UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 Plaintiff Kimberly Barnes-Staples responds to the motion for summary judgment mostly 

by complaining about a hiring process that she does not understand. Her argument that the 

“guidelines” were not followed is flawed because she is mistaken about the interviewing process. 

Her allegations about “lies, shifting justifications, and inconsistencies” are based on a 

misapprehension of the hiring process such that none of her claims come close to proving that the 

proffered reason for Wittstock’s selection was pretext for race discrimination (she apparently 

dropped her sex discrimination and retaliation claims). Even if the court does not deem admitted 

many of the defendant’s statements of fact, or strike portions of her declaration, which it should 

because Barnes-Staples violated Rule 56.1, her claims fail because she cannot prove pretext. 

Argument 

 Barnes-Staples’s claim that the second-round interviewers did not comply with the 

guidelines, and that the interviewers and decision-maker “lied” and offered inconsistent reasons 

for selecting Wittstock, is wrong, mostly because she does not understand the GSA’s hiring 

process, and her remaining claims are meritless such that no reasonable jury would find in her 

favor. Also, many of her responses to the defendant’s Rule 56.1 statement of facts, parts of her 

statement of additional facts and her declaration should be stricken, for the reasons set forth below. 

KIMBERLY BARNES-STAPLES, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

EMILY W. MURPHY, Administrator, 

General Services Administration, 

 Defendant. 

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No. 20 C 3627 

Judge Kendall 

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I. Barnes-Staples Failed to Comply with Local Rule 56.1 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The court should ignore Barnes-Staples’s fact-dependent arguments that are not supported 

by a statement of fact that complies with Rule 56.1, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), or Fed. R. Evid. 602 or 

801. As set forth below, many of her paragraphs in her Rule 56.1 statement of additional facts, 

her responses to the defendants Rule 56.1 statement, and in her declaration, do not comply with 

the rules, and they should therefore be disregarded. 

Summary judgment motions are governed by Rule 56 and Local Rule 56.1, both of which 

the court strictly enforces. See, e.g., Ciomber v. Cooperative Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 643 (7th 

Cir. 2008.) Local Rule 56.1 is straightforward and clear; it requires each party opposing a motion 

for summary judgment to file: (1) a concise response to each numbered paragraph in the moving 

party’s statement, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific citations to the record, and 

(2) a separate statement of any additional facts, including reference to affidavits and other evidence 

relied upon. LR 56.1(b)(3). The rule “provides the only acceptable means of disputing the other 

party’s facts and of presenting additional facts to the district court.” Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. 

Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995); Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000) 

Furthermore, the court “deems a fact admitted if one party supports that fact with 

admissible evidence and the other party fails to controvert the fact with citation to admissible 

evidence.” Kaminski v. Napolitano, No. 07 C 3405, 2009 WL 1891799, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 

2009) (citing Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Services, Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817-18 (7th Cir. 2004); 

Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting LR 56.1(a)(3)). And the 

court “may disregard statements and responses that do not properly cite to the record.” In re First 

Farmers Fin. Litig., No. 14 CV 7581, 2017 WL 6026652, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2017) (citing

Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co., LLC, 401 F.3d 803, 809–810 (7th Cir. 2005)). Also, where the 

defendant moves for summary judgment, “facts presented only in response to a defendant’s 

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statement of facts, but not in the plaintiff’s own statement of additional facts are improper because 

the defendant has no mechanism to reply or otherwise dispute them.” Wilcox v. Allstate Corp., 

No. 11 C 814, 2012 WL 6569729, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2012)(internal citations omitted). 

Here, Barnes-Staples’s responses to the defendant’s statement of facts are not simple or 

concise denials supported by the record. See e.g., Plaintiff’s Response to the Defendant’s Rule 

56.1 Statement of Facts, ¶¶ 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 15 (in part), 16, 18–29, 38– 40, 42, 43, 45, 47–49, 

51, 53, 54. Instead, she improperly inserts conclusory assertions, conjecture, additional facts, and 

argumentative denials without citations to specific evidentiary materials. Trimble v. All.-

DeKalb/Rock-Tenn Co., 801 F. Supp. 2d 764, 768 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Many of her responses include 

additional facts that should have been included in her additional facts, not responses, which is 

improper because “facts presented only in response to a defendant’s statement of facts, but not in 

the plaintiff’s own statement of additional facts are improper because the defendant has no 

mechanism to reply or otherwise dispute them.” Wilcox, No. 11 C 814, 2012 WL 6569729, at *6 

(N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2012). The court should ignore the responses that violate Rule 56.1. Id.

Furthermore, several paragraphs of Barnes-Staples’s additional facts and declaration 

should be ignored. Under Rule 56(c), an affidavit or declaration used to oppose a motion for 

summary judgment must “be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible 

in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” 

Trimble, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 768. Rule 602 similarly states that a “witness may not testify to a 

matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal 

knowledge of the matter.” Fed. R. Evid. 602. Id. Accordingly, in an affidavit opposing summary 

judgment, “[c]onclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts, will not suffice.” Id. citing 

Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003). Affidavits are sufficient only “to the extent 

that they provide evidence that would be admissible if offered live on the witness stand.” 

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Nedzvekas v. LTV Copperweld, 356 F.Supp.2d 904, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Additionally, “although 

personal knowledge may include reasonable inferences, those inferences must be grounded in 

observation or other first-hand personal experience. They must not be flights of fancy, 

speculations, hunches, intuitions, or rumors about matters remote from that experience.” Trimble,

801 F. Supp. 2d at 768, citing Payne, 337 F.3d at 773. Here, several paragraphs of BarnesStaples’s declaration should be ignored for lack of foundation or because they contain hearsay, 

including paragraphs 6, 8, 9 in part, 10 and 13. Her statement of additional facts that rely on 

inadmissible evidence should also be ignored, including paragraphs 3, 8, 12, 14, 31, 33 in part, and 

35 in part. 

II. No Pretext.

 Even if the court considers the improper Rule 56.1 responses, statements of fact, and 

declaration (it should not), Barnes-Staples cannot prove pretext. She concedes that she was not 

clearly more qualified for the director position under the “Millbrook standard.” Mem. at 6–7; 

Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1180 (7th Cir. 2002). Instead, relying on Rudin v. Lincoln 

Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2005), she points to “bits and pieces” of 

“circumstantial evidence,” which supposedly show that the hiring process was “tainted,” and that 

the second-round interviewers cannot be believed such that a jury might therefore find “an 

inference of discriminatory intent.” Rudin, 420 F.3d 712, 720 - 21 (7th Cir. 2005); Mem. at 1, 7. 

Barnes-Staples’s claims are unsupported, and her case is easily distinguishable from Rudin.

 As the court in Rudin makes clear, the “pertinent question in a Title VII case is not whether 

a plaintiff has direct (including circumstantial) or indirect proof of discrimination, but whether she 

has presented sufficient evidence that her employer’s decision was motivated by an impermissible 

purpose.” Rudin, 420 F.3d at 720 (7th Cir. 2005), citing Logan v. Kautex Textron N. Am., 259 F.3d 

635, 638 (7th Cir. 2001); Kolasa v. Dunkin’ Donuts Midwest Distrib. Ctr., Inc., No. 08 C 3534, 

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2009 WL 1904345, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2009). “A plaintiff cannot raise a genuine issue if the 

evidence shows only that the employer made a wrong assessment of the applicant.” U.S. E.E.O.C. 

v. Target Corp., 460 F.3d 946, 960 (7th Cir. 2006), citing Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1175. “Instead, 

the plaintiff must present evidence that supports an inference that the employer was intentionally 

dishonest when it gave its nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the applicant.” Id. So long as 

the decision-maker genuinely believed that the selectee was better qualified for the job, the 

employer “is entitled to act on that belief.” Blise v. Antaramian, 409 F.3d 861, 867–68 (7th Cir. 

2005). Here, there is no evidence that decision-maker Green did not honestly believe that 

Wittstock was more qualified for the director position. 

A. The Process Was Not “Tainted.” 

 First, this case is not remotely like Rudin. There, a white professor claimed race 

discrimination after she was passed over for a tenure-track position in favor of a black candidate 

after an explicitly “race-conscious hiring process” involving several applicants and 

decisionmakers. Ruden 420 F.3d at 721. The successful candidate was not even initially among 

those selected for an interview but was inserted into the interview list to ensure “diversity among 

the interviewees,” such that the candidate bypassed the entire first round of elimination. Id. at 716, 

722. After the interviews, the plaintiff was ranked second highest among the candidates, while the 

selectee was ranked second from the bottom. Id. Also, the head of the screening committee told 

the plaintiff that the successful candidate “was not more qualified” than she was, and that the 

committee was under “administrative pressure” to select the chosen candidate. The university’s 

president disputed that there was any pressure and told the plaintiff that the committee head was 

“lying” and that “there was a problem with the process, the way the hiring was done.” Id. at 717-

18. Based on those facts, including the university’s explicitly race-conscious hiring process and 

the selectee’s insertion “into the interview pool based on his race,” the court concluded that the 

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defendant deviated from its hiring practices so much that there was a “systematic abandonment of 

its hiring policies,” such that an inference of discrimination could be drawn that entitled the 

plaintiff to a jury trial. Id. at 723. 

 Here, on the other hand, selectee Wittstock: (1) was not “inserted” into the hiring process 

based on her race, (2) was not ranked near the bottom of those who made it to the final secondround interview (in fact, she was ranked at the top), and (3) no one involved in the hiring process 

offered an alternative reason for Wittstock’s selection. Wittstock scored the highest in the first 

and only scoring round such that the process could have ended there, since there was such a 

disparity between the scores with Wittstock scoring well above the others, such that only Wittstock 

would have been referred to the final second-round interview. DSF ¶¶ 8–10; Defendant’s 

Response to Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts (“DRPSF”), ¶ 23. Also, unlike in 

Rudin, the second-round interviewers here, including decision-maker Green, provided the same 

reason for Wittstock’s selection, as set forth in our opening brief at 5–6. In any event, BarnesStaples’s false claim that the guidelines were violated is based on her misunderstanding of the 

hiring process, as set forth below. 

 The Guidelines. 

The GSA’s “guidelines” provide for two types of interviews for filing a vacancy: a 

“screening interview” and a “selection interview.” DRPSF ¶ 22. A “screening interview” may be 

necessary when “there are numerous candidates in the highest quality category and the number 

referred for selection consideration must be more manageable, or when filling highly technical 

positions.” Id. “It is not always necessary to conduct a screening interview.” Id. A “selection 

interview” is conducted “to provide the selecting official or hiring manager with more specific 

information about each candidate’s job-related competencies upon which the selection decision 

will be made.” Id. 

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In April 2016, then PBS Deputy Commissioner Michael Gelber issued a directive stating 

that for higher level positions, including GS-15 positions, the Assistant Commissioner “of the 

business line associated with that Division [here, PBS] will participate on the final interview 

panel.” DRPSF ¶¶ 22, 23, 26. After the final interview, the “hiring” Assistant Commissioner 

(“AC”) or the Regional Commissioner (“RC”) “will notify the Deputy Commissioner and Chief 

of Staff when a selection has been made and provide a brief description of the selectee.” Id. Next, 

the “Commissioner’s Office will review the selection and hold discussions with the hiring” AC or 

RC, as appropriate. Id. “Once the hiring AC/RC receives approval from the Commissioner’s 

Office, the AC/RC may contact the local human resources representative in order to proceed with 

a tentative job offer for the selectee.” Id. 

Here, GSA correctly followed its hiring process for the GS-15 position as follows: the 

number of applicants was “manageable,” so, as set forth in our opening brief (at 2-3), GSA’s 

human resources department screened the candidates by reviewing the written applications rather 

than conducting “screening” interviews. DRPSF ¶¶ 15, 22; DSF ¶ 5. HR then created a list of 

five qualified candidates who were referred for a first round (“selection”) interview; appropriate 

questions based on the “competencies” were developed; a rating system was created; and 

candidates were interviewed. DSF ¶¶ 5 – 10.; DRPSF ¶ 22. Wittstock scored the highest and 

Barnes-Staples scored third out of five. Id. 

The first-round panel could have recommended only Wittstock for the final interview since 

her score was so much higher than the others; however, since Matt Poisson had been the Acting 

Director for a year and a half, the interviewers decided to establish the scoring cut-off for the final 

interview so that Poisson would be included, which necessarily also included Barnes-Staples since 

her score was slightly (3.15/3.10) better than Poisson’s. DSF ¶¶ 9, 10; DRPSF ¶ 23. In other 

words, the only reason Barnes-Staples even made it to the second and final round is because the 

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GSA wanted Poisson to be interviewed in the second round (despite his lower-than-Wittstock 

score) since he had been acting in the director position for a year and a half. Id. 

Because the selection was for a grade GS-15 or higher position, final interviews were then 

conducted, pursuant to the 2016 Gelber directive, by a panel that included selecting official Green, 

RC Cooke, and PBS Acting Deputy Commissioner Azevedo. DSF ¶¶ 12–15; DRPSF ¶¶ 22 - 29. 

Once the second-round final interviews were concluded, and after the panel members discussed 

the candidates, Green selected Wittstock; RC Cooke forwarded the selection to Deputy 

Commissioner Gelber for approval; and Gelber approved the selection, with the concurrence of 

Acting DC Azevedo, as required by the 2016 Gelber directive. Id.; DSF ¶¶ 19 – 28. 

Barnes-Staples misapprehends the process entirely. She mistakenly ignores the entire first 

round “selection interview,” and instead focuses on the second final round, when she complains 

that the interviewers did not follow the “guideline.” Mem. at 7. That mistake defeats her 

“guidelines” argument because her claim that the second-round interviewers did not ask proper 

questions, take into consideration her experience or background, establish a rating scale, or arrive 

at a unanimous consensus can easily be rejected because the GSA was not required to take any of 

those actions in the final round (they mostly did anyway) since the first round “selection interview” 

panel already met all those requirements. DSF ¶¶ 5 – 10; DRPSF ¶¶ 15, 22–30. Also, the secondround interviewers considered the experiences and skills of the final candidates, including BarnesStaples, anyway through the candidates’ answers to the questions before coming to a consensus 

that Wittstock was the selectee. DSF ¶¶ 12–28. Decision-maker Green then properly submitted 

his selection through RC Cooke to Deputy Commissioner Gelber, who approved the selection. 

Even if there had been procedural missteps (there were none here), those failings would 

have to have been more than simply technical violations of a hiring guideline or policy to warrant 

consideration here. As another judge of this court explained: cases “like Rudin and two similar 

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cases decided by me involve blatant or systemic deviations from essential personnel rules or 

concealment of facts which underlie the decision,” or where “a competitive process for a 

supervisory position was mangled so badly that the original person given the job lacked the 

qualifications set forth in the job description and there was direct evidence of racial/gender bias in 

the workplace.” Gibbons v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 04 C 5368, 2007 WL 118226, at *4 

(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2007); Hanners v. Trent, 674 F.3d 683, 695 (7th Cir. 2012)(“we conclude that 

the minor deviation from written policy is insufficient to avoid summary judgment.”) BarnesStaples has not shown any deviation from the GSA’s hiring guidelines or from the 2016 Gelber 

directive, much less show that there was a “systematic abandonment of its hiring policies.” Ruden

420 F.3d at 722. 

Barnes-Staples also misstates the evidence. She falsely claims that the guidelines “clearly 

prohibit” asking “interview questions focused on a specific issue in the division” (Mem. 8–9), 

when in fact the guideline actually states: be “mindful that the questions do not assess a 

competency that is expected to be learned on the job. For example, do not ask candidates how 

they would handle a situation that is covered by a specific internal policy or procedures that will 

be introduced on the job.” DRPSF ¶ 19. Aside from the fact that the first-round interview 

questions easily met this requirement, nothing in the guideline prohibits the second-round 

interviewers from asking, for example, the candidates’ plan for meeting the challenges in the 

division or asking how they would meet the challenge of increasing leasing standards by 50% 

(which should have been an easy one for Barnes-Staples since she has a “leasing warrant”). DSF 

¶ 13. Also, if Barnes-Staples is complaining that she was unaware of the challenges of the division 

because she had not worked in the division for over ten years, it was incumbent on her to learn 

about the challenges before her interview so she could answer the questions. Mem. at 8–9. 

