Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Andrew Ndubisi Ucheomumu, Misc. 

Docket AG No. 27, September Term, 2015. Opinion by Hotten, J. 

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE — SANCTIONS — SUSPENSION: Maryland attorney 

failed to maintain an attorney trust account, failed to competently represent client in federal 

lawsuit, failed to clearly communicate billing structure to client, made an agreement with 

a client for an unreasonable fee, failed to hold third-party funds in trust, failed to properly 

terminate representation, presented frivolous arguments in a federal lawsuit, was 

sanctioned by a federal court, and failed to properly maintain records of client’s payments 

to attorney and third-parties. Attorney’s misconduct violated Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct: 1.1, 1.4(b), 1.5(a), 1.15(a) and (c), 1.16(d), 3.1, 3.4(a) and (d), 8.4(a) 

and (d), Maryland Rules 16-604 (now Maryland Rule 19-404) and 16-606.1 (now 

Maryland Rule 19-407), and Maryland Code (Repl. Vol. 2010), § 10-306 of the Business 

Occupations & Professions Article. Under the circumstances, an indefinite suspension with 

the right to apply for reinstatement after 90 days is the appropriate sanction. As a condition 

of reinstatement, upon application, Respondent must provide the Attorney Grievance 

Commission and Bar Counsel with appropriate documentation showing the existence and 

maintenance of an attorney trust account.
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, 

Maryland 

Case No. 25749-M 

Argued: September 8, 2016 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

Misc. Docket AG No. 27

September Term, 2015 

______________________________________ 

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

OF MARYLAND 

v. 

ANDREW NDUBISI UCHEOMUMU 

______________________________________ 

Barbera, C.J., 

Greene,

Adkins,

McDonald,

Watts, 

Hotten, 

Getty, 

JJ.

______________________________________ 

Opinion by Hotten, J.

______________________________________ 

Filed: December 15, 2016
On July 10, 2015, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (“Petitioner”), 

acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against 

Andrew Ndubisi Ucheomumu (“Respondent”) charging him with violating the Maryland 

Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”)1

, arising out of his representation of 

David C. Jackson and Jackson’s companies, Jalin Realty Capital Advisors (“Jalin”) and 

American Capital Holdings (“ACH”). Petitioner’s gravest allegations against Respondent 

claimed that Respondent continued to assist Jackson after Respondent was placed on actual 

or constructive notice of Jackson’s fraudulent lending practices.2

 The hearing judge agreed 

and found that Respondent was “well aware of Jackson’s illegal activity,” and that 

Respondent’s representation “actively aided and abetted” Jackson and Jalin. 

For the reasons outlined infra, we disagree with the hearing judge’s finding that 

Respondent had knowledge of Jackson’s advance fee fraud during Respondent’s 

representation. Accordingly, we disagree with the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent 

“aided and abetted” Jackson’s criminal activity. In light of Respondent’s less serious 

violations of the MLPRC discussed herein, we find that the appropriate sanction is an 

indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement after 90 days. As a condition 

 

1

 Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct were 

renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and moved 

to Title 19, Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules. This opinion refers to the MLRPC, not the 

MARPC, because all relevant conduct took place before July 1, 2016. 

2

 On September 29, 2015, a jury in the United States District Court for the District 

of Connecticut found Jackson guilty of both conspiracy to commit wire fraud and 

substantive counts of wire fraud. U.S. v. Jackson and Hurt, No. 3:14-cr-00250-JBA (D. 

Conn. Sept. 29, 2015).
- 2 - 

of reinstatement, upon application, Respondent must provide the Attorney Grievance 

Commission and Bar Counsel with appropriate documentation showing the existence and 

maintenance of an attorney trust account.

Petitioner charged Respondent with alleged violations of several rules of the 

MLRPC: Rule 1.1 (Competence); Rule 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of 

Authority Between Client and Lawyer); Rule 1.4 (Communication); Rule 1.5 (Fees); Rule 

1.15 (Safekeeping Property); Rule 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation); Rule 

3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions); Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and 

Counsel); Rule 8.4 (Misconduct); Petitioner also charged Respondent with violations of: 

Maryland Rule 16-6043

 (Trust account — Required deposits); Maryland Rule 16.606.14

(Attorney trust account record-keeping); and § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and 

Professions Article of the Maryland Code (Trust money restrictions). 

I. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

By an Order dated July 13, 2015, we referred the Petition to the Honorable Ronald 

B. Rubin of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for an evidentiary hearing. On 

October 22, 2015, Judge Rubin (“the hearing judge” or “the hearing court”) rendered 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The findings were as follows:

The [R]espondent, Andrew N. Ucheomumu (“Ucheomumu” or 

“[R]espondent”), is 56 years old. He immigrated to the United States from 

Nigeria in 1979. Before practicing law, he had been employed in the 

 

3 Maryland Rule 16-604 is now codified as Maryland Rule 19-404, effective as of 

July 1, 2016. 

4 Maryland Rule 16.606.1 is now codified as Maryland Rule 19-407, effective as 

of July 1, 2016. 
- 3 - 

import/export business from 1979 through 2006, Ucheomumu received his 

undergraduate degree in 2003 from the University of Pittsburgh. He received 

his law degree from the David A. Clarke School of Law of the University of 

the District of Columbia in 2008. Ucheomumu was admitted to the Maryland 

Bar on June 15, 2009. 

In 2009, Ucheomumu received an LL.M. from The American 

University School of Law in constitutional and national security law. In 

2011, he received an LL.M. from the University of Hull in England, in 

European Public Law.

After law school, Ucheomumu began practice as a solo practitioner. 

At the time of the events giving rise to the Petition, [R]espondent’s 

professional experience was limited to serving as a panel attorney in Prince 

George’s County, where he handled juvenile matters, a small number of 

family law, and simple contract cases.

Ucheomumu first met David C. Jackson (“Jackson”) in 1993 at a 

“business incubator” located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where they both 

maintained offices. At that time, Jackson was operating a mortgage business 

and Ucheomumu was running an import/export business. In 2006, Jackson 

was convicted of mortgage fraud and sentenced to a forty-one month term in 

federal prison. This story was, according to [R]espondent, “front page news” 

in the local Pittsburgh newspaper. Respondent admitted that he knew, in 

2006, that Jackson had been convicted of mortgage fraud. Ucheomumu 

moved to Maryland in June 2006. 

Jackson was released from prison in 2009. In June 2010, Jackson 

contacted Ucheomumu by telephone. According to [R]espondent, Jackson 

simply “looked me up” out of the blue and said that he was “back in business 

on the mortgage lending side.” During that conversation, Ucheomumu told 

Jackson that he had passed the Maryland Bar and was now engaged in the 

practice of law. Shortly thereafter, in July 2010, Ucheomumu was asked by 

Jackson to serve as “outside general counsel” for Jalin Realty Capital 

Advisers, LLC (“Jalin”), an entity controlled by Jackson.

A. Books and Records 

On August 26, 2010, Jackson signed a retainer agreement on behalf 

of Jalin, which [R]espondent had prepared to memorialize the representation. 

Jalin allegedly was a hard money lender located in Ohio. The retainer 

agreement was signed by Jackson using the name of “C. David Manns.” 

According to [R]espondent, Jackson told him that he had legally changed his 
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name to Manns after his release from federal prison. Respondent, however, 

never requested proof of or verified whether Jackson had legally changed his 

name. 

As well, [Respondent] never visited Jalin’s office or conducted any 

due diligence into Jalin’s lending operation, despite knowing that Jackson 

previously had been convicted of mortgage fraud. Nevertheless, from July 

2010 through December 2012, [R]espondent performed a variety of legal 

services for Jalin, a successor entity known as American Capital Holdings, 

L[L]C (also controlled by Jackson),[] and Jackson personally.

According to the retainer agreement, [R]espondent was hired as 

“Outside Counsel on General Matters.”[] The first page of the agreement 

provides that there is to be a $10,000.00 non-refundable retainer. The retainer 

agreement said: “This means CLIENT will not get the money back.” 

