65409973v.7 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

DAWON A. WORDLAW, on behalf of herself 

and all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF 

CHICAGO, LLC; ENTERPRISE HOLDINGS, 

INC., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 20-cv-03200 

Hon. Manish S. Shah 

Hon. Magistrate Gabriel A. Fuentes 

DEFENDANTS ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF CHICAGO, LLC AND 

ENTERPRISE HOLDINGS, INC.’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW 

IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 2

LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 3

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 4

I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS TO ENTERPRISE 

HOLDINGS, INC., AS PLAINTIFF HAS PLED NO ALLEGATIONS TO 

SUPPORT ENTERPRISE HOLDINGS, INC.’S INCLUSION IN THIS 

LAWSUIT AS A CORPORATE PARENT ....................................................................... 4

II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE CLAIMS FOR VIOLATIONS 

OF BIPA AGAINST DEFENDANTS................................................................................ 6

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails To Distinguish Between The Defendants And 

Constitutes Improper Group Pleading .................................................................... 6

B. Plaintiff Fails Plausibly To Allege That Defendants Violated Section 15(b) 

of BIPA ................................................................................................................... 8

C. Plaintiff Fails Plausibly To Allege That Defendants Violated Section 15(a) 

of BIPA ................................................................................................................... 9

D. Plaintiff Fails Plausibly To Allege That Defendants Violated Section 15(d) 

of BIPA ................................................................................................................. 11

III. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FAILS TO PLEAD RECKLESSNESS OR 

INTENT AS REQUIRED BY BIPA ................................................................................ 12

IV. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT PROVIDES 

PLAINTIFF’S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY .......................................................................... 12

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 14

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

 Page(s) 

Cases 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662 (2009) ......................................................................................................... passim

Atkins v. Hasan, 

No. 15 CV 203, 2015 WL 3862724 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2015) ..................................................8 

Bank of Am., N.A. v. Knight, 

725 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2013) .....................................................................................................7 

Baylay v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C., 

222 F. Supp. 3d 698 (N.D. Ill. 2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2018) ...........................14 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544 (2007) .....................................................................................................3, 4, 7, 11 

Berger v. PIKR, Ltd., 

No. 14 C 8543, 2015 WL 2208200 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2015) .....................................................8 

Brooks v. Ross, 

578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................................................9 

Carey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 

48 Ill. App. 3d 482; 363 N.E.2d 400 (2d Dist. 1977) ..............................................................14 

Carter v. Dolan, 

No. 08 C 7464, 2009 WL 1809917 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2009) ...................................................7 

Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. N. Am., Inc., 

No. 16 CV 06113, 2017 WL 4269005 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017) ..............................................8 

Cooley v. Power Constr. Co., LLC, 

2018 IL App (1st) 171292, 107 N.E.2d 435 ............................................................................13 

Davis v. Bank of Am. Corp., 

No. 16 C 5993, 2017 WL 4237047 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2017) ...................................................8 

EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 

496 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007) .....................................................................................................4 

Gross v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 

2018 WL 558515 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018) ................................................................................7 

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In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., 

683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012).......................................................................................................6 

Folta v. Ferro Eng’g, 

2015 IL 118070; 43 N.E.3d 108 (Ill. 2015) .......................................................................13, 15 

Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 

13 Ill. 2d 460 (Ill. 1958) ...........................................................................................................14 

Heard v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 

440 F. Supp. 3d 960 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (Pallmeyer, J.) ....................................................... passim

In re Jimmy John's Overtime Litig., 

No. 14 C 5509, 2018 WL 3231273 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2018) ...................................................6 

Kloss v. Acuant, Inc., 

No. 19 C 6353, 2020 WL 2571901 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2020) .............................................9, 12 

Liera v. City of Chicago, 

No. 13 C 9032, 2014 WL 3921359 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2014) .....................................................8 

Ma v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 

No. 19-CV-3367, 2020 WL 533702 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2020) (Dow, J.) ....................................6 

Marijan v. Univ. of Chi., 

2018 WL 3463272 (N.D. Ill. 2018) ...........................................................................................6 

McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC, et al., 

Case No. 17 CH 11311 (Cir. Ct. Cook County) ......................................................................13 

Namuwonge v. Kronos, Inc., 

19 C 03239, 418 F. Supp. 3d 279 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2019)............................................8, 9, 12 

Nischan v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC, 

865 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................................14 

Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 

62 Ill. 2d 556; 343 N.E.2d 913 (1992) .....................................................................................14 

Rehabcare Grp. E., Inc. v. CC Care, LLC, 

No. 15 C 10876, 2016 WL 2595108 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2016) ...................................................7 

Richardson v. Cty. of Cook, 

250 Ill. App. 3d 544; 621 N.E.2d 114 (1st Dist. 1993) ............................................................13 

Rogers v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc., 

No. 19 C 2937, 409 F. Supp. 3d 612 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2019) ................................................12 

Sharp v. Gallagher, 

95 Ill. 2d 322; 447 N.E.2d 786 (Ill. 1983) ...............................................................................13 

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Taha v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 781, 

947 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2020) .....................................................................................................5 

Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 

526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008) ...................................................................................................6 

Vacos v. LaSalle Madison Hotel Co., 

21 Ill. App. 2d 569; 159 N.E.2d 24 (1st Dist. 1959) ................................................................14 

Statutes 

740 ILCS § 14/1 ...............................................................................................................................1 

820 ILCS § 305/5(a) ................................................................................................................13, 14 

820 ILCS § 305/11 ...................................................................................................................13, 14 

740 ILCS § 14/15(a) ..............................................................................................................2, 9, 10 

740 ILCS § 14/15(b) ................................................................................................................2, 8, 9 

740 ILCS § 14/15(d) ..................................................................................................................2, 11 

Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act ........................................................................... passim

Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act .............................................................................2, 13, 14, 15 

Other Authorities 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ...........................................................................................................................5, 8 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ..................................................................................................................4, 8 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 .............................................................................................................................1 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 .............................................................................................................................4 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)..............................................................................................................3, 15 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 ...................................................................................................13 

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65409973v.7 

INTRODUCTION 

Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1-1, “Compl.”) purports to assert a claim against 

Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC (“Enterprise Leasing”) and Enterprise Holdings, 

Inc. (“Enterprise Holdings”) (collectively, “Defendants”), on behalf of herself and others 

similarly situated, for the alleged collection, use, storage and disclosure of Plaintiff’s biometric 

data in purported violation of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 

ILCS § 14/1, et seq. Plaintiff’s Complaint represents a misguided effort to pursue a class action 

against an improper Defendant, Enterprise Holdings, a “corporate parent,” with no role in the 

timekeeping system at issue in the Complaint, and against Enterprise Leasing, which has 

complied with BIPA—and should be dismissed for several fatal flaws. 

First, Plaintiff’s Complaint speculatively and insufficiently attempts to ensnare 

Enterprise Holdings into a controversy in which it has zero involvement. Plaintiff’s claim 

against Enterprise Holdings is entirely baseless for the simple fact that Enterprise Holdings, as a 

parent company which never employed Plaintiff or members of the putative class, has never 

implemented, utilized, or maintained a time keeping system, or any other similar technology. 

Enterprise Holdings is improperly named as a Defendant in this case—which is underscored by 

the complete absence of plausible factual allegations relating to Enterprise Holdings.1

Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint simply lumps the Defendants together (incorrectly), 

without any plausible factual allegations regarding the various roles of such entities, which 

necessitates dismissal. Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege any plausible allegations as to how 

Defendants violated BIPA but rather alleges in conclusory fashion that “Defendants” collectively 

1 Defendants reserve any remedies available under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

On June 23, 2020, Defendants’ counsel sent Plaintiff’s counsel a letter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure Rule 11 alerting Plaintiff’s counsel to deficiencies and factual inaccuracies in the Complaint. 

Plaintiff has declined to dismiss or amend her Complaint, which necessitated the filing of this Motion. 

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violated BIPA vis-à-vis a “biometric timekeeping system” without providing any specific details 

as to how Defendants independently violated BIPA, or how Enterprise Holdings could have even 

possibly violated BIPA as a “corporate parent.” 

Third, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to assert any non-conclusory and plausible allegations 

that Defendants—including Enterprise Holdings who did not employ Plaintiff and did not 

operate or maintain a timekeeping system as alleged in the Complaint—are: (1) “in possession of 

[Plaintiff’s] biometric identifiers or biometric information” as necessary to state violations of 

Sections 15(a) and 15(d) of BIPA; (2) “collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or 

otherwise obtain” Plaintiff’s or other individuals’ biometric identifiers or biometric information 

as necessary to state violations under Section 15(b) of BIPA; or (3) have “disclose[d], 

redisclose[d], or otherwise disseminate[d]” Plaintiff’s or other individuals’ biometric data. 

