IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

July 29, 2020 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. GIL JACKSON GROSECLOSE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Sullivan County

No. S68,627 James F. Goodwin, Jr., Judge

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No. E2019-01721-CCA-R3-CD

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The Appellant, Gil Jackson Groseclose, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court 

to driving under the influence (DUI) and DUI, per se, and the trial court convicted him 

after a bench trial of DUI, second offense. The trial court merged the convictions, Class A 

misdemeanors, and sentenced the Appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be 

served as one hundred twenty days in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, 

the Appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of DUI, 

second offense, because the judgment of conviction for his prior DUI was void and that the 

trial court erred by ordering confinement of more than the mandatory minimum sentence

in jail. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the 

judgments of the trial court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.

MONTGOMERY, JR., J., and D. MICHAEL SWINEY, SP. J., joined.

Lesley A. Tiller, Assistant District Public Defender, Blountville, Tennessee, for the

appellant, Gil Jackson Groseclose.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Garrett D. Ward, Assistant Attorney 

General; Barry P. Staubus, District Attorney General; and Mitchell B. Watson, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

In October 2017, the Sullivan County Grand Jury returned a presentment charging 

the Appellant with DUI; DUI, per se; and DUI, second offense. The Appellant filed a 

10/15/2020
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motion “to suppress and/or exclude evidence of [his] prior conviction for Driving under 

the Influence as alleged in Count Three of the Presentment and to dismiss Count Three of 

the Presentment.” The Appellant argued in the motion that his 2008 guilty plea to DUI in 

general sessions court was void because the officer swore to the affidavit of complaint in 

the presence of a notary instead of a qualified judicial officer. The trial court reviewed the 

affidavit and the judgment of conviction for Sullivan County General Sessions Court case 

number K3320. The trial court denied the Appellant’s motion, explaining as follows:

He - he’s pled guilty. And the Court’s of the opinion that the guilty 

plea corrects any infirmities or inconsistencies with regard to the - affidavit 

such that the judgment would then be facially valid, and it’s such that you 

could not attack - collaterally attack that conviction and judgment in this 

proceeding. 

On March 25, 2019, the Appellant entered a “blind” plea to DUI and DUI per se. 

The State did not provide a recitation of the facts during the plea hearing, but the Appellant 

stipulated to the following “essential facts constituting the offense(s),” which appeared in 

Officer Eric Keller’s affidavit of complaint:

On June 23, 2016 at approximately 2046 hours I, Officer Keller (511), 

was dispatched to 1317 Virginia Ave., Food City parking lot, in reference to 

a reckless driver that was possibly under the influence. Central dispatch 

advised the suspected vehicle was a blue BMW 745i that was now parked in 

the Family Dollar parking lot, at 1404 Virginia Ave. They also advised the 

driver was wearing a v-neck t-shirt. Upon my arrival, I noticed a blue BMW 

745i, with Tennessee tag (Y82 72N), parked in the parking lot of the [F]amily 

[D]ollar in front of the RedBox movie rental. The vehicle engine was still 

on as well as the headlights.

There were several subjects at the RedBox. I asked who the driver 

was of the blue BMW. A white male with a white [v]-neck t-shirt, fitting the 

description of the suspected driver, stated he was. The driver was identified 

as Gil Groseclose. I informed Mr. Groseclose, I had received multiple calls 

about a reckless driver. Mr. Groseclose stated he was not driving recklessly. 

I then asked if he was driving the BMW, in which he stated “yes”. Mr. 

Groseclose stated, he dropped his wife and kid off at Food City on Virginia 

Ave. and drove across the street to rent a DVD at the RedBox.

I asked Mr. Groseclose if he would perform a few tests for me to 

verify that he was fine to drive. Mr. Groseclose agreed to do so. I

administered the Standardized Field Sobriety Test to Mr. Groseclose 
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consisting of: Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, Walk and Turn test, and the 

One Leg Stand test. Mr. Groseclose performed poorly on all tests exhibiting 

several clues on each portion. It was very difficult for him to keep his 

balance, and his speech was slurred. Mr. Groseclose was placed under arrest 

for Driving Under the Influence.

