[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Suwalksi v. Peeler , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4061.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O

. 2021-O HIO -4061

T HE S TATE EX REL

. S UWALSKI , A PPELLEE , v . P EELER , J UDGE ; E WING , A PPELLANT

. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Suwalksi v. Peeler , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4061.] Prohibition—Marsy’s Law, Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10a—Federal Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq.—Federal firearms disability— Restoration of firearms rights—Court of appeals’ judgment granting writof prohibition invalidating judge’s grant of misdemeanor-domesticviolence offender’s application for relief from federal firearms disability affirmed. (No. 2020-0755—Submitted April 27, 2021—Decided November 18, 20 21.)

A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals fo r Warren County, No. CA2019-05-053,

2020-Ohio-3233.

__________________S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 O’C ONNOR , C.J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Roy Ewing, was c onvicted in Warren County of misdemeanor domestic violence for assaulting his then-wife, app ellee, Jamie

Suwalski. As a result of that conviction, federal law prohibit s Ewing from possessing a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), unless, as relevant in this case, the domestic-violence offense is one for which Ewing “has had [his] civil rights restored” under Ohio law, 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). Ewing f iled in the Warren County Court of Common Pleas an application under R.C. 2923.14 for relief from

his federal firearms disabilit y, and Judge Robert W. Peeler, 1 a judge of that court, granted Ewing’s application and i ssued an order restoring his f irearms rights. {¶ 2} Suwalski sought a writ of prohibiti on in the Twelfth District C ourt of Appeals, seeking to prevent Judge Peeler’s order from being eff ective and invoking Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution, also known as “Marsy’s Law.” The court of appeals permitted Ewing to intervene. The court of ap peals granted the writ, holding that Judge Peeler l acked the judicial power to re lieve Ewing of the federal firearms disability imposed by 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). 20 20-Ohio-3233, 155 N.E.3d 47, ¶ 24. {¶ 3} We agree that a writ of prohib ition is warranted, but our ratio nale for that conclusion differs from that of the court of appeals. Bec ause Suwalski has established the elements necessary for a writ of prohibition, w e affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. I. Relevant Background A. Ewing Is Convicted of Domes tic Violence for Assaulting Suwalski

{¶ 4} In April 2017, Ewing was convicted in Warren County of domestic

violence under R.C. 2919.25 and viol ating a protection order un der R.C. 2919.27, both first-degree misdemeanors. T he convictions arose from Ewi ng’s assault of

1. Ewing initiated the appeal to this court. Judge Peeler, wh o was the respondent in the court of appeals, did not file a notice of appeal or otherwise participa te in this appeal.January Term, 2021

3 Suwalski. He was sentenced to 20 days in jail, with ten days s uspended, one year of probation, and a fine. The T welfth District affirmed Ewing’ s domestic-violence conviction on direct appeal. State v. Ewing , 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2017-05- 062 and CA2017-05-063, 2018-Ohio-451.

B. Relevant Firearms-Disab ility and Restoration Statutes {¶ 5} Ewing’s conviction for misdemea nor domestic violence triggered his firearms disability under the fede ral Gun Control Act, 18 U.S.C . 921 et seq. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. 922( g)(9) provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person * * * who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerc e, or possess in or affecti ng commerce, any firea rm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstat e or foreign commerce. 2

{¶ 6} The firearms restrictions imposed by 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) do not apply to every misdemeanor-domestic-v iolence conviction. In the defi nitions section of the Gun Control Act, Congress provided four circumstances in wh ich a

misdemeanor-domestic-violence c onviction does not trigger the f irearms

restrictions:

A person shall not be considered to have been convicted of such an offense for purposes of [18 U.S.C. 921 et seq.] if the

2. Ewing has not argued that the “interstate commerce” limitat ion in 18 U.S.C. 922(g) renders the statute inapplicable to him. Indeed, by seeking relief from th e disability imposed by 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), Ewing implicitly acknowledges that he might engage i n firearms-related activity covered by the statute.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 conviction has been expunged or s et aside, or is an offense for which the person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense) unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expr essly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess , or receive firearms.

