A t t he t i m e o f writ i ng , ap p ro xim ately t en yea rs ha ve p asse d si nc e H i ck m an w as i nju red

. G i ve n t ha t wo rke rs’ 1
co m p ensat i o n cases are t o be res o l ved as exp ed i t i o usl y as po ss i b l e, s ee T enn. C o d e A nn. § 5 0

- 6

- 2 2 5 (f ) ( Sup p
. 20 0 3 ), i t ap p ears t hat t hi s case has l i ngered i n t he judici al s y st em m uch t o o l o ng.



### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT JAC KSON A pr il 7, 200 4 S es sio n DAVID HI CKMAN v. CONT INE NTAL BAKI NG COMPANY

Appeal f romthe Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. 107936-2 F loyd Pe ete , Jr., Chancellor

No. W2003-00405-SC- R3-CV - F iled Septem ber 2, 2004

The pre sent worke rs’ c ompensation ca se re quires us to consider the tri al co u rt ’s assessment of v o ca tional disabilit y

and, with re spect to the e mploy er’ s alleg ed subrog ation interest, 1) the applicability

of Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-112( c)( 1); 2) the e x tent of the e mploy er’ s cre dit ag ainst future liability under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-112( c)( 2 ); 3 ) the appropriate disposition of medical expenses incurr ed prior t o t h e time of trial in the e mploy ee’ s wor k er s’ compensation suitbut not paid by the employ er; a nd 4) the propriety of re quiring the employ er to pay

a proportionate share of the employ ee’ s attorney ’s fe e fr om a third-party tort action. The trial c ourt’s judg ment is affirme d in part and r ever sed in part, and the ca se is rema nded.
Te nn. C odeAnn . 5 0- 6- 22 5( e )( 3) ; J udgm e nt of t he Tr ial Co ur t A ffirm e d in P ar t a nd Reve rsed in Par t, Case R em anded
J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined.
K ar e n R

. C i c a l a , M e m p h i s , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e A p p e l l a n t , C o n t i n e n t a l B ak i n g C o m p a n y. Mark L edbetter , Memphis, Tennesse e, for the Appellee , David Hickman. OP IN ION
F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound
On J uly 4, 1994, Dav i d Hi ckman, an employ ee of Continental Baking Company 1 (“Continental”) , was at t em p t i ng to freea jammed doug h control conve y or whe n he sustained anCont i n en t al s t i pu l at es t h at H i ck man ’ s i n j u r y w as w or k

- r el at ed. 2
-2- injury to his cervical spi ne and shoulder. The spinal injury require d surg ery to corr ect. Hic kman 2 filed a tort action ag ainst APV Ba ker, I nc. (“A PV”), the ma nufac turer of the doug h control conve y or, and filed a

worke rs’ c ompensation suit ag ainst Continental. Hickman’s attorney ag ree d in writing to protect Continental’s subrog ation interest.
On J anuary

22, 1997, Hickman se ttled his lawsuit against APV for $552,000. Hickman’ s a tto rn e y re c e ive d a

on e -thir d con ting e nc y

fe e a ndpa id the ba la nc e of these ttl e me nt p ro c e e ds , tot a lin g $3 68 ,0 00 , to Hi c kman. De sp ite thea g re e me nt t o pr ote c t Con tin e ntal’ s su br og a tio n in te re st, Continental was not notified of the se ttlement until April 1997, after the se ttleme n t p ro ce ed s had been distributed to Hickman. The wor kers’ compensation case w as tried on J u ly 12, 1999. Construing Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-112( c)( 1), the trial c ourt fo u n d t h at Continental was not entitled to be reimburse d for benef

its it had previously paid. It c oncluded, howeve r, that Continental was entitled to a cr edit ag ainst its future liabilityin the amount of $7,041.45. Continental appea led. The Spec ial Wor k er s ’ C o m pensation Appe als Panel found that the trial court’ s judgme nt w as not a final order beca use it did not i nclude f

indings a s to the permane ncy of Hi c kman’ s in

jury or his re su lti ng vo c a tio na l di sa bil ity . T he Pa ne l r ema nd ed thec a se wi th instructions for further proc eeding s and for a fina l judgment.
Onre ma nd , th e tria l c ou rt re ite rate d it s h ol di ng that Co nti ne nta l w a s e nti tle d to a c re dit a g a ins t f utu relia bil ity in the a mou nt o f $ 7, 04 1. 45 a nda wa rd e d H ic kman p e rm a ne nt p art ia l di sa bil ity be ne fi ts o f 1 1% to the wh ole bo dy

