IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 19–1740

Filed February 14, 2020

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

DUANE J. GOEDKEN,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance 

Commission.

In an attorney disciplinary action, the grievance commission 

recommends suspension for multiple violations of ethical rules. LICENSE 

SUSPENDED.

Tara van Brederode and Wendell J. Harms, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

Duane J. Goedken, Muscatine, pro se.
2

WIGGINS, Chief Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (the Board) 

brought a complaint against an attorney arising out of several 

delinquencies in probate matters. The attorney was delinquent in filing 

reports for five estates and one trust. He also failed to respond to the 

Board’s complaint and failed to cooperate with the Board’s investigation of 

his violations. The Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission (the 

commission) found the attorney’s conduct violated our ethical rules.

The commission recommended we suspend the attorney’s license to 

practice law for ninety days. On our de novo review, we agree that the 

attorney violated our ethical rules and agree with the commission’s 

recommended suspension. 

Therefore, we suspend the attorney’s law license indefinitely with no 

possibility of reinstatement for ninety days. 

I. Standard of Review.

“We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo.” Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Capotosto, 927 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 

2019). “The Board must prove the misconduct by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence.” Id. “A convincing preponderance of the 

evidence is more than the typical preponderance standard in a civil case 

but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. West, 901 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Iowa 2017). We give 

respectful consideration to the commission’s findings but we are not 

bound by them. Id. 

II. Findings of Fact. 

We find the facts as follows. We admitted attorney Duane J. 

Goedken to practice law in Iowa in 1963. Goedken practices law in 

Muscatine County. In the course of his practice, Goedken has represented 
3

business entities and a large utility, as well as parties in various estates 

and trusts. 

Goedken experienced serious health problems in the later years of 

his career. He had escalating heart problems until, around January 21, 

2014, Goedken had a heart attack that left him hospitalized for fifteen

days. After he recovered from the heart attack, his doctor kept him on 

many medications, including blood thinners. This proved an issue when, 

in 2017, Goedken began experiencing problems with his vision. By late 

2017, he was unable to read his computer screen. Goedken’s eye doctors 

recommended surgery. However, the eye surgeon refused to perform the 

surgery while Goedken was on blood thinners, due to the bleeding risk. 

Because taking Goedken off the blood thinners risked causing a stroke, 

Goedken’s doctor was forced to find a surgeon willing to operate while 

Goedken was on blood thinners. The surgeon performed the operation on 

May 9, 2018. Goedken’s vision was slow to improve, but by fall of 2018, 

Goedken could read computer screens well enough to get by again. 

Tragedy stuck Goedken around this time. In 2018, Goedken’s eldest 

daughter, who lived in Arizona, was diagnosed with breast cancer. Despite 

undergoing treatment, the daughter’s cancer rapidly spread to other 

organs until she eventually checked herself into hospice care in December 

2018. Goedken and his wife planned to go to Arizona to be with her, but 

Goedken wanted to finish his work first. However, Goedken’s daughter’s 

cancer was aggressive, and she passed away around one week after 

checking herself into hospice care. 

Many, but not all, of the delinquencies in this case arose during or 

between Goedken’s vision problems and the death of his daughter. The 

current complaint arose out of Goedken’s trust and estate representation. 

He received delinquencies in five estates and one trust. 
4

A. Count I: Wathan Trust. Count I of the commission’s report 

concerns the Wathan trust. Goedken’s involvement in the Wathan trust 

dates back to 1986. In 1986, Grace Wathan filed an application to appoint 

a trustee to the Cecil Wathan Residuary Trust after the death of her 

husband, Cecil Wathan. Goedken represented the trustee, Blue Grass 

Savings Bank. 

