alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Francis Bronger *v.*Hope Insurance Company.

Insurance — Contract—Assessment—Notice—Penalty.

Actual notice of assessment was all that the charter required and it appellant neglected to pay the same, he must be regarded as electing to suspend his right to collect his policy of insurance. Such suspension was an essential part of the contract.

APPEAL FROM LOUISVILLE CHANCERY COURT.

February 16, 1872.

Opinion of ti-ie Court by

Judge Lindsay:

The testimony of Bly, the witness of the appellant, shows that certain assessments were made against him which remained unpaid at the time of the loss of the property in sured. There is no evidence showing that such assessments were illegal or irregular.

*19
      *Gazlay Yeoman, & Reinecke, for appellant.*

*Wilson, for appellee.*

The evidence shows that notice of these assessments was sent to appellant through the post office, and his own admissions lead to the conclusion that such notice was received by him. As held in the case of *Muhoff vs. Hope Insurance Co.,*actual notice of a legal assessment was all that the charter required, and if appellant neglected for thirty days after such actual notice to pay the same, he must be regarded a-s electing to suspend his right to collect his policy of insurance in case of loss. And further that the suspension of the policy holder’s right to collect the amount of his loss in case it should occur during the time of such default, is not in the nature of a penalty. The charter makes such suspension an essential part of the contract, and the insurer cannot 'be heard to complain, that the company insists upon the enforcement of such condition.

Judgment affirmed.
9607.

#### Hearn *v.*The State.

Decided May 1, 1918.

Indictment for assault with intent to murder; from Harris superior court—Judge Howard. February 1, 1918.

*M. TJ.*Mooty, for plaintiff in error.

*O. F. McLaughlin, solicitor-general,*contra.

Broyles, P. J.

1. Where, upon the trial of one charged with assault with intent to murder, the judge, just as lie was about to charge the law relating to mutual combat, was informed by counsel for the accused (who was corroborated by counsel for the State) that, before making his argument to the jury, he asked the solicitor-general, not within the hearing of the court, if he insisted that the doctrine of mutual combat' entered into the case, and the solicitor-general replied that he did not think it did, and therefore he (counsel for the accused) did not in his argument discuss that theory, and that he felt, under the circumstances, “it would be unfair to the defendant .to submit that theory to the jury,” it was not error for the. court nevertheless to instruct the jury upon the law of mutual combat, provided such an instruction was authorized by the evidence or the defendant’s statement.

2. The excerpt from the charge complained of in the 2nd ground of the amendment to the motion for a new trial was authorized by the evidence and the defendant’s statement, and, under the note of the judge qualifying his approval of this ground of the motion, and in the light of the entire charge, was not erroneous for any reason assigned.

3. In view of the clear charge of the court upon the subject of stabbing, it was not error to fail to .charge the law of voluntary manslaughter, and -in connection therewith to instruct the jury that if the assault occurred under such circumstances as would have made the offense voluntary manslaughter had death ensued, the accused would not be guilty of assault with intent to murder, but would be guilty of the offense of stabbing only'.

4. Although the judge did not read to the jury section 65 of the Penal Code (1910), his charge upon the subject of stabbing was sufficient, in the absence of a timely written request for a fuller charge upon this subject.

5. The remaining ground of the amendment to the motion for a new trial, not having been argued in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error, is treated as abandoned.

6. The evidence authorized the verdict, and the cokrt did not err in refusing to grant a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bloodworth and Harwell, JJ., eoneur.*
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

I, Emanuel N. Hilario, Chief Financial Officer, in connection with the
Annual Report on Form 10-K of McCormick & Schmicks Seafood Restaurants, Inc. for the annual period ended December 29, 2007 (the Report), hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of McCormick & Schmicks Seafood Restaurants, Inc.



|                         
|-------------------------
|/s/    EMANUEL N.
HILARIO
|Emanuel N. Hilario       
|Chief Financial Officer  
|Dated: March 10, 2008
#### J. A. Goode's Admr. *v.*Elizabeth Goode.

Executions — Sale of Land — Transfer by Purchaser.

By the sheriff’s sale, the equity of the intestate in the land passed and by the transfer to Banister of Moore’s purchase he acquired the equity and when Mrs. Goode paid Banister for it she in equity was substituted to all his rights.

Vendor and Purchaser — Parol Sale of Land — Objection.

The parol evidence of the sale of the land was not objected to and if it had been the judgment and execution under which the sale was made would have been produced. The objection to the evidence comes too late, when it is made for the first time in the court of appeals.

APPEAL PROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT.

December 18, 1871.

Opinion by

Judge Peters :

By the evidence it is shown that the land claimed by appellee was sold by virtue of an execution against her late husband, the intestate, and the witness, Moore, purchased it at the sheriff's sale; that he transferred the benefit of his purchase to Banister, and he transferred, by parol *it may be, the beneñt of the same to appellant,*or to her and her husband, but however that was, it is very clear that appellee paid Banister for it, in part by conveying to him the land she inherited from her father, Mr. McCarty, and the residue out of money she had deposited in the Commercial Bank at Lebanon; that money she deposited in the bank as early as April, 1863, and paid to Banister the difference between the price of the land in controversy and what he allowed for her land out of the fund deposited in said bank.

