IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN OSBORNE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

ADMINISTRATION BOARD OF 

KRAFT HEINZ, et al.,

Defendants.

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2:19-cv-00307

In re KRAFT HEINZ SHAREHOLDER 

DERIVATIVE LITIGATION

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2:19-cv-00549

OPINION

Mark R. Hornak, Chief United States District Judge

On February 21, 2019, Kraft Heinz Food Company (“Kraft Heinz”) announced certain 

accounting adjustments and revealed the existence of a U.S. Securities and Exchange 

Commission (“SEC”) investigation. (No. 19-307, Am. Compl., ECF No. 45, ¶¶ 2–5; No. 19-549, 

Am. Compl., ECF No. 29, ¶¶ 9–10.) Twelve (12) lawsuits followed in four (4) different courts, 

each alleging that the Defendants are liable because they disseminated, approved, or failed to 

correct allegedly false and/or misleading statements regarding Kraft Heinz’s internal controls, its 

compliance with SEC regulations, and the value of its goodwill and intangible assets.

This Court is presiding over five (5) such matters: (1) an Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act (“ERISA”) action at No. 19-307; and (2) four (4) shareholder derivative suits, 
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which are consolidated at No. 19-549. Currently before the Court are two (2) Motions to 

Transfer, one (1) filed by the ERISA Defendants, and the other filed by the Defendants in the 

consolidated shareholder derivative suit.1(No. 19-307, Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer Venue to the 

Northern District of Illinois, ECF No. 50; No. 19-549, Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer Venue to the 

Northern District of Illinois, ECF No. 30.)

Defendants’ Motions seek “to bring order to all of this litigation” and request that this 

Court “transfer the cases pending before it to the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Illinois, which is the locus of the center of gravity of these claims, and where the firstfiled actions are pending.” (No. 19-307, Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Transfer Venue, 

ECF No. 51, at 1–2.) That resolution, the Defendants argue, would allow for the federal cases to 

be adjudicated in one (1) forum in an efficient and consistent manner. (Id. at 2.)

The ERISA Plaintiffs, on the other hand, oppose transfer to Chicago because litigation in 

Pittsburgh “simply makes sense.” (No. 19-307, Pls.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mem. of Law in 

Supp. of Mot. to Transfer Venue, ECF No. 56, at 1.) Not only is the Plan administered in 

Pittsburgh, but all of the Plan’s assets are held within a trust account administered in Pittsburgh, 

and, most importantly, Pittsburgh is the ERISA Plaintiffs’ chosen forum. (Id.)

Similarly, the derivative Plaintiffs argue that Pittsburgh is the proper forum for “obvious”

reasons: (1) public SEC filings list Pittsburgh as the Company’s corporate headquarters; and (2) 

an individual Plaintiff resides in Pittsburgh. (No. 19-549, Pls.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to 

Transfer Venue to the Northern District of Illinois, ECF No. 38, at 3.)

The Court has reviewed all briefing in support or opposition of the Defendants’ Motions 

to Transfer and will grant the Motions for the reasons stated below.

1 The Motions to Transfer, and the Defendants’ briefing in support of such, are identical. Therefore, throughout this 

Opinion, the Court will only cite to the Defendants’ briefing in support of the Motion to Transfer at No. 19-307.
3

I. BACKGROUND

A. Kraft Heinz’s Chicago and Pittsburgh Offices

Kraft Heinz was formed in 2015, when, through a series of transactions, Kraft Foods 

Group, Inc., headquartered in Chicago, merged with and into Kraft Heinz Foods Company (f/k/a 

H.J. Heinz Company), headquartered in Pittsburgh. (No. 19-307, Decl. of Anna Oliveira in Supp. 

of Def.’s Mot. to Transfer Venue, ECF No. 52, ¶ 5.) The Company is co-headquartered in two 

(2) locations: Chicago (the historical headquarters of Kraft) and Pittsburgh (the historical 

headquarters of Heinz). (Id. ¶ 6.)

The Chicago headquarters is Kraft Heinz’s largest office nationwide, with approximately 

1,400 employees working out of that office. (Id. ¶ 7.) In addition, the Chicago office serves as 

the home base for the Company’s officers and several senior executives, including the Chief 

Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Business Planning and Development Officer, 

and Principal Accounting Officer and Global Controller, all of whom are Defendants in the 

actions pending before this Court. (Id. ¶ 8.)

And, central to the matters before this Court, the Kraft Heinz employees responsible for 

preparing, reviewing, certifying, and approving the Company’s regulatory filings, press releases, 

and statements on earnings calls from 2017 to 2019 largely performed their work out of the

Chicago Office. (Id. ¶ 14.) The Company’s investor relations team, which is based in Chicago, is 

responsible for drafting earnings-related press releases and talking points for earnings calls with 

investors and analysts, with input from a Chicago-based individual on the Corporate Affairs 

team. (Id.) The Company’s Senior Vice President of Corporate Affairs, who currently resides in

Pittsburgh, also reviews those materials. (Id.)

In contrast, employees based at Kraft Heinz’s Pittsburgh co-headquarters focus on 
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activities related to supply chain planning, sales and operations planning, human resources, and 

information technology. (Id. ¶ 9.)

B. The Lawsuits

On February 21, 2019, Kraft Heinz announced, among other things, impairment charges 

to its goodwill accounting for intangible assets, an SEC subpoena regarding accounting practices 

in the Company’s procurement function, and a reduction in the Company’s quarterly dividend 

from $0.625 per share to $0.40 per share. (No. 19-307, ECF No. 45, ¶¶ 72–74.) Several lawsuits

ensued, all of which claim that the Defendants are liable for disseminating or approving false 

and/or misleading statements in regulatory filings, press releases, and on earnings calls 

concerning the adequacy of the Company’s internal controls, its compliance with SEC 

regulations, and the value of its goodwill and intangible assets.

1. The Chicago Actions

The first-filed of the remaining lawsuits,

2 Hedick v. Kraft Heinz Co., No. 19-1339 (N.D. 

Ill.), is a shareholder class action that was filed in the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois (the “Chicago Court”) on February 24, 2019. Two (2) substantially 

similar actions were later filed in that same District and were consolidated with Hedick on 

October 8, 2019: (1) Iron Workers Dist. Council (Phila. and Vicinity) Ret. & Pension Plan v. 

Kraft Heinz Co., No. 19-1845 (N.D. Ill.); and (2) Timber Hill LLC v. Kraft Heinz Co., No. 19-

2807 (N.D. Ill.). (No. 19-1339, Order, ECF No. 149.)

2. The Pittsburgh Actions

Then, participants in certain Kraft Heinz retirement plans filed a lawsuit in this Court on 

March 19, 2019, alleging violations of ERISA. That matter, Osborne v. Emp. Benefits Admin. 

2 Walling v. Kraft Heinz Co., No. 19-214 (W.D. Pa.), was filed on February 26, 2019, and was voluntarily dismissed 

on April 26, 2019.
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Bd. of Kraft Heinz, is currently pending at No. 19-307.

Lastly, five (5) shareholder derivative lawsuits were also filed in the Western District of 

Pennsylvania: (1) DeFabiis v. Hees, No. 19-433 (W.D. Pa.) was filed on April 16, 2019; (2) 

Vladimir Gusinsky Revocable Tr. v. Hees, No. 19-549 (W.D. Pa.) was filed on May 8, 2019; (3) 

Kailas v. Hees, No. 19-567 (W.D. Pa.) was filed on May 13, 2019; (4) Silverman v. Behring, No. 

19-574 (W.D. Pa.) was filed on May 15, 2019; and (5) Green v. Behring, No. 19-613 (W.D. Pa.)

was filed on May 23, 2019. Two (2) of those shareholders (those in DeFabiis and Kailas) 

voluntarily dismissed their cases in the Western District of Pennsylvania and one of them 

(DeFabiis) refiled in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 

voluntarily dismissed there, again, and then refiled in the Delaware Chancery Court.3 The three 

(3) remaining shareholder derivative suits were consolidated at No. 19-549, which is currently 

pending before this Court. (No. 19-549, Order, ECF No. 20.)

C. The Motions to Transfer

Now, the Defendants in the matters pending before this Court (the only federal matters 

not before the Northern District of Illinois) seek to transfer those actions from this Court to the 

Chicago Court. (No. 19-307, ECF No. 50; No. 19-549, ECF No. 30.) Those Motions have been

fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Our Circuit provides two (2) mechanisms by which a district court may consider a motion

to transfer: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); and (2) the “first-filed” rule.

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “a district court may transfer a civil action to another

district where the case might have been brought, . . . for the convenience of the parties and 

3 DeFabiis is now pending before the Delaware Court of Chancery at No. 2019-0587-AGB.
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witnesses and in the interest of justice.” In re McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings LLC, 909 F.3d 

48, 57 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879–80 (3d Cir. 1995)).

Ultimately, the district court retains broad discretion to determine whether or not transfer is 

appropriate. In re United States, 273 F.3d 380, 387 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. 

Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981)).

In considering a motion to transfer under § 1404(a), district courts in our Circuit apply a 

two-part inquiry. First, as required by § 1404(a), a court must determine whether the action could 

have been originally brought in the transferee forum (i.e., whether venue in the transferee district 

is proper). Then, in addition to considering the factors enumerated by § 1404(a), a court should

apply the balancing test set forth by the Third Circuit in Jumara, which requires district courts to 

weigh a number of public and private interests in order to determine whether the transferee 

forum “would best serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses as well as the interests of 

justice.” Mitel Networks Corp. v. Facebook, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 463, 467 (D. Del. 2013).

The private interests to be balanced relate to § 1404(a)’s concern for “the convenience of 

the parties and witnesses” and may include the following: (1) the plaintiff’s original choice of 

forum; (2) the defendant’s forum preference; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the 

convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; (5) the 

convenience of the witnesses, but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be 

unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (6) the location of any relevant records or files, 

limited to the extent that the files could not be produced in the alternative forum. Jumara, 55 

F.3d at 879.

By contrast, the public interests to be balanced are not necessarily tied to the parties, but 

instead derive from § 1404(a)’s consideration of “the interests of justice” and may include the 
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following: (1) the enforceability of the judgment; (2) practical considerations that could make the 

trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; (3) the relative administrative difficulty in each of the fora

resulting from court congestion; (4) the local interest in deciding local controversies at home; 

(5) the public policies of the fora; and (6) the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable 

state law in diversity cases. Id. at 879–80.

District courts are to consider both the public and private factors to determine, on 

balance, whether the litigation would “more conveniently proceed and the interests of justice be 

better served by transfer to a different forum.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879 (quoting 15 Charles A. 

Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3847 (2d ed. 1986)). And the Court should keep 

in mind that “[t]he purpose of transferring venue under § 1404(a) is to prevent the waste of time, 

energy, and money and to protect litigants, witnesses, and the public against unnecessary 

inconvenience and expense.” Stillwagon v. Innsbrook Golf & Marina, LLC, No. 11-1338, 2013 

WL 1180312, at *24 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2013) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 

616 (1964)).

