J-S69003-17

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ELIJAH MACON

Appellant No. 1474 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 1, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0005145-2016

BEFORE: BOWES, RANSOM, JJ. and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2017

Elijah Macon appeals from the judgment of sentence of three years 

probation that was imposed after he was convicted of receiving stolen 

property (“RSP”) and carrying an unlicensed firearm. We reject Appellant’s 

challenges to the denial of his suppression motion and sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his conviction of RSP. Accordingly, we affirm. 

The pertinent facts follow. On April 14, 2016, Mount Oliver Police 

Sergeant Kevin Lockhart and Mount Oliver Police Officer William Griser were 

on duty in different locations. At 4:30 a.m., they received a dispatch that 

two African-American males with backpacks were breaking into cars along 

Quincy Avenue. While traveling to that location and ten minutes after 

receiving the broadcast, Officer Griser observed two African-American males 
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with backpacks on Transverse Street, about two blocks from Quincy Avenue, 

and Officer Griser broadcast that information. Sergeant Lockhart arrived at

Transverse Street moments later. Sergeant Lockhart detained and 

questioned Appellant for investigatory purposes while Officer Griser spoke 

with Appellant’s companion. Appellant and the other man gave conflicting 

stories to the two police officers about where they had been and where they 

were headed. Neither Appellant nor the other male were able to supply an 

address for their destination. 

Officer Griser searched the backpack of Appellant’s companion, finding 

a prescription pill container with the name of a third party and social security 

cards belonging to different people. Sergeant Lockhart patted down 

Appellant and his backpack. He felt an object that appeared to be a firearm. 

Inside of Appellant’s backpack, Officer Lockhart discovered a gun that was 

not registered to Appellant. Later, police ascertained that the weapon was 

stolen. The presence of that firearm was the basis for Appellant’s 

convictions of RSP and possession of an unlicensed firearm. This appeal 

followed the denial of Appellant’s suppression motion and imposition of the 

above-delineated judgment of sentence. 

On appeal, Appellant raises these averments. 

I. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Macon's motion to 

suppress the evidence obtained from the search of Mr. Macon's

backpack?
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II. Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to

support Mr. Macon's conviction for Receiving Stolen Property?

Appellant’s brief at 6. 

Appellant first claims that the court improperly denied his suppression 

motion.1 The standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress 

evidence is settled: 

 An appellate court's standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions 

drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth 

prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only 

the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence 

for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's 

factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court 

is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court's 

legal conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of 

legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not 

binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if 

the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, 

the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to plenary 

review.

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1 Normally, we would address a sufficiency issue first in that a successful 

claim results in discharge. Commonwealth v. Ford, 141 A.3d 547, 552 

(Pa.Super. 2016). However, in the present case, Appellant does not contest 

that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction of possession of an 

unlicensed firearm, challenging only the RSP conviction. Hence, discharge 

would not be a remedy herein, and we will address the issues in the order 

presented. 
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Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255, 1257 (Pa.Super. 2017), 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526–27 (Pa.Super. 

2015).

Herein, Appellant contests the suppression court’s conclusion that the 

pat down of his backpack was a legitimate safety search. In

Commonwealth v. Guess, 53 A.3d 895 (Pa.Super. 2012), we articulated 

that a police officer may conduct a safety pat down once the officer 

possesses reasonable suspicion, based upon articulable facts, that the 

person in question has committed a crime. 

Therein, two men unsuccessfully attempted to break into the 

apartment of a man, and, after they stopped, the victim observed the two 

men attempting to break into an adjacent apartment. He reported the 

incident to police along with a general description of the two suspects. 

Within ten minutes, police arrived at the scene of the reported burglary. 

They soon saw two suspects, Guess and another man, who were in the 

vicinity of the crime and who were wearing the clothing described by victim 

of the attempted burglary. Guess and his cohort started to leave once they 

saw police, but were immediately approached and questioned by the 

responding officers. 

The suspects said that they were at the apartment complex to visit a 

friend, whose name they were unable to provide. Guess dropped a credit 

card embossed with a women’s name. After ascertaining that the credit card 
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did not belong to Guess, a police officer patted him down for the officer’s 

safety, finding jewelry and arresting him. 

