IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

VEOLA HANKLE-SAMPLE,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

THE CITY OF CHICAGO, TINA 

CONSOLA, JOEL FLORES, CHARLES 

BILLOWS, & RESHMA SONI, 

Defendants. 

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Case No. 20-cv-1997 

Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

Veola Hankle-Sample (“Plaintiff”), a former employee of the City of Chicago, worked with 

Charles Billows, Tina Consola, Joel Flores, and Reshma Soni. On the heels of her termination, 

Plaintiff brought this lawsuit [23] against the City, Billows, Consola, Flores, and Soni (collectively 

“Defendants”) alleging various Title VII and civil rights violations. All Defendants moved to 

dismiss [29, 33.] 

For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. In particular, 

the Court dismisses the City as to the § 1983 claims, Counts II, V, VI, VIII, X, and XII, without 

prejudice. However, the City’s motion to dismiss the Title VII and ADEA claims, Counts I, III, 

IV, VII, IX, and XI, is denied. 

As to the Individual Defendants, the Court dismisses all Individuals Defendants from the 

Title VII and ADEA claims, Counts I, III, IV, VII, IX, and XII, without prejudice. Furthermore, 

the Court dismisses Defendants Flores and Soni from the remaining claims against them, the 

§ 1983 claims, Counts II, V, VI, VIII, X, and XII. Therefore, Flores and Soni are terminated from 

the First Amended Complaint without prejudice. However, the Court denies Defendants Billows’ 

and Consola’s motion to dismiss the § 1983 claims, Counts II, V, VI, VIII, X, and XII. 

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I. Background1

 Plaintiff is a fifty-two-year-old African American woman. [23 at ¶ 4.] In May 2014, 

Plaintiff began her employment with the City of Chicago’s Department of Finance as the Manager 

of Revenue Collection. [Id. at ¶ 13.] She was promoted to Assistant Director of Street Operations 

in December 2016. [Id. at ¶ 16.] In this new role, she initially reported to the Deputy Director of 

Street Operations, Bill Keenan, who is an African American male. [Id. at ¶ 16.] In January 2017, 

Plaintiff received an email from Defendant Consola, the First Deputy Director, informing Plaintiff 

that Plaintiff would report to Defendant Billows, “a younger, White male.” [Id. at ¶ 17.] 

Defendant Billows was allegedly promoted to Assistant Deputy. [Id.] However, Plaintiff emailed 

the Personnel Director, Doniece Stevens, “inquiring about the reporting change,” and Stevens 

informed Plaintiff “that she was unaware of this change and that the change was fictitious and had 

not been approved.” [Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20.] Keenan was also informed that this change was not 

approved, but Plaintiff was nevertheless “forced to report to” Defendant Billows. [Id. at ¶ 20.] 

 Between 2017 and 2019, “Plaintiff made a plethora of complaints verbalizing race 

discrimination and disparate treatment to several managerial agents of the Defendant.” [23 at 

¶ 21.] Specifically, she “complained that non-Black employees that hold the same title and work 

in the same department were paid less than the Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Black peers, a practice 

perpetuated by Defendants Consola and Soni.” [Id. at ¶ 22.] In July 2018, Plaintiff filed two EEO 

complaints against the City of Chicago, alleging that she was subject to different terms of 

employment because of her race and that she was paid less than several similarly situated nonBlack employees. [Id. at ¶ 23.] In response to these complaints, “the Defendant engaged in a 

campaign to harass Plaintiff” and “posed continuous impediment to Plaintiff’s ability to perform 

1

 The Court accepts as true all of Plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable 

inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007). 

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essential job functions.” [Id. at ¶¶ 24–25.] 

For example, Defendant Consola began sending “unprofessional, rude” emails to Plaintiff 

and “would bypass three levels of hierarchy to interrogate and insult Plaintiff about matters that 

were not in Plaintiff’s job purview.” [23 at ¶¶ 26–27.] Defendant Consola also claimed that 

Plaintiff’s employees had erroneously issued 4,000 tickets when, in reality, only 70 tickets were 

issued in error. [Id. at ¶ 49.] Defendant Billows refused to communicate with Plaintiff, interact 

with Plaintiff, or provide Plaintiff with any instructions or training for her new position. [Id. at 

¶ 30.] He would deliberately fail to include Plaintiff on important communications she needed to 

do her job. [Id.] Defendant Billows did interact with Plaintiff’s similarly situated but white 

coworkers. [Id. at ¶ 31.] Billows also “taunted Plaintiff and told other employees that he received 

a promotion over Plaintiff even though he does not have any educational degrees.” [Id. at ¶ 37.] 

The Defendants excluded Plaintiff from various meetings that were directly tied to 

Plaintiff’s job tasks, such as meetings with aldermen and meetings about new equipment. [23 at 

¶¶ 33–34.] 

Plaintiff “complained to Defendant’s leadership numerous times about the discriminatory 

conduct she endured from Charles Billows.” [23 at ¶ 36.] Defendants Consola and Flores 

“condoned Billows’ behavior toward Plaintiff and failed to intervene.” [Id. at ¶ 61.] 

Prior to filing her complaints, Plaintiff never received negative comments about her work 

or any performance evaluations, but after she filed her complaints, she received a negative 

performance evaluation. [23 at ¶¶ 38–40.] She was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan 

(herein “Performance Improvement Plan” or “PIP”) for forty-five days. [Id. at ¶ 41.] It was 

Defendants’ practice to train employees that were placed on PIPs; however, Plaintiff never 

received any training. [Id. at ¶¶ 42–43.] Plaintiff’s PIP also “included demerits for job tasks that 

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did not lie within Plaintiff’s job purview.” [Id. at ¶ 45.] This PIP process was “significantly 

different than the process Defendants conducted with similarly situated White employees.” [Id. at 

¶ 47.] After filing her complaints, Defendants held her to “different standards than her White 

younger, male co-workers.” [Id. at ¶ 50.] For example, Plaintiff was given an assignment to 

complete a training manual, which she completed. [Id. at ¶ 51.] A white younger male was given 

the same assignment; he did not complete this and other assignments but was never disciplined 

and instead received a raise. [Id. at ¶ 52.] 

