This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 CAROLE ROBINSON, 2 Petitioner/Cross-Appellee-Appellant, 3 v. No. A-1-CA-36061 4 MARTY BRITO and MONICA BRITO, 5 Respondents/Cross-Appellants-Appellees. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 7 Sarah M. Singleton, District Judge 8 Robert Richards 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellant 11 Marty Brito 12 Monica Brito 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 Pro Se Appellees 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 HANISEE, Judge. 17 {1} Petitioner Carole Robinson appeals from the district court’s order awarding her 18 attorney fees on October 26, 2016. [DS 1; 3 RP 481] This Court first issued a notice 192 proposing to dismiss for lack of a final order. Following Robinson’ s withdrawal of her 1 motion to reconsider pending before the district court, this Court issued a second 2 notice of proposed disposition addressing the merits of Robinson’s appeal and 3 proposing to affirm. Robinson filed a memo randum in opposition, which we have duly 4 considered. Remaining unpersuaded, we affirm. 5 {2} In our notice of proposed disposition, we addressed four central contentions 6 raised by Robinson’s numerous issues: (1 ) the district court’s determinations 7 underlying the attorney fees award were erroneous; (2) the district court erred in 8 refusing to allow Robinson to submit a bill fo r legal services to provide an itemization 9 of her fees and costs after the district court entered its order; (3) the district court erred 10 in the amount of attorney fees it awarde d; and (4) the district court erred in 11 determining the amount of attorney fees aw arded to Lexus of Santa Fe (Garnishee), 12 for which Robinson was partially responsible. [CN 4; see DS 13-15] Addressing the 13 first three issues together, we proposed to conclude Robinson had not demonstrated 14 the district court abused its discreti on in awarding Robinson a lower amount of 15 attorney fees than she soughtbecause Robinson’s contraryassertions and reliance on 16 her withdrawn motion to reconsider and an itemization of costs do not show the 17 district court’s findings underlying the fe e award were not supported by substantial 18 evidence. [CN 4-7] In her response, Robins on continues to make contrary assertions 193 regarding the district court’s assessment of Robinson’s motivation for declining a 1 settlement offer; the value of pleadings Robinson filed, in light of her successful 2 motion for summary judgment; and the district court’s motivation in awarding 3 Robinson a lesser award of attorney fees th an she requested. [MIO 1, 4, 5] As we 4 noted in our proposed disposi tion, “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is 5 clearly contrary to the logical conclusi ons demanded by the facts and circumstances 6 of the case. The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling of the 7 district court.” Gilmore v. Gilmore , 2010-NMCA-013, ¶ 24, 147 N.M. 625, 227 P.3d 8 115 (citations omitted); see also State v. Rojo , 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 9 971 P.2d 829 (stating contrary evidence supporting a different result does not provide 10 a basis for reversal because the fact-finder is free to reject that version of the facts). 11 Under the standard and in li ght of the record before us, we conclude Robinson’s 12 continued assertion of contrary facts does not provide a basis for reversal of the 13 attorney fee award. 14 {3} Robinson also continues to argue the district court erred in refusing to consider 15 her itemization of fees and costs submitted after entry of the order awarding attorney 16 fees and Robinson’s motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal. [MIO 10, 13, 14] 17 Robinson asserts this Court should consid er her motion for reconsideration and 18 itemization of fees and costs in reviewing the award of attorney fees, even though the 194 motion to reconsider was later withdraw n, because Robinson fairly invoked rulings 1 by the district court. [MIO 7] Notwithstanding the fact Robinson withdrew her motion 2 from the district court’s consideration, we note a district court may properly refuse to 3 consider evidence in a motion to reconsid er that could have been, but was not, 4 included in the original motion. See Deaton v. Gutierrez , 2004-NMCA-043, ¶¶ 9-10, 5 135 N.M. 423, 89 P.3d 672. We therefore concludethe district court did not err in not 6 considering Robinson’s assertions in her mo tion to reconsider and itemization of fees 7 and costs, and we decline to address in the first instance the assertions made in those 8 pleadings. 9 {4} Robinson further continues to argue the district court erred in not awarding her 10 all of her requested attorney fees based on her failure toprovide sufficient detail about 11 the costs and fees. Robinson contends she followed the same pro cedure as Garnishee, 12 which received all of its requested fees, by filing an affidavit by her attorney. In 13 support of this argument, Robinson assert s the method by which Garnishee requested 14 attorney fees became the law of the case, and she was treated unfairly when she did 15 not receive her full requested amount using the same procedure Garnishee used. [MIO 16 8-9, 16] We are unconvinced the law of th e case doctrine is applicable here, and 17 Robinson does not demonstrate how it is applicable, beyond merely asserting it 18 applies. See Bank of New York v. Romero , 2016-NMCA-091, ¶ 9, 382 P.3d 991 (“The 195 law of the case doctrine is a matter of preced ent and policy; it is a determination that, 1 in the interests of the parties and judicialeconomy, once a particular issue in a case 2 is settled it should remain settled.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 3 Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 4 1076 (“We will not review unclear arguments, or guess at what [a party’s] arguments 5 might be.”). We therefore conclude the law of the case doctrine does not provide a 6 basis for reversal of the attorney fee award. 7 {5} In addressing Robinson’s fourth issue, we proposed to conclude the district 8 court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Robinson to pay half of the attorney fees 9 incurred by Garnishee in defending Robinson’s garnishment petition because 10 Garnishee was entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 35- 11 12-16(B) (1977); Robinson had agreed Garn ishee was entitled to reasonable attorney 12 fees; and Robinson failed to articulate why the award was an abuse of discretion. [CN 13 7-8] In her memorandum in opposition, R obinson no longer argues she should not be 14 responsible for half of Garnishee’s attorneyfees and instead asserts she should recover 15 additional attorney fees sufficient to cover the attorney fees she owes to Garnishee 16 because the debt owed to Garnishee cons titutes a cost. [MIO 16] In support of this 17 proposition Robinson first cites Rule 12-403( B)(3) NMRA, which states allowable 18 costs may include “reasonable attorney fees for services rendered on appeal in causes 196 where the award of attorney fees is permitted by law[.]” R obinson next cites Valley 1 Improvement Ass’n v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. , 1993-NMSC-061, ¶ 17, 2 116 N.M. 426, 863 P.2d 1047, in which our Supreme Court held the district court’s 3 failure to quantify an award of damages rendered the j udgment non-final. Neither of 4 the authorities Robinson cites is applicableto her argument she should be able to 5 recover a greater award of attorney fees to cover a debt of attorney fees she owes. We 6 therefore conclude Robinson was not entitled to recover attorney fees to cover the 7 attorney fees she owes Garnishee. 8 {6} Finally, we note Robinson argues for the first time in her memorandum in 9 opposition the district court improperly deniedher the opportunity to review the order 10 awarding attorney fees and erred in failing to rule on th e motion for reconsideration 11 within sixty days. [MIO 6] We construe these arguments as a motion to amend the 12 docketing statement. The essential requireme nts to show good cause to grant a motion 13 to amend a docketing statement are: (1) th e motion be timely, (2) the new issue sought 14 to be raised was either (a) properly preserved below or (b) allowed to be raised for the 15 first time on appeal, and (3) the issues raised are viable. See State v. Moore , 16 1989-NMCA-073, ¶ 42, 109 N.M. 119, 782 P.2d 91, superceded by rule on other 17 grounds as stated in State v. Salgado , 1991-NMCA-044, 112 N.M. 537, 817 P.2d 730. 187 For the following reasons, we deny Robi nson’s motion to amend the docketing 1 statement because the issues raisedare not viable appellate issues. 2 {7} In support of the argument the district court denied her an opportunity to object 3 to the order awarding attorney fees, R obinson cites Rule 1- 054(D)(4) NMRA, which 4 addresses the procedure for entry of an order on recovery of costs. [MIO 6] However, 5 Robinson’s issues on appeal relate to only the award of attorney fees, not costs. [ See 6 DS 13-15] And as we noted above, Robinson has not demonstrated why the fees she 7 owes Garnishee could be classified as a co st. We therefore conclude the time limit for 8 entry of an order under Rule 1-054.1is not applicable, and this issue is not viable. 9 {8} Robinson also argues the district court erred in failing to timely rule on her 10 motion for reconsideration. However, as we previously noted, Robinson has 11 withdrawn her motion for reconsideration. Thus, any assertion of error regarding the 12 timely disposition of her motion is moot . “A reviewing court generally does not 13 decide academic or moot questions.” Crutchfield v. N.M. Dep’t of Taxation & 14 Revenue , 2005-NMCA-022, ¶ 36, 137 N.M. 26, 106 P.3d 1273. Therefore, we 15 conclude this is not a viable appellate issue. 16 {9} Accordingly, for the reasons explai ned in this Court’s second notice of 17 proposed disposition and above, we deny R obinson’s motion to amend the docketing 18 statement and affirm. 198 {10} IT IS SO ORDERED. 1

_____________________________ 2 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 3

WE CONCUR: 4

__________________________________ 5 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 6

__________________________________ 7 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 8