alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
No. 14,745.

#### The Board of Commissioners of Marshall County *v.*Johnson.

County *Auditor.*— Fees.—A county auditor can recover only sucb compensation as the statute allows Mm, and he is not entitled to recover compensation for duties performed by Mm except where the statute so provides, although the services may be regarded by him and by the board of commissioners as “ extra services,” entitling him to *“*extra ” compensation.

From the Marshall Circuit Court.

*A. C. Capron*and *H. Corbin,*for appellant,

*J. D. McLaren*and *E. C. Martindale,*for appellee.

Elliott, J.

We do not deem it necessary in this caseto notice the questions of practice discussed by counsel, for we think it entirely clear that, upon the facts disclosed in the special finding, the judgment must be reversed.

*239Filed Feb. 18, 1891.

It is well settled that a county auditor can recover only such compensation as the statute allows him, and that he is not entitled to recover compensation for duties performed by him except where the statute so provides, although the services may be regarded by him and by the board of commissioners as “ extra services ” entitling him to “ extra ” compensation. We have so often discussed' this general question that we decline to again discuss it. *Board, etc.,*v. *Barnes,*123 Ind. 403; *Williams*v. *Segur,*106 Ind. 368; *Board, etc.,*v. *Gresham,*101 Ind. 53; *Noble*v. *Board, etc.,*101 Ind. 127; *Board, etc.,*v. *Harman,*101 Ind. 551; *Wright*v. *Board, etc.,*98 Ind. 88; *Donaldson*v. *Board, etc.,*92 Ind. 80; *Nowles*v. *Board, etc.,*86 Ind. 179. For many years the General Assembly has clearly and unequivocally declared its policy to be that no constructive fees shall be allowed upon any pretext to county officers, and this court has uniformly given full effect to that policy. Many of the items allowed the appellee were allowed in direct violation of the words as well as the spirit of the statute, and the finding cafi not possibly be sustained.

We do not enter upon any discussion of the effect of former decisions of the board of commissioners, for the reason that no such question is presented by the record. It is only proper for us now, in view of the condition in which the record comes to us, to adjudge that many of the items • of the appellee’s claim are illegal.

Judgment reversed, with instructions to grant a new trial, and to proceed in accordance with this opinion.
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 38810

STATE OF IDAHO

,

Plaintiff-Respondent

,

v.

CORY W. WICKEL

,

Defendant-Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 323

Filed: January 18, 2012

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fift h Judicial District, State of Idaho, Cassia County. Hon. Michael R. Crabtree , District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and unified sentence of thirty years, with a minimum period of confinement of ten years , for lewd conduct with a minor under

sixteen

, affirmed

.

Molly J. Huskey, S tate Appellate Public Defender; Eric D. Fredericksen, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________

Before LANSING, Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge; and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Cory W. Wickel pled guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen . I.C. § 18

- 1508

. In exchange for h is guilty plea, the state agreed not to pursue additional charges. The district

court sentenced Wickel to a unified term of thirty years, with a minimum perio d of confinement

of ten years . Wickel filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, which the district

court denied. Wickel appeals, challenging the excessiveness of his sentence.

Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the

factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sent ence are well established and

need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez , 121 Idaho 114, 117

- 18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014

-2 15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez , 106 Idaho 447, 449

- 51, 680 P.2d 869, 871

- 73 (Ct. App.

1984); State v. Toohill , 103 Idaho 565, 5 68, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing

the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho

722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record

in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.

Therefore, Wickel ’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
#### JOYNER v. STAR DELIVERY & TRANSFER

No. 200P97

Case below: 125 N.C.App. 743

Petition by defendant for discretionary review pursuant to G.S. 7A-31 denied 23 July 1997.
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-19-00367-CR

IN RE SHANE MIX

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Shane Mix, a jail inmate, seeks a mandamus to compel the trial court to rule on 

Mix’s application for writ of habeas corpus. There are numerous procedural problems 

with the petition, such as no service on the trial court judge as the respondent and the 

State as the real-party-in-interest, no certification, no appendix, and no record, as 

required by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.5; 52.3(j), (k); 52.7. 

However, we use Rule 2 to dispense with these requirements and proceed to a timely 

disposition of the petition.