After the first trustee’s report was approved on April 6, 1994, the 

district court waived further reports to March 31, 1997. However, 

Goedken did not file the trustee report and the clerk of court sent a 

delinquency notice October 26, 1999. Goedken filed the report 

December 30, 1999. The district court again waived further reports, this 

time until March 31, 2002. Goedken filed this report April 16, 2002. The 

next report was due March 31, 2007. Once again, Goedken failed to file 

the report on time, and the clerk of court sent him a delinquency notice 

on June 5, 2007. Goedken filed the report August 1, 2007. The next 

report was due March 31, 2012. On November 29, 2012, the clerk of court 

sent Goedken another delinquency notice. He filed the report February 1, 

2013, and the next report was due March 31, 2017. On December 1, 2017, 

the clerk of court sent Goedken another delinquency notice. Goedken filed 

the trustee’s report March 14, 2018. After scheduling and cancelling 

hearings to explain the delay in the filing and to address Goedken’s 

suspension, the district court approved the report on April 24. In total, 

Goedken received four delinquency notices in the Wathan trust.

In May 2019, Grace Wathan passed away. The Wathan trust’s 

assets go to Wathan’s children. Another attorney, Steve Kundel, is 

handling Wathan’s estate. 

B. Count II: Milder Estate. Goedken also represented Timothy J. 

Dickerson as the executor of Phyllis D. Milder’s estate. Dickerson 
5

petitioned to probate Milder’s will on March 22, 2017, and the district 

court appointed Dickerson executor and Goedken as Dickerson’s attorney. 

After Goedken failed to file the inventory report, the clerk of court 

sent him a delinquency notice on December 1. Goedken filed the inventory 

report February 2, 2018. However, the clerk of court again issued 

Goedken a delinquency notice December 1, 2018, this time for failure to 

file an interlocutory report. On April 25, 2019, Kundel filed an appearance 

in the case and Dickerson filed his interlocutory report. On July 15, the 

day before the commission hearing, Goedken withdrew from the Milder 

estate. 

C. Count III: Price Estate. Michael D. Price petitioned to probate 

Ralph E. Price’s estate on June 8, 2017. The district court appointed Price 

as executor and Price designated Goedken as his attorney in the matter. 

When Goedken failed to file the inventory report, the clerk of court sent 

him a delinquency notice on December 1. 

The estate was still delinquent March 20, 2018, so the district court 

set a hearing for May 4, directing Price and Goedken “to show cause as to 

why they should not be removed or held in contempt.” Neither Price nor 

Goedken attended this hearing. The court rescheduled the hearing for 

May 24 and ordered Price and Goedken to appear. On May 8, the 

Muscatine County sheriff served Goedken with the court’s order. The next 

day, Goedken had eye surgery. 

Goedken and Price attended the May 24 hearing, and Goedken

explained his vision issues, taking the blame for Price missing the hearing. 

The court ordered him to file the report within ten days. The next day, 

Goedken filed the inventory report. He filed the interlocutory report 

June 7. 
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On December 18, 2018, Goedken filed an interim final report, 

certifying the only thing left open in the estate was the filing of an Iowa tax 

return. Goedken did not complete the report because of amendments to 

the federal tax code. On December 20, the court held the estate would be 

held open until Goedken filed a supplemental report confirming the taxes 

had been taken care of and withheld $500 of Goedken’s fee to reflect the 

incomplete work. In the meantime, on March 28, 2019, the court 

scheduled a hearing for April 25 to address our suspension of Goedken’s

license for failing to respond to the Board. On April 23, after we reinstated 

his license, Goedken filed the supplemental report and the court closed 

the Price estate and cancelled the April 25 hearing. 

D. Count IV: Briggs Estate. Deborah S. McNamara and Donald D. 

Briggs petitioned the court to probate the will of Dorothy A. Briggs and 

applied to be coexecutors on June 14, 2017. When they were appointed, 

they designated Goedken as their attorney of record. 

On December 1, the clerk of court issued a delinquency to Goedken 

for failure to file the inventory report. Goedken filed the inventory report 

December 12. On December 10, 2018, Goedken filed an interim final 

report pending tax clearance. On December 31, the court approved the 

interim final report and held the estate open, reserving $1000 of Goedken’s 

payment for when Goedken filed a supplemental report confirming the 

taxes had been taken care of. In the meantime, on March 28, 2019, the 

court scheduled a hearing for April 25 to address our suspension of 

Goedken’s license. On April 22, Goedken filed the tax certificate, and on 

April 23, he filed two supplemental reports. The court closed the Briggs 

estate on April 23 and cancelled the April 25 hearing. 

