IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

JOEL BYRD, JOHN A. PERKOVICH, )

JOSEPH J. WRIGHT, LOUIS J. GORDON, ) 

MICHAEL KEELE, PEDRO LUNA, )

and ROBERT J. COOPER, and ) 

all others similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 

)

CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, )

)

Defendants. )

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Joel Byrd, John A. Perkovich, Joseph J. Wright, Louis J. Gordon, Michael Keele, 

Pedro Luna, Robert J. Cooper and all others similarly situated, by and through their attorneys,

Amanda Clark and Matthew Pierce of Asher, Gittler & D’Alba, Ltd., complain of Chicago Transit 

Authority, and, in so doing, allege as follows:

Nature of Action

1. This is an action to recover unpaid overtime compensation and other relief under 

the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended (“the Act”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 216, and the Illinois 

Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), 820 ILCS 105/4, et seq.

Jurisdiction and Venue

2. Jurisdiction for this action is conferred upon this Court by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337.

This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1367.

Case: 1:20-cv-03613 Document #: 1 Filed: 06/19/20 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:1
2

3. Venue in this district is proper under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) and (c) because the 

unlawful employment practices occurred in this district and Defendants have their place of 

business in this judicial district.

Parties

4. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, are or were 

“employees” of Defendants within meaning of Section 203(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e).

5. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, are or were 

“employees” of Defendants within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the IMWL, 820 ILCS 105/3(d).

6. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other employees 

similarly situated pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Copies of Plaintiffs’ consent forms are attached 

hereto and contemporaneously filed herewith.

7. Defendant Chicago Transit Authority is a municipal corporation operating a mass 

transit system in the City of Chicago located in the geographical territory subject to this Court’s 

jurisdiction. Defendant Chicago Transit Authority is a “public agency” as that term is defined in 

Section 203(x) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(x).

8. Defendant was, and at all times hereinafter mentioned has been, an “employer” of 

Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, within the meaning of Section 203(d) of the Act, 29 

U.S.C. 203(d), and, as such, is subject to the provisions of Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207.

9. Defendant is or was, and at all times hereinafter mentioned has been, an “employer” 

of Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated within the meaning of Section 3(d) of the IMWL, 820 

ILCS 1056/3(c).

Case: 1:20-cv-03613 Document #: 1 Filed: 06/19/20 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:2
3

10. At all relevant times, Defendant has been and is an “enterprise engaged in 

commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” and is a public agency engaged in public 

activities for purposes of Section 203(s) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s).

11. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs’ wages, hours and terms and conditions of 

employment were contained in collective bargaining agreements between the Defendant and 

various labor organizations (“Plaintiffs’ Unions”).

12. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs’ Unions were members of the Chicago Transit 

Authority Trades Coalition (“Coalition”), which consists of a total of eleven unions whose 

members perform trade work for the Chicago Transit Authority, and which bargains with 

Defendant to set wages, hours and working conditions for the members of those locals.1

13. At all relevant times in which he worked for Defendant, Joel Byrd, was employed 

as a maintainer and was a member of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 9.

14. At all relevant times in which he worked for Defendant, Plaintiff Joseph J. Wright 

worked as a Foreman and a member of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 9. 

15. At all relevant times in which he worked for Defendant, Plaintiff John A. Perkovich 

was employed as a Foreman and a member of Carpenters Union, Local 1027.

16. At all relevant times in which he worked for Defendant, Louis J. Gordon, was 

employed as a lineman and was a member of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 

Local 9.

1 The members of the Coalition are as follows: International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Local 1247; International 

Union of Bricklayers, District Council 1; United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 1027; International Brotherhood 

of Electrical Workers, Local 9; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 134; International 

Association of Machinists, District 8; International Association of Machinists, Automobile Mechanics, Local 701; 

Painters District Council #14; Pipe Fitters, Local 597; Plumbers Local 130; Sheet Metal Workers Local 73.

Case: 1:20-cv-03613 Document #: 1 Filed: 06/19/20 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:3
4

17. At all relevant times in which he worked for Defendant, Michael Keele, was 

employed as an escalator mechanic and was a member of International Brotherhood of Electrical 

Workers, Local 134.

18. At all relevant times in which he worked for Defendant, Pedro Luna, was employed 

as a maintainer and was a member of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 9.

19. At all relevant times in which he worked for Defendant, Robert J. Cooper, was 

employed as a maintainer and was a member of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 

Local 9.

20. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs worked hours in excess of the applicable overtime 

threshold under Section 7(k) of the Act, and became entitled to receive one and one-half times 

their regular rates of pay for all such excess hours under the Act.

Count I

(Failure to Pay Overtime in Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act)

21. Plaintiffs reallege and restate Paragraphs 1 through 20 of the Complaint as if set 

forth fully herein.

22. The Coalition negotiated collective bargaining language providing for Shift 

Differential Pay as follows, in relevant part:

SHIFT DIFFERENTIAL

Employees whose shift starts during the 1530--2330 evening window period will 

receive a ten (10%) percent shift differential for all hours worked during such times. 

Employees whose shift starts during the 2330--0700 night window period will 

receive a fifteen (15%) percent shift differential for all hours worked during such 

times. An employee whose shift starts during the 1530—2330 evening window 

period, and ends during the 2330—0700 night window period will receive the shift 

differential corresponding to the window period during which the majority of his 

or her hours are worked. In the event that a shift contains equal numbers of hours 

applicable to both window periods, the higher shift differential shall apply to all 

hours worked in that schedule. Additionally, an employee whose shift starts prior 

to the evening shift window period, or whose shift starts during the night shift 

Case: 1:20-cv-03613 Document #: 1 Filed: 06/19/20 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:4
5

period and extends into the day shift, shall receive the appropriate shift differential 

for all hours worked on that shift if at least 50% of the employee’s shift is worked 

during the evening or night window period as the case may be.

23. The collective bargaining agreement for Carpenters Union, Local 1027 contains the 

above-referenced shift differential provision negotiated by the Coalition in Article 2.5(F).

24. The collective bargaining agreement for International Brotherhood of Electrical 

Workers contains the above-referenced shift differential provision negotiated by the Coalition in 

Article 3.4(Y)(2).

25. The collective bargaining agreement for the Plumbers Union, Local 130 contains 

the above-referenced shift differential language negotiated by the Coalition in Article 2.5(F).

26. All of the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the Coalition on behalf 

of its union affiliates contain the above-referenced shift differential language. Thus, employees 

who are members of the unions affiliated with the Coalition and who are similarly situated to 

Plaintiffs are subject to the above-referenced shift differential language. 

27. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs, and all similarly situated employees, performed 

work during the evening and/or night window period.

28. Within the last three (3) years, Plaintiffs worked hours in excess of the applicable 

overtime threshold under Section 7(k) of the Act, and became entitled to receive one and one-half 

times their regular rates of pay for all such excess hours under the Act.

29. At all relevant times within the last three (3) years, and at times in which Plaintiffs 

satisfied the applicable overtime threshold mandated by Section 7(k) of the Act, Defendant did not 

include Shift Differential Pay in the calculation of the “regular rate of pay” for such employees as 

that term is defined in Section 207(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(e), for purposes of determining 

the overtime amounts owed to each such employee.

Case: 1:20-cv-03613 Document #: 1 Filed: 06/19/20 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:5
6

30. The Shift Differential Pay amounts constitute “remuneration for employment paid 

to, or on behalf of, the employee” and, as such, should be included in the calculation of each 

employee’s “regular rate of pay” as that term is defined in Section 207(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 

207(e).

31. Defendant’s failure to include Shift Differential Pay amounts in the calculation of 

the “regular rate of pay” for Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated employees over the last three 

years for purposes of determining overtime payments to those employees, constitutes a violation 

of Sections 207 and 215(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 215(a)(2).

