F ILED U.S. COURT O F APP EALS EL EV EN TH C IRC UIT July 26, 20 06 T HOMA S K. KA HN CLERK [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

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N o. 05- 1491 1 Non-A rgum ent Calendar

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -- D.C. Dock etNo. 0 4- 60 23 8- CV-KAM COREYDA VI S, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll an t,

ve rs us U. S. POSTMASTER GENERAL, JohhP ott er , P ostm as te r G en er al of the U n i t e dS t a t e s P o s t a l S e rv i c e Ag e n c y, Defen da nt -Ap pe ll ee.

--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- - Appeal f rom the United State s District Court for the Southern D istrict of Florida

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(J ul y 26 , 200 6) Be fo re E D MO N D SO N , Ch ie f Judg e, D U BIN A and H U L L , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. PE R CU RIA M:2

Pl ai nti ff -Appe llant C or ey

D av is, an A fr ic an -A m er ic ane m plo y ee of the Un i t ed St at es Po s t al Se rv i ce (t h e “Po s t al Se rv i ce ”) , ap p ea l s th e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s gr an t of sum m ar y j udgm en t t o th e Po stm as te r G en er al ( the “ Po stm as te r” ) on h is claim s of rac e-based disparate tre atm ent, r etaliation, and hostile work
en vir onm en t, in vio la tio n of T itl e V II , 42 U
. S. C. § 20 00e e t se q. N o r ev er sib le
e rr o r h a s b e e n s h o w n ; w e a f

f i rm. W e re vie wthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r uli ngs on a

m oti on f or sum m ar y j udgm en t de
novo ; w e vie wa ll ev ide nc e an d f ac tua l i nf er en ce s inthe li ght

m ost f av or ab le to the non-m ovin g party . Gay v. G ilm an Paper

Co., 125 F.3d 1432 , 1434 (11th Cir. 1997 ). Sum

m ary j udgm ent is appropriate “ if the pleadings, deposit ions, answer s to i nte rr oga tor ie s, and a dm iss ion s onf ile , tog ethe r w iththe a ff

idavit s, if any , sho w that the re is no g enuin e iss ue a s to any m at er ia l f

ac t and tha t the m ovi ng p ar ty is entitled to a judgm ent as a m atter of law. ” Fe d.R. Civ.P. 56(c). W e fi rs t a ddr es s D av is’ s di sparate tr eatm en t c la im
. D av is a lle ge d th at , be tw ee n 19 99 and 2 004, the P ost al S er vic e dis cr im inate d a ga ins t hi m be ca use of his r ac e thr oughthe se a dve rs e em plo ym en t a ct s: ( 1) r ea ssi gni ng h im to w ork on differe nt m achines; (2) assigning him to work alone; (3) not allowing him to work with other A frican-Am ericans; (4) not prov iding him with re quested assis tance; (5 ) m oni tor ing his w ork e xc es siv el y ; ( 6) pa gin g hi m thr ough out

the w ork day ; ( 7)In his complaint, Davis alleg ed additional discriminatory conduc t t h at t h e d istrict court 1 c on c lud e d d id n ot c on sti tut e a dv e rs e e mpl oy me nt a c ts; and , o n app eal , Davis do e s n ot r e ne w h is arg umen tth atth es e i n ci d en t s we re ad v er s e e mp l o y m en tac t s . T h er ef

o re , h e h as ab an d o n ed arg

ument about these c laims on appea l. See Acc ess Now, Inc. v. Southwest A irlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (e x plaining that a par ty abandons a

n issue when he fails to raise it in his initi al brief on appea l). 3 giv ing him

dif fi cu lt w ork a ssi gnm en ts; ( 8) m ovi ng h im be tw ee n w ork op er at ion s; (9 ) giv ing him

a“ bia se d w ar

nin g” a ft er

he w orke d th ro ugh a br eak; ( 10) pr ev en tin g hi m

f ro m ta lki ng t o othe r co -w orke rs ; ( 11) c los el y m oni tor ing his
m ove m en ts at w ork; ( 12) f re que ntl y c hangi ng h is j ob r es pons ibi lit ie s; and ( 13) talking down to him

in a dem eaning m anner. 1 In considering d isparate tre atm ent claim s supp orted by circum stantial
ev ide nc e, “ the pla int if

f fi rs t ha s th e bur de n of

e sta bli shi ng a pr im a fa ci e ca se of discrim ination , which creates a rebuttable presum

ption that the em

ploy er a cted il le ga ll y .” W il so n v . B/E Aero sp ace, In c., 37 6 F .3d10 79 , 10 87 (11 th Cir . 20 04 ).

