alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Michael A. NASH, Defendant-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 03-6630.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Dec. 16, 2004.

Tony R. Arvin, Asst. U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Bruce I. Griffey, Office of Bruce Irwin Griffey, Memphis, TN, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before DAUGHTREY, COOK, and FARRIS,* Circuit Judges.

*

 The Hon. Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM.

There is no legal basis for reversing the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence. First, the magistrate judge did not clearly err in finding that Nash lacked credibility. Nash points to minor potential inconsistencies and memory lapses in the testimony of the government’s witnesses to show that the testimony was not credible. Such gaps in the testimony, such as the clothing officers wore, whether Mr. Nash’s name was called at the door, whether the officer spoke with a raised voice, whether any officers had *993weapons raised, were peripheral to the heart of the testimony and do not indicate lack of credibility sufficient to constitute clear error.

Nor was Nash’s consent the product of coercion. In light of all relevant factors and circumstances, including the details of the detention and a consideration of “more subtle forms of coercion that might flaw [an individual’s] judgment,” the record reflects that Nash’s consent was freely given. *See United States v. Ivy,*165 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting *United States v. Watson,*423 U.S. 411, 424, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976)). Here, Nash was handcuffed and surrounded by a handful of police officers, but these facts alone are insufficient to create a lack of voluntariness in his consent to search. *See United States v. Burns,*298 F.3d 523, 541 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that a defendant’s consent was valid even though given in custody); *see also United States v. Strache,*202 F.3d 980, 986 (7th Cir.2000) (holding that where a defendant was handcuffed for twenty minutes and had not been Mirandized, his consent to search was nonetheless voluntary).

Nash’s reliance on *United States v. Saari,*272 F.3d 804 (6th Cir.2001), to argue he was illegally “seized” prior to his granting consent, is likewise unavailing. The court in Saari explicitly upheld the legitimacy of doorstep investigatory interviews such as that to which Nash was subjected, and only found that Saari had been constructively arrested because of the coercive aspects of the interaction— aspects largely missing from the interaction in this case. No testimony in the present case indicates drawn weapons, raised voices, or coercive demands on the part of the police such as those at play in Saari. Rather, Nash opened the door willingly, and when requested, stepped out onto the porch, engaged in conversation, and freely gave his consent to the search.

AFFIRMED.
#### Michael M. HENRY, Petitioner—Appellant, v. Gene M. JOHNSON, Director, Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 04-7459.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 16, 2004.

Decided Dec. 28, 2004.

Michael M. Henry, Appellant pro se. Richard Bain Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM.

Michael M. Henry seeks to appeal from the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. *See Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Henry has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials be*291fore the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED*
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Tanavionne Marcell Robertson, Appellant

No. 06

- 16

- 00093

- CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee Appeal from the 6th District Court of Lamar County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 26412 ).
Memorandum Opinion delivere d by Justice Moseley, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court

below

. We affirm the judgment of the trial c ourt

. We note that the appellant, Tanavionne Marcell Robertson, has adequately indicated his

inability to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED FEBRUARY 1, 2017

BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
Filed by Automated Filing Services Inc. (604) 609-0244 - Quincy Resources, Inc. - Exhibit 4.7






Exhibit 4.7

 CONSENT TO ACTION WITHOUT MEETING

  OF

  SHAREHOLDERS OF

  QUINCY RESOURCES, INC.

 As provided under Nevada Revised Statutes, §78.320.2,
  the following resolutions were adopted by at least a majority of the Shareholders
  of QUINCY RESOURCES, INC., deemed effective March 2, 2004: 

      RESOLVED, The 2003 Key Employee
  Stock Option Plan as set forth in Schedule "A" attached hereto, be and is hereby
  approved; 

      FURTHER RESOLVED, 1,900,000
  shares of the Company's common stock be and are hereby allocated and reserved
  for issuance under the 2003 Key Employee Stock Option Plan; 

      FURTHER RESOLVED, Pursuant to
  the terms of the 2003 Key Employee Stock Option Plan and an Option Certificate
  to be issued thereunder, the Company grant: (1) options to acquire 1,670,000
  shares of the Company's common stock at a price of $0.25 per share to the persons
  and in the amounts set forth in Schedule "B" attached hereto; and, (2), options
  to acquire 225,000 shares of the Company's common stock at a price of $0.67
  per share to the persons and in the amounts set forth in Schedule "C" attached
  hereto. 

