UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

CYNTHIA B.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Commissioner 

of Social Security,

 Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 20 CV 428

Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim

November 8, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Cynthia B. seeks supplemental security income (“SSI”) asserting that she is 

disabled by depression, panic disorder, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine,

degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder, obesity, and lymphedema of the right 

lower extremity. Before the court are the parties’ cross motions for summary 

judgment. For the following reasons, Cynthia’s motion is denied, and the 

government’s is granted:

Procedural History

Cynthia filed her application for SSI benefits in November 2016 alleging that 

she has been disabled since January 2013. (Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 15, 258-

63.) Her application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Id. at 15, 125-

36, 138-51.) She sought and was granted a hearing before an Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 15, 200-02, 246-47.) At the October 2018 hearing, at which 

1 Pursuant to Internal Operating Procedure 22, the court uses only the first name 

and last initial of Plaintiff in this opinion to protect her privacy to the extent possible.

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 1 of 30 PageID #:1467
2

Cynthia appeared with her case worker, attorney, and a vocational expert (“VE”), 

Cynthia changed her disability onset date from January 2013 to November 2016. (Id. 

at 15, 41-91.) The ALJ ruled in February 2019 that Cynthia was not disabled. (Id. 

at 15-35.) The Appeals Council denied Cynthia’s request for review, (id. at 1-5), 

making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner, see Jozefyk v. 

Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2019). Cynthia then filed this lawsuit seeking 

judicial review, and the parties consented to this court’s jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c); (R. 28).

Facts

Cynthia completed her GED in 1998 and worked as a bookkeeper, babysitter, 

and then as a teller at a credit union until 2013, when she said she was fired because 

of her impairments. (A.R. 52-53, 268-69, 278, 295, 608, 660; see also id. at 312 

(stating in December 2016 function report, “[G]ot fired by my boss because of my 

conditions. Didn’t always see eye to eye.”).) Cynthia alleges that she has been unable

to work since then because of depression, panic disorder (triggering irritable bowel 

syndrome (“IBS”) symptoms), and difficulty sitting, standing, walking, 

understanding, remembering, and concentrating. (Id. at 25, 52-54, 306-12.) She 

submitted documentary and testimonial evidence to support her claim.

A. Medical Evidence

Cynthia underwent a mental health assessment in September 2016 and 

reported symptoms related to depression and anxiety. (A.R. 652-81.) She also 

disclosed that “her family home was being foreclosed.” (Id. at 667.) Her appearance 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 2 of 30 PageID #:1468
3

suggested she was “[p]hysically disabled,” but she exhibited appropriate attention, 

normal affect and perceptions, logical and coherent thought processes, good judgment 

and insight, intact memory, and no acute risk factors. (Id. at 668-71.) The social 

worker who evaluated Cynthia diagnosed her with persistent depressive disorder 

with anxious distress and assigned her a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”)

score of 47, indicating serious symptoms.2 (Id. at 681.) The social worker also 

recommended that Cynthia participate in a transitional living program (“TLP”) “to 

develop social skills, coping skills, and [activities of daily living].” (Id. at 678.)

About two weeks later, Dr. Thomas Lee conducted a psychiatric evaluation of

Cynthia. (Id. at 608-11.) He noted that Cynthia had been living with her mother, 

but when her mother died in 2015, she became homeless after the family home went 

into foreclosure. (Id. at 608.) Dr. Lee noted Cynthia’s reports of frequent crying but

no suicidal thoughts, paranoia, or psychotic symptoms. (Id.) Cynthia informed 

Dr. Lee that she had seen a psychiatrist 15 years earlier and was taking Fluoxetine, 

Lorazepam, and Bupropion. (Id.) On examination Dr. Lee found normal attention, 

mood, speech, affect, orientation, thought process, thought content, and memory. (Id. 

at 609.) He opined that she had fair judgment and deficits of anxiety and depression. 

(Id. at 609-10.) He listed her diagnoses as major depression (recurrent) and panic 

disorder without agoraphobia and assigned her a GAF score of 50. (Id. at 610.) He 

2 GAF is “no longer recognized in the American Psychiatric Association’s 

DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS” but 

previously was used in disability proceedings. See Brinley v. Berryhill, 732 Fed.

Appx. 461, 463 (7th Cir. 2018).

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 3 of 30 PageID #:1469
4

recommended that she continue her medications and enter transitional living, with 

individual and group therapy, case management and crisis intervention, medication 

management, and psychiatric review every two to six weeks. (Id. at 611.)

During a consultative examination a few months later in January 2017, the 

examiner observed that Cynthia did not appear to be depressed or anxious but that 

she had difficulty interpreting abstract expressions. (Id. at 644-45.) Cynthia was 

noted to be “oriented to person, place and time” and to have “normal range of 

reasoning and concentration to the task at hand.” (Id. at 644.) The examiner opined, 

however, that Cynthia likely could not handle funds. (Id.) As for physical 

impairments, the examiner indicated that Cynthia suffers from morbid obesity and 

spinal stenosis with neuropathy in the legs, among other conditions. (Id. at 644-45.)

In September 2018 Cynthia underwent a comprehensive mental health 

assessment and was noted to have achieved “maximum progress within her

treatment with managing her [medications] and independently maintaining 

[activities of daily living].” (Id. at 886-915; see also id. at 886-88 (noting that Cynthia 

continued to show signs of depression and anxiety), 890 (noting that Cynthia 

“significantly improved with treatment in TLP”).)

B. Hearing Testimony

Cynthia testified that she struggles with depression, IBS, panic, chronic pain,

and concentration. (A.R. 52-53.) Although she worked for a credit union for several 

years, she said she was fired in 2013 because she made “too many mistakes” and had 

to take too many restroom breaks. (Id. at 53; see also id. at 312 (noting in function 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 4 of 30 PageID #:1470
5

report that she has “fear of not being near a bathroom because of incontinence”).) She 

said it is “hard for [her] to function in a structured setting” or around other people. 

(Id.)