Mix contends he filed an application for writ of habeas corpus under article 11.08 

of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure on October 7, 2019, and the trial court has 

ignored him. He has provided no record to support this contention.
In re Mix Page 2

The need to consider and rule on a properly filed and presented request for relief 

is not a discretionary act but a ministerial one, and a trial court is allowed a reasonable 

time within which to perform that act. In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228-229 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding). The duty to act, however, generally does not arise until 

the movant has brought the request for relief to the trial judge's attention; and mandamus 

will not lie unless the movant makes such a showing, and the trial judge then fails or 

refuses to rule within a reasonable time. See id. at 228. Whether a reasonable time has 

lapsed is dependent upon the circumstances of each case. Ex parte Bates, 65 S.W.3d 133, 

135 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding). Mix bears the burden of providing this 

Court with a sufficient record to establish his right to mandamus relief. In re Blakeney, 

254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding). 

Assuming Mix filed his application on the date alleged, it has been pending with 

the trial court for less than 30 days. While some pleadings necessitate expedited 

dispositions, Mix has not explained why the trial court not ruling on his article 11.08 

application for writ of habeas corpus is an abuse of discretion under the facts of his case. 

In point of fact, Mix has not provided any explanation of what the facts of his application 

for writ of habeas corpus are such that an expedited disposition is necessary. Thus, Mix 

has not carried his burden to show that the trial court has had a reasonable time within 

which to rule on Mix’s application.

Accordingly, Mix’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied without prejudice to 

Mix filing a new petition for writ of mandamus if: 1) the trial court does not rule on Mix’s 

application for writ of habeas corpus after a reasonable time; 2) Mix has served his new 
In re Mix Page 3

mandamus petition on all the parties as required; and 3) Mix has provided a record 

showing his entitlement to relief as required.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Neill

Petition denied

Opinion delivered and filed October 30, 2019

Do not publish 

[OT06]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

ABLE HOME HEALTH, LLC, ) 

on behalf of plaintiff and ) 

the class members defined herein, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 20 C 3052 

 ) 

vs. ) Judge Ellis 

 ) Magistrate Judge Cole 

VERVE GLOBAL, INC., ) 

and JOHN DOES 1-10, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL

 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i), Plaintiff Able Home Health, LLC, voluntarily 

dismisses its individual claims against Defendant Verve Global, Inc. with prejudice and without 

costs. Plaintiff Able Home Health, LLC voluntarily dismisses its class claims against Defendant 

Verve Global, Inc. without prejudice and without costs. Plaintiff Able Home Health, LLC 

voluntarily dismisses its claims against John Does 1-10 without prejudice and without costs. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 s/ Heather Kolbus 

 Heather Kolbus 

Daniel A. Edelman 

Heather Kolbus 

EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER 

 & GOODWIN, LLC 

20 S. Clark Street, Suite 1500 

Chicago, IL 60603 

(312) 739-4200 

(312) 419-0379 FAX 

Case: 1:20-cv-03052 Document #: 11 Filed: 07/06/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:42
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I, Heather Kolbus, hereby certify that on July 6, 2020, I caused a true and accurate copy 

of the foregoing document to be filed with the Court’s CM/ECF system, and to be served via 

email and U.S. Mail upon the following: 

 Rishi Agrawal - rishi@agrawalfirm.com 

 The Agrawal Firm, LLC 

 415 North LaSalle Street, Suite 300A 

 Chicago, IL 60654 

 s/ Heather Kolbus 

 Heather Kolbus 

Daniel A. Edelman 

Heather Kolbus 

EDELMAN, COMBS, LATTURNER 

 & GOODWIN, LLC 

20 S. Clark Street, Suite 1500 

Chicago, IL 60603 

(312) 739-4200 

(312) 419-0379 FAX 

 

 

 

Case: 1:20-cv-03052 Document #: 11 Filed: 07/06/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:43
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

SANDRA ZELNER by her next friend, STEVEN )

ZELNER, individually and on behalf of all others ) 

similarly situated, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No. 20-cv-03585

v. )

)

UNIFIN INC., ) Hon. Mary M. Rowland 

)

)

Defendant. )

NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rule 41(a) (1) (A) (i) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, the above-titled action against Defendant shall be dismissed with prejudice and on the 

merits, with each side to bear its own fees and costs.