. Sin c e Con tin e nta l ha d pr e vio us ly pa id Hi c kman $1 6, 84 2. 76 in perma nent partial disabilit y benef its, an amount equivalent to 11% to the body as a whole, the c ourt c on c lud e d th a t Co nti ne nta l ha d d isc ha rg e d it s o bli g a tio n to pay

su c h b e ne fi ts. Th e c ou rt a lso he ld that H ic kman w a s e nti tle d to fu tur e me dic a l e xpe ns e s f or the ba la nc e of

his lif e a ndthat no c re dit under Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-112 should be a pplied to such expenses. Continental appea led the trial court’s ruli ng as t o its subrog ation interest. Hickman appea led thetria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing of vo c a tio na l disa bil ity . Wh ile theapp e a l w a s p e nd ing be fo retheAp pe a ls Panel, an or der w as ente red transfer ring the ca se for

full Supreme Court re view.
Ana lys is
Vo c a tio na l D isa

bil ity
Hickman a

rg ues that the trial court’s a war d of 11% pe rmane nt partial disability is contrary to the weig ht of evidenc e at tria l. We ag ree
. The e x tent of vocational disabilit y is a question of fa ct. Geor g e v. Bldg

. Materia ls Corp. of Am., 44 S.W .3d 481, 488 (Tenn. 2001). As such, the trial court’s determination of th e e x t en t of-3-

v o c a t i o n a l d i s ab i l i t y i s r e v i e w e d “ ‘ d e n o v o u p o n t h e r e c o r d o f t h e tr i a l c o u rt , a c c o m p a n i e d b y a pr e su mpt ionof

thec or re c tne ss o f the fi nd ing , u nle ss the pr e pond eran ce o f the e vid e nc e is oth e rw ise .’ ” I d. (q uo tin g Te nn
. R. Ap p. P. 13 (d ))

. Th e tria l c ou rt , ho we ve r, did no t e xpla in h ow it arrived at its disabilityawa rd. When the trial court fails to make f indings of f

act, ther e is nothing upon which the presumption of corr ectne ss c an attach. Goodman v. Memphis Park Comm’n, 851 S.W .2d 165, 166 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). T herefo re , o u r standard of revie w is de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss a s to the trial court’s determination of vocational disability , see id., a nd we must revie w the re cord to determine the pr eponder anceof the e vidence , see G anzevoort v. Russell, 949 S .W.2d 293, 296 (Tenn. 1997).
A vocational disabilit y

results when an em p l oy ee’ s abilityto earn wag es in any form of em p l o y m en t available to him or her in an uninjure d condition is dim inished by injury . Walker v. Saturn Corp., 986 S.W .2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1 9 9 8 ). I n assessing the extent of an employ ee’ s vocational disability , the t rial court should consider the following fac tors: the employ ee’ s skills and training , education, ag e, loca l job opportuniti es, anatomical impairment rating , and ca pacity to work at the kinds of employment available in the employ ee’ s disabled condition. I d.; see a lso Georg e, 44 S.W .3d at 488. Moreove r, t he employ ee’ s own assessment of hi s or her phy sical condition and resulting disabiliti es cannot be disreg arde d. Walker, 986 S.W.2d at 208.
Our examination of the require d fac tors indicates that Hickman has a substantial voc ational disability . As such, we conclude that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the trial court’ s awa rd of 11% permanent partial disabilit y . Considering all o f t h e above fa ctors, we hold that the evidenc e preponde rate s in favor of an awa rd of 70% perma nent partial disabilityto the whole body . Hickman, who was f ifty y ear s old at the time of trial, testified that all of hi s prior work experience had involved maintenanc e engine ering , a fie ld that require s fre quent and of ten strenuous phy sical exertion, and that he is no long er able to work in this field. I t is undisput ed that Hickman never returne d to work a tC o n t i n e n t a l a t a w a g e e q u a l t o o r g r e a t e r t h a n t h e w a g e h e w a s r e c e i v i n g a tt h e t i m e o f h i s i n j u r y. Hi c kman r e c e ive s So c ia l Se c urity dis abil ity

