alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### A. J. Davis, etc., *v.*E. B. Owsley, etc.

Appeals and Errors — Errors of Law at the Trial — No Evidence to Sustain Verdict.

It is immaterial whether the court erred or not in giving the law to the jury when there is no evidence to'sustain a verdict, if it had been rendered for the plaintiff.

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

June 15, 1871.

Brown, *for appellants.*

*Bodley & Sumrall, for appellees.*

OPINION BY

JUDGE--

The instructions and rulings of the court on the conclusion of the evidence in this case seemed to have been correct, but whether they were or not we are satisfied that the evidence did not authorize a verdict for the plaintiff, nor was it such as to have sustained such a verdict if it had been rendered; on the contrary, the court might properly have given the peremptory instruction to find for the defendants, which was asked at the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiff. According to a well settled rule, therefore, the judgment ought not to be reversed whether the court erred or not in its ruling as to some questions of law which by the failure of evidence to sustain any verdict for the plaintiff is now rendered immaterial.

Wherefore the judgment is *affirmed.*
**Exhibit 32.2**

**Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

In connection with the Quarterly Report of FelCor Lodging Limited Partnership (the “Registrant”) on Form 10-Q for the three and nine months ended September 30, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report), the undersigned hereby certifies, in the capacity as indicated below and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|   | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Registrant. |
|--------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| November 8, 2007 | /s/Andrew J. Welch |  
 
Andrew J. Welch

 
 
Chief Financial Officer of FelCor Lodging

 
Trust Incorporated, as general partner of

 
FelCor Lodging Limited Partnership

 

 

  |
|------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
H. Res. 206

In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

July 31, 1997.

Resolved, That upon adoption of this resolution it shall

be in order to consider the conference report to accompany

the bill (H.R. 2014) to provide for reconciliation pursuant to

subsections (b)(2) and (d) of section 105 of the concurrent

resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1998. All points of

order against the conference report and against its consideration are waived. The conference report shall be considered

as read. The conference report shall be debatable for three

hours equally divided and controlled by the chairman and

ranking minority member of the Committee on Ways and

Means

Attest:

Clerk.
#### Pablo LANGAMAN, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES COMPANY OF HAWAII, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 77-2403.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

April 11, 1980.

Richard S. Kanter, Honolulu, Hawaii, argued for plaintiff-appellant; John Harris Paer, Honolulu, Hawaii, on the brief.

Anne L. Williams, Honolulu, Hawaii, for defendant-appellee.

Before CHAMBERS, WALLACE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges:

Appellant Langaman filed this action against the appellee, his creditor, for violation of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. He claimed that the creditor’s failure to disclose the effect of an acceleration clause on the finance charge violated the Act and violated Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z (12 C.F.R. § 226.1 et seq.).

We withdrew this case from submission to await the Supreme Court’s ruling on the subject. In *Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin,*- U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 790, 63 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980), the Supreme Court ruled that such failure of disclosure is not a violation of the Act or of Regulation Z, thus overruling *St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii,*573 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1977) and *Kessler v. Associates Financial Services Co.,*573 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1977).

The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.

Affirmed.
|                            |                                                              |                            |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
|                            |                                                                   |
|                       |                                                         |                       |
| DATE:              May 24, 2007 | BY:                                                          | */s/              MIN TAN YANG* |
|                            | MIN                TAN YANGCHIEF                EXECUTIVE OFFICER |
|                            |                                                                   |

|                                  |                                                              |                                        |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
|                                  |                                                                   |
|                             |                                                         |                                   |
| DATE:              May 24, 2007  | BY:                                                          | /s/ *SUANG-YI              PAI*   |
|                                  | SUANG-YI                PAICHIEF                FINANCIAL OFFICER |
|                                  |                                                              |

----
#### Hayner & Dunlevy *v.*Robt. Templeman.

Appearance — Filing Affidavit — Effect of.

The filing of the affidavit controverting the grounds of attachment had the legal effect of entering the appearance of the defendant for all purposes.

Judgments — Rendering of Before Cause Stands for Trial — Clerical Misprision.

It is a clerical misprison to render judgment before the cause stands for trial, but where no motion has been made in the lower court to correct the error, the Court of Appeals cannot reverse.

APPEAL FROM FLEMING CIRCUIT COURT.

September 6, 1871.

*543
      *Cox, for appellants.*

*Anderson for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

The filing of the affidavit controverting the alleged grounds of attachment had the legal effect of entering the appearance of the appellants to the action, for all purposes, hence the judgment against them cannot be regarded or treated as void.

If erroneous at all, it is because it was rendered before the cause stood for trial. Whether or not it was error to give judgment at the same term at which appellants entered their appearance we do not deem it essential to decide.