I then transported Mr. Groseclose to BRMC for a blood draw, in which he 

consented. Officer Keesee transported Mr. Groseclose to the Sullivan 

County Jail for booking. The offense occurred in Bristol, Sullivan County, 

Tennessee.

The State introduced the Appellant’s Official Toxicology Reports into evidence, showing 

that his blood contained 94 nanograms per milliliter of Alprazolam and that his blood 

alcohol content (BAC) was 0.084 gram percent.

Immediately after the trial court accepted the Appellant’s guilty pleas to DUI and 

DUI, per se, the Appellant waived his right to a jury trial, and the trial court held a bench 

trial on the charge of DUI, second offense. The State called Officer Keller to the stand, 

and he identified the case file for case number K3320. The file included a judgment of 

conviction for the Appellant’s 2008 guilty plea to DUI. The State rested its proof, and the 

Appellant made a motion for judgment of acquittal, again arguing that the Appellant’s prior 

conviction was void because the police officer’s affidavit of complaint was improperly 

sworn in the presence of a notary. The Appellant also argued that his conviction was void 

because no arrest warrant was issued. The trial court denied the Appellant’s motion for 

judgment of acquittal, stating that “the Court [is] relying upon its previous holding at the 

motion to suppress, [and] the Court’s of the opinion that his appearance in general sessions 

court coupled with his plea would have cured the . . . defect.” 

Based on the 2008 judgment of conviction, the trial court found the Appellant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt of driving under the influence, second offense. After a 

sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be 

served as one hundred twenty days in jail followed by supervised probation.

II. Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The Appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support enhancement of his

DUI conviction to DUI, second offense. The State argues that the evidence is sufficient 

and that the Appellant is essentially attempting to attack the validity of his prior conviction, 

which is improper in a subsequent proceeding. We agree with the State.
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When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the general 

standard of review by an appellate court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). The State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the 

evidence and all reasonable or legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom. State 

v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Questions concerning the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight and value to be afforded the evidence, as well as all factual issues 

raised by the evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 

659 (Tenn. 1997). Accordingly, in a bench trial, the trial judge, as the trier of fact, must 

resolve all questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight and value to be 

given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence. State v. Ball, 973 

S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). The trial judge’s verdict carries the same 

weight as a jury verdict. State v. Hatchett, 560 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tenn. 1978).

A guilty verdict can be based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a 

combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 140 

(Tenn. 1998). “The [trier of fact] decides the weight to be given to circumstantial evidence, 

and ‘[t]he inferences to be drawn from such evidence, and the extent to which the 

circumstances are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, are questions 

primarily for the [trier of fact].’” State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 662 (Tenn. 2006) (quoting 

Marable v. State, 313 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tenn. 1958)). “The standard of review ‘is the 

same whether the conviction is based upon direct or circumstantial evidence.’” State v.

Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 

275 (Tenn. 2009)). 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401(a)(1) provides that a person commits 

DUI when the person drives or is in physical control of a vehicle “on any of the public 

roads and highways of the state, or on any streets or alleys, or while on the premises of any 

shopping center, trailer park, or apartment house complex, or any other premises that is 

generally frequented by the public at large” while the person is under the influence of an 

intoxicant. A person convicted of DUI, first offense, “shall . . . serve in the county jail or 

workhouse not less than forty-eight (48) consecutive hours nor more than eleven (11) 

months and twenty-nine (29) days.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-402(a)(1)(A). A person 

convicted of DUI, second offense, “shall . . . serve in the county jail or workhouse not less 

than forty-five (45) consecutive days nor more than eleven (11) months and twenty-nine 

(29) days.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-402(a)(2)(A). 