E. Count V: Manatt Estate. On July 9, 2017, Sue A. Cox 

petitioned to probate the will of Mona I. Manatt and become executor in 
7

the Manatt estate. Cox designated Goedken as her representative in the 

matter. 

On December 1,1 the clerk of court issued a delinquency notice 

because Goedken failed to file the inventory report. When the estate was 

still delinquent on March 20, 2018, the court scheduled a hearing for 

May 4, for Cox and Goedken “to show cause as to why they should not be 

removed or held in contempt.” Neither attended. After the Muscatine 

County sheriff personally served Goedken and after his eye surgery, 

Goedken appeared before the district court.2 

The court ordered Goedken to file the inventory and an interlocutory 

report by June 8, 2018. Goedken filed the inventory on May 25. He filed 

an interlocutory report on June 5, reporting the impediments to closing 

the estate had been removed. On March 28, 2019, the district court 

scheduled a hearing on the issue of Goedken’s suspended law license. 

However, on April 25, the court continued the hearing to July 25. On 

July 15, Goedken filed a final report and accounting, though he admitted 

before the commission that the estate became more complicated after his 

June 5 report. Attorney Gregory A. Johnston has since filed an 

appearance in the Manatt estate, and Goedken has withdrawn. 

F. Count VI: Lechner Estate. On June 18, 2018, Michael C. 

Wilson petitioned to probate Elizabeth F. Lechner’s estate and have an 

executor appointed. The court appointed First National Bank of Muscatine 

as executor, and the bank designated Goedken as the attorney in the 

estate. 

 1Goedken thus received four delinquency notices on December 1, 2017.

2The scheduled Cox hearings overlapped with the scheduled Price hearings and 

were before the same district court judge.
8

On December 1, 2018, the clerk of court issued Goedken a 

delinquency notice for failure to file the inventory report. Goedken filed 

the inventory report January 22, 2019. On April 8, 2019, attorney Kundel 

appeared on behalf of the bank. The court ordered Goedken withdrawn 

from the case on May 2, 2019. 

G. Count VII: Response to Delinquency Notices. After Goedken 

failed to cure the delinquencies in the Wathan trust, Milder estate, Price 

estate, and Manatt estate, on April 17, 2018, the Board mailed Goedken 

letters giving him thirty days to certify he had cured the delinquencies. 

The Board explained it would take no further actions if the delinquencies 

were cured, but it would open a formal complaint against Goedken if he 

did not cure the delinquencies. 

When Goedken failed to cure the delinquencies, the Board opened a 

complaint against him under Iowa Court Rule 35.6. The Board sent 

Goedken a letter explaining the situation on July 23, and Goedken 

acknowledged receipt of that letter on July 26. However, Goedken did not 

respond to the Board’s complaint. 

On August 17, the Board sent Goedken a second letter notifying him 

a complaint had been opened against him. He acknowledged receipt of the 

letter on August 24 but again failed to respond to the Board. 

Due to Goedken’s failure to respond, on December 27, the Board

filed a certificate with this court under Iowa Court Rule 35.7(3). On 

January 2, 2019, the clerk of our court notified Goedken we would 

suspend his license if the certificate the Board filed was not withdrawn 

within twenty days. Goedken acknowledged receipt of this notice on 

January 4. 

Still, Goedken did not respond. Therefore, we suspended Goedken’s 

license on January 30. Goedken acknowledged receipt of the suspension 
9

order February 4. Our order informed Goedken of his obligation to comply 

with the notification provisions of Iowa Court Rule 34.24, requiring him to 

notify his clients of his suspension and advise them to seek legal advice 

elsewhere. However, he did not inform his clients of his suspension or 

withdraw from their cases at this time. 

Finally, on April 9, Goedken responded to the Board’s complaint. 

The Board withdrew its certificate, and Goedken paid the reinstatement 

fee. We reinstated Goedken’s law license on April 10. 