Cynthia lived in her family home, and after her mother died in 2015, she said 

she moved to a two-year TLP because she was having difficulty remembering 

information and was anxious. (Id. at 54, 60, 67.) TLP staff scheduled appointments 

for her, monitored her medication, and performed safety checks. (Id. at 60-61.) The 

TLP provided Cynthia with 12 hours of structure each day, filled with trips, group 

and individual therapy, and other activities. (Id. at 59-60.) Cynthia said she lived 

with a roommate without issues, but sometimes isolated herself and did not 

participate in meetings or activities because she wanted alone time or was 

experiencing IBS symptoms. (Id. at 59-63, 70.)

Cynthia cried while testifying, explaining that her brother died a week before 

the hearing. (Id. at 58.) She said he too had suffered from lifelong depression. (Id.) 

She has low energy, struggles to get out of bed, feels drained, and has difficulty 

concentrating, retaining information, and sleeping. (Id. at 59, 68.) Cynthia has been 

diagnosed with panic disorder and depressive disorder, which causes her to feel 

“[v]ery low, low self-esteem” and “hopeless[].” (Id. at 57.)

Cynthia testified that she also has difficulty walking and has used a cane for 

mobility and balance for about five years because of radiating pain from spinal 

stenosis. (Id. at 55.) She can stand for only about 10 to 15 minutes at a time. (Id.) 

She said she has carpal tunnel syndrome but has not received treatment for it because 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 5 of 30 PageID #:1471
6

of insurance issues. (Id. at 55-56.) Cynthia has a driver’s license but does not drive 

and has difficulty using public transportation because she feels “nervous[], very 

panicky, [and] . . . very stressed” around groups of people and without a restroom 

nearby. (Id. at 56-57.)

Cynthia’s TLP case worker testified that she had been working with Cynthia 

one to two times a week for about three months. (Id. at 74-75.) The case worker said 

that Cynthia met the necessary goals of the program, but Cynthia’s anxiety made it 

difficult for her to participate in a group that had many participants (e.g., 10 

members). (Id. at 76-77.) As a result, the case worker moved Cynthia to a “lower 

populated” group, and this helped her. (Id.)

The ALJ posed hypotheticals to the VE regarding whether someone with a 

specific residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and Cynthia’s age, education, and past 

work could perform work in the national economy. (Id. at 82-86.) One hypothetical 

concerned an individual with an RFC for sedentary work and specific limitations, 

including no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and no more than occasional

climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, crouching, kneeling, crawling, 

bending, twisting, or overhead reaching with the right upper extremity. (Id. at 82-

83.) The individual should avoid concentrated exposure to work hazards, such as

unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery, and be permitted to stand for 

1 to 2 minutes after sitting for 45 minutes and use a cane as needed to get to and from 

her workstation. (Id. at 82-83.) The individual should be limited to understanding, 

remembering, and carrying out only simple, routine tasks, performing the same tasks 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 6 of 30 PageID #:1472
7

without strict quotas or public contact, and interacting with coworkers and 

supervisors only occasionally. (Id. at 83.) The VE testified that a person with such 

an RFC could perform jobs in significant numbers in the national economy, such as 

addresser, cutter and paster, and stuffer. (Id.)

A second hypothetical included the added limitation that the individual should 

be limited to frequent reaching forward and laterally with the right upper extremity. 

(Id. at 84.) The VE responded that “[a]ll positions could still be performed, [with] no 

reduction in numbers.” (Id.) However, if the individual is off task more than 15% of 

the time or needs to take breaks for 10 to 20 minutes at a time on a regular basis, no 

work would be available. (Id. at 85-86.)

C. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ followed the standard five-step evaluation process, and at step one 

determined that Cynthia had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the 

application date, November 18, 2016. (A.R. 17.) At step two the ALJ found that 

Cynthia suffers from severe impairments of depression, panic disorder, degenerative 

disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder, 

obesity, and lymphedema of the right lower extremity. (Id. at 17-18.) She also suffers 

from diabetes, peripheral neuropathy, hypertension, hyperlipidemia, 

hypothyroidism, and GERD, although the ALJ concluded that these impairments 

were stable or not medically determinable. (Id. at 18-20.)

At step three the ALJ determined that Cynthia’s impairments were not of 

listings-level severity. (Id. at 20-23.) The ALJ considered the “paragraph B” criteria

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 7 of 30 PageID #:1473
8

and found that Cynthia had a mild limitation in understanding, remembering, or 

applying information and moderate limitations in interacting with others, adapting 

or managing oneself, and concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace (“CPP”). (Id. 

at 22.) Because Cynthia did not suffer marked or extreme limitations in at least two 

of these areas, the paragraph B criteria were not satisfied. (Id.) The ALJ also

considered the “paragraph C” criteria and likewise found the requirements were not 

met. (Id. at 22-23.)

Before turning to step four, the ALJ found that Cynthia has the RFC to perform 

sedentary work with the following limitations: no climbing of ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds; occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, crouching, 

kneeling, crawling, bending, twisting, and overhead reaching with the right upper 

extremity; and frequent reaching forward and laterally with the right upper 

extremity. (Id. at 23-24.) She should avoid concentrated exposure to work hazards 

(e.g., unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery) and be permitted to 

stand for 1 to 2 minutes after sitting for 45 minutes and use a cane to get to and from 

her workstation. (Id.) The ALJ also limited Cynthia to understanding, remembering, 

and carrying out only simple, routine tasks, performing the same tasks without strict 

quotas or public contact, and occasionally interacting with coworkers and 

supervisors. (Id. at 24.) The ALJ concluded at step four that Cynthia had no past 

relevant work, but because a person with her RFC could perform jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy, the ALJ concluded that Cynthia was 

not disabled. (Id. at 33-34.)

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 8 of 30 PageID #:1474
9

Standard of Review

When reviewing the ALJ’s decision, the court asks only whether the ALJ 

applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision has the support of 

substantial evidence. See Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019). 