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Barnes-Staples also claims (Mem. at 8–9) that “the telling twist” is that “this question” (she 

does not say which question she is referring to) “made Wittstock’s selection a foregone 

conclusion” because Wittstock worked in the division while Barnes-Staples did not. That is 

obviously not true (not that there’s anything wrong with having specifically applicable 

experience). If anything, candidate Poisson, who was performing the duties of the position as the 

acting director for a year and a half, would be a “foregone conclusion” if selected since he was in 

the job as the acting director. DSF ¶ 17. The bottom-line is that Wittstock simply answered the 

final interview questions more thoroughly, which demonstrated that she had the experience and 

skills to perform the job better than the other candidates, and Barnes-Staples has no evidence to 

the contrary. Accordingly, no reasonable jury would infer discriminatory intent based on the 

questions that were asked in either the first or the second-round interviews. (It of course does not 

matter if the jury would have its own opinions on how best to conduct the interviews.) 

Second, Barnes-Staples’s argument (Mem. at 9, 14) that the process was unfair because the 

interviewers did not give her more credit for her “MBA” is, as we stated in our opening brief (at 

12), belied by her admission that education was not a requirement for the position. First, this court 

of course is not a super-personnel department charged with making the process fair, Ajayi v. 

Aramark Bus. Servs., 336 F.3d 520, 532 (7th Cir. 2003); the question is whether there was 

intentional discrimination. Her attempt to make education a requirement by pointing to the 

educational backgrounds of the interviewers, some of whom (Cooke, Juarez and Green) have 

MBAs (Mem. at 9), fails because the interviewers were not applying for the Real Estate Director 

position. If she is trying to show that Cooke, Juarez, or Green were treated differently, she offers 

no evidence that the GS-15 positions held by them did not require an MBA, like the real estate 

director position, but that their degrees were counted anyway during the hiring process for their 

positions. Besides, as we stated earlier, Poisson, a white male, also has an MBA, and he was not 

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selected either, which shows that education was not a requirement for the position. GSA Mem. at 

12. Barnes-Staples’s citation to the current GSA website (Mem. at 9) for recruitment proves 

nothing except that the GSA does not discriminate. 

Barnes-Staples’s claim (Mem. at 10) that her “experience and proficiency” were 

“disregarded” is unsupported and false. She points to a 2018 email from interviewer Azevedo 

regarding a different job where Azevedo referenced the selectee’s “past performance, the 

significance of the work they currently manage, and their ability to achieve outstanding results,” 

as if that has any relevance to hiring for the position here. Mem. at 10. Besides, the interviewers 

(both first and second round) considered past experiences and ability to achieve outstanding results 

when they found, based on the interview responses, that Wittstock scored the highest in the first 

round and that, in the second round, her interview examples, questioning, and depth of knowledge 

regarding the ability to transform and change how leasing is done, and how the division is managed 

and operates, was superior to all the other candidates. DSF ¶¶ 5 - 22. 

Third, Barnes-Staples complains that a “rating scale” was not developed before the secondround interviews were conducted but, again, she misapprehends the process. Mem. at 10. The 

guidelines required that a rating scale be established in the “selection interview,” which it was 

when the first-round panel graded each answer on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest rating 

and then ranked the candidate’s consensus scores from highest to lowest with Wittstock scoring 

the highest at 3.9, while Barnes-Staples, with a score of 3.15, was ranked third of the five 

candidates. DSF ¶¶ 8 – 9. 

Even if a rating scale were required for the second-round interview, which it was not, as 

set forth above, Barnes-Staples provides no basis for concluding that by not developing a second 

rating scale, the process somehow discriminated against her based on her race, or that it resulted 

in a “systematic abandonment” of GSA’s “hiring policies.” Oseman-Dean v. Illinois State Police, 

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No. CIV.A. 11 C 1935, 2012 WL 1280226, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2012)(“plaintiff must develop 

a link between the irregularities and possible discrimination”) citing Everett v. Cook County, 655 

F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 2011). And there is no evidence that had a second-round rating system 

been used, Barnes-Staples would have come out on top. (And again, whether better or fairer 

procedures could have been used is irrelevant unless there is evidence of illegal discrimination.) 

Last, Barnes-Staples complains that a “unanimous consensus” was not reached because 

Azevedo did not “specifically recommend the top candidate,” that she supposedly never “provided 

input into who she thought was the most qualified,” and that she claimed she never “agreed with 

Wittstock being the candidate.” Mem. at 9–10. But the first-round interviewers reached a 

unanimous consensus and scored the candidates, and as explained above, Azevedo’s role was not 

to “recommend” or “select” anyone, rather she was there because the 2016 Gelber directive 

required her to participate in the process. DRPSF ¶¶ 22–30. 

Regardless, Barnes-Staples undermines her argument because, on the one hand, she 

complains that Azevedo worked closely with Wittstock and was therefore biased toward her 

(Mem. at 12), yet on the other hand, she argues that Azevedo did not agree that Wittstock would 

be selected prior to the selection. Mem. at 10–11. If Azevedo were biased toward Wittstock, she 

obviously would have concurred in the selection. In any event, Azevedo was not biased toward 

anyone, and as the 2016 Gelber directive required, she participated in the final round of interviews, 

asked questions during the interviews, discussed each candidate with Green and Cooke, and 

concurred in the selection of Wittstock, and Barnes-Staples provides no evidence to the contrary. 

DSF ¶¶ 12–19, 28; DRPSF ¶¶ 22–30. 

B. “Lies, Shifting Justifications, and Inconsistencies.” 

Barnes-Staples faults the second-round interviewers, claiming they “lied” and provided 

“shifting justifications” and inconsistent reasons for selecting Wittstock, when in fact, it is BarnesCase: 1:20-cv-03627 Document #: 81 Filed: 12/13/21 Page 12 of 16 PageID #:1545
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Staples who should be faulted for not understanding the hiring process. Mem. at 11 – 13. She 

falsely accuses “Azevedo” of “lying” when Azevedo testified that she did not “recommend” 

Wittstock for the position while Cooke and Green testified that they all came to a consensus that 

Wittstock would be selected. Mem. at 11–12. “Recommending” a candidate and coming to a 

“consensus” are clearly two different processes. As the record makes clear, Azevedo’s role was 

to participate in the interview and concur, or not, in the final selection (she concurred in selecting 

Wittstock.) DRPSF ¶¶ 22 – 30. Her role was not to “recommend” or “select” anyone; that is the 

role of the selecting official, Green. Id.; DSF ¶¶ 19 – 20. 

Next, Barnes-Staples falsely claims that Green was not the “ultimate decisionmaker” 

because “Azevedo and Cooke testified that Robert Green and the regional commissioner Gelber” 

were the final decision-makers. Mem. at 12. Barnes-Staples gets lost in semantics and titles. First, 

Gelber was the PBS Deputy Commissioner at the time, not the Regional Commissioner. DRPSF 

¶ 29. Second, as the 2016 Gelber directive required, Green, as the selecting official, notified 

Regional Commissioner Cooke of his selection, and Cooke in turn notified Deputy Commissioner 

Gelber of the selection. DRPSF ¶¶ 22 - 30. Gelber then approved the selection and the offer was 

made to Wittstock by the human resources department, as required by the 2016 Gelber directive. 

Id. 

Barnes-Staples does not explain how any of this is relevant to her discrimination claim 

and, in any event, it does not suggest that anyone “lied.” If anything, it shows that Barnes-Staples 

does not understand the hiring process or the organizational structure at the GSA, despite having 

worked for the GSA for almost 30 years (DSF ¶ 3). 

