IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

GINGER DARTY, on behalf of herself and all 

other persons similarly situated known and 

unknown, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COLUMBIA REHABILITATION AND 

NURSING CENTER, LLC d/b/a INTEGRITY 

HEALTHCARE OF COLUMBIA, 

Defendant. 

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Case No.: 

NOTICE OF REMOVAL 

Defendant Columbia Rehabilitation and Nursing Center LLC, by its attorneys Jody Kahn 

Mason, Jason A. Selvey and Julia S. Wolf of Jackson Lewis P.C., and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1331, 1441 and 1446, hereby removes this action from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 

County Department, Chancery Division, to the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Illinois, Eastern Division. In support thereof, Defendant states as follows: 

Procedural History and Plaintiff’s Allegations 

1. On March 26, 2020, Plaintiff Ginger Darty (“Darty” or “Plaintiff”) commenced this 

action by filing a putative Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) against Defendant Columbia 

Rehabilitation and Nursing Center LLC d/b/a Integrity Healthcare of Columbia (“Columbia” or 

“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, County Department, Chancery 

Division. The lawsuit is captioned Ginger Darty, on behalf of herself and all other persons 

similarly situated, known and unknown, v. Columbia Rehabilitation and Nursing Center, LLC 

d/b/a Integrity Healthcare of Columbia, and numbered 2020 CH 03580 (the “State Court Action”). 

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Copies of Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Compl.”) and all other documents heretofore filed in the State 

Court Action are attached hereto as Exhibit A. 

2. The Complaint alleges that Defendant used a timekeeping system that required 

Plaintiff and others to scan their hands each time they started and finished work. (Compl. ¶ 4). As 

a result, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “collected, stored, used, and transferred [Plaintiff’s and a 

putative Class’s] unique biometric hand geometry scan identifiers, or information derived from 

those identifiers,” without following the requirements of the Illinois Biometric Information 

Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. (Compl. ¶ 11). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant violated Sections 15(a), (b), and (d) of the BIPA by: (i) “capturing or collecting 

Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans and personal identifying information based on 

their hand geometry scans without first informing them in writing that Defendant was doing so”; 

(ii) failing to inform Plaintiff and the Class “in writing of the purpose of [collecting their alleged 

hand geometry scans] and the length of time that Defendant would store” the alleged biometric 

identifiers and/or biometric information; (iii) failing to obtain Plaintiff’s and the Class’s written 

consent prior to capturing or collecting Plaintiff’s and the Class’s alleged hand geometry scans 

and personal identifying information allegedly derived therefrom; (iv) failing to make publicly 

available a written policy establishing a retention schedule and destruction guidelines for its 

alleged possession of biometric information; and (v) disclosing or otherwise disseminating 

Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans and personal identifying information to 

Defendant’s timekeeping vendor without first obtaining their consent. (Compl., ¶¶ 43, 44, 45, 51, 

58 ). Plaintiff alleges that these violations were reckless or, in the alternative, negligent. (Id. ¶¶ 53, 

60). 

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3. For herself and each member of the putative class, Plaintiff seeks: (1) statutory 

liquidated or actual monetary damages, whichever is higher; (2) injunctive relief; and (3) 

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. (Compl., ¶¶ 46, 53, 60). 

4. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of “Defendant’s workers who scanned their 

hands in Defendant’s biometric time clock system in Illinois between March 26, 2015 and the 

present without first executing a written release.” (Compl., ¶ 27). 

5. On March 30, 2020, Plaintiff requested that Defendant waive service of the 

Complaint and associated Summons. That day, Plaintiff’s counsel sent the undersigned counsel a 

Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt of Summons and Complaint, which Defendant returned 

on April 20, 2020. (See Ex. A). Defendant has not filed an answer or any other pleading responsive 

to the Complaint, nor has it appeared or made any arguments before the State Court. 

Timeliness of Removal 

6. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1), if the grounds for removal are apparent on the 

face of the initial pleading, “[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed 

within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the 

initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or 

within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then 

been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.” 

7. Here, for the reasons explained below, the grounds for removal are apparent on the 

face of the Complaint. 

8. Defendant files this Notice of Removal on April 29, 2020, 30 days after Plaintiff 

emailed counsel a copy of the Complaint on March 30, 2020 and requested that Defendant waive 

formal service. Although Defendant would contend that this did not commence the 30-day time 

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period to remove the action, Defendant filing this Notice of Removal within 30 days thereof 

demonstrates that it is, without a doubt, timely. 

Basis for Removal

9. Removal is proper under the 28 U.S.C. §1331, which provides that “[t]he district 

courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States.” 

10. Here, and as further described below, removal is appropriate because the putative 

class includes a substantial number of employees who are union members and whose employment 

is governed by a collective bargaining agreement entered into by their union and Defendant. As 

such, resolving the claims of these bargaining unit employees would necessarily require 

interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement and are thus subject to federal preemption 

pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. §185. 

11. Section 301 of the LMRA grants federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over 

disputes involving the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. 

Lueck, 417 U.S. 202, 210-11 (1985). “[C]laims founded directly on rights created by collectivebargaining agreements, and also claims ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective 

bargaining agreement’” are subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. See Peatry v. Bimbo Bakeries 

USA, Inc., No. 19 C 2942, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32577, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2020), citing 

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987). “If the resolution of a state law claim 

depends on the meaning of, or requires interpretation of, a collective bargaining agreement, the 

application of state law is preempted and federal labor law principles must be employed to resolve 

the dispute.” See Peatry, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32577, at *6, citing Atchley v. Heritage Cable 

Vision Assocs., 101 F.3d 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2013). 

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12. As is relevant here, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from November 2019 

through December 2019. (Compl. ¶ 2). Although not herself a member, in the five years preceding 

the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint, a substantial number of the employees at Columbia who used 

the timekeeping system at issue were members of United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, 

Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, 

CLC (the “Union”). (Exhibit B, Declaration of Alan Irni (“Irni Declaration”) ¶ 4). 

13. During that time, Defendant was a party to collective bargaining agreements 

(“CBAs”) with the Union which governed the terms and conditions of the Union members’ 

employment with Columbia, including, but not limited to the equipment to be utilized by the 

employees.1 (Ex. B, ¶ 5). As a result, the terms and conditions of employment for a substantial 

portion of the putative class were dictated by the CBAs and any disputes involving the 

interpretation and application of the agreements were to be resolved according to the CBAs’ 

mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures. (Id.). 

14. Where a CBA sets forth the terms of employment, claims alleging BIPA violations 

necessary require an analysis of that CBA and are thus subject to federal preemption. See 

Fernandez v. Kerry, Inc., Case No. 17-cv-8971, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64070, at *16-17 (N.D. 

Ill. Apr. 10, 2020) (holding that because plaintiffs’ BIPA claims necessarily required interpretation 

of the collective bargaining agreement, they are preempted under the LMRA and therefore 

removable). 

15. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals “concluded that it is not possible to 

resolve a BIPA dispute over fingerprint time clocks without reference to the collective bargaining 

1

 The longest potential statutory limitations period under the BIPA is five years. Columbia does not 

concede that a five-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiff’s claims under the BIPA nor does it waive 

any right to challenge the applicable statute of limitations in this matter. 

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agreement.” Kerry, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64070, at *16, referencing Miller v. Southwest Airlines 

Co., 926 F.3d 898, 903 (7th Cir. 2019). In Southwest Airlines, the Seventh Circuit considered BIPA 

claims brought against an employer whose union contracts were subject to the Railway Labor Act, 

45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188,2 and found that the claims required an interpretation of the relevant 

collective bargaining agreement and were thus preempted by federal law, even where the biometric 

timekeeping systems were not expressly referenced in the agreement. Southwest Airlines, 926 F.3d 

at 904-06 (“It is not possible even in principle to litigate disputes about . . . [the use of] fingerprint 

information . . . without asking whether the union has consented on the employees’ collective 

behalf.”). 

16. Here, a substantial portion of the putative class are union members whose 

employment with Defendant is subject to the terms of collective bargaining agreements that 

include provisions mandating the grievance and arbitration of disputes under the CBAs, which 

would include the claims at issue. (See Ex. B, Irni Declaration, ¶¶ 5-6). 

17. While removal based on federal preemption of the claims of a putative class is an 

issue of first impression in this Circuit, federal preemption of a substantial proportion of potential 

putative class claims under Section 301 of the LMRA raises a substantial and immediate federal 

interest that should be adjudicated exclusively in a federal district court consistent with the uniform 

body of federal labor law interpreting collective bargaining agreements and the contours of LMRA 

preemption. Indeed, LMRA preemption will significantly affect this Court’s jurisdiction and the 

adjudication of this matter, both now and later during this litigation (e.g., at the class certification 

2

 The preemption standards under the Railway Labor Act and the LMRA are functionally the same. 

See Kerry, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64070, at *16; Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 260 

(1994). 

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stage, should the Court not dismiss the matter before then). These circumstances warrant 

immediate removal to this federal court. 

Venue and Procedural Steps 

18. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois is the 

appropriate venue for removal of the State Court Action. Under 28 U.S.C. §1441, a civil action 

brought in any state court in which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction 

is to be removed to the district court for the district and division embracing the place where the 

state court action is pending. The State Court Action was filed in Cook County, Illinois, which is 

located in this judicial district and division. 

19. As required by 28 U.S.C. §1446(a), the Complaint, Summons and all other 

“process, pleadings, and orders” served to date on Defendant are attached hereto as Exhibit A. 

20. As required by 28 U.S.C. §1446(d), written notice of this Notice of Removal will 

be sent promptly to Plaintiff’s counsel by email and U.S. Mail, and promptly filed with the Clerk 

of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. 

21. By filing this Notice of Removal, Defendant does not waive any defenses to the 

claims Plaintiff asserts on behalf of herself and the putative class, including that Plaintiff has not 

pleaded a claim upon which relief can be granted and that class certification is inappropriate. 

WHEREFORE, Defendant Columbia Rehabilitation and Nursing Center LLC hereby 

removes case number 2020 CH 03580 pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, 

County Department, Chancery Division, to the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

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Dated: April 29, 2020 

By: 

Respectfully submitted, 

COLUMBIA REHABILITATION AND 

NURSING CENTER LLC d/b/a 

INTEGRITY HEALTHCARE OF 

COLUMBIA 

 /s/ Jody Kahn Mason 

 One of Its Attorneys

Jody Kahn Mason 

Jason A. Selvey 

Julia S. Wolf 

Jackson Lewis P.C. 

150 North Michigan Ave., Suite 2500 

Chicago, Illlinois 60601 

Tel.: 312.787.4949 

Fax: 312.787.4995 

Jody.Mason@jacksonlewis.com 

Jason.Selvey@jacksonlewis.com 

Julia.Wolf@jacksonlewis.com 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I, Jody Kahn Mason, an attorney, certify that on April 29, 2020 I caused a true and correct 

copy of the attached Notice of Removal to be served via email and U.S. mail on the following 

counsel of record at the addresses listed: 

Douglas M. Werman 

Zachary C. Flowerree 

WERMAN SALAS P.C. 

77 West Washington St., Suite 1402 

Chicago, IL 60602 

dwerman@flsalaw.com 

zflowerree@flsalaw.com 

Brandon M. Wise 

Paul A. Lesko 

PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC 

818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 2 

St. Louis, MO 63104 

bwise@pwcklegal.com 

plesko@pwcklegal.com 

s/ Jody Kahn Mason 

4833-5142-0347, v. 2 

4833-5142-0347, v. 2

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EXHIBIT A 

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 

COUNTY DEPARTMENT, CHANCERY DIVISION

GINGER DARTY, on behalf of herself )

and all other persons similarly situated )

known and unknown, ) Case No.

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge

) 

v. )

)

COLUMBIA REHABILITATION AND )

NURSING CENTER, LLC d/b/a INTEGRITY )

HEALTHCARE OF COLUMBIA, )

)

Defendant. )

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Ginger Darty (“Plaintiff”), files this Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”) against 

Columbia Rehabilitation and Nursing Center, LLC d/b/a Integrity Healthcare of Columbia

(“Defendant”) for violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.

SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

1. Defendant operates Integrity Healthcare of Columbia, a nursing home facility in 

Columbia, Illinois.

2. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a Nurse between approximately November 

2019 and December 2019.

3. Throughout her employment, Defendant required her and other employees to use a 

biometric time clock system to record their time worked.

4. Defendant required Plaintiff and other employees to scan their hands in Defendant’s

biometric time clock each time they started and finished working, including punching in and out 

for lunch breaks.

FILED

3/26/2020 5:28 PM

DOROTHY BROWN

CIRCUIT CLERK

COOK COUNTY, IL

2020CH03580

8967922

Return Date: No return date scheduled

Hearing Date: 7/27/2020 10:00 AM - 10:00 AM

Courtroom Number: 2302

Location: District 1 Court

 Cook County, IL

FILED DATE: 3/26/2020 5:28 PM 2020CH03580

2020CH03580

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5. Unlike an employee identification number or employee identification card, hand 

geometry is a unique and permanent identifier. 

6. By requiring employees to scan their hands to record their time, instead of 

identification numbers or badges only, Defendant ensured that one employee could not clock in 

for another. 

7. Thus, there’s no question that Defendant achieved a labor management benefit from 

using a biometric time clock.

8. But there’s equally no question that Defendant placed employees at risk by using 

their biometric identifiers to “punch the clock.” 

9. In enacting the Biometric Information Privacy Act, the Illinois legislature 

recognized that biologically unique identifiers, like hand scans, can never be changed when 

compromised, and thus subject a victim of identity theft to heightened risk of loss. 

10. As a result, Illinois restricted private entities, like Defendant, from collecting, 

storing, using, or transferring a person’s biometric identifiers and information without adhering to 

strict informed-consent procedures established by the Biometric Information Privacy Act.

11. Defendant collected, stored, used, and transferred the unique biometric hand 

geometry scan identifiers, or information derived from those identifiers, of Plaintiff and others 

similarly situated without following the detailed requirements of the Biometric Information

Privacy Act.

12. As a result, Defendant violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act and 

compromised the privacy and security of the biometric identifiers and information of Plaintiff and 

other similarly-situated employees.

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE

13. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because, during the relevant 

time period, Defendant did business in Illinois, was registered to do business in Illinois, and 

committed the statutory violations alleged in this Complaint in Illinois. 

14. Cook County is an appropriate venue for this litigation because Defendant’s 

principal office is located in Cook County and it does business there.

THE PARTIES

15. Plaintiff is an individual who is a citizen of Illinois. 

16. Defendant is an Illinois limited liability company with its principal place of 

business in Skokie, Illinois.

REQUIREMENTS OF THE BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT

17. In enacting the Biometric Information Privacy Act, the Illinois legislature 

recognized that the full ramifications of biometric technology are not yet fully known and so the 

public will benefit from “regulations on the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage 

retention, and description of biometric identifiers and information.” 740 ILCS 14/5(f)-(g).

18. The Biometric Information Privacy Act prohibits a “private entity” from capturing 

or collecting biometric identifiers or information from an individual unless that private entity first 

obtains the individual’s written consent or employment-related release authorizing the private 

entity to capture or collect an individual’s biometric identifiers and/or biometric information. 740 

ILCS 14/15(b)(3).

19. Relatedly, the Biometric Information Privacy Act prohibits a private entity from 

capturing or collecting biometric identifiers or information from an individual unless that private 

entity first informs the individual, in writing, of the following: (a) that the private entity is 

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collecting biometric identifiers or information, (b) the purpose of such collection, and (c) the length

of time the private entity will retain the biometric identifiers or information. 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(1)-

(2).

20. In addition, the Biometric Information Privacy Act prohibits a private entity from 

possessing biometric identifiers or information unless it creates and follows a written policy, made 

available to the public, establishing a retention schedule and destruction guidelines for its 

possession of biometric identifiers and information. 740 ILCS 14/15(a).

21. Finally, the Biometric Information Privacy Act prohibits a private entity from 

disclosing or otherwise disseminating biometric identifiers or information without first obtaining 

an individual’s consent for that disclosure or dissemination, unless the disclosure or dissemination 

was (a) in furtherance of an authorized financial transaction, (b) authorized by law, or (c) pursuant 

to a valid warrant or subpoena. 740 ILCS 14/15(d).

BACKGROUND FACTS

22. When Plaintiff scanned her hand in Defendant’s biometric time clock, Defendant

captured and stored Plaintiff’s hand geometry scan, or personal identifying information derived 

from Plaintiff’s hand geometry scan.

23. When Plaintiff scanned her hand in Defendant’s biometric time clock, Defendant 

disclosed her hand geometry scan – or personal identifying information derived from her hand 

geometry scan – to Defendant’s time-keeping vendor.