32. By failing and refusing to compensate Plaintiffs and other similarly situated 

employees at a rate not less than one-and-one-half (1-1/2) times their “regular rate of pay” for 

hours worked in excess of the statutory threshold, Defendant has violated Sections 207 and 

215(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 215(a)(2).

33. Defendant’s violations of the Act were willful in that Defendant’s failure to pay 

proper overtime compensation was done knowingly and intentionally in violation of the Act or 

with reckless disregard for Defendant’s obligations under the Act.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that judgment be entered against Defendants as follows:

A: A declaratory judgment finding that Defendants willfully violated Sections 207 and 

215(a)(2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207 and 215(a)(2).

B: A money judgment against Defendants for all sums, which may be found to be due 

to Plaintiffs as compensatory damage, interest, liquated damages, attorneys’ fees and costs.

C: An order directing all other and additional relief deemed just and proper by the 

Court.

Case: 1:20-cv-03613 Document #: 1 Filed: 06/19/20 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:6
7

Count II

(Failure to Pay Overtime in Violation of the Illinois Minimum Wage Law)

34. Plaintiffs reallege and restate Paragraphs 1 through 33 of the Complaint as if set 

forth fully herein.

35. Within the last three (3) years, Plaintiffs worked hours in excess of the forty(40)-

hour threshold set forth under Section 4a of the IMWL, 820 ILCS 105/4a, and, as such, became 

entitled to receive one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for all such excess hours under 

the IMWL.

36. At all relevant times within the last three (3) years, and at times in which Plaintiffs 

satisfied the applicable overtime threshold mandated by Section 4a of the IMWL, Defendant did 

not include Shift Differential Pay in the calculation of the “regular rate” of pay for such employees 

as that term is used in Section 4a of the IMWL, for purposes of determining the overtime amounts 

owed to each such employee.

37. The Shift Differential Pay amounts constitute remuneration for employment paid 

to, or on behalf of, the employee and “wages” under Section 3 of the IMWL, and, as such, should 

be included in the calculation of each employee’s “regular rate” of pay as that term is used in 

Section 4a of the IMWL, 820 ILCS 105/4a.

38. Defendant’s failure to include Shift Differential Pay amounts in the calculation of 

the “regular rate” of pay for Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated employees over the last three 

years for purposes of determining overtime payments to those employees, constitutes a violation 

of Section 4a of the IMWL, 820 ILCS 105/4a.

39. By failing and refusing to compensate Plaintiffs and other similarly situated 

employees at a rate not less than one-and-one-half (1-1/2) times their “regular rate” of pay for 

Case: 1:20-cv-03613 Document #: 1 Filed: 06/19/20 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:7
8

hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week, Defendant has violated Section 4a of the IMWL, 

820 ILCS 105/4a.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, pray that judgment be entered 

against Defendant as follows: 

A. A declaratory judgment finding that Defendant willfully violated Section 4a 

of the IMLW, 820 ILCS 105/4a.

B. A money judgment against Defendant for all sums which may be found to 

be due to Plaintiffs, and all other similarly situated employees, as compensatory damages, treble 

damages, damages in the amount of 5% of the amount of any underpayments for each month 

following the date of payment during which such underpayments remain unpaid, attorneys’ fees 

and costs.

C. An order directing all other and additional relief deemed just and proper by 

the Court.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Amanda R. Clark

Amanda R. Clark

Matthew J. Pierce

Counsel for Plaintiffs

ASHER, GITTLER & D’ALBA, LTD.

200 W. Jackson Blvd. Suite 720

Chicago, Illinois 60606

312/263-1500 (phone)

312/263-1520 (fax)

arc@ulaw.com

mjp@ulaw.com

Case: 1:20-cv-03613 Document #: 1 Filed: 06/19/20 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:8