IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth Ex Rel. :

Troy Connelly, :

Appellant :

: No. 1919 C.D. 2016

v. :

: Submitted: May 12, 2017

Robert Gilmore, et al. :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE JOSEPH M. COSGROVE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: August 25, 2017

Troy Connelly (Connelly) appeals, pro se, from the October 25, 2016 

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County (trial court) granting the 

motion of Robert Gilmore and associated defendants (Gilmore) to dismiss Connelly’s 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition). We affirm.

Background

On December 17, 2003, the Philadelphia County Court of Common 

Pleas sentenced Connelly to an aggregate term of 85 to 170 years’ imprisonment for 

convictions stemming from a series of criminal episodes that included kidnappings, 

rapes, and a robbery. He is presently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution 

at Greene (SCI-Greene).
2

In 2013, Connelly submitted a request to the Department of Corrections 

(DOC) for his sentencing order pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law,

1

and the DOC 

denied the request on the ground that the sentencing order did not exist within its 

possession, custody, or control. By adjudication dated October 16, 2013, the Office 

of Open Records affirmed the denial, relying on the attestation of the Records 

Supervisor at SCI-Greene who stated that, after conducting a search, she could not

locate Connelly’s sentencing order. 

On March 12, 2015, Connelly filed the Petition with the trial court, 

alleging that he is being confined without lawful justification because the DOC is not 

in possession of his sentencing order. On this theory, Connelly asserts that his 

continued confinement constitutes involuntary servitude in violation of Section 1 of 

the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. amend. 

XIII, §1, and an unlawful restraint in violation of section 2902 of the Pennsylvania 

Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. §2902. 

On April 27, 2015, after his Petition went unanswered by Gilmore, the 

Superintendent of SCI-Green, Connelly forwarded the Petition to the sheriff to 

effectuate service on Gilmore and the associated defendants. 

On July 31, 2015, Connelly filed a motion requesting that the trial court 

grant the Petition because Gilmore did not file an answer to the Petition. The trial 

court held an informal conference on February 4, 2016, with Connelly and the 

attorney for Gilmore. The trial court thereafter ordered a stay in the proceeding on 

February 8, 2016, pending the outcome of Connelly’s class-action lawsuit against the 

DOC, which asserted legal issues that were substantially similar to those raised in the 

Petition. 

 

1 Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§67.101 – 67.3104.
3

On February 12, 2016, Gilmore filed a motion to dismiss Connelly’s 

Petition, contending that the averred facts were insufficient to warrant relief. On 

October 25, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting Gilmore’s motion from 

which Connelly now appeals.2

Discussion

Connelly argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 

grant his Petition on the following grounds: (1) the trial court dismissed his Petition 

without a hearing; (2) Gilmore failed to timely respond to the Petition in violation of 

section 6504 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §6504, and thereby agreed by silence 

that Connelly is unlawfully detained; and (3) the trial court’s dismissal of the Petition 

constituted interference with a writ of habeas corpus in violation of section 6505 of 

the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §6505.

Initially, we note that “a claim that a defendant’s sentence is illegal due 

to the inability of the DOC to produce a written sentencing order related to [his] 

judgment of sentence constitutes a claim legitimately sounding in habeas corpus.” 

Joseph v. Glunt, 96 A.3d 365, 368 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). A writ of habeas corpus “is an extraordinary remedy that is available 

after other remedies have been exhausted or are ineffectual or nonexistent . . . [and] is 

not a substitute for appellate review.” Department of Corrections v. Reese, 774 A.2d 

1255, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2001). Primarily, “the writ of habeas corpus has functioned 

. . . to test the legality of the petitioner’s commitment and detention,” Commonwealth 

 

2

“Our standard of review of a trial court’s order denying a petition for [a] writ of habeas 

corpus is limited to [an] abuse of discretion.” Rivera v. Department of Corrections, 837 A.2d 525, 

528 (Pa. Super. 2003).
4

ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 280 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1971), and “lies to correct void or 

illegal sentences or an illegal detention.” Commonwealth ex rel. Butler v. Rundle, 

180 A.2d 923, 924 (Pa. 1962). 

Connelly first asserts that his confinement is illegal because the DOC is 

not in possession of his sentencing order and the trial court therefore erred in 

dismissing the Petition without convening a hearing. This argument, however, has 

been considered and rejected by both this Court and the Superior Court. 

