IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DANNY T.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 2992

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Danny T.’s claim for

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction 

of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the 

reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s decision [Doc. 

No. 22] is granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion 

for summary judgment [Doc. No. 28] is denied.

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security 

Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by his first name and the first initial of his last 

name.

2

 Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(d).

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BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 15, 2014, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB, alleging disability since 

December 4, 2013. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after 

which he timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), 

which was held on November 9, 2016. On May 17, 2017, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s 

claim for DIB, finding him not disabled under the Social Security Act. Plaintiff then 

appealed to this Court, and, on January 31, 2019, pursuant to an agreed motion, the 

Court remanded the matter and instructed the ALJ to reassess Plaintiff’s 

impairments, reassess the medical opinion evidence, and reassess Plaintiff’s 

residual functional capacity.

After remand, the Social Security Administration Appeals Council directed 

the ALJ to further evaluate the nature and severity of Plaintiff’s shoulder 

impairment, further consider Plaintiff’s maximum residual functional capacity, and 

obtain supplemental evidence from a vocational expert (“VE”) to clarify the effect of 

the assessed limitations on Plaintiff’s occupational base. Another hearing before the 

same ALJ was held on January 9, 2020. Plaintiff personally appeared and testified 

at the hearing and was represented by counsel. A medical expert (“ME”) and a VE 

also testified. On January 29, 2020, the ALJ again denied Plaintiff’s claim for DIB, 

finding him not disabled under the Act. The Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s 

request for review, leaving the ALJ’s January 29, 2020 decision as the final decision 

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of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the District Court under 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).

II. ALJ DECISION

Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential 

evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of December 4, 2013. At step 

two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; spinal stenosis, status post 

decompression procedure of the lumbar spine (with residual mild degenerative disc 

disease and degenerative joint disease); degenerative joint disease of the shoulders, 

bilaterally; degenerative joint disease of the knees, bilaterally; and obesity. The ALJ 

concluded at step three that Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in combination, do not 

meet or medically equal a listed impairment.

Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with the following additional 

limitations: can lift and carry 10 pounds occasionally, and less than 10 pound 

frequently; can push or pull as much as can lift and carry; can sit for 6 hours out of 

an 8-hour workday; can walk for 2 hours out of an 8-hour workday; can stand for 2 

hours out of an 8-hour workday; can occasionally reach overhead to the left,

frequently reach overhead to the right, and can frequently reach in all other 

directions, bilaterally; can frequently handle or finger items, bilaterally; can 

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occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can 

occasionally balance, kneel, stoop, or crouch, but never crawl; and can never have 

exposure to unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, or prolonged exposure to 

vibration.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be unable to perform his 

past relevant work as a construction laborer. However, at step five, based upon the 

VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff can perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national 

economy, leading to a finding that he is not disabled under the Social Security Act.

DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a plaintiff is 

disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff

presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does 

the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform her former 

occupation? and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4). 

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An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that 

the plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 

389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, 

precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 

one to four. Id. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the 

burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even 

in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of 

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not 

high. Substantial evidence is . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and 

means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019)

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(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in 

evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also 

Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision 

must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is 

adequately supported”) (citation omitted).

However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved 

of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838 

F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has 

adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every 

piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide 

some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. 

Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to 

a plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 

conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate 

the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful 

appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 

2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to 

fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately 

articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). 

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Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 

1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). 

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons, 

including: (1) the ALJ erred in failing to explain if or how he considered Plaintiff’s 

subjective allegations that addressed the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects 

of his pain and symptoms; (2) the ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinion 

evidence; and (3) the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC.

In advancing his third argument, Plaintiff contends, inter alia, that the ALJ 

failed to adequately account for his expressed need to lie down to alleviate pain.

Pertinent to that topic, at the first hearing, Plaintiff testified that he would “lay 

down for some relief during the day” for approximately ten minutes “to try to get rid 

of the real aggravating pain.” (R. 54-55.) At the second hearing, Plaintiff testified

that he continues to lay down on an exercise table which “brings some relief” from 

his pain. (Id. at 1366.) In her January 29, 2020 decision, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s 

reports “that, at home, he will lie down flat on his back, on the floor, to alleviate 

stress on his back.” (Id. at 1299.) However, aside from noting Plaintiff’s allegations 

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in that regard, as Plaintiff points out, the ALJ’s decision does not otherwise address 

Plaintiff’s asserted need to lie down during the day in any manner.

“An ALJ errs when the RFC fails to account for a claimant’s allegation that 

he needs to lie down.” Tincher v. Colvin, No. 13 C 8410, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

90961, at *25 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2015) (citation omitted). Accordingly, in completely 

failing to address Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his need to lie down, the ALJ 

erred. See Eula M. v. Berryhill, No. 17 C 6669, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84685, at *23 

(N.D. Ill. May 20, 2019) (“The ALJ was required to explain either (1) why plaintiff’s 

testimony could not be accepted or (2) why she could work on a full-time basis 

despite her alleged need to lie down for three hours when she experienced 

migraines.”). The ALJ’s error was not harmless, as the VE testified that Plaintiff 

would not be allowed to lie down in the workplace. (R. 1377.) 

Ultimately, the ALJ’s failure to account for Plaintiff’s asserted need to lie 

down requires that this matter be remanded. See Gibson-Jones v. Chater, No. 96-

2626, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 7640, at *13 (7th Cir. Apr. 14, 1997) (“We therefore . . . 

remand the case to the ALJ so that he may identify more specific medical evidence 

supporting his rejection of [the claimant’s] testimony that she needed to lie down 

daily. The ALJ must more specifically articulate his reasons for believing that [the 

claimant’s] testimony is contradictory and inconsistent. If the ALJ is unable to 

articulate more specific reasons, he must award [the claimant] the relief she 

requests because, if she needs to lie down daily, she will be unable to perform even 

sedentary work with a sit/stand option.”); Wesolowski v. Colvin, No. 15 C 8830, 2016 

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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144261, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2016) (“The ALJ also failed to 

explain why he did not include Wesolowski’s need to lie down intermittently. On 

remand, the ALJ should expand the record if necessary in order to properly 

determine Wesolowsi’s RFC.”).

Based on its conclusion that remand is necessary for the above reasons, the 

Court need not explore in detail the remaining errors claimed by Plaintiff. The 

Court emphasizes that the Commissioner should not assume these issues were 

omitted from the opinion because no error was found. Indeed, the Court admonishes 

the Commissioner that, on remand, special care should be taken to ensure that 

Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms are properly evaluated and the medical opinions are 

properly weighed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s 

decision [Doc. No. 22] is granted in part and denied in part, and the Commissioner’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 28] is denied. The Court finds that 

this matter should be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings 

consistent with this Order.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

DATE: January 31, 2022 ________________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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