UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DWAYNE E.,

 Plaintiff,

 Case No. 20 C 4103

 v.

 Magistrate Judge Sunil R. Harjani

ANDREW M. SAUL,

Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Dwayne E. seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). An 

administrative law judge determined that Dwayne was not disabled because he could perform light 

work with some limitations. Dwayne seeks reversal and remand of the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security. The Commissioner moves for summary judgment [19] seeking 

affirmance of the decision denying benefits. For the reasons explained below, the ALJ’s denial of 

Dwayne’s application for DIB is reversed and remanded for further administrative proceedings. 

BACKGROUND

Dwayne (who was 50 at the time of the ALJ’s decision) alleges disability due to spinal 

stenosis, bulging discs, spinal curvature, and dyslexia. (R. 48). Dwayne has a long history of 

medical issues including chronic back pain, spinal stenosis, degenerative changes to vertebral 

endplates, osteoarthritis of lumbar spine, and bulging lumbar discs. Id. at 297, 529, 599, 496, 1918.

His back pain increased significantly after he was injured at work in December of 2017. Id. at 731.

Dwayne was injured while pushing a thousand-pound heavy goods vehicle engine. Id. at 308, 644, 

731. He was treated with pain medications such as Percocet and valium and with physical therapy.

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 1 of 14 PageID #:2053
2

Id. at 306, 644, 1504. Dwayne was discharged from therapy because he experienced increased 

pain with the treatment and because his symptoms were not improving. Id. 662. Dwayne uses a 

cane to help him walk without stumbling. Id. at 1504. He began using a cane for support six 

months after his work injury. Id. at 30. Dwayne completed three years of high school and his prior 

work was as a welder and forklift operator Id. at 72-73, 542.

On July 25, 2019, the ALJ issued a decision denying Dwayne’s DIB claim. (R. 79-95). 

Following the five-step sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Dwayne had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of December 30, 2017 (step 1) and that he 

suffered from the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the thoracic and lumbar spine; 

diverticulosis; bilateral inguinal hernias; depression; alcohol abuse; and anxiety (step 2). Id. at 82. 

Further, the ALJ determined that Dwayne’s mental impairments were non-severe and did not 

satisfy the Paragraph B criteria because he experienced only a moderate limitation in 

understanding, remembering, or applying information, mild limitation in interacting with others, 

mild limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and mild limitation in adapting 

or managing oneself. Id. at 82-83. The ALJ then determined that Dwayne’s impairments did not 

meet or equal the severity of a list impairment (step 3). Id. at 82. The ALJ next found that Dwayne

retained the RFC to perform light work except that he can never: climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds 

and can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs. Id. at 84. The ALJ 

determined that Dwayne must avoid concentrated exposure to hazard and must be able to shift 

positions from sitting standing or vice versa for one to two minutes every thirty minutes while 

remaining on task. Id. At step 4, the ALJ concluded that Dwayne had no past relevant work. Id. 

at 93. Given the RFC, at step 5, the ALJ determined that Dwayne could perform three other jobs 

identified by the VE: price marker, mail sorter, and assembler. Id. at 94. Based on this step 5 

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 2 of 14 PageID #:2054
3

finding, the ALJ found that Dwayne was not disabled. Id. at 95. The Appeals Council denied

Dwayne’s request for review on May 18, 2020, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of 

the Commissioner. Id. at 1-6; Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).

DISCUSSION

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). To determine whether 

a claimant is disabled, the ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry: (1) whether the claimant is currently 

unemployed, (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment, (3) whether the claimant’s 

impairment meets or equals any of the listings found in the regulations, see 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. 

P, App. 1 (2004); (4) whether the claimant is unable to perform her former occupation; and (5) 

whether the claimant is unable to perform any other available work in light of his age, education, 

and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 

2000). These steps are to be performed sequentially. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). “An affirmative 

answer leads either to the next step, or, on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. 

A negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a determination 

that a claimant is not disabled.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 868 (internal quotations omitted).

Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings 

are supported by substantial evidence or based upon a legal error. Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 

936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 

(2019) (internal quotations omitted). “Although this standard is generous, it is not entirely 

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 3 of 14 PageID #:2055
4

uncritical.” Steele, 290 F.3d at 940. Where the Commissioner’s decision “lacks evidentiary 

support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be remanded.” 

Id. In reviewing an ALJ’s decision, the Court may not “reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts, 

decide questions of credibility, or substitute [its] own judgment for that of the” ALJ. Burmester v. 

Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019). Although the Court reviews the ALJ’s decision 

deferentially, the ALJ must nevertheless “build an accurate and logical bridge” between the 

evidence and her conclusions. See Steele, 290 F.3d at 938, 941 (internal citation and quotations 

omitted).

Dwayne challenges four aspects of the ALJ’s assessment of his residual functional 

capacity. Specifically, he complains that the ALJ: (1) erred by failing to assess Dwayne’s need to 

use a cane; (2) erred in assessing the opinion evidence; (3) failed to support the functional capacity 

finding; (4) and failed to properly assess Dwayne’s symptoms. As explained below, the Court 

finds Dwayne’s first challenge to the RFC determination persuasive and remands this case for 

further administrative proceedings on that basis.

Dwayne argues the ALJ’s failure to assess his cane use in the RFC requires remand. “The 

RFC is the maximum that a claimant can still do despite his mental and physical limitations.” Craft 

v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 675–76 (7th Cir. 2008); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). An ALJ’s failure to 

address a claimant's need to use a cane in the RFC evaluation may require remand. See Thomas v. 

Colvin, 534 F. App’x 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2013); Dean v. Berryhill, No. 16 C 9269, 2018 WL 

3608555, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 2018).

Here, the vocational expert at Dwayne’s ALJ hearing testified that cane usage would

preclude a claimant from performing the three light work occupations the VE suggested Dwayne 

could perform. R. at 42. Importantly, the VE opined that if a person with Dwayne’s occupational 

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 4 of 14 PageID #:2056
5

base needed a cane that would reduce that person to sedentary work. Id. For those reasons, 

Dwayne’s cane use would erode light work leaving only sedentary work, which should result in a 

disability finding under the Agency regulations known as the Medical-Vocational Guidelines

given his age and other vocational factors. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 § 201 (providing 

that an individual approaching advanced age between ages of 50 and 54 is disabled if limited to 

sedentary work, has education that does not provide for direct entry into skilled work, and has no 

transferable skills from previous work experience); Thomas, 534 F. App'x 546, 550–51 (finding 

52-year-old plaintiff would be disabled under the grids if she could perform only sedentary work). 

Therefore, if the ALJ did fail to properly evaluate Dwayne’s use of a cane, the error is not harmless 

and requires remand.

Upon review of the record, the Court finds that the ALJ’s failure to evaluate Dwayne’s 

cane use in the RFC assessment is reversible error. There is substantial evidence in the record 

supporting Dwayne’s cane use which the ALJ should have, at a bare minimum, mentioned in her

functional limitation evaluation. See Davis v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-7372, 2017 WL 4772714, at 

*7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2017) (finding the ALJ erred by not addressing the claimant’s use of a cane 

in assessing his RFC); Dean, 2018 WL 3608555, at *4; Tovar v. Berryhill, No. 18 CV 2260, 2018 

WL 6696568, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2018) (An ALJ must always “include a discussion of why 

reported symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions can or cannot reasonably be 

accepted as consistent with the medical and other evidence.”). Lacking in this ALJ’s disability 

determination is an evaluation that bridges the ALJ’s reasoning with the outcome. 

Dwayne’s cane use was noted in numerous parts of the record. First, the agency reports

signed off by Dr. Bilinsky and Dr. Mandala note Dwayne’s cane use and slow gait under the

sections for exertional and environmental limitations. (R. 47-74, 55, 56, 70). Dr. Bilinsky’s 

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 5 of 14 PageID #:2057
6

records also note that Dwayne previously presented to the agency’s field office with a cane and 

that he moaned throughout the interview. Id. at 50, 208. Next, the records for Dwayne’s first 

physical therapy evaluation session after his work accident on January 22, 2018 note that he used

a cane due to his inability to walk without stumbling. Id. at 1504. A month later when Dwayne 

went to the emergency room for treatment of his abdominal pain, the records indicate he used a 

cane as an assistive device. Id. at 1390. Furthermore, during his evaluation visit with Dr. Rana on 

March 13, 2018, Dwayne expressed that he experienced difficulty walking more than half a block 

and that his doctor recommended the cane. Id. at 541. Dr. Rana’s notes also describe Dwayne 

inability to tandem walk and his moderate difficulty with walking on toes and heels and squatting 

and arising. Id. at 543. Dr. Rana also listed “cane” under “need/use of assistive device.” Id. 

Moreover, Dr. Rana recognized that Dwayne’s walk was slow with the cane, that he walked 

without the cane in the exam room, and that he could slowly walk more than 50 feet without 

assistance. Id. at 544. Following that visit, Dwayne had a psychiatric examination by Dr. Gil who 

also noted his slow walk and use of a cane to ambulate. Id. at 552. Dwayne had a second round 

of physical therapy with Shandrea Boyd starting on April 24, 2018 and those records also note that 

he reported stumbling while walking and intermittent cane use for ambulation. Id. at 644. Boyd 

further stated that Dwayne wanted to wean off use of the cane but had an antalgic walk and 

decreased cadence. Id. at 645, 646. The records note that Dwayne’s goal of increased cadence 

without the use of an assistive device was not met at the end of his therapy treatment. Id. at 664. 

Dwayne continued his treatment with Dr. Harsoor, a pain management specialist, and the records 

for those visits state “patient uses does not use assistive device.1” Id. at 1907, 1911, 1940, 1944, 

1 The ALJ maintains, and the Commissioner affirms, that Dr. Harsoor’s records indicate Dwayne did not 

use an assistive device despite the nonsensical order of Dr. Harsoor’s words in the statements regarding 

his cane use. R. 88

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 6 of 14 PageID #:2058
7

1948, 1952. Dwayne’s cane use appears again in the records for his emergency room visit on 

September 12, 2018. Id. at 1644. Lastly, Dwayne’s primary care physician referenced his cane 

use in her medical source statement, noting that Dwayne used the cane to do any kind of walking, 

and that he specifically needs it for balance, weakness, pain, and his unsteady gait. Id. at 728.

Dwayne’s own subjective report revealed his cane use. On February 9, 2018, Dwayne

completed an adult function report, where he stated that his doctor suggested he use a cane and 

that he used a cane most of the time to ambulate. Id. at 216. He also noted that he used an electric 

cart when he and his wife shopped for food. Id. at 213. His wife also reported that Dwayne used

a cane for stability, that his doctor recommended the cane, that his walk was slow with the cane, 

and that he makes attempts to move about in the house without a cane. Id. at 223, 225, 228. At his 

hearing on June 14, 2019, Dwayne stated that the cane helps with his pain and that he is able to

walk for about 50 feet without the cane. Id. at 29, 30. He further testified that he could walk from 

the sofa to the bathroom and vice versa without a cane. Id. at 38. 

Despite this record evidence, the ALJ mentioned only a few instances of Dwayne’s cane 

use in her recitation of Dwayne’s medical history, starting with Dwayne’s testimony at the hearing. 

Id. at 85. The ALJ went on to cite to Dr. Rana’s evaluation noting that Dwayne was able to walk 

without the cane in the exam room and that he walked more than fifty feet without assistance. Id.

at 86. The ALJ moved on to point to Dwayne’s physical therapy evaluation on April 28, 2018

where she stated that he intermittently used a cane for ambulation. Id. at 87. Finally, disregarding

the likely typo in the record, the ALJ asserts that Dwayne did not use an assistive device when he 

treated with Dr. Harsoor. Id. The ALJ did not say anything more to address the additional evidence 

of Dwayne’s cane use in the record. In her concluding statements about Dwayne’s RFC, she 

reasoned that Dwayne’s capacity to perform light work was based on his medical imaging results

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 7 of 14 PageID #:2059
8

and his own testimony regarding his ability to lift twenty pounds, and that any further limitations 

were not justified by the record as a whole. Id. at 92-93. 

An ALJ must articulate a “logical bridge between the evidence and the conclusions so that 

the court “can assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford the claimant 

meaningful judicial review.” Jones v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010); Gass v.

Berryhill, No. 1:16-CV-292 RLM-SLC, 2017 WL 3705060, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 28, 2017); see 

also Dean, 2018 WL 3608555, at *4 (remanding where the ALJ failed to thoroughly examine and 

articulate logical reasons for disregarding ample evidence of claimants need for an assistive device 

in making his disability determination); Newell v. Astrue, 869 F. Supp. 2d 875, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2012) 

(“An ALJ must always “include a discussion of why reported symptom-related functional 

limitations and restrictions can or cannot reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical 

and other evidence.”) This Court recognizes that the Seventh Circuit has recently stated that “the 

“logical bridge” language in caselaw is descriptive but does not alter the applicable substantialevidence standard.” Brumbaugh v. Saul, 850 F. App’x 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2021). The Seventh

Circuit has also called this requirement “lax.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Cir. 2008); 

Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2008). “If a sketchy opinion assures us that the ALJ 

considered the important evidence, and the opinion enables us to trace the path of the ALJ's 

reasoning, the ALJ has done enough.” Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287-88 (7th Cir. 1985). 

In this Court’s view, the logical bridge provision has always been descriptive and never a standard 

of review on its own. “Logical bridge” is simply a more sophisticated way of saying “analysis” –

a basic function that should be contained in all judicial opinions. In any setting where a court 

conducts judicial review of a lower court’s decision, the reviewing court looks not just for 

statement of facts or a summary of the evidence, but rather an analysis of those facts in light of the 

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 8 of 14 PageID #:2060
9

applicable law and an articulation of the reasons, however minimal, for the judge’s conclusion. 

This concept is no different in a district court’s review of an ALJ opinion. Zurawski v. Halter, 245

F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence or 

testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ's analysis must provide some glimpse into the reasoning 

behind her decision to deny benefits.”); Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th

Cir. 2005) (“The ALJ must at least minimally articulate the analysis of the evidence with enough 

detail and clarity to permit meaningful appellate review.”); Steele, 290 F.3d at 940 (“when the 

ALJ’s decision lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful 

review, the case must be remanded.”)

Here, the ALJ does even less than the bare minimum to assess Dwayne’s cane use, 

resulting in a decision that is not supported by substantial evidence. In the ALJ’s recounting of 

Dwayne’s medical history she pointed to only a handful of instances in the record where Dwayne’s 

cane use was noted. Yet, the ALJ’s brief recitation of Dwayne’s cane use does not reveal what 

significance if any the ALJ attached to Dwayne’s cane use. Moreover, the ALJ utterly failed to 

connect Dwayne’s case use with her RFC determination, which was a finding of light work, and 

which (according to the vocational expert) cannot be performed using a cane. 

The error in this case – or to put it another way, the lack of substantial evidence supporting 

the ALJ’s decision – is more egregious than other cases involving cane use. Courts have remanded 

even in situations where the ALJ made at least a meager effort to examine cane use and establish

a logical reasoning for disregarding evidence of cane use. For example, in Tovar v. Berryhill, the 

ALJ rejected the claimant’s contention that he used a walker or cane by explicitly stating in the 

opinion that there was no evidence of the need for a cane in the treatment record. 2018 WL 

6696568, at *3. The court determined that the ALJ ignored references in the record of claimant’s

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 9 of 14 PageID #:2061
10

cane use and failed to articulate a logical reasoning behind the decision to find claimant was not 

limited by the use of a cane or a walker. Id. at 3-5. In Frazier v. Saul, the court remanded where 

the ALJ provided no explanation for concluding that claimant did not need a cane on an ongoing

basis despite evidence and testimony to the contrary. No. 19 C 5785, 2020 WL 4208109, at *5 

(N.D. Ill. July 22, 2020). There, the ALJ had stated the claimant “would not have needed a cane 

on an ongoing basis during the period at issue.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The district court 

rejected this conclusory statement as failing to confront the evidence and explaining why the 

claimant’s need for a cane was rejected. 

In the present case, the ALJ failed to make any statement about Dwayne’s cane use or his 

need for a cane like the ALJs in Tovar and Frazier. The ALJ’s decision was thus without

meaningful evaluation. It is unknown if the ALJ here considered any of the evidence related to 

Dwayne’s cane use or need for a cane in formulating the RFC. Reading the ALJ’s opinion 

liberally, the ALJ stated at one point that “any further limitations were not justified by the record 

as a whole.” Id. at 92-93. However, this conclusory assertion is a deficient assessment of the 

record evidence on claimant’s use of a cane and, frankly, even less of an explanation than what 

the ALJs in Tovar and Frazier provided.

The Commissioner defends the ALJ’s failure to assess Dwayne’s cane use by recounting 

only a portion of the medical record. The Commissioner arguesthat the ALJ purportedly explained 

why plaintiff did not require a cane to ambulate through her discussion of this evidence. 

Specifically, the Commissioner references Dwayne’s visit with Dr. Donkoh where, according to 

the Commissioner, Dwayne had a positive straight leg raise test and full strength and sensation in 

the legs. However, the record provides a different story – it reflects that Dwayne described a

stabbing, shooting pain that resembled a knife moving around in his back during his examination 

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 10 of 14 PageID #:2062
11

with Dr. Donkoh. (R. 706). Furthermore, Dr. Donkoh noted that Dwayne had significant difficulty

raising his legs to cooperate with the exam. Id. at 707. He also noted that Dwayne’s attempt at a 

straight leg raise elicited pain in his lumbar region. Id. Finally, after his examination, Dr. Donkoh 

determined that Dwayne’s work capacity was limited to desk duty or sedentary work. Id. at 708. 

Next, the Commissioner discussed Dr. Rana’s examination of Dwayne and inaccurately stated that 

Dwayne was able to walk on his toes and heels during that visit. The record evidence actually 

shows that, during this examination, Dwayne experienced moderate difficulty with walking on 

toes and heels and squatting and arising. Id. at 543. 

Additionally, the Commissioner points out that Dwayne was able to walk without a cane 

in Dr. Rana’s exam room for more than 50 feet unassisted, as evidence that eliminates the need for 

a cane. However, this logic has been squarely rejected. See Thomas, 534 F. App’x at 551 (“walking 

for 50 feet without a cane— ‘a brief excursion’—does not demonstrate an ability to stand for 6 

hours.”). Even if Dwayne is able to walk for 50 feet and walk from his sofa to the bathroom

without a cane, that does not translate into his ability to perform light work or tolerate a full-time

job. Dean, 2018 WL 3608555, at *4 (“although the Commissioner cites to medical evidence in the 

record that claimant can walk 50 feet without use of an assistive device, this is not the same as the 

ability to sustain full time employment.”); Andrew B. v. Saul, No. 19 C 1592, 2020 WL 2085002, 

at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2020) (“Even so, walking 50 feet without a cane does not translate into an 

ability to walk or stand for six hours in a work setting.”). 

In further arguing that the ALJ did consider Dwayne’s cane use in a meaningful way, the 

Commissioner advances Dr. Harsoor’s note, which as a result of the typo described above, is 

actually incomprehensible and can cuts both ways. Next, the Commissioner calls into question 

Dwayne’s credibility with respect to how long he could stand and walk. The Commissioner argues

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 11 of 14 PageID #:2063
12

that Dr. Bilinsky and Dr. Mandala did not find that Dwayne required a cane because they simply 

noted his cane use, and thus there was nothing for the ALJ to address as to Dwayne’s cane use. 

But our situation here is similar to the one the Seventh Circuit faced in Thomas v. Colvin. In 

Thomas, the court found that the error was “not that the medical evidence required the ALJ to find 

that Dwayne needed a cane to stand and walk, but that the ALJ failed to consider the issue at all,

leaving the Court without a finding to review.” 534 F. App’x at 550. Like in Thomas, the ALJ’s 

mention of Dwayne’s repeated cane use alone requires the ALJ to engage in a discussion about the 

impact of that limitation in the RFC findings. The ALJ was obligated to articulate her evaluation 

of Dwayne’s cane use and ultimately provide a logical bridge between the evidence of his cane 

use and her conclusion. Tovar, 2018 WL 6696568, at *3 (“because of this explanatory void, the 

Court cannot trace the ALJ's reasoning behind the decision to find Plaintiff not limited by a need 

to use a cane or a walker and, thus, remand is required.”). The Commissioner and the ALJ also 

ignore Dwayne’s own testimony about his cane use, his primary physicians’ opinion regarding his 

cane use, and not to mention the several other cane references in the record. (R. 216, 223, 225, 

228, 552, 644, 728, 1390, 1504, 1644). Moreover, although light work requires an ability to stand 

and/or walk for up to six hours of an eight-hour workday, the ALJ’s decision is void of a discussion 

about how Dwayne’s cane use is consistent with prolonged ambulation. Andrew B., 2020 WL 

2085002, at *4. In short, this Court is unable to determine if Dwayne’s cane use was ignored, 

overlooked, or simply not believed. Tovar, 2018 WL 6696568, at *5.

Strangely, while the ALJ did not evaluate Dwayne’s cane use in her RFC assessment, she 

did present the issue in her hypothetical question to the VE. See Yurt v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 850, 857 

(7th Cir. 2014) (“In this circuit, both the hypothetical posed to the VE and the ALJ’s RFC 

assessment must incorporate all of the claimant's limitations supported by the medical record.”). 

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 12 of 14 PageID #:2064
13

During Dwayne’s hearing, the ALJ asked the VE if cane usage would reduce a person who worked 

as a price maker, mail sorter, or assembler to sedentary work, and the VE responded affirmatively. 

(R.42). In Andrew B., this Court found that the ALJ’s failure to include the claimant’s need for a 

cane for prolonged ambulation in the RFC assessment and hypothetical to the VE was reversible 

error. 2020 WL 2085002, at *3. This Court determined that the ALJ was required to ask the VE 

whether his answers regarding the claimant’s RFC to perform the light work jobs identified by the 

VE would be different if the hypothetical individual relied on a cane for prolonged ambulation. Id. 

at 5.

Notwithstanding that the ALJ did ask the VE the relevant question in this case, the outcome 

was no different than the one in Andrew B. because the ALJ chose to wholly ignore the VE’s

response in her RFC evaluation. In both cases, had the ALJs incorporated the claimant’s cane use 

for prolonged ambulation in the RFC they may have concluded that the claimants were only 

capable of performing sedentary work. Id. In the present case, that error is critical because if

Dwayne, given his age, had been limited to sedentary work, the agency's Medical Vocational 

Guidelines would dictate a finding of disabled. Further, because the record does not reveal that 

Dwayne could perform the jobs identified by the VE with the use of a cane, the Court cannot find

that the ALJ's error in evaluating this limitation from the RFC was harmless. McKinzey v. Astrue,

641 F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding error cannot be deemed harmless unless the Court can

find “with great confidence” that the result would be the same on remand). Accordingly, this case 

must be remanded for reevaluation of the RFC. On remand, the ALJ shall include an evaluation 

of Dwayne’s cane use for ambulation in formulating the RFC and explicitly explain how Dwayne’s 

cane use does or does not alter her determination. 

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 13 of 14 PageID #:2065
14

Because this error regarding Dwayne’s use of a cane for prolonged ambulation is sufficient 

to warrant remand, the Court declines to address the remaining errors asserted by Dwayne. On 

remand, Dwayne may raise his arguments regarding any other alleged errors by the ALJ. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 416.1483, 416.1484 (when a case is remanded by a federal court for further 

consideration, “[a]ny issues relating to your claim may be considered . . . whether or not they were 

raised in the administrative proceedings leading to the final decision in your case.”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment [19] is 

denied. Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the ALJ’s decision is reversed, and this 

case is remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant 

Commissioner of Social Security.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 2021 ______________________________

Sunil R. Harjani

United States Magistrate Judge

Case: 1:20-cv-04103 Document #: 23 Filed: 10/12/21 Page 14 of 14 PageID #:2066