RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3606-20

A.R.R.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

H.E.C.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Argued March 30, 2022 – Decided August 29, 2022

Before Judges Accurso and Enright.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, 

Docket No. FV-07-2029-21.

Casandra T. DeStefano argued the cause for appellant 

(Tonacchio, Spina & Compitello, attorneys; Ciro 

Spina, on the briefs).

Rasmeet K. Chahil argued the cause for respondent 

(Lowenstein Sandler LLP, attorneys; Paul F. 

Giannoglou and Michael T. G. Long, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant H.E.C. appeals from a final restraining order entered against 

him pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 

to -35, based on the predicate acts of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13), 

and contempt of the temporary restraining order, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(17). 

He contends the court's credibility and factual findings are flawed and the 

evidence was insufficient to establish either a predicate act or that plaintiff 

A.R.R. required the protection the order provides.1 Having reviewed the 

record, we cannot agree on either point and, accordingly, affirm the restraining 

order. 

The facts were established at a hearing conducted on June 8, 2021, at 

which both parties testified. Plaintiff testified she and defendant met as 

children through family friends but didn't start dating until early 2016 when 

both were in their mid-twenties. Plaintiff was then working as a paralegal. 

Defendant is a mechanical engineer, commissioning "mission critical 

1

 Because we are satisfied the trial court's finding of the predicate act of 

harassment is well supported in the record, we do not consider whether 

plaintiff also proved the predicate act of contempt of a domestic violence order 

pursuant to subsection b. of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9 that constitutes a crime or 

disorderly persons offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(17). See Tribuzio v. 

Order, 356 N.J. Super. 590, 598-99 (App. Div. 2003) (concluding defendant's 

conduct constituted the predicate act of harassment and, accordingly, declining 

to "address whether defendant's conduct also constituted stalking").
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equipment," at hospitals and data centers, "making sure their electrical grid is 

up to par and ready for any disturbances." The parties moved in together in 

mid-2018 in New York, and plaintiff ended their relationship in August 2020, 

when she moved out and relocated to New Jersey.

According to plaintiff, in the beginning of their relationship, defendant

"was kind, respectful, very charming and funny," but he changed slowly over 

time. She described several incidents beginning in late 2017 of defendant 

shoving or slapping her when he was drunk or angry. Defendant denied ever 

having been physically violent with plaintiff. Plaintiff, however, had a 

photograph of her thigh with raised red marks reminiscent of a handprint, 

which the court admitted in evidence. Plaintiff testified she took the 

photograph about a half an hour or so after defendant slapped her a couple of 

months before she moved out. Plaintiff claimed her leg hurt for days, and she 

told defendant if he hit her again, she would call the police. According to 

plaintiff, "he just said he was 'playing.'" 

At the hearing, defendant admitted he slapped plaintiff's leg, causing the 

injury in the photograph, but testified he was "just playing." According to 

defendant, he and plaintiff were in a "tickle-fight" that she started. He claimed 

plaintiff, who is nine inches shorter than he is and nearly one hundred pounds 
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lighter, "put [him] in a chokehold." When she didn't respond to him "telling 

her, tapping her like hey, you got it got it," he slapped her "out of the last act 

of desperation." He claimed "it was all playing around."

Plaintiff testified she became more dependent on defendant over the 

course of their relationship, which she came to believe was his design. She 

relied on him for transportation as she did not drive, and he discouraged her 

efforts to get a driver's license by sitting in the passenger seat, yelling and 

making her anxious when she was at the wheel. She claimed she became 

financially dependent on defendant when he encouraged her to quit her job and

go to school full time in September 2019. Plaintiff testified defendant 

monitored her finances, and she believed purposely tried to exhaust her 

savings, buying furniture and things for defendant's new house, which he could 

readily have purchased himself. 

According to plaintiff, defendant controlled their intimate relationship as 

well, waking her in the middle of the night and not allowing her to go back to 

sleep until she had sex with him. Defendant admitted to sometimes waking 

plaintiff for sex, testifying it may have happened four or five times over the 

course of their relationship. Asked about it on direct examination, he testified, 

"everyone gets a little — a little touchy feely at nighttime. Some nights she 
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would say no, that would be fine, I would just rollover and fall asleep." He 

was adamant he never forced her to have sex, saying "I'm not that guy."

Plaintiff recounted that near the end of their relationship, defendant 

began "acting more hostile, picking fights with [her] a lot more." She testified 

defendant became "unpredictable," and she "didn't feel safe around him" after 

he made several comments alluding to him killing or harming her. Plaintiff 

moved out without telling defendant in late August 2020. She left the 

computer they shared, signing out of all her accounts, but took the cell phone 

he had given and set up for her.