be ne fi ts andha s n ot wor ked sin c e he su staine d h is injury . He take s over- the-c ounter pa in relieve rs and uses a portable TENS unit to obtain relief fr om his constant pain, despit e having underg one surge ry on his back. Hic kman obtained his hig h school diplo ma b u t o n ly a tt e n d e d o n e a n d o n e
- h a lf y e ar s o f c o ll e g e
. T h r e e d o c to r s g a v e me dical impairment rating s: Dr. R i l ey J ones, an orthopedic surg eon, g ave H ickman an 11% medical impairment rating to the body ; D r. Alfr ed B onati, a neur osurg eon, g ave an impairment rating of 10% to the whole body ; and Dr. Robert Christopher, a specialist in reha bilitative medicine, opined that Hickman ha s a 26% impairme nt to the whole body . Phill ip Miny ard, a vocational e x pert, opined that Hi c kman is pe rm a ne ntl y a nd tot a lly dis able d, bu t he a dmi ts that Hi c kman wo uld be ableto w or k in some ca pacity

. Our a war d to Hickman of 70% permanent partial disability to the whole body equate s to a tot a l a wa rdof $1 07 ,1 81 .2 0. Con tin e nta l pr e vio us ly pa id $ 16 ,8 42 .7 6 inpe rm a ne nt p art ia l di sa bil ity benef its. Theref

ore, H ickman’s r emaining future be nefits, paid periodically , will total $90,338.44. As we w ill dis cuss later , Continental is entitl ed to a c re d it in thi s amount pursuant to Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-112( c)( 2).W he n the injury o r d ea th fo r wh i ch co m p en sati o n is p aya b l e u nd er the W o rke rs’ 3 C o m p en sati o n L aw was ca us ed un d er c i rcu m st an ce s cre ati ng a lega l l i ab i l i t y aga i nst

so m e p e rs o n o the r th a n the e m p lo ye r to p a y d a m a g e s, the inj u re d w o rk e r .
. . sh a ll h a v e the rig h t t o tak e c o m p e n sa tio n un d e r su c h la w , a n d s u c h inj u re d w o rk e r . . . may pu r s u e s u ch

. . . r eme dy by pr oper ac t i on i n a cou r t of compe t en t j u r i s di ct i on agai nst s uch o t her person.

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 5 0

- 6

- 1 1 2 (a) (19 9 9 ). -4- Con tin e nta l’ s Su br og a tio n Inte re st We now turn to Continental’s arg uments reg arding its subrog ation interest. Continental contends that the tria l court misconstrued Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-112 and applicable case law in ar

riving at its f

inal judgme nt. I n particula r, Continental arg ues that the trial court e rre d in 1) failing to enforc e Continental’s subrogation lien under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 112(c) (1); 2) r efusing to gr ant Continental cre dit f or its future liability

up to the amount of Hickma n’s third-party rec overy ; 3) reduc ing Continental’s subrog ation interest by the cost of Dr

. B on a ti’ s me dic a l tr e a tme nt; a nd4) re qu iring Con tin e nta l to re imb ur se Hi c kman f or a pr op ortio nate share of his attorney ’s fe e in settling the third-party action.
1. Enforc ement of Subrog ation Lien
Th e tria l c ou rt

fo un d th a t Co nti ne nta l ha d n ot f ull y or pa rt ia lly pa id and di sch arg e d it s liability to Hickman under

Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 50-6-112(c )(1) and ther efor e held that Con tin e nta l w a s n ot e nti tle d to bere imb ur se d f or thebe ne fi ts that it ha d p re vio us ly pa id. I n th is respe ct, the trial c ourt err ed. Subrog ation li en s o f e m p l o y er s p ro v i d i n g wo rk er s ’ c o m p en s at i o n ar e go v er n ed by Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-112. Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 5 0 -6 -1 12(a) permits an injured employ ee who rec eives worke rs’ compensation be nefits to pur sue an a ction ag ainst a thirdparty tortfea sor who ca

used or c ontributed in causing t h e employ ee’ s injury

. To preve nt the 3 employ ee f

rom rec eiving a do uble re covery , howeve r, Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 50-6-112( c) pr ovides that the injured worker’ s employ er shall have a s ubrog ation lien ag ainst any rec overy the employ ee r ece ives from the third pa rty as we ll as a cr edit ag ainst any future liability that a c c ru e s.
Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 5 0- 6- 11 2( c )( 1) pr ov ide s,
I n [t he] event of suc h rec overy ag ainst such t hird person by the worke r
. . . by judgme nt, se ttlement or otherwise , and the e mploy er’ s maxi mum liability for worke rs’ compensation unde r this c hapter has been f ully or partially

paid an d d ischarg ed, the e mploy er sha ll have a subrog ation lien there for ag ainst such re covery , and the e mploy er may intervene in any

action to protec t and enf

orce such lien.In t he event t he net reco very b y t he wo rker

. . . e x c e e d s the am o unt p ai d b y t he 4
e m p lo ye r, a n d the e m p lo ye r ha s n o t, a t the tim e , p a id a n d d isc h a rg e d the e m p lo ye r’s

f ul l maxi mum l i abi l i t y for w ork er s ’ comp ens at i on un der t hi s chapt er , t he emp l oy er shal l be ent i t l ed t o a credit on the e m p lo ye r’ s f ut ure l i ab i l i t y , as i t accrues, t o t he ext ent t he net recove ry co l l ect ed exceed s t he am o unt pa i d by t he em p l o y er.
T enn. C o d e A nn. § 5 0

- 6

- 1 1 2 (c)( 2 ) ( 1 9 9 9 ).

A l t ho ugh we are unab l e t o de t erm i ne t he b asi s fo r t he t ri al co urt ’ s reasoni ng, t he co urt arr i ved at t he am o unt 5 of Cont i n en t al ’ s cr edi t ag ai n s t f u t u r e l i abi l i t y by r edu ci n g t h e $84, 216. 74 pr ev i ou s l y pai d by Cont i n en t al by $28, 072. 25,
as a pr op ort i o na t e s har e of t he at t orn ey ’ s f

ee i n t he s et t l ement of

t he t hi r d- part y ac t i on, an d by $4 9, 10 3 f or medi cal
ex p en ses that H i ck m an p aid o ut o f his sett l em en t p ro ce ed s.

-5- I ssues of statutory

construction ar e questions of law that are revie wed de novo with no presumption of cor rec tness g iven to the trial court’s conclusions. Moore v. Tow n of Collierville, 124 S.W .3d 93, 97 (Tenn. 2004). We must ex amine the lang uag e of the statute and if the lang uag e is unambig uous apply the ordinary

and plain meaning. Par

ks v. Tenn. Mun. L eag ue Risk Mgmt. Pool, 974 S.W .2d 677, 679 (Tenn. 1998) . The lang uag e of Te nnessee Code Annotated se ction 50-6-112( c)( 1) is clea r and unambig uous. Under this sec tion, the employ er is entitled to a subrogation lien ag ainst the e m p l o ye e ’ s t h i r d

- p art y r e c o v e r y i f t h e e m p l o ye r

h a s f u l l y or partiall

y pa id anddis c ha

rg e d it s maxi mum workers’ compensation liability

. Continental partially paid and discharg ed its max imum wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n li abil ity by pay ing a tot a l of $8 4, 21 6. 74 in wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n b e ne fi ts fo r H ic kman’ s July

4, 19 94 inj ury : $1 5, 31 1. 60 in te mpo ra ry tot a l dis abil ity be ne fi ts, $1 6, 84 2. 76 in p e r m a n e n t p art i a l d i s ab i l i t y b e n e f i t s , a n d $ 5 2 , 0 6 2

. 3 8 i n m e d i c a l e x p e n s e s
. C o n s e q u e n t l y, Continental is en t i t l ed t o a subrog ation lien under the statute in the amount of $84,216.74, repr esenting amounts previously paid to the employ ee or

on his behalf.
2. F utu reLia

bil ity
The trial c ourt furthe r conc luded that Tenne ssee Code Annotated sec tion 50-6-112(c )(2) 4
app lie d to the c ir c ums ta nc e s of the pr e se nt c a se a ndthe re fo rehe ld that Co nti ne nta l w a s e nti tle d to a cr edit of $7,041.45 ag ainst its future liabilit y
. The court, howeve r, held that Continental was not 5
e nti tle d to a c re dit fo r fu tur e me dic a l e xpe ns e s. Th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d inlim iti ng Con tin e nta l’ s c re dit to $ 7 , 0 4 1

. 4 5 , b u t it c o rr e c tl y c o n c lu d e d th a t Co n ti n e n ta l’ s c r e d it d o e s n o t ap p ly to f u tu r e medica l e xpe ns e s.
Un de r Te nn e sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 5 0- 6- 11 2( c )( 2) , a n e mpl oy e r i s e nti tle d to a c re dit ag a in s t f u tu r e li ab il ity to th e e xte n t th e e mp lo y e e ’ s n e t r e c o v e r y e xc e e d s th e a mo u n t that the employ er ha s previously

paid in worke rs’ c ompensation bene fits. I n t h e p re sent ca se, Hickma n’s net reco ve ry

tot a le d $ 36 8, 00 0, a ndCon tin e nta l ha d p re vio us ly pa id $ 84 ,2 16 .7 4 inwo rk e rs ’ compensation benefits. As such, Continental is entitled to a cr edit ag ainst futu re l i ab ilityin the amount of $283,783.26 ($368,000 less $84,216.74). Consequently , the t rial court erre d in limi ting Continental’s cre dit ag ainst future liability to $7,041.45. Continental will be entitled to a cre dit from there ma ini ng su m of

$2 83 ,7 83 .2 6 f

or thea wa rdof pe ri od ic pay me nts of

pe rm a ne nt p art ia l di sa

bil ity benef its, tot aling $90,338.44.-6-

On the other

hand, the tria l court c o rrectly held that Continental’s cre dit ag ainst future liabilitydoes not apply

to f uture medical e x penses. In rea ching this conclusion, the trial court r elied on Gr a ve s v . Co c ke Cou nty , 2 4 S. W.3 d 2 85 (T e nn . 2 00 0) . In G ra ve s, a wo rk e r s e ttl e d a

thi rd -p arty tort claim and then settled his worke rs’ compensation claim for a lum p sum. The parties ag ree d that the employ er w as entitled to reimburse ment for medical expenses it ha d alre ady paid on beha lf of the employ ee. T he part i es co u l d n o t agree a s to whether the employ er w as entitled to a c redit for future me dical expenses that wer e unknown and incalculable at the t ime of t he hearing . We held that the “c re d i t on the employ er’ s future liability ” as use d in Tennesse e Code Annotated sec tions 50-6-112( c)( 2) and ( 3) does not enc ompass payments that are unknown at the t ime of t he trial c ourt’s hearing. Grave s, 24 S.W .3d at 288. We conclude d that emp l o y ees should not be placed in the difficult position of not being a ble to spend the money they rec eive in a third-party suit for fea r that so me or a ll o f tho se fu nd s may

ha ve to b e pa id t o th e e mpl oy e r i f n e e de d me dic a l tr e a tme nt i s so ug ht. I d. We a lso de te rm ine d th a t th e goals o f j ud ic ia l e c on omy a ndfi na lit y

of wo rk e rs ’ compensation settlements supported our holding . I d.
Th e pr e se nt wo rk e rs ’ co mpe ns a tio n ca se wa s not se ttl e d for a lump s um a s w a s th e c a se in Gra ves. However, our

construction of Te nnessee Code Annotated se ctions 50-6-112(c )(2) and (3) in Gra ve s is no t a ff

e c te d b y thema nn e r i n w hic h th e be ne fi ts a re pa id. Emplo y e e s w ill be pla c e d in thedif fi c ult po sit ion of no t bei ng able to spe nd the ir thi rd -p arty re c ov e ri e s eve n if p e ri od ic pay me nts are cre dited ag ainst the third-party rec overy . Holding the se funds hostag e for an indef inite period of tim e is j us t a s u na c c e pta bl e un de r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s a s it wa s inGr a ve s. As su c h, thelog ic underlying Grave s compels us to rea ch a simil ar result in this case
. We there fore apply the holding of Gra ves to the pre sent ca se and c onclude that Continental is not entitled to a cre dit ag ainst future lia bil ity fo r m e dic a l e xpe ns e s th a t areun kn ow n o r i nc a lc ula blea t the tim e of thetria l of thewo rk e rs ’ compensation case.
3. Me dic a l T re a tme nt b y Dr . B on a ti
Af te r o btaini ng the pr oc e e ds fr om h is thir d- pa rty su it, Hi c kman c on su lte d D r. Al fr e d B on a ti, a ne ur os ur g e on who spec ia lize s inorthr os c op ic sp ina l su rg e ry . Prior to the tria l of

