Editorial 

NIST Standards on Livescan 

Note: The views expressed in this editorial are those ofthe awhors, 

and do not necessarily reflect the opinion or position of the Internal 

Revenue Service. 

Many latent print examiners are probably not aware of the travesty 

which is taking place within the field of latent print identification. The 

subject has received some, albeit minimal, coverage in the Journal of 

Forensic Identification , and has been somewhat discussed at IAT conferences and meetings. The topic is the fingerprint image standards 

being set by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. There 

have been a total of four official meetings held by NlST in the Washington, D.C. area. Although these meetings have been open to all 

concerned individuals, they have all been dominated by vendors and 

ten print/record managers who, from the onset, have been opposed to 

the latent print viewpoints concerning high image quality. 

For those individuals who have read but not responded to, or understood, the information presented in this journal, and for those who are 

not even aware of what is occurring, we would like to enlighten you. 

The government of the United States is about to establish standards 

which will directly affect the science of fingerprint identification for 

years to come. These standards will dictate the methods in which 

fingerprints are to be recorded electronically (li vescan), compressed, 

transmitted, exchanged, stored, and decompressed for all AFIS. These 

methods will, in turn, directly affect the qual ity of the electronic fingerprint image that wil l be retained as part of a master fingerprint file, 

whether at the local, state or federal level. At issue is doing away with 

inked fingerprint cards and relying solely upon electronically stored 

.fingerprint images. Inextricably associated with such a scheme are the 

standards for those images and the fttture offingetprint identification 

as we know it. 

You might assume that the law enforcement agencies involved, and 

certainly the lAl, would adequately represent the fi eld of fingerprint 

identification, and therefore would strive for the highest possible qualJ. Forensic !dent. 

43 (3), 1993\223 
ity standards. This has not been so. The IAI did 

representative at the fourth and final meeting of the 

for the Interchange of Fingerprint Information. At th

meetings representatives from the IAI did hold discu

did present their dissenting views, but this was ineffec

Those attending the NIST workshops were not r

working fingerprint professionals. The majority of th

agencies involved sent administrators, ten print manag

ager or AFIS managers, who largely spoke against hi

in general, and latent print requirements specifically. 

tatives were mainly computer personnel, or other s

Very few latent print or ten print examiners were in

allowed to vote. 

NIST is not without fault. Whenever national sta

established, NIST sources admitted that they often 

different locations throughout the country so as to 

people and varying points of view as possible. Fo

standard, they elected to hold all four meetings in the W

area. While examiner attendance was sparse, vend

attendance was plentiful. Obviously vendors were co

ing the least expensive alternatives. Records manag

with needing the least costly expenditure to provide m

ments for AFIS ten print searches. 

The original AFIS concept was to have the ability 

prints from scenes of crimes via cold searching again

master file. The FBI concept was initially geared to

print records as a part of criminal history informati

more people without fingerprint skills became involv

AFIS idea evolved into its current convoluted form, 

and searching system with some latent print capabilit

lem with this is the result that some departments are n

disregarding latent prints from crime scenes if they 

quality. (Quo vadis, AFIS?) 

The gradual shift in assessing fingerprint quality a

ing to the least expensive, minimum ten print need

pounded by the new standard unfairly pushed thr

fingerprint images that will be recorded, transmitted

stored under this standard likely will not contain ade

mation, incipient ridge data, and other fine details, n

J. Forensic Ident. 

224 /43 (3), 1993 
ity standards. This has not been so. The IAI did n

representative at the fourth and final meeting of the N

for the Interchange of Fingerprint Information. At th

meetings representatives from the IAI did hold discus

did present their dissenting views, but this was ineffect

Those attending the NIST workshops were not re

working fingerprint professionals. The majority of th

agencies involved sent administrators, ten print manage

ager or AFIS managers, who largely spoke against hig

in general, and latent print requirements specifically. F

tatives were mainly computer personnel, or other si

Very few latent print or ten print examiners were inv

allowed to vote.

NIST is not without fault. Whenever national stan

established, NIST sources admitted that they often h

different locations throughout the country so as to i

people and varying points of view as possible. Fo

standard, they elected to hold all four meetings in the W

area. While examiner attendance was sparse, vend

attendance was plentiful. Obviously vendors were con

ing the least expensive alternatives. Records manage

with needing the least costly expenditure to provide m

ments for AFIS ten print searches.

The original AFIS concept was to have the ability 

prints from scenes of crimes via cold searching agains

master file. The FBI concept was initially geared tow

print records as a part of criminal history informatio

more people without fingerprint skills became involv

AFIS idea evolved into its current convoluted form, 

and searching system with some latent print capability

lem with this is the result that some departments are n

disregarding latent prints from crime scenes if they 

quality. (Quo vadis, AFIS?)

The gradual shift in assessing fingerprint quality an

ing to the least expensive, minimum ten print needs 

pounded by the new standard unfairly pushed thro

fingerprint images that will be recorded, transmitted, 

stored under this standard likely will not contain adeq

mation, incipient ridge data, and other fine details, n

J. Forensic Ident.

224 /43 (3), 1993