alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
Pursuant to 
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I,
Edwin C. Quattlebaum, Ph.D., Chief Executive Officer, President and
Co-Chairman of the Board of Directors of MetaMorphix, Inc. (the Registrant),
certify that to the best of my knowledge, based upon a review of the annual
report on Form 10-KSB/A (Amendment No. 2) for the year ended December 31,
2006 of the Registrant (the Report):

| |                                                                                                                                                                  
| | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | (1) The
  Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
  the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and                        
| |                                                                                                                                                                  
| | (2) The
  information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
  respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
  Registrant.

| |     |                                                                                  
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | By: | /S/ EDWIN C. QUATTLEBAUM                                                         
| |     |                                                                                  
| |     | Edwin C. Quattlebaum, Ph.D.                                                      
| |     | Chief Executive Officer, President and Co-Chairman of the Board of
  Directors of
| |     | MetaMorphix, Inc.                                                                

Date: February 29, 2008

---
H. Res. 367

In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

February 25, 1998.

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule

XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the

Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of

the bill (H.R. 1544) to prevent Federal agencies from pursuing policies of unjustifiable nonacquiescence in, and relitigation of, precedents established in the Federal judicial circuits.

The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. General

debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one

hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and

ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary.

After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under

the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on the Judiciary now

printed in the bill. Each section of the committee amendment

in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read. Dur-
2

•HRES 367 EH

ing consideration of the bill for amendment, the Chairman of

the Committee of the Whole may accord priority in recognition on the basis of whether the Member offering an amendment has caused it to be printed in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for that purpose in clause 6 of

rule XXIII. Amendments so printed shall be considered as

read. The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may: (1)

postpone until a time during further consideration in the

Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded vote on any

amendment; and (2) reduce to five minutes the minimum

time for electronic voting on any postponed question that follows another electronic vote without intervening business,

provided that the minimum time for electronic voting on the

first in any series of questions shall be fifteen minutes. At

the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the

Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with

such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member

may demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment

adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the

committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and

amendments thereto to final passage without intervening mo-
3

•HRES 367 EH

tion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.

Attest:

Clerk.
9505.

#### Cleveland *v.*The State.

Decided April 2, 1918.

Indictment for misdemeanor; from city court of Polk county— Judge John K. Davis. January 24, 1918.

The indictment charged the defendant with having used to and of a certain female and in her presence obscene, vulgar, and profane language tending to cause a breach of the peace, to wit: “No, I am not the one; any one who says I am is a God damn liar.” According to testimony for the State, Mrs. Pay, the female named in the indictment, said to the defendant, in regard to a fence, “You tore down the fence, you are on us;” and he said, “I am not, the one that says I am tells a God damned lie.” According to other testimony for the State hé said he did.not think the fence was over the line, and said, “The one that says it tells a God *125damned lie.” The defendant denied that he used the language1 charged; and, according to his statement and testimony of his .witness, Mrs. Ray’s .son, who accompanied her at the time referred to by the State’s witnesses, said to him, “I have come here to see you [or “you all”] about stealing my land,” or “that land.”

*124Broyles, P. J.

1. The language which the evidence for the State showed that the defendant used was substantially the same as charged in the indictment, and there was no variance between the indictment and the proof.

2. Under the facts of the case it was error for the court to refuse to give the following requested charge to the jury: “If you find that the defendant used substantially the language set out in the indictment, he may defend and justify himself by showing that he was provoked to use the language by on'e other than such female; the sufficiency of the provocation being a question for the jury, under all the circumstances of the case.” *Ray*v. *State,*113 *Ga.*1065 (39 S. E. 408).

3. There is no merit in the remaining ground of the amendment to the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Bloodworth and Harwell, J.J., concur.*

*125
      *Bunn & TrawicJc,*for plaintiff in error.

*J. A. Wright, solicitor, B. 8. Ault,*contra.
#### The State *v.*Mitchell, in Error.

IT was *held*in this case, that the statute of 1831, prohibiting all persons, except travellers, from wearing or carrying concealed weapons, is not unconstitutional.
**EXHIBIT 23.2**

**CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**

We consent to the incorporation by reference in theRegistration Statements (Form S-3 No. 333-128798, No. 333-128799 and No. 333-128800 and Form S-8 333-119516) of Eagle Hospitality Properties Trust, Inc., and in the related Prospectuses, of our reports dated February 28, 2006 with respect to theconsolidated financial statements and schedule of Eagle Hospitality Properties Trust, Inc., Eagle Hospitality Properties Trust, Inc.’s management assessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and the effectivenessof internal control over financial reporting of Eagle Hospitality Properties Trust, Inc., included in this Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2005. 

/s/ Ernst & Young LLP 

Chicago, Illinois 

February 28, 2006
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

Jacqueline Stevens

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:20−cv−02725

Honorable Mary M.

