### FI LED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT J uly 13, 20 05 THO MAS K. KAH N CL ERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ _ N o. 04- 1049 7

____ ____ ____ _ D. C. Docket N o. 02-00138 CV -O C-10-G RJ SHARON KAY, Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant, ve rs us LESTER COGGINS TRUCKING, INC., D efendant-Appellee.

____ ____ ____ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the Mi ddl e D istri ct

of F lor ida

____ ____ ____ (J ul y 13 , 200 5) Be fo re A N D E RS O N , P RY O R and H IL L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s.As F lor ida c ourt s a pp ly the same fe de ra l A DAana ly tic a l f ra me wo rk to s tate F CRA 1 claims, we w ill phrase our discussion in ADA te rms only
. Se eCha nd a v . E nge lha rd /I CC , 234 F.3d 1219 ( 11 Cir. 2000).

th 2 PE R CU RIA M: T his is anappe al f

ro m the gr an t by

the dis tr ic t c ourt of

am oti on and supp le m en ta l m oti on f

or sum m ar y j udgm en t f

ile d by L es te r Co ggi ns T ru ck ing , In c. ( L CT or

tr uc kin g c om

pany ), and the de nia l of

am oti on f

or sum m ar y j udgm en t fi le d by S haro n K ay

( K ay ), in ana ct ionbr ough t by K ay a ga ins t L CT , und er

both th e Am eri can s wi th Dis ab il it ie s Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 1 21 01 , et seq . , and the Fl or id a Ci vi l Ri gh ts Act o f 19 92 (FCRA), § 7 60 .01 , et seq . K ay f ile d su it ag ai nst LCT when itdi d n ot hi re h er as a truc k d riv er b ecau se sh e h ada li fti ng res tri ct io n. Ba se d up on the f

oll ow ing , w e af

fi rm the j udgm en t of

the dis tr ic t c ourt. I. K ay c la im s th at

L CT is lia

ble und er the A D Abe ca

use it e rr one ousl y re gard ed he r as havin g asub stanti al ly li m iti ng i m

pa irm en t. K ay

a sse rt s th at

she 1
can e as ily f ulf ill a ll the j ob r equir em en ts o f a tr uc ke r, and, in fa ct , w as hir ed by an oth er tr uc kin g c om

pany tw o y ears late r. N ev er

the le ss, she c ont en ds tha t sh e is

“ an un im pa ire d p ers on reg ard edas h av in g asu bs ta nt ia ll y li m it in g i m

pa irment,” th ereb y sat is fy in g t he th ird cat eg ory of “ di sabi li ty” un de r th e ADA. See 42 U. S. C. § 121 02(2) (C); 29 C. F. R. § 163 0.2(g)(a s a person without an im pairm ent that3

subs tanti al ly

li m its m aj or

li fe a ct ivi tie s, but

one w ho i s pe rc ei ve d a s havin g a lim iting im

pairm ent). She cla im s she was discrim inated against when LC T
w ith dr ewit s c ondi tio na l of fe r of e m plo ym en t up on l earn ing of he r lif tin g re str ic tio n. The fact s ar e n ot in di sp ut e. They will no t b e rep eat edat l en gt h h ere. Su ffi ce i t t o s ay

th atKay un de rwen t s uc ces sf

ul ne ckfus io n s ur ge ry

in May 200 0. Her n eu ro su rg eo n, Dr. St ev en so n, p la cedno res tri ct io ns on he r fu tu re ac ti vi ti es . Five m onth s later she sought em ploym ent with L CT . Kay testified it wa s he r int en t t o w ork w ithhe r husb an d a s part of aL CT dr ivi ng t eam . A cc or din g to LC T’ s standard, publish ed j ob descriptio n for L CT driving team s, ea ch LC T dr ivi ng t eam

m em be r w as r equir ed

to lif t up to fi fty

( 50) pounds as one of

the j ob requirem ents and pass a Departm ent of T ransportation (DO T) phy sical ex am in at io n. Do c. 96 , Ex. K. A ft er appl ic at ionw as m ad e, K ay w as r ef er re d to D r. Me de ro ’ s c lin ic f or the DO T e valuation
. Although she passed the phy sical exam ination , occ upation al phy sic ian D r. Me de ro te m por ar ily r es tr ic te d K ay

f ro m li ft ing m or e than th irty

( 30) poun ds and f

ro m r ea ch ing above he r shou lde rs . D r. Me de ro te sti fi ed that he did so d ue to he r re ce nt s ur ge ry . I n hi s op ini on, the r es ult s of the sur ge ry

w er e not co m ple te ly he al ed
. D r. Me de ro te sti fi ed that he be lie ve d th at

if he did not im poseThe two re maining issues r aised by Kay in her brie f ar e without merit and a re a ffirme d 2 without discussion. See 11 Cir. R. 36-1. th 4 a tem porary lifting restriction on Kay , she w ouldfac e a m uch greater risk of rei n ju ry th a n as i mi l a r

ap p l i c a n twh o h a dn o tu n d e r g o n e s u r g e ry. K ay did not se ek any r ea sona ble a cc om

m odatio n f

ro m L CT f or the li ft ing restriction im

posed. For e xam

ple, she did

not a sk L CT to al lowhe r to dri ve a s a te am w ithhe r husb an d. A lth oughD rs . Me de ro and S te ve nsondif fe r in the ir opi nio n of

K ay ’ s po st- ope rativ e lif

tin g r es tr ic tio ns i n te rm s of w ei ght , the y

both ag re e that K ay

did not suf fe r ev enapartia l permanent disa bility b u to n l y a te m pora rydis abi lit

y . II. Ingr an tin g L CT ’ s m oti on f or sum m ar y j udgm en t, the dis tr ic t c ourt f ound that Kay did no t m eet her burden of establish ing a pri m a fa ci e c as e of discrim ination under the AD A. Based upon the following d iscussio n, w e agre e. 2 III . W e re view the grant by

the district court of LC T’ s m otion for sum m ary j udgm en t de novo , vi ewin g t he fact s i n ali gh t m os t fa vo rab le to Kay . Se e W atk ins
v. F ord M oto r C o. . 190 F . 3d 1 213, 121 6 ( 11 Ci r. 199 9)
. W e re sol ve a ll th
re as ona ble inf er en ce s and f

ac ts i n ali ght

m ost f av or ab le to K ay , the non m ovi ngOn a pp e a l, K ay

a pp e ars to h ave a

ba nd on e d h e r a

rgume nt a s to (A ) a

nd (B ). We w ill 3 there fore only

discuss (C), whethe r L CT errone ously ‘re g arde d her a s disabled.’ 5 pa rty. Id
. ; se e als o A ugus ta I

ron and Ste el

W ork s, I nc . v . E m plo ye rs I ns. of W ausa u , 835 F. 2d 85 5, 856 (11 Cir. 1988 ). th

IV. T he A D Apr ote ct s “ qua lif ie d in div idu al s w ithadis ab ili ty ” fr om discrim ination in their em ploym ent, the hiring process, or prom otion s. 42 U .S .C. § 121 12(a). T o prove that an em ploy er violated Title I of the A DA , the plaintiff
m ust first establish a prima facie case by proving each of the following three el em en ts : (1 ) th atth e p la in ti ff i s a “ qu al ifi edin di vi du al ,” (2 ) wit h a“ di sabi li ty,” an d ( 3) that the pla int if

f w as e xc lud ed

f ro m the pos iti on s ough t be ca use of the di sabi li ty. 42 U.S.C. § 1 21 12 . In order to prove an A DAviolatio n, a plaintiff m ust prov e that he or she has a dis ab ili ty . T he statut or y f ram ew ork, se ct ion3( 2) of the A D A , de fi ne s dis abi lit y in the following m anner: “ [t] he term ‘ disabili ty ’ m eans, w ith respect to an ind ivi dua l: ( A ) a phy sic al or m en ta l i m

pa irm en t tha t su

bst an tia lly

li m its one or m ore of the m aj or life ac tivities o f such indiv idual; (B) a r ecord of such an im pa irm en t; or

( C) an in div idu al r eg ar de d a s havin g su chan im pa irm en t. 42

36

U . S. C. § 12 , 102( 2) ; Sutto n v. United States , 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); D oe v . D ek alb County Schoo l District , 145 F. 3d 14 41, 1445 (11 Cir. 1998 ). th The c om panion regulations prov ide that in order to prove that LCT

‘ regarded her

as disabled,’ Kay

m ust establis h any

one of the following three re qui re m en ts: ( 1) that sh e ha s aphy sic al im pa irm en t tha t do es not

sub stanti al ly lim it an y of he r m aj or

li fe a ct ivi tie s bu t i s tr eate d by L CT a s c onst itu tin g su cha lim itatio n; ( 2) that sh e ha s aphy sic al or m en ta l i m

pa irm en t tha t su

bst an tia lly lim its one of her m aj or life ac tivities b ut onl y as a r esult of LCT ’ s attitude toward suc h im pa irm en t; or