his wo rk e rs ’ c omp e ns a tio n c la im, Hi c kman p a id $ 49 ,1 03 ou t of his se ttl e me nt pr oc e e ds fo r Dr . B on a ti’ s se rv ic e s. Continental was not advis ed o f Hi ckman’ s intent to seek treatment from Dr. B onati and did not authorize these medic al expenses. These medical e x penses a re distinct from the t ypes of medic al expenses we ha ve previously discussed. They are not expenses that Conti nental has pr eviously paid, for whic h it would be entitled to r eimbursement. Moreove r, they are unlike the medica l expenses a dd re sse d in Gra ve s, wh ic h we re un kn ow n an d inc a lc ula ble a t the tim e of

app ro va l of

thewo rk e rs ’ compensation settlement and hea ring conce rning the subrog ation issue. Although the se ex p en s es we re unauthorized, the trial court a ppare ntly found them to be rea sonabl e an d nece ssary , and Continental does not contest this finding on appea l. As such, Hickman is entitled to have these medical e x penses paid by Continental. Upon Continental’s payment of these medical expenses to H ickman, howeve r, Continental w ill be e ntitled to recove r the same a mount as part of its subrog ation lien under Te nnessee Code Annotated se c ti o n50-6-112( c)( 1).In the e v e n t o f a re c o v e ry fro m su c h o the r p e rs o n b y the w o rk e r . . . b y ju d g m e n t, 6 set t l em ent or o t herwi se, t he at t o rney rep re sent i ng s uch i njured wo rker

. . . and
e ff e c ting the re c o v e ry, sh a ll b e e n tit le d to a re a so n a b le fe e fo r th e a tto rn e y’s
se rv ices, and t he at t o rney s hal l have a f i rs t l i en t herefo r agai nst t he reco very; provi ded, t hat i f t he emp l oy er ha s en gag ed ot her coun s el t o re pres ent t he emp l oy er i n ef fe c ting recove ry agai nst s uch o t her person, t hen a co urt of co m p et ent juri sdi ct i o n s hal l , upo n ap p l i cat i o n, ap p o rt i o n t he reasonab l e fee b et ween t he at t o rney fo r t he wo rker and t he at t o rney fo r t he em p l o y er, i n pro p o rt i o n to t he
s er v i ce s r en der ed.

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 5 0

- 6

- 1 1 2 (b) (19 9 9 ). -7- 4. Attorney ’s Fe e
F ina lly , w e mus t de te rm inew h e th e r th etria l c ou rt

e rr e d inre qu iring Con tin e nta l to re imb ur se Hickman for a pr oportionate shar e of the attorney ’s fe e in settling the third-party action. The trial co u rtd i d n o terr i n s o d o i n g.
T e n n e s se e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 5 0- 6- 11 2( b) g rants theinj ur e d e mpl oy e e ’s a tto rn e y a fi rs t lien ag ain s t an ythird-party rec overy
. This Court has held that in case s in which the employ er

6
c ho os e s n ot t o p art ic ipate in the pr os e c uti on of the thi rd -p arty su it thee mpl oy e e ’s a tto rn e y ’s fe e sh a ll be cha rg ed against the entire rec overy and shall reduc e the employ er’ s subrog ation claim by a pro rata amount. Summ er s v
. Command Sy s., I nc., 867 S.W.2d 312, 315-16 (Tenn. 1993). In Aetna Casualty & Sure ty Co. v. Gilreath, w e stated that “[t] he L eg islature has unque stionably implied that if the employ er ha s not eng ag ed other counsel, the e mploy ee’ s attorney shall be entitled to a fe e and lien not only on that portion of the re covery belong ing to the e mploy ee, but a lso upon the employ er’ s portion of the re covery .” 625 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Tenn. 1981).
I n this case, Continental did not e mploy counsel. I nstead, it r elied upon the ag ree ment that Hickman’ s counsel would prote ct its subrog ation lien. We seriously ques t i on whether

disbursing the proc eeds of

a third-pa

rty settlement to one’s c lient is s u fficient to protect the e mploy er’ s subrog ation lien. Nonethele ss, we hold that Hickman is entit led to be re imbursed for Continental’s proportionate sha

re of the attorne y ’s fe e fr om the third-party suit. Continental’s portion of the thirdp art y r e c o v e r y t o t a l s $ 8 4 , 2 1 6

