No. 89-412 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1990 

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

-vsDAVID E. RAMSTEAD, 

Defendant and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Antonia P. Marra, Great Falls, Montana 

For Respondent: 

t - Hon. Marc Racicot, Attorney General, Helena, Montana 

Elizabeth S. Baker, Asst. Atty. General, Helena, t: Montana "-A Patrick L. Paul, County Attorney, Great Falls, (: ) Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: March 22, 1990 

* Decided: May 25, 1990 
Justice Diane G. Barz delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

David Everrett Ramstead, defendant, was charged on November 

2, 1988, with one count of felony theft and one count of 

misdemeanor theft pursuant to 45-6-301(1) (a), MCA. The case 

proceeded to trial on March 20, 1989. On March 21, 1989, the jury 

returned a guilty verdict for each offense charged. Defendant was 

sentenced to a term of three and one-half years' imprisonment, with 

six months suspended on the condition that he pay restitution in 

the amount of $32.43 and that he undergo alcohol and drug 

counseling. Defendant appeals from his conviction and judgment. 

We affirm. 

The following issues were raised on appeal. 

1. Whether the District Court erred in denying defendant's 

motion to dismiss, in which the defendant asserted that the 

information charging him with two counts of theft was not supported 

by probable cause. 

2. Whether the District Court properly admitted evidence of 

defendant's prior criminal conduct. 

3. Whether defendant's two theft convictions are supported 

by sufficient evidence. 

4. Whether defendant's felony conviction should be reversed 

on the ground that the State failed to prove that the sundial's 

value exceeded $300. 

On October 11, 1988, upon returning home from a trip to 

Wyoming, Charles Hill noticed that his sundial was missing from 

the front yard of his home in Great Falls, Montana. Hill's 

2 
daughter, who had been checking on the house while her parents were 

gone, testified that the sundial was in place in the yard on the 

evening of October 10, 1988. Hill reported the theft on October 

12, 1988. 

The sundial was subsequently recovered by a Great Falls city 

police officer at Carl Weissman and Sonsv recycling business in 

Great Falls. It was then discovered that defendant had sold the 

sundial to Weissmanvs at approximately 2:00 p.m. on October 11, 

1988. The sundial was constructed of aluminum and had been cast 

at the former Anaconda foundry in Great Falls in 1972. The 

sundial, originally designed by Hill, was calibrated and built for 

the longitude and latitude of Great Falls and kept accurate time. 

Hill, who had evaluated aluminum items during his employment with 

the Anaconda Company, estimated the value of the sundial to be 

$2,000 at the time it was built. He further testified that the 

sundial presently was worth over $1,000. Jim Rowe, an expert 

witness on behalf of the State, further testified that he would 

charge approximately $1,500 to reproduce the sundial today. 

On the same day that defendant brought in the sundial to 

Weissmanvs to sell--October 11, 1988--defendant also brought in a 

piece of stainless steel and sold it at the same time as the 

sundial. After defendant had left, Weissmanvs scrap yard manager 

discovered that the stainless steel item had belonged to Weissmanvs 

and had previously been sitting within the fenced yard. Defendant 

had neither purchased nor been given permission to take the scrap 

which he later sold back to Weissmanvs for approximately $8.00. 
Defendant was subsequently convicted by a jury of Count One, 

a felony charge arising out of theft of the sundial from Charles 

Hill, and of Count Two, a misdemeanor charge arising out of theft 

of the stainless steel item from Weissman and Sons. Defendant 

appeals, raising four issues on appeal. 

The first issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court 

erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss, in which the 

defendant asserted that the information charging him with two 

counts of theft was not supported by probable cause. 

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on March 6, 1989, premised 

on the ground that the affidavit in support of the information 

failed to show probable cause that the defendant had committed the 

charged offenses of theft. Defense counsel asserted that the 

affidavit was deficient on both counts because it alleged only that 

defendant possessed the items, and that it did not demonstrate that 

defendant had taken either item from the owners. 

