1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMILEH B.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

1

Defendant.

No. 20 CV 2481

Magistrate Judge McShain

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jamileh B. brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial 

review of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) decision denying her application 

for benefits. For the following reasons, the Court grants plaintiff’s request to reverse 

the SSA’s decision and remand this case to the agency [15],2 denies the Commissioner 

of Social Security’s request to affirm the SSA’s decision [20], and reverses the SSA’s 

decision.

Background

In early June 2015, plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability 

and disability insurance benefits, alleging an onset date of August 14, 2012. [14-3] 

204. Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. [Id.]. Plaintiff 

requested a hearing, which was held by an administrative law judge (ALJ) on August 

3, 2017. [Id.]. In a decision dated October 25, 2017, the ALJ ruled that plaintiff was 

not disabled. [Id.] 211. The Appeals Council denied review on June 8, 2018, making 

the ALJ’s decision the agency’s final decision. [14-1] 1-4. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955, 

404.981.

1 In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Kilolo Kijakazi, the Acting Commissioner of Social 

Security is substituted as the defendant in this case in place of the former Commissioner of 

Social Security, Andrew Saul.

2 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers 

are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings, with the exception of citations 

to the administrative record [14], which refer to the page numbers in the bottom right corner 

of each page.

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Plaintiff timely appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois. See Jamileh B. v. Berryhill, 1:18-cv-5306 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2018) [1]. The 

Commissioner filed an agreed motion for reversal with remand for further 

administrative proceedings, which the district court granted. Id. [26], [28]. The 

district court instructed the Commissioner on remand to: (a) reconsider the functional 

capacity evaluation and certain medical opinions; (b) reconsider plaintiff’s ability to 

perform her past relevant work; and (c) offer plaintiff the opportunity to complete the 

administrative record resolving the above issues, and issue a new decision. Id. [28]. 

Plaintiff reappeared for a second hearing, which was held by an ALJ on 

October 28, 2019. [14-11] 1019. In a decision dated December 26, 2019, the ALJ on 

remand ruled that plaintiff was disabled for a closed period from April 23, 2015,

through December 13, 2017. [Id.] 1033. The ALJ ruled that plaintiff was not disabled, 

at any time, between December 15, 2017, and December 31, 2017, the latter date 

being plaintiff’s date last insured (“DLI”). [Id.] 1038. Plaintiff did not file written 

exceptions with the Appeals Council and the Appeals Council did not review 

plaintiff’s case on its own within sixty days after the date of the ALJ’s decision, 

making the ALJ’s decision the agency’s final decision. [14-11] 1015. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.955, 404.981.

Plaintiff timely appealed to this Court. [1]. The Court has jurisdiction to review 

the Acting Commissioner’s decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

3

Legal Standard

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as “the inability to engage 

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical 

or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted 

or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ conducts a sequential

five-step inquiry: (1) whether the claimant has performed any substantial gainful 

activity during the period for which he claims disability; (2) whether the claimant has 

a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the claimant’s 

impairment meets or equals any listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant can 

perform his past relevant work (i.e., the claimant retains the residual functional 

capacity (RFC) to perform his past); and (5) whether the claimant is unable to perform 

any other available work in light of his age, education, and work experience (i.e., able 

to perform any other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy). 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4) & 416.920(a). “An affirmative answer leads either to 

the next step, or on Steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A 

3 The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction in this case by a United States 

Magistrate Judge. [8].

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negative answer at any point, other than Step 3, ends the inquiry and leads to a 

determination that the claimant is not disabled.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 

(7th Cir. 2000).

“The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially to determine if it is 

supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Substantial evidence is a 

standard that “requires more than a mere scintilla of proof and instead such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Walker v. Berryhill, 900 F.3d 479, 482 (7th Cir. 2018). Substantial evidence is “not a 

high threshold: it means only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 

2021) (quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019)). But the standard 

“is not entirely uncritical. Where the Commissioner’s decision lacks evidentiary 

support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review, the case must be 

remanded.” Brett D. v. Saul, No. 19 C 8352, 2021 WL 2660753, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 

29, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Berger v. Astrue,

516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2008) (“When an ALJ recommends that the agency deny

benefits, it must first ‘build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to the

conclusion.’”) (internal citation omitted).

The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ awarded plaintiff benefits in part, finding she was disabled only from 

April 23, 2015, through December 13, 2017. [14-11] 1020. Relevant to this appeal, the 

ALJ found that during that two-year, seven-month period plaintiff had the following 

severe impairments: a right and left shoulder injury and diabetes; plaintiff’s bilateral 

shoulder conditions medically equaled listing 1.02(b) until May 30, 2016; and between 

May 31, 2016, and December 13, 2017, plaintiff had the ability to perform light work 

with some limitations. [Id.] 1021, 1031. Specifically, the ALJ found plaintiff could 

occasionally: flex, extend, and rotate the cervical spine, reach overhead bilaterally, 

crouch, and squat. [Id.] 1031. The ALJ also stated plaintiff could frequently reach in 

all other directions and perform fine and gross manipulation, bilaterally. [Id.]. 

Finally, the ALJ found, plaintiff could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolding. [Id.]. 

The ALJ found that based on plaintiff’s RFC there were no jobs that existed in 

significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could have performed and 

therefore, concluded plaintiff was disabled. [Id.] 1033. The ALJ noted even if plaintiff 

had the RFC to perform a full range of light work, she was disabled by direct 

application of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines. [Id.].

The ALJ concluded, however, that plaintiff’s disability ended December 14, 

2017, due to medical improvement. [Id.] 1034. Specifically, the ALJ found that while 

plaintiff could still only perform light work, she no longer had limitations in flexing, 

extending, or rotating her cervical spine, and therefore could perform jobs including 

the semiskilled occupations of timekeeper, pricer, and contract clerk. [Id.] 1035-38. 

In support of this RFC finding, the ALJ cited treatment records showing plaintiff had 

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no musculoskeletal abnormalities or complaints during appointments in November 

and December 2017. [Id.] 1034. The ALJ also emphasized that on December 13, 2017, 

plaintiff completed an exercise stress test which demonstrated plaintiff had normal 

extremities. [Id.]. The ALJ noted that on April 28, 2018, plaintiff underwent a 

rheumatology evaluation which showed plaintiff having a full range of motion, intact 

motor strength, intact grip strength, and, again, no shoulder or musculoskeletal 

abnormalities. [Id.] 1034-35. While the ALJ acknowledged “there were few objective 

findings during this time,” referring to the timeframe of December 13, 2017, to

December 30, 2017, the ALJ nonetheless concluded that plaintiff’s “history of 

multiple shoulder surgeries supports these ongoing limitations, but does not justify 

greater limitations.” [Id.] 1035-36.

The ALJ’s RFC analysis considered the physical capacity questionnaire 

conducted by treating rheumatologist Dr. Diana Sandler, who recommended 

significant restrictions. But the ALJ ultimately gave Dr. Sandler’s opinion no weight. 

[Id.] 1036-37. Dr. Sandler stated plaintiff could use her hands to grasp, turn, and 

twist objects, her fingers to finely manipulate, and her arms to reach overhead only 

10% of the time during an 8-hour workday and that plaintiff would be absent from 

work four days per month because of her impairments. [14-19] 1869-70. The ALJ 

found that although plaintiff began to “show more objective signs of arthritis or 

fibromyalgia in 2018, this was after the [DLI]” and evidence prior to the DLI shows 

plaintiff had “relatively intact functioning, which does not support” Dr. Sandler’s 

significant limitations. [14-11] 1036-37. The ALJ also considered plaintiff’s testimony 

that she continued to have debilitating pain in her shoulders, as well as arthritis or 

fibromyalgia that prevented her from working. But the ALJ ultimately found 

plaintiff’s statements inconsistent because the record evidence did not show plaintiff 

had significant functional limitations prior to plaintiff’s DLI. [Id.] 1035. While the 

ALJ acknowledged plaintiff’s complaints of shoulder pain in 2016, she pointed out 

that plaintiff stopped describing shoulder pain to her physicians in 2017 and

examinations in 2018 showed no shoulder or musculoskeletal abnormalities. [Id.]. 