About two months after plaintiff left, and after she failed to respond to 

six different email messages defendant sent from three different accounts, she 

began to get notices from Instagram that someone was trying to log into her 

account. In December, she received several notifications on her iPhone that 

she was logged onto a different device, although the only device she had was 

that cell phone. When she signed into her iCloud account, she saw her "iCloud 

was logged onto [her] phone, and [defendant's] computer as well as another 

phone that he's in possession of." Plaintiff testified she tried to reset the 

passwords to her account but the problems continued. 
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Over the next couple of months, when she logged into the new laptop 

she'd purchased, "the mouse would move on its own. [Defendant's] name was 

popping up in auto fill. There were a lot of updates, strange activity." When 

plaintiff called the computer company, she learned her laptop was being 

controlled remotely. She testified she believed her passwords were being 

changed through the use of a key logger, which she described as "some type of 

device . . . used to record my passwords" because she would change her 

passwords "and minutes later they would be changed" again and she would be 

locked out. Plaintiff testified her iCloud, Spotify, Facebook, Instagram, 

Microsoft, and Google Drive accounts were all hacked and she never regained 

access to any of them. With the hacking of her Google Drive account, plaintiff 

testified she lost access to all her personal photos and documents. 

Plaintiff's Malloy College account was also hacked, which prevented her 

from attending classes during the months the college was operating remotely 

because of the COVID-19 pandemic. She missed so many classes during the 

first weeks of January and February 2021 that she'd been forced to drop all her 

courses in the Spring 2021 semester. According to plaintiff, she tried 

unsuccessfully to reset her password several times, working with the college's 

IT staff. She testified she believed defendant was behind the hacking because 
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he had access to her accounts through their shared computer, he'd set up her 

iPhone, and her Malloy account name was changed to "New York Rangers 1." 

Plaintiff testified there was a picture of her in a Rangers shirt on social media. 

She believed the account name was defendant's "way of letting me know that 

he was still monitoring me."

Plaintiff presented the testimony of the senior director of technology at 

Malloy College. He explained that he'd been alerted plaintiff's student email 

account and learning management login were both compromised and being 

manipulated by someone else, necessitating the creation of entirely new 

accounts. Although the college had not been able to identify the hacker by 

connecting the IP address to a particular person, he and his staff were able to 

connect "a general vicinity of the IP address," which was Westbury, New 

York. Defendant lived in the neighboring town of Hempstead. The college 

ended up lending plaintiff a laptop to continue her studies.

Plaintiff also testified she'd been hounded by a bill collector over 

payment for a couch the parties had purchased by trading it in for their old 

couch. While the furniture company had successfully delivered the new 

couch, it had somehow gotten the wrong address for picking up the old couch, 

although both were at defendant's home. Plaintiff believed defendant 
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"deliberately gave them the wrong address and now they're billing me for the 

full amount even though he's in possession of both couches." As recently as 

three months before the hearing — over six months after plaintiff left 

defendant's home and after the TRO had been entered — the furniture store 

advised her defendant had called to say he could not help with the issue. 

Although defendant denied having anything to do with the computer hacking 

or the problem with the furniture store, he admitted on cross-examination that 

he knew the store would look to plaintiff to collect the balance due on the new 

couch if the old one was not returned. 

Plaintiff testified the entire several-month ordeal had put her under 

"severe emotional distress" and anxiety. She claimed she had been prescribed 

anti-anxiety medication and was seeing a therapist weekly as she was in "a 

constant state of hyper-vigilance and fear all the time. . . . Because I already 

saw what he did and I feel like he's not going to stop." 

Having heard the testimony, the judge entered the FRO, finding plaintiff 

had established a history of domestic violence based on her testimony and the 

picture of the injury to her leg, which defendant admitted he caused, as well as 

a predicate act of domestic violence in the form of harassment and contempt of 

the TRO, but not the other predicate acts alleged — criminal mischief, cyber 
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harassment and terroristic threats — and that she was in need of the protection 

of an FRO. The judge found plaintiff a credible witness, noting she testified 

consistently and responded in like manner to questions posed on both direct 

and cross examination. In contrast, the judge found defendant not credible or 

believable, rejecting his claim "that any acts committed by him against 

plaintiff either did not happen or could be explained away." She found 

defendant's confusing explanations over how the furniture store could readily 

determine his address for delivery of the new couch, but not for pick-up of the 

old one, led her to conclude defendant gave "the wrong address to the store," 

and only resolved the problem "shortly before the date of the hearing to 

present himself in a better light."

After reviewing the applicable law and summarizing the allegations and 

the testimony elicited at the hearing, the judge found plaintiff had harassed 

plaintiff by "improperly access[ing] her computer with the purpose to alarm 

and to seriously annoy [her]." Acknowledging defendant's argument that 

plaintiff had not adduced any direct evidence that he "hacked or improperly 

accessed plaintiff's computer," the judge noted "circumstantial evidence can be 

as compelling as direct" evidence, and was so here. The judge noted neither 

party testified "that plaintiff's access to her phone, her computer, and 
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corresponding social media accounts, and school accounts was problematic 

before she fled from defendant." The judge found it undisputed that the parties

shared a computer during the time they lived together and defendant "set up 

her phone" and "knew her passwords." He also "knew or had reason to know 

her social media accounts," and "her network of family and friends." 

The judge also found "defendant monitored [plaintiff's] finances, 

encouraged her dependency, controlled their sexual relationship, shoved her, 

struck her, and yelled at her." Given the parties had known each other since 

childhood, the judge concluded it was not an overreach "to presume that 

defendant was in a position to know plaintiff's vulnerabilities, and how to 

exploit the same." 

The judge found there was "a previous history of domestic violence 

between the parties," and "defendant's harassment electronically from New 

York to New Jersey" was "a continuing act of domestic violence." She further 

found there existed an immediate danger to plaintiff's person or property, and

credited plaintiff's testimony that she is "in fear all the time," "hyper vigilant," 

and "in treatment with a psychiatrist for anxiety." Given those findings, the 

judge determined plaintiff remained under threat and for her safety and to 

prevent further abuse required the protection an FRO provides. 
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Our review of a trial court's factual findings is limited. Cesare v. 

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Findings by the trial court "are binding on 

appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at 

412. Deference is especially appropriate in a case, such as this one, in which 

the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility 

because the trial court's ability to see and hear the witnesses provides it a 

better perspective than a reviewing court to judge their veracity. Ibid.

A final restraining order may issue only if the judge finds the parties 

have a relationship bringing the complained of conduct within the Act, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d); the defendant committed an act designated as domestic 

violence, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a); and the "restraining order is necessary, upon 

an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to 

protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." 

Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006) (noting once the 

jurisdictional prerequisites have been met, the judge's task is two-fold; first to 

determine whether plaintiff proved a predicate act, and, if so, whether a final 

restraining order is necessary to protect the victim from immediate danger or 

to prevent further abuse).
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Applying those standards here, we find no basis to upset the factual 

findings or legal conclusions of the trial court set forth above. The parties 

were both represented by counsel and each party testified — plaintiff at length 

and defendant very briefly, and only to flatly deny or minimize plaintiff's 

many allegations. The judge had ample opportunity to judge their credibility 

and obviously found defendant's seriously lacking. The judge believed 

plaintiff that defendant monitored her finances, encouraged her dependency, 

controlled their sexual relationship, and physically abused her, and rejected 

defendant's attempts to deny or minimize "any acts committed by him" — as 

we do here.

The trial judge's conclusion that defendant committed the predicate act 

of harassment by "improperly access[ing] [plaintiff's] computer with the 

purpose to alarm and to seriously annoy [her]" was based on factual findings 

well-supported by the record. Specifically, defendant's access to the parties' 

shared computer and plaintiff's phone, his technical background as a 

mechanical engineer, commissioning "mission critical equipment" at hospitals 

and data centers, his knowledge of her passwords and the social media 

accounts she utilized, the extent and timing of the hacking and the absence of 

any problem with plaintiff's computer or phone before she fled defendant, all 
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support the judge's conclusion that defendant manipulated plaintiff's online 

accounts with the express purpose of alarming or seriously annoying her. See

H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 326 (2003) (noting "'[a] finding of a purpose to 

harass may be inferred from the evidence presented' and from common sense 

and experience" (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997))).

As we noted in Silver, once a court has concluded the plaintiff 

established an act of domestic violence, the "second determination — whether 

a domestic violence restraining order should be issued — is most often 

perfunctory and self-evident." 387 N.J. Super. at 127. We believe the ongoing 

and pervasive nature of the hacking made it so here. Notwithstanding, the trial 

judge explained her reasons for entering the order — defendant's prior history 

of controlling behavior and domestic violence toward plaintiff, the timing of 

the hacking, that defendant was in a position to know plaintiff's vulnerabilities, 

and the impact of the hacking on plaintiff's physical and mental wellbeing —

all of which have considerable support in the record. The judge's factual 

findings and credibility determinations were adequate, and her legal analysis is 

sound. We find no error, much less reversible error, in her conclusion that 

plaintiff required the protection of a final restraining order. 
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Affirmed.