Filed 3/19/14 P. v. Leonardo CA2/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

RAMON LEONARDO, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 B247926 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BA387357) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. 

Drew E. Edwards, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Law Offices of Andy Miri and Andy Miri, for Defendant and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson and Brendan 

Sullivan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

____________________ 
2

 A jury convicted appellant Ramon Leonardo of four felonies: Sodomy of a child 

under 10 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a));1

 oral copulation and sexual 

penetration of a child under 10 years of age (§ 288.7, subd. (b)); and two counts of 

performing lewd acts upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a)). Appellant was sentenced to a total 

state prison term of 48 years to life. 

 Appellant contends the trial court committed error by failing to (1) suppress 

statements he made to police, and (2) appoint him a Nahuatl interpreter at trial. We 

disagree and affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Appellant’s victim was his seven-year-old stepdaughter, A. L. (A.). Because he 

does not challenge the evidence supporting his convictions and because the details of his 

crimes are thoroughly set forth by the parties, we discuss only the relevant procedural 

background at issue here. 

The Interview 

After he was taken into custody, appellant was interviewed by Detective Frank 

Ramirez of the Los Angeles Police Department. The interview was conducted in 

Spanish. The jury received a transcript of the interview and a video of the interview was 

played for the jury. Appellant’s handcuffs were removed before any questioning began. 

Detective Ramirez testified that he spent nearly the first hour—“a great deal of time”—

asking appellant general background questions to ensure that appellant could understand 

him. He asked appellant such questions as his age (25), where he was from (Mexico), 

when he came here (19), where he worked (carwash), who he lived with (wife and 

stepdaughters), and if he had been in jail before (once). 

 After concluding general questioning, Detective Ramirez read appellant each of 

his Miranda2

 rights in Spanish. After reading each right, Detective Ramirez asked 

 1

 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

2

 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). 
3

appellant if he understood. Appellant responded “Si” each time. Appellant agreed to 

continue talking with Detective Ramirez. 

 Detective Ramirez then asked appellant to sign a Miranda waiver form that was 

written in Spanish. Detective Ramirez first asked appellant if he read Spanish and if he 

knew how to sign. Appellant responded, “Yeah.” Detective Ramirez explained the form, 

which lists each of appellant’s rights and asks if he understands each one. Appellant 

initialed his rights and marked that he understood each one. Appellant marked “Si” to the 

question asking if he wanted to continue talking, and he signed the form. 

 Detective Ramirez then began the interrogation. Appellant eventually admitted 

sexually assaulting A. on two occasions. Although he initially stated that he was just 

playing with her, he later admitted performing specific sexual acts. He stopped touching 

A. because he realized what he was doing was wrong. 

Motion to Suppress, Hearing, and Ruling 

 Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the statements he made to Detective 

Ramirez, on the ground that appellant did not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently 

waive his Miranda rights. At the hearing, defense counsel argued that appellant did not 

understand the questions asked because of his low education level and limited 

understanding of the Spanish language. According to defense counsel, appellant’s native 

language was the Aztec dialogue of Nahuatl. Defense counsel also argued that appellant 

was confused, as demonstrated by the fact that he said “so many ums, . . .” 

 The trial court denied the motion. The court noted that it had the benefit of 

reading the interview transcript and that appellant “was able to carry out a conversation 

quite well in the entirety of the interview in Spanish.” The court found that the Miranda

waivers were valid because they were voluntary and there was no sign of any coercion. 

DISCUSSION 

I. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Motion to Suppress 

A. Applicable Law 

Statements obtained during custodial interrogation are only admissible in evidence 

if police informed the suspect of his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney 
4

present during questioning and obtained from the suspect a voluntary, knowing and 

intelligent wavier of those rights. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475.) A valid waiver 

may be express or implied. (People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 246.) 

In determining whether a defendant waived his Miranda rights, a court must 

consider “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.” (Fare v. 

Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 724–725.) In Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 

the Supreme Court identified two distinct components of the inquiry: “‘First, the 

relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product 

of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, 

the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right 

being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the ‘totality 

of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and 

the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda 

rights have been waived.’” (Id. at p. 421.) On appeal, we accept the trial court’s 

resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluation of credibility, if supported 

by substantial evidence. (People v. Whitson, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 248.) 

B. Analysis 

Appellant argues that his Miranda waivers were not voluntarily made because 

Detective Ramirez used a “ruse” to obtain his confession, by falsely stating that the 

hospital had physical evidence linking him to the crimes. Appellant also argues that his 

waivers were not knowingly and intelligently made because he has only a sixth-grade 

education, a limited understanding of the Spanish language, worked in “menial 

employment” at a carwash, is from “Aztec peasant stock,” and was “obviously highly 

upset being faced with the charge that he had molested his seven year old step daughter.” 

According to appellant, these facts made his admissions “suspect” and “tend to 

demonstrate that [he] did not understand what he was doing when he spoke to the 

detective[] without counsel.” Appellant’s arguments are wholly unpersuasive. 

As to the voluntariness of appellant’s waivers, “‘A statement is involuntary if it is 

not the product of ‘“a rational intellect and free will.”’ [Citation.] The test for 
5

determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant’s “will was 

overborne at the time he confessed.” [Citation.]’” (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 

Cal.4th 318, 346–347.) There is no evidence in the record that Detective Ramirez 

resorted to physical or psychological pressure to elicit a waiver of appellant’s Miranda

rights. Appellant’s handcuffs were removed at the outset of his interview. Before 

appellant was read his Miranda rights, Detective Ramirez only asked general questions 

about appellant’s job, family and where he was from. Detective Ramirez did not ask 

questions or engage in conduct that would elicit an incriminating response from appellant 

before he was read his Miranda rights. Only after appellant was read his Miranda rights 

and signed the waiver form, did Detective Ramirez use a “ruse.” But even so, 

“Numerous California decisions confirm that deception does not necessarily invalidate a 

confession.” (People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 167.) Nothing here supports 

the finding that appellant’s will was so overborne that his confession was not voluntarily 

made. 

As to whether appellant made knowing and intelligent waivers, the record shows 

that appellant expressly waived his Miranda rights. Detective Ramirez read to appellant 

each of his Miranda rights and asked, after each one was read, whether appellant 

understood them. Appellant responded in the affirmative, and agreed to continue talking 

with Detective Ramirez. Before interrogating appellant, Detective Ramirez went over 

appellant’s Miranda rights once more by having appellant read and sign a waiver form 

written in Spanish. Appellant initialed all of the questions, marked that he understood 

each right, and signed the form. At no time did appellant make any statements that he 

was confused as to what the waivers meant, or indicate an interest in invoking any of the 

listed rights. 

Appellant’s claim that he has a limited understanding of the Spanish language is 

not supported by the record. As the trial court noted, appellant “was able to carry out a 

conversation quite well [during] the entirety of the interview in Spanish.” Detective 

Ramirez also asked appellant if he read Spanish and knew how to sign before having him 

complete the waiver form, and appellant responded, “Yeah.” 
6

Similarly, appellant’s claim that he did not make an intelligent and knowing 

waiver of his Miranda rights because he has a limited education and worked at a car wash 

in menial employment does not assist him. As the People note, even if appellant 

possessed relatively low intelligence, he was sufficiently intelligent to attempt to deceive 

Detective Ramirez by initially claiming that he was just playing with A. There is no 

evidence that appellant lacked sufficient intelligence to understand his Miranda rights or 

the consequences of his waivers. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not error in denying appellant’s motion to 

suppress. 

II. The Trial Court Properly Denied Appellant’s Request for A Nahuatl Interpreter 

At the start of trial, appellant requested that a Nahuatl interpreter be appointed. 

The trial court denied the request, and appellant was assisted at trial by a Spanish 

interpreter. Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his request. We disagree. 

A. Applicable Law 

 Interpreters perform three interrelated but distinct roles in a criminal proceeding: 

(1) as a “witness interpreter” to enable questioning of non-English speaking witnesses; 

(2) as a “proceedings interpreter” to enable a non-English speaking defendant to 

understand exchanges at trial among the witnesses, the attorneys, and the court; and (3) as 

a “defense interpreter” to enable a non-English speaking defendant to communicate with 

his or her English-speaking attorney. (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 410.) 

“The right to an interpreter has its underpinnings in a number of state and federal 

constitutional rights. These include a defendant’s rights to due process, to confrontation, 

to effective assistance of counsel, and to be present at trial.” (People v. Romero, supra, 

44 Cal.4th at p. 410.) The California Constitution provides that a criminal defendant who 

does not understand English “has a right to an interpreter throughout the proceedings.” 

(Cal. Const., art I, § 14.) 

B. Analysis 

Appellant’s claim that he was not sufficiently competent in the Spanish language 

such that he should have been appointed a Nahuatl interpreter is not supported by the 
7

record. In denying appellant’s request, the trial court noted that since 2011, appellant had 

made at least 15 court appearances, including the preliminary hearing, and had used a 

Spanish language interpreter at every appearance. At one point, appellant entered into a 

plea agreement and used the services of the Spanish interpreter to do so—directly 

answering all questions posed to him by the trial court. The trial court noted that 

appellant had “never indicated at any time until this moment that he needed any other 

interpreter.” The trial court also noted that it had read the transcript of appellant’s 

interview with Detective Ramirez and found that appellant addressed all the questions 

directly and did not indicate that he could not understand Spanish. 

Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of appellant’s request for a 

Nahuatl interpreter. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS. 

 _____________________________, Acting P. J. 

 ASHMANN-GERST 

We concur: 

______________________________, J. 

CHAVEZ 

______________________________, J.*

FERNS 

 *

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.