“ A plaintiff e stablish es a prim a fa cie ca se of disparate tre atm ent by showing that [h e] w as aqua lif

ie d m em be r of apr ote ct ed

c la ss and w as sub

j ec te d to an a dve rs e em plo ym en t a ct ionin co ntr as t w ithsim ilarl y sit ua te d e m plo y ee s ou tsi de the pr ot ect edcla ss .” Id
. W e ha ve e xpl ai ne d th at

an a dve rs e em

plo ym en t a ct

is “ anult im at e em ploym ent decision, such as discharge or failure to hire, or other conduct that al te rs the e m

plo y ee ’ s c om

pe nsatio n, te rm s, c ondi tio ns, or pr ivi le ge s ofIn rea chingth is conclusion on Davis’s dispar ate tre atment claim, we need not discuss the 2 Supreme Court’s re cent de cision about the nature of an ad v er s e employ ment act in a dif

fer ent co n t ex t : t h e co ntextof a r etaliation claim. See B urling ton N. & Santa Fe Ry . Co. v. W hite, No. 05-259, manuscr ipt op. at 4-18 (U.S. J une 22, 2006). 4 em plo ym en t, de pr ive s hi m

or he r of e m plo ym en t op portun iti es , or a dve rs el y af fe ct s hi s or

he r status a s an e m

plo y ee . ” G upt a v. F lor ida Bd
. of Re ge nts , 212 F. 3d 5 71, 587 ( 11th C ir
. 200 0) ( int er na l qu otatio n om itt ed ). I n a ddi tio n, w e ha ve state d th at , in the va st m aj or ity of c as es , ate m

por ar y c hange in w ork a ssi gnm en ts that c re at es no t an gib le harm , and d oe s no t a lte r the e m plo y ee ’ s pe rm an en t j ob title, is not adverse. Davis v. Tow n of Lake Par k, 245 F.3d 1232, 1245 (11th Cir. 20 01 ). W e ar e not persuaded that the incid ents Davis discusses on appeal, either ind ivi dua lly

or c oll ec tiv el y , c onst itu te an a dve rs e em plo ym en t a ct . T he se

2 inc ide nts c hie fl y

c onc er n D av is’ s w ork a ssi gnm en ts o r the sup er vis ionof his
w ork; and D av is d ir ec ts u s to no e vid en ce that the se inc ide nts a ff ec te d th e te rm s, co ndi tio ns, or

pr ivi le ge s of

his e m plo ym en t. S ee id. a t 12 39 ( expla ini ng tha t “ it is cl ear that t o su

ppor t a c la im und er T itl e V II ’ s anti -d isc ri m inatio n c lause the emp l o yer’s ac t i o n m

u s ti m p ac tth e t er m s , c o n d i t i o n s , o r p ri v i l eg es o f t h e p l ai n t i ff ’s job in a real an d d em on st rab le way ”) (i nt ern al qu ot at io n o m it te d) . There fo re, we co nc lud e that D av is h as not sa tis fi ed the e le m en ts o f his pr im a fa ci e ca se ; and theThe district cour t did conclude that Da

vis was suspended f

rom work dur ing a

time that he was 3 incar cer ated a

nd that this suspension constituted an adver se employ ment act. Although D avis does no t r a ise thi s is su e on

a pp e a l, t he Pos tma ste r argue s that Da vis wa s no t a c tua lly su sp e nd e d f ro m hi s job ; and , e ve n if he wa s su sp e nd e d, thi s su sp e ns ion did no t ri se to the lev el o f an adv e rs e employ ment act. Reg ardle ss of whether the Postal Servic e’s response to Da v i s ’s i ncar cer ation constituted an adve rse e mploy ment ac t , Davis st ill has failed to pre sent a prima f acie case of discrimination beca

use he ha s pointed to no ev id e n c e s h o w ingthat a Postal Service e mploy ee outside of his protec ted class wa s not suspe nded afte r being incar cer ated. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997) (“ In deter mining whe ther e mploy ees a re simi larly situated for pur poses of e sta bli sh inga pr ima fa c ie c a se , it

is n e c e ssa

ry to c on sid e r whe the r t

he e mpl oye e s are inv olv e d in or ac cused of

the same or

simil ar c onduct and a

re disciplined in diffe rent wa y s.”). 5 district court did n ot err in deter m ining that no genu ine issue of m aterial f act e x i s t e dab o u tD a v i s ’s d i s p a r a t e tr e a t me n t c l a i m. 3 We n e x ta d dr e s s D a v i s ’s r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m. D a v i s ar g u e s th a tth e s a me incidents th at suppo rted his disp arate treatm ent claim also establish th at the Postal Se rv ic e re ta liate d a ga ins t hi m f or f ili ng c harg es w iththe E qua l E m plo ym en t O ppor tun ity Co m m iss ion( “ E E O C” ) be tw ee n 20 00 and 2 003. “ T o e sta bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se of

