J-S54023-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JESUS MANUEL BELTRAN-LEON

Appellant No. 2214 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 28, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0001711-2012

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 30, 2014

Appellant, Jesus Manuel Beltran-Leon, appeals from the October 28, 

2013 aggregate judgment of sentence of four to eight years’ incarceration, 

imposed following his conviction by a jury of persons not to possess a 

firearm, firearms not to be carried without a license, possession of a 

controlled substance (cocaine), and the summary traffic offense of periods 

for requiring lighted lamps.

1

 After careful review, we affirm.

A review of the certified record reveals the following history of the 

case. Based on circumstances that unfolded during a traffic stop, Appellant 

was charged on December 25, 2011, with the latter three of the 

aforementioned offenses. On March 27, 2012, the trial court permitted the 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), and 75 

Pa.C.S.A. § 4302(a)(1), respectively.
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Commonwealth to amend its information to add the charge of persons not to 

possess a firearm. On May 9, 2012, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial 

motion, including a motion to suppress physical evidence allegedly obtained 

by the police as a result of their illegal detention of Appellant. After a 

hearing held on June 25, 2012, the trial court denied Appellant’s pretrial 

motions by order filed January 15, 2013. The matter proceeded to a jury 

trial on September 13, 2013.2 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found 

Appellant guilty of all counts, and the trial court found Appellant guilty of the 

summary traffic offense. 

Prior to sentencing, Appellant’s privately retained trial counsel 

petitioned for leave to withdraw his representation after Appellant’s 

sentencing, as he had not been retained to represent Appellant beyond that 

proceeding. The trial court granted the petition by order entered October 

15, 2013, to be effective at the conclusion of Appellant’s sentencing. The 

trial court sentenced Appellant on October 28, 2013, to an aggregate term of 

incarceration of four to eight years.3 At sentencing, as the trial court was 

____________________________________________

2 The trial was held jointly with Appellant’s co-defendant, Jose Rigoberto 

Garcia-Quintero.

3 The trial court imposed a term of four to eight years’ incarceration on the 

person not to possess firearm count, a concurrent term of incarceration of 

three to six years on the possession of a firearm without a license count, and 

a concurrent term of incarceration of six to 12 months on the possession of a 

controlled substance count.
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advising Appellant of his post-sentence rights, counsel initiated the following 

exchange.

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: I had filed a motion to 

withdraw which Judge Trebilcock had granted that on 

October 15th effective after today’s date.... I think 

[Appellant] is interested in filing an appeal. I think 

his issues raised at the suppression matter are 

certainly viable and I would request the court give [] 

consideration. I understand he’s filed for a public 

defender. One has not been yet assigned to him.

THE COURT: Very well. We’ll direct[] the 

transcription of the record, expand the time within 

which to file post-sentence motions for 45 days 

as well as time within which to file a [sic] 

appeal. That can be expanded if the transcript has 

not been provided to the public defender for good 

cause shown.

N.T., 10/28/13, at 9-10 (emphasis added). Appellant did not file a postsentence motion. On December 12, 2013, Appellant filed a notice of 

appeal.4 

____________________________________________

4 We note that a timely appeal must be filed within 30 days of the judgment 

of sentence in open court. Pa.R.A.P. 903(c)(3). “[T]he timeliness of an 

appeal implicates our jurisdiction and may be raised sua sponte” 

Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1035 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations omitted). The period for filing an appeal may not be enlarged by 

this Court. Pa.R.A.P. 105(b). Instantly, Appellant’s notice of appeal was 

filed 45 days after the trial court imposed its judgment of sentence, and 

ordinarily we would quash the appeal as untimely. “However, we have held 

that we will address an otherwise untimely appeal if fraud or breakdown in 

the trial court’s processes resulted in an untimely appeal.” Commonwealth 

v. Khalil, 806 A.2d 415, 420 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted), appeal 

denied, 818 A.2d 503 (Pa. 2003). This Court has declined to quash an 

appeal where a “problem arose as a result of the trial court’s misstatement 

of the appeal period, which operated as a breakdown in the court’s 

operation.” Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788, 791 (Pa. Super. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On December 13, 2013, the trial court issued an order directing 

Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). On January 

3, 2014, the trial court granted an extension, requiring Appellant to file his 

Rule 1925(b) statement on or before February 3, 2014. Appellant filed his 

Rule 1925(b) statement on February 4, 2014. In a footnote within his 

concise statement, Appellant noted, “[t]he deadline for filing this 1925(b) 

statement was February 3, 2014, however due to a winter snow storm, the 

Clerk of Court’s Office was closed on that date.”5 Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

2001). Instantly, the trial court advised Appellant that his new counsel 

would have 45 days to file a post-sentence motion and notice of appeal. 