Leave to file an information will be granted if it appears 

from the application that probable cause exists to indicate that 

an offense has been committed by the defendant. Section 46-11- 

201(1), MCA. In the affidavit, the State need only recite facts 

sufficient to indicate a probability that the named defendant 

committed an offense. Contrary to what defendant infers in his 

argument, the State does not need to demonstrate a prima facie case 

at this juncture. State v. Buckingham (Mont. 1989) , 783 P. 2d 1331, 

1334, 46 St.Rep. 2102, 2105; State v. Bradford (1984), 210 Mont. 

130, 139, 683 P.2d 924, 928-29. 
In reviewing an affidavit for a determination of probable 

cause, a district court may use common sense and draw permissible 

inferences. State v. Riley (1982), 199 Mont. 413, 423, 649 P.2d 

1273, 1278. On appeal, this Court's role is merely to determine 

whether a district court abused its discretion. Buckinqham, 783 

P.2d at 1334, 46 St.Rep. at 2105; Bradford, 210 Mont. at 139, 683 

P.2d at 929. 

The affidavit presented to the District Court in this case 

contained sufficient factual allegations to support a finding of 

probable cause as to each charge. With respect to Count One, the 

affidavit demonstrated that (1) a theft had occurred from the 

property of Charles Hill; (2) the property taken had a value 

exceeding $300; and (3) defendant had possession of the stolen 

property and sold it on the same day that the theft was discovered. 

With respect to Count Two, the affidavit described that (1) 

defendant possessed a stainless steel item and obtained money for 

its sale; (2) the item did not belong to defendant when he sold it; 

and (3) the item was owned by Carl Weissman and Sons and had been 

in Weissman's own scrap yard prior to its possession by defendant. 

In light of the above, the District Court did not err in denying 

defendant's motion to dismiss. 

The second issue raised on appeal is whether the District 

Court properly admitted evidence of defendant's prior criminal 

conduct. 

On December 23, 1988, the State filed notice that they 

intended to introduce evidence during trial of a prior crime, a 
misdemeanor theft, in which defendant had pled guilty. Defendant 

filed a motion in limine on March 10, 1989 requesting that the 

prior misdemeanor theft not be allowed into evidence. After a 

hearing, the District Court denied defendant's motion and allowed 

the State to introduce evidence of defendant's prior crime of 

misdemeanor theft. 

The evidence that the State introduced regarding the prior 

misdemeanor theft was that on February 13, 1988, defendant and Tony 

Lopez sold four aluminum gas tanks to Pacific Hide and Fur, a Great 

Falls recycling business. The tanks were identified later the same 

day as having been stolen from Vic Brewer's yard. A subsequent 

investigation revealed that the tanks had been within the fenced 

yard area of Brewer's property, and tennis shoe tracks were left 

in the mud showing that someone had climbed the fence to get to the 

tanks' location. As a result of the investigation, Tony Lopez and 

defendant were arrested, and both admitted that they had gone over 

the fence to get to the tanks. Defendant was charged with felony 

theft and, pursuant to an agreement with the Cascade County 

Attorney's office, entered a plea of guilty to a charge of 

misdemeanor theft. Defendant argues that the admission of the 

evidence outlined above was improper in light of State v. Just 

(1979) , 184 Mont. 262, 602 P. 2d 957. 

Evidence that a defendant has committed other crimes is not 

admissible to prove character in order to show that a defendant 

acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence is admissible only 

if it is introduced ''as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 

accident." Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid. 

The four substantive factors that the State must demonstrate 

in order to introduce evidence of other crimes are that the other 

crimes are (1) similar in nature; (2) not remote in time; (3) tend 

to establish a common scheme, plan or system; and (4) that the 

probative value of the other crimes is not substantially outweighed 

by their prejudice to defendant. State v. Randall (Mont. 1989), 

772 P.2d 868, 869-70, 46 St.Rep. 794, 796; Just, 184 Mont. at 269, 

602 P.2d at 961. After applying the four factors to the facts of 

this case, we hold that the District Court did not err in allowing 

the admission of the February 13, 1988 crime. 

