UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 16-1613 (TJK)

USMAN JALLOH,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT UNDERWOOD et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Plaintiff Usman Jalloh filed this lawsuit against Defendants Robert Underwood, Arthur 

Kimball, Sean Miller, and Thomas Anderson. He alleges that Defendants—all police officers—

violated his rights by beating and then maliciously prosecuting him. To summarize their 

encounter: after a brief discussion over whether Jalloh was properly parked, Officer Underwood 

alleges that Jalloh hit him with his ice cream truck (which Jalloh denies). Officer Underwood 

and Sergeant Kimball chased Jalloh from the District of Columbia into Maryland, and—by then 

joined by Officers Miller and Anderson—stopped him and forcibly removed him from his truck. 

Jalloh alleges that the officers then beat him and denied him proper medical care (which the 

officers deny). Jalloh was later charged in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia with 

assaulting a police officer while armed, fleeing, and reckless driving, but the case was eventually 

dismissed without prejudice.

Officer Underwood and Sergeant Kimball, employed by the District of Columbia, and 

Officers Miller and Anderson, employed by Prince George’s County, Maryland, have filed 

renewed motions for partial summary judgment directed at Count II of the Amended Complaint, 

which alleges that Defendants failed to provide Jalloh with medical assistance following his 
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arrest, in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. For the reasons below, 

both motions are granted.

I. Legal Standard

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if a dispute over it “might affect the outcome of the suit under 

the governing law,” and a dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

248 (1986). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “go beyond the pleadings and by her 

own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

II. Analysis

A. Officer Underwood and Sergeant Kimball’s Motion

These Defendants argue that Jalloh must bring Count II under the Fifth, rather than 

Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, ECF No. 80-1 at 7–8.

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 To begin with, they are correct that 

 1 Officer Underwood and Sergeant Kimball also argue that Jalloh failed to seek leave of Court 

before filing his Amended Complaint. ECF No. 80-1 at 6. Counsel admits he should have so 

moved. ECF No. 86 at 3. But “leave to amend a complaint should be freely given in the absence 

of undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the opposing party, repeated failure to cure 

deficiencies, or futility.” See Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548–549 (D.C. Cir. 

1999) (citation omitted). The Court had already made clear in its prior opinion that it would 

“grant Jalloh leave to amend Count II” for the reasons discussed there. ECF No. 72 at 6. And 

allowing Jalloh leave to amend at this stage would not unduly delay the proceeding, substantially 

alter the scope and nature of the proceedings, or cause any prejudice to the parties. The Court 

therefore grants Jalloh leave to file the Amended Complaint, nunc pro tunc to the date on which 

it was filed.
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the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia, which employs them. 

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). And Jalloh has waived any argument that the 

Fourth Amendment applies. Although he continues to cite the Fourth Amendment as a basis for 

relief, ECF No. 75 ¶ 1, ¶ 69, he does not identify any law to support his Fourth Amendment 

claim nor has he responded to these Defendants’ arguments. When a plaintiff opposes a motion 

without addressing all of the movant’s arguments, the court “may treat [the unaddressed 

arguments] as conceded.” Hayes v. Dist. of Columbia, 923 F. Supp. 2d 44, 49 (D.D.C. 2013) 

(granting summary judgment on denial of medical care claim where plaintiff forfeited

arguments).

Even construed under the Fifth Amendment, though, Officer Underwood and Sergeant 

Kimball are entitled to summary judgment on Jalloh’s failure to provide medical assistance claim

in Count II. The Fifth Amendment’s due process clause creates an affirmative duty to provide 

medical care to an arrestee injured during an arrest. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 

U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Butera v. Dist. of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 645 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (due 

process claims apply through the Fifth Amendment to the District of Columbia). But to make 

out a substantive due process violation, the state actor’s behavior must be “so egregious, so 

outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Molina-Aviles v. 

Dist. of Columbia, 824 F. Supp. 2d 4, 9–10 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. 

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998)). To show a due process violation in the context of failure 

to provide medical treatment, a state actor must show “deliberate indifference” to the arrestee’s

condition. Cnty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 850. This “stringent” standard exists to 
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“differentiate substantive due process, which is intended only to protect against arbitrary 

government action, from local tort law.” Butera, 235 F.3d at 651.

These Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim. Jalloh has 

failed to show that they exhibited conscience-shocking “deliberate indifference” to his medical 

needs. Jalloh does not dispute Officer Underwood’s claim that Jalloh spoke to paramedics who 

arrived on the scene. ECF No. 80-7 ¶ 12; ECF No. 86 at 3. Nor does Jalloh raise a genuine issue 

of fact about whether he even asked for medical attention. In his response to these Defendants’ 

supplemental statement of material facts as to which there is no genuine issue, Jalloh did not

dispute that he “did not ask for medical assistance while he was at the scene.” See ECF No. 80-7 

¶ 3; ECF No. 86 at 3. And when asked in his deposition if he asked anyone there for medical 

help, he replied “No. I didn’t.” ECF No. 54-4 at 162:3–8.

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 Given these undisputed facts, these 

Defendants’ actions, whatever other disputes may exist about them, cannot have constituted

“deliberate indifference” that “may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” See 

also Hall v. Lanier, 671 F. Supp. 2d 103, 106 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing unconstitutional denial 

of medical care claim where plaintiff spoke with officers at the arrest scene and did not request 

medical treatment).

B. Officers Miller and Anderson’s Motion

Because they are employed by Prince George’s County, Maryland, Officers Miller and 

Anderson argue that Jalloh must bring Count II under the Fourteenth (rather than the Fifth) 

Amendment, and they are correct. City of Revere, 463 U.S. at 244. And although Count II 

 2 Jalloh did purport to dispute this point in his response to Officer Miller and Anderson’s 

statement of material facts as to which there is no genuine issue, but he cited no record evidence 

that creates such a dispute. ECF No. 79-1 at 7; ECF No. 85 at 4.
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references the Fourth Amendment in passing, Jalloh does not argue, or cite any case law for the 

proposition, that the Fourth Amendment provides a basis for this claim independent or different 

from the standards that apply to such a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Under these 

circumstances, the Court finds that Jalloh has waived any Fourth Amendment arguments to 

support Count II. See Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“It is not 

enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do 

counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.”) (citation 

omitted).

Like Officer Underwood and Sergeant Kimball, Officers Miller and Anderson are also 

entitled to summary judgment on Count II because no reasonable factfinder could conclude that 

their behavior violated the applicable stringent legal standard.3

 To repeat, Jalloh does not 

dispute that he spoke to paramedics who arrived on the scene. And he does not raise a genuine 

issue of material fact as to whether he even asked for medical attention. Thus, he has not shown 

that these Defendants’ actions could constitute “deliberate indifference” that “may fairly be said 

to shock the contemporary conscience.” See also Hall, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 106.

III. Conclusion and Order

For all these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Renewed Motions for 

Summary Judgment, ECF No. 79 and 80, are GRANTED, and Count II of the Amended 

 3 The Court is skeptical of these Defendants’ argument that there is no genuine issue of material 

fact whether they had a duty to provide medical care to Jalloh because he was never in their 

custody. See ECF No. 79-1 at 9. They themselves do not dispute Jalloh’s claim that he was 

placed in Officer Anderson’s cruiser at some point, which suggests otherwise. ECF No. 75 ¶ 35; 

ECF No. 79-1 at 6.
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Complaint is DISMISSED as to all Defendants. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the parties 

shall meet, confer, and submit a joint status report by April 16, 2021, advising the Court as to the 

parties’ interest in settling or mediating the case before proceeding to set a pretrial conference 

and trial date.

/s/ Timothy J. Kelly

TIMOTHY J. KELLY

United States District Judge

Date: March 2, 2021