(Emphasis added.) 18 U. S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii). {¶ 7} The law of the jurisdiction in which a person was convicted determines whether the person ha s had his “civil rights restore d” within the meaning of the Gun Control Act. See Caron v. United States , 524 U.S. 308, 312- 313, 118 S.Ct. 2007, 141 L.Ed.2d 303 (1998). Governing such a determination under Ohio law is R.C. 2923.14, w hich allows “any person who is prohibited from acquiring, having, carrying, or using firearms” to “apply to th e court of common pleas in the county in which the person resides for relief from such prohibition.” R.C. 2923.14(A)(1). Relevant here, R.C. 2923.14 allows a commo n pleas court to grant the application if the applicant (1) has been “fully disc harged” (if the disability was the result of a conviction), (2) “has led a law- abiding life since discharge * * * and appears likel y to continue to do so,” and ( 3) “is not otherwise prohibited by law from acquiring, having, or using firearms.” R.C. 2923.14(D)(1)(a) and (D)(2) and (3). C. Ewing Applies for Relief from His Firearms Disability {¶ 8} In February 2019, Ewing filed in the Warren County Court of Common Pleas an application for relief under R.C. 2923.14, seek ing an order relieving him of the firearms re strictions imposed by 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). The

state did not contest the trial court’s authority to grant the requested relief; to the contrary, it stipulated that R.C. 2923.14 allows a court of com mon pleas to grant relief from a federal firearms disability to a person who is un der the disability dueJanuary Term, 2021

5 to a misdemeanor-domestic-viole nce conviction. The state did n ot call Suwalski as a witness at the hearing on Ewi ng’s application, but it submitt ed to the court her unsworn statement opposing the res toration of Ewing’s firearms rights. {¶ 9} Judge Peeler granted Ewing’s app lication and ordered that he be

“restored to all civil firearm rights to the extent enjoyed by any citizen.” The state did not appeal Judge P eeler’s ruling. D. Suwalski Seeks Relief in Prohibition {¶ 10} One month after Judge Peeler gra nted Ewing’s application, Suwal ski filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition in the Twelfth Dist rict. Suwalski alleged that Judge Peeler lacked jurisdic tion to relieve Ewing of his f ederal firearms disability and that Judge Peeler’s order doing so violated her rights, as a crime victim, to safety and protection under Marsy’s Law, Article I, Section 10a(1) and (4) of the Ohio Constitution. She further alleged that she had the right to petition the court of appeals for relief under Article I, Section 10a(B) . Specifically, she sought a writ of prohibition rest raining Judge Peeler from carr ying into effect his order relieving Ewing of the firearms disability. {¶ 11} The court of appeals granted Ewi ng’s motion to intervene, and t he

case was submitted for a decisi on following the pa rties’ filing of merit briefs and a stipulated statement of facts. T he court of appeals granted a writ of prohibition, holding that Judge Peeler lacked t he judicial power under Ohio law to relieve Ewing of the federal firearms disability imposed by 18 U.S.C. 922(g)( 9). 2020-Ohio3233, 155 N.E.3d 47, at ¶ 24. {¶ 12} Ewing appealed to this court as of right. II. Analysis {¶ 13} In an appeal of right from a court of appeals’ judgment in an extraordinary-writ action, we review the judgment as if the act ion had been originally filed in this court. State ex rel. Taylor v. Glasser , 50 Ohio St.2d 165, 166-167, 364 N.E.2d 1 (1977).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 A. Marsy’s Law {¶ 14} Marsy’s Law was established on February 5, 2018, when Article I

, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution was amended following an i nitiative adopted by Ohio voters at the 2017 general election. Marsy’s Law enume rates ten victims’ rights, “which shall be protect ed in a manner no less vigorous than the rights

afforded to the accused.” Artic le I, Section 10a(A), Ohio Cons titution. Those rights include the following:

(1) to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s safety, dignity and privacy; (2) upon request, to reasonable and timely notice of all public proceedings involving the criminal offense or delinquent act against the victim, and to be pres ent at all such proceedings; (3) to be heard in any public proceeding involving release, plea, sentencing, disposition, or p arole, or in a ny public proc eeding in which a right of the victim is implicated; (4) to reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused; (5) upon request, to reasonable notice of any release or escape of the accused; (6) except as authorized by section 10 of Article I of th[e] constitution, to refuse an interview, deposition, or other disc overy request made by the accused or any person acting on behalf of t he accused; (7) to full and timely restitution from the person who

committed the criminal offense or d elinquent act against the vi ctim; (8) to proceedings free from unreasonable delay and a prompt conclusion of the case;January Term, 2021

7 (9) upon request, to confer with the attorney for the government; and (10) to be informed, in writi ng, of all rights enumerated in

this section.

