UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

FIRST CHOICE FEDERAL CREDIT 

UNION, on Behalf of Itself and All Others 

Similarly Situated, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FAIR ISAAC CORPORATION, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION ............................................................................................. 1

II. PARTIES ............................................................................................................................ 4

A. Plaintiff ................................................................................................................... 4

B. Defendant ................................................................................................................ 5

III. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE ...................................... 5

IV. ALLEGATIONS OF FACT SUPPORTING THE CLAIM FOR RELIEF ........................ 6

A. Credit Scores ........................................................................................................... 6

B. The Markets for Credit Scores in the United States ............................................... 7

C. Fair Isaac Has a Monopoly in the B2B Credit Score Market ................................. 9

D. Attempts To Compete Have Been Stymied by Fair Isaac’s Monopoly in the 

B2B Credit Score Market...................................................................................... 11

E. Fair Isaac Has Contracted with the Credit Bureaus as Agents and 

Co-Conspirators in Its Scheme To Monopolize.................................................... 13

F. Fair Isaac’s Other Anticompetitive and Exclusionary Conduct ........................... 14

1. Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus Have Entered into Anticompetitive 

Contract Terms that Restrict Their Ability To Compete and Sell 

VantageScore ............................................................................................ 15

a. The Anticompetitive Agreements Restrict the Credit Bureaus’ 

Ability To Develop or Sell Other Credit Scores Compatible 

with B2B Purchasers’ Existing Systems ....................................... 15

b. Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus Have Agreed to a Penalty 

Pricing and Bundling Scheme To Foreclose Competition from 

Competitors in the B2B Credit Score Market ............................... 17

c. Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus Have Agreed to Contract 

Provisions that Allow Fair Isaac To Extract Monopoly Prices ..... 19

2. Fair Isaac’s Campaign To Create Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt About 

VantageScore Among B2B Purchasers .................................................... 19

3. Fair Isaac’s Anticompetitive and Exclusionary Conduct Harms 

Competition............................................................................................... 22

V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ................................................................................. 23

VI. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND TOLLING .......................................................... 25

VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF .................................................................................................... 25

CLAIM ONE: MONOPOLIZATION 15 U.S.C. § 2 ........................................................ 25

CLAIM TWO: CONSPIRACY TO MONOPOLIZE 15 U.S.C.§ 2 ................................. 27

CLAIM THREE: UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT OF TRADE 15 U.S.C. §1 ............ 29

VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................... 30

IX. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL ........................................................................................ 31

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Plaintiff First Choice Federal Credit Union, on behalf of itself and all other similarly 

situated residents of the United States, brings claims under the Sherman Act against Defendant 

Fair Isaac Corporation (“Fair Isaac”) for redress of the injury and damages resulting from its 

monopolizing, conspiring to monopolize, and otherwise unreasonably restraining trade from at 

least as early as January 1, 2006, through the date by which the anticompetitive effects of 

Defendant’s violations of law shall have ceased, but in any case no earlier than the present (the 

“Class Period”). Based upon personal knowledge, information and belief, proceedings and 

admissions made in Case No. 1:17-cv-08318 (N.D. Ill.), related ongoing federal government 

investigations, and investigation of counsel, Plaintiff alleges: 

I. NATURE OF THE ACTION 

1. “Credit Scores” are three digit numbers that rank or “score” creditworthiness 

within a range by applying certain algorithms to credit histories. There are two distinct markets 

for Credit Scores in the United States: (1) the market for the sale of Credit Scores to lenders, 

financial institutions, and other businesses for risk management decisions (the “B2B Credit 

Score Market”); and (2) the market for the sale of Credit Scores directly to consumers to monitor 

their own credit records (the “business-to-consumer” or “B2C Credit Score Market”). 

2. This case concerns the B2B Credit Score Market, over which Defendant Fair 

Isaac has unlawfully maintained a 90% monopoly for many years. 

3. Fair Isaac has abused its monopoly power by engaging in anticompetitive and 

exclusionary conduct and agreements. Fair Isaac has suppressed competition, stymied 

innovation, and limited access to credit for millions of Americans – all in violation of Sections 1 

and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1, 2. 

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4. Fair Isaac’s FICO Credit Scores (“FICO Scores”) have dominated the market for 

nearly three decades. Fair Isaac executives have bragged that their FICO Scores are “the 800-

pound gorilla” and are “deeply embedded in the system in North America.” Fair Isaac admitted 

in 2017 that it has “maintained a 90-plus percent market share for at least 13 years.” Fair Isaac 

advertises that its FICO Scores are used for 90% of all lending decisions in the United States and 

that Fair Isaac sells four times more FICO Scores per year than McDonald’s sells hamburgers 

worldwide.

5. TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax are credit reporting agencies that collect, 

standardize, and distribute information on consumer credit activity (collectively, the “Credit 

Bureaus”). Credit Bureaus sell lenders, financial institutions, and other businesses credit reports 

and Credit Scores – including Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores – that are used to make decisions about 

whether and on what terms to evaluate and extend credit. Credit Bureaus sell those credit reports 

and Credit Scores to businesses in every state. For decades, Credit Bureaus have acted as Fair 

Isaac’s agents and co-conspirators to broker sales between businesses and Fair Isaac of the 

dominant FICO Scores. Fair Isaac has used these distribution agreements to place 

anticompetitive restrictions on the three dominant Credit Bureaus’ ability to develop or distribute 

competitive Credit Scores; prohibited Credit Bureaus from individually negotiating royalty 

prices for access to FICO Scores; charged discriminatory and prohibitively high royalty prices 

for FICO Scores if a Credit Bureau customer purchases a FICO Score while providing the 

consumer with a competing score; and increased the royalty prices that must be paid by Credit 

Bureaus. Nevertheless, the Credit Bureaus have agreed to, and acquiesced in, these restrictions. 

6. In 2006, VantageScore Solutions, LLC (“VantageScore”), a joint venture of the 

Credit Bureaus, launched a competitive Credit Score known as VantageScore. From the outset, 

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VantageScore was competitively priced, highly predictive, and scored millions more Americans 

than Fair Isaac’s FICO products. Today, by making full use of the Credit Bureaus’ consumer 

data, including rental and utility payments, VantageScore is capable of providing Credit Scores 

for an additional 30 million Americans who do not have a FICO Score. Were VantageScore 

widely adopted by businesses, millions more creditworthy Americans would have the 

opportunity to apply for a home mortgage, car loan, or credit card, and obtain credit at lower 

costs. 

