IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

MARCO-DANE JACKSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO 

POLICE OFFICER BERNADETTE 

KELLY, and FORMER POLICE 

SUPERINTENDANT EDDIE 

JOHNSON,

Defendants. 

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Case No. 20-cv-3734 

Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. 

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Marco-Dane Jackson (“Jackson”) brings suit against Defendant Police Officer 

Bernadette Kelly (“Defendant” or “Officer Kelly”) for unreasonable search and unlawful search 

and arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1

 Currently before the Court is Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim [16]. For the following reasons, the Court concludes 

that Defendant’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Defendant’s motion to dismiss 

[16] is therefore granted. Furthermore, given the basis for the dismissal, leave to amend would be 

futile. Accordingly, a final judgment will enter at this time. Civil case terminated. 

DISCUSSION 

 The complaint [1] alleges that on the afternoon of December 9, 2017, Officer Kelly stopped 

Plaintiff for no reason while he was walking down the street. Officer Kelly told Plaintiff that 

someone on the street had called the police reporting that their home had been burglarized, which 

Plaintiff claims “was false.” [1] at 5. Officer Kelly allegedly grabbed Plaintiff, turned him around, 

and searched his private area in a very aggressive, sexual, and harassing manner in front of 

bystanders. After Officer Kelly failed to find anything in her search, she allegedly pulled 

Plaintiff’s pants down in front of bystanders, embarrassing Plaintiff. Officer Kelly then 

handcuffed Plaintiff and escorted him to the 7th District Police Station. Plaintiff was charged with 

a narcotics violation for manufacture/delivery of crack cocaine. Id. at 3. The case against Plaintiff 

was subsequently dismissed. See id. at 4. Based on these facts, Plaintiff asserted Section 1983 

claims for violation of the Fourth Amendment (arrest without probable cause, search without 

warrant or probable cause, and excessive force), failure to intervene, and conspiracy. Plaintiff also 

11 All other claims and Defendants were dismissed from this action in the Court’s July 27, 2020 screening 

order. See [9]. 

 

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asserted a Monell claim based on the allegation that Officer Kelly was acting pursuant to “General 

Order G03-02” (an alleged CPD policy for which the complaint provided no further explanation). 

 In its screening order, the Court allowed the Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and 

unlawful search and arrest claims against Officer Kelly to go forward. See [9] at 2-3. The Court 

cautioned Plaintiff, however, that “these claims are likely barred by the statute of limitations—an 

affirmative defense that Officer Kelly is free to raise in a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 3. Officer 

Kelly has now moved to dismiss the claims against her based on the two-year statute of limitations 

that applies to Section 1983 claims. See Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 

2019); 735 ILCS 5/13-202. The Court agrees that the claims against Officer Kelly are barred by 

the statute of limitations, and therefore grants her motion to dismiss. 

 A claim for excessive force accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time 

the defendant police officer allegedly used the excessive force. See Gonzalez v. Entress, 133 F.3d 

551, 555 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Valdez v. Village of Brookfield, Illinois, 2020 WL 2935125, at 

*3 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2020) (“A claim of excessive force under § 1983 ‘accrues immediately’ at the 

time the alleged excessive force occurs.” (quoting Evan v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362, 363 (7th Cir. 

2010))). A claim for unlawful arrest accrues when the arrestee becomes held pursuant to legal 

process—“when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.” Wallace 

v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007) (limitations period for arrestee’s § 1983 unlawful arrest claim 

against city police officers began to run at time he appeared before examining magistrate and was 

bound over for trial, not later upon his release from custody after state dropped charges against 

him). Typically, this must occur within 48 hours of arrest. See Fonder v. Sheriff of Kankakee 

County, 823 F.3d 1144, 1145 (7th Cir. 2016). 

 In this case, Plaintiff was searched and arrested in December 2017, but did not file this suit 

until more than two and a half years later, in June 2020. His excessive force claim accrued on 

December 9, 2017, and clearly is barred by the statute of limitations. The docket from Plaintiff’s 

state criminal proceedings (17112153201) shows that on December 10, 2017, a judge found 

probable cause for Plaintiff’s detention. Defendant attaches a copy of the docket to her motion to 

dismiss, and the Court may take judicial notice of it. See Spiegel v. Kim, 952 F.3d 844, 847 (7th 

Cir. 2020) (“A court may take judicial notice of public records such as ... state court 

documents[.]”). Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest claim therefore accrued on December 10, 2017, over 

two and a half years before Plaintiff filed suit. Therefore, both of Plaintiff’s claims against Officer 

Kelly are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 

 In his response to Officer Kelly’s motion, Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations on 

his claims was tolled by 735 ILCS 5/13-202. But as Officer Kelly points out, the statutory 

language on which Plaintiff relies has no application here. The sentence on tolling reads, in full: 

“If the compelling of a confession or information by imminent bodily harm or threat of imminent 

bodily harm results in whole or in part in a criminal prosecution of the plaintiff, the 2-year period 

set out in this Section shall be tolled during the time in which the plaintiff is incarcerated, or until 

criminal prosecution has been finally adjudicated in favor of the above referred plaintiff, 

whichever is later.” Id. There is no suggestion in either the complaint or Plaintiff’s response brief 

that he provided a confession or information that was used to criminally prosecute him. 

Finally, equitable tolling is not available to Plaintiff, either, because “Illinois does not toll 

the statute of limitations for inmates, nor does it consider a lack of resources sufficiently 

extraordinary to equitably toll the statute of limitations.” Bryant v. City of Chicago, 746 F.3d 239, 

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242 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Tucker v. Kingston, 538 F.3d 732, 734–35 (7th Cir. 2008); Wilson v. 

Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 1992)). 

CONCLUSION 

 For these reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss [16] is granted and a final judgment will 

be entered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Civil case terminated.

Dated: June 10, 2021 

 ____________________________ 

 Robert M. Dow, Jr. 

 United States District Judge 

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