Id. {¶ 15} Marsy’s Law additionally provides victims with the ability to vindicate those right s in the courts:

The victim, the attorney for the government upon request of the victim, or the victim’s other lawful representative, in any proceeding involving the criminal offense or delinquent act aga inst

the victim or in which the vic tim’s rights are implicated, may assert the rights enumerated in this section and any other right affor ded to the victim by law. If the relie f sought is denied, the victim or the victim’s lawful representative may petition the court of appeal s for the applicable district, which shall promptly consider and deci de the petition.

Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10a(B). B. Ewing’s Exhaustion Argument {¶ 16} In his first proposition of law, Ewing argues that Suwalski fai led to

“exhaust” her claim in the trial court before she sought relief in the court of appeals. {¶ 17} We do not find Ewing’s argument pe rsuasive. Article I, Section 10a(B) of the Ohio Constitution allows a victim to “assert the rights enumerated” in Article I, Section 10a(A) “i n any proceeding involving the c riminal offense” and allows the victim to “petition the court of appeals” if the rel ief sought is denied. In this case, Suwalski—a nonparty to the firearms-restoration proc eeding in theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 common pleas court—raised her obj ection to Ewing’s application by submitting to

that court a statement in opposition to the application. {¶ 18} We hold that Suwalski sufficiently asserted her rights in the c ommon pleas court. And having done so, she did not fail to exhaust h er claim and had the right to petition the court of appeals for relief after Judge P eeler granted Ewing’s application over her objection. C. Suwalski Invoked Rights Protected by Marsy’s Law {¶ 19} In his second proposition of law, Ew ing challenges the notion t hat Marsy’s Law is applicable in th is case. Ewing contends that an application for relief from a firearms disability does not implicate any of the victims’ rights enumerated in Marsy’s Law and that Suwalski therefore had no ri ght to petition the court of appeals for re lief under Marsy’s Law. {¶ 20} We reject Ewing’s argument. At least two rights under Marsy’s Law are applicable here—the right “to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s safety” and the right “to reasonable protection from t he accused.” Ohio Constitution, Article I, Sections 10a(A)(1) and (4). And Artic le I, Section 10a(B) allows a victim to assert her rights “in any proceeding involving the criminal offense.” (Emphasis added.) We hold that Ewing’s application to the common pleas court under R.C. 2923.14 to relieve him of his federal fi rearms disability, which was imposed as a result of his domestic-violence convicti on for assaulting Suwalski, was a proceeding “i nvolving the criminal offense” un der Article I, Section 10a(B). {¶ 21} In determining the meaning of t he phrase “involving the crimina l offense” in Article I, Section 10a(B), we must give the words t heir usual, normal, or customary meaning. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn. , 146 Ohio St.3d 356, 2016-Ohio-2806, 56 N.E.3d 950, ¶ 16. Here, the natural meaning of the word “involving” i s “to relate closely” or “conn ect.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1191 (1993). The firearms di sability imposedJanuary Term, 2021

9 on Ewing under federal law exists only because of his domestic- violence conviction for assaulting Suwalski. See 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). More over, the language of R.C. 2923.14 connects a proceeding for relief from a firearms disabi lity to the criminal offense that caused the disability. See R.C. 2923.14(B)(1) (requiring an applicant to recite in the application a ll “indictments, convictions, or adjudications upon which the applicant’s disabilit y is based”). Indeed, if a fire arms disability is based upon a criminal conviction, a court may not grant the applicati on unless the applicant “has been fully discharged from [any] imprisonment, c ommunity control, post-release control, [or] paro le” relating to the conviction. R.C. 2923.14(D)(1)(a). Thus, under R.C. 2923.14’s plain te rms, an application for reli ef from a firearms disability involves “the criminal offense,” at least when, as h ere, the firearms disability arose from a criminal conviction.

