SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4563-19

INDEPENDENT INVESTORS,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SEAN R. GOLEMAN, 

Individually and as

Administrator of the

Estate of Jesse J. Goleman,

Deceased, MEGAN GOLEMAN,

spouse of Sean R. Goleman, 

ANDY GOLEMAN, MRS. 

ANDY GOLEMAN, spouse of 

Andy Goleman, STATE OF NEW 

JERSEY, KEVIN REVOIR,

CHRISTINA REVOIR, GEORGE

M. YATES,

Defendants.

____________________________

BOROUGH OF AUDUBON,

Appellant.

____________________________

Argued August 17, 2022 – Decided September 8, 2022

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-4563-19

Before Judges Messano, Natali and Smith.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Camden County, Docket No. F019973-16.

Salvatore J. Siciliano argued the cause for appellant 

(Siciliano & Associates, LLC, attorneys; Salvatore J. 

Siciliano, of counsel and on the brief; Jennifer McPeak, 

on the brief).

Adam D. Greenberg argued the cause for respondent 

(Honig & Greenberg, LLC, attorneys; Adam D. 

Greenberg, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In 2008, Jesse J. Goleman bought a parcel of land (the Property) in the 

Borough of Audubon (the Borough). For many years, a gasoline service station 

had operated on the Property, but Goleman decided to use the premises to 

service automobiles without pumping gas. In 2011, the Borough issued 

Goleman a permit to remove an underground fuel storage tank. Goleman died 

on January 24, 2013, and his son, Sean, was appointed administrator of the estate

(the Estate).

The Borough filed liens on the Property for unpaid taxes. On October 3, 

2013, at a public auction, plaintiff, Independent Investors, purchased tax sale 

certificates for tax years 2013 and 2014. In August 2015, the Borough sent a 

"Notice of Imminent Hazard" to the Estate concerning a building on the 
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Property, and it subsequently hired a contractor to demolish the building. The 

Borough placed another lien on the Property for the costs of demolition.

In July 2016, plaintiff filed a foreclosure complaint against the Estate. 

Plaintiff also filed suit against the Borough one month later, claiming it was 

entitled to notice of the demolition and subsequent lien because it held the tax 

sale certificates. Plaintiff sued to vacate the demolition lien. The suit was 

resolved — plaintiff dismissed its complaint, and the Borough discharged its 

demolition lien.1 Meanwhile, plaintiff obtained an uncontested final judgment 

of foreclosure by default in April 2018, vesting plaintiff with legal title to the 

Property.

In February 2019, without notice to the Borough, plaintiff moved to vacate 

the default foreclosure judgment. In support, one of plaintiff's partners, Ethel 

Roerdomp, certified the Borough's environmental consultant and an unnamed 

employee of the Borough misrepresented the environmental condition of the 

Property prior to plaintiff's filing of its foreclosure action. Roerdomp claimed 

the consultant said his company removed underground tanks, tested the soil on 

the Property, and "there was no contamination and no further action required." 

1 We were advised at oral argument that as part of the settlement, the Borough 

reformed a 2016 tax sale certificate to include some of the demolition costs.
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Roerdomp said this "information was false," and if plaintiff "had received 

truthful information, [it] would not have proceeded to final judgment."

On March 15, 2019, the judge granted plaintiff's unopposed motion, 

vacated the default foreclosure judgment, reverted title to the Property to the 

Estate, and dismissed plaintiff's foreclosure complaint. Nearly one year later, 

in February 2020, the Borough filed a motion to intervene in the foreclosure 

suit; plaintiff filed opposition. 

The Borough argue: (1) it did not discover plaintiff had successfully 

vacated the default judgment until August 2019; (2) plaintiff's claims of 

misrepresentation by a municipal employee lacked any support; and (3) plaintiff 

was on constructive notice of environmental conditions on the property because 

Goleman's applications, including one which sought removal of the underground 

storage tank, were public records. The Borough also contended that reversion 

of title to the Estate resulted in revenue loss to the Borough; therefore, 

intervention was appropriate given the Borough's strong interest in the 

foreclosure litigation.