. 7 4 , a n d t h e p r o p o rt i o n a t e f e e i s o n e
- t h i r d o f

t h a ta m o u n t

. A c c o r d i n g l y, Con tin e nta

l shall pay Hi ckm an $ 28 ,0 72 .2 5, repr esen ti ng rei mb urs eme ntof atto rn e y ’s fe e s p re vio us ly paid by Hickman.
Conclusion
We hold that the trial court err ed in f ailing to e nforc e Continental’s subrog ation lien under Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 50-6-112(c )(1) . We a lso hold that Continental is require d to pay $4 9, 10 3, re pr e se nti ng thec os t of me dic a l e xpe ns e s in c ur

re d f or Dr. Bonati’ s me dic a l tr e a tme nt. U p o n s u c h p a y me n t, h o w e v e r , th a t a mo u n t w il l b e in c lu d e d in Co n ti n e n ta l’ s s u b r o g a ti o n li e n
. We further conclude that Continental shall pay Hickman $28,072.25, r epre senting a proportionate shareT h is c o m p u ta tio n m a y b e il lus tra te d a s fo llo w s: 7

C ont i nen t al O wes H i ckman

A t t o r n e y ’ s F e e
.... .... .... .... .... $28, 072. 25 B o n a t i S t a t e m e n t

.... .... .... .... . . $49, 103. 00

T ot al $77, 175. 25 H i ckman O wes Co nt i nen t al

S u b r o g a t i o n L i e n
.... .... .... .... . . $84, 216. 74 B o n a t i S t a t e m e n t

.... .... .... .... . . $49, 103. 00

T ot al $133, 319. 74

R eca p
O w e d b y H i c k m a n t o C o n t i n e n t a l

.... .... .... .... .... .... .... $133, 319. 74 Le s s amount owed t o H i ckman by Co nt i nen t al

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $77, 175. 25

B al an ce $56, 144. 49

-8- of the a tt o rn e y ’s fe e Hickman incurre d in the third-party action. Computing these amounts, Hickman owes Continental a total of $56,144.49. 7
Continental is also entitl ed to a c redit ag ainst fut ure liability to the extent that Hickman’s third-party

rec overy ex ce eds t he amount Continental previously paid in worke rs’ c ompensation benef its. As such, Continental is entitled to a credit in the amount of $283,783.26. An ex amination of the re quired fac tors preponde rate s in f avor of an incre ase in the trial court’s a war d of permanent pa rt ia l di sa bil ity fr om 1 1% to 70% to the wh olebo dy , r e su lti ng in a tot a l pe rm a ne nt p art ia l di sa bil ity a wa rdof $1 07 ,1 81.2 0. Con tin e nta l pr e vio us ly pa id $ 16 ,8 42 .7 6 inpe rm a ne nt p art ia l di sa bil ity benef its and has re ceive d this amount as part of its subrog ation lien. Hickman’ s projecte d, rema ining awa rd for perma nent partial disabilitytotals $90,338.44 in periodic payments. Continental will be entitled to a cre dit in the total amount of those periodic payments. Our holding in Grave s v. Cocke Countycompels us, howeve r, to hold that the cre dit a g ainst future liability does not apply

to medical expenses that are unknown or incalcula ble at the t ime of t he trial of the wor kers’ compensation case.
All other issues ra ised by the parties are without merit. Accor dingly , th e trial court’ s judgme nt is affirmed in pa rt and re verse d in par t , and the c ase is re manded to the tria l court for pr oc e e din g s c on sis te nt wi th thi s op ini on
. Cos ts of thi s app e a l areta xede qu a lly a g a ins t th e app e llant, Continental Baking Co., and the appe llee, Da vid Hickman, and the ir sureties, for which execution m a y i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ JANI CE M . H OLDE R, JUS TI CE