IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-13-00095-CR

JEREMY CHAD BUKOWSKI,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 18th District Court

Johnson County, Texas

Trial Court No. F45969

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In four issues, appellant, Jeremy Chad Bukowski, challenges his conviction for 

capital murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (West Supp. 2013). Specifically, 

appellant contends that: (1) police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him; (2) 

the trial court erred by failing to include an instruction in the jury charge requiring 

unanimity with respect to the alleged felonies underlying the capital-murder offense; 
Bukowski v. State Page 2

(3) his confession violated the “Texas Confession Statute”; and (4) the trial court 

erroneously admitted hearsay evidence during a suppression hearing. We affirm.1

I. APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In his first issue, appellant contends that he was arrested pursuant to an illegal 

stop. Specifically, appellant argues that law enforcement did not have reasonable 

suspicion to pull him over. As such, appellant asserts that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying his first amended motion to suppress.

A. Standard of Review

We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse 

of discretion, using a bifurcated standard. See Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We 

give “almost total deference” to the trial court’s findings of historical fact that are 

supported by the record and to mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an 

evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89. We review de novo 

the trial court’s determination of the law and its application of law to facts that do not 

turn upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. When the trial court has not 

made a finding on a relevant fact, we imply the finding that supports the trial court’s 

ruling, so long as it finds some support in the record. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818-

19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see Moran v. State, 213 S.W.3d 917, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

We will uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is 

 

1 As this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we only recite 

those facts necessary to the disposition of the case. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1, 47.4.
Bukowski v. State Page 3

correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 

590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and 

judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. 

Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When reviewing a trial 

court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we view all of the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the ruling. Garcia-Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2008).

When a trial judge makes explicit fact findings regarding a motion to suppress, 

an “appellate court [must first] determine whether the evidence (viewed in the light 

most favorable to the trial court’s ruling) supports these fact findings.” Kelly, 204 

S.W.3d at 818. “The appellate court then reviews the trial court’s legal ruling[s] de novo 

unless the trial court’s supported-by-the-record explicit fact findings are also dispositive 

of the legal ruling.” Id.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against 

unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see 

Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24. To suppress evidence because of an alleged Fourth 

Amendment violation, the defendant bears the initial burden of producing evidence 

that rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 

672 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009). A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or seizure 

occurred without a warrant. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672. Once the defendant has made 
Bukowski v. State Page 4

this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the State, which is then required to establish 

that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or was reasonable. Id.

at 672-73; Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Whether a search is reasonable is a question of law that we review de novo. 

Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Reasonableness is measured by 

examining the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 63. It requires a balancing of the 

public interest and the individual’s right to be free from arbitrary detentions and 

intrusions. Id. A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it 

falls within one of the “specifically defined and well-established” exceptions to the 

warrant requirement. McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

B. Reasonable Suspicion

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized three distinct categories of 

interactions between police officers and citizens: (1) encounters; (2) investigative 

detentions; and (3) arrests. State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 

Courts look to the totality of the circumstances to determine into which category an 

interaction falls. Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 49.

An investigatory detention occurs when a person yields to an officer’s show of 

authority under a reasonable belief he is not free to leave. Id. The inquiry is whether a 

reasonable person in the citizen’s position would have felt free to decline the officer’s 

requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Id. “[A] police officer can stop and 

briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable 

suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the 
Bukowski v. State Page 5

officer lacks probable cause.” Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) 

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). This 

is an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the detaining officer and 

looks solely to whether an objective basis for the detention exists. Ford v. State, 158 

S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). When an officer subjects a defendant to an 

investigatory detention, it is the State’s burden to prove the reasonableness of the 

warrantless detention. Id.

