96-524

 No. 96-524

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

DALE THOMAS KLOCK,

 Plaintiff and Appellant,

 v.

THE TOWN OF CASCADE, MONTANA; GORDON BOOTH; LAURI CARY; 

ROBERT NICHOLSON; MEDRIC BRUNEAU; JACK WHITAKER; ROY AAFEDT; 

PEGGY BELTRONE; BARRY MICHELOTTI; JOHN STRANDELL; BRANDT LIGHT;

JULIE MACEK; MURRY MOORE; STOCKMENS BANK; ROBERT VERMILLION;

and JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, presently unknown,

 Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Cascade,

 The Honorable James E. Purcell, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 John Keith, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana

 For Respondents:

 Kevin C. Meek; Davis, Hatley, Haffeman & Tighe; Great Falls, Montana 

 (for Town of Cascade, Booth, Cary, Nicholson, Bruneau, and Vermillion)

 Neil E. Ugrin; Ugrin, Alexander, Zadick & Higgins; Great Falls, Montana

 (for Whitaker, Aafedt, Beltrone, Michelotti, Strandell, Light, and Macek)

 Guy W. Rogers and Tiffany B. Lonnevik; Brown, Gerbase, Cebull, Fulton,

 Harman & Ross; Billings, Montana (for Moore and Stockmens Bank)

 Submitted on Briefs: June 5, 1997

 Decided: August 12, 1997

Filed:

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-524%20Opinion.htm (1 of 8)4/16/2007 11:38:42 AM
96-524

 _________________________________________

Clerk

Justice Terry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.

 The appellant, Dale Thomas Klock, filed a complaint against the respondents, the

Town of Cascade, Montana, Gordon Booth, Lauri Cary, Robert Nicholson, Medric

Bruneau, Robert Vermillion, Jack Whitaker, Roy Aafedt, Peggy Beltrone, Barry

Michelotti, John Strandell, Brandt Light, Julie Macek, Murry Moore, and Stockmens

Bank, in the District Court for the Eighth Judicial District in Cascade County. 

After a

hearing, the District Court: (1) denied Klock's motion for entry of default 

judgment; (2)

granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents; and (3) awarded attorney fees 

to

the respondents, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. Klock appeals. We affirm the 

judgment

of the District Court.

 The following issues are presented on appeal:

 1. Did the District Court err when it denied Klock's motion for entry of 

default judgment?

 2. Did the District Court err when it granted summary judgment in favor of

the respondents?

 3. Did the District Court err when it awarded attorney fees to the 

respondents,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988?

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 In February 1995, Murry Moore, president of Stockmens Bank, contacted the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), and the 

Cascade

County Sheriff's Office and informed them that Dale Thomas Klock, in his official

capacity as Mayor of Cascade, deposited $20 million in the form of money orders into

the Town of Cascade's bank account. Each money order stated that it was payable at

Norwest Bank, Butte, Montana, through Account No. 8520799406. In the past, that

account belonged to the United States District Court for the District of Montana. 

It was

closed, however, due to attempts by "Freemen" to use its funds. In September 1994,

Stockmens Bank and other Montana banks had been put on notice of these types of

fraudulent transactions by a special notice from the FRB, and had been requested to

contract the FBI upon receipt of such a transaction.

 Robert Vermillion, general counsel for the Town of Cascade, learned of Klock's

attempt to deposit the fraudulent money orders when he was contacted by Cascade Town

Council member Lauri Cary. Due to his concern that the Town of Cascade could be

exposed to civil liability, Vermillion contacted Klock and unsuccessfully attempted 

to

gather information about the money orders. He also contacted Moore, who told him 

that

the money orders were fraudulent.

 On February 27, 1995, Vermillion prepared a memo in which he memorialized the

substance of his conversations with Cary and Klock. He also sent a letter to Klock 

in

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-524%20Opinion.htm (2 of 8)4/16/2007 11:38:42 AM
96-524

which he advised him that, because he was the Town of Cascade's attorney, a potential

conflict of interest could preclude him from giving legal advice to Klock regarding 

the

money orders. Vermillion sent additional copies of that letter to Town of Cascade

Council Members Medric Bruneau and Gordon Booth. 

 Julie Macek, Deputy County Attorney for Cascade County, investigated the 

matter. 

On March 6, 1995, she prepared an information with which to charge Klock with

criminal syndicalism and official misconduct, and an affidavit in support. On that 

same

day, Macek and Brandt Light, Cascade County Attorney, decided to issue a summons,

and not a warrant, for Klock's arrest. 