      FURTHER RESOLVED, For each Optionee
  listed on Schedule "B", the Options shall vest as to one quarter on January
  1, 2004, as to one quarter on July 1, 2004, as to one quarter on January 1,
  2005, and as to one quarter on July 1, 2005. All Options granted to the persons
  and in the amounts set forth in Schedule "B" shall expire on December 3, 2008


      FURTHER RESOLVED, For each Optionee
  listed on Schedule "C", the Options shall vest as to one quarter on July 13,
  2004, as to one quarter on January 13, 2005, as to one quarter on July 13, 2005,
  and as to one quarter on January 13, 2006. All Options granted to the persons
  and in the amounts set forth in Schedule "C" shall expire on January 13, 2009.


      FURTHER RESOLVED, the President
  and Secretary are authorized and instructed to notify the Transfer Agent of
  the Company of such action; and,

      FURTHER RESOLVED, the President,
  Secretary and Treasurer of the Company are authorized and empowered to take
  any and all action necessary to effectuate the foregoing resolutions. 

 SHAREHOLDERS: 

 We, the undersigned, being at least a majority of the Shareholders
  of QUINCY RESOURCES, INC. consent to the foregoing action without a meeting
  and waive notice of any meeting requirement by our signatures below. 

 /s/ Daniel T. Farrell

  DANIEL T. FARRELL (a facsimile signature shall be considered the same as
  an original signature) 

  Number of Shares: 3,973,000 

 /s/ John Cullen

  JOHN CULLEN (a facsimile signature shall be considered the same as an original
  signature) 

  Number of Shares: 390,000 

 /s/ William M. Sheriff

  WILLIAM M. SHERIFF (a facsimile signature shall be considered the same as
  an original signature) 

  Number of Shares: 6,001,000
CFTC Ex. 96

Case: 1:20-cv-03758 Document #: 79-10 Filed: 11/05/21 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:1548
Case: 1:20-cv-03758 Document #: 79-10 Filed: 11/05/21 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:1549
Filed 5/17/22 P. v. Arias CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JUAN JOSE ARIAS,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B316706

(Super. Ct. Nos. 2020020130,

2020032243)

(Ventura County)

Juan Jose Arias pleaded guilty in two cases being 

appealed: resisting an officer by force (Pen. Code,

1 § 69, subd. (a)) 

and trespass by threat (§ 601, subd. (a)). He also admitted he 

was out on bail when he committed both offenses. (§ 12022.1, 

subd. (b).)

In a third case, which for some reason is not part of 

this appeal, Arias pleaded guilty to trespass by threat and 

evading an officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) and admitted to 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless 

otherwise stated/
2

being out on bail. The parties agreed to a total sentence of 11 

years for all three cases. The trial court sentenced Arias to 11 

years as follows: the upper term of three years for one count of 

trespass by threat, consecutive middle terms of eight months for 

each of the three remaining offenses, and consecutive terms of 

two years each on three enhancements for committing the 

offenses while out on bail.

Arias entered the residence of the mother of his 

children in violation of a stay away order and fought with officers 

who tried to arrest him. He appeals his sentence.

We appointed counsel to represent Arias in this 

appeal. After examining the record, he filed a brief raising no 

issues.

On March 29, 2022, we advised Arias by mail that he 

had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or 

issues that he wished to raise on appeal. We received no reply. 

We have reviewed the entire record and are satisfied 

that Arias’s attorney has fully complied with his responsibilities 

and that no arguable issue exists. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 

Cal.3d. 436, 441.)

