1 Ap pellan t con tend s the trial cou rt erre d in ov erru ling his m otion f or a d irecte d ve rdict. NO. 07-04-0113-CR IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL D OCTOBER 4, 2005

______________________________ DONNIE LEWAYNE FOX, Appellant

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE 242 ND DISTRIC T COURT O F HALE COUN TY; NO. B14,965-0305; HON. ED SELF, PRESIDING

_______________________________ Memorandum Opinion

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and REAVIS an d CAMPBELL, JJ. Appellant, Donnie LeWayne Fox, w as convic

ted of the offense of evading arrest or detention in a motor vehicle. The tw o issues raised con cern the leg al and factual sufficiency of

the evidence underlyi ng the determi nations not only that he committed t he crimebut also that he committed it in Hale County

. 1 We aff irm the judg ment of the trial court.2 T he bo rd er be twe en Ha le a nd Lu bb oc k C ou ntie s d iss ec ts A be rn ath y. 2 The standards by

which w e review claims of

legal and factual insuff iciencyare well established. We refer the parties to Jackson v. Virgini a, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W .3d 477 (Tex. Cri m. App. 200 4), Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 5 89 (Tex. Cr im. App. 2003), and King v. State, 29 S. W .3d 5 56 (T ex. Crim. App. 2000)

for an explanat ion of them. Next, a person ev ades arrest or detention if he inten tionallyflees from a person he knows is a peace officer w ho is attempting lawfully to arrest or

detain him. T EX
. P EN
. C ODE A NN
. §38.04(a) (Ver non 2003). Her e, appellant que stions the suffici ency of the evidence showing that he knew

thata law enforcement officer was attempting to stop h im. Because the evidence al legedly

did not establish that fact, he purpor tedly coul d not be convi cted of intentionally

fleeing from the officer . With that said, we tur n to the recor d before us. Trooper Eustacio Gal van testified that on M a rch 18, 2003, i n the early afternoon, he received a report of a possible intoxicated driv er of a whi te van proc eed ing do wn Interstate 27. He located the van in Abernathy, Tex as, and whi le it wa s still w ithin Hal e Coun ty. 2 At the time, it was being driven er ratically , that is, from th e shoulder of the road across the l ane towardsthe center li ne and back. The trooper also testified that “[ w]hen I first saw

the van – the first

thing we do is turn on our emergency

lights , our overheads, and that’s jus t to get the driver’s attention . . . [a]nd I turned on the emer gency l ights and I kept wait ing for a res ponse . . . .” (Emphas is added). He also sai d that he 1) pull ed over to the center line so he could se e the driv er in the dri ver’s s ide mirror and observed the driver look in his direction, 2) followed the driver for a mile or a mile and a half w ith still no response, and 3) then turned on his si r en which i s generall y loud enoug h to be heard.3 Voluntary int oxicat ion is not a defe nse to a c rim inal offe nse . T EX
. P EN
. C ODE A NN
. § 8.04( a) (Ver non

2003). 3 Appellant

did not stop for s everal mor e miles, but w hen he did it w as agains t a guardrail
on an o verpass. In a ll, the appellant traveled five to seven miles af ter the officer f irst turned on his l ights in e ffort to detain him. Knowledge that one is a peace officer attemp ting to detain or arrest a suspect can be established t hrough cir cumstantial ev idence. Wrigh t v. State, 855 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Tex. App.–Houston 14 th 1993, no pet.). The evidence here of the time of day, appellant’s erratic drivin g, the use of lights and the siren, the distance tr aveled after ac

tivation o f the officer’s lights an d siren, the officer ’s movement i nto the cente r of the roadway until h e could see into appellant’ s rearvi ew mirr or and observation of appellant looking back in his direction is some ev idence from whi ch a rational jury could have f oun d beyond a reasonable doubt t hat appellant knew a peace officer

was attempt ing to stop him. 3 And, the insinuation t hat appellant’s intoxic ation at the time precluded him from perceiv ing the officer falls short of c ausing us toquestion our confidenc e in th e outcome of the proceeding when review ing all of theevidence i n a neutral li ght. In shor t, the evidence is legally and factually

sufficient to establ ish that appell ant evaded arr est as charg ed. Regar ding venu e, that need only be established by a preponder ance of the evidence. T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. A NN
. art. 13.17 (Ver non 2005). And, theevidence us ed to establish it may be either direct or circumstanti al. Black v. Stat e, 645 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Additionally, it is enough if it per mits the factfinder to reaso nably conclude that the offense wascommitted in thecounty all eg ed. Sudds v. State, 1404

S.W.3d 813, 817-18 (Tex. App.–H ouston [14 th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Flowers v. State, 133 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2004, no pet.). As previously mentioned, the trooper testif ied that he located app ellant in that part of Abernathy s ituated in Hal e County. A nd, upon locating him, he activated his emergency lights. By enacti ng those li ghts, the trooper init iated his attempt to stop appellant while both he and appellant w ere in Hale County. And, given t hat attempting to stop the appellant

is an element

of the off ense for which appellant was convicted, evidence appe ars of record from which a reasonable j ury could rationally conclude that

at least one el ement of the crime occu rred in Hal e County or within 400 yards of i ts boundary. And, tha t wa s enough to establish venue in Hale C ounty and defeat any claim of legal insufficiency , and factual insufficiency

as well when the findi ng is tested against al l record e viden ce. T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC
. A NN
. art. 13.04 (Ver non 2005) (stati ng that an offense committed on the boundaries of two or more counties, or wit hin 400 yar ds thereof, may beprosecuted in any one of such counties ); Schier v. St ate, 60 S.W.3d 340, 344-45 (Tex. App.–H ouston [14 th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (stating that to satisfy venue when the general venue statute applies, the State must prove th at at least one element of the crime occurred within the county);
see also Sudds v. State, 140 S.W.3d at 817-18 (stating that venue deter minations cannot be challenged on the basis of factual insufficiency ). Accordingl y, we overruleeach issue and affirm the judgment of the trial cour t.

Per Curiam Do not publish

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