D. Res Judicata {¶ 22} In his third proposition of law, Ewing posits that Suwalski’s prohibition action is barred by re s judicata. Under the doctri ne of res judicata, a prior valid judgment on the merits bars a subsequent action bet ween the same parties, or their privies, as to all claims that were or might have been litigated in the prior action. See Grava v. Parkman Twp. , 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 381-382, 653 N.E.2d 226 (1995). Without citing any app licable legal authority, Ewi ng argues that Judge Peeler’s order, which the state did not appeal, is a prior vali d judgment on the merits that has the effect of res judi cata on Suwalski’s prohibition a ction. {¶ 23} Article I, Section 10a(B) of the Ohio Constitution unequivocall y grants to crime victims the right to petition the court of appe als if they are denied relief in a proceeding involving the criminal offense or in whi ch the victim’s rights are implicated. In this case, Suwalski opposed Ewing’s applica tion in the common pleas court and then petitioned the court of appeals after Judg e Peeler granted the application over her objection. And to apply res judicata as a bar to Suwalski’sS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 prohibition action in the court of appeals would be inconsisten t with the constitutional rights granted t o crime victims unde r Marsy’s La w. E. The Merits of Suwalski’s Prohibition Action {¶ 24} In his final proposition of law, Ewing argues that prohibition does not lie under the facts of this case. He argues that even if J udge Peeler had “debatable jurisdiction” over the proceeding involving his appl ication for relief from his federal firearms disability, jurisdiction was not pate ntly and unambiguously lacking. He also argues that the trial court’s g rant of his application was proper. And Ewing contends t hat even if that ruling was in correct, Judge Peeler erred only in the exercise of his jurisdiction—an error for which a writ of prohibition will not issue. {¶ 25} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Suwalski must establis h that (1) Judge Peeler is about to or has exercised judicial power, ( 2) his exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ would re sult in injury for which no other adequate remedy ex ists in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel.

Shumaker v. Nichols , 137 Ohio St.3d 391, 2013-Ohio-4732, 999 N.E.2d 630, ¶ 9. Suwalski need not satisfy the t hird requirement if Judge Peeler “patently and unambiguously” lacked jurisdiction. State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals , 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15

. 1. Judge Peeler’s Exercise of Judicial Power in Granting Ewing’s Application Was Unauthorized by Law {¶ 26} There is no question that Judge P eeler exercised judicial power in considering Ewing’s applicati on and granting him relief under R .C. 2923.14. Thus, we turn to the second element necessary for Suwalski to establi sh her entitlement to a writ of prohibition: wheth er Judge Peeler’s exercise of ju dicial power was unauthorized by law. See Shumaker at ¶ 9. {¶ 27} Ewing is subject to a firearms disability under 18 U.S.C. 922(g )(9), a federal statute that prohibits a person who has been convicte d of misdemeanorJanuary Term, 2021

11 domestic violence from possessing a firearm. Ewing argues that his application to restore his firearms rights under R.C. 2923.14 wa s appropriatel y granted because 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) empow ers a state to remove a federa l firearms disability when, under the state’s law, “the person * * * has h ad civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the los s of civil rights under such an offense).” Ewing’s inte rpretation of 18 U.S.C. 921(a)( 33)(B)(ii) is incorrect, and so is his argument concerning the reach of a com mon pleas court’s authority under R.C. 2923.14. {¶ 28} Ewing’s interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) ignores t he statute’s qualification that a p erson is not subject to a feder al firearms disability

based on a domestic-violence c onviction if his civil rights hav e been “restored” under state law—i.e., the person must have first lost those civil rights under state

law as a result of the offense. See Logan v. United States , 552 U.S. 23, 36, 128 S.Ct. 475, 169 L.Ed.2d 432 (2007) (noting that the words “civil rights restored” in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) “do not cover a person whose civil rights were never taken away” under state law). A gain, 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(i i) applies only “ if the law of the applicable jur isdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense.” (Emphasis added.) B ut Ewing never lost those civ il rights under Ohio

law as a result of his misdemea nor-domestic-violence conviction . Under Ohio’s weapons-under-disability statute , an offender’s conviction for misdemeanor domestic violence (or any other misdemeanor) does not bar the o ffender from acquiring, having, carrying, or using a firearm. R.C. 2923.13( A)(2) and (3). Thus, the exception in 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)(ii) is inapplicable to Ewing’s

misdemeanor-domestic-violence c onviction. As a matter of feder al law, Ewing was ineligible to have his firearms rights restored because he neve r lost those rights

under Ohio law. {¶ 29} Ewing is thus ineligible to have any firearms rights restored a s a matter of Ohio law. In order for an Ohio court to grant relief from a firearmsS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 disability, the applicant must not be “otherwise prohibited by law from acquiring, having, or using firearms.” R .C. 2923.14(D)(3). As explained above, Ewing is prohibited by federal law from po ssessing firearms by virtue ofhis domesticviolence conviction; he has no Ohio-law firearms disability. H e therefore does not qualify for any relief from his firearms disability under R.C. 2923.14. In fact, Ewing remains under that disability notwithstanding Judge Peele r’s order. Thus, Judge Peeler’s grant of Ewing’s application was unauthorized by law, because nothing in federal or Ohio law pe rmitted Judge Peeler to grant the application. {¶ 30} In arguing that Judge Peeler had the statutory authority to rel ieve him of his federal firearms disability, Ewing asserts that this court must give weight

to an uncodified section of 2011 H .B. No. 54, which amended R.C . 2923.14. That

uncodified section states:

It is the intent of the Gener al Assembly in amending section 2923.14 of the Revised Code to apply the amendments to that section retroactively to any rest oration of rights granted prev iously to any applicant under section 2923.14 of the Revised Code or u nder any previous version of that s ection. The General Assembly is explicitly making this amendment to clarify that relief from a weapons disability granted under section 2923.14 of the Revised Code restores a person’s civil firearm rights to such an extent that the uniform federal ban on possessi ng any firearms at all, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), does not apply to that person , in correlation with the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretati on of 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20) in Caron [, 524 U.S. 308, 118 S.Ct. 2007, 141 L.Ed.2d 303].

(Emphasis and brackets a dded.) 2011 H.B. No. 54, Section 3.January Term, 2021

13 {¶ 31} Ewing overstates the reach of S ection 3. That provision expres sly refers to a court’s authority t o relieve a person of a disabili ty that was imposed under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). 3 But Ewing’s federal firearms disability arose by operation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9), not 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The General Assembly did not indicate any intent to au thorize courts to restore fire arms rights lost by domestic-violence offenders under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). In any event, again, Ewing is not under any Ohio-law weapons disability for his misdemeano r-domesticviolence conviction. {¶ 32} We hold that Judge Peeler’s grant of Ewing’s application to rem ove his federal firearms disab ility was not authorized by law. 2. No Adequate Remedy Exists in the Ordinary Course of the Law {¶ 33} The final requirement for a writ of prohibition is whether deny ing the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate rem edy exists in the ordinary course of the law, Shumaker , 137 Ohio St.3d 391, 2013-Ohio-4732, 999 N.E.2d 630, at ¶ 9, or if that element is not satisfied, whethe r Judge Peeler “patently and unambiguously” lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Sapp , 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, at ¶ 15. Although Judge Peeler erred in granting relief to Ewing, we hold that he did not lack subject-matter ju risdiction over Ewing’s application. {¶ 34} R.C. 2923.14 confers jurisdiction on the courts of common pleas to grant applications for relief from firearms disabilities. To b e sure, the courts must exercise their legal authority within the strictures contained in the statute. See, e.g. , R.C. 2923.14(D) (listing the require ments that must be satisfie d before the court may grant an application for relief). But as a jurisdictional matter, R.C. 2923.14 grants general jurisdiction to the common pleas courts to adjud icate applications for relief from a firearms disability. The fact that Judge Pee ler exercised that

3. Under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), the firearms restrictions apply to any person who has been convicted of an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for a term exc eeding one year.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 jurisdiction erroneously does not give rise to a writ of prohib ition. See State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein , 153 Ohio St.3d 560, 2018-Ohio-3155, 108 N.E.3d 1089, ¶ 24. “Indeed, there are many cases in which a court lacks the legal authority to grant the relief sought but nevertheless ha s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.” Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman , 157 Ohio St.3d 296, 2019-Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 14. {¶ 35} Nonetheless, we hold that denying the writ in this case would r esult in injury to Suwalski for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of the law. Judge Peeler’s order grants Ewing relief fr om his firearms disability—relief to which he is not entitled as a matter of la w. And absent an extraordinary writ, Suwalski would be without a forum in which or a method to challenge the erroneous order and assert her rights under Marsy ’s Law. {¶ 36} The availability of an appeal typically constitutes an adequate remedy. See State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Gwin , 64 Ohio St.3d 245, 248, 594 N.E.2d 616 (1992). But an appeal was not available to Suwalski. She was not a party to the application proceeding in the common pleas court. And the fact that a victim has the right to petition the court of appeals under Art icle I, Section 10a(B) of the Ohio Constitution does not make the victim a party or pr ovide her standing on which to assert an appeal. See State v. Hughes , 2019-Ohio-1000, 134 N.E.3d 710, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Although the state could have appealed Judge Peeler’s order, it did not represent Suwalski’s interests; it even erroneously stipulated that Ewing was eligible to obtain relief from his federal firearms disabil ity under R.C. 2923.14. {¶ 37} Additionally, unlike the circumstances involved in State ex rel. Thomas v. McGinty , 164 Ohio St.3d 167, 2020-Ohio-5452, 172 N.E.3d 824, ¶ 38- 49 (lead opinion), in which the lead opinion determined that as sault victims who had invoked Marsy’s Law had an a dequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to challenge the trial cour t’s discovery order in the under lying case, Suwalski was not the subject of a discovery order that required some act ion or acquiescenceJanuary Term, 2021

15 on her part. Judge Peeler’s orde r is also unlike a discovery o rder in general, which

is an exercise of a court’s broa d discretion for which a writ o f prohibition generally

will not issue to correct even an abuse of that discretion. See State ex rel. Mason v.

Burnside , 117 Ohio St.3d 1, 2007-Ohio-6754, 881 N.E.2d 224, ¶ 11. The error here is not that Judge Peeler abused his discretion in applying R .C. 2923.14 to Ewing’s fitness to be relieved of his firearms disability, but that R.C . 2923.14 did not provide a legal basis for the relief that Ewing sought as a matter of l aw. {¶ 38} This case presents the type of extraordinary circumstances in w hich there is no clear path in the ordinary course of the law by whi ch Suwalski may seek redress. Marsy’s Law gives Suwalski the ability to assert her rights in the trial court and to petition the court of appeals if relief is denied. Arti cle I, Section 10a(B), Ohio Constitution. But Marsy’s Law does not define and, to dat e, the General Assembly has not defined, how such a petition might entitle a v ictim to relief. In this case, Suwalski objected to the restoration of Ewing’s fire arms rights in the common pleas court and then petitioned the court of appeals for relief in the form of a complaint for a writ of pr ohibition after Ewing’s applicat ion was granted. Under the specific circumstances of this case, we hold that a c omplaint for a writ of prohibition was an appropriate way to petition the court of appeals for redress, because Judge Peeler’s order was plainly unauthorized by R.C. 2 923.14 and because Suwalski lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary cour se of the law to redress the injuries to her ri ghts under Marsy’s Law. Thus, th e court of appeals was correct in determining that extrao rdinary relief in prohibition is warranted.

III. Conclusion {¶ 39} For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals insofar as it grante d a writ of prohibition invalida ting Judge Peeler’s grant of Ewing’s application for relief from his federal firear ms disability. Judgment affirmed.

D ONNELLY , S TEWART , and B RUNNER , JJ., concur.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 K ENNEDY , J., dissents, with an opinion joined by F ISCHER and D E W INE , JJ.

_________________ K ENNEDY , J., dissenting. {¶ 40} Article I, Section 10a of the Ohio Constitution, also known as “Marsy’s Law,” enumerates specific rights afforded to victims o f crime, including the rights “to be treated with fairness and respect for the vic tim’s safety, dignity and privacy” and “to reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused.” Marsy’s Law permits a victim of a c rime to “petition the court of appeals for the applicable district” to vindicate his or her enumerated rights. Article I, Secti on 10a(B), Ohio Constitution. {¶ 41} Relying on Marsy’s Law, appell ee, Jamie Suwalski, filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition in the Twelfth District Cou rt of Appeals against Warren County Court of Common Pleas Judge Robert W. Peeler, ass erting that he violated her rights under Marsy’s Law when he purported to reli eve her ex-husband, appellant, Roy Ewing, of a feder al firearms disability. The co urt of appeals granted the writ. 2020-Ohio-3233, 155 N.E.3d 47, ¶ 24-25. However, ba sed on the plain language of the enumerated rights established in Marsy’s Law, t he rights that