7. Rather than compete on the merits with VantageScore, Fair Isaac has engaged in a 

pattern of anticompetitive conduct over the course of more than a decade to discourage the 

adoption of VantageScore and preserve its own monopoly, with the Credit Bureaus’ assistance. 

Fair Isaac has abused its monopoly power to prevent the Credit Bureaus from successfully 

marketing and selling a competitive alternative to FICO Scores and has waged a disparaging 

public relations and advertising campaign to create fear, uncertainty, and doubt about 

VantageScore’s viability and reliability with lenders and consumers. 

8. Through its exclusionary conduct, Fair Isaac has succeeded in preventing the 

substantial sales growth that VantageScore or a competing credit scoring system would have 

achieved though competition on the merits. Having suppressed competition, Fair Isaac has been 

able to significantly increase prices, including most recently in September 2019, for its FICO 

Scores. But for Fair Isaac’s suppression of competition and the resulting contractual agreements 

not to compete, VantageScore or another competitive credit scoring system would have thrived 

and won substantial market share through its innovative product and would have reduced the 

prices paid for B2B Credit Scores by Plaintiff and members of the Class. 

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9. Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct has harmed businesses that 

have been deprived of competitive pricing for instruments that allow them to gauge credit risk 

and have had their freedom of choice restricted. Opening the market to competition is essential 

to competitive pricing and product innovation, including scoring the tens of millions of 

creditworthy Americans who have been denied access to credit. 

10. In February 2018, TransUnion filed antitrust counterclaims for monopolization 

and related claims against Fair Isaac in this District. See Fair Isaac Corp. v. Trans Union LLC, 

No. 1:17-cv-08318, ECF No. 38 (redacted counterclaims). In March 2019, The Honorable Judge 

Sharon Johnson Coleman denied Fair Isaac’s motion to dismiss TransUnion’s antitrust 

counterclaims. See id., ECF No. 96. The matter is ongoing. 

11. On March 15, 2020, Fair Isaac disclosed that it was under investigation by the 

Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice for exclusionary conduct relating to 

the allegations in the counterclaims upheld by Judge Coleman.1

II. PARTIES 

A. Plaintiff 

12. Plaintiff First Choice Federal Credit Union is a federally chartered credit union 

with a principal place of business in New Castle, Pennsylvania. 

13. Plaintiff is a financial institution that provides financial services, including 

deposit accounts, credit and/or debit cards, and lending and other credit-related facilities for 

consumers. 

 

1 See Fair Isaac Corporation, Press Release: FICO Statement Regarding Antitrust Investigation, 

PR Newswire (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/fico-statementregarding-antitrust-investigation-301024452.html. 

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14. During the Class Period, Plaintiff directly purchased B2B Credit Scores from 

Defendant and a Credit Bureau. 

15. Plaintiff was injured in its business or property as a direct, proximate, and 

material result of Defendant’s violations of law. 

16. Plaintiff is threatened with future injury to its business and property by reason of 

Defendant’s continuing violations of law. 

B. Defendant 

17. Defendant Fair Isaac Corporation is a Delaware corporation, with its principal 

place of business at 181 Metro Drive, Suite 700, San Jose, California 95110. 

III. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 

18. This action arises under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (as 

amended), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 (as 

amended), 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26. 

19. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1332(d), and 

1337. 

20. Venue is proper in this District under 15 U.S.C. §§15(a) and 22, and 28 U.S.C. 

§1391(b), (c) and (d), because during the Class Period, Defendant resided, transacted business, 

was found, or had agents in the United States, including in this District, and a substantial portion 

of the alleged activity affected interstate trade and commerce, including in this District. 

21. During the Class Period, Defendant’s conduct was within the flow of, was 

intended to, and did, in fact, have a substantial effect on the interstate commerce of the United 

States, including in this District. 

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22. During the Class Period, Defendant used the instrumentalities of interstate 

commerce, including interstate wires, wireless spectrum, and the U.S. mail, to effectuate its 

illegal scheme. 

23. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant transacted 

business, maintained substantial contacts, and is located and/or committed unlawful conduct in 

this District. The unlawful scheme was directed at, and had the intended effect of, causing injury 

to persons residing in, located in, or doing business in this District. 

24. Plaintiff purchased at least one FICO Score from Fair Isaac and TransUnion, 

which is headquartered in this District. 

25. Defendant employs persons who work in its Credit Score business in this District. 

26. Defendant is registered to do business in Illinois with the Illinois Secretary of 

State. 

27. Defendant selected this District to institute Case No. 1:17-cv-08318, to which this 

case is filed as related by Plaintiff. 

IV. ALLEGATIONS OF FACT SUPPORTING THE CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

A. Credit Scores 

28. Credit Scores are typically three-digit numbers that are designed to assess credit 

risk. Higher scores generally indicate that a consumer poses less credit risk. Credit Scores are 

produced using credit scoring systems that apply a credit scoring algorithm to a consumer credit 

report. Credit Scores are usually accompanied by “reason codes,” which inform the lender about 

the reasons that contributed most significantly to reducing a particular consumer’s Credit Score. 

29. Credit Scores are the most widely used indicators of consumers’ creditworthiness 

in the United States. Lenders, financial institutions, and other businesses rely on Credit Scores to 

decide whether and on what terms to extend credit to consumers. Consumers, in contrast, rely on 

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Credit Scores to determine whether they will be able to get a mortgage, credit card, auto loan, or 

other credit product and the rate they will pay. 

30. The Credit Bureaus collect and supply aggregated consumer credit data in the 

form of consumer reports. The Credit Bureaus continuously gather credit and financial data 

about consumers from creditors, governmental entities, public records, collection agencies, and 

other third parties. This information is then compiled into a “credit file.” The Credit Bureaus 

sell credit reports, which include information gathered from a consumer’s credit file, to 

businesses and consumers. 

31. While Credit Scores are sometimes sold together with credit reports, credit reports 

are different from Credit Scores and can be sold independently. A credit report is a statement 

that has detailed information about a consumer’s credit activity and current credit situation. A 

consumer’s credit report might, for example, include information about that consumer’s history 

of mortgage payments, credit card balances, credit card payments, and credit inquiries. A Credit 

Score takes the detailed information in a credit report and turns it into a single three-digit 

number. 