Near the end of her employment, Plaintiff continued to make complaints. Specifically, on 

May 2, 2019, Plaintiff complained again about retaliation based on her race and gender; 

specifically, she complained that Defendant Billows was ignoring her request for training and 

information needed to complete her job. [23 at ¶ 58.] She requested a meeting with Managing 

Deputy Joel Flores, hoping that he would intervene as he typically met with every person in the 

department on request. [Id. at ¶ 59.] Defendant Flores “refused to meet with Plaintiff because she 

complained about discrimination.” [Id.] On May 21, 2019, Plaintiff reported Defendants Billows 

and Consola for their personal use of the municipal vehicle fleet, and Plaintiff filed a complaint 

for unfair labor practices “due to Defendant’s mandate that Plaintiff report to Charles Billows, a 

White, younger male, even though Billows held a f[i]ctitious title.” [Id. at ¶ 55.] On June 3, 2019, 

Plaintiff “complained via email, citing that she was being harassed, discriminated against, and 

targeted because of prior protected activity.” [Id. at ¶ 62.] 

Plaintiff’s work environment took a mental and physical toll on her. On May 10, 2019, 

Plaintiff enrolled in the Employee Assistance Program because she was overwhelmed with the 

harassment and began experiencing chest pains, shortness of breath, and headaches. [23 at ¶ 54.] 

Shortly thereafter, she was diagnosed with severe anxiety, prescribed medication for panic attacks, 

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and given a physician’s instruction to take a leave from work. [Id. at ¶ 54.] 

On August 16, 2019, Plaintiff was terminated and placed on the City of Chicago’s “DoNot-Rehire” list without cause or justification. [23 at ¶ 64.] Plaintiff alleges upon information 

and belief that her position was filled “with a White, younger male.” [Id. at ¶ 65.] Finally, Plaintiff 

alleges that “Defendant has a deliberate and systemic practice of discriminating against Black 

Women. Plaintiff’s predecessor, a Black Woman resigned because of Defendant’s systemic, 

discriminatory practices.” [Id. at ¶ 66.] Plaintiff also alleged that, “[u]pon information and belief, 

the Defendant promotes inexperienced White males with no education beyond high school over 

well-qualified, Black Women.” [Id. at ¶ 67.] 

Plaintiff then filed this twelve-count complaint [23] alleging: (I) Title VII race 

discrimination, (II) § 1983 race discrimination, (III) Title VII harassment (race), (IV) Title VII 

harassment (retaliation), (V) § 1983 harassment (race), (VI) § 1983 harassment (retaliation), 

(VII) Title VII retaliatory discharge, (VIII) § 1983 retaliatory discharge, (IX) Title VII age 

discrimination, (X) § 1983 age discrimination, (XI) Title VII sex/gender discrimination, 

(XII) § 1983 sex/gender discrimination. Defendants moved to dismiss [29, 33.] 

II. Legal Standard 

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted, the complaint typically must comply with Rule 8(a) by providing “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), such 

that the defendant is given “fair notice of what the * * * claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

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662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S at 555). In determining whether the complaint meets 

this standard, the Court accepts as true all of Plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations and draws 

all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 618. 

III. Analysis 

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint contains twelve claims related to racial discrimination 

and retaliation, as well as age and sex discrimination that she alleges she experienced during her 

employment with the City of Chicago. The City and Individual Defendants have each moved to 

dismiss the entire complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Although the City has stylized its motion 

as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), it also includes affirmative defenses as to which the 

City’s motion is more properly characterized as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 

12(c). For ease of reading, the Court will address the Title VII and Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act (“ADEA”) claims (Counts I, III, IV, VII, IX, and XI), then the § 1983 claims 

(Counts II, V, VI, VIII, X, and XII).

A. Title VII Claims (Counts I, III, IV, VII, IX and XI) 

The Court begins with the Defendants’ motions to dismiss the Title VII and ADEA claims 

entirely (Counts I, III, IV, VII, IX and XI). The Individual Defendants seek dismissal because 

neither statute imposes individual or supervisory liability. The City Defendants advance several 

arguments, chief among them that Plaintiff has neither alleged a “materially adverse” employment 

action to predicate her various claims nor exhausted her administrative remedies on certain others. 

The Court will begin by explaining why the Individual Defendants are dismissed from Counts I, 

III, IV, VII, IX and XI. Then, it will address why Counts I, III, IV, VII, IX, and XI state a claim 

for relief against the City and thus dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is improper as to those Counts. 

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1. Individual Defendants 

Defendants Billows, Consola, Flores, and Soni argue that Title VII does not impose 

individual or supervisor liability, and only an “employer” meeting the statutory definition can 

properly be sued. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining “employer” as “a person engaged in an 

industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees * * * and any agent of such a 

person.”); 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (same). The Court agrees. None of the individual Defendants are 

employers, and Plaintiff raises no argument to the contrary. Lee v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R. 

Corp., 912 F.3d 1049, 1053–54 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[E]ven a complaint that passes muster under the 

liberal notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) can be subject to 

dismissal if a plaintiff does not provide argument in support of the legal adequacy of the 

complaint.”). As the Seventh Circuit explained in Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 

1995), so long as “a supervisor does not, in his individual capacity, fall within Title VII’s definition 

of employer, [a plaintiff] can state no set of facts which would enable her to recover under the 

statute.” Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot sue any of the Individual Defendants under Title VII or the 

ADEA. The Court therefore dismisses the Individual Defendants, Billows, Consola, Flores, and 

Soni from all of Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims (Counts I, III, IV, VII, IX and XI). 