Appellant filed his notice of appeal in reliance on the trial court’s 

representation. In light of the cited authority, we decline to quash this 

appeal.

5 Although counsel’s assertion, that due to inclement weather the Office of 

the Clerk of Courts of York County was closed on February 3, 2014, is not 

corroborated in the record, neither the trial court nor the Commonwealth 

questions this assertion contained in his Rule 1925(b) statement, and we 

see no reason to do so. Nevertheless, we note Appellant should have sought 

leave to file nunc pro tunc for extraordinary circumstances per Rule 

1925(b)(2), rather than assume acceptance of his late filing. 

Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 59-60 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

However, even if we deem Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement untimely, we 

note this Court has held that such “failure to timely file a Rule 1925(b) 

statement is the equivalent of a failure to file said statement.” 

Commonwealth v. Fischere, 70 A.3d 1270, 1275, n.2 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(en banc), appeal denied, 83 A.3d 167 (Pa. 2013), citing Commonwealth 

v. Thompson, 39 A.3d 335, 340 (Pa. Super. 2012). Since such late filing is 

tantamount to per se ineffective assistance of counsel, we may address any 

late filed issues in lieu of a remand, if the trial court has fully addressed 

them in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Id., citing Thompson, supra. Such is 

the case here. 
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Statement, 2/4/14, at 2, n.1. On February 24, 2014, the trial court filed its 

Rule 1925(a) opinion. Therein the trial court referenced its January 15, 

2013 opinion as containing the reasoning for its denial of Appellant’s pretrial 

motions, now questioned on appeal.

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our consideration.

Whether the suppression court committed an error of 

law in denying Appellant’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion 

to Suppress Evidence when the police maintained 

Appellant in an unlawful investigatory detention after 

determining that they lacked probable cause to 

arrest Appellant for DUI?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

A challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression motion implicates 

this Court’s following standard of review.

[We are] limited to determining whether the 

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by 

the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. Because the 

Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression

court, we may consider only the evidence of the 

Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the 

defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, Jones v. Pennsylvania, 131 S. Ct. 

110 (2010).

This Court is bound by those of the suppression 

court’s factual findings which find support in the 

record, but we are not bound by the court’s 

conclusions of law. When the suppression court’s 

specific factual findings are unannounced, or there is 
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a gap in the findings, the appellate court should 

consider only the evidence of the prevailing 

suppression party ... and the evidence of the other 

party ... that, when read in the context of the entire 

record, remains uncontradicted.

Commonwealth v. Astillero, 39 A.3d 353, 357 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal 

denied, 48 A.3d 1246 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted). 

However, where the appeal of the determination of 

the suppression court turns on allegations of legal 

error, [t]he suppression court’s conclusions of law 

[...] are not binding on an appellate court, whose 

duty it is to determine if the suppression court 

properly applies the law to the facts. As a result, the 

conclusions of law of the suppression court are 

subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 40 A.3d 1245, 1247 (Pa. Super. 2012),

appeal denied, 51 A.3d 837 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).

In this case, Appellant avers that the physical evidence seized from his 

vehicle was “the result of [the police] illegally holding [Appellant] in 

custody[, and] must be suppressed.” Appellant’s Brief at 12.

Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 

and the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution both protect the people from 

unreasonable searches and seizures. Jurisprudence 

arising under both charters has led to the 

development of three categories of interactions 

between citizens and police. The first, a “mere 

encounter,” does not require any level of suspicion or 

carry any official compulsion to stop or respond. The 

second, an “investigative detention,” permits the 

temporary detention of an individual if supported by 

reasonable suspicion. The third is an arrest or 

custodial detention, which must be supported by 

probable cause.
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In evaluating the level of interaction, courts 

conduct an objective examination of the totality of 

the surrounding circumstances. Commonwealth v. 

Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (2000) 

(citations omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Lyles, 97 A.3d 298, 302, (Pa. 2014) (some citations 

omitted)

A totality-of-the-circumstances approach allows the 

court to consider all facts at the officer’s disposal and 

does not require the court to disregard those 

adduced during a valid interdiction, [such as a] 

traffic stop. Indeed, routine constitutional analysis 

requires courts to utilize facts gathered during each 

escalating phase of a police investigation in 

determining whether police acted properly as the 

interaction between police and citizen proceeded 

towards an arrest.

Commonwealth v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1258-1259 (Pa. Super. 2008).