III. Violations.

The Board alleged, and the commission found, that Goedken 

violated six of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. First, the 

commission found Goedken violated Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 

32:1.3, diligence, in his handling of the trust and estates listed above. The 

commission also found Goedken violated several rules with respect to his 

uncooperative behavior and suspension. Those violations include rule 

32:1.4(a)(3), keeping the client reasonably informed; rule 32:1.16(a)(1), 

withdrawing from the representation; rule 32:1.16(d), protecting the 

client’s interests; and rule 32:8.1(b), knowingly failing to respond. Finally, 

the commission found Goedken violated rule 32:8.4(d), conduct prejudicial 

to the administration of justice, both in his dilatory handling of the trust 

and estates and in his failure to cooperate with the Board. 

Although Goedken’s failure to answer the Board’s complaint made

“the facts alleged . . . properly deemed admitted, we nonetheless conduct 

an independent review of [his] alleged ethical violations.” Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCuskey, 814 N.W.2d 250, 257 (Iowa 2012).

A. Rule 32:1.3: Diligence. Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct 

32:1.3 states that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 

promptness in representing a client.” In the probate context, an attorney 
10

does not typically violate rule 32:1.3 by missing one deadline or receiving 

one delinquency notice. Capotosto, 927 N.W.2d at 588. However, repeated 

failures “to perform required functions as attorney for the executor,” meet 

deadlines, and close the estate within a reasonable time can amount to a 

violation of the rule. Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Iowa 2012)). Receipt of multiple 

delinquencies can result in violation of this rule. Id. Neglect of the type 

that violates rule 32:1.3 “involves ‘a consistent failure to perform those 

obligations that a lawyer has assumed, or a conscious disregard for the 

responsibilities a lawyer owes to a client.’ ” Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d at 102

(quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 

860, 867 (Iowa 2010)). We have held that failure to appear at a scheduled 

hearing violates rule 32:1.3. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Weiland, 885 N.W.2d 198, 208 (Iowa 2016).

This case arose from Goedken receiving a total of nine delinquency 

notices. Goedken failed to file interlocutory reports in multiple cases and 

received four delinquency notices in the Wathan trust alone. This record 

of delinquencies demonstrates Goedken’s consistent failure to perform his 

obligations. Goedken also failed to appear at two scheduled court hearings 

and had to be personally served by the sheriff to ensure his attendance 

when those hearings were rescheduled. 

Moreover, Goedken’s attitude toward his delinquencies, displayed in 

his hearing before the commission, showed he had a conscious disregard 

for our probate rules. When questioned about the delinquencies, Goedken 

expressed that he does not “attend to details very much” and had “better 

things to do with [his] time than interlocutory reports.” Goedken went on 

to explain that he has difficulty adhering to “the standards that other 

people set for [him], which [he does not] see any sense for,” and noted that 
11

he also practices in Illinois, which does not require the same deadlines in 

handling estates. He further referred to requests that he file required 

reports as “silly requests.” Accordingly, we find Goedken violated rule 

32:1.3 by his dilatory handling of the Wathan trust and the five estates. 

B. Rule 32:1.4(a)(3): Keeping the Client Reasonably Informed, 

Rule 32:1.16(a)(1): Withdrawing from the Representation, and Rule 

32:1.16(d): Protecting the Client’s Interests. The commission next 

found Goedken violated three interrelated rules when his law license was 

suspended. The commission found Goedken violated rule 32:1.4(a)(3) by 

failing to inform his clients of his suspension and rule 32:1.16(a)(1) by 

failing to withdraw despite his suspended license, thereby not protecting 

his client’s interests in violation of rule 32:1.16(d). 

Rule 32:1.4(a)(3) says “[a] lawyer shall . . . keep the client reasonably 

informed about the status of the matter.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 

32:1.4(a)(3). We ordinarily find violations of rule 32:1.4(a)(3) when an 

attorney fails to respond to client inquiries or update the client about 

required hearings. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Turner, 918 

N.W.2d 130, 145 (Iowa 2018); Weiland, 885 N.W.2d at 209. Here, Goedken 

failed to inform two clients, Price and Cox, about hearings that were held 

to determine why reports in those matters were delinquent. Goedken’s 

failure to inform his clients Cox and Price of hearings in their cases 

violated this rule.