2. City Defendant 

The Court turns now to the more complex issues raised by the City’s request to dismiss 

Counts I, III, IV, VII, IX and XI on the ground that these Title VII and/or ADEA claims do not 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted or otherwise have not been exhausted. The Court 

will address the Plaintiff’s claims thematically, proceeding as follows: First, it will address the 

Title VII race discrimination claims (Counts I and III); second, it will reach the Title VII sex- and 

age-discrimination claims (Counts IX and XI); third, it will address the Title VII retaliatory 

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harassment and discharge claims (Counts IV and VII). Although the City furnishes multiple 

reasons to dismiss each claim, the Court will address only the arguments that impact its analysis. 

a. Title VII Race Discrimination (Counts I and III) 

The City argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII race discrimination claims (Counts I and III) 

should be dismissed. As to both claims, the City maintains that Plaintiff has not alleged a 

materially adverse action driven by race discrimination to state a claim for relief under Rule 

12(b)(6). As to the discriminatory discharge claim (Count I), the City argues that Plaintiff has not 

exhausted her administrative remedies. The Court will address each argument in turn. 

The City contends that Plaintiff’s discharge and hostile-work-environment claims should 

be dismissed primarily on two independent bases: (1) that Plaintiff has not pled a material, adverse 

action, and (2) the conduct alleged was not animated by race discrimination. The pleading standard 

for Title VII claims is not demanding: a plaintiff “need only aver that the employer instituted a 

(specified) adverse employment action against the plaintiff on the basis of her” protected status. 

Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 

526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008)). See, e.g., Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 

1028 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002), does 

not require a Title VII complaint to anticipate methods of proof used at summary judgment). 

“In a discrimination case, a materially adverse employment action is one which visits upon 

a plaintiff ‘a significant change in employment status.’” Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 917 (7th 

Cir. 2016). Title VII proscribes not only “economic” or “tangible” discrimination, but also 

“requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.” Alamo v. Bliss,

864 F.3d 541, 549 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harris v. Forklift 

Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). 

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Here, the discriminatory discharge (Count I) clearly constitutes a materially adverse 

employment action to state a claim for relief. Bell v. E.P.A., 232 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir. 2000) 

(“For an employment action to be actionable, it must be a ‘significant change in employment 

status, such as hiring * * * or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’” (citation 

omitted)). 

Shifting to the hostile work environment claim (Count III), a Plaintiff states a claim under 

Title VII if she alleges the following four prongs: “(1) [s]he ‘was subject to unwelcome 

harassment’; (2) ‘the harassment was based on [her] [protected trait]’; (3) ‘the harassment was 

severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive 

working environment’; and (4) ‘there is basis for employer liability.’” Id. at 549 (quoting Huri v. 

Off. of the Chief Judge of the Cir. Ct. of Cook Cnty., 804 F.3d 826, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2015)). 

The third prong, severe or pervasive harassment, is designed to assess whether the 

workplace is objectively hostile to a reasonable person. We ask whether the environment is “so 

pervaded by discrimination that the terms and conditions of employment are altered.” Alamo, 

864 F.3d at 550 (quoting Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2441 (2013)). In answering 

that question, “we consider the totality of the circumstances, including: ‘the frequency of the 

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere 

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work 

performance,” together with the “specific circumstances of the working environment and the 

relationship between the harassing party and the harassed.” Id. at 549–50 (first quoting Harris, 

510 U.S. at 23; and then quoting Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317, 330 (7th Cir. 2003)). Our 

context-specific task is designed to strike a balance between transforming Title VII into a “general 

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civility code” without going so far as to require allegations of a “hellish” workplace for a claim to 

survive. Id. at 550. 

In this case, Plaintiff states a claim for a hostile work environment because the totality of 

the circumstances, if proven, indicate that her coworkers seriously undermined her job 

performance and contributed to her discharge. Specifically, she argues in her brief that Defendant 

Billows “each and every day * * * deliberately concealed information that Ms. Hankle-Sample 

needed to perform her essential job functions,” falsified allegations about her performance, placed 

her on a Performance Improvement Plan, and denied her training that might have afforded her an 

opportunity to redeem herself once on the PIP. [40, at 17, 19.]2

 In short, she alleges that her 

coworkers did not just engage in run-of-the-mill office antics, but rather that their conduct impeded 

her performance and culminated in her eventual discharge. See [29 at Ex. B] (enumerating 

“delegation” and “enforcement of work standards and timeliness” as among Plaintiff’s 

“deficien[cies]” on her Performance Improvement Plan); Tyler v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R. 

Corp., 2018 WL 5977925, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2018) (complaint could state an actionable claim 

for harassment where plaintiff was repeatedly criticized, disciplined, and ultimately relocated and 

denied supplies needed to perform his job). 

2

 Among other allegations, in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that “[o]n several occasions, 

Billows deliberately failed to include Plaintiff on important communications that are conducive to the 

essential functions of Plaintiff’s job.” [23 at ¶ 30.] Those “actions prevented Plaintiff from managing her 

staff and completing essential job tasks. * * * Plaintiff pleaded with Defendant Billows to communicate 

with her so that she could effectively carry out her job functions.” [Id. at ¶ 32.] She further alleges that her 

coworkers “falsified and embellished reports” for errors she did not make. [Id. at ¶¶ 48–49.] Plaintiff adds 

that “Defendants ignored Plaintiff’s request for training, access to information, inclusion on 

communications, and meetings essential to her job functions for years.” [Id. at ¶ 101.] She also alleges 

that “normal course of business” was to “train employees that are placed on PIP’s” but that “Billows” from 

whom she was “to receive training” “refused to interact with Plaintiff.” [Id. at ¶¶ 41–43.] Further, she 

alleged that the PIP “included demerits for job tasks that did not lie within Plaintiff’s job purview.” [Id. at 

¶ 45.] 