Rowland

United States Department of Homeland Security,

et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Tuesday, October 27, 2020:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland: The court has reviewed

the joint status report. Plaintiff has propounded written discovery requests relating to

Count II. Defendant will respond to the discovery requests by November 6, 2020. Parties

shall file a further status report by 12/22/20. Mailed notice. (dm, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cv-02725 Document #: 15 Filed: 10/27/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:86
exv10w5



 





Exhibit 10.5




GAS MARKETING AGREEMENT




     THIS GAS MARKETING AGREEMENT (the “Agreement”), made and entered into the
      day of           , 2004, by and between Mewbourne Oil Company (“MOC”), ,
Mewbourne Energy Partners    -A, L.P. (the “Partnership”) and Mewbourne
Development Corporation (“MD”).



Recitals





	 	1.	 	MD and the Partnership are participants in a drilling program
(the “Program”) governed by that certain Drilling Program Agreement
dated           , 200  by and among MOC, the Partnership and MD (the
“Program Agreement”).
	 
	 	2.	 	Under the terms of the Program Agreement, MOC is the “Program
Manager” and also serves a the “Operator” of the “Program’s”
properties under the terms of a joint operating agreement.
	 
	 	3.	 	MOC operates hundreds of oil and gas wells in which
non-affiliated parties own working interests.
	 
	 	4.	 	MOC has developed expertise in the marketing of natural gas
produced from the wells it operates.
	 
	 	5.	 	In recognition of MOC’s gas marketing expertise,
non-affiliated parties have contracted with MOC for gas marketing
services on substantially the same terms as provided for in this
Agreement.




AGREEMENT




     NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the respective
undertaking and obligations of the parties set forth below, the parties agree
as follows:




	 	1.	 	MOC shall provide gas marketing services to the Program
pursuant to which the Program’s gas production will be bundled with
other parties’ gas production in an effort to maximize the overall
price and terms received for the Program’s gas production.
	 
	 	2.	 	The term of this Agreement shall begin on           ,
and shall continue through December 31, 2004, and from year to year
thereafter, until terminated by any party hereto upon 60 days prior
notice.
	 
	 	3.	 	For its services rendered, Operator shall charge Program and
the Program shall pay, a fee of $0.035 per Mcf of gas owned by the
Program and sold for the Program’s account by MOC. This fee shall
be assessed only upon gas sold by MOC under multi-month term or
single month spot market contracts; the fee shall not be assessed
upon gas sold under long term percentage-of-proceeds or
percentage-of-index contracts.




1









 






	 	4.	 	This Agreement shall not create, nor shall it be construed as
creating, a mining or other partnership, joint venture, agency
relationship or association, or to render the parties liable as
partners, co-venturers or principals nor shall it give rise to any
fiduciary duties among the parties hereto.
	 
	 	5.	 	Defined terms used herein but not defined herein shall have
the meaning given such terms in the Program Agreement.




     EXECUTED at Tyler, Texas on the date indicated above.




	 	 	 	 	 
	 	
MEWBOURNE OIL COMPANY 



 	 
	 	
By:  	 	 
	 	 	James Allen Brinson 	 
	 	 	Attorney-in-Fact 	 
	 





	 	 	 	 	 
	 	MEWBOURNE DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, in its individual corporate

capacity and in its capacity as managing

general partner of Mewbourne Energy Partners    -A, L.P.

 	 
	 	By:  	 	 
	 	 	J. Roe Buckley 	 
	 	 	Executive Vice President 	 
	 









2
#### WESTSIDE FUEL SERVICE, INC., A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. SIDNEY G. STEIKER, T/A STEIKER MOTORS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Argued January 15, 1946

Decided January 31, 1946.

Before Justices Cash, Bodine and Perskie.

Eor the defendant-appellant, *Hein S Smith*and *Seym,our A. Smith.*

Eor the plaintiff-appellee, *Hugh C. Spernow.*

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Bodine, J.

The parties to this suit entered into a contract September 15th, 1944, for the purchase and sale of a truck. *592The plaintiff made a down payment of $500. The sale was not consummated because the plaintiff could not obtain a permit for the purchase of the truck from the Office of Defense Transportation. The plaintiff recovered the down payment.

The defendant appeals claiming that the contract was complete and regular upon its face, and that its written terms could not be varied by parole. There is some doubt whether the contract was complete upon its face. It seems not to have been and lacks acceptance but we make no point of that. Federal regulations in existence at the time the contract was made required that the purchaser obtain a permit from the Office of Defense Transportation. These regulations were known to both the buyer and the seller and any contract which they made was subject to such regulation, and the court in which the action was brought was obliged to take notice thereof.

Since the plaintiff could not obtain a permit he could not make the purchase and the defendant could not make the sale. When such fact became known to the defendant it was his duty to return the deposit.

Having failed so to do after demand, the action was properly brought and the judgment of the District Court is affirmed, with costs.
AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

__________ District of __________

)

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff

v. Civil Action No.

Defendant

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To:

(Name of the plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint,

two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you. 

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case. 

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service. 