B. The Markets for Credit Scores in the United States 

32. There are two distinct markets for Credit Scores in the United States: (1) the B2B 

Credit Score Market; and (2) the B2C Credit Score Market. B2B and B2C Credit Scores are 

priced, purchased, and used very differently and serve very different purposes. The lenders, 

financial institutions, and other businesses in the B2B Credit Score Market that purchase and use 

Credit Scores to assess creditworthiness and make decisions about whether and on what terms to 

extend credit or otherwise take on risk do not consider credit reports, insurance scores, or any 

other information about borrowers, to be a substitute for Credit Scores. 

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33. Consumers in the B2C Credit Score Market purchase their own Credit Scores to 

better understand their own creditworthiness and how they likely will be viewed by potential 

lenders. 

34. The United States is the relevant geographic market in which B2B Credit Scores 

are provided. The restraints on competition in the B2B Credit Score Market contained in Fair 

Isaac’s contracts relate to the provision of B2B Credit Scores to businesses throughout the 

United States. 

35. Purchasers in the B2B Credit Score Market are comprised of lenders, financial 

institutions, and other businesses that purchase B2B Credit Scores in order to make risk 

management decisions (“B2B Purchasers”). Lenders, financial institutions, and other businesses 

that purchase Credit Reports from Defendant and/or the Credit Bureaus generally purchase 

Credit Scores in order to determine the creditworthiness and identity of qualified borrowers to 

whom a preapproved credit offer will be extended (“pre-screening”), make lending decisions 

(“lending”), or review the risk associated with existing borrowers for purposes such as extending 

additional credit or changing other account terms (“account management”). 

36. Customers in the B2C Credit Score Market, in contrast, purchase Credit Scores in 

order to manage their credit, protect their identity, or assess their likelihood of obtaining credit. 

Today, American consumers have signed up for over 160 million credit monitoring or identity 

protection accounts from businesses such as Capital One, Credit Karma, and LifeLock. Many of 

those accounts include access to the consumer’s own Credit Score. 

37. The credit risk scoring industry, industry analysts, policy analysts, and investors 

recognize the B2B Credit Score Market as distinct from the B2C Credit Score Market. Fair Isaac 

also regularly acknowledges that the B2B Credit Score Market is distinct from the B2C Credit 

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Score Market. For example, in its 2019 Form 10-K, Fair Isaac distinguished between its 

“business-to-business scoring solutions and services” and “business-to-consumer scoring 

solutions and services including myFICO® solutions for consumers.” 

38. The B2B Credit Score Market is characterized by significant barriers to entry. 

B2B Purchasers encounter significant “switching costs” if they adopt a new Credit Score that has 

different score-to-risk relationships or that uses different reason codes – regardless of whether it 

is an updated version of the score they already use or an entirely new brand of Credit Score 

(unlike consumers in the B2C Credit Score Market). These switching costs arise because 

employees have to be trained in the properties and characteristics of a new score; B2B 

Purchasers must ensure that the new score will be adequately predictive of the creditworthiness 

of their own customer base; B2B Purchasers often conduct extensive, costly, and timeconsuming validation tests to determine whether the new score is cost-effective; and B2B 

Purchasers may need to invest in updating their internal systems to ensure technical 

compatibility between those systems and a new score. 

39. Network effects also characterize the B2B Credit Score Market. For example, in 

the mortgage and auto loan industries, the consistent use of particular Credit Scores with similar 

score-to-risk relationships and reason codes facilitates the bundling of large groups of mortgage 

and auto loans from different originators into securities that can be sold to investors. Because of 

the consistent use of a single type of Credit Score, marketing materials for these securities can 

include data on the average and stratified Credit Scores of the borrowers associated with the 

underlying loans. 

C. Fair Isaac Has a Monopoly in the B2B Credit Score Market 

40. Fair Isaac has maintained a monopoly over the B2B Credit Score Market in the 

United States for roughly three decades, largely through the unlawfully achieved dominance of 

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its FICO product line, which includes many different types of FICO Scores. Introduced in the 

1980s, Fair Isaac’s “FICO Classic” Credit Scores are the best known and most widely used B2B 

Credit Scores in the United States. FICO Classic applies an algorithm to each Credit Bureau’s 

data and generates a score between 300 and 850 that purports to give an indication of the 

individual’s credit risk. It also generates a set of “reason codes” that explain the reasons the 

consumer has not been assigned the maximum score. 

41. Fair Isaac advertises its monopoly in the B2B Credit Score Market. On its 

website, Fair Isaac advertises: 10 billion FICO Scores are sold each year, which is four times the 

number of hamburgers that McDonald’s sells worldwide each year; 27.4 million FICO Scores 

are sold every day, which is over twice the number of cups of coffee Starbucks sells worldwide 

in a day; and 90% of all lending decisions in the United States rely on FICO Scores.

42. Similarly, in its 2019 Form 10-K, Fair Isaac described its “FICO Scores” as “the 

standard measure in the U.S. of consumer credit risk” and reported that “FICO Scores are used 

. . . by nearly all of the major banks, credit card organizations, mortgage lenders and auto loan 

originators.” 

43. Fair Isaac representatives have described Fair Isaac’s FICO Score as “the 800-

pound gorilla” in the market for B2B Credit Scores and bragged about Fair Isaac’s 90% market 

share. For example, in November 2017, at the JPMorgan Ultimate Services Investor Conference, 

Fair Isaac’s CFO and Executive Vice President, Michael Pung, stated that Fair Isaac’s FICO 

Scores are: 

 The “most widely used credit scoring system here in the U.S.”; 

 Used by “[v]irtually every major lender in the U.S.”; and 

 Fair Isaac has “maintained a 90-plus percent market share for at least . . . 13 

years.” 

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44. Fair Isaac representatives have also recognized that FICO Scores have benefited 

from the network effects created by the widespread use of FICO Scores in many industries. For 

example, in November 2011, then-CEO of Fair Isaac, Mark Greene, explained that the “network 

effect” of “FICO Scores . . . being sort of the standard language” and “having everybody . . . 

standardize on a FICO Score, that’s magic.”