Fourth, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead reckless or willful violations of BIPA and 

such allegations should be dismissed or stricken. 

Fifth, although Plaintiff does not specifically allege that she was employed by Defendants 

(and if so, which one), dismissal is also warranted because any claim for damages under BIPA is 

preempted by the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (“IWCA”), which provides the exclusive 

remedies for injuries arising amid the employer-employee relationship. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Dawon Wordlaw (“Plaintiff”) is a citizen of Illinois who alleges that she 

“worked for Defendants in Chicago, Illinois.” (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 16.) Plaintiff’s Complaint names 

Enterprise Holdings and Enterprise Leasing as Defendants, and alleges that Enterprise Holdings 

is the “corporate parent of Defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC,” id. ¶ 12, 

but does not otherwise distinguish between the two entities. Rather, Plaintiff’s Complaint 

alleges in conclusory fashion that Defendants “operate automobile leasing services in the state of 

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Illinois” and implies that Defendants collectively operate a “biometric timekeeping system.” (Id.

¶¶ 5, 15.)2

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that she was required by Defendants to use a biometric time 

clock system to record her time worked each time she clocked in and out of a shift at work. (Id.

¶ 18.) Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants violated they BIPA by failing to: (1) inform 

Plaintiff and members of the class in writing that their biometrics were being collected and 

stored prior to such collection; (2) inform Plaintiff and members of the class in writing of the 

purpose and length of term that their biometrics were being captured, collected, stored prior, and 

used; (3) obtain a written release; (4) provide a retention schedule; and (5) to obtain consent from 

Plaintiff for any dissemination of her biometrics. (Id. at ¶ 41.) Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to 

assert a single claim for violation of BIPA, and seeks relief, including, but not limited to, 

injunctive relief, statutory damages of $5,000 for each willful and/or reckless violation of BIPA, 

$1,000 for each negligent violation of BIPA, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. ¶ 46.)3

LEGAL STANDARD 

Rule 12(b)(6) requires dismissal where a complaint fails to allege sufficient facts “to state 

a claim for relief that is plausible on its face” and presents nothing more than “threadbare recitals 

of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

2 As discussed infra at Argument §§ I-III, it is impossible for Defendants to discern the specific 

allegations against each Defendant as the Complaint engages in improper group pleading and merely 

parrots the language of BIPA in conclusory fashion. 

3 Plaintiff also filed a “placeholder” Motion for Class Certification Or, Alternatively For A 

Deferred Class Certification Ruling Pending Discovery in state court. (ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiff has not 

sought to prosecute the motion before this Court, and Defendants reserve their right to oppose Plaintiff’s 

motion and to challenge class certification at a future date when and if the motion is ever noticed in 

accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules. 

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Accordingly, to survive a Rule 12 motion to dismiss, Rule 8(a)(2) imposes two “hurdles” 

that a complaint must satisfy. EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th 

Cir. 2007). First, a complaint must describe the Plaintiff’s claims and the grounds supporting 

them in “sufficient detail to give the defendants fair notice” of the claims against them. Id. 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). This standard requires more than mere “labels and 

conclusions” or “formulaic recitations of the cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678. Second, the court must determine whether the allegations, if true, “plausibly 

suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level.’” 

Concentra Health Servs, 496 F.3d at 773 (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. 569 at 1973 n. 14). 

ARGUMENT 

I. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS TO ENTERPRISE 

HOLDINGS, INC., AS PLAINTIFF HAS PLED NO ALLEGATIONS TO 

SUPPORT ENTERPRISE HOLDINGS, INC.’S INCLUSION IN THIS LAWSUIT 

AS A CORPORATE PARENT 

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to include any plausible allegations as to Enterprise Holdings, 

and accordingly, must be dismissed. Specifically, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges nothing more 

than the fact that Defendants “operate automobile leasing services in the state of Illinois,” 

Plaintiff “worked for Defendants,” Enterprise Holdings “is the corporate parent of Defendant 

Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC,” and refers to the timekeeping system at issue 

collectively as “Defendants’ biometric timekeeping system.” (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 12, 15-16).4

However, Plaintiff’s Complaint notably does not contain any plausible allegations that 

Defendants, including Enterprise Holdings, as a “corporate parent,” violated BIPA. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Enterprise Holdings must be dismissed. 