At each step of the transfer inquiry, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating

that transfer of venue is appropriate and, “unless the balance of convenience of the parties is 

strongly in favor of defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should prevail.” Shutte v. Armco 

Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970).

B. The Third Circuit’s “First-Filed” Rule

Our Circuit has also adopted the first-filed rule, which “gives a court the power to enjoin 

the subsequent prosecution of proceedings involving the same parties and the same issues 

already before another district court.” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Univ. of Pa., 850 

F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 929 (3d 
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Cir. 1941) (“In all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has possession of the 

subject must decide it.”) (quoting Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. 532, 535 (1824)). The rule “permits 

courts to consolidate similar cases by transferring later-filed cases for consolidation with the 

first-filed case.” Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of City of St. Petersburgh, Fla. v. Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd., No. 

19-2711, 2019 WL 5485549, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2019).

The Third Circuit has not clarified the degree of similarity required under the rule. 

However, several district courts within our Circuit have found that “a flexible approach . . . more

fully meets the purposes of the first-filed rule.” Id. (citing Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc. v. 

Tatro, 153 F. Supp. 3d 714, 724 (E.D. Pa. 2015); see also Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 836 F.3d 

205, 216 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he first-filed rule is grounded on equitable principles and requires 

district court judges to fashion a flexible response to the issue of concurrent jurisdiction.”). 

Under the flexible approach, the first-filed rule “applies to cases that are substantially similar.”

Palagano v. NVIDIA Corp., No. 15-1248, 2015 WL 5025469, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2015).

In other words, “the applicability of the first-filed rule is not limited to mirror image 

cases where the parties and the issues perfectly align. Rather, the principles underlying the rule 

support its application where the subject matter of the later filed case substantially overlaps with 

that of the earlier one.” Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of City of St. Petersburgh, Fla., 2019 WL 5485549, at 

*3. The “substantive touchstone of the first-to-file inquiry is subject matter.” Id. (quoting Shire 

U.S., Inc. v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 404, 409 (E.D. Pa. 2008)).

Simply put, substantial overlap in subject matter between two (2) separate actions is

significant in terms of determining whether or not an action should be transferred under the firstfiled rule. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 850 F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir. 1988) (“[T]he court 

which first has possession of the subject must decide it.”); see also Ivy-Dry, Inc. v. Zanfel Labs., 
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Inc., No. 08-4942, 2009 WL 1851028, at *5 (D.N.J. June 24, 2009) (“[A] plain reading of the 

Third Circuit’s opinion in EEOC strongly suggests that whether the cases share subject matter is 

more important than the absolute identity of the parties.”).

However, even if transfer is warranted under the first-filed rule, the Court may retain 

jurisdiction of a later-filed action if faced with “rare or extraordinary circumstances, inequitable 

conduct, bad faith, or forum shopping.” Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 850 F.2d at 972.

III. DISCUSSION

The Court finds that it is appropriate to consider the Defendants’ Motions to Transfer 

under both the § 1404(a) transfer analysis and the Third Circuit’s first-filed rule. For the reasons 

stated below, both standards weigh in favor of transferring the actions at No. 19-307 and No. 19-

549 to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

A. The Propriety of the Transferee Forum

As noted above, a district court may only transfer an action to a “district or division 

where it might have been brought” originally. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Accordingly, the Court may 

only transfer the actions at No. 19-307 and No. 19-549 to the Chicago Court if venue would have

been proper in that District initially and if that Court could have exercised personal and subject 

matter jurisdiction over each action.

Here, the Defendants argue, and (importantly) the Plaintiffs offer no argument to the 

contrary, that venue in the Northern District of Illinois is proper. (No. 19-307, ECF No. 51, at 7.) 

And the Court agrees that both actions could have originally been filed in the Northern District 

of Illinois.

The action at No. 19-307 was brought pursuant to Section 502 of the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132. (No. 19-307, ECF No. 45, at ¶ 1.) According 
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to that provision, venue is proper “where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, 

or where a defendant resides or may be found.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2). The record in this case is 

clear that nearly all individual Defendants are located in Chicago. (No. 19-307, ECF No. 52, 

¶¶ 8, 13, 18.) Thus, venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois regarding the ERISA

action.

The action at No. 19-549 alleges violations of: (1) Sections 10(b), 21D, and 14(a) of the 

Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78u-4, and 78n(a); (2) SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 

§ 240.10b-5; and (3) state law fiduciary duties. (No. 19-549, ECF No. 29, ¶¶ 139–60.) Claims 

alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act may be brought in a district where a defendant 

resides or is found, among other things. In re: USA Techs., Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 18-

13759, 2019 WL 4785780, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2019). As stated above, nearly all individual

Defendants are located in Chicago. (No. 19-307, ECF No. 52, ¶¶ 8, 13, 18.) And pendent venue 

would then exist over both the SEC Rule 10b-5 claim and the state law claim, regardless of 

whether or not proper venue could have been established as to each claim individually, because

all claims at issue “arise out of the same operative facts.” High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs., 

Inc., 353 F. Supp 2d 487, 493 (M.D. Pa 2005). Thus, venue is proper in the Northern District of 

Illinois regarding the consolidated shareholder derivative action.

Likewise, the Chicago Court would have had jurisdiction over each suit if initially filed 

there. The Company’s presence in Illinois, as well as that of the individual Defendants,

establishes personal jurisdiction; subject matter jurisdiction would have existed over each federal 

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and supplemental jurisdiction would apply to the state law 

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367.