Additionally, comment 3 to rule 32:1.4 explains paragraph (a)(3) 

“requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the 

status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing 

or the substance of the representation.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.4 cmt. 

[3]. In Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Earley, we found 

attorney Brian Earley violated, inter alia, rule 32:1.4(a)(3) by failing to 
12

inform his clients when his law license was suspended. 774 N.W.2d 301, 

308 (Iowa 2009). Moreover, the timing and substance of representation 

are undoubtedly affected by a lawyer’s law license being suspended. Thus, 

we find Goedken’s failure to inform his clients of his suspension violates 

rule 32:1.4(a)(3). 

Rule 32:1.16(a)(1) says a lawyer “shall withdraw” from representing 

a client when “the representation will result in violation of the Iowa Rules 

of Professional Conduct or other law.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.16(a)(1). 

We have found that “a lawyer’s representation of a client after suspension” 

violates rule 32:1.16(a)(1). McCuskey, 814 N.W.2d at 255. Despite his 

suspension, Goedken continued to attempt to represent his clients, even 

commenting that his loss of access to EDMS caused him problems. 

Without a valid license, this representation was in contravention of the 

Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct. Thus, Goedken violated rule 

32:1.16(a)(1).

Finally, the commission found Goedken violated rule 32:1.16(d) by 

violating rules 32:1.4(a)(3) and 32:1.16(a)(1) and not informing his clients 

his law license had been suspended. Rule 32:1.16(d) requires a lawyer, 

[u]pon termination of representation, . . . [to] take steps to the 

extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, 

such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time 

for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and 

property to which the client is entitled, and refunding any 

advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned 

or incurred.

Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:1.16(d). In Earley, we found attorney Earley 

violated rule 32:1.16(d) when he failed to inform his clients of his 

suspension. 774 N.W.2d at 308. Like Earley, Goedken did not inform his 

clients that his law license was suspended. Accordingly, Goedken violated 

rule 32:1.16(d). 
13

C. Rule 32:8.1(b): Knowingly Failing to Respond. The 

commission next found Goedken violated rule 32:8.1(b) by failing to 

respond to the Board’s inquiries. Rule 32:8.1(b) requires “a lawyer . . . in 

connection with a disciplinary matter” to not “knowingly fail to respond to 

a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary 

authority.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.1(b). “We can infer an attorney’s 

knowing failure to respond to the demand for information when there is 

proof the attorney received the Board’s inquiries but still did not provide 

the information sought.” Turner, 918 N.W.2d at 150. Goedken received 

multiple letters from the Board, all acknowledged received, but failed to 

respond to any of the Board’s complaints until after his law license was 

suspended. He admitted he chose not to open the Board’s letters because 

they upset him. Therefore, Goedken violated rule 32:8.1(b).

D. Rule 32:8.4(d): Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of 

Justice. Finally, the commission found Goedken violated rule 32:8.4(d) 

by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The 

commission found Goedken violated this rule both through his dilatory 

handling of the five estates and the Wathan trust and through his failure 

to cooperate with the Board throughout the complaint process.

Rule 32:8.4(d) states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a 

lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 

justice.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). “There is no precise test for 

determining whether an attorney’s conduct violates the rule.” Weiland, 

885 N.W.2d at 212. In general, acts that are prejudicial to the 

administration of justice “hamper[] the efficient and proper operation of 

the courts or of ancillary systems upon which the courts rely.” Id. (quoting 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Monroe, 784 N.W.2d 784, 788 

(Iowa 2010)). “We have consistently held an attorney’s misconduct 
14

causing prolonged or additional court proceedings violates this rule.” 

Capotosto, 927 N.W.2d at 589. This is true because such proceedings 

waste “valuable judicial and staff resources.” Id. (quoting Van Ginkel, 809 

N.W.2d at 103).

