme Court explained that on habea s revie w of a state cour t criminal judg ment under 28 U .S.C. § 2254, “an err or is harmless unless it had substantial and injurious e ffe ct or influence in determining the jury ’s ver dict.” Fry v. P liler , 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007). Moreove r, “[u]nder Fr y , a n e rr or is c on sid ered no t har

mle ss whe n th e matte r i s so e ve nly balanc ed that the habeas court has grave doubt as to t he har mlessness of the e rror .” Vi lla ga rc ia , 599 F.3d at 537. I n Vi lla ga rc ia we c onsidered a

materia lly

i n d istinguishable ha

beas pe tition under O.R.C. § 29 29 .1 4. I ns te a d o f t

he tw o y e ars of

inc arc e ra tio n p re sc ri be d b y

Oh io s tatut e fo r a

se c on d c la ss felony , Villag arc ia was se ntence d to seven y ear s imprisonment based on judicially -found f acts. Id

. at 535. This C o u rt ex p l ai n ed that to bringits sentencing scheme in line with Blak e ly , “ the Oh io Supreme Court followed the approa ch taken in Booke r and seve red the Blak

e ly -off ending portions of Oh io’ s f e lony -s e nte nc ingstatut e s . . . . T his re me dy le ft Oh io s e nte nc ingjud g e s w ithfu ll a uth or ity to sentence within the statutory rang e without making finding s justify ing sentenc es in excess of the minimum .” Id . at 537.No. 08-4494

12 Under the Ohio Supreme Court’s r emedy , Petitioner would be exposed on rese ntencing to a maxi mum se ntence of one ter m of ten y ear s for his first cla ss felony , and thre e ter ms of eig ht y ear s for e ach of

his second cla ss felonies, all runningconsec utively

. See O.R.C. § 2929.14(A). H oweve r, although Pe t i t i o n er ’s m ax i m u m p o t en t i al s en t en ce u p o nre -s en t en ci n g i s m u ch gre at er than his curre nt sentenc e, the Blakely vio latio n in Pe tit ion e r’ s se nte nc e wa s n ot h arm le ss. We n ote d th a t “[ u]nde r t he po st- Foster

se nte nc ingsc he me , a lth ou g h th e c ourt is f re e to

se nte nc e to a

ny te rm wi thi n th e statut or

y ma ximum

. . . w ith ou t makin g jud ic ia l f ind ing s, it is a lso not constrained to f

ollow the formula pr eviously dictated b y t h e s evered provisions.” Vi lla ga rc ia , 59 9 F .3 d at 53 8. Th e re ma ini ngpr ov isi on s o f O hio ’s se nte nc ingstatut e de lin e a te a numbe r o f c ri te ri a for a sentenc ing judg e’s c onsideration. The se include, a mong othe rs, such dissimilar fac tors as, the phy sical o r m en t al i njury suffe red by

the victim[ ;] . . . [t he] offende r’s occupation[ ;] . . . [t he] offende r’s re lationship with t he victim[; ] . . . [ whether the] offe nder c ommitt ed the of fense as a pa

rt of an or g anize d criminal ac tivity [; ] . . . [whether the] off

ender was motivated by prejudice based on rac e, ethnic ba ckg round, g ender , sexual orientation, or relig ion[ ;] . . . [t he existence of] provocation[ ;] . . . [t he exis tence of] gr ounds to mi t i gat e the offe nder’ s conduct[;] . . . likel[ ihood of] committ[ ing] future crimes. O.R.C. § 2929.12. Given the wide rang e of fa ctors that a se ntencingjudge may now consider

under O hio law,

we held that we “simply cannot know whether the sentenc ing judg e would ac cord the rele vant fa ctors the same w eig ht when re assessing [petit ioner’s se ntence ] ou t s i d e t h e dictate s of the seve red provisions.” Vi lla

ga rc ia , 5 99 F .3 d at 53 9; se e als o Un ite d Stat es v . B ar ne tt , 3 98 F .3 d 5 16 , 5 28 (6 th Cir. 2005) (holding in the wake of Booke r th a t w e c o u ld n o t c o n c lu d e tha t a Booke r er ror wa s harmless s i n ce i t was impossible to know how a district court, unc onstrained by a mandatoryNo. 08-4494

13 Gu ide l i n e s sc he me , w ou ld w e ig h d if fe re nt a rgume nts and

e vid e nc e , a

nd that “ it w ou ld b e e xce e din g ly difficult for a defe ndant [who was sentenc ed in fe dera l court pre

- Booke r , but whose direc t appea l was he ard po st- Booke r ] t o show t h at h is sentence would have be en diffe rent if the district c ourt had sentenc ed him under the advisory , rathe r than the ma ndatory , Guidelines fr amewor k.”). C. Summ ary Petitioner’s sentenc e under Ohio law violated clea rly established fede ral law as ar ticulated by the Supreme Court in Blakely v. W ashington , and did not constitute harmless er ror. III . C ON CL USI ON We RE VE RSE the dis tr ic t court ’s de c isi on and g ra nt t he pe tit ion

fo r a wr it o f h a be a s c or pu s. Th e Pe tit ion e r i s o rd e re d r e le a se d fr om c us tod y un le ss t he State of

Oh io r e se nte nc e s Pe tit ion e r w ith in 180 day s in acc ordanc e with the re quirements of this opinion.