Dated: December 10, 2020

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Celetha Chatman

Celetha C. Chatman

Michael Wood

Celetha Chatman

Community Lawyers, LLC.

20 N. Clark Street, Suite 3100

Chicago, IL 60602

Ph: (312) 757-1880

Fx: (312) 476-1362

mwood@communitylawyersgroup.com

cchatman@communitylawyersgroup.com

Case: 1:20-cv-03585 Document #: 9 Filed: 12/10/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:29
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Celetha C. Chatman, an attorney, certify that I shall cause to be served a copy of the Notice of 

Voluntary Dismissal upon the following individual(s), as indicated below, this day of 

December 10, 2020 along with a certified copy of the notice entered in the case referenced 

above:

___ CM/ECF 

___ Facsimile

___ Federal Express

___ UPS

___ USPS Mail

___ Messenger

_X_ Email

Unifin, Inc. 

c/o Ian Saric

5996 W Touhy Ave Suite, 2000

Niles, IL. 60714

ian@unifinrs.com

Case: 1:20-cv-03585 Document #: 9 Filed: 12/10/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:30
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Adrian Grissom , Appellant

No. 06

- 24

- 00026

- CR v.

The State of Texas , Appellee Appeal from the 124th District Court of Gregg County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 53475

- B ). Panel consists of Chief Justice Stevens
and Justices van Cleef and Rambin. Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice
Rambin

.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the appeal should be dismissed

for want of jurisdiction . Therefore, we dismiss the a ppeal.

We note that the appellant, Adrian Grissom , has adequately indicated his inability to pay

costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED MAY 23, 2024
BY ORDER OF THE COURT
SCOTT E. STEVENS
CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey , Clerk
Exhibit 32



CERTIFICATION



In connection with the Annual Report of United Pan Am Financial Corp (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2004 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), Ray Thousand and Garland W. Koch certify in their capacities as Chief Executive Officer and President and Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer,
respectively, of the Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (a) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (b) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have hereunto signed this Certification
as of September 3, 2004.



/s/    RAY THOUSAND

Ray Thousand

Chief Executive Officer and President



/s/    GARLAND KOCH

Garland Koch

Chief Financial Officer/Exec. Vice President
---

UNITED STATES

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549



---



FORM 10-Q/A



---



Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section
13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

For the quarterly period ended June 30, 2003

Commission File Number 000-24051



---



UNITED PANAM FINANCIAL CORP.

(Exact name of Registrant as specified in its charter)



---



|                                                               |  |                                        
|-------------------------------------------------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------
|California                                                     |  | 95-3211687                             
|(State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization) |  | (I.R.S. Employer Identification Number)



3990 Westerly Place,
Suite 200

Newport Beach, CA 92660

(Address of principal executive offices) (Zip Code)



(949) 224-1917

(Registrants telephone number, including area code)



---



Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period
that the registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days.    Yes  x    No ̈



Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is an accelerated filer (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange
Act).    Yes ̈No  x



The number of shares outstanding of the Registrants Common Stock as of July 31, 2003
was 15,886,332 shares.



---





---

EXPLANATORY NOTE



This quarterly report on Form 10-Q/A amends our original quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2003
as of the date of filing the original Form 10-Q on August 6, 2003. We are amending the original quarterly report for the quarter ended August 6, 2003 to correct and restate the consolidated financial statements for the quarters ended June 30, 2003
and 2002. The restated numbers for the quarters ended June 30, 2003 and 2002 and a further explanation about the restatements are included in the annual report on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2003, which was filed on September 3,
2004.





---

SIGNATURES



Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the
undersigned thereunto duly authorized.



|                       |  |                                                                                 
|---------------------- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Date: October 26, 2004 |  | United PanAm Financial Corp.                                                    
|                       | 
|                       |  | /s/ Ray Thousand                                                                
|                       |  | Ray Thousand Chief Executive Officer and
President (Principal Executive Officer)
H. Res. 350

In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

April 28, 1998.

