IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 20–0563 

Submitted March 24, 2021—Filed April 16, 2021 

Amended April 21, 2021 

RICHARD BAUER, Individually and as Trustee for the KENDALL R. 

BAUER TRUST, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

BRADLEY R. BRINKMAN,

Appellee. 

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals. 

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey A. 

Neary, Judge. 

The plaintiff seeks further review of a court of appeals decision 

affirming the district court’s order granting the defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s defamation action. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT 

AFFIRMED.

Christensen, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all 

justices joined. 

Harry K. Widdison, Sioux City, for appellant. 

Ryland Deinert and Rene Charles Lapierre of Klass Law Firm, L.L.P., 

Sioux City, for appellee. 
2 

Shefali Aurora of the ACLU of Iowa, Des Moines, for amicus curiae 

American Civil Liberties Union of Iowa. 
3 

CHRISTENSEN, Chief Justice. 

In this case, the plaintiff, a manager of an apartment building in 

small-town Sloan, Iowa, brought a defamation action against another 

Sloan resident arising from his social media post in which he called the 

plaintiff a slumlord. The plaintiff alleged the defendant asserted a false 

statement of fact that he is an unscrupulous landlord of a slum area. Both 

parties filed motions for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The 

district court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the action. 

The district court reasoned that the context of the defendant’s statement 

shows he was not attempting to comment on the plaintiff’s apartments, 

but rather insult the plaintiff. Therefore, it concluded the statement was 

a constitutionally protected opinion and dismissed the claim. The court 

of appeals affirmed. The plaintiff applied for further review, and we 

granted his application. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

Plaintiff Richard Bauer (Bauer) resides in Sloan, Iowa, where he 

manages Bauer Apartments. The apartments are owned by the Kendall R. 

Bauer Trust for which he is the trustee. On September 22, 2015, Kathy 

Lynch (Kathy) began the construction of Pet Perfect LLC, a dog care facility, 

directly next to Bauer Apartments. Bauer became concerned issues were 

going to arise from the dogs and their feces due to the outdoor area being 

constructed. He contacted the Sloan City Council and asked for the city’s 

zoning ordinances. Bauer also contacted Kathy about his concerns and 

offered to buy the parcel of land where she was building the facility. She 

refused. He ultimately filed suit against the City of Sloan and the city 

council members claiming they failed to enforce a zoning ordinance. 

Pet Perfect LLC has its own Facebook page that posted about Bauer’s 

pending lawsuit and cameras he had installed on the exterior of the 
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apartments. On July 5, 2017, Kathy’s daughter, Gabbie Lynch, published 

a post on her personal Facebook page complaining about Bauer and his 

concerns with the dog feces outside at Pet Perfect LLC. She included in 

her post a photo of a letter his attorney sent to Kathy. Several people 

commented on the post, including defendant Bradley Brinkman 

(Brinkman). Brinkman is a friend of Kathy’s. He also lives across the 

street from Bauer Apartments. Brinkman’s Facebook comment states: 

It is because of shit like this that I need to run for mayor! 

[grinning emoji] Mr. Bauer . . . you sir are a PIECE OF SHIT!!! 

Let’s not sugar coat things here people. Kathy Lynch runs a 

respectable business in this town! You sir are nothing more 

than a Slum Lord! Period. I would love to have you walk 

across the street to the east of your ooh so precious property 

and discuss this with me! 

On March 12, 2019, Bauer filed suit against Brinkman claiming he 

was liable for defamation due to his use of the term slumlord. He asserted 

claims for libel per se, libel per quod, and libel by implication. On 

January 10, 2020, Bauer filed a motion for partial summary judgment 

seeking judgment as a matter of law on liability and a trial on damages 

only. Brinkman resisted the motion and filed his own motion for summary 

judgment arguing that he could not be liable for the use of the term 

because it was an expression of opinion. The district court held a hearing 

on the motions. 

On March 20, the district court granted Brinkman’s motion for 

summary judgment finding that his use of the term slumlord was not a 

statement of fact, but rather a constitutionally protected expression of 

opinion. The district court reasoned that the term slumlord could 

hypothetically be used as a statement of fact, however, in the context of 

the Facebook post it was apparent Brinkman was trying to insult Bauer 

rather than assert facts about the quality of Bauer Apartments. Bauer 
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appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s order 

dismissing the action. Bauer applied for further review, and we granted 

his application. 

