*Pursuant to 5

TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5

TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-50344

Summary Calendar

RAUL E. GUERRA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS; HON. RAUL A. GONZALEZ,

Individually and in his official capacity as Justice; HON. NATHAN L.

HECHT, Individually and in his official capacity as Justice; HON. JOHN

CORNYN, Individually and in his official capacity as Justice; HON. CRAIG

ENOCH, Individually and in his official capacity as Justice; HON. ROSE

SPECTOR, Individually and in her official capacity as Justice; HON. PRISCILLA OWEN, Individually and in her official capacity as Justice; 

HON. JAMES A. BAKER, Individually and in his official capacity as

Justice; HON. GREG ABBOTT, Individually and in his official capacity

as Justice; BOARD OF DISCIPLINARY APPEALS; STEVEN J. WATKINS,

Individually and in his official capacity as Chairman of the Board of Disciplinary Appeals; STATE OF TEXAS; HON. THOMAS R. PHILLIPS,

Individually and in his official capacity as Chief Justice,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(SA-96-CV-1130)

December 2, 1998

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, JOLLY and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Chief Judge:*
 

1

18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1).

 

2Rule 8.05 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure provides for compulsory

disbarment when an attorney is convicted of an “Intentional Crime” under Rule 1.06(O). 

 

3Barrientos v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 911 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1990).

 

4Hebert Abstract v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd., 914 F.2d 74 (5thCir. 1990), citing 5A

Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1367 at 509-510 (1990).

2

Raul Guerra appeals the district court’s rejection of his challenge to his disbarment

under the Texas Board of Disciplinary Rules. For the reasons assigned, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Before his disbarment, Guerra was a practicing attorney handling both criminal and

civil matters. Guerra sold two guns to one of his clients, a convicted felon. Following an

indictment on charges of money laundering and wrongfully giving a weapon to a known

felon, Guerra pleaded guilty to the weapons charge1and the government dismissed the

money laundering charge. After the judgment of conviction was entered, the Chief

DisciplinaryCounselfor the StateBar of Texas petitioned the Board of Disciplinary Appeals

of the Supreme Court of Texas to impose compulsory discipline upon Guerra because of his

conviction. Finding that Guerra had committed an “Intentional Crime” as defined by Rule

1.06(O) of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, the Board disbarred Guerra under

Rule 8.05.2 The Supreme Court of Texas denied his appeal and Guerra brought the instant

action. Both Guerra and the defendants filed motions for judgment on the pleadings. The

district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants and Guerra appealed.

ANALYSIS

We review de novo the grant of a judgment on the pleadings.3 Judgment on the

pleadings is appropriate when the material facts of the case are not in dispute and a decision

requires only an examination of the pleadings and judicially noticed facts.4 None of the
 

5The Texas Rules provide for compulsory discipline for “Intentional Crimes.”

 An “Intentional Crime” is defined by Rule 1.06(O) as “any Serious Crime that requires

proof of knowledge or intent as an essential element” or “any crime involvingmisapplication

of money or other property held as a fiduciary.” “Serious Crime” is in turn defined by Rule

1.06(U) as “barratry; any felony involvingmoral turpitude; anymisdemeanorinvolving theft,

embezzlement, or fraudulent or reckless misappropriation of money or other property; or any

attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation of another to commit any of the foregoing crimes.”

Guerra contends that his crime can only be a “serious crime” if it is one involving moral

turpitude requiring proof of knowledge or intent as an essential element, as his conviction

does not involve any those listed under “Serious Crimes.”

 

7District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

 

8

Id.

 

9Civil Serv. Comm’n v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 423 U.S. 548, 578-579

(1973), cited in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159 (1974).

3

material facts herein are contested.

Guerra contendsthat the TexasRules of Disciplinary Procedure deny substantive due

process because they permit compulsory disbarment proceedings based on convictions for

crimes of “moral turpitude,” which he claimsis a constitutionally vague term.5.Cite for this.6

The district court correctly found that a federal court can review proceedings of this nature

only in the form of a general challenge to the constitutionality of the Rules.7 Consistent with

this limitation we cannot determine the merits of Guerra’s disbarment but must limit our

inquiry to a facial challenge of the laws as written.8 Our review of the pertinent constitutional

standards persuades that a facial challenge to the Texas Disciplinary Rules must fail. The

district court astutely noted that the test for vagueness in regulatory prohibitions is whether

“they are set out in terms that the ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and

comply with, withoutsacrifice to the public interest.”9 As the Rule at issue was promulgated

to regulate the conduct of lawyers, our consideration becomes whether the nature of the
 

10Howell v. State Bar of Texas, 843 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1988); People v. Morley, 725

P.2d 510 (Colo. 1986).

 

11Jordan v. DeGeorge 341 U.S. 223 (1951).

 

12Howell at 208 (holding that even if a bar regulation is vague in some of its application,

a court need not “throw the baby out with the bathwater”).

 

13Federal Communications Comm’n v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265 (1949).

 

14George W. Bennett Bryson & Co. v. Norton Lilly & Co., 502 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir.

1974).

4

proscribed conduct is understandable to an attorney.10 We agree with the district court that

the term is not so vague that a lawyer cannot understand it.11 Assuming arguendo that the

statute may be considered vague in some hypothetical applications, we are not inclined to

invalidate the regulation in toto.

12 Because we agree with the district court that the regulation

in question is not impermissibly vague in all its applications, we must uphold its

constitutionality.

Nor do we find merit in Guerra’s contention that the Texas Rules of Disciplinary

Procedure violate due process by allowing the Texas Supreme Court to decide appeals of

these decisions without oral argument. Due process does not require that an oral argument

be presented in all circumstances.13 We have held that due process does not require oral

argument in cases in which there are no novel or complex issues of law; good briefs are

submitted by both parties; the record is not overly voluminous, and the case involves no

broad issues of social policy.14 We find that the issues involved and the record are such that

Guerra’s due process rights were not violated by the absence of oral argument.

Nor do we find merit in Guerra’s contention that due process was violated because

neither the TexasBoard of Disciplinary Appeals nor the Texas Supreme Court were required
 

15Guerra also asserts in his brief, but does not discuss, that the Disciplinary Rules violate

equal protection by denying a meaningful appeal to one class of attorneys within the

disciplinary process. We agree with the district court’s assessment that the Disciplinary

Rules do not violate these principles. No suspect class or fundamental right is involved;

Guerra has presented no evidence, and we do not find from the record, that the Rules are not

rationally related to a legitimate government interest. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Nordgren v. Hafter, 789 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1986).

 

16Tex. R. App. P. 75(f) (Vernon Supp. 1997) (amended 1997).

5

to issue a formal opinion.15 We are aware of no authority declaring that due process requires

the issuance of formal opinions. Further, as the Texas Supreme Court contends, the Texas

Rules of Appellate Procedure in effect at the time of Guerra’s appeal required only that the

Texas Supreme Court issue formal opinions “in such cases as the court deems of sufficient

importance to be reported.”16 We find nothing violative of due process in this Rule.

The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.