1. Violation of rule 32:8.4(d) due to neglect. We have held receipt of 

repeated delinquency notices is conduct prejudicial to the administration 

of justice. Id. This rule forbids attorneys from using the clerk of court as 

a “private tickler system” to remind them to file required reports. Iowa

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Curtis, 749 N.W.2d 694, 699 (Iowa 

2008); accord Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d at 103. 

Here, the clerk of court was forced to issue nine delinquency notices 

to Goedken, and the district court wasted significant time attempting to 

schedule and hold hearings related to those delinquencies. Although some 

of those delinquency notices were issued during a time when mitigating 

factors were present in Goedken’s life, the delinquency notices in the 

Wathan trust were sent prior to Goedken’s heart attack, eye issues, and 

the death of his daughter. Indeed, the repeated delinquencies in the trust 

suggest Goedken was using the clerk of court as a “private tickler system.” 

We therefore find Goedken’s handling of the five estates and the Wathan 

trust was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation 

of rule 32:8.4(d).

2. Violation of rule 32:8.4(d) by Goedken’s lack of response to the 

Board’s complaint. Failure to timely respond to Board communications 

can result in a violation of rule 32:8.4(d). West, 901 N.W.2d at 525. When 

an attorney fails to respond to Board communication, the attorney wastes 

Board resources and time in pursuing a response from the attorney. See 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 831 N.W.2d 194, 200 

(Iowa 2013). 
15

In this case, Goedken received repeated notices from the Board, first 

a notice that if he did not cure the delinquencies in his cases a complaint 

would be opened, then the opening of the complaint, then a second notice 

that a complaint had been opened, and lastly a notice the Board had filed

a certificate against him. Finally, we suspended Goedken’s law license on 

January 30. Not until over two months after this suspension, April 9, did 

Goedken finally respond to the Board. We find this conduct was 

prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of rule 32:8.4(d).

IV. Sanction.

We have no standard sanction for types of attorney misconduct. 

Capotosto, 927 N.W.2d at 589. We determine what sanction is appropriate 

based on the facts of each individual case. Id. 

When fashioning a sanction, we examine several factors, 

including “the nature of the violations, the need for 

deterrence, protection of the public, maintenance of the 

reputation of the Bar as a whole, and the violator’s fitness to 

continue to practice law.” 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Ackerman, 786 N.W.2d 491, 497 

(Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Ramey, 639 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 2002)). We consider both aggravating 

and mitigating factors to determine the appropriate sanction. West, 901 

N.W.2d at 526. The commission recommended a ninety-day suspension 

for Goedken’s misconduct. However, we have the discretion to impose a 

greater or lesser sanction. Id. 

A. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors. The commission found 

several aggravating factors in Goedken’s conduct. Those factors included 

Goedken’s history of prior discipline, lengthy experience with the practice 

of law, and multiple violations of the same type. On our de novo review, 

we find these factors, as well as Goedken’s attitude toward and failure to 
16

cooperate with the Board and his continued practice of law despite his 

suspension, are aggravating factors.

Prior admonitions are considered an aggravating factor. Id. at 528. 

This factor is even stronger when those prior actions involved the same 

cases or subject matter as the present action because they put the attorney 

“on notice of his [or her] ethical requirements.” Id. Even “somewhat dated” 

prior reprimands can be considered an aggravating factor. Van Ginkel, 

809 N.W.2d at 110. However, “for prior discipline to qualify as an 

aggravating factor, we must have disciplined an attorney before he or she 

commits the subsequent act.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Noel, 933 N.W.2d 190, 205 (Iowa 2019).

Goedken received a public reprimand in 1986 for probate 

delinquencies. The Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct 

privately admonished Goedken in 1987 and 1988 for probate 

delinquencies as well. Finally, Goedken received a public reprimand in 

October 2018 for delinquencies in his handling of two estates between 

2015 and 2017. However, the 2018 reprimand occurred after many of the 

relevant delinquencies in this case. That reprimand is only properly 

considered an aggravating factor in those delinquencies that arose after 

October 2018. Yet, the reprimands in 1986, 1987, and 1988 are properly 

considered an aggravating factor in our determination of the appropriate 

sanction. 

