J-S74015-14

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J.B., JR. A/K/A 

A.B., A MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.J.B., SR., A/K/A A.J.B., 

FATHER

No. 1587 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered April 24, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001480-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DONOHUE, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 22, 2014

A.J.B., Sr., (Father) appeals from the order entered on April 24, 2014, 

that granted the petition filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (DHS), seeking the involuntary termination of his parental rights to 

A.J.B., Jr., (Child) (born in March of 2009) pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). We affirm. 

In his brief, Father sets forth the following questions for our review:

A. Whether the court erred in failing to find that for the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, 

appellant father was visiting with his child, obtained 

employment, was seeking housing for himself and his child, had 

consistent negative drug screens, was continuing to live in a 

recovery house and complied with their rules, completed the 

majority of his family service plan objectives, and did not intend 

to relinquish his claim to his child or refused and/or failed to 

perform parental duties. 

B. Whether the court erred in failing to find that for the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, 

appellant father had consistent contact and visits with his child. 
J-S74015-14

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C. Whether the court erred in finding that there were repeated 

and continuing findings of incapacity, abuse, neglect and/or 

dependency of this minor child by appellant father, when 

appellant father visited with his child, obtained employment, was 

seeking housing for himself and his child, had consistent 

negative drug screens, was continuing to live in a recovery 

house and complied with their rules, and completed the majority 

of his family service plan objectives. 

D. Whether the court erred in finding that the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, as 

to father, when appellant father was visited with his child, 

obtained employment, was seeking housing for himself and his 

child, had consistent negative drug screens, was continuing to 

live in a recovery house and complied with their rules, completed 

the majority of his family service plan objectives. 

E. Whether the court erred in finding that the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the children continue to exist 

and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child, when appellant father can remedy the 

conditions within a reasonable period of time, and when he was 

visiting with his child, obtained employment, was seeking 

housing for himself and his child, had consistent negative drug 

screens, was continuing to live in a recovery house and complied 

with their rules, completed the majority of his family service plan 

objectives. 

F. Whether the court erred in finding that DHS made[] 

reasonable efforts towards reunification, by either failing and/or 

refusing to help father obtain insurance benefits to pay for 

continuous drug treatment or therapy and testing or a viable 

option or to consider options other than terminating father's 

parental rights, when he had completed the majority of his 

family service plan objectives. 

G. Whether the court erred in terminating father's parental 

rights, when the sole reason he was unable to obtain housing, 

provide medical care for the [child] and maintenance of the 

child, was his lack of income, which was changing with his 

advancement to full time employment and health benefits. 

Father’s brief at 3-4. 
J-S74015-14

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We review an order terminating parental rights in accordance with the 

following standard:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the 

decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. 

Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the decree 

must stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to 

involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court must accord 

the hearing judge's decision the same deference that we would 

give to a jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive 

review of the record in order to determine whether the trial 

court's decision is supported by competent evidence.

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879 

A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The burden is upon the petitioner to 

prove by clear and convincing evidence that its asserted grounds for seeking 

the termination of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276. 

Moreover, we have explained that:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

Id. at 276 (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 

2003)). The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. 

Super. 2004). If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we 

will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result. In re 

Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003). 
J-S74015-14

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We have reviewed the certified record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the comprehensive opinion authored by the Honorable 

Joseph L. Fernandes of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 

filed on July 23, 2014. We conclude that Judge Fernandes’ thorough, wellreasoned opinion properly disposes of the issues raised by Father. 

Accordingly, we adopt Judge Fernandes’ opinion as our own and affirm the 

order appealed from on that basis. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/22/2014
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS' 

FOR THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA. . 

FAMILY COURT DIVISION 

In Re: AJ.B., JR. aka A.B. A MINOR 

APPEAL OF: AJ.B., SR., Father 

OPINION 

Fernandes, J.: 

CP-SI-DP-0001480-2011" . 

CP-SI-AP-0000638-20 13 

: IS87 EDA 2014 

Appellant, AJ.B., SR. ("Father"), appeals from the order entered on April 24, 2014, granting the 

petition filed by the Depaltment of Human Services of Philadelphia County ("DHS"), to 

involuntarily terminate his parental rights to A.lB., JR. aka A.B. ("Child") pursuant to the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2S11 (a) (1), (2), (S), (8), and (b). Athena M. Dooley Esquire, 

counsel for Father, filed a timely notice of appeal with a Statement of Errors pursuant to Rule 

1925. 