At Step Five, the ALJ found that as a former mortgage loan processor, a skilled 

position, plaintiff acquired skills that would transfer to the semiskilled job of a 

timekeeper, pricer, or contract clerk with little, if any, adjustment given how similar 

these jobs are to a mortgage loan processor. [Id.] 1038. The ALJ, referring to the 

vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony, listed the specific skills associated with the 

mortgage loan processor position, those being “verbal recording, record keeping, use 

of office equipment, [and] verifying information.” [Id.] 1037. However, the ALJ did 

not explain how the listed skills associated with a mortgage loan processor aligned or 

resembled the skills of any of the three positions the VE identified. [Id.] 1038.

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Discussion

Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s decision makes two reversible errors: (1) the ALJ 

failed to apply a “disability freeze” to her disability insurance benefits and (2) the 

ALJ’s findings related to whether plaintiff has transferable work skills are 

unsupported by substantial evidence. [15] 8, 11-13. The Court agrees with plaintiff 

and finds that, due to errors made by the ALJ, substantial evidence does not support 

the decision to deny benefits and that the case must be remanded for further 

proceedings. 4

I. The ALJ’s Failure to Shift Plaintiff’s Date Last Insured Based on 

Established Period of Disability is Not Harmless Error. 

Plaintiff argues that after the ALJ found plaintiff disabled from April 23, 2015 

to December 13, 2017, a period of thirty-one months, the ALJ should have shifted her 

DLI based on this established period of disability, also known as applying a “disability 

freeze.” [15] 8. Because of that established period of disability, plaintiff asserts her 

insured status should have been extended through September 2019. [Id.] 9. Plaintiff 

alleges that during this period of extended coverage, she developed hand impairments

that make her unable to perform jobs the ALJ identified at Step Five which require 

frequent hand use. [Id.] 10. Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s failure to apply a freeze and 

evaluate plaintiff’s subsequent impairments in calculating plaintiff’s RFC is thus not

harmless error and is outcome-determinative. [Id.]. The Commissioner responds that 

the ALJ’s failure to apply a disability freeze is harmless because the ALJ discussed 

medical evidence of plaintiff’s condition after her DLI, including plaintiff’s hand pain 

allegations, and nonetheless concluded plaintiff was not disabled after December 14, 

2017. [20] 6-7.

A disability freeze preserves a plaintiff’s insured status during a period of 

disability. Program Operations Manual Sys. (“POMS”) DI 25501.240 Disability 

Freeze & Established Onset, Soc. Sec. Admin. The purpose of a disability freeze is 

“[t]o eliminate the years of low earnings (due to a worker’s disability) from the 

computation of benefits and to preserve the worker's insured status.” POMS DI 

10105.005 Eligibility for Disability Ins. Benefits (DIB) or the Disability “Freeze,” Soc. 

Sec. Admin; see also Ransom v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 1326, 1331 (7th Cir. 1988). Freeze 

periods protect insured status by reducing the number of quarters needed for insured 

status or prolonging the period for which disability insured status is met. POMS RS 

00605.215(B) Effects of a Period of Disability, Soc. Sec. Admin. To qualify for a 

disability freeze the claimant must: (1) be insured as required by the disability 

provisions; (2) file an application for disability determination; (3) be under a disability 

as defined by the statute; and (4) wait five months. POMS DI 10105.005.