In [Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 

884, 889 (Pa. 2000)], our Supreme Court set forth a 

number of factors to assist in determining whether 

the interaction between a defendant and a police 

officer following the conclusion of a valid traffic stop 

is a mere encounter or an investigative detention:

(1) the presence or absence of police 

excesses; (2) whether there was physical 

contact; (3) whether police directed the 

citizen's movements; (4) police demeanor and 

manner of expression; (5) the location and 

time of the interdiction; (6) the content of the 

questions and statements; (7) the existence 

and character of the initial investigative 

detention, including its degree of coerciveness; 

(8) ‘the degree to which the transition between 

the traffic stop/investigative detention and the 

subsequent encounter can be viewed as 

seamless, ... thus suggesting to a citizen that 

his movements may remain subject to police 
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restraint,’ ... and (9) whether there was an 

express admonition to the effect that the 

citizen-subject is free to depart, which ‘is a 

potent, objective factor.’

Commonwealth v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1253 

(Pa.Super.2008) (en banc) (citing and quoting 

Strickler, 563 Pa. at 75, 757 A.2d at 898–99). 

When an individual has been subjected to a valid 

detention but police then continue to engage the 

person in conversation, the person is less likely to 

believe that he is actually free to leave the scene. 

Id.

Commonwealth v. Caban, 60 A.3d 120, 127-128 (Pa. Super. 2012), 

appeal denied, 79 A.3d 1097 (Pa. 2013). “To maintain constitutional 

validity, an investigative detention must be supported by a reasonable and 

articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in criminal activity 

and may continue only so long as is necessary to confirm or dispel such 

suspicion....” Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (Pa. 2000).

The facts involving the traffic stop, further detention and subsequent 

arrest of Appellant transpired as follows. Appellant was driving on Carlisle 

Street in Hanover Borough at around 11:00 p.m. on December 24, 2011. 

N.T., 6/25/12, at 58. He was observed by Hanover Borough Police Officer 

Kelly Brubaker to be travelling without headlights on. Id. Officer Brubaker 

effected a traffic stop, and in her subsequent interaction with Appellant, 

developed a suspicion of a possible driving under the influence of alcohol 

(DUI) violation. Id. at 11, 64. Officer Brubaker then directed Appellant to 

exit the vehicle in order to perform field sobriety tests. Id. As Appellant is 
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a native Spanish speaker, Officer Brubaker questioned his comprehension of 

her instructions on how to perform the tests, which were not completed. Id.

at 12-13, 64. Hanover Borough Police Sergeant Jason Byers heard the 

report of the traffic stop and proceeded to the scene due to his greater 

relative experience with DUI arrests.6 Id. at 11. Upon arrival, Sergeant 

Byers detected an odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from Appellant’s 

breath and learned that Appellant had admitted to drinking. Id. at 12. 

Sergeant Byers then administered an additional field sobriety test, which 

Appellant completed successfully. Id. Sergeant Byers described Appellant’s 

demeanor as “giggly and laughing,” and stated “he appeared he may be 

intoxicated.” Id. at 14. The officers then had Appellant submit to a 

preliminary test of his breath (PBT), which indicated a blood alcohol content 

(BAC) of .158. Id. at 12.

Thereafter, the police officers determined there was no probable cause 

to arrest Appellant for DUI. Id. at 13. This was due in part to the Hanover 

Borough Police Department’s policy that “the [PBT] is not used to make an 

arrest[, but] simply used to confirm [] suspicions.” Id. at 8. Nevertheless, 

the officers did not release Appellant as they had concerns about Appellant’s 

____________________________________________

6 Sergeant Beyers had nine years’ experience with the Hanover Borough 

Police Department, handling about 10 to 20 DUI arrests per year. Officer 

Brubaker and a third officer on the scene, Officer Mease, by contrast, each 

had only about two years’ experience. N.T., 6/25/12, at 4-5, 11. 
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ability to drive home safely. Id. at 14-15. Specifically, Sergeant Byers 

testified at the suppression hearing as follows.

[BY ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY:]

Q. Okay. And I want to talk specifically 

about some of the things that you observed about 

[Appellant]. You indicated that you did not feel at 

that time as though you had probable cause for the 

arrest for [DUI]. Did [Appellant] appear to be 

intoxicated or drunk?

[BY SERGEANT BYERS:]

A. He appeared to have been drinking, 

obviously from admitting he had been drinking, the 

odor of alcoholic beverage, he was giggly and 

laughing, but he was not specifically what I would –

I’m trying to think how to phrase this. He appeared 

he may be intoxicated, and certainly upon providing 

the PBT, it was – I was able to say that, yes he very 

well could have this BAC with the behaviors he’s 

explained; however, I’m a firm believer that you 

have to build the probable cause, and I’m not just 

going to use a BAC to say that – or a breath test to 

say, okay, now he’s intoxicated.

 

I certainly didn’t feel, upon learning of 

the breath sample BAC, that I was going to allow 

him to walk away. I did not feel it was safe for him 

to walk away, and again, based on my observations 

of the passenger, I was certainly not going to allow 

him to drive or walk away from the scene. 

Id. at 14-15.7

____________________________________________

7 The passenger was Appellant’s co-defendant, Garcia-Quintero, who had the 

odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from his breath, had trouble staying 

awake during the stop, and had trouble balancing upon exiting the vehicle. 

N.T., 6/25/12, at 15-16.
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After affording Appellant the opportunity to call for a ride, which 

proved unsuccessful, the officers directed Appellant to enter the back of one 

of the police cruisers in order to be transported home. Id. at 24. Upon 

securing the keys to the vehicle, Sergeant Byers observed an open 

container, containing what smelled like an alcoholic beverage. Id. at 42-43. 

Sergeant Byers, then directed Garcia-Quintero to exit the passenger seat for 

the same purpose. Id. Sergeant Byers returned to Appellant’s vehicle to 

reposition it in a legally parked manner. Id. at 26. When closing the 

passenger door, Sergeant Byer observed a gun leaning against the center 

console. Id. at 27. Appellant and Garcia-Quintero were then removed from 

the cruisers to be held more securely and were searched for weapons. Id.

at 29. In the process of securing the gun, Sergeant Byers observed a dollar 

bill folded in a manner that according to his training suggested it was being 

used as a packet for narcotics. Id. at 29-30. On closer inspection, it was 

discovered that the dollar bill contained a white powdery substance, which 

field-tested as cocaine. Id. at 31. Appellant was read his Miranda rights in 

both Spanish and English. Id. at 58-59. Appellant then gave his permission 

to the police to further search the vehicle. Id. at 33-34. Sergeant Byers 

noted an abundance of air fresheners placed throughout the vehicle and 

what appeared to be disturbed panel coverings. Id. at 34-35. After 

checking databases, the police officers determined neither Appellant nor 

Garcia-Quintero had a license to carry a firearm and neither was the 
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registered owner of the firearm. Id. at 32-33. Appellant was then placed 

under arrest. Id. at 32. Thereafter, a search warrant was obtained for the 

vehicle and two packets of cocaine were found in the subsequent search. 

Id. at 35-36.

Instantly, Appellant concedes the initial traffic stop was legal and 

supported by probable cause of the headlight infraction. Appellant’s Brief at 

13, citing Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 115-116 (Pa. 2008). 

Similarly, Appellant does not challenge that upon interacting with Appellant 

during the traffic stop, Officer Brubaker, and later Sergeant Byers, made 

observations supporting a reasonable suspicion of possible DUI. Id. at 13-

14. However, noting Strickler’s admonition that detentions based on 

reasonable suspicion should last only so long “as is necessary to confirm or 

dispel such suspicion,” Appellant argues his further detention by the police 

after they determined no probable cause existed to arrest for DUI was 

illegal. Id. at 12, 13, quoting Commonwealth v. LaMonte, 859 A.2d 495, 

500 (Pa. Super. 2004), quoting Strickler, supra. 

Making excuses to detain [Appellant] any longer 

after the officers made [the] determination [that 

probable cause for DUI did not exist] was a violation 

of the 4th Amendment and Article 1, Section 8. The 

appropriate course of action was to let Appellant go. 

The seizure was illegal. The evidence obtained as a 

result of the continued unlawful detention should 

have been suppressed.

Id. at 17. 
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Citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 654 A.2d 1096, 1097 (Pa. Super. 

1995), appeal denied, 664 A.2d 972 (Pa. 1995), the trial court concluded the 

removal of Garcia-Quintero from the vehicle was lawful and “the weapon in 

question, although not visible until [] Garcia-Quintero[] was taken out of the 

vehicle, was not [obtained as] a result of illegal police conduct.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 1/15/13, at 6. In Brown, we held “that an officer, when making a 

lawful stop of a motor vehicle, may order the occupants out of the car 

despite the lack of a reasonable suspicion that the passengers are engaged 

in criminal activity.” Brown, supra. As Brown was an appeal by a 

passenger challenging his own seizure without independent reasonable 

suspicion during a traffic stop, it is inapposite to the instant appeal, where 

Appellant lacks standing to challenge Garcia-Quintero’s detention.8

Instantly however, the decision by the police officers to not arrest 

Appellant for DUI did not negate the existence of probable cause, which is 

evaluated on an objective, not subjective, basis. Our Supreme Court has 

recently clarified this principle.

