IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

HOLMES COUNTY BANK AND TRUST 

COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

v.

FAIR ISAAC CORPORATION,

Defendant. 

Civil Action No.

Class Action Complaint

Jury Trial Demanded

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Plaintiff Holmes County Bank and Trust Company (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of itself and all 

others similarly situated, files this complaint against Fair Isaac Corporation (“Fair Isaac” or 

“Defendant”) for violations of federal antitrust laws and state antitrust and consumer protection 

laws. The allegations herein are based on Plaintiff’s personal knowledge as to its own acts and 

on information and belief as to all other matters, such information and belief having been 

informed by the investigation conducted by and under the supervision of its counsel.

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

1. A credit score is a three-digit, statistical number designed to represent a

borrower’s credit risk or the likelihood that that borrower will pay back a loan on time. Fair Isaac 

creates and distributes a certain brand of credit scores, known as FICO® Scores. FICO Scores 

have dominated the credit score market for nearly three decades. 

2. Fair Isaac has been vocal about its dominant position in the market, bragging that 

their FICO Scores are “the 800-pound gorilla.”1In fact, Fair Isaac advertises that its FICO 

Scores are used for 90% of all lending decisions in the United States and that it sells four times 

more FICO Scores per year than McDonald’s sells hamburgers worldwide.2

3. In the United States, there are two distinct markets for credit scores: (1) the 

market for supplying credit scores to lenders, financial institutions, and other businesses for risk 

management decisions (the “business-to-business” or “B2B” market) and (2) the market for 

supplying credit scores directly to consumers to monitor their own credit records (the “businessto-consumer” or “B2C” market). Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and others who 

purchased FICO credit scores in the B2B market.

1

“What Does ‘Good’ Credit Really Mean?,” CNBC, available at

https://www.cnbc.com/id/27458815.

2

https://www.fico.com/25years/.

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4. Fair Isaac mainly distributes FICO Scores through the three national credit 

reporting agencies—also known as credit bureaus or consumer reporting agencies—Equifax Inc. 

(“Equifax”), Experian PLC (“Experian”), and Trans Union LLC (“TransUnion”). 

5. The credit reporting agencies sell lenders, financial institutions, and other 

businesses credit reports and credit scores, including Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores, that are used to 

make decisions about whether and on what terms to extend credit to American consumers. 

6. For decades, the credit reporting agencies depended on Fair Isaac for the credit 

scores they distributed, and Fair Isaac used the credit reporting agencies and the restrictions in 

the distribution agreements it entered into with them to implement its multi-pronged 

anticompetitive scheme.

7. Fair Isaac’s distribution agreements with the credit reporting agencies contain 

multiple provisions that are designed to maintain Fair Isaac’s dominant position in the 

marketplace and to extract monopoly rents. For one, Fair Isaac restricts the credit reporting 

agencies’ ability to develop or distribute competing credit scores. Fair Isaac also uses its royalty 

prices for FICO Scores to inhibit the credit reporting agencies from bundling a competing score 

with the FICO Score when selling to downstream customers. In addition, because Fair Isaac has 

insisted that all three credit reporting agencies pay it the same royalty price for FICO Scores, the 

individual agencies cannot negotiate for a lower royalty and pass along that benefit to their 

customers. The credit reporting agencies have nonetheless agreed to these (and other) restrictions 

in their dealings with Fair Isaac and thus joined Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive scheme.

8. One good example of how Fair Isaac was able to use its dominant position and 

distribution agreements to stifle competition involves a company called VantageScore Solutions, 

LLC (“VantageScore”). In 2006, VantageScore, an independent joint venture of the three 

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national credit reporting companies, launched a competing credit score known as 

VantageScore®. From the outset, VantageScore was competitively priced, highly predictive, and 

scored millions more Americans than Fair Isaac’s FICO products. Indeed, today, by making full 

use of the credit reporting agencies’ consumer data, including rental and utility payments, 

VantageScore is capable of providing credit scores to 30 million more Americans than Fair 

Isaac. If VantageScore were widely adopted by lenders, these creditworthy Americans would 

have the opportunity to apply for a home mortgage, car loan, or credit card and obtain credit at 

lower cost.

9. Rather than compete on the merits with VantageScore, though, Fair Isaac engaged 

in a pattern of anticompetitive conduct to discourage the adoption of VantageScore and preserve 

its own monopoly. Fair Isaac has abused its monopoly power to impose onerous contractual 

terms on the credit reporting agencies designed to prevent them from successfully marketing and 

selling VantageScore as an alternative to FICO Scores and has waged a disparaging public 

relations and advertising campaign to create fear, uncertainty, and doubt about VantageScore’s 

viability and reliability with lenders and consumers.

10. Fair Isaac’s conduct has not gone unnoticed by the federal government. On March 

13, 2020, Politico reported that the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) opened an antitrust 

investigation into Fair Isaac. According to Politico, “The probe follows years of complaints from 

rivals about Fair Isaac’s dominance, and comes amid efforts by Congress and financial regulators 

to inject more competition into the credit score market.”3 Additionally, the site reported that 

3

“DOJ opens antitrust probe into credit score giant Fair Isaac,” Politico, available at 

https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/13/justice-fair-isaac-antitrust-129204.

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“[DOJ] recently sent letters to Fair Isaac and others in the consumer credit industry asking them 

to preserve documents.”4

11. On March 15, 2020, Fair Isaac confirmed that it was under investigation by the 

DOJ’s Antitrust Division, for exclusionary conduct.5

12. DOJ’s investigation follows an ongoing private action between TransUnion and 

Fair Isaac in which TransUnion has brought antitrust counterclaims against Fair Isaac regarding 

Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive conduct in the market for credit scores.6 On March 27, 2019, the 

district court denied Fair Isaac’s motion to dismiss TransUnion’s antitrust counterclaims.7

13. As a result of Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive conduct, Plaintiff and members of the 

Class have been injured in their business and property during the Class Period (defined below), 

and their injury is continuing. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, treble damages, and/or related 

relief under federal antitrust laws and state antitrust and consumer protection laws.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

14. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections 4 

and 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a) and 26) and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 

1337(a). This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 

1367.

15. Venue is appropriate within this district under 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (Clayton Act), 15 

U.S.C. § 22 (venue for antitrust matters brought under the federal antitrust laws) or 28 U.S.C. 

§1391(b) (federal venue statute). Defendant transacted business, was found, or had agents within 

4

Id.

5

https://www.fico.com/en/newsroom/fico-statement-regarding-antitrust-investigation.

6 Fair Isaac Corporation v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 17-cv-08318 (N.D. Ill.), ECF No. 38.

7

Id., ECF No. 96.

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this District, and a portion of the affected interstate trade and commerce discussed below was 

carried out in this District. 

16. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Defendant has transacted 

business, maintained substantial contacts, and/or committed overt acts in furtherance of the 

illegal scheme throughout the United States, including in this District. The scheme has been 

directed at, and has had the intended effect of, causing injury to persons residing in, located in, or 

doing business throughout the United States, including in this District. Defendant’s conduct, as 

described in this Complaint, was within the flow of, was intended to, and did have a substantial 

effect on, the interstate commerce of the United States, including in this District.

III. THE PARTIES

A. Plaintiff

17. Plaintiff Holmes County Bank and Trust Company is a bank with its principal 

place of business at 316 Court Square, Lexington, Mississippi, 39095.