Factual and Procedural Background 

On June 8, 2011, the Depaltment of Human Services (DHS) received and Emergency General 

Protective Service (EGPS) repOlt alleging that Mother had given birth to Child S.H. at Thomas 

Jefferson University Hospital; that 'Mother tested positive for cocaine, benzodiazepines, opiates 

and methadone at the time of delivery; that Mother had not obtained any infant supplies for Child 

S.H. because she anticipated that she should enter an inpatient drug and alcohol treatment 

program with Child S.H., and that the treatment program would provide her with infant supplies; 

and that Mother had an extensive history of drug use beginning when she was fourteen years old. 

DHS subsequently learned that Child S.H. would remain hospitalized at Thomas Jefferson 

University Hospital for an unspecified period of time. On June 10,2011, DHS met with Mother, 

who admitted that she used drugs and was in need of substance abuse treatment. On June 12, 

2011, Mother was admitted to Family House for inpatient drug and alcohol treatment, but DHS 

learned that Mother would be unable to care for Child S.H. when she was discharged from 

Thomas Jefferson University Hospital because her prescribed medication caused drowsiness. 

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The report also alleged that A.B. ("Child"), Mother's eldest son, born on March 29, 2009, was 

residing with D.T., a maternal great-aunt, who in accordance with an earlier substantiated repmi 

had been awarded custody. On June 20, 2011, DHS learned that the maternal great-aunt, D.T. 

plmUled to move to Florida; that she was unable to take the Child with her; that she had agreed to 

continue to care for the Child until July 29, 2011. On July 14,2011, DHS held a family planning 

meeting. The Child's maternal uncle agreed to care for the Child and his sibling, S.H. After a 

home evaluation and submission of criminal and ChildLine clearances, maternal uncle, J.H. was 

approved as a caregiver. On July 26, 2011, DHS learned that Child S.H. was ready to be 

discharged from Thomas Jefferson University Hospital. On July 26, 2011, DHS obtained an 

Order of Protective Custody ("OPC") for both children and they were placed with their maternal 

uncle, J.H. 

At the shelter care hearing for the children held on July 28, 2011, the court lifted the OPC and 

ordered that the temporary conunitment to DHS to stand. The court ordered that DHS refer 

maternal uncle, J.H., for kinship care services; that maternal uncle, J.H., and Father be referred to 

the Clinical Evaluation Unit ("CEU") for a fotihwith drug screen, dual diagnosis assessment, and 

monitoring, and that Mother be granted liberal supervised visits. 

On August 4, 2011, in an adjudicatory hearing the couti discharged the temporary commitment 

to DHS, adjudicated children dependent, and cOl1lll1itted them to DHS. Father was ordered to 

submit a paternity test. The court ordered that Mother and Father be referred to the Achieving 

Reunification Center ("ARC"); that Mother be referred to the CEU for a forthwith drug screen, 

dual diagnosis assessment, and monitoring; and that Father be referred to the CEU for a 

forthwith dmg screen and monitoring. 

On September 22, 20 11, the initial Family Service Plan ("FSP") meeting was held. The FSP 

permanency goal for children was to return to the care of their parent(s). The FSP objectives for 

Mother and Father were to achieve and maintain recovery from drug andlor alcohol problems; to 

comply with all treatment recommendations and evaluations; to pmiicipate in regular supervised 

visits with children; to participate in Individual Service Plans ("ISP") and other designated 

meetings as requested; and to patiicipate in placement parenting and emichment classes. 

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Mother's additional FSP objectives were to stabilize her mental health, receive ongoing 

treatment, and comply with treatment recommendations; to inform and provide documentation to 

DHS about her treatment; to engage in anger management counseling and to obtain suitable 

housing. 

On November 1,2011, the court ordered that children remain as committed to DHS; that Father 

re-engage with ARC; that Father's weekly supervised visits at maternal uncle's home continue; 

that Father be granted a monthly supervised visit at the agency; and that visitation could be 

modified by agreement of the parties. The court found that Father was moderately compliant 

with the permanency plan. The court noted that Father was scheduled for an intake appointment 

at The Wedge Medical Center on November 3, 2011. 

