1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

Stacey H., )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 3:20-cv-50112

v. ) 

) Magistrate Judge Lisa A. Jensen

Kilolo Kijakazi, )

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,1 )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Stacy H. brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking reversal or a remand 

of the decision denying her disability insurance benefits.2 For the reasons set forth below, the 

Commissioner’s decision is reversed, and this case is remanded.

 I. Background

In June 2016, Plaintiff applied for social security disability insurance benefits alleging she 

became disabled on April 15, 2016. Plaintiff alleged that she was unable to work as of the date of 

her disability primarily due to her chronic neck and back pain with associated numbness in her 

arms and legs.

Following a hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision on February 

26, 2019, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments 

did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. The ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff’s 

1 Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for Andrew Marshall Saul. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

2 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
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degenerative disc disease did not meet or medically equal Listing 1.04. R. 20. The ALJ concluded 

that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with certain 

restrictions. Plaintiff was 47 years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision.

Plaintiff appeals the ALJ’s decision arguing that the ALJ erred in analyzing whether she

met or medically equaled Listing 1.04(A).3 Therefore, although the record demonstrates that 

Plaintiff sought medical treatment for a number of conditions, this Court will focus on the evidence 

relevant to the ALJ’s Listing 1.04(A) analysis in the discussion below.

II. Standard of Review

A reviewing court may enter judgment “affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of 

the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If 

supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive. Id.

Substantial evidence consists of “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). Accordingly, 

the reviewing court is not to “reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, 

or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 

510 (7th Cir. 2019).

However, the Seventh Circuit has emphasized that review is not merely a rubber stamp. 

Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (a “mere scintilla” is not substantial evidence). 

A reviewing court must conduct a critical review of the evidence before affirming the 

Commissioner’s decision. Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2008). Even when 

3 In her opening brief, Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination and subjective symptom 

evaluation. However, in her reply brief Plaintiff abandons these arguments. Accordingly, the Court will not

address them. See Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that failing to 

respond to an argument in a response brief results in waiver). However, Plaintiff should raise any of these 

concerns with the ALJ on remand.
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adequate record evidence exists to support the Commissioner’s decision, the decision will not be 

affirmed if the Commissioner does not build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to 

the conclusion. Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2008). Moreover, federal courts 

cannot build a logical bridge on behalf of the ALJ. See Mason v. Colvin, No. 13 C 2993, 2014 WL 

5475480, at *5-7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2014).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff argues that reversal or remand is proper because the ALJ failed to adequately 

analyze whether her back condition, including cervical, lumbar, and thoracic disc disease with 

peripheral neuropathy, meets or medically equals the criteria of Listing 1.04(A).

A claimant is eligible for benefits if she has an impairment that meets or equals an 

impairment found in the listing of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). The listings specify the 

criteria for impairments that are considered presumptively disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a). A 

claimant may also demonstrate presumptive disability by showing that his impairments are 

accompanied by symptoms that are equal in severity to those described in a specific listing. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1526(a). Therefore, at step three of the sequential evaluation process, in “considering 

whether a claimant’s condition meets or equals a listed impairment, an ALJ must discuss the listing 

by name and offer more than perfunctory analysis of the listing.” Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 

935 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Barnett v. Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004)).

Listing 1.04 addresses spinal disorders, including degenerative disc disease that result in 

compromise of a nerve root or the spinal cord. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.04. Listing 

1.04(A) requires “evidence of nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic 

distribution of pain, limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with associated muscle 

weakness or muscle weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and if there is involvement 
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of the lower back, positive straight-leg test (sitting and supine).” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 

1 § 1.04(A).

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease of the cervical, lumbar, and 

thoracic spine as well as her peripheral neuropathy constituted severe impairments. R. 17. 

However, the ALJ’s listing analysis regarding whether Plaintiff met or equaled Listing 1.04(A) 

consisted of the following two-sentence statement:

The claimant’s degenerative disc disease does not meet or medically equal Listing 

1.04 of the Appendix 1 impairments. The record fails to demonstrate nerve root 

compression characterized by neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, limitation of 

motion of the spine, motor loss accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and positive 

straight leg raising (1.04A).

