IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

JUOZAS V., 1 ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) No. 20 C 3692 

v. ) 

 ) Magistrate Judge Gabriel A. Fuentes 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting ) 

Commissioner of Social Security,2

 ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER3

 

Plaintiff Juozas V. applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) in 2013, claiming he 

became disabled on June 1, 2009 due to degenerative disc disease in his lumbar spine, although he 

continued to work three days a week as a receptionist until March 2012. (R. 191, 223, 1550.) An 

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied Plaintiff’s application in January 2015 (R. 9); that 

decision was ultimately appealed to the district court, and the Commissioner agreed to remand the 

case. (R. 705-10.) On remand, Plaintiff submitted evidence that he had anxiety and depression in 

addition to lumbar spine issues. (See, e.g., R. 629-31, 801-23.) In December 2017, the ALJ issued 

1

 Plaintiff’s surname has been omitted from this opinion in compliance with the Court’s Internal Operating 

Procedure No. 22. 

2

 The Court substitutes Kilolo Kijakazi for her predecessor, Andrew Saul, as the proper defendant in this 

action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) (a public officer’s successor is automatically 

substituted as a party). 

3

 On August 31, 2020, by consent of the parties and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 73.1, 

this case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Cox for all proceedings, including entry of final judgment. 

(D.E. 12.) On March 22, 2022, the Executive Committee reassigned the case to this Court pursuant to Local 

Rule 40.3(c), as this Court presided over an earlier case involving this Plaintiff (18-2044). 

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a second opinion denying benefits, finding Plaintiff was not disabled through his date last insured 

(“DLI”) of September 30, 2015.4 (R. 600-20.) 

In September 2019, on appeal to this Court, we ordered remand based on one issue: the 

ALJ had found Plaintiff had moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace, but failed 

to account for those limitations in the residual functional capacity (“RFC”). (R. 1313-15.) The 

Appeals Council (“AC”) subsequently vacated the ALJ’s decision and without further explanation, 

remanded the case to a new ALJ “for further proceedings consistent with the order of the court.” 

(R. 1318.) While the case was pending, Plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security 

Income (“SSI”) (disability benefits that do not depend on a DLI), alleging that on July 1, 2017, he 

became disabled based on thoracic outlet syndrome,5

 in addition to back pain, anxiety and 

depression. (R. 1512, 1553.) The new ALJ consolidated Plaintiff’s applications and held another 

hearing, and in March 2020, issued an opinion concluding Plaintiff was not disabled under the 

Social Security Act. (R. 1118.) Plaintiff did not file exceptions to the opinion, and the AC did not 

assume jurisdiction, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.984(d). Plaintiff has now appealed to this Court seeking reversal of the latest ALJ opinion 

(D.E. 18), and the Commissioner has filed a motion to affirm (D.E. 24). 

I. The ALJ’s March 2020 Opinion 

The Court begins with the ALJ’s opinion that is under review, which provides a thorough 

discussion and analysis of the evidence in the record. With regard to Plaintiff’s mental 

4

 To be entitled to DIB, a claimant must establish disability on or before their DLI. Mandrell v. Kijakazi, 

25 F.4th 514, 515 (7th Cir. 2022). 

5 “Thoracic outlet syndrome is a group of disorders that occur when blood vessels or nerves in the space 

between the collarbone and first rib are compressed, causing shoulder and neck pain and numbness in the 

fingers.” https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/thoracic-outlet-syndrome/symptoms-causes/syc 

-20353988#:~:text=Thoracic%20outlet%20syndrome%20(TOS)%20is,and%20numbness%20in%20 

your%20fingers.

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impairments, the ALJ discussed this Court’s September 2019 remand order but explained that after 

reviewing the evidence, she had determined that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment 

that resulted in any functional limitations. (R. 1117.) The ALJ first examined the evidence prior to 

Plaintiff’s DLI, and concluded that other than taking medication, Plaintiff underwent “minimal 

treatment for his mental health symptoms,” was able “to improve his mood using non-medication 

methods including online support groups,” and had “relatively normal mental status exams.” (R. 

1121-22.) The ALJ then reviewed the post-2015 evidence and determined that Plaintiff’s condition 

“had not changed significantly by the time he filed” for SSI in the second half of 2018. (R. 1122.) 