In satisfying the similarity of crimes factor, the prior crime 

does not need to be identical to the crime charged, so long as 

"sufficient similarityI1 exists in a defendant's actions on both 

occasions. Randall, 772 P.2d at 870, 46 St.Rep. at 797. In this 

case, defendant's prior crime was strikingly similar to the crimes 

with which he was charged in the present case. Each involved the 

theft of recyclable metal' products from private property; each 

resulted in the sale of stolen items by defendant to a Great Falls 

recycling business for scrap value; each was committed while 

defendant was in the company of Tony Lopez; and on each occasion 

defendant claimed that he had llfoundll the stolen property, although 

he entered a guilty plea as a result of the first incident. The 

prior crime introduced by the State in this case involved a very 

specific instance of theft which was nearly identical to the theft 
. . 

charged. In light of the facts in this case, the first factor, 

that the crimes must be similar in nature, is satisfied. 

The second factor that a court must consider is whether the 

prior crime is remote in time. As a general rule, remoteness of 

the prior crime affects the credibility of the evidence and not its 

admissibility. State v. Eiler (Mont. 1988), 762 P.2d 210, 217, 45 

St.Rep. 1710, 1718; State v. Doll (1985), 214 Mont. 390, 396, 692 

P.2d 473, 476. In the present case, approximately eight months 

elapsed from the time defendant committed the misdemeanor theft in 

February and the two thefts that occurred in October of the same 

year. In light of other cases before this Court, eight months 

between the crimes is not too remote in time. State v. Hall 

(Mont. 1988), 761 P.2d 1283, 1285, 45 St.Rep. 1726, 1729 (six 

months); State v. Stroud (1984), 210 Mont. 58, 71, 683 P.2d 459, 

466 (three and one-half years) ; Eiler, 762 P.2d at 216-17, 45 

St.Rep. at 1718 (five years). 

The third factor that the State must demonstrate is that the 

prior crime has a "tendency1' to establish a common scheme, plan or 

system. Eiler, 762 P.2d at 217, 45 St.Rep. at 1719. The prior 

crime introduced in the present case presented a strong showing of 

a common scheme, plan or system by defendant. In particular, both 

incidents were thefts; the items taken on both occasions were 

aluminum materials that were subsequently brought to a recycling 

business for their scrap value; and the participants in both 

incidents were identical. Defendant's prior theft of aluminum 

materials tended to show a common scheme by defendant to procure 
items of recyclable value on his salvaging trips even if it 

required him to enter private property. The State successfully 

demonstrated the third factor. 

The final factor the State must demonstrate before a court 

allows introduction of prior crimes into evidence is that the 

probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by 

the prejudice flowing to the defendant. This Court has held that 

satisfaction of the first three Just factors, as outlined above, 

establishes the probative value of the prior crime evidence. State 

v. Keefe (Mont. 1988), 759 P.2d 128, 135, 45 St.Rep. 1034, 1042. 

This Court in Just then also established three procedural 

requirements which, if satisfied, indicates that the prejudicial 

effect the evidence may present for the defendant is less likely 

to occur. Eiler, 762 P.2d at 218, 45 St.Rep. at 1720. Those 

requirements are: 

1. notice to the defendant prior to trial that 

evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts will 

be introduced; 

2. an admonition by the judge to the jury when 

the evidence is introduced that it is admitted 

solely for one or more of the accepted 

purposes stated in Rule 404(b); and 

3. a cautionary jury instruction to the same 

effect, providing in unequivocal terms that 

the evidence is admitted for the purpose 

earlier stated and not to try and convict the 

defendant for prior wrongful conduct. 

Randall, 772 P.2d at 871, 46 St.Rep. at 789 (quoting Doll, 214 

Mont. at 395, 692 P.2d at 475-76). 

In accordance with these requirements, the State filed notice 

on December 23, 1988, nearly three months prior to trial, that it 
intended to offer evidence of the February 1988 theft and 

defendant's subsequent plea of guilty. The District Court gave a 

cautionary instruction to the jury at least three times during 

trial--immediately prior to the introduction of any evidence 

regarding the February 13, 1988 theft, and at two other times 

during the course of the trial. At the end of the trial and in 

conjunction with the other jury instructions, the court gave the 

same cautionary instruction one last time. The jury was instructed 

as follows: 

The State has offered evidence that the 

defendant at another time engaged in other 

crimes. That evidence was not admitted to 

prove the character of the defendant in order 

to show he acted in conformity therewith. The 

only purpose of admitting that evidence was to 

show knowledge, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident. You may not use that 

evidence for any other purpose. 

