Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC12-246

____________

JERONE HUNTER,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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No. SC14-88

____________

JERONE HUNTER,

Petitioner,

vs.

JULIE L. JONES, etc.,

Respondent.

[April 30, 2015]

PER CURIAM.

Jerone Hunter appeals an order of the circuit court denying his motion to 

vacate his convictions of first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and petitions this Court for a writ of 
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habeas corpus. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the denial of his 

postconviction motion and deny his habeas petition.1

I. BACKGROUND

On direct appeal, this Court described the facts as follows: 

On August 27, 2004, Hunter was charged in a fourteen-count 

superseding indictment relating to the murders of Erin Belanger, 

Roberto Gonzalez, Michelle Nathan, Anthony Vega, Jonathon 

Gleason, and Francisco Ayo-Roman. Hunter, with codefendants Troy 

Victorino and Michael Salas, went to trial on July 5, 2006. 

Codefendant Anthony Cannon previously pled guilty as charged.

The evidence at trial established the following. On the morning 

of August 6, 2004, a coworker of two of the occupants of a residence 

on Telford Lane in Deltona, Florida, discovered the victims’ bodies. 

Belanger lived at the Telford residence with Ayo-Roman, Nathan, and 

Vega. Gonzalez and Gleason happened to be at the house the night of 

the murders. The six victims had been beaten to death with baseball 

bats and had sustained cuts to their throats, most of which were 

determined to have been inflicted postmortem. Belanger also 

sustained lacerations through her vagina up to the abdominal cavity of 

her body; the injuries were consistent with having been inflicted by a 

baseball bat. The medical examiner determined that some of the 

victims had defensive wounds. A dead Dachshund was also found in 

the house.

Following a call to 911, law enforcement officers responded to 

the scene. The front door had been kicked in, breaking a deadbolt 

lock and leaving a thirteen-inch shoe-print impression on the door. 

The victims were found throughout the house and blood was 

everywhere. A knife handle and knife blade were recovered at the 

scene, along with two playing cards with bloody shoe imprints, a bed 

sheet with footwear impressions, as well as a pay stub with a footwear 

impression.

Hunter, who at the time was eighteen years old and in twelfth 

grade, met codefendant Cannon two months before the murders. He 

 

1. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.
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knew codefendant Salas from high school. Hunter met codefendant 

Victorino during the end of June or beginning of July of 2004, and 

moved in with Victorino a few days later. Together Hunter and 

Victorino lived in three different residences, including a house that 

belonged to victim Belanger’s grandmother. No one had permission 

to stay at Belanger’s grandmother’s house, but Victorino testified that 

the owner’s grandson had given him permission to stay there.

Approximately a week before the murders, Belanger contacted 

police concerning suspicious activity at her grandmother’s residence. 

Victorino also reported to police that he had items stolen from the 

same house. He became angry when the police told him he would 

have to provide a list of the stolen property. Victorino told the police 

he would take care of the matter himself. Victorino also met with 

Belanger at her residence, seeking return of his property.

Brandon Graham, who was living with codefendants Cannon 

and Salas, met Hunter and Victorino when they went to Belanger’s 

house on Telford Lane a few days before the murders so that 

Victorino could pick up his belongings. Victorino wanted them to 

fight the people at the residence. Hunter yelled for the occupants to 

come out and fight.

On the morning before the murders, Graham, Salas, and 

Cannon drove to the house where Hunter and Victorino were living. 

Victorino discussed a plan to beat everyone to death at the Telford 

residence, asking them if they “were down for it” and saying to 

Hunter, “I know you’re down for it” because he had belongings stolen 

as well. All agreed. Victorino verbally described the layout of the 

Telford house and who would go where. Hunter asked if they should 

wear masks; Victorino said no because they would kill all of the 

occupants.

A witness testified that around midnight on August 5, 2004, she 

saw Hunter, Salas, Cannon, and Victorino near the murder scene. 

And Graham testified that the morning after the murders, he saw 

Victorino’s belongings in the back of Cannon’s SUV. On the day 

after the murders, Victorino was arrested on a probation violation.

In his statement to police, Hunter said that he had gone in 

Cannon’s SUV to the house on Telford on late Saturday or early 

Sunday to get his belongings that had been taken from Belanger’s 

grandmother’s house. He had an aluminum baseball bat with him. 

Hunter said he entered the house through the front door and found 

Gleason in the recliner in the living room. Hunter screamed, 
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“Where’s my stuff,” and when Gleason said, “I don’t know,” he hit 

him with the bat. Hunter hit Gleason because he thought he was 

lying. Gleason attempted to get up from the recliner and Hunter hit 

him again. Hunter said he hit Gleason more than three times but less 

than twelve. Hunter said he then went to look for his belongings. 

Hunter also indicated that he encountered victim Gonzalez in one of 

the bedrooms. He claimed he hit Gonzalez because Gonzalez had 

swung at him with a stick. After Gonzalez dropped his stick, Hunter 

continued to hit him, three to five more times. Hunter then continued 

looking for his belongings. Eventually, Hunter and his codefendants 

left in Cannon’s SUV. Hunter, who wore a black shirt, black shorts, 

and blue and white Nike tennis shoes during the incident, stated that 

he washed his clothes afterwards.

Cannon’s SUV was seized on August 7, 2004. Salas admitted 

to being at the Telford residence the night of the murder and stated 

that Cannon had driven them there. Salas described what he had done 

while in the house and said the bats had been discarded at a retention 

pond. Based upon that information, law enforcement authorities 

recovered two bats from the pond and two bats from surrounding 

trees.

Salas testified about Hunter’s involvement in the murders. 

Salas explained that before the men entered the house on Telford, 

Hunter called Salas and Cannon “[b******]” because they did not 

want to take part in the plan. Hunter ran into the house after 

Victorino. Salas ran in next and saw Hunter swing his bat. Hunter 

said to Gleason, “I don’t like you” and started hitting him. Hunter 

asked Salas if he had killed Gonzalez; Hunter called Salas a “[p****] 

boy” when Salas said he was not killing anyone. Hunter then ran into 

the bedroom and began hitting Gonzalez in the face and head. Hunter 

hit Gonzalez between twenty and thirty times, saying he had to kill 

him. Salas left the house. When Hunter came out he described how 

he found Nathan hiding in one of the bedrooms and killed her when 

she pled for her life. Salas described Hunter as having a look of 

“ferule [sic] joy.” 

Pursuant to a search warrant, numerous items were taken from 

the house where Hunter and Victorino lived. Among the items taken 

was a pair of size thirteen boots, a pair of size ten and one-half Nike 

blue and white tennis shoes without shoe laces, and a pair of shoe 

laces. These shoes, the laces, and other physical evidence were 

admitted at trial linking Hunter, Salas, and Victorino to the murders.
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Hunter v. State, 8 So. 3d 1052, 1057-59 (Fla. 2008) (footnotes omitted). 

Following the penalty phase, “[t]he jury recommended a death sentence for 

the murder of Gleason by a vote of ten to two, a death sentence for the murder of 

Gonzalez by a vote of nine to three, a death sentence for the murder of Nathan by a 

vote of ten to two, a death sentence for the murder of Vega by a vote of nine to 

three, and life sentences for the murders of Belanger and Ayo-Roman.” Id. at 

1060-61. The trial court followed the jury’s recommendations, finding that the 

aggravating circumstances2 outweighed the mitigating circumstances,3and 

 

2. “[T]he trial court found the following five aggravating circumstances 

with their respective assigned weights: (1) the defendant has been previously 

convicted of another capital felony or felony involving the use or threat of violence 

to a person—very substantial weight; (2) the crime for which the defendant is to be 

sentenced was committed while he was engaged in the commission of the crime of 

burglary—moderate weight; (3) the crime for which the defendant is to be 

sentenced was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful 

arrest—moderate weight; (4) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, 

or cruel—very substantial weight; and (5) the capital felony was a homicide and 

was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any 

pretense of moral or legal justification—great weight.” Hunter, 8 So. 3d at 1061.

3. “[T]he trial court found three statutory mitigating circumstances and 

assigned weights: (1) age of the defendant at the time of the crime—some weight; 

(2) the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination 

of another person—some weight; (3) the defendant has no significant history of 

prior criminal activity—little weight. The trial court also found three nonstatutory 

mitigating circumstances: (1) the level of maturity of the defendant at the time of 

the crime—little weight; (2) the defendant exhibited good conduct during 

incarceration—very little weight; and (3) the defendant exhibited good conduct 

during trial—very little weight.” Id.
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sentenced Hunter to death for the murders of Jonathon Gleason, Roberto Gonzalez, 

Michelle Nathan, and Anthony Vega. Id. at 1061. 

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Hunter’s convictions and sentences.4 

Id. at 1076. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied Hunter’s petition 

for writ of certiorari. Hunter v. Florida, 556 U.S. 1191 (2009). 

On April 14, 2010, Hunter filed a motion for postconviction relief. After 

summarily denying several claims and after holding an evidentiary hearing on 

Hunter’s claims alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty 

phase and guilt phase, the postconviction court denied relief. Hunter now appeals 

 

4. On direct appeal, Hunter argued that: (1) “the trial court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers;” (2) 

“the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the shoe laces seized from 

his temporary residence;” (3) “the trial court erred in denying his motion for 

mistrial as his rights under the Sixth Amendment to confrontation and crossexamination were violated when the State’s witness, Cannon, the fourth 

perpetrator, refused to be cross-examined;” (4) “the trial court erred in denying his 

motion for judgment of acquittal;” (5) “the trial court erred in denying his motion 

to sever his trial from that of his two codefendants;” (6) there was “instructional 

error during the guilt phase [because the] use of the conjunction ‘and/or’ between 

the defendants’ names resulted in reversible error;” (7) “the trial court assigned 

improper weights to the mitigating factors and improperly balanced the mitigation 

against the aggravating factors;” (8) “[this Court’s] proportionality review is 

legally insufficient because this Court only considers cases where death has been 

imposed,” and “his death sentence is disproportionate;” (9) “lethal injection, the 

chemicals used to carry out a death sentence, and Florida’s procedures for 

administering the death penalty are unconstitutional under both the Florida and 

United States Constitutions;” and (10) “his death sentence is unconstitutional under 

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).” Id. at 1061-76.
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the denial of his postconviction motion. He also petitions this Court for a writ of 

habeas corpus. 

II. POSTCONVICTION MOTION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Penalty Phase

First, Hunter argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

during the penalty phase for: (1) failing to present further nonstatutory mitigation 

evidence; (2) failing to develop and present evidence of Hunter’s future conduct in 

prison as mitigation; and (3) his statement during closing arguments that a majority 

vote was required to impose a death sentence. Because Hunter has failed to 

establish the requirements necessary for relief, we affirm the trial court’s denial of 

relief. 

Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court explained that two requirements must 

be met for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful:

First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the 

lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably 

competent performance under prevailing professional standards. 

Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be 

demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the 

proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined.

Bolin v. State, 41 So. 3d 151, 155 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v. Wainwright, 

490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986)).
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Regarding the deficiency prong of Strickland, there is a strong presumption 

that trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort 

be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the 

circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 

counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. The defendant carries the burden to 

“overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 

‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 

U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

Regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland, the defendant “must show that 

but for his counsel’s deficiency, there is a reasonable probability he would have 

received a different sentence. To assess that probability, we consider ‘the totality 

of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence 

adduced in the [postconviction] proceeding’—and ‘reweig[h] it against the 

evidence in aggravation.’ ” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 41 (2009) (quoting 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98 (2000)); see also Dennis v. State, 109 

So. 3d 680, 690 (Fla. 2012) (“[T]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that, ‘absent the [deficient performance], the factfinder would have 

[had] a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.’ ”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). 
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“A reasonable probability is a ‘probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.’ ” Dennis, 109 So. 3d at 690 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

Because both prongs of Strickland present mixed questions of law and fact, 

this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the trial court’s factual 

findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the 

trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. See Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-

72 (Fla. 2004). 

1. Additional Nonstatutory Mitigation

Hunter argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present further 

nonstatutory mitigation evidence at the penalty phase. Specifically, Hunter asserts 

that trial counsel should have introduced numerous aspects of Hunter’s social 

history, including Hunter’s stressful home environment, his family history of 

mental illness, and his being kicked out of his family’s house prior to the offenses. 

We affirm the denial of this claim. 

First, Hunter has failed to demonstrate deficiency. At the postconviction 

evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that in their case preparation they 

focused on Hunter’s mental health. Trial counsel explained that they met with 

Hunter’s family members a number of times, but they were uncooperative and not 

willing to admit the family history of mental illness. Additionally, trial counsel 

testified that they retained an investigator, Odalys Rojas, to interview Hunter’s 
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family members and others and summarize the findings. Trial counsel involved 

Ms. Rojas in several meetings in efforts to obtain a comprehensive social history 

on Hunter but did not call her to testify at trial, noting that her testimony may have 

opened the door for negative testimony about Hunter’s aggression. See Everett v. 

State, 54 So. 3d 464, 474 (Fla. 2010) (“This Court has also consistently held that a 

trial counsel’s decision to not call certain witnesses to testify at trial can be 

reasonable trial strategy.”). Instead, during the penalty phase, trial counsel called 

three mental health experts, including a psychiatrist, neuropsychologist, and 

psychologist, to testify to Hunter’s mental health and Hunter’s family history of 

mental illness. And “strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of 

counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s 

decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.” Occhicone v. 

State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000). Therefore, Hunter has failed to 

demonstrate deficiency. 

Additionally, Hunter has not demonstrated prejudice. During the 

postconviction hearing, Dr. McClaren testified that Hunter was probably exposed 

to domestic violence and other negative influence in his family environment that 

would be traumatic for a child to experience. Further, in a deposition, Dr. Mings 

discussed his findings of Hunter’s mental illness, including Hunter being in the 

early stages of schizophrenia. However, this additional mitigation evidence Hunter 
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presented during the postconviction hearing was largely cumulative of the 

mitigation evidence presented during the penalty phase. For example, Hunter’s 

social history and mental health issues were presented at the penalty phase through 

the testimonies of Hunter’s family members and doctors. The trial record reflects 

that the family members testified that Hunter mostly kept to himself, carried on 

conversations with his deceased twin brother, witnessed his father physically 

abusing his mother, and felt abandoned by his older brother moving out. 

Additionally, three mental health experts testified during the penalty phase that 

Hunter suffered from serious mental health issues throughout his life. Specifically, 

Dr. Berns addressed “Hunter’s family’s history of mental illness, including 

schizophrenia and depression.” Hunter, 8 So. 3d at 1060. Dr. Mings testified that 

“[Hunter’s] profile was consistent with a person with a psychotic mental illness 

[and] that Hunter was not functioning as a normal adult.” Id. Additionally, Dr. 

Gur conducted behavior imaging and concluded that Hunter’s brain damage and 

functioning would tend to make him a follower. Id. Therefore, because the 

additional evidence Hunter claims should have been presented was largely 

cumulative of the evidence actually presented during the penalty phase, Hunter has 

not established a reasonable probability of a different result had trial counsel 

presented this additional evidence during the penalty phase. In other words, our 

confidence in the outcome is not undermined. See Atwater v. State, 788 So. 2d 
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223, 234 (Fla. 2001) (“There is no reasonable probability that re-presenting 

virtually the same evidence through other witnesses would have altered the 

outcome in any manner.”). 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief. 

2. Evidence of Future Conduct in Prison

Hunter also argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to develop 

and present evidence of Hunter’s future conduct in prison as mitigation at the 

penalty phase. Specifically, Hunter claims that trial counsel should have 

introduced evidence that Hunter is not a psychopath and conclusions of 

psychological measures that show Hunter’s risk of future violence is lower than the 

base rate. We affirm the denial of this claim.

First, Hunter has failed to demonstrate deficiency. At the evidentiary 

hearing, trial counsel testified that their strategy regarding mitigation was to focus 

on Hunter’s mental health issues. And evidence about Hunter’s future conduct in 

prison, including his potential for rehabilitation and nonviolent existence in prison, 

would have been contradictory to trial counsel’s mitigation theory. For example, 

at the penalty phase, Hunter presented family members and experts who testified to 

Hunter’s mental health issues, including schizophrenia and a profile consistent 

with a person with a psychotic mental illness. See Hunter, 8 So. 3d at 1060. In 

contrast, during the postconviction proceeding, Dr. Brown and Dr. McClaren 
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agreed with the conclusion that Hunter is not a psychopath. Therefore, because it 

appeared to contradict the mental health testimony, trial counsel’s decision not to 

present evidence about Hunter’s future conduct in prison and that his risk of future 

violence was lower than the base rate appears to have been a reasonable strategic 

decision. See Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048 (“[S]trategic decisions do not 

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been 

considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of 

professional conduct.”).

Additionally, Hunter has not demonstrated prejudice. While Hunter 

presented evidence of future conduct in prison in the postconviction proceeding, 

evidence was also presented that the findings were based on speculation. 

Moreover, even considering future conduct in prison with the other mitigation 

evidence presented during the postconviction proceeding, as well as the mitigation 

presented at the penalty phase, the mitigating circumstances would not outweigh 

the five aggravating circumstances presented in this case, namely conviction of a 

capital felony, during the course of a burglary, for the purpose of avoiding or 

preventing a lawful arrest, HAC, and CCP. See Tanzi v. State, 94 So. 3d 482, 491 

(Fla. 2012) (“The mitigating evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing combined 

with the mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase would not outweigh the 

evidence in aggravation as this case included six aggravating circumstances given 
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great and utmost weight.”). Therefore, there is not a reasonable probability that 

investigating and presenting evidence of Hunter’s future conduct in prison would 

have led to a different result. In other words, our confidence in the outcome is not 

undermined. 

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief.

3. Trial Counsel’s Statement About the Majority Vote 

Further, Hunter argues that trial counsel was ineffective for his statement 

during closing arguments that a majority vote was required to impose a death 

sentence. However, we affirm the denial of this claim.

Even assuming that trial counsel was deficient for his statement during 

closing arguments, Hunter has failed to demonstrate prejudice. In the jury 

instructions, the trial court correctly advised the jury of the vote required for the 

advisory sentence. Notably, the votes for each of the four victims to impose the 

death penalty were beyond the majority vote stated. Therefore, there is not a 

reasonable probability that, absent trial counsel’s statement during closing 

arguments, that there would have been a different result. In other words, 

confidence in the outcome is not undermined.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Hunter’s claim that trial 

counsel were ineffective during the penalty phase.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Guilt Phase
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Next, Hunter argues that trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase 

for failing to properly preserve his objection and move for a mistrial regarding 

Robert Anthony Cannon’s testimony. However, Hunter did not demonstrate that 

he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged error. 

Cannon, the fourth perpetrator, negotiated a plea deal in exchange for 

agreeing to testify at the joint trial of the other three defendants, including Hunter. 

On direct appeal, this Court denied Hunter’s claim “that the trial court erred in 

denying his motion for mistrial as his rights under the Sixth Amendment to 

confrontation and cross-examination were violated when the State’s witness, 

Cannon, the fourth perpetrator, refused to be cross-examined.” Hunter, 8 So. 3d at 

1065. 

In a codefendant’s case, Victorino v. State, 127 So. 3d 478, 488 (Fla. 2013), 

where the same issue was raised regarding Cannon’s testimony, this Court found 

that Victorino was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s error in failing to preserve 

alleged error and to move for a mistrial at the time of Cannon’s testimony. 

Similarly, in this case, we affirm the denial of Hunter’s claim.

Hunter has not demonstrated that Cannon’s testimony was so harmful as to 

merit a mistrial. In fact, Cannon’s testimony and refusal to answer questions did 

not vitiate Hunter’s trial. See England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 401-02 (Fla. 2006) 

(“A motion for a mistrial should only be granted when an error is so prejudicial as 
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to vitiate the entire trial.”). Cannon’s comments regarding Hunter were brief and 

unelaborated. Specifically, on direct examination, Cannon’s testimony regarding 

Hunter was the following: (1) Cannon knew Hunter for a couple days prior to the 

crimes, and (2) Victorino, Hunter, Salas, and Cannon entered the home armed with 

baseball bats. Therefore, similar to what we concluded in Victorino, Cannon’s 

testimony mentioning Hunter did not vitiate Hunter’s trial. Victorino, 127 So. 3d 

at 489 (“[O]nly a few lines of testimony were harmful to Victorino . . . As a result, 

Cannon’s testimony was not essential to the State’s case against Victorino.”). 

Further, the incriminating points made in Cannon’s testimony regarding 

Hunter were established by other evidence. Specifically, in his statement to police, 

Hunter stated that on the night of the offenses, he went to the Telford home to get 

his belongings, and he had an aluminum baseball bat with him. Hunter, 8 So. 3d at 

1058. Hunter further stated that he hit victims Gleason and Gonzalez several times 

with the bat. Id. Additionally, “Salas testified about Hunter’s involvement in the 

murders,” that “Hunter ran into the house after Victorino[, and] Salas ran in next 

and saw Hunter swing his bat.” Id. at 1059. Cannon’s testimony was cumulative 

and merely “lent further support to . . . fact[s] already known to the jury.” Cherry 

v. State, 781 So. 2d 1040, 1051 (Fla. 2000). Therefore, Hunter was not prejudiced 

by trial counsel’s error. See Victorino, 127 So. 3d at 490 (“[T]he incriminating 

portions of Cannon’s testimony were substantially cumulative to other evidence 
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presented at trial. A defendant is not prejudiced by the improper admission of 

evidence if the evidence is merely cumulative.”).

Accordingly, this Court affirms the trial court’s denial of Hunter’s claim that 

trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase.

C. Other Issues

Hunter also raises four constitutional challenges, all of which do not entitle 

him to relief: (1) rule 4-3.5(d)(4) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar is 

unconstitutional; (2) the trial court unconstitutionally instructed the jury that its 

role was advisory; (3) Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates due process and 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment on its face and as applied to him because 

Florida’s death penalty statute does not ensure that defendants are not sentenced to 

death in an arbitrary and capricious manner; and (4) his sentence is 

unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). These claims are 

procedurally barred because they should have been or were raised on direct 

appeal.5 See Dennis, 109 So. 3d at 698; Lukehart v. State, 70 So. 3d 503, 521-22 

(Fla. 2011); Troy v. State, 57 So. 3d 828, 842-44 (Fla. 2011). Therefore, this Court 

affirms the denial of each of these claims.

 

5. On direct appeal, Hunter raised the claims that the lethal injection 

protocol and Florida’s procedures for administering the death penalty are 

unconstitutional and that his sentence violated Ring, and this Court found that 

Hunter is not entitled to relief. Hunter, 8 So. 3d at 1075-76. 
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D. Cumulative Error

Hunter also argues that he was denied a fundamentally fair trial based on 

cumulative error. “However, where the individual claims of error alleged are 

either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative error also 

necessarily fails.” Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Parker 

v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla. 2005)). As discussed in the analysis of the 

individual issues above, the alleged errors are either procedurally barred or without 

merit. Therefore, the cumulative error claim is similarly without merit, and we 

affirm the denial of this claim.

III. HABEAS PETITION

In his habeas petition, Hunter contends that Florida’s death penalty statute 

violates the Eighth Amendment’s evolving standards of decency because most 

states require a unanimous jury verdict to recommend a death sentence. However, 

this Court recently reviewed and rejected this same argument in Kimbrough v. 

State, 125 So. 3d 752, 753 (Fla. 2013). As we explained in Kimbrough, Hunter’s 

claim “is subject to our general jurisprudence that non-unanimous jury 

recommendations to impose the sentence of death are not unconstitutional.” 

Kimbrough, 125 So. 3d at 754 (quoting Mann v. State, 112 So. 3d 1158, 1162 (Fla. 

2013)); see also Parker, 904 So. 2d at 383 (“This Court has repeatedly held that it 
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is not unconstitutional for a jury to recommend death on a simple majority vote.”). 

Accordingly, we deny relief.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the denial of Hunter’s postconviction 

motion and deny his habeas petition.

It is so ordered. 

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, 

and PERRY, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

Two Cases:

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Volusia County, 

William A. Parsons, Judge - Case No. 642004CF001380XXXAWS

And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 

James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle Region, 

and Ann Marie Mirialakis, Assistant-Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Middle 

Region, Tampa, Florida,

for Appellant/Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and James Donald 

Riecks, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,

for Appellee/Respondent