1

Filed 6/29/21 Rossa v. Blue Bird Body Co. CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

DANIEL ROSSA,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BLUE BIRD BODY COMPANY,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A160544

 (San Mateo County

 Super. Ct. No. 18CIV05767)

Plaintiff Daniel Rossa brought this products liability lawsuit for 

injuries he sustained in April 2018 when the electrical retracting steps of a 

library bookmobile owned and operated by his employer, the County of San 

Mateo, malfunctioned and crushed his foot, resulting in much of it having to

be amputated. One of the defendants is Respondent Blue Bird Body 

Company (Blue Bird), an out-of-state company that manufactured the 

vehicle, which another out-of-state company purchased and then converted 

from its original configuration as a bus into a bookmobile. Blue Bird moved 

to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the trial 

court granted the motion. Rossa now appeals, contending that California 

may exercise specific jurisdiction over Blue Bird given the extent of its 

business dealings in this state with respect to the subject matter of this 

lawsuit.
2

We agree the court erred in granting the motion and conclude the 

matter must be remanded for further proceedings regarding Blue Bird’s inforum activities and amenability to suit in California.

BACKGROUND

A. The Motion to Quash

Blue Bird’s motion to quash, filed on October 4, 2019, was supported by

a declaration from an employee, Milo Ringe III, who is Blue Bird’s Director of 

Government Specifications and Testing. 

According to Ringe’s declaration, Blue Bird is a company that 

manufactures, assembles and sells buses and has been doing business since 

1927. It is incorporated in Georgia and has its principal place of business 

there. Blue Bird manufactured the bus involved in this case in Georgia, and 

sold it to a company located in Ohio called OBS, Inc., which then converted 

the bus into a bookmobile.1

Ringe stated that “[a]ll of Blue Bird’s activity that was involved in 

regard to the design, manufacture, assembly and sale of the . . . bus took 

place in Georgia.” He also stated that “[n]one of Blue Bird’s conduct in 

regard to the subject bus took place in California.” 

Ringe acknowledged that Blue Bird “sells and delivers its buses to 

authorized dealers such as OBS, Inc.” but stated that “[o]nce those buses are 

sold to a dealer, [Blue Bird] has no control over the modifications to those 

vehicles or where any vehicles are shipped, distributed, sold or re-sold.” 

With one limited exception, Ringe’s declaration was silent as to

whether, and to what extent, Blue Bird carries on business in California. His

1 The vehicle did not have retractable steps installed when OBS bought 

it from Blue Bird. OBS also made other modifications, including changing

the vehicle’s door configuration. 
3

sole reference to that subject was an assertion (which he would later 

acknowledge was inaccurate) that the company “does not have any employees 

or offices in California.” 

Instead of addressing Blue Bird’s commercial presence in (or absence 

from) California, Ringe instead asserted only that the company “has never 

sold or advertised, and currently does not sell or advertise, any bookmobiles

in California.” (Italics added.) That fact, of course, was beside the point 

because Blue Bird is in the school bus business, not the bookmobile business. 

As Ringe himself stated, Blue Bird “does not design, manufacture or sell 

bookmobiles.”

Plaintiff’s counsel filed a written opposition to the motion that asserted 

there was evidence of Blue Bird’s “purposeful contacts with California and 

causal relation” to Rossa’s injuries. It argued that Blue Bird had carried on 

internet advertising, had California-based dealerships and service centers, 

and also had been involved with this very bookmobile after the vehicle had 

been delivered to the County of San Mateo, as reflected in some email 

correspondence. In the alternative, plaintiff requested a 90-day continuance 

to conduct further discovery into the jurisdictional issue.

Plaintiff’s counsel filed a supporting declaration attaching two sets of 

materials: (a) a meet and confer letter he had sent to defense counsel, with 

enclosures he stated were materials he had obtained from Blue Bird’s 

website, and (b) emails described as having been “received from the County of 

San Mateo in the ordinary course of business.” 