By the sheriff’s sale the equity of intestate in the land passed, and by the transfer to Banister of Moore’s purchase he acquired that equity, and when Mrs. Goode paid Banister for it, she, in equity, was substituted to all his rights.

The parol evidence of the sale of the land was not objected to; if it had been it can scarcely be questioned that the judgment and execution under which the sale was made would have been produced. The objection to the evidence comes too late, when it is made for the first time in this court.

*658
      *W. B. Harrison, for appellant.*

*Noble, for appellee.*

As therefore appellee has paid for the land the court properly-adjudged it to her, and directed the sheriff who made the sale to convey it to her.

Wherefore the judgment is *affirmed.*
H. Res. 278

In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

October 28, 1997.

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall

be in order to consider the conference report to accompany

the bill (H.R. 1119) to authorize appropriations for fiscal

year 1998 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of

the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths

for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. All points of order against the conference report and

against its consideration are waived. The conference report

shall be considered as read.

Attest:

Clerk.
#### Jas. C. Rudd *v.*Geo. Weisinger.

Continuance — Affidavit Read as Evidence.

It is not error to refuse a continuance where by agreement of the parties the affidavit filed in support of a motion for a continuance is permitted to be read as evidence in the cause.

Attorney and Client — Jury to Fix Value of Service.

Where the employment of an attorney is fully proven and that he was to have a reasonable fee is well established, it is for the jury alone to determine what the services were worth.

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON COURT OF COMMON PLEAS.

February 7, 1872.

*Harrison, for appellant.*

*J. G. Wilson, W. O. Harris, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Pryor:

The only ground relied on for a new trial in the court below was the refusal on the part of the court to grant the appellant a continuance of the cause on the affidavit filed by his attorney. This affidavit, by consent of the appellee, was permitted to be read as evidence in the cause; it is true that the law permitting the affidavits to be read as a deposition had been enacted but a few days previously, but in this we can see no reason for rejecting the affidavit, and its being permitted to be read was in favor of the appellant, and to the prejudice of the appellee.

The employment of appellee as counsel is fully proven, and that he was to have a reasonable fee is equally as well established. It was for the jury alone to determine what appellee’s services were worth. The testimony authorized the verdict and the judgment of the court below is affirmed.
JUDGMENT

Court of Appeals 

 

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-15-00462-CV

POST OAK LANE TOWNHOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION, Appellant

V.

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON F/K/A THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS 

TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWABS SERIES 2003-BC1

AND WADE RINER, INDIVIDUALLY, Appellees

Appeal from the 11th District Court of Harris County (Tr. Ct. No. 2013-00567)

After due consideration, the Court grants the motion to dismiss this appeal filed 

by the appellant, Post Oak Lane Townhome Owners Association. It is therefore 

CONSIDERED, ADJUDGED, and ORDERED that the appeal be dismissed.

It is further ORDERED that appellant pay all costs incurred by reason of this 

appeal. 

It is further ORDERED that this decision be certified below for observance.

Judgment rendered July 28, 2015.

Judgment rendered by panel consisting of Chief Justices Radack and Justices 

Higley and Massengale.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

OUYEINC LTD.,

Plaintiff,

v.

1Baaaai and et al., 

Defendants.

Case No. 20 cv 3488

NOTICE OF DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 41(a)(1)

Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Ouyeinc Ltd.

(“Ouyeinc” or “Plaintiff”) hereby dismisses this action with prejudice pursuant to settlement as 

to the following Defendants:

Defendant Name Line No.

vivian_shop 243

wenzhoushengdexinxikejiyouxiangongsi 250

star sky 215

Dazone Toontor 53

opretty 170

iGeTek 110

FreeTom 86

Becuu 20

best2016 24

Case: 1:20-cv-03488 Document #: 49 Filed: 09/01/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:212
Dannimohua 51

Shenzhenshiwantengkejiyouxiangongsi 201

chenchen88 36

DATED September 1, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James A. Karamanis

James A. Karamanis

Barney & Karamanis, LLP

Two Prudential Plaza

180 N. Stetson, Ste 3050

Chicago, IL 60601

Tel.: 312/553-5300

Attorney No. 6203479

James@bkchicagolaw.com

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF Ouyeinc Ltd.

Case: 1:20-cv-03488 Document #: 49 Filed: 09/01/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:213
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#### William H. Cord *v.*Newman A. Glasscock, etc.

Attorney and Client — Lien for Fee Notice to Defendant.

The demand, in this case not being for the recovery of incidental damages, hut for property, and a claim in money on which $200 was paid, on the compromised judgment, the appellee had a lien thereon for his fee as the plaintiff’s attorney, of which the pendency of the suit was notice to the defendant.

APPEAL FROM THE FLEMING CIRCUIT COURT.

October 21, 1871.

*Cord, for appellant.*

Andrews, *for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Hardin :

The demand in this case not being for the recovery of incidental damages, but for property, and a claim in money on which $200 were paid on the compromise judgment, the appellee had a lien thereon for his fee as the plaintiff’s attorney, of which the pendency of the suit was notice to the defendants according to the decision of this court in the case of *Stephens & Hermes v. Farrar Brothers, 4 Bush*13, and the lien was properly asserted by the motion for a rule on the grounds disclosed, and the court therefore erred in refusing to. award the rule for the purpose of litigating the defendant’s claim.

Therefore the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
| Exhibit 99.4 **SASCO Series 2004-9XS****Aggregate Statement of Principal and Interest Distributions to****Certificateholders****for January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004****Ending Principal****Class****Principal****Interest****Balance**LT1-R 0.00 0.00 0.00 LT2-R 0.00 0.00 0.00 1-A1A 52,627,097.81 926,974.45 53,236,902.19 1-A1B 14,618,803.99 290,690.97 14,788,196.01 1-A2A 0.00 451,537.20 20,904,500.00 1-A2B 0.00 441,781.76 20,904,500.00 1-A3A 0.00 753,333.36 20,000,000.00 1-A3B 0.00 532,749.44 18,413,000.00 1-A4A 0.00 1,130,533.36 30,500,000.00 1-A4B 0.00 581,497.44 15,946,000.00 1-A4C 0.00 275,000.00 7,500,000.00 1-A4D 0.00 360,666.64 10,000,000.00 1-A5 0.00 1,092,115.84 29,149,000.00 1-A6 0.00 1,152,076.80 34,288,000.00 1-M1 0.00 375,483.44 10,004,000.00 1-M2 0.00 291,040.00 7,276,000.00 2-A1 9,933,452.19 3,033,685.90 99,916,547.81 2-M1 0.00 76,700.00 2,301,000.00 2-M2 0.00 60,375.04 1,725,000.00 CERT-INS 0.00 47,952.08 0.00 M3 0.00 167,650.00 4,790,000.00 P 0.00 234,639.30 100.00 R 0.00 0.00 0.00 X 0.00 5,012,887.85 403,318,527.01 Reserve Fund 0.00 0.00 1,000.00 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-7189

LEVON STOKES, Petitioner - Appellant, versus THOMAS R. CORCORAN, Warden; ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge. (CA98-3962-DKC) Submitted: January 13, 2000 Decided: January 19, 2000 Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Levon Stokes, Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr., AttorneyGeneral, Ann Norman Bosse, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the district court’s order is “stamped” July 30, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was entered on the docket sheet on August 2, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 2 PER CURIAM:Levon Stokes seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny Stokes’ motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See Stokes v. Corcoran , No. CA-98-3962-DKC (D. Md. Aug. 2, 1999). * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondent

v. BEAU WILLIAM CHERMER, Petitioner : : : : : : : : : : : No. 486 WAL 2014 Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW , this 10th day of March, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED
.
Smith Barney Futures Management LLC
                         388 Greenwich Street, 7th Floor
                          New York, New York 10013-2396

June 11, 2001



Graham Capital Management, L.P.
Stamford Harbour Park
333 Ludlow Street
Stamford, Ct. 06902

Attention:  Mr. Kenneth G.  Tropin

     Re: Management Agreement Renewal

Dear Mr. Tropin:

     We are writing with respect to your  management  agreement  concerning  the
commodity pool to which reference is made below (the "Management Agreement"). We
are extending the term of the Management Agreement through June 30, 2002 and all
other provisions of the Management Agreement will remain unchanged.

o        Smith Barney Global Markets Futures Fund
o        Smith Barney Diversified Futures Fund L.P. II
o        Smith Barney Diversified Futures Fund L.P.
o        Salomon Smith Barney Diversified 2000 Futures Fund L.P.

     Please acknowledge receipt of this modification by signing one copy of this
letter and returning it to the attention of Mr. Daniel  McAuliffe at the address
above or fax to  212-723-8985.  If you have any  questions  I can be  reached at
212-723-5435.

Very truly yours,

SMITH BARNEY FUTURES MANAGEMENT LLC


By:       /s/ Daniel R. McAuliffe, Jr.
         ------------------------------------
         Daniel R. McAuliffe, Jr.
         Chief Financial Officer & Director


AGREED AND ACCECPTED

GRAHAM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT L.P.

By:        /S/ Kenneth G.  Tropin
         ------------------------------------

Print Name:    Kenneth G.  Tropin
             --------------------------------
                Chief Financial Officer

DRMcA/sr
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<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED SOVEREIGN
SPECIALTY CHEMICALS INC.'S JUNE 30, 1999 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED
IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
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