IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-60243

DANNY L. ROBINSON,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

RODGER RYAN; INTERVECT USA, INCORPORATED, doing business as

Alimak Hek, Incorporated,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:07-CV-74

Before STEWART, CLEMENT, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Danny Robinson sued Rodger Ryan and his employer, Intervect USA, Inc.,

seeking damages allegedly resulting from a car accident involving Robinson and

Ryan. Following a jury verdict of no liability, Robinson filed alternative motions

for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. Robinson now appeals the

district court’s denial of both motions. We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 8, 2012

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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At the time of the incident giving rise to this suit, Ryan worked for

Intervect as an elevator repairman. His job required him to work in several

states in the southeast region of the country, and he therefore traveled

extensively. On January 20, 2005, Ryan was driving a rented pickup truck from

his home in Alabama through Sherman, Mississippi, on his way to perform a

service job in Memphis, Tennessee. Ryan stopped at a truck stop in Sherman,

parked his vehicle in a parking spot, and went into the convenience store. He

returned to the truck five to ten minutes later and listened to the presidential

inauguration on the radio for several minutes. During this same period,

Robinson, who then served as the Police Chief of Sherman, arrived at the truck

stop and parked his police car near the air pump, behind and perpendicular to

Ryan’s truck. The parties dispute how close together the two cars were parked

and how long before the collision Robinson had pulled in behind Ryan, but when

Ryan backed out of his parking spot, his rear bumper collided with the rear

quarter panel of Robinson’s car. 

On May 7, 2007, Robinson filed a complaint in the Mississippi state court,

alleging that Ryan had negligently backed his truck into Robinson’s police car,

causing injuries to Robinson’s right elbow and neck. Robinson and Intervect

successfully removed the case to the Northern District of Mississippi, where it

was tried to a jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a special

verdict that included the finding that Ryan was not “liable for negligence which

legally caused or contributed to Danny Robinson’s damages, if any,” and

awarded no damages. Arguing that the evidence overwhelmingly supported

liability, Robinson moved for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, for

a new trial. The district court denied both motions. This timely appeal followed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo,

applying the same standards as the district court. See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co.

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of Am. v. Ernst & Young LLP, 542 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2008). When a case is

tried by a jury, a Rule 50(a) motion is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the

evidence. In resolving such challenges, we draw all reasonable inferences and

resolve all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the jury

verdict. Thus, we will reverse the denial of a Rule 50(a) motion only if the

evidence points so strongly and so overwhelmingly in favor of the nonmoving

party that no reasonable juror could return a contrary verdict. Foradori v.

Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 2008). 

We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion.

Such a denial will be affirmed unless the appellant makes a “clear showing of 

an absolute absence of evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” Whitehead v. Food

Max of Miss., Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

DISCUSSION

I. Judgment as a Matter of Law

Robinson contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the

jury’s verdict on liability. The parties have focused much of their briefing on

whether the evidence adduced at trial conclusively demonstrated that Ryan was

negligent in backing his truck into Robinson’s car. But we need not address this

disagreement because the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude

that Robinson’s alleged injuries were not the result of the accident, and therefore

were not caused by Ryan, regardless of whether Ryan was negligent. Although

two of Robinson’s treating physicians, John Mitias and Glen Crosby, testified

that the accident was a contributing cause of his injuries, other evidence

indicated that his injuries were not caused by the accident. 

For example, the evidence showed that Robinson did not seek any medical

treatment until a full week after the accident. When he did seek treatment for

the first time following his injuries, his medical records indicate that he

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complained primarily of lower back pain and denied that his symptoms were

connected with any known trauma. Robinson did not seek treatment for his 1

elbow for more than three months after the accident, and when he did, he was

diagnosed with lateral epicondylitis, commonly known as tennis elbow, which

Dr. Mitias testified was a degenerative condition that could have been present

before the accident. Mitias also testified that if the condition in Robinson’s elbow

was directly caused by the accident, the pain would have manifested itself within

the first week. Although Mitias did opine that the condition was related to the

accident, he admitted that this conclusion was based almost entirely on

Robinson’s own account of when his symptoms began, and that his degree of

certainty was lessened by the fact that Robinson did not seek treatment for his

elbow for over three months after the accident. The jury also heard testimony

that Robinson had received medical attention for his right elbow in connection

with an incident that occurred years before the accident, a fact that Mitias

admitted would have affected his opinion about the cause of Robinson’s condition

had he been aware of it. 

Moreover, there is no medical record that Robinson complained of any neck

pain until almost two years after the accident, despite the fact that during this

period he met with a physician and physical therapists on numerous occasions.

Like Mitias, Dr. Crosby, who eventually treated Robinson’s neck, admitted his

conclusion that Robinson’s injuries were caused by the accident was based only

on Robinson’s statements to him about when his symptoms began. Crosby also

testified that some of Robinson’s neck problems stemmed from degenerative disc

disease, a condition that does not typically result from trauma. Thus, the

evidence about the cause of Robinson’s injuries was in conflict and did not point

Robinson testified that he complained of pain in his elbow at this first doctor’s visit, 1

but his assertion was not corroborated by the other evidence.

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“so strongly and so overwhelmingly” in favor of Robinson that no reasonable

juror could return a contrary verdict. 

As we have explained:

A jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and those

inferences may constitute sufficient proof to support a verdict. On

appeal we are bound to view the evidence and all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to the jury’s determination.

Even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we had

been the trier of fact, we are not free to re-weigh the evidence or to

re-evaluate credibility of witnesses. We must not substitute for the

jury’s reasonable factual inferences other inferences that we may

regard as more reasonable.

Int’l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 297 (5th Cir. 2005). The jury was free

to discredit the evidence connecting Robinson’s injuries to the accident, and we

must not overturn its reasonable conclusion. 

II. New Trial 

Robinson contends that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the great weight

of the evidence, warranting a new trial. 

Our review of the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial

is more deferential than our review of a motion for judgment as a

matter of law. We will reverse the trial court’s denial of a motion for

a new trial only when there is a clear showing of an abuse of

discretion. To show an abuse of discretion in this respect, the

defendant must show an absolute absence of evidence to support the

jury’s verdict. 

Foradori, 523 F.3d at 497 (citations omitted). Because we have already

concluded that the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence in reviewing the

district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law, we necessarily find that

there was no abuse of discretion in its denying the motion for a new trial. See id.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED. 

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