18. With four locations throughout Mississippi, Plaintiff has provided financial 

services to its customers since 1932.

19. During the Class Period, Plaintiff directly purchased B2B credit scores from Fair 

Isaac, credit bureaus, or both. Plaintiff’s purchases from credit bureaus include purchases 

through Equifax and TransUnion.

B. Defendant

20. Defendant Fair Isaac is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of 

business at 181 Metro Drive, Suite 700, San Jose, California, 95110.

IV. TRADE AND COMMERCE AFFECTED

21. Fair Isaac is in the business of selling credit scores in the B2B market.

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22. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, Fair Isaac has sold a substantial amount 

of credit scores in the B2B market in interstate commerce in numerous states around the United 

States.

23. Fair Isaac’s conduct has affected a substantial amount of interstate trade and 

commerce in the United States. 

V. CREDIT SCORES IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Credit Scores

24. Credit scores are the most widely-used indicators of borrowers’ creditworthiness 

in the United States. Lenders, financial institutions, and other businesses rely on credit scores to 

decide whether and on what terms to extend credit. A credit score can determine whether an 

individual will be able to get a mortgage, credit card, auto loan, or other credit product and the 

rate that the individual will pay.

25. Credit scores are typically three-digit numbers that are designed to assess credit 

risk. Higher scores generally indicate that a consumer poses less credit risk. Credit scores are 

produced using credit scoring systems that apply a credit scoring algorithm to a borrower’s credit 

report. Credit scores are usually accompanied by “reason codes” which inform the lender about 

the reasons that contributed most significantly to reducing a particular borrower’s credit score.

26. Credit reporting agencies collect and supply aggregated credit data in the form of 

reports as permitted under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681. The credit reporting 

agencies expend substantial resources to maintain sophisticated databases of credit data and 

compete with one another to provide the most comprehensive, timely, and accurate information 

on borrowers’ financial behavior. The credit reporting agencies continuously gather credit and 

financial data about potential borrowers from creditors, government entities, public records, 

collection agencies, and other third parties and compile this information into a “credit file.” The 

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credit reporting agencies sell credit reports, which include information gathered from borrowers’

credit files, to businesses (B2B) and consumers (B2C).

27. While credit scores, such as a FICO Score, are frequently sold together with 

credit reports, credit reports are different from credit scores and can be sold independently. A 

credit report is a statement that has detailed information about a borrower’s credit activity and 

current credit situation. A credit report might, for example, include information about that 

borrower’s history of mortgage payments, credit card balances, credit card payments, and credit 

inquiries. A credit score takes the detailed information in a credit report and turns it into a single 

three-digit number.

B. The Market for Credit Scores in the United States

28. In the United States, the B2B and B2C markets are two distinct markets for credit 

scores.

29. The customers in the B2B market, which include lenders and financial 

institutions, are a distinct and recognizable group of purchasers of credit scores that use credit 

scores differently than consumers in the B2C market. Lenders, financial institutions, and other 

businesses generally buy the credit scores one score at a time—i.e., “transactionally”—or in 

batches that include the scores of multiple individuals, and they then use those scores for reasons 

such as identifying qualified borrowers to whom a preapproved credit offer will be extended 

(“pre-screening”), making lending decisions, or reviewing the risk associated with existing 

borrowers for purposes such as extending additional credit or changing other account terms 

(“account management”). By contrast, in the B2C market, consumers typically purchase one 

score at a time—their own—to manage their credit, protect their identity, or assess their 

likelihood of obtaining credit. In other words, customers in the B2B market purchase scores to 

use them to sell or manage another credit risk product whereas consumers in the B2C market 

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purchase the scores as an end-product. Because of the significant differences between the ways 

credit scores are used in the B2B and B2C markets, credit scores can be priced differently in 

these two markets.

30. While the B2B market is a mature market that has existed for decades, the B2C 

market is relatively new but is growing as more consumers become interested in credit 

monitoring and identity protection. Today, American consumers have signed up for over 160 

million credit monitoring or identity protection accounts from businesses such as Capital One, 

Credit Karma, and LifeLock, and many of those accounts include access to the consumer’s credit 

score.

31. It is well-recognized that the B2B market is distinct from the B2C market credit. 

Indeed, the risk scoring industry, industry analysts, policy analysts, investors, and even Fair Isaac 

all acknowledge that the B2B market and B2C market are distinct. For example, in its 2019 10-

K, Fair Isaac distinguished between its “business-to-business scoring solutions and services” and 

“business-to-consumer scoring solutions and services including myFICO® solutions for 

consumers, and associated professional services.”8

32. The B2B credit score market is characterized by significant barriers to entry. 

Customers, particularly lenders and financial institutions, are strongly inclined and incentivized 

to stick with the type of credit score that they have been using because there are significant 

“switching costs” associated with adopting a new credit score—regardless of whether it is an 

updated version of the score already used or an entirely new brand of credit score. These 

switching costs arise because employees have to be trained in the properties and characteristics 

of a new score; lenders must ensure that the new score will be adequately predictive of the 

8 Fair Isaac Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (2019).

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creditworthiness of their own customer base; lenders must conduct extensive, costly, and timeconsuming validation tests to determine whether the new score is cost-effective; and lenders may 

need to invest in updating their internal systems to ensure technical compatibility between those 

systems and a new score. These switching costs are so substantial that firms often decide not to 

switch even if a new score is cheaper or more predictive than the old score. In March 2006, thenCEO of Fair Isaac Thomas Grudnowski told American Banker that switching to a new credit 

score “is really, really hard, and you have to have a really, really good reason to do it.”9

33. Network effects also characterize the credit scoring market. As more banks and 

consumers use a particular type of credit score, that credit score becomes a de facto “industry 

standard.” For example, in the mortgage and auto loan industries the consistent use of particular 

credit scores facilitates the bundling of large groups of mortgage and auto loans from different 

originators into securities that can be sold to investors. Because of the consistent use of a single 

type of credit score, marketing materials for these securities can include data on the average and 

stratified credit scores of the borrowers associated with the underlying loans.

C. Distribution of FICO Scores in the B2B Market

34. Fair Isaac mainly distributes FICO Scores through the three credit reporting 

agencies. During fiscal years 2019, 2018, and 2017, Fair Isaac’s revenues generated from its 

“agreements with Experian, TransUnion and Equifax collectively accounted for 29%, 25% and 

20% of [its] total revenues, respectively.”10

9

“Bureaus Take Another Run At Fair Isaac” American Banker, available at 

https://www.americanbanker.com/news/bureaus-take-another-run-at-fair-isaac-br-i-will-singlealgorithm-pitch-be-enough-to-persuade-lenders-i.

10 Fair Isaac Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (2019).

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35. To receive FICO scores, Plaintiff has entered into a service agreement with 

Equifax. The agreement makes clear that Plaintiff receives FICO scores jointly from Equifax and 

Fair Isaac. 

36. For example, the section of Plaintiff’s service agreement titled “Additional Terms 

and Conditions Applicable to Fair, Isaac Scores” states that the “following additional terms and 

conditions apply to any Scores jointly provided by Equifax and Fair, Isaac & Co.” (Fair Isaac 

was formerly known as Fair, Isaac and Company.)

37. Plaintiff’s service agreement also states that “Equifax is the authorized agent of 

Fair, Isaac for purposes of executing this Agreement as it pertains to the Scores and for 

collection of all fees and charges arising thereunder with respect to the Scores.”

D. Fair Isaac Has a Monopoly in the Market for Credit Scores

38. Fair Isaac has had a monopoly over the market for B2B credit scores in the United 

States for roughly three decades, largely through the dominance of its FICO product line, which 

includes many different types of FICO Scores.

39. Introduced in the 1980s, Fair Isaac’s FICO Classic credit scores are the best 

known and most widely used in the United States. FICO Classic is a tri-bureau-enabled scoring 

system, which means that it can be used with all three credit reporting agencies’ data and allows 

lenders, financial institutions, and other business to shift their business across all three credit 

reporting agencies by lowering switching costs. Being able to shift business between the credit 

reporting agencies allows lenders to negotiate better pricing and to deal with the particular credit 

reporting agencies that have suitable data regarding the characteristics of individual borrowers or 

market segments. FICO Classic applies an algorithm to each credit reporting agency’s data and 

generates a score between 300 and 850 that purports to give an indication of a borrower’s credit 

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risk. It also generates a set of “reason codes” that explain the reasons the borrower has not been 

assigned the maximum score. 

40. Because each credit bureau has different data, a borrower’s FICO Score may be 

different for the three credit bureaus. Fair Isaac explains that the differences could be attributed 

to one credit bureau “hav[ing] unique information captured on a [borrower] that is not being 

captured by the other two, or the same data element may be stored or displayed differently by the 

credit bureaus.”11

41. Over the years, Fair Isaac has come out with new versions of its Classic FICO 

Score. The FICO Score 8 is currently the most widely used version; however, FICO Score 9 is 

the newest version. Additionally, there are industry-specific scores that are designed for specific 

types of credit, such as auto loans or credit cards. According to Fair Isaac, “The foundation of 

these versions is the same as the base FICO Score versions, but they are fine-tuned based on 

industry-specific risk behaviors.” 

11 “Why are my FICO Scores different for the 3 credit bureaus?” myFICO, available at 

https://www.myfico.com/Credit-Education/Questions/why-are-my-credit-scores-different-for-3-

credit-bureaus.

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42. In the chart below, Fair Isaac illustrates which FICO Scores are in use and in 

which industries:12

43. Fair Isaac brags about its dominance in the credit score markets and, in particular, 

its stranglehold on the larger and more mature B2B market. On its public website, Fair Isaac 

advertises that:

• 10 billion FICO Scores are sold each year, which is four times the number of hamburgers 

that McDonald’s sells worldwide each year; 

• 27.4 million FICO Scores are sold every day, which is over twice the number of cups of 

coffee Starbucks sells worldwide in a day; and 

• 90% of all lending decisions in the United States rely on FICO Scores.13

44. Similarly, in its 2019 10-K, Fair Isaac described its “FICO Scores” as “the 

standard measure in the U.S. of consumer credit risk” and reported that “FICO Scores are used . . 

12 “FICO Scores Versions: Did you know you have more than one FICO Score?” myFICO, 

available at https://www.myfico.com/credit-education/credit-scores/fico-score-versions.

13 https://www.fico.com/25years/.

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. by nearly all of the major banks, credit card organizations, mortgage lenders and auto loan 

originators.”14

45. The use of FICO Scores is particularly entrenched among mortgage lenders 

because the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan 

Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) have mandated the use of Classic FICO Scores for 12 

years. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac buy mortgages from lenders and either hold these mortgages 

in their portfolios or package the loans into mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) that may be 

sold. Because lenders use the cash raised by selling mortgages to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 

to engage in further lending, these entities’ purchases help ensure that borrowers who buy homes 

and investors that purchase apartment buildings and other multifamily dwellings have a 

continuous, stable supply of credit available to them. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require banks 

and mortgage lenders to acquire and use Classic FICO Scores when available in order to sell 

mortgage loans to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

46. Fair Isaac representatives have described Fair Isaac’s FICO Score as “the 800-

pound gorilla” in the market for credit scores and bragged about Fair Isaac’s market share.15 For 

example, in November 2017, at the JPMorgan Ultimate Services Investor Conference, Fair 

Isaac’s CFO and Executive Vice President Michael Pung stated that:

• The FICO scoring system “is the most widely used credit scoring system here in the 

U.S.;”

• “Virtually every major lender in the U.S. [uses] the FICO Score for some sort of credit 

lending decision;” and

14 Fair Isaac Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (2019).

15

“What Does ‘Good' Credit Really Mean?,” CNBC, available at

https://www.cnbc.com/id/27458815.

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• Fair Isaac has “maintained a 90-plus percent market share for at least the [last] 13 

years.”16

47. Fair Isaac representatives have also recognized that FICO Scores benefit from the 

network effects created by the widespread use of FICO Scores in many industries. For example, 

in November 2011, then-CEO of Fair Isaac Mark Greene explained that the “network effect” of 

“FICO Scores . . . being sort of the standard language” and “having everybody . . . standardize on 

a FICO Score, that’s magic.”17

48. Fair Isaac’s monopoly in the market for credit scores has given it power to control 

prices, particularly in the mature B2B market. Fair Isaac’s CEO Will Lansing has noted that in 

the B2B market for credit scores Fair Isaac has “quite a bit of discretion and whether we want 

our margins to be higher or lower or where they are.”18

E. Attempts to Compete Have Not Affected Fair Isaac’s Monopoly in the 

Market for Credit Scores

49. Before 2006, credit scores other than Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores existed but failed 

to gain substantial enough market share to challenge Fair Isaac’s dominance in the market for 

credit scores. Each of the credit reporting agencies had its own proprietary, “in-house” credit 

scores that reflected only the consumer information from one credit reporting agency: 

TransUnion had “TransRisk,” Experian had “ScorexPlus” (designed for lenders) and “Plus” 

(designed for consumers), and Equifax had “ERS.”

50. Then in March 2006, VantageScore, the most promising competitor to FICO 

Scores in both the B2B and B2C markets, introduced the VantageScore credit score and credit 

16 Fair Isaac Corp., Transcript, JPMorgan Ultimate Services Investor Conference (Nov. 14, 

2017).

17 Fair Isaac Corp., Transcript, Analyst/Investor Day (Nov. 3, 2011).

18 Fair Isaac Corp., Transcript, Barclays Global Technology, Media and 

Telecommunications Conference (Dec. 12, 2017).

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scoring system. VantageScore offered customers the first tri-bureau-enabled alternative to FICO 

Scores.

51. From the time that it was first released, VantageScore has provided credit scores 

for millions more borrowers than the FICO scoring systems. Whereas Fair Isaac’s FICO scoring 

systems would not generate a score if a consumer had not used credit in more than six months or 

if a credit account was less than six months old, VantageScore calculated scores for consumers 

that had not used credit for up to two years. It also reached more consumers by using utility and 

telecommunications payment histories when reported to the credit rating agencies.

52. Today, VantageScore provides scores for 30 million more Americans than 

traditional FICO scoring systems—reducing the number of adults without a credit score by 

almost half. Fair Isaac’s FICO Classic credit scoring system is less advanced than VantageScore 

and excludes many creditworthy Americans that VantageScore can reliably score. In fact, 

approximately one-fourth of the U.S. population does not have a FICO Score. Ten million of 

those newly scored individuals are “prime” borrowers that should be attractive to traditional 

lenders.