Therefore, because both venue and jurisdiction are proper in the Northern District of
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Illinois, the Court concludes that the actions at No. 19-307 and No. 19-549 could have been 

originally brought in the proposed transferee forum and will thus proceed to the second step of 

the transfer analysis.

B. The Jumara Factors

Next, the Court must balance the various public and private interests set forth by the 

Third Circuit in Jumara. After doing so, and for the reasons stated below, the Court concludes 

that the factors weigh strongly in favor of transferring both cases to the Northern District of 

Illinois.

1. Private Interests – Convenience of the Parties and Witnesses

In assessing the private interests at stake, the Court is to consider “the convenience of the 

parties and witnesses.” In re: Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 867 F.3d 390, 402 (3d Cir. 2017) 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). On balance, the Court finds that the private interests weigh in favor 

of transferring both cases to the Northern District of Illinois.

i. Plaintiffs’ Forum Preference

First, the Court is to consider the “plaintiff’s forum preference as manifested in the 

original choice.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Both the derivative Plaintiffs and the ERISA Plaintiffs, 

obviously, prefer the district where the action was originally filed—the Western District of 

Pennsylvania.

Generally, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should “not be lightly disturbed.” Id. An 

individual plaintiff’s forum preference, however, is entitled to little weight in a shareholder

derivative suit or in a class action. See Scanlan v. Am. Airlines Grp., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 673, 

677 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (“[W]here there are hundreds of potential plaintiffs . . . the claim of any one 
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plaintiff that a forum is appropriate merely because it is his home forum is considerably 

weakened.”) (quoting Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947)).

Here, there is no indication that the derivative Plaintiffs have any particular personal 

interest that would entitle their choice of forum to special weight. The best that the Plaintiffs are

able to provide on this front is an assertion that “at least one of the Plaintiffs resides in 

Pittsburgh.” (No. 19-549, ECF No. 38, at 2.) However, that resident is only “generally familiar 

with the concerns and allegations in the complaint.” (No. 19-549, ECF No. 40, ¶ 4.) And, as far 

as the Court can tell, that individual Plaintiff will not be significantly inconvenienced if the 

litigation were to proceed in another forum because, given the nature of a shareholder derivative 

suit, it is unlikely that he would be called to testify at trial or otherwise required to actively 

participate in any other substantive proceedings. See In re Amkor Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 06-

298, 2006 WL 3857488, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2006) (stating that “the nominal plaintiff’s role 

in [a class or shareholder derivative action] is likely to be quite minimal.”). Consequently, the

derivative Plaintiffs’ choice of forum, while weighing against transfer, is not entitled to 

significant deference.

And the ERISA Plaintiffs (who filed their Complaint as a class action “on behalf of 

themselves and other similarly situated current and former employees of Kraft Heinz Food 

Company”) likewise fail to identify any particular personal interest that would entitle their 

choice of forum to special weight. (No. 19-307, ECF No. 45, at 1.) Plaintiffs’ only stated interest

is that the Plan itself is administered in Pennsylvania.

4 Therefore, the ERISA Plaintiffs’ choice of 

forum, while weighing against transfer, is not entitled to significant deference.5

4 Plaintiffs argue that their choice of forum should receive heightened deference simply because the claims at issue

revolve around ERISA. (No. 19-307, ECF No. 56, at 7.) However, Plaintiffs concede that such a result has not yet 

been mandated by the Third Circuit. And, as the United States Supreme Court held, a plaintiff’s forum preference in 

a class action, like the one brought by the ERISA Plaintiffs, is considerably weakened. Koster, 330 U.S. at 524; see 
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Thus, as to both the derivative and ERISA Plaintiffs, the first Jumara factor generally 

weighs against transfer, but will be afforded little deference because of the communal nature of 

each action.

ii. Defendants’ Forum Preference

The Defendants, on the other hand, prefer that the case be transferred to the Northern

District of Illinois. The gist of their argument is that transfer would bring all related actions 

before one (1) federal district court, which would allow for the cases to be resolved in a 

consistent and efficient manner. (No. 19-307, ECF No. 51, at 1–2.) Notwithstanding the 

“common sense” nature of this factor, it is, however, generally afforded little deference. As such,

the Court will count this factor in favor of transfer but is obligated to only consider it 

incrementally.

iii. Where the Claim Arose

The third factor the Court is to consider is whether or not “the claim arose elsewhere.”

Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. “This consideration focuses on where the activities relevant to the 

claims at issue took place.” Stillwagon, 2013 WL 1180312, at *26 (citing Van Cauwenberghe v. 

Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988) (the “locus of the alleged culpable conduct” determines the 

place where the claim arose)). “More specifically, in the context of claims based on 

misrepresentations or omissions, misrepresentations and omissions are deemed to occur in the 

district where they were transmitted or withheld, not where they are received.” Panitch v. 

also In re Amkor Tech., 2006 WL 3857488, at *3 (“[T]he weight accorded to plaintiff’s choice of forum is 

considerably reduced in class and derivative actions, where each of many potential plaintiffs may claim the right to 

have the action heard in his home forum, and where the nominal plaintiff’s role in the litigation is likely to be quite 

minimal.”).

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In addition, the ERISA Plaintiffs appear to insinuate that a forum-selection clause applies in this instance. (See No. 

19-307, ECF No. 56, at 7–8.) The Court, however, agrees with the Defendants’ position that Plaintiffs’ Response 

conflates a choice-of-law provision with a forum-selection clause. (See No. 19-307, ECF No. 58, at 9–10.)
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Quaker Oats Co., No. 16-4586, 2017 WL 1333285, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2017) (quoting

Palagano, 2015 WL 5025469, at *5).