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The City’s reliance on Dalton v. Board of Education for, Mount Vernon Township High 

School District 201, 162 F. Supp. 3d 807, 812–13 (S.D. Ill. 2016), Duminie v. Northeast Illinois 

Regional Commuter Railroad Corp., 2020 WL 1288876, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2020), and Adam 

v. Obama for America, 210 F. Supp 3d 979, 990–91 (N.D. Ill. 2016), is misplaced because Plaintiff 

alleges that the workplace conditions seriously affected her career prospects. In Dalton, the court 

dismissed a hostile work environment claim because, among others, the employee’s allegations 

that she was denied training did not alter her job prospects or advancement. 162 F. Supp. 3d at 

812–13. Here, the totality of the circumstances, including Plaintiff’s performance record predating 

the complaints, her coworkers’ fabrication of errors, interference with important files, disregard 

for “Plaintiff’s request for training, access to information, inclusion on communications, and 

meetings essential to her job functions for years,” and denial of training designed to redeem her 

performance following the Performance Improvement Plan, suggest the conduct altered her 

performance. See [23 at ¶¶ 39, 41, 43; 48–49, 101, 121.] In short, and unlike the Dalton plaintiff, 

Plaintiff points to ways that her colleagues’ behavior “‘tend[ed] to affect’ [her] employment status 

or benefits [and] cause[d] ‘material harm’ to [her] opportunities for growth or advancement.” See 

Dalton, 162 F. Supp. 3d at 813. 

Duminie and Adam are inapposite as well. Plaintiff alleges that coworker conduct seriously 

affected her job prospects. In both cases cited by the City, the plaintiffs did not allege that their 

coworkers’ “slights,” including failure to collaborate and train negatively, impacted job 

performance nor culminated in discharge. See Duminie, 2020 WL 1288876 at *2, *7; Adam, 

210 F. Supp. 3d at 983–84. In contrast here, “the totality of the circumstances,” Alamo, 864 F.3d 

at 550, includes Plaintiff’s allegations that Billows’ conduct recurred, spanned at least two years, 

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and prevented her from “perform[ing] essential, day-to-day job functions”—all of which plausibly 

could have contributed to disciplinary measures. [See 23 at ¶¶ 24, 30, 60.] 

In addition to its argument that Plaintiff has not alleged a materially adverse action, the 

City submits that Plaintiff has not alleged that her coworkers were motivated by a discriminatory 

purpose. It is true that “there must be some connection to [the protected characteristic], for not 

every perceived unfairness in the workplace may be ascribed to discriminatory motivation merely 

because the complaining employee belongs to [the protected class].” Cole v. Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. 

Univ., 838 F.3d 888, 896 (7th Cir. 2016). However, the City’s arguments fail for two reasons. 

First, Plaintiff includes several allegations that employees outside of the protected class were not 

subjected to similar treatment: Plaintiff alleges that she was not afforded the same opportunities 

white employees were to succeed on her PIP. [See 23 at ¶ 47.]3

 She also alleges that similarly 

situated employees were held “to different standards than her White younger, male, co-workers,” 

for example receiving promotions despite failure to complete the same assignments. [Id. at ¶¶ 50–

52.] While these allegations are not particularly robust in their details, “the complaint * * * clearly 

connects this treatment to [Plaintiff]’s protected status” which “is sufficient at the 12(b)(6) stage.” 

See Alamo, 864 F.3d at 554 (holding plaintiff stated a claim because“[t]he complaint also clearly 

connects this treatment to Mr. Alamo’s protected status, claiming that “other, non-Latino 

firefighters have not been subjected” to these types of “hurdles, obstacles, and challenges in their 

attempts to return to work after a medical leave of absence.”); Watkins v. City of Chicago, 2018 

WL 2689537, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (Plaintiff’s allegation that she was suspended and white or 

3

 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that in her own experience, “Plaintiff witnessed numerous PIP procedures 

with numerous other employees. The PIP process that the Defendants conducted with the Plaintiff was 

significantly different than the process Defendants conducted with similarly situated White employees.” 

[23 at ¶¶ 43, 46–47]. She further alleges that “non-Black employees that hold the same title and work in 

the same department were paid less than the Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Black peers.” [Id. at ¶ 22.] 

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male employees accused of similar misconduct were not disciplined in this manner, “although 

threadbare,” stated a claim). 

Second, the cases cited by Defendant are readily distinguishable because this is not a 

situation where “nothing in in Plaintiff’s complaint suggest[ed] that the alleged harassment 

Plaintiff received had anything to do with her race.” Duminie, 2020 WL 1288876, at *6 (emphasis 

in original). Nor is this an instance of a dearth of evidence at summary judgment, see Dalton,

162 F. Supp. 3d at 810, Boss, 816 F.3d at 920, where Plaintiff has failed to allege a single link at 

the “‘put up or shut up’ moment of litigation.” Id., at 813 (quoting Johnson v. Cambridge 

Industries, Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003)). 

As a backstop, the City argues that Plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies on 

certain claims, including the discriminatory discharge. Although it frames its motion as a motion 

to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a failure to exhaust is an affirmative 

defense and thus a Rule 12(b)(6) motion—which tests the adequacy of the allegations to state a 

valid claim—is inapt, because plaintiffs need not plead around affirmative defenses in a 

complaint.” Surgit v. City of Chicago, 2021 WL 1192674, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2021). As 

Judge Chang recently put it: 

In reality, the proper vehicle to assert lack of exhaustion (if it is to be considered at 

the pleading stage) is a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. If 

discovery is not needed to resolve the exhaustion defense, and “if the allegations of 

the complaint [viewed] in the light most favorable to the plaintiff show that there 

is no way that any amendment could salvage the claim,” then the Court may 

consider the motion at the pleading stage. 

Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527, 

533 (7th Cir. 2006)). 