45. Fair Isaac’s monopoly in the B2B Credit Score Market for Credit Scores has 

given it the power to control prices. Indeed, Fair Isaac’s CEO, Will Lansing, has noted that in 

the B2B Credit Score Market Fair Isaac has “quite a bit of discretion in whether we want our 

margins to be higher or lower or where they are.” 

D. Attempts To Compete Have Been Stymied by Fair Isaac’s Monopoly in the 

B2B Credit Score Market 

46. In March 2006, VantageScore introduced the VantageScore Credit Score and 

credit scoring system. VantageScore is a competitor to FICO Scores in the B2B Credit Score 

Market. 

47. From the time it was first released in 2006, VantageScore scored millions more 

consumers than the FICO scoring systems. Whereas Fair Isaac’s FICO scoring systems would 

not generate a score if a consumer had not used credit in more than six months or if a credit 

account was fewer than six months old, VantageScore calculated scores for consumers that had 

not used credit for up to two years. It also reached more consumers by using utility and 

telecommunications payment histories when reported to the Credit Bureaus. 

48. Today, VantageScore scores 30 million more Americans than traditional FICO 

scoring systems. Fair Isaac’s outdated FICO Classic credit scoring systems – which are still used 

by many lenders – exclude many creditworthy Americans that VantageScore can reliably score. 

About one-quarter of American adults – some 65 million people – do not have a traditional FICO 

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Score. VantageScore is capable of reducing the number of adults without a Credit Score by 

almost half. Ten million of those newly scored individuals are “prime” borrowers that should be 

attractive to traditional lenders. 

49. Without a Credit Score, it is difficult or impossible to apply for or successfully 

obtain a mortgage, car loan, or reasonable interest rates on personal lines of credit. Not having a 

Credit Score can also have drastic effects outside of the credit market. For example, Credit 

Scores are increasingly used by landlords to screen potential tenants. 

50. Those excluded by Fair Isaac’s traditional FICO scoring systems – who face an 

increased risk of being denied access to credit in the form of credit cards, auto and home loans, 

and apartment housing – include disproportionate numbers of low-income and minority 

consumers. 

51. Indeed, one advocacy group focused on making it possible for people with limited 

incomes, especially people of color, to achieve financial security has observed: “Black and 

Hispanic individuals are . . . significantly more likely than white individuals to be credit 

invisible” – meaning that they have “no established credit history,” are “unscored,” and “lack[] 

sufficient or recent enough credit history to be given a [FICO] credit score.” VantageScore 

calculates a score for 9.5 million Hispanic and Black consumers who do not have a FICO Score, 

including 2.7 million minority consumers who should be considered “prime” borrowers. 

52. Despite the potential advantages of using VantageScore, Fair Isaac continues to 

maintain its monopoly in the B2B Credit Score Market. In February 2013, at a Morgan Stanley 

Conference, Fair Isaac’s CEO, Will Lansing, explained that despite the existence of 

VantageScore, “there [is] not that much competition around our [B2B] scores business” because 

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“FICO scores are very much part of the fabric of the banking industry” and are “really deeply 

imbedded.” 

E. Fair Isaac Has Contracted with the Credit Bureaus as Agents and 

Co-Conspirators in Its Scheme To Monopolize 

53. With its dominant position in the B2B Credit Score Market, Fair Isaac uses the 

Credit Bureaus to perpetuate and extend its monopoly. Fair Isaac’s relationship with B2B 

Purchasers is often dependent on B2B Purchasers’ relationships with the Credit Bureaus. To 

facilitate the sale of its FICO Scores to B2B Purchasers, Fair Isaac enlists the assistance of the 

Credit Bureaus. 

54. When a B2B Purchaser requires a Credit Score, it purchases the report from the 

Credit Bureau and the Credit Score jointly from the Credit Bureau and Fair Isaac. Although the 

payment may at times occur in a single transaction, the practical reality, as expressly set forth in 

contracts governing the sale of Credit Scores to B2B Purchasers, is that both the Credit Bureau 

and Fair Isaac act as the provider of the FICO Score. 

55. B2B Purchasers’ contracts for FICO Scores are often known as Credit Scoring 

Services Agreements (“CSSAs”). CSSAs provide for both the method of payment and fee model 

for the delivery of Credit Score services. 

56. For example, the CSSA between Plaintiff, its Credit Bureau TransUnion, and Fair 

Isaac makes clear that “the Fair Isaac Scores are the property of Fair Isaac and are proprietary to 

Fair Isaac” and that Fair Isaac grants to Plaintiff a “limited license to use, internally, the Fair 

Isaac Scores solely for the particular purpose . . . for which the Fair Isaac Scores were obtained.” 

The CSSA further provides that TransUnion “is fully authorized to sign this Agreement, 

including Exhibit A, on behalf of Fair Isaac and such signature on behalf of Fair Isaac constitutes 

Fair Isaac’s agreement to the terms and conditions of this Agreement.” Exhibit A to the CSSA 

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then sets forth the various Fair Isaac Scores which may be purchased by Plaintiff and specifically 

permits the fees for such Fair Isaac Scores to “be included in a separate pricing schedule between 

TransUnion and Client.” 

57. In Plaintiff ’s and Class members’ procurement of FICO Scores, the Credit 

Bureaus act as co-conspirators and agents of Fair Isaac. Indeed, Plaintiff’s CSSA provides that 

“TransUnion [will] deliver Fair Isaac Scores” to Plaintiff and that TransUnion is executing the 

Agreement “for itself and Fair Isaac Corporation.” 

F. Fair Isaac’s Other Anticompetitive and Exclusionary Conduct 

58. Fair Isaac has used its monopoly power to coordinate a multi-faceted campaign to 

eliminate competition from VantageScore. Fair Isaac has been explicit that this is its goal. In 

April 2015, Will Lansing informed investors on a quarterly earnings conference call that Fair 

Isaac’s strategic goal was to ensure that “the entire industry adopts FICO scores instead of 

[other] scores.” To achieve this goal, Fair Isaac has enlisted its competitors (the Credit Bureaus, 

which jointly own and control VantageScore) to agree to anticompetitive contracts that: prevent 

them from developing or selling alternative Credit Scores that could be seamlessly integrated 

into many lenders’ systems or used interchangeably with FICO Scores; prevent them from 

competing with each other to negotiate prices from FICO; and create a pricing scheme that 

effectively forecloses B2B Purchasers from choosing to use FICO Scores in their lending 

decisions while simultaneously providing customers with a competing Credit Score, including 

VantageScore. At the same time, Fair Isaac has waged a media campaign against VantageScore 

and has made false and misleading statements in order to sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about 

VantageScore’s reliability. By its anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct, Fair Isaac has 

injured competition in the B2B Credit Score Market, increased prices for Plaintiff and the Class, 

and limited access to credit for millions of Americans. 