Suwalski has asserted are not implicated in the underlying reli ef-from-disability

matter. Suwalski has not claimed to have been treated without fairness and respect for her safety in the matter, and Ewing is no longer an accused person. Because she asserts no other grounds est ablishing a right to the relief that she seeks in prohibition, I would reverse the judgment of the Twelfth Distri ct and dismiss the action. Because the major ity does not, I dissent. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 42} In April 2017, Ewing was convicted of a misdemeanor count of

domestic violence. Suwalski was the victim of the offense. Be cause of that conviction, it is a federal crime for Ewing to possess a firear m or ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). However, h e will not be under that disabi lity if he “has [his]January Term, 2021

17 civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdictio n provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offe nse).” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(33)(B)( ii). {¶ 43} Ewing sought relief under R.C. 2923.14 to remove the federal firearms disability, and Suwalski submitted an unsworn statemen t opposing the

restoration of his firearms ri ghts. Judge Peeler issued an ord er purporting to restore Ewing’s rights to keep and bear arms, notwithstanding the feder al law. The court of appeals granted Suwalski’s request for a writ of prohibition . It concluded that Marsy’s Law gave her standing to sue, 2020-Ohio-3233, 155 N.E.3 d 47, at ¶ 12, and it held that “Judge Peeler does not have the judicial power under Ohio law, specifically R.C. 2923.14, to relieve Ewing of the federal fire arms disability imposed upon him under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9),” id. at ¶ 24. Law and Analysis

Constitutional Construction {¶ 44} “The purpose of our written Constitution is to define and limit the powers of government and secure the rights of the people

. It controls as written unless changed by the people themselves through the amendment p rocedures established by Article XVI of the Ohio Constitution.” Cleveland v. State , 157 Ohio St.3d 330, 2019-Ohio-3820, 136 N.E.3d 466, ¶ 16 (lead opinion). {¶ 45} In discerning the meaning of a constitutional provision, we giv e undefined words in the provision their usual, normal, or custom ary meaning

. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn. , 146 Ohio St.3d 356, 2016- Ohio-2806, 56 N.E.3d 950, ¶ 16

. “[W]e may go beyond the text to consider other sources of meaning, such as the purpose of an amendment, the hi story of its adoption, or its attending circums tances, only ‘when the langua ge being construed is “obscure or of doubtful meaning.” ’ ” Cleveland at ¶ 17, quoting State ex rel.

Wallace v. Celina , 29 Ohio St.2d 109, 112, 279 N.E.2d 866 (1972), quoting Cleveland v. Bd. of Tax Appeals , 153 Ohio St. 97, 103, 91 N.E.2d 480 (1950).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 Marsy’s Law {¶ 46} The people of Ohio adopted Marsy’s Law “[t]o secure for victims justice and due process throughout the criminal and juvenile ju stice systems.” Article I, Section 10a(A), Ohi o Constitution. Section 10a(A)(1 ) grants a victim of a crime the right “to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s safety, dignity and privacy,” and Secti on 10a(A)(4) provides the victim the right “to reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting on behalf of the

accused.” {¶ 47} Article I, Section 10a(B) guarantees a victim of a crime the ri ght to assert the enumerated rights a nd to seek redress if the rights are denied:

The victim, the attorney for the government upon request of the victim, or the victim’s other lawful representative, in any proceeding involving the criminal offense or delinquent act aga inst

the victim or in which the vic tim’s rights are implicated, may assert the rights enumerated in this section and any other right affor ded to the victim by law. If the relie f sought is denied, the victim or the victim’s lawful representative may petition the court of appeal s for the applicable district, which shall promptly consider and deci de the petition.