4 Because these issues are dispositive, the Court need not address plaintiff’s other arguments.

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Plaintiff met the insured status under the disability provisions through 

December 31, 2017, which is the date the ALJ used as plaintiff’s deadline for 

establishing disability. [14-11] 1049. The ALJ evaluated plaintiff’s impairments up 

to this date to determine plaintiff’s RFC and whether plaintiff could perform her past 

relevant work or other work. [Id.] 1035-37. If the ALJ had applied a disability freeze, 

plaintiff would have had until September 2019 to establish disability. See Ford v. 

Colvin, 1:14–CV–01046–RGA, 2015 WL 4608136, at *6 (D. Del. July 31, 2015)

(finding if the ALJ applied a disability freeze plaintiff would have an additional two 

years beyond plaintiff’s date last insured to establish disability).

The Court concludes that the ALJ’s failure to apply a disability freeze to extend 

plaintiff’s DLI through September 2019 is not harmless error. If plaintiff had until 

September 2019 to establish her disability, the ALJ would have had to “evaluate all 

relevant evidence” when determining plaintiff’s RFC through this period. Arnett v. 

Astrue, 676 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 2012). While the ALJ considered evidence of 

plaintiff’s current functioning, that is, evidence from after the expiration of plaintiff’s 

insured status on December 31, 2017, the administrative hearing testimony and the 

ALJ’s decision make clear the ALJ considered this evidence only to determine 

whether an impairment existed prior to plaintiff’s DLI. [14-11] 1035-37, 1066. The 

ALJ’s consideration of such evidence for this purpose is ordinarily appropriate. See 

Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 924-25 (7th Cir. 2010) (reversing where the ALJ did 

not consider evidence regarding claimant’s current condition to determine the 

severity of plaintiff’s impairments before her insured status expired). However,

evaluating evidence post-dating a plaintiff’s DLI for this purpose is distinct from 

evaluating evidence to determine plaintiff’s impairments and RFC at the outset, that 

is, to determine whether plaintiff is currently disabled. See Schloesser v. Berryhill, 

870 F.3d 712, 717-18 (7th Cir. 2017).

The Court concludes that had the ALJ applied the disability freeze and 

evaluated evidence related to plaintiff’s hand impairments—evidence post-dating 

December 31, 2017—in crafting plaintiff’s RFC and identifying jobs plaintiff could 

perform, the ALJ could have concluded plaintiff was disabled. First, evidence of 

plaintiff’s hand impairments through September 2019 likely would have affected the 

ALJ’s identification of impairments at Step Two of her analysis. During the second 

administrative hearing, plaintiff’s counsel pointed out that after plaintiff’s DLI, 

treating rheumatologist Dr. Sandler evaluated plaintiff noting “arthritis, pain in the 

hands, swelling, [and] stiffness.” [14-11] 1065. The ALJ responded, “That sounds like 

a new impairment, the arthritis in the hands,” adding that plaintiff’s “treatment 

started . . . after the [DLI] . . . in 2018.” [Id.] 1066. The ALJ’s testimony indicates that 

had plaintiff’s DLI been extended through at least 2018, when plaintiff began 

treatment for rheumatoid arthritis symptoms, the ALJ would have considered 

arthritis among plaintiff’s impairments. [14-19] 1865. The ALJ in turn would have 

had to consider that impairment in determining plaintiff’s RFC at Step Four,

regardless of whether the ALJ would conclude the impairment was severe. Judy M. 

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v. Kijakazi, 21 C 2028, 2023 WL 2301448, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2023) (“[w]hen 

determining a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider all medically determinable 

impairments, including those that are not severe” and “must also consider all the 

effects and limitations resulting from those impairments.”)(citing Craft v. Astrue, 539 

F.3d 668, 676 (7th Cir. 2008); Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 807 (7th Cir. 2014)). A 

decision that fails to consider evidence relating to plaintiff’s hand impairment, even 

if that evidence is “very sparse,” would be cause for remand. Herron v. Shalala, 19 

F.3d 329, 333-34 (7th Cir. 1994) (reversing where ALJ did not explain the rejection 

of claimant’s hand pain allegations and failed to consider evidence related to 

claimant’s hand impairment).

Second, the ALJ’s consideration of evidence related to plaintiff’s hand 

impairment post-dating December 31, 2017, would undoubtedly impact Step Five of 

her analysis. During the second administrative hearing, the ALJ asked the VE

several hypotheticals to assess whether plaintiff could perform her past work as a 

mortgage loan processor or other work. [14-11] 1062, 1069-70, 1074. In each 

hypothetical the ALJ posed, the individual’s RFC included frequent fine and gross 

manipulation. [Id.]. Based on the ALJ’s hypotheticals and plaintiff’s transferable 

skills, the VE concluded plaintiff could work as a timekeeper, pricer, or contact clerk. 

[Id.] 1071. The VE also testified that the jobs he identified would involve computer 

typing and require frequent reaching, handling, and fingering. [Id.] 1072-73. The ALJ 

then concluded, in her decision, that plaintiff could perform these three positions. 

[Id.] 1037-38. Considering evidence of plaintiff’s hand impairment, particularly 

plaintiff’s hand pain allegations and her rheumatologist’s evaluation which stated 

plaintiff could use her hands to grasp, turn, and twist objects and fingers to finely 

manipulate only 10% of the time during an 8-hour workday, the ALJ would have, at 

a minimum, been required to address the VE’s testimony that the identified positions 

required frequent handling and fingering. [14-19] 1814, 1869-70. See Martinez v. 

Astrue, 630 F.3d 693, 696-97 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversing where ALJ failed to “mention 

the difficulty that plaintiff has in using her hands mak[ing] the ALJ’s suggestion that 

she could be a ‘hand assembler’ amount to a bad joke.”); see also Smith v. Apfel, 231 

F.3d 433, 438 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing where ALJ failed to address the VE’s 

testimony that the forklift driver position required “frequent to constant” use of 

plaintiff’s right ankle to operate the foot controls, considering his most recent x-ray 

indicated mild to moderate degeneration in that precise area). 

To summarize, if the ALJ applied a freeze and plaintiff had until September 

2019 to establish disability, the ALJ would have recognized arthritis among plaintiff’s 

impairments and accounted for plaintiff’s arthritis in crafting her RFC and 

identifying jobs plaintiff could perform, jobs that likely would not require frequent 

handling and fingering. Therefore, the Court cannot find the ALJ’s error in failing to 

extend plaintiff’s DLI, based on plaintiff’s established disability period, harmless. 

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II. The ALJ’s Conclusions Regarding Plaintiff’s Transferable Skills 

Are Not Supported by Substantial Evidence. 

Plaintiff also alleges the ALJ made several errors in concluding plaintiff could 

perform other jobs: (a) failing to find plaintiff acquired skills from past work before 

concluding she could perform the skilled positions of general and dividend clerk 

during the August 14, 2012, through June 10, 2014 timeframe; and (b) failing to 

explain what the work skills of the identified occupations were, how plaintiff’s 

acquired skills would transfer to those occupations, and why minimal vocational 

adjustment would be required considering plaintiff’s advanced age and medical 

impairments, during the December 13 to December 31, 2017 timeframe. [15] 11-13.

The Commissioner responds any error in finding plaintiff could perform semiskilled 

and skilled work, without a finding of transferable skills is harmless because plaintiff 

had the same RFC both before and after she turned 55 years old in June 2014. [20] 

7-8. The Commissioner explains that given plaintiff had the same RFC, she could 

perform the identified jobs after she turned 55 years old that she could perform before 

she turned 55 years old. [Id.]. To plaintiff’s other transferable skills arguments, the 

Commissioner responds that plaintiff offers no contradictory vocational evidence that 

the skills identified by the VE were not transferable to the jobs the VE identified or 

that there was more than little, if any, vocational adjustment required. [Id.] 9.