Here, neither Plaintiff nor the City of Chicago argue that the Court should not address the 

exhaustion defense. Rather, Plaintiff attached two of three EEOC filings (a September 2018 and 

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May 2019 amended charge) to her First Amended Complaint as exhibits, and she has not otherwise 

contested in her brief that the Court may consider the allegations at this stage. Nevertheless, one 

important issue remains that is not capable of resolution at this stage. The City argues that Plaintiff 

has not exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to her discharge from the City. In 

response, Plaintiff attaches a third EEOC filing (a September 2019 second amended charge) 

evidencing that she did, in fact, indicate that “[i]n retaliation for filing previous complaints of 

discrimination, I was discharged on or about August 16, 2019.” [40 at Ex. C.] In reply, the City 

insists that Plaintiff did not state that she filed the September 2019 charge with the EEOC, nor 

could the City confirm that she had done so. It is clear from the missing puzzle pieces that this is 

a far cry from a situation in which the allegations “set forth everything necessary to satisfy the 

affirmative defense” issues presented by the City. United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th 

Cir. 2005); Compare Surgit v. City of Chicago, No. 1:19-CV-07630, 2021 WL 1192674, at *2–3 

(N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2021). 

In sum, Plaintiff has stated a claim for a discriminatory discharge (Count I) and hostile 

work environment (Count III) with a sufficient connection to racial animus. These allegations, if 

proven, could provide indirect evidence to satisfy the McDonnell-Douglas framework at the later 

summary judgment stage. And consideration of the City’s exhaustion defense is premature given 

the information gap noted above. 

b. Title VII Sex Discrimination and ADEA Age Discrimination 

(Counts IX and XI) 

Shifting to the remaining statutory discrimination claims, the City maintains that the 

Plaintiff’s age (Count IX) and sex discrimination (Count XI) claims should be dismissed because 

(1) Plaintiff fails to allege a material adverse action, (2) fails to allege a connection to 

discriminatory animus, and (3) fails to administratively exhaust her remedies. The first and third 

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arguments can be disposed of quickly, as the Court has already found that the discharge constitutes 

a material, adverse action for Title VII purposes and that consideration of the exhaustion defense 

to her discharge claim is premature. 

The Court is not persuaded by the City’s second basis for dismissal, that there is no alleged 

connection between the Defendants’ conduct and sex- or age-based animus. Plaintiff sufficiently 

alleges that similarly situated employees outside of the protected class were treated differently. 

[See 23 at ¶¶ 19, 50–52, 67.]4

 Those allegations are enough to put the employer on notice of the 

nature of these claims on the pleadings, thereby “satisfying the standard applied in Swanson, 

Tamayo, and Concentra.” Carlson, 758 F.3d at 827. The City’s arguments rest primarily on 

summary judgment cases, and the Seventh Circuit has cautioned courts to heed the lower burden 

at the pleading stage. See id. (“The plaintiff is not required to include allegations * * * that would 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ‘indirect’ method of proof.”). 

Accordingly, Counts IX and XI against the City state claims upon which relief can be 

granted. 

c. Title VII Retaliation (Counts IV and VII) 

Shifting to the Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claims, Plaintiff alleges she was discharged 

(Count VII) and harassed (Count IV) in retaliation for statutorily-protected conduct—namely, 

filing complaints that she was discriminated against. The City maintains that both claims should 

be dismissed. Regarding the discharge, the City alleges there was no plausible connection between 

4

 Specifically, she alleges that “Defendants continued to hold Plaintiff to different standards than her White 

younger, male, co-workers,” including a colleague who received, but did not complete, the same and other 

assignments as Plaintiff had not been disciplined and received a salary increase. Furthermore, she alleges 

that “[o]n information and belief,” similarly situated male, younger coworkers were promoted with 

performance deficiencies, citing Charles Billows’ promotion as one example. 

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Plaintiff’s complaints and her termination. As to the harassment, the City maintains that there was 

no sufficiently hostile work environment to state a claim for relief. 

i. Discharge (Count VII) 

“Pleading a retaliation claim under Title VII requires the plaintiff to ‘allege that she 

engaged in statutorily protected activity and was subjected to adverse employment action as a 

result.’” Carlson, 758 F.3d at 827 (quoting Luevano, 722 F.3d at 1029). The Seventh Circuit 

recognizes a broad swath of protected conduct, and there is “no dispute that [the plaintiff] satisfied 

the first element by filing her EEOC charge.” Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Serv., Inc., 336 F.3d 520, 

533 (7th Cir. 2003). Complaints to employers, including “an official complaint with an employer” 

may qualify, but only if the complaint states that discrimination occurred based on a protected 

class. Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis et al., 457 F.3d 656, 663–64 (7th Cir. 2006). 

While a Plaintiff need not allege a causal connection at the pleading stage, Luevano, 722 

F.3d at 1020, she must allege enough to make out a plausible retaliation claim. Carlson, 758 F.3d 

at 828–29. There is “no bright-line timing rule” to guide whether a retaliation claim is plausible. 

Id. at 829. “If the best a plaintiff can do is allege that he engaged in protected activity and then, 

years later, the employer took an adverse action against him, the claim may not be permitted to 

proceed.” Id. at 828. However, when a plaintiff alleges “an ongoing campaign of retaliation” or 

provides a plausible explanation for the lapse, even an otherwise lengthy interval may suffice to 

survive Rule 12(b)(6). See id. at 828–29 (reversing summary dismissal of retaliation claims 

despite four-month gap because such “parsing of events lost sight of the bigger picture, which 

showed an ongoing pattern of retaliation”); Alamo, 864 F.3d at 555–56 (reversing Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal because plaintiff’s explanation for time gap between complaint and employer’s 

retaliatory conduct meant lapse “[could] [n]ot be used to suggest a break in the causal chain”). 

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In this case, Plaintiff’s allegations present a plausible connection between her multi-year, 

repeated effort to blow the whistle on her employer and her discharge. Specifically, during the 

same period as her trials on the job, in addition to the EEOC complaints in 2018 and 2019, she 

alleges that she filed two EEO complaints on or about July 2018, emailed complaints to her 

supervisors between 2017 and 2019, and (at some unspecified time) complained to the Mayor’s 

office. [See 23 at ¶¶ 21–23, 56, 62.] In sum, in the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff describes 

a “ongoing period of retaliation,” Carlson, 758 F.3d at 828, during the very same period in which 

she filed internal and external whistleblower complaints. Her allegations that similarly situated 

employees who did not engage in protected activity were treated more favorably further reinforce 

the inference.5

 [23 at ¶ 43.] 