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

PERREN, J.
3

Rocky J. Baio, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### APPEAL 

### O F 

### F LORIDA 

### S ECOND 

### D ISTRICT In the Interest of B.P. and M.P., children.

D.P., Appellant,
v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES and GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM,

Appellees. No. 2D23-2153 March 15, 2024 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco County; Linda H. Babb, Judge. Angela B. Wright, Tampa, for Appellant. Bruce Bartlett, State Attorney of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, and Leslie M. Layne, Assistant State Attorney, Clearwater, for Appellant Department of Children and Families. Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Amanda Victoria Glass, Senior Attorney, Tallahassee, for Appellant Guardian ad Litem Program. PER CURIAM. D.P., the father in this dependency proceeding, appeals from the order denying his motion for reunification. We treat this appeal as a2

petition for writ of certiorari, see D.P. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams. , 367 So. 3d 595, 597 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023), and dismiss. Petition dismissed. LaROSE, MORRIS, and BLACK, JJ., Concur. Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

Commodity Futures Trading Commission, )

)

Plaintiff )

) 

v. ) Case No. 20-3758

)

Long Leaf Trading Group, Inc., James A. )

Donelson, Timothy M. Evans, Jeremy S. Ruth, )

And Andrew D. Nelson, )

)

Defendants. )

)

AGREED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR

DEFENDANTS LONG LEAF TRADING GROUP, INC. AND

JAMES A. DONELSON TO FILE THEIR ANSWER

NOW COMES Defendants, Long Leaf Trading Group, Inc., and James A. Donelson, by 

and through their attorneys, and for their Agreed Motion to Extend the Time for Them to File Their 

Answer, state as follows:

1. Defendants Long Leaf Trading Group, Inc. and James A. Donelson’s Answer to the 

Complaint is due September 3, 2020.

2. Plaintiff has agreed to a two-week extension of the due date for these Defendants 

to file their Answer, to September 17, 2020.

WHEREFORE, Defendants Long Leaf Trading Group, Inc. and James A. Donelson request 

entry of an Order extending their time for filing their Answer to September 17, 2020.

Respectfully Submitted,

LONG LEAF TRADING GROUP, INC. and

JAMES A. DONELSON

Laurence M. Landsman

Case: 1:20-cv-03758 Document #: 19 Filed: 09/03/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:103
2

Nicholas P. Iavarone

niavarone@iavaronefirm.com

The Iavarone Law Firm, P.C.

2516 Waukegan Rd., No. 399

Glenview, IL 60025

(312) 637-9466

Laurence M. Landsman

llandsman@llflegal.com 

Latimer LeVay Fyock, LLC

55 W. Monroe St., Ste. 1100

Chicago, IL 60603

(312) 419-3029

Case: 1:20-cv-03758 Document #: 19 Filed: 09/03/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:104
Form of 2004-1 Executive Deferred Compensation Plan



 EXHIBIT 10.16 
  
 2004-1 AMENDMENT TO 
  
 MEMEC, LLC EXECUTIVE DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN 
  
 (Amended and Restated Effective October 1, 2001) 
  
 This 2004-1 Amendment to Memec, LLC Executive Deferred Compensation Plan (Amended and Restated Effective October 1, 2001) [“Plan”] is adopted effective January
1, 2004 as follows: 
  

	 	1.	A new Section (b)-(1) is added in Article II to read in full as follows: 

  
 (b)-(1) “Base Salary” refers to a Participant’s base salary, as determined by the Company, that is payable to the Participant by
the Company during a Plan Year. 
  

	 	2.	A new Section (d)-(1) is added in Article II to read in full as follows: 

  
 (d)-(1) “Bonus” refers to a Participant’s bonus, as determined by the Company, that is payable to the Participant by the Company
during a Plan Year. 
  

	 	3.	A new Section (f)-(1) is added in Article II to read in full as follows: 

  
 (f)-(1) “Commissions” refers to a Participant’s commissions, as determined by the Company, that are payable to the Participant by
the Company during a Plan Year. 
  

	 	4.	The last sentence of Section 4.1(a) is deleted and the following is added at the end of Section 4.1(a): 

  
 For a Plan Year, an eligible Employee who elects to participate in the Plan must defer a minimum of two thousand dollars
($2,000). For a Plan Year, an eligible Employee may defer a maximum of the following amounts that are payable during such Plan Year: (1) 50% of the Participant’s Base Salary, (2) 100% of the Participant’s Bonus, and (3) 100% of the
Participant’s Commissions. 
  

	 	5.	Section 4.1(b) is amended to read in full as follows: 

  
 (b) Except as otherwise provided in this Section 4.1(b), an eligible Employee must submit his or her Deferral Election form pertaining to Compensation
payable during a Plan Year to the Committee no later than the last day of the calendar year preceding such Plan Year. However, during the Plan Year in which an Employee first becomes eligible to participate in the Plan, the eligible Employee may
make his or her election within the first 30 days after the date the Employee is notified of his or her eligibility to participate in the Plan. 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this 2004-1 Amendment to the Plan has been executed in the State of California on this
     day of March, 2004. 
  

	
	 MEMEC, LLC

	
	 By:




  

 2
#### Richard R. ASSING, Claimant-Appellant, v. Anthony J. PRINCIPI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 02-7352.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Oct. 20, 2004.

ORDER

Pursuant to the Court’s letter dated September 23, 2004,

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

This appeal is dismissed.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING 

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED 

 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL 

 OF FLORIDA 

 SECOND DISTRICT 

JOSEPH SERRA, MICHELLE SERRA, ) 

MICHAEL SERRA, and JOHN A. ) 

SHAHAN, ) 

 ) 

 Appellants, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No. 2D15-593 

 ) 

MARY BROWN, ) 

 ) 

 Appellee. ) 

 ) 

Opinion filed June 3, 2016. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pasco 

County; William H. Burgess, III, Judge. 

John A. Shahan, Tarpon Springs, for 

Appellants. 

Knute J. Nathe of McClain, Alfonso & 

Meeker, P.A., Dade City, for Appellee. 

LaROSE, Judge. 

Joseph Serra, Michelle Serra, Michael Serra, and their counsel, John 

Shahan, appeal the trial court's final order awarding attorney's fees to Mary Brown 

pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2014). 

The order on appeal contains no findings required under section 57.105 to 

support the award. Consequently, we must reverse. See Dep't of Revenue v. 
- 2 - 

Marchines, 974 So. 2d 1085, 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Goldberg v. Watts, 864 So. 2d 

59, 60 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Mason v. Highlands Cty. Comm'rs, 817 So. 2d 922, 923 

(Fla. 2d DCA 2002). 

We render no view as to the underlying merits of the fee award. We only 

hold that the record before us and the order on appeal are insufficient to support 

imposition of a section 57.105 sanction. We therefore reverse the order and remand 

with directions for the trial court to make appropriate findings of fact to justify the award 

of attorney’s fees. 

Reversed and remanded with directions. 

NORTHCUTT and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
Honorable George 

County Auditor 

K. Smith Opinion No. M-892 

Records Building 

Dallas, Texas 75202 

Re: Whether proceeds from the 

sale of bonds issued by 

Dallas County for road 

improvements may be commingled with other monies 

under authority of Article 

VIII, Section 9, Texas 

Dear Mr. Smith: Constitution. 

You ask whether your county‘can transfer certain funds 

to the counties consolidated "General Fund" from a "Capital 

Improvement Fund" made up of proceeds from the sale of a 

certain issue of tax supported road bonds. 

Article VIII, Section 9, Texas Constitution, as amended 

in 1967, reads, in part: 

I! 

. . . Any county may put all tax 

money collected by the county into one 

general fund, without regard to the purpose 

or source of each tax . . .v (Emphasis 

added) 

This language of the Constitution Is clear that the 

"General Fund" is to be made up of funds raised by taxation 

and not proceeds from the sale of bonds. 

Our prior Opinion NO. ~-207 (1968) reads, in part: 

The 1967 amendment to Section 

9 besiowing power upon any county to put 

all its tax money into one fund does not 

require that this be done, but instead 

confers the power subject to the good judgment of the Commissioners Court, so long 

as it does not impair outstanding bonds 

or, obligations. Limited exercis? of 

conferred power, as under the facts here, 

4347 
Honorable George K. Smith, page 2 (M-892) 

is well recognized by our Courts. cf. 

State v. City of Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 

s w 2d 737 143 (1960). " 

edj.. ’ 

(Emphasis 

It is also elementary that the proceeds from the sale 

of county bonds can only be used for the purpose authorized 

and may not be diverted to other purposes or uses. Barrington 

v. Cokinas, 161 Tex. 136, 338 S.W.2d 133 (1960). 

In view of the constitutional limitation on monies ellgible for deposit in the General Fund, as well as the restrictions on the use of bond proceeds, we find no merit in the 

proposition that bond proceeds or a portion thereof are subject 

to deposit in such fund pending their expenditure. 

SUMMARY 

Section 9 of Article VIII Texas 

Constitution, as amended in 1967 allows 

a county to deposit all tax money collected by the county in one general fund, 

without regard to the purpose or source 

of each tax, but does not permit the 

deposit of bond proceeds in the general 

fund. 

Prepared by Robert B. Davis 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Kerns Taylor, Chairman 

W. E. Allen, Co-Chairman 

John Reeves 

Austin~ Bray 

Jack Goodman 

Fisher Tyler 

4348 
, ,- .- 

, t ,. ~ 

Honorable George K. Smith, page‘ 3 (M-892) 

MEADE F. GRIFFIN 

Staff Legal Assistant 

ALFRED WALKER 

Executive Assistant 

NOLA WHITE 

First Assistant 

4349
IV

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 207

Electing the Chief Administrative Officer of the United States House of

Representatives.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 31, 1997

Mr. BOEHNER submitted the following resolution; which was considered and

agreed to

RESOLUTION

Electing the Chief Adminstrative Officer of the United States

House of Representatives.

1 Resolved, That Jay Eagen, of the Commonwealth of

2 Pennsylvania, be, and he is hereby, chosen Chief Adminis3 trative Officer of the House of Representatives.

Æ
IV

105TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION H. RES. 497

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to require a twothirds vote on any bill or joint resolution that either authorizes the

President to enter into a trade agreement that is implemented pursuant

to fast-track procedures or that implements a trade agreement pursuant

to such procedures.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 25, 1998

Mr. TRAFICANT submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the

Committee on Rules

RESOLUTION

Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to

require a two-thirds vote on any bill or joint resolution

that either authorizes the President to enter into a trade

agreement that is implemented pursuant to fast-track

procedures or that implements a trade agreement pursuant to such procedures.

1 Resolved, That clause 5 of rule XXI of the Rules of

2 the House of Representatives is amended by adding at the

3 end the following new paragraph:

4 ‘‘(e) No bill or joint resolution that—

5 ‘‘(1) authorizes the President to enter into a

6 trade agreement that is implemented by a bill or
2

•HRES 497 IH

1 joint resolution that is considered by each House of

2 Congress under procedures that preclude amend3 ments; or

4 ‘‘(2) implements any trade agreement and that

5 is not subject to amendment;

6 shall be considered as passed or agreed to unless so deter7 mined by a vote of not less than two-thirds of the Members

8 voting.’’.

Æ
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

No. 02

- 21

- 00290

- CV

I N THE E STATE OF X AVIER G OMEZ

III, D ECEASED §

§

§

§ On Appeal from Probate Court No. 2

of Tarrant County ( 2019

- PR00979

- 2 )

J uly 21

, 2022

Memorandum Opinion by Justice

Bassel

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that the

appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed

.

It is further ordered that Appellee Jackson Cons truction , Ltd. shall pay all costs

of this appeal, for which let execution issue.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By /s/ Dabney Bassel

Justice Dabney Bassel