II. Standard of Review. 

We review a district court’s summary judgment ruling for correction 

of errors at law. Terry v. Dorothy, 950 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Iowa 2020). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 443 (Iowa 2013). Summary judgment 

“is afforded a unique role in defamation cases. Judges have a 

responsibility to determine whether allowing a case to go to a jury would 

. . . endanger first amendment freedoms.” Id. (omission in original) 

(quoting Jones v. Palmer Commc’ns, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Iowa 1989), 

overruled in part on other grounds by Schlegel v. Ottumwa Courier, 585 

N.W.2d 217, 224 (Iowa 1998)). 

III. Analysis. 

The prima facie elements a plaintiff must prove in a defamation 

action are that “the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) 

defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff.” Id. at 464 (quoting Taggart 

v. Drake Univ., 549 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Iowa 1996)). Generally speaking, 

defamation is the publication of false statements of fact which tend to 

harm an individual’s reputation. Huegerich v. IBP, Inc., 547 N.W.2d 216, 

221 (Iowa 1996). “Defamation includes the twin torts of libel and slander. 

Libel involves written statements, while slander involves oral statements.” 

Bierman, 826 N.W.2d at 444 (quoting Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 

174 (Iowa 2004), overruled in part on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott 

Int’l, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016)). This case concerns libel. Libel is 
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the “malicious publication, expressed either in printing or in 

writing, or by signs or pictures, tending to injure the 

reputation of another person or to expose [that person] to 

public hatred, contempt, or ridicule or to injure [the person] 

in the maintenance of [a] business.” 

Delaney v. Int’l Union UAW Loc. No. 94, 675 N.W.2d 832, 839 (Iowa 2004) 

(alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 

510 (Iowa 1996)). 

Statements that cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual 

facts about a person are not actionable as defamation. Milkovich v. Lorain 

J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 (1990). Thus, speech that is 

considered “rhetorical hyperbole” and “vigorous epithet” are nonactionable 

as defamation. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14, 90 

S. Ct. 1537, 1542 (1970). Whether a statement is capable of a defamatory 

meaning is a question for the court. Jones, 440 N.W.2d at 891. 

We use a four-factor test to determine whether an alleged 

defamatory statement can reasonably be interpreted as alleging actual 

facts or is a protected expression of opinion. Bandstra v. Covenant 

Reformed Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 47 (Iowa 2018). First, we consider 

“whether the alleged defamatory statement ‘has a precise core of meaning 

for which a consensus of understanding exists or, conversely, whether the 

statement is indefinite and ambiguous.’ ” Id. (quoting Yates v. Iowa W. 

Racing Ass’n, 721 N.W.2d 762, 770 (Iowa 2006)). Second, we consider to 

what degree the statement is “objectively capable of proof or disproof.” Id.

(quoting Yates, 721 N.W.2d at 770). Third, we examine “the context in 

which the alleged defamatory statement occurs.” Id. (quoting Yates, 721 

N.W.2d at 770). Fourth, we contemplate “the broader social context” the 

alleged defamatory statement fits into. Id. (quoting Yates, 721 N.W.2d at 

770). 
7 

Bauer argues that Brinkman’s speech calling him a slumlord 

implied a factual assertion that he is an “unscrupulous landlord” of an 

apartment building that is a slum or in a slum area. He provides the 

following definition for slumlord: 

[A]n unscrupulous landlord who milks a property without 

concern for tenants, neighborhoods or their own long term 

interests. Slumlords overcharge for property in poor 

neighborhoods that is kept in poor repair and allowed to 

deteriorate. Some indicators of property run by a slumlord 

include number of police calls, and city and county code 

violations on the properties. 

Slumlord Law and Legal Definition, US Legal, 

https://definitions.uslegal.com/s/slumlord [https://perma.cc/UZG9-

RR8T] (last visited April 9, 2021). The Iowa Code defines a slum area as: 

[A]n area in which there is a predominance of buildings or 

improvements, whether residential or nonresidential, which: 

by reason of dilapidation, deterioration, age or obsolescence; 

by reason of inadequate provision for ventilation, light, air, 

sanitation, or open spaces; by reason of high density of 

population and overcrowding; by reason of the existence of 

conditions which endanger life or property by fire and other 

causes; or which by any combination of such factors, is 

conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, infant 

mortality, juvenile delinquency, or crime, and which is 

detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare. 

Iowa Code § 403.17(22) (2019). Brinkman argues that his Facebook 

comment was a protected expression of opinion. The dispositive question 

in this case is whether a reasonable reader could conclude that 

Brinkman’s Facebook comment implied a factual statement that Bauer is 

a rental property owner or landlord of a slum area. 