Lastly, Section 10a(E) states t hat “[a]ll provisions of this se ction shall be selfexecuting and severable, and shall supersede all conflicting st ate laws.” {¶ 48} Suwalski maintains that “Article I, Section 10a(B) provides cri me victims with explicit standing to assert their rights in trial courts and seek review of rights violations in appellate courts.” I agree with that p roposition. But under the facts of this case, Marsy’s Law does not give Suwalski stan ding to bring the prohibition action at issue.January Term, 2021

19 {¶ 49} Suwalski maintains that Marsy’s Law grants victims of crime “constitutional rights to safety and protection.” However, tha t is not what Marsy’s Law says. Marsy’s Law grants crime victims the right “to be tr eated with fairness and respect for the victim’s safety, dignity and privacy,” Arti cle I, Section 10a(A)(1), but it does not create a freestanding right to safet y. Further, Suwalski

has not asserted that she has not been treated with fairness an d respect. Marsy’s Law does grant crime victims a ri ght to reasonable protection, but it is a right to “reasonable protection from the accused,” Article I, Section 10 a(A)(4). And here, Ewing is no longer “the accused.” {¶ 50} A person becomes the accused when the prosecution of the person commences by indictment, complaint, or arrest. See Dillingham v. United States , 423 U.S. 64, 65, 96 S.Ct. 303, 46 L.Ed.2d 205 (1975). And a pe rson ceases to be

“the accused” once he or she is convicted. Joseph v. State , 236 Ind. 529, 538, 141 N.E.2d 109 (1957); Steele v. State , 52 Del. 5, 9, 151 A.2d 127 (1959); see also

Burnett v. State , 514 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1974) (“a person remains

accused until his conviction beco mes final”). Ewing was convic ted of the

misdemeanor-domestic-violence of fense against Suwalski, but he is not currently accused of any crime against Suwalski. Therefore, he is not “t he accused” for purposes of Marsy’s Law. {¶ 51} We have also recognized that a person “has standing in a prohib ition case if it ‘is either a party to the proceeding sought to be pr ohibited * * * or demonstrates an injury in fact to a legally protected interest. ’ ” (Ellipses added in Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. ) Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Oil & Gas

Comm ., 135 Ohio St.3d 204, 2013-Ohio-224, 985 N.E.2d 480, ¶ 7, fn. 1, quoting State ex rel. Matasy v. Morley , 25 Ohio St.3d 22, 23, 494 N.E.2d 1146 (1986). But Suwalski was not a party to Ew ing’s relief-from-disability proc eedings before Judge Peeler, and in this court, she has not pointed to any spe cific facts showing that she has suffered any injury based on the order. As the ma jority explains,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 although Judge Peeler had subject -matter jurisdiction over Ewin g’s application, he lacked the authority to remove Ewing’s federal firearms disabil ity. Consequently, Suwalski has not been injured by the order purporting to restor e Ewing’s rights to keep and bear arms. A writ of prohibition, then, is of no bene fit to her. See State

ex rel. Thomas v. Nestor , 164 Ohio St.3d 144, 2021-Ohio-672, 172 N.E.3d 136, ¶ 9 (“a court need not grant extraor dinary relief in mandamus when the relator would receive no benefit from such an order”). {¶ 52} Lastly, even if Suwalski had standing to commence the prohibiti on action at issue, she would not be entitled to the writ. This c ourt has indicated that intervention into a pending acti on may provide an adequate reme dy in the course

of the law. See State ex rel. Schroeder v. Cleveland , 150 Ohio St.3d 135, 2016- Ohio-8105, 80 N.E.3d 417, ¶ 18. The denial of a motion to inte rvene itself may be a final, appealable order. Southside Community Dev. Corp. v. Levin , 116 Ohio St.3d 1209, 2007-Ohio-6665, 878 N.E.2d 1048, ¶ 6. And if Suwal ski had been allowed to intervene in the relief-from-disability proceedings, she would have had the right to appeal the approva l of Ewing’s application, afford ing her an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law that precludes extraor dinary relief in prohibition. {¶ 53} For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and dismiss Suwalski’s prohibition action. The majorit y does not, so I

dissent.

F ISCHER and D E W INE , JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.

_________________ Ohio Crime Victim Justice Center and Elizabeth A. Well; and Oh io

Domestic Violence Network and M icaela Deming, for appellee. Christopher Paga n, for appellant. Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, L.L.P., Gregory J. Phi llips, Addisah Sherwood, and James J. W alsh Jr.; and Pillsbury Winthro p Shaw Pittman,January Term, 2021

21 L.L.P., Bruce A. Ericson, Julia E. Judish, Jeetander T. Dulani, Charrise L. Alexander, Alton L. Hare, and Katherine T. Danial, urging affir mance for amici curiae Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project, Aequitas, The Legal Aid Society of Cleveland, Advocates for Basic Legal Equal ity, Inc., and Legal Aid of Western Ohio, Inc.

_________________