On February 3, 2012, the cOUli, in a permanency review hearing, ordered that both children 

remain as committed to DHS. The court found that Father had been excluded as S.H.'s Father 

through a paternity test. The court ordered that Father continue his supervised visits with Child 

A.B. at the maternal uncle, J.H.'s home; that maternal uncle, J.H., maintain a visitation log; and 

that the visits could be modified by agreement of the parties. The court found that Child A.B. 

was receiving Early Intervention speech therapy. Father was also referred to the CEU for a 

forthwith drug screen, dual diagnosis assessment and monitoring. 

On April 18, 2012, the cOUli ordered that Father be referred to the CEU for monitoring; that 

Father be granted twice-weekly unsupervised visits with Child A.B. for up to four hours; that 

Mother be prohibited ii-om paJiicipating in Father's unsupervised visits with Child A.B.; and 

learned that the children's maternal great-aunt P.C. aJld maternal great-uncle L.C., were 

participating in training to become foster parents for Children. It was ordered that Children 

could be moved to an appropriate placement prior to the next court date. The COUli found that 

Father had completed a Focus on Fathers workshop on April 9, 2012. 

On May 21, 2012, Children were placed with maternal great-aunt, P.C., and maternal greatuncle, L.C., through Children's Choice, where they currently remain. On June 20, 2012, in a 

permanency review hearing, the court ordered that children remain as committed to DHS; that 

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Father continue his drug and alcohol treatment at The Wedge Medical Center and his parenting 

education classes at ARC; that Father's unsupervised visits with Child A.B. continue; and that 

the visits could be modified by agreement of the parties. The Court noted that that Father had 

completed Parenting Education and Healthy Relationship counseling classes. 

On September 21, 2012, in a permanency review hearing, the cOUli ordered that they remain as 

committed to DHS; and that that Father re-engage at ARC. The COUli learned that Mother and 

Father were residing together at 7156 Van Dyke Street. Father was found to be moderately 

compliant with the permanency plan. 

On December 4,2012, the cOUli ordered that they remain as committed to DHS. Father did not 

attend the hearing, and the court ordered that he be referred to the CEU when he avails himself. 

The court found that Father had completed parenting classes at The Wedge Medical Center but 

failed to return for his drug and alcohol program since October 2012. The Master ordered that 

Father be granted supervised visits at the agency only. 

On January 22, 2013, in a permanency review hearing, the court found that Children had been in 

DHS placement for 17 months and ordered that they remain as committed to DHS. The COUli 

found that Father had not visited Child A.B. since the beginning of November 2012. Father was 

referred to the CEU forthwith for drug screen, dual diagnosis assessment and moni toring. 

On March 8, 2013, an FSP meeting was held. The FSP pelmanency goal for Child was changed 

to adoption. The FSP noted that Child had been placed by DHS since July 26, 2011, and that 

neither Mother nor Father had been able to complete their FSP objectives. On March 22, 2013, 

at a permanency review hearing the court ordered that Father be re-referred to the CEU forthwith 

for drug screen and dual diagnosis assessment. 

On June 18, 2013, the COUli found that Child had been in placement for 22 months, and ordered 

that the next court date be listed as contested goal change termination hearing. It was repOlied 

that Father was residing in a recovery house but was not receiving drug and alcohol treatment; 

that Father had not visited Child A.B. since May 17,2013 and was non-compliant with making 

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himself available to DHS; Father was found moderately compliant. Father had failed to follow 

up with obtaining housing or employment, and failed to meet with his reunification worker. It 

was reported that Father's visits with Child A.B. has been modified to supervised visits due to 

Father's earlier admission that he had been selling drugs. 

On November 1, 2014, DHS filed a petition for involuntary termination of Father's parental 

rights. On November 14, 2014, in a permanency review hearing, the court found that DHS made 

reasonable effolis for reunification and scheduled a Contested Goal Change Hearing for April 

11,2014. On April II, 2014, the court found DHS's reasonable efforts and rescheduled the Goal 

Change Hearing for April 24, 2014. On that day, Father's parental rights were terminated. 

Father's attorney filed a timely notice of appeal with a Statement of Errors on May 22, 2014. 