In order to determine whether probable cause 

exists to justify a warrantless arrest, we must 

consider the totality of the circumstances. 

[Commonwealth v. Clark, 735 A.2d 1248, 1252 

____________________________________________

8 Although we deem the trial court’s rationale inapposite, we can 

nonetheless affirm the trial court’s decision for reasons other than those 

upon which it relied. See Commonwealth v. Harper, 611 A.2d 1211, 

1213 n.1 (1992).
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(Pa. 1999)]; see also lllinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 

213, 233 (1983). “Probable cause exists where the 

facts and circumstances within the officer’s 

knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of 

reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has 

been or is being committed,” and must be “viewed 

from the vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, 

cautious police officer on the scene at the time of the 

arrest guided by his experience and training.” 

Clark, supra at 1252 (quotation omitted). As we 

have stated:

Probable cause is made out when the 

facts and circumstances which are within the 

knowledge of the officer at the time of the 

arrest, and of which he has reasonably 

trustworthy information, are sufficient to 

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 

belief that the suspect has committed or is 

committing a crime. The question we ask is 

not whether the officer’s belief was correct or 

more likely true than false. Rather, we require 

only a probability, and not a prima facie

showing, of criminal activity. In determining 

whether probable cause exists, we apply a 

totality of the circumstances test.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 

(Pa. 2009) (emphasis in original; citations and 

quotation marks omitted).

In the Fourth Amendment context, “the fact 

that the officer does not have the state of mind 

which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide 

the legal justification for the officer’s action does not 

invalidate the action taken as long as the 

circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that 

action.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 

813 (1996). In other words,

Fourth Amendment reasonableness is 

predominantly an objective inquiry. We ask 

whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, 

justify the challenged action. If so, that action 
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was reasonable whatever the subjective intent 

motivating the relevant officials. This 

approach recognizes that the Fourth 

Amendment regulates conduct rather than 

thoughts....

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, --- U.S. ----, ----, 131 S. Ct. 

2074, 2080 (2011) (citations and quotation mark 

omitted).

Commonwealth v. Martin, --- A.3d ---, 2014 WL 4745782, *10-11 (Pa. 

2014).

Accordingly, we reject Appellant’s position that the decision by the 

police not to charge him with DUI, due to their subjective belief that 

probable cause did not exist, eliminated all legitimacy for his continued 

detention. Here, applying the foregoing standard and viewing the totality of 

the circumstances known to the officers at the time they observed the 

firearm, we conclude that probable cause did objectively exist to arrest 

Appellant for DUI. These factors include the open container found in the 

vehicle, Appellant’s admission that he had been drinking, the odor of 

alcoholic beverage on his breath, Appellant’s demeanor as “giggling and 

laughing,” and the PBT’s BAC results of .158. 

Although not always admissible at trial, “a portable breathalyzer test 

(PBT) [is] frequently used to establish probable cause to arrest.” 

Commonwealth v. Teems, 74 A.3d 142, 147 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal 

denied, 79 A.3d 1098 (Pa. 2013). “[I]t is well established that probable 

cause to arrest can be supported by the existence of evidence that is 
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inadmissible at trial.” Commonwealth v. Weaver, 76 A.3d 562, 567 (Pa. 

Super. 2013), appeal granted, 86 A.3d 862 (Pa. 2014). The Hanover Police 

Department’s policy to employ discretion in not arresting based on PBT 

results does not preclude an objective determination of probable cause from 

the “vantage point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer.” 

Martin, supra, quoting Clark, supra. In light of the existence of probable 

cause, there is no Fourth Amendment violation in Appellant’s continued 

detention by the police for the purpose of driving him home in lieu of a more 

restrictive arrest. Since during that detention the gun and dollar bill were 

readily observed and supported reasonable suspicion of further criminal 

activity, we conclude the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in 

declining to grant Appellant’s suppression motion.9 See Anderson, supra.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude Appellant’s sole issue on appeal 

is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the October 28, 2013 judgment of 

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Stabile joins the memorandum.

Judge Lazarus concurs in the result.

____________________________________________

9 Because of our disposition of this issue, we need not address the 

Commonwealth’s contention that the continued detention of Appellant was 

justified based on probable cause for public drunkenness, 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5505. Commonwealth’s Brief at 6.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/30/2014