Reasonable suspicion exists if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when 

combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably 

conclude a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal 

activity. Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Whether 

reasonable suspicion exists depends on the content of the information known to the 

officer as well as its degree of reliability. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2011). The State need not, however, establish that a crime actually occurred 

prior to the investigatory detention, and a detention or search is unlawful at its 

inception may not be validated by what it turns up. State v. Griffey, 241 S.W.3d 700, 704 

(Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d); see Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 

1379, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000) (“The reasonableness of official suspicion must be 

measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search.”). The 

reasonableness of a temporary detention is examined in terms of the “totality of the 

circumstances” at its inception. See Woods, 956 S.W.2d at 38. Individual circumstances 

must not be considered in isolation, and the facts known to the officer must amount to 
Bukowski v. State Page 6

something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. Id. at 35. 

Moreover, the Woods Court recognized that “there may be instances when a person’s 

conduct viewed in a vacuum, appears purely innocent, yet when viewed in light of the 

totality of the circumstances, those actions give rise to reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 38.

There is no requirement that the “facts adduced to give rise to a reasonable 

suspicion must show that the detainee has committed, is committing, or is about the 

commit, a particular and distinctively identifiable penal offense.” Derichsweiler v. State, 

348 S.W.3d 906, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The Derichsweiler Court explained that:

Moreover, the detaining officer need not be personally aware of every fact 

that objectively supports a reasonable suspicion to detain; rather, the 

cumulative information known to the cooperating officers at the time of 

the stop is to be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion 

exists.

. . . .

Unlike the case with probable cause to justify an arrest, it is not a sine qua 

non of reasonable suspicion that a detaining officer be able to pinpoint a 

particular penal infraction. The reason is simple but fundamental. A brief 

investigative detention constitutes a significantly lesser intrusion upon the 

privacy and integrity of the person than a full-blown custodial arrest. For 

this reason, a warrantless investigative detention may be deemed 

“reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes on the basis of a lesser 

quantum or quality of information—reasonable suspicion rather than 

probable cause. Likewise, because a detention is less intrusive than an 

arrest, the specificity with which the articulable information known to the 

police must demonstrate a particular penal offense has occurred, is 

occurring, or soon will occur, is concomitantly less. It is, after all, only an 

“investigative” detention. So long as the intrusion does not exceed the 

legitimate scope of such a detention and evolve into a greater 

intrusiveness inherent in an arrest-sans-probable-cause, the Fourth 

Amendment will tolerate a certain degree of police proaction.
Bukowski v. State Page 7

Id. at 915-17 (internal footnotes & quotations omitted) (emphasis in original); see 

Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 337, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (op. on reh’g) (noting that 

probable cause is to be evaluated by the court on the basis of the collective information 

of the police rather than that of only the officer who conducts the search or performs the 

act of arresting).

C. Discussion

In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found the following 

beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) Deputy Michael Pool[e] personally observed the scene of the Capital 

Murder, Robbery[,] and Burglary at the home of the alleged victim, Rick 

Warren[,] in Rio Vista, Johnson County, Texas. Deputy Pool[e] conducted 

interviews of Michelle Adams, the victim’s sister, and Eddie Reed, the 

victim’s brother-in-law at the scene of the offenses. Deputy Pool[e] was 

told by Michelle Adams that the defendant, Jeremy Bukowski[,] and his 

girlfriend, Jennifer Davis, had recently lived with the victim and had been 

evicted from the property by the victim’s mother because they had stolen 

items from the victim. Michelle Adams related to Deputy Pool[e] that the 

defendant was angry about his eviction and the allegations of theft and 

that she believed that he was the one who had committed the offenses 

against the victim. Deputy Pool[e] relayed this information to other 

deputies and detectives with the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office, 

including Leona Yocham, Deputy Clark, Sheriff Bob Alford, and Troy 

Fuller.