4

Indeed, the allegations in the Complaint vis-à-vis Enterprise Holdings’ “biometric timekeeping 

system” are simply false. Plaintiff’s counsel has been on notice of such misrepresentations of material 

fact since shortly after the filing of the Complaint. See supra n. 1. 

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Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plausibly allege that Enterprise Holdings, as a “corporate 

parent,” has any role whatsoever in the implementation, maintenance, and/or operation of 

timekeeping systems for employees who work at Enterprise-branded locations in Illinois, as 

alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Complaint appears to concede this by 

alleging in conclusory fashion that Enterprise Holdings is simply “the corporate parent of 

Defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC.” (Compl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff’s allegation 

that Enterprise Holdings violated BIPA is also contradicted by the very allegation in the 

Complaint that Defendants “obtain[ed] and operat[ed] an employee timekeeping system,” 

without alleging that she was employed by either Defendant (including Enterprise Holdings as a 

“corporate parent,”) or any connection between herself, Enterprise Holdings, and the 

timekeeping system at issue. (Id. ¶ 42) (emphasis added). 

The Complaint simply makes no plausible allegations connecting Enterprise Holdings to 

Plaintiff’s employment, or the location where she worked, which could plausibly support a claim 

that Enterprise Holdings violated BIPA vis-à-vis Plaintiff or had any role in the timekeeping 

system whatsoever. The totality of the allegations against Enterprise Holdings amount to 

nothing more than pure speculation that it had any role in the harm alleged in the Complaint, 

which simply is not sufficient to satisfy Rule 8. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682; Heard v. Becton, 

Dickinson & Co., 440 F. Supp. 3d 960, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (Pallmeyer, J.) (dismissing BIPA 

class action noting that “[t]he court is not required to credit rank speculation) (citing Taha v. Int'l 

Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 781, 947 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2020)). 

Plaintiff’s Complaint amounts to nothing more than a thinly-veiled attempt to name a 

corporate parent without attempting to satisfy her burden of providing each Defendant with 

notice of the nature of the allegations asserted and should be dismissed on this basis, and as 

frequently recognized by courts in this District. See, e.g., Ma v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. 19-

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CV-3367, 2020 WL 533702, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2020) (Dow, J.) (“CVS Health is a holding 

company with no employees and no involvement, direct or indirect, in the facts underlying the 

case that make it a proper defendant. Plaintiff has presented no facts to the contrary. That 

warrants dismissing CVS Health as a defendant.”); Marijan v. Univ. of Chi., 2018 WL 3463272, 

at *7 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (citing Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1087-89 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(dismissing claim where the complaint contained no allegations that the defendant had control 

over any relevant aspects of the plaintiff's employment). 

In sum, BIPA only applies to “private entities” who possess, collect, capture, purchase, 

receive through trade, or otherwise obtain,” an individual’s biometric information—which 

clearly does not apply to Enterprise Holdings—nor does Plaintiff’s Complaint suggest otherwise.

Thus, there is no basis for Plaintiff to pursue her claim against Enterprise Holdings.5

II. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE CLAIMS FOR VIOLATIONS 

OF BIPA AGAINST DEFENDANTS 

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails To Distinguish Between The Defendants And 

Constitutes Improper Group Pleading 

Plaintiff’s Complaint merely alleges in conclusory fashion that “Defendants” collectively 

violated BIPA, without providing any specific details regarding the role of each Defendant. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 5, 17, 19-26, 39-43, 45.) Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed on this basis 

alone. See, e.g. Carter v. Dolan, No. 08 C 7464, 2009 WL 1809917, at **3-4 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 

5 To the extent that Plaintiff intends to pursue an alternative theory of liability, such as a jointemployer theory (which has no basis in the plain language of BIPA), courts (including the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Seventh and Third Circuits) have definitively rejected such a theory—including 

holding that Enterprise Holdings is not a joint-employer as a corporate parent. See In re Enter. Rent-ACar Wage & Hour Employment Practices Litig., 683 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]e conclude that 

the District Court was correct in its summary judgment conclusion and that the plaintiffs have failed to 

demonstrate that Enterprise Holdings, the parent of the 38 subsidiaries, is a joint employer of the branch 

assistant managers.”); see also In re Jimmy John's Overtime Litig., No. 14 C 5509, 2018 WL 3231273, at 

*23 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 2018) (“We conclude that Jimmy John's is not a joint employer and grant summary 

judgment in its favor.”). 