r et al ia tio n un de r T itl e V II , apla int if f m ust sho wthat ( 1) he
en ga ge d instatut or ily

pr ote ct ed

e xpr es sio n; ( 2) he suf

fe re d an a dve rs e em ploym ent action; and (3) there is som e causal r elation between the tw o events.” O lm ste d v. T ac o B el l C or p. , 141 F . 3d 1 457, 146 0 ( 11th C ir
. 199 8)
. A ft er the pla int if f ha s e sta bli she d apr im a fa ci e ca se , the e m plo y er ha s an op portun ity

to art ic ul at e a l eg it im at e, no n- ret al ia to ry reas on forth e ch al le ng edem pl oym en t ac t. I d
. Ne v e rt h e l e s s , th e “p l a i n t i f f b e a r s th e u l t i mat e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g b y a6

pr ep onde ranc e of

the e vid en ce that the r ea son pr ovi de d by the e m plo y er is a pr et ex t f or pr ohi bit ed , r et al ia tor

y c ondu ct . ” I d. H er e, the dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d sum m ar y j udgm en t t o th e Po sta l S er vic e on Davis’s r etaliation claim ; the court concluded th at D avis had no t dem onstrated that the Postal Service ’ s legitim ate, non-retaliatory rea son for its em

ploym ent acts w as p re t ex tu al . B ec au s e, o n ap p ea l , Da v i s d o es n o tch al l en g e t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s de ci sio n th at

he f ai le d to sho wpr et ex t onthi s c la im , and b ec au se our r ev ie wof

the record does not indi cate that the district court’ s decision was in error, we aff irm t h e g r a n to f

s u mmary j u d g me n tt o th e P o s t ma s t e r o n D a v i s ’s r e t a l i a t i o n c l a i m. D av is a lso arg ue s th at

the inc ide nts he ide nti fi ed on a ppe al a s be ing a dve rs e em plo ym en t a ct s c onst itu te d ape rv as ive pa tte rnof abuse , w hic h c re at ed

ahos til e w ork e nvi ro nm en t. T o e sta bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se f

or ahos til e w ork e nvi ro nm en t cl ai m , apla int if

f m ust de m onstrate that ( 1) he be lon gs t o apr ote ct ed gr oup; ( 2) he ha s be ensub

j ec te d to unw el co m e hara ssm en t; (3 ) the hara ssm en t w as ba se d ona pr ote ct ed c hara ct er ist ic ; ( 4) the hara ssm en t w as suf fi ci en tly se ve re or pe rv as ive to al te r the te rm s and c ondi tio ns o f em plo ym en t and c re at e a dis cr im inator ily abusi ve worki ng en vi ro nm en t; an d (5 ) th e em pl oyer is res po ns ib le forth aten vi ro nm en t. Mi lle r v. K en w orth o f D oth an , I nc . , 277 F . 3d 1 269, 127 5 ( 11th C ir
. 200 2)
. T he
em plo y ee m ust pr es en t “ co nc re te e vid en ce in the f orm of spe ci fi c fa ct s, ” not

j ust7

co nc lu so ry

all eg at io ns an d a ss ert io ns . See Earl ey v. Ch am pi on Int ern at ’l Cor

p., 907 F.2d 107 7, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990 ). Upon our r ev ie wof

the r ec or d and the part ie s’ br ie fs , w e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr

in gr an tin g sum

m ar y j udgm en t t o th e Po stm as te r on D av is’ s ho sti le w ork e nvi ro nm en t c la im
. D av is h as not de m onstrate d th at

the
com plained-of conduct u nreasonably interfer ed with his job perf orm ance. See Me ndoz a v. Bo rd en , I nc . , 195 F . 3d 1 238, 124 6 ( 11th C ir
. 199 9) ( enbanc ) (n oti ng that w e co nsi de r w he the r co nduc t un re as ona bly int er fe re d w iththe e m

plo y ee ’ s j ob pe rf orm an ce in de ci din g if

the c ondu ct

w as se ve re e noug h to a lte r the te rm s and
co ndi tio ns o f em

plo y m en t)
. T he re fo re , D av is’ s a lle ga tio ns, e ve n if tr ue , do n ot
m ee t our standard

f or e sta bli shi ng a hos til e w ork e nvi ro nm en t tha t w as suf fi ci en tly
se ve re or pe rs ua siv e to a lte r the te rm s and c ondi tio ns o f his e m plo ym en t. AFFIR MED.