Discussion: 

On appeal, Father raises the following issues: 

I. Did the trial comi err in failing to find that, for the six months immediately preceding the 

filing of the petition for termination of parental rights, Child's Father was visiting him, 

had already obtained employment, had consistent negative drug screens, was seeking 

housing for himself and the Child, continued to live in a recovery house and complying 

with its rules, completed the majority of his FSP, did not intend to relinquish his claim to 

the Child and did not refuse or fail to perform his parental duties? 

2. Did the comi err in failing to find that, for the six months immediately preceding the 

filing of the petition, Father had consistent contact and visits with his Child? 

3. Did the court err in finding Father's repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

andlor dependency of his Child, due to the fact that Father was visiting his child, had 

already obtained employment, was seeking housing for himself and Child, had consistent 

negative drug screens, continued to live in a recovery house, complied with its rules and 

completed the majority of his FSP objectives? 

4. Did the court err in finding that the conditions that led to the removal or placement of the 

Child, continue to exist as to the Father, due to the fact that Father was visiting his child, 

had already obtained employment, was seeking house for himself and the Child, had 

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consistent negative drug screens, continued to live in a recovery house, complied with its 

rules, and completed the majority of his FSP? 

5. Did the court err in finding that the conditions that led to the removal or placement of the 

Child continue to exist, and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the Child, when Father can remedy the conditions within a reasonable period 

of time, and due to the fact that Father was visiting his child, had already obtained 

employment, was seeking housing for himself and the Child, had consistent negative drug 

screens, continued to live in a recovery house, complied with its rules, and completed the 

majority of his FSP? 

6. Did the comt err in finding that DHS made reasonable effOlts towards reunification by 

either failing and/or refusing to help Father obtain insurance benefits to pay for 

continuous drug treatment therapy and testing or a viable option, or to consider options 

other than terminate Father's parental rights, when Father completed the majority of his 

Family Service Plan objectives? 

7. Did the comt err in terminating Father's parental rights because of his lack of income, 

inability to obtain housing, provide medical care and maintain the Child, due to the fact 

that Father was advancing in obtaining full-time employment and health benefits? 

8. Did the court en' in finding that the Child was removed from Father's care due to the fact 

that the Child was in Mother's care while Father was incarcerated? 

Father's raises eight separate issues on appeal. For purposes of this opinion Father's issues will 

be consolidated as follows: Issues One and Two will be consolidated and analyzed as it relates 

to the grounds established in the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a) (1); Issue Three will be 

discussed and analyzed as it relates to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a) (2); Issues Four 

and Five will be discussed and analyzed as it relates to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a) 

(5) and (8); Issue Six which questions DHS' reasonable effOlts towards reunification, will be 

treated individually as well Issue Eight; and Issue Seven will be discussed as it relates to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (b). 

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The grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights are enumerated in the Adoption Act at 

23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a). The Adoption Act provides the following grounds for involuntary 

termination: 

(a) Genel'all'ule - The rights of a parent, in regards to a child, may be terminated after a petition 

is filed on any of the following grounds: 

(1) The parent, by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding 

the filing of the petition, has either evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to 

a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties. 

In proceedings to involuntaty terminate parental rights; the burden of proof is on the party 

seeking termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for 

termination. In re Adoption o[Atencio, 539 Pa. 161,650 A.2d 1064 (1994). To satisfy section 

(a) (1), the moving patiy must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct sustained for at 

least six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental duties. The 

standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct weighty 

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction without hesitance of the 

truth of precise facts in issue. In re D.Js., 1999 Pa. Super. 214 (1999). 

DHS developed a set of FSP objectives for Father on September 22, 2011. The objectives and 

goals developed were parenting, visitation, housing, employment, and drug and alcohol 

treatment (N.T. 4/24/14, pg. 45). The agency worker's testimony established the existence of an 

ISP, which objectives coincided with Father's DHS FSP objectives (N.T. 4/24114, pg. 14). 

Father completed parenting classes and is employed (N.T. 4/24/14, pg. 48). Father attended the 

visits established with relative consistency (N.T. 4/24114, pg. 67) only missing fifteen visits prior 

to November 2012. However, he disappeared from November of 2012 to late January 2013 

(N.T. 4/24/14, pg. 67) and did not provide any information about his whereabouts (N.T. 4/24/14, 

pgs. 67-68). During this period no visitation took place (N.T. 4124114, pg. 68), nor did Father 

call the Child (N.T. 4/24114, pg. 68). 

