NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 17-2231

___________

CHRIS ANN JAYE,

 Appellant 

v.

JOHN HOFFMAN, NJ Attorney General, in his Official Capacity and individual 

capacity; IONE CURVA, NJ Deputy Attorney General, in her Official Capacity and 

individual capacity; THE HON. PETER BUCHSBAUM, (retired) is sued individually 

and in his Official Capacity as Judge of the Law Division of Hunterdon County; THE 

HON. JUDGE YOLANDA CICCONE, is sued individually and in her Official Capacity; 

THE HON. JUDGE MARY C. JACOBSON, is sued in her individual capacity and in her 

Official Capacity as NJ Superior Court Judge; THE HON. PATRICK MCMANIMON, is 

sued in his individual capacity and in his Official Capacity as a judge on recall from 

retirement paid by the State of New Jersey; CHRISTOPHER KOOS, Esq. is sued in his 

individual capacity and in his Official Capacity as employee for the State of New Jersey; 

JUDITH IRIZZARI, is sued in her individual capacity and in her Official Capacity as 

Civil Division Manager for the Superior Court of Mercer County; CAROLINE 

RECORD, is sued in her individual capacity and in her Official Capacity as NJ Supreme 

Court's Secretary for the Office of Attorney Ethics; JUDGE ACCURSO, is sued 

individually and in her Official Capacity as NJ Appellate Judge; JUDGE MANAHAN, is 

sued individually and in his Official Capacity as NJ Appellate Judge; JUDGE HAAS, is 

sued individually and in his Official Capacity as NJ Appellate Judge; JUDGE 

YANNOTTI, is sued individually and in his Official Capacity as NJ Appellate Judge; 

JUDGE HURD, is sued individually and in his Official Capacity as NJ Superior Court 

Judge; JUDGE MARBREY, is sued individually and in his Official Capacity as NJ 

Superior Court Judge; JUDGE INNES, is sued individually and in his Official Capacity 

as NJ Superior Court Judge; JUDGE GOODLEITZ, is sued individually and in his 

Official Capacity as NJ Superior Court Judge; ASHLEY CAGNON, is sued in her 

Official Capacity and individual capacity; BRIAN WILSON, is sued in his Official 

Capacity and individual capacity; BRIAN FLANAGAN, is sued in his Official Capacity 

and individual Capacity; CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER, is sued individually and 

in his Official Capacity as NJ Supreme Court Judge, supervisor of the NJ Office of 

Attorney Ethics, Trust Fund of New Jersey and Judgment Process Services of the State of 

New Jersey; JUDGE PETER SHERIDAN, is sued in his individual capacity as well as in 
2

his official capacity as a federal judge in the United States District Court of New Jersey; 

CLERK MELFI, is sued in her individual capacity as well as in her official capacity as 

Clerk for the Office of the Clerk of Hunterdon County; JOHN DOES 1-20, (Fictitious 

Names) are sued individually and in their official capacities as State actors; JOHN DOES 

(21-30), (Fictitious Names) are sued individually and in their official capacity as 

employees of the United States District Court of New Jersey

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-16-cv-07771)

District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 16, 2018

Before: JORDAN, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 19, 2018)

___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

In October 2016, appellant Chris Ann Jaye filed a complaint in the District Court 

alleging, inter alia, that numerous New Jersey judges, court staff, and state government 

employees violated her rights in connection with several state-court actions.1

 In the 

complaint, Jaye also named as a defendant the Hunterdon County Clerk, Mary H. Melfi. 

She alleged that Clerk Melfi had recorded fraudulent liens and assignments against her 

 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

1 Those cases primarily concern a dispute between Jaye and her condominium association 

and other litigation relating to her residence in the Oak Knoll Village Condominium. 
3

property, and had “deliberately refused to act to discharge recorded liens filed against 

[her] home after they were paid, under duress, by [her].” (Compl. ¶¶ 40-41, ECF No. 1.) 

Jaye generally claimed violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985(2), § 1986, and the New 

Jersey Civil Rights Act.

In April 2017, Jaye moved the District Court for “partial summary judgment and 

emergent order for injunctive relief” regarding defendant Melfi’s allegedly fraudulent 

filings. In the motion, Jaye asserted that defendant Melfi’s fraudulent actions had 

“slandered her title . . . placing [her] at risk of a foreclosure.” (Br. at 1, ECF No. 39-2.) 

She further alleged that the “false filings have been relied on as evidence and have 

resulted in a series of suits which have resulted in great losses, impact[ing] [her] ability to 

sell [her] home and other [costs] of litigation.” (Id.) Jaye sought an order directing Melfi 

to “discharge all liens and assignments slandering title to [her] property.” (Id. at 6.) By 

order entered May 2, 2017, the District Court denied Jaye’s motion. Jaye appealed.

We exercise jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order denying emergent 

injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).2

 See In re Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 

F.3d 383, 392 (3d Cir. 2006). “We generally review a district court’s denial of a 

preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion but review the underlying factual findings 

for clear error and examine legal conclusions de novo.” Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 

F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2009) 

 
4

The District Court properly denied Jaye’s motion. To obtain a preliminary 

injunction, Jaye was required to demonstrate: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; 

(2) the probability of irreparable harm if relief is denied; (3) that granting preliminary 

relief would not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) that the 

public interest favors such relief. Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 

(3d Cir. 2004). We see no error in the District Court’s decision to deny relief on the 

ground that Jaye failed to demonstrate that she would suffer irreparable injury without the 

injunction. The harms that Jaye articulated—being unable to sell her house and forced to 

pay the costs of litigation—were not immediate and could be remedied with money 

damages. See Cont’l Grp., Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 

1980) (explaining that a probability of irreparable harm requires a clear showing of 

immediate irreparable injury or presently existing actual threat

We have reviewed Jaye’s arguments in support of her appeal and conclude that 

they are meritless. To the extent she challenges the District Court’s disposition of her 

request for partial summary judgment, this ruling is not properly before us, as our 

jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the District Court’s denial of injunctive relief.3

 3 Jaye’s Notice of Motion to Expand the Record and Motion to Stay State Action per 28 

U.S.C. § 2283 are denied.