The materials from Blue Bird’s website included promotional materials 

highlighting the quality of the company’s buses and technical support 

network, the volume of its business and its nationwide scope. For example, 

one page, discussing the “Quality & Durability” of its buses, advertised that 
4

“At Blue Bird, quality and durability have always been of paramount 

importance. That is why over 180,000 of the buses that we’ve manufactured 

since our founding in 1927 are still on the road. We pay attention to the 

details that deliver performance, continually exploring how a product can be 

improved.” (Italics added.) 

Another page, captioned “Serviceability,” advertised the ease of 

performing maintenance and repairs on Blue Bird vehicles, touting the 

company’s “superior technical training programs,” “factory trained 

technicians,” and its “expansive dealer & service network.” It said the 

company “lead[s] the school bus industry in both quantity and quality of 

technical training offered to our customers,” and that “over 335 dealerships 

and affiliated vehicle service centers are available throughout North 

America.” 

Still another page, captioned “Service and Parts,” encouraged 

customers to “access important documents online” (including a driver’s 

handbook, service manual and other technical references), advertised the 

company’s “extensive selection of top-quality parts” and “well-stocked 

inventory,” and encouraged customers to “[c]ontact your local Blue Bird 

dealer to get the parts you need, when you need them” from the company’s 

“centrally located parts distribution center [that] boasts 1.3 million cubic feet 

of clean, orderly, highly automated space with over 20,000 part numbers to 

quickly fulfill your part needs.”

At the very top of that page, captioned under the heading, “Get Service 

When You Need It,” the company advertised the following: “At Blue Bird, we 

recognize that your new bus purchase is just one part of the equation. The 

North American Blue Bird Dealer Network, backed by the knowledgeable Blue 

Birds Parts and Service Team, has you covered for the life of your bus. The 
5

local parts, service, warranty, and genuine school bus expertise you need are 

readily available at hundreds of North American full-line dealers and dealerauthorized service centers.” (Italics added.) Included was a map depicting the 

company’s network of dealers and authorized service centers all across North 

America, including throughout California: 

Another page, from the “Dealer/Service Center Locator” portion of the 

company’s website, reflected the results of a search conducted within 200 

miles of Sacramento County, depicting at least 10 locations in that area of 

California alone:
6

The website also actively solicited business. It allowed visitors to 

“request a quote,” encouraged them to join the company’s mailing list to 

receive “the latest updates and promotions,” and included links to a variety of 

other topics, including product information, information about financing and 

“purchasing a bus,” “find[ing] a service center,” warranty information,

“FAQs,” and “do[ing] business with Blue Bird.” 
7

In addition to these website materials, the ten pages of email 

correspondence attached to the declaration of plaintiff’s counsel included

materials that appear to reflect discussions between San Mateo County

personnel and various outside service technicians about warranty repairs 

made to the bookmobile in the December 2011/January 2012 timeframe.

Several of these communications refer to Blue Bird’s involvement, both from 

outside of California and within the state.

2 

2 It began on December 14, 2011, when service personnel from an 

entity called “Cummins West” in San Leandro (which is apparently affiliated 

with another named defendant, Cummins Pacific, LLC) responded to reports 

by a supervisor at a company called Belmont Motor Pool, Abdul “Shamim”

Khan, about problems with the bookmobile. The Cummins West employee 

advised Khan to “See if you can get Blue Bird out there to look at this . . . . [¶] 

If it is a Cummins Warrantable repair and it is not drivable, Cummins will 

pay for the tow within the first year. Otherwise it is customer billable.” The 

next day, December 15, Khan reported to San Mateo County’s vehicle and 

equipment manager, Tony Hardwood, “FYI. [¶] The Bookmobile broke down 

again and have contacted Blue Bird. They are looking into it.” 