Next, the ALJ examined Plaintiff’s mental health treatment at the time of his SSI 

application and determined that “the mental status examinations and cognitive testing during this 

period document generally normal mental status exams and positive response to treatment,” and 

medical records noted no limitations in attention and concentration. (R. 1123-24.) The ALJ 

concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were non-severe and caused only mild limitation in 

the paragraph B functional areas (understanding, remembering or applying information; 

interacting with others; concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing 

oneself). (Id.) The ALJ noted that in February 2019, Plaintiff’s therapist indicated Plaintiff “had 

demonstrated significant progress,” and in March 2019, neuropsychological testing revealed 

Plaintiff had average intellectual functioning (despite taking the test in English, which was his 

second language) and only mild difficulties in attention, memory, depression and anxiety, despite 

Plaintiff not taking any psychotropic medication. (R. 1122-23.) In April 2019, Plaintiff told his 

neurologist that he had panic attacks when leaving the house ever since he discontinued Klonopin 

(a sedative) due to side effects in 2015; however, the ALJ pointed out that in September 2019, he 

told his psychiatrist that he had not had a panic attack in months, and his mental status exam was 

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normal. (R. 1123-24.) Moreover, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff went to the gym on a regular basis, 

took care of his elderly parents, and occasionally babysat his niece and nephew. (R. 1124.) The 

ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff performed worse at a December 2019 neuropsychological exam 

but noted that the examiner attributed this to Plaintiff’s anxiety and lack of sleep. (Id.) 

The ALJ gave great weight to the non-examining state agency mental consultants, who 

opined in 2013 and 2018 that Plaintiff had a nonsevere mental impairment. (R. 1125.) In the 2013 

opinions, the consultants emphasized that Plaintiff’s anxiety was secondary to his back pain, and 

in 2018, the consultants noted that Plaintiff drove a car, went shopping alone, attended church 

weekly and frequently went to the gym. (Id.) The ALJ found these opinions were supported by the 

medical record, including later records from 2019. (Id.) 

By contrast, the ALJ gave little weight to the March 2014 opinion from treating psychiatrist 

Alessandra Tachauer, M.D., and the January 2019 opinion from treating therapist, Vince 

Hennenberg, LSW. (Id.) The ALJ explained that Dr. Tachauer’s opinion was “inconsistent 

internally and with the records in the file at this time.” (Id.) Likewise, the ALJ found Mr. 

Hennenberg’s opinion that Plaintiff had marked social limitations was internally inconsistent, not 

supported in Mr. Hennenberg’s treatment notes, and inconsistent with the record, which showed 

that Plaintiff attended medical appointments, therapy, and physical therapy (“PT”) regularly. (R. 

1125-26.) The ALJ also gave little weight to the February 2020 mental impairment questionnaire 

filled out by psychiatrist Dhruthi Kalangi, M.D., who assessed Plaintiff as being seriously limited 

in interacting with others, memory, concentration, and adapting and managing oneself; the ALJ 

found that assessment inconsistent with the records from this period, including notes from 

Plaintiff’s counselor indicating Plaintiff went to the gym daily, enjoyed reading, concerts and 

cooking, occasionally went out with his friends, and appeared neat and well-groomed. (R. 1126.) 

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With regard to physical impairments, the ALJ found Plaintiff had severe lumbar 

degenerative disc disease, thoracic outlet syndrome and cubital tunnel syndrome,6 but that these 

impairments did not meet or medically equal a listing. (R. 1120.) The ALJ assigned Plaintiff an 

RFC to perform light work except Plaintiff could occasionally climb; frequently but not constantly 

crawl, crouch, kneel, stoop and balance; and frequently but not constantly handle, finger, and feel 

bilaterally. (R. 1126-27.) The ALJ arrived at this RFC after examining evidence of Plaintiff’s 

physical impairments from 2013 through 2020, and determining that Plaintiff’s statements about 

the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his pain were inconsistent with: (1) his treatment, 

which the ALJ found to be generally “routine and conservative;” (2) his physically active lifestyle; 

and (3) medical examinations and imaging showing only mild findings. (R. 1128.) 

The ALJ noted that despite pursuing only “conservative treatment,” Plaintiff “has yet to 

display significant functional deficits” and has remained physically active, attending the gym up 

to seven days a week, including using the elliptical and lifting weights. (R. 1128, 1133, 1136.) The 

ALJ determined that “the bulk of [Plaintiff’s] complaints appear to be related to acute 

exacerbations due to overexertion at the gym, at home, or in other settings such as engaging in 

heavy lifting, doing exercises that were too intense, or accidentally dropping . . . or running into 

things,” and shoveling snow. (R. 1132, 1136.) The ALJ found that objective testing of Plaintiff’s 

low back was consistent with this level of activity: lumbar MRIs consistently revealed only mild 

degenerative findings with no stenosis, and physical exams documented few abnormalities. (R. 