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 

(2019) (quotation and citations omitted). This is a deferential standard that 

precludes the court from reweighing the evidence or substituting its judgment for 

that of the ALJ’s, allowing reversal “only if the record compels a contrary 

result.” Deborah M. v. Saul, 994 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation and citation 

omitted); see also Hahn v. Kijakazi, No. 22-1106, 2022 WL 6628832, at *3 (7th Cir. 

Oct. 11, 2022) (“In examining the ALJ’s decision we may ‘not reweigh the evidence, 

resolve debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine credibility, or substitute our 

judgment for the ALJ’s so long as substantial evidence supports it.’” (citation 

omitted)). “Even if reasonable minds could disagree on whether a claimant is 

disabled based on the record evidence, a reviewing court must affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits if the decision is adequately supported.” 

Hahn, 2022 WL 6628832, at *3 (citation omitted).

Cynthia asserts that a more “critical[] review” of the ALJ’s decision is 

necessary “to ensure that the ALJ has built an ‘accurate and logical bridge from the 

evidence to his conclusion.’” (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 8-9 (citations omitted); see also R. 26, 

Pl.’s Reply at 1.) While the Seventh Circuit endorses a “very deferential” standard of 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 9 of 30 PageID #:1475
10

review—in which the court’s “role is extremely limited,” Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48

F.4th 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted), Cynthia is correct that in this 

Circuit the ALJ must “provide a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his 

conclusions,” Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2021). Put another way, 

the ALJ’s “analysis must say enough to enable a review of whether the ALJ 

considered the totality of a claimant’s limitations.” Lothridge v. Saul, 984 F.3d 1227,

1233 (7th Cir. 2021).

Some have cast doubt on the applicability of the logical bridge provision in a 

landscape shaped by the substantial evidence standard. Indeed, one Seventh Circuit 

panel has explained that “the ‘logical bridge’ language in our caselaw is descriptive 

but does not alter the applicable substantial-evidence standard.” Brumbaugh v. Saul, 

850 Fed. Appx. 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152); 

see also Dwayne E. v. Saul, No. 20 CV 4745300, 2021 WL 4745300, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 

Oct. 12, 2021) (noting that, “[i]n this Court’s view, the logical bridge provision has 

always been descriptive and never a standard of review on its own”). More recently,

in the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Jarnutowski, 48 F.4th 769, two members of the 

panel deciding the matter relied on the logical bridge provision to find that the ALJ 

did not adequately explain her reasoning, while the third member dissented because 

he found that the ALJ had done so. The dissenting member remarked, “[c]onsidering 

the ALJ’s entire opinion, our very deferential review, and keeping in mind that the 

burden of proof remains on the claimant when the ALJ determines the RFC, the 

majority requires a specificity and explanation beyond what the regulations and case

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 10 of 30 PageID #:1476
11

law require[].” Id. at 777. Following the Jarnutowski ruling, at least one court has 

reflected on the “subjectiv[ity]”—and corresponding “lack of predictability”—that the 

logical bridge provision carries with it. Leida G. v. Kijakazi, No. 18 CV 6129, 2022 

WL 4367171, at *3 & n.4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2022).

Regardless, the Seventh Circuit has reaffirmed that the ALJ must meet the 

logical bridge requirement to satisfy the substantial evidence standard. 

See Jarnutowski, 48 F.4th at 773; Wright v. Kijakazi, No. 20-2715, 2021 WL 3832347, 

at *5 (7th Cir. Aug. 27, 2021) (“[W]e will not ‘nitpick[]’ the ALJ’s decision, but rather 

give the opinion a ‘commonsensical reading,’ focusing on whether the ALJ built a 

‘logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.’” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, 

this court assesses whether the ALJ’s analysis meets the longstanding logical bridge 

requirement when applying the substantial evidence standard.

Analysis

Cynthia claims the ALJ erred by: (1) finding at step three that Cynthia’s 

mental impairments did not satisfy listings 12.04 or 12.06; (2) rejecting treating 

source opinions; and (3) failing to account for her non-exertional limitations in her 

RFC. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br.) The government responds that the ALJ supported her decision 

with substantial evidence by repeatedly pointing to Cynthia’s treatment records. 

(R. 24, Govt.’s Resp.)

A. Step Three

Cynthia challenges the ALJ’s step-three finding that her mental impairments 

did not meet or medically equal listings 12.04 (depressive, bipolar, and related 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 11 of 30 PageID #:1477
12

disorders) or 12.06 (anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders). (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 

9-13; A.R. 21.) At step three the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) “compares 

the impairment or combination of impairments found at step two to a list of 

impairments identified in the regulations,” which are also known as “the listings.” 

Victoria R. v. Kijakazi, No. 20 CV 4444, 2022 WL 3543231, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18,

2022). Certain criteria described in the regulations must be satisfied to meet or 

medically equal a listing. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. The claimant alleging 

a listings-level impairment bears the burden of demonstrating that she satisfies the 

criteria of the applicable listing. See id. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520(d), 404.1526; Ribaudo

v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2006). The court first examines the ALJ’s 

application of the paragraph B criteria.

The court finds no error in the ALJ’s analysis of the paragraph B criteria. The 

ALJ considered the criteria as required for listings 12.04 and 12.06 and found that 

Cynthia’s mental impairments did not meet them because she did not suffer at least 

one extreme or two marked limitations. (A.R. 21-23.) For understanding, 

remembering, or applying information, the ALJ assessed only a mild 

limitation―citing records showing Cynthia independently managed her medication

and had intact memory, no learning barriers, and average intellectual ability. (Id. at 

21 (citing, e.g., id. at 670, 676, 684).)

The ALJ assessed moderate limitations in the remaining functional areas. 