53. Without a credit score, it is difficult or impossible to apply for or successfully 

obtain a mortgage, car loan, or reasonable interest rates on personal lines of credit. Not having a 

credit score can also have drastic effects outside of the credit market. For example, credit scores 

are increasingly used by landlords.

54. Those excluded by Fair Isaac’s traditional FICO scoring systems—who face an 

increased risk of being denied access to credit in the form of credit cards, auto and home loans, 

and apartment housing—include disproportionate numbers of low-income and minority 

consumers. Indeed, one advocacy group focused on making it possible for people with limited 

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incomes, especially people of color, to achieve financial security, has observed: “Black and 

Hispanic individuals are . . . significantly more likely than white individuals to be credit 

invisible”—meaning that they have “no established credit history”—or “unscored”—meaning 

that they “lack[] sufficient or recent enough credit history to be given a credit score.”19

VantageScore calculates a score for 9.5 million Hispanic and African-American consumers who 

do not have a FICO Score, including 2.7 million minority consumers who should be considered 

“prime” borrowers.

55. Despite the advantages of using VantageScore, Fair Isaac continues to have a 

monopoly in the market for credit scores. In February 2013, at a Morgan Stanley Conference, 

Fair Isaac’s CEO Will Lansing explained that despite the existence of VantageScore, “there [is] 

not that much competition around our scores business” because “FICO Scores are very much 

part of the fabric of the banking industry” and “really deeply imbedded.” Mr. Lansing claimed 

that because “Fannie and Freddie have mandated that FICO Scores have to be part of a mortgage 

origination,” Fair Isaac is “in very low risk territory.”20

VI. FAIR ISAAC’S EXCLUSIONARY ACTS AND OTHER ILLEGAL CONDUCT 

TO MAINTAIN AND EXPAND ITS MONOPOLY

56. Fair Isaac has used its monopoly power to coordinate a multi-faceted campaign to 

eliminate competition. Fair Isaac has been explicit that this is its goal. In April 2015, Mr. 

Lansing informed investors on a quarterly earnings conference call that Fair Isaac’s wanted to 

ensure that “the entire industry adopts FICO scores instead of [other] scores.”21

19 “The Importance of Credit Reports & Credit Scores for Building Financial Security,” 

CFED, available at https://prosperitynow.org/files/PDFs/Credit_Fact_File_07-2016.pdf.

20 Fair Isaac Corp., Transcript, Morgan Stanley Technology, Media & Telecom Conference

(Feb. 27, 2013).

21 Fair Isaac Corp., Transcript, Q2 2015 Earnings Call (April 23, 2015).

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57. To achieve this goal, Fair Isaac has included several anticompetitive provisions in 

its distribution agreements with the three national credit reporting agencies. Foremost, Fair Isaac 

restricts the credit reporting agencies’ ability to develop or distribute competing credit scores. 

Fair Isaac also uses its royalty prices for FICO Scores to inhibit the credit reporting agencies

from bundling a competing score with the FICO Score when selling to downstream customers. In 

addition, because Fair Isaac has insisted that all three credit reporting agencies pay it the same 

royalty price for FICO Scores, the individual agencies cannot negotiate for a lower royalty and 

pass along that benefit to their customers.

58. At the same time, Fair Isaac has waged a media campaign specifically against 

VantageScore and made false and misleading statements in order to sow fear, uncertainty, and 

doubt about VantageScore’s reliability. The result has been to restrain competition in the market 

for credit scores, to increase prices for FICO Scores, and to limit access to credit for millions of 

Americans.

A. Fair Isaac Has Imposed Anticompetitive Contract Terms on the Credit 

Reporting Agencies that Restrict Their Ability to Compete and Sell Other 

Credit Scores, Including VantageScore

59. With TransUnion’s prior contracts with Fair Isaac set to expire on December 31, 

2014, Fair Isaac demanded that TransUnion enter into a new Analytic and Data License 

Agreement (“ADLA”) rather than renewing the parties’ existing contracts. Fair Isaac represented 

to TransUnion that TransUnion’s two major competitors, Experian and Equifax, had already 

agreed to materially similar new contracts with Fair Isaac and said that if TransUnion did not 

agree to the terms demanded by Fair Isaac, it would lose substantial business from customers that 

depend on FICO Scores. In its counterclaims against Fair Isaac, TransUnion alleged that it would 

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not have accepted many of the terms in the ADLA if it were not for Fair Isaac’s monopoly and 

market power in the market for credit scores.

22

60. TransUnion also revealed in its counterclaims that Fair Isaac provided the initial 

draft of the ADLA on October 3, 2014, less than three months before the parties’ existing 

contracts were set to expire. TransUnion alleged that “the short time between that date and 

expiration created immense time pressure” and that “Fair Isaac refused to grant . . . even shortterm extensions on the existing agreements until the very end of the process.”

23 Nevertheless, 

with Fair Isaac’s assurances that TransUnion’s competitors agreed to materially similar

contracts, TransUnion signed the agreement.

61. Ultimately, by signing these contracts, Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion acted 

in furtherance of Fair Isaac’s plan to exclude competitors and maintain its monopoly.

1. Fair Isaac Has Restricted the Credit Reporting Agencies’ Ability to 

Develop or Sell Other Credit Scores Compatible with Customers’ 

Existing Systems

62. Section 12.5 of the ADLA, which is labeled “No Equivalent Products,” provides 

that TransUnion may not “internally develop” a credit scoring system that is “aligned to the 

odds-to-score relationship of any Fair Isaac Analytic” or uses more than a limited number of 

reason codes that “match” reason codes used by any Fair Isaac Analytic. Section 12.5 of the 

ADLA further prohibits TransUnion from distributing “any competing analytic” (i.e., credit 

scoring system) that is aligned with FICO Scores or uses too many of the same reason codes, and 

it expressly names Vantage Score Solutions LLC as a developer of such a scoring system that 

may not be distributed if VantageScore were to offer an “Equivalent Product.”

22 Fair Isaac Corporation v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 17-cv-08318 (N.D. Ill.), ECF No. 38.

23 Id.

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63. For example, if a VantageScore product used a 700 score to indicate a less-thanfive-percent risk of credit delinquency, and if a 700 FICO Score also indicated the same risk of 

delinquency, then Section 12.5 prevents TransUnion from distributing the competing 

VantageScore product. Similarly, if a VantageScore product used reason codes that match 20% 

of the reason codes used by FICO scoring systems, Section 12.5 prohibits TransUnion from 

distributing the product.

64. Section 12.5 effectively prevents TransUnion from selling an alternative to 

FICO’s credit scores that would be compatible with many businesses’ systems, models, and 

processes and allow lenders to have a legitimate choice between using FICO Scores and an 

alternative score. Many lenders have spent substantial effort and resources to develop systems, 

models, and processes that are designed for FICO Scores. Lenders’ systems, models, and 

processes are tailored to FICO’s odds-to-score relationship (i.e., each given score has a given 

ratio of non-defaulting consumers to defaulting consumers), and reason codes (the particular 

reasons cited for increased risk of default). For example, a bank’s software might be designed to 

accept one or more FICO Scores and reason codes, combine this information with data it collects 

internally, and automatically produce a lending decision.

65. Section 12.5 protects Fair Isaac’s monopoly and not its intellectual property. The 

odds-to-score relationship is an arbitrary mapping between risk and score and does not reflect 

protectable intellectual property. Similarly, there is nothing proprietary about the reasons that 

might be used in a credit rating; Fair Isaac certainly did not invent them. Rather, they reflect 

well-established industry best practices for lending.

66. Fair Isaac has imposed a similar or identical “No Equivalent Products” term on 

Equifax and Experian. By imposing a “No Equivalent Products” term on TransUnion, Equifax, 

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and Experian, Fair Isaac has sought to block all three credit reporting agencies from offering 

alternative VantageScore products that would allow lenders to easily switch from FICO Scores 

to VantageScore without incurring the cost of redesigning their lending programs and systems or 

to use VantageScore alongside or interchangeably with FICO Scores.

2. Fair Isaac Has Engaged in a Pricing Scheme to Unlawfully Leverage 

Its Monopoly Power and Foreclose Competition from VantageScore 

in the Credit Score Market

67. Section 9.2 of the ADLA, labeled “Dynamic Royalty Schedule,” provides that 

“once every twelve (12) months during the Term, Fair Isaac shall have the right to replace the 

Royalty Schedule by providing a new royalty schedule to TransUnion in writing.” While this 

provision gives Fair Isaac the right to adjust prices, it does not give Fair Isaac the power to 

introduce new contract terms, royalty categories, or definitions. Fair Isaac has abused and 

exploited this provision in 2015, 2016, and 2017 by not only raising prices but also introducing 

entirely new and non-negotiated contract terms, royalty categories, and definitions.

68. In 2015, Fair Isaac unilaterally imposed a new “Pre-Qualification” royalty 

category. In a footnote to the current royalty schedule, Fair Isaac defines “Pre-Qualification” to 

“mean an End User’s qualification of a potential consumer customer for an End User’s own 

internal lending offering” and distinguishes between: (1) lenders that use FICO Scores for “PreQualification” without providing any credit score or credit data to consumers and (2) lenders that 

use FICO Scores for “Pre-Qualification” and also provide credit scores or credit data to 

consumers “in connection” with the “Pre-Qualification.” Certain large banks and lenders offer 

consumer customers opportunities to apply to qualify for credit opportunities (e.g., a credit card 

or loan) and, at the same time, receive their personal credit score. The offer of a free credit score 

to a consumer can entice consumers to apply for credit opportunities.

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69. The royalty price associated with a FICO Score used for “Pre-Qualification” 

depends on whether other credit scores or credit data are provided to consumers. If a lender 

purchases a FICO Score for use in “Pre-Qualification” and does not provide any credit score or 

credit data to the consumer “in connection” with the “Pre-Qualification,” there is one per-score 

royalty rate. If the lender purchases a FICO Score for use in “Pre-Qualification” and provides a 

VantageScore (or any other credit score) to the consumer “in connection” with the “PreQualification,” there is a different per-score royalty rate that is higher—a penalty rate.

70. The penalty rate can be avoided in one of two ways, both of which involve 

purchasing exclusively FICO Scores. First, the lender could purchase a FICO Score for use in 

“Pre-Qualification” and provide no credit score or credit data to the consumer. Second, the 

lender could purchase a bundled FICO product from Fair Isaac. Fair Isaac offers bundled 

products to lenders that combine the use of scores by lenders (in the B2B market) with the 

provision of scores to consumers (in the B2C market).

71. Fair Isaac’s contracts with Equifax and Experian include a similar or identical 

“Dynamic Royalty Schedule” provision and Fair Isaac has imposed a similar or identical “PreQualification” royalty category on Equifax and Experian. Through the “Pre-Qualification” 

royalty category, Fair Isaac has leveraged its entrenched monopoly power in the larger B2B 

market to exclude competitors from the emerging B2C market. Fair Isaac’s royalties effectively 

foreclose the credit reporting agencies from selling lenders FICO Scores for use in the B2B 

market and VantageScores for use in the B2C market and drives lenders to buy exclusively Fair 

Isaac’s FICO Scores. As a consequence of Fair Isaac’s imposition of the “Pre-Qualification” 

royalty category, TransUnion has lost sales of VantageScore to major banks for use in the B2C 

market.

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72. There is no legitimate business justification for the penalty rate Fair Isaac 

demands for FICO Scores when the lender also purchases a VantageScore (or any other 

competing credit score) to disclose to consumers. The transparent goal of the “Pre-Qualification” 

royalty category is to drive all of a credit bureau’s customers engaging in “Pre-Qualification” to 

purchase exclusively FICO Scores and make it cost-prohibitive for customers engaging in “PreQualification” to purchase any competing credit score for disclosure to consumers.

3. Fair Isaac Has Imposed Contract Provisions that Allow It to Extract 

Monopoly Prices

73. Section 9.16 of the ADLA, which is labeled “Level Playing Field,” requires that 

the prices that are made available to TransUnion be made available to the other credit reporting 

agencies. Taken together, Section 9.2 (“Dynamic Royalty Schedule”) and Section 9.16 (“Level 

Playing Field”) enable Fair Isaac to unilaterally increase the royalty prices it charges for FICO 

Scores. Fair Isaac’s contracts with Equifax and Experian include similar or identical “Level 

Playing Field” and “Dynamic Royalty Schedule” provisions.

74. Fair Isaac has used the “Level Playing Field” and “Dynamic Royalty Schedule” 

provisions in its contracts with the credit reporting agencies to extract monopoly prices from all 

three credit reporting agencies and their customers and prevent any credit reporting agency from 

negotiating lower royalty prices than the others. For example, in 2017, less than a month after the 

Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) announced that Fannie Mae and 

Freddie Mac would continue requiring the use of Fair Isaac’s FICO Classic products in 

connection with their mortgage programs through at least 2019, Fair Isaac increased the price of 

FICO Scores used for “Mortgage” by a certain amount, dependent on the quantity of scores 

purchased. On information and belief, Fair Isaac imposed the same pricing increase on all of the 

credit agencies. Fair Isaac’s pricing increase has the effect of raising costs not only for the credit 

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reporting agencies but also for banks, mortgage lenders, and—ultimately—ordinary consumers 

seeking mortgage loans.

B. Fair Isaac’s Campaign to Create Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt About 

VantageScore with Lenders and Consumers

75. Fair Isaac has waged an aggressive public relations and advertising campaign to 

spread false statements, convey false impressions, and mislead lenders and consumers about the 

qualities and characteristics of FICO Scores and VantageScore. In advertisements, letters, and 

blog posts, Fair Isaac has disparaged VantageScore by calling it a “Fako” score, falsely claimed 

that VantageScore is an unreliable measure of creditworthiness, and misrepresented the 

information considered by VantageScore’s credit scoring system.

76. On December 12, 2017, Fair Isaac took out a full-page advertisement in the Wall 

Street Journal addressed to “Lenders, Policymakers and Consumer Advocates” that disparaged 

VantageScore without identifying it by name. The advertisement contrasted Fair Isaac, which “is 

not owned by the credit bureaus” and whose FICO Scores have been used “by lenders and 

securitization investors for decades,” with an alternative credit score, which is “owned by the 

credit bureaus,” is less reliable than FICO Scores in evaluating credit risk, and fails to use “sound 

practices” or “science-based credit evaluation.” To anyone familiar with the market for credit 

scores, the advertisement unambiguously conveys the false message that VantageScore is 

“Weakening scoring standards, [and] harm[ing] consumers, and the lending system.”

77. The Wall Street Journal advertisement directed readers to “[l]earn more at 

FICO.com/independent,” a Fair Isaac-owned website that connects visitors to articles and blog 

posts that disparage VantageScore by name. One such blog post asserts: “Despite claims by 

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VantageScore, weakening the minimum scoring criteria will not empower millions of low-risk 

mortgage credit seekers.”24

78. Also during December 2017, Mr. Lansing was quoted in the Financial Times

disparaging VantageScore as a “Fako” score.25 Mr. Lansing accused JPMorgan Chase and 

Capital One of confusing consumers about their creditworthiness by distributing VantageScore 

because VantageScore is not used by the banks for lending decisions.

79. Fair Isaac’s public website includes numerous posts disparaging VantageScore 

and making false or misleading statements about VantageScore’s features. For example, one blog 

post claims that “[r]esearch results consistently showed that scoring models relying solely on 

sparse or old credit data were weak and did a poor job forecasting future performance.”26 This 

statement is false and misleading because it conveys the false message that VantageScore’s 

scoring model is “weak” and does a “poor job forecasting future performance” because it 

considers a consumer’s full credit history even if the consumer has not used a traditional credit 

line in the last six months. In fact, studies have shown that VantageScore is strongly predictive.

80. Another blog post claims that whereas “FICO Score 9 differentiates medical from 

non-medical collections,” “VantageScore does not.”27 This statement conveys the false message 

that VantageScore does not differentiate medical from non-medical collections. In fact, 

VantageScore 3.0 was the first credit scoring system to address medical debt. VantageScore 4.0, 

24 “Truth Squad: Will Looser Scoring Standards Help Millions More Americans Get 

Mortgages?” FICO, available at https://www.fico.com/blogs/truth-squad-will-looser-scoringstandards-help-millions-more-americans-get-mortgages.

25

“Credit score row as FICO chief hits out at banks over ‘Fako’ rivals,” Financial Times, 

available at https://www.ft.com/content/2222880c-cfa5-11e7-9dbb-291a884dd8c6.

26

“Why Bureau Data Alone Can’t Score More Consumers,” FICO, available at 

https://www.fico.com/blogs/why-bureau-data-alone-can-t-score-more-consumers.

27 “Truth Squad: Is FICO Score 700 the Same as VantageScore 700?” FICO, available at

https://www.fico.com/blogs/truth-squad-fico-score-700-same-vantagescore-700.

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the most recent version of VantageScore, which was announced in April 2017, distinguishes 

medical collection accounts from non-medical collection accounts and penalizes medical 

collections less than non-medical ones.

81. Fair Isaac has also argued that the VantageScore products that TransUnion 

distributes are flawed because they have different odds-to-score relationships and different 

reason codes than FICO products. In a “Truth Squad” blog post on its public website, Fair Isaac 

argues that a “clean swap-out” of FICO Scores for VantageScores will not work for lenders 

because the “FICO Score and VantageScore . . . do not share the same odds-to-score 

relationship, meaning the risk at a given score is different.”28 Fair Isaac also claims that 

comparing VantageScores to FICO Scores is “confusing” and that a lender that attempts to use 

both types of scores may make “poor lending and investment decisions” because of the 

“important differences” in the odds-to-score relationship.29

82. Fair Isaac’s campaign against VantageScore is not new. In October 2006, just 

months after the launch of VantageScore, Fair Isaac filed a lawsuit against TransUnion, Equifax, 

Experian, and VantageScore in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota30. 

Fair Isaac’s numerous claims included a claim that the development of VantageScore violated 

the antitrust laws and a claim that the development of VantageScore constituted trademark

infringement. In its prayer for relief, Fair Isaac sought nothing less than the end of VantageScore, 

requesting that the “Defendants be ordered to dissolve VantageScore.”31

28 Id.

29 Id. 

30 Fair Isaac Corporation v. Equifax Inc. et al., 06-CV-04112 (D. Minn.), ECF 1.

31 Id.

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83. All of Fair Isaac’s claims failed, and, in fact, the jury concluded that Fair Isaac 

was the wrongdoer. In support of its trademark infringement claim, Fair Isaac had alleged that 

VantageScore’s use of a scoring range of 501-990 constituted trademark infringement because it 

was similar to FICO’s scoring range of 300-850. The credit reporting agencies and VantageScore 

counterclaimed for fraud on the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), alleging 

that Fair Isaac had misrepresented to the PTO that only FICO used the 300-850 score range. The 

jury concluded that Fair Isaac had committed fraud on the PTO by making false statements as 

part of its application to register the score range of 300-850 as a trademark.

84. The public statements described in the foregoing paragraphs were transmitted to 

and seen by a substantial number of businesses and consumers in the United States.

C. Fair Isaac’s Anticompetitive Conduct Harms Competition and Consumers

85. Fair Isaac’s campaign of exclusionary conduct to maintain and expand its 

monopoly has harmed and continues to harm participants in both the B2B and B2C markets of 

the credit risk scoring market by foreclosing opportunities for the credit reporting agencies to sell 

VantageScore. If allowed to continue, Fair Isaac’s conduct will ultimately force VantageScore, 

its primary competitor, out of the market entirely, and deprive the credit reporting agencies of the 

ability to sell VantageScores to customers. In turn, Fair Isaac has been able to impose monopoly 

prices and more onerous terms on the credit reporting agencies, resulting in higher costs for the 

businesses and consumers that use credit scores.

86. Fair Isaac’s conduct has reduced choice for the credit reporting agencies, lenders, 

and consumers. The anticompetitive terms that Fair Isaac has imposed on the credit reporting 

agencies have frustrated their ability to sell VantageScore at competitive prices or sell competing 

credit scores (from VantageScore or any other competitor) that could be seamlessly integrated 

into lenders’ existing processes and systems. And, Fair Isaac’s media and advertising campaign 

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against VantageScore has been successful in sowing fear, uncertainty, and doubt about 

VantageScore in the marketplace. Media sources, financial blogs, and consumers have absorbed 

Fair Isaac’s message that VantageScore is a “Fako” score merely because it is not a FICO Score. 

For example, thebalance.com—a website devoted to personal finance issues—posted in February 

2017: “If you purchased your credit score anywhere but MyFICO.com, then it’s a Fako score.”32

VII. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE TIMELY

A. Fair Isaac Concealed Its Unlawful Scheme

87. During the Class Period, Fair Isaac wrongfully and affirmatively concealed its

unlawful conduct. Plaintiff and members of the Class had no knowledge of Fair Isaac’s unlawful 

scheme and could not have discovered the scheme through the exercise of reasonable diligence 

until February 12, 2018 when TransUnion filed its counterclaims against Fair Isaac.33

88. Fair Isaac wrongfully and affirmatively concealed the existence of its 

anticompetitive scheme from Plaintiff and the public by, among other things, concealing the 

restrictive nature of the contracts between Fair Isaac and the three national credit reporting 

agencies—contracts which have prevented the credit reporting agencies from developing or 

selling alternative credit scores and have imposed a pricing scheme that forecloses lenders from 

using VantageScore in their B2C businesses. Additionally, contracts between Fair Isaac and the 

credit reporting agencies, such as the ADLA, are subject to confidentiality provisions that have 

prohibited the credit reporting agencies from disclosing terms of those contract to third parties 

absent written authorization from Fair Isaac.

32 “FICO & FAKO Credit Scores,” the balance, available at 

https://www.thebalance.com/fico-and-fako-credit-scores-960497.

33 Fair Isaac Corp. v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 17-cv-08318 (N.D. Ill.), ECF No. 38.

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89. As a result of Fair Isaac’s fraudulent concealment, all applicable statutes of 

limitations affecting Plaintiff’s claims have been tolled.

B. Fair Isaac’s Actions Are a Continuing Violation

90. In addition, this Complaint alleges a continuing course of conduct (including 

conduct within the limitations periods). Therefore, should the Court not find that any applicable 

statute of limitations was not tolled due to Defendant’s fraudulent concealment, Plaintiff and 

members of the Class are entitled to recover damages they suffered during the limitations period.

91. A claim accrued for Plaintiff each time Fair Isaac offered FICO Scores to Plaintiff 

at prices artificially inflated by Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive conduct. Each offer of FICO Scores 

at a supra-competitive price constituted another overt act in furtherance of Fair Isaac’s 

continuing anticompetitive scheme.

VIII. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

92. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and, under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3), as representatives of a Class defined as follows:

All B2B Purchasers residing in the United States that directly purchased a FICO 

Score from Fair Isaac and/or a Credit Bureau beginning at least as early as 

January 1, 2006 until the effects of Fair Isaac’s conduct cease (“Class Period”).

93. The following persons and entities are excluded from the Class:

(a) Fair Isaac and its counsel, officers, directors, management, employees, 

subsidiaries, or affiliates;

(b) All natural persons that purchased their own Credit Score solely via 

myFico.com, the Credit Bureaus, or other entities for their personal use; 

(c) All governmental entities; 

(d) All Counsel of Record; and 

(e) The Court, Court personnel, and any member of their immediate families.

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94. Members of the Class are so numerous and so widely dispersed throughout the 

country that joinder is impracticable. Further, the Class is readily identifiable from information 

and records in Defendants’ possession.

95. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of all members of the Class. Plaintiff’s 

claims arise out of the same common course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of the other 

members of the Class. Plaintiff and all members of the Class were and will continue to be 

damaged by the same wrongful conduct.

96. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class.

Plaintiff’s interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the Class.

97. Plaintiff is represented by counsel who are experienced and competent in the 

prosecution of class action litigation and have particular expertise in class action antitrust 

litigation in the financial industry.

98. Questions of law and fact common to the Class include:

(a) Whether Fair Isaac unlawfully maintained monopoly power through all or 

part of their overall anticompetitive scheme;

(b) Whether there exist any legitimate procompetitive reasons for some or all 

of Fair Isaac’s conduct;

(c) To the extent any such procompetitive benefits exist, whether there were 

less restrictive means of achieving them;

(d) Whether Fair Isaac’s scheme, in whole or in part, has substantially 

affected interstate commerce;

(e) Whether Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive conduct caused antitrust injury 

through overcharges to the business or property of Plaintiff and members of the Class; and

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(f) The quantum of aggregate overcharge damages to the Plaintiff and 

members of the Class.

99. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class predominate over 

any questions that may affect only individual class members, because Fair Isaac has acted on 

grounds generally applicable to the entire Class.

100. Class treatment is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 

controversy because, among other things, class treatment will permit a large number of similarly 

situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a similar forum simultaneously, efficiently, 

and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, and expense that numerous 

individual actions would engender. The benefits of proceeding through the class mechanism, 

including providing injured persons and entities with a means of obtaining redress on claims that 

might not be practicable to pursue individually, substantially outweigh any difficulties that may 

arise in the management of this class action.

101. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this 

action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Sherman Act § 2: Unlawful Monopolization

102. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and 

allegations.

103. The market for the sale of B2B credit scores constitutes a relevant product market 

in the United States.

104. Fair Isaac has, and at all relevant times had, monopoly power in the market for 

B2B credit scores.

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105. Through unlawful, interconnected, and mutually reinforcing anticompetitive acts, 

Fair Isaac has substantially foreclosed competition in the market for B2B credit scores in 

violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.

106. Fair Isaac has demonstrated its ability to control prices and exclude competition 

by raising prices without a corresponding decrease in demand, and to supracompetitive levels.

107. Fair Isaac could not have maintained its monopoly power in the market for B2B 

credit scores if it were not for the anticompetitive contract terms it has imposed on the credit 

reporting agencies and its campaign of false and misleading statements about VantageScore. 

108. Fair Isaac’s monopoly is not due to growth or development because of a superior 

product, business acumen, or historic accident.

109. Fair Isaac’s monopolization has injured and will continue to injure competition in 

the relevant market.

110. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts affect interstate commerce and 

injure competition nationwide.

111. There is no legitimate business or pro-competitive justification for Fair Isaac’s 

conduct, and any purported legitimate business justification is a mere pretext. Indeed, even if 

such a justification existed, any purported pro-competitive benefits can be achieved through 

alternative means less restrictive of competition.

112. As a direct, substantial, and proximate result of Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive and 

unlawful actions, Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured in their business or 

property in an amount to be established at trial. Plaintiff and members of the Class are each 

entitled to treble damages for Fair Isaac’s violations of the Sherman Act alleged herein.

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113. Plaintiff and members of the Class are threatened with future injury to their 

business and property unless the injunctive relief requested is granted.

COUNT II

Sherman Act § 2: Conspiracy to Monopolize

114. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and 

allegations.

115. The market for the sale of B2B credit scores constitutes a relevant product market 

in the United States.

116. Fair Isaac has, and at all relevant times had, monopoly power in the market for 

B2B credit scores.

117. Through unlawful, interconnected, and mutually reinforcing anticompetitive acts, 

Fair Isaac has substantially foreclosed competition in the market for B2B credit scores in 

violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2.

118. Fair Isaac has demonstrated its ability to control prices and exclude competition 

by raising prices to supracompetitive levels without a corresponding increase in demand.

119. Fair Isaac entered into a combination or conspiracy with TransUnion, Experian, 

and Equifax to maintain its monopoly power in the market for B2B credit scores. Fair Isaac 

created and maintained this combination or conspiracy through a series of agreements with each

of the three credit bureaus. In these agreements, the credit bureaus and Fair Isaac agreed that the 

credit bureaus would not offer or sell VantageScore or any other competing credit score to 

Plaintiff and members of the Class.

120. These agreements foreclosed competition in a substantial portion of the B2B 

Credit Score Market and unlawfully maintained Fair Isaac’s monopoly, resulting in Fair Isaac 

extracting supracompetitive prices for FICO Scores from Plaintiff and members of the Class.

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121. Fair Isaac’s monopoly is not due to growth or development because of a superior 

product, business acumen, or historic accident.

122. Fair Isaac’s monopolization conspiracy has injured and will continue to injure 

competition in this market.

123. Fair Isaac has acted with the specific intent of monopolizing the market for B2B 

credit scores in the United States.

124. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts substantially affect interstate 

commerce and injure competition nationwide.

125. There is no legitimate business or pro-competitive justification for Fair Isaac’s 

conduct, and any purported legitimate business justification is a mere pretext. Indeed, even if 

such a justification existed, any purported pro-competitive benefits can be achieved through 

alternative means less restrictive of competition.

126. As a direct, substantial, and proximate result of Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive and 

unlawful actions, Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured in their business or 

property in an amount to be established at trial. Plaintiff and members of the Class are each 

entitled to treble damages for Fair Isaac’s violations of the Sherman Act alleged herein.

127. Plaintiff and members of the Class are threatened with future injury to their 

business and property unless the injunctive relief requested is granted.

COUNT III

Sherman Act § 1: Contract in Restraint of Trade

128. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and 

allegations.

129. The market for the sale of B2B credit scores constitutes a relevant product market 

in the United States.

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130. Fair Isaac has, and at all relevant times had, monopoly power in the market for 

B2B credit scores.

131. Fair Isaac and TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax entered into agreements that 

contained anticompetitive terms whereby each credit bureau agreed not to offer or sell 

VantageScore credit scores as a competing product to Plaintiff and members of the Class.

132. The agreements between Fair Isaac and the credit bureaus had substantial 

anticompetitive effects. The agreements excluded VantageScore, a significant competitor, from a 

substantial portion of competition in the B2B Credit Score Market and raised the prices for FICO 

Scores above the competitive level.

133. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts substantially affect interstate 

commerce and injure competition nationwide.

134. There is no legitimate business or pro-competitive justification for Fair Isaac’s 

conduct, and any purported legitimate business justification is a mere pretext. Indeed, even if 

such a justification existed, any purported pro-competitive benefits can be achieved through 

alternative means less restrictive of competition.

135. As a direct, substantial, and proximate result of Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive and 

unlawful actions, Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured in their business or 

property in an amount to be established at trial. Plaintiff and members of the Class are each 

entitled to treble damages for Fair Isaac’s violations of the Sherman Act alleged herein.

136. Plaintiff and members of the Class are threatened with future injury to their 

business and property unless the injunctive relief requested is granted.

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COUNT IV

State Antitrust Laws

137. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and 

allegations.

138. Defendant has violated, and Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to 

relief under, the antitrust laws of the States of Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, 

Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New 

Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, 

South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, as well as the District 

of Columbia, as follows:

(a) Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-1403, et seq.;

(b) Cal. Bus. Code §§ 16700, et seq.;

(c) Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 35-27, et seq.;

(d) D.C. Code §§ 28-4503, et seq.;

(e) Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 480-2, 480-9, et seq.;

(f) 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. §§ 10/3, et seq.;

(g) Iowa Code §§ 553.5, et seq.;

(h) Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 50-112, et seq.;

(i) Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 10 §§ 1102, et seq.;

(j) MD Code Ann., Com. Law, §§ 11-204, et seq.;

(k) Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 445.773, et seq.;

(l) Minn. Stat. §§ 325D.52, et seq. and Minn. Stat. §§ 8.31, et seq.;

(m) Miss. Code Ann. §§ 75-21-3, et seq.;

(n) Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 59-802, et seq.;

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(o) Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 598A.060, et seq.;

(p) N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 356:3, et seq.;

(q) N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-1-2, et seq.;

(r) N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340;

(s) N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-2.1, et seq.;

(t) N.D. Cent. Code Ann. §§ 51-08.1-03, et seq.;

(u) Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 646.730, et seq.;

(v) R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6-36-5, et seq.;

(w) S.D. Codified Laws §§ 37-1-3.2, et seq.;

(x) Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-25-101, et seq.;

(y) Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-3104, et seq.;

(z) Vt. Stat. Ann. 9, §§ 2453, et seq.;

(aa) W.Va. Code §§ 47-18-4, et seq.;

(bb) Wis. Stat. §§ 133.03, et seq.

COUNT V

State Unfair and Trade Practices Laws

139. Plaintiff repeats and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs and 

allegations.

140. By reason of the foregoing, Defendant has violated, and Plaintiff and members of 

the Class are entitled to relief under, the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Laws 

of the States of Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, 

New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont, as well as 

the District of Columbia, as follows:

(a) Ark. Code Ann.§§ 4-88-101, et seq.;

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(b) Cal. Bus. & Prof Code §§ 17200, et seq.;

(c) Conn. Gen. Stat. §42-110a, et seq.;

(d) D.C. Code §§ 28-3901, et seq.;

(e) Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201, et seq.;

(f) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, et seq.;

(g) Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.010, et seq.;

(h) Mont. Code Ann., §30-14-103, et seq., and §30-14-201, et seq.;

(i) N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-12-1, et seq.;

(j) N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349, et seq.;

(k) N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1, et seq.;

(l) R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6-13.1-1, et seq.;

(m) S.C. Code Ann. §39-5-10, et seq.; and

(n) VT. Stat. Ann., tit. 9, §2451, et seq.

IX. DEMAND FOR RELIEF

141. Accordingly, Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and the proposed Class, respectfully 

demands that the Court:

(a) Determine that this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3), direct that reasonable notice of this action, as 

provided by Rule 23(c)(2), be given to the Class, and declare Plaintiff as named representative of 

the Class;

(b) Enter judgment against Fair Isaac and in favor of Plaintiff and the Class;

(c) Award damages (i.e., three times overcharges) to the Class in an amount 

to be determined at trial, plus interest in accordance with law;

(d) Enter injunctive relief to stop Fair Isaac’s unlawful conduct;

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(e) Award Plaintiff and the Class their costs of suit, including reasonable 

attorneys’ fees as provided by law; and

(f) Award such further and additional relief as is necessary to correct for the 

anticompetitive market effects Fair Isaac’s unlawful conduct caused and as the Court may deem 

just and proper under the circumstances.

X. JURY DEMAND

142. Pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff, on behalf of 

itself and the proposed Class, demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.

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Date: June 9, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Marvin A. Miller

Marvin A. Miller 

Lori A. Fanning

MILLER LAW LLC

115 South LaSalle Street, Suite 2910

Chicago, Illinois 60603

Telephone: (312) 332-3400

mmiller@millerlawllc.com

lfanning@millerlawllc.com

Local Counsel for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class

Gregory S. Asciolla (pro hac vice forthcoming)

Karin E. Garvey (pro hac vice forthcoming)

Robin A. van der Meulen (pro hac vice forthcoming)

Matthew J. Perez (pro hac vice forthcoming)

Jonathan S. Crevier (pro hac vice forthcoming)

LABATON SUCHAROW LLP

140 Broadway

New York, New York 10005

Telephone: (212) 907-0700

gasciolla@labaton.com

kgarvey@labaton.com

rvandermeulen@labaton.com

mperez@labaton.com

jcrevier@labaton.com

Charles F. Barrett (pro hac vice forthcoming)

NEAL & HARWELL, PLC

1201 Demonbreun Street

Suite 1000

Nashville, Tennessee 37203

Telephone: (615) 244-1713

cbarrett@nealharwell.com

Don Barrett (pro hac vice forthcoming)

BARRETT LAW GROUP, P.A.

404 Court Square

P.O. Box 927

Lexington, Mississippi 39095

Telephone: (662) 834-2488

dbarrett@barrettlawgroup.com

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donbarrettpa@gmail.com

Richard R. Barrett (pro hac vice forthcoming)

BARRETT LAW GROUP, P.A.

2086 Old Taylor Road, Suite 1011

Oxford, Mississippi 38655

Telephone: (662) 380-5018

rrb@rrblawfirm.net

Attorneys for Plaintiff and the Proposed Class

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