Here, the Defendants argue that all activities relevant to the claims at issue occurred in 

Chicago—not Pittsburgh. (No. 19-307, ECF No. 51, at 11.) At the heart of both the ERISA 

action and the shareholder derivative suit is the fact that “Kraft Heinz and its officers and 

employees are alleged to have made, approved, or failed to correct misrepresentations or 

omissions in regulatory filings, press releases, and on earnings calls regarding internal controls, 

goodwill and intangible asset impairment accounting, and procurement issues, or failed to 

adequately oversee those accounting functions.” (Id. at 11–12.) And, as the Defendants argue, 

any such conduct was carried out by employees located almost entirely in Chicago. (ECF No. 52, 

at ¶¶ 8, 14.)

In other words, the Defendants assert that it is irrelevant that Kraft Heinz maintains a 

second headquarters in Pittsburgh, or that the Company’s SEC filings list Pittsburgh as the 

location of Kraft Heinz’s Principal Executive Offices. Rather, the Defendants urge the Court to 

focus on the location in which the events at issue arose. And here, because each suit revolves

around alleged misrepresentations and/or omissions that occurred in Chicago, the claim 

necessarily arose in that same city. (ECF No. 51, at 13 (citing In re Amkor Tech., 2006 WL 

3857488, at *5, which transferred a securities case involving a company with Pennsylvania 

offices because “the vast majority of events and public statements alleged in the Complaint 

occurred or were made in Arizona from the Company’s Arizona Headquarters”).)

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, disagree. The derivative Plaintiffs argue that Kraft Heinz is 

co-headquartered in Pittsburgh, the Company’s annual shareholder meeting is held in Pittsburgh, 

and the Company also maintains close ties with the larger Pittsburgh community, including 
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primary sponsorship of the Pittsburgh Pickle festival known as “PicklesBurgh.” (No. 19-549, 

ECF No. 38, at 7.)

The derivative Plaintiffs, however, fail to allege that any misstatements or omissions 

occurred in Pittsburgh, or that any of the senior executives or accounting personnel responsible 

for such statements carried out their relevant duties in Pittsburgh, or that any alleged wrongful 

conduct had its locus here. At best, Plaintiffs brief verifies that venue is proper in Pittsburgh. 

However, that fact is immaterial to where the claims at issue arose. And, because venue can be 

proper in multiple districts, confirming that venue is proper in Pittsburgh doesn’t foreclose

transfer to Chicago, where venue is also proper.

The ERISA Plaintiffs don’t fare much better. Their main argument on this prong is that 

the Kraft Heinz Savings Plan maintains a Pittsburgh address and, as a result, the conduct of the 

fiduciary Defendants “necessarily occurred in Pennsylvania . . . regardless of where [they] were 

physically located.” (No. 19-307, ECF No. 56, at 8.)

However, “when [an ERISA] plaintiff alleges only a breach of fiduciary duty, rather than 

makes a claim for benefits due, the breach is considered to have occurred where defendants acted 

or failed to act as their duties required.” Cross v. Fleet Reserve Ass’n Pension Plan, 383 F. Supp. 

2d 852, 856 (D. Md. 2005); see also Wright v. Elton Corp., No. 16-329, 2017 WL 1035830, at 

*4 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2017) (holding that “the place where the breach occurred was where 

defendants acted or failed to act as their duties required” in an ERISA case claiming only breach 

of fiduciary duty); McFarland v. Yegen, 699 F. Supp. 10, 13 (D.N.H. 1988) (“A breach of 

fiduciary duties . . . can occur only where the defendants commit or fail to commit the actions 

that their duties require.”).
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Here, the claimed breach occurred when the Defendants allegedly made, approved, or 

failed to correct misrepresentations or omissions in regulatory filings, press releases, and on 

earnings calls. (No. 19-307, ECF No. 45, ¶¶ 8–12; No. 19-549, ECF No. 29, ¶ 69.) And all signs 

point to any such actions occurring in Chicago. (See No. 19-307, ECF No. 52.) The Company’s 

officers and several senior executives are based in Chicago. (Id. ¶ 8.) The Kraft Heinz employees 

responsible for preparing, reviewing, certifying, and approving the Company’s regulatory filings, 

press releases, and statements on earnings calls from 2017 to 2019 largely performed their work 

out of the Chicago Office. (Id. ¶ 14.) And the Company’s Chicago-based investor relations team

is responsible for drafting earnings-related press releases and talking points for earnings calls 

with investors and analysts, with input from a Chicago-based individual on the Corporate Affairs 

team. (Id.) The ERISA Plaintiffs do not dispute the above-listed facts, nor do they provide 

evidence that the Defendants made, approved, or failed to correct misrepresentations or 

omissions while in Pittsburgh.

In sum, the Defendants have presented strong arguments that the claims at issue in both 

cases arose in Chicago, to which the Plaintiffs failed to provide any convincing counter 

arguments. As such, this factor weighs very significantly in favor of transfer.

iv. Convenience of the Parties

Next, the Court is to consider “the convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative 

physical and financial condition.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Neither party provided argument as to 

this factor. However, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of transfer.

Although Kraft Heinz’s financial resources likely exceed that of the Plaintiffs in either 

action, the burden imposed on the Company by litigating substantially similar claims in two (2)

separate districts would be considerable. See, e.g., Panitch, 2017 WL 1333285, at *7 
17

(“[R]equiring [the defendant] to defend materially identical suits in two districts would 

inevitably lead to duplication of voluminous discovery and documentary evidence, the burden of 

which would fall almost entirely on the company.”).

