alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

PETER H. MILLER, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D16-3159 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed March 2, 2018. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas County; William H. Burgess, III, Judge. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Jean-Jacques A. Darius, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Brandon R. Christian, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, CASANUEVA, and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.
#### Commonwealth *v.*Philip Cooper.

Intoxicating Liquors — Sale to Minor — Forfeiture of License — Indictment —Jurisdiction.

It is not charged in the indictment that the appellee was a vendor of spirituous liquors and unless he had such a license, the fine is only fifty dollars, which does not give the Court of Appeals jurisdiction. Every fact necessary to give jurisdiction should be stated and as that is not done in this case the court cannot assume that appellee had a license to sell liquor and on conviction might forfeit same.

APPEAL FROM WASHINTON CIRCUIT COURT.

June 5, 1872.

Opinion by

Judge Peters :

By an act of the legislature approved March 22, 1871, it is provided that if any person shall sell, give, loan, or procure for or furnish to a person under twenty-one years of age, any spirituous, vinous or malt liquors or any mixture of either without the written consent of the father of such person, if living, or of the mother, or guardian, if the father be dead, he shall be fined upon conviction in any court having jurisdiction thereof fifty dollars for each offense, and costs to include an attorney’s fee of $20, if the commonwealth is represented on the trial by the attorney for the commonwealth or the county, or by an attorney appointed by *761the court to prosecute when neither the commonwealth’s nor county attorney is present. And by the 3d section of said act it is provided that if any licensed vendor of such liquors be convicted of the offense in addition.to the fine above named, he shall forfeit his license, etc. Vol. 1, Sess. Acts 1871, p. 85.

*Attorney-General, for appellant.*

*Hays & Cunningham, for appellee.*

It is not charged in the indictment that the appellee was a licensed vendor of spirituous liquors and unless he had such license the fine is only fifty dollars and this court would have no jurisdiction. Every fact necessary to give jurisdiction should be stated, and as that is not done in this case, this court cannot assume that appellee had a license to sell liquor, and on conviction might forfeit the same. Wherefore the appeal is dismissed for the want of jurisdiction.
I

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 876

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase the deduction

for the health insurance costs of self-employed individuals to 100 percent

of such costs.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 27, 1997

Mrs. KELLY (for herself, Mr. BACHUS, Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. FATTAH, Mr. FILNER, Mr. GOODLING, Mr. SAM JOHNSON of Texas, Mr. LINDER, Mr. MCHUGH, Mr.

MANZULLO, Mr. METCALF, Mr. MINGE, Ms. MOLINARI, Mrs. MYRICK,

Mr. NORWOOD, Mr. PITTS, Ms. PRYCE of Ohio, Mr. RIGGS, Ms. RIVERS,

Mr. SCARBOROUGH, Mr. BOB SCHAFFER of Colorado, Mr. SENSENBRENNER, Mr. SKEEN, Mr. SMITH of Michigan, Mr. THORNBERRY, and

Ms. WOOLSEY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to increase

the deduction for the health insurance costs of self-employed individuals to 100 percent of such costs.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Self-Employed Health

5 Fairness Act of 1997’’.
2

•HR 876 IH

1 SEC. 2. INCREASE IN DEDUCTION FOR HEALTH INSURANCE

2 COSTS OF SELF-EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS TO

3 100 PERCENT OF SUCH COSTS.

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (1) of section 162(l)

5 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to special

6 rules for health insurance costs of self-employed individ7 uals) is amended to read as follows:

8 ‘‘(1) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION.—In the case

9 of an individual who is an employee within the

10 meaning of section 401(c)(1), there shall be allowed

11 as a deduction under this section an amount equal

12 to 100 percent of the amount paid during the tax13 able year for insurance which constitutes medical

14 care for the taxpayer, his spouse, and dependents.’’

15 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by

16 this section shall apply to taxable years beginning after

17 December 31, 1996.

Æ
#### John Hayden's Admr., etc., *v.*Henry Bell & Son et al

Executors and Administrators — Account of Sales — Appraisement—May be Adopted as Accurate.

An administrator should keep accurate accounts of all sales of the personal property of the estate, whether made publicly or privately. If he fails to do so his liability on account of such property can only be ascertained by adopting the appraisement as correctly setting out its value.

APPEAL PROM WHITLEY CIRCUIT COURT.

*James, for appellant.*

*Kinkead & Buckner, for appellee.*

December 7, 1870.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

The exceptions to the master’s report were properly overruled.

The administrator should have kept an accurate account of all sales of the personal property of the estate of his intestate, whether made publicly or privately. He failed to do so, hence his liability on account of such property could only be ascertained even proximately by adopting the appraisement as correctly setting out its value, and holding him responsible for its conversion.

He was charged with no interest upon the notes and accounts for the two years within which he was allowed to settle his accounts-, and not even then for such interest as he may have collected. He has no reason to complain at being required to account for interest after the expiration of the time within which he should have settled. The whole amount of the judgment is $770.46. The amount in the administrators hands, according to the master’s report, was $509.06. To this should be added the amount he claims to have paid the widow of the intestate, $252.50 with interest on the same, $129.24; in all, $381.79, and for which he was erroneously credited. This makes his total liability $890.85 or $120.59 more than he is required to account for.

It is true appellee did not except to the credit on the payment to the widow, but this court will not reverse for error of the court below, when it appears from the whole case that the substantial rights of the party appealing has not been injuriously affected by the judgment complained of.

Judgment affirmed.
IV

105TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 343

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the award of

attorneys’ fee, costs, and sanctions of $285,864.78 ordered by United

States District Judge Royce C. Lamberth on December 18, 1997, should

not be paid with taxpayer funds.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 28, 1998

Mr. HAYWORTH (for himself, Mr. ARMEY, Mr. ARCHER, Mr. THOMAS, Mr.

DELAY, Mr. BOEHNER, Mr. ENGLISH of Pennsylvania, Mr. CRANE, Mr.

LIVINGSTON, Mr. RAMSTAD, Mr. SALMON, Mr. SESSIONS, and Mr.

STUMP) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on the Judiciary

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that

the award of attorneys’ fee, costs, and sanctions of

$285,864.78 ordered by United States District Judge

Royce C. Lamberth on December 18, 1997, should not

be paid with taxpayer funds.

Whereas the President’s Task Force on National Health Care

Reform, convened by President Clinton in 1993, was

charged with calling together officials of the Federal Government and others to debate critical health issues of

concern to the American Public;
2

•HRES 343 IH

Whereas the Task Force convened behind closed doors and

inappropriately included individuals who were not employees of the Federal Government;

Whereas United States District Judge Royce C. Lamberth

ruled in Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc., et al. versus Hillary Rodham Clinton, et al.,

that representatives of the administration engaged in

‘‘dishonest’’ and ‘‘reprehensible’’ conduct in characterizing the membership of the Task Force;

Whereas Judge Royce C. Lamberth on the basis of such conduct ruled against the now-defunct Task Force, and ordered the defendants to pay $285,864.78 in attorneys’

fees, costs, and sanctions for the plaintiffs; and

Whereas American taxpayers should not be held responsible

for the inappropriate conduct of Federal Government officials and lawyers involved with the Task Force: Now,

therefore, be it

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that the award of $285,864.78 in attorneys’

3 fees, costs, and sanctions that Judge Royce C. Lamberth

4 ordered the defendants to pay in Association of American

5 Physicians and Surgeons, Inc., et al. versus Hillary

6 Rodham Clinton, et al., should not be paid with taxpayer

7 funds.

Æ
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 251 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 251

       Expressing support for the goals of America Recycles Day.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 29, 1997

Mr. Farr of California (for himself, Mr. Porter, Mr. Gejdenson, and Mr. 
 Gilchrest) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to 
                       the Committee on Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
       Expressing support for the goals of America Recycles Day.

Whereas the people of the United States generate approximately 208,000,000 tons 
        of municipal solid waste each year, or 4.3 pounds per person per day;
Whereas the average office worker in the United States generates between 120 and 
        150 pounds of recoverable white office paper a year;
Whereas the Environmental Protection Agency recently estimated that the 
        recycling rate in the United States has reached 27 percent of the solid 
        waste stream;
Whereas making products from recycled materials allows the people of the United 
        States to get the most use of every tree, every gallon of oil, every 
        pound of mineral, every drop of water, and every kilowatt of energy that 
        goes into the products they buy;
Whereas manufacturing from recycled materials creates less waste and fewer 
        emissions;
Whereas recycling saves energy, reducing the need to deplete nonrenewable energy 
        resources;
Whereas it is estimated that 9 jobs are created for every 15,000 tons of solid 
        waste recycled into new products;
Whereas recycling is completed only when recovered materials are returned to 
        retailers as new products and are purchased by consumers;
Whereas buying recycled products conserves resources and energy, reduces waste 
        and pollution, and creates jobs;
Whereas more than 4,500 recycled products are now available to consumers;
Whereas the United States has a two-way, use and reuse system of recycling and 
        buying recyclables;
Whereas Americans support recycling, but need a regular reminder of the 
        importance of buying recycled content products, the availability of 
        recycled content products, and how to recycle; and
Whereas states and localities throughout the country will be establishing 
        November 17, 1997, and November 15, 1998, as ``America Recycles Day'' in 
        their communities: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That--
            (1) the House of Representatives supports the goals of 
        America Recycles Day; and
            (2) the House of Representatives requests that the 
        President issue a proclamation calling on the people of the 
        United States to support the goals of each America Recycles Day 
        with appropriate ceremonies and activities.
                                 <all>
```
#### Molla ABDI, Petitioner, v. John D. ASHCROFT, Attorney General of the United States, Respondent.

No. 03-2438.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 6, 2005.

Decided Jan. 12, 2005.

Roger K. McCrummen, Seaman & Stoll, Kansas City, MO, for Petitioner. Blair T. O’Connor, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before MURPHY, FAGG, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Molla Abdi, a citizen of Ethiopia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed without opinion an Immigration Judge’s (IJ’s) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and voluntary departure.1

After careful review of the record, we conclude that the IJ’s decision on Abdi’s asylum application is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. *495*See Menendez-Donis v. Ashcroft,*360 F.3d 915, 917-19 (8th Cir.2004) (standard of review). The IJ discredited Abdi’s allegations of persecution because his testimony was general and meager, and contained significant inconsistencies with his asylum application. We defer to this credibility finding. *See Nyama v. Ashcroft,*357 F.3d 812, 816-17 (8th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (deference standard); *Kondakova v. Ashcroft,*383 F.3d 792, 796 (8th Cir.2004) (IJ’s credibility finding was supported by specific, cogent reasons for disbelief where alien’s testimony and asylum application were inconsistent), *petition for cert. filed,*73 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S. Oct. 27, 2004) (No. 04-584). In addition, because Abdi failed to meet the burden of proof on his asylum claim, his application for withholding of removal necessarily fails as well, *see Kratchmarov v. Heston,*172 F.3d 551, 555 (8th Cir.1999) (withholding-of-removal standard is more difficult to meet than asylum standard); we see no basis in the record for relief under the CAT, *see Ngure v. Ashcroft,*367 F.3d 975, 992-93 (8th Cir. 2004) (discussing requirements for CAT relief); and we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of voluntary departure, *see*8 U.S.C. §§ 1229c(f) (no court shall have jurisdiction over appeal from denial of voluntary departure), 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (no court shall have jurisdiction to review “any judgment” regarding grant of voluntary-departure relief).

Accordingly, we deny the petition.

1

. The IJ's decision, therefore, constitutes the final agency determination for purposes of judicial review. *See Dominguez*v. *Ashcroft,*336 F.3d 678, 679 n. 1 (8th Cir.2003); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4) (2004).
July 23, 2013

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

RENE ORLANDO CASALLAS, Appellant

NO. 14-13-00475-CR V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

________________________________

This cause was heard on the transcript of the record of the court below. The 

record indicates that the appeal should be DISMISSED. The Court orders the 

appeal DISMISSED in accordance with its opinion, appellant pay all costs 

incurred by reason of this appeal, and this decision be certified below for 

observance.
1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 38810

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CORY W. WICKEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 323

Filed: January 18, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Cassia

County. Hon. Michael R. Crabtree, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of thirty years, with a minimum 

period of confinement of ten years, for lewd conduct with a minor under 

sixteen, affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Eric D. Fredericksen, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

Before LANSING, Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Cory W. Wickel pled guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. I.C. § 18-1508. 

In exchange for his guilty plea, the state agreed not to pursue additional charges. The district 

court sentenced Wickel to a unified term of thirty years, with a minimum period of confinement 

of ten years. Wickel filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, which the district 

court denied. Wickel appeals, challenging the excessiveness of his sentence.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the 

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
2

15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 

1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Wickel’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
### IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14

- 41453 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.
VICENTE ROSALES , Defendant

- Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 2:14

- CR

- 855

- 1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM , DENNIS , and HIGGINSON , Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: *
The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Vicente Rosales has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Rosales h a s not filed a response. W e have reviewed counsel’s brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED October 2 2 , 2015

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 14-41453 Document: 00513243022 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/22/2015No. 14

- 41453

2 appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRA NTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the
APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5 TH C IR

. R. 42.2. Case: 14-41453 Document: 00513243022 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/22/2015
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 492 Agreed to House (ATH)]

105th CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 492

 Designating minority membership on certain standing committees of the 
                                 House.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 24, 1998

 Mr. Fazio of California submitted the following resolution; which was 
                        considered and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Designating minority membership on certain standing committees of the 
                                 House.

    Resolved, That the following named Members be, and they are hereby, 
elected to the following standing committees of the House of 
Representatives:
    Committee on Banking and Financial Services: Mr. Goode of Virginia.
    Committee on National Security: Mrs. Tauscher of California and Mr. 
Brady of Pennsylvania.
    Committee on Small Business: Mr. Brady of Pennsylvania.
                                 <all>
```
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#### J. B. Jameson *v.*B. F. Jameson's Admr.

March 14, 1872.

APPEAL FROM EDMONSON CIRCUIT COURT.

Homestead — Act Exempting Homestead — Prior Debts.

A homestead is not exempt from execution for debts created prior - to June, 1866.

Same — Prior Lien On Land Other than the Homestead Created by Levy of Execution.

Where prior liens on land outside of the homestead have been created by levy of execution, there is no equitable principle by which these liens in favor of subsequent creditors can be made subordinate to antecedent debts.

*56*Smith, B. Lawlers, for appellant.*

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Pryor:

The executions in favor of Neeter, Otter & Son, and Lawlers-, and the attachment in favor of Greer, were all levied on the two-tracts of land in Edmonson County, one tract containing about ninety-eight acres and the other forty acres.

The appellant resided on the forty acres previous to the passage of the Act of June, 1866, exempting homestead from execution, and has so continued to reside -since that time.

These prior liens on the land, outside of the homestead, were created by an actual levy of the executions and the attachment in favor of Greer and others, and although the debts due Jameson’s Admr., Terry, Wheat & Co. and others were created previous to June, 1866, there is no equitable principle by which these liens created in favor of subsequent creditors are made subordinate to antecedent debts, when no liens prior in date exist, whilst the creditor with his debt in existence previous to the passage of the homestead law may subject it to the payment of his debt; then if a subsequent creditor levies his execution or attachment on land not a part of the homestead, his lien will be enforced for the reason that it is as much liable for the one debt as the other, and this court will not divest him of that lien in favor of the antecedent creditor who has no lien in order to protect the homestead.

These liens having been first created in favor of subsequent creditors upon land other than the homestead, it was proper first to sell this land to satisfy these debts, and the antecedent creditors (those existing prior to June, 1866) had a right to subject the homestead to the payment of their debts, for the reason that there was no other property out of which they could be satisfied.

The judgment of the court below must, therefore, be *affirmed.*