UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DAWON A. WORDLAW,

Plaintiff,

v.

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF 

CHICAGO, LLC and ENTERPRISE 

HOLDINGS, INC.,

Defendants.

No. 20 CV 3200

Judge Manish S. Shah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

While working at an Enterprise car-rental facility in Cook County, Dawon 

Wordlaw scanned her fingerprints to clock in and out of each shift. She claims that

Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC, and its parent company, Enterprise 

Holdings, Inc., used this timekeeping system to impermissibly collect, retain, and

share her fingerprints without her informed consent. Wordlaw sued both Enterprise 

Chicago and Enterprise Holdings for violating the Illinois Biometric Information 

Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. Defendants move dismiss under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The motion is denied. 

I. Legal Standards

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plausibly suggests 

a right to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). 

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must allege facts 

sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court

accepts all factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the 

plaintiff’s favor, but the court need not do the same for legal conclusions or 

“threadbare recitals” supported by only “conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678, 80–82. In other words, a plaintiff must provide “more than labels” or “a formulaic 

recitation of a cause of action’s elements,” and the complaint must “contain either 

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to 

sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 562.

II. Facts

Enterprise Chicago and its parent company, Enterprise Holdings, operate carrental services in Illinois. [21] ¶ 15.1 Wordlaw worked at defendants’ facility in Cook 

County. Id. ¶ 25. She received her paychecks from Enterprise Chicago, but Enterprise 

Holdings controlled her work environment, including timekeeping, privacy, and 

employee behavior and discipline. Id. ¶ 26. According to the complaint, Enterprise 

Holdings “exercised primary, if not exclusive, control over” Enterprise Chicago’s 

“practices with respect to employee privacy matters and other employment 

conditions.” Id. ¶ 22. 

Allegedly, Enterprise Holdings directed employee-management and privacy 

policies for its regional subsidiaries, including Enterprise Chicago. Id. ¶¶ 21–23.

Enterprise Holdings’s Code of Conduct, for example, referred to itself and its 

1 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers 

are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings. Facts are taken from the first 

amended complaint [21] and plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss [28].

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subsidiaries as one “Company.” [21] ¶ 17; [21-1] at 3. The Code applied to all, 

“regardless of our position within the Company.” [21] ¶ 18; [21-1] at 6. And the Code 

assured that Enterprise Holdings and its subsidiaries were “committed to protecting 

the privacy of its employees’ private information,” which the company protected “by 

limiting access to those who have a business need to know it, securing the systems

that transmit or store it, and ensuring our use of the information complies with 

privacy laws.” [21] ¶¶ 19–20; [21-1] at 16, 18.

The complaint does not distinguish between the two defendants in its central 

allegations. In 2016, the defendants started using biometric scanning and timetracking devices to monitor workers’ hours at the Cook County facility. [21] ¶¶ 5, 25. 

The new system required Wordlaw and other employees to scan their fingerprints 

each shift when they clocked in, and again when they clocked out. Id. ¶ 27. The 

defendants did not inform Wordlaw in writing that her biometric data were being 

collected or the purpose of the collection. Id. ¶ 29. Nor did the defendants seek or 

obtain her written consent, or disclose material information about retention, 

disclosure, and destruction of her biometric data. Id. ¶¶ 29–31. Defendants also did 

not make public any written policy on the company’s retention and destruction of 

biometric data. Id. ¶ 31. Wordlaw was nevertheless required to scan her fingerprints 

each shift until she left in 2019. Id. ¶ 27. Without obtaining Wordlaw’s written 

consent, defendants not only collected and retained this information, but they also 

shared it with third parties, including other Enterprise subsidiaries, data storage 

vendors, and payroll service providers. Id. ¶¶ 5, 32.

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Wordlaw brings a claim against defendants under the Illinois Biometric 

Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. She argues, in essence, that 

defendants’ collection, retention, and dissemination of her fingerprints failed to 

comply with BIPA’s written notice and consent requirements. Id. ¶¶ 42–52; [28] at 

2–3. Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

III. Analysis

Defendants make four arguments to support the motion: (1) the Illinois 

Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILCS 305, preempts plaintiff’s BIPA claim; 

(2) plaintiff fails to allege a BIPA violation against either defendant; (3) plaintiff fails 

to state a claim against Enterprise Holdings; and (4) plaintiff fails to plead 

intentionality or recklessness under BIPA. None justify dismissal of the complaint.

A. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act

Preemption under the Workers’ Compensation Act is an affirmative defense.

Baylay v. Etihad Airways P.J.S.C., 881 F.3d 1032, 1039 (7th Cir. 2018). A plaintiff 

need not anticipate affirmative defenses in a complaint, and a claim will be dismissed

on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “only where ‘the allegations of the complaint itself set forth 

everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense.’” Chicago Bldg. Design, P.C. 

v. Mongolian House, Inc., 770 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. 

Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005)).

The Workers’ Compensation Act does not preempt Wordlaw’s BIPA claim. The 

Act generally provides “the exclusive means” for an employee to recover against an 

employer for work-related injuries. Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL 118070, ¶ 14

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(citing Meerbrey v. Marshall Field and Co., Inc., 139 Ill.2d 455, 462 (1990)). But it 

does not preempt independent-tort claims if (among other exceptions) an employee 

can establish that the injury was not accidental or was not compensable under the 

Act. Id. Accidental is not a “technical legal term but encompasses anything that 

happens without design or an event which is unforeseen by the person to whom it 

happens.” Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Commission, 62 Ill.2d 556, 563 (1976) (quoting 

International Harvester Co. v. Industrial Commission, 56 Ill.2d 84, 88 (1973)).

Compensable injuries are those suffered in the line of duty during the course of 

employment, but the test for “whether an injury is compensable is related to whether 

the type of injury categorically fits within the purview of the Act.” Folta, 2015 IL 

118070, ¶ 23.

The alleged BIPA violations here were no accident. Rather, they were the 

product of a company policy that “intentionally collected employee fingerprints for 

purposes of maintaining a biometric timekeeping system.” Burlinski v. Top Golf USA 

Inc., No. 19-CV-06700, 2020 WL 5253150, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2020). I agree with 

those courts that have rejected the preemption defense for similar BIPA claims. See 

id. (employer policy of collecting employee fingerprints for timekeeping was not 

accidental); Treadwell v. Power Solutions International, Inc., 427 F.Supp.3d 984, 990 

(N.D. Ill. 2019) (same).

Further, BIPA injuries are not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation 

Act. Intangible injuries may be compensable under the Act if tied to “a sudden, severe 

emotional shock traceable to a definite time, place and cause which causes 

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psychological injury or harm has suffered an accident within the meaning of the Act, 

though no physical trauma or injury was sustained.” Pathfinder, 62 Ill.2d at 563. The 

privacy injuries BIPA protects are not the kind of intangible injuries compensable 

under the Workers’ Compensation Act. See McDonald v. Symphony Bronzeville Park 

LLC, 2020 IL App (1st) 192398, ¶¶ 27–28 (holding that BIPA injuries are “simply not 

compensable under the [Workers’] Compensation Act” and noting the unanimity of 

Illinois trial courts in “reaching the same general conclusion”); Cothron v. White 

Castle System, Inc., 467 F.Supp.3d 604, 615–16 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (collecting federal and 

state cases to show that “courts have unanimously rejected” the idea that BIPA 

claims are preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act). 

The BIPA claim is not preempted.

B. Biometric Information Privacy Act

BIPA protects individuals’ uniquely sensitive privacy interests in their

personal biometric information, including their fingerprints. 740 ILCS 14/5–14/10. 

The statute is enforced through a private right of action, available to “[a]ny person 

aggrieved by a violation.” Id. § 14/20.

Section 15—BIPA’s substantive core—places restrictions on the collection, 

retention, and disclosure of biometric information. Three subsections are relevant 

here. First, section 15(a) requires private entities that possess biometric information 

to develop a publicly available written policy, establishing a retention schedule and 

guidelines for destroying the information. Id. § 14/15(a). Next, section 15(b) requires 

private entities seeking to collect biometric information to first (1) inform the person 

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whose biometrics are being collected, in writing, that the information is being 

collected or stored; (2) inform the person in writing of the “specific purpose and length 

of term” for which the biometrics are being collected, stored, and used; and (3) receive 

a written release from the person. Id. § 14/15(b). This “informed-consent regime ... is 

the heart of BIPA.” Bryant v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617, 626 (7th Cir. 