The Court also considers the fact that the Plaintiffs in each action will have “little, if any, 

documentary evidence to contribute” at trial given the nature of each suit. See Catanese v. 

Unilever, 774 F. Supp. 2d 684, 690 (D.N.J. 2011) (finding the “convenience of parties” factor to 

weigh in favor of a company defending against multiple putative class action suits in various 

jurisdictions). As such, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.

v. Convenience of the Witnesses

Fifth, the Court is to consider the convenience of the witnesses, but “only to the extent 

that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 

879; see also Smart Audio Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 2d 718, 732 (D. Del. 2012) 

(noting that this factor applies only insofar as “a witness actually will refuse to testify absent a 

subpoena”). In addition, “witnesses who are employed by a party carry no weight,” because 

“each party is able, indeed, obligated to procure the attendance of its own employees for trial.” 

Affymetrix, Inc. v. Synteni, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 192, 203 (D. Del. 1998). In considering this 

factor, however, “the Court should be particularly concerned not to countenance undue 

inconvenience to third-party witnesses . . . who have no direct connection to the litigation.” 

Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Altera Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 744, 757 (D. Del. 2012).

Here, no party has indicated that a party witness will be unable or unwilling to testify in 

either District. The Defendants, however, have noted that some third-party witnesses would be 

outside this Court’s subpoena power. (No. 19-307, ECF No. 51, at 13.) “For example, the 

Company’s auditors at [PricewaterhouseCoopers] perform their work out of the Company’s 
18

Chicago offices, and the relevant outside legal and financial advisors to the Company and the 

Board of Directors are based in either Chicago, New York, Boston, or Washington, DC.” (Id.) 

That consideration tips the scale in favor of transfer. See Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc. v. Nat’l 

Prods. Corp., 230 F. Supp. 2d 655, 661 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (granting transfer in part because the

transferee forum would have power to compel process of key third-party witnesses).

vi. Location of Documents

Lastly, the Court must consider the location of any relevant records or files, to the extent

that those materials may be unavailable in one forum or the other. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Here, 

nothing in the record indicates that the relevant evidentiary materials would be unavailable in 

either Chicago or Pittsburgh. Thus, this factor remains relatively neutral, but for the reasons 

noted at the outset, the record before the Court is that all of the activities that were challenged in 

these actions allegedly occurred by individuals located in Chicago, doing their work in Chicago, 

so the natural and likely inference is that any documents relative to those things, to the extent 

they are paper rather than virtual, are in Chicago.

vii. Conclusion

On balance, the Court finds that the private Jumara factors weigh in favor of transferring 

both actions to the Northern District of Illinois. Chicago appears to be at the center of the action 

in all cases at issue. As such, transfer to that District would likely make litigation more 

convenient for a majority of the parties and witnesses involved. The Court will next consider the 

public factors.

2. Public Interests – Interests of Justice

In balancing the public interests, the Court is to consider “the interest of justice,” rather 

than focusing on the wants and needs of the parties. In re: Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 867 F.3d 
19

at 402. As with the private interests considered above, the Court also finds that the public

interests weigh in favor of transferring both actions to the Northern District of Illinois.

i. Enforceability of the Judgment

First, the Court is to consider whether or not shifting the litigation to the transferee forum 

would inhibit “enforceability of the judgment.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Here, “it is unlikely that 

there would be any significant difference in the difficulty of enforcing a judgment rendered by 

one federal forum or the other.” In re: Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 867 F.3d at 410 (quoting 1 

James Moore, et al., Moore’s Manual: Federal Practice & Procedure, § 7.81[3][b] (2017)).

Thus, this factor remains neutral.

ii. Practical Considerations

Second, the Court is to weigh “practical considerations that could make the trial easy, 

expeditious, or inexpensive.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. One such consideration is the avoidance of 

duplicative litigation in different fora. See Cont’l Grain Co. v. The FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 

(1960) (“To permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely the same issues are 

simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to the wastefulness of time, energy and 

money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent.”). And our Circuit has found this to be a critical 

factor in the transfer analysis. In re Amendt, 169 F. App’x 93, 96 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Here, the most 

important factor is the avoidance of duplicative litigation: Adjudicating almost identical issues in 

separate fora would waste judicial resources.”); see also Job Haines Home for the Aged v. 

Young, 936 F. Supp. 223, 233 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 1996) (“A strong public policy favors avoiding 

duplicative litigation in different fora. Where the parties and issues are the same, or similar, and 

another court is already familiar with the case, bringing related litigation together in one forum 

ensures that pretrial discovery may be conducted more efficiently, witnesses’ time may be 
20

conserved, public and parties’ litigation expenses may be reduced, and inconsistent results can be 

avoided.”) (internal citations omitted).

In addition, “courts in our district have held that where there is a strong likelihood of 

consolidation with a related action, a transfer of venue is warranted.” Panitch, 2017 WL 

1333285, at *6 (quoting Palagano, 2015 WL 5025469, at *3). “In fact, the presence of a related 

action in the transferee forum is such a powerful reason to grant a transfer that courts do so even 

where other Jumara factors, such as the convenience of the parties and witnesses, would suggest 

the opposite.” Villari Brandes & Kline, P.C. v. Plainfield Specialty Holdings II, Inc., No. 09-

2552, 2009 WL 1845236, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2009). Accordingly, “the existence of a related

action in another district is a sound reason for favoring transfer when venue is proper there, even 

though the transfer conflicts with the plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Id.