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In January 2013 Father stal1ed working through a temporary agency (N.T. 4124/14, pg. 71). 

Father's income is approximately nine hundred dollars every two weeks (N.T. 4/24/14, pg. 66). 

Nonetheless, Father did not use his wages to provide for Child's needs (NT. 4/24/14, pg. 71). 

Father purchased a Ford Mustang instead (NT. 4/24/14, pg. 75). 

Father still lacks appropriate housing and is living at a recovery house (NT 4/24/14, pgs. 48, 

65). In spite of his compliance with his employment and parenting objectives, Father did not 

fulfill the most impol1ant goal in the FSP, drug and alcohol treatment (N.T. 4124114, pg. 45). It 

was established that, because Father lives out of the county, CEU was unable to recommend any 

drug and alcohol program for him. It was established that DHS provided Father with the 

information to obtain medical insurance assistance in order for him to obtain drug screens at his 

residential drug program in Bucks County. At the same time, the court order him to obtain drug 

screens at the CEU free of charge, which he failed to avail himself (N.T. 4124/14, pgs. 45-49, 

52). The trial court found DHS made reasonable eff0l1s to help Father on: February 220d , April 

18th , June 20th , September 21 st and December lih ,2012, and on: January 220d , March 220d , 

June 18'h, Aprilll'h and November 14'h, 2013. 

At one point in time prior to October 2012, Father was involved in a drug and alcohol treatment 

at the Wedge. In October 2012 during a FSP meeting, Father disclosed and admitted that he 

has been selling drugs and providing urine samples with other people's urine with the purpose of 

passing his drug test (NT. 4/24/14, pg. 47). As a result, alcohol and drug treatment remains an 

objective since Father never successfully completed a program (N.T. 4/24/14, pg. 62). Also, as a 

consequence of his admission, Father's unsupervised visitation changed to supervised visitation 

(N.T. 4/24114, pg. 67). Father never provided any documentation to verify completion of his 

drug and alcohol program (N.T. 4124/14, pg. 46), which was requested on a weekly basis (N.T. 

4124114, pg. 63). Prior to November 2013, no certification of completion was ever provided by 

Father (N.T. 4124114, pg. 63). Father stated that he requires health insurance to be involved in a 

drug and alcohol program (N.T. 4/24/14, pg. 63); however, he did not use his wages to pay for 

health insurance or complied with cOUl1 refell'als to the CEU free of charge (N. T. 4/24114, pgs. 

49-72). 

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DHS' petition for termination was filed on November 1, 2013. Since 2012, Father has been 

continuously failing to perform his parental duties toward the Child. Father has consistently 

refused or failed to perform parental duties, such as provide for Child's needs (N.T. 4/24114, pg. 

71), obtain appropriate housing (N.T. 4/24114, pgs. 48, 65) and complete drug and alcohol 

treatment (N.T. 4/24114, pg. 62). Father's pattern of non-compliance continued for at least six 

months prior to the filing of the termination petition. As a result, all the elements of the Adoption 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a) (1) have been fnlly satisfied. 

The Adoption Act at 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251l(a) (2) also includes, as a ground for involuntary 

termination of parental rights, the repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of 

the parent that causes the child to be without essential parental care, contro I or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being, and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. This ground is not limited 

to affirmative misconduct. It may include acts of refusal to perform parental duties but more 

specifically on the needs of the child. Adoption ofC.A.W, 683 A.2d 911, 914 (Pa. Super. 1996). 

COUlis have further held that the implications of the parent's limited success with services geared 

to remedy the barriers to effective parenting can also satisfy the requirements of §2511 (a) 2. In 

the matter of B.L. W, 843 A.2d 380 (Pa. Super. 2004), the court's grave concerns about the 

Father's ability to provide the level of protection, security and stability that his child needed was 

sufficient to warrant termination. rd. at 388. 

