COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Felton, Kelsey and Senior Judge Willis 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LEON MARTIN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1221-02-2 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY 

 JUNE 17, 2003 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HALIFAX COUNTY 

Leslie M. Osborn, Judge 

 J. William Watson, Jr. (Watson, Nelson, 

Morrison & Miller, on brief), for appellant. 

 H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Leon Martin argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by admitting two drug certificates of analysis into 

evidence because, he claims, the chain of custody for the drugs 

had not been properly established. Martin also contends that 

the court abused its discretion by admitting a doctor's 

examination of the drugs in question. Finding no error in the 

trial court's judgment, we affirm. 

I. 

On appeal, we review the evidence "in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth." Kingsbur v. Commonwealth, 40 

 

 * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated 

for publication. 
Va. App. 307, 308, 579 S.E.2d 357, 358 (2003). That principle 

requires us to "discard the evidence of the accused in conflict 

with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the 

credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair 

inferences that may be drawn therefrom." Holsapple v. 

Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 522, 528, 574 S.E.2d 756, 758-59 

(2003) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

 During August 2000, Dennis Barker, an investigator with the 

South Boston Police Department, was assigned to work with the 

Halifax County Drug Task Force. On August 22, 2000, Barker met 

with Samuel Kirby, an informant with the Task Force, to "have 

Mr. Kirby go out and make a drug purchase." Barker searched 

Kirby and his vehicle. Satisfied that Kirby was not carrying 

any contraband, Barker informed Kirby of "who he should attempt 

to purchase drugs from" and provided him with an "audio 

transmitter tape recorder, a video device," and "$50 to purchase 

crack cocaine." 

 Kirby drove to Martin's house where Martin sold him three 

rocks of crack cocaine for $50. Kirby immediately returned and 

delivered the drugs to Barker, who field tested the substance 

and verified that the contraband was crack cocaine. Barker then 

placed the drugs in a Ziploc bag, sealed the bag with red 

evidence tape, and both Kirby and Barker initialed the bag. 

Upon returning to his office, Barker placed the drugs in his 

secure evidence locker. 

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 Barker sent the drugs to the Virginia Division of Forensic 

Science for analysis via certified mail. Along with the drugs, 

Barker submitted a form entitled the "Division of Forensic 

Science Request for Laboratory Examination," which included 

specific serial numbers and information about the offense. The 

Division returned a certified mail receipt acknowledging that it 

had received the drugs from Barker. The receipt was not signed, 

but was initialed and contained the article number "P 088 575 

986." After completing the examination, the Division returned 

the drugs, a certificate of analysis, and the Request for 

Laboratory Examination. In addition to the forensic scientist's 

signature, the Request contained the same initials that appeared 

on the postal receipt, followed by the article number "P 088 575 

986." 

 On August 23, 2000, Russ Nicollson, an investigator with 

the Halifax-South Boston Drug Task Force, arranged for Kirby to 

purchase drugs from Martin. Nicollson followed the identical 

procedure as had Barker, and Kirby again purchased $50 worth of 

crack cocaine from Martin. Nicollson sent the baggie via 

certified mail for analysis at the Division. As before, the 

Division acknowledged receiving the drugs by returning a 

certified receipt that was initialed and contained the article 

number "Z-248-186-426." Following the examination, the Division 

returned the drugs, certificate of analysis, and the Request for 

Laboratory Examination. Once again, the Request contained the 

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identical initials as the postal receipt and also contained the 

article number "Z-248-186-426." 

 Based on the two transactions, Martin was tried on four 

counts of possession with intent to distribute, in violation of 

Code § 18.2-248, and one count of conspiring to distribute a 

Schedule I or II controlled substance, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-256. At the trial for the August 22 sale, Martin's 

counsel objected to the introduction of the certificate of 

analysis, arguing that the lack of a legible name on the postal 

receipt created a fatal break in the chain of custody. The 

trial court overruled the objection, noting that "it would 

appear that whoever initialed this lab report was the same 

initial that goes on this [return receipt] when you compare the 

two together." 

 The trial court overruled a similar objection concerning 

the chain of custody for the drugs purchased on August 23. The 

trial court admitted the evidence, noting that the matching 

initials on the postal receipt and the Request for Laboratory 

Examination indicated that an agent of the Division received the 

package and delivered it to the forensic scientist responsible 

for the case. Finding Martin guilty of all the offenses, the 

trial court sentenced him to prison for 75 years, suspending 43 

years of the total sentence. 

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II. 

 "'The admissibility of evidence is within the broad 

discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be 

disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.'" 

