NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 19a0505n.06

Case No. 19-1139

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JAVONTAE L. DYSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN

BEFORE: SUTTON, COOK, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.

COOK, Circuit Judge. Claiming that a disability prevented him from working, Javontae 

Dyson applied (as an adult) for 82 days of unpaid Social Security child’s insurance benefits

available to disabled children of a parent meeting the monetary threshold. An ALJ denied those 

benefits. Because substantial evidence supports that decision, we AFFIRM.

I.

After administrative denial of Dyson’s claim, he requested a hearing and submitted 

evidence in support. In analyzing Dyson’s claim, the ALJ applied the test laid out in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4) and determined Dyson to be unentitled to the benefits he sought. 

From the evidence, the ALJ assessed that Dyson suffered from several severe impairments, 

including a “learning disorder,” “adjustment disorder,” and “personality disorder.” Dyson 

complains that the ALJ’s decision bypassed evidence of his other medical conditions: 
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schizophrenia, “maj[or] depression,” asthma, knee problems, morbid obesity, hypertension, and 

glaucoma and retinal detachment in his right eye.

The ALJ’s review of Dyson’s severe impairments resulted in the administrative conclusion 

that those caused “mild restriction in activities of daily living; mild difficulties in social 

functioning; and moderate difficulties maintaining concentration, persistence or pace,” but did not

“meet or medically equal” the statutory criteria necessary to obtain benefits. That is, though 

Dyson’s impairments compromised his “ability to perform work at all exertional levels,” his

“limitations have little or no effect on” his ability to perform jobs for which he is qualified. 

After the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied his appeal, Dyson

brought this action, and the district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. This appeal followed.

II.

To collect child’s insurance benefits, Dyson must show that, before reaching age 22, he 

was dependent on a parent receiving Social Security benefits and he could not “engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment” lasting at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d), 423(d)(1).

So long as the ALJ’s decision “is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant 

to proper legal standards,” we will affirm it. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 

(6th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). In the social security context, “the threshold for such 

evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). Though 

we require “more than a mere scintilla,” evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion” is enough. Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938)). This court does not weigh evidence, assess credibility, or resolve conflicts in 

testimony—that’s the ALJ’s job. Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642, 644 (6th Cir. 1990). We will 
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affirm “if substantial evidence, or even a preponderance of the evidence, supports the claimant’s 

position, so long as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003).

We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that the ALJ supported his decision with 

substantial evidence. Valley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 427 F.3d 388, 390 (6th Cir. 2005).

III.

According to Dyson, the ALJ erred in failing to consider his non-severe impairments as 

part of his “residual functional capacity,” defined as “the most [a claimant] can still do despite” 

any “physical and mental limitations[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). He points to Social Security 

Ruling 96-8p, which commands an ALJ, in assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity

(“RFC”), to consider evidence of non-severe impairments:

In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider limitations and restrictions 

imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those that are not “severe.” 

While a “not severe” impairment(s) standing alone may not significantly limit an 

individual’s ability to do basic work activities, it may--when considered with 

limitations or restrictions due to other impairments--be critical to the outcome of a 

claim.

SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996).

As Dyson observes, the medical records before the ALJ show numerous health conditions 

beyond the three severe impairments of learning, adjustment, and personality disorders. And true, 

the ALJ ignored those other afflictions in denying benefits. 

But substantial evidence supports this decision. For starters, the ALJ properly disregarded 

evidence of Dyson’s other medical conditions when determining his residual functional capacity

because the evidence fell outside the narrow temporal window relevant to Dyson’s claim—

December 31, 2007, his alleged onset date, through March 21, 2008, the day before his twentysecond birthday. For that 82-day period, Dyson submitted only one medical document—a “Missed 
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Appointment Record” for March 7, 2008. Dyson, therefore, provided no evidentiary support for 

establishing his medical conditions’ impairing effects during the relevant time period. Dyson 

submitted plenty of records pertinent to before and after his claimed disability dates. But 

“disability is determined by the functional limitations imposed by a condition, not 

the mere diagnosis of it.” Hill v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2014)

(citing Higgs v. Bowen, 880 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir. 1988)); see also SSR 96-4p, 1996 WL 374187, 

at *1 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (“A ‘symptom’ is not a ‘medically determinable physical or mental 

impairment[.]’”). Dyson’s diagnosis with an ailment in (or before) 2005 does not mean that 

ailment impaired him between December 31, 2007 and March 21, 2008. None of Dyson’s records

shed light on his level of impairment during that relevant time. And the evidentiary burden is 

Dyson’s to carry. See Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d 417, 423 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining 

that a claimant bears the burden of proving his lack of residual functional capacity).

Take Dyson’s asthma. The record shows he suffered from asthma both before and after 

the relevant period, but not between December 31, 2007 and March 21, 2008. Even if we assume 

that he remained asthmatic during that time, Dyson proffers no evidence that asthma impaired his

functioning. He maintains that his asthma “supported limitations that concerned the avoidance of 

pulmonary irritants, fumes, odors, dust, etc.” Yet, though he bears the burden of proving his RFC,

Dyson provides no corroborating medical evidence. Same goes for the rest of Dyson’s non-severe 

conditions: The ALJ lacked evidence of how these impaired his functioning capacity during the 

relevant period. See Essary v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 114 F. App’x 662, 667 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding 

ALJ did not err by ignoring claimant’s medically documented obesity when the claimant “failed 

to present evidence of any functional limitations resulting specifically from her obesity”); Long v. 

Apfel, 1 F. App’x 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming no-disability finding where “[t]he record . . . 
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does not contain a single statement by a treating physician indicating that Long’s health problems 

result in any specific work-impairing limitations”). Given the lack of medical evidence supporting 

Dyson’s stance that these health conditions impaired his work functioning, the ALJ appropriately 

bypassed his non-severe impairments in calculating his RFC.

Considering the three severe impairments recognized by the ALJ, substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s decision here. The ALJ noted at the outset of his decision that Dyson received 

“no real care” and “no specific treatment” for his severe impairments before reaching age 22. And

Dyson’s testimony shows his ability to carry out daily functions: “he took care of four children, 

cooked, cleaned, and drove while working until March 31, 2008.” Reviewing Dyson’s educational 

and medical records, the ALJ further observed that Dyson could “read at the level of a sixth grader” 

and “handle simple math calculations,” while having no “difficulty interacting with others[.]” 

The ALJ next looked to an “impartial medical expert,” Dr. Larry Kravitz, who reviewed 

Dyson’s entire medical record and “opined that [he] could perform simple, repetitive tasks” 

notwithstanding his impairments. Finding Dr. Kravitz’s conclusions consistent with the record, 

the ALJ gave them “significant weight[.]” The ALJ accordingly found that Dyson “could have 

handled simple instructions” during his period of alleged disability. He also reasoned that the 

record “showed [Dyson’s] ability to work at the level of substantial gainful activity during which 

he took care of four children.” Finding that he “was able to understand, remember, and carryout 

simple instructions; deal with changes in a routine work setting; and respond appropriately to 

supervision and coworkers,” the ALJ concluded that “although [Dyson’s] impairments were 

severe, they did not preclude him from completing basic work related activities.” 

By relying on Dr. Kravitz’s opinion and ensuring that the opinion was consistent with 

Dyson’s medical records, the ALJ supported his decision with substantial evidence. We regularly 
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find that substantial evidence supports a no-disability determination when the ALJ relies primarily 

on independent medical advice consistent with the claimant’s medical records. See Glasgow v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 690 F. App’x 385, 387 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding no-disability finding 

supported by substantial evidence where independent psychologists found that, though the 

claimant produced evidence of “work-preclusive limitations,” he “could perform simple, repetitive 

tasks”). Just as in Glasgow, after reviewing Dyson’s medical records, Dr. Kravitz opined that, 

even with his impairments, Dyson “could perform simple, repetitive tasks.” The ALJ reasonably 

credited these conclusions as consistent with Dyson’s medical records, and thus adequately 

supported his no-disability determination. Id. at 387.

Dyson protests that, in considering his severe and non-severe impairments, the ALJ should 

have obtained expert vocational testimony to determine whether Dyson could perform any of the 

work that “exists in significant numbers” in the regional or national economy. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(2)(A). As explained, though, the ALJ properly ignored Dyson’s non-severe impairments. 

True, the Commission bears the burden of identifying a “significant number of jobs in the economy 

that accommodate the claimant’s residual functional capacity . . . and vocational profile[.]” Jones, 

336 F.3d at 474. But Dyson points to no authority requiring the ALJ to consult an expert. Indeed, 

we rejected that very argument not long ago. See Collins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 357 F. App’x 

663, 670–71 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that, where, like Dyson, claimant had “solely nonexertional” 

impairments, ALJ did not err by relying on statutory guidelines rather than an expert).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding of Dyson’s non-disability during the 

relevant period and the denial of child’s insurance benefits; we will not disturb it. We AFFIRM.