In Travis v. Giroux, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 489 C.D. 2013, filed December 

18, 2013) (unreported), a prisoner argued in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

that “the DOC’s regulations and the Judicial Code require a sentencing order and 

other documentation before the DOC may confine an individual” and “because no 

sentencing order exists for his conviction, the DOC was without authority to confine 

him.” Slip op. at 7. On appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal of the prisoner’s

petition, concluding that “the absence of a sentencing order does not make his 

confinement illegal.” Id. Likewise, where a prisoner was unable to secure a copy of 

his sentencing order through the RTKL and thereafter filed a petition for habeas 

corpus, the Superior Court held that the prisoner “has no basis on which to argue that 

the DOC does not have the authority to incarcerate him merely because it does not 

possess a copy of his sentencing order.” O’Hara v. Giroux, (Pa. Super., No. 15 WDA 

2015, filed August 11, 2015) (unreported), slip op. at 6. The rationale supporting 

these decisions is that, even though the DOC does not possess a prisoner’s sentencing 

order, this fact fails to demonstrate that the prisoner was not convicted of or 

sentenced for a crime, and there is no legal authority, statutory or otherwise, that 

provides a prisoner with grounds for discharge in such a scenario. See Joseph, 96 

A.3d at 372 (stating that “the trial court correctly concluded that, even in the absence 
5

of a written sentencing order, the [DOC] had continuing authority to detain [the 

prisoner].”). 

Conversely, both this Court and our Superior Court have held that where 

the criminal docket sheet, or other comparable evidence, reflects that the prisoner was 

convicted and sentenced, there is “sufficient authority to maintain a prisoner’s 

detention notwithstanding the absence of a written sentencing order[.]” Joseph, 96 

A.3d at 372; see Travis, slip op. at 6.

This Court may take judicial notice of official court records and public 

documents in a connected case. See, e.g., Pa.R.E. 201(b)(2); Germantown Cab 

Company v. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 27 A.3d 280, 283 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2011); Doxsey v. Commonwealth, 674 A.2d 1173, 1174 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Upon 

our review, we note that the entries for criminal docket numbers CP-51-CR-0203521-

2002, CP-51-CR-0203531-2002, and CP-51-CR-0304071-2002 clearly evidence that 

Connelly was convicted of multiple criminal offenses and the trial court imposed 

various sentences consecutively totaling a final aggregate sentence of 85 to 170 

years’ imprisonment. (Docket Sheets, CR-0203521, at 4-5; CR-0203531, at 4; CR0304071, at 4.) In adjudicating Connelly’s federal habeas action, the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania cited notes of testimony from 

the sentencing hearing, observing: “On December 17, 2003, the trial judge sentenced 

Connelly to 85-170 years incarceration. Sentencing Transcript, December 17, 2003 

at 49-51.” Connelly v. Beard, (E.D. Pa., No. 09-4711, filed August 9, 2010), slip op. 

at 3. 

Moreover, Connelly previously filed an identical lawsuit, making the

same claims and arguments that he currently advances, in the form of a civil rights 

action which the defendants removed to the United States District Court for the 
6

Western District of Pennsylvania. In affirming the district court’s dismissal of 

Connelly’s complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 

recounted and determined:

 

On October 16, 2013, presumably in response to an inquiry, 

a records supervisor at SCI-Greene created an “Agency 

Attestation of Nonexistence of Records” form indicating 

that she was not in possession of the sentencing orders from 

Connelly’s state court cases. Thereafter, Connelly filed a 

complaint in the Greene County Court of Common Pleas 

against the Secretary of the DOC, alleging that, because the 

trial court never completed a written sentencing order, he 

was being illegally [confined] . . . .

Connelly does not contend that he was not convicted or 

sentenced by the Court of Common Pleas. Instead, he 

asserts that his confinement is illegal because there is no 

written sentencing order. Connelly argues that this 

omission invalidates the DOC’s authority to hold him in 

custody and that he thus is entitled to damages. However, 

the exhibits attached to the motion to dismiss demonstrate 

that the trial judge signed written sentencing orders in each 

of Connelly’s cases. In addition, the Clerk of Court drafted 

and signed multiple commitment sheets. Under these 

circumstances, we conclude that Connelly has not stated a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.