2020) (citing Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp., 2019 IL 123186). Finally, 

section 15(d) prohibits private entities in possession of a person’s biometric data from 

disclosing or disseminating it without the person’s consent. 740 ILCS 14/15(d). 

The complaint asserts that defendants’ fingerprint-timekeeping system

violated sections 15(a), (b), and (d) of BIPA. Defendants argue that the complaint fails 

to allege a BIPA violation against either defendant because plaintiff engages in 

improper group pleading, and also fails to allege any facts showing that defendants 

collected, possessed, or disclosed plaintiff’s biometric data in violation of section 15. 

[26] at 13–18; [29] at 12–15.

To start, there’s no impermissible group pleading here. When a plaintiff brings 

claims against multiple defendants, “[e]ach defendant is entitled to know what he or 

she did that is asserted to be wrongful.” Bank of America, N.A. v. Knight, 725 F.3d 

815, 818 (7th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff has provided both defendants with sufficient notice

of wrongdoing. The complaint asserts that the fingerprint-timekeeping system did 

not comply with BIPA. Plaintiff plausibly alleges that this system was in effect at the

Cook County facility for at least three years. [21] ¶¶ 25–27. And she alleges that 

Enterprise Holdings and Enterprise Chicago jointly operated this facility, with the 

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former controlling her work environment and setting employee privacy policy, and 

the latter signing her paychecks. Id. ¶¶ 15, 26. Plaintiff is saying, in other words, that 

she plans to prove that both defendants violated BIPA, even though she is currently

unable to allege which one in particular installed and controlled the timekeeping 

system. [28] at 8. For now, Wordlaw has alleged enough to put both defendants on 

notice of their alleged wrongdoing. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 

Wordlaw’s lawyers certified that their factual contentions have or are likely to have 

evidentiary support—they accuse both defendants of collecting, possessing, and 

disclosing biometric information, and I expect that they’ve leveled such accusations 

in good faith.

As for the substance of plaintiff’s BIPA claims, the complaint plausibly states 

a claim under sections 15(a), (b), and (d). Most clearly, plaintiff alleges that while

working at the Cook County facility from 2016 to 2019, her fingerprints were daily 

collected without her written consent, and without written notice of the collection or 

the purpose behind it. Id. ¶¶ 25–32. This is sufficient to state a claim for unlawful 

collection under section 15(b). See Bryant, 958 F.3d at 626 (failure to follow the 

requirements of section 15(b) before collecting fingerprints denies individuals “the 

opportunity to consider whether the terms of that collection and usage were 

acceptable given the attendant risks”).

Plaintiff also adequately alleges unlawful retention under section 15(a). 

Unlawful retention of biometrics “inflicts a privacy injury in the same sense that an 

unlawful collection does.” Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC, 980 F.3d 1146, 

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1154 (7th Cir. 2020); see also id. at 1154–55 (“Just as section 15(b) expressly 

conditions lawful collection of biometric data on informed consent, section 15(a) 

expressly conditions lawful retention of biometric data on the continuation of the 

initial purpose for which the data was collected.”). Here, plaintiff alleges that 

although defendants collected her fingerprints each shift, they failed to provide a 

biometric retention schedule—publicly or otherwise—detailing who possessed the 

information, the length of time for its storage, or guidelines for its permanent 

destruction. [21] ¶¶ 31, 37(b), 47(e). A reasonable inference follows: absent a written 

policy or guidelines ensuring compliance, defendants’ retention of plaintiff’s 

fingerprint did not comport with BIPA. See Fox, 980 F.3d at 1155 (“The BIPA 

requirement to implement data retention and destruction protocols protects a 

person’s biometric privacy just as concretely as the statute’s informed-consent 

regime.”). Defendants argue, however, that section 15(a) is inapplicable because 

plaintiff fails to allege “a single fact” showing that defendants “ever took ‘possession’ 

of her purported biometric data.” [26] at 17. Not so. Defendants’ collection of plaintiff’s 

fingerprints at the beginning and end of each shift raises a reasonable (and obvious) 

inference that, once collected, defendants possessed the fingerprint data. The data 

needed to be possessed to connect an employee to the hours worked—the purpose of 

the timekeeping system implies possession.

