IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES MUNDO, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 20 C 2562

v. )

) Judge John Z. Lee

CITY OF CHICAGO and )

JANIC HOGAN, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

As a gay and gender-nonconforming man, Plaintiff James Mundo apparently 

does not fit the Chicago Fire Department’s (“CFD”) dominant stereotype for male 

employees. As a result, Mundo alleges in this action that he was subjected to 

pervasive harassment and discrimination by his direct superior, Janice Hogan, while 

working for the CFD’s Labor Relations Division from 2016 to 2018. Based on that 

alleged conduct, Mundo brings claims against Hogan and the City of Chicago (“the 

City”) under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Illinois Gender Violence Act. Before 

the Court is the City’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 and IGVA counts with prejudice

as to itself. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied 

in part. 

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I. Background1

James Mundo was hired by the CFD as a firefighter in August 2006. Am. 

Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 31. It was at the firehouse that Mundo first experienced the 

CFD’s pervasive “anti-gay” environment, id. ¶ 42, which was characterized by a 

dominant “heterosexual mentality” to which other male firefighters were expected to 

conform. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. As a male firefighter who did not conform to this mentality, 

Mundo was subjected to frequent acts of discrimination and harassment during the

two years he worked at the firehouse. Id. ¶¶ 6, 14. 

In January 2008, Mundo was transferred to the Internal Affairs Division,

where he worked until January 2013. Id. ¶ 7. Mundo then was assigned to work in 

the Labor Relations Division, under the direct supervision of Hogan, Deputy Chief of 

Administrative Services. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. 

Hogan, a heterosexual female, shared the dominant mentality that Mundo had 

witnessed at the firehouse and expected all male employees to conform to her vision

of a heterosexual, masculine firefighter. Id. ¶¶ 11–13. But Mundo, whom Hogan 

knew to be gay and married to another man, did not conform to the stereotype that 

Hogan and others in the CFD preferred. Id. ¶¶ 14–16. As a result, Hogan believed 

that Mundo needed to be “straightened out” to align with her preferred stereotype. 

Id.¶ 17. To achieve that goal, Hogan considered it acceptable to treat Mundo 

differently than other male CFD employees on account of his sexual orientation and 

gender non-conformity. Id. ¶¶ 18, 21.

1 The Court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded facts alleged” in the complaint when 

reviewing a motion to dismiss. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). 

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Between 2016 and 2018, Hogan subjected Mundo to dozens of acts of sexual 

harassment and discrimination, including:

• Undressing in front of Mundo, directing him into her office while she 

was undressed, and exposing her breasts to him, id. ¶ 19(b), (j), (p);

• Asking him if his husband would mind if they had sex, id. ¶ 19(c);

• Referring to another firefighter as a “faggot” in his presence, id. ¶ 19(d);

• Asking him to masturbate in front of her, id. ¶ 19(g);

• Mocking “people claiming sexual harassment,” id ¶ 19(o); and

• Telling him she was sure he did not have any gag reflex, id. ¶ 19(cc).

Mundo repeatedly complained of Hogan’s offensive conduct to her, but she was 

unmoved, viewing him as her “gay plaything” with whom she “could do whatever she 

wanted” without fear of discipline. Id. ¶ 19(dd). She even threatened to send Mundo 

“back in the field,” where he would likely experience even greater harassment, if he 

did not go along with her behavior. Id. ¶¶ 19(ee), 26, 44. Although Mundo reported

some incidents of Hogan’s harassment to the CFD’s Assistant Commissioner of 

Internal Affairs, he hesitated to report them all due to her threats. Id. ¶¶ 25–26.

Hogan’s persistent harassment caused Mundo to suffer from anxiety, panic 

disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and depression. Id. ¶ 27. He has been on 

medical leave of absence due to those conditions since October 2018. Id. ¶ 28.

Mundo filed this action in April 2020, alleging four counts: (1) discrimination 

pursuant to Title VII against Hogan and the City; (2) violation of equal protection 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Hogan; (3) violation of equal protection pursuant 

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to § 1983 against the City; and (4) violation of the Illinois Gender Violence Act by 

Hogan and the City. See Compl., ECF No. 1. The City previously moved to dismiss 

Counts III and IV, but the motion was stricken after Mundo indicated a desire to file

an amended complaint. Believing that the amended counts suffer from the same 

deficiencies, the City has renewed its motion to dismiss the new Counts III and IV

under Rule 12(b)(6). See Def. City’s Mot. Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 32. 

II. Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must “state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 

the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This standard 

“is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility 

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (cleaned up). 

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a 

“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Moreover, while courts “must take all of 

the factual allegations in the complaint as true” for purposes of a motion to dismiss, 

they are “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Accordingly, “[t]hreadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice” to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

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III. Analysis

The City moves to dismiss Counts III and IV, arguing that it cannot be held 

liable under § 1983 or the IGVA. The Court takes each count in turn.2

A. Count III

In challenging the sufficiency of Mundo’s § 1983 claim, the City argues that he 

has not established municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services 

of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Under Monell, “a municipality cannot 

be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 691. Instead, for 

a municipality to be held liable, a plaintiff must allege that an official policy of the 

municipality itself was the driving force behind his or her injury. Id at 694. “A 

plaintiff can establish on official policy through (1) an express policy that causes a 

constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so 

permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an 

allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final 

policymaking authority.” Teesdale v. City of Chi., 690 F.3d 829, 833–834 (7th Cir. 

2012) (cleaned up). 

2 The City also makes two arguments that the Court need not address. First, the City 

contends that Count III is untimely to the extent it is premised on discrimination that Mundo 

allegedly suffered while working as a firefighter from 2006 to 2008. See Am. Compl. ¶ 42. 

But in his response brief, Mundo clarified that this allegation was provided only as context 

for Hogan’s alleged threat to send him “back in the field,” see id. ¶ 19(ee), not as an 

independent basis for Count III. Second, the City moves to dismiss Mundo’s prayers for 

punitive damages against the City in Counts I, III, and IV, see id. ¶¶ 65, 85, 93, on the ground 

that municipalities may not be assessed punitive damages, see City of Newport v. Fact 

Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). Conceding this point, Mundo withdraws his requests 

for punitive damages against the City in his responsive brief. 

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Here, Mundo concedes that there was no express policy authorizing the alleged 

misconduct by Hogan. On the contrary, the complaint acknowledges that the CFD 

has “adopted written policies that . . . prohibit discrimination or harassment on the 

basis of sex.” Am. Compl. ¶ 43. Nor does Mundo maintain that Hogan was acting as 

a person with final policymaking authority when she committed the alleged acts at 

issue.

Instead, Mundo grounds his claim on the existence of a “long-standing” custom 

or practice within the CFD of “allow[ing] its members to embarrass, humiliate, 

ostracize, diminish, [and] discriminate” against gay and gender-nonconforming 

firefighters, notwithstanding its written policies to the contrary. Id. ¶ 41. Although

the complaint does not describe the precise contours of this alleged custom or practice, 

the main theory seems to allege the failure to “train, supervise, and discipline” CFD 

employees “so as to prevent civil rights violations of the[ir] LGBT+ and gendernonconform[ing]” male colleagues. See id. ¶ 40. Put differently, Mundo posits that 

the CFD’s failure to enforce its express written policies of prohibiting discriminatory 

behavior has allowed it to flourish, resulting in an “underbelly of discrimination 

against gay male firefighters” by employees, like Hogan, who face little risk of 

repercussions. Id. ¶ 35; see also id. ¶¶ 39, 43.

The City contends that Mundo has not plausibly established the existence of 

any such custom or practice because he “failed to allege any instances of [it] other 

than his own isolated experiences,” citing Daniel v. Cook Cty., 833 F.3d 728, 735 (7th 

Cir. 2016)). Mot. at 6. But the City makes too much of this one sentence in Daniel. 

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As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, “there is no clear consensus as to how 

frequently [a widespread custom or practice] must occur to impose Monell liability.” 

Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303 (cleaned up). The only hard and fast rule (to the extent one 

exists) is that “it must be more than one instance, or even three.” See also Palmer v.

Marion Cty., 327 F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 2003) (“When a plaintiff chooses to challenge 

a municipality’s unconstitutional policy by establishing a widespread practice, proof 

of isolated acts of misconduct will not suffice; a series of violations must be presented 

to lay the premise of deliberate indifference.”); Jackson v. Marion Cty., 66 F.3d 151, 

152 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[P]roof of a single act of misconduct will not suffice; for it is the 

series that lays the premise of the system of inference.”); City of Oklahoma City v.

Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985) (plurality op.) (“Proof of a single incident of 

unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell . . . .”). 

Moreover, a plaintiff need not necessarily identify “every other or even one 

other individual” who has been affected by the alleged custom or practice, see White

v. City of Chi., 829 F.3d 837, 844 (7th Cir. 2016), so long as he or she presents a series 

of bad acts from which a trier of fact can “infer from them that the policymaking level 

of government was bound to have noticed what was going on.” Jackson, 66 F.3d at 

152. Mundo satisfies that pleading burden here. 

Indeed, the complaint alleges not just a few, but dozens of instances of sexual

harassment by Hogan, one of the CFD’s chief administrative officers, occurring 

constantly over course of several years. It alleges that Hogan acted without fear of 

discipline and that Mundo’s complaints about her behavior did little to change it. It 

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alleges that Hogan’s own superiors engaged in heteronormative banter as well, 

making such behavior “fair game for the regimen.” Am. Compl. ¶ 37. Along the same 

lines, it alleges that sexual harassment at the firehouses was so well-known that

Hogan threatened to send Mundo back there if he did not tolerate her behavior. 

These allegations, if taken as true, would establish that “sexual harassment was the 

general, on-going, and accepted practice at the [] Fire Department” and that CFD 

policymakers “knew of, tolerated, and participated in the harassment.” See Bohen v. 

City of E. Chi., 799 F.2d 1180, 1189 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding for plaintiff on § 1983 

claim against the City of East Chicago based on pervasive sexual harassment at the 

East Chicago Fire Department); see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45–49.

3 

The City’s suggestion that Mundo fails to allege a widespread practice or 

custom of the City as opposed to the CFD also is unpersuasive. Granted, in Latuszkin

v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit drew a distinction between policies and 

customs “of the City” and those “of the CPD,” or the Chicago Police Department. 250 

F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2001). But, in Latuszkin, the City was the sole defendant. By 

contrast, in cases where the plaintiff has sued both the municipality and its fire 

department, the Seventh Circuit often has lumped them together for purposes of

§ 1983. See Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1189 (“[I]t is clear that Bohen has an actionable § 1983 

claim against all defendants, including the fire department and the City of East 

3 By contrast, in Daniel, the plaintiff’s Monell claim was based solely on the treatment 

that he received (or failed to receive) to address a single wrist injury that he received while 

playing basketball at his correctional facility. 833 F.3d at 730. This was “his own isolated 

experiences” to which the court referred in its opinion. See id. at 735. 

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Chicago.”); see also Garrison v. Burke, 165 F.3d 565, 572 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999) (equating

the cities of East Chicago and Rockford with their respective fire departments).

4 

For these reasons, the City’s motion to dismiss Count III is denied.

B. Count IV

Next, the City moves to dismiss Count IV on the grounds that a municipality 

cannot be liable as a “person” under the Illinois Gender Violence Act (“IGVA”). In 

relevant part, that statute provides that “[a]ny person who has been subjected to 

gender-related violence . . . may bring a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or 

other appropriate relief against a person or persons perpetrating that gender-related 

violence.” 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 82/10. “For purposes of this Section, ‘perpetrating’

means either personally committing the gender-related violence or personally 

encouraging or assisting the act or acts of gender-related violence.” Id. 

Pointing to this Court’s recent decision in Robinson v. FedEx Ground Package 

System, Inc., the City argues that it is not a proper defendant under the IGVA because 

it is not a “person” within the meaning of the IGVA. No. 19 C 1717, 2020 WL 586866,

at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2020). Indeed, as the Court explained in Robinson, every 

district court so far “to squarely address this issue has decided that the IGVA does 

not apply to corporations.” Id. at *3 (citing Rosas v. Komatsu Am. Corp., No. 18 C

1120, 2018 WL 3758564, at *2 (C.D. Ill Aug. 8, 2018) (“District courts that have 

4 Furthermore, courts in this district have held that the City is the only proper 

defendant in an action based on alleged policies of the CFD, given that the latter “is not a 

legal entity separate from the City.” See Gomez v. City of Chi., No. 16 C 7743, 2017 WL 

131565, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 2017) (quoting Stevanovic v. City of Chi., 896 N.E.2d 355, 356 

(Ill. App. Ct. 2008). It would be odd to insulate the City from liability when it is the only 

proper party. 

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explicitly considered the issue of whether an entity, as opposed to a natural person 

(human being), can be sued for violating the IGVA have all concluded that such suits 

against entities cannot be maintained.”); Fuesting v. Uline, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 739, 

743–44 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (collecting cases)). While two district courts have allowed 

IGVA claims against corporations to proceed, neither addressed this issue. See Smith

v. Rosebud Farmstand, 909 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1009 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Cruz v. Primary

Staffing, Inc., No. 10 C 5653, 2011 WL 1042629, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2011).

To support his view of the statute, Mundo leans on the Illinois appellate court’s 

decision in Gasic v. Marquette Management, Inc., 146 N.E.3d 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019). 

There, the court held, by a 2-1 vote, that “under some circumstances, a legal entity, 

such as a corporation, can act ‘personally’” within the meaning of the IGVA. Id. at

14. 

Granted, in a diversity action such as this, the Court’s job is to “apply Illinois 

law as the Illinois Supreme Court would apply it.” AAR Aircraft & Engine Grp., Inc.

v. Edwards, 272 F.3d 468, 470 (7th Cir. 2001). And, where it has not spoken on an 

issue, decisions of the Illinois appellate courts are authoritative, unless there is

“compelling reason to doubt” that the Illinois Appellate Court has “stated the law 

correctly.” Id. 

In this case, the Court has compelling reason to doubt that the majority’s 

holding in Gasic states the law as the Illinois Supreme Court would. When 

interpreting an Illinois statute, the “primary objective . . . is to give effect to the 

intent of the legislature.” In re Madison H., 830 N.E.2d 498, 503 (Ill. 2005). “The 

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best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and 

ordinary meaning.” People v. Christopherson, 899 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Ill. 2008).

As the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized, the “plain and ordinary meaning 

of the term ‘person’ is an individual human being.” Id. (cleaned up). And “[i]n Illinois, 

the general rule is that absent a statutory definition that expands the meaning of 

person, that term refers to an individual, not a legal entity.” Fayfar v. CF Mgmt.-IL,

LLC, No. 12 C 3013, 2012 WL 6062663, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2012) (citing People v.

Christopherson, 879 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), aff’d, 899 N.E.2d 257 (Ill.

2008)).

Nothing in the text of the IGVA suggests that the drafters intended to deviate 

from this rule. Robinson, 2020 WL 586866, at *3. Nor does the Illinois Statute on 

Statutes suggest as much, given that it provides only that the term ‘person’ “may

extend” to legal entities, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 70/1.05 (emphasis added), not that it “must 

or even . . . usually does” so, Fuesting, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 743. 

That the legislature intended to use the ordinary meaning of ‘person’ becomes 

especially evident in view of the surrounding statutory language. For starters, the 

statute refers to “persons” who “personally commit” or “personally encourage” genderrelated violence. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 82/10 (emphases added). While corporations

are sometimes considered persons, they cannot be said to act ‘personally” because 

they act only “through their agents.” Rosas, 2018 WL 3758564, at *3. What is more, 

the provision in question first refers to a “person who has been subject to genderrelated violence.” 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 82/10 (emphasis added). It is hard to imagine 

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how an artificial entity could be subject to gender-related violence. See Gasic, 146 

N.E.3d at 260 (Schmidt, C.J., dissenting). And since Illinois courts “assign the same 

meaning to identical words in different parts of the same statute absent clear 

legislative intent to the contrary,” the use of ‘person’ later on in the same provision 

should be read to refer only to natural persons as well. Id.

Thus, while “the rulings of the state intermediate appellate courts” should 

generally “be accorded great weight,” the Court is compelled to find that Gasic does 

not reflects how the Illinois Supreme Court would rule on the issue at hand. See State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pate, 275 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2001). Rather, because 

the Court believes that the Illinois Supreme Court would agree with its decision in 

Robinson, it grants the City’s motion to dismiss with respect to Count IV.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the City’s motion to dismiss is denied as to 

Count III, but granted as to Count IV. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. ENTERED: 8/3/21

__________________________________

John Z. Lee

United States District Judge

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