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HLD-087 (January 2011) NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 10-4299

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IN RE: MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS,

Petitioner

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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

(Related to M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 4-10-cv-01514)

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Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

January 31, 2011

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, ALDISERT and WEIS, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : March 22, 2011) 

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OPINION

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PER CURIAM.

`Michael Curtis Reynolds, a federal prisoner convicted in 2007 of various 

terrorism-related offenses, requests a writ of mandamus requiring the District Court to 

take judicial notice of all the facts he asserted in his civil case before the District Court. 

We will deny Reynolds’s petition.

In the civil action underlying the instant mandamus petition, Reynolds 
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sought compensatory and punitive damages from two FBI agents because he was 

allegedly falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted based on those agents’ false 

statements. The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 

and determined that the action was also subject to dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 

512 U.S. 477 (1994), insofar as the alleged unconstitutional prosecution would imply the 

invalidity of Reynolds’s 2007 federal conviction. Reynolds appealed.

While his appeal was pending, Reynolds filed the instant petition for 

mandamus, requesting that this Court order the District Court to take judicial notice of all 

of the facts alleged in his complaint and hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue.1 He 

also filed motions in the District Court requesting that the District Court take judicial 

notice of certain facts or consider those facts admitted. It appears from those motions 

that Reynolds believed he was essentially entitled to a default judgment because the FBI 

agents had not responded to his complaint, regardless of the fact that they had never been 

served given the District Court’s disposition of the matter. We ultimately dismissed 

Reynolds’s appeal because it lacked legal merit.

“We have the power to issue a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1651(a), in exceptional cases where the traditional bases for jurisdiction do not apply.” 

In re Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 F.3d 383, 398 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). 

 

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Since the instant petition pertains solely to Reynolds’s civil case, we will not 

consider his request that we mandate a hearing pursuant to Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. 

v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), in his criminal case.
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Mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary remedy” available only in “exceptional 

circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, or a clear abuse of 

discretion.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (citation 

omitted). It “is not a substitute for appeal and . . . will not be granted if relief can be 

obtained by way of our appellate jurisdiction.” In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 

226 (3d Cir. 1998). The party seeking mandamus must establish an absence of other 

adequate means to obtain the requested relief, a “clear and indisputable” right to the writ, 

and that issuance of the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. In re PressmanGutman Co., 459 F.3d at 399. 

Mandamus is not appropriate here because it is apparent that Reynolds’s 

petition, which was filed while his appeal was pending, is in essence a second appeal 

seeking to force the District Court to entertain a lawsuit it had already deemed subject to 

dismissal. Furthermore, nothing in Reynolds’s petition establishes a clear and 

indisputable right to the extraordinary remedy he seeks. Accordingly, we will deny his 

petition for mandamus.