Finally, the complaint sufficiently alleges that the defendants disseminated 

plaintiff’s fingerprint data in violation of section 15(d). Plaintiff claims that

defendants shared her biometrics with “third parties, such as other Enterprise 

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subsidiaries, data storage vendors, and payroll service providers” without her 

consent. [21] ¶ 5; see also id. ¶ 30. Defendants question the sufficiency of this 

allegation, which is based “upon information and belief” and “fails to allege any 

specifics relative to the alleged disclosure of information.” [26] at 18. But Wordlaw is 

not required to include “detailed factual allegations” in her complaint. See Alexander 

v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013). Instead, Wordlaw need only “give 

enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds 

together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff has 

done so here. Defendants implemented a timekeeping system that collected her 

biometrics and then shared them—without her consent—with subsidiaries, data 

storage vendors, and payroll service providers. Plaintiff will have to prove unlawful 

dissemination to prevail, but more detail about how she will do that is not necessary 

at this stage of the case.

C. The Claim Against Enterprise Holdings

Defendants next argue that Enterprise Holdings had nothing to do with the 

timekeeping system and should be dismissed as a party. Plaintiff’s BIPA claim 

against Enterprise Holdings hinges on two theories. The first is that Enterprise 

Holdings directly collected, possessed, and disseminated her fingerprints; the second, 

alternative ground, is that Enterprise Holdings either: (1) specifically directed 

Enterprise Chicago’s timekeeping policy, making it as a direct-participant in the 

BIPA violation, or (2) exercised sufficient control over plaintiff to make it liable as 

her joint employer. The overarching inquiry for each, though, is whether Enterprise 

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Holdings was sufficiently involved in the Cook County facility’s fingerprinttimekeeping system. There’s enough in the complaint to plausibly suggest that it was.

1. Direct Liability Under BIPA

Wordlaw first claims that Enterprise Holdings directly violated BIPA because 

Enterprise Holdings itself operated the timekeeping system. She points to its Code of 

Conduct, which she reads as portraying Enterprise Holdings and its subsidiaries as 

a single company and providing “clear indications that Enterprise Holdings is the 

primary decision-maker with respect to implementing uniform privacy practices ... 

across its regional subsidiaries, including Enterprise Chicago.” [28] at 5. As plaintiff 

sees it, the Code makes “it is entirely plausible that certain aspects of the biometric 

practices at issue were conducted by Enterprise Holdings.” Id. at 7. The complaint 

also draws on plaintiff’s personal experience at the Cook County facility, and claims 

that Enterprise Holdings exerted primary control over her work environment. [21] 

¶ 26. This is enough, plaintiff argues, to support an inference that Enterprise 

Holdings was responsible for the timekeeping system, especially when plaintiff has 

been “unable to allege which particular entity included in the ‘Company’ installed 

and controlled [the system]” because defendants failed to make required disclosures

under BIPA. [28] at 8. Defendants counter that the complaint fails to allege that 

Enterprise Holdings had any role in the implementation, maintenance, or operation

of the fingerprint-timekeeping system. [26] at 8–13.

Plaintiff’s heavy reliance on the Code of Conduct is misguided. The Code does 

not suggest that Enterprise Holdings controls each individual subsidiary, nor does it

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plausibly show that Enterprise Holdings was responsible for the timekeeping system

at the Cook County facility. Rather, it appears to be a general statement of Enterprise 

Holdings’s principles, providing guidance to employees, subsidiaries, and other 

affiliates. See [21-1] at 6 (“[T]his document is intended as a guideline for achieving

and maintaining the highest ethical business practices.”). While it states that the 

company follows privacy laws and protects employees’ private information, Wordlaw 

thinks that means that Enterprise Holdings “directed the installation of biometric 

timekeeping devices across its subsidiaries” and managed “the storage and 

dissemination of its employees’ biometric information.” [28] at 6. That leap is not a 

reasonable inference from the generic guideline in the Code. The Code does not tell 

us whether Enterprise Holdings directed and managed the biometric timekeeping at 

the Cook County facility.