The City’s attempt to break the causal link fails because “this parsing of events los[es] sight 

of the bigger picture, which showed an ongoing pattern of retaliation.” See Carlson, 758 F.3d at 

829. At a minimum, only three months elapsed between her formal EEOC Complaint in May 2019 

and discharge in August 2019. Even this lapse, however, “must be viewed through the lens” of 

her ongoing complaints. Id. Plaintiff’s discharge followed on the heels of two and a half years of 

formal and informal complaints that she was being discriminated against on the basis of race and 

sex to her employer, the Mayor’s office, and the EEOC. See, e.g., Vazquez v. Suncast Corp., 

2019 WL 2576554, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 2019) (one month lapse following reports to HR 

and several threats to HR plausibly alleged her complaints caused employer retaliation); Conner 

v. Bd. of Trs. for Univ. of Ill., 2019 WL 5179625, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2019) (temporal 

5

 Plaintiff alleges that “other employees placed on PIPs were trained because they had not engaged in 

protected activity.” [Id. at ¶ 44.] To the extent the allegation states a legal conclusion, the Court disregards 

the allegation that these PIPs were trained “because they had not engaged in protected activity,” but 

otherwise notes the dissimilar treatment of persons outside the protected claim to infer a causal chain. [Id.]

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proximity, complaints about racial discrimination multiple times over four years, differential 

treatment satisfied Rule 12(b)(6)). 

Finally, the cases on which the City relies are readily distinguishable. Unlike the Plaintiff 

in Tarpley v. City Coll. of Chi., 87 F. Supp. 3d 908, 913–14 (N.D. Ill. 2015), plaintiff alleges a 

pattern of protected conduct and complained directly to multiple supervisors, on multiple 

occasions concerning the discriminatory treatment. See id. at 913–14 (dismissing complaint for 

retaliatory discharge because plaintiff did not allege that the employer was aware of her single 

complaint to IDHR containing an allegation of race-based discrimination). Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. 

of City of Chi., 647 F.3d 652, 665–666 (7th Cir. 2011), was decided on a motion for summary 

judgment. To be sure, Plaintiff could have been clearer as to which “managerial agents” she dealt 

with, who thus would have had knowledge of her complaints. Still, Plaintiff has sufficiently 

alleged that the retaliatory discharge had a connection to her complaints of discrimination. 

ii. Hostile Work Environment (Count IV) 

The City’s claim that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on Count IV can be disposed of 

much more easily. For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has stated a claim for a hostile work 

environment. Although retaliation-based actions by an employer need not be “less objectively 

offensive than in the context of sex or race,” Boss, 816 F.3d at 920, the workplace conduct alleged 

in the First Amended Complaint is sufficiently severe to chill an ordinary employee from blowing 

the whistle and thus states a claim for relief. 

B. Section 1983 Claims (Counts II, V, VI, VIII, X, and XII) 

The Court shifts to the § 1983 Claims in the First Amended Complaint. Like the Title VII 

claims, the Defendants move to dismiss all § 1983 claims (II, V, VI, VIII, X, and XII). The 

Defendants primarily argue that Plaintiff failed to state a § 1983 claim because she did not 

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(1) sufficiently allege personal involvement of the individual defendants, Billows, Consola, Flores, 

and Soni, and (2) support her claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social 

Services, 463 U.S. 658 (1978). With respect to Counts II, V, VI, VIII, X, and XII, the Court will 

address the Individual Defendants’ arguments before turning to the City’s arguments, respectively. 

1. Individual Defendants 

The Individual Defendants seek dismissal of the § 1983 claims against them. The 

Defendants advance several reasons for dismissal. All four employees maintain that the First 

Amended Complaint does not allege their personal involvement in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s 

rights. As a backstop, the Individual Defendants largely raise the arguments raised above with 

respect to the Title VII claims. Specifically, they contend that (i) there is no adverse action to 

support the race, sex, or age discrimination claims, (ii) there is no indication that the defendants 

were motivated by a discriminatory animus, and (iii) there is no indication that Plaintiff’s 

whistleblowing caused her discharge. For the reasons already stated, the Court rejects these 

backstop arguments. 

“For constitutional violations under § 1983, ‘a government official is only liable for his or 

her own misconduct.’ There is no such thing as respondeat superior liability for government 

officials under § 1983.” Taylor v. Ways, 999 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2015)). 

With respect to supervisors, “[t]he supervisor is therefore liable only if she was personally 

involved in the constitutional violation.” Taylor, 999 F.3d at 493. As the Seventh Circuit recently 

explained: 

Personal involvement in a subordinate’s constitutional violation requires 

supervisors to “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or 

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turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.” Put another way, personal 

involvement in the equal protection context requires specific intent to discriminate. 

Id. at 494 (citations omitted) (quoting Matthews v. City of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th 

Cir. 2012)). 

In this case, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged Billows’ and Consola’s personal involvement 

in the remaining claims, but not Flores’ and Soni’s. Regarding Billows, among other allegations, 

Plaintiff states that “for two years, Charles Billows deliberately and repeatedly ignored Plaintiff, 

withheld pertinent information from Plaintiff, and denied Plaintiff access to files and information,” 

and later refused to train Plaintiff during the forty-five-day period following her PIP. [24 at ¶¶ 43, 

60.] Plaintiff alleges that Consola placed “unreasonable expectations and demands on Plaintiff” 

[Id. at ¶¶ 22, 26–27] and “falsified and embellished reports” including “4,000 erroneously” issued 

tickets “under Plaintiff’s supervision.” [Id. at ¶¶ 48–49.] 