Plaintiff contended the motion was untimely because the Borough knew

the foreclosure action was pending and could have intervened at that time but 

chose not to do so. Further, plaintiff argued that it stopped paying property taxes 
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in 2015, resulting in the Borough issuing another tax sale certificate, which the 

Borough itself purchased in December 2016. Plaintiff contended the Borough

suffered no adverse consequence from vacation of the foreclosure judgment 

since the Borough's lien had priority over all other liens. Lastly, plaintiff argued 

the Borough should not be permitted to intervene, because it was not a necessary 

party in the foreclosure action. Plaintiff argued only parties who have a right to 

redeem are proper parties to a tax foreclosure complaint, and the Borough could 

not have redeemed the Property following plaintiff's successful foreclosure.

In an oral decision following arguments, the Chancery judge reasoned, 

"[T]here's nothing to intervene . . . this case doesn't exist anymore. . . . [T]here's 

no lawsuit between the plaintiff and [the Borough] . . . making any allegations 

about misrepresentation . . . that had to do with the tank." The judge's May 8, 

2020 order noted the foreclosure litigation "is hereby DISMISSED," and, "[a]s 

a result of the dismissal," the judge denied the Borough's motion to intervene .

The Borough moved for reconsideration, which the judge denied in a July 

24, 2020 order. Essentially, without reexamining the merits of plaintiff's earlier 

motion to vacate, the judge reasoned, "I vacate[d] the final judgment. . . . [O]nce

it's vacated, we don't have a lawsuit anymore. There's no more foreclosure 
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because the final judgment in that action is vacated. So, there's nothing to 

intervene in."

The Borough appeals. It argues that intervention was appropriate since

the Borough was an "interested party" in the foreclosure suit because plaintiff 

alleged misrepresentation by a Borough employee in seeking to vacate the 

judgment. Plaintiff counters by arguing the appeal is untimely, the Borough's 

motions were unsupported by any factual evidence, and the Borough is not an 

"interested party" entitled to intervene because it was unaffected by plaintiff's 

successful motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment.

We disagree with plaintiff's rationale and conclude the Borough was 

entitled to intervene, even after the judge vacated the foreclosure judgment. 

Therefore, we reverse. In doing so, we do not reach the merits of the Borough's 

opposition to the motion to vacate, but rather remand the matter for the court to 

reconsider anew plaintiff's motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment.

We initially reject plaintiff's contention that the Borough's appeal of the 

May 8, 2020 order is untimely. "An appeal from a final judgment must be filed 

with the Appellate Division within forty-five days of its entry . . . and served 

upon all other parties . . . ." Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 540 (2011) (citing 

R. 2:4-1 and R. 2:5-1(a)). "A timely filed motion for reconsideration tolls the 
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time for filing an appeal." Eastampton Ctr, LLC v. Plan. Bd. of Eastampton, 

354 N.J. Super. 171, 187 (App. Div. 2002) (citing R. 2:4-3(a)). 

Additionally, Rule 2:4-4(a) permits a maximum thirty-day extension of 

time for good cause, but only if the appellant actually files the notice of appeal 

"within the time as extended." Lombardi, 207 N.J. at 540–41 (citing R. 2:4-4). 

"Where the appeal is untimely, [we lack] jurisdiction to decide the merits of the 

appeal." Ridge at Back Brook, LLC v. Klenert, 437 N.J. Super. 90, 97 n.4 (App. 

Div. 2014) (quoting In re Hill, 241 N.J. Super. 367, 372 (App. Div. 1990)).

The Borough filed a timely motion for reconsideration with the Chancery 

judge twenty days after the May 8, 2020 order. The Borough still had twentyfive days after entry of the July 24, 2020 order denying the motion for 

reconsideration, or, until August 18, 2020, to file its appeal within the forty-five 

days required by Rule 2:4-1(a). The Borough's notice of appeal was filed on 

August 24, 2020, after the forty-five-day limit, but within the thirty-day 

extension period permitted by Rule 2:4-4(a). Although the Borough did not 

move for an extension as required by that Rule, we would have found good cause 

had such a motion been made. As a result, we treat the notice of appeal as if it 

was a timely motion for an extension, see, e.g., Seltzer v. Isaacson, 147 N.J. 
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Super. 308, 311–12 (App. Div. 1977), and conclude the Borough's notice of 

appeal was filed within time.

To satisfy intervention as of right, Rule 4:33-1 requires a moving party:

(1) claim "an interest relating to the property or 

transaction which is the subject of the transaction," (2) 

show [that the movant] is "so situated that the 

disposition of the action may as a practical matter 

impair or impede its ability to protect that interest," (3) 

demonstrate that the "[movant's] interest" is not 

"adequately represented by existing parties," and (4) 

make a "timely" application to intervene.