But Wordlaw’s factual allegations about her work environment do. Plaintiff 

alleges that Enterprise Holdings “exercised primary, if not exclusive, control over” 

Enterprise Chicago’s practices “with respect to employee privacy matters and other 

employment conditions.” [21] ¶ 22. More specifically, she alleges that “her work 

environment, including ... employee timekeeping, employee privacy, employee 

discipline, and the scope of acceptable employee behavior, were controlled by” 

Enterprise Holdings. Id. ¶ 26. These are specific factual statements that, at this 

stage, must be accepted as true. And if Enterprise Holdings controlled employee 

timekeeping and privacy matters at the Cook County location while plaintiff worked 

there, then it’s plausible that Enterprise Holdings administered the timekeeping

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system and unlawfully collected her fingerprint scans. To recover against Enterprise 

Holdings, plaintiff will of course need to prove her allegations of control. But the

complaint states a plausible BIPA claim against Enterprise Holdings.

2. Direct-Participant or Joint-Employer Liability

Because plaintiff plausibly states a claim against Enterprise Holdings for 

directly violating BIPA, plaintiff’s alternative theories of liability do not provide 

grounds for dismissal. I briefly discuss them here, however, because plaintiff

acknowledges that discovery may reveal that Enterprise Holdings did not directly 

collect, retain, and disclose biometric data. If that happens, she argues that recovery 

is still possible under a direct-participant or joint-employer theory of liability.2

Illinois courts recognize the theory of direct-participant liability as an 

exception to the general rule that a parent is not liable for the actions of its 

subsidiary. Forsythe v. Clark USA, Inc., 224 Ill.2d 274, 290 (2007). Under the theory, 

a plaintiff must show “a parent’s specific direction or authorization of the manner in 

which an activity is undertaken” and that the injury that resulted was foreseeable. 

Id. But direction or authorization from a parent must surpass “the control exercised 

as a normal incident of ownership in disregard for the interests of the subsidiary.” Id. 

To determine whether a joint-employer relationship exists, Illinois courts 

consider whether “two or more employers exert significant control over the same 

2 Defendants argue that BIPA does not permit vicarious liability. [26] at 10–11 (“There are 

no articulated avenues of liability in BIPA covering a company that is merely related to an 

entity which allegedly engages in conduct regulated by the BIPA if the related company does 

not engage in such activities itself.”). Of course, mere relation would not suffice to establish 

liability. But while BIPA is limited to “private entities,” the text does not close the door on 

traditional theories of agency liability. 

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employees—where from the evidence it can be shown that they share or co-determine 

those matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment.” Village of 

Winfield v. Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 176 Ill.2d 54, 60 (1997) (quoting Orenic v. 

Ill. State Labor Relations Bd., 127 Ill.2d 453, 474 (1989)). Relevant factors include 

the “putative joint employer’s role in hiring and firing; promotions and demotions; 

setting wages, work hours, and other terms and conditions of employment; discipline; 

and actual day-to-day supervision and direction of employees on the job.” Id. 

The direct-participant and joint-employer theories require fact-intensive 

inquiries. As such, plaintiff’s success will rise and fall with her ability to show that 

Enterprise Holdings specifically directed the timekeeping policies of Enterprise 

Chicago—or significantly controlled her work environment—during her tenure. Like 

her allegations of direct liability under BIPA, reliance on the Code of Conduct is 

largely a distraction. Plaintiff argues, for example, that the Code “admits” that 

Enterprise Holdings was plaintiff’s employer and “satisfies the vast majority of the 

factors courts consider with respect to the joint-employer determination.” [28] at 10–

11 (emphasis omitted). But the Code alone does not establish that Enterprise 

Holdings in fact exerted significant control over plaintiff at the Cook County facility. 

The Code’s references to the company as a single unit don’t suggest anything more 

than an ordinary parent-subsidiary relationship. To prove one of her alternative 

theories of liability, Wordlaw will have to rely on other evidence specifically showing

that Enterprise Holdings authorized or directed the timekeeping policy, or that it was 

so involved with the day-to-day that it was a joint employer. 

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On the other side, plaintiff’s joint-employer theory is not precluded. 

Defendants argue that In re Enterprise Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Employment 

Practices Litigation, 683 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2012), “definitively held” that Enterprise 

Holdings is not a joint employer of its subsidiaries’ employees. [29] at 11 (emphasis 

omitted); see also [26] at 11. But that case doesn’t bar plaintiff from pursuing a jointemployer theory under Illinois law. Instead, the Third Circuit there held that, under 

the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., Enterprise Holdings was not a 

joint employer of its subsidiaries’ assistant branch managers. In re Enterprise, 683 

F.3d at 471. The case has no preclusive effect over plaintiff’s claim because she was 

not a party to it. See Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2000) (issue 

preclusion applies only when, among other things, “the party against whom estoppel 

is invoked was represented in the prior action.”). Further, the court’s determination 

based on the factual record before it says nothing about the relationship between 

Enterprise Holdings, Enterprise Chicago, and employees at the Cook County facility 

from 2016 to 2019. 

Plaintiff has alleged that Enterprise Holdings significantly controlled her work 

environment in several important ways. If she can prove these allegations with facts, 

neither BIPA nor In re Enterprise prevents her from pursuing a claim on a jointemployer theory.

D. State of Mind

BIPA establishes a two-tiered regime for statutory damages. 740 ILCS 14/20.

Private entities that negligently violate BIPA are on the hook for at least $1,000 in 

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liquidated damages per violation, but if a violation is intentional or reckless, that 

amount jumps to $5,000. Id. § 14/20(1)–(2). The Act also provides that for each 

violation—regardless of mental state—a plaintiff may recover reasonable attorneys’ 

fees and costs or “other relief, including an injunction.” Id. § 14/20(3)–(4). Defendants

argue that plaintiff has failed to plead that the alleged violations were reckless or 

intentional. [26] at 19. They claim that because the complaint “is devoid of any 

assertions to support her claim that Defendant acted recklessly or intentionally,” the 

enhanced-damages request should be stricken or dismissed. [29] at 15–16.

Defendants’ argument starts from a faulty premise: that BIPA’s relief

provisions create distinct legal claims. They don’t. Instead, “a complaint asserting 

only one legal right, even if seeking multiple remedies for the alleged violation of that 

right, states a single claim for relief.” Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wetzel, 424 

U.S. 737, 743 n.4 (1976). And Rule 12(b)(6) doesn’t authorize “piecemeal dismissals 

of parts of claims; the question at this stage is simply whether the complaint includes 

factual allegations that state a plausible claim for relief.” BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 

809 F.3d 317, 325 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). Wordlaw has plausibly alleged 

violations of her rights under section 15. That violation entitles her to some form of 

relief under section 20, and defendants are on notice that Wordlaw intends to pursue 

heightened damages under section 20(2). See Cothron, 467 F.Supp.3d at 615 (N.D. Ill. 

2020) (“[I]f the complaint plausibly pleads violations of [section 15] ... then, even 

absent specific allegations about ... mental state with respect to each of those claims, 

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it has stated a claim entitling [plaintiff] to litigation expenses and injunctive relief 

under section 20.”). At the pleading stage, plaintiff need do no more.

Moreover, plaintiff has adequately alleged that defendants’ BIPA violations 

were at least negligent, if not reckless or intentional. The defendants implemented a 

timekeeping policy that daily collected employee fingerprints from at least 2016 to 

2019. They did so in Cook County, years after BIPA took effect, and all while claiming 

to comply with all privacy laws. See [28] at 14. The complaint’s allegation that in 

2016, “defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing” that the timekeeping 

system was subject to BIPA’s requirements is plausible. [21] ¶ 50. Yet defendants 

made no effort to comply with BIPA. This is enough to allege a negligent, reckless, or 

intentional violation.

Defendants’ request to strike or dismiss plaintiff’s damages request is denied.

IV. Conclusion

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, [25], is denied. Defendants shall answer the 

complaint by January 11, 2021, and the parties shall file a joint status report with a

proposed discovery schedule on January 19, 2021.

ENTER:

___________________________

Manish S. Shah

United States District Judge

Date: December 21, 2020

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