 On March 8, 1995, Macek met with the Cascade County Attorney's staff and

informed them of the charges which she and Light had decided to file. On March 9,

1995, a meeting was held at the Cascade County Commissioner's Office. The following

persons attended that meeting: Cascade Town Council members Lauri Cary and Robert

Nicholson; Cascade County Commissioners Jack Whitaker, Roy Aafedt, and Peggy

Beltrone; Cascade County Sheriff Barry Michelotti and Undersheriff John Strandell; 

and

County Attorney Brandt Light. The purpose of the meeting was for Light to advise the

attendees that the Cascade County Attorney's Office had decided to charge Klock with

criminal syndicalism and official misconduct. The attendees also discussed personal 

and

public safety issues. 

 On that same day, the information was signed by the District Court and filed 

with

the Clerk. Klock was charged with one count of misdemeanor official misconduct and

three counts of felony bad check issuance. He was served shortly thereafter. 

Following

the March 9, 1995, meeting, Council members Cary and Nicholson discussed whether

Klock should be suspended as mayor pending the outcome of the criminal charges. They

personally agreed that the Town's best interests would be served by a suspension. 

 They also expressed concern with regard to the manner in which Klock or other

Freemen might react to the suspension. Specifically, Cary was concerned that Klock 

or

other Freemen might try to seize records from the Town Hall or otherwise impair the 

city

government's operations. On that basis, she raised the issue of changing the locks 

to the

Town Hall. She contacted Council member Bruneau and he agreed that the locks should

be changed. She called a locksmith and had the locks to the Town Hall changed.

 On March 10, 1995, a special meeting of the Cascade Town Council was held for

the purpose of determining whether Klock should be suspended from his position as

mayor. Notice of the hearing was posted at the Town Hall and at least three other

locations. Approximately 100 to 150 people attended the meeting. During the meeting,

all four members of the Town Council voted to suspend Klock from office pending the

outcome of the criminal charges brought against him.

 On August 21, 1995, Klock filed a complaint and request for injunctive relief in

the District Court. The "County defendants" (Whitaker, Aafedt, Beltrone, Michelotti,

Strandell, Light, and Macek) are identified in the counts which allege, inter alia,

violation of civil rights, conspiracy to violate civil rights, and malicious 

prosecution/abuse

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-524%20Opinion.htm (3 of 8)4/16/2007 11:38:42 AM
96-524

of process. The "Town defendants" (the Town of Cascade, Booth, Cary, Nicholson,

Bruneau, and Vermillion) are identified in the counts which allege, inter alia, 

wrongful

removal from office, violation of civil rights, conspiracy to violate civil rights, 

malicious

prosecution/abuse of process, and breach of fiduciary duty. Moore and Stockmens Bank

are identified in the counts which allege, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, 

conversion,

and violations of Montana's Uniform Commercial Code. 

 The Bank filed an answer and denied all liability. The County defendants filed 

a

motion to dismiss, which the District Court denied. Subsequently, the Bank, the 

County

defendants, and the Town defendants (collectively, "the respondents") each filed a 

motion

for summary judgment, supported by affidavits.

 Klock filed a motion for entry of default judgment against the Town defendants

and the County defendants. After a hearing, the District Court: (1) denied Klock's

motion; and (2) granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents.

 The respondents also moved the District Court to award them attorney fees,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. After a hearing, the District Court granted that 

motion.

 ISSUE 1

 Did the District Court err when it denied Klock's motion for entry of default

judgment?

 At the summary judgment hearing, Klock moved the District Court to enter default

judgment against the County defendants and the Town defendants. The court, however,

concluded that they made a timely appearance in the action and strenuously defended

against Klock's claims. On that basis, the court denied the motion.

 On appeal, Klock contends that the District Court erred when it denied the 

motion

for entry of default judgment. Specifically, he claims that the County defendants 

and the

Town defendants failed to file an "answer" to the complaint. Therefore, he maintains

that the court erred when it refused to enter default judgment against them.

 The entry of default judgment is governed by Rule 55, M.R.Civ.P., which

provides, in relevant part, that "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for 

affirmative

relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules 

and that

fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter the party's 

default."

Rule 55(a), M.R.Civ.P. (emphasis added).

 After the County defendants' motion to dismiss was denied, the County defendants

and the Town defendants each filed a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule

56, M.R.Civ.P. We therefore conclude that at the time Klock filed a motion for entry

of default judgment the County defendants and the Town defendants were, in fact,

"otherwise defend[ing]" as provided by Montana's Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err when it denied Klock's

motion for entry of default judgment. That part of the District Court's judgment is

affirmed.

 ISSUE 2

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-524%20Opinion.htm (4 of 8)4/16/2007 11:38:42 AM
96-524

 Did the District Court err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the

respondents?

 Summary judgment is governed by Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P., which provides, in

relevant part, as follows:

 The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

 with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

 material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

 of law.

Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.

 The purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate the burden and expense of

unnecessary trials. Berens v. Wilson (1990), 246 Mont. 269, 271, 806 P.2d 14, 16. 

This Court reviews an order which grants summary judgment de novo and applies the

same criteria as the district court. Fenger v. Flathead County (1996), 277 Mont. 

507,

509-10, 922 P.2d 1183, 1184. The party moving for summary judgment has the initial

burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact in light of the

substantive principles that entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. Cecil v. 

Cardinal

Drilling Co. (1990), 244 Mont. 405, 409, 797 P.2d 232, 234.

 After the moving party has met its burden, the burden then shifts to the party

opposing the motion to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Sprunk

v. First Bank System (1992), 252 Mont. 463, 466, 830 P.2d 103, 104. The party

opposing the motion must present facts of a substantial nature showing that genuine 

issues

of material fact remain for trial. Wangen v. Kecskes (1993), 256 Mont. 165, 172, 845

P.2d 721, 726.

 In order to meet its burden, the party opposing the motion must present 

substantial

evidence, not mere denial, speculation, or conclusory statements. Sprunk, 252 Mont. 

at

463, 830 P.2d at 105. "The opposing party's facts must be material and of a 

substantial

nature, not fanciful, frivolous, gauzy, nor merely suspicions." Fleming v. Fleming

Farms, Inc. (1986), 221 Mont. 237, 241, 717 P.2d 1103, 1105. Moreover, the opposing

party cannot rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but "has an affirmative 

duty to

respond by affidavits or other sworn testimony containing material facts that raise 

genuine

issues; conclusory or speculative statements will not suffice." Groshelle v. Reid 

(1995),

270 Mont. 443, 447, 893 P.2d 314, 316. 

 In response to Klock's complaint, the Bank, the Town defendants, and the County

defendants each filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the District

Court made the following conclusions:

 In this case [the respondents] meet their burden of showing that no

 issues of material fact exist by supplying the Court with the affidavits. 

 Because [they] have met their burden, [Klock] must present material and

 substantial evidence raising disputed material facts. [He] failed to provide

 the Court with material substantial evidence of disputed material facts. 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-524%20Opinion.htm (5 of 8)4/16/2007 11:38:42 AM
96-524

 Instead, [he] makes conclusory or speculative statements to raise a genuine

 issue of material fact. Therefore, after considering all reasonable inferences

 from the evidence in [his] favor, the Court determines no genuine issue of

 material facts exist.

On that basis, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the 

respondents

with regard to all of Klock's claims.

 On appeal, Klock contends that the District Court erred when it granted

 summary judgment in favor of the respondents. Specifically, he claims

 that genuine issues of material fact exist and, therefore, that summary

 judgment is inappropriate.

 After a review of the record, we conclude that Klock has failed to establish a

genuine issue of material fact with regard to any of his claims. In fact, the 

record is

devoid of any evidence to contradict the respondents' affidavits submitted in 

support of

their respective motions for summary judgment. Rather, Klock relies on speculative 

and

conclusory statements which are not directly supported by evidence contained within 

the

record. For example, the "statement of facts" in his appellate brief does not refer 

to

affidavits, deposition testimony, discovery responses, or any evidence in the 

record. 

Instead, it consists almost entirely of references to oral arguments made by his 

counsel

at the summary judgment hearing. 

 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err when it granted summary

judgment in favor of the respondents. That part of the District Court's judgment is

affirmed.

 ISSUE 3

 Did the District Court err when it awarded attorney fees to the respondents,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988?

 After the District Court entered summary judgment in their favor, the Bank, the

County defendants, and the Town defendants each moved the court for an award of

attorney fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. After a hearing, the court granted 

those

motions.

 On appeal, Klock contends that the District Court erred when it awarded attorney

fees to the respondents. Specifically, he maintains that: (1) his civil rights 

claims, made

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985, were not frivolous, meritless, or lacking

foundation; (2) the amount of the fees awarded is unreasonable; and (3) "no basis

whatsoever exists for the grant of attorney fees to [the Bank and Robert Vermillion] 

since

the allegations regarding these defendant [sic] do not relate to civil rights 

violations."