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1. Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus Have Entered into Anticompetitive 

Contract Terms that Restrict Their Ability To Compete and Sell 

VantageScore 

59. In January 2015, Fair Isaac and TransUnion entered into a contract, the Analytic 

and Data License Agreement. With TransUnion’s prior contracts with Fair Isaac set to expire on 

December 31, 2014, Fair Isaac demanded that the parties enter into a new contract rather than 

renew their existing contracts. Fair Isaac represented to TransUnion that Experian and Equifax 

had already agreed to materially similar new contracts with Fair Isaac. If TransUnion did not 

agree to the terms demanded by Fair Isaac, it would lose substantial business from customers that 

depend on FICO Scores. On information and belief, TransUnion, Equifax, and Experian all 

agreed to Fair Isaac’s plan to exclude competitors and maintain its monopoly. 

a. The Anticompetitive Agreements Restrict the Credit Bureaus’ 

Ability To Develop or Sell Other Credit Scores Compatible 

with B2B Purchasers’ Existing Systems 

60. Fair Isaac has imposed a similar or identical “No Equivalent Products” clause on 

each of the Credit Bureaus. By imposing a “No Equivalent Products” term, Fair Isaac has sought 

to block the Credit Bureaus from offering alternative Credit Score products, such as 

VantageScore, that would allow B2B Purchasers to easily switch from FICO Scores to 

VantageScore without incurring the cost of redesigning their lending programs and systems, or to 

use VantageScore alongside or interchangeably with FICO Scores. The Credit Bureaus have 

agreed to and acquiesced in these anticompetitive agreements, terms, and resulting 

anticompetitive effects. 

61. The “No Equivalent Products” clause provides that a Credit Bureau may not 

internally develop a credit scoring system that is aligned to the odds-to-score relationship of any 

Fair Isaac Analytic or that uses more than a limited number of reason codes that “match” reason 

codes used by any Fair Isaac Analytic. It also prohibits a Credit Bureau from distributing any 

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competing analytic (i.e., credit scoring system) that is aligned with FICO Scores or uses too 

many of the same reason codes. The clause expressly names Vantage Score Solutions LLC as a 

developer of such a scoring system that may not be distributed if VantageScore were to offer an 

“Equivalent Product.” 

62. For example, if a competing Credit Score product used a 700 score to indicate a 

less-than-five-percent risk of credit delinquency, and if a 700 FICO Score also indicated the 

same risk of delinquency, then the “No Equivalent Products” clause prevents a Credit Bureau 

from distributing the competing product. Similarly, if a competing Credit Score product used 

reason codes that match 20% or more of the reason codes used by FICO scoring systems, the 

“No Equivalent Products” clause prohibits a Credit Bureau from distributing the product. 

63. The “No Equivalent Products” clause effectively prevents a Credit Bureau from 

developing (contrary to the original goal of VantageScore and the easy ability to do so) or selling 

an alternative to FICO’s Credit Scores that would (1) be compatible with many B2B Purchasers’ 

systems, models, and processes; and (2) allow B2B Purchasers to have a legitimate choice 

between using FICO Scores and an alternative score. Many B2B Purchasers have spent 

substantial effort and resources to develop systems, models, and processes that are designed for 

FICO Scores. B2B Purchasers’ systems, models, and processes are tailored to FICO’s odds-toscore relationship (i.e., each given score has a given ratio of non-defaulting consumers to 

defaulting consumers), and reason codes (the particular reasons cited for increased risk of 

default). For example, a bank’s software might be designed to accept one or more FICO Scores 

and reason codes, combine this information with data it collects internally, and automatically 

produce a lending decision. 

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64. The “No Equivalent Products” clause protects and sustains Fair Isaac’s monopoly. 

The odds-to-score relationship is an arbitrary mapping between risk and score and does not 

reflect protectable intellectual property. Similarly, the reason codes that may not be used by an 

“Equivalent Product” were not invented by Fair Isaac but reflect well-established industry best 

practices for lending. 

b. Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus Have Agreed to a Penalty 

Pricing and Bundling Scheme To Foreclose Competition from 

Competitors in the B2B Credit Score Market 

65. Fair Isaac’s contracts with each Credit Bureau include a similar or identical 

“Dynamic Royalty Schedule” clause and a similar or identical “Pre-Qualification” royalty 

category. Through the “Pre-Qualification” royalty category, Fair Isaac has effectively foreclosed 

lenders from the ability to purchase and use a FICO Score in their lending decision while 

providing a consumer with a competing Credit Score, which drives lenders to buy exclusively 

Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores and not to purchase competing Credit Scores. As a consequence of 

Fair Isaac’s imposition of the “Pre-Qualification” royalty category, TransUnion has lost sales of 

VantageScore to major banks to provide to consumers. 

66. In 2015, Fair Isaac unilaterally imposed, and the Credit Bureaus have complied 

with, a new “Pre-Qualification” royalty category, which Fair Isaac defines to “mean an End 

User’s qualification of a potential consumer customer for an End User’s own internal lending 

offering.” This royalty category distinguishes between: (1) lenders that use FICO Scores for 

“Pre-Qualification” without providing any Credit Score or credit data to consumers; and (2) 

lenders that use FICO Scores for “Pre-Qualification” while also providing Credit Scores or credit 

data to consumers “in connection” with the “Pre-Qualification.” Certain banks and lenders offer 

consumers opportunities to apply to qualify for credit opportunities (e.g., a credit card or loan) 

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and, at the same time, receive their personal Credit Score. The offer of a free Credit Score to a 

consumer can entice consumers to apply for credit opportunities. 

67. The royalty price associated with a FICO Score used for “Pre-Qualification” 

depends on whether other Credit Scores or credit data are provided to consumers. If a lender 

purchases a FICO Score for use in “Pre-Qualification” and does not provide any Credit Score or 

credit data to the consumer “in connection” with the “Pre-Qualification,” there is one per-score 

royalty rate. If the lender purchases a FICO Score for use in “Pre-Qualification” and provides 

any other Credit Score (such as a VantageScore) to the consumer “in connection” with the “PreQualification,” there is a different per-score royalty rate that is higher – a penalty rate. 

