IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs November 16, 2011

QUINTON ALBERT CAGE v. DAVID SEXTON, WARDEN

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Johnson County

No. 5891 Lynn W. Brown, Judge

No. E2011-01609-CCA-R3-HC - Filed July 10, 2012

The Petitioner, Quinton Albert Cage, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that

his convictions and sentences were illegal because the United States Constitution did not

authorize the Tennessee Legislature to create criminal statutes. Upon motion by the State,

the habeas court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the

Petitioner failed to demonstrate that his judgments were facially void and noting that nothing

on the face of the judgments indicated that the underlying sentences were invalid. Following

our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the summary dismissal by the

habeas court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES CURWOOD

WITT, JR., and CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JJ., joined.

Quinton Albert Cage, Mountain City, Tennessee, pro se.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; and Lacy Wilber, Assistant Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 2, 1994, a Montgomery County jury convicted the Petitioner of

aggravated rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated

robbery, and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. After a sentencing hearing on

January 13, 1995, the Petitioner received sentences of twenty-five years for aggravated rape

twenty years for especially aggravated kidnapping; eight years for aggravated robbery; three
years for attempted aggravated robbery; and two years for reckless endangerment. The

sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, and

reckless endangerment were ordered to run consecutively; the sentence for attempted

aggravated robbery was ordered to run concurrently with the other sentences. See State v.

Quinton Cage, No. 01C01-9605-CC-00179, 1999 WL 30595 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 26,

1999).

On June 3, 2011, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief. In the

petition, he alleged that the United States Constitution did not grant authority to the

Tennessee legislature to enact criminal laws. As a result, he insisted that his convictions

were illegal and that the judgments were void. In response to the allegations, the State filed

a motion to dismiss the petition on June 30, 2011. Before the Petitioner responded, the

habeas court issued an order on July 13, 2011, granting the State’s motion. The habeas court

granted relief finding that “[n]othing in the petition would support a finding that the

petitioner’s conviction[s are] void or that his sentence has expired.”

ANALYSIS

The Petitioner contends that the habeas court committed error in dismissing his

petition for relief without allowing him to respond to the State’s motion to dismiss. The

Petitioner also contends that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to convict and

sentence him because the United States Constitution did not grant Tennessee’s Legislature

the authority to enact criminal statutes. He explains that the Tennessee Legislature’s

unauthorized creation of criminal statutes under the premise of dual sovereignty “deprive[s]

him of the privilege and immunity from double jeopardy[.]” The Petitioner further contends

that his indictments did not have the appropriate signatures. The State responds that the

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habeas court properly dismissed the petition for relief without a hearing because the

Petitioner’s judgments are, at best, voidable because neither the face of the judgments nor

the record of proceedings indicate that the trial court was without jurisdiction to determine

the case. The State also responds that even if the indictment at issue had not been properly

endorsed, this allegation would not merit habeas relief. Addressing the merits of the petition,

the State further responds that the trial court possessed and properly exercised its territorial

jurisdiction, that the Tennessee Legislature derives its authority to create criminal statutes

from the United States Constitution’s grant of police powers to the states, and that the state

constitution provides for the creation of courts.

 This argument was not included in the petition for relief. 1

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The determination of whether to grant habeas corpus relief is a question of law and

our review is de novo. Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 262 (Tenn. 2007). The

Tennessee Constitution guarantees a convicted criminal defendant the right to seek habeas

corpus relief. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15. However, the grounds upon which habeas corpus

relief will be granted are very narrow. Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). In

this state, habeas corpus relief only addresses detentions that result from void judgments or

expired sentences. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993). A judgment is void

“only when ‘[i]t appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the proceedings upon

which the judgment is rendered’ that a convicting court was without jurisdiction or authority

to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment or other restraint has

expired.” Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d 15, 20 (Tenn. 2004) (quoting State v. Ritchie, 20

S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted)). On the other hand, a voidable judgment

or sentence is one which is facially valid and which requires evidence beyond the face of the

judgment or the record of the proceedings to establish its invalidity. Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at

83. A petitioner bears the burden of establishing a void judgment or illegal confinement by

a preponderance of the evidence. Hogan v. Mills, 168 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tenn. 2005).

Moreover, it is permissible for a court to summarily dismiss a habeas corpus petition, without

the appointment of counsel and without an evidentiary hearing, if there is nothing on the face

of the record or judgment to indicate that the convictions or sentences addressed therein are

void. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994).

Our review of the record indicates that the Petitioner failed to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that his convictions and sentences are void. The State asserts

that the Petitioner’s judgments are, at best, merely voidable because addressing the issues

raised by the Petitioner would require evidence beyond the face of the judgment, and we

agree. See Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83. The Petitioner simply alleges that the Tennessee

Legislature was not granted the authority to create state criminal statutes from the U.S.

Constitution. This argument goes beyond questioning whether the court had subject-matter

jurisdiction and, in essence, questions the state’s authority to create the criminal statutes that

the courts are charged with applying. This alleged “defect” is not at all apparent from the

judgment or record of proceedings.

Turning to the Petitioner’s claim that the Tennessee Legislature does not have the

authority to create criminal statutes, we note that the Constitution does require a distinction

between what is truly national and what is truly local. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568

(1995). “The United States Constitution created a federal government of limited powers,

while reserving a generalized police power to the states. As a general rule, the possession and

enjoyment of all rights are subject to a reasonable exercise of the police power of the states,

and that the police power extends to all great public needs.” 16A C.J.S. Const. Law §611

(2012); see U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-18 (2000). The regulation and punishment

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of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved

in interstate commerce has always been the province of the States. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618;

see, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 426, 428, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.)

(stating that Congress “has no general right to punish murder committed within any of the

States,” and that it is “clear ... that congress cannot punish felonies generally”). Indeed, we

can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National

Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication

of its victims. Id.; see, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S., at 566, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (“The Constitution ...

withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power”).

Within the realm of police power, the legislature may act in any matter that

falls within the dictates of the constitution expressly or by necessary

implication. In fact, according to some authorities, the ability of the state to

provide for the health, safety and welfare of the citizen is inherent in the police

power without any express statutory or constitutional provision. It extends to

all matters which concern the regulation and control of the internal affairs of

the state, and may even directly affect the internal affairs of a business or

industry, as long as the legislation is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.

16A C.J.S. Const. Law §611 (2012); see East N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-33

(1945); see generally Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 82 (1946) (The court

stated that it was “not concerned with the wisdom of this [state] legislation or the need for

it[ and that p]rotection of the safety of persons is one of the traditional uses of the police

power of the States.”).

We, therefore, reject the argument that only the federal government may regulate

criminal conduct occurring wholly intrastate. “In our constitutional system, it is the

sovereign states that possess general ‘police powers.’” SNPCO, Inc. v. City of Jefferson

City, --- S.W.3d ----, 2012 WL 987998, at *3 (Tenn. 2012); see Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518

U.S. 470, 475 (1996); Estrin v. Moss, 430 S.W.2d 345, 348 (1968). State governments have

the authority to enact any laws that are reasonably related to the health, safety, welfare, and

morals of its citizens, subject only to the constraints imposed by the federal and state

constitutions, and states may delegate these police powers to local governments. SNPCO,

Inc., --- S.W.3d ----, 2012 WL 987998, at *3; see Motlow v. State, 145 S.W. 177, 188-89

(1912); see also State ex rel. Lightman v. City of Nashville, 60 S.W.2d 161, 162 (1933)

(discussing the State’s ability to delegate powers to local governments).

Basically, the Petitioner’s assertions amount to no more than a claim that the trial

court erred in exercising jurisdiction that it clearly possessed under the governing criminal

and sentencing statutes and the Tennessee Constitution, as the state constitution provides for

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the creation of courts of general, special, or limited jurisdiction. TENN. CONST. amend. VI,

§1; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-101. Additionally, as there is no allegation that the court

departed from the mandates of the lawfully-enacted statutes criminalizing the Petitioner’s

behavior, the habeas court was correct in concluding that the trial court did not commit error

in exercising its jurisdiction.

Briefly addressing the Petitioner’s claim that the indictment lacked the appropriate

signatures, we must first note that this argument was not included in his petition for relief,

and the habeas court did not have an opportunity to address this issue. This court has

repeatedly held that we will not review issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.

Regardless, the issue is without merit. Even assuming that the indictment at issue had not

been properly endorsed, this allegation would not merit habeas relief. See Milburn L.

Edwards v. Cherry Lindamood, Warden, No. M2006-01092-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 152233

at * 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2007). This court has previously held that an allegation

regarding the lack of the district attorney’s signature on an indictment will not warrant

habeas relief. Derrick Richardson v. Virginia Lewis, Warden, and the State of Tennessee,

2

No. E2005-00817-CCA-R3-HC, 2006 WL 3479530, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 1, 2006).

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the judgment of the

habeas corpus court summarily dismissing the petition.

________________________________

D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JUDGE

 The Petitioner never specifies which signatures were missing from the indictments. 2

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