At most it was but a clerical misprision, and though the judgment was excepted to, no motion has been made in the court below to correct the supposed misprision. This court therefore has no power to revise the action of the circuit court in the premises. Civil Code, Sec. 580. *Duncan v. Wickliffe, 4*Metcalfe 120.

Judgment affirmed.
#### John W. Sullivan *v.*Commonwealth.

Trial — Instructions Must be included in Bill of Exceptions.

An instruction not embraced in the bill of exceptions will not be considered by the court of Appeals.

APPEAL PROM GREEN CIRCUIT COURT.

January 6, 1872.

*John W. Lewis, for appellant.*

*Attorney General, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

This court cannot reverse' a judgment in a penal prosécution upon the ground that the verdict is against the evidence.

The instruction complained of is not embraced in the bill of exceptions, nor identified by any order of the court.

The clerk does not even state that the two papers copied in the record purporting to be instructions are those given by the court upon the trial of this case. For these reasons we cannot disturb the decision of the circuit court.

Judgment affirmed.
Case 2:15-mj-01932-JFM Document 3 Filed 12/22/15 Page 1 of 3
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COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

CLEAN FUEL TECHNOLOGIES II,

LLC, A TEXAS LIMITED LIABILITY

COMPANY,

Appellant,

v

.

E.L. HOLLINGSWORTH & CO., INC.,

A MICHIGAN CORPORATION,

Appellee. §

§

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 15

- 00277

- CV

Appeal from

120 th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC # 2015

- DCV0527 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is a joint motion to dismiss the appeal pursuant to T EX .R.A PP .P.

42.1(a)( 2 ) because the parties have resolved the dispute . We grant the motion and dismiss the

appeal. Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, c osts of the appeal are assessed against the party

incurring same

. See T EX .R.A PP .P. 42.1(d).

August 17, 2016

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-19-00590-CR

Derwin Ray ROBINSON,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2019CR1021

Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 26, 2020

MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED; APPEAL DISMISSED

On September 13, 2019, appellant Derwin Ray Robinson filed a notice of appeal for his 

conviction for possession of a controlled substance in an amount more than one gram but less than 

four grams. On February 3, 2020, we notified Robinson’s appointed appellate counsel that her 

appellate brief was past due, and we ordered counsel to file a response by February 13, 2020. In 

that notice, we cautioned counsel that if we did not receive an adequate response by the ordered 

due date, we would abate the appeal to the trial court for an abandonment hearing. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.8(b)(2). When counsel did not file a response, we ordered the appeal abated and 
04-19-00590-CR

- 2 -

remanded the matter to the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine: (1) whether Robinson 

desired to prosecute his appeal; (2) whether Robinson was indigent; and (3) whether appellate 

counsel abandoned the appeal. 

On April 15, 2020, the trial court held the hearing, and the district court clerk filed a 

supplemental clerk’s record that included findings of fact stating Robinson did not wish to pursue

his appeal and appellate counsel would be filing a motion to dismiss. The court reporter also filed 

a supplemental reporter’s record of the hearing, where Robinson stated on the record his desire not 

to pursue the appeal. On May 1, 2020, we ordered the abatement lifted and the appellate deadlines

reinstated. In that order, we informed counsel that if she sought to have the appeal voluntarily 

dismissed, she must file a motion that complies with Rule 42.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate 

Procedure; otherwise, her brief was due by June 1, 2020. 

On August 4, 2020, counsel filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, requesting the appeal 

to be dismissed. Rule 42.2(a) requires a motion for voluntary dismissal to be signed by the 

appellant and his attorney. TEX. R. APP. P. 42.2(a). Here, the motion filed by counsel lacked

Robinson’s signature as required by Rule 42.2(a). See id. However, in lieu of Robinson’s 

signature, we note that Robinson stated on the record he did not desire to pursue the appeal. His 

clear indication of his wish to abandon the appeal provides a sufficient basis for this court to 

suspend the requirements of Rule 42.2(a) and dismiss the appeal. See id. R. 2 (providing appellate 

court may suspend a rule’s operation in a particular case for good cause or to expedite a decision). 

Accordingly, we grant the motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal. See id. R. 42.2(a). 

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
#### Irvine T. Green *v.*Wm. Pullins.

Partnership — Settlement—Written Memorandum.

The •written ¡memorandum of the settlement of a partnership, executed by both parties, is prima facie a full settlement of all the accounts between the parties at the time the paper was signed.

APPEAL. PROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT.

December 17, 1870.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay :

The written memorandum of settlement executed by both parties, as well as other circumstances developed, by the record satisfy us that all accounts between them growing out of the partnerships during the year 1866 were fully settled at the time said paper was executed.