Soni and Flores, who are presumably Billows’ and Consola’s supervisors, require more to 

remain in the case. Supervisors “need not have participated directly in the constitutional 

deprivation, but the allegations must amount to more than vicarious liability for [their supervisees’] 

unlawful actions.” Taylor, 999 F.3d at 495. “Personal involvement in a subordinate's 

constitutional violation requires supervisors to ‘know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve 

it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.’” Id. at 494 (quoting Matthews, 

675 F.3d at 708). 

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that Soni and Flores may be 

liable as supervisors. Plaintiff alleges that Flores refused to meet with her, despite her complaints 

about ongoing discrimination. Her allegations that Flores met with others outside of the protected 

classes and that “he refused to meet with Plaintiff,” [23 at ¶ 59], are insufficient without a more 

specific allegation that Flores at least knew the subject matter of the complaints and nevertheless 

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ignored Plaintiff and/or condoned Billows’ and Consolas’s behavior. Plaintiff does not allege 

how, at all, Soni “turn[ed] a blind eye” to any supervisees conduct or evinced a “specific intent” 

to discriminate. See Taylor, 999 F.3d at 494–95 (plaintiffs had not satisfied burden to show that 

supervisors, who had no personal involvement in the supervisees conduct, knew about and 

disregarded supervisees conduct and therefore “acted on the basis of race”). 

None of Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary alter the Court’s analysis. Plaintiff’s 

sweeping references to “Defendants” in the First Amended Complaint fail to identify Flores and/or 

Soni’s role in issuing and executing the PIP, the denial of training, her termination, and omit how 

these two Defendants ignored her complaints. [See 23 at ¶¶ 38–42.] That failure to “identify any 

wrongful act of any particular defendant or defendants related to” the alleged violations is fatal to 

her § 1983 claims against Flores and Soni. See, e.g., Harris v. City of Chicago, 2020 WL 4815907 

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2020) (dismissing individual defendants because plaintiff “does not identify 

any wrongful act of any particular defendant or defendants related to his [constitutional] claim”). 

Plaintiff therefore states a claim for relief on Counts II, V, VI, VIII, X, and XII against 

Defendants Billows and Consola, but Defendants Flores and Soni are dismissed from Counts II, 

V, VI, VIII, X, and XII of the First Amended Complaint (and therefore the case) without prejudice. 

2. City Defendant 

The City next argues that the Court should dismiss Counts II, V, VI, VIII, X, and XII of 

the Complaint because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim to hold the municipality liable under

Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person may sue anyone who, while acting under color of law, causes him to 

be deprived of any of his constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 

51, 60–62 (2011). A municipality can be held liable under § 1983 only “when execution of [its] 

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policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be 

said to represent official policy,” causes the constitutional deprivation. Monell, 536 U.S. at 694. 

The Seventh Circuit has articulated three avenues to state a claim under Monell: 

To establish an official policy or custom, a plaintiff must show that his 

constitutional injury was caused by (1) the enforcement of an express policy of the 

[city], (2) a widespread practice that is so permanent and well settled as to constitute 

a custom or usage with the force of law, or (3) a person with final policymaking 

authority. Absent proof that the injury in question was caused by an employee with 

final policymaking authority or by an express policy or established custom of the 

municipality, there can be no liability on the part of the municipality itself. 

Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428, 434 (7th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (citations 

omitted) (quoting Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010)). To allege a 

plausible custom, Plaintiff must show “a ‘wide-spread practice’ that although not authorized by 

written law and express policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ 

with the force of law.” Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting McTigue 

v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995)).

Plaintiff concedes that there is no express policy to support Monell liability on any of the 

claims. However, she asserts that the municipality is liable through the second and third avenues: 

either because a custom or practice of race-, sex-, age-, and retaliation-based discrimination and 

harassment caused her deprivations or because the harassment she endured was the result of a 

decision of a final policymaker. Neither of Plaintiff’s theories is adequately pled. 

a. Monell: Race Discrimination (Counts II and V) 

Turning first to the race-based Monell claims, the City argues that Plaintiff cannot point to 

a “custom or widespread practice * * * * []supported by specific factual content” to impose liability 

on the municipality. [29, at 5.] Plaintiff points to several types of allegations to try to support her 

view that there was a “permanent and well-settled” practice of race discrimination for purposes of 

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Counts II and V. Those include (1) Plaintiff’s own experiences on the job, (2) her allegations that 

other Black employees received lower pay, (3) her allegation that Black employees were passed 

over for promotion in favor of non-Black employees, and (4) her allegation that her predecessor, 

another Black employee, resigned due to discriminatory treatment.6 The Court agrees that 

Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that the City had a practice, custom, and/or 

policy of discriminating against Black employees for disparate treatment and harassment in the 

workplace. 

To plead a Monell claim, Plaintiff must allege “a series of constitutional violations.” 

Calderone v. City of Chicago, 979 F.3d 1156, 1164–65 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estate of Novack 

ex rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 2000)). Isolated events do not 

plausibly allege a pervasive practice or custom under Monell. See Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 

850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate that the practice is 

widespread and that the specific violations complained of were not isolated incidents.”). Plaintiff’s 

allegations that non-Black employees with the same title and work were paid less than plaintiff 

and her Black peers [23 at ¶ 22] are not pled with sufficient facts to nudge them across the line 

from speculation to plausibility. “[B]oilerplate” allegations that repeat the elements of a Monell 

claim without any further factual content are dismissed for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Annan 

v. Village of Romeoville, 2013 WL 673484, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2013) (concluding that an 

6

 Specifically, as to her personal experience, she alleges that a white employee was promoted over her and 

several black employees. [23 at ¶ 19.] She alleges that Defendants impeded her job functions over the 

course of several years. [Id. at ¶ 25.] She also alleges she was replaced with a white younger, male. [Id. at 

¶ 65.] As to other employees, she alleges that the Defendant “has a deliberate and systemic practice of 

discriminating against Black Women” including that “Plaintiff’s predecessor, a Black Woman resigned 

because of the Defendant’s systemic, discriminatory practices” [Id. at ¶ 66], that “Defendant promotes 

inexperienced White males with no education beyond high school over well-qualified, Black women” [Id.

at ¶ 67], and that non-Black employees with the same title and work were paid less than plaintiff and her 

Black peers [Id. at ¶ 22], for which she filed a complaint [Id. at ¶ 23]. 

