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Scott E. Davis 

State Bar No. 016160 

SCOTT E. DAVIS, P.C. 

8360 E. Raintree Drive, Suite 140 

Scottsdale, AZ 85260 

Telephone: (602) 482-4300 

Facsimile: (602) 569-9720 

email: davis@scottdavispc.com

Attorney for Plaintiff Francene Rosenkrans 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Francene Rosenkrans, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

AIG Life Insurance Company; Camden 

Property Trust; Camden Property Trust 

Disability Plan , 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 

COMPLAINT 

 

 Now comes the Plaintiff Francene Rosenkrans (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”), 

by and through her attorney, Scott E. Davis, and complaining against the Defendants, she 

states: 

Jurisdiction 

 1. Jurisdiction of the court is based upon the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act of 1974 (ERISA); and in particular, 29 U.S.C. §§1132(e)(1) and 1132(f). 

Those provisions give the district courts jurisdiction to hear civil actions brought to recover 

employee benefits. In addition, this action may be brought before this Court pursuant to 28 

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U.S.C. §1331, which gives the Court jurisdiction over actions that arise under the laws of 

the United States. 

Parties 

 2. Plaintiff is a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona. 

3. Upon information and belief, Camden Property Trust (hereinafter referred to 

as the “Company”) sponsored, administered and purchased a group long-term disability 

insurance policy which was fully insured by AIG Life Insurance Company (hereinafter 

referred to as “AIG”). The specific AIG long term disability group insurance policy is 

known as Group Policy No.: GLTD-50978 (hereinafter referred to as the "Policy"). The 

Company’s purpose in sponsoring, administering and purchasing the Policy was to provide 

long-term disability insurance for its employees. Upon information and belief, the AIG 

Policy may have been included in and part of an employee benefit plan, specifically 

named the Camden Property Trust Disability Plan (hereinafter referred to as the “Plan”) 

which may have been created to provide the Company’s employees with welfare benefits. 

At all times relevant hereto, the Plan constituted an “employee welfare benefit plan” as 

defined by 29 U.S.C. §1002(1). 

4. Upon information and belief, AIG functioned as the claim administrator of 

the policy; however, pursuant to the relevant ERISA regulation, the Company and/or the 

Plan may not have made a proper delegation or properly vested fiduciary authority or power 

for claim administration in AIG. 

5. AIG operated under a conflict of interest in evaluating her long-term 

disability claim due to the fact that it operated in dual roles as the decision maker with 

regard to whether Plaintiff was disabled as well as the payor of benefits. AIG’s conflict 

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existed in that if it found Plaintiff was disabled, it was then liable for the payment of her 

disability benefits. 

6. The Company, AIG and the Plan conduct business within Maricopa County 

and all events giving rise to this Complaint occurred within Arizona. 

Venue 

7. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132(e)(2) and 28 

U.S.C. §1391. 

Nature of the Complaint 

8. Incident to her employment, Plaintiff was a covered employee pursuant to 

the Plan and the relevant Policy and a “participant” as defined by 29 U.S.C. §1002(7). 

Plaintiff seeks disability income benefits from the Plan and the relevant Policy pursuant to 

§502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(1)(B), as well as any other potential nondisability employee benefits she may be entitled to from the Plan and any other Company 

Plan, as a result of being found disabled in this action. 

9. After working for the Company as a loyal employee, Plaintiff became 

disabled on or about August 21, 1999, due to serious medical conditions and was unable to 

work in her designated occupation as a Leasing Consultant. Plaintiff has remained disabled 

as that term is defined in the relevant Policy continuously since that date and has not been 

able to return to any occupation as a result of her serious medical conditions. 

10. Following her disability, Plaintiff filed a claim for short term disability 

benefits which was approved by AIG, and those benefits have been paid and exhausted. 

11. Following the exhaustion of her short-term disability benefits, Plaintiff then 

filed for long-term disability benefits under the relevant Policy which was administered by 

AIG. AIG made every decision in Plaintiff’s long-term disability claim. 

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12. Upon information and belief, the relevant AIG Policy and definition of 

disability governing Plaintiff’s long term disability claim is as follows: 

“Disability” or “Disabled” means: 

1. You cannot perform each of the material duties of your regular 

occupation; and 

2. After benefits have been paid for 24 months, you cannot 

perform each of the material duties of any gainful occupation 

for which you are reasonably fitted taking into consideration 

training, education or experience; or 

3. You, while unable to perform all of the material duties of your 

regular occupation on a full-time basis, are: 

a. Performing at least one of the material duties of your 

regular occupation or another occupation on a part-time 

or full-time basis; and 

b. Earning currently at least 20% less per month than your 

indexed pre-disability earnings due to that same injury 

or sickness. 