A couple of weeks later, on December 30, Khan gave Hardwood an 

update: “The service manager at Blue Bird in Canton, OH told me that he 

was going to contact somebody in Colton, CA and have them come out to look 

at the bus. They think that it might be a Blue Bird software problem. I did 

not receive any calls, so I called Canton Blue Bird and was told that the 

service manager was on vacation till next week. [¶] I called Blue Bird in 

Colton and spoke to Fay and was told that no one from Canton had contacted 

them. She told me that since they were too far from us, she will look for 

somebody in our area who could help us but it will not be till next Tuesday or 

Wednesday. [¶] . . . [¶] I will contact the service manager in Canton, OH 

again on Tuesday.” [see next page]

Several weeks later, on January 19, Khan updated Hardwood again: 

“As per Bob Ferne (owner of OBS, Blue Bird dealer, where the Book Mobile 

was purchased from) the Blue Bird factory reps are communicating with 

Cummings. He will call me as soon as he gets an answer. [¶] I was told there 

are other Blue Bird buses out there, including Monterey county’s bus with 

similar problems.” Then a week later, on January 27, another update from 

Khan: “Blue Bird Ca rep, John Vaugh just informed me that he will be going 
8

Blue Bird filed written objections to the declaration of plaintiff’s 

counsel and its attachments, on numerous grounds. 

Ringe filed a supplemental declaration with Blue Bird’s reply papers. 

He acknowledged that “there are service centers and dealers authorized by 

Blue Bird in many states, including California.” However, he asserted they 

“are separate and independent companies,” and reiterated, as previously 

stated, that “Blue Bird does not have any facilities in California.” Ringe also 

made a retraction: he acknowledged that an email included with the 

opposition papers “indicated someone spoke to ‘John Vaugh’ and referred to 

him as a ‘Blue Bird Ca rep.,’ ” and corrected his prior statement that Blue 

Bird does not have any employees located in California. Ringe stated that 

Blue Bird has three employees in California, including one named John 

Vaughn.

The matter proceeded to a hearing on November 22, 2019, and the trial 

court continued it for three months, until February 20, 2020, to enable 

plaintiff to conduct jurisdictional discovery. 

Plaintiff got nowhere. After completing the deposition of a county fact 

witness that had been previously scheduled and then got delayed for reasons 

beyond plaintiff’s control, plaintiff’s counsel (on December 17) asked defense 

counsel to stipulate to a 30-day continuance of the motion to quash hearing 

and to propose a suitable pre-hearing briefing schedule to allow for the 

to Cummins West on Monday to look at our Book Mobile. He also said that 

he will be bringing a part with him that will probably fix the problem.” 

A few months later, Hardwood followed up with OBS about sorting out 

reimbursements for the “warranty repairs” that had been performed, and on 

April 20, an OBS employee responded by telling Hardwood, “I’m currently 

working with Blue Bird regarding the tow bills in question. I will also get 

with our accounts payable and promptly send payment.” 
9

submission of additional evidence, but defense counsel did not respond. 

Plaintiff’s counsel then, in early January 2020, propounded written discovery 

requests on Blue Bird aimed at disclosing the extent of Blue Bird’s business 

dealings in California (described post, pp. 9-10). A few days before Blue 

Bird’s responses were due, defense counsel claimed (on February 4) he never 

received plaintiff’s earlier mail asking for a continuance of the hearing but he 

still did not accede, contending plaintiff’s outstanding discovery requests 

were irrelevant (they “do[] not address the legal issues relating to general 

and/or specific jurisdiction pursuant to the current state of the law,” and “do[] 

not relate to any conduct giving rise to the controversy that relates to any 

alleged contact with the forum”), and he insisted Blue Bird would oppose any 

request for additional time to oppose its motion to quash. 

When Blue Bird answered the discovery requests a few days later, it 

responded with the proverbial stone wall. For example, plaintiff asked Blue 

Bird:

• to describe its business relationship with the dealers and service 

centers in California that “use the name ‘Blue Bird’ or its variations”;

• whether its employees “provide[d] warranty service” to the 

bookmobile (and if so, to provide details);

• to produce documents reflecting its business dealings with an 

entity called A-Z Bus Sales, Inc. in Sacramento, California, which appears to 

be affiliated with a co-defendant, “A2Z”;

• to admit that it “sells vehicles, including vehicle components, 

through businesses you make efforts to use for that purpose in California”; 

• to admit that it “makes efforts to respond with [its] employed 

personnel to sites in California to perform warranty obligations”; and
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• to admit that it had initiated litigation as a plaintiff in California 

Superior Court in the past ten years.