Page two, however, recited inconsistently that legal work for Jalin was 

to be billed at an hourly rate of $195.00 per hour and charged against the 

retainer.

Page four recited that time is to be recorded in tenths of an hour and 

that the attorney “will bill monthly for legal services.” Further, the retainer 

agreement provided that bills for legal services “are payable immediately 

when received.”

During this period of representation, [R]espondent did not maintain 

an attorney trust account. Consistent with the language of the retainer 

agreement, [R]espondent deposited funds received from his client into his 

general bank account at the Bank of America.[] Respondent, who billed at 

$195.00 per hour according to the retainer agreement, sent only one invoice 

to Jackson on September 23, 2010.[] This invoice covered the period August 

23, 2010 through September 22, 2010. No further invoices were created or 

sent to the client until after a complaint had been filed with Bar Counsel and 

an inquiry into [R]espondent’s recordkeeping was initiated. Respondent did 

not maintain contemporaneous records of Jalin or Jackson’s payments apart 

from his bank records and the single invoice. 

On January 7, 2011, [R]espondent received a payment of $1,150.00 

from American Capital Holdings, a company formed by Jackson. 

Respondent did not have a separate retainer agreement with American 

Capital Holdings. It is not entirely clear from the record whether this 

company is a legal successor to Jalin or a separate, new entity which Jackson 

formed to continue its lending business. Respondent performed no due 
- 5 - 

diligence in this regard and was unclear during his testimony at the hearing 

as to the precise nature of this entity and its ownership structure.[] Respondent 

was paid legal fees by American Capital Holdings[] and used some of the 

funds he received from American Capital Holdings to pay other attorneys. 

The court finds that [R]espondent paid one firm, the Pemberton Law Firm of 

Minnesota, the sum of $1934.00, not the $4,000.00 as originally instructed 

by Jackson. 

Between August 2010 and December 2012, [R]espondent received a 

total of $90,850.00 in legal fees from Jackson and his businesses.[] During 

that same period, [R]espondent billed Jackson and his companies for 

$153,512.25.[] Some of the funds deposited into [R]espondent’s bank 

account were earmarked for third parties, such as local counsel.[]

B. Knowledge of Jackson’s Criminal Activities

According to FBI Agent Ronald Henderson, [R]espondent was told 

during a meeting on June 6, 2011, that Jackson was again under criminal 

investigation for mortgage fraud, and that Jackson used C. David Manns and 

Charles Jackson as aliases. Agent Henderson also presented [R]espondent 

with a financial analysis of the fraud under investigation and a summary of 

Jackson’s past criminal history. The agent wanted to interview Jackson, but

[R]espondent, on Jackson’s behalf, requested transactional immunity from 

federal prosecution. The government was willing only to grant Jackson use 

immunity.[] As a consequence, on Jackson’s behalf, [R]espondent declined 

the Agent’s request for Jackson to cooperate in the federal investigation.

The court credits Agent Henderson’s testimony and disbelieves 

[R]espondent’s recollection of the meeting and its import. Clearly, as of June 

6, 2011, [R]espondent knew that Jackson once again was under federal 

criminal investigation for fraud. The court finds that during his representation 

of Jalin, American Capital Holdings and Jackson, [R]espondent performed 

no due diligence regarding his clients’ business practices, or the pleadings 

and discovery responses he filed on their behalf in various litigations, despite 

knowing that investors were claiming that Jalin was running an advance fee 

scheme[—]taking their advance fees but refusing to fund loans. 

Once [R]espondent met with federal investigators in June 2011, the 

court finds that [R]espondent either knew, or recklessly disregarded, the fact 

that Jalin was taking advance fees from clients and then intentionally failing 

to fund loans. Despite this knowledge, [R]espondent thereafter actively aided 

and abetted Jalin (and Jackson) by intentionally obfuscating the truth about 

Jalin’s business practices in communications with other attorneys who were 
- 6 - 

complaining about Jalin’s refusal to return fees or to fund loans, and in filings 

with courts. Respondent’s conduct in this regard was willful, and was not the 

result of a subjective, good faith mistake.

The court finds, based on a review of [R]espondent’s time records 

along with [R]espondent’s testimony at the hearing, that [R]espondent was 

intimately involved with Jalin’s business practices and Jackson’s personal 

matters, his protests to the contrary notwithstanding. Respondent was well 

aware, the court finds, that Jalin was taking advance fees from clients, 

declining thereafter to fund loans, and that Jalin’s clients were regularly 

demanding refunds of the advance fees. Despite this knowledge, 

[R]espondent continued with the representation, including the filing of two 

federal lawsuits to aid and assist Jackson’s criminal efforts. Also, 

[R]espondent, among other things, represented Jackson personally 

concerning the restitution Jackson owed for his prior mortgage fraud 

conviction, as well as legal research for Jackson’s potential (and personal) 

tort claims. For [R]espondent to claim that he did not know what was going 

on – as he did during his testimony – belies credulity. The court disbelieves 

[R]espondent’s testimony to the contrary. 

As Judge Moylan observed in Steinberg v. Arnold, “as fact finder, [the 

judge] has the usual jury prerogatives of whether to believe or disbelieve 

witnesses, how much weight to give testimony and ultimately whether to be 

persuaded or not to be persuaded.” 42 Md. App. 711, 712 (1979). The court 

is persuaded, by clear and convincing evidence, that [R]espondent knowingly 

assisted Jackson’s illegal advance fee scheme and profited therefrom.

C. Jalin v. A Better Wireless

In July 2010, [R]espondent began representing Jalin in a dispute with 

Mitch Koep, the owner of A Better Wireless, NISP, LLC, a Minnesota 

company. A Better Wireless had sought funding through Jalin, paying an 

advance fee of $37,500.00. Jalin failed to provide funding and refused to 

refund the fee. On behalf of Jalin, the court finds that [R]espondent reviewed 

documents and provided advice with respect to this failed loan transaction. 

Thereafter, on January 21, 2011, [R]espondent filed a lawsuit on behalf of 

Jalin in federal court in Minnesota. The complaint pled a number of causes 

of action and sought money damages and injunctive relief. According to the 

complaint, A Better Wireless falsely accused Jalin of mishandling the loan. 

Respondent conducted no pertinent factual investigation before filing the 

complaint. Further, [R]espondent failed to procure a notarized affidavit that 

was needed to support the demand for injunctive relief. As well, 
- 7 - 

[R]espondent failed to appear for a pre-trial conference on June 8, 2011, and 

was sanctioned $450.00 by the court. 

Thereafter, in August 2011, [R]espondent was served with discovery 

requests by counsel for A Better Wireless. On October 9, 2011, [R]espondent 

sent responses to the interrogatories and request for production of documents 

which wholly failed, the court finds, to comply with settled federal discovery 

rules. The responses, the court finds, contained frivolous and boilerplate 

objections, having nothing to do with the information requested by the 

opposing party. At the hearing in this matter, [R]espondent was not able to 

satisfactorily explain to this court why he answered the Minnesota discovery 

in the manner in which he did. 

Not surprisingly, the federal magistrate judge supervising the 

Minnesota case also found [R]espondent’s professional conduct sorely 

lacking. Among other things, the magistrate judge found that [R]espondent 

“made no attempt to explain why its discovery responses are substantially 

justified.” The magistrate judge also found that the “discovery responses fail 

to meet an objective standard of reasonableness.” The court sanctioned 

[R]espondent personally in the amount of $1,610.00. The court also 

precluded [R]espondent’s clients from using in any subsequent proceedings 

in the case any documents or other information requested but not provided 

in the discovery responses drafted and filed by [R]espondent. The complaint 

[R]espondent filed for Jalin later was dismissed by the district judge, with 

prejudice. 

D. The Texas Litigation

 Jalin was dissolved in 2011, in connection with the bankruptcy filing 

by Anthony Byrd, a nephew of Jackson. Jalin, it turns out was simply a 

registered trade name of Rhythm Stone Media Group, LLC, not a separate 

company. Jackson established American Capital Holdings to continue his 

“lending” business. 