68. The penalty rate can be avoided in one of two ways, both of which involve 

purchasing exclusively FICO Scores. First, the B2B Purchaser could purchase a FICO Score for 

use in “Pre-Qualification” and provide no Credit Score or credit data to the consumer. Second, 

the B2B Purchaser could purchase a bundled FICO product from Fair Isaac. Fair Isaac offers 

bundled products to lenders that combine the use of scores by lenders with the provision of 

scores to consumers. 

69. There is no legitimate business justification for the penalty rate agreed upon by 

Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus when the lender also purchases any other Credit Score to 

disclose to consumers. The transparent purpose of the “Pre-Qualification” royalty category is to 

drive all B2B Purchasers engaging in “Pre-Qualification” to purchase exclusively FICO Scores 

and make it cost-prohibitive for B2B Purchasers engaging in “Pre-Qualification” to purchase a 

competing Credit Score for disclosure to consumers. This scheme has been effective, and few, if 

any, B2B Purchasers have opted to pay the penalty rate. 

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c. Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus Have Agreed to Contract 

Provisions that Allow Fair Isaac To Extract Monopoly Prices 

70. Fair Isaac’s “Level Playing Field” provision requires that the prices that are made 

available to one Credit Bureau be made available to the other Credit Bureaus. Taken together, 

the “Dynamic Royalty Schedule” and the “Level Playing Field” clauses enable Fair Isaac to 

unilaterally increase the royalty prices it charges for FICO Scores. Fair Isaac’s contracts with 

TransUnion, Equifax, and Experian include similar or identical “Level Playing Field” and 

“Dynamic Royalty Schedule” provisions. 

71. Fair Isaac has used the “Level Playing Field” and “Dynamic Royalty Schedule” 

provisions in its contracts with the Credit Bureaus to extract monopoly prices from B2B 

Purchasers. These provisions disincentivize a Credit Bureau from negotiating for a lower price 

because it knows that even if it succeeds, it will not as a result gain a competitive advantage over 

the other Credit Bureaus. 

2. Fair Isaac’s Campaign To Create Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt 

About VantageScore Among B2B Purchasers 

72. Despite having successfully induced the Credit Bureaus to agree with Fair Isaac 

and with each other to impose restrictions on VantageScore’s ability to compete with FICO, Fair 

Isaac has gone even further and waged an aggressive public relations and advertising campaign 

to spread false statements, convey false impressions, and mislead B2B Purchasers about the 

qualities and characteristics of FICO Scores and VantageScore. In advertisements, letters, and 

blog posts, Fair Isaac has disparaged VantageScore by calling it a “Fako” score, falsely claimed 

that VantageScore is an unreliable measure of creditworthiness, and misrepresented the 

information considered by VantageScore’s credit scoring system.

73. On December 12, 2017, Fair Isaac took out a full-page advertisement in The Wall 

Street Journal addressed to “Lenders, Policymakers and Consumer Advocates” that disparaged 

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VantageScore without identifying it by name. The advertisement contrasted Fair Isaac, which 

“is not owned by the credit bureaus” and whose FICO Scores have been used “by lenders and 

securitization investors for decades,” with an alternative Credit Score, which is “owned by the 

credit bureaus,” is less reliable than FICO Scores in evaluating credit risk, and fails to use “sound 

practices” or “science-based credit evaluation.” To anyone familiar with the market for Credit 

Scores, the advertisement unambiguously conveys the false message that VantageScore is 

“[w]eakening scoring standards, [and] harm[ing] consumers, and the lending system,” 

particularly in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

74. The Wall Street Journal advertisement directed readers to “Learn more at 

FICO.com/independent,” a Fair Isaac-owned website that connects visitors to articles and blog 

posts that disparage VantageScore by name. One such blog post asserts: “Despite claims by 

VantageScore, weakening the minimum scoring criteria will not empower millions of low-risk 

mortgage credit seekers.” 

75. Moreover, the implication that FICO Classic scoring systems provide Credit 

Scores for as many consumers as VantageScore is false and misleading. VantageScore provides 

Credit Scores for millions of American consumers that are not scored by FICO Classic scoring 

systems. 

76. Fair Isaac’s website includes numerous posts disparaging VantageScore and 

making false or misleading statements about VantageScore’s features. For example, one blog 

post claims that “[r]esearch results consistently showed that scoring models relying solely on 

sparse or old credit data were weak and did a poor job forecasting future performance.” This 

statement is false and misleading because it conveys the message that VantageScore’s scoring 

model is “weak” and does a “poor job forecasting future performance” because it considers a 

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consumer’s full credit history even if the consumer has not used a traditional credit line in the 

last six months. In fact, studies have shown that VantageScore is strongly predictive. 

77. Another blog post claims that whereas “FICO Score 9 differentiates medical from 

non-medical collections,” “VantageScore does not.” This statement conveys the false message 

that VantageScore does not differentiate medical from non-medical collections. In fact, 

VantageScore 3.0 was the first credit scoring system to address medical debt. VantageScore 4.0, 

the most recent version of VantageScore, distinguishes medical collection accounts from nonmedical collection accounts and penalizes medical collections less than non-medical ones. 

78. Fair Isaac’s campaign against VantageScore is not new. In 2006, just months 

after the launch of VantageScore, Fair Isaac filed a meritless lawsuit against the Credit Bureaus 

and VantageScore in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. See Fair 

Isaac Corporation v. Equifax Inc., No. 06-cv-04112 (D. Minn.). This was the monopolist’s first 

attempt to kill the nascent competitor. Fair Isaac’s numerous claims included a claim that the 

development of VantageScore violated the antitrust laws and a claim that the development of 

VantageScore constituted trademark infringement. In its prayer for relief, Fair Isaac sought 

nothing less than the end of VantageScore: It requested that the “Defendants be ordered to 

dissolve VantageScore.” 

79. All of Fair Isaac’s claims failed; in fact, the jury concluded that Fair Isaac was the 

wrongdoer. In support of its trademark infringement claim, Fair Isaac had alleged that 

VantageScore’s use of a scoring range of 501-990 constituted trademark infringement because it 

was similar to FICO’s scoring range of 300-850. The Credit Bureaus and VantageScore 

counterclaimed for fraud on the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), alleging 

that Fair Isaac had misrepresented to the PTO that only FICO used the 300-850 score range. The 

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jury concluded that Fair Isaac had committed fraud on the PTO by making false statements as 

part of its application to register the score range of 300-850 as a trademark. 