A statement that is precise and easy to verify is more likely a fact 

than an opinion. Jones, 440 N.W.2d at 891. An example of a defamatory 

statement that is capable of precise meaning and easily verifiable is an 

accusation that a person committed a crime. Yates, 721 N.W.2d at 773; 
8 

see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21, 110 S. Ct. at 2707 (finding whether 

plaintiff committed perjury could be objectively verified by comparing his 

two sets of differing testimony on a topic). We have held that an alleged 

defamatory statement that a plaintiff reads at a third-grade level is a 

precise and specific statement, which could be verified. Jones, 440 N.W.2d 

at 892. On the other hand, we have determined that a statement that a 

greyhound racing dog kennel was “substandard and poor performers” is 

not capable of a precise and verifiable meaning. Yates, 721 N.W.2d at 773. 

We have also held that a defendant’s statement that, “unless . . . he was 

holding a knife to her throat, it wasn’t rape” was an opinion, partly because 

there is a lack of consensus of understanding on whether rape exists 

without a threat of force. Bandstra, 913 N.W.2d at 48–49. 

In certain contexts, courts likely could assign a precise meaning to 

the term slumlord. For example, in Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 

1032 (Del. 1998) (en banc), the Delaware Supreme Court examined the 

use of the term slumlord in a newspaper article headline in conjunction 

with the article’s contents. The article stated that the plaintiff owned 

seventy properties and reprinted allegations that he had “done well 

through poorly-maintained surface parking lots and rental homes.” Id. 

The article included a claim that some of the rental homes were poorly 

maintained row houses occupied by tenants. Id. The article’s author 

omitted the plaintiff’s assertions that only five of the seventy properties 

were houses and just one house was occupied by a tenant. Id. at 1033. 

Thus, in Ramunno it is possible to assign a precise meaning to the term 

slumlord as used in the article because it was supported by fact-specific 

statements. See id. at 1038 (determining that the alleged defamatory 

statements could reasonably be understood as implying the plaintiff 

owned a sizable amount of substandard rental housing). 
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However, a term is not automatically categorized as an assertion of 

fact because it is capable of precise meaning and verification when read in 

isolation. The context surrounding the use of a term must be considered 

to determine whether it is protected as rhetorical hyperbole. See Knievel 

v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1071, 1074 (9th. Cir. 2005) (determining use of 

term “pimp” in the context of a webpage containing pictures and captions 

of athletes at award events was not capable of precise meaning); Beverly 

Enters., Inc. v. Trump, 182 F.3d 183, 188 (3d. Cir. 1999) (finding statement 

that “you people at Beverly are all criminals” was a mere insult); Rasky v. 

Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 431 N.E.2d 1055, 1059 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) 

(determining use of term “slumlord” in a news telecast was capable of an 

innocent construction). For example, Brinkman additionally called Bauer 

a “piece of shit” in the Facebook comment. While the phrase is certainly 

capable of precise meaning and objective verification, it is obvious it was 

meant only as name-calling and an insult. 

In Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler, the 

United States Supreme Court examined whether two newspaper articles’ 

use of the term “blackmail” to describe a real estate developer’s negotiating 

position was actionable as defamation. 398 U.S. at 8, 90 S. Ct. at 1538. 

The real estate developer argued that speakers at a public meeting and the 

newspaper articles charged him with the crime of blackmail, and could be 

held liable since they knew he had not committed the crime. Id. at 13, 90 

S. Ct. at 1541. The Court disagreed, determining that no reader of the 

speech could have reasonably thought Besler was being charged with the 

criminal offense of blackmail. Id. at 14, 90 S. Ct. at 1542. The court noted 

that the term was used during a heated debate, and “even the most 

careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more than 
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rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered 

Bresler’s negotiating position extremely unreasonable.” Id. 

When determining whether a statement can reasonably be 

understood as a factual assertion we view it “in the context of the 

surrounding circumstances and within the entire communication.” 

Bandstra, 913 N.W.2d at 47 (quoting Huegerich, 547 N.W.2d at 221). The 

proper inquiry “is not the literal wording of the statement but what a 

reasonable reader or listener would have understood the author to have 

said.” Yates, 721 N.W.2d at 771. Therefore we must examine the broader 

social context the statement was made in, as well as the context of 

Brinkman’s specific Facebook comment. 

Today, the “most important place[] . . . for the exchange views” is 

cyberspace, especially social media. Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 

U.S. ___, ___, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–37 (2017) (deeming social media the 

“modern public square”). Social media sites like Facebook give users a 

low-cost and easy way to voice their views. Id. at ___, 137 S. Ct. at 1735. 