On January 30, 2012, [R]espondent filed a complaint on behalf of 

American Capital Holdings in federal court in Texas. The suit was against an 

entity called Brightway Financial Group for allegedly issuing bogus standby 

letters of credit. In connection with this litigation, and in opposition to a 

motion to compel arbitration, [R]espondent knowingly filed an affidavit for 

Jackson using the false name [“]Charles Jackson,” not David C. Jackson, 

which was his legal name.
- 8 - 

E. Mitigation

 By way of mitigation, [R]espondent presented the testimony of 

Samuel Hamilton, a well-known and senior member of the Bar. Mr. 

Hamilton has known [R]espondent since 2010. The court credits Mr. 

Hamilton’s testimony regarding [R]espondent’s character during the period 

and in the context which he has known him.

(Footnotes omitted). 

The Conclusions of Law made by the hearing judge were as follows:

Conclusions of Law

In view of the court’s factual findings, the court concludes that 

[R]espondent has violated a number of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 

The court finds that [R]espondent knowingly failed to deposit client funds 

into an attorney trust account in violation of Rule 1.1. Respondent did not 

even have an attorney trust account until after his representation of Jalin and 

Jackson ended, in violation of Rule 16-604. As well, [R]espondent was 

required to deposit funds intended for Gilbert and Pemberton in trust, and not 

in his general bank account. Similarly, [R]espondent did not maintain 

contemporaneous records of his receipt of client funds until after Jackson 

filed a complaint and Bar Counsel requested [R]espondent to provide time 

and billing records, in violation of Rule 16-606.1. See also Section 10-306 

of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, which prohibits the use 

of trust money for other than its intended purpose[]. 

With respect to the A Better Wireless litigation in Minnesota, the 

court finds that [R]espondent demonstrated a lack of competence in violation 

of Rule 1.1. The court further finds that [R]espondent failed, under Rule 

1.4(a)(3) to comply with reasonable requests for information during 

discovery. The court also finds that [R]espondent violated Rule 1.4(b) by 

failing to disclose and clarify to his clients, in an unambiguous manner, the 

structure of the billing arrangement and the apportionment of fees to specific 

legal work. The court also finds that [R]espondent manifestly did not possess 

the requisite skill and experience to prosecute the Minnesota federal action, 

as evidenced by his testimony in this case, and the decision of two Minnesota 

federal judges. 

Respondent also violated Rule 3.1 in connection with the Minnesota 

litigation. Among other things, the complaint [R]espondent filed had no good 

faith, factual basis and the [R]espondent had no documents to support the 
- 9 - 

allegations he made in the complaint. Further, the complaint was, at best, 

highly misleading and, the court finds, was part of a concerted effort to assist 

Jackson in holding onto illegally earned advance fees extracted in connection 

with a fraudulent lending scheme.

Respondent’s conduct in discovery also violated Rule 3.4(a) and Rule 

3.4(d). Respondent intentionally withheld substantive, discoverable 

information he learned from his meeting with the FBI and the complaints of 

other Jalin clients about its failure to fund loans. He also failed, in good faith, 

to meet and confer with opposing counsel. Further, in connection with the 

Minnesota case, the court finds that [R]espondent did not properly account 

to his clients (albeit they too were part of a criminal enterprise themselves) 

for the fees he charged, in violation of Rule 1.5(a). 

The court finds that [R]espondent violated Rule 1.15(a) by failing to 

maintain funds belonging to third parties in an attorney trust account. 

Respondent also violated Rule 1.15(c) and (d) when he failed to obtain third 

parties’ informed consent (the Pemberton Law Firm and Greg Gilbert, 

Esquire) before depositing unearned funds into his general bank account. The 

court also finds that [R]espondent violated Rule 1.16(d) by failing to send 

Jackson invoices and a complete copy of his file, after Jackson requested 

these documents on at least two occasions. 

The court also finds multiple violations of Rule 8.4. Respondent 

plainly violated Rule 8.4(c) and (d) (and therefore also Rule 8.4(a)). 

Particularly egregious was his filing of two declarations by Jackson, using 

different names, with two federal courts. The court finds that [R]espondent 

knew that these were filed in an attempt to mislead and misinform the court 

and opposing counsel, and to conceal Jackson’s true identity. Respondent, 

the court finds, intentionally used a false name on behalf of his client 

(Jackson) in two court filings, all of which aided and assisted his client’s 

cover-up of an on-going fraud scheme, and enabled [R]espondent at the same 

time to bill and collect tens of thousands of dollars in fees. It defies common 

sense for [R]espondent to posit that he was unware of Jackson’s activities 

and that he was simply another person “duped” by Jackson. The court finds 

the opposite to be true; [R]espondent, well aware of Jackson’s illegal activity, 

dined on the gravy train until that gravy simply got too hot to handle. 

(Footnotes omitted). 
- 10 - 

II. Standard of Review 

The manner in which this Court reviews attorney discipline proceedings is well 

established:

This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney discipline 

proceedings in Maryland. We conduct an independent review of the record 

and we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless shown to be clearly 

erroneous. Under our independent review of the record, we must determine 

whether the findings of the hearing judge are based on clear and convincing 

evidence. With respect to exceptions, upon our review of the record, the 

hearing judge’s findings of fact generally will be accepted unless they are 

clearly erroneous. A hearing judge’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous 

if there is any competent material evidence to support it. As to the hearing 

judge’s conclusions of law, such as whether provisions of the Maryland 

Rules of Professional Conduct were violated, our consideration is de novo. 

Attorney Grievance v. Hodes, 441 Md. 136–69, 168, 105 A.3d 533, 552–53 (2014) 

(citations, footnote, and quotations omitted). Petitioner filed no exceptions to the hearing 

judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommends disbarment. Respondent 

filed numerous exceptions to both the hearing judge’s findings of fact and conclusions of 

law.

III. Respondent’s Exceptions to the Findings of Fact 

Respondent’s Exceptions to the Findings of Fact Pertaining to Respondent’s 

Knowledge and Assistance of Jackson’s Criminal Activity 

Respondent presents several exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact 

regarding Respondent’s knowledge of Jackson’s criminal activity during Respondent’s 

representation of Jackson and his companies. Underlying our analysis is the 

“fundamental principle that the factual findings of the assigned judge in an attorney 

disciplinary proceeding ‘are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed on review unless 
- 11 - 

clearly erroneous.’” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17, 741 A.2d 

1143, 1152 (1999) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470, 671 

A.2d 463, 473 (1996)). A hearing judge’s factual finding is not clearly erroneous “[i]f 

there is any competent material evidence to support [it].” YIVO Inst. for Jewish Research 

v. Zaleski, 386 Md. 654, 663, 874 A.2d 411, 416 (2005). 

Respondent opposes the hearing judge’s findings of fact that, after Respondent 

conferred with Agent Henderson in June 2011, “[R]espondent either knew, or recklessly 

disregarded, the fact that Jalin was taking advance fees from clients and then intentionally 

failing to fund loans.” Respondent argues that the jury verdict sheet utilized in Jackson’s 

wire fraud trial supports Respondent’s position. The guilty verdict adjudged Jackson’s 

conduct during a time period which spanned from April 27, 2010 to August 3, 2010. 

Jackson did not initially contact Respondent regarding legal representation until July 16, 

2010. Conversely, Petitioner contends that Respondent’s billing records, Jackson’s use of 

aliases, and Respondent’s meeting with Agent Henderson provide competent material 

evidence that Respondent had knowledge of, or recklessly disregarded, Jalin’s fraudulent 

activities. 

Agent Henderson’s testimony regarding the June 2011 meeting with Respondent 

provides evidence of the infancy of the investigation of Jackson at the time of Agent 

Henderson’s meeting with Respondent. Agent Henderson testified at Respondent’s 

evidentiary hearing as follows:

So the purpose of our meeting, then, with [Respondent] was to talk to 

him about possibly getting his client, Mr. Jackson, to potentially cooperate. 

And during the course of that meeting, then we gave, we laid out some of the 
- 12 - 

evidence that we basically collected against his client. One of the, a couple 

of the things were that his client, we knew that his client’s name was David 

Jackson, not C. David Manns, and that’s the name that he [had] been using 

to, in communicating with several victims that we had spoken to. 

We also communicated to [Respondent] about Mr. Jackson’s past. We 

knew that he had a previous felony conviction. Had just gotten out of federal 

prison in 2009. And we knew the, told [Respondent] that we knew the extent 

of the fraud that [Jackson] had committed previously. And then we talked to 

[Respondent] about, basically told him that we had done some financial 

analysis, some bank record analysis, and had spoken to victims, and talked 

to them about statements that were made to, to them by Mr. Jackson.5

Before the hearing court, Agent Henderson testified that, at the time of his meeting with 

Respondent, Agent Henderson was not aware of the issuance of any warrant pertaining to 

Jackson’s advance fee fraud. Agent Henderson further testified that he could not recall 

whether a target letter6

 had been issued regarding any ongoing investigation of Jackson’s 

advance fee fraud.7

 The ultimate conviction against Jackson was based on conduct that 

 

5

 Respondent sought transactional immunity for Jackson’s cooperation in the 

investigation, which the Government was not willing to provide. 

6

 A target letter is “a prosecutor’s letter to a potential defendant stating that a 

criminal investigation is underway and suggesting that the recipient consult counsel.” 

Target Letter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 

7

 Respondent’s counsel’s cross-examination of Agent Henderson contained the 

following exchange: 

[Respondent’s counsel]: . . . You’re not aware of any application for a 

warrant that was made as of that time as to Mr. Jackson, is that correct?

[Agent Henderson]: Correct. 

[Respondent’s counsel]: You’re not aware as to whether there was any target 

letter that was ever issued to Mr. Jackson as of that point, are you?

 (continued...)
- 13 - 

occurred during a time period that almost entirely preceded Respondent’s representation 

of Jackson. The guilty verdict in Jackson’s federal criminal conspiracy trial found Jackson 

guilty of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and substantive counts of wire fraud occurring 

on or about the following dates in 2010: April 27, May 10, May 21, June 23, June 24, July 

1, July 14, July 30, and August 3.8

 Respondent’s billing records show that he had billed 

Jackson for 2.1 hours of work on July 19, 2010 and 3.2 hours of work on July 21, 2010 for 

a total of 5.3 hours billed during the time period in which Jackson’s convicted conduct 

occurred. Respondent’s retainer agreement was not signed by Jackson until August 27, 

2010. Based on the record, it is too grave of an inferential step to charge Respondent with 

sufficiently particularized knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, Jackson’s criminal 

activity, as there is no competent material evidence to support that finding by clear and 

convincing evidence. Thus, Respondent’s exception is sustained.

Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge’s factual finding that Agent Henderson 

“presented [R]espondent with a financial analysis of the fraud under investigation . . . .” 

The testimony of Agent Henderson regarding this matter was as follows:

 

(...continued)

[Agent Henderson]: I don’t recall if any— 

[Respondent’s counsel]: All right, that’s all I’m interested in. Whether you 

recall.

[Agent Henderson]: —whether, whether there was a target letter at that point.

8

 Jury Verdict, U.S. v. Jackson and Hurt, No. 3:14-cr-00250-JBA (D. Conn. Sept. 

29, 2015). 
- 14 - 

And then we talked to [Respondent] about, basically told him we had done 

some financial analysis, some bank record analysis, and had spoken to 

victims and, and talked to them about statements that were made to, to them 

by Mr. Jackson. 

Petitioner did not file a written response to this exception.9 “A hearing judge’s factual 

finding is not clearly erroneous if there is any competent material evidence to support 

it.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 16, 85 A.3d 117, 125 

(2014) (quotation omitted). Agent Henderson’s testimony that he “told [Respondent] [the 

FBI] had done some financial analysis” does not lead to the inference that “Agent 

Henderson also presented [R]espondent with a financial analysis of the fraud under 

investigation . . . .” A presentation of financial analysis is substantially different from a 

communication that “some financial analysis[]” has been completed. Thus, Respondent’s 

exception is sustained.

Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “Respondent was well aware 

. . . that Jalin was taking advance fees from clients, declining thereafter to fund loans, and 

that Jalin’s clients were regularly demanding refunds of the advance fees. Despite this 

knowledge, [R]espondent continued with the representation, including the filing of two 

federal lawsuits to aid and assist Jackson’s criminal efforts.” For the reasons stated above, 

Respondent’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding regarding Respondent’s knowledge 

of Jackson’s criminal activity is sustained. It follows that, without knowledge of Jackson’s 

 

9

 Petitioner however noted at oral argument before this Court that Agent 

Henderson’s representation to Respondent that the FBI “had done some financial analysis, 

some bank record analysis,” could be deemed as a presentation of financial analysis. We 

disagree with such a broad interpretation of Agent Henderson’s testimony. 
- 15 - 

criminal activities, Respondent could not aid and abet Jackson’s criminal activities. See, 

e.g., Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 334, 941 A.2d 1107, 1122 (2008) (holding that “a 

person aids and abets the commission of a crime by knowingly associating with the 

criminal venture with the intent to help commit the crime, being present when the crime is 

committed, and seeking by some act to make the crime succeed”). 

There is no competent material evidence to support a finding that Respondent’s 

continued representation and lawsuits “aid[ed] and assist[ed] Jackson’s criminal efforts.” 

The first lawsuit, entitled Jalin Realty Capital Advisors, LLC v. A Better Wireless, NISP, 

LLC, was brought in United States District Court for the District of Minnesota on January 

21, 2011. 917 F.Supp. 2d 927 (D. Minn. 2013). This suit involved claims for 

cybersquatting,10 trademark infringement, common law defamation and tortious 

interference. Id. All of Jalin’s claims were dismissed by the court on summary judgment, 

and A Better Wireless’ motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim for fraud was 

denied. Id. at 945. The suit was ultimately settled. 

 

10 As explained by the A Better Wireless court: 

Congress enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 

U.S.C. § 1125(d), (‘the ACPA’) in 1999 to protect trademark owners against 

cybersquatting—the practice of registering well-known brand names as 

Internet domain names in order to force the rightful owners of the marks to 

pay for the right to engage in electronic commerce under their own brand 

name. 

Jalin Realty Capital Advisors, LLC v. A Better Wireless, NISP, LLC, 917 F.Supp. 2d 927, 

935 (D. Minn. 2013) (citations and quotations omitted). 
- 16 - 

The second lawsuit, entitled American Capital Holdings, LLC v. Brightway 

Financial Group, LLC, was brought in the Northern District of Texas on January 30, 2012. 

This suit was based upon claims by Jackson that Alex Hurt, and others associated with 

Brightway, had defrauded Jackson’s company, ACH, and its customers by issuing 

fraudulent guaranty letters of credit from a dummy company known as RBS Alliance. The 

lawsuit was ultimately dismissed based upon a decision upholding a mandatory arbitration 

clause in the parties’ contract. There is no competent material evidence of record to support 

a finding that Respondent’s representation and filing of these two lawsuits “aid[ed] and 

assist[ed] Jackson’s criminal efforts.” 

Next, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding of fact that Respondent 

“knowingly assisted Jackson’s illegal advance fee scheme and profited therefrom.” For the 

reasons expressed above, there is no competent material evidence of record to support a 

finding by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent had knowledge of, let alone 

assisted in, Jackson’s criminal activities. Thus, this exception is sustained. 

Respondent’s Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Remaining Findings of Fact 

Respondent demurs to the finding of fact that “[R]espondent paid one firm, the 

Pemberton Law Firm of Minnesota, the sum of $1[,]934.00, not the $4,000.00 as originally 

instructed by Jackson.” Respondent testified before the hearing court that he sent to 

Jackson the Pemberton Law Firm’s bill of $1,934 to be paid by Jackson directly to the 

Pemberton Law Firm. Respondent averred that he sent this bill to Jackson because Jackson 

habitually paid Respondent for his work, while also giving Respondent payments that were 

to be forwarded to Pemberton. Respondent further testified that Jackson wired $4,000 and 
- 17 - 

then $2,000 into the Respondent’s operating account. Respondent testified that, at the time 

these funds were wired, Jackson owed Respondent the sum of $52,333 for legal work 

performed. 

An email from Respondent to Jackson, with the subject line “Re: Money Transfer 

from AMERICAN CAPITAL HOLDINGS, LLC []” stated as follows: “This is to certify 

that we received a total of $6,000.00 representing the following: A) $4,000.00 for 

Pemberton Law Firm in Minnesota. B) $2,000 for The Ucheomumu Group, LLC to offset 

the cost of traveling and lodging in Minnesota for the upcoming hearing scheduled for 

September 19, 2012. Thank you.” Respondent testified before the hearing court that, 

immediately after Respondent sent this email, Jackson sent Respondent a considerable 

amount of documents to review. Respondent then asked Jackson how Jackson would pay 

Respondent for this document review, as Jackson already had an outstanding balance due 

to Respondent. Respondent testified that Jackson then instructed Respondent to only pay 

the Pemberton Law Firm their outstanding balance of $1,934 from the wired funds, instead 

of $4,000 as Jackson originally instructed. 

Despite Respondent’s testimony regarding Jackson’s second instruction to only pay 

$1,934 of the wired funds to Pemberton, the evidence of this second instruction does not 

render null and void the competent material evidence to support the finding of fact that 

“[R]espondent paid one firm, the Pemberton Law Firm of Minnesota, the sum of $1934.00, 
- 18 - 

not the $4,000.00 as originally instructed by Jackson.” (Emphasis added). Thus, 

Respondent’s exception is overruled. 11

Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “[i]n July 2010, 

[R]espondent began representing Jalin in dispute with Mitch Koep, the owner of A Better 

Wireless, NISP, LLC, a Minnesota company.” The evidence of record demonstrates that 

Respondent’s representation in the A Better Wireless suit began in October 2010, not July 

2010. Thus, this exception is sustained. 

Lastly, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “Respondent failed 

to procure a notarized affidavit that was needed to support the demand for injunctive 

relief.” While this is ultimately supported by competent material evidence of record, we 

also note that the record reflects that Respondent made attempts to procure the affidavit 

from his client, Jackson. Jackson, through no fault of Respondent, failed to provide the 

requisite information needed for the affidavit to Respondent.

IV. Respondent’s Exceptions to the Conclusions of Law 

Respondent filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law. We review 

the hearing judge’s conclusions of law de novo, addressing each of Respondent’s 

exceptions.

 

11 Notwithstanding Respondent’s testimony regarding Jackson’s amendment of 

Jackson’s original instruction, as noted in Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s 

Exceptions “[o]f course, it is undisputed that the funds earmarked for Pemberton were 

never maintained in trust.” Respondent’s violations of rules and statutes governing trust 

accounts are outlined infra. 
- 19 - 

Respondent’s Exceptions to the Conclusions of Law Pertaining to Respondent’s 

Knowledge and Assistance of Jackson’s Criminal Activity 

Respondent excepts to the following conclusions of law made by the hearing judge 

pertaining to Respondent’s knowledge and assistance of Jackson’s criminal activity: 

Further, the complaint [in the A Better Wireless suit] . . . was part of a 

concerted effort to assist Jackson in holding on to illegally earned advance 

fees extracted in connection with a fraudulent lending scheme. 

***

Respondent . . . intentionally used a false name on behalf of his client 

(Jackson) in two court filings, all of which aided and assisted his client’s 

cover-up of an on-going fraud scheme[.] 

For the reasons outlined in Section III, we sustain Respondent’s exceptions pertaining to 

the hearing judge’s conclusions of law based on findings of fact that Respondent had 

knowledge of, or recklessly disregarded, Jackson’s criminal activity, and acted in 

furtherance thereof. 

Respondent’s Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Remaining Conclusions of Law 

Respondent’s Exception to Rule 1.1 as it Pertains to Trust Accounts 

Rule 1.1 provides, “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. 

Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 

preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” Respondent excepts to the 

hearing judge’s conclusion of law that Respondent “knowingly failed to deposit client 

funds into an attorney trust account in violation of Rule 1.1” During all times pertinent to 

Respondent’s representation of Jackson and Jalin, Respondent did not maintain an attorney 

trust account. Thus, Respondent’s exception is overruled. As we held in Attorney 
- 20 - 

Grievance Comm’n v. Shephard, competent representation includes proper treatment and 

maintenance of client funds in a trust account. 444 Md. 299, 324–25, 119 A.3d 765, 780 

(2015). We find by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Rule 1.1 by 

failing to maintain an attorney trust account during his representation of Jackson, Jalin, and 

ACH.

Respondent’s Exception Regarding Rule 1.15 

Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion of law that Respondent 

“was required to deposit funds intended for Gilbert and Pemberton in trust, and not into his 

general bank account.” Rule 1.15(a) and (c) provide: 

(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a 

lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the 

lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained 

pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall 

be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. 

Other property shall be identified specifically as such and appropriately 

safeguarded, and records of its receipt and distribution shall be created and 

maintained. Complete records of the account funds and of other property 

shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least five 

years after the date the record was created. 

* * * 

(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a 

different arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit legal fees and expenses that 

have been paid in advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those 

funds for the lawyer’s own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses 

incurred. 

Respondent argues that he did not personally deposit any funds intended for third parties 

into his bank account. Rather, Jackson wired the funds into Respondent’s account. We hold 

that violations of Rule 1.15(a) and (c) do not require intention, and in this case, Respondent 

did not maintain a trust account in which funds could be deposited. Thus, Respondent’s 
- 21 - 

exception is overruled. Accordingly, we find that Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) and 

(c).

The hearing judge further found that Respondent violated Rule 1.15(d). Rule 

1.15(d) provides: 

(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third party 

has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. 

Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement 

with the client, a lawyer shall deliver promptly to the client or third person 

any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive 

and, upon request by the client or third person, shall render promptly a full 

accounting regarding such property.

Respondent testified before the hearing court that Respondent sent to Jackson the 

Pemberton Law Firm’s bill of $1,934 to be paid by Jackson directly to the Pemberton Law 

Firm. Respondent further testified that, on September 13, 2012, Jackson wired $4,000 and 

then $2,000 into the Respondent’s operating account. Respondent testified that, at the time 

these funds were wired, Jackson owed Respondent the sum of $52,333 for legal work 

performed. 

An email from Respondent to Jackson confirmed the wire transfer of $6,000, and 

further confirmed that $4,000 of the wired funds were intended for Pemberton. Respondent 

testified before the hearing court that, immediately after Respondent sent this email, 

Jackson sent Respondent a considerable amount of documents to review. Respondent then 

asked Jackson how he would pay Respondent for this document review, as Jackson already 

had an outstanding balance due to Respondent. Respondent testified that Jackson then 

instructed Respondent to only pay the Pemberton Law Firm their outstanding balance of 

$1,934 of the wired funds, instead of $4,000 as Jackson originally instructed. The evidence 
- 22 - 

shows that Pemberton ultimately received $1,934 pursuant to Jackson’s amended 

instruction. We cannot find by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to 

promptly notify Pemberton of the funds Pemberton was entitled to receive pursuant to 

Jackson’s amended instruction. In addition, Respondent did not fail to promptly deliver the 

funds to Pemberton pursuant to Jackson’s amended instruction. Thus, Respondent did not 

violate 1.15(d). 