R. 20. Plaintiff argues that this is the type of perfunctory analysis that the Seventh Circuit has 

found to be inadequate. This Court agrees. In Minnick, the ALJ merely stated that the plaintiff’s 

degenerative disc disease did not meet or equal Listing 1.04 because “[t]he evidence does not 

establish the presence of nerve root compression, spinal arachnoiditis, or spinal stenosis resulting 

in pseudoclaudication, as required by that listing.” 775 F.3d at 935. The court in Minnick noted 

that this statement provided no analysis to support the ALJ’s conclusion. Id. at 935-36 (remanding 

because the ALJ’s two-sentence discussion contained “no analysis whatsoever” and was “the very 

type of perfunctory analysis we have repeatedly found inadequate”). The ALJ’s two-sentence 

listing statement here also contains no analysis and for that reason it is cursory and deficient.

The Commissioner does not contest that the ALJ’s analysis was cursory. Instead, the 

Commissioner argues that after the step three analysis the ALJ discussed the medical evidence and 

this discussion supports the ALJ’s finding that Listing 1.04(A) was not met. While the Court will 

not discount the ALJ’s listing analysis just because it appears elsewhere in the opinion, the 

Commissioner has not explained how the medical evidence discussed later in the opinion 
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constitutes the ALJ’s listing analysis. It is true that the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s medical 

evidence. However, in her summary she makes no reference to any listing. A mere summary is not 

the same as meaningful analysis. See Edmonson v. Colvin, No. 14 CV 50135, 2016 WL 946973, 

at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2016) (“It is true that the ALJ engaged in a fairly lengthy recitation of the 

medical evidence, but this was mostly a long chronology of doctor visits with little commentary 

or analysis. Even when the ALJ offered some fleeting commentary, he never connected it back to 

the specific 1.04(A) requirements.”); Chuk v. Colvin, No. 14 C 2525, 2015 WL 6687557, at *8 

(N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2015) ([S]ummarizing a medical history is not the same thing as analyzing it, in 

order to build a logical bridge from evidence to conclusion.”); Alevaras v. Colvin, No. 13 C 8409, 

2015 WL 2149480, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2015) ([M]erely summarizing medical evidence is not 

the same thing as analyzing it and explaining how the evidence supports the conclusion that the 

claimant is not disabled.”).

Moreover, in examining the chronology that the ALJ sets forth after her step three analysis 

she lists (without discussion) many findings supportive of Listing 1.04(A). For example, while she 

states at step three that the record fails to demonstrate “limitation of motion of the spine,” she then 

goes on in the next section to state “[e]xams showed decreased range of motion of the cervical and 

lumbar spine (6F/5-6, 14F/5).” R 21. In addition, her medical record chronology reports MRI 

evidence of spinal cord compression, hand/leg numbness diagnosed as peripheral neuropathy, and 

abnormal EMG results in the bilateral lower extremities indicative of possible bilateral S1

radiculopathy. R. 21. While these findings could be consistent with Listing 1.04(A), the ALJ makes 

no comment one way or the other as to what impact these findings had on her listing analysis.

The ALJ does note the following near the end of her medical record chronology in 

conjunction with her RFC analysis: “Additionally, although the claimant has peripheral 
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neuropathy and obesity, exams frequently showed 5/5 strength in the upper and lower extremities, 

normal reflexes, and can do heel, toe and tandem gait.” R. 22. However, this Court’s review of the 

record reveals numerous findings of abnormal strength in the upper and lower extremities, 

abnormal reflexes in the upper and lower extremities, and difficulty with heel/toe movement. For 

example, Plaintiff has been diagnosed with hyperreflexia, including abnormal reflexes in the upper 

and lower extremities R. 624. Dr. Arbona stated that her numbness and hyperreflexia probably 

come from cord involvement. R. 624. Consultative examiner Dr. Ramchandani found decreased 

strength in the lower extremities, including difficulty squatting. While he stated that Plaintiff could 

walk on her heels and toes, Dr. Ramchandani noted that in doing so she had to lean on the table 

for support. R. 468. Moreover, the record contains numerous findings of decreased strength in the 

upper extremities as well. R. 536, 551-53, 619. An ALJ cannot cherry-pick the records by relying 

on those that support her opinion and ignoring those that do not. See Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 

419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010) (“An ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical evidence 

and cannot simply cherry-pick facts that support a finding of non-disability while ignoring 

evidence that points to a disability finding.”). Thus, even the limited RFC analysis that appears 

later in the opinion does not accurately summarize the records or provide substantial evidence to 

support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff does not meet or equal Listing 1.04(A). In sum, this Court 

does not consider the ALJ’s subsequent medical record chronology sufficient to support her twosentence statement regarding Listing 1.04.