1128-30.) The ALJ noted that in 2017, Plaintiff’s therapist wondered how Plaintiff’s pain affected 

him because he was going to the gym “as often as possible,” and his appearance and grooming 

6 “Cubital tunnel syndrome happens when the ulnar nerve, which passes through the inside of the elbow, 

becomes inflamed and irritated. https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/cubitaltunnel-syndrome#:~:text=What%20is%20cubital%20tunnel%20syndrome,inflamed%2C%20swollen%2C 

%20and%20irritated. 

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were much better than might be expected from someone in debilitating pain. (R. 1130.) The ALJ 

acknowledged that Plaintiff complained of low back pain in 2018 but noted that lumbar spine 

imaging continued to show mild findings and an orthopedist prescribed only anti-inflammatories 

and PT. (R. 1130-31.) Plaintiff also complained of low back pain in 2019 after using dumbbells 

and a rowing machine, but his physical exam was normal; he was prescribed a muscle relaxant and 

home PT and instructed to avoid intensive lower back exercises. (R. 1131.) Imaging showed 

Plaintiff’s “degenerative disc disease was generally stable, [and] only mildly increased . . . at L1-

L2.” (Id.) In January 2020, Plaintiff’s orthopedist again found imaging of Plaintiff’s low back was 

“unremarkable,” and Plaintiff’s physical exam was normal. (R. 1132.) 

 The ALJ also acknowledged Plaintiff reported that his symptoms of shoulder pain, upper 

extremity numbness and chest pain from his thoracic outlet syndrome worsened in 2018. (R. 1124, 

1128, 1133, 1136.) However, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff demonstrated better than average cardiac 

function for his age group, and he continued going to the gym and remained physically active. (Id.) 

Moreover, Plaintiff did not attempt rib resection surgery despite being referred by various 

providers over the course of two to three years as the best option to help his upper body symptoms. 

(Id.) Instead, Plaintiff underwent specialized PT, pain management, and Botox injections, after 

which Plaintiff reported “significant improvement.” (R. 1133-34.) In the second half of 2018, 

imaging confirmed Plaintiff’s thoracic outlet syndrome had worsened, and Plaintiff’s thoracic 

surgeon Andrew Arndt, M.D., again encouraged Plaintiff to undergo surgery. (R. 1134-35.) In 

February 2020, orthopedic surgeon Grant Garrigues, M.D., also recommended surgery to address 

Plaintiff’s arm pain and numbness, but Plaintiff did not pursue surgical options. (R. 1135.) 

The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Arndt’s February 2020 RFC opinions. The ALJ found 

them internally inconsistent, as Dr. Arndt opined Plaintiff could not sit for more than 20 minutes 

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at a time or stand at all, yet he could sit, stand and walk for six hours in an eight-hour day. (R. 

1137.) In addition, the ALJ found Dr. Arndt’s opinion that Plaintiff’s upper extremity issues would 

interfere with his concentration frequently and limit him to handling and fingering up to 50% of 

the time and reaching up to 25% of the time was inconsistent with Plaintiff exercising up to seven 

days a week. (Id.) By contrast, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinions of the non-examining 

state agency medical consultants, who opined that Plaintiff could do light work with occasional 

climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds and frequent stooping, crouching, crawling, handling, 

fingering and feeling. (R. 1136.) The ALJ determined that the manipulative limitations adequately 

accounted for Plaintiff’s upper extremity symptoms despite his testimony that he had difficulty 

typing, because he did upper body workouts (although working out too intensely exacerbated his 

symptoms) and he had done temporary work involving typing. (R. 1135-36.) In addition, the ALJ 

found that the postural limitations were consistent with Plaintiff’s testimony about what he could 

lift and evidence that his lower back pain worsened when he worked out too intensely. (R. 1136.) 

II. Analysis 

An ALJ’s decision will be affirmed if it is supported by “substantial evidence,” which 

means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, – U.S. –, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). “[T]he threshold for such 

evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Id. The Court “will not reweigh the evidence, resolve 

debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine credibility, or substitute our judgment for the ALJ’s 

determination. Rather, this court asks whether the ALJ’s decision reflects an adequate logical 

bridge from the evidence to the conclusions.” Reynolds v. Kijakazi, 25 F.4th 470, 473 (7th Cir. 