13. In support of her claim for long-term disability benefits, Plaintiff submitted to 

AIG, medical evidence which supported her allegation that she met any definition of 

disability as defined in the relevant Policy. 

14. AIG approved Plaintiff’s long-term disability claim and paid her long-term 

disability benefits through July 10, 2014, for a total of approximately fourteen (14) years. 

15. During the period of time Plaintiff was receiving long-term disability benefits, 

she also applied for, was approved for and is currently receiving Social Security disability 

benefits through the Social Security Administration (hereinafter referred to as “SSA”). 

16. Plaintiff informed AIG that her claim for Social Security disability benefits 

had been approved and she submitted to AIG documentation from the SSA which 

confirmed the approval. 

17. The SSA found Plaintiff became disabled from engaging in any gainful 

occupation which may have existed in the national economy. 

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18. The SSA’s definition of disability is more stringent and difficult to meet than 

the aforementioned definition of disability in the AIG Policy for the first 24 months of 

disability and substantially similar to the Policy’s definition of disability after the first 24 

months of disability. Therefore, the SSA’s approval of Plaintiff's claim and the fact that 

SSA has continued to pay her benefits for so many years is relevant evidence for this Court 

to consider with regard to the unreasonableness of AIG’s decision to terminate and deny 

Plaintiff’s claim and benefits. 

19. In a letter dated July 17, 2014 AIG informed Plaintiff it was terminating her 

long term disability benefits beyond July 10, 2014, without any medical documentation or 

evidence that Plaintiff’s medical conditions had improved or that she was capable of 

returning to work. 

20. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1133, Plaintiff timely appealed AIG’s July 10, 2014 

termination of her benefits. 

21. In support of her appeal and claim for long-term disability benefits, Plaintiff 

submitted to AIG additional medical evidence demonstrating that she met any definition of 

disability set forth in the Policy. 

22. In a letter dated September 17, 2014, AIG informed Plaintiff it was again 

denying her claim for long-term disability benefits, which Plaintiff timely appealed. 

23. In support of her appeal and claim for long-term disability benefits, Plaintiff 

submitted to AIG additional medical evidence demonstrating that she met any definition of 

disability set forth in the Policy. 

24. As part of its review of Plaintiff’s claims for disability benefits, AIG obtained 

a medical records only "paper review" of Plaintiff’s claim from Randall King, M.D., who is 

consulting physician for the University Disability Consortium (hereinafter "UDC"). As the 

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attached interrogatory answers confirm (See Exhibit "A" to this Complaint), UDC has a 

long business relationship with the disability insurance industry by providing the type of 

medical records reviews as occurred in this case and Plaintiff alleges UDC may derive a 

significant amount of its annual revenue from its relationship with the industry. As a result, 

Plaintiff alleges that in the review of her claim, Dr. King was not independent, objective or 

impartial with regard to the opinions he rendered regarding whether or not Plaintiff was 

disabled. 

25. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff believes Dr. King may be long time 

medical consultant for the disability insurance industry, UDC and/or AIG. As a result, 

Plaintiff believes Dr. King may have an incentive to protect his own consulting relationship 

with the disability insurance industry, UDC and/or AIG by providing medical records only 

paper reviews, which selectively review or ignore evidence such as occurred in Plaintiff’s 

claim, in order to provide opinions and report(s) which are favorable to insurance 

companies and/or AIG and which supported the denial of Plaintiff’s long-term disability 

claim. 

26. In a letter dated February 26, 2015, AIG notified Plaintiff it had denied her 

claim for long-term disability benefits under the Policy. In the letter, AIG also notified 

Plaintiff she had exhausted her administrative levels of review and could file a civil action 

lawsuit in federal court pursuant to ERISA. 

27. Upon information and belief, AIG’s February 26, 2015 denial letter confirms 

it failed to provide a full and fair review, and in the process committed several procedural 

violations pursuant to ERISA due to among other reasons, completely failing to credit, 

reference, consider, and/or selectively reviewing and/or de-emphasizing most, if not all of 

Plaintiff’s reliable evidence. 

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28. In evaluating Plaintiff’s claim on appeal, AIG had an obligation pursuant to 

ERISA to administer Plaintiff’s claim “solely in her best interests and other participants” 

which it failed to do. 1

 

29. AIG failed to adequately investigate and failed to engage Plaintiff in a 

dialogue during the appeal of her claim with regard to what evidence was necessary so 

Plaintiff could perfect her appeal and claim. AIG’s failure to investigate the claim and to 

engage in this dialogue or to obtain the evidence it believed was important to perfect 

Plaintiff's claim is a violation of ERISA and Ninth Circuit case law, and a reason she did not 

receive a full and fair review. 

