This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1866

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

vs.

Iri Armando Ruiz-Deleon,

Appellant.

Filed November 23, 2015

Reversed and remanded

Cleary, Chief Judge

Dissenting, Schellhas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-14-2298

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant 

County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Villalva Lijó, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and 

Klaphake, Judge.



 

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

CLEARY, Chief Judge

Appellant Iri Armando Ruiz-Deleon was convicted of first-degree aggravated 

robbery after a pat-search near the scene of the robbery produced a metal pen and $71 

in cash, which appellant stated did not belong to him. Appellant challenges the 

conviction, arguing that the fruits of this search should have been suppressed as the 

result of an unconstitutional search. Because we conclude that this evidence was 

collected in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights and erroneously admitted at 

trial, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS

On January 24, 2014, 911 emergency response received a call from a cab driver 

reporting that he had been robbed by a customer. Police dispatch informed officers 

that a suspect had committed a robbery with a knife and was believed to be fleeing on 

foot northbound on Portland Avenue with stolen cash. The suspect was described as a 

Hispanic male, approximately 5’ 6” tall and wearing dark clothing. A few blocks from 

the location of the crime, officers saw appellant walking down the sidewalk and three 

officers stopped to question him. The officers shouted for appellant to stop and put his 

hands up, and he complied. The three officers approached appellant, and at least one 

officer had his gun drawn. One officer placed appellant in handcuffs, on his knees,

and conducted a pat-search. The search produced a wallet that contained no money. 

Due to several factors, appellant and the officers had difficulty communicating.

Appellant seemed to be intoxicated and was slurring his speech. Appellant is a 
3

Spanish-speaker and spoke limited English, repeating a few phrases many times. The 

arresting officer spoke limited Spanish and communicated partially in English and 

partially in Spanish. The officers learned appellant’s name from the identification in 

his wallet and determined that he had no open warrants. The officers then released 

appellant and told him to go home.

However, as one officer walked away from appellant back to his squad car, 

appellant walked towards him and spoke to him. As the officer was speaking with 

appellant, he also began communicating by radio with another officer who was with 

the victim a few blocks away. The other officer informed him that, according to the 

victim, the suspect had asked the victim to go to Buena Vista Apartments. The officer 

testified his suspicion of appellant was renewed because of appellant’s strange 

behavior and because appellant had earlier told the officer that his destination was 

Buena Vista Apartments. The officer then handcuffed and pat-searched appellant.

This second pat-search produced two items that the officer felt inside 

appellant’s sweatshirt pocket and then removed: a pen and $71 of cash. The officer 

also testified that he saw the cash protruding from appellant’s sweatshirt pocket. The 

officer asked appellant if the money was his and appellant said, “it’s not my money.” 

The victim was brought to the scene of arrest for a “show-up” identification where he

identified appellant as the perpetrator. On January 27, appellant was charged with 

Aggravated Robbery First Degree under Minn. Stat. § 609.245, subd. 1 (2012).

On May 1, 2014 the court held a Rasmussen hearing. Appellant’s attorney 

argued for suppression of the show-up identification of appellant on the basis that it 
4

was impermissibly suggestive. Appellant’s attorney did not argue for suppression of 

any statements made by appellant at the scene of arrest or physical evidence acquired 

by police. The court denied the motion to suppress.

Appellant’s jury trial began on June 16, 2014. On June 18, appellant’s attorney 

moved to reopen the Rasmussen hearing to argue that appellant’s statement at the 

scene of arrest, “it’s not my money,” should be suppressed. Although the state 

objected to the motion on several grounds, the court found good cause to hear the 

belatedly raised suppression issue. The court heard arguments regarding appellant’s 

motion to suppress the statement. Only one witness, the arresting officer, testified at 

the Rasmussen hearing. Following testimony, appellant’s attorney made a new 

argument for suppression of physical evidence obtained through the pat-search at the 

scene of arrest. The court denied the motion to suppress the statement and the motion 

to suppress physical evidence. In its memorandum in support of the order denying the 

motions, the court found that at the time of the relevant statement, appellant was 

neither in police custody nor subject to police interrogation. The court also stated that 

the physical evidence “was uncovered by both a ‘plain feel’ and ‘plain view’ search, 

and thus, the evidence should be admissible.” A jury found appellant guilty. This 

appeal followed.