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2009) (dismissing § 1983 complaint on the grounds it collectively alleged illegality by all 

defendants without identifying actions each defendant undertook); Rehabcare Grp. E., Inc. v. CC 

Care, LLC, No. 15 C 10876, 2016 WL 2595108, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 2016) (“RehabCare's 

allegations that “Defendants” made promises, representations and requests does not give 

sufficient notice of the basis for RehabCare's promissory estoppel claim against TM.”). This 

pleading deficiency is even more glaring in that Plaintiff does not even allege that she was 

employed by Defendants, and if so, which Defendant she was employed by, much less how, 

when, or which entity allegedly captured, possessed, or disclosed her biometric data. Gross v. 

Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 2018 WL 558515, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2018) (“Numerous 

cases establish that the omission of such key information from a complaint is an indicia of artful 

pleading, rather than a good faith effort to provide fair notice of a claim.”). 

Moreover, there is a lack of any basis as to how Enterprise Holdings could have possibly 

violated BIPA vis-à-vis Plaintiff and members of the putative considering that Enterprise 

Holdings did not employ Plaintiff and members of the putative class, did not implement or 

operate a timekeeping system as alleged in the Complaint, and does not own, operate and/or 

manage, maintain or control the day-to-day operations of the Enterprise-branded location where 

Plaintiff worked (a fact which also is not alleged in the Complaint). 

Such allegations are deficient under even the most relaxed pleading standard and fail to 

provide each Defendant with proper notice as to the claims against them as required under the 

principles established by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. 

v. Knight, 725 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The Rules of Civil Procedure set up a system of 

notice pleading. Each defendant is entitled to know what he or she did that is asserted to be 

wrongful. A complaint based on a theory of collective responsibility must be dismissed.”); 

Davis v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 16 C 5993, 2017 WL 4237047, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2017) 

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(“Rule 8(a)(2) precludes lumping plaintiffs and defendants together without clarifying which 

plaintiff alleges what wrongdoing against which defendant.”) (citation omitted); Atkins v. Hasan, 

No. 15 CV 203, 2015 WL 3862724, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2015) (“Details about who did what 

are not merely nice-to-have features of an otherwise-valid complaint; to pass muster under Rule 

8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim to relief must include such 

particulars.”).6 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed on this basis.

B. Plaintiff Fails Plausibly To Allege That Defendants Violated Section 15(b) of 

BIPA 

The requirements of Section 15(b) of BIPA only apply to entities that actively “collect, 

capture, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain” individuals’ biometric 

identifiers or biometric information. Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege a single fact to 

support the conclusion that Defendants collected Plaintiff’s biometric data. 

As recently held by Chief Judge Rebecca Pallmeyer in dismissing a BIPA class action: 

[F]or Section 15(b)’s requirements to apply, an entity must, at a minimum, take an 

active step to “collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise 

obtain” biometric data. 740 ILCS 14/15(b). [Plaintiff] has not adequately pleaded 

that [Defendant] took such any such step. For example, [Plaintiff] repeatedly 

alleges that [Defendant] ‘collected’ his biometric data without alleging how, 

when, or any other factual detail.” 

Heard, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 966 (emphasis added); see also Namuwonge v. Kronos, Inc., 19 C 

03239, 418 F. Supp. 3d 279, 286 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2019) (“Together, these allegations do not 

plausibly allege that [defendant] collected, captured, or otherwise obtained [plaintiff’s] biometric 

6 See also Liera v. City of Chicago, No. 13 C 9032, 2014 WL 3921359, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 

2014) (“[A]llegations against collective groups do not survive motions to dismiss because defendants are 

not put on notice of the claims against them.”); Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. N. Am., Inc., 

No. 16 CV 06113, 2017 WL 4269005, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2017) (dismissing the complaint because 

it did not distinguish between the defendants, referring interchangeably to “the defendants” and “TTI” 

and further pleading that all seven corporate identities committed every action attributed to the corporate 

defendant TTI); Berger v. PIKR, Ltd., No. 14 C 8543, 2015 WL 2208200, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2015) 

(“The Plaintiff’s group pleading does not provide each defendant with adequate notice of the claims 

against it. So, the Plaintiff’s claims against PIKR, PBS, and PRL are dismissed without prejudice.”). 

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information. Without more, [plaintiff] does not plausibly allege a violation of section 15(b).”); 

Kloss v. Acuant, Inc., No. 19 C 6353, 2020 WL 2571901, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2020) (“Such 

barebone factual support and recitation of statutory language is not enough to put [defendant] on 

notice of [plaintiff’s] claims in order to properly investigate or prepare a defense.”). 

Like in Heard, Namuwonge, and Kloss, Plaintiff merely alleges in a conclusory fashion 

that Defendants collectively “captured,” “collected,” “stored,” and/or “used” Plaintiff’s 

biometrics and the biometrics of the alleged putative class members, but provides no basis for 

such allegations that warrant surviving dismissal. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 39-41.) The Complaint 

fails to allege who (i.e., which Defendant, see supra Argument §§ I, II(A)), how, when, or any 

other factual detail in this regard. Indeed, the Complaint does not even allege which Defendant 

employed her, Plaintiff’s dates of employment, the location at which Plaintiff worked, the period 

of time during which she used the time clock at issue, or any plausible allegations that do 

anything more than simply parrot the elements of BIPA—which is plainly insufficient to survive 

a motion to dismiss. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[P]laintiffs who merely 

parrot the statutory language of the claims that they are pleading . . . rather than providing some 

specific facts to ground those legal claims . . . must do more.”). 

This is especially true here, where Plaintiff has not alleged any semblance of relationship 

or link between herself and Defendants—including that she was employed by Defendants—or 

any allegations linking Enterprise Holdings, as a “parent company” to the violations asserted 

whatsoever. In sum, Plaintiff’s Complaint simply does not allege a single plausible fact that 

Defendants collected Plaintiff’s biometric data and thus the Complaint should be dismissed. 

C. Plaintiff Fails Plausibly To Allege That Defendants Violated Section 15(a) of 

BIPA 

The Complaint similarly fails to allege that Defendants ever took “possession” of her 

purported biometric data, as contemplated in Sections 15(a) of BIPA. Here, the Complaint fails 

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to allege a single fact suggesting that Defendants currently possess Plaintiff’s biometric data, 

which would in turn trigger any obligations to maintain and follow a written policy establishing a 

retention schedule and destruction guidelines pursuant to Section 15(a) of BIPA. Instead, 

Plaintiff admits that she is ignorant as to whether Defendants “possess” or ever have “possessed” 

Plaintiff’s biometric data. (Id. at ¶ 25) (“Plaintiff is unaware of the status of the biometrics 

obtained by Defendants.”). 

Plaintiff’s allegations are nothing more than the recitation of the elements of Section 15(a) 

and therefore, cannot survive a motion to dismiss. For example, in Heard, supra, the Court found 

that such bald pleading is insufficient to show “possession” for purposes of Section 15(a): 

[T]he court agrees with BD that Heard has not adequately pleaded “possession” 

because he fails to allege that BD “exercised any dominion or control over [his] 

biometric data”.... Like Heard’s allegations concerning collection, most of his 

allegations concerning possession merely parrot the statutory language. (See 

Compl. ¶¶ 9, 37, 39-40, 54, 68, 93-95 (alleging, without more, that BD “stored” 

biometric information).) Only one paragraph of the Complaint provides more 

detail: it states that at some time after the hospitals required Heard to scan his 

fingerprint into Pyxis devices, BD “subsequently stored [Heard’s] fingerprint data 

in their systems.” 

Heard, 2020 WL 887460, at *5. Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint is arguably even more deficient, as 

the only specific allegations related to “possession” are that Defendants “capture, collect, store, 

and use” Plaintiff’s biometric information, and that Plaintiff was “required to provide biometric 

scans to Defendants each time Plaintiff needed to clock in and clock out of a shift at work.” 

(Compl. ¶¶ 18, 39-43, 45.) Notably absent is any plausible allegation that Defendants (and if so, 

which one, when, and how) “possess” Plaintiff’s biometric information. This deficiency is even 

more glaring in light of Plaintiff’s failure to allege by which entity she was employed, her dates 

of employment, at which location(s) she worked, or the time period for which she used the 

timekeeping technology described in the Complaint. 

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D. Plaintiff Fails Plausibly To Allege That Defendants Violated Section 15(d) of 

BIPA 

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations, based solely on “information and belief,” that 

Defendants disclosed her biometric information without consent is conclusory and unsupported 

by any other allegations contained in the Complaint.7 The Complaint fails to allege any specifics 

relative to the alleged disclosure of information by Defendants, including which Defendant 

allegedly disclosed her information, when and how her information was disclosed, and the 

identity of any entities that allegedly received Plaintiff’s biometric information. (See Compl. ¶ 

20-22, 24, 41.) Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants violated Section 15(d) of BIPA are purely 

speculative—as evidenced by Plaintiff’s allegations based solely upon “information and 

belief”—and entirely factually unsupported. This simply is insufficient pursuant to the pleading 

principles established in Twombly and Iqbal and is the precise type of pleading that has been 

dismissed in other similar BIPA cases. 

As explained by Judge Pallmeyer in Heard: 

Heard offers no basis for the allegation that BD disclosed his biometric data (or that 

of the putative class members). Heard concedes that he relies solely on 

“information and belief” in alleging that BD violated Section 15(d), but argues that 

he is permitted to do so because the “facts of necessity” are within BD's exclusive 

control *** Heard has not satisfied the court that BD alone has possession of the 

facts necessary to Heard's Section 15(d) claim. *** Heard, therefore, is not entitled 

to plead disclosure based upon information and belief. In its current form, Heard's 

Complaint contains no allegations of fact which, if true, suggest there is any basis 

to even suspect that BD disseminated the biometric data at issue. The court is not 

required to credit rank speculation. 

Heard, 2020 WL 887460, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 2020).8 The same result follows here. 

7 Moreover, Plaintiff’s Complaint is rife with factual inaccuracies and baseless allegations. 

8 See also Namuwonge, 2019 WL 6253807, at *4 (“[Plaintiff] has not pleaded sufficient factual 

allegations that plausibly suggest that [defendant] disclosed or distributed her data to a third party.”); 

Kloss v. Acuant, Inc., No. 19 C 6353, 2020 WL 2571901, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2020) (“Such barebone 

factual support and recitation of statutory language is not enough to put Acuant on notice of Kloss’s 

claims in order to properly investigate or prepare a defense.”). 

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III. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT FAILS TO PLEAD RECKLESSNESS OR INTENT 

AS REQUIRED BY BIPA 

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants intentionally or recklessly violated BIPA also fail 

because Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any assertions to support their claim that Defendants 

acted recklessly or intentionally. Rather, Plaintiff asks the Court to summarily determine and 

declare that Defendants’ actions were “willful and/or reckless,” and seeks an award of statutory 

damages without providing any allegations to support such a declaration or award under BIPA. 

(See Compl., Prayer For Relief). Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions are insufficient. 

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint simply alleges that by “obtaining and operating an employee 

timekeeping system which uses biometrics that was devoid of the privacy protections required by 

BIPA,” that “Defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that the biometric systems 

would be subject to the provisions of BIPA,” but failed to comply. (Compl. ¶ 43.) Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s allegations in this regard should be stricken or dismissed as courts increasingly have 

done in the absence of any such plausible allegations. See, e.g., Namuwonge, 418 F. Supp. 3d at 

286 (“[Plaintiff] does not allege any substantive details regarding whether the allegations were 

reckless or intentional....Thus, [Plaintiff]’s claim for damages based on intentional and reckless 

conduct is dismissed.”); Rogers v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc., No. 19 C 2937, 409 F. Supp. 

3d 612, 619 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2019) (“Rogers’ conclusory statement of CSX’s intent is 

insufficient to allow us to infer that CSX acted intentionally or recklessly and does nothing to 

distinguish this case from every possible BIPA case where the defendant is alleged to have failed 

to meet the strictures of Section 15.”). 

IV. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT PROVIDES PLAINTIFF’S 

EXCLUSIVE REMEDY 

Although Plaintiff does not allege that she was employed by either Defendant (and if so, 

which Defendant), the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (“IWCA”) also likely preempts 

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Plaintiff’s claims for damages under BIPA.9 The IWCA created a system where “in exchange 

for a system of no-fault liability upon the employer, the employee is subject to statutory 

limitations on recovery for injuries and occupational diseases arising out of and in the course of 

employment.” Folta v. Ferro Eng’g, 2015 IL 118070, ¶12; 43 N.E.3d 108, 111 (Ill. 2015). “As 

part of this ‘balancing,’ the Act further provides that the statutory remedies under it shall serve as 

the employee’s exclusive remedy if he sustains a compensable injury.” Sharp v. Gallagher, 95 

Ill. 2d 322, 326; 447 N.E.2d 786, 787 (Ill. 1983) (internal quotation omitted); Cooley v. Power 

Constr. Co., LLC, 2018 IL App (1st) 171292, ¶12, 107 N.E.2d 435, 439 (“Employees that are 

injured at work do not have a cause of action against their employer, and their exclusive remedy 

is to apply for benefits under the [IWCA]”); see also 820 ILCS § 305/5(a) (setting forth 

exclusivity provision); 820 ILCS § 305/11 (the “compensation herein provided, together with the 

provisions of this Act, shall be the measure of the responsibility of any employer”). And to be 

sure, this exclusivity provision applies to Plaintiff’s claims under BIPA because that provision 

specifically provides that an employee has “[n]o common law or statutory right to recover 

damages from the employer * * * for injuries incurred in the course of her employment.” 

Richardson v. Cty. of Cook, 250 Ill. App. 3d 544, 547; 621 N.E.2d 114, 117 (1st Dist. 1993) 

(emphasis added); 820 ILCS § 305/5(a) (providing that an employee has “[n]o common law or 

statutory right to recover damages from the employer”) (emphasis added); 820 ILCS § 305/11; 

Gannon v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 13 Ill. 2d 460, 463 (Ill. 1958) (“The language of the 

[exclusivity] section, read alone, leaves no room for construction [because] it bars any ‘statutory 

right to recover damages for injury’”); see also, e.g., Vacos v. LaSalle Madison Hotel Co., 21 Ill. 

App. 2d 569, 572; 159 N.E.2d 24, 26 (1st Dist. 1959) (affirmed preemption of employee’s 

9 This issue is currently pending before the Appellate Court of Illinois First Judicial District which 

granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 in McDonald 

v. Symphony Bronzeville Park, LLC, et al., Case No. 17 CH 11311 (Cir. Ct. Cook County). 

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statutory damages claimst; the “clear language of [Section 5(a)] bars any right . . . to recover” 

outside the IWCA); Carey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 48 Ill. App. 3d 482, 484; 363 

N.E.2d 400, 401-02 (2d Dist. 1977) (same). 

To circumvent this exclusivity rule, Plaintiff must demonstrate that his injury [1] “was 

not accidental,” [2] “did not arise from...employment,” [3] “was not received during the course 

of...employment,” or [4] “is not compensable under the Act.” See Nischan v. Stratosphere 

Quality, LLC, 865 F.3d 922, 934 (7th Cir. 2017). No exception to exclusivity applies here. First, 

to the extent Plaintiff has suffered an injury as a result of placing a finger on a time-clock 

scanner, her “injury” would be “accidental,” particularly given that the Complaint does not 

allege that Defendants implemented a time-clock system with a “specific intent to injure [its] 

employee[s].” See, e.g., Baylay v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C., 222 F. Supp. 3d 698, 704 (N.D. Ill. 

2016), aff’d, 881 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2018). Second, Plaintiff admits that her alleged injuries 

arose out of her employment and were received during the course of her employment. (See 

Compl.¶¶ 17-26.) Third, “[t]he fact that [Plaintiff] sustained no physical injury or trauma is 

irrelevant to the applicability of the Act. Rather, an injury is compensable under the Act if it was 

sustained during the course of employment and arose from that employment.” See Pathfinder 

Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 563; 343 N.E.2d 913, 917 (1992) (employee that has a 

“psychological injury or harm has suffered an accident within the meaning of the Act, though no 

physical trauma or injury was sustained”); see also Folta, 2015 IL 118070 at ¶¶18-30; 43 N.E.3d 

at 113-16. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish that her injury avoids the exclusivity provision of the 

IWCA, and her claim for damages should be dismissed in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6). 

CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, Defendants respectfully requests that the Court enter an order 

dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

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DATED: August 31, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF 

CHICAGO, LLC and ENTERPRISE 

HOLDINGS, INC. 

By /s/ Thomas E. Ahlering

 One of Their Attorneys 

Erin Dougherty Foley 

edfoley@seyfarth.com

Thomas E. Ahlering

tahlering@seyfarth.com 

Alexandra S. Oxyer 

aoxyer@seyfarth.com 

SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 

233 S. Wacker Dr., Suite 8000 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

Telephone: 312-460-5000 

Facsimile: 312-460-7000

Case: 1:20-cv-03200 Document #: 18 Filed: 08/31/20 Page 20 of 21 PageID #:100
65409973v.7 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 31st day of August, 2020, a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system which will 

send notification to the e-mail addresses of all counsel of record denoted on the electronic Mail 

Notice List. 

/s/Thomas E. Ahlering

Thomas E. Ahlering 

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