A prior DUI conviction is merely used to enhance a sentence for DUI and is not an 

element of DUI, second or subsequent offense. State v. Ronnie Lamar Evans, No. E2000-
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00327-CCA-R9-CD, 2001 WL 501414, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, May 11, 

2001); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-405(a). Nevertheless, the State must prove the prior 

conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sanders, 735 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1987); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-203(3). “A certified computer printout of the 

official driver record maintained by the department of safety shall constitute prima facie 

evidence of any prior conviction.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-405(d). If the defendant 

challenges the prior conviction, “the court may require that a certified copy of the judgment 

be provided for inspection by the court.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-405(d).

Here, the State introduced a certified copy of the Appellant’s 2008 judgment of 

conviction into evidence at trial. The judgment of conviction showed that the Appellant 

pled guilty to DUI in general sessions court. Therefore, taken in the light most favorable 

to the State, the evidence is sufficient to support the Appellant’s conviction of DUI, second 

offense. 

The Appellant contends that his sufficiency of the evidence issue “hinges around 

the validity of his 2008 conviction” and that his 2008 conviction is “clearly void” because 

the affidavit of complaint was signed by a notary public rather than a clerk or magistrate 

and because no arrest warrant was issued. However, “unless invalid on its face, a prior 

judgment of conviction in a court with personal and subject matter jurisdiction cannot be 

collaterally attacked in a subsequent proceeding in which the challenged conviction is used 

to enhance punishment.” State v. McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tenn. 1987). 

Likewise, “a facially invalid judgment cannot be used to enhance punishment in a 

subsequent prosecution.” State v. Jody Glen Loy, No. E2006-02206-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 

WL 2229259, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, May 30, 2008). Tennessee Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32(e) provides that a judgment of conviction shall be signed by the 

judge and entered by the clerk and that the judgment of conviction must include the plea, 

the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence. 

The trial court conducted a pretrial hearing to assess the validity of the 2008 

judgment of conviction and ruled that the judgment was facially valid. As noted by the 

Appellant, this court reviews questions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. 

State v. Livingston, 197 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tenn. 2006). 

The document at issue is the standard general sessions court form. The form can be 

found on the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) website and consists of one page, 

front and back. The front of the document contains an affidavit of complaint section and a 

probable cause determination section. The Appellant’s written waiver and guilty plea, 

signed by the Appellant, his attorney, and the judge, and the judgment are on the back of 

the document. The judgment of conviction bears the general sessions judge’s signature;

shows that the Appellant entered a guilty plea to DUI and was found guilty of the offense;
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and reflects a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as forty-eight hours 

in jail followed by probation. The judgment of conviction satisfies all of the requirements 

of Rule 32(e), Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

In support of his argument that the judgment is void, the Appellant cites State v.

Jones, 512 S.W.3d 258 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016), in which this court affirmed the trial 

court’s holding that the affidavit of complaint was sworn before a notary public rather than 

a qualified judicial officer and, therefore, was invalid. However, unlike this case, Jones

did not involve a defendant’s collateral attack of a judgment. Here, the judgment of 

conviction had to be facially void in order to be inadmissible as proof of the prior 

conviction. The judgment at issue was not facially void. Therefore, the trial court properly 

ruled it could be used to enhance the Appellant’s sentence to DUI, second offense. 

B. Sentencing

The Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying full probation except 

for the statutory minimum jail sentence. The State argues that the trial court properly 

sentenced the Appellant. We agree with the State.

At the Appellant’s sentencing hearing, Mike Groseclose, the Appellant’s father, 

testified that the Appellant was thirty-one years old. When the Appellant was a freshman 

in high school, he was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). 

The Appellant was prescribed Ritalin and took the medication for more than one year. 

However, his parents “didn’t see a big difference” in his behavior, so he stopped taking it. 

Mr. Groseclose said that in hindsight, “we shouldn’t have maybe taken him off of it at that 

time.” Mr. Groseclose said that the Appellant’s communication could be “erratic at times.” 

The Appellant knew what he wanted to say but said it “in different ways.” Mr. Groseclose 

stated that the Appellant got “somewhat excited,” that the Appellant’s ADHD “cause[d] a 

lot of that problem,” and that the Appellant was not very articulate. Regarding the 

Appellant’s ability to learn, Mr. Groseclose thought the Appellant “was probably in his 

class.” However, the Appellant had a few learning disabilities and could not concentrate 

“long enough . . . to really learn the right way.”