From the beginning of this case, when Child was placed with the natural great-aunt and 

subsequently when the Child was moved to maternal uncle and until the day of tenl1ination 

hearing on April 24, 2014, Father has failed and refused to remedy the causes that brought Child 

into care. Father continues to have a substance abuse problem, unstable housing and noncompliance with his treatment (N.T. 4/24114, pgs. 44-45, 48-49, 52, 65). Father has had no 

success in remedying the barriers to become an effective Father. Father has been well aware of 

his FSP objectives (N.T. 4/24114, pgs. 14,45). Father has used his wages to buy a car instead of 

buying health insurance, and provide for the Child's needs (NT 4/24114, pgs. 48, 66, 71-72). 

Father has failed to provide DHS with any documentation and for a period of time his 

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whereabouts were unknown (N.T. 4/24/14, pgs. 46, 63, 67-68). Father has admitted selling 

drugs and providing urine samples of other people's urine to pass drug screens (N.T. 4124114, pg. 

47). Drug and alcohol treatment remains an incomplete FSP objective (N.T. 4124114, pg. 62). 

Due to Father's non-compliance, he went from having unsupervised visitation to supervised 

visitation (N. T. 4124/14, pg. 67). Father continues to lack housing and currently lives in a 

recovery house (N.T. 4124/14, pgs. 48, 65). However despite Father's lack of compliance, DHS 

has continuously made reasonable effolis in 2011, 2012, and 2013 to provide Father with 

services. Child has been in placement for a period of thiliy-three months. The Child needs 

permanency; consequently, DHS has met its burden under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a) (2). 

DHS also requested termination of parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (a) (5), whereby 

child may be removed by court or voluntary agreement and is placed with an agency at least six 

months, conditions which led to the placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or 

will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the selvices reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions leading to placement, and 

temlination best serves the child's needs and welfare. 

DHS, as a children and youth agency, cannot be required to extend services beyond the period of 

time deemed as reasonable by the legislature or be subjected to herculean efforts. A child's life 

cannot be put on hold in hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the 

responsibilities of parenting. In re JT., 817 A.2d 509 (Pa. Super. 2001). As a consequence, 

Pennsylvania's Superior Court has recognized that the child's needs and welfare requires 

agencies to work toward termination of parental rights when a child has been placed in foster 

care beyond reasonable temporal limits and after reasonable efforts for reunification have been 

made by the agency, that have resulted unfruitful. This process should be completed within 

eighteen months. In re N w., 851 A.2d 508 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

The Child has been in care for a period of thirty-tlU'ee months. Father's substance abuse, 

unstable housing and non-compliance with the treatment caused the placement of the child (NT 

4/24/14, pg. 44). Father went from having unsupervised visitation to supervised visitation (NT 

4124114, pg. 67). Father never provided any documentation that verifies his drug and alcohol 

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program completion (N.T. 4/24114, pg. 46), which was requested on a weekly basis (N.T. 

4/24/14, pg. 63). Father lacks appropriate housing and is living in a recovery house (N. T. 

4/24114, pgs. 48, 65). Father continues to be unable to SUllU110n the ability to handle his 

responsibilities of parenting. Well more than eighteen months have passed, and Child is no 

closer to be reunified with Father as to when Child came into care. Child's life call110t be put on 

hold in hope that the Father will remedy the conditions that led to placement within a reasonable 

amount of time. The needs and welfare of the Child dictate that DHS met its burden as to the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 I (a) (5). 

As to §25l 1 (a) (8) of23 Pa.C.S.A., DHS met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that 

the Child has been out of Father's care for twelve months or more and the conditions leading to 

the placement still exist, and termination would best serve the needs and welfare of the Child. 

Child has been continuously under DHS custody for a period of thirty-tlnee months (N.T. 

4/24/14, pg. 43). The conditions that led to the Child's placement still exist (N.T. 4124114, pgs. 

68-69). Despite the good faith efforts ofDHS to make services available (N.T. 4/24/14, pgs. 48-

49,52), it is in the best interest of the Child to terminate Father's parental rights (N.T. 4/24/14, 

pgs.68-69) 

Father's sixth issue on appeal is whether cOUli erred in finding DHS made reasonable effOlis 

towards reunification. Pe1111sylvania Juvenile Act recognizes family preservation as one of its 

primary purposes. In interest orR.p. a Minor, 957 A.2d 1205 (Pa. Super. 2008). As a result, 

welfare agencies must make reasonable efforts to reunify the biological parents with their 

children. Nonetheless, if those effOlis fail, the agency must redirect its effolis toward placing the 

child in an adoptive home. Agencies are not required to provide services indefinitely when a 

parent is unwilling or unable to apply the instructions received. In re R. T., 778 A.2d 670 (Pa. 