2022) (citations and quotations omitted). The Court rejects Plaintiff’s arguments for remand for 

the reasons set forth below. 

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A. The ALJ Did Not Violate the “Law of the Case” Doctrine. 

Initially, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s 2020 decision violated the law of the case as set 

forth in this Court’s September 2019 order reversing and remanding the December 2017 ALJ 

decision. (D.E. 18: Pl.’s Br. at 4-6.) According to the law of the case doctrine, the ALJ must 

conform its proceedings on remand to the issues decided “expressly or by necessary implication” 

by the reviewing court. Surprise v. Saul, 968 F.3d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 2020) (citations and quotations 

omitted). “For the law of the case doctrine to come into play, the court must have first determined 

the particular issue, as an actual decision of an issue is required to establish the law of the case. If 

an issue is left open after remand, the lower tribunal is free to decide it.” Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

Plaintiff contends that this Court came to “the clear conclusion” that he had “moderate 

concentration limitations which had to be adequately accommodated,” so that the ALJ’s 

determination that he had only mild mental limitations, and no related functional limitations in the 

RFC, violated the law of the case. (Pl.’s Br. at 6.) This argument misconstrues the plain language 

of the September 2019 order. The Court explained that because the prior ALJ had “expressly” 

found Plaintiff had moderate limitations in concentration, persistence or pace, “she was required 

to account for it in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC,” but the ALJ had not done so. (R. 1312-15.)7

 In 

his reply, Plaintiff alternatively argues that this Court made an “implicit finding” that he had 

moderate limitations, which the ALJ was bound to follow on remand. (D.E. 30: Pl.’s Reply at 4.) 

However, this Court made no finding, explicitly or implicitly, on the severity of Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments. We held only that once the ALJ determined the severity of Plaintiff’s mental 

7

 The ALJ had assigned Plaintiff an RFC limited to “simple, routine, repetitive tasks” and “understand[ing], 

remember[ing], and carry[ing] out simple instructions,” which the Seventh Circuit has expressly held does 

not, by itself, adequately address limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace. (R. 1314-15, citing 

Winsted v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2019), and Crump v. Saul, 932 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 2019)). 

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impairments, the ALJ had to account for that determination in the RFC. Thus, in this case as in 

Surprise, the new ALJ upon remand did not violate the law of the case by declining to adopt 

limitations in the first ALJ’s opinion, because the district court did not make any factual findings 

as to the claimant’s limitations or impairments in its remand order. 968 F.3d at 659, 661. 

Plaintiff also argues that the new ALJ violated the law of the case by reaching a new 

conclusion based on “the same” or “basically the same evidence as the prior ALJ had,” without 

explaining why the prior ALJ’s assessment was erroneous. (Pl.’s Reply at 2, 4.) To the contrary, 

the new ALJ had to consider Plaintiff’s new SSI claim and almost 2,000 additional pages of record, 

and the ALJ thoroughly explained each of her conclusions in the opinion. Regardless, because this 

Court’s September 2019 Order did not make any factual or legal determinations regarding the first 

ALJ’s assessment of the nature or extent of Plaintiff’s mental health symptoms, the newly assigned 

ALJ “was free to reassess” them on remand without violating the law of the case doctrine. Surprise, 

968 F.3d at 663, citing Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 2009). As Magistrate 

Judge Cole stated in Thelmarae W. v. Saul: 

The law of the case doctrine requires an administrative agency to conform its 

further proceedings in the case to the principles set forth in the appellate decision. 

It did so. There was no violation of the law of the case doctrine. The ALJ was not 

ordered to find a severe mental impairment or find the plaintiff had a disability. The 

ALJ did as she was instructed. It just didn’t go the way the plaintiff had wanted. 

476 F. Supp. 3d 717, 730 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

B. The ALJ’s Decision Not to Include Mental Limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC Was 

Supported By Substantial Evidence. 