Multiple instances of the same type of neglect constitute another 

aggravating factor. Capotosto, 927 N.W.2d at 589. The clerk of court 

issued Goedken delinquencies in six separate cases. These six instances 

of the same or substantially similar neglectful conduct represent an 

aggravating factor in our analysis.
17

We also consider experience in the practice of law to be an 

aggravating factor. West, 901 N.W.2d at 528. Goedken has been 

practicing law for over fifty-six years. Thus, Goedken’s lengthy experience 

represents an aggravating factor.

Additionally, failure to cooperate with and a dismissive attitude 

toward the Board can be an aggravating factor. Turner, 918 N.W.2d at 

154–55. Goedken waited until after his license was suspended by this 

court to finally respond to the Board. Goedken’s failure to cooperate with 

the Board is properly considered an aggravating factor. Moreover, 

Goedken’s conduct before the commission included a failure to 

acknowledge wrongdoing. He excused the delinquencies by saying he does 

not “attend to details very much” and had “better things to do with [his] 

time than interlocutory reports.” He admitted he did not “see any sense 

for” Iowa’s probate rules. He referred the delinquency notices and requests 

that he file required probate reports as “silly requests” and spoke flippantly 

about attorney withdrawal rules, dismissing them as “your [(the 

commission’s)] rules” rather than rules he must be familiar with and abide 

by. 

Finally, continued practice of law with a suspended license is an 

aggravating factor, apart from itself being a violation of rule 32:1.16(a)(1). 

See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Crotty, 891 N.W.2d 455, 

467–68 (Iowa 2017). Despite being suspended, Goedken continued to 

work on the estates in issue here and even told the commission that losing 

access to EDMS slowed him down. 

The commission also noted certain mitigating factors, among them 

Goedken’s vision problems, personal matters, lack of apparent harm to his

clients, and lack of dishonest or selfish motive. On our do novo review, we 
18

agree these factors mitigate Goedken’s conduct, alongside the work 

Goedken completed in the cases.

We consider health issues to be a mitigating factor in determining 

the appropriate sanction. West, 901 N.W.2d at 527. Thus, Goedken’s 

vision difficulties, making using a computer a near impossibility, and his 

heart complications constitute a mitigating factor. Additionally, although 

personal issues do not excuse ethical violations, they can be considered a 

mitigating factor. Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d at 110. Moreover, “personal 

stress may relate directly to neglect.” Id. It is evident Goedken’s 

daughter’s illness and death impacted Goedken’s legal practice in late 

2018. Lack of harm to clients “is a significant mitigating factor.” Id. There 

is no evidence in this record suggesting harm came to Goedken’s clients 

due to his neglect of their matters. Substantial work completed can also 

be a mitigating factor. Capotosto, 927 N.W.2d at 590–91. Goedken 

ultimately managed to close three of the relevant estates and has 

withdrawn from the others. Finally, lack of selfish motive or desire for 

pecuniary gain is a mitigating factor. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 

Bd. v. Bieber, 824 N.W.2d 514, 528 (Iowa 2012). Like the commission, we 

find no evidence of a selfish motive in Goedken’s conduct. 

These mitigating factors are significant. Although Goedken allowed 

multiple delinquencies to occur across six cases, a majority of those 

delinquencies took place during a period when his vision had deteriorated 

to the point that he could not even read a computer screen. Moreover, it 

is apparent Goedken’s failure to respond to the Board and degree of neglect 

were affected by both his health issues and his personal stresses. Finally, 

Goedken is eighty-one years old and is currently seeking to retire after a 

lengthy legal career. He has taken steps toward this retirement by closing 
19

estates or withdrawing from matters. We find reasons such as protection 

of the public and deterrence less persuasive in this context.