Connelly v. Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, (3d Cir., No. 

17-1444, filed April 27, 2017) (“Connelly I”), slip op. at 1-2.

3

 

In his appellate brief, Connelly asserts that he has “not been duly 

convicted or sentenced. A sentence is not imposed until it is reduced to a written 

Judgment signed by the sentencing Judge . . . .” (Connelly’s reply brief at 4.) 

However, this issue was also disposed of by the Third Circuit: 

 

3 Available at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7419, at *2-3.
7

The sentencing order for count three of CP-51-CR0304071-2002, which sentenced Connelly to ten to twenty 

years for kidnapping, is not signed. The sentencing order 

for the other count in CP-51-CR-0304071-2002, as well as 

the sentencing orders in all of the other cases, were signed 

by the judge. The omission does not deprive the document 

of legal effect. 

Connelly I, slip op. at 2 n.1; see also Boyd v. Department of Corrections, 831 A.2d 

779, 783 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). 

Under the case law of the Third Circuit and Pennsylvania, the dismissal 

of an action for failure to state a claim is a final judgment on the merits for purposes 

of res judicata and collateral estoppel, Post v. Hartford Insurance Co., 501 F.3d 154, 

169 (3d Cir. 2007); Brown v. Cooney, 442 A.2d 324, 326 (Pa. Super. 1982), and 

Pennsylvania state courts accord preclusive effect to federal court judgments. Bardo 

v. Department of Public Welfare, 397 A.2d 1305, 1307 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979). 

Because Connelly had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the above issues in his 

federal civil rights action, the Third Circuit’s determination that valid sentencing 

orders exist in all of his cases are factual and legal issues that have been firmly 

resolved. As such, this Court will afford the Third Circuit’s resolution of these issues

preclusive effect, see Day v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschfat, 464 A.2d 1313, 

1318-19 (Pa. Super. 1983); Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 357-61 (3d Cir. 

1999), or, in the alternative, will view the Third Circuit’s decision as probative 

evidence indicating that the sentencing orders do in fact exist. 

A hearing is not required where, as here, the petitioner’s allegations are 

refuted by the record and/or the law, or where the petition does not make out a prima 

facie case for allowing the writ. See Balsamo v. Mazurkiewicz, 611 A.2d 1250, 1253 

(Pa. Super. 1992); Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Claudy, 90 A.2d 382, 383 (Pa. 
8

Super. 1952). In light of the above, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Connelly’s Petition without holding a hearing. 

Next, Connelly argues that the trial court was obligated to grant his 

Petition and release him from confinement because Gilmore failed to file a timely 

response under section 6504 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §6504. Relatedly, 

Connelly contends that the trial court’s failure to do so constituted interference with a 

writ of habeas corpus in violation of section 6505 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. 

§6505. 

Section 6504 of the Judicial Code provides:

The writ, or the order to show cause why the writ should 

not issue, shall be directed to the person having custody of 

the person detained. It shall be returned within three days 

unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding 20 

days, is allowed. The person to whom the writ or the order 

is directed shall make a return certifying the true cause of 

the detention and, except as otherwise prescribed by general 

rules or by rule or order of court, shall produce at the 

hearing the body of the person detained.

42 Pa.C.S. §6504.

Section 6505 of the Judicial Code provides, in relevant part:

Any person who shall fail or refuse to respond to a writ or 

to an order under this chapter, or who shall change the place 

of detention of any person for the purpose of defeating the 

writ . . . or shall do any act for the purpose of defeating the 

writ or the order, commits a misdemeanor of the second 

degree.

42 Pa.C.S. §6505.

In the Petition, Connelly does not aver that the trial court issued a writ or 

an order to show cause to Gilmore and that Gilmore failed to respond to the writ or 

order. Rather, Connelly contends that Gilmore did not respond or file an answer to 
9

the Petition. However, section 6504 of the Judicial Code does not direct “the person 

having custody of the person detained,” i.e., Gilmore, to respond to the petition for 

habeas itself. Id. To the contrary, under section 6502 of the Judicial Code, “any 

judge of a court of record may issue the writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the 

cause of detention for any person or for any other lawful purpose.” 42 Pa.C.S. §6502. 

Thereafter, “[t]he writ, if issued, directs the restraining authority to produce the 

person and state the ‘true cause of the detention.’” Chadwick v. Caulfield, 834 A.2d 

562, 566 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quoting section 6504 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. 

§6504). According to the plain language of section 6504 of the Judicial Code, it is 

only after the trial court issues a writ, or ostensibly an order to show cause, that a

defendant has to file a response justifying the detention. 

In its statutory form, habeas corpus is a “civil remedy,” Commonwealth 

v. McNeil, 665 A.2d 1247, 1249-50 (Pa. Super. 1995), and section 6504 of the 

Judicial Code is a statutory rule that is further supplemented by the rules of civil 

procedure. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 133 (suspending statutes that are inconsistent with the 

civil rules). Pursuant to the civil rules, absent a rule to show cause, Gilmore was not 

legally required to respond to the Petition. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 206.6(a) (stating that a 

rule to show cause “shall direct that an answer be filed to the petition.”). Further, 

even if the trial court issued Gilmore with a rule to show cause, any failure on his part 

to file a timely answer would not automatically mandate that the trial court accept the 

facts in the Petition as admitted and grant the Petition. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 206.7(a) &

Note (stating that where there is a “failure to file or to timely file an answer,” the 

court may enter an “appropriate order,” but that order need not be “adverse” to the 

defendant). 
10

Indeed, the trial court “may disregard any error or defect of procedure 

which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 126. 

Following this rule, Pennsylvania courts have adopted a permissive view regarding 

the filing of untimely responsive pleadings, and the courts will disregard the 

untimeliness where the delay in filing does not prejudice the opposing party and 

especially when justice so requires it. See Peters Creek Sanitary Authority v. Welch,

681 A.2d 167, 170 (Pa. 1996); Gale v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 698 A.2d 

647, 650 (Pa. Super. 1997). Here, Connelly does not allege any prejudice as a result 

of Gilmore’s delay in filing an answer or response to the Petition. Given that

Connelly’s related class-action lawsuit was pending prior to filing the Petition, see

Parnell v. Wetzel, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1737 C.D. 2014, filed July 24, 2015) 

(unreported), the instant action was stayed by the trial court pending resolution of that 

lawsuit, and Gilmore filed his motion to dismiss in the interim, we can discern no 

concrete prejudice inuring to Connelly. Neither can we discern any error in the trial 

court’s procedural treatment and disposition of the Petition.

Finally, section 6505 of the Judicial Code is a criminal statute that makes 

it a misdemeanor of the second degree to interfere with a writ. 42 Pa.C.S. §6505. 

Even if this Court accepts, for the sake of the argument, Connelly’s rather dubious 

proposition that the trial court violated section 6505 in either failing to grant the 

Petition or issue a writ/rule to show cause, this statutory section does not create a civil 

cause of action, much less provide a textual basis upon which to grant the Petition 

and order Connelly’s release. Cf. Lindsay v. Thomas, 465 A.2d 122, 124-25 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1983) (declining to imply a remedy or cause of action into a statute where 

there was no provision evidencing the General Assembly’s intent to create a remedy 

or cause of action). Moreover, it is beyond cavil that Connelly lacks standing to 
11

institute criminal proceedings against the trial court. Despite the fact that an 

individual is a victim of a crime, the victim only acts as a prosecuting witness, and

“the state, represented by the District Attorney, is the party plaintiff in a criminal 

prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Malloy, 450 A.2d 689, 693 (Pa. Super. 1982). As 

such, Connelly cannot criminally prosecute a trial court in these habeas corpus 

proceedings, and we conclude that his arguments are baseless.

Conclusion

Having determined that Connelly’s assertions of error are meritless, we 

affirm the trial court’s order dismissing his Petition. 

 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

Judge Cosgrove concurs in result only.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commonwealth Ex Rel. :

Troy Connelly, :

Appellant :

: No. 1919 C.D. 2016

v. :

:

Robert Gilmore, et al. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 25th day of August, 2017, the October 25, 2016 order 

of the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County is affirmed. 

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge