EXHIBIT K

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 5:13-cv-0444-VAP-OPx Date April 14, 2020 

Title Quinton Gray v. County of Riverside 

 

Present: The Honorable VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

CHRISTINE CHUNG Not Reported 

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter 

 

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s): 

None Present None Present 

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) MINUTE ORDER GRANTING “EMERGENCY MOTION TO 

ENFORCE CONSENT DECREE” [DKT. 177]

On April 6, 2020, Plaintiff Quinton Gray (“Plaintiff”) filed a document captioned 

“Emergency Motion1 to Enforce Consent Decree.” (“Motion,” Dkt. 177). Pursuant to this 

Court’s April 8, 2020 Minute Order, (Dkt. 182), Defendant County of Riverside 

(“Defendant”) opposed the Motion on April 10, 2020 (“Opp.,” Dkt. 183). After 

considering all papers submitted in support of, and in opposition to, the Motion, as well 

as the arguments advanced during the telephonic hearing on April 13, 2020, the Court 

GRANTS the Motion. 

In 2016, the Parties entered into a Consent Decree “to ensure the provision of 

constitutional health care and to ensure non-discrimination for inmates with disabilities 

in the Riverside County Jails.” (Dkt. 173 ¶ 1). The plaintiff class includes three distinct 

subclasses: the medical subclass, which comprises “[a]ll prisoners who are now, or will 

in the future be, subjected to the medical care policies and practices of the Riverside 

 1 The Court notes that an “Emergency Motion” is procedurally improper. Plaintiff 

should have filed an ex parte application to shorten time for hearing on a motion, 

in conformance with Local Rule 7-19. In the interests of justice, the Court will 

treat Plaintiff’s Motion as though it had been filed properly. 

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Jails”; the mental health subclass, which comprises “[a]ll prisoners who are now, or will 

in the future be, subjected to the mental health care policies and practices of the 

Riverside Jails”; and the disability subclass, which comprises “all prisoners who are 

now, or will be in the future, subjected to policies and practices of the Riverside jails 

regarding specialized or sheltered housing for prisoners due to their mobility 

impairments and need for assistive devices, and the provision and confiscation of 

accommodations for prisoners with mobility impairments[.]” (Dkt. 173 ¶ 3). 

The Parties to the Consent Decree negotiated a Remedial Plan, which “is 

designed to meet the minimum level of health care necessary to fulfill Defendant’s 

obligations under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as to ensure nondiscrimination against inmates with disabilities in the areas addressed by the Plan, as 

required by the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” (Dkt. 173 ¶ 9). In light 

of the coronavirus (“COVID-19”) pandemic2, “Plaintiffs seek to enforce the Consent 

Decree by requiring the County to submit a plan to the Court to implement the 

Governor’s order for physical distancing for all Californians housed in the jails and to 

provide sanitation and other essential services generally accepted as necessary in 

correctional facilities to provide for the basic health needs of incarcerated people.” 

(Motion at 3-4). 

As Defendant argues, the Consent Decree specifies a dispute resolution process 

which provides that the Parties first conduct negotiations to resolve informally matters in 

dispute, then, if they are unable to resolve the dispute, to request that the Relevant 

Court experts evaluate the issue and prepare a report. Following preparation of this 

report, if the parties still are unable to resolve the issue, they may request mediation 

with Judge Raul Ramirez. Only after having mediated are the parties to file a motion for 

relief with this Court. (Dkt. 173 ¶¶ 26–29). Here, the parties have conducted the first 

two steps, but have not yet mediated. Nevertheless, “[g]iven the urgent nature of the 

proceedings, Plaintiffs request the Court modify the Consent Decree to allow for urgent 

appeal for enforcement directly to the Court.” (Motion at 17 n.2). 

 2 The pandemic has caused unprecedented disruption to daily life. On March 13, 

2020, the President of the United States declared a National Emergency in response to the Coronavirus Disease- 2019 (“COVID-19”) pandemic pursuant to 

the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq.). California Governor 

Gavin Newson has declared a state of emergency in response to the COVID-19 

outbreak and, in his March 19, 2020 Executive Order N-33-20, “require[d] physical distancing to keep Californians at least six feet apart at all times and to prepare hospitals and health care workers for the coming surge in cases.” (Motion 

at 2). 

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The Court finds good cause to modify the Consent Decree to permit appeal to 

this Court. “[A] party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the burden of 

establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree. . 

. . A party seeking modification of a consent decree may meet its initial burden by 

showing either a significant change either in factual conditions or in law.”” Rufo v. 

Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383–84 (1992). The party seeking 

modification need not prove the change in circumstance was “unforeseen and 

unforeseeable” at the time of entering into the consent decree, but “[o]rdinarily, . . . 

modification should not be granted where a party relies upon events that actually were 

anticipated at the time it entered into a decree.” Id. at 385 (emphasis added). Here, 

clearly, the emergency resulting from the pandemic constitutes a “significant change in 

circumstances” that was not actually foreseen at the time the parties entered into the 

Consent Decree. Id. at 383. 

The parties therefore meet the standard to modify the Consent Decree to permit 

appeal to this Court. In light of the urgency of the matter, the Court orders a two-track 

dispute resolution mechanism. The Parties are to proceed with mediation before Judge 

Ramirez on April 17, 2020, or an earlier date, if possible. (See Opp. at 10). The Court 

simultaneously assumes jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree to the extent 

specified in this Order. 

The Court next turns to Defendant’s obligations under the Consent Decree. 

Plaintiff seeks to enforce the Consent Decree’s mandate to “meet the minimum level of 

health care necessary to fulfill Defendant’s obligations under the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments,” (Dkt. 173 ¶ 9), by ensuring that Defendants implement the physical 

distancing recommendations made by the Court’s experts, (see Dkt. 178, Ex. J, Allen 

Expert Report, ¶¶ 9-10, 14-16; Dkt. 178, Ex. K, Gage Expert Report, ¶¶ 5-10.). Plaintiff 

argues that the County has several options available to limit the spread of the disease 

within the jails, including transferring prisoners to new, currently empty, John J. Benoit 

Detention Center (“JJBDC”) in Indio, California; relocating particularly vulnerable 

prisoners; and even release people to allow for physical distancing. (Motion at 4). At 

the hearing, Defendant did not have information regarding conditions in the existing 

county jail facilities, insisted that moving prisoners to a newly completed, empty jail in 

Indio was not feasible, and admitted that it had not researched alternative housing 

options such as recreation centers, halfway houses, and hotels. Rather than having 

created a plan to safeguard those most vulnerable to the COVID-19 virus, Defendant 

conceded that it has not conducted an analysis of its own records to identify particularly 

vulnerable prisoners. It also has not conducted an analysis of its jail population to 

determine whether there are any low-level offenders who might be eligible for early 

release. 

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Despite Defendant’s insistence that conditions in the Riverside County jails are 

compliant with public health recommendations regarding social distancing, its counsel 

lacked information to respond to the Court’s questions regarding the ability to maintain 6 

feet distance between all prisoners in the jail, at all times, its plan for doing so, the size 

of cells and dormitories, and the number of prisoners per room. 

Defendant failed to provide satisfactory information about the feasibility of transfer of prisoners to other jail or non-jail facilities, including transfers of prisoners currently 

confined in crowded jails to the new, empty, John J. Benoit Detention Center (“JJBDC”) 

in Indio, California. The County states that it is “not-yet-ready to be populated” but provides no details as to why. (Opp. at 13). The County stated at the hearing that the facility was completed in February 2020, but maintained that it is not yet ready for prisoners. 

In their papers and at the hearing, Defendant argued that “[t]he Sheriff’s Department is 

currently in the midst of a ninety day ‘transition period’ of the facility to determine 

whether any issues arise that will need to be resolved before JJBDC can be populated 

with inmates.” (Dkt. 183-4, “Graves Decl.” ¶ 4). The County states that the technology 

used in the JJBDC facility differs from that of other County facilities, but did not explain, 

in its papers or at the hearing, why this would prevent the transfer of inmates in an 

emergency situation. (Graves Decl. ¶ 5). 

Should the County be unable to implement adequate social distancing within its 

existing jail facilities and take other necessary steps to decrease risk of infection, this 

Court has the authority to order the transfer of prisoners to different facilities. Under 

California law, the Sheriff has the authority to relocate prisoners to respond to 

emergency situations: 

In any case in which an emergency endangering the lives of inmates of a 

state, county, or city penal or correctional institution has occurred or is imminent, the person in charge of the institution may remove the inmates 

from the institution. He shall, if possible, remove them to a safe and convenient place and there confine them as long as may be necessary to 

avoid the danger, or, if that is not possible, may release them. 

Other courts, including the Superior Court for the County of Sacramento County, already have ordered the Sheriff to use its authority under Cal. Gov't Code § 8658 to respond to the coronavirus emergency. See Order Authorizing Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department to Grant Release (Cal. Super. Ct., Sac. Cty., Mar. 25, 2020). 

Defendant argues that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) precludes this 

Court from ordering the release of prisoners. Even assuming this is true, nothing in the 

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PLRA prohibits a district judge from ordering the transfer of prisoners in response to violations of their constitutional rights, as the district court did in Brown v. Plata, 2013 WL 

3200587, No. C01-1351 TEH (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2013), nor would it prohibit the Court 

from ordering the Sheriff to use his authority under § 8658 to transfer prisoners. 

“[A]n order to transfer any single inmate out of a prison to correct the violation of 

a constitutional right” where a “transfer was necessary for the inmate to obtain appropriate medical care” is not a “prisoner release order,” but rather a transfer. Plata v. Brown, 

2013 WL 3200587 at *8. The same is true of “a policy that would result in transfer of a 

large group of inmates.” Id. Indeed, several potential courses of action qualify as 

“transfer” for the purposes of the PLRA. Relocation to halfway houses, for example, is a 

“transfer” rather than “release.” The PLRA defines a “residential reentry center” as a 

form of “prerelease custody.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(2)(B) (“A prisoner placed in prerelease custody pursuant to this subsection who is placed at a residential reentry center 

shall be subject to such conditions as the Director of the Bureau of Prisons [(BOP)] determines appropriate.”). Ninth Circuit case law assumes that a person in a “residential 

reentry center” is a “prisoner” and subject to BOP control. See, e.g., Bottinelli v. Salazar, 929 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1) as “requiring that 

the BOP, ‘to the extent practicable, ensure that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a portion of the final months of that term’ in prerelease custody”). 

In Plata v. Brown, the court declined to decide which standard governs the 

court’s review of such requests for transfer, finding that the Plata plaintiffs could satisfy 

the most burdensome standard. That standard “would require [them] to demonstrate 

that the [transfer] policy must be enforced because failure to do so would result in deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at *10. The Court makes no determination here as to whether Plaintiff has met this standard, but notes that the County’s 

recitation of “aggressive and swift” measures it has taken in response to COVID-19, 

none of which concern jails, suggests that the County’s failure to act to protect inmates 

does indeed constitute deliberate indifference. (Opp. at 16). The County’s assurances 

that it has provided unlimited free soap to prisoners and advised prisoners to remain 

physically distant—without establishing that it is physically possible to do so—is unlikely 

to be sufficient to defeat a claim of deliberate indifference (or sufficient to defeat the request to transfer prisoners for health reasons). 

In sum, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that it is currently taking adequate 

precautions to protect the health of the prisoners in the county jails. Plaintiff’s request 

that Defendant be required “to submit a plan to the Court to implement the Governor’s 

order for physical distancing for all Californians housed in the jails” (Motion at 3-4), is 

therefore GRANTED. 

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Plaintiffs are instructed to submit a proposed order detailing the findings and 

outstanding questions from the April 13, 2020 hearing no later than 4:00 p.m. on April 

15, 2020. Prior to submission to the Court, Plaintiff shall share the proposed order with 

Defendant, who may approve the it as to form and content or submit objections to Court 

thereafter. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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