Super. 2001). 

Due to the fact that Father lives out of the county, it was established that CEU was unable to 

recommend any program. As a consequence, DHS helped Father find appropriate programs 

(N.T. 4/24114, pgs. 48-49, 52). In 2012, the trial court found reasonable efforts on: February 

22"d , April 18th , June 20th , September 21 st and December lih. In 2013, the court found 

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reasonable efforts on January 22nd ,March 22nd ,June 18th , April 11th and November 14th. The 

termination petition was filed on November 1,2013. The court has consistently found that DRS 

made reasonable eff0l1s throughout the life of the case. DRS offered services and alternatives to 

Father. Nonetheless, Father decided not to follow DRS guidance and avail himself of the 

services being offered. 

The trial court will now consider Father's seventh issue on appeal. In order to terminate 

parental rights, the paI1y seeking termination must also prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the termination is in the best interest of the child. Also the best interest of the child is 

determined after consideration of the needs and welfare of the child such as love comfo11, 

security and stability. In re Bowman, 436 Pa. Super. 647, A.2d 217 (1994). See also In re 

Adoption ofT.T.B .. 835 A.2d 387, 397 (Pa. Super. 2003). Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (b), 

the trial cOUl1 must also consider what, if any bond exists between Father and child. In re 

Involuntary Termination of C. WS.M. and K.A.L.M.. 839 A.2d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2003). The 

trial cOUl1 must examine the status of the bond to determine whether its termination "would 

destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship". In re Adoption ofT.B.B., 387,397 

(Pa.Super.2003). In assessing the parental bond, the trial court is permitted to rely upon the 

observations and evaluations of social workers. In re K.Z.S" 946 a.2d 753,762-763 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511 (b), the rights of a parent also shall not be terminated solely 

on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing 

and medical iffound to be beyond the control of the parent. 

The Child will not suffer any ineparable harm by terminating Father's parental rights (N.T. 

4124/14, pg. 50). Child looks to aunt and uncle to satisfy his daily needs (N.T. 4/24/14, pg. 50). 

In addition, foster parents do in fact ensure that Child's services are in order on a daily basis 

(N.T. 4/24/14, pg. 69). Conversely, Father does not use his wages to provide for the Child's 

daily needs (N.T. 4/24/14, pg. 69) and has not been involved in any of the special services 

required by the Child (N.T. 4/24/14, pg. 51). Father and Child do not have a parent child/bond 

(N.T. 4/24/14, pg. 77). Father does not provide for the Child's comfort, security and stability. 

The foster parents do (N.T. 4/24114, pg. 69). It is in the best interest of Child to be adopted (N.T. 

4124114, pg. 69). Moreover, the termination of Father's parental rights will not cause irreparable 

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harm to the Child since there is no parent/child bond. The cOllli determined that the testimonies 

of the DHS witnesses were credible. Additionally, the record clearly establishes that Father's 

parental rights are being terminated due to his lack of non-compliance with his FSP objectives, 

no parent/child bond, causing no irreparable harm if it is severed and not due to environmental 

factors. 

Father's final issue on appeal questions whether the court erred in finding that the Child was 

removed from Father's care due to the fact that the Child was in Mother's care while Father was 

incarcerated. Nothing in the record suggests or establishes that Father was incarcerated at the 

time Child was found to be dependent. In fact, and it is on the record that Father was present at 

the Shelter Care hearing, and at the Adjudication hearing of the Child. 

Conclusion: 

For the aforementioned reasons, the court finds that DHS met its statutory burden by clear and 

convincing evidence regarding the termination of the parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511 (a) and (b). The cOllli also finds that it will not cause irreparable harm to the Child to sever 

any bond, and it is in the best interest of the Child since it would best serve the emotional needs 

and welfare of the Child. 

Accordingly, the order entered on April 24, 2014, terminating the parental rights of Father AJ.B. 

Sr. should be affirmed. 

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