With respect to interacting with others, Cynthia reported anxiety and panic 

symptoms, but the ALJ noted that treatment records show she interacted well with 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 12 of 30 PageID #:1478
13

siblings, a neighbor, friends, a roommate, and TLP staff and peers. (Id. at 22 (citing 

id. at 684 (categorizing Cynthia’s difficulty communicating with others as “moderate 

impairment”), 695 (noting Cynthia “appears to display appropriate social interactions 

while in groups”), 901-02 (noting Cynthia’s report that her relationships with siblings 

are “good” and “supportive” and her neighbor is “like a second mom”), 1034 (reporting 

Cynthia was “communicative with staff and peers and appeared less anxious and 

isolative during group”); but see id. at 76-77 (testifying that Cynthia’s anxiety made 

it difficult for her to participate in a large group)).) As for CPP limitations, the ALJ 

determined there were “no ongoing issues” mentioned in treatment records—and 

evaluations from October 2016 to September 2018 reflect a normal level of 

concentration and attention. (Id. (citing e.g., id. at 613, 617, 714, 720, 732, 736, 740, 

1111, 1202, 1273, 1313).) The ALJ acknowledged, however, that Cynthia’s depression 

and anxiety could “possibly” cause attention issues. (Id.) Finally, for adapting and 

managing oneself, the ALJ assessed a moderate limitation based on records showing 

that Cynthia did not need special reminders for daily care and was “generally 

independent” in her daily activities, even though she lived in a highly structured TLP 

environment. (Id. (citing id. at 1016 (noting Cynthia reported she was “making 

healthy choices, budgeting, laundry, hygiene”), 1094 (noting Cynthia reported “steady 

set” of activities of daily living and that she was “doing well” in this area)).) The ALJ 

supported her paragraph B analysis with substantial evidence showing that despite 

the severity of Cynthia’s impairments, they were not severe enough to establish 

marked limitations.

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 13 of 30 PageID #:1479
14

Cynthia nevertheless argues that the ALJ engaged in a “misleading” 

assessment of the paragraph B criteria by cherry picking information that supported 

her analysis. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 9-10.) To demonstrate that an ALJ’s step-three 

finding lacks the support of substantial evidence, a claimant “must identify record 

evidence that was misstated or ignored, and that could support a finding that 

claimant met or equaled the criteria.” Robert S. v. Kijakazi, No. 20 CV 2235, 2021 

WL 5979361, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 16, 2021). The evidence Cynthia cites fails to

satisfy this standard. To be sure, Cynthia contends that the ALJ “falsely asserted 

that from the fall of 2016 through September 2018, [Cynthia] had normal 

concentration and attention.” (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 10.) But the evidence belies 

Cynthia’s argument. As the government correctly points out, the ALJ cited many

treatment records supporting this statement. (R. 24, Govt.’s Mem. at 6 (citing 

A.R. 22).)

Cynthia also cites a GAF score of 47 from her September 2016 mental

evaluation as evidence of a serious impairment. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 10.) But the ALJ 

assigned “little weight” to the GAF scores in her analysis because the scores were 

based on “subjective reports” and typically were assessed during periods of mental 

symptom exacerbation, rendering them “inherently unreliable” and “no longer 

use[d].” (A.R. 33.) The ALJ also observed that Cynthia’s GAF scores generally ranged 

from 51 to 55, reflecting “moderate symptoms and limitations,” even though “mental 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 14 of 30 PageID #:1480
15

status examinations usually showed mild to moderate objective findings.”3 (Id. (citing 

id. at 610 (Sept. 2016 GAF score of 50; noting high score of 60 within past year), 618

(Oct. 2016 GAF score of 55), 741 (May 2017 GAF score of 55), 935 (March 2018 GAF 

score of 51), 1011 (Jan. 2018 GAF score of 55), 1112 (April 2018 GAF score of 55), 

1203 (June 2018 GAF score of 55)).) Consistent with the general range of GAF scores, 

the ALJ assessed moderate limitations in three of four functional areas. (Id. at 21-

22; see also id. at 682-98 (identifying Cynthia’s deficits and classifying them as 

“moderate[]”).) As such, Cynthia’s arguments fall short of demonstrating that her 

mental impairments satisfied the paragraph B criteria. Ribaudo, 458 F.3d at 583.

The ALJ next considered the paragraph C criteria and likewise found they 

were not met. (A.R. 22-23.) Under paragraph C, a claimant alleging a mental 

disorder must show her mental impairment is “serious and persistent,” as 

demonstrated by “a medically documented history of the disorder over a period of at 

least [two] years,” and evidence of both: 

(1) [m]edical treatment, mental health therapy, psychosocial 

support(s), or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing and 

that diminishes the symptoms and signs of your mental disorder

. . .; and

(2) [m]arginal adjustment, that is, you have minimal capacity to 

adapt to changes in your environment or to demands that are not 

already part of your daily life . . . .

3 “GAF scores of 51-60 indicate moderate symptoms or limitations in social, 

occupational, or school function.” Felts v. Saul, 797 Fed. Appx. 266, 269 n.1 (7th Cir.

2019). 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 15 of 30 PageID #:1481
16

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (emphasis in original); Victoria R., 2022 WL 

3543231, at *11. The ALJ explained that although a June 2015 depression screening 

showed “moderate depression,” (A.R. 23 (citing id. at 380)), other screenings 

performed that month and in February, March, and May 2016 were negative for 

depression, (id. (citing id. at 388, 459, 465, 467, 474, 478, 484, 486)). And despite 

Cynthia’s participation in the TLP for more than two years, the ALJ emphasized that 

Cynthia “only entered the [TLP] in September 2016 following the loss of her family 

home due to foreclosure and upon the suggestion of a social worker”—circumstances 

that the ALJ said were “not necessarily due to signs, symptoms, or exacerbation of 

her mental disorder.” (Id.)

Even if Cynthia could satisfy the first prong of the paragraph C criteria, the 

ALJ found Cynthia failed to show that “despite diminished symptoms and signs, [she] 

achieved marginal adjustment.” (Id.) The ALJ observed that the objective evidence, 

including psychiatric evaluations and treatment records, revealed no “deterioration 

in functioning,” no changes in medication, and no increase in or emergent need for 

psychiatric visits. (Id.) She noted that Cynthia’s treating psychiatrist recorded only 

mild depression in June 2018, (id. (citing id. at 1201)), and minimal or no symptoms 

in July, August, and September 2018, (id. (citing id. at 1234, 1272, 1312)). The ALJ

also cited records showing that Cynthia had “significantly improved in treatment” at 

the TLP and achieved “maximum progress.” (Id. (citing id. at 890 (noting Cynthia 

“has been able to successfully manage her [symptoms] and take her medication 

independently” and has been “successful in gaining the necessary skill sets to actively 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 16 of 30 PageID #:1482
17

manage [symptoms] and complete [activities of daily living] independently”), 912 

(noting Cynthia “has made maximum progress in the last year in her treatment”)).). 

The ALJ reasoned that this evidence demonstrated improvement, not an 

exacerbation of symptoms or deterioration in functioning. (Id.) Additionally, at the 

time of the hearing Cynthia was preparing to move out of the TLP, signifying an 

ability to adapt, according to the ALJ. (Id.) 

Cynthia argues that the ALJ engaged in a “perfunctory” and “egregious”

assessment of the paragraph C criteria, rendering her step-three finding unsupported 

by substantial evidence. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 10; R. 26, Pl.’s Reply at 2.) She says she

satisfies the paragraph C criteria because her mental impairments lasted at least two 

years, and she received treatment in a highly structured TLP resulting in diminished 

symptoms but achieving only “marginal adjustment.” (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 10-11.) The 

key issue in this appeal, according to her, “centers on whether [she] met the marginal 

adjustment criterion”—and on this point, Cynthia asserts that there is “no evidence 

that she can adjust to life outside the TLP.” (Id.) Cynthia points to her TLP case 

worker’s testimony that Cynthia would be unable to shop for groceries without help. 

(Id.) But as the ALJ noted, the case worker’s concerns centered on Cynthia’s physical 

limitations, not mental limitations. (A.R. 25; see also R. 24, Govt.’s Mem. at 8 (citing 

A.R. 994 (noting Cynthia independently prepared menu plan and shopping list, 

selected items at grocery store within allotted time, and paid for groceries)).) Cynthia 

also relies on the opinions of her treating providers. Yet as explained below, the ALJ 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 17 of 30 PageID #:1483
18

gave those opinions “little” or “limited” weight because they were not supported by 

the medical evidence of record.

Cynthia next attempts to undermine the evidence relied on by the ALJ. For 

example, Cynthia complains that the ALJ’s explanation as to why she entered the 

TLP—because she lost her home to foreclosure and a social worker suggested the 

TLP—was “false” and her support “flimsy.” (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 13.) At the hearing 

Cynthia testified that after her mother died, she needed someone to care for her 

because she was having difficulty retaining information and was anxious about that 

limitation. (A.R. 54-55.) As the government points out, however, Cynthia offered no 

evidence that she entered the TLP because of mental health distress, other than one 

record noting that she suffered moderate depression after her mother died—and that 

record was followed by a string of negative depression screening results. (R. 24, 

Govt.’s Mem. at 7.) Furthermore, Cynthia’s September 2016 psychiatric evaluation 

with Dr. Lee lists her “[c]hief complaint/[c]urrent psychiatric symptoms” as “45 [year 

old, white single female] who had been living alone in family home . . . became 

homeless when her home was foreclosed on after her mother’s death in [March 2015].”

(A.R. 608; see also id. at 610 (listing as diagnostic formulation: “45 [year old, white 

single female] with 15 [year] history of depression and anxiety referred to TLP by 

social worker . . . due to homeless[ness] after death of mother and foreclosure on 

parent’s home where she was living”).) As part of that evaluation, Dr. Lee conducted 

a mental status examination, finding normal attention, mood, speech, affect, 

orientation, thought process, thought content, and memory. (Id. at 609.) While 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 18 of 30 PageID #:1484
19

Dr. Lee ultimately recommended that Cynthia enter the TLP, (id. at 611), Cynthia

does not establish that mental symptom exacerbation led to her TLP participation.

Cynthia also challenges the ALJ’s “emphasis on the fact that [Cynthia was] 

‘preparing to transition’” out of the TLP because TLP staff follow up with clients and 

assist with setting up appointments. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 13 (citing A.R. 80-81).) 

Cynthia notes that she was “already allowed to overstay the limit at the program . . . 

because she [was] not ready to transition.” (Id.) Yet at the hearing Cynthia’s case 

worker clarified that the TLP extended Cynthia’s participation pending the outcome 

of her disability claim because it needed to understand whether Cynthia would 

receive income. (A.R. 75.) In short, because Cynthia did not submit evidence 

undermining the maximum progress her providers said she had made, she failed to 

satisfy her burden of demonstrating marginal adjustment. See Victoria R., 2022 WL 

3543231, at *11.

Cynthia nevertheless contends that the court must consider whether the ALJ 

made an impermissible “leap of logic” in finding that she was capable of living 

independently when, according to her, the medical evidence contradicts this

inference. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 11.) She argues that even if the ALJ supported her 

listings assessment with substantial evidence, remand still may be necessary if the 

ALJ did not adequately explain how Cynthia—a resident in a highly structured TLP 

that included group and individual therapy meetings, monthly psychiatric visits, and 

treatment with psychotropic medications—could sustain full-time competitive work. 

(See R. 26, Pl.’s Reply at 3-4.) In this regard, Cynthia attempts to tease out any

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 19 of 30 PageID #:1485
20

tension between the substantial evidence standard and the Seventh Circuit’s logical 

bridge requirement. See Jarnutowski, 48 F.4th at 775-77 (finding that despite some 

evidence supporting ALJ’s decision, reversal was required where ALJ “failed to build 

an accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and her conclusion”). 