In response, Blue Bird interposed lengthy relevance objections to all of 

these requests, construed several of them narrowly so as to avoid a direct

answer,3 and danced around several to the point of absurdity.

4 It objected to 

many of these requests that were plainly relevant to the jurisdictional issues,

claiming any responsive facts would not be sufficient to satisfy the legal 

standards governing general and special jurisdiction. 

Having run out of time to set a hearing on a motion to compel further 

responses prior to the continued hearing on jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s counsel 

moved ex parte to have a motion to compel heard on shortened time and the 

hearing continued. Plaintiff explained that Blue Bird failed to respond to 

discovery principally based on a “direct causation” theory of specific 

jurisdiction that had never before been recognized, was not the law, and 

indeed was currently pending before the United States Supreme Court. 

As it had threated to do, Blue Bird opposed the ex parte motion, 

principally on the ground the discovery was “based on antiquated and/or 

erroneous interpretations of law regarding jurisdiction” and therefore 

3 For example, on the subject of authorized dealers and service centers, 

Blue Bird stated that it did not know of any dealerships or authorized service 

centers in California that “use the name ‘Blue Bird’ in their name” (italics 

added) and otherwise objected on the grounds of relevance, vagueness and 

ambiguity.

4 On the subject of “warranty service” performed on the bookmobile, it 

responded to one interrogatory as follows: “to its knowledge, none of its 

employees provided ‘warranty service’ to the subject vehicle as it understands 

the term ‘service.’ Blue Bird understands ‘service’ to mean maintenance 

procedures carried out at a set time interval or after the vehicle has traveled 

a certain distance. Service intervals are generally specified by the service 

schedule in the applicable operator’s and/or service manual(s).” 
11

irrelevant. It argued “there is no basis for specific or ‘conduct-linked’ 

jurisdiction in this case because this lawsuit does not arise out of any conduct 

by Blue Bird in California or that Blue Bird intentionally directed at 

California.” The ex parte judge denied plaintiff’s motion for lack of good 

cause. The order also noted that the local court rules require a party to 

advise the court at least 3 court days ahead of time if a matter is to be taken 

off calendar. But plaintiff’s counsel was told he could address the court at the 

continued hearing to ask for more time. 

At the continued hearing on February 20, 2020, plaintiff’s counsel tried

to submit further papers in opposition to Blue Bird’s motion to quash, but the 

court ruled the papers were untimely and declined to accept them, and they 

are not in the record. Plaintiff’s counsel also raised the issue of Blue Bird’s 

inadequate discovery responses, and Blue Bird argued that plaintiff had 

squandered his time. The court declined to entertain the prospect of a 

continuance because plaintiff’s counsel had not apprised the court earlier, 

when he began encountering discovery delays, that he would need more time. 

Plaintiff’s counsel tried to make a record about the supplemental papers he 

wanted to file, and the court threatened him with contempt of court if he 

spoke “one more word.” 

The court then adopted its tentative ruling granting Blue Bird’s motion 

to quash. The court noted it was undisputed that Blue Bird is not subject to 

general jurisdiction and made a finding that Blue Bird has “no physical 

presence in California, no assets, no personnel, and no regular contacts” with 

California. 

The court also ruled there was no basis to exercise specific jurisdiction. 

In full, it reasoned: “Plaintiff fails to demonstrate any acts by Blue Bird that 

constitute purposefully establishing contacts with California. Further, since 
12

Blue Bird has no contacts with the state, the Plaintiff has not shown that his 

claim arises out of or is related to such contacts. (Burger King Corp. v. 

Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 477-478.) The emails attached to Plaintiff’s 

opposing declaration are not authenticated. However, even if the emails were 

admitted into evidence, they do not show that Blue Bird had purposeful 

contacts with California.” 

The ruling also denied plaintiff’s request for more time to conduct 

discovery, because plaintiff “has not shown that discovery will likely produce 

evidence of additional ‘contacts’ to justify subjecting Blue Bird to general or 

specific jurisdiction.” 

This appeal followed.5

DISCUSSION

“In reviewing a trial court’s determination of jurisdiction, we will not 

disturb the court’s factual determinations ‘if supported by substantial 

evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘When no conflict in the evidence exists, however, the 

question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages 

in an independent review of the record.’ ” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 

29 Cal.4th 262, 273.)

It has long been the law that a state may exercise specific jurisdiction 

over an out-of-state defendant “if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ 

his activities at residents of the forum [citation], and the litigation results 

from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” (Burger 

5 We previously notified the parties we were considering dismissing 

this appeal as untimely and directed them to provide letter briefs addressing 

that subject. Appellant’s letter briefing alluded to the fact that the superior 

court issued emergency pandemic-related orders that bear on this issue. 

Having located and analyzed those orders, we have concluded, for reasons 

that are unnecessary to discuss, that the appeal is timely.
13

King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472 (Burger King).) Here, the 

trial court concluded that the purposeful availment prong was not satisfied, 

and for that reason neither was the arise-out-of-or-relate-to requirement. In 

effect, the trial court did not reach the latter prong because its decision on the 

purposeful availment prong mooted the question. 

Rossa fails to address these two requirements specifically or explain 

why the trial court erred. He contends the trial court “adopted an incorrect 

and restrictive limitation on the definition of ‘minimum contacts’ which 

should warrant specific jurisdiction.” He argues that under World-Wide 

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, “[‘

]specific jurisdiction may 

lie over a foreign defendant that places a product into the “stream of 

commerce” while designing . . . advertising . . . establishing channels for 

regular advice’ or [‘

]marketing through a distributor who has agreed to act as 

a sales agent in the forum state.[’

] ” He points out that Blue Bird has 

employees, authorized service centers and dealers in California, and that the 

claim against Blue Bird is not directed at the bus’s current configuration as a 

bookmobile but rather at components of that vehicle made by Blue Bird. 

Finally, Rossa contends the trial court erred in not permitting further 

discovery before ruling on the motion to quash in light of Blue Bird’s 

“complete failure . . . to respond to discovery.” 

Blue Bird does address the requirements for personal jurisdiction, but

makes no attempt to defend the court’s conclusion that the “purposeful 

availment” prong was not met. We could take that as a concession and 

simply proceed to the relatedness prong. (See Bader v. Avon Products, Inc. 

(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 186, 193 [where respondent challenges only the 

relatedness prong of specific jurisdiction analysis on appeal, appellate court 

accepts that limitation and addresses only that issue].) But because we will 
14

be remanding this matter, we hold that this prong is satisfied. Blue Bird’s 

silence on this subject is appropriate, because the court’s conclusion that 

“Plaintiff fail[ed] to demonstrate any acts by Blue Bird that constitute 

purposefully establishing contacts with California” cannot be squared with 

the record. 

The “purposeful availment” prong is met “where the defendant 

‘deliberately’ has engaged in significant activities within a State [citation], or 

has created ‘continuing obligations’ between himself and residents of the 

forum.” (Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 475-476.) In either situation, 

the defendant “manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting 

business there, and because his activities are shielded by ‘the benefits and 

protections’ of the forum’s laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to 

require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well.” (Id. 

at p. 476.)

Even on this thinnest of records (thin in large part because of Blue 

Bird’s evasive responses to discovery), it is evident that Blue Bird has a 

significant and deliberate commercial presence in California. To begin with, 

the court erred in finding that Blue Bird has “no personnel” in California. 

Indeed, it was ultimately undisputed in the trial court that Blue Bird has 

three employees in California, including one who, by all accounts, appears to 

have been involved in repairing the very vehicle at issue here.6 In addition, 

6 We consider all of the evidence plaintiff submitted with his opposition 

papers (i.e., the emails and website materials) because Blue Bird did not 

request a ruling on its evidentiary objections and, apart from the court’s 

reference to the unauthenticated nature of the emails, the court did not rule 

on the objections. Furthermore, despite noting the unauthenticated nature of 

the emails, the trial court nonetheless considered their content. Thus, Blue 

Bird’s evidentiary objections have been forfeited. (See, e.g., Zhi An Wang v. 

Fang (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 907, 915, fn. 6.)
15

the website materials that plaintiff proffered clearly demonstrate Blue Bird’s 

deliberate efforts to exploit the market for buses in California. It does so 

through a wide variety of means, most significantly through relationships 

with authorized dealers and service centers located in California, advertising, 

a training program offered nationally, a centralized inventory of parts made 

nationally available, as well as an interactive website that enables and 

encourages potential customers anywhere, including in California, to “request 

a quote using our interactive tool” and to sign up for marketing and 

promotional material. Moreover, the only reasonable inference from the 

undisputed fact that there are numerous “authorized” Blue Bird dealers and 

service centers in California is that such commercial arrangements are the 

result of legal contracts negotiated and entered into by Blue Bird with those 

independent companies in California. For these reasons, Blue Bird’s tacit 

concession that the “purposeful availment” prong was established is 

appropriate.

7 Simply put, despite the fact Blue Bird prevented discovery into 

7 See, e.g., Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 480-481, 487 (defendant 

purposely availed itself of Florida forum by entering into franchise agreement 

with corporation headquartered in Florida that created a “substantial and 

continuing relationship” between the two); International Shoe Co. v. State of 

Wash., Office of Unemployment Compensation and Placement (1945) 326 U.S. 

310 (regular and systematic solicitation of business by 13 in-state salesman 

held sufficient to establish minimum contacts with forum); Secrest Machine 

Corp. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 664, 671 (out-of-state manufacturer 

made purposeful “ ‘ efforts . . . to serve . . . the market for its product’ ” by, 

inter alia, sending employee to assist California business with installation of 

its product, sending spare parts, advising on maintenance and advertising 

nationally); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1969) 

71 Cal.2d 893, 902-903 (“indirect” distribution of product to forum through 

middlemen and independently owned dealerships “ ‘effect[s] little, if any, 

alternation in the jurisdictional situation’ ”); Jayone Foods, Inc. v. Aekyung 

Industrial Co. Ltd. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 543, 559 (foreign supplier 
16

its sales activity in California (and we do not know the extent of its sales 

volume in California or the amount of revenue it derives from California), 

“the ‘quality and nature’ ” of Blue Bird’s relationship to the California vehicle 

market “can in no sense be viewed as ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated.’ ” 

(Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 480.) 

We therefore turn to the only basis upon which Blue Bird does defend 

the trial court’s ruling, which is the contention plaintiff “did not and cannot 

establish that his claim arises out of any forum-related conduct of Blue Bird.” 

As it did below, Blue Bird asserts that this is so because it manufactured the 

bus out-of-state, sold it to an out-of-state third party (OBS, which modified 

the vehicle into a bookmobile), and had no control over the modifications or 

the vehicle’s resale to a California buyer. 

While this appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court 

decided Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) 

__U.S.__ [141 S.Ct. 1017] (Ford Motor Co.), which definitively repudiated this 

narrow view of the nexus required to establish specific jurisdiction. Ford 

Motor Co. clarified that when a company “serves a market for a product in a 

State and that product causes injury in the State to one of its residents, the 

State’s courts may entertain the resulting suit” (id. at p. 1022), regardless 

whether the specific product that caused injury was manufactured, designed 

and purchased elsewhere and the defendant had no role in the product 

making its way into the state. (See also Trimble Inc. v. PerDiemCo LLC (Fed. 

Cir., May 12, 2021) 997 F.3d 1147, 1156 [Ford Motor Co. “established that a 

broad set of a defendant’s contacts with a forum are relevant to the minimum 

contacts analysis” and “emphasized that a defendant’s contacts ‘must show 

“purposefully directed its activities toward California businesses when it 

repeatedly sold its products to various California distributors”).
17

that the defendant deliberately “reached out beyond” its home—by, for 

example, “exploi[ting] a market” in the forum State or entering a contractual 

relationship centered there’ ”].)

At issue in Ford Motor Co. was whether an out-of-state car 

manufacturer, Ford, was subject to two products liability suits by state 

residents for accidents occurring in their states, even though the particular 

cars involved in the accidents had been designed, manufactured and 

originally purchased out of state, and only later made their way into the two 

states though resales and consumer relocations. (See Ford Motor Co., supra, 

141 S.Ct. at pp. 1022-1023.) Ford Motor Co. conceded it purposefully availed 

itself of the two forums by conducting substantial business in both states for 

automobiles and related products (see id. at p. 1026), and the Supreme Court 

indicated the concession was appropriate given the extent of its business 

dealings in those states (through advertising, sales, repair services and the 

distribution of replacement parts to Ford dealers and independent shops 

alike) (see id. at p. 1028). But Ford contended its conduct was not sufficiently 

related to the two suits, because its conduct in the forum did not give rise to 

the suits. On Ford’s view, specific jurisdiction could attach only in the states 

where it had designed or manufactured the cars, or in the states where it had

sold the two vehicles involved in the accidents. (Id. at p. 1026.) 

The Supreme Court rejected that “causal” view of specific jurisdiction

and said “Ford’s “causation-only approach finds no support in this Court’s 

requirement of a ‘connection’ between a plaintiff’s suit and a defendant’s 

activities.” (Ford Motor Co., supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 1026; see also id. at 

p. 1033 [concurring opn. of Alito, J.] [rejecting Ford’s “unprecedented rule 

under which a defendant’s contacts with the forum State must be proven to 

have been a but-for cause of the tort plaintiff’s injury”]; id. at p. 1039 
18

[concurring opn. of Gorsuch, J.] [“The parties have not pointed to anything in 

the Constitution’s original meaning or its history that might allow Ford to 

evade answering the plaintiffs’ claims in [their chosen forums]”].) 

Ford Motor Co. explained: “None of our precedents has suggested that 

only a strict causal relationship between the defendant’s in-state activity and 

the litigation will do. As just noted, our most common formulation of the rule 

demands that the suit ‘arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with 

the forum.’ [Citation.] The first half of that standard asks about causation; 

but the back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates that some relationships will 

support jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does not mean anything 

goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase ‘relate to’ incorporates 

real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum. 

But again, we have never framed the specific jurisdiction inquiry as always 

requiring proof of causation—i.e., proof that the plaintiff ’s claim came about 

because of the defendant’s in-state conduct. [Citation.] So the case is not 

over even if, as Ford argues, a causal test would put jurisdiction in only the 

States of first sale, manufacture, and design. A different State’s courts may 

yet have jurisdiction, because of another ‘activity [or] occurrence’ involving 

the defendant that takes place in the State. [Citation.] [¶] And indeed, this 

Court has stated that specific jurisdiction attaches in cases identical to the 

ones here—when a company like Ford serves a market for a product in the 

forum State and the product malfunctions there.” (Ford Motor Co., supra, 

141 S.Ct. at pp. 1026-1027, italics added, fn. omitted; see also id. at pp. 1027-

1028 [discussing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, supra, 444 U.S. 

286 and its progeny].)8 

8 In the view of three concurring Justices, the majority’s analysis 

injects new doctrinal confusion (by treating the “arising out of or relating to” 
19

Under Ford Motor Co., the location of injury matters (see Ford Motor 

Co., supra, 141 S.Ct. at pp. 1026, 1027, fn. 3, 1030), as does the nature and 

extent of the defendant’s commercial presence in the forum (see id. at 

pp. 1028-1030). Citing and extensively discussing prior precedent, Ford 

Motor Co. reaffirmed the rule that “when a corporation has ‘continuously and 

deliberately exploited [a State’s] market, it must reasonably anticipate being 

haled into [that State’s] court[s]’ to defend actions ‘based on’ products causing 

injury there.” (Id. at p. 1027.) The Court cautioned that not “any person 

using any means to sell any good in a State is subject to jurisdiction there if 

the product malfunctions after arrival,” because “isolated or sporadic 

transactions” are treated differently for jurisdictional purposes than 

“continuous” ones. (Id. at p. 1028, fn. 4.) But it concluded that because Ford 

had “systematically served a market” in two states for the same model of 

vehicles that two plaintiffs claimed caused injury to them in those states (by 

extensively promoting, selling and servicing those types of cars in those two 

states), the connection between the plaintiff’s claims and the manufacturer’s 

in-state activities was sufficiently close to support the exercise of jurisdiction

even though, like here, the defendant had sold the particular vehicles 

involved elsewhere. (See id. at pp. 1028, 1032.)