80. The public statements described in the foregoing paragraphs were transmitted to 

and seen by a substantial number of businesses and consumers nationwide. 

3. Fair Isaac’s Anticompetitive and Exclusionary Conduct Harms 

Competition 

81. Fair Isaac’s campaign of exclusionary conduct to maintain and expand its 

monopoly has harmed and continues to harm participants in the B2B Credit Score Market. Fair 

Isaac’s unlawful conduct, including that which has been taken in concert with the Credit 

Bureaus, has foreclosed competition in the B2B Credit Score Market by foreclosing 

opportunities for the Credit Bureaus to sell VantageScore or any other competitive products. 

The anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct has allowed Fair Isaac to maintain its monopoly 

and charge monopoly prices for B2B Credit Scores to B2B Purchasers during the Class Period. 

82. Fair Isaac’s conduct, in concert with the Credit Bureaus, including by the 

contracts entered into by the Credit Bureaus, has reduced choice for B2B Purchasers. The 

anticompetitive terms agreed to between Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus have frustrated the 

ability of B2B Purchasers to purchase VantageScore or any other competitive Credit Score that 

could be seamlessly integrated into lenders’ existing processes and systems. Fair Isaac’s media 

and advertising campaign against VantageScore has been successful in sowing fear, uncertainty, 

and doubt about VantageScore in the marketplace. 

83. Media sources, financial blogs, and consumers have absorbed Fair Isaac’s 

message that VantageScore is a “Fako” score merely because it is not a FICO Score. For 

example, thebalance.com – a website devoted to personal finance issues – posted in February 

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2017, and continues to display as of the date of this filing: “If you purchased your Credit Score 

anywhere but MyFICO.com, then it’s a Fako score.”2

V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 

84. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself, and, under Rules 23(a) and (b) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of: 

All B2B Purchasers residing in the United States that directly purchased a 

FICO Score from Fair Isaac and/or a Credit Bureau during the Class Period. 

85. Excluded from the Class are: Defendant, its officers, directors, management, 

employees, subsidiaries, and affiliates. Also expressly excluded are any natural persons that 

purchased their own Credit Score solely via myFico.com, the Credit Bureaus, or other entities for 

their personal use. 

86. Also excluded is the Judge presiding over this action, his or her law clerks, 

spouse, and any person within the third degree of relationship living in the Judge’s household or 

the spouse of such a person. 

87. Members of the Class are so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder 

is impracticable. Further, members of the Class are readily identifiable from information and 

records in the possession of Defendant. 

88. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiff 

and members of the Class were damaged by the same wrongful conduct of Defendant. 

89. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of members 

of the Class. The interests of Plaintiff are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the 

members of the Class. 

 

2

 Latoya Irby, FICO & FAKO Credit Scores, The Balance (Aug. 18, 2018), 

https://www.thebalance.com/ fico-and-fako-credit-scores-960497 (last visited Apr. 23, 2020). 

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90. Plaintiff is represented by counsel with experience in the prosecution and 

leadership of class action antitrust and other complex litigation, including class actions in the 

financial services industry. 

91. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class predominate over 

questions that may affect only individual Class members, thereby making damages with respect 

to members of the Class as a whole appropriate. Questions of law and fact common to members 

of the Class include, but are not limited to: 

a. whether Defendant monopolized, conspired to monopolize, or unreasonably 

restrained trade in violation of federal law; 

b. the duration of the alleged unlawful conduct; 

c. injury suffered by Plaintiff and members of the Class; 

d. damages suffered by Plaintiff and members of the Class; and 

e. whether Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable 

to members of the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or 

corresponding declaratory relief with respect to members of the Class as a 

whole. 

92. Class action treatment is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication 

of the controversy. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to 

prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the 

unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, or expense that numerous individual actions would 

require. 

93. The benefit of proceeding through the class mechanism, including providing 

injured persons or entities a method for obtaining redress on claims that could not practicably be 

pursued individually, substantially outweighs potential difficulties in management of this class 

action. 

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94. Plaintiff knows of no special difficulty to be encountered in the maintenance of 

this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 

95. Plaintiff has defined members of the Class based on currently available 

information and hereby reserves the right to amend the definition of members of the Class, 

including, without limitation, the Class Period. 

VI. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND TOLLING 

96. By its very nature, the unlawful activity in which Defendant engaged was selfconcealing from Plaintiff and the Class. As a result of Defendant’s affirmative acts, 

misrepresentations, and nondisclosures as alleged herein, any applicable statutes of limitation on 

claims asserted by Plaintiff and members of the Class have been and are tolled, and Defendant is 

equitably estopped from raising statutes of limitations as a defense. 

97. Any applicable statutes of limitations were tolled at least until February 12, 2018, 

the date that TransUnion filed its Counterclaim against Defendant. 

98. The federal government’s initiation of its antitrust investigation of Defendant’s 

unlawful conduct also operates to toll any federal statute of limitations under 15 U.S.C. § 16. 

VII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 

CLAIM ONE: 

MONOPOLIZATION 

15 U.S.C. § 2 

99. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges the preceding allegations as 

though fully set forth herein. 

100. The relevant product market is the market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores. 

101. The relevant geographic market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores is the United 

States. 

102. The B2B Credit Score Market is the relevant market. 

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103. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have at least 90% market share in the B2B 

Credit Score Market. 

104. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in the B2B Credit 

Score Market. 

105. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have the power to control prices or exclude 

competition in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

106. Through unlawful, interconnected, and mutually reinforcing anticompetitive and 

exclusionary acts and agreements, Fair Isaac has substantially foreclosed competition in the 

market for B2B Credit Scores in the United States in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 

15 U.S.C. § 2. 

107. Fair Isaac has demonstrated its ability to control prices and exclude competition 

by raising prices without a corresponding increase in demand and to supracompetitive levels. 

108. Fair Isaac’s monopoly is not due to growth or development because of a superior 

product, business acumen, or historic accident. 

109. Fair Isaac’s monopolization has injured and will continue to injure competition in 

this market. 

110. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts substantially affect interstate 

commerce and injure competition nationwide. 

111. The anticompetitive conduct raised the prices for FICO Scores above the 

competitive level and otherwise injured competition without any offsetting procompetitive 

benefit to consumers. 

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112. Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured in their business or property 

by reason of Defendant’s violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act within the meaning of 

Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §15. 

113. Plaintiff and members of the Class are threatened with future injury to their 

business and property by reason of Defendant’s continuing violation of Section 2 of the Sherman 

Act within the meaning of Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §26. 

CLAIM TWO: 

CONSPIRACY TO MONOPOLIZE 

15 U.S.C. § 2 

114. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges the preceding allegations as 

though fully set forth herein. 

115. The relevant product market is the market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores. 

116. The relevant geographic market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores is the United 

States. 

117. The B2B Credit Score Market is the relevant market. 

118. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have at least 90% market share in the B2B 

Credit Score Market. 

119. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in the B2B Credit 

Score Market. 

120. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have the power to control prices or exclude 

competition in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

121. Through unlawful, interconnected, and mutually reinforcing anticompetitive and 

exclusionary acts and agreements, Fair Isaac has substantially foreclosed competition in the 

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market for B2B Credit Score Market in the United States in violation of Section 2 of the 

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. 

122. Fair Isaac has demonstrated its ability to control prices and exclude competition 

by raising prices without a corresponding increase in demand, and to supracompetitive levels. 

123. Fair Isaac entered into a combination or conspiracy with the Credit Bureaus to 

maintain its monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score Market. Fair Isaac created and maintained 

this conspiracy through a series of agreements with each of the Credit Bureaus. In these 

agreements, the Credit Bureaus and Fair Isaac agreed that the Credit Bureaus would not offer or 

sell VantageScore or any other competing Credit Score to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 

Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus further agreed that the Credit Bureaus would act as Fair Isaac’s 

agent in the sale of FICO Scores to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 

124. These agreements foreclosed competition in a substantial portion of the B2B 

Credit Score Market and unlawfully maintained Fair Isaac’s monopoly, resulting in Fair Isaac 

extracting supracompetitive prices for FICO Scores from Plaintiff and members of the Class. 

125. Fair Isaac’s monopoly is not due to growth or development because of a superior 

product, business acumen, or historic accident. 

126. Fair Isaac’s monopolization conspiracy has injured and will continue to injure 

competition in this market. 

127. Fair Isaac has acted with the specific intent of monopolizing the market for B2B 

Credit Scores in the United States. 

128. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts substantially affect interstate 

commerce and injure competition nationwide. 

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129. The conspiracy raised the prices for FICO Scores above the competitive level and 

otherwise injured competition without any offsetting procompetitive benefit to consumers. 

130. Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured in their business or property 

by reason of Defendant’s violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act within the meaning of 

Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §15. 

131. Plaintiff and members of the Class are threatened with future injury to their 

business and property by reason of Defendant’s continuing violation of Section 2 of the Sherman 

Act within the meaning of Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §26. 

CLAIM THREE: 

UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT OF TRADE 

15 U.S.C. § 1 

132. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges the preceding allegations as 

though fully set forth herein. 

133. The relevant product market is the market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores. 

134. The relevant geographic market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores is the United 

States. 

135. The B2B Credit Score Market is the relevant market. 

136. Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus have had and continue to collectively have at 

least 90% market share in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

137. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in the B2B Credit 

Score Market. 

138. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have the power to control prices or exclude 

competition in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

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139. Fair Isaac entered into agreements with TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax that 

contained anticompetitive terms whereby each Credit Bureau agreed not to offer or sell 

VantageScore as a competing product to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 

140. The agreements between Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus had substantial 

anticompetitive effects. The agreements excluded VantageScore, a significant competitor, from 

a substantial portion of competition in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

141. The agreements raised the price for FICO Scores above the competitive level and 

otherwise injured competition without any offsetting procompetitive benefit to consumers. 

142. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts substantially affect interstate 

commerce and injure competition nationwide. 

143. Plaintiff and members of the Class continue to suffer damage, and will continue to 

do so, if Fair Isaac does not cease its anticompetitive conduct. 

144. Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured in their business or property 

by reason of Defendant’s violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, within the meaning of 

Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §15. 

145. Plaintiff and members of the Class are threatened with future injury to their 

business and property by reason of Defendant’s continuing violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 

Act, within the meaning of Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. 

VIII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and members of the Class, respectfully prays 

that This Honorable Court: 

A. Order that this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) 

and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that it be named a Class Representative, that the 

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undersigned be named Lead Class Counsel, and that reasonable notice of this action, as provided 

by Rule 23(c)(2), be given to members of the Class; 

B. Adjudge that Defendant violated the federal antitrust laws as set forth above; 

C. Award Plaintiff and members of the Class actual, treble, and exemplary damages; 

D. Award Plaintiff and members of the Class attorneys’ fees and costs of suit, 

including costs of consulting and testifying experts; 

E. Award Plaintiff and members of the Class pre- and post-judgment interest; 

F. Enjoin Defendant from its violations of law; and 

G. Grant such other, further and different relief, including structural relief, as may be 

just and proper. 

IX. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

Under Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff demands a trial by 

jury as to all issues so triable. 

 

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Dated: April 23, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

CARLSON LYNCH LLP

Gary F. Lynch 

1133 Penn Avenue, 5th Floor 

Pittsburgh, PA 15222 

Telephone: 412-322-9243 

Facsimile: 412-231-0246 

glynch@carlsonlynch.com 

Katrina Carroll 

111 W. Wacker Drive, Suite 1240 

Chicago, IL 60602 

Telephone: 312-750-1265 

kcarroll@carlsonlynch.com 

MOLOLAMKEN LLP

/s/ Steven F. Molo 

Steven F. Molo 

Lisa W. Bohl 

300 N. LaSalle Street, Suite 5350 

Chicago, IL 60654 

Telephone: 312-450-6700 

Facsimile: 312-450-6701 

smolo@mololamken.com 

lbohl@mololamken.com 

Lauren M. Weinstein 

(pro hac vice forthcoming) 

600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 

Washington, D.C. 20037 

Telephone: 202-556-2000 

Facsimile: 202-556-2001 

lweinstein@mololamken.com

Counsel for Plaintiff First Choice Federal Credit Union 

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