 42 U.S.C. 1988(b) provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n any action or 

proceeding

to enforce a provision of [42 U.S.C. 1983 or 42 U.S.C. 1985] . . . the court, in 

its

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-524%20Opinion.htm (6 of 8)4/16/2007 11:38:42 AM
96-524

discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part 

of the

costs."

 In Hughes v. Rowe (1980), 449 U.S. 5, 101 S. Ct. 173, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163, the

United States Supreme Court established the applicable standard for awarding attorney

fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. The Court concluded that an award of attorney 

fees

to a prevailing defendant is appropriate if the plaintiff's civil rights claim is 

"meritless in

the sense that it is groundless or without foundation." Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14.

Furthermore, it is well established that both the decision to award fees and the 

amount

of the award are upheld absent an abuse of discretion. Wagner v. Empire Development

Corp. (1987), 228 Mont. 370, 372, 743 P.2d 586, 587; Flowers v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n

(8th Cir. 1995), 49 F.3d 391, 392.

 We must first, therefore, decide whether the District Court abused its 

discretion

when it awarded attorney fees to the respondents, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. The

court based its decision to award attorney fees on the following rationale:

 [T]he Court examined all facts before it and found that [Klock] did not

 support his [42 U.S.C. 1983 & 1985] claims . . . with substantial

 credible facts. In effect, this Court determined that [his] claims,

 unsupported by facts, were meritless and without foundation. Even at this

 late date in the proceedings, [he] is unable to provide the Court with

 credible evidence of the alleged civil rights violations.

 We have already concluded, when we affirmed the District Court's order granting

summary judgment, that the record is devoid of any evidence which directly supports

Klock's claims and that, instead, he relies on speculative and conclusory statements 

which

find no support within the record. We therefore conclude that the District Court 

did not

abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney fees to the respondents, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. 1988. 

 Next, we must decide whether the amount of fees awarded by the District Court

is reasonable. After a hearing and a review of the "affidavits of attorney fees" 

submitted

by the respondents, the court made the following determinations:

 In this case, reasonable fees are those fees required to defend against

 [Klock's] alleged civil rights violations. . . . In using [its] discretion the

 Court determines that since [he] alleged eight counts, two of which were

 civil rights claims, [the respondents] are entitled to one-fourth or 25% of

 their attorney fees. 

 In essence, the District Court applied the "lodestar" approach, which involves

multiplication of an attorney's reasonable hourly rate times the reasonable number of

hours spent on the litigation. Audit Serv., Inc. v. Frontier-West, Inc. (1992), 252 

Mont.

142, 153, 827 P.2d 1242, 1250. In Ihler v. Chisholm (1993), 259 Mont. 240, 855 P.2d

1009, the prevailing party moved the District Court to award attorney fees pursuant 

to

42 U.S.C. 1988. The court awarded attorney fees and employed the lodestar approach

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-524%20Opinion.htm (7 of 8)4/16/2007 11:38:42 AM
96-524

when it calculated the amount to be awarded. 

 On appeal, we upheld the court's application of the lodestar approach and

recognized that there is a "strong presumption" that an award of attorney fees 

calculated

by the lodestar approach is a reasonable fee. Ihler, 259 Mont. at 245, 855 P.2d at 

1012

(citing City of Burlington v. Dague (1992), 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S. Ct. 2638, 2641,

120 L. Ed. 2d 449, 456).

 We therefore conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when 

it

employed the lodestar approach and awarded the respondents one-fourth or 25 percent 

of

their total attorney fees.

 Finally, Klock contends that the District Court erred when it awarded attorney 

fees

to the Bank and Vermillion. Specifically, he maintains that "no basis whatsoever 

exists

for the grant of attorney fees to [the Bank and Vermillion] since the allegations 

regarding

these defendant [sic] do not relate to civil rights violations under Title 42 

section 1983."

 The record, however, does not support Klock's contention. A review of the

complaint, the transcript of the summary judgment hearing, and the District Court's 

order

granting summary judgment, establishes that the Bank and Vermillion were forced to

defend Klock's claim made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1985, which alleges a conspiracy to

violate his civil rights. We therefore conclude that the District Court did not err 

when

it awarded attorney fees to the Bank and Vermillion.

 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err when it awarded 

attorney

fees to the respondents pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. 

 The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. 

 /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/96-524%20Opinion.htm (8 of 8)4/16/2007 11:38:42 AM