[Cite as Cuyahoga Hts. v. Majors, 2014-Ohio-3326.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

Nos. 100687 and 100689

VILLAGE OF CUYAHOGA HEIGHTS

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

STEPHANIE A. JELENIC MAJORS, 

ET AL.

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Garfield Heights Municipal Court 

Case Nos. CRB-1300948 and CRB-1300949 

BEFORE: Jones, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and E.A. Gallagher, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 31, 2014 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

James A. Levin 

2800 Euclid Avenue 

Suite 545 

Cleveland, Ohio 44115 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Jonathan D. Greenberg 

Walter & Haverfield, L.L.P. 

1301 East 9th Street 

Suite 3500 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.: 

{¶1} In these consolidated cases, defendants-appellants, Stephanie A. Jelenic 

Majors and James A. Majors Jr., appeal from their endangering children convictions, 

entered after a bench trial. We affirm. 

{¶2} In 2013, the Majors were each charged with one count of endangering 

children, a misdemeanor of the first degree. The matter proceeded to a bench trial, at 

which the following pertinent evidence was presented. 

{¶3} On April 15, 2013, Lieutenant Brian Sturgill of the Cuyahoga Heights Police 

Department received a dispatch to assist in a possible domestic situation. Lieutenant 

Sturgill testified that he arrived on scene approximately four minutes after he was 

dispatched. Lieutenant Sturgill, who had been in the Majors’ house before, parked his 

cruiser near the Majors’ car and observed that their car was parked on a public street, 

approximately six to eight feet in front of their house. 

{¶4} When he arrived on scene, two Garfield Heights police cruisers were already 

there. The lieutenant walked down the street to where the officers were waiting and 

conferred with them “for a minute,” before they all walked back towards the Majors’ 

house. When Lieutenant Sturgill looked into the Majors’ vehicle, he noticed a baby 

sitting in its car seat. The baby had been there for some undetermined time period prior 

to Lieutenant Sturgill’s arrival on the scene. Lieutenant Sturgill testified that the car was 

unlocked and the windows were open. 

{¶5} Lieutenant Sturgill removed the ten-month-old infant from the vehicle and 

placed him in his cruiser. Lieutenant Sturgill testified that the baby did not exhibit any 
signs of physical distress with the exception of “an unusual skin condition” and “severe 

diaper rash.” 

{¶6} Lieutenant Sturgill stayed by his patrol vehicle with the infant while the other 

police officers attempted to locate the child’s parents. The Garfield Heights officers 

proceeded to knock on the Majors’ porch door for “two to four minutes” before someone 

finally answered the door. Once the Majors were escorted out of their home, Lieutenant 

Sturgill brought the baby to the front steps of the home. Lieutenant Sturgill testified that 

while the Majors were being interviewed by the Garfield Heights police, he noted that 

Stephanie seemed nervous, had delayed responses to questioning, and had noticeably 

“pinpoint pupils,” that Lieutenant Sturgill testified were signs of heroin or opiate use. 

Similarly, Lieutenant Sturgill testified that James exhibited slurred speech and delayed 

responses to questioning that led Lieutenant Sturgill to believe that James was also under 

the influence of drugs or alcohol. 

{¶7} Thereafter, Stephanie was transported to a nearby hospital by EMS for an 

injury to her hip or side. Because officers believed James was in an “inebriated state,” a 

family member was contacted to take custody of the baby. The Majors were later 

charged with child endangering. 

{¶8} The trial court convicted both Stephanie and James of child endangering and 

sentenced each to 180 days in jail, suspended, and one year of inactive probation. 

{¶9} The Majors appeal, raising two assignments of error for review. 

I. Assignments of Error

[I.] The trial court erred by denying appellants’ motion for judgment of 
acquittal pursuant to Rule 29. 

[II.] The trial court erred by rendering a verdict in favor of the 

plaintiff-appellee, Village of Cuyahoga Heights; such a verdict remains 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

II. Law and Analysis

{¶10} In the first assignment of error, the Majors argue that the trial court erred in 

denying their Crim.R. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. In the second assignment of 

error, the Majors argue that their convictions were against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. Although these assignments of error involve different legal standards, because 

the facts are the same for both, we will discuss them together. 

{¶11} Crim.R. 29 mandates that the trial court issue a judgment of acquittal where 

the state’s evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for the offense; Crim.R. 29(A) 

and a sufficiency of the evidence review require the same analysis. State v. Tenace, 109 

Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, 847 N.E.2d 386, ¶ 37. 

{¶12} In analyzing whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, the 

reviewing court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” 

and ask whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 

S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 

(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus; State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 651 N.E.2d 965 

(1995). 

{¶13} When reviewing a claim challenging the manifest weight of the evidence, 
the court, reviewing the entire record, must weigh the evidence and all reasonable 

inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving 

conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State 

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Reversing a conviction 

as being against the manifest weight of the evidence should be reserved for only the 

exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id. We 

are reminded that “it is not the function of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for 

that of the factfinder.” Jenks at 279. 