Ford Motor Co. did not purport to change the law. The court 

unanimously rejected Ford’s causation-based view of specific jurisdiction, and 

unanimously agreed Ford was subject to suit given the extent of its business 

dealings in both states. But it did resolve confusion among lower state and 

prong as two separate categories, either one of which suffices to satisfy prong 

two). (See Ford Motor Co., supra, 141 S.Ct. at pp. 1033-1034 [concurring opn. 

of Alito, J.]; id. at pp. 1034-1039 [concurring opn. of Gorsuch, J.].) 
20

federal courts about the nexus required to establish specific jurisdiction.9 

And, importantly, in doing so it repudiated the “causation” test of jurisdiction 

that Blue Bird expressly invoked below, and also distinguished two of the 

principal precedents that Blue Bird has relied upon in the trial court and this 

court in both contending it cannot be subject to suit in California given the 

out-of-state provenance of the vehicle involved here,

10 and in resisting 

plaintiff’s jurisdictional discovery. (See Ford Motor Co., supra, 141 S.Ct. at 

pp. 1030-1032 [discussing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court (2017)

__U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 1773] and Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277].)

9 Prior to Ford Motor Co., courts “wrestled with the nexus requirement 

of specific jurisdiction in a variety of factual settings and . . . reached diverse 

conclusions as to the appropriate test for determining the proper nexus 

between the nonresident defendant’s business activity and the claim asserted 

by the plaintiff. The tests adopted range from narrow or strict causationbased tests to more flexible relatedness tests requiring the showing of some 

connection or relationship between the claim and the business activity.” 

(Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno (D.C. Ct. App. 2000) 746 A.2d 320, 333 

[en banc].) Compare, e.g., Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co. (Minn. 2019) 931 

N.W.2d 744, 753 [“the requirements of due process are met so long as 

[defendant’s forum] contacts relate to the claim”; such contacts need not 

“cause the claim”] and Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co. Ltd. (Fed. 

Cir. 2008) 552 F.3d 1324, 1337 [arise-out-of-or-relate-to prong “is far more 

permissive than either the ‘proximate cause’ or the ‘but for’ analyses”] with

Menken v. Emm (9th Cir. 2007) 503 F.3d 1050, 1058 [plaintiff must “show 

that he would not have suffered an injury ‘but for’ [defendant’s] forum-related 

conduct”]; Waite v. All Acquisition Corp. (11th Cir. 2018) 901 F.3d 1307, 

1313-1314 [defendant’s forum contacts “must be a but-for cause of the 

torts”].)

10 For example, in the trial court Blue Bird argued that under BristolMyers, “a plaintiff must establish a direct causal connection between the 

alleged injuries and the defendant’s activities in state,” and “[t]here is no 

connection here since all of the relevant conduct of Blue Bird occurred in 

Georgia, but nothing occurred in California.” 
21

It is unnecessary to analyze those other cases in depth, or the specific 

facts of Ford Motor Co. at great length, or to assess the extent to which the

decision controls the outcome here. Although there appear to be many 

similarities, the parties and the trial court did not have the benefit of Ford 

Motor when the jurisdictional issue was litigated and decided below. A

remand for further proceedings in light of the Supreme Court’s decision

therefore is appropriate so that jurisdictional discovery can be conducted in 

light of that decision, additional evidence presented, and a new hearing held. 

(See Code Civ. Proc., § 909 [appellate court may “for any purpose in the 

interests of justice, . . . give or direct the entry of any judgment or order and 

may make any further or other order as the case may require”].) 

DISPOSITION

The order granting Blue Bird’s motion to quash service of summons is 

vacated and the matter is remanded for further proceedings, including 

appropriate discovery, consistent with this opinion. Appellant shall recover 

his costs. 
22

STEWART, J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, Acting P.J.

MILLER, J.

Rossa v. Blue Bird Body Company (A160544)