Respondent’s Exception Regarding Rule 1.4(b) 

 Respondent further demurs from the hearing judge’s finding that Respondent 

“violated Rule 1.4(b) by failing to disclose and clarify to his clients, in an unambiguous 

manner, the structure of the billing arrangement and the apportionment of fees to specific 

legal work.” Rule 1.4(b) states that, “[a] lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 

reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 

representation.” Respondent’s retainer agreement, signed by Jackson, stated in a section 

entitled “FEES BEYOND RETAINER[,]” “CLIENT has read and understands that this 

Agreement calls for any and all fees to be figured on an hourly basis . . . .” Respondent’s 

emails to Jackson claimed that, with respect to the A Better Wireless matter, Respondent 

charged Jackson flat fees: $7,000 to file a temporary restraining order and $12,000 for 

subsequent litigation. In addition, Respondent’s billing records show that Respondent 

charged hourly fees for the A Better Wireless matter. We find that Respondent’s failure to 

clearly communicate his billing structure to Jackson in an unambiguous manner is a 

violation of Rule 1.4(b). Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ross, 428 Md. 50, 74, 50 A.3d 

1166, 1179–80 (2012). 
- 23 - 

Respondent’s Exception Regarding Rule 3.4 

Respondent next excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that “[R]espondent 

intentionally withheld substantive, discoverable information he learned from his meeting 

with the FBI and the complaints of other Jalin clients about its failure to fund loans.”12 The 

hearing judge found that Respondent violated Rule 3.4(a) and (d). Rule 3.4(a) states that 

“[a] lawyer shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or 

unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or other material having potential 

evidentiary value.” Rule 3.4(d) states that “[a] lawyer shall not . . . in pretrial procedure, 

make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply 

with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party[.]” Judge Brisbois’ Order, 

which sanctioned the Respondent for Respondent’s conduct during discovery in the A 

Better Wireless matter, stated: 

Moreover, combined with Plaintiff’s late responses to discovery, late 

submission of verification of discovery responses by a corporate 

representative, and failure to even appear at the present motion hearing, 

suggests that Plaintiff’s discovery requests were formulated for an improper 

purpose and intended to delay and harass the Defendant.13

 

12 We do not agree that Respondent’s failure to provide information related to his 

meeting with Agent Henderson regarding the preliminary investigation into his client’s 

conduct, constitutes a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent’s other 

conduct, however, in the A Better Wireless litigation constitutes a violation of Rule 3.4. 

13 Jalin Realty Capital Advisors, LLC v. A Better Wireless, NISP, LLC v. Rhythm 

Stone Media Group, LLC, No. 0:11-cv-00165-JRT-LIB (D. Minn. Feb. 22, 2012). 
- 24 - 

Respondent’s conduct during discovery in the A Better Wireless litigation, as evidenced by 

Judge Brisbois’ Order, violated Rule 3.4(a) and (d). Thus, Respondent’s exception is 

overruled. 

Respondent’s Exception Regarding Rule 1.5(a)

 Lastly, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent “did 

not properly account to his clients (albeit they too were part of a criminal enterprise 

themselves) for the fees he charged, in violation of Rule 1.5(a).” Rule 1.5(a) provides: 

A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable 

fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The facts to be considered in 

determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: 

 (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 

questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 

properly; 

 (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 

particular employment will preclude other employment of the lawyer; 

 (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 

services; 

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained; 

 (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 

 (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 

client; 

 (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 

performing the services; and 

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Respondent claimed that, “[a]fter our initial invoice [was] not paid in full, we agreed with 

[Jackson] that he must pay us on a flat fee basis for our work. Thus, we did not have an 
- 25 - 

invoice relationship with [Jackson], thereafter.” As noted in our analysis of Respondent’s 

violation of Rule 1.4(b), a flat fee arrangement was not discussed within the retainer 

agreement. The agreement stated in a section entitled “FEES BEYOND RETAINER,” 

“CLIENT has read and understands that this Agreement calls for any and all fees to be 

figured on an hourly basis . . . .” Respondent charged flat fees for work that was also billed 

on an hourly basis. We find that the ambiguous and contradictory nature of billing 

structure, which was not clearly communicated to the client, constitutes an unreasonable 

fee agreement in violation of Rule 1.5(a). Thus, Respondent’s exception is overruled. 

The Hearing Judge’s Remaining Conclusions of Law 

Maryland Rule 16-604 

The hearing judge further found that Respondent violated Maryland Rule 16-604,14

as Respondent did not have a trust account during the relevant time period. We agree. 

Maryland Rule 16-604 provides: 

Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including cash, 

received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a client 

or third person to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, 

unless received as payment of fees owed the attorney by the client or in 

reimbursement for expenses properly advanced on behalf of the client, shall 

be deposited in an attorney trust account in an approved financial institution. 

This Rule does not apply to an instrument received by an attorney or law firm 

that is made payable solely to a client or third person and is transmitted 

directly to the client or third person. 

 

14 Maryland Rule 16-604 is now codified as Maryland Rule 19-404, effective as of 

July 1, 2016. We refer to the former rule, as the hearing judge’s conclusions of law were 

made prior to this change and referred to the former rule. 
- 26 - 

Maryland Rule 16-604 requires that all funds received by a lawyer from a client or third 

person, and designated to be delivered to a client or third person, be deposited in a trust 

account. Respondent did not have an attorney trust account until after his representation of 

Jalin concluded. Therefore, any deposit of a third party fee was a de facto commingling of 

fees with Respondent’s personal funds. Respondent received several payments from 

Jackson intended for third parties, none of which were transferred to a trust account. 

Therefore, Respondent’s actions violated Rule 16-604. 

Maryland Rule 16-606.1 

 The hearing judge found that the Respondent violated Rule 16-606.115 as 

Respondent did not maintain contemporaneous records of his receipt of client funds until 

after Jackson filed a complaint and Bar Counsel requested Respondent to provide time and 

billing records. We agree. Maryland Rule 16-606.116 proscribes that for each attorney trust 

 

15 Maryland Rule 16.606.1 is now codified as Maryland Rule 19-407, effective as 

of July 1, 2016. We refer to the former rule, as the hearing judge’s conclusions of law were 

made prior to this change and referred to the former rule. 

16 Maryland Rule 16-606.1 provides: 

 (a) Creation of records. The following records shall be created and 

maintained for the receipt and disbursement of funds of clients or of third 

persons: 

(1) Attorney trust account identification. An identification of all 

attorney trust accounts maintained, including the name of the financial 

institution, account number, account name, date the account was opened, 

date the account was closed, and an agreement with the financial institution 

establishing each account and its interest-bearing nature. 

 (continued...)
- 27 - 

 

(...continued)

(2) Deposits and disbursements. A record for each account that 

chronologically shows all deposits and disbursements, as follows:

 (A) for each deposit, a record made at or near the time of the deposit 

that shows (i) the date of the deposit, (ii) the amount, (iii) the identity of the 

client or third person for whom the funds were deposited, and (iv) the purpose 

of the deposit; 

 (B) for each disbursement, including a disbursement made by 

electronic transfer, a record made at or near the time of disbursement that 

shows (i) the date of the disbursement, (ii) the amount, (iii) the payee, (iv) 

the identity of the client or third person for whom the disbursement was made 

(if not the payee), and (v) the purpose of the disbursement; 

 (C) for each disbursement made by electronic transfer, a written 

memorandum authorizing the transaction and identifying the attorney 

responsible for the transaction.

(3) Client matter records. A record for each client matter in which the 

attorney receives funds in trust, as follows: 

 (A) for each attorney trust account transaction, a record that shows (i) 

the date of the deposit or disbursement; (ii) the amount of the deposit or 

disbursement; (iii) the purpose for which the funds are intended; (iv) for a 

disbursement, the payee and the check number or other payment 

identification; and (v) the balance of funds remaining in the account in 

connection with the matter; and

 (B) an identification of the person to whom the unused portion of a 

fee or expense deposit is to be returned whenever it is to be returned to a 

person other than the client. 

(4) Record of funds of the attorney. A record that identifies the funds 

of the attorney held in each attorney trust account as permitted by Rule 16-

607 b. 

