UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

WENCKAITIS, et al., ) 

) Case No. 20-cv-03743

Plaintiffs, ) 

) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

v. )

) 

SPECIALTY CONTRACTORS, INC., et al., ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On July 11, 2023, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Tom Wenckaitis and 

Anthony Marshall (“Plaintiffs”) and against Defendants Specialty Contractors, Inc. and John O’Hara 

(“Defendants”) in an amount of $84,625.57 in relation to Defendants’ violations of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”), Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), Illinois Employment Classification 

Act (“IECA”), and the Illinois Wage Payment & Collection Act (“IWPCA”). Before the Court is

Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $324,698.05. For the following 

reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion and awards Plaintiffs $296,227.55 in attorneys’ fees and 

costs [118].

Background

The parties tried this case before the Court in a two-day bench trial on April 6 and 7, 2022. 

Following this trial, on July 11, 2023, the Court set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law as 

required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). In its judgment, the Court found Defendants 

to be joint and severally liable for their violations of the above statutes, in favor of Defendants on 

their counterclaim against Wenckaitis for the retention of the flex fund double payment, and against 

Defendants on their remaining counterclaims. (Dkt. 86.) In its judgment, the Court entered a total 

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combined award of $84,625.57, with $34,696.69 in favor of Plaintiff Wenckaitis, $49,928.88 in favor 

of Plaintiff Marshall, and $4,126.00 against Plaintiff Wenckaitis. (Dkt. 87.)

After judgment was entered, parties filed a series of post-trial motions, including the instant

motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court now considers this motion.

Legal Standard

The FLSA and IMWL directs courts to “allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the 

defendant, and costs of the action.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also 820 ILCS 105/12 § 12(a). “The award’s 

size is a function of three numbers: the hours worked, the hourly rate, and any overall adjustments up 

or down.” Sommerfield v. City of Chicago, 863 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2017). 

To determine the amount of attorney’s fees and costs, first, the court must calculate the

“lodestar” which is “the hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” Johnson 

v. GDF, Inc., 688 F.3d 927, 929 (7th Cir. 2012). The lodestar may also take into account factors such 

as “the amount involved and the results obtained,” as well as “the experience, reputation, and ability 

of the attorneys.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1937 n. 3, 76 L. Ed. 2d 

40 (1983). Once the court calculates the lodestar, it may then determine whether an adjustment is 

warranted under the case-specific circumstances. Nichols v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 4. F.4th 

437, 441 (7th Cir. 2021). If a plaintiff requests fees for the fee award litigation, the court will also 

determine that after calculating the lodestar. Id. (citing Batt v. Micro Warehouse, Inc., 241 F.3d 891, 894 

(7th Cir. 2001). 

District courts “have wide latitude in determining attorneys’ fee awards.” Strange v. Monogram 

Credit Card Bank of Georgia, 129 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 1997). Where a court uses its discretion to 

adjust a fee award, it must “provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons.” Small v. Richard 

Wolf Medical Instruments Corp., 264 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd., 

176 F.3d 399, 409 (7th Cir. 1999). “The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough 

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justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 839, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2216, 180 

L. Ed. 2d 45 (2011).

Discussion

In their motion, Plaintiffs request an award for attorneys’ fees for counsels Chris Wilmes 

($99,216.00) and Emily Brown ($203,680.00) and paralegals Ben Goldberg ($7,181.00) and Kassandra 

Perez ($10,148.00) for a total of $320,225.00 in attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs also seek to recover $4,473.05 

in nontaxable costs. As shown in the table below, in total, Plaintiffs request attorneys’ fees and costs 

of $324,698.05.1 

Attorney Hourly 

Rate Hours Attorney’s Fees

Chris Wilmes $520.00 190.8 $99,216.00

Emily Brown $400.00 509.2 $203,680.00

Ben Goldberg $215.00 33.4 $7,181.00

Kassandra Perez $215.00 47.2 $10,148.00

Total Attorneys’ Fees $320,225.00

Nontaxable Costs $4,473.05

Total Attorneys’ Fees and Nontaxable Costs $324,698.05

The Court proceeds by calculating the lodestar, considering the objections raised by Defendants 

in doing so. 

A. Calculating the lodestar: reasonableness of the hourly rate 

“A reasonable hourly rate is based on the local market rate for the attorney’s services” and the 

“best evidence of the market rate is the amount the attorney actually bills for similar work.” Montanez 

v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 553 (7th Cir. 2014). The burden of proving the “market rate” for the services 

1 The Court notes that in their reply brief filed on December 21, 2023, Plaintiffs request $17,684.00 reflecting 

time spent preparing the fee petition and replying to Defendants’ response between October 2, 2023 and December 19, 

2023. (Dkt. 124, Ex. C.) It is established Seventh Circuit precedent that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to recover fees 

for the time reasonably spent in establishing and negotiating their rightful claim to the fee. See Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 

1231, 1235 (7th Cir. 1980). But “[a]s the Seventh Circuit has admonished over and over, reply briefs are for replying, not 

for raising new matters or arguments that could and ought to have been advanced in the opening brief.” See Sommerfield v. 

City of Chicago, No. 06 C 3132, 2012 WL 3779104 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2012) (Cole, J.) (collecting cases). Here, Plaintiffs did 

not state their intent to recover for these fees in their original motion. For this reason, the Court does not include this 

$17,684.00 and associated time entries in its lodestar calculation of attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiffs have leave to file 

an additional petition for attorneys’ fees for this amount if they so choose.

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rendered is on the fee applicant, but once the attorney provides evidence establishing his market rate, 

“the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate why a lower rate should be awarded.” Spegon v. 

Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 554–55 (7th Cir. 1999).

Here, Plaintiffs set the hourly rates for attorneys Wilmes and Brown at $520.00 and $400.00

per hour and that for the paralegals at $215.00 per hour. Plaintiffs provide several forms of evidence 

to support their hourly rate, including: exhibits showing the standard hourly rates for Brown, Wilmes,

and their paralegals, Dkt. 118, Ex. 7; two prior cases where this Court and a court in this district 

awarded Wilmes fees at comparable rates, see Gunn v. Stevens Security & Training Services, Inc., No. a17-

CV-06314, 2020 WL 5593747 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2020) (Coleman, J.) (awarding Wilmes fees at $450.00

per hour, Brown fees at $320.00 per hour, and paralegals at $190.00 per hour); Barber v. Beverly Freight, 

Inc., No. 22 CV 6920, Dkt. 21 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2023) (Seeger, J.) (awarding Wilmes fees based on a 

$520.00 hourly rate); caselaw from courts in this district supporting a comparable hourly rate for 

attorneys of Brown’s level of seniority, Dkt. 118 at 9–10; and an affidavit from Marni Willenson, a 

civil rights and employment litigation attorney licensed to practice in Illinois and familiar with 

Plaintiffs’ counsels, supporting the reasonableness of these rates. (Dkt. 118, Ex. 8.) 

In response to this evidence, Defendants argue that the Willenson affidavit is insufficient 

because it is “conclusory,” does not assert “a direct relationship with Mr. Wilmes [nor] experience 

with Ms. Brown,” and because “Willenson’s experience in the legal field far exceeds both Ms. Brown 

and Mr. Wilmes.” (Dkt. 123 at 6–7.) To support this argument, Defendants point to the Seventh 

Circuit’s holding in Nichols v. Illinois Department of Transportation. 4 F.4th 437 (7th Cir. 2021). There, 

the court upheld the district court’s decision to find the affidavits submitted by the plaintiff as 

insufficient for a variety of reasons, including not stating the affiant’s hourly rate, not specifically 

addressing fees in comparable employment cases, being too general, and not listing a judicially 

approved or client-paid amount for work in similar cases. Id. at 442. 

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Here, the Willenson affidavit has no such deficiencies. The affidavit describes Willenson’s 

billing rate and provides two judicially approved billing rates in prior cases, and also describes 

Willenson’s experience observing and working with Wilmes and his colleagues. (Dkt. 118, Ex. 8.)

Based on this examination of the affidavit, the Court finds the Willenson affidavit to be sufficiently 

persuasive to substantiate the fees requested. And based on the weight of the additional evidence 

provided by Plaintiffs, which Defendants do not challenge, the Court similarly finds the hourly rates 

proposed by Plaintiffs for Wilmes ($520.00), Brown ($400.00), and the paralegals ($215.00) to be 

reasonable. 

B. Calculating the lodestar: reasonableness of the hours expended

Plaintiffs represent that the 700 attorney hours and 80.6 paralegal hours described in their 

motion are reasonably expended. Defendants object, arguing that Plaintiffs’ fees are excessive, vague, 

and not proportional to the award. The Court addresses each of these objections in turn.

1. Excessiveness of time billed by Plaintiffs

When calculating the reasonableness of the hours expended, the total time should exclude 

work that was “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. “Put 

another way, hours that an attorney would not properly bill to his or her client in the private sector 

cannot properly be billed to the adverse party under a fee-shifting statute such as the FLSA.” Spegon, 

175 F.3d at 552. Courts should also disallow hours expended by counsel “on tasks that are easily 

delegable to non-professional assistance” and time spent by paralegals “on what are essentially ‘clerical’ 

or secretarial tasks.” Id. (citing People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. Of Educ., School Dist. No. 205, 90 F.3d 

1307, 1316 (7th Cir. 1996).

Defendants broadly object to Plaintiffs’ requested attorneys’ fees as being excessive. 

Specifically, Defendants object to (1) the 14.5 hours Plaintiffs spent preparing the complaint—which 

included class action pleadings that ultimately were not pursued—and an additional 0.8 hours for time 

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spent emailing class representatives; (2) the more than 30 hours spent preparing for the depositions 

of Kristin Lyons and John O’Hara, despite the deposition being “approximately 1.4 hours long and 

her questioning on the stand at trial lasted mere minutes”; and (3) the 1.0 hour billed for a 

teleconference on January 12, 2021. (Dkt. 123 at 5–13.) Defendants also point to specific objections 

they made on the parties’ Local Rule 54.3 Joint Statement of Parties. (Dkt. 118, Ex. 4.) Plaintiffs 

dispute these allegations, but concede that they are willing to reduce the time Brown spent in 

deposition preparation from 23.8 hours to 15 hours, and to strike the 4.1 hours Wilmes billed to attend 

and participate in the O’Hara deposition. (Dkt. 124 at 7.)

i. Time billed preparing the complaint

The Court disagrees with Defendants that all the time Plaintiffs spent preparing the initial

complaint is excessive because it included class-action pleadings that ultimately were not pursued by 

Plaintiffs. The presence of these pleadings does not negate the work Plaintiffs allege to have 

conducted in drafting the complaint, namely “interviewing the Plaintiffs, reviewing client pay records, 

drafting the factual allegations, researching the applicable legal standards, and listing the appropriate 

counts.” Dkt. 123 at 11. As such, the Court will not strike all the time associated with the initial 

complaint. But the Court does strike Plaintiffs entry on 06/08/2020, on which Brown billed 0.80 

hours ($320.00) for work revising the complaint to specifically include evidence from and calls with 

class representatives. 

ii. Time billed for Lyons and O’Hara depositions

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ concession of the excessive hours spent by counsels 

preparing for and taking the Lyons and O’Hara depositions by reducing the time Brown spent in 

preparing for the Lyons deposition from 23.8 hours to 15 hours and striking the 4.1 hours Wilmes 

billed to attend and participate in the O’Hara deposition. As such, the Court strikes this time and 

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reduces the requested fees by $5,652.00: 8.8 hours for Brown ($3,520.00) and 4.1 hours for Wilmes 

($2,132.00). 

iii. Time billed for January telephonic status hearing

The Court agrees with Defendants’ contest of the 1.0 hour telephonic status hearing billed by 

Brown on January 12, 2021. The docket does not show that a teleconference occurred on January 12, 

2021, but does show that a telephone status hearing was held on January 15, 2021. As such, the Court 

strikes this time and removes 1.0 hour from Brown ($400.00) from the lodestar.

iv. Review of other time entries

In addition to the above objections, the Court reviewed the eighty-one entries Defendants 

identified in their response as violating Local Rule 54.3(d), Dkt. 123 at 8–13, as well as Plaintiffs entries 

provided as an exhibit to this motion. (Dkt. 118, Ex. 9.) Based on this review, the Court strikes the 

following entries, in whole or in part, for being excessive:

Entries by Brown

Date Hours Rate Narrative Reason for Strike

Hours & 

Fees 

Struck

3/22/2021 4.1 $400.00 “Review documents to be produced 

with plaintiffs’ production and 

redactions (3.1); Draft subpoenas 

for IDES, research service 

addresses, and email Mr. Wilmes re: 

same (1.0).”

The Court strikes “Draft 

subpoenas for IDES, research 

service addresses, and email Mr. 

Wilmes re: same,” as the entry 

describes clerical work that is 

excessive when billed by at the rate 

of an attorney. 

1.0 

($400.00)

4/14/2021 1.2 $400.00 “Draft notices of depositions and 

finalize deficiency letter. Send to 

opposing counsel.”

The Court strikes this entry, as it 

describes clerical work that is 

excessive when billed at the rate of 

an attorney.

1.2 

($480.00)

1/24/2022 2.5 $400.00 “Prepare for pretrial conference 

(.6); walk to and from pretrial 

conference (.5); attend pretrial 

conference (.7).”

The Court strikes “Walk to and 

from pretrial conference” as an 

excessive charge, as it does not 

describe legal work on behalf of 

the client.

0.5 

($200.00)

3/10/2022 3.8 $400.00 “Draft witness examination 

questions (3.5); Emails and 

conferences with Mr. Wilmes and 

Ms. Schwartz re: paralegal resources 

for trial (0.3).”

The Court strikes time from 

“Draft witness examination 

questions” as being duplicative and 

excessive, as an entry by Brown on 

the prior day also reads “Draft 

witness examinations (3.0)” 

2.0 

($800.00)

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Date Hours Rate Narrative Reason for Strike

Hours & 

Fees 

Struck

3/22/2022 4.9 $400.00 “Draft direct examinations of 

clients; Draft exam of witness and 

research witness’s background; 

Emails with Mr. Ortiz re: admin 

trial prep.”

The Court strikes time from 

“Draft direct examinations of 

clients” as being duplicative and 

excessive, as entries by Brown on 

the prior day and subsequent day 

also read “Draft direct and cross 

exams for trial (3.5)”

3.0

($1200.00)

Total Time and Attorney’s Fees Struck 27.1 

($7,320.00)

Entries by Perez

Date Hours Rate Narrative Reason for Strike

Hours & 

Fees 

Struck

3/28/2022 1.0 $215.00 “Walk to Tech training at 

courthouse (.3); Tech training at 

court house (0.7).”

The Court strikes this entry, as it 

describes clerical work.

1.0 

($215.00)

4/1/2022 6.0 $215.00 “Label exhibits for trial. (.7); Print 

and organize 5 copies of each 

exhibit re: Trial preparation (5.0); 

emails to Ms. Brown re: Exhibits 

for trial (.3).”

The Court strikes time spent 

preparing the exhibits, as it 

describes clerical work.

5.7 

($1,225.00)

4/4/2022 5.0 $215.00 “Prepare exhibit binders for Trial.” The Court strikes time spent 

preparing the exhibits, as it 

describes clerical work.

5.0 

($1,075.00)

4/5/2022 5.0 $215.00 “Fix exhibit binders re: new exhibit 

numbers and remaking new 

binders with finalized numbers.”

The Court strikes time spent 

preparing the exhibits, as it 

describes clerical work.

5.0 

($1,075.00)

Total Time and Attorney’s Fees Struck 17.0 

($3590.50)

For these reasons, the Court strikes a total of 48.20 hours ($13,042.50) from attorneys’ fees 

requested by Plaintiffs as being excessive.

2. Vagueness of time billed by Plaintiffs

District courts have broad discretion to strike vague or unjustified billing entries. Montanez, 

755 F.3d at 556. Here, Defendants’ contest that many of the billing entries provided by Plaintiffs are 

“vague and represent block billing.” (Dkt. 124 at 7.) The Court is not persuaded that entries that use 

block billing are de facto vague, as it is not uncommon for clients to permit their attorneys to use 

block billing. See Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Tr. of Chicago, 433 F.3d 558, 569 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Although 

‘block billing’ does not provide the best possible description of attorneys’ fees, it is not a prohibited 

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9

practice.”); In re Synthroid Marketing Litigation, 264 F.3d 712, 722 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he amount of 

itemization and detail required is a question for the market. If counsel submit bills with the level of 

detail that paying clients find satisfactory, a federal court should not require more.”).

Despite Defendants’ objections to the practice, it is clear from reviewing both parties’ time 

entries that both Plaintiffs and Defendants regularly used block billing in this case. Given that both 

parties—and their clients—have determined that block billing is a suitable practice, the Court will not 

blanketly strike all of Plaintiffs’ entries that use block billing as requested by Defendants. Cf. Farfaras, 

433 F.3d at 569 (describing defendants counsels’ objection to plaintiffs’ “use of block billing and 

‘vague’ descriptions” as “hypocritical”). 

In consideration of Defendants’ objection of Plaintiffs entries being impermissibly vague, the 

Court reviewed the eighty-one entries Defendants identified in their response as violating Local Rule 

54.3(d), Dkt. 123 at 8–13, as well as Plaintiffs entries provided as an exhibit to this motion. (Dkt. 118, 

Ex. 9.) Based on this review, the Court strikes the following entries, in whole or in part, for being 

impermissibly vague:

Entries by Brown

Date Hours Rate Narrative Reason for Strike

Hours & 

Fees 

Struck

8/25/2020 1.4 $400.00 “Conference with opposing 

counsel and follow up call with 

Mr. Wilmes re: same (0.5); Review 

client documents and email to Mr. 

Goldberg re: preparing

documents for production (0.8).”

The Court strikes 50% of time 

for this entry, as it describes 

internal communications with 

insufficient detail on the topic 

and purpose of the 

communication.

0.7 

($280.00)

12/22/2020 1.4 $400.00 “Review damages calculations.” The Court strikes this entry, as 

it provides insufficient detail on 

why counsel carried out this 

task.

1.4

($400.00)

1/19/2021 5.2 $400.00 “Draft discovery requests and 

review documents and statute.”

The Court strikes 50% of the 

time in this entry, as “review 

documents and statute” is 

impermissibly vague.

2.6

($1040.00)

3/8/2021 2.7 $400.00 “Review client’s documents and 

draft discovery responses.”

The Court strikes 50% of the 

time in this entry, as “Review 

client documents” does not 

sufficiently describe what 

1.35 

($540.00)

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Date Hours Rate Narrative Reason for Strike

Hours & 

Fees 

Struck

documents were reviewed or 

their relevance to the case.

4/15/2021 1.6 $400.00 “Review clients documents to 

prepare for deposition.”

The Court strikes this entry, as 

it does not sufficiently describe 

what documents were reviewed.

1.6

($640.00)

1/13/2022 9.4 $400.00 “Prepare and finalize pretrial brief, 

proposed order, and proposed 

findings of facts and conclusions 

of law; Prepare exhibits; Emails 

with opposing counsel re: 

proposed stipulations; 

Conferences with Mr. Wilmes re: 

same.”

While block billing is not de 

facto vague, the Court strikes 

50% of time from this entry, as 

the number of activities 

described in this entry coupled 

with the amount of time billed 

makes it unclear whether what, 

if any, time spent was excessive.

4.7

($1,880.00)

1/14/2022 7.7 $400.00 “Review, revise, and finalize for 

filing proposed pretrial order, 

plaintiffs’ trial exhibits, proposed 

findings of facts and conclusions 

of law, and trial brief; Conferences 

with Mr. Wilmes and Mr. Bartlett 

re: same.”

While block billing is not de 

facto vague, the Court strikes 

50% of time from this entry, as 

the number of activities 

described in this entry coupled 

with the amount of time billed 

makes it unclear whether what, 

if any, time spent was excessive.

3.85 

($1,540.00)

Total Time and Attorney’s Fees Struck 28.0 

($5,920.00)

Entries by Wilmes

Date Hours Rate Narrative Reason for Strike

Hours & 

Fees 

Struck

5/07/2021 0.1 $520.00 “E-mails about discovery.” The Court strikes this entry, as 

it is not clear who the attorney 

emailed.

0.10 

($52.00)

5/28/2021 0.1 $520.00 “Emails about ruling from 

magistrate judge.”

The Court strikes this entry, as 

it is not clear who the attorney 

emailed.

0.10 

($52.00)

2/07/2022 0.2 $520.00 “Call with Tony Marshall.” The Court strikes this entry, as 

it does not describe what the 

call was about.

0.2 

($104.00)

7/10/2023 0.2 $520.00 “Rule 78.5 request.” The Court strikes this entry, as 

it is not clear what action was 

taken regarding the Rule 78.5 

request.

0.2 

($104.00)

9/01/2023 0.1 $520.00 “Email American Community 

Bank.”

The Court strikes this entry, as 

it does not describe the relation 

of this email to the instant case.

0.1 

($52.00)

Total Time and Attorney’s Fees Struck 0.7 

($364.00)

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Entries by Goldberg

Date Hours Rate Narrative Reason for Strike

Hours & 

Fees 

Struck

4/16/2021 1.3 $215.00 “Emails with Ms. Brown re: 

pulling and compiling documents 

to send to client and pull, compile, 

and send same to Ms. Brown for 

review.”

The Court strikes this entry, as 

it does not sufficiently 

describe the task such that the 

Court can determine whether 

the time billed is reasonable.

1.3

($279.50)

Total Time and Attorney’s Fees Struck 1.3 

($279.50)

For these reasons, the Court strikes a total of 30 hours ($6,563.50) from attorneys’ fees 

requested by Plaintiffs as being vague.

3. Proportionality of time billed by Plaintiffs

Along with their arguments that Plaintiffs requested attorneys’ fees are excessive and vague, 

Defendants also argue that the Court should deny the requested fees as being disproportionate to the 

damages recovered and the initial settlement demand. 

i. Proportionality compared to damages recovered

Defendants argue that the Court should reject the $324,698.05 in attorneys’ fees and costs 

sought by Plaintiffs on the basis that the amount is disproportionate to the $84,625.57 the Court 

granted to Plaintiffs in its judgment following trial. Defendants also argue that the fact that 

“[Plaintiffs] [c]ounsel spent over 105 hours preparing the trial brief in this matter and/or preparing 

demonstrative exhibits” was “excessive for a two-day bench trial with three relevant witnesses.” (Dkt. 

123 at 5.) Defendants also point to the discrepancy in the amount they billed ($50,096.16) to the 

amount Plaintiffs request ($324,698.05). (Id. at 4.)

The Court is not persuaded by these arguments. The Seventh Circuit has consistently rejected 

the notion that a plaintiff’s attorney’s fees must be calculated proportionally to the plaintiff’s damages. 

Anderson v. AB Painting & Sandblasting Inc., 578 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing cases holding the 

same). Because fee-shifting provisions represent Congress’s desire for “even small violations of 

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certain laws to be checked through private litigation and because litigation is expensive, it is no surprise 

that the cost to pursue a contested claim will often exceed the amount in controversy.” Id. 

Additionally, “when a plaintiff has obtained an excellent result, his attorney should recover a 

fully compensable fee (i.e., the modified lodestar amount).” Spegon, 175 F.3d at 557. Here, Plaintiffs 

prevailed against Defendants on all four counts for both Wenckaitis and Marshall. With the exception 

of the hours the Court has already excluded from its lodestar calculation for being excessive or vague, 

the Court will not penalize Plaintiffs’ counsel for their level of representation of their clients solely on 

the basis that they succeeded at trial. 

In light of this congressional intent, the proper determinates of attorney’s fees are the factors 

considered in calculating the lodestar amount, which the Court has done so here. For these reasons, 

the Court declines to reduce the lodestar amount in proportion to the damages recovered at trial.

ii. Proportionality compared to the initial settlement demand

The Seventh Circuit has held that “substantial settlement offers should be considered by the 

district court as a factor in determining an award of reasonable attorney’s fees.” Moriarty v. Svec, 233 

F.3d 955, 967 (7th Cir. 2000). But when a Defendant has “tested [their] luck and lost” after rejecting 

a settlement offer, they must “pay for the attorney hours reasonably required to see the case through 

trial.” Johnson v. GDF, Inc., 668 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original). 