The demurrer to Green’s cross action for the $210 was properly sustained, and as he failed to amend, he must be taken to have abandoned the further prosecution of the same. Green’s claim for excess corn furnished in 1866 was evidently embraced in the settlement of the accounts of that year before referred to, hence his claim to the entire corn crop raised in 1867 was unfounded.

*363
      *Turkr & Scott, for appellant.*

*Caperton, for appellee.*

We think he received all the credits to which the proof showed he was entitled, and that the judgment in favor of Pullin is correct.

Judgment *affirmed.*

Judge Hardin did not sit in the case.
1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

_________________

NO. 09-13-00027-CV

_________________

IN RE THEODORE R. KEHTEL AND JENNIFER C. KEHTEL

________________________________________________________________________

Original Proceeding

________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Theodore R. Kehtel and Jennifer C. Kehtel seek mandamus to compel the trial 

court to vacate an order transferring venue. Relators have not established that they are 

entitled to the relief sought in their petition. See In re Kehtel, No. 09-12-00602-CV, 2012 

Tex. App. LEXIS 10760, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 28, 2012, orig. proceeding) 

(mem. op.). Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied. 

PETITION DENIED. 

PER CURIAM

Opinion Delivered January 31, 2013

Before McKeithen, C.J., Gaultney and Kreger, JJ.
#### D. M. Griffith, etc., *v.*P. B. Hicks, by Commonwealth.

Executions — Proof of Issuai — Official Act of Deputy Binds Sheriff and His Sureties.

A receipt-purporting to have been given by a deputy sheriff in the absence of proof of his signature is not competent evidence as to the *688issual of an. execution, because the execution itself or the execution docket is the highest evidence. Therefore, there is a failure to prove that the collection of the debt by the deputy was an official act binding on the sheriff and his sureties.

APPEAL FROM DAVIESS CIRCUIT COURT.

January 20, 1871.

*James, for appellants.*

*Sweeney, for appellee.*

Opinion by

Judge Robertson :

There is not sufficient proof that an execution was ever issued to the sheriff of Daviess county. The receipt purporting to have been given by Warfield as deputy sheriff of Daviess county was incompetent as evidence because there was no proof of his signature, and because the execution itself or the execution docket would have been the highest evidence, and no execution having been issued and the execution docket not only failing *to*show the contested fact- but tending to show that the only execution issued was directed to the sheriff of McLean county, there is a failure to prove that the collection of the debt by Warfield was an official act binding on the sheriff of Daviess or his sureties.

Wherefore the judgment against the sureties was unauthorized and is therefore reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
#### Wm. Calloway, etc., *v.*Wm. Herrin, etc.

Execution — Sale of Land — Purchaser’s Bond — Money Paid to Sheriff Also.

If the $400.00 was paid to the sheriff as alleged, he received it without right aud became liable to refund it; but that did not create any liability of the sheriff to the plaintiff who has his sale bond for all he was entitled to.

February 27, 1872.

APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT.

*Webb & Barbour, for appellants.*

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Hardin :

Whether under any circumstances the sheriff was authorized to receive any part of the price of the land in money from the purchaser, when the law made it his d'uty to make the sale on credit and take the purchaser's bond, as it is alleged in the petition that the sheriff took the money for the full amount of the price of the land, we cannot see how the plaintiff, who is presumed to have collected the bond, could be also entitled to the $400 alleged to have been paid to the sheriff. If the $400 were paid to the sheriff as alleged he received it without right and became liable to refund it; but that did not, in our opinion, create any liability of the sheriff to the plaintiff, who had his sale bond for all he was entitled to.

Wherefore the judgment sustaining the demurrer to the petition is affirmed.
Exhibit 31.2  CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION  I, Gordon L. Wiltse, certify that:  1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Lions Petroleum Inc.;  2. Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances under which statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.  4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:  (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and  (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and  5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer’s auditors and the audit committee of small business issuer’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):  (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer’s internal control over financial reporting. Date: February 19, 2008/s/ Gordon L. Wiltse
Gordon L. Wiltse
Chief Financial Officer
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<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                   DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                      JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                        JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                   19,249
<SECURITIES>                                  0
<RECEIVABLES>                           401,261
<ALLOWANCES>                                  0
<INVENTORY>                             123,251
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                        543,761
<PP&E>                                  189,306
<DEPRECIATION>                                0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                          802,639
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                 1,195,409
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<OTHER-SE>                             (478,090)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>            802,639
<SALES>                               1,021,544
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                      1,021,544
<CGS>                                   321,814
<TOTAL-COSTS>                           740,952
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                              0
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                     (144,451)
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