 (b) Monthly reconciliation. An attorney shall cause to be created a 

monthly reconciliation of all attorney trust account records, client matter 

records, records of funds of the attorney held in an attorney trust account as

 (continued...)
- 28 - 

account, a chronological record must be kept detailing transactions made from or to such 

account. Respondent did not maintain contemporaneous records of client funds to be 

maintained in trust. Thus, Respondent violated Rule 16-606.1.

Maryland Code (Repl. Vol. 2010), § 10-306 

of the Business Occupations & Professions Article

 

Section 10-306 provides that “[a] lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose 

other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.” Respondent 

received attorney’s fees intended for third parties into his operating account. Respondent 

did not at any point transfer these funds into a trust account, as Respondent did not have a 

trust account until after his representation of Jalin and Jackson ended. Thus, Respondent 

violated § 10-306. 

 

(...continued)

permitted by Rule 16-607 b, and the adjusted month-end financial institution 

statement balance. The adjusted month-end financial institution statement 

balance is computed by adding subsequent deposits to and subtracting 

subsequent disbursements from the financial institution’s month-end 

statement balance. 

 (c) Electronic records. Whenever the records required by this Rule 

are created or maintained using electronic means, there must be an ability to 

print a paper copy of the records upon a reasonable request to do so. 

 (d) Records to be maintained. Financial institution month-end 

statements, any canceled checks or copies of canceled checks provided with 

a financial institution month-end statement, duplicate deposit slips or deposit 

receipts generated by the financial institution, and records created in 

accordance with section (a) of this Rule shall be maintained for a period of 

at least five years after the date the record was created.
- 29 - 

Rule 1.1 

The hearing judge found that “[w]ith respect to the A Better Wireless litigation in 

Minnesota, the court finds that [R]espondent demonstrated a lack of competence in 

violation of Rule 1.1.” In the A Better Wireless litigation, Respondent was sanctioned for 

discovery violations.17 In addition, in the Order granting summary judgment to A Better 

Wireless on all of Jalin’s claims, the judge stated that Respondent’s claims on behalf of 

Jalin were “variously unsupported, insufficiently pled, and entirely without merit.” Jalin 

Realty Capital Advisors, LLC v. A Better Wireless, NISP, LLC, 917 F.Supp. 2d 927, 931 

(D. Minn. 2013). The court continued, “[t]he factual record before the Court is quite sparse, 

due in large part to the conduct of Jalin’s counsel during discovery.” Id. These facts, when 

taken together, provide clear and convincing evidence of Respondent’s violation of Rule 

1.1 in the A Better Wireless litigation. 

Rule 1.4(a)(3) 

The hearing judge found that Respondent “failed, under Rule 1.4(a)(3) to comply 

with reasonable requests for information during discovery.” Rule 1.4(a)(3) provides: “[a] 

lawyer shall . . . promptly comply with reasonable requests for information[.]” We have 

held that Rule 1.4(a)(3), “deals with an attorney’s communications with his or her client 

and not his or her communication or lack of communication with the court.” Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Patton, 432 Md. 359, 377, 69 A.3d 11, 22 (2013). We cannot find 

 

17 Jalin Realty Capital Advisors, LLC v. A Better Wireless, NISP, LLC v. Rhythm 

Stone Media Group, LLC, No. 0:11-cv-00165-JRT-LIB (D. Minn. Feb. 22, 2012). 
- 30 - 

by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent’s conduct in discovery in this matter 

stems from Respondent’s failure to communicate with Jackson. Thus, Respondent’s 

conduct during discovery did not violate Rule 1.4(a)(3).

Rule 1.16(d) 

Rule 1.16(d) requires that “[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take 

steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving 

reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, 

surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled . . . .” Respondent violated 

Rule 1.16(d) by failing to send Jackson invoices and a complete copy of his file after 

Jackson requested them on two occasions in January 2011 and February 2013.

Rule 3.1 

 Rule 3.1 states that “[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 

controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which 

includes, for example, a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of 

existing law.” In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Culver, we concluded that “Respondent’s 

conduct went well beyond the realm of zealous advocacy” when the hearing judge 

concluded that:

Respondent engaged in a pattern of conduct of obstruction and delay to 

interfere in [the client]’s suit against him. He filed suit against [the client], 

alleging defamation, then failed to file written answers to discovery and 

evaded attempts to be deposed. Respondent eventually voluntarily dismissed 

that suit. After [the client] filed suit against Respondent, [Respondent] filed 

a bankruptcy petition on the eve of the damages hearing in order to stay the 

hearing. 
- 31 - 

381 Md. 241, 279, 263, 849 A.2d 423, 446, 436 (2004). The bankruptcy judge in Culver

concluded that “[t]his case is little more than a smoke screen. Whether it was filed in good 

faith or not is debatable.” Id. at 280, 849 A.2d at 447. In the Order granting summary 

judgment to A Better Wireless on all of Jalin’s claims, Chief United States District Court 

Judge Tunheim stated that Respondent’s claims on behalf of Jalin were “variously 

unsupported, insufficiently pled, and entirely without merit.” Jalin Realty Capital 

Advisors, LLC v. A Better Wireless, NISP, LLC, 917 F.Supp. 2d 927, 931 (D. Minn. 2013). 

Chief Judge Tunheim further noted in his Order: 

Jalin did not file an answer to ABW’s counterclaims. After the Magistrate 

Judge granted Jalin’s three requests to extend the deadline[], Jalin moved to 

dismiss ABW’s counterclaims on a number of grounds that were each 

rejected by this Court. See Jalin Realty Capital Advisors, 2012 WL 838439, 

at *3 (“Jalin’s theories of dismissal are variously opaque and patently without 

merit.”). The Court also warned Jalin’s counsel that one of its arguments 

violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) because it lacked factual support. See id. at 

*4 (“Rooting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in facts 

that counsel conceded at oral argument to be false—namely that Rhythm and 

Jalin are distinct corporate entities—is not acceptable under Rule 11.”). 

Id. at 933, n. 3 (citations omitted). The court continued, “[t]he factual record before the 

Court is quite sparse, due in large part to the conduct of Jalin’s counsel during discovery.” 

Id. 

Although Jalin initially asserted that, upon information and belief, A Better Wireless 

never sent any loan application fee directly to Jalin, in its declaration, Jalin acknowledged 

that it received $37,500 from Ride Ocean Zoom on behalf of A Better Wireless. Judge 

Tunheim found that Respondent’s complaint “appears highly misleading for failing to 

reference Ride Ocean Zoom’s role in the transaction.” We agree with the hearing judge’s 
- 32 - 

conclusion of law that Respondent’s conduct in the A Better Wireless litigation constitutes 

a violation of Rule 3.1.

Rule 8.4

The hearing judge found multiple violations of Rule 8.4. Rule 8.4 provides, in 

relevant part:

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: 

 (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so 

through the acts of another; 

* * * 

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation; 

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice 

. . . . 

For the reasons outlined in Section III, we do not agree with the hearing judge regarding 

Respondent’s knowledge and assistance of Jackson’s criminal activity. Further, we do not 

find by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent engaged in any conduct amounting 

“dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” Thus, Respondent did not violate Rule 

8.4(c). 

This Court finds, however, that the record demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the Respondent violated Rule 8.4(d). We have stated that “[i]n general, an 

attorney violates [Rule 8.4(d)] when his or her conduct impacts negatively the public’s 

perception or efficacy of the courts or legal profession.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
- 33 - 

Rand, 411 Md. 83, 96, 981 A.2d 1234, 1242 (2009) (citations omitted). Respondent’s 

conduct in the A Better Wireless litigation constitutes a violation of Rule 8.4(d). Thus, it 

follows that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(a). 

