Rel: May 31, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 

may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

CL-2023-0794

_________________________

W.S. II 

v.

Houston County Department of Human Resources 

_________________________

CL-2023-0805

_________________________

E.A. 

v.

Houston County Department of Human Resources 

Appeals from Houston Juvenile Court

(JU-21-344.02)
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

2

FRIDY, Judge.

W.S. II ("the father") and E.A. ("the mother") appeal separately 

from a judgment of the Houston Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") 

terminating their parental rights to their child, E.H.S. ("the child"). Both 

parents challenge the juvenile court's subject-matter jurisdiction over 

this action under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and 

Enforcement Act ("the UCCJEA"), § 30-3B-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, 

and it appears that that issue may be dispositive. As discussed herein, 

however, the record on appeal does not include sufficient evidence for us 

to review the jurisdictional issue. Therefore, the cause must be remanded 

to the juvenile court for it to determine whether it has subject-matter 

jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

Background

The Houston County Department of Human Resources ("DHR") 

filed a petition in the juvenile court to terminate the mother's parental 

rights on December 19, 2022. On June 15, 2023, it filed an amended 

petition that sought, in addition, to terminate the father's parental 

rights. The petitions acknowledged that both the parents were living in 

Florida. The juvenile court held the trial in this matter on October 30, 
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3

2023. Although subject-matter jurisdiction was not an issue at the trial, 

some evidence relevant to that issue was presented. It was undisputed 

that the child was born in Dothan in early November 2021, at which time 

the mother and the child tested positive for methamphetamine. Anna 

Starling, the DHR caseworker involved in this matter, testified that DHR

had assumed custody of the child about one week after her birth. The 

child had been in the same Alabama foster home since that time, Starling 

said. 

The mother testified that she had lived at the same address in 

Clarksville, Florida -- about an hour-and-fifteen-minute drive from 

Dothan -- for about four years. Before giving birth to the child, she said, 

she had been convicted in Florida of felony possession of 

methamphetamine. According to the mother, she had violated her parole, 

and an active warrant for her arrest existed when the child was born. 

The mother also said that she and the father had six other children, and 

the State of Florida had terminated their parental rights to all of them. 

The mother testified that she came to Alabama to have the child 

because of "the situation that I had with my kids in Florida, as well as 

the warrant." She said that her contractions had started and that she 
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

4

was in "active labor" when she made the trip from Florida to Dothan to 

have the child. The mother testified that, about twelve hours after she 

delivered the child, she was arrested at the hospital in Dothan and 

charged with violating her parole. Starling characterized the mother as 

a fugitive from justice. The mother testified that when she was released 

from the hospital, she was held in the Houston County jail for twenty 

days before law-enforcement officials from Bay County, Florida, returned 

her to Florida. The mother said she then served eighteen months in 

prison in Florida and had been released only one month before the trial 

of this matter.

The mother testified that she had never lived in Alabama and did 

not know anyone in the state. The obstetrician who had provided her with 

prenatal care was in Marianna, Florida, she said. Other than giving birth 

to the child in Alabama, her contact with DHR, and the two visits she

had had with the child in Houston County, the mother said, she had no 

connections with Alabama. There is no evidence regarding whether the 

mother had intended to return to Florida with the child if Florida lawenforcement officials had not taken her back to that state involuntarily. 
CL-2023-0794 and CL-2023-0805

5

The father testified that he has always been a Florida resident and, 

other than the child, he had no connections to Alabama. He said that for 

the four or five months immediately preceding the trial, he had lived in 

Blountstown, Florida. Before that, he said, he had lived in Bristol, 

Florida, for a little more than a year. He said that when the child was 

born, he was incarcerated in Jackson County, Florida. The mother 

corroborated the father's testimony.

The juvenile court entered a judgment terminating the parental 

rights of the mother and the father on October 31, 2023. In the judgment, 

the juvenile court stated without explanation that jurisdiction was 

proper and that the mother and the father had been served with proper 

notice of the proceedings in accordance with the Alabama Rules of Civil 

Procedure. It made no findings regarding its subject-matter jurisdiction 

under the UCCJEA, which governs jurisdiction of child-custody matters, 

including actions to terminate parental rights. 

The mother and the father did not file motions to alter, amend, or 

vacate the judgment, but each filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. 

DHR did not favor this court with an appellate brief. 

Analysis
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6

In their respective appeals, the mother and the father both contend 

that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the 

UCCJEA to enter a judgment terminating their parental rights because, 

they say, Alabama was not the child's home state. Neither party 

presented this argument to the juvenile court. However, it is well settled 

that "the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and it 

may be raised at any time, even for the first time on appeal or by an 

appellate court, ex mero motu." K.L. v. M.W., [Ms. CL-2023-0274, Jan. 5, 

2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024).