But here, the ALJ examined the record and adequately explained why Cynthia 

did not satisfy the criteria required to meet or equal listings 12.04 or 12.06. While 

Cynthia contests in particular the ALJ’s assessment of the paragraph C criteria, the 

ALJ properly “considered the important evidence, and [her] opinion enables [the 

court] to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning.” Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 

287-88 (7th Cir. 1985). As discussed, the ALJ cited objective evidence—including 

contemporaneous notes from Cynthia’s providers—to support her finding that 

Cynthia did not satisfy her burden of showing that she achieved marginal 

adjustment. (A.R. 23 (citing id. at 886-915 (demonstrating “maximum progress” in 

treatment, independent medication management, and success in gaining skills to 

manage symptoms and complete daily activities); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, 

App. 1, 12.03(C); Daniel H. v. Kijakazi, No. 20 CV 2597, 2021 WL 5370140, at *4 (S.D. 

Ind. Nov. 2021). Accordingly, Cynthia failed to demonstrate that she satisfies the 

listings criteria for a presumptive disability.

B. Opinion Evidence

Cynthia next challenges the ALJ’s evaluations of her treating psychiatrist, 

three treating therapists, and two treating nurse practitioners, arguing that the ALJ

afforded their opinions little or limited weight without offering sound explanations 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 20 of 30 PageID #:1486
21

for doing so. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 13-14.) Under the treating physician rule in effect at 

the time Cynthia filed her disability claim, an ALJ must give controlling weight to a 

treating physician’s opinion if it is: “(1) supported by medical findings; and 

(2) consistent with substantial evidence in the record.”4 Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 

408, 415 (7th Cir. 2008). If the ALJ concludes that a treating physician’s opinion is 

not entitled to controlling weight, she must give “good reasons” for discounting the 

opinion, after considering factors such as the nature of the treatment relationship, 

the frequency of examination, the physician’s specialty, the type of tests performed, 

and the reliability of the opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c); Brown v. Colvin, 845 

F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2016).

Here, the ALJ evaluated a host of treating source opinions, including a series 

of opinions from Cynthia’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Lee, who opined in 2016 and 

2017 that Cynthia was unable to work because of panic attacks, spinal stenosis, 

extensive nerve damage, incontinence, IBS, frequent use of the bathroom, persistent 

depressive disorder, mood instability, and questionable social judgment. (A.R. 31-33

(citing id. at 790-91, 793, 801-02, 804).) The ALJ afforded little weight to these 

opinions, explaining that while Dr. Lee was “an acceptable medical source,” his 

conclusions that Cynthia was not able to work were “not binding” on the SSA and 

were inconsistent with “the longitudinal evidence of record,” including generally 

4 The SSA has since adopted new rules for evaluating the opinions of treating 

physicians. See 82 Fed. Reg. 58844-01, 2017 WL 168819, at *5844 (Jan. 18, 2017). 

Because the new rules apply only to disability applications filed on or after March 27, 

2017, they do not apply here. (Id.)

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 21 of 30 PageID #:1487
22

unremarkable psychiatric evaluations showing stable mood and controlled IBS 

symptoms. (Id.) 

Dr. Lee also submitted a December 2017 mental RFC5 in which he opined that 

since 1993, Cynthia had experienced symptoms and limitations precluding her from 

being able to work. (Id. at 808.) He opined that these symptoms and limitations

would cause Cynthia to be “off task” more than 30% of a workday, miss six days of 

work each month, and preclude her from working on a sustained basis without 

continuous supervision or undue interruptions. (Id. at 810.) The ALJ assigned 

limited weight to this mental RFC, finding the limitations inconsistent with Dr. Lee’s

own evaluations and the record evidence. (Id. at 33.) The ALJ indicated that Dr. 

Lee’s opinions appear to be based in part on Cynthia’s subjective reports because he

started treating her in September 2016, and his mental RFC covered the time period 

from 1993 through 2017. (Id.) Furthermore, the ALJ noted Dr. Lee opined that 

Cynthia suffered medication side effects of constipation and fatigue, but the objective 

medical evidence did not note any side effects. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ determined that 

Dr. Lee’s opinions were internally inconsistent—for example, Dr. Lee opined that 

Cynthia could carry out detailed instructions but could not understand or remember 

detailed instructions. (Id. (citing id. at 809).)

5 Dr. Lee submitted another mental RFC in September 2018, opining that Cynthia 

would be unable to work because of symptoms related to depression, anxiety, neglect 

of critical functions, diminished ability to concentrate, impulsivity, and 

hypersensitivity. (A.R. 1330-33.)

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 22 of 30 PageID #:1488
23

As for Dr. Lee’s opinions, Cynthia contends that the ALJ failed to consider the 

nature of Dr. Lee’s relationship as her treating psychiatrist and to explain why his 

opinions were not binding or supported. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 14.) Cynthia claims the 

ALJ erred by describing Dr. Lee as “an acceptable medical source,”6 rather than as 

her “treating specialist.” (Id. (citing A.R. 31).) But earlier in her decision, the ALJ 

referred to Dr. Lee as Cynthia’s “treating provider[]” and “psychiatrist,” (A.R. 21), 

and discussed his “psychiatric evaluations” of her, (id. at 23, 27, 31). The ALJ also 

noted that Dr. Lee began treating Cynthia in 2016 and that he submitted opinions 

describing her symptoms and limitations from November 2016 through December 

2017. (Id. at 31-33 (citing id. at 808-11 (noting that Dr. Lee began treating Cynthia 

on September 1, 2016, and that he met with her once a month)).) As such, the ALJ 

sufficiently considered the nature of Dr. Lee’s treatment relationship with Cynthia. 

See Ray v. Saul, 861 Fed. Appx. 102, 105-06 (7th Cir. 2021) (noting that court “will 

affirm the ALJ’s decision if [it is] confident that the ALJ’s reasoning sufficiently 

accounted for the substance of the prescribed factors”).