However, users must be aware that they could potentially be liable for their 

online speech. A statement’s publication on social media does not 

automatically categorize it as a protected opinion and bar the author from 

liability for defamation. See Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 

(N.Y. 1995) (emphasizing that an article’s publication in the opinion 

section of a newspaper does not automatically preclude liability for 

defamation). Many people rely on social media as a source of factual 

information. In 2020 fifty-three percent of U.S. adults reported getting 

news from social media “often” or “sometimes.” Elisa Shearer & Amy 

Mitchell, Pew Resch. Ctr., News Use Across Social Media Platforms in 2020

4, 5 (2021) https://www.journalism.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/ 

8/2021/01/PJ_2021.01.12_News-and-Social-Media_FINAL.pdf [https:// 
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perma.cc/8445-ZVHC] (stating Facebook was reported as the top news 

source out of eleven social media sites). 

Here, the context of the speech begins with a Facebook post by 

Gabbie Lynch on her personal page. The post criticized Bauer for 

expressing concerns about dog feces outside at Pet Perfect LLC. Several 

people commented on her post expressing their own opinions about Bauer. 

Bauer concedes in his briefing that none of the comments on the thread 

discussed the condition of the apartments or his managerial abilities. It 

would be more reasonable for a reader to understand Brinkman’s use of 

“slumlord” as a serious factual assertion if the Facebook thread related 

specifically to Bauer’s occupation and Bauer Apartments. However, the 

Facebook post and comments were individual’s emotionally charged 

responses to how they perceived Bauer’s actions in relation to Kathy’s 

business. As an example of the tone of the comments on the thread, the 

comment directly above Brinkman’s states, “Dear Mr. Bauer” followed by 

a photo with enlarged text stating, “Good morning. Don’t forget to drink 

your water and mind your own fucking business.” This context of an 

ongoing heated discussion on matters separate from Bauer’s role as a 

rental property manager lends support to the conclusion that Brinkman’s 

speech was name-calling and an insult rather than an assertion of fact. 

See Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 13–14, 90 S. Ct. at 1541–42 (noting context of 

a heated public debate showed statement was rhetorical hyperbole rather 

than factual); Feld v. Conway, 16 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D. Mass. 2014) 

(determining that a tweet calling the plaintiff crazy was a protected opinion 

when viewed in the context of an ongoing heated debate on the internet 

about the disappearance of the plaintiff’s horse). 

An examination of the specific context of Brinkman’s Facebook 

comment additionally shows his statements were rhetorical hyperbole 
12 

rather than assertions of facts. He states “It is because of shit like this 

that I need to run for mayor!” followed by a grinning emoji, and that Bauer 

is a “PIECE OF SHIT!!!” before calling him a slumlord. The tone “is pointed, 

exaggerated, and heavily laden with emotional rhetoric and moral outrage” 

thus alerting readers that the statements are expressions of personal 

judgment. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 32, 110 S. Ct. at 2712 (Brennan, J., 

dissenting); see also Wahrendorf v. City of Oswego, 899 N.Y.S. 502, 503–

04 (App. Div. 2010) (determining statements made on the internet that the 

plaintiffs were slumlords and sociopaths and their property was a garbage 

heap and pigpen was name-calling and general insults because the tone 

was intended to be humorous and sarcastic). 

Furthermore, Brinkman did not attempt to provide any support for 

the statement that Bauer is a slumlord; therefore, a reader is alerted it is 

an insult and a “single, excited reference” rather than a factual assertion. 

See Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915, 926–28 (C.D. Cal. 2018) 

(quoting Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 581 (Tex. 2002)) (determining 

tweet calling plaintiff a “total con job” was rhetorical hyperbole in part 

because it provided no support for the statement). Brinkman’s deposition 

testimony that Bauer is not actually a slumlord also lends support to the 

conclusion that his Facebook comment was rhetorical hyperbole and an 

insult rather than a factual assertion. If he had insisted it was true, that 

would tend to show he saw his Facebook comment as factual. See id.

(noting defendant did not repeat the alleged defamatory statement or make 

a sustained attack on plaintiff); Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 584 (finding that 

defendant’s “consistent position at trial that his accusations of corruption 

were true is a compelling indication that he himself regarded his 

statements as factual and not mere opinion”). 
13 

Therefore, we conclude that based on the context of Brinkman’s 

speech any reasonable reader would understand that the use of the term 

slumlord was only rhetorical hyperbole and name-calling. The record is 

devoid of any evidence that anyone thought Brinkman asserted a factual 

statement about Bauer as a landlord or Bauer Apartments. See Greenbelt, 

398 U.S. at 14, 90 S. Ct. at 1542 (noting there was no evidence anyone 

thought the alleged defamatory statement was a factual assertion). 

IV. Conclusion. 

For these reasons we affirm the district court’s order granting 

Brinkman’s motion for summary judgment. 

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.