Crest v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 165, 170, 578 S.E.2d 88, 90 

(2003) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 231, 236, 563 

S.E.2d 364, 366 (2002)). Because a trial court "by definition 

abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law," Leonard v. 

Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 134, 148, 571 S.E.2d 306, 313 (2002) 

(citations omitted), we review its conclusions of law de novo

"to determine that its discretion was not guided by erroneous 

legal conclusions," Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 

(1996). 

 To admit a certificate of analysis into evidence, the 

Commonwealth must first present "proof of the chain of custody" 

for the drugs to be examined. Alvarez v. Commonwealth, 24 

Va. App. 768, 776, 485 S.E.2d 646, 650 (1997). Establishing the 

chain of custody does not require the Commonwealth to "eliminate 

every conceivable possibility of substitution, alteration, or 

tampering." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 678, 529 

S.E.2d 769, 783 (2000) (citation omitted). Instead, the 

Commonwealth need only provide "reasonable assurance that the 

sample to be admitted at trial is the same sample, and in the 

same condition, as when it was first obtained." Id. The 

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Commonwealth can shoulder this burden by establishing every 

"vital link in the chain of possession." Alvarez, 24 Va. App. 

at 777, 485 S.E.2d at 650.1 

 To relieve the Commonwealth of "having to present testimony 

regarding the chain of custody of an analyzed or examined 

substance," Code § 19.2-187.01 "authorizes a trial court to 

receive a certificate of analysis as evidence of the chain of 

custody of the material tested." Harris v. Commonwealth, 261 

Va. 185, 188, 541 S.E.2d 547, 548 (2001) (citation omitted). 

Under this statute, receipt by an authorized agent of the 

Division "shall be prima facie evidence" as to the custody of 

the material until the laboratory returns the materials to the 

trial court following the examination. Id. (quoting Code 

§ 19.2-187.01). 

 In this case, the Commonwealth established a sufficient 

chain of custody for the drugs seized during both sales. In 

each instance, the police officers mailed the narcotics to the 

 1

 Martin also challenges the trial court's decision to allow 

testimony from Steve Watsen, a forensic chemist with the Drug 

Enforcement Administration. Martin, however, admits that his 

trial attorney "did not sufficiently interpose the objection" on 

this matter. "The Court of Appeals will not consider an 

argument on appeal which was not presented to the trial court." 

Proctor v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 233, 246, 578 S.E.2d 822, 

829 (2003) (quoting Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308, 

494 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1998)); See Rule 5A:18. For this reason, 

we are barred from determining whether the trial court abused 

its discretion by admitting Watsen's testimony. Further, under 

the circumstances of this case, we see no reason to invoke the 

good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18. 

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Division and, on each occasion, the Division verified its 

receipt by executing the Request for Laboratory Examination. 

This receipt alone establishes prima facie evidence of the chain 

of custody. See Harris, 261 Va. at 188-89, 541 S.E.2d at 548 

(noting that "the prosecution established, prima facie, that the 

contraband was received by such an agent; there is no hint that 

it was received, for example, by some mere non-employee 

bystander who happened to be loitering on the laboratory's 

premises"). 

 It is true, as Martin points out, that the initials on the 

postal receipts do not appear to be consistent with the 

signatures on the two Requests for Laboratory Examination. That 

difference, however, does not in any way undermine the statutory 

inference —— particularly given the fact that the initials 

appear on all four documents (both postal receipts and both lab 

request forms). It may be true that the actual forensic 

scientists who performed the examinations and signed the 

laboratory request forms did not physically receive the mail 

from the postman or sign the postal receipts. Nothing in Code 

§ 19.2-187.01 requires that they do so. 

To be sure, the presence of the postal receipts addressed 

to the proper addressee gives rise to a presumption of its own. 

"All authorities hold that mailing a letter, properly addressed 

and stamped, raises a presumption of its receipt by the 

addressee." Hartford Fire Ins. v. Mut. Sav. & Loan Co., Inc., 

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193 Va. 269, 273, 68 S.E.2d 541, 544 (1952); see also Washington 

v. Anderson, 236 Va. 316, 322, 373 S.E.2d 712, 715 (1988); 

Manassas Park Dev. Co. v. Offutt, 203 Va. 382, 385, 124 S.E.2d 

29, 31 (1962); Villwock v. Ins. Co. of N. America, 22 Va. App. 

127, 135 n.4, 468 S.E.2d 130, 134 n.4 (1996). That so, the 

postal receipts tend to defeat, not support, Martin's effort to 

overcome the statutory inference under Code § 19.2-187.01. 

III. 

In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

admitting into evidence the certificates of analysis. Finding 

no error on this issue, we affirm Martin's convictions. 

 Affirmed. 

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