( 3) that sh e ha s no phy sic al or m en ta l i m

pa irm en t bu t i s tre at edby L CT as ha vi ng su ch an im pa irment. See C. F. R. § 16 30. 2; Sut ton , 119 S. Ct . a t 21 45- 46; Ros sb ac h v . Cit y o f Mi ami , 371 F. 3d 13 54, 1359-60 (11 Cir. th 20 04 ). Inthi s c as e, K ay

m ust pr ove that sh e ha s a‘ dis ab ili ty ’ f or pur pose s of the A D Abe ca

use she w as “ re gard ed

a s havin g an im

pa irm en t” by

L CT . A lth ough K ay w as not im pa ir ed , w as she r eg ar de d a s im pa ir ed by L CT w he n it

le ar ne d of D r. Me de ro ’ s r ec om

m en da tio n th at

she not li ft m or e than th irty

( 30) pounds? 2 9 C.F .R. § 1630 .2(g). T he fac t that she claim s she was per ceived to be unable to lift her ar m s above her head or to lift m ore than thirty (30) pound s can be considered an impairment, ye t not a d isabi lity for purposes of provin g a pri m a fa ci e c as eAlthough this circ uit has never direc tly decide d the question of whe ther a lifting 4 restric tion fails as a matter of law to e stablish a disability within the meaningof the AD A, a number of othe r circ uits have dete rmined that it does. See R eed v . Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 1061 (11 Cir. 2000) citing Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp. , 121 F.3d 537, 539- 40 (9 Cir. 1997); th th W illiams v. Channel Master Satellite Systems, Inc
. , 1 01 F .3 d 3 46 , 3 49 (4 Cir . 1 99 6) ; Aucutt v. th Six Flags Ove r Mid-Ame rica, Inc. , 8 5 F .3 d 1 31 1, 13 19 (8 Cir . 1 99 6) ; Ray v . Glidden Co. , 85 th F .3 d 2 27 , 2 28 -2 9 ( 5 Cir . 1 99 6) . O ne dis tr ic t c ourt in G e or g ia

ha s c ho se n n ot t o f

oll owthe c a se th law of the se other c ircuits. I t held that a ser ious and permane nt lifting re striction could be considere d a disability

under the ADA. See F

rix v. Florida Tile Industries, Inc. , 970 F.Supp. 1027, 1034 (N.D.G a.1997)( emphasis adde d). B ased on the fac ts of this case, we need ne ver rea ch the issue of

whether a liftingrestric tion constitut es or doe sn’t constitute a disability for purposes of the ADA. Ka y ’s impairment wa s temporar y . Even Dr s. Stevenson and Mede ro, who dis a g re e ov e r whe the r a

lif tin gre str ic tio n is ne c e ssa ry at a ll, bo th a g re e that K ay ’s c on dit ion is only temporar y and that she did not suffe r eve n a partial perma nent disability . For

this reason, Fr ix is disti nguishable on its fac ts. Id.

7 un de r th e ADA. Se e To

yo ta Mot or

Mfg ., Ken tu cky, In c. v. W il li ams , 122 S . Ct . 681, 690 (200 2). T o m ake this determ ination , w e m ust cons ider (1) the nature 4 and severity

of K ay ’ s im

pairm ent, ( 2) the duration or expected duration o f her im pa irment, a nd(3) th e p erm an en t o r lo ng -te rm im pa ctof h er i m

pa irment. See Gordon v. E. L . H

amm & Assoc. , I

nc. , 100 F. 3d, 907, 912 (11 Cir. 1996 ) ci tin g 29 th C.F .R. § 1630 .2(j )(2). W e have thorough ly

exam ined the record. K ay has produced no evi dence that L CT e rr one ousl y

pe rc ei ve d he r to h av e a subs tanti al ly li m iti ng and s ign if

ic an t im pairm ent. F urtherm ore, her only im pairm ent, r eal or im agined, w as neither se ve re, p erm an en t n or

lo ng -te rm

forpu rp os es of t he ADA. It wa s t em po rary. T he re w as nothin g to pr ev en t K ay f ro m r e- ap ply ing f

or the j ob, onc e thi s sh ort-8

te rm pe ri od h ad

pa sse d. F or

thi s r ea son, K ay

c an not sa tis fy the thi rd c at eg or y of

“ di sabi li ty” un de r 42 U.S.C. § 1 22 01 (2 )(C) and29 C.F.R. § 16 30 .2(g ). Se e als o not e 4 su pr a. A s K ay c oul d no t m ee t the r equir em en ts o f L CT ’ s pu bli she d j ob de sc ri pti on, she w as una

ble to pe rf

orm the e sse nti al f

unc tio ns o f the pos iti on f or w hic h sh e ap pli ed
. T he se r equir em en ts w er e j ob r el at ed and c onsi ste nt w ith busi ne ss n ec es sity . K ay

sim ply w as not qua lif ie d f or the j ob at the ti m e she ap pli ed
. VI . E xa m ini ng the f

ac ts i n th e lig ht m ost

f av or ab le to K ay , K ay

ha s f ai le d to establish a pri m a fa ci e case of discrim ination under the AD A. U nder a de novo rev ie w, th e d is tri ctco ur t p ro pe rly gran te d LCT’s m ot io n fo r su m m ary jud gm en t. T he or de r an d j udgm en t of the dis tr ic t c ourt are a ff

irm ed
. AFFIR MED.