Next, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ relied on the opinions of the state agency 

physicians that a listing was not met. There are several problems with this argument. First, there 

is no evidence in the record that the ALJ in fact relied upon the state agency physician opinions to 

support her step three finding. The Commissioner concedes this point but argues that this error “is 
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harmless because she subsequently considered and discussed these opinions.” Defendant’s 

Response at 4, Dkt. 25. However, the ALJ’s subsequent discussion of the state agency physician 

opinions was in regard to their opinion concerning Plaintiff’s RFC. Even then, she gave the state 

agency physicians opinions only “some weight” because “evidence received at the hearing level 

shows that the claimant is more limited than determined by the State agency consultants[.]” R. 23. 

As such, this Court cannot say with great confidence that on remand the ALJ would rely on the 

state agency physicians to support her step three finding. See Schomas v. Colvin, 732 F.3d 702, 

707 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding an error harmless only when a court can “predict with great confidence 

that the result on remand would be the same”).

Most importantly, however, this Court agrees with Plaintiff that on this record it would be 

improper for the ALJ to rely on the state agency physicians’ opinions regarding whether Plaintiff 

met Listing 1.04 without the benefit of various records that the state agency physicians did not 

have at the time they rendered their opinions. See Moreno v. Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 

2018), as amended on reh’g (Apr. 13, 2018) (“An ALJ should not rely on an outdated assessment 

if later evidence containing new, significant medical diagnoses reasonably could have changed the 

reviewing physician’s opinion.”).

Here, Plaintiff points out that the state agency physicians did not have the following:

- the 2017 MRI of the cervical spine which showed an annular bulge with minimal 

encroachment at C5/6; disc bulge contacting the ventral cord which is slightly 

flattened at C6/7. R. 481;

- the 2017 MRI of the thoracic spine which showed disc protrusion with mild flattening 

of the right anterior cord with right lateral recess encroachment at T9/10; disc
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protrusion with migration and contact with the ventral cord with reniform cord 

morphology at T10/11. R. 482;

- the 2017 MRI of the lumbar spine that showed annular bulge barely contacting the 

ventral sac and minimal left foraminal encroachment at L4/5; annular bulge, lateral 

recess encroachment, facet arthrosis, and foraminal stenosis moderate on the right and 

minimal on the left at L5/S1. R. 483;

- the July and September 2018 records of Dr. Arbona who noted “major compression” 

of the spinal cord, “compression of the thoracic cord,” and impact on the “cervical 

cord.” R. 612, 626.

- The EMG of Plaintiff’s lower extremities showing absent bilateral H soleus response 

consistent with bilateral S1 radiculopathy. R 512.

The above evidence is significant especially for purposes of analyzing whether a claimant meets 

Listing 1.04. See Ivy v. Saul, No. 1:19-CV-380-JD, 2020 WL 4463160, at *5 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 4, 

2020) (“The ALJ’s reliance on the state agency opinions fails when the state agency physicians 

did not have access to the CT scan that showed a compromised spinal cord.”).

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Finally, the Commissioner argues that the burden remains on Plaintiff to establish that her 

impairment meets or equals an impairment enumerated in the listings. However, Plaintiff listed 

ample evidence that could establish that she met or medically equaled Listing 1.04(A). With regard 

to nerve root compression, Plaintiff points to the 2017 MRIs of the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar 

spine that all show cord compression as well as Dr. Arbona’s records, which diagnose “major 

compression” of the spinal cord, compression of the thoracic cord, and impact on the cervical cord.

4 Because the state agency physicians did not have updated and relevant medical records it was similarly 

improper for the ALJ to rely on their opinions to support a finding that Plaintiff’s symptoms did not equal 

Listing 1.04(A).
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With regard to neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, Plaintiff points to numerous references 

to radicular pain and sciatic pain. Specifically, the record reveals evidence of cervical pain with 

upper extremity radiculopathy. R. 491, 532-33. Dr. Bear noted that Plaintiff’s neck pain and 

radicular symptoms may be related to cervical spine abnormalities with narrowed spinal canal with 

possible nerve root impingement and clear signs and symptoms of impingement syndrome. R. 532-

33. With regard to the lower extremities, consultative examiner Dr. Ramchandani noted pain in 

the paraspinal region of the thoracolumbar spine and in the thighs, with decreased range of motion. 

Plaintiff had reduced sensation to pin prick in the legs. Dr. Ramchandani diagnosed Plaintiff with 

lumbar stenosis with radiculopathy of the lower extremity secondary to spondylolisthesis. R 468-

69. EMG of the lower extremities also confirmed findings consistent with bilateral S1

radiculopathy. R. 512. 

Regarding the other required findings under Listing 1.04, Plaintiff points to evidence of 

limitation of motion of the spine. R. 472. As set forth above, the ALJ affirmatively stated that 

Plaintiff’s “[e]xams showed decreased range of motion of the cervical and lumbar spine (6F/5-6, 

14F/5).” R. 21. The record also reveals evidence of atrophy in her left leg. R. 468. There is also 

evidence of muscle weakness in the lower extremities as well as abnormal reflexes. R. 468.

Weakness in the upper extremities is also supported by the records, R. 551-53, as is abnormal 

reflexes in the arms. R. 623-24. The above evidence is at the very least indicative of meeting 

Listing 1.04(A). 

The Commissioner does not deny that these findings could be consistent with Listing 

1.04(A). The Commissioner argues only that by pointing to “various tests and notes in the record, 

plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate that her degenerative disc disease met or equaled Listing 

1.04 for the durational requirement of the Act.” Defendant’s Response at 4, Dkt. 25. However, the 
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ALJ did not base her finding that Plaintiff did not meet Listing 1.04 on the failure of Plaintiff to 

show that she met all of the listing criteria for the durational requirement of the Act. Under the 

Chenery doctrine, this Court must confine its review to the grounds on which the ALJ made her 

finding. See, e.g., Jeske v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Our review is limited also to 

the ALJ’s rationales; we do not uphold an ALJ’s decision by giving it different ground to stand 

upon.”); Meuser v. Convin, 838 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding that where “the ALJ did not 

rely on this rationale in his opinion, [] the Commissioner cannot now rely on it”). Moreover, 

Plaintiff’s neck and back pain with numbness have been described as chronic and as lasting more 

than 12 months. R. 414, 491, 632.

The ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff’s neck and back condition did not meet or medically equal 

Listing 1.04(A) is not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ failed to discuss her reasoning 

and failed to address evidence that may support a finding that Listing 1.04(A) was met. As such, 

the ALJ’s inadequate analysis requires remand.

Finally, this Court declines Plaintiff’s request for a direct award of benefits. A direct award 

of benefits is a “rare step.” Martin v. Saul, 950 F.3d 369, 371 (7th Cir. 2020). Such an award of 

benefits is appropriate “only if all factual issues involved in the entitlement determination have 

been resolved and the resulting record supports only one conclusion – that the applicant qualifies 

for disability benefits.” Allord v. Astrue, 631 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, because the 

ALJ did not adequately analyze all of the evidence to determine if Plaintiff’s condition meets 

Listing 1.04(A) and did not have the benefit of state agency physicians opinions based on updated 

medical records this Court cannot say that there is only one conclusion that can be drawn here. 

This Court finds that remand is the more appropriate course so that the ALJ can reach her 

conclusions after proper consideration and analysis of all of the relevant evidence.
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IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and the 

Commissioner’s motion is denied. The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the case is 

remanded for further proceeding consistent with this opinion.

Date: July 16, 2021 By: ______________________

Lisa A. Jensen

United States Magistrate Judge