D E C I S I O N

“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress, we review the 

district court’s factual findings under our clearly erroneous standard. We review the 
5

district court’s legal determinations, including a determination of probable cause, de 

novo.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Minn. 2012) (citation omitted).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 

10 of the Minnesota Constitution guarantee an individual’s right to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 174-75 (Minn. 

2007). Evidence seized in violation of the constitution must generally be suppressed.

Id. at 177-78. “Warrantless searches are generally unreasonable unless they fall within 

a recognized warrant exception.” State v. Ortega, 770 N.W.2d 145, 149 (Minn. 2009). 

One of the exceptions to the warrant requirement is for protective pat-down searches 

on the outside of a suspect’s clothing to find weapons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-

31, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883-85 (1968). Under Terry, a police officer “may stop and frisk 

a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be 

engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably believes the suspect might 

be armed and dangerous.” State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), 

aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993). “The purpose of this limited search is not 

to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation 

without fear of violence . . . .” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 

1923 (1972).

Appellant argues that the second pat-search performed by the arresting officer 

was not based on a reasonable belief that appellant was armed and dangerous, and thus 

the pen and cash discovered during that search should be suppressed. Appellant 

argues that because the officer had “conducted a pat-search of appellant just moments 
6

earlier” and appellant “made no furtive, threatening or unexpected movements during 

[the] encounter,” or otherwise indicated he was a threat, the second pat-search was 

impermissible. The state responds that due to factual developments after the first patsearch, the second pat-search was justified.

Generally, “once a Terry search has determined that the suspect is not armed, 

the police may not without probable cause once again search the suspect.” State v. 

Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 255 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted). However, the 

supreme court has held that even after an initial Terry stop, behavior or circumstances 

that give an officer heightened suspicion can justify a second pat-down. Id. When 

analyzing whether a search was justified, the court must evaluate the totality of the 

circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable person and give “due weight . . . to 

the specific reasonable inferences [that the officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in 

light of his experience.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883; see also Appelgate v. 

Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 402 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn. 1987).

The officer who performed the search gave two explanations for the search

during his testimony. First, the officer stated the search was to determine if appellant 

possessed the stolen money. The state does not assert that the officer had probable 

cause to search appellant or that appellant was under arrest at the time of the search. 

The pat-search cannot be justified if the purpose was to search appellant for evidence 

of the crime. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 250-51 (citing Williams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.

Ct. at 1923).
7

Second, the officer stated the search was for officer safety. The state argues 

that the search was justified under Terry as a pat-search for officer safety. However, 

this explanation cannot be squared with the facts in this case. When officers first 

approached appellant, they placed him on his knees and in handcuffs and performed a 

thorough pat-search. After detaining appellant for this first search and questioning 

him for about four minutes, they released him and told him to go home. The officer 

walked back to his squad car, and appellant was out of his sight for a few seconds. 

After appellant resumed conversation with the officer, the officer handcuffed appellant 

and performed another thorough pat-search.

The district court stated that “[t]his [second] pat down search was necessary 

since the individual had been out of law enforcement control, no matter how brief a 

time.” This was based on the officer’s testimony that it was his habit to perform

another pat-search of a suspect if he was out of his sight for any amount of time. 

However, this habit does not create a reasonable belief that appellant was armed and 

dangerous. By the time of the second pat-search, appellant was in handcuffs and had 

already been thoroughly searched for weapons. In these circumstances, appellant’s 

having been out of sight for a few seconds did not provide officers with reasonable 

grounds to believe that appellant was armed or presented a threat to officer safety. In 

the absence of this reasonable suspicion, the officer was not permitted to perform the 

pat-search. Because the unjustified search was in violation of appellant’s rights under 

the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the 
8

Minnesota Constitution, the fruits of this search must be suppressed. State v. Harris, 

590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 1999).

Appellant argues on appeal that three pieces of evidence should have been 

suppressed: the cash and pen produced by the pat-search and appellant’s statement,

“It’s not my money.”

1

The cash and pen were directly produced by the illegal search

and these items must be suppressed. Id. The district court erred by admitting these 

fruits of the search. Appellant’s statement was given just after the illegal search. This 

court must determine whether the taint of the illegal search requires the statement to be 

suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 

488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963).

In Wong Sun, the United States Supreme Court ruled:

We need not hold that all evidence is fruit of the poisonous 

tree simply because it would not have come to light but for 

the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt 

question in such a case is whether, granting establishment 

of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 

objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that 

illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable 

to be purged of the primary taint.

Id. at 487-88, 83 S. Ct. at 417 (quotation omitted). The Minnesota Supreme Court has 

outlined several factors that determine whether the illegal government action has 

tainted the evidence sought to be admitted.

These factors include the purpose and flagrancy of the 

misconduct, the presence of intervening circumstances, 

whether it is likely that the evidence would have been 

 

1 Appellant has not raised the issue of the admissibility of the show-up identification 

on appeal. Thus, the court does not reach this issue.
9

obtained in the absence of the illegality and the temporal 

proximity of the illegality and the evidence alleged to be 

the fruit of the illegality.

State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Minn. 1989).

Appellant’s statement, “It’s not my money,” must be suppressed. The 

statement was made by appellant in response to being confronted with the fruits of the 

illegal search. The confrontation occurred immediately after the illegal search and it is 

unlikely that the statement would have been made absent the unconstitutional 

intrusion. It is tainted by the illegal search and the district court erred by admitting the 

statement.

Finally, this court must determine whether the erroneous admission of this 

evidence requires reversal of appellant’s conviction. “When an error implicates a 

constitutional right, we will award a new trial unless the error is harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 2012). “An error is 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to 

the error.” Id. (quotation omitted). When determining if a verdict is surely 

unattributable to erroneously admitted evidence, this court should consider “the 

manner in which the evidence was presented, whether it was highly persuasive, 

whether it was used in closing argument, and whether it was effectively countered by 

the defendant.” State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 171 (Minn. 2013) (quotation 

omitted). The relevant inquiry “is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the 

error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict 
10

actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” State v. Juarez, 

572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted).

Here, the district court erred by admitting the cash and pen found on appellant 

along with appellant’s statement, “It’s not my money.” This evidence played a large 

part in the state’s case against appellant. The prosecutor repeatedly referred to this 

evidence. First, the state presented the arresting officer’s testimony that the search of 

appellant produced approximately the amount of cash reported stolen and a pen that 

the officer believed could be used as a weapon. These items were placed into evidence 

as exhibits. The officer also testified that appellant made the statement that the money 

was not his. Further, the prosecutor asked appellant about this statement in crossexamination. Despite the video evidence of appellant making this statement, appellant

denied making it, likely affecting his credibility to the jury. Finally, in closing 

arguments, the prosecutor described the items found on appellant and quoted this 

statement. He emphasized that the amount of cash found on appellant was 

approximately the amount that the victim reported stolen and referred to the pen, 

stating that appellant “was armed with an item used in a manner to lead the victim to 

reasonably believe that the article was a dangerous weapon.”

The fruits of the illegal search were a highly persuasive part of the prosecutor’s 

evidence. They were presented in closing arguments as clear evidence of elements of 

the crime. Appellant could not effectively counter this evidence. A reasonable jury 

would, at minimum, consider this persuasive evidence in making its decision. The 

guilty verdict in this case was not surely unattributable to the erroneously admitted 
11

evidence. Because appellant was prejudiced by evidence collected in violation of his 

constitutional rights and erroneously admitted at trial, we reverse and remand for a 

new trial.2

Reversed and remanded.

 

2 Because we are reversing and remanding for a new trial, we need not address 

allegations of prosecutorial misconduct or other issues raised in appellant’s pro se

supplemental brief.
D-1

SCHELLHAS, Judge (dissenting)

I respectfully disagree that the district court erred by denying appellant’s 

suppression motion. 

The Richfield Police Department dispatched Officer Brian Bataglia “to the area of 

62nd and Portland Avenue on a report of a robbery, cab driver held at knife point. 

Suspect took cash and was fleeing northbound on Portland Avenue.” The dispatcher 

advised that the suspect was a Hispanic male who was approximately five feet six inches 

tall and wearing dark clothing. At the mid-trial Rasmussen hearing, Officer Bataglia 

testified that he was en route to the location of the victim when another officer advised 

that he was with a male party matching the suspect’s description. Officer Bataglia then 

responded to assist that officer. Officer Bataglia testified that “[he] began to approach the 

suspect from the south . . . [and] told the suspect to put his hands up; the suspect was not 

compliant.” Officer Bataglia then spoke Spanish to the suspect and told him to get down 

on his knees, and the suspect did not comply. At that point, “[Officer Bataglia] holstered 

[his] gun which was originally at the low ready, . . . placed the male suspect down onto 

his knees and placed him into handcuffs for officer safety.” Officer Bataglia performed a 

quick safety pat-search. As noted by the district court, the squad videos, admitted into 

evidence at the Rasmussen hearing, depict this encounter. 

Officer Bataglia testified that during this time period, the suspect, later identified 

as appellant, was speaking in Spanish and was belligerent. But when Officer Bataglia 

learned that appellant had no warrants, he removed his handcuffs. Because Officer 

Bataglia had not located a knife, he told another officer to “get [appellant] ID’d and kick 
D-2

him so that [they could] continue to search the area for the suspect.” Officer Bataglia 

asked the dispatcher to notify Minneapolis police that the officers were hoping to set up a 

perimeter to conduct a canine search for the suspect. The officers instructed appellant to 

“go home” and walked back to their squad cars. 

But appellant did not follow the officers’ instruction to go home. As noted by the 

district court, this is apparent in the squad videos. Instead of following the officers’ 

instruction, appellant followed Officer Bataglia from a distance of about 10 to 15 feet, 

speaking to Officer Bataglia in English and stating that “it was [appellant’s] brother.” 

Officer Bataglia questioned appellant regarding his brother’s identity and asked whether 

his brother had been in the cab, and Officer Bataglia believed that appellant “could 

possibly be involved in the situation.” Officer Bataglia therefore again detained appellant

and sought additional information about the robbery from the officer who was with the 

victim. Officer Bataglia learned that only one passenger was in the cab at the time of the 

robbery and that the passenger had asked to be dropped off at the Buena Vista 

Apartments. Appellant then stated that he was headed to the Buena Vista Apartments, 

and Officer Bataglia conducted another pat-search and discovered a pen and cash. When 

asked why he conducted a second pat-search, Officer Bataglia testified that “[m]ore 

details involved had come out to implicate this male party and coming from, or going to 

the location of where the cab driver was suppose[d] to drop him off.” When asked 

directly whether the pat-search also was for officer safety, Officer Bataglia said yes. 

On cross-examination, Officer Bataglia agreed that appellant was “extremely 

intoxicated,” and the squad videos are consistent with that testimony. Also on cross-
D-3

examination, Officer Bataglia testified that he did not immediately place appellant in 

handcuffs when appellant mentioned his brother and that he could not recall whether he 

handcuffed appellant for the second time before or after the second pat-search. Regarding 

officer safety, Officer Bataglia explained the need for the second pat-search as follows: 

“[I]f [the suspect] is not in total—if I am not monitoring him and if I take my eyes off 

him at any time then he will be patted down again for officer safety.”

On redirect examination, Officer Bataglia testified that during the second patsearch, he saw and felt money coming out of appellant’s sweatshirt pocket and removed 

the money “to establish that the dollar amount that [appellant] had on him was similar to 

the dollar amount that the victim stated that was taken from him” in order to “[d]etermine 

if we had the correct party detained.” After Officer Bataglia discovered the money in 

appellant’s sweatshirt pocket, appellant volunteered that the money was not his. 

The district court found Officer Bataglia’s testimony to be “credible in all 

respects.” When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, “[appellate 

courts] review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard.” 

State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). “Such findings 

can be held to be clearly erroneous only if, on the entire evidence, [the appellate court is] 

left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has occurred.” State v. Stephenson, 

310 Minn. 229, 231, 245 N.W.2d 621, 623 (1976). 

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I of the 

Minnesota Constitution prohibit the unreasonable search and seizure of “persons, houses, 

papers, and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. Warrantless 
D-4

searches are per se unreasonable, subject to limited exceptions. State v. Othoudt, 482 

N.W.2d 218, 222 (Minn. 1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 

507, 514 (1967)). One such exception was recognized in Terry v. Ohio, which set forth 

the circumstances in which police may constitutionally “stop and frisk” suspicious 

persons without a warrant. 392 U.S. 1, 10, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1874 (1968). Under Terry,

police may “stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer 

reasonably believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.” State v. Dickerson, 481 

N.W.2d 840, 843 (Minn. 1992), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).

“The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is 

whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief 

that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. 

“The purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the 

officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence . . . .” Adams v. Williams, 407 

U.S. 143, 146, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1923 (1972). When determining whether an officer 

reasonably conducted a pat-search, “due weight must be given . . . to the specific 

reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 

experience.” Terry, 392 U. S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883.

Appellant challenges the constitutional validity of Officer Bataglia’s second patsearch. He argues that the district court erred by not suppressing the pen and cash because 

the second pat-search was not based on a reasonable belief that appellant was armed and 

dangerous. Appellant’s focus on Officer Bataglia’s subjective reasons for the pat-search
D-5

is misplaced. We should assess Officer Bataglia’s decision to conduct a second patsearch of appellant under an objective standard, as instructed by the United States 

Supreme Court in Terry. 

The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful 

only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those 

charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more 

detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the 

reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the 

particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is 

imperative that the facts be judged against an objective 

standard: would the facts available to the officer at the 

moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 

appropriate?

Id. at 21–22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). We therefore should 

not speculate regarding Officer Bataglia’s subjective reasons for the pat-search.

Appellant also argues that the second pat-search was invalid because there was no 

reason to believe that he was armed and dangerous. But an officer need not be absolutely 

certain that an individual is armed before conducting a pat-search; instead, the issue is 

whether a reasonably prudent officer in the circumstances would be justified in believing 

that his safety or that of others was in danger. Id. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883. We must give 

“due weight . . . to the specific reasonable inferences [that the officer] is entitled to draw 

from the facts in light of his experience.” Id.

The state persuasively argues that the circumstances in this case—particularly 

appellant’s belligerent conduct during the initial encounter with police, his failure to 

follow the instruction to go home, and his peculiar pursuit of and attempt to engage 

Officer Bataglia from behind—objectively support a suspicion that appellant might be 
D-6

armed and dangerous. Cf. State v. French, No. A13-0062, 2014 WL 1271875, at *3 

(Minn. App. Mar. 31, 2014) (noting that handcuffed suspect whom officer had patsearched and was escorting suddenly broke free and brandished knife with eight-inch 

blade), review denied (Minn. June 17, 2014). I disagree with the majority that 

“appellant’s having been out of sight for a few seconds did not provide officers with 

reasonable grounds to believe that appellant was armed or presented a threat to officer 

safety.” I would conclude that a reasonably prudent officer in the circumstances would 

have been warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger and, 

accordingly, that Officer Bataglia’s second pat-search of appellant was reasonable.

A pat-search must be “confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to 

discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police 

officer.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S. Ct. at 1884. But police may seize nonthreatening 

contraband detected during a pat-search under the plain-view doctrine, so long as the 

search “stays within the bounds marked by Terry.” Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 373, 113 S. Ct. 

at 2136. “Under [the plain-view] doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which 

they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the 

officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” 

Id. at 375, 113 S. Ct. at 2136–37. As applied in the pat-search context,

[i]f a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s 

outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass 

makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no 

invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already 

authorized by the officer’s search for weapons; if the object is 

contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the 
D-7

same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view 

context.

Id. at 375–76, 113 S. Ct. at 2137. The incriminating character of the item seized must be 

“immediately apparent” without the need to conduct “some further search of the object.” 

Id. at 375, 113 S. Ct. at 2137.

Here, the district court found that Officer Bataglia discovered the cash by both a 

plain-feel and plain-view search and concluded that the evidence therefore was 

admissible. We must defer to the court’s credibility determinations, Dickerson, 481 

N.W.2d at 843, and nothing in the record supports a conclusion that the court’s findings 

are clearly erroneous. I would affirm the court’s conclusion that Officer Bataglia did not 

violate appellant’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; 

the court therefore did not err by denying appellant’s suppression motion.

Regarding the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred by not suppressing 

appellant’s statement that the money was not his, I would conclude that any error was 

harmless. “When an error implicates a constitutional right, [an appellate court] will award 

a new trial unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. An error is harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt if the jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to the error.” 

State v. Davis, 820 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Minn. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted). 

When determining if a verdict is surely unattributable to erroneously admitted evidence, 

the court must consider “the manner in which the evidence was presented, whether it was 

highly persuasive, whether it was used in closing argument, and whether it was 

effectively countered by the defendant.” State v. Sterling, 834 N.W.2d 162, 171 (Minn. 
D-8

2013) (quotation omitted). “[T]he admission of a defendant’s statements to police at trial 

in violation of Miranda does not require a new trial if the state can show beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.” State v. Farrah, 735 N.W.2d 336, 343 

(Minn. 2007). The question to be asked is: “What effect did the jury’s hearing the 

defendant’s statement actually have on the guilty verdict rendered?” Id. (quotation 

omitted).

Here, appellant’s statement “clearly had no substantial or significant impact on the 

verdict.” See State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 1993) (concluding that 

although statements made by defendant while handcuffed to handrail violated Miranda, 

statements “clearly had no substantial or significant impact on the verdict”). Appellant’s 

statement did not play a major role in the state’s case; the state presented the evidence in 

a manner whereby the jury would not have focused unduly on it, and it was not the focus 

of any single witness’s testimony. The prosecutor did not dwell on it in either the opening 

statement or closing argument. And as in Walsh, “[t]he evidence against [appellant] was 

strong,” and “[t]he statement[] made . . . [was] quite innocuous.” Id. The victim identified 

appellant as the perpetrator. Appellant stated that he was heading to the Buena Vista 

Apartments, and the cab passenger had asked to be brought to the same location before he 

robbed the victim. Appellant fit the physical description of the perpetrator, he had cash on 

his person in an amount that the victim reported as stolen, and he possessed a metal pen 

that the victim could have mistaken for a knife. Moreover, appellant availed himself of 

the opportunity to counter the evidence, arguing that the statement was consistent with

his account of events and that he was merely communicating that the money in his pocket 
D-9

had been given to him by a friend. I would conclude that the district court’s erroneous 

admission of the evidence was harmless. See Walsh, 495 N.W.2d at 605.

Based on the foregoing, I would affirm appellant’s conviction.