{¶14} The Majors were convicted of endangering children, in violation of R.C. 

2919.22(A), which provides, in relevant part: 

No person who is the parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody or 

control, or a person in loco parentis of a child under eighteen years of age * 

* * shall create a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child, by 

violating a duty of care, protection, or support. 

{¶15} A “substantial risk” is defined as “a strong possibility, as contrasted with a 

remote or significant possibility, that a certain result may occur or that certain 

circumstances may exist.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(8). 

{¶16} “The existence of the culpable mental state of recklessness is an essential 

element of the crime of endangering children under R.C. 2919.22(A).” State v. McGee, 

79 Ohio St.3d 193, 680 N.E.2d 975 (1997), syllabus. A person acts recklessly when, 

with heedless indifference to the consequences, he or she perversely disregards a known 

risk that his or her conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain 
nature. R.C. 2901.22(C). A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with 

heedless indifference to the consequences, he or she perversely disregards a known risk 

that such circumstances are likely to exist. Id.

{¶17} The Majors argue that the prosecution failed to offer sufficient evidence that 

they recklessly created a substantial risk to the health or safety of their child. To support 

their position, the Majors cite State v. Martin, 134 Ohio App.3d 41, 730 N.E.2d 386 (1st 

Dist.1999), and State v. Boone, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-950427, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 

3387 (Aug. 14, 1996). In Martin, the court found that a parent did not create a 

substantial risk to her nine-year-old child’s safety when she left the child in the back of a 

car while she went into a store, even though the child accidently knocked the car into gear 

and the car rolled into the aisle of the parking lot; the child was not injured. In Boone, 

the court found that a parent who intentionally drove away and left her seven-year-old 

child in a public parking lot created only a speculative risk, not a substantial risk, to the 

child. 

{¶18} The prosecution relies on State v. Hawkins, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008CA 

00280, 2009-Ohio-5253, and State v. Lewis, 192 Ohio App.3d 153, 2011-Ohio-187, 948 

N.E.2d 487 (5th Dist.), for the proposition that leaving an infant unattended in an 

unlocked vehicle on a public street creates clear and substantial risks to the child’s safety, 

including the risk of kidnapping and vehicle theft. 

{¶19} As the Majors point out, in both Hawkins and Lewis, extreme temperatures 

and public parking lots were cited as reasons for upholding the defendants’ convictions. 

But Martin and Boone are distinguishable from this case as well. Martin and Boone both 
concerned older children who could independently act on their own, not a helpless baby 

who relied on his parents to meet his basic needs. The statutory duty imposed by the 

law upon parents to care, protect, and support their child necessarily requires different 

actions depending on the age and ability of each child. The duty naturally requires 

different actions with a ten-month-old baby than with an older child that can walk, talk, 

and eat on his or her own. An older child can most often communicate more effectively, 

appreciate danger and verbally object if accosted, seek help from others, or, if it had been 

a situation like the one in this case, simply got out of the car and walk into his house. 

The infant here was unable to do so. Moreover, in Boone, the testimony was that the 

defendant pulled out of the parking lot, drove a short distance, and then came back and 

watched her child in the parking lot. In this case, there was circumstantial evidence 

presented at trial that the Majors were neither watching nor could see their baby in his car 

seat. 

{¶20} In Beachwood v. Hill, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93577, 2010-Ohio-3313, this 

court upheld a child endangering conviction when the defendant left three children, ages 

4, 7, and 8, alone in the car with a cell phone while she shopped for groceries. This court 

expressly distinguished Martin and Hughes, stating: 

Here Hill left three children alone, the youngest of whom was four years of 

age. It was 9:00 p.m. Hill’s car window was open far enough for her 

four-year-old to extend part of her body out the window, and someone 

could have reached inside. The parking lot was on a busy street, very close 

to Interstate 271, and had steady pedestrian and vehicular traffic. Any 
rational trier of fact could have found these factors presented a substantial 

risk to the health or safety of the children. 

* * * 

Hill left her three very young children unattended in a public parking lot, on 

a busy street, at 9:00 p.m., for 15 minutes. 

{¶21} The facts in Hill are admittingly different from the facts in the case at bar, 

but Hill was decided by this district and the cases the Majors and the prosecution rely on 

were all decided by other appellate districts. 

Rarely will we find earlier cases decided on facts that are identical to the 

ones we face presently; it seems that the outcome of child endangerment 

cases are highly fact-specific. 

Id. at ¶ 21. Yet, because these cases are so fact-specific is all the more reason to find that 

the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction as charged; the court 

must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Id.