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within

60 days from , the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the

United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date:

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Printed name of party waiving service of summons Printed name

Address

E-mail address

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons

and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in

the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff

and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

 Northern District of Illinois State of Illinois CSL Plasma, Inc and CSL Behring LLC 20 cv 3535 Neil Kelley, Illinois Attorney General's Office June 26, 2020 CSL Behring, LLC

 Eric A. Berg

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

 155 North Wacker Drive, Suite 4300

 Chicago, IL 60606

 eric.berg@ogletree.com

 312-558-1424

7/17/2020

 

Case: 1:20-cv-03535 Document #: 9 Filed: 07/21/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:37
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 177 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 177

  Prohibiting any personal staff employee of a Member of the House of 
  Representatives from holding a paid position in the campaign of the 
                           employing Member.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 26, 1997

Mr. Goodlatte submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                    the Committee on House Oversight

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
  Prohibiting any personal staff employee of a Member of the House of 
  Representatives from holding a paid position in the campaign of the 
                           employing Member.

    Resolved,

SECTION 1. PERSONAL STAFF EMPLOYEES OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF 
              REPRESENTATIVES PROHIBITED FROM HOLDING PAID POSITIONS IN 
              CAMPAIGNS OF EMPLOYING MEMBERS.

    (a) In General.--A personal staff employee of a Member of the House 
of Representatives may not, with respect to any period described in 
subsection (b), be employed by a political committee of the Member or 
otherwise perform services for pay from campaign funds of the Member.
    (b) Period Described.--A period referred to in subsection (a) is 
any pay period of the House of Representatives for the personal staff 
employee position involved.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    As used in this resolution--
            (1) the term ``Member of the House of Representatives'' 
        means a Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident 
        Commissioner to, the Congress;
            (2) the term ``personal staff employee'' means, with 
        respect to a Member of the House of Representatives, a clerk 
        hire or other employee on the personal staff of the Member; and
            (3) the term ``political committee'' has the meaning given 
        that term in section 301 of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
        of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431).
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         0001048407
<NAME>                        ENERGY VENTURES INC.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                         227,431
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  38,192
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               446,124
<PP&E>                                         72,173
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 1,206,851
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          1,243,618
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       1,601,802
<OTHER-SE>                                     0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   1,206,851
<SALES>                                        200,025
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               200,025
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  876,229
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               (676,204)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             28,589
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (676,204)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            0
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (676,204)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (.053)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (.053)



</TABLE>
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

N o. 04

- 15

- 00184

- CR

Sallia VASQUEZ

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 290th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2014CR10163

Honorable Melisa Skinner, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Jason Pulliam, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 19, 2015

MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED; DISMISSED

A ppellant filed a motion to dismiss thi s appeal

. The motion is granted, and this appeal is

dismissed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.2(a).

PER CURIAM

Do not publish
#### Emeline A. T. Whitford v. Leverett Crooks et al.

[See 47 Mich. 283.]

*Ejectment*— Estoppel—Affidavit *for order of publication.*

Where a defendant in ejectment obtained possession from the executor of an estate, he is estopped, as against the estate or persons claiming thereunder, from denying their possessory right; and if they rely on the estoppel, and recover possession, defendant has the burden of disproving their title.

Whether jurisdiction of foreclosure proceedings is not acquired where the affidavit for the order of publication is *sufficient*— Q.

Error to Kalamazoo. (Mills, J.)

Jan. 11.

Jan. 17.

Ejectment. Plaintiff brings error.

Reversed.

*Breese & Stearns*for appellant.

*Howard & Roos*for appellee.

Marston, J.

The evidence in this ease is undisputed that defendant Crooks obtained possession of the premises in controversy from one of the executors of the estate of Seth Wheelock, and that as against the estate or those claiming under or through the same, he is estopped from denying their possessory right thereto, and the court should have so charged the jury. *Jochen v. Tibbells*ante p. 33.

There must therefore be a new trial, and as the plaintiff may, as she has the right, rely upon the estoppel and recover a judgment giving her the possession, thus compelling the defendant to take the initiative to inquire into the plaintiff’s title, should he think proper so to do, we deem it better to abstain from examining the other questions in the case. We may add however that we are by no means satisfied that all the tax deeds were shown to be defective, or that the court •did acquire jurisdiction in the foreclosure proceedings, the affidavit for order of publication having been sufficient whatever the facts previous thereto may have been. The *41case may therefore assume a very different aspect upon the next trial.

The judgment will be reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered.

The other Justices concurred.
Order entered October 2 3 , 2020

In The 

### Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05
- 19
- 01427
- CV TROY D. SHIELDS, JR., Appellant

V. PATRICIA K. SHIELDS, Appellee On Appeal from the Co unty Court at Law No. 3

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. CC
- 19
- 04278
- C

ORDER Before the Court is appellant’s second motion for extension of time to file his corrected opening brief

. We GRANT the motion and ORDER appellant’s corrected opening b rief be filed no later than November 9, 2020.

/s/ BILL WHITEHILL JUSTICE