30. Plaintiff alleges AIG provided an unlawful review which was neither full nor 

fair and that violated ERISA, specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 2560.503-1, by failing to adequately 

investigate her claim; by providing a one sided review of Plaintiff’s claim that failed to 

consider all the evidence submitted by her and/or de-emphasizing medical evidence which 

supported Plaintiff’s claim; by failing to adequately consider the fact that SSA continued 

to find Plaintiff was entitled to SSA disability benefits; by failing to credit Plaintiff’s 

reliable evidence; by disregarding Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms; failing to consider all 

the diagnoses and/or limitations set forth in her medical evidence as well as the impact the 

combination of those diagnoses and impairments would have on her ability to work; by 

 

1

 It sets forth a special standard of care upon a plan administrator, namely, that the 

administrator "discharge [its] duties" in respect to discretionary claims processing "solely 

in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries" of the plan, § 1104(a)(1); it 

simultaneously underscores the particular importance of accurate claims processing by 

insisting that administrators "provide a 'full and fair review' of claim denials," Firestone, 

489 U.S., at 113, 109 S. Ct. 948, 103 L. Ed. 2d 80 (quoting § 1133(2)); and it 

supplements marketplace and regulatory controls with judicial review of individual claim 

denials, see § 1132(a)(1)(B). Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (U.S. 

2008). 

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failing to engage Plaintiff in a dialogue so she could perfect her claim and failing to consider 

the impact the side effects from Plaintiff's medications would have on her ability to engage 

in any occupation. 

31. Plaintiff alleges a reason AIG provided an unlawful review which was neither 

full nor fair and that violated ERISA, specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 2560.503-1, is due to its 

conflict of interest that manifested as a result of the dual roles AIG undertook as the 

decision maker and the payor of benefits. AIG’s conflict of interest provided it with a 

financial incentive to deny Plaintiff’s claim, thereby saving itself money. 

32. Plaintiff is entitled to discovery regarding AIG’s aforementioned conflicts of 

interest. UDC’s and any individual who reviewed her claim and the Court may properly 

weigh and consider extrinsic evidence regarding the nature, extent and effect of any

conflict of interest and/or ERISA procedural violation which may have impacted or 

influenced AIG’s decision to deny her claim. 

33. With regard to whether Plaintiff meets the definition of disability set forth in 

the policy, the standard of review for the Court to apply is de novo, because even though the 

Policy unlawfully contains discretionary language, it was issued in the State of Texas where 

Camden Property Trust is headquartered and Texas banned discretionary clauses in 

disability policies in 2011. In denying her claim, Plaintiff alleges AIG failed to provide a 

full and fair review pursuant to ERISA, and AIG’s decision to terminate her benefits is de 

novo wrong. If the Court concludes the Policy confers discretion and that the standard of 

review is for an abuse of discretion, Plaintiff alleges AIG’s unlawful ERISA violations as 

referenced herein are an abuse of discretion, that they precluded a Full and Fair review as 

required by ERISA and are so flagrant that they justify de novo review. 

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34. As a direct result of AIG’s decision to deny Plaintiff’s disability claim, she 

has been injured and suffered damages in the form of lost long term disability benefits, in 

addition to other potential non-disability employee benefits she may have been entitled to 

receive or was receiving through or from the Plan, from any other Company Plan and/or the 

Company as a result of being found disabled. Plaintiff believes other potential nondisability employee benefits may include but not be limited to, health and other insurance 

related coverage or benefits, retirement benefits or a pension, life insurance coverage and/or 

the waiver of the premium on a life insurance policy which provided coverage for her and 

her family/dependents. 

35. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132, Plaintiff is entitled to recover unpaid benefits, 

prejudgment interest, reasonable attorney's fees and costs from Defendants. 

36. Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest at the legal rate pursuant to A.R.S. 

§20-462, or at such other rate as is appropriate to compensate her for losses she incurred 

as a result of Defendants’ nonpayment of benefits. 

 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 

 A. For an Order finding that Plaintiff meets the definition of disability set forth 

in the Plan and/or Policy and requiring Defendants to pay her the long-term disability 

benefits she is due as well as any other non-disability employee benefits she may be 

entitled to as a result of being found disabled, from the date she was first denied all of 

these benefits through the date of judgment and prejudgment interest thereon; 

 B. For an Order directing Defendants to continue paying Plaintiff the 

aforementioned benefits until such time as she meets the conditions for the termination of 

benefits; 

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 C. For attorney’s fees and costs incurred as a result of prosecuting this suit 

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132(g); and 

 D. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 

 

DATED this 18th day of December, 2015. 

 SCOTT E. DAVIS. P.C.

 By: /s/ Scott E. Davis 

 Scott E. Davis 

 Attorney for Plaintiff

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