1 Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions

that have no precedential value and merely decide particular

cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes

needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal

profession." Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined

that this opinion should not be published. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 95-30277

Summary Calendar

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP.,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

VERNA PRESTON GREEN, ET AL.,

Defendants,

WILLIAM B. RAGSDALE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Western District of Louisiana

92 CV 1851

( August 25, 1995 )

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 1

BACKGROUND

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver

of the now-defunct Louisiana Bank & Trust Company , filed suit2 Only Ragsdale is a party to this appeal.

2 against Verna Preston Green, Eugene J. Green, Jr., Wi lliam

R agsdale, Green & Ragsdale, Inc., and Flame Control, Inc., to

collect on eight promissory notes. 2 Ultimately, the FDIC filed a

motion for summary judgment against all makers of all notes. The

district court granted the FDIC's motion for summary judgment, in

which it determined that Ragsdale was liable for three of the

loans.

In the order granting the motion for summary judgment, the

district court ordered the FDIC to submit a proposed judgment and

documentation to supp ort its calculation of the interest due on

each note. Because the parties could not agree on the content of

the proposed judgment, the district court then ordered each party

to submit a proposed judgment. R agsdale and the FDIC each

submitted proposed judgments. T he district court entered judgment

using the interest rates in Ragsdale's proposed judgment.

Ragsdale filed a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to vacate the

judgment arguing, inter alia

, that the amount of interest due on

the loans was in dispute because the FDIC had failed to provide the

district court with the requested documentation to support its

interest calculations. T he district court agreed that the FDIC had

failed to comply with the court's order to provide documentation to

support its interest calculations, but denied the Rule 59(e) motion

because it had used the interest figures submitted by Ragsdale.

Ragsdale filed a timely notice of appeal.3 OPINION

Ragsdale argues that the district cou rt improperly granted

summary judgment for the FDIC because there remain genuine issues

of material fact regarding the rate and amount of interest due on

the loans. He does not contest the district court's order to the

extent it found h im liable under three of the loans. Ragsdale

argues that the information supplied by the FDIC regarding

interests on the loans was inconsis tent and unreliable and,

therefore, can not support the interest rate in the judgment.

Ragsdale submitted a proposed judgment in which he applied an

interest rate of 7.5% per annum on each of the loans. T he district

court used this interest rate to compute the interest due on the

loans. T herefore, Ragsdale cannot argue on appeal that the

district court used the incorrect interest rate. See Sierra Club

v. Yeutter

, 926 F.2d 429, 438 (5th Cir. 1991) (it is a "cardinal

rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as error a

ruling or other trial proceeding invited by [such] party" (internal

quotations and citation omitted)); Tel-Phonic Services, Inc. v. TBS

Int'l, Inc.

, 975 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1992) ("A party will not

be heard to appeal the propriety of an order to which it agreed.").

Ragsdale argues that he should not be held to the figures

which he included in his proposed judgment because he had resigned

from the companies six months before the loans were executed and

did not have personal knowledge of the loans or the interest rates.

He contends that due to his lack of personal knowledge he was

forced to use the prayer in the FDIC's amended complaint as theopin\95-30277.opn

4

basis of his proposed judgment. E ven if Ragsdale's statement is

correct, the appropriate time to have challenged the FDIC's

interest calculations and to have obtained the ne cessary

information to prepare a proposed judgment was before he submitted

his proposed judgment. See Brotherhood of Ry., Airline, and S.S.

Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employees v. St. Louis

Southwestern Ry. Co.

, 676 F.2d 132, 140 (5th Cir. 1982) ("A

defeated liti gant cannot set aside a judgment because of his

failure to interpose a defense that could have been presented at

trial, or because he failed to present on a m otion for summary

judgment all of the facts known to him that might have been useful

to the court.") (inter nal quotations and citation omitted).

Because Ragsdale made no effort to obtain information to determine

the appropriate interest rates and failed to provide the district

court with any evidence to support a different calculation, he

cannot argue that the district court erred by using the interest

rates he suggested. The district court's judgment is

AFFIRMED

.