Barnes-Staples’s remaining arguments are equally meritless. She complains that not 

currently working in the real estate division should not be counted against her because Azevedo 

testified that GSA hires people into positions that are from outside GSA, but Barnes-Staples misses 

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the point. Mem. at 12. First, this argument has nothing to do with discrimination. In any event, 

her lack of recent real estate division experience was evident in her less-than-thorough answers to 

the second-round interview questions, and in her apparent misunderstanding of the challenges 

facing the division. DSF ¶¶ 16 – 28. 

Barnes-Staples’s complaint (Mem. at 13) that she was not qualified for the job in a “prior 

promotion” because she lacked the technical background while, for the promotion at issue here, 

she was not promoted due to technical knowledge, is undeveloped, at best. How this director job 

relates to the other promotion and what technical skills were at issue in each position obviously 

matters, yet Barnes-Staples provides no facts or analysis to show that the two jobs are even equal, 

much less explain that she was somehow subjected to “shifting justifications.” Mem. at 13. 

Similarly, she challenges interviewer Cooke’s assessment of the answers to the final interview 

questions, but her complaint is based solely on her bald allegations and opinions, not facts or 

evidence. Id. Besides, Cooke, a Black male, is the same race as Barnes-Staples. DSF ¶¶ 12, 49. 

 Barnes-Staples also complains that the selection was “subjective,” and that the GSA 

ignored the “objective” evidence, including her “MBA” (which she obtained about 30 years ago). 

Mem. at 14 – 15. As set forth above, education was “objectively” not a requirement for the director 

position, as Barnes-Staples even admits. DSF ¶ 43. Also, GSA followed the guideline and 

properly conducted structured interviews that are designed to be as objective as possible. DSF ¶ 

7. Regardless, subjectivity is an inherent part of the interviewing process. As the Seventh Circuit 

has held, this “court has also never held that a job interview must be scored according to some sort 

of objective criteria. Quite the contrary.” Blise, 409 F.3d at 868, citing Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 

1176 (quoting Sattar v. Motorola, Inc., 138 F.3d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[N]othing in Title 

VII bans outright the use of subjective evaluation criteria.”). In any event, Barnes-Staples’s 

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conclusory allegations that the decision to select Wittstock was “subjective” and a “mask” for 

discrimination (Mem. at 15) is not supported by the record evidence. 

In the end, Barnes-Staples’s arguments amount to petty gripes about a hiring process she 

does not understand. She ignores the entire first round interviews because they do not fit with her 

theory of the case. Regardless, both rounds of interviews were conducted properly; Green made 

his selection, with the concurrence and input of the two other second-round interviewers; and that 

selection was approved by the Deputy Commissioner, all in accordance with the guidelines and 

the 2016 Gelber directive. Barnes-Staples has no evidence that the process was improper or that 

the GSA’s reason for selecting Wittstock cannot be believed. 

III. Barnes-Staples Abandoned Her Remaining Claims. 

Barnes-Staples abandoned her sex discrimination claim, probably because Wittstock is also 

female. She also abandons her claim that she was retaliated against, that she was denied a 

promotion to a real estate director position in July 2018, and that she was discriminated or 

retaliated against based on “other protected classes.” Regardless, she failed to exhaust her 

administrative remedies for those claims, and therefore the court should dismiss them, as set forth 

in our opening brief. GSA Mem. at 14–15. 

Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, this court should grant summary judgment for defendant. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 JOHN R. LAUSCH, Jr. 

 United States Attorney 

 By: s/ Kurt N. Lindland 

 KURT N. LINDLAND 

 Assistant United States Attorney 

 219 South Dearborn Street 

 Chicago, Illinois 60604 

 (312) 353-4163 

Case: 1:20-cv-03627 Document #: 81 Filed: 12/13/21 Page 15 of 16 PageID #:1548
16 

 kurt.lindland@usdoj.gov 

Case: 1:20-cv-03627 Document #: 81 Filed: 12/13/21 Page 16 of 16 PageID #:1549