[N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 453 

N.J. Super. 272, 286 (App. Div. 2018) (alterations in 

the original) (quoting Am. C.L. Union of N.J., Inc. v. 

Cnty. of Hudson, 352 N.J. Super. 44, 67 (App. Div. 

2002)).]

The rule is not discretionary. Meehan v. K.D. Partners, LP, 317 N.J. Super. 563, 

568 (App. Div. 1998).

Contrary to the motion judge's reasoning, "[g]enerally, intervention after 

judgment is allowed if necessary 'to preserve some right which cannot otherwise 

be protected.'" Warner Co. v. Sutton, 270 N.J. Super. 658, 662 (App. Div. 1994)

(quoting Chesterbrooke Ltd. P'ship v. Plan. Bd. of Chester, 237 N.J. Super. 118, 

123 (App. Div. 1989)). We have even "recognized the appropriateness of 

granting a party affected by a judgment leave to intervene to pursue an appeal if 

a party with a similar interest who actively litigated the case in the trial court 
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has elected not to appeal." CFG Health Sys., LLC v. Cnty. of Essex, 411 N.J. 

Super. 378, 385 (App. Div. 2010) (emphasis added).

In this case, contrary to plaintiff's contentions, the Borough was an 

interested party in the foreclosure litigation. Although plaintiff was not required 

under the applicable statutes to name the Borough as a party in its foreclosure 

complaint, it was required to serve a copy of its complaint on the municipal tax 

collector. N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.41; see also N.J.S.A. 54:5-98 (providing for 

redemption to "be made to the tax collector . . . at his [or her] official office"). 

The Borough had no reason to intervene in the foreclosure litigation while it was 

pending because plaintiff's successful foreclosure coincided with the Borough's 

aspirations that the Property would now be owned by a taxpaying entity that 

might further develop the Property to its highest and best use. 

Additionally, reversion of title to properties already foreclosed upon 

imposes obligations upon the Borough which further support the conclusion that 

it was entitled to notice of plaintiff's motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment. 

The Borough's Code of Ordinances required the identification of abandoned 

properties. For example, Code of Ordinances, Audubon, N.J., Code § 105-

111(a) provides:

The public officer . . . designated by the mayor is 

hereby directed to identify abandoned properties within 
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the borough, place said properties on an abandoned 

property list established as provided in N.J.S.A. 55:19-

55, and provide such notices and carry out such other 

tasks as are required to effectuate an abandoned 

property list as provided by law.

A property may be deemed abandoned when "[a]t least one installment of 

property tax remains unpaid and delinquent . . . ." N.J.S.A. 55:19-81(c). 

There is a critical connection between tax-delinquent-abandoned 

properties and an owner of a tax sales certificate on such property. Under 

N.J.S.A. 55:19-83(a), a property will not be placed on the abandoned properties 

list if the owner of a tax sale certificate for such a property paid the real estate 

taxes when due, "takes action to initiate foreclosure proceedings" in a timely 

fashion and "diligently pursues foreclosure proceedings in a timely fashion 

thereafter." In short, the Borough's interests in plaintiff's application to vacate 

the foreclosure judgment were obvious.

Equally apparent is the Borough's inability to ameliorate the harm it 

suffered from the vacatur of plaintiff's foreclosure judgment by foreclosing on 

the 2016 tax sale certificate it now owns. Simply put, the Borough did not own

the Property after plaintiff successfully foreclosed nor does it wish to own the 

Property now. 
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Nor do we think the Borough's motion to intervene was untimely. 

Undisputedly, plaintiff never served the Borough with its notice to vacate the 

foreclosure judgment. Also undisputed, at least on this record, is that the 

Borough did not find out about reversion of title to the Property to the Estate as 

a result of plaintiff's motion until August. The Borough moved to intervene in 

February. Given time strictures routine to the initiation of official government 

litigation, the motion to intervene was timely filed. Exxon Mobil Corp., 453 

N.J. Super. at 286. 

In sum, we reverse the order denying the Borough's intervention and 

reconsideration motions and remand the matter to the Chancery judge, who 

shall, upon notice to all interested parties, reconsider anew plaintiff's motion to 

vacate the foreclosure judgment with due consideration to the Borough's 

opposition. We leave the conduct of the proceedings to the judge's sound 

discretion.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.