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allegation that defendant “maintains a policy by which officers use excessive force to arrest 

individuals with no probable cause or reasonable suspicion warranting such” was insufficient to 

state a Monell claim). 

Setting aside the boilerplate allegations, Plaintiff points only to (1) the specific actions of 

Plaintiff’s coworkers against her personally, (2) examples of two White males with less education 

and/or performance issues receiving promotions, and (3) a single incident involving the Plaintiff’s 

predecessor. These isolated incidents alone, without more specifics to establish a “permanent and 

well-settled” pattern, Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d at 380, are insufficient to attach municipal 

liability. See, e.g., Gable v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]hree incidents 

were too few to indicate that the City had a widespread custom of which City policymakers had 

reason to be aware.”).7

As an alternative, Plaintiff attempts the third avenue to Monell liability, that her 

deprivations were caused by a final policymaker. “State or local law determines whether a person 

has policymaking authority for purposes of § 1983.” Waters v. City of Chicago, 580 F.3d 575, 581 

(7th Cir. 2009). Under local law: 

[t]he Chicago City Council is the City’s legislative body with the authority to adopt 

rules regarding employment policy. The City Council has delegated the authority 

to promulgate personnel rules to the Commissioner of Human Resources. As a 

result, both the City Council and Commissioner of Human Resources may be 

considered final policymakers for the City in the area of employment. 

7

 Plaintiff’s custom and practice argument also is not supported by sufficient facts “tending to show that 

City policymakers were aware of the behavior of the officers, or that the activity was so persistent and 

widespread that City policymakers should have known about the behavior.” Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 

250 F.3d 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff also would need to allege that the widespread practice was the 

“moving force” behind her deprivation. “Municipalities may be found directly liable only when their own 

policy or custom is the ‘moving force’” behind the deprivation. Wilson v. Cook County, 742 F.3d 775, 780 

(7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Teesdale v. City of Chicago, 690 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2012)). Plaintiff also has 

not pointed to any allegations that city policymakers knew of and were the moving force behind the 

widespread custom and practice of race discrimination or harassment. 

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Id. at 581 (internal citations omitted) (citing Chi., Ill. Municipal Code § 2-74-050). 

None of the individual agents named in the First Amended Complaint are final 

policymakers because none is the Commissioner of Human Resources nor are they members of 

the City Council. Consola is the First Deputy Director [23 at ¶ 6]; Billows is the Deputy Director 

of Street Operations [id. at ¶ 7]; Flores is the Managing Deputy [id. at ¶ 8]; and Soni is the City 

Comptroller. [Id. at ¶ 9.] While an executive official may have policymaking authority by express 

delegation, see Waters, 580 F.3d at 581, Plaintiff has not alleged any express delegation of that 

power. At most, the Plaintiff alleges that Soni, Billows, Consola, and Flores administered, rather 

than set, personnel policy. See id. at 582 (“The authority * * * to set policy—i.e., to adopt rules 

for the conduct of government—distinguishes a ‘final policymaker,’ whose decisions may subject 

a municipality to § 1983 liability, from an official who merely possesses ‘authority to implement

pre-existing rules.’”) (quoting Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2008)). 

Plaintiff therefore has not alleged that any final policymaker was involved in the constitutional 

deprivation. 

Having found that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for Monell 

liability through any of the three avenues articulated by the Seventh Circuit, Counts II and V are 

therefore dismissed against the City without prejudice. 

b. Monell: Age, Sex, and Retaliatory Discrimination (Counts VI, 

VIII, X, XII) 

The City argues that Counts VI, VIII, X, and XII should be dismissed for failure to allege 

a widespread custom or practice of gender- and age-based discrimination. The Court agrees. 

Because Plaintiff neither argues nor cites specific allegations in her brief to support her position 

that there is a widespread practice or custom of retaliatory, gender, or age discrimination, her claim 

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fails. See Lee, 912 F.3d at 1053–54; Duminie, 2020 WL 1288876, at *5 (plaintiff’s cursory 

argument without pointing to any specific facts constituted grounds for dismissal of the claim). 

Furthermore, Plaintiff does not point to any specific facts to support her claim in Count VI 

that there is a widespread custom of retaliating against employees. Nor does she point to any facts 

to support Counts X and XII that the City has a widespread custom or practice of age or sex 

discrimination, as distinct from race discrimination. The isolated events alleged in her First 

Amended Complaint allege only the following four points: Plaintiff (1) personally incurred ageand sex-discrimination, (2 & 3) examples of promotions of two younger men, one with fewer 

qualifications and another with performance deficiencies, and (4) her predecessor’s resignation. 

These four instances, though sufficient as grounds to tie her allegations to animus at the pleadings 

stage, are isolated events that do not amount to a well-settled pattern of sex-based discrimination, 

see Gable, 296 F.3d at 538, nor do they suggest that the City was the moving force behind her 

coworkers’ behavior. Furthermore, as explained above, Plaintiff has not identified any final 

policymaker that caused these alleged deprivations. Counts II, V, VI, VIII, X, and XII therefore 

fail as a matter of law against the City and are dismissed without prejudice. 

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IV. Conclusion 

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ 

motions to dismiss [29, 33]. 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted in part as follows: 

x All Individual Defendants (Billows, Consola, Flores, and Soni) are dismissed from Counts 

I, III, IV, VII, IX, and XII; 

x Defendants Flores and Soni are dismissed from Counts II, V, VI, VIII, X, and XII as well, 

and therefore dismissed from the case; 

x The City is dismissed from Counts II, V, VI, VIII, X, and XII. 

Defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied in part as follows: 

x Individual Defendants Billows’ and Consola’s motion to dismiss Counts II, V, VI, VIII, X, 

and XII is denied; 

x The City’s motion to dismiss Counts I, III, IV, VII, IX, and XI is denied. 

Dated: September 29, 2021 __________________________

 Robert M. Dow, Jr. 

 United States District Judge 

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