Guess claimed that his search and seizure was unconstitutional. We 

noted that, for purposes of the constitution, interactions with police are 

placed in one of three categories. The first is a mere encounter, where no 

level of suspicion is required. The second is an investigatory detention, 

where a seizure has occurred and which must be supported by reasonable 

suspicion. The third is an arrest, which police must have probable cause to 

conduct. 

This Court in Guess ruled that the interaction between police and 

Guess was a mere encounter until he was patted down for safety purposes, 

when we ruled that the interaction escalated into an investigatory detention. 

We noted that, in order to justify a pat-down search under Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1 (1968), “the officer must have reasonable suspicion, under the 

totality of the circumstances, that criminal activity is afoot and that ‘the 

individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is 

armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others.’” Id. at 901 

(partially quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). We held that the investigatory 

detention at issue was valid and “was supported by reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity and a justifiable belief in the need to protect officer safety.” 

Id. 
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Specifically, we relied upon the following facts. Guess and his cohort 

matched the physical description given by the victim and were found within 

the apartment complex where the crime occurred. Further, when police 

approached Guess, Guess appeared nervous and eager to flee. In addition, 

Guess and his companion were unable to provide the name of the friend who 

they purportedly were visiting in the complex. Finally, Guess dropped a 

credit card that did not bear his name. We stated that police were “justified 

in believing that criminal activity was afoot and that a pat-down search was 

necessary for officer safety.” Id. at 902. We arrived at this conclusion 

despite the fact that no police officer specifically articulated that they had a 

reason to conclude that Guess was armed. 

The facts herein are indistinguishable. Police received a report of two 

African-American males breaking into vehicles and carrying backpacks. 

Appellant and his companion were African-American men with backpacks 

and were discovered by police two blocks from the reported crime scene. A 

prescription pill bottle and social security cards that did not belong to 

Appellant’s cohort were found in his backpack. Appellant and his companion 

were traveling in a direction that was not consistent with their stated 

destination and were unable to give the address where they were headed. 

They appeared anxious, nervous, and eager to flee the police. Thus, under 

Guess, reasonable suspicion was present and a safety pat down warranted. 
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We therefore conclude that the suppression court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying Appellant’s suppression motion. 

Appellant’s second averment is that there was insufficient evidence to 

support his RSP conviction. Since a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence raises a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Giron, 155 A.3d 635, 638 

(Pa.Super. 2017). 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden 

of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire 

record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received 

must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon 

the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence 

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 159 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa.Super. 2017) 

(emphasis added; citation omitted). 

The crime of receiving stolen property is defined as follows:
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(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of theft if he 

intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property 

of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it 

has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, 

retained, or disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a). Accordingly, the elements of the crime of receiving 

stolen property include “(1) intentionally acquiring possession of the 

movable property of another; (2) with knowledge or belief that it was 

probably stolen; and (3) the intent to deprive permanently.”

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 128 A.3d 261, 265 (Pa.Super. 2015). 

Appellant solely maintains that the evidence was insufficient to 

establish that he knew or believed that the gun was probably stolen, and 

admits that the other elements of the crime was established. Appellant’s 

brief at 17. As to this element of the crime in question, we observed 

Circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge may include, inter 

alia, the place or manner of possession, alterations to the 

property indicative of theft, the defendant's conduct or 

statements at the time of arrest (including attempts to flee 

apprehension), a false explanation for the possession, the 

location of the theft in comparison to where the defendant 

gained possession, the value of the property compared to the 

price paid for it, or any other evidence connecting the defendant 

to the crime. 

Id. at 265. 

Herein, Appellant was in possession of a firearm, was evasive with 

police, and appeared anxious to flee. His cohort had items belonging to 

others that had been stolen in his backpack. Additionally, the gun in 

question belonged to someone other than Appellant and, in order to be 
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legally carried on the street, had to be licensed. Appellant did not have that 

license. He and his companion were in the process of breaking into cars 

when the firearm was found. We conclude that the facts and circumstances 

at issue herein support a finding that Appellant knew beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the gun in his backpack was stolen. Accordingly, we reject his 

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his RSP conviction. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/16/2017