24. Before or after requiring the Plaintiff to use a biometric timeclock, Defendant never 

provided Plaintiff any written materials stating that it was collecting, retaining, or disclosing her

hand geometry scan or personal identifying information derived from her hand geometry scans.

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25. Before requiring the Plaintiff to use a biometric timeclock, Defendant never 

obtained Plaintiff’s written consent, or release as a condition of employment, authorizing the 

collection, storage, dissemination, or use of her hand geometry scan or personal identifying 

information derived from Plaintiff’s hand geometry scan.

26. Defendant violated Plaintiff’s privacy by capturing or collecting her unique

biometric identifiers and information and sharing those identifiers and information with its timekeeping vendor, without her consent.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

27. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of Defendant’s workers who scanned their hands

in Defendant’s biometric time clock system in Illinois between March 26, 2015 and the present

without first executing a written release (“the Class”).

28. Plaintiff and the Class are similar to one another because they were all subject to 

the same allegedly illegal practices: scanning their hands in Defendant’s biometric time clock

system despite Defendant failing to adhere to the requirements of the Biometric Information

Privacy Act.

29. The Class includes more than 75 members.

30. As a result, the Class is so numerous that joining of all class members in one lawsuit

is not practical.

31. The issues involved in this lawsuit present common questions of law and fact, 

including: whether the Class scanned their hands to clock in and out during shifts; whether

Defendant collected the Class’s “biometric identifiers” or “biometric information” under the 

Biometric Information Privacy Act; and whether Defendant complied with the procedures in 740 

ILCS 14/15(a), (b), and (d) of the Biometric Information Privacy Act.

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32. These common questions of law and fact predominate over variations that may exist 

between members of the Class, if any.

33. Plaintiff, the members of the Class, and Defendant have a commonality of interest 

in the subject matter of the lawsuit and the remedy sought.

34. If individual actions were required to be brought by each member of the Class

injured or affected, the result would be a multiplicity of actions, creating a hardship to the Class, 

to the Court, and to Defendant. 

35. Accordingly, a class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient 

adjudication of this lawsuit and distribution of the common fund to which the Class is entitled.

36. The books and records of Defendant are material to Plaintiff’s case as they disclose 

how and when Plaintiff and the Class scanned their hands in Defendant’s biometric time clock

system and what information Defendant provided Plaintiff and the Class about the collection, 

retention, use, and dissemination of their biometric identifiers and information.

37. Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.

38. Plaintiff retained counsel experienced in complex class action litigation.

COUNT I

Violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(b))

(Class Action)

39. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the previous allegations of this Complaint.

40. Defendant is a “private entity” under the Biometric Information Privacy Act. 740 

ILCS 14/10.

41. Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans qualify as “biometric identifier[s]” 

as defined by the Biometric Information Privacy Act. 740 ILCS 14/10.

42. Defendant has “biometric information” from Plaintiff and the Class through its

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acquisition and retention of information based on Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans.

43. Defendant violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act by capturing or 

collecting Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans and personal identifying information

based on their hand geometry scans without first informing them in writing that Defendant was

doing so.

44. Defendant violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act by capturing or 

collecting Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans and personal identifying information

based on their hand geometry scans without first informing them in writing of the purpose of 

Defendant doing so and the length of time Defendant would store and use Plaintiff’s and the 

Class’s biometric identifiers and/or biometric information.

45. Defendant violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act by capturing or 

collecting Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans and personal identifying information

based on their hand geometry scans without first obtaining their written consent or other release 

authorizing Defendant to capture or collect Plaintiff’s and the Class’s biometric identifiers and/or 

biometric information.

46. Unlike other Illinois companies, Defendant failed to take notice and follow the 

requirements of the Biometric Information Privacy Act even though the law was enacted in 2008 

and numerous articles and court filings about the law’s requirements were published before 

Defendant committed the legal violations alleged in this Complaint.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class pray for a judgment against Defendant as follows:

A. Awarding liquidated or actual monetary damages, whichever is higher, to Plaintiff 

and each member of the Class for each violation of the Biometric Information 

Privacy Act as provided by 740 ILCS 14/20(1)-(2);

B. Enjoining Defendant from committing further violations of the Biometric 

Information Privacy Act as authorized by 740 ILCS 14/20(4);

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C. Awarding Plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing and 

prosecuting this action as provided by 740 ILCS 14/20(3); and

D. Such other and further relief as this Court deems appropriate and just as provided 

by 740 ILCS 14/20(4).