{¶22} In this case, the Garfield Heights police officers were already on scene when 

the lieutenant arrived but, to his knowledge, the Garfield Heights officers did not know 

the baby was in the car. Lieutenant Sturgill parked his cruiser in front of the Majors’ 

house, walked down the street to where the other officers were located and conferred with 

them “for a minute,” before he walked back to the house and discovered the unattended 

baby. Although the Majors’ car was parked on the street only six to eight feet away 

from the porch door, Lieutenant Sturgill testified that the baby was sitting behind the 

driver’s side seat, so he estimated the child to be another three feet away from the porch 

door. The house had an enclosed porch with a door and a second door that led to the 
main living area of the house so one would have to go through two doors in order to enter 

the house. Additionally, the police had to knock on the porch door for “two to four 

minutes” before someone finally answered the door. 

{¶23} Lieutenant Sturgill testified that while it was neither too hot nor too cold 

outside, the car was unlocked and the windows were open. He estimated the time that 

the baby was alone in the car to be “approximately 10 minutes.” Although it is not 

known what time the Garfield Heights police officers arrived on scene, based on the 

timeline, it is likely the baby was left in the car for more than ten minutes. 

{¶24} The evidence showed that, for at least a ten-minute period, the Majors, both 

of whom appeared to be under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, abandoned their 

ten-month old baby in an unlocked car on a public street. They left the car windows 

open and entered their house, going through two exterior doors. Neither parent 

responded to a police officer removing their baby from the car and it took police two to 

four minutes of knocking to get someone to answer the door. 

{¶25} To support their argument that their convictions were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, the Majors again argue that there was no evidence that they acted 

recklessly or that there was a substantial risk to the health or safety of their baby. We 

disagree. 

{¶26} Although these types of cases are intensely fact-specific and, therefore, do 

not easily lend themselves to comparison to other child endangering cases, the facts of 

this specific case show that the Majors created a substantial risk to the health and safety 

of their child. Their actions were not simply an act of bad parenting or an error in 
judgment. The mother appeared high on “heroin or opiates” and the father was so 

inebriated that another family member had to take custody of the baby. They left their 

ten-month-old baby in an unlocked car on a public street with the windows down, went 

into the house, and even after three police cars pulled up and a police officer removed 

their baby from the car, it still took two to four minutes of the officers knocking on their 

door for one of them to answer. 

{¶27} In light of these facts, there was sufficient evidence to support the 

convictions for child endangering. We further find that their convictions were not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶28} The assignments of error are overruled. 

{¶29} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellants costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Garfield 

Heights Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCURS; 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., DISSENTS WITH 

SEPARATE OPINION 

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., DISSENTING: 

{¶30} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s position that the Village presented 

sufficient evidence to establish that the appellants recklessly created a substantial risk to 

the health or safety of their child. In my view, the factual circumstances involved in this 

case, although troubling, did not rise to the level of criminal conduct. 

{¶31} As stated by the majority, “substantial risk” is defined as “a strong 

possibility, as contrasted with a remote or significant possibility, that a certain result may 

occur or that certain circumstances may exist.” Thus, there must be some evidence 

beyond mere speculation as to the risk of harm that could potentially occur due to a single 

imprudent act. 

{¶32} In this case, the child was not injured, and the state failed to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt that there was a strong possibility that he would have been injured. The 

majority makes much of the fact that the car was unlocked with the windows rolled down. 

 However, these factors alone are not sufficient to support a child endangering 

conviction. See State v. Martin, 134 Ohio App.3d 41, 730 N.E.2d 386 (1st Dist.1999). 

Lt. Sturgill’s testimony established that appellants were just a short distance away from 

the child, that the vehicle was parked just “six to eight feet” in front of the appellants’ 
home, in a residential neighborhood with minimal pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and 

that the weather was neither “particularly hot” nor “particularly cold.” Moreover, the 

prosecution failed to present any evidence regarding the duration of time the child was 

left unsupervised prior to the arrival of Lt. Sturgill. 

{¶33} The majority further references Lt. Sturgill’s testimony that the mother’s 

eyes were dilated, indicating use of “heroin or opiates,” and that the father appeared to be 

slurring his words, indicating that he was inebriated. However, there was no evidence 

presented to confirm that appellants were in fact under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 

Lt. Sturgill was merely asked to speculate on this issue during his direct examination. 

Thus, the trial court was left to speculate on numerous relevant factors and was only able 

to find appellants guilty of child endangering by drawing inferences upon inferences. 

{¶34} Under these circumstances, I would find that Lt. Sturgill’s testimony did not 

prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of a substantial risk to the health or safety 

of the child. Instead, Lt. Sturgill’s testimony merely presented potentially harmful 

scenarios that, although might have been remotely or even significantly possible, did not 

have a strong possibility of occurring. 

{¶35} Accordingly, I believe that insufficient evidence exists to support the trial 

court’s verdict pronouncing appellants guilty of child endangering. 

{¶36} Based on the foregoing, I would sustain appellants’ first assignment of error 

and reverse and vacate their child endangerment convictions.