IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JACK A.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 3446

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Jack A.’s claim for 

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction 

of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the 

reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 15] is 

denied, and the Commissioner’s request for affirmance [Doc. No. 19] is granted.

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security 

Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by his first name and the first initial of his last 

name.

2

 Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(d).

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BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 31, 2017, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB, alleging disability since 

April 30, 2016. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which

he timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which 

was held on March 8, 2018. Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the 

hearing and was represented by counsel. A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. 

At the hearing, Plaintiff amended the alleged onset date to April 15, 2017.

On May 9, 2019, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding him not 

disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration Appeals 

Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the 

final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the District Court 

under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005). 

II. ALJ DECISION

Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential 

evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since his amended alleged onset date of April 15, 2017.

At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments:

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar and cervical spine; tendon/ligament tear of 

the left ankle (status post repair); degenerative joint disease and tendon tears of the 

left shoulder and rotator cuff (status post repair); degenerative joint disease and 

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tendon tears of the right shoulder and rotator cuff (status post repair); and obesity. 

The ALJ concluded at step three that Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in 

combination, do not meet or medically equal a listed impairment.

Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following additional 

limitations: can lift and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds

frequently; is limited to occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, 

crawling, and climbing of ramps and stairs; can never climb ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds; and can frequently reach, push, and pull in all directions with the 

bilateral upper extremities. At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is capable 

of performing his past relevant work as a courier and hotel clerk, leading to a 

finding that he is not disabled under the Social Security Act.

DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a plaintiff is 

disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff

presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does 

the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

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enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform her former 

occupation? and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4). 

An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that 

the plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 

389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, 

precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 

one to four. Id. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the 

burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even 

in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of 

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not 

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high. Substantial evidence is . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and 

means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019)

(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in 

evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also 

Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision 

must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is 

adequately supported”) (citation omitted).

However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved 

of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838 

F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has 

adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every 

piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide 

some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. 

Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to 

a plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 

conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate 

the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful 

appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 

2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to 

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fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately 

articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 

1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). 

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons, 

including: (1) the ALJ did not incorporate into the RFC the bilateral overhead 

reaching limitation found by a state agency consultant; (2) the ALJ misquoted the 

opinion of Dr. Charles Bush-Joseph; (3) the ALJ incorrectly stated the findings of a 

shoulder September 2018 MRI; and (4) the ALJ improperly weighed the opinion of 

Dr. Charles Brikha. Each argument will be addressed below in turn.

A. State Agency Consultant Opinion

Plaintiff claims error with respect to the ALJ’s treatment of the opinion of the

state agency consultant who provided an opinion at the reconsideration level. The 

ALJ assessed the state agency consultant’s opinion as follows:

At reconsideration, the State agency medical consultant found that 

[Plaintiff] was limited to light exertional work, with manipulative, 

postural, and environment limitations. This opinion is persuasive, as it 

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is consistent with and supported by the overall record, which shows 

improved functional ability with treatments.

(R. 19-20 (citations omitted).) According to Plaintiff, the state agency doctor 

determined that Plaintiff was “limited to occasional overhead reaching bilaterally” 

and the ALJ erred because her “RFC does not include occasional overhead 

reaching.” (Pl.’s Memo at 9.)

However, an “ALJ is not required to rely entirely on a particular physician’s 

opinion or choose between the opinions [of] any of the claimant’s physicians.” 

Schmidt v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Accordingly, 

the Court agrees with Defendant that “nothing requires the ALJ to adopt each and 

every limitation opined by a physician, even when she finds the opinion persuasive.” 

(Def.’s Resp. at 12.) Further, the Court agrees with Defendant that any error with 

respect to the ALJ’s assessment of the state agency consultant’s opinion is 

harmless, as the job of hotel clerk (Plaintiff’s previous job that the ALJ determined 

he could perform) involves reaching and handling occasionally. Thus, even if 

Plaintiff were limited to only occasional reaching, he could perform his past relevant 

work as a hotel clerk. Ultimately, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s first argument.

B. Opinion of Dr. Charles Bush-Joseph

Plaintiff complains that the ALJ misquoted Dr. Bush-Joseph (shoulder 

surgeon) when she stated that the doctor “allowed the claimant to continue work at 

full duty without restrictions” in April 2017. (R. 17.) Plaintiff asserts that Dr. BushJoseph’s note at the time stated that Plaintiff should “continue to follow his ankle 

surgeon’s recommendation in regard to work restrictions after his recent left ankle 

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surgery.” (Pl.’s Memo at 10.) However, Dr. Bush-Joseph’s April 2017 note does in 

fact state that that Plaintiff “may continue to work at full duty without 

restrictions.” (R. 333.) The Court agrees with Defendant that it was not error (and 

not a misquote) for the ALJ to acknowledge Dr. Bush-Joseph’s statement in that 

respect. Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s second argument.

C. September 2018 Shoulder MRI

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ incorrectly stated that a “September 2018 MRI 

of the left shoulder revealed post-surgical changes of prior supraspinatus tendon 

repair, but no evidence of a full-thickness recurrent tear.” (R. 18.) Plaintiff points 

out that the MRI does in fact show a tear. However, the Court agrees with 

Defendant that even if the ALJ may have overlooked some of the finding of the 

shoulder MRI, Plaintiff has failed to show that any harm resulted because the ALJ 

did place some limitations with respect to Plaintiff’s upper extremities (i.e., only 

frequent reaching, pushing, and pulling). Furthermore, and in any event, the Court 

finds that the ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s shoulder condition as of September 

2018 is otherwise supported by her notations that “the claimant wanted to continue 

with Crossfit” and was “doing Olympic Lifts at Crossfit the day before.” (Id. at 18.)

Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s third argument.

D. Opinion of Dr. Charles Brikha

In his final argument, Plaintiff contends, essentially, that the ALJ 

improperly evaluated the opinions of Dr. Brikha. The ALJ assessed Dr. Brikha’s 

opinions as follows:

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September 2016 notes show that the claimant complained of lower 

backache. Charles Brikha, M.D., limited the claimant to sedentary 

work. In October 2016, Dr. Brikha continued the sedentary work 

allowance until completion of physical therapy. The opinions of Dr. 

Brikha are not persuasive, as subsequent records show improved 

functional ability, which are not consistent with a sedentary work 

limitation.

(R. 18-19 (citations omitted).) Plaintiff’s claimed errors are belied by the fact that 

the ALJ gave a sound reason (medical records showing substantial improvement) 

for rejecting Dr. Brikha’s conclusion.

Furthermore, in addition to medical records showing improved functional 

ability, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could perform more than sedentary 

work is supported by Plaintiff’s own testimony, which the ALJ noted as follows:

The claimant stated that he joined Crossfit in October 2017 and goes to 

the gym every other day, or 3 times per week. He testified that he lifts 

20-pound weights, and uses a support box for pull-ups. . . . He estimated 

that he is able to jog up to 200 meters, stand up to 15 minutes, and sit 

comfortably for 15 minutes. Despite these allegations, the claimant 

reported that he is able to perform personal care, prepare his own meals, 

do laundry, mow the lawn, drive a car, go out alone, shop in stores, visit 

his father in the nursing home, handle his own finances, spend time with 

others, attend church, and perform hobbies such as watching television 

and working out at the gym.

(Id. at 16.) Ultimately, the Court finds that the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Brikha’s 

opinions was proper and her overall rejection of a sedentary work limitation is 

supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s fourth 

argument.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the points of error raised by Plaintiff are not welltaken. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 15] is denied, 

and the Commissioner’s request for affirmance [Doc. No. 19] is granted.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

DATE: December 13, 2021 ___________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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