Plaintiff argues that even if the ALJ’s determination that he had mild mental limitations 

was supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ erred by omitting mental restrictions from his RFC 

because ALJs must consider limitations imposed by all of an individual’s impairments, even those 

that are not severe, in assessing an individual’s RFC. (Pl.’s Br. at 7, citing SSR 96-8p.) However, 

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as this Court’s discussion of the ALJ’s opinion shows, the ALJ did examine the evidence of 

Plaintiff’s mental impairments at length, both evidence tending to support and undermine 

Plaintiff’s claimed limitations and determined that “the balance of the evidence” showed that 

Plaintiff’s mild mental impairments did not further limit Plaintiff’s ability to do basic work 

activities in the RFC. Bakke v. Kijakazi, – F.4th –, 2023 WL 2473109, at *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 13, 

2023). “This explicit weighing is precisely within the purview of the ALJ—and it is not our place 

to reweigh evidence, even where reasonable minds might disagree about the outcome.” Id. 

Moreover, Plaintiff “has not pointed to any medical opinion or evidence to show any 

[mental impairments] caused any specific limitations.” Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 905 (7th 

Cir. 2021). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have explained why his impairments would not 

result in time off task since the VE opined that allowable off-task time could not exceed 15% of 

the workday. (Pl.’s Br. at 9.) But the VE testified as to a hypothetical individual. It was Plaintiff’s 

burden to show that his impairments would keep him off task, and the ALJ did not find any such 

limitations supported by the evidence. Thus, the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff had mild mental 

impairments that did not require limitations in his RFC was supported by substantial evidence. 

C. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Doctors’ RFC Opinions Was Supported 

By Substantial Evidence. 

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ’s decision to give little weight to the opinion of treating 

psychiatrists Dr. Tachauer in 2014 and Dr. Kalangi in 2020 and treating therapist Mr. Henneberg 

in 2019, while giving great weight to the opinions of the non-examining State agency reviewing 

mental consultants, “did not comport with 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(c)” and was not supported by 

substantial evidence. (Pl.’s Br. at 11-12.) First, a point of clarification. Section 404.1527(c) applies 

to claims filed before March 27, 2017, and thus applies only to Plaintiff’s DIB claim. This section 

contains the so-called “treating source rule,” which provides that the ALJ will “[g]enerally . . . 

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give more weight to medical opinions from . . . treating sources.” Id. at 404.1427(c)(2). If a treating 

source’s medical opinion as to the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments is “wellsupported” and “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence,” the ALJ “will give it 

controlling weight,” but if the treating source’s opinion is not given controlling weight, the ALJ 

must “give good reasons” and consider factors including length, nature, extent and frequency of 

the treating relationship, the supportability and consistency of the physician’s opinion, and the 

physician’s specialization. Id. For claims filed after March 27, 2017, such as Plaintiff’s SSI claim, 

the treating source rule does not apply, and the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary 

weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) . . . including those from [the 

claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). “The most important factors” for the ALJ 

to consider are the “supportability” of the opinion in the medical source’s explanation and notes 

and its “consistency” with other evidence in the record. Id. at § 404.1520c(b)(2), (c). 

Under either regulation, the ALJ’s determination here was supported by substantial 

evidence. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “fail[ed] to explain why the consistent opinions of two 

treating psychiatrists and a treating therapist” (in that they all opined Plaintiff had marked social 

limitations) “were not entitled to greater weight than the opinions of the non-examining State 

agency psychologists.” (Pl.’s Br. at 12.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, the ALJ’s analysis was 

thorough and built the necessary logical bridge between the evidence and her conclusions. The 

ALJ explained that the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating mental health professionals were internally 

inconsistent, unsupported by their own treatment notes, and inconsistent with other evidence in 

the record. Even under the treating source rule, the treater’s medical opinion must be “wellsupported” and “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” before it will be given 

controlling weight. The ALJ thus did “not err in choosing to discount [the treating physician’s] 

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opinions and credit the state agency physicians’ conclusions” because “the ALJ examined [the 

treating physician’s] medical opinions for consistency with the record and internal supportability 

and found them lacking, articulating each of those analyses in his opinion.” Bakke, 2023 WL 

2473109, at *5. 

Plaintiff also argues that the “specific reasons [given by the ALJ] for discounting [his] 

treating psychiatrists’ opinions are not supported by substantial evidence.” (Pl.’s Br. at 12.) The 

“specific reasons” Plaintiff points to are his ability to perform “basic daily activities” and to 

“passively watch children with assistance from another adult,” his enjoyment of nature, music, and 

concerts, and the fact that he “was neat and well-groomed upon two occasions.” (Id.) However, 

Plaintiff’s focus on these activities not only ignores the ALJ’s explanation regarding the lack of 

consistency and supportability in the psychiatrists’ opinions, but it also ignores the ALJ’s far 

heavier reliance on Plaintiff’s ability to take care of his elderly parents and to work out frequently, 

even daily, at the gym. “When [Plaintiff] criticizes the ALJ’s analysis of [his] daily functioning, . 