(2) Troy Fuller responded to the crime scene in Rio Vista and was given 

reports by all deputies and other personnel on the scene, including 

deputies Poole and Clark and detectives Mike Gaudet and Leona Yocham 

and others. Based on the information he received, including information 

derived from Michelle Adams and the law enforcement on the scene, he 

believed that the defendant, Jeremy Bukowski[,] was the actor in the 

offenses, a suspect in the offenses or had been involved in the offenses and 

other criminal activity. Based on these beliefs, Troy Fuller contacted the 

Johnson County Sheriff’s Dispatch and requested a call to be released to 

law enforcement to find the defendant, Jeremy Bukowski, and to stop him 

and investigate him for his involvement in the Capital Murder, Robbery[,] 
Bukowski v. State Page 8

and Burglary of Rick Warren. Troy Fuller spoke directly to Lee Shastid 

and Marshall Whitlock of the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office and asked 

them to find, detain[,] and investigate the defendant. Shastid and 

Whitlock received information from Troy Fuller and began to look for the 

defendant in Burleson, Texas, one of Bukowski’s last known residences. 

Troy Fuller had been provided with the name, date of birth, description, 

vehicle description[,] and a photo of the defendant, Jeremy Bukowski, 

which was provided to Shastid, Whitlock[,] and other members of law 

enforcement who were asked to find, detain[,] and investigate the 

defendant.

(3) Marshall Whitlock of the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office was also 

assigned to the STOP Special Crimes Unit of Johnson County. Whitlock 

contacted other members of STOP, including Mark Goetz, Larry Sparks[,] 

and Nick Garret[t], and asked them to detain and investigate the 

defendant for Capital Murder. Larry Sparks was provided with the name, 

date of birth, vehicle description[,] and photograph of the defendant and 

began looking for him in Cleburne, Johnson County, Texas. Sparks was 

able to find Bukowski using the photograph provided and seeing him in a 

vehicle that matched the description of Bukowski’s vehicle at a known 

drug location in Cleburne, Texas at 510 E. Willingham Street. Sparks 

began following the vehicle and called to Mark Goetz and Nick Garrett to 

stop the vehicle for investigation of Bukowski’s involvement in the 

Capital Murder.

(4) Mark Goetz pulled along Bukowski’s vehicle and signaled him to pull 

over, which he did. Sparks then made contact with Bukowski and asked 

him to exit the vehicle and conducted a “Terry frisk” for officer safety. 

Sparks asked Bukowski if he had anything in his pockets that would hurt 

Sparks. Bukowski said he had “a point (syringe) in his right pocket that 

he had used to shoot methamphetamine that morning.” Sparks asked 

Bukowski if he had anything illegal in the vehicle and Bukowski admitted 

to having scales in the vehicle. Sparks arrested Bukowski for the criminal 

offense of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Sparks conducted an 

inventory of the vehicle and had Officer Nick Garrett transport the vehicle 

for impound at the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office.

(5) That under the totality of the circumstances, the stop and detention of 

Defendant was lawfully conducted based on reasonable suspicion that an 

offense had been committed or was being committed and that Defendant 

was involved. The warrantless pat down search of Defendant was 

lawfully conducted for officer safety. The arrest of Defendant and the 

search incident to that arrest of the vehicle were lawfully conducted after 
Bukowski v. State Page 9

the arrest of Defendant of the criminal offense of Possession of Drug 

Paraphernalia.

On appeal, appellant complains that Adams did not personally witness the 

alleged crimes; therefore, she was not a reliable witness upon which police could rely to 

develop reasonable suspicion. We disagree.

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that “information provided to 

police from a citizen-informant who identifies himself and may be held to account for 

the accuracy and veracity of his report may be regarded as reliable.” Derichsweiler, 348 

S.W.3d at 914-15. Further, “[i]n such a scenario, the only question is whether the 

information that the known citizen-informant provides, viewed through the prism of 

the detaining officer’s particular level of knowledge and experience, objectively 

supports a reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity is afoot.” Id. at 915. 

Testimony during the suppression hearing demonstrated that Adams was on the 

property the night of the incident and that she made a frantic telephone call to the 

police at approximately 2:00 a.m., relaying that: “someone had broken into her 

brother’s house, had taken his items, and had hurt him. Those were her words. And 

that he was not breathing.” 

Upon arriving at the scene, police saw Adams, a resident on the property who 

lived about twenty yards away from the crime scene, standing in the driveway “visibly 

frantic, arms waving, very distraught.” The police subsequently investigated Warren’s 

mobile home and discovered visible damage to the inside door frame, that several of 

Warren’s possessions were missing, and Warren “laying [sic] on the floor by his bed 
Bukowski v. State Page 10

laying [sic] on his back face up. He was very, very visible in the face and there was [sic] 

no visible signs of life.” Based on their investigation of the crime scene, police 

determined that Warren had been murdered and that a robbery or burglary had taken 

place.

After securing the scene, police spoke with Adams once again. According to 

Michael Poole, a patrol deputy for the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office, Adams 

recounted the following:

Ms. Adams advised us that approximately 1:00 o’clock she had been 

visiting with her brother. They’d been sitting out on the front porch just 

kind of talking. She returned to her residence. [Warren] went inside his. 

And then maybe an hour later she noticed that his front door was open, 

which she advised us was not common behavior for him, and she heard a 

loud thud or banging sound as she went to try to make contact with her 

brother and she saw two shadows. That was all that she was able to 

describe it as. And then she went inside after she awoke [sic] her husband 

up. They went in and found Mr. Warren and called us. 

When asked who might have been involved in the incident, Adams advised 

police that: (1) appellant and his girlfriend, Jennifer Davis, had recently lived in 

Warren’s mobile home, which is located in a remote place; (2) equipment used for the 

renovation of other mobile homes on the property was missing during the time 

appellant and Davis lived in Warren’s mobile home; (3) she confronted appellant about 

the missing items and asked Davis to leave; (4) appellant and Davis refused to leave 

and continued living in Warren’s mobile home until Adams’s mother arrived from out 

of state and had appellant and Davis evicted; and (5) appellant was angry about the 

eviction. In fact, Adams told Deputy Poole that the eviction of appellant and his 

girlfriend was an “unpleasant experience, it was not a happy parting.” In addition, 
Bukowski v. State Page 11

Adams noted that appellant is a member of the Aryan Brotherhood criminal gang and 

that his street name is “Bounce.” Several officers testified at the suppression hearing 

that they regarded Adams as credible and reliable.

Based on the information obtained from the crime scene and from Adams, police 

determined that appellant had a motive to commit the crimes and, thus, was a person of 

interest. Police proceeded to obtain information about appellant’s vehicle and his 

whereabouts. Appellant was well known to police as a drug user in the area; therefore, 

police were able to obtain appellant’s name, date of birth, description, vehicle 

description, and a photo of appellant. Appellant was eventually discovered in 

Cleburne, Texas, and Officer Mark Goetz effectuated the stop and detention of 

appellant, as noted in the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

Considering the knowledge of all of the police involved in the investigation, in 

addition to the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the record contains 

sufficient, articulable facts that give rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity 

was afoot and, thus, supports the temporary detention of appellant. See State v. Kerwick, 

393 S.W.3d 270, 273-74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923; York 

v. State, 342 S.W.3d 528, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)); see also Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d 

915-17; Castro, 227 S.W.3d at 741. As such, we cannot say that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. See Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48; see 

also Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 88-89. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s first issue.
Bukowski v. State Page 12

II. THE JURY CHARGE

In his second issue, appellant complains that the jury charge wrongfully allowed 

a non-unanimous verdict because it did not require the jury to agree on the underlying 

offense—robbery or burglary—during which the murder occurred.

A. Standard of Review

In reviewing a jury-charge issue, an appellate court’s first duty is to determine 

whether error exists in the jury charge. Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1996). If error if found, the appellate court must analyze that error for harm. 

Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). If an error was 

properly preserved by objection, reversal will be necessary if the error is not harmless. 

Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Conversely, if error was 

not preserved at trial by a proper objection, a reversal will be granted only if the error 

presents egregious harm, meaning appellant did not receive a fair and impartial trial. 

Id. To obtain reversal for jury-charge error, appellant must have suffered actual harm 

and not just merely theoretical harm. Sanchez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 767, 775 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2012); Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). To determine 

whether a defendant suffered harm, we consider: “(1) the charge itself; (2) the state of 

the evidence[,] including contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence; (2) 

arguments of counsel; and (4) any other relevant information revealed by the record of 

the trial as a whole.” Jordan v. State, 1 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. 

ref’d) (quoting Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 171).