Mr. Groseclose testified that he and the Appellant had a “close” relationship and 

that he saw the Appellant every day. The Appellant lived with his girlfriend, and they had 

been in a relationship about six years. The Appellant and his girlfriend had a three-yearold son, and the Appellant was in the process of adopting his girlfriend’s eight-year-old 

son from a previous relationship. The Appellant was the only financial provider for his 

family and worked as a chef at two restaurants. After the Appellant’s DUI conviction, he 

lost his ability to drive. The Appellant worked about eighty hours per week, and Mr. 

Groseclose drove him to work every day at 4:00 a.m.
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Mr. Groseclose testified that if the trial court ordered incarceration, the Appellant’s 

girlfriend and her children could afford to live in their apartment only thirty days before 

being evicted. Mr. Groseclose said that the Appellant “pays the bills and everything,” that 

the Appellant read to the children, and that the Appellant was “potty training” the threeyear-old. The Appellant used to drive the eight-year-old to school every day, and he went 

with the children to all of their medical appointments. He also tried to help the older child 

with his homework. Mr. Groseclose said he had not seen the Appellant drink alcohol since 

his arrest for DUI, which occurred in 2016. The Appellant also seemed to be “on a little 

better note” and was “more aware of things.” Mr. Groseclose said that he was retired and 

that he could continue to transport the Appellant wherever the Appellant needed to go if 

the trial court granted alternative sentencing. At the conclusion of Mr. Groseclose’s 

testimony, the Appellant introduced a certified copy of the payments he had made toward 

his fines and court costs.

The parties discussed the Appellant’s presentence report with the trial court. 

According to the report, the Appellant was a high school graduate and attended Palm Beach 

Culinary School in Florida but did not complete the program. The Appellant stated in the 

report that had never been diagnosed with a mental illness or received mental health

counseling but that he had been prescribed Adderall as a teenager. The Appellant described 

his physical health as “fair” due to problems walking after a 2007 car accident in which he 

broke his leg. The Appellant stated in the report that he no longer consumed alcohol and 

estimated that he stopped drinking in November 2018. The Appellant did not report any 

past or current drug use in the questionnaire for his presentence report but reported to the 

presentence officer that he used marijuana in high school. According to the report, the 

Appellant denied to the presentence officer that he had a juvenile record; however, the 

officer noted in the report that the Appellant had a “juvenile history” in that the Appellant 

tested positive for marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine and that the Appellant was 

“convicted” of marijuana possession in 2008. The report showed that the Appellant 

worked full time as a cook at the 620 Restaurant in Bristol and part time as a side chef at 

the Martha Washington Restaurant in Abingdon, Virginia.

The report showed that the Appellant had the following prior misdemeanor

convictions: driving while impaired in 2011, vandalism in 2010, DUI in 2008, drug 

possession in 2008, speeding in 2008, a red-light violation in 2008, two thefts in 2007, and 

theft in 2005. The report showed that in 2007, the Appellant had two felony burglary 

convictions and one felony theft conviction. The report also showed several violations of 

probation.

The trial court noted that the Appellant could have been indicted for DUI, third 

offense, due to his 2008 DUI and 2011 DWI convictions. The trial court stated that it was 
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“not really” going to consider the Appellant’s juvenile record and that it was not going to 

put “great emphasis” on his speeding and red-light violations. Nevertheless, the trial court 

found that enhancement factor (1), that “[t]he defendant has a previous history of criminal 

convictions or criminal behavior, in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate 

range,” applied to the Appellant’s sentence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1). The trial 

court also applied enhancement factors (8) that “[t]he defendant, before trial or sentencing, 

failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community,” 

and (10) that “[t]he defendant had no hesitation about committing a crime when the risk to 

human life was high because “drinking and driving is a very dangerous and risky thing.” 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114(8), (10). In mitigation, the trial court applied factors (1), 

that “[t]he defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily 

injury,” and (13), the “catchall” provision, for the Appellant’s positive work history. Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-35-113(1), (13). The trial court found that the enhancement factors 

outweighed the mitigating factors, merged the Appellant’s three convictions, and sentenced 

him to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as one hundred twenty days in jail 

followed by supervised probation. 