Cynthia also challenges the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Lee’s opinions were not 

binding or supported. She criticizes the ALJ’s discounting of Dr. Lee’s opinions that 

Cynthia was unable to work because such conclusions are reserved for the 

Commissioner. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 14 (citing A.R. 31).) But “offering an opinion on 

6 The ALJ’s description of Dr. Lee as “an acceptable medical source,” (A.R. 31), is 

consistent with the applicable regulation governing opinion evidence for claims filed 

before March 27, 2017, 20 C.F.R. § 416.927 (defining “[m]edical opinions” as 

“statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature 

and severity” of impairments).

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 23 of 30 PageID #:1489
24

the ultimate issue—whether [the claimant] was disabled during the relevant period, 

[is] a question reserved for the Commissioner.” Ray, 861 Fed. Appx. at 105. 

Regardless, the ALJ grappled with Dr. Lee’s opinions, comparing them with his 

treatment records and the record evidence as a whole. (A.R. 23, 27-33.) Because the 

ALJ found that the longitudinal evidence did not “demonstrate severe 

symptomatology,” and instead revealed “generally unremarkable” psychiatric 

evaluations, “stable” mood, and “controlled” IBS symptoms, she assigned little weight 

to Dr. Lee’s opinions. (See id. at 23 (noting Dr. Lee’s findings of “mild depression” in 

June 2018 but then “minimal or no symptoms” in July, August, and September 2018), 

27 (noting Cynthia’s reports to Dr. Lee of frequent crying but finding on examination 

normal attention, mood, speech, affect, thought processes, thought content, and 

memory), 28-29 (noting Dr. Lee’s referral into TLP in September 2016 but then 

recording: in October 2016 normal concentration/attention, euthymic mood, 

appropriate and normal range of affect, good judgment and insight, appropriate 

grooming, and normal thought processes/content; in December 2016 unremarkable 

mental status examination, except for difficulty interpreting abstract expressions; in 

March, April, and May 2017 unremarkable mental status examinations with GAF 

scores between 51 and 55; in January, April, May, and July 2018 unremarkable 

mental status examination except for anxious and depressed mood that did not 

worsen and became stable), 30 (noting Dr. Lee’s findings in September 2018 that 

Cynthia showed no signs of depression and that she was managing anxiety 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 24 of 30 PageID #:1490
25

symptoms).) The ALJ supported her assessment of Dr. Lee’s opinions with 

substantial evidence.

Cynthia next criticizes the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Lee’s mental RFC on grounds 

that it was: (1) “contrary to the evidence”; (2) based on Cynthia’s own reports; and (3) 

relied on an absence of “vegetative depressive symptoms.” (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 14.) 

Each of these arguments fails. First, Cynthia cites no treatment records supporting 

her argument that the ALJ unfairly characterized the evidence. (Id. (citing A.R. 32-

33, ALJ’s opinion evaluation).) Second, the ALJ considered whether Cynthia’s 

reports to Dr. Lee were supported by and consistent with the objective evidence in 

the record, as she was required to do. (A.R. 33); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3)-(4). 

The ALJ found they were not, explaining that while Cynthia’s claimed symptoms date

back to 1993, there were no treatment records until November 2016, and no 

medication side effects were indicated in the records. (A.R. 33.) Third, the ALJ 

supported her opinion evaluation in part based on Dr. Lee’s own treatment records, 

which showed that Cynthia was “doing fairly well” despite the unexpected death of a 

friend and that she denied “any vegetative depressive symptoms,” contrary to the 

extreme limitations Dr. Lee espoused. (Id. (citing id. at 1009-12).) 

Cynthia also argues that mental symptoms cannot be viewed by x-ray and, as 

such, Dr. Lee’s observations should trump a lack of objective findings. (R. 18, Pl.’s 

Br. at 14.) But as discussed with respect to Dr. Lee’s opinions, the ALJ cited 

substantial evidence, including contemporaneous observations from Dr. Lee’s 

records, revealing mental evaluations that were unremarkable. (A.R. 27-33.) The 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 25 of 30 PageID #:1491
26

ALJ was permitted to grant less weight to Dr. Lee’s mental RFC based on the 

objective medical evidence, including his own treatment records. See Henke v. Astrue, 

498 Fed. Appx. 636, 646 (7th Cir. 2012) (upholding treating physician evaluation 

where “sweeping conclusions lacked support in [physician’s] own treatment notes”). 

Cynthia next asserts that the ALJ improperly afforded only little weight to 

therapist Rachael Mathew’s December 2017 opinion that Cynthia suffered marked 

social and attention limitations and would have a “very difficult” time sustaining 

work because of her IBS symptoms and anxiety. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 14; A.R. 32 (citing 

id. at 812-13).) Mathew’s opinion discusses how Cynthia’s IBS symptoms exacerbate 

her anxiety. (A.R. 812-13 (noting that: “[c]lient struggles with IBS in addition to her 

psychiatric symptoms, which make it hard for her to be far away from a restroom”; 

“Cynthia’s IBS symptoms are exacerbated by her anxiety and make[] it physically 

difficult for her to be away from a restroom”; [c]lient’s IBS symptoms are always on 

her mind and cause extreme physical mental and emotional distress”; “[s]he finds it 

very difficult to relax or be at peace, unless she is always within a couple of steps 

away from a bathroom”; “[c]lient is often worried and concerned about her IBS 

symptoms, which increases her anxiety”; “[i]n my opinion, due to client’s IBS 

symptoms and struggle with anxiety, it would be very difficult for her to work”).) 

The ALJ gave little weight to Mathew’s opinion because the record did not 

“fully support” it. (Id. at 32.) Earlier in her decision, the ALJ explained that shortly 

before her disability onset date, Cynthia reported during a medical visit “occasional 

fecal and urinary incontinence.” (Id. at 19-20 (citing id. at 760 (Oct. 2016 treatment 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 26 of 30 PageID #:1492
27

record)).) A few weeks later, in late October 2016, Dr. Lee started Cynthia on 

Imodium. (Id. at 20 (citing id. at 618, 719).) In her November 2016 function report, 

and as the ALJ noted, Cynthia did not mention IBS issues. (Id. (citing id. at 277); but 

see id. at 306 (Dec. 2016 function report alleging “incontinence (urine [and] fecal) due 

to spinal stenosis”)).) By December 2016 Cynthia reported to Dr. Lee that she had 

“less frequent anxiety about leaving the apartment and going out for fear of having a 

bowel accident in public since on Imodium 2 mg daily.” (Id. (citing id. at 723).) 

Thereafter, Dr. Lee recorded on several occasions Cynthia’s reports that her bowel 

symptoms had decreased. (Id. (citing id. at 1009, 1110, 1201, 1234).) The ALJ also 

noted that group records did not reflect absences by Cynthia for bathroom breaks. 

(Id. at 29 (citing id. at 1098, 1103); but see id. at 76.) Based on her review of the 

objective evidence, the ALJ concluded that Cynthia’s IBS symptoms were controlled 

with medication by December 2016 and “less frequent” in January 2018. (Id. (citing 

id. at 1009 (Jan. 2018 treatment record noting that “[b]owel symptoms continue to be 

less”)).) Because the ALJ found support lacking for Mathew’s opinion, the ALJ

rejected Mathew’s assessment that Cynthia suffered marked restrictions and, as 

such, that she was unable to work. (Id. at 32.)

Cynthia challenges the ALJ’s evaluation to the extent it focused on Cynthia’s

IBS symptoms, rather than on the panic attacks that would ensue from such issues. 

(R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 14.) Yet as explained, the ALJ discussed Cynthia’s “anxiety/fear of 

having bowel accidents” earlier in her decision, and cited Cynthia’s report to Dr. Lee 

that, after starting Imodium, she had “less frequent” anxiety and fear. (A.R. 20 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 27 of 30 PageID #:1493
28

(citing id. at 723).) This is not a case of the ALJ ignoring evidence. Rather, the ALJ 

reviewed and weighed the evidence, and supported her opinion evaluation with 

substantial evidence. Where, as here, “the decision is adequately supported,” Elder, 

529 F.3d at 413, the court cannot reweigh that evidence or substitute its judgment 

for that of the ALJ’s, Deborah M., 994 F.3d at 788. This is true, “even if reasonable 

minds could differ concerning whether [the claimant] is disabled.” Jarnutowski, 48 

F.4th at 773 (citing Elder, 529 F.3d at 413); see also Hahn, 2022 WL 6628832, at *3.

Finally, insofar as Cynthia generally asserts that the ALJ “inexplicably 

discounted” other opinions, including from other therapists and nurse practitioners, 

(R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 13), she did not develop this argument and therefore forfeits it, 

see John K. MacIver Inst. for Pub. Pol’y, Inc. v. Evers, 994 F.3d 602, 614 (7th Cir.

2021) (“A party who does not sufficiently develop an issue or argument forfeits it.”).

C. RFC Assessment

Cynthia argues that the ALJ erred by not accounting for her non-exertional 

limitations—specifically, her CPP limitations—in assessing her RFC. (R. 18, Pl.’s 

Br. at 15-16.) The RFC measures the maximum a person can do despite her 

limitations and must be based on “all the relevant evidence” in the record. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1545(a)(1); see also Pepper v. Colvin, 712 F.3d 351, 362 (7th Cir. 2013). In 

assessing a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ “must give substantial weight to the medical 

evidence and opinions submitted, unless specific, legitimate reasons constituting 

good cause are shown for rejecting it.” Chambers v. Saul, 861 Fed. Appx. 95, 101 (7th 

Cir. 2021) (quoting Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995) (quotations 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 28 of 30 PageID #:1494
29

omitted)). Nevertheless, a flawed RFC assessment will not justify remand unless the 

claimant can identify additional limitations not already included in the RFC. 

See Pavlicek v. Saul, 994 F.3d 777, 784 (7th Cir. 2021); Jozefyk, 923 F.3d at 498.

Here, the ALJ determined that Cynthia suffers from non-exertional limitations

and accounted for limitations supported by the record. See Cervantes v. Kijakazi, 

No. 20-3334, 2021 WL 6101361, at *2 (7th Cir. Dec. 21, 2021). At step three the ALJ 

evaluated the paragraph B evidence and determined that Cynthia suffers moderate 

deficits in three functional areas, including CPP. (A.R. 30.) The ALJ provided 

substantial evidence to support that assessment, as explained. (See, e.g., A.R. 22 

(citing id. at 613, 617, 714, 720, 732, 736, 740, 1111, 1202, 1273, 1313 (recording 

normal attention and concentration), id. at 684, 695, 901-02, 1034 (reporting 

appropriate social interactions in groups, good relationships with siblings and 

neighbor, and “communicative” nature with staff and peers)).) 

Taking these deficits into account, the ALJ formulated an RFC including the 

following non-exertional limitations: Cynthia “can understand, remember and carry 

out no more than simple, routine work tasks” and perform “the same tasks day in and 

day out without strict quotas.” (Id.) With respect to her restrictions in interacting 

with others, the ALJ limited Cynthia to performing work with no public contact and 

only occasional contact with coworkers or supervisors. (Id.) Cynthia argues that her 

TLP participation shows she cannot perform basic work functions and that her 

providers’ medical opinions support this conclusion. (R. 18, Pl.’s Br. at 15.) But as 

explained, the ALJ addressed Cynthia’s TLP participation and found that while it 

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 29 of 30 PageID #:1495
30

justified the inclusion of certain non-exertional limitations in Cynthia’s RFC, it did 

not preclude all work. (See A.R. 20-33.) Also as explained, the ALJ considered the 

opinion evidence and adequately supported her decision to discount such evidence. 

(See id. at 30-33.) Where, as here, the ALJ supported her RFC with substantial 

evidence, the court affirms that finding. See Pepper, 712 F.3d at 363.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Cynthia’s motion for summary judgment is denied, 

and the government’s is granted.

ENTER:

____________________________________

Young B. Kim

United States Magistrate Judge

Case: 1:20-cv-00428 Document #: 32 Filed: 11/08/22 Page 30 of 30 PageID #:1496