The UCCJEA "is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a 

child custody determination by a court of this state," § 30-3B-201(b), Ala. 

Code 1975, which includes establishing subject-matter jurisdiction in 

child-custody proceedings that involve or may involve more than one 

jurisdiction. H.T. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 163 So. 3d 1054, 

1062 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014); R.L. v. J.E.R., 69 So. 3d 898, 900 (Ala. Civ. 

App. 2011). The UCCJEA encompasses proceedings for the termination 

of parental rights. § 30-3B-102(4), Ala. Code 1975. 

In its petition and amended petition seeking the termination of the 

mother's and the father's parental rights, DHR alleged that both the 
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7

mother and the father lived in Florida. It further alleged that the juvenile 

court had jurisdiction in this case because, it said, the child was a 

resident of Houston County. The petitions state that, on November 10, 

2021 -- within days of the child's birth -- the juvenile court had found the 

child to be dependent in a separate action ("the dependency action") and 

had placed her in the legal custody of DHR. Although DHR recognized 

that both of the child's parents were residents of Florida, it does not 

appear from the record that DHR or the juvenile court considered the 

UCCJEA to determine whether the juvenile court had subject-matter 

jurisdiction.

The November 10, 2021, dependency judgment is not included in 

the record on appeal in this matter. The juvenile court would have had 

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to consider the termination of the 

mother's and the father's parental rights to the child if it had made a 

child custody determination consistent with § 30-3B-201 and until it 

"determine[d] that neither the child, nor the child and one 

parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a 

significant connection with this state and that substantial 

evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the 

child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; 

or ... [it] or a court of another state determine[d] that the 

child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent 

[did] not presently reside in this state."
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8

§ 30-3B-202(a)(1)-(2), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). Therefore, to 

have subject-matter jurisdiction in the current action, the juvenile court 

would had to have had subject matter-jurisdiction consistent with the 

requirements of § 30-3B-201 when it made its initial child-custody 

determination, which appears to have been the November 10, 2021, 

dependency judgment. Patrick v. Williams, 952 So. 2d 1131, 1138 (Ala. 

Civ. App. 2006).

Section 20-3B-201 provides that an Alabama court has subjectmatter jurisdiction over an initial child-custody determination if:

"(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date 

of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state 

of the child within six months before the commencement of 

the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a 

parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this 

state;

"(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction 

under subdivision (1), or a court of the home state of the child 

has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this 

state is the more appropriate forum under Section 30-3B-207 

or 30-3B-208 [of this chapter], and:

"a. The child and the child's parents, or the 

child and at least one parent or a person acting as 

a parent, have a significant connection with this 

state other than mere physical presence; and
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9

"b. Substantial evidence is available in this 

state concerning the child's care, protection, 

training, and personal relationships;

"(3) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (1) 

or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that 

a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to 

determine the custody of the child under Section 30-3B-207 or 

30-3B-208 [of this chapter]; or

"(4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction 

under the criteria specified in subdivision (1), (2), or (3)."

§ 30-3B-201(a). See also H.T. v. Cleburne Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 163 

So. 3d 1054, 1062-67 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (applying the UCCJEA under 

circumstances similar to those in the instant case).

Because the juvenile court's subject-matter jurisdiction was not 

challenged in the termination action, the parties did not develop a record 

that would enable us to conduct a meaningful review regarding whether 

any of the criteria set forth in § 30-3B-201(a) were met. Additionally, the 

record of the dependency action is not included in the record on appeal.

Therefore, we are unable to determine whether the juvenile court's 

subject-matter jurisdiction was invoked under the UCCJEA at the outset 

of this matter. However, the evidence and information that is before us 

indicates that there may be merit to the mother and the father's 
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10

contention that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to 

consider whether to terminate their parental rights. 

Because we are without sufficient information to conduct a 

meaningful review of the jurisdictional question, we reinvest the juvenile 

court with jurisdiction for it to determine whether, under the UCCJEA,

it had subject-matter jurisdiction in this case and to return its decision 

to this court within forty-two days. The juvenile court is instructed to 

supplement the record on appeal with any additional proceedings it may 

conduct to comply with this opinion. It should also supplement the record 

with the record in the dependency action if it considers evidence from 

that proceeding.

CL-2023-0794 -- REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

CL-2023-0805 -- REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Lewis, JJ., concur.