B. Appropriate Sanction. When neglect is the primary form of 

misconduct an attorney engaged in, sanctions “have ranged from a public 

reprimand to a six-month license suspension.” Capotosto, 927 N.W.2d at 

589. In Capotosto, the attorney allowed six estates to become delinquent 

and subsequently entered into a deferral agreement with the Board

wherein he was supposed to remedy all delinquencies or withdraw, 

participate in six hours of probate-related continuing legal education, and 

not begin work on any new probate cases. Id. at 587. He failed to follow 

the agreement; he did not cure the existing delinquencies or withdraw and, 

in fact, opened new estates, resulting in an increase of delinquent cases 

where he was the attorney of record from five to twelve. Id. We considered 

this course of conduct, as well as his prior reprimands, to be a significant 

aggravating factor. Id. at 590. However, we found Capotosto’s important 

work in the community and substantial work done on the cases to be 

mitigating factors. Id. at 590–91. Based on the above, we suspended 

Capotosto’s license for sixty days. Id. at 591.

Another case involving significant probate delinquencies was Iowa 

Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Ochs, 804 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 

2011). In that case, the attorney repeatedly missed deadlines in ten cases. 

Id. at 721. One of those cases resulted in a private reprimand from the 

Board. Id. However, “[d]uring the hearing on the complaint, Ochs was 

honest, contrite, and apologetic.” Id. Additionally, Ochs did “not involve 

aggravating circumstances such as misrepresentation or violations of 

court orders found in many neglect cases in which we have imposed 

lengthy suspensions,” but instead “center[ed] almost entirely on the abject 

failure of an attorney to comply with the basic structural rules governing 
20

the processing of numerous probate cases over a prolonged period of time.” 

Id. at 722. Based on these factors, we suspended Ochs’s license for thirty 

days. Id. at 723.

Finally, in Marks, we considered the appropriate sanction for 

Samuel Zachary Marks. 831 N.W.2d at 196. Only one estate was involved, 

but nine delinquency notices had been issued. Id. Marks failed to respond 

to the Board’s complaint against him. Id. at 196–97. Even though 

[t]he Board sent four separate communications regarding the 

matter to Marks over a period of eight months[,] Marks did not 

respond until two months after the fourth communication, 

promising to follow up within two weeks of that 

communication. He failed to follow up.

Id.

Marks also had a long and sordid history of being reprimanded and 

suspended. Id. at 197. Marks had appeared before this court on two 

separate occasions for disciplinary issues. Id. In 2009, we suspended 

Marks’ license for thirty days for neglecting two probate estates, and in 

2012, we issued a public reprimand for conduct occurring prior to 2009. 

Id. Marks was also suspended in 2006 and 2008 for failure to cooperate 

with the Board and was publicly reprimanded in 2007 for lack of diligence, 

incompetence, and failure to cooperate with the Board. Id. Based on these 

factors, we suspended Marks’ license to practice law for three months. Id.

at 202.

On our review of this case, we determine Goedken’s conduct, 

coupled with the aggravating and mitigating factors, requires a ninety-day

suspension. Unlike Ochs, Goedken’s violations cover more than just a 

large number of delinquencies. A thirty-day suspension is too little. 

Although this case resembles Capotosto, where delinquent handling of 

estates was accompanied by failure to comply with the Board and a history 
21

of prior reprimands, there are additional aggravating factors here. 

Particularly, Goedken’s continued practice of law despite the suspension 

of his license and his flippant attitude toward the Board and the

commission, similar to Marks’ uncooperative behavior and long history of 

reprimands, justify a longer suspension. 

V. Disposition.

In light of the above considerations, we suspend Goedken’s license 

to practice law in Iowa for an indefinite period with no possibility of 

reinstatement for ninety days from the date of filing this opinion. After 

ninety days, Goedken must apply for reinstatement if he wishes to 

continue to practice law. See Iowa Ct. R. 34.25. The suspension applies 

to all facets of the practice of law. Id. r. 34.23(3). Goedken shall comply 

with the notification requirements of Iowa Court Rule 34.24. We tax the 

costs of this action to Goedken in accordance with Iowa Court Rule 

36.24(1).

LICENSE SUSPENDED.

All justices concur except Waterman, J., who takes no part.