Whereas on February 4, 1948, the people of Sri Lanka

gained their independence from the British;

Whereas the people of Sri Lanka and the United States have

a common interest in the promotion and preservation of

democratic systems of government;

Whereas the people of Sri Lanka and the United States have

had many shared values and interests, including the desire to promote the peaceful development of the South

Asian region;

Whereas Sri Lankan citizens who have visited or lived in the

United States, and United States citizens who have visited or lived in Sri Lanka, have done much to improve

mutual understanding and build friendship over the past

fifty years;

Whereas United States citizens of Sri Lankan origin have

contributed greatly to the advancement of knowledge, the

development of the United States economy, and the enrichment of cultural life in the United States;

Whereas the ties of trade and investment between the United

States and Sri Lanka have grown over fifty years to the

benefit of the people of both countries; and
2

•HRES 350 EH

Whereas the fiftieth anniversary of the independence of Sri

Lanka offers an opportunity for Sri Lanka and the

United States to renew their commitment to international

cooperation on issues of mutual interest and concern:

Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives—

(1) congratulates the people of Sri Lanka on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of their nation’s independence; and

(2) looks forward to broadening and deepening

United States cooperation and friendship with Sri Lanka

in the years ahead for the benefit of the people of both

countries.

Attest:

Clerk.
As of: 8/19/21 10:45 AM 

PUBLIC SUBMISSION 

Docket: NIST-2021-0004 

Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework 

Comment On: NIST-2021-0004-0001 

Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework 

Document: NIST-2021-0004-DRAFT-0023 

Comment on FR Doc # 2021-1617 6 

Received: August 19, 2021 

Status: Pending_Post 

Tracking No. ksi-zprx-e6z8 

Comments Due: August 19, 2021 

Submission Type: Web 

Submitter Information 

Email: 

Government Agency Type: Foreign 

Government Agency: Infocomm Media Development Authority 

General Comment 

Please see attached document. 

Attachments 

AI RMF RFI Response V2.2
#### Narinder SINGH, a/k/a Narinder Singh Buhullar, Petitioner, v. BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, Respondent.

No. 03-40886.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Jan. 14, 2005.

Narinder Singh Buhullar, Flushing, NY, for Petitioner, pro se.

Richard E. Rosenberger, Assistant United States Attorney (Sarah S. Normand, Assistant United States Attorney, David N. Kelley, United States Attorney, on the *808brief), United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Respondent, of counsel.

PRESENT: KEARSE, CABRANES and SACK, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Petitioner seeks review of an October 20, 2003 order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen his immigration proceedings. He has also moved for a stay of deportation pending appeal, which this Court has granted.

Though petitioner’s brief raises arguments exclusively relating to the denial of his petition for asylum, this Court only has jurisdiction to review the denial of his motion to reopen, as that order is the basis of this appeal. *Zhao v. Dept. of Justice,*265 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir.2001). As to all other orders, the petition for review is untimely.

A party is limited to one motion to reopen, and it must be filed within 90 days after the rendering of the final administrative decision in the proceeding sought to be reopened. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). An exception is provided to this rule for aliens who are applying for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed country circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). It is undisputed that the motion to reopen which is the subject of this appeal is petitioner’s second motion to reopen and that it was filed more than 90 days after the final administrative decision in the original proceeding was issued, and petitioner has made no argument regarding any changed country circumstances. Accordingly, the motion to reopen was properly denied.

We have considered all of petitioner’s claims and found them to be without merit. We hereby DENY the petition for review. Accordingly, the stay of deportation previously entered is hereby lifted.
UN PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18
- 7138

DAVID MEYERS , Petitioner

- Appellant ,

v. DIRECTOR HAROLD CLARKE , Respondent

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia , at Roanoke

. James P. Jones , District Judge. ( 7 : 18

- cv
- 00435

- JPJ

- PMS )

Submitted : April 18, 2019 Decided: April 29, 2019

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
David Meyers, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: David Meyers appeals the district court’s order dismissing his petition for a writ of
mandamus. We have reviewed the record and find no abuse of discretion. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder , 379 U.S. 104, 111 n.8 (1984) (stating that issuance of writ of mandamus is a matter of discretion with the court to which the petition is addressed ). Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Meyers v. Clarke , 7:18

- cv
- 00435

- JPJ

- PMS (W.D. Va. Sept. 7, 2018). We also deny Meyers’ motions to
seal the case and for in camera assistance. We dispense with oral argument becau se the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED