IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-08-00374-CR

ALISHA BEIGHTOL,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 40th District Court

Ellis County, Texas

Trial Court No. 32913CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Alisha Beightol was convicted by a jury of the offense of Possession of a 

Controlled Substance with Intent to Deliver – Penalty Group I. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY 

CODE ANN. § 481.112 (Vernon 2003). She was tried jointly with her co-defendant, 

Donnie Lloyd Poole, who was also convicted of the same offense.1 Based on the jury’s 

verdict in the punishment phase, the trial court sentenced Beightol to imprisonment for 

seven (7) years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice – Institutional Division. 

Because we find that the denial of Beightol’s motion for an instructed verdict was 

 

1 Poole has also appealed his conviction in No. 10-08-00387-CR.
Beightol v. State Page 2

proper, the issues regarding the chain of custody and the improper foundation of the 

evidence were waived due to inadequate briefing, and the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in the admittance of the exhibits regarding the composition of the 

methamphetamine, we affirm the judgment.

Instructed Verdict

Beightol argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for an instructed 

verdict at the close of the evidence because there was insufficient evidence that Beightol 

had knowledge or was otherwise involved in the drug transaction at issue.

An instructed (or directed) verdict is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the 

evidence. Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In reviewing 

the legal sufficiency of the evidence, this Court looks at all of the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979); Bigon v. State, 252 

S.W.3d 360, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Under a legal sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence admitted, both 

properly and improperly admitted, as well as direct and circumstantial evidence. 

Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The jury, as sole judge of the 

witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, is free to accept or 

reject any or all of the evidence presented by either side. See Margraves v. State, 34 

S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The reviewing court must give deference to 

"the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the 
Beightol v. State Page 3

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Hooper 

v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 

318-19). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the 

guilt of an actor and can alone be sufficient to establish guilt. Guevara v. State, 152 

S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

Beightol argues that the evidence was insufficient to connect her to the 

transaction. Beightol was charged both as a principal and under the law of parties. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.01(a), 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). Therefore, if there is legally 

sufficient evidence that Beightol acted as either a principal or party to the offense, we 

will uphold the jury's verdict. See Rabbani v. State, 847 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1992) ("The principle is well-established that when the jury returns a general verdict 

and the evidence is sufficient to support a guilty finding under any of the allegations 

submitted, the verdict will be upheld.").

Under the law of parties, "[a] person is criminally responsible as a party to an 

offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for 

which he is criminally responsible, or by both." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.01(a) (Vernon 

2003). A person is "criminally responsible" for an offense committed by the conduct of 

another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he 

solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the 

offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2). Evidence is sufficient to convict under the law of parties where 

the accused is physically present at the commission of the offense and encourages its 

commission by words or other agreement. Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. 
Beightol v. State Page 4

Crim. App. 1994). In determining whether an accused participated as a party, the fact 

finder may examine the events occurring before, during, and after the commission of 

the offense and may rely on actions of the accused that show an understanding and 

common design to commit the offense. Id. Further, circumstantial evidence may be 

used to prove party status. Id. To convict under the law of parties, when the defendant 

is not the "primary actor," the State must prove (1) conduct constituting an offense, and 

(2) an act by the defendant that was done with the intent to promote or assist such 

conduct. Christensen v. State, 240 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, 

pet. ref'd). 

A transaction between Poole, known by law enforcement to be a drug dealer, 

and a confidential informant was set up for the sale of 14 grams of methamphetamines 

to be delivered by Poole at a convenience store. Beightol was traveling in the front 

passenger seat of Poole’s vehicle. Through phone conversations which were recorded, 

the location of the transaction was moved to a second location. The confidential 

informant entered Poole’s van and gave a pre-arranged signal to law enforcement 

stationed nearby that drugs were present. Poole was arrested for traffic warrants and 

Beightol was detained at the scene. 

The recording of the telephone conversations was admitted into evidence. A 

voice that was said to be Beightol’s had a conversation with the confidential informant 

where the original location of the transaction, the change of the time of the meeting, and 

money were discussed. In the same conversation, Poole said that “it” would be in a 

stick of deodorant. An empty deodorant stick and the deodorant that had been 
Beightol v. State Page 5

removed were located on the floor between where Beightol and Poole were seated. The 

drugs were located in the rear of the van. Reviewing the evidence under the 

appropriate standards, giving deference to the jury as the determiner of facts and the 

credibility of the witnesses, we find the evidence was legally sufficient to prove that 

Beightol was, at a minimum, guilty as a party of the offense as charged. We overrule 

Beightol’s first issue.

Improper Foundation and Chain of Custody

Beightol argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting three 

exhibits because the proper foundation for the exhibits was not established and that the 

State’s witnesses failed to establish the chain of custody of the exhibits prior to trial. 

Beightol offers no other argument or authorities regarding these two issues. Therefore, 

these issues are inadequately briefed, and therefore, are waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

38.1(i). See Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We overrule 

issues two and four.

Composition of Controlled Substance

Beightol contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting three 

exhibits since the sponsoring witness, a DPS chemist, was unable to testify as to the 

actual amount of methamphetamine contained in the controlled substance and that the 

indictment only alleged possession of a controlled substance, namely, 

methamphetamine, and does not specifically include adulterants and dilutants. 

However, the definition of a “controlled substance” in the Texas Health and Safety 

Code is as follows:
Beightol v. State Page 6

“Controlled substance” means a substance, including a drug, an 

adulterant, and a dilutant.... The term includes the aggregate weight of 

any mixture, solution, or other substance containing a controlled 

substance.” 

Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.002(5) (Vernon 2003).

The DPS chemist testified that the total weight of the drugs seized was 13.86 

grams in weight and contained methamphetamine. We overrule issue three.

Conclusion

We find that the trial court did not err in denying Beightol’s motion for an 

instructed verdict. We find that the issues regarding the chain of custody and improper 

foundation were waived due to inadequate briefing. We find that the trial court did not 

otherwise abuse its discretion in the admittance of the exhibits. We affirm the judgment 

of conviction.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Reyna, and

Justice Davis

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed November 25, 2009

Do not publish

[CR25]