Plaintiff replies the ALJ’s errors are not harmless because for the period post-dating 

June 12, 2014, plaintiff being 55 years or older and limited effectively to sedentary 

work, “there must be very little if any vocational adjustment required” to find plaintiff 

has “skills transferable to sedentary occupations,” like those the ALJ identified. [15] 

13 (citing Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 82-41(4)(c)).

“‘Transferability’ is defined as ‘applying work skills which a person has 

demonstrated in vocationally relevant past jobs to meet the requirements of other 

skilled or semiskilled jobs.’” Key v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1056, 1062 (7th Cir. 1991)

(quoting SSR 1982(2)(b) (1979); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)). To find a claimant’s skills 

transferable to other jobs, an ALJ must determine whether the skilled activities that 

the claimant performed in her past work can be used to “meet the requirements of 

other jobs, based on the similarity of the occupationally significant work that both 

jobs require.” Benoit v. Colvin, 13-CV-4482, 2016 WL 1073050, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 

17, 2016) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568(d)). Specifically, the “ALJ must identify the 

claimant’s acquired work skills and the specific occupations to which the acquired

work skills are transferable.” Id. “The transferability of skills is a determination 

entrusted to the ALJ, not the VE” and courts “review the actual reasons given by the 

ALJ without speculating about what the ALJ might have considered.” Abbott v. 

Astrue, 391 Fed. App’x 554, 558-559 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted).

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Here, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff could perform other jobs during several 

distinct periods. In the first period, August 14, 2012, through June 10, 2014, the ALJ 

concluded plaintiff could perform the semiskilled position of general clerk and skilled 

position of dividend clerk. [14-11] 1027. However, in coming to this conclusion the 

ALJ’s decision did not list any of plaintiff’s acquired skills or explain whether those 

skills were similar to those required for either the skilled or semiskilled positions the 

ALJ identified. [Id.]. This was error as the ALJ was required to identify plaintiff’s 

specific work skills before concluding plaintiff could perform these positions. See 

Abbott, 391 Fed. App’x at 558 (reversing where ALJ did not list the specific skills 

associated with claimant’s past relevant work, but only stated that claimant’s past 

relevant work was skilled and claimant had transferable work skills); see also Key, 

925 F.2d at 1062-63 (same). 

Moving to the final period, December 13, 2017, through December 31, 2017, 

the ALJ found that plaintiff’s work skills (which she identified as verbal recording, 

record keeping, use of office equipment, and verifying information) were transferable 

to other occupations such as being a time keeper, pricer, or contact clerk, and that 

plaintiff would need to make very little, if any, vocational adjustment in terms of 

tools, work processes, work settings, or the industry. [14-11] 1037-38. This finding 

was based exclusively on the VE’s testimony. [Id.]. The ALJ failed to explain in any 

detail the required work skills of the identified positions, and therefore, her 

conclusion that plaintiff’s skills were transferable and that minimal vocational 

adjustment would be required is unsupported by substantial evidence. See Benoit, 

2016 WL 1073050, at *6 (citing Abbott, 391 Fed. App’x at 558). While the record may 

provide substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that “very little, if any” 

vocational adjustment would be required of plaintiff, the Court cannot make this 

assumption based on the VE’s testimony, which also did not explain in any depth the 

degree of vocational adjustment required. Daniels v. Astrue, 854 F.Supp.2d 513, 527 

(N.D. Ill. 2012); see also Draegert v. Barnhart, 311 F.3d 468, 475-77 (2d Cir. 2002) 

(holding that specific findings on transferable skills are necessary even where the 

ALJ relies on the testimony of a VE); see also Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 

F.3d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). Accordingly, and considering that this 

matter is already being remanded, the Court further remands this case so that the 

ALJ may reconsider her findings regarding vocational adjustment. Id.

For that reason, as well as the other reasons discussed above, the case must be 

remanded.

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Conclusion

The decision of the SSA is reversed, and in accordance with the fourth sentence 

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

_____________________________________

HEATHER K. McSHAIN

United States Magistrate Judge

DATE: May 1, 2023

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