. . []he is, as above, inviting us to reweigh the evidence. But when assessing an ALJ’s credibility 

determination, . . . we merely examine whether the ALJ’s determination was reasoned and 

supported.” Grotts v. Kijakazi, 27 F.4th 1273, 1279 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Plaintiff’s selective reading of the ALJ’s opinion notwithstanding, the Court 

finds that the ALJ’s determination was reasoned and supported by substantial evidence, and we 

“decline [Plaintiff’s] offer to substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ’s.” Id. at 279-80. 

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in giving great weight to the 2013 and 2018 

opinions of the non-examining State agency consultants because they “could not have listened to 

and factored in [Plaintiff’s] testimony” or the March 2019 neuropsychological opinion. (Pl.’s 

Reply at 5.) However, the ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s testimony and considered the evidence from 

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2019 and 2020 and determined that the state agency opinions were supported by the medical 

record, including later records from 2019. (R. 1125.) In other words, the ALJ weighed all the 

evidence, both evidence tending to support and undermine Plaintiff’s allegations, and determined 

that “the balance of the evidence” showed that the opinions of state agency physicians were more 

reliable that those of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. See Bakke, 2023 WL 2473109, at *4. Thus, 

the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. 

D. The ALJ’s Determination at Steps 4 and 5 as to the Jobs Available to an 

Individual with Plaintiff’s Manipulative Limitations Was Supported by 

Substantial Evidence. 

Lastly, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s determination that he could “frequently” handle, 

finger and feel (i.e., perform fine manipulation). (Pl.’s Br. at 13-14.) The ALJ gave great weight 

to the opinions of the non-examining state agency consultants, who opined that Plaintiff could 

perform frequent handling, fingering and feeling (R. 1136), and the ALJ gave little weight to Dr. 

Arndt’s RFC opinion which limited Plaintiff to handling and fingering up to 50 percent of the 

workday. (R. 1137.) Contrary to Plaintiff’s arguments, the ALJ explained in detail why she gave 

little weight to Dr. Arndt’s opinion and great weight to the state agency opinions. The ALJ 

determined that Dr. Arndt’s opinion was internally inconsistent and inconsistent with evidence 

that Plaintiff did upper body workouts and temporary work involving typing, while the 

manipulative limitations in the state agency opinions adequately accounted for Plaintiff’s upper 

extremity symptoms. (R. 1135-37.) Therefore, the ALJ’s decision to give great weight to the state 

agency opinions and little weight to Dr. Arndt’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence, 

and we will not reweigh the evidence. 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff contends that the “ALJ erred by failing to address the specific 

percentage of time [he] could handle and finger,” because the vocational expert (“VE”) testified 

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that an individual who could not use their hands more than 50 percent of the time for handling, 

fingering and feeling (in addition to the other limitations laid out by the ALJ) could not perform 

any work. (Pl.’s Br. at 13-14.) By contrast, under the Social Security Regulations, the ALJ’s 

determination that Plaintiff had the RFC to “frequently” handle, finger and feel means that he 

could perform fine manipulation from one-third to two-thirds (or 33 to 67 percent) of the workday. 

SSR 83-10. 

While the VE’s testimony was far from a model of clarity, both the VE’s and the ALJ’s 

intended meanings were clear, and the ALJ’s Steps 4 and 5 determinations were supported by 

substantial evidence. To put it simply, the VE testified that Plaintiff’s past relevant work and a 

significant number of other jobs in the national economy were available for an individual who 

could perform fine manipulation at least 50 percent of the workday. (R. 1188-89.) The ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff was able to perform fine manipulation 33 to 67 percent of the workday, 

and the ALJ relied on the VE’s testimony in concluding that Plaintiff could perform her past 

relevant work and a significant number of other jobs in the national economy. (R. 1138-39.) The 

ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence because the jobs cited by the VE would 

necessarily be included within Plaintiff’s RFC to handle, finger and feel 33 to 67 percent of the 

workday. 

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CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s brief in support of remand (D.E. 18) and 

grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (D.E. 24.) 

 ENTER: 

 

 ________________________________ 

 GABRIEL A. FUENTES 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

DATED: March 27, 2023 

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