This court reviews the length, range, and manner of service of a sentence imposed 

by the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard with a presumption of 

reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012); see State v. Caudle, 388 

S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012) (applying the Bise standard to alternative sentencing). 

In determining a defendant’s sentence, the trial court considers the following factors: (1) 

the evidence, if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the presentence 

report; (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the 

nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information 

offered by the parties on enhancement and mitigating factors; (6) any statistical information 

provided by the Administrative Office of the Courts as to sentencing practices for similar 

offenses in Tennessee; (7) any statement by the defendant in his own behalf; and (8) the 

potential for rehabilitation or treatment. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-102, -103, -210; 

see also Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 697-98. The burden is on the Appellant to demonstrate the 

impropriety of his sentence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sent’g Comm’n Cmts.

In determining a specific sentence within a range of punishment, the trial court 

should consider, but is not bound by, the following advisory guidelines:

(1) The minimum sentence within the range of punishment is the 

sentence that should be imposed, because the general assembly set the 

minimum length of sentence for each felony class to reflect the relative 

seriousness of each criminal offense in the felony classifications; and
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(2) The sentence length within the range should be adjusted, as 

appropriate, by the presence or absence of mitigating and enhancement 

factors set out in §§ 40-35-113 and 40-35-114.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c).

Although the trial court should consider enhancement and mitigating factors, the 

statutory enhancement factors are advisory only. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114; see 

also Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 701; State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 343 (Tenn. 2008). Our 

supreme court has stated that “a trial court’s weighing of various mitigating and 

enhancement factors [is] left to the trial court’s sound discretion.” Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 

345. In other words, “the trial court is free to select any sentence within the applicable 

range so long as the length of the sentence is ‘consistent with the purposes and principles 

of [the Sentencing Act].’” Id. at 343.

In misdemeanor sentencing, the “trial court need only consider the principles of 

sentencing and enhancement and mitigating factors in order to comply with the legislative 

mandates of the misdemeanor sentencing statute.” State v. Troutman, 979 S.W.2d 271, 

274 (Tenn. 1998). Thus, the trial court is afforded considerable latitude in misdemeanor 

sentencing. See State v. Johnson, 15 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). The trial 

court retains the authority to place a defendant on probation immediately or after a time of 

confinement. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(a). In sentencing a misdemeanor 

defendant, the trial court must fix a percentage of the sentence, not to exceed seventy-five 

percent, that the defendant must serve in confinement before being eligible for release into 

rehabilitative programs. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-302(d).

In the instant case, the Appellant had a prior criminal history that included several 

felonies and numerous misdemeanors. Moreover, the trial court found that the applicable 

enhancement factors, which the Appellant does not contest, outweighed the applicable 

mitigating factors. This court does not reweigh mitigating and enhancement factors. See

Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 345. We note that in pronouncing the Appellant’s sentence, the trial 

court noted the discrepancy between Mr. Groseclose’s testimony that the Appellant 

stopped drinking alcohol in 2016 and the Appellant’s claim in the presentence report that 

he did not stop consuming alcohol until 2018. Additionally, the trial court commented on

inconsistencies mentioned in the Appellant’s presentence report. Specifically, the trial 

court noted that the Appellant claimed in his presentence questionnaire that he had never 

used drugs but admitted to the presentence officer that he had used marijuana in high school 

and that the Appellant claimed to the officer that he did not have a juvenile record when 

“we know that he did.” The trial court’s comments suggest that it did not find the Appellant 

particularly credible, which reflects poorly on his potential for rehabilitation. See State v. 

Nunley, 22 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). We also find it significant that the 
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Appellant violated several probation sentences in the past. Accordingly, we conclude that 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the Appellant was not an 

appropriate candidate for full probation after service of the statutory minimum jail 

sentence.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the 

judgments of the trial court.

_________________________________ 

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE