1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

William Amor,

Plaintiff,

v. 

John Reid & Associates, et al., 

Defendants.

Case No. 20 C 1444 

Judge Jorge L. Alonso 

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Before the Court is the motion for summary judgment (“Motion” or “Mot.”) brought by 

Defendants John Reid & Associates, Inc. (“Reid & Associates”), Michael Masokas (“Masokas”), 

and the Estate of Arthur T. Newey (“Newey”). For the following reasons, the Court grants the 

Motion in part and denies the Motion in part. 

Background

In this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Jeanne Olson, as 

Trustee of the William Amor Revocable Living Trust (“Plaintiff”),1 alleges that the Defendant 

Officers violated William Amor’s (“William Amor” or “Amor”) constitutional rights under the 

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by coercing a false 

confession from him (Count II) and thereby conspiring to deprive Amor of his constitutional 

rights (Count IV) and failing to intervene to prevent the misconduct (Count V). Plaintiff also 

asserts claims under Illinois state law for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII) 

and conspiracy (Count VIII). Finally, Plaintiff brings a claim against Reid & Associates for the 

1 William Amor died on January 31, 2023, and the Court substituted Jeanne Olson, not individually but as Trustee of 

the William Amor Revocable Living Trust, as Plaintiff. (Order, ECF No. 124.)

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state-law torts of its employees on the basis of respondeat superior (Count IX).

2 Defendants now 

move for summary judgment in their favor on all claims against them.

In resolving a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 587 (1986). The following facts are taken from the record and are largely undisputed unless 

otherwise noted.3

In September 1995, William Amor and his wife, Tina Miceli (“Tina”), lived with Tina’s 

mother, Marianne Miceli (“Marianne”), in an apartment at 218 East Bailey, Naperville, Illinois.

(PSOF ¶ 6.)4 Around 6:20 p.m. on September 10, 1995, Amor and Tina left to go to a drive-in 

movie theater, while Marianne stayed behind. (Id. ¶ 11.) When Tina and Amor returned from the 

movies sometime around midnight, they learned from Naperville Police Department (“NPD”) 

2 Plaintiff is not pursuing his claims for fabrication, substantive due process, or unlawful detention (Counts I and III) 

(Pl. Resp. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summary Judgment 18 n.3) and so Counts I and III are dismissed. This Court 

previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution (Count VI), finding it abated with Amor’s death. 

(Order, ECF No. 124.) The remaining counts for this Court’s consideration on summary judgment are Counts II, IV, 

V, VII, VIII, and IX.

3 Local Rule 56.1 outlines the requirements for the introduction of facts parties would like considered in connection 

with a motion for summary judgment and states that motions to strike are disfavored. The Court enforces Local Rule 

56.1 strictly. See McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir. 2019) (“We take this 

opportunity to reiterate that district judges may require strict compliance with local summary-judgment rules.”);

FTC v. Bay Area Bus. Council, Inc., 423 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Because of the important function local 

rules like Rule 56.1 serve in organizing the evidence and identifying disputed facts, we have consistently upheld the 

district court’s discretion to require strict compliance with those rules.”). At the summary judgment stage, a party 

cannot rely on allegations; he or it must put forth evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A); see also Grant v. Trs. of Ind. 

Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017) (“As the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a lawsuit,’summary judgment 

requires a non-moving party to respond to the moving party’s properly-supported motion by identifying specific, 

admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial.”). Where one party supports a 

fact with admissible evidence and the other party fails to controvert the fact with citation to admissible evidence, the 

Court deems the fact admitted. See Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 218–19 (7th Cir. 2015); 

Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2004). This does not, however, absolve the 

party putting forth the fact of the duty to support the fact with admissible evidence. See Keeton v. Morningstar, Inc., 

667 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2012). The moving party has the “ultimate burden of persuasion” to show entitlement to 

judgment as a matter of law. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006).

4 The Court refers to the Defendants’statement of material facts as “DSOF” (ECF No. 145) and Plaintiff’s statement 

of additional material facts as “PSOF” (ECF No. 160).

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Officers that there had been a fire in their apartment. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 18.) Marianne died as a result of 

the fire. (PSOF ¶ 2.)

On the night of the fire, detectives Michael Cross and Robert Guerrieri questioned Amor, 

who denied having anything to do with it. (Id. ¶ 21.) On September 12, 1995, Richard O’Brien—

the polygrapher that NPD regularly used to conduct polygraphs—gave Amor a polygraph. (Id. ¶ 

22.) O’Brien determined that Amor’s polygraph was inconclusive due to a lack of emotional 

responses, possibly because Amor had consumed alcohol prior to the exam. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) 

On September 15, detective Cross arrested Amor on an outstanding traffic warrant. (Id. ¶ 

27.) The detectives had a plan “to talk to [Amor] then at the police station” about the fire at 218 

East Bailey. (Id.) During Amor’s subsequent five hours of interrogation that day, Amor again told 

the detectives that he was innocent. (Id. ¶ 28.) Detectives Brian Cunningham and Cross told 

Plaintiff about “various aspects of the fire,” including that “shortly after he and Tina left the 

apartment the fire broke out and spread quickly;” that Tina had told him “that she may have left a 

lit cigarette in the apartment;” and that the fire started near the swivel chair. (Id.) Detectives 

Cunningham and Cross also suggested the idea that on the day of the fire, Amor spilled vodka on 

newspapers and may have misplaced a lit cigarette. (Id. ¶ 29.) Amor wrote out a one-page 

handwritten statement to that effect. (Id.) That information was provided to Amor by the 

detectives and was false. (Id.) After Amor wrote out his statement, he was transported to DeKalb 

County Jail where he remained for the next two weeks. (Id. ¶ 30.)

On October 3, 1995, Amor was released from DeKalb County Jail around 2 p.m. (Id. ¶ 

31.) At the time he was released, Amor had not yet eaten that day and he had only slept four 

hours the night before. (Id.) Cross and Guerrieri were waiting for Amor in the lobby of the jail. 

(Id. ¶ 32.) Cross and Guerrieri planned to give Amor a polygraph immediately after he was 

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released from custody, but instead of going back to their usual polygrapher, they took Amor to 

Reid & Associates in Chicago, an hour-and-a-half away. (Id.) This was not the first time that 

Cross had used Reid & Associates; Cross estimated that he brought a witness to Reid & 

Associates 20 times, or possibly less. (Id. ¶ 33.) 

When Cross and Guerrieri picked Amor up from the DeKalb County Jail, they told him

that they wanted him to “take a polygraph” in Chicago and that it was “in [his] best interest to 

take it.” (Id. ¶ 34.) Amor was not told that he was free to leave, and he did not feel as though he 

had a choice. (Id.) When he was released from jail, Amor “had nowhere to stay,” and “no wallet, 

no keys, no money, no phone.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Cross and Guerrieri drove Plaintiff to Reid & 

Associates in a locked police car (id. ¶ 36), although Amor was not handcuffed while being 

transported (DSOF ¶ 31). Amor assumed without asking that the police were working with Reid 

& Associates based only on the fact that he was picked up and taken right to Reid & Associates.

(Id. ¶ 30.)

When they arrived at approximately 3:50 p.m., Cross and Guerrieri went to speak with 

Masokas, a polygrapher for Reid & Associates who was trained in the Reid technique for 

polygraphing and interrogation. (PSOF ¶ 36.) Masokas had had past dealings with NPD (id. ¶ 

33), although Cross had not met Masokas or Newey before that day (DSOF ¶ 27). Masokas, 

Cross, and Guerrieri spoke for a little less than an hour. (PSOF ¶ 37.) The detectives told 

Masokas the fire was intentionally set (they had ruled out any accidental causes); Amor was a 

scammer; the victim had a $100,000 life insurance policy; and Amor was their suspect. (Id.) 

Masokas testified that as a polygrapher he would come up with the questions to ask a subject 

during a polygraph. (Id. ¶ 38.) Cross testified that in this case, he might have told Masokas 

questions he wanted Masokas to ask during the polygraph, but he did not remember. (Id.; Defs.’

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Resp. to PSOF ¶ 38.) The parties dispute whether it can be inferred from this testimony that 

Cross gave Masokas questions to ask Amor. 

At around 4:40 p.m., Masokas went to speak with Amor. (Id. ¶ 39.) Amor testified that 

while at Reid & Associates, no one raised their voice to him and he was only touched in order to 

administer the voluntary polygraph; he was treated “you know, good, bad or indifferent, they’re 

just – they have a job just like you do and I do.” (DSOF ¶ 33.) Prior to administering the 

polygraph test, Masokas had Amor fill out a form about his medical condition. (PSOF ¶ 40.) 

Amor told Masokas that he had a headache, cold symptoms and physical discomfort, and that he 

had only gotten four hours of sleep the night before (id.), which gave Masokas “a bit of a 

concern.” (Id. ¶ 41.) Amor signed a consent form and Miranda waiver. (DSOF ¶ 35.) The parties 

dispute whether it can be inferred from these facts that Amor was “in custody” at Reid & 

Associates. (PSOF ¶ 41; Defs.’ Resp. to PSOF ¶ 41.)

Amor was hooked up to the polygraph machine and given a polygraph examination from 

5:30 p.m. to 6:15 p.m. (DSOF ¶ 38.) Amor was given five tests during his polygraph: two tests 

where he was asked questions “straight through” in the same order (“straight through test”); one 

test where he was asked the same questions but the order was mixed (“mixed question test”); one 

in which he was instructed to answer the questions silently (“silent answer test”); one where he 

was instructed to answer every question as “yes” but not asked the control questions (“yes test”); 

and a “card test” that is designed to show the subject that the polygraph instrument works. 

(PSOF ¶ 42.) During the straight through, mixed question, and silent answer tests, Amor was 

asked relevant, irrelevant and control questions. (Id.)

Amor was asked the following relevant questions during his polygraph:

Question 3 (relevant): On Sunday, September 10th, did you do anything to 

start a fire in your apartment?

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Question 5 (relevant): Did you help or plan with anyone to start that fire? 

Question 8 (relevant): Before you left for the movies, did you know your 

apartment was going to be destroyed by a fire? 

Question 9 (relevant): Do you know who set that fire in your apartment? 

(Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff answered “no” to each of these questions. (Id.)

Amor was asked the following control questions during his polygraph: 

Question 6 (control): Besides traffic violations and stealing, did you do 

anything against the law? 

Question 11 (control): Besides an argument, did you ever do anything to 

intentionally hurt someone?

(Id. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff answered “no” to each of these questions. (Id.) 

Masokas found that Amor was not deceptive in his answers to either of the control 

questions. (Id. ¶ 45.) However, Masokas alleged that there were reactions—meaning Amor was 

answering deceptively—to each of the relevant questions. (Id. ¶ 46.). Masokas testified that he 

assessed whether each response indicted deception (id.; Defs.’ Resp. to PSOF ¶ 46) and denied 

that there was a contradiction between his finding that Amor was not deceptive in answering the 

control questions—indicating that he had never intentionally hurt anyone and never broke the 

law beyond stealing or traffic—and his finding that Amor was deceptive in answering the 

relevant questions—whether Amor had knowledge or involvement in setting the fire at 218 E. 

Bailey. (PSOF ¶ 47.) Masokas memorialized his finding that Plaintiff was deceptive in a letter to 

Cross. (Id. ¶ 48.) In that letter, Masokas described Amor as having “significant emotional

responses” throughout the polygraph. (Id.)

Plaintiff submits the report of polygraph expert Dan Sosnowski (“Sosnowski”), in which 

Sosnowski opines that Masokas’s finding of deception was incorrect. (PSOF ¶ 49.) When asked 

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whether there was “any way that a neutral, objective, qualified polygraph examiner could look at 

the data generated during Mr. Amor’s polygraph examination and reach the conclusion that 

deception was indicated,” Sosnowski responded, “I don’t believe that to be the case.” (Id.; Defs.’

Resp. to PSOF ¶ 49.) Sosnowski further opines that after scoring Amor’s polygraph charts using 

well-accepted polygraph techniques, he does not believe Amor was being deceitful and a 

competent polygraph examiner should have been able to determine Amor was being truthful. 

(PSOF ¶ 50.)

To evaluate Amor’s polygraph, Masokas used a “visual inspection,” meaning he went 

“through the chart” and used a “check mark system.” (Id. ¶ 51.) This was the scoring system in 

place at Reid & Associates at the time of Amor’s polygraph. (Id.) Under the check mark system, 

“[a] very light check mark will respond to a minimal response, a very heavy check mark 

indicates a significant response.” (Id. ¶ 52.) The polygrapher scores each relevant and control 

question using the check mark system to determine whether a person is being truthful or 

deceptive. (Id.) Masokas testified that for a particular question, if there was some emotional 

response indicated across multiple tests, that would be an indicator that there is some deception 

as to that question. (Id. ¶ 53.) Masokas could not say how many tests had to indicate an 

emotional response to a particular question for him to find deception; rather, he compared

consistent emotional responses to a particular question across multiple tests with the lack of 

consistent or significant emotional responses to another question. (Id.) In other words, he 

considered both “consistency” and “significance in a response” across tests, although “there’s a 

number of different factors that would be weighed in” and there was no rigid scoring system. 

(Id.) 

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Masokas testified that often a polygrapher could just “look[] at” the polygraph charts and 

that would be sufficient to reach a conclusion about whether a subject was being deceptive or 

not—a polygrapher would not have to actually score the charts. (Id. ¶ 54.) Because Amor’s 

responses “were a little bit more subtle,” he preferred “to write it out.” (Id. ¶ 55.) Masokas 

testified that Amor’s responses to relevant questions three, five, eight, and nine received a light 

check mark, indicating a “not real significant” response. (Id.) Masokas nonetheless evaluated 

each relevant question as deceptive. (Id.)

Sosnowski testified that although he did not know if the check mark system was 

disallowed at that time, no other institution recognized by the American Polygraph Association 

(“APA”) used it. (Id. ¶ 56; Defs.’ Resp. to PSOF ¶ 56.) Sosnowski opined that Masokas “used a 

scoring technique that was outdated and had no supporting research or documentation that would 

demonstrate that the technique was reliable.” (PSOF ¶ 56.) In his opinion, a numeric scoring 

system is “much more objective” than the check mark system, which is “very subjective.” (Id.) 

Reid & Associates’ corporate representative, Joseph Buckley, testified that numerical scoring 

arose because “[s]ome of the guys in the profession got very nervous with check marks, because 

they felt it was too subjective.” (PSOF ¶ 57.) Buckley further testified that there was no industry 

standard in 1995, that the industry standard at the time of his deposition (2022) was check marks, 

and that numerical scoring seems more objective but is the same in principle as check marks. 

(Defs.’ Resp. to PSOF ¶ 57.)

After Masokas scored Amor’s polygraph, Masokas asked Newey to also score the charts. 

(PSOF ¶ 58.) Newey also worked for Reid & Associates as a polygrapher at that time. (Id.) The 

parties dispute whether Newey scored the test results at all or whether he just looked at the 

polygraph. (PSOF ¶ 59; DSOF ¶ 39.) Masokas testified that he believed Newey created his own 

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physical scoring sheet, although it was possible “it was visual and he just looked at it.” (PSOF ¶ 

59.) There is no such scoring sheet in Amor’s file. (Id.) Sosnowski testified that typically when a 

second polygrapher scores the polygraph chart, they do so on a separate piece of paper and give 

it to the original examiner, who then puts it in the file. (Id.)

After Masokas scored the exam, he conducted a post-test interrogation of Amor. (Id. ¶ 

60.) That interrogation began at approximately 6:30 p.m. and lasted one hour. (Id.) Although 

Reid & Associates had the ability to videotape post-polygraph interrogations, none of Amor’s

interrogations were videotaped. (Id. ¶ 61.) Masokas told Amor that he failed the polygraph test. 

(DSOF ¶ 43.) Using lies or trickery during an interrogation, at least regarding misrepresenting 

evidence, was a permissible Reid & Associates interrogation technique, “provided everything 

else is proper.” (PSOF ¶ 63.) Plaintiff submits the expert testimony of a false-confession expert, 

Dr. Richard Leo, who opines that falsely telling a subject they failed a polygraph is a risk factor 

for false confessions. (PSOF ¶ 67.) He further opined that “[t]he polygraph false evidence ploy 

often exerts a profound impact on suspects, inducing feelings of hopelessness and despair and 

moving them from denial to admission.” (Id.)

Masokas described Amor’s interrogation as “more of a monologue as opposed to a 

dialogue.” (Id. ¶ 69.) During that “monologue,” Masokas suggested options to Amor as to why 

he was failing the polygraph. (Id.) This is step two in the Reid method of interrogation in which 

an interrogator uses “themes” to “suggest reasons why the presumed guilty suspect committed 

the underlying act that minimizes his blameworthiness, culpability and/or the consequences he 

will face.” (Id.) Masokas testified that Amor was cooperative and engaged during the interview 

and continued to deny any involvement in the crime. (Id. ¶ 70.) Masokas nonetheless refused to 

accept Amor’s denials (id.) and, because he was not “making any progress with [Amor], they 

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decided that Newey should join the interrogation.” (Id. ¶ 71.) Masokas clarified that he meant 

that he was not progressing towards getting Amor to agree that he had knowledge or 

responsibility for the fire. (Id.) 

Newey and Masokas then returned to the interrogation room, and interrogated Amor from 

7:45 to 8:30 p.m. (Id. ¶ 72.) Masokas described this interrogation as “very similar to the first 

discussion.” (Id. ¶ 73.) Newey again offered Amor “suggestions as to why he may be failing the 

test” and Amor continued to deny any knowledge or involvement. (Id.) Masokas testified that it 

was possible they brought up Amor “spilling the vodka as was given to [them] by the 

investigators,” although he did not remember. (Id.)

Newey and Masokas then left the interrogation room and spoke to Cross and Guerrieri. 

(Id. ¶ 74.) According to Masokas, he and Newey “went out to the lobby, conferred with [the 

detectives], let them know that Mr. Amor was not passing the polygraph, that we had spoken to 

him and he was still denying any involvement and that there was no explanation on his part why 

he was not passing.” (Id.) After speaking with the detectives, Newey decided he wanted to talk 

with Amor one more time, on his own. (Id. ¶ 75.) Newey spoke to Amor from approximately 

8:45 p.m. to 9:15 p.m., after which he conferred with the detectives again. (Id.) Amor still 

continued to deny any involvement or knowledge in the fire. (Id.) Cross and Guerrieri then 

interrogated Amor at Reid & Associates from approximately 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. (Id. ¶ 76.)

Thereafter, the detectives again conferred with Newey. (Id.)

Both Masokas’s and Newey’s interrogations of Plaintiff included proposing reasons or 

justifications for Amor to have started the fire; this is considered a minimization technique. (Id. ¶ 

77.) Leo opined that social science research has “repeatedly demonstrated that minimization 

techniques sometimes imply that the suspect will receive help, leniency, immunity, freedom 

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and/or a different benefit in exchange for compliance and confession.” (Id. ¶ 78.) He further 

opined, “Mr. Masokas’ and Mr. Newey’s use of this minimization interrogation techniques 

during their polygraph interrogation of William Amor increased the risk that Mr. Amor’s will 

would be overborne and that he would make or agree to a false and/or unreliable incriminating 

statements, admissions and/or confessions.” (Id.)

All told, Amor was in the interview rooms at Reid & Associates for approximately fiveand-a-half hours. (Id. ¶ 79.) Cross testified that that length of time was “different” and “unusual.” 

(Id.) At no time was Amor given any food or drink while there. (Id. ¶ 80.)

At around 10:30 p.m., Amor, Cross, and Guerrieri left for the NPD. (Id. ¶ 81.) Amor was 

not asked if he would continue speaking with the detectives but was instead simply told that they 

would be continuing their interrogation in Naperville. (Id.) No one from Reid & Associates 

accompanied Amor to Naperville and Amor had no further interactions with Reid & Associates 

employees while at NPD. (DSOF ¶ 49.) Reid & Associates worked with police departments on 

an “ad hoc” basis and would not be involved in any continuing interrogation once a subject left. 

(PSOF ¶ 63.)

During the continued interrogation at Naperville, Cross told Amor that even Tina thought 

he was guilty and arranged for Amor to be served with divorce papers during his interrogation.

(Id. ¶ 82.) In addition, Amor testified that Cross threatened and physically assaulted him during 

the interrogation. (Id. ¶ 83.) In particular, Amor testified that Cross grabbed Amor by his upper 

shoulders/neck, shook him and pushed him against the wall, then yelled: “I’m going to kick your 

fucking ass if you don’t confess.” (Id.) Either Cross or Guerrieri then told Amor that if he just 

signed a statement, he could go home. (Id.) Amor was again Mirandized and gave a statement 

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stating that he intentionally set the fire by pouring vodka on a newspaper and flicking a cigarette 

into the fire. (DSOF ¶ 50.) 

Although the Reid & Associates’ corporate representative admitted that he had never 

heard of having a suspect served with divorce papers during an interrogation following a 

polygraph, he testified that it was up to Cross and Guerrieri to decide “[w]hatever [they] think is 

best.” (PSOF ¶ 64.) Similarly, Masokas testified that he had no idea what happened during 

Plaintiff’s continued interrogation back at Naperville following his polygraph. (Id.)

Reid & Associates employees were not required to document the use of trickery or deceit 

in their post-polygraph interrogations. (PSOF ¶ 65.) Rather, Buckley testified that employees 

were trained to document only “the subject matter of the examination . . . , who the examinee 

was, the dated examination[;]” “any pre-test discussion that shed light on the issue;” “the test 

questions that were asked[;]” “our opinion as to whether the person was truthful or deceptive[;]” 

and “any post-test acknowledgements or admissions that might have taken place.” (Id.) Indeed, 

Masokas’s report in this case does not disclose that he used deception during his and Newey’s 

post-polygraph interrogation of Amor—and there is no indication otherwise that he disclosed the 

same to the prosecutor. (Id.) Buckley testified that a polygrapher could lie about “potential 

evidence” such as “a witness we don’t have, a DNA match we don’t have, that kind of thing.” 

(Id. ¶ 66.) That was true notwithstanding the fact that Buckley admitted that telling an innocent 

person that they failed a polygraph when they did not—i.e., lying about “potential evidence”—

“would be very stressful.” (Id.)

At 1:14 a.m. on October 4, 1995, after 12 total hours of the pre-test interview, polygraph 

examination, and interrogation, Amor wrote a confession that he later contended is false and 

involuntary. (PSOF ¶ 84.) Amor testified that the following information in the confession was 

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“fed” to him: “When I got up I bumped the ashtray knocking the cigarette onto the newspaper 

with vodka spilled on it. I did not pick up the cigarette but instead continued to go use the 

restroom knowing a fire would probably result. . . . The loss was meant to be minimal for 

personal gain. No harm was ever supposed to come to any person or persons.” (Id. ¶ 85.) The 

ignition scenario in Amor’s false confession is scientifically impossible. (PSOF ¶ 86.) It is not 

possible to start a fire—let alone a fire of the magnitude of the fire at 218 E. Bailey—by 

dropping a cigarette onto a vodka-soaked newspaper. (Id.) Amor was tried in September 1997, 

and his confession was the centerpiece of the prosecution. (Id. ¶ 88.) Masokas testified at Amor’s

pretrial hearing and claimed that he found Amor to be deceptive in his polygraph. (Id. ¶ 87.)

Amor was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated arson and sentenced to 45 years on 

the murder charge and 20 years on the arson charge, to run concurrently. (Id. ¶ 89.)

On January 28, 2015, Amor filed a motion for leave to file a successive post-conviction 

petition and an attached proposed successive post-conviction petition. (Id. ¶ 90.) After a hearing, 

the circuit court granted Amor’s post-conviction petition and vacated Plaintiff’s conviction. (Id. ¶ 

91.) The court held that modern science undercut the conclusions that the State’s experts reached 

regarding the cause and origin of the fire. (Id.) The court further found that Amor’s confession 

was “scientifically impossible.” (Id. ¶ 92.) In so ruling, the court did not address how the 

confession came to be or reach a conclusion regarding Amor’s claim of coercion and 

contamination. (Id.) Instead, the court held that “[w]hatever the reasons for [Amor’s] 

scientifically impossible confession, the new evidence places the evidence presented at trial in a 

different light and undercuts this Court’s confidence in the factual correctness of the guilty 

verdict.” (Id.) Amor was retried for the arson-murder, and on February 21, 2018, Judge Brennan 

issued a 7-page opinion acquitting Amor of the crime. (Id. ¶ 93.)

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On April 10, 2018, Amor filed a Petition for a Certificate of Innocence (“COI”). (Id. ¶ 

95.) The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing in part that Amor “failed to establish that he 

did not by his own conduct voluntarily bring about his conviction.” (Id. ¶ 96.) The parties had 

agreed that Judge Miller, who was presiding over the COI, could review the relevant materials 

under 735 ILCS § 2-702(f). (Id. ¶ 97.) That would include “prior sworn testimony or evidence 

admitted in the criminal proceedings.” (Id.) In addition, Amor submitted as exhibits Judge 

Brennan’s opinion acquitting him, excerpts of the criminal retrial, and a letter from Amor to Tina 

in which Amor discusses (among other things) a plan for securing money and ensuring care for 

Marianne. (Id. ¶ 98.) For its part, the State submitted as exhibits to its motion to dismiss the 

grand jury testimony of a single witness, excerpts of the criminal trial and the Rule 23 order 

denying Amor’s direct appeal. (Id.) After a brief oral argument, Judge Miller denied Amor’s

Petition for a COI. (Id. ¶ 99.) In doing so, Judge Miller “considered the filing of the parties,” “the 

applicable case and statutory law,” “the relevant portions of the Illinois Criminal Code,” and 

“Judge Brennan’s decision regarding the bench trial that occurred.” (Id.) Based on the materials 

identified above, Judge Miller found that Amor voluntarily brought about his conviction because 

he gave a statement to the police. (Id. ¶ 100.) In support of that finding, the Judge stated that the 

appellate court on direct appeal had considered the voluntariness of Amor’s confession, and after 

taking “a look at the defendant’s education, the fact that he was provided with sustenance and, 

otherwise, apparently, treated fairly,” the appellate court concluded that the confession was freely 

given. (Id.)

On April 9, 2018, Amor sued the City of Naperville and detectives Cross, Guerreri, 

Cunningham, and other NPD officers, asserting similar claims to those in the instant case. See 

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2523 (N.D Ill. 2018) (Tharp, J.) (the “Naperville Case”). On August 5, 2024, a jury rendered a 

verdict in favor of Amor and against Cross and the City of Naperville on two of the claims. See 

id., ECF Nos. 384–85. 

Amor filed the instant lawsuit against Reid & Associates, Masokas, and Newey on 

February 27, 2020. Defendants now move for summary judgment in their favor on all remaining 

claims. For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion. 

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). To defeat summary 

judgment, a nonmovant must produce more than a “mere scintilla of evidence” and come 

forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Johnson v. Advocate 

Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court considers the entire 

evidentiary record and must view all the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from that 

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Horton v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 948 

(7th Cir. 2018). The Court does not “weigh conflicting evidence, resolve swearing contests, 

determine credibility, or ponder which party’s version of the facts is most likely to be true.” 

Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2021). However, “[t]he mere 

existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise 

properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine 

issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). 

Ultimately, summary judgment is warranted only if a reasonable jury could not return a verdict 

for the nonmovant. Id. at 248. 

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Discussion

I. Section 1983 Claims—State Actors (Counts II, IV, and V)

Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims that are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 (“§ 1983” or “Section 1983”) fail because Defendants were at all times private citizens not 

acting under the color of state law. Plaintiff responds that Defendants Masokas and Newey can 

be held liable as state actors because a reasonable jury could find they conspired with the NPD to 

violate Amor’s constitutional rights. The Court agrees. 

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by 

the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” L.P. v. Marian Cath. High Sch., 852 F.3d 

690, 696 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). “Private persons are 

considered state actors—that is, they are deemed to have acted under color of state law and thus 

face § 1983 liability—in certain limited circumstances.” Camm v. Faith, 937 F.3d 1096, 1105 

(7th Cir. 2019). “The first is where the State effectively directs or controls the actions of the 

private party such that the State can be held responsible for the private party’s decision. . . . The 

second situation is when the State delegates a public function to a private entity.” Id. (cleaned 

up). Additionally, “[a] private person acts under color of state law when she is a ‘willful 

participant in joint action with the State or its agents.’” Marian Cath. High Sch., 852 F.3d at 696 

(quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)). “Put another way, a private person may be 

liable under § 1983 ‘for conspiring with a state actor to violate the constitutional rights of 

another.’” Huiras v. Cafferty, No. 22-CV-1109-PP, 2023 WL 2188666, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 23, 

2023) (quoting Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir. 2013)), aff’d as modified, No. 

23-1385, 2023 WL 6566492 (7th Cir. Oct. 10, 2023). “This is known as the ‘conspiracy theory’ 

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of § 1983 liability.” Amor v. John Reid & Assocs., No. 20 C 1444, 2021 WL 825609, at *6 (N.D. 

Ill. Mar. 4, 2021) (quoting Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2019)). 

Under the conspiracy theory of liability, “[t]he plaintiff must identify a sufficient nexus 

between the state and the private actor to support a finding that the deprivation committed by the 

private actor is ‘fairly attributable to the state.’” Marian Cath. High Sch., 852 F.3d at 696 

(quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). “[T]o establish conspiracy 

liability in a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that (1) the individuals reached an agreement 

to deprive him of his constitutional rights, and (2) overt acts in furtherance [of the agreement] 

actually deprived him of those rights.” Amor, 2021 WL 825609, at *6 (quoting Beaman v. 

Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2015)).

Defendants challenge the first element, arguing there is no evidence that suggests that the 

NPD, Masokas, Newey, and/or Reid & Associates reached an agreement to deprive Amor of his 

constitutional rights. Masokas previously made a similar argument on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss in this case. The Court, Judge Lee then-presiding, found that Amor adequately pleaded a 

conspiracy theory of state action under Section 1983 because the following facts sufficiently 

alleged a “concerted effort” between the NPD, Reid & Associates, Masokas, and Newey: 

Defendants participated in Amor’s interrogation pursuant to an agreement between Reid & 

Associates and the City of Naperville, under which the City “regularly delegated to [JR&A] and 

its employees the responsibilities of interrogating, testing, and eliciting statements from persons 

suspected of criminal activity;” Amor was taken to Reid & Associates’ office for polygraph 

testing by NPD officers in a locked police car; once there, Masokas and Newey administered 

several rounds of polygraph testing; Masokas and Newey lied to Amor and told him that he 

failed a polygraph test; after the testing, Masokas and Newey questioned Amor at Reid & 

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Associates’ offices until 11:30 p.m. on October 3, 1995—using mentally and emotionally 

abusive tactics—with the cooperation and involvement of the NPD. Thus, the Court found that 

“the complaint specifically alleges a ‘concerted effort’ between the NPD and Defendants during 

the allegedly abusive interrogation of Amor while he was held at JR&A.” Id. (citing Spiegel, 916 

F.3d at 616).

The Court further noted the following allegations: Amor later falsely confessed while 

detained at the NPD; the confession and other inculpatory statements were attributed to Amor by 

Masokas and Newey, in addition to employees of the NPD; and Masokas and Newey 

“subsequently memorialized a false account of their interrogation of Plaintiff, which was used to 

support the charges against Plaintiff and deny him bond pending trial.” Id. at *7. The Court 

found that Amor “sufficiently ‘raises the inference of mutual understanding’ between Masokas, 

Newey, and the NPD, because these acts ‘are unlikely to have been undertaken without an 

agreement.’” Id. (quoting Amundsen v. Chi. Park Dist., 218 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

Accordingly, the Court held that the complaint “sufficiently alleges an ‘express or implied 

agreement among defendants to deprive [him of his] constitutional rights,’ and therefore states a 

claim that Defendants acted under color of law for the purposes of § 1983.” Id. (quoting Scherer 

v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1988)).

Plaintiff now presents evidence—much of which is undisputed—in support of nearly all 

of the allegations that the Court considered to be sufficient to state a claim for a conspiracy 

theory of Section 1983 liability: Amor was taken to Reid & Associates’ office for polygraph 

testing by NPD officers in a locked police car; once there, Masokas administered several rounds 

of polygraph testing; Masokas and Newey lied to Amor and told him that he failed a polygraph 

test; after the testing, Masokas, Newey, Cross, and Guerrieri alternately conferred with each 

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other and questioned Amor at Reid & Associates’ offices until 10:00 p.m., using coercive tactics.

To be sure, Plaintiff no longer argues or submits evidence that Reid & Associates had an 

agreement with the NPD whereby the NPD “regularly delegated to [Reid & Associates] and its 

employees the responsibilities of interrogating, testing, and eliciting statements from persons 

suspected of criminal activity.” However, a conspiracy often occurs behind closed doors outside 

the presence of the object of the conspiracy, Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 

2003) (a conspiratorial “meeting of minds. . . may need to be inferred even after an opportunity 

for discovery, for conspirators rarely sign contracts”), and so “[r]arely in a conspiracy case will 

there be direct evidence of an express agreement among all the conspirators to conspire.” Bell v. 

City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1255 (7th Cir. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Russ v. 

Watts, 414 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, “circumstantial evidence may provide adequate 

proof of conspiracy.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 

872, 875 (7th Cir. 1971) (same); Smith v. Daniels, No. 01-4157, 2003 WL 1717635, at *5 (N.D. 

Ill. March 23, 2003). “The question of whether an agreement exists should not be taken from a 

jury in a civil conspiracy case so long as there is a possibility that the jury can infer from the 

circumstances that the alleged conspirators had a meeting of the minds and thus reached an 

understanding to achieve the conspiracy’s objectives.” Cameo Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Senn, 

738 F.2d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 1983) (cleaned up); see also Krilich v. Vill. of S. Holland, No. 92-

5285, 1994 WL 457227, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 1994) (same). “The existence or nonexistence 

of a conspiracy is essentially a factual issue that the jury, not the trial judge, should decide.”

Cameo Convalescent Ctr., 738 F.2d at 841 (cleaned up).

Here, in addition to submitting evidence in support of nearly all the allegations this Court 

previously found relevant (outlined above), Plaintiff also submits evidence that the detectives 

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gave Masokas background information on the case, including telling Masokas that Amor may 

have started the fire by leaving a burning cigarette near a vodka-soaked newspaper; Cross’s 

ambiguous testimony as to whether he gave Masokas the questions he wanted Masokas to ask 

Amor, which would be a deviation from ordinary practice; expert opinion that Masokas used an 

outdated, highly subjective scoring system that had no supporting research or documentation of 

reliability and that no other institution recognized by the APA used; expert opinion that no 

objective, qualified polygraph examiner could have looked at the data generated during Amor’s

polygraph and found that Amor was deceptive; Masokas’s testimony that he gave light check 

marks to Amor’s responses to the “relevant questions,” yet falsely reported them to the detectives 

as “significant” (meaning deceptive); conflicting evidence as to whether Newey actually scored 

Amor’s polygraph; all-told, Amor was at Reid & Associates’ offices for five-and-a-half hours, 

which was unusually long; and Amor had not slept more than four hours the night before and 

was not given food or water. On balance, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence upon 

which a reasonable jury could find that Masokas, Newey, Cross, and Guerrieri had a meeting of 

the minds such that the acts they performed were “unlikely to have been undertaken without an 

agreement.” Amundsen, 218 F.3d at 718. All of the evidence Defendants point to purportedly 

countering these facts simply present genuine disputes of material fact for the jury to decide. 

Accordingly, summary judgment is denied in this respect.

The Court need not consider whether Masokas and Newey were performing a public 

function.

II. Coerced Confession Claim (Count II)

a. Collateral Estoppel

Next, Defendants argue that Count II is barred by collateral estoppel because the 

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voluntariness of Amor’s confession was previously adjudicated against him. On April 10, 2018, 

Amor filed a Petition for a COI. To prevail, Amor had to show in part that he “did not by his own 

conduct voluntarily cause or bring about his . . . conviction.” 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g). The State 

filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that Amor “failed to establish that he did 

not by his own conduct voluntarily bring about his conviction.” The court denied the Petition, 

finding that Plaintiff voluntarily brought about his conviction because he gave a statement to the 

police. The appellate court affirmed. See People v. Amor, 180 N.E.3d 170 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).

The parties agree that federal courts must give state court judgments the same preclusive 

effect as would a court in the state in which the judgment was rendered. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Allen 

v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). The Illinois COI statute states that “[t]he decision to grant or 

deny a certificate of innocence shall be binding only with respect to claims filed in the Court of 

Claims and shall not have a res judicata effect on any other proceedings.” 735 ILCS 5/2-702(j); 

Walker v. White, No. 16 CV 7024, 2021 WL 1058096, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2021) 

(certificate of innocence lacks preclusive effect in federal court). 

Defendants nonetheless argue that Illinois’s COI statute does not preclude collateral 

estoppel here because (1) the statute specifically applies to the “decision,” not the findings on 

issues of fact and law in reaching the ultimate decision; (2) the Illinois legislature has expressly 

prohibited the use of a court’s findings of fact or law in other contexts, so its failure to do so here 

must have been an intentional omission; and (3) the statute is specific to “res judiciata” and not 

collateral estoppel. In the Naperville Case, the district court considered and rejected these same 

three arguments in a well-reasoned opinion denying the defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment in relevant part:

None of these arguments persuade the Court that Mr. Amor’s coercion claim should 

be collaterally estopped. Contrary to the defendants’ assertions, Illinois common 

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law does not use the term res judicata in exclusive reference to claim preclusion. 

Instead, res judicata is commonly described as a “judicial doctrine comprised of 

two corollary branches.” Osborne v. Kelly, 207 Ill. App. 3d 488, 152 Ill. Dec. 422, 

565 N.E.2d 1340, 1342 (1991); see also Bagnola v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical 

Lab’ys, 333 Ill.App.3d 711, 267 Ill. Dec. 358, 776 N.E.2d 730, 735 (2002) (“The 

doctrine of res judicata precludes relitigation of claims or issues previously decided. 

It is divided into two branches: estoppel by judgment, referred to as res judicata and 

estoppel by verdict, also known as collateral estoppel.”). The Seventh Circuit held 

the same in Council v. Vill. of Dolton. 764 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir. 2014). In that 

case, even though the statute in question mentioned only res judicata and not 

collateral estoppel, the Seventh Circuit recognized that “collateral estoppel is a 

branch of res judicata” under Illinois law. Id. The statute therefore barred the 

operation of collateral estoppel when the statute stated that “no finding, 

determination, decision, ruling, or order . . . issued pursuant to this Act . . . shall . . 

. constitute res judicata.” Id.

The defendant’s reliance on the language in Section 702(j) referring to “the decision 

to grant or deny,” and not the “findings” of the court, is similarly unavailing. In Mr. 

Amor’s case, the state court’s decision not to issue a COI ultimately turned on its 

determination that Mr. Amor voluntarily confessed, thereby foreclosing his ability 

to obtain a COI under Section 702(d). Granting preclusive effect to the state judge’s 

finding regarding the voluntariness of Mr. Amor’s confession is indistinguishable 

from granting preclusive effect to the decision to deny the COI in the first instance. 

It represents the entire issue before the court. Thus, in Fields v. City of Chicago, 

No. 10 C 1168, 2014 WL 12778835 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 29, 2014), Judge Kennelly 

entered an order stating that a state court’s findings at a COI proceeding were not 

entitled to issue preclusive effect or judicial notice in federal court, citing Section 

702(j). Order on Mot. Concerning Certificate of Innocence Proceeding, Fields v. 

City of Chicago, 10-cv-01168, ECF No. 551 (“[T]he Illinois statute governing COI 

petitions unambiguously provides that a decision on such a petition ‘shall not have 

a res judicata effect on any other proceedings’ . . . . Allowing the state trial judge’s 

findings in evidence would essentially end-run this prohibition.”).

Relatedly, in Patrick v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a district 

court’s decision to admit a § 1983 plaintiff’s COI at trial, finding that Fed. R. Evid. 

403 did not operate to exclude it. 974 F.3d at 827. Though this case did not directly 

address issue preclusion, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the “principal 

purpose of a certificate of innocence is to remove legal obstacles that prevent a 

wrongly convicted person from receiving relief in the Illinois Court of Claims,” 

which is why the statute specifies that a COI decision “shall not have a res judicata 

effect on any other proceedings.” Id. at 833. The court clarified that this provision 

did not render “a certificate of innocence . . . categorically inadmissible in other 

proceedings,” though it was a legitimate concern for the purposes of Rule 403 that 

jurors would give the COI “conclusive weight.” Id. The Court ultimately found that 

the district court’s decision to admit the COI with a limiting jury instruction was 

not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 834. Though addressing the issue in a different 

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context, Patrick illustrates that COIs, even if they are admissible at trial, are not 

entitled to conclusive weight. It follows that the same holds true at the summary 

judgment stage.

Because a judicial finding in a COI proceeding would not receive issue preclusive 

effect under Illinois law, Mr. Amor is not barred from litigating the voluntariness 

of his confession in these proceedings.

Olson v. Cross, No. 18 CV 2523, 2024 WL 361200, at *12–13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2024).

While Olson is not binding on this Court, this Court is nonetheless persuaded by the 

district court’s reasoning in the Naperville Case and, for the same reasons, concludes that 

collateral estoppel does not bar Plaintiff’s coerced confession claim. 

b. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact Otherwise Preclude Summary 

Judgment on Plaintiff’s Coerced Confession Claim Against Masokas and 

Newey

Next Defendants argue Plaintiff’s coerced confession claim hinges on Masokas and 

Newey’s false representation to Amor that he failed the polygraph, but misrepresenting the 

strength of evidence to a suspect during an interrogation does not constitute coercion.

“The due process clause can apply to coerced confessions when the circumstances of the 

interrogation are grossly inappropriate.” Grayson v. City of Aurora, 157 F. Supp. 3d 725, 741 

(N.D. Ill. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774 (2003)). “This is because ‘[a] 

conviction obtained by the use of an involuntary confession violates due process.’” Id. at 741

(quoting United States v. Stadfeld, 689 F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 2012)). “A confession is voluntary 

. . . where the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that ‘it is the product of a rational 

intellect and free will and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or 

deceptive interrogation tactics that have overcome the defendant’s free will.” United States v. 

Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 281 (7th Cir. 2011). Conversely, “[a] confession is involuntary when it was 

given in circumstances that were sufficient to overbear the confessor’s free will.” Johnson v. 

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Pollard, 559 F.3d 746, 753 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); 

see also Weidner v. Thieret, 866 F.2d 958, 963 (7th Cir. 1989)). The court must “examine the 

totality of the circumstances surrounding a confession to determine whether the confession is 

voluntary.” Id.

Defendants rely upon Johnson for the proposition that misrepresenting a polygraph, 

without other facts indicating a person’s will was overborne, is not sufficient to find a coerced 

confession. 559 F.3d at 753. In Johnson, the detective did not know the plaintiff had failed a 

polygraph when the detective stated, “It’s my understanding you must have failed that polygraph 

because you’re still here.” Id. at 754. While the statement could be a mere reflection of the 

detective’s belief that the plaintiff would have been released if he had passed the polygraph, even 

if the court assumed the detective made a misleading statement, “[t]he fact that the detective 

made a false or misleading statement during the course of the interrogation would not, by itself, 

render [the plaintiff’s] confession involuntary.” Id. “An interrogating officer’s misrepresentations 

are neither dispositive of nor irrelevant to the question of whether a defendant’s statement was 

voluntary.” Id. When looking at the circumstances as a whole, the court found “even if [the 

detective] deliberately misrepresented the results of the polygraph examination, the 

circumstances surrounding [the plaintiff’s] confession were not so coercive as to render the 

confession involuntary”: the plaintiff was questioned on four separate occasions, but the 

interrogations were not unduly lengthy; the plaintiff was offered food, beverages, cigarettes, and 

short breaks; he was informed of his Miranda rights at the outset of all but one of his interactions 

with interrogators; and he was neither too young nor naïve to not comprehend the meaning of the 

warnings. Id. at 755–56. 

The circumstances in Johnson are distinguishable and show that there are genuine issues

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of material fact for the jury to decide in this case. Here, the totality of the circumstances 

surrounding the confession would permit a reasonable jury to find they overrode Amor’s free 

will and induced him to make false inculpatory statements. Weighing against a finding that 

Amor’s confession was involuntary is the fact that he was given his Miranda rights and that he 

was neither so young nor naïve as to not comprehend them, see id.; Amor described his treatment 

at Reid & Associates as “you know, good, bad or indifferent, they’re just – they have a job just 

like you do and I do”; and the allegedly coerced confession did not occur at Reid & Associates, 

see Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1992) (whether there was a “break in the 

stream of events . . . sufficient to insulate” a confession from earlier taint depends on a number of 

factors, including the change in place of interrogations and identity of interrogators (citations 

omitted)). The fact that Masokas and Newey were not present when Amor confessed is not 

dispositive because they took steps that purportedly caused Amor’s coerced confession. Cf. 

Gibson v. City of Chicago, No. 19 C 4152, 2020 WL 4349855, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2020)

(finding plaintiff sufficiently alleged personal involvement in individual coerced confession 

claim against two officers who allegedly “interviewed him and administered the polygraph 

examination, all steps that [plaintiff] alleges caused his coerced confession.”).

Weighing in the other direction are the following facts (both undisputed and taken in the 

light most favorable to Plaintiff): Masokas and Newey falsely told Amor he failed the polygraph 

test; a jury could find that Masokas and Newey knew they were lying to Amor; Amor had no 

food or water that day; Amor had only slept four hours the night before; Masokas and Newey 

used minimization techniques during the interrogation to suggest a less culpable reason why 

Amor committed the crime; Masokas and Newey fed Amor false information about how the fire 

allegedly started; and Amor was at Reid & Associates for five-and-a-half hours, which was 

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unusual. See Anderson v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 526, 530 (noting food, sleep, and water deprivation 

and a mentally coercive interrogation would result in the conclusion that a confession was 

involuntary); Grayson, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 742 (finding a reasonable jury could find confession 

was coerced where, among other things, the detectives intentionally fed him details of the crime). 

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s coerced confession claim (Count II) against Masokas and 

Newey must go to a jury and summary judgment is therefore denied.

c. Monell Claim Against Reid & Associates

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails because Plaintiff fails to show 

any widespread practice of Reid & Associates. “Liability under § 1983 is direct rather than 

vicarious.” Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018). “[J]ust as a municipal 

corporation is not vicariously liable under a theory of respondeat superior for the constitutional 

torts of its employees, a private corporation is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for its 

employees’ deprivations of others’ civil rights.” Iskander v. Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th 

Cir. 1982) (internal citations omitted); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–

94 (1978). As such, there is no vicarious liability on Reid & Associates for the alleged acts of 

Masokas, Newey, or other unidentified employees. Instead, Plaintiff alleges a Monell theory of 

liability against Reid & Associates, which “applies in § 1983 claims brought against private 

companies that act under color of state law.” Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 

658, 664 (7th Cir. 2016). 

To hold Reid & Associates liable, Plaintiff “must have evidence of ‘(1) an action pursuant 

to a municipal policy, (2) culpability, meaning that policymakers were deliberately indifferent to 

a known risk that the policy would lead to constitutional violations, and (3) causation, meaning 

the municipal action was the moving force behind the constitutional injury.’” Pulera v. Sarzant, 

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966 F.3d 540, 550 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal punctuation omitted) (citing Hall v. City of Chicago, 

953 F.3d 945, 950 (7th Cir. 2020); Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404-07 

(1997)). Defendants challenge the first element. To prove the existence of a municipal policy, 

Plaintiff can offer evidence of: (i) an express or written policy, (ii) a widespread custom or 

practice, or (iii) a deliberate act by a decision-maker with final policymaking authority. King v. 

Kramer, 763 F.3d 635, 649 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Ienco v. City of Chicago, 286 F.3d 994, 998 

(7th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff pursues the second theory of liability, arguing Reid & Associates had

two widespread practices as part of the so-called Reid technique: (1) an invalid check mark 

scoring system; and (2) allowing trickery without guidance or protections for the subject.

Although Defendants couch their argument in the first element (widespread practice), the 

Court’s analysis overlaps with the third element (causation). See Calderone v. City of Chicago, 

979 F.3d 1156, 1164 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The pivotal question is ‘always whether an official policy, 

however expressed . . . , caused the constitutional deprivation.’” (quoting Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t of 

Corrs., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017))). Defendants argue that the two practices that Plaintiff 

identifies are not themselves unconstitutional. See Johnson, 559 F.3d at 754 (“[T]he fact that the 

detective made a false or misleading statement during the course of the interrogation would not, 

by itself, render [the plaintiff’s] confession involuntary.”). “[W]here the policy relied upon is not 

itself unconstitutional, considerably more proof than the single incident will be necessary in 

every case to establish both the requisite fault on the part of the [entity], and the causal 

connection between the ‘policy’ and the constitutional deprivation.” City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 

471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985); see also Calderone, 979 F.3d at 1164 (“One single incident cannot 

suffice; rather, [the plaintiff] must show ‘a series of constitutional violations.’” (quoting Estate of 

Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 2000))). Defendants argue 

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that Plaintiff points to only one incident involving Amor alone and so fails to show sufficient 

frequency of conduct to impose Monell liability. See Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 427 (7th 

Cir. 2020) (“[T]he frequency of conduct necessary to impose Monell liability must be more than 

three.”).

Contrary to the Defendants’ contention, the Court understands Plaintiff’s position to be

that Reid & Associates’ practices amount to more than simply misleading the subject about the 

strength of the evidence (which by itself would be insufficient to show that a confession is 

involuntary), and that those practices together are coercive and facially unconstitutional. Namely, 

Plaintiff argues that Reid & Associates used a check mark system (undisputed) that was a 

manipulable and unreliable method for scoring polygraph tests (disputed), allowed the use of 

deception regarding potential evidence (undisputed), never documented any such deception or 

disclosed it to the prosecutor (undisputed), and turned a blind eye to the interrogation methods 

that were used by local law enforcement on a subject after the subject left Reid & Associates

(undisputed), which together overbore Plaintiff’s will and coerced a false confession. 

In support, Plaintiff submits Reid & Associates’ testimony that using lies or trickery 

during an interrogation, at least regarding misrepresenting evidence, was a permissible Reid & 

Associates interrogation technique; expert testimony that falsely telling a subject they failed a 

polygraph is a risk factor for false confessions; Reid & Associates’ testimony that telling an 

innocent person that they failed a polygraph would be very stressful; Reid & Associates’ 

testimony that it used the check mark system at the time of Amor’s polygraph; expert testimony 

that Reid & Associates’ check mark system was an outdated, highly subjective scoring system 

that had no supporting research or documentation of reliability and was not used by any other 

institution recognized by the APA; and Reid & Associates’ testimony that a numeric scoring 

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system was developed in response to a concern that the check mark system was too subjective.5

The undisputed and disputed evidence, with all inferences drawn in Plaintiff’s favor, is 

sufficient to show that Reid & Associates had widespread practices of using an unreliable and 

manipulable check mark scoring system and allowing deception during interrogation without

certain guidance or protections for the subject, see Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 695 (7th Cir. 

2006), and to create a question for the jury as to whether those practices caused proximate harm 

to Amor, LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 277 F. Supp. 3d 969, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (“As long as the 

causal link is not too tenuous, the question whether the municipal policy or custom proximately 

caused the constitutional infringement should be left to the jury.” (citation omitted)). Plaintiff 

need not show evidence of other false confessions brought about by Reid & Associates’ practices

to survive summary judgment. Davis, 452 F.3d at 695.

For all of these reasons, summary judgment is denied as to Plaintiff’s Monell claim.

III. Derivative Constitutional Claims (Counts IV and V)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for unlawful conspiracy to deprive constitutional 

rights (Count IV) and failure to intervene (Count V) are derivative of Plaintiff’s coerced 

confession claim (Count II) and therefore also fail.6 Because Plaintiff’s coerced confession claim

5 Plaintiff also points to a reference in a case to a 1982 published study concluding that of fifty charts that had been 

verified as truthful by subsequent confessions of other people, Reid & Associates’ polygraphers independently 

rescored the charts and incorrectly classified 39% of the verified innocent examinees as guilty. Veazey v. Commc’ns 

& Cable of Chi., Inc., 194 F.3d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff does not submit the 1982 study itself, any related 

expert testimony, or any evidence that the scoring method used in 1982 was the same as the method used in 1995. 

Without more, the Court does not find this study to be compelling evidence that the inaccurate classifications in 

1982 were a result of the same check mark method used with Amor’s polygraph test in 1995.

6 Plaintiff is not pursuing his claims for fabrication of evidence (Count I) and unlawful detention (Count III). Supra 

n.2.

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survives summary judgment, the derivative claims do not fail for the reason argued by 

Defendants.

IV. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) (Count VII)

To prevail on an IIED claim under Illinois law, Plaintiff must prove (1) that Defendants’

conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) that Defendants knew that there was a high probability 

their conduct would cause Amor severe emotional distress; and (3) that Defendants’ conduct in 

fact caused Amor severe emotional distress. Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 842 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Defendants challenge the first element, arguing that Plaintiff’s IIED claim fails because there is 

no evidence of extreme or outrageous conduct. 

Conduct is extreme and outrageous if it goes “beyond all possible bounds of decency” 

such that it is “intolerable in a civilized community.” Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 83 

(Ill. 2003) “The extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct may arise from the defendant’s 

abuse of some position which gives him actual or apparent authority over the plaintiff or the 

power to affect the plaintiff’s interests.” Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp., 607 N.E.2d 201, 211 

(Ill. 1992); McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988) (“The more control which a 

defendant has over the plaintiff, the more likely that defendant’s conduct will be deemed 

outrageous.”); Fox, 600 F.3d at 842 (“An important factor in this analysis is whether a defendant 

abused a position of authority.”). 

Defendants argue that because Plaintiff has no evidence that Defendants violated Amor’s 

constitutional rights, no evidence of extreme or outrageous conduct remains, and the IIED claim 

must fail. See Cooney v. Casady, 746 F. Supp. 2d 973, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (“Without any 

evidence of misconduct on defendants’ part, I easily conclude that plaintiff’s intentional 

infliction of emotional distress claim, which is based on the same conduct underlying her § 1983 

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claim, fails.”), aff’d, 735 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2013). “This logic mirrors the argument put forth by 

the defendants in moving for summary judgment on Counts [IV and V]: if the underlying 

constitutional tort claim fails, then any claims based on those alleged violations also must fail.” 

Olson, 2024 WL 361200, at *19. For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff has put forth 

sufficient evidence at this stage to survive summary judgment on his coerced confession claim. 

Accordingly, summary judgment is denied.

V. Illinois Conspiracy Claim (Count VIII) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Illinois conspiracy claim is derivative of the IIED claim 

and therefore must fail for the same reason. See Mauvais-Jarvis v. Wong, 987 N.E.3d 864, 895 

(Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (“It is well-settled that conspiracy, standing alone, is not a separate and 

distinct tort in Illinois.”). Because the IIED claim survives summary judgment, the derivative 

conspiracy claim does not fail on the basis argued by Defendants. 

VI. Illinois Respondeat Superior Claim (Count IX) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Illinois claim for respondeat superior is derivative of the 

IIED claim and therefore must fail for the same reason. Because the IIED claim survives 

summary judgment, the derivative respondeat superior claim against Reid & Associates does not 

fail on the basis argued by Defendants. 

Conclusion

The Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

[143]. Counts I and III are dismissed in full because Plaintiff states that he is not pursuing his 

claims for fabrication, substantive due process, or unlawful detention. Summary judgment is 

denied with respect to Counts II, IV, V, VII, VIII, and IX. The Court sets a status hearing for 

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10/17/2024 at 9:30 a.m. and directs the parties to file a joint status report by three business days 

prior to the status hearing.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED: September 26, 2024

_____________________________

HON. JORGE ALONSO

United States District Judge

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