V. Sanction 

We shall hold that the appropriate sanction in this case is an indefinite suspension 

with the right to apply for reinstatement after 90 days. In addition, upon application for 

reinstatement, Respondent must provide the Attorney Grievance Commission and Bar 

Counsel with appropriate documentation showing the existence and maintenance of an 

attorney trust account. We recognize the appropriate sanction for violations of the Rules of 

Professional Conduct generally “depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, 

including consideration of any mitigating factors.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 375, 872 A.2d 693, 713 (2005) (citations omitted). The purposes 

of attorney discipline are as follows: “‘to protect the public, to deter other lawyers from 

engaging in violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and to maintain the 

integrity of the legal profession.’” Id. (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 374 

Md. 505, 526, 823 A.2d 651, 663 (2003)). In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 741 A.2d 1143 (1999), we said: 

Because ‘an attorney’s character must remain beyond reproach’ this Court 

has the duty, since attorneys are its officers, to insist upon the maintenance of 

the integrity of the bar and to prevent the transgressions of an individual 

lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute. Disciplinary proceedings have 

been established for this purpose, not for punishment, but rather as a catharsis 

for the profession and a prophylactic for the public. 
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Id. at 27, 741 A.2d. at 1157 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Deutsch, 294 Md. 

353, 368–69, 450 A.2d 1265, 1273 (1982)). 

When imposing sanctions, we have enunciated that, “‘[t]he public is protected when 

sanctions are imposed that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations 

and the intent with which they were committed.’” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 

Gore, 380 Md. 455, 472, 845 A.2d 1204, 1213 (2004) (emphasis added). As in every case, 

we consider the nature of the ethical duties violated in light of any aggravating or mitigating 

circumstances. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 598–99, 911 A.2d 

440, 447–48 (2006). We also look to our past cases involving attorney discipline when 

imposing sanctions. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thompson, 376 Md. 500, 520, 830 

A.2d 474, 486 (2003). Under the ABA standards, mitigating factors include:

Absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish 

motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to make 

restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; full and free disclosure 

to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 

inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation; physical or 

mental disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim 

rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions; remorse; and 

finally, remoteness of prior offenses.

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Taylor, 405 Md. 697, 721, 955 A.2d 755, 769 (2008) 

(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 488–89, 671 A.2d 463, 483 

(1996)). 

We note that mitigating circumstances exist in the case at bar. Respondent testified 

before the hearing court that he erroneously relied on local counsel’s assurances that local 

counsel would appear on his client’s behalf at the scheduling conference and motions 
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hearing in the A Better Wireless matter. Respondent expressed remorse to the hearing court 

and acknowledged that he was ultimately responsible, as lead counsel, for failing to appear 

at both proceedings. Respondent paid the U.S. District Court’s imposed sanction of $1,610 

to opposing counsel in that matter. 

Respondent was a newly admitted attorney at the time of his representation of Jackson and 

Jackson’s companies. Respondent was admitted the Bar in June of 2009. His representation 

of Jackson and his companies spanned from 2010 to 2012. Respondent admitted to the 

hearing court that he was engaged in matters that were “over [his] head” in relation to his 

representation of Jackson and Jackson’s companies. Although Respondent had a prior 

career in the import/export business, and he was fifty-six years old at the time of the hearing 

in this matter, Respondent was, nonetheless, inexperienced in the unique challenges that 

confront solo practitioners, and those in private practice, generally, during his 

representation of Jackson and Jackson’s companies. Lastly, Mr. Samuel Hamilton, Esq., a 

longtime member of the Maryland Bar, testified favorably before the hearing judge 

regarding Respondent’s quality of character since Mr. Hamilton initially met Respondent 

in 2010. The hearing judge expressly credited Mr. Hamilton’s testimony regarding 

Respondent’s character.

This Court’s jurisprudence demonstrates that the appropriate sanction in the case at 

bar is an indefinite suspension with the right to apply for reinstatement after 90 days.18 For 

 

18 As a condition of reinstatement, upon application, Respondent must provide the 

Attorney Grievance Commission and Bar Counsel with appropriate documentation 

showing the existence and maintenance of an attorney trust account.
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example, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Stillwell, we suspended indefinitely an 

attorney, with the right to apply for reinstatement in no sooner than 60 days, for lack of 

diligence in pursuing a client's matter, failing to keep the client reasonably informed about 

the status of the representation, and failing to deposit an unearned retainer in a client trust 

account, constituting violations of MLRPC 1.3, 1.4, and 1.15 respectively. 434 Md. 248, 

274, 74 A.3d 728, 743 (2013). In determining the appropriate sanction, we noted as a 

mitigating circumstance that the attorney fully cooperated with Bar Counsel and provided 

all information that was required to assist in his investigation. Id. at 273, 74 A.3d at 732. 

By contrast, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Patterson, 421 Md. 

708, 28 A.3d 1196 (2011), we indefinitely suspended an attorney, with the right to reapply 

for readmission no sooner than six months, for violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 

involving trust accounts, failure to exercise diligence, and failure to communicate with a 

client. See Id. at 743, 28 A.3d at 1216–17. The attorney in Patterson, committed each of 

these violations multiple times with multiple clients. Id. Furthermore, in Patterson, the 

attorney was found to have violated Rule 8.1 for failing to cooperate with Bar Counsel with 

respect to two client complaints. See id. at 738–39, 28 A.3d at 1214. Unlike in Patterson, 

Respondent in the case at bar did not commit a Rule 8.1 violation. 

In other cases, where the offending attorney has mishandled client funds, but not as 

a result of dishonest conduct, we have suspended the offending attorney indefinitely with 

the right to apply for readmission after a period of time. For example, in Attorney 

Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 872 A.2d 693 (2005), the offending 

attorney violated several rules of the MLRPC, including MLRPC 1.15, due to employee 
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theft and ineffectual accounting procedures. Id. at 369, 872 A.2d 693, 710. We suspended 

the attorney in that case indefinitely with the right to apply for readmission after 30 days, 

noting inter alia the lack of intentionally dishonest conduct on the part of the offending 

attorney. Id. at 386, 872 A.2d at 720. In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 380 Md. 

180, 844 A.2d 397 (2004), the attorney was found to have violated, among other Rules, 

MLRPC 1.15, had been previously sanctioned, and was found to have operated a relatively 

large negative balance to his client trust account (approximately $40,000), but was not 

accused of dishonest conduct in relation to his handling of client funds. Id. at 193, 844 A.2d 

at 405. In that case, we suspended Sperling indefinitely, with the right to apply for 

readmission after 90 days. Id.

Respondent engaged in serious, wide-ranging misconduct, and violated numerous 

MLRPC, two Maryland Rules, and one provision of the Code of Maryland. Specifically, 

Respondent did not maintain an attorney trust account for over two years. He formed his 

law practice and plainly ignored his responsibility to set up a trust account to hold 

separately unearned client funds and funds for third parties. During that time, Respondent 

maintained client funds and funds for third parties in his general bank account with Bank 

of America.19

Further, Respondent engaged in behavior which prompted the U.S. District Court 

for the District of Minnesota to personally sanction Respondent for his conduct during 

 

19 For these reasons, we require that, upon reapplication for admission, Respondent 

must provide appropriate documentation showing the existence and maintenance of an 

attorney trust account. 
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discovery. Magistrate Judge Brisbois found that Respondent’s conduct necessitated more 

than just monetary sanctions, and further precluded Respondent’s clients—in any 

subsequent proceedings in the case—from using any documents or other information that 

was requested but not provided in the discovery responses. Within the scope of that same 

litigation, Chief Judge Tunheim stated that Respondent’s conduct was unacceptable under 

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Considering the spectrum and degree of Respondent’s misconduct, in light of the 

mitigating circumstances, we indefinitely suspend Respondent from the practice of law in 

Maryland with the right to apply for reinstatement after 90 days. As a condition of 

reinstatement, upon application, Respondent must provide the Attorney Grievance 

Commission and Bar Counsel with appropriate documentation showing the existence and 

maintenance of an attorney trust account. 

IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL 

PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE 

CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING 

COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, 

PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 19-

709(d), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS 

ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY 

GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST 

ANDREW NDUBISI UCHEOMUMU.