Here, the cases currently pending before the transferee forum are substantially similar to 

the actions currently before this Court. Both the Pittsburgh and Chicago securities claims 

concern the same alleged material misstatements and omissions, as does the ERISA action. (See

No. 19-307, ECF No. 45; No. 19-1339, ECF No. 179; No. 19-549, ECF No. 29). The same key 

issues are at the heart of each case: Who said or did what? When? And why? In the Court’s 

estimation, allowing litigation surrounding the same key facts to sprawl across districts would 

waste the “time, energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent.” Cont’l Grain Co., 

364 U.S. at 26.

For instance, the parties in the actions currently pending before this Court all agree that 

discovery in the Pittsburgh and Chicago actions will need to be coordinated if transfer does not 

occur. (See No. 19-307, Tr. of Telephone Status Conference, ECF No. 41, at 7–8.) In addition, 

the Defendants raise the possibility that discovery disputes could become problematic if transfer 
21

were not to occur. “If, for example, a dispute arises in connection with discovery that impacts all 

these cases, absent transfer, would both courts hear that issue?” (No. 19-307, Defs.’ Reply in 

Supp. of Mot. to Transfer Venue, ECF No. 58, at 5–6.) Or, “[i]f a discovery motion was made in 

the securities cases, and resolved in Chicago in favor of the Defendants, would the plaintiffs be 

able to seek a second bite at the apple in this Court?” (Id.)

In contrast, transfer of the actions currently pending before this Court to the Northern 

District of Illinois would allow for one (1) federal court to run the show.6 Regardless of the legal 

claims at issue, discovery would be simplified, witnesses’ time would be conserved, expenses 

would be reduced, and inconsistent results would certainly be avoided. And that is exactly what 

§ 1404(a) envisioned. And as noted above, the litigation in Chicago had a head start on these 

cases, and this Court believes that such puts the Chicago Court in the better position to

adjudicate what are essentially parallel claims.

As such, the Court finds that the “practical considerations” factor strongly weighs in 

favor of transferring both actions to the Northern District of Illinois.

iii. Court Congestion

Next, the Court is to consider “the relative administrative difficulty in the two fora 

resulting from court congestion.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Based on data provided by the 

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the Northern District of Illinois appears in some 

variables to be more congested than the Western District of Pennsylvania, specifically as to 

weighted civil cases per judge, and time to disposition of civil cases (but not by much as to that 

factor). By the same token, this Court’s vacancy rate has been about 25% to 50% or more higher 

for about five (5) years, with about 60% more felony criminal cases assigned to each district

6 The Court recognizes that the matter pending before the Delaware Chancery Court will not be joined with the 

federal actions. However, that is not a sufficient reason for the actions at issue to proceed in more than one (1) 

federal forum.
22

judge. See Combined Civil & Criminal Federal Court Management Statistics (Dec. 31, 2019),

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile1231.2019.pdf. As 

with many statistical indicators in life, sound arguments can be presented from a number of 

variables. The Chicago Court is a big, busy federal court. This Court is about half the size, and 

also quite busy, especially with its criminal docket, which is required to take precedence over the 

civil matters in the ordinary course.

However, keeping the cases in Pittsburgh will not necessarily lead to overall ease of case 

administration for either Court. For example, as discussed above, the Pittsburgh and Chicago 

Courts will need to work together on some level to coordinate discovery if transfer is denied. 

And, even if discovery is coordinated, individual decisions made by either Court (regarding

discovery disputes or other logistical matters) might be undone in all practicality by an opposite 

ruling from the other Court.

As such, this factor is for the most part a “push,” and due to this Court’s more expansive 

criminal docket, generally weighs in favor of transfer. That is also enhanced substantially by the 

inconvenience compounded by allowing various actions to continue in two (2) different fora, 

especially when the Chicago cases had a material head start.

iv. Local Interest

Fourth, the Court is to consider “the local interest in deciding local controversies at 

home.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Given the fact that Kraft Heinz is co-headquartered in both 

Pittsburgh and Chicago, and because several of the individual Defendants reside in Chicago and 

at least one (1) individual Plaintiff resides in Pittsburgh, this factor is neutral.
23

v. Public Policies of the Fora

Similarly, the public policies of the fora are neutral because both venues have competing 

interests in that the Defendant Company is co-headquartered in both Districts. Thus, this factor 

remains neutral.

vi. Familiarity with Applicable State Law

Lastly, the Court is to consider “the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state 

law in diversity cases.” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879–80. Here, as to the claims that arise under federal 

law, the familiarity of the respective Districts with state law is not applicable. And as to any state 

law claims, this Court has no reason believe that there is a “disparity in the qualifications of the 

federal judges sitting in the two districts to pass on the same [state] law.” Id. at 883. Thus, this 

factor remains neutral.

vii. Conclusion

On balance, the Court finds that the public Jumara factors weigh meaningfully in favor 

of transferring both actions to the Northern District of Illinois. Substantially similar litigation is 

already pending before the transferee forum. That in itself overwhelmingly suggests that the 

interests of justice would be served via transfer, as discovery would be streamlined, witnesses’

time would be saved, and inconsistent results would be avoided.

3. Jumara Conclusion

In sum, of the twelve (12) Jumara factors, six (6) weigh in favor of transfer, one (1)

weighs against transfer, and five (5) are neutral. Having considered the factors in their totality, 

the Court finds that the Defendants have demonstrated that the Jumara factors weigh strongly in 

favor of transfer, in that: (1) the claims at issue likely arose in Chicago; (2) the convenience of 

the parties and witnesses will likely be served by transferring the actions to the Chicago Court; 
24

and (3) substantially similar litigation is already pending before the transferee forum. Those 

considerations are countered by Plaintiffs’ preference that the cases remain in Pittsburgh. In the 

Court’s estimation, however, such considerations do not warrant denial of the Defendants’

Motions.

The Court would therefore grant the Defendants’ Motions to transfer the cases to the 

Northern District of Illinois in applying the Jumara test.

C. First-Filed Rule

As noted above, the Third Circuit has adopted the first-filed rule, which also allows a 

district court to transfer a later-filed action to the district in which the first-filed case is pending,

so long as the subject matter of the cases sufficiently overlaps. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity 

Comm’n, 850 F.2d at 971 (“[T]he court which first has possession of the subject must decide 

it.”).

Here, while the theories of liability differ across cases, the factual background and 

subject matter is almost identical. Each case at issue—either in Chicago or Pittsburgh—revolves 

around the same alleged misstatements and omissions. (See No. 19-307, ECF No. 45; No. 19-

1339, ECF No. 179; No. 19-549, ECF No. 29). And no party disagrees that the facts underlying 

each action are substantially similar. In fact, the parties stipulated to such:

Plaintiffs in the Derivative Action seek to recover the extensive costs the Company has 

expended (and is continuing to expend) undertaking the restatement, the extensive 

internal investigations, and responding to the SEC investigation. Additionally, the

Company has been named as a defendant in a class action lawsuit for alleged violations 

of the federal securities laws pending in the Northern District of Illinois (“Securities 

Action”). The ERISA Plaintiffs allege breaches of fiduciary duties under ERISA based 

on a similar set of underlying facts.

See No. 19-307, Joint Status Report, ECF No. 40, at 4.
25

What is at dispute, according to the Plaintiffs, is that even though the factual 

circumstances are the same, the legal claims at issue and the parties involved differ from case to 

case.

7

(No. 19-307, ECF No. 56, at 11–12; No. 19-549, ECF No. 38, at 3–5.) However, as 

outlined above, a flexible analysis of the first-filed rule directs district courts to consider whether 

or not “the subject matter of the later filed case substantially overlaps with that of the earlier 

one”—not the parties or the legal claims for relief. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of City of St. Petersburgh, 

Fla., 2019 WL 5485549, at *3–4.

And, in the Court’s estimation, exceptional circumstances do not suggest that the Court 

should refrain from applying the first-filed rule. Forum shopping is not a concern because the 

Defendants did not file any of the actions at issue. See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 850 

F.2d at 978 (noting that the forum shopping exception only applies when a plaintiff shows that a 

defendant in the second action filed the first action to avoid the second forum). There has been 

no showing of bad faith on behalf of the Defendants. And the substance of the actions before this 

Court have not progressed beyond that of the actions before the Northern District of Illinois, in 

that this Court has not yet addressed the merits of the actions currently pending before it.8See, 

e.g., Auto. Serv. Ass’n of N.J., Inc. v. Rockland Exposition, Inc., No. 08-3186, 2008 WL

5244282, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2008) (declining to extend the first-filed rule where the court in 

7 The derivative Plaintiffs also argue that the first-filed action was actually DeFabiis because that was the first 

shareholder derivative suit to be filed. (No. 19-549, ECF No. 38, at 3.) However, that case was voluntarily 

dismissed, refiled in the Southern District of New York, voluntarily dismissed again, and then refiled in the 

Delaware Chancery Court. So, in the Court’s estimation, the Chicago securities actions are the only earlier-filed 

actions that the Pittsburgh cases could be joined with. Ultimately, the purpose of the first-filed rule is to conserve 

time and resources when possible. And transfer of the Pittsburgh cases to the Northern District of Illinois will do just 

that.

8 By the same token, the actions pending before the Chicago Court have not progressed substantially beyond that of 

those pending before this Court. So far, the Chicago Court has consolidated cases and appointed lead counsel. (No. 

19-1339, ECF No. 150.) The parties filed an Amended Complaint on January 6, 2020. (No. 19-1339, ECF No. 179.)

And two (2) Motions to Dismiss were filed on March 6, 2020, which remain pending. (ECF Nos. 215, 217.) As 

such, transfer of the cases currently pending before this Court to the Northern District of Illinois would not be 

fruitless—the Chicago Court will remain the sole arbiter as to all material issues in what are essentially parallel

claims.
26

the later-filed action had already denied a motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion to 

dismiss or transfer the action).

Therefore, the Court finds that transfer of the actions at No. 19-307 and No. 19-549 is

also appropriate under the Third Circuit’s first-filed rule.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Defendants have met their burden of 

proving that venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois, that private and public interests 

at stake will be served by transferring the actions, and that the Third Circuit’s first-filed rule 

similarly warrants transfer of both actions. Accordingly, the actions at No. 19-307 and No. 19-

549 shall be transferred to the Northern District of Illinois.9

An appropriate Order will follow.

s/ Mark R. Hornak

Mark R. Hornak

Chief United States District Judge

Dated: April 9, 2020

cc: All counsel of record

9 A Motion to Appoint Lead Counsel was filed in the action at No. 19-433 on June 14, 2019. (No. 19-433, ECF No. 

35.) That action, however, has since been voluntarily dismissed and was de-consolidated from the matters pending at 

No. 19-549. (No. 19-549, Order, ECF No. 20.) As such, the Court no longer views the Motion at No. 19-433, ECF 

No. 35 to be “live,” but to the extent that it is, any such Motion is dismissed without prejudice, in that the transferee 

Court is the appropriate forum to consider such Motion now that all (federal) actions revolving around the alleged 

misstatements and/or omissions are pending before that Court.