The defendant is not being tried for that 

other crime. He may not be convicted for any 

other offense than that charged in this case. 

For the jury to convict the defendant of any 

other offense than that charged in this case 

may result in unjust double punishment of the 

defendant. 

This instruction unequivocally apprised the jury that the evidence 

was to be considered only for the purposes permitted by Rule 

404 (b) . 

In addition, the February 13, 1988 crime tended to show, 

contrary to defendant's assertions, that he "actively and knowingly 

participated" in the crime with which he was charged. Defendant 

testified that he found the sundial and that he would not have gone 

onto private property to retrieve it. Thus, the critical element 
in dispute was defendant's state of mind at the time he took the 

property. Evidence that he had entered private property on another 

occasion for the purpose of taking recyclable materials 

contradicted defendant's testimony and tended to show that he acted 

purposely and knowingly when he took the sundial and that it was 

not by accident or as the result of a mistaken belief that the 

sundial was abandoned. 

Given the rigid adherence to the Just procedures and the 

satisfaction of the first three Just factors in this case, we hold 

that the probative value of the February 13, 1988 crime was not 

substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The admission 

of the evidence was a proper exercise of the ~istrict Court's 

discretion. 

The third issue raised on appeal is whether defendant's two 

theft convictions are supported by sufficient evidence. 

Defendant argues that his conviction on both counts should be 

reversed because insufficient evidence existed to support a guilty 

verdict. Defendant argues that the circumstantial evidence was 

inconsistent with the mental state required to commit the charged 

offenses. 

The direct evidence at trial showed that defendant obtained 

the sundial from Hill's property and that he sold it a short time 

later to Weissmanls. The sundial had been positioned in its 

customary location the evening before defendant obtained it. The 

evidence further showed that defendant obtained a stainless steel 

item which had earlier been in the scrap yard at Weissmanls, and 
sold that item back to Weissman's at the time he sold the sundial. 

Both of the items were shown to have been taken from the owners 

without permission. In addition to this direct evidence, the 

circumstantial evidence, including defendant's prior acts, tended 

to show that defendant acted with the requisite mental state when 

he took the items. In particular, defendant testified that he had 

llfoundll the sundial and the stainless steel item, as well as the 

gas tanks that belonged to Vic Brewer. The evidence, however, 

demonstrated that the gas tanks were stolen. Defendant himself had 

previously admitted climbing Brewer's fence to get to the tanks. 

This evidence cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's story 

as to the location of the sundial and the stainless steel item. 

When combining both the direct and circumstantial evidence, the 

evidence was sufficient for a trier of fact to find all elements 

of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. 

This Court has recognized that lvpossession of stolen property, 

accompanied by other incriminating circumstances, and false or 

unreasonable explanation by the suspect is sufficient to sustain 

a conviction . . . 'I State v. Cox (1987), 226 Mont. 111, 114, 733 

P. 2d 1307, 1309. Applying these standards to the present case, and 

in view of the evidence discussed above, we hold that sufficient 

evidence exists to support the conclusion that defendant had the 

purpose and knowledge to commit the two thefts with which he was 

charged. 

The last issue raised on appeal is whether defendant's felony 

conviction should be reversed on the ground that the State failed 
to prove that the sundial's value exceeded $300. 

When conflicting evidence of value is presented, it is "solely 

within the province of the jury to weigh these figures and consider 

the weight to be given to the testimony of each of the experts." 

State v. Dess (1984), 207 Mont. 468, 473, 674 P.2d 501, 505. 

Accord State v. Milhoan (1986), 224 Mont. 505, 510, 730 P.2d 1170, 

1173. Ample evidence was before the jury from which it could find 

that the value of the sundial exceeded $300. Hill, who had 

designed the plans for the sundial and had experience in valuing 

aluminum products, estimated the value of the sundial at $2,000 

when made, and testified that the sundial presently was worth at 

least $1,000. His testimony was corroborated by Jim Rowe, an 

expert witness, who testified that the sundial was unique and that 

he would charge approximately $1,500 to produce it today, although 

it could be worth even more if sold on a retail basis. The bases 

for Rowels conclusion were fully explained to the jury, including 

the process for creating a similar sundial and the hours required 

for production. This testimony was contradicted only by defense 

witness Bill Rogne, who testified that the sundial was worth only 

$250. Rogne's opinion was called into question during crossexamination, and it appeared that he refused to place a value on 

the sundial based upon what it would cost to replace it. In view 

of the evidence presented, it was within the jury's province to 

find that the value of the sundial exceeded $300. 

This Court will not consider disputed questions of fact on 

appeal, nor will it weigh the credibility of the witnesses or their 
testimony. State v. Crumley (1986), 223 Mont. 224, 226, 725 P.2d 

214, 216. Further, even if the evidence presented by defendant 

was consistent with innocent conduct, this Court has held that such 

factual discrepancies are matters properly resolved by the jury. 

State v. Cain (1986), 221 Mont. 318, 321, 718 P.2d 654, 657. 

Affirmed. 

We concur: A 

"A* // -A Justice 

Justices 
Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting: 

I dissent on two grounds, 1) that the evidence of other crimes 

in this case was improper, and 2) the value of the alleged stolen 

items does not exceed the misdemeanor value of $300. 

Defendant Ramstead apparently makes his living in Great Falls 

by going up and down alleys and other places of refuse to salvage 

articles which he later sells for junk or for recycling. He 

testified in his defense that he had found a birdbath a couple of 

feet from a garbage can in an alley and had picked it up, along 

with a piece of steel which he was also charged with taking. There 

is no direct evidence in the record that he went upon the property 

of Hill, the owner of the birdbath in order to take it into 

Ramstead1s unauthorized control. 

Ramstead was charged with felony theft under § 45-6-301, MCA. 

By another statute, 5 45-6-304, MCA, possession of stolen property 

is not in itself proof of the commission of the offense of theft. 

Such possession it places a burden on the possessor to remove the 

effect of that possession as a circumstance to be considered with 

all other evidence pointing to his guilt. Section 45-6-304, MCA. 

The evidence the State presented in this case came from 

witnesses who testified that the last time they saw the birdbath 

it was in Hill's yard. No direct evidence places Ramstead in the 

yard to take the birdbath, nor does any witness contravene 

Ramstead1s own testimony that he found the birdbath in the alley 

by the garbage can. 

In that state of the record, the admission of evidence of 

another misdemeanor theft some eight months earlier was extremely 

prejudicial to Ramstead and its use outweighed any probative value 

of the other crimes evidence. It cannot be denied that the State 

used the other crimes evidence to have the jury infer that in this 

case Ramstead did in fact go into Hill's yard to appropriate the 

birdbath. While other crimes evidence may be admitted under Rule 

404(b), Montana Rules of Evidence, for the purpose of showing a 

common scheme, plan or system, it is strictly inadmissible for the 
purpose of showing consummation of the particular offense which has 

been charged and is the subject of the trial. State v. Randall 

(1989) I - Mont. -, 772 P.2d 868, 869; State v. Just (1979) , 184 

Mont. 262, 268, 602 P.2d 957, 960; and State v. Taylor (1973), 163 

Mont. 106, 120, 515 P.2d 695, 704. 

Counsel for the defendant, before the trial, moved in limine 

to reject the other crimes evidence, but the court denied the 

motion. During the argument on that motion, the State argued that 

it would show in the other crime, through a purported accomplice 

of the defendant and others, that Ramstead did go on to the other 

personls property in order to take metal objects and sell them. 

However in the testimony during the trial, the purported accomplice 

testified that they did not go over the fence or onto another 

person's property to retrieve objects. In effect no witnesses 

testified, either in the other crimes evidence or in the case at 

bar, that Ramstead had gone onto private property to steal 

something. 

In this situation, the District Court should have excluded the 

other crimes evidence, because its prejudicial effect outweighed 

any probative effect. 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts Itmay, however, 

be admissible where [it] is probative of any other fact 

that is of consequence to the determination of the 

[case], such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, modus operandi, 

or absence of mistake or accident. l1 Haw. R. Evid. 404 (b) . But its acknowledged tendency to distract the trier of 

fact compels the trial court to weigh the evidence and 

to exclude it I1if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion 

of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence.I1 

State v. Pinero (Haw. 1989), 778 P.2d 704, 710. 

The other crimes evidence was the central focus of this case 

when it was tried in the District Court. The State spent more than 

half of its time in presenting the other crimes evidence. The pro 
forma admission by the District Court of other crimes evidence 

without any real consideration of whether the requirements of Rule 

404 were met has resulted in the exception of Rule 404 swallowing 

up what the Rule originally intended, that other crimes evidence 

is inadmissible. 

My other objection to the conviction is that the value of the 

alleged stolen property is not sufficiently established in this 

case. The birdbath, along with a number of other items, were sold 

to a junk dealer for $44. Section 45-2-101(69)(a), MCA, provides 

that llvaluell means the market value of the property at the time and 

place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily 

ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a 

reasonable time after the crime. It seems utterly ridiculous that 

the replacement value of this aluminum birdbath was $1,500 or 

$2,200 as the case may be. From the record I find nothing more 

than a minor misdemeanor crime, if a theft was actually proved. 

For that misdemeanor, defendant has been sentenced to serve 32 

years in the Montana State Penitentiary. It is a small wonder we 

have overcrowded jail conditions there. 

I concur with Justice Hunt's dis 

Justice 
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., dissenting: 

I specially concur in the foregoing dissent of Justice Sheehy 

and wish to add that, although the establishment of the three Just 

factors may indicate that the introduction of other crimes evidence 

may have some probative value, the use of that other crimes 

evidence must still be ultimately balanced against its prejudicial 

effect. The majority states that compliance with certain procedural 

activities alleviates any prejudicial effect that may result from 

the introduction of this other crimes evidence. It is with this 

analysis that I disagree. 

Just evidence, or other crimes evidence, may be used to 

prove that the defendant had the intent to commit the crime 

charged. Rule 404 (b) , M.R. Evid. In other words, the Just evidence 

is used primarily to support the requisite "state of mind" element 

of the charged crime. In Just, the Court adopted a four-step 

analysis in determining whether evidence of other crimes was 

admissible. State v. Just, 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957 (1979) . 

In addition to these four steps, the Court also adopted certain 

procedural safeguards to protect the defendant against the almost 

certain prejudice that would occur to the defendant at any time 

Just evidence is admitted. However, as the majority would believe, 

these safeguards did not replace the requirement of balancing the 

probative value of such evidence versus its prejudicial effect. 

To determine the prejudicial effect that the introduction of 

Just evidence may have on a defendant's case the Court must examine 

each individual set of facts. If, in reviewing each set of facts, 

the Court determines that "the jury might overestimate the 

probative value of the evidence and assume that merely because the 

defendant committed crimes before, he is likely to be guilty of the 

crime chargedf1 the introduction of the Just evidence is overly 

prejudicial and must be excluded. State v. Hansen, 187 Mont. 91, 

99, 608 P. 2d 1083, 1088 (1980) . 
The facts of this case, as discussed in Justice Sheehyls 

dissent, indicate that the only evidence used to prove the 

defendant's "state of mindH in committing the charged offense was 

the Just evidence. Without additional evidence to support this 

necessary element, the prejudicial effect upon the defendant was 

significant and must be scrutinized beyond the procedural 

safeguards described by the majority. Although the jury was 

properly instructed regarding the significance of the Just evidence 

in their deliberations, it is obvious, in light of the lack of 

evidence existing in the record to support the defendant's 

commission of the charged theft, that the jury chose to convict the 

defendant based upon the previous "bad act." Such an occurrence 

totally contradicts the purpose of Just evidence. The conviction 

should be reversed because the jury overestimated the probative 

value of the evidence and concluded that, based upon the Just 

evidence, the defendant was likely to be guilty of the crime 

charged. 

- Justice