COUNT II

Violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(a))

(Class Action)

47. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the previous allegations of this Complaint.

48. Defendant is a “private entity” under the Biometric Information Privacy Act. 740 

ILCS 14/10.

49. Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans qualify as “biometric identifier[s]” 

as defined by the Biometric Information Privacy Act. 740 ILCS 14/10.

50. Defendant has “biometric information” from Plaintiff and the Class through its 

acquisition and retention of information based on Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans.

51. Defendant violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act by possessing Plaintiff’s 

and the Class’s hand geometry scans and personal identifying information based on their hand

geometry scans without creating and following a written policy, made available to the public, 

establishing a retention schedule and destruction guidelines for its possession of biometric 

information derived from Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans.

52. Unlike other Illinois companies, Defendant failed to take notice and follow the 

requirements of the Biometric Information Privacy Act even though the law was enacted in 2008 

and numerous articles and court filings about the law’s requirements were published before 

Defendant committed the legal violations alleged in this Complaint.

53. As a result, Defendant’s violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act were 

reckless or, in the alternative, negligent.

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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class pray for a judgment against Defendant as follows:

A. Awarding liquidated or actual monetary damages, whichever is higher, to Plaintiff 

and each member of the Class for each violation of the Biometric Information 

Privacy Act as provided by 740 ILCS 14/20(1)-(2);

B. Enjoining Defendant from committing further violations of the Biometric 

Information Privacy Act as authorized by 740 ILCS 14/20(4);

C. Awarding Plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing and 

prosecuting this action as provided by 740 ILCS 14/20(3); and

D. Such other and further relief as this Court deems appropriate and just as provided 

by 740 ILCS 14/20(4).

COUNT III

Violation of the Biometric Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14/15(d))

(Class Action)

54. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the previous allegations of this Complaint.

55. Defendant is a “private entity” under the Biometric Information Privacy Act. 740 

ILCS 14/10.

56. Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans qualify as “biometric identifier[s]” 

as defined by the Biometric Information Privacy Act. 740 ILCS 14/10.

57. Defendant has “biometric information” from Plaintiff and the Class through its 

acquisition and retention of information based on Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans.

58. Defendant violated the Biometric Information Privacy Act by disclosing or 

otherwise disseminating Plaintiff’s and the Class’s hand geometry scans and personal identifying 

information based on their hand geometry scans to Defendant’s timekeeping vendor without first 

obtaining their consent for that disclosure or dissemination.

59. Unlike other Illinois companies, Defendant failed to take notice and follow the 

requirements of the Biometric Information Privacy Act even though the law was enacted in 2008 

and numerous articles and court filings about the law’s requirements were published before 

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Defendant committed the legal violations alleged in this Complaint.

60. As a result, Defendant’s violations of the Biometric Information Privacy Act were 

reckless or, in the alternative, negligent.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff and the Class pray for a judgment against Defendant as follows:

A. Awarding liquidated or actual monetary damages, whichever is higher, to Plaintiff

and each member of the Class for each violation of the Biometric Information 

Privacy Act as provided by 740 ILCS 14/20(1)-(2);

B. Enjoining Defendant from committing further violations of the Biometric

Information Privacy Act as authorized by 740 ILCS 14/20(4);

C. Awarding Plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in filing and 

prosecuting this action as provided by 740 ILCS 14/20(3); and

D. Such other and further relief as this Court deems appropriate and just as provided 

by 740 ILCS 14/20(4).

Dated: March 26, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Douglas M. Werman

One of Plaintiff’s Attorneys

Douglas M. Werman- IL Bar No.- 6204740

dwerman@flsalaw.com

Zachary C. Flowerree- IL Bar No.- 6305935

zflowerree@flsalaw.com

WERMAN SALAS P.C. (Firm ID: 42031)

77 West Washington St., Suite 1402

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 419-1008

Brandon M. Wise – IL Bar No.- 6319580

bwise@pwcklegal.com

Paul A. Lesko – IL Bar No.- 6288806

plesko@pwcklegal.com

PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE, APLC

818 Lafayette Ave., Floor 2

St. Louis, MO 63104

(314) 833-4825

Attorneys for Plaintiff

FILED DATE: 3/26/2020 5:28 PM 2020CH03580

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EXHIBIT B 

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