Here, Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs made an initial settlement demand of 

$40,000.00 and $12,000.00 in attorneys’ fees at the start of the case, the Court should reject Plaintiffs’ 

current request for attorneys’ fees—which is “approximately 27 times the [settlement] amount”—as 

being excessive. (Dkt. 123 at 5.). But as in Johnson, the fact that Defendants declined this earlier 

settlement on the reasonable belief that they might prevail at trial does not absolve Defendants of 

their current requirement to pay attorneys’ fees and costs for the resulting trial. For this reason, the 

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Court will not reduce Plaintiffs’ requested attorneys’ fees and costs on the basis that Plaintiffs 

previously offered a lower amount in their settlement. 

C. Nontaxable costs billed by Plaintiffs

Defendants object to Plaintiffs’ costs incurred for research using Westlaw, which constitute 

$4,343.34 of the $4,473.05 of non-taxable costs sought by Plaintiffs. In their objection, Defendants 

argue that while Plaintiffs attached the Westlaw charges to their motion, itemized by month, 

timekeeper, and client matter number, “there is no affidavit supporting that these charges pertain to 

the case at hand,” “no explanation as to how these charges relate to plaintiffs or what the client number 

or account number means,” and “no explanation as to what was researched, what was used, or how 

this research furthered the case.” (Dkt. 123 at 13–14.). Defendants also argue that because “most 

firms treat these charges as overhead,” the Court should not consider these charges. (Id. at 14.)

The Court is not persuaded by these arguments. The Seventh Circuit has held that costs for 

computer-assisted research, such as Westlaw charges, are recoverable. See Harman v. Lyphomed, Inc., 

945 F.2d 969, 976 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Computer-assisted research fees—so long as reasonably 

incurred—in theory reduce the number of attorney hours otherwise needed for (presumably) more 

time-consuming manual research and are therefore compensable.”) Here, the Westlaw charges 

provided by Plaintiffs clearly pertain to the instant case. The charges identify the number of 

transactions, the day the transaction occurred, and the amount charged. (Dkt. 118, Ex. 11.) Further, 

the charges also show Brown, Wilmes, and Perez as the users, and provide the same account number 

and client matter number for each transaction—the same client matter number that is included on 

Plaintiffs’ billing entries. (Dkt. 118, Ex. 9, 11.)

In addition to their objections to Plaintiffs’ Westlaw charges, Defendants also object to the 

Amended Bill of Costs filed by Plaintiffs on November 22, 2023, and Plaintiffs’ ordering of the trial 

transcript to attach to their response brief objecting to their motion to reconsider judgment. Plaintiffs 

Case: 1:20-cv-03743 Document #: 126 Filed: 09/30/24 Page 13 of 14 PageID #:2599
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do not seek to recover those costs in the motion before the Court. As such, the Court does not 

address these objections. 

For these reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for non-taxable costs in the amount of 

$4,473.05.

D. Attorneys’ fees and costs granted

For the above reasons, the Court adjusts Plaintiffs’ lodestar and grants attorneys’ fees and

costs as described below:

Attorney Hourly 

Rate Hours Attorney’s Fees

Chris Wilmes $520.00 186.0 $96,720.00

Emily Brown $400.00 454.1 $181,640.00

Ben Goldberg $215.00 32.1 $6,901.50

Kassandra Perez $215.00 30.2 $6,493.00

Total Attorneys’ Fees $291,754.50

Nontaxable Costs $4,473.05

Total Attorneys’ Fees and Nontaxable Costs $296,227.55

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ motion and awards Plaintiffs $296,227.55 in 

attorneys’ fees and costs [118].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/30/2024

Entered: _____________________________ 

 SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN

 United States District Court Judge 

Case: 1:20-cv-03743 Document #: 126 Filed: 09/30/24 Page 14 of 14 PageID #:2600