B. Jury Unanimity
Bukowski v. State Page 13

The Texas Constitution requires a unanimous verdict in felony criminal cases. 

TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.29(a) (West Supp. 2013). 

A unanimous verdict is more than a mere agreement on a violation of a statute; it 

ensures that the jury agrees on the factual elements underlying an offense. Francis v. 

State, 36 S.W.3d 121, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (op. on reh’g) (en banc). Generally, 

instructing a jury on alternative theories of committing the same offense does not 

violate the unanimity requirement. Martinez v. State, 129 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2004); see Jefferson v. State, 189 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“Thus, 

while jury unanimity is required on the essential elements of the offense, when the 

statute in question establishes different modes or means by which the offense may be 

committed, unanimity is generally not required on the alternate modes or means of 

commission.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). If a defendant is charged 

with multiple offenses, however, the trial court must instruct the jury that it cannot 

return a guilty verdict unless it unanimously agrees upon which offense the defendant 

committed. Soto v. State, 267 S.W.3d 327, 335 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.) 

(citing Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en banc)).

C. Discussion

At trial, appellant objected to sections six and seven of the jury charge on the 

grounds that neither required unanimity as to which underlying offense of capital 

murder was committed—robbery or burglary. In Gardner v. State, the Texas Court of 

Criminal Appeals stated the following:
Bukowski v. State Page 14

We have consistently followed the Kitchens analysis in the context of 

capital murder jury charges: the gravamen of capital murder is 

intentionally (or knowingly) causing a death, plus any one of various 

different types of aggravating elements, and we most recently concluded 

that our holding in Kitchens applies equally to all alternate theories of 

capital murder contained within [Penal Code] § 19.03, whether they are 

found in the same or different subsections, so long as the same victim is 

alleged for the predicate murder. Kitchens remains good law. The jury 

charge properly set out the underlying felonies of burglary and retaliation 

in the disjunctive, and the jury did not need to be unanimous concerning 

which felony appellant was in the course of committing.

306 S.W.3d 274, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted); 

see Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In Kitchens, the Court 

noted that: 

And although the indictment may allege the differing methods of 

committing the offense in the conjunctive, it is proper for the jury to be 

charged in the disjunctive. It is appropriate where the alternate theories of 

committing the same offense are submitted to the jury in the disjunctive 

for the jury to return a general verdict if the evidence is sufficient to 

support a finding under any of the theories submitted. Indeed, the 

Supreme Court has determined that there is no general requirement that 

the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie 

the verdict.

823 S.W.2d at 258 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see Russeau v. State, 171 

S.W.3d 871, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“[T]he evidence in a capital murder prosecution 

need be sufficient to establish only one of the underlying felonies alleged in the 

indictment.”).

Here, appellant was charged with capital murder under section 19.03(a)(2), 

which provides that a person “commits an offense if the person commits 

murder . . . and . . . the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of 

committing or attempting to commit . . . burglary, robbery . . . .” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
Bukowski v. State Page 15

§ 19.03(a)(2). Moreover, in this case, the indictment alleged both burglary of a 

habitation and robbery in the conjunctive as underlying felonies for capital murder. In 

addition, the jury charge alleged the same victim for the predicate murder, Warren, and 

allowed the jury to convict appellant of capital murder if they found beyond a 

reasonable doubt that he caused the death of Warren while in the course of committing 

or attempting to commit robbery or burglary of a habitation. In other words, the jury 

was charged in the disjunctive with respect to the purported burglary of a habitation 

and robbery felonies underlying the capital-murder offense. Under the law articulated 

in Gardner and Kitchens, this is proper. See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 302; see also Kitchens, 

823 S.W.2d at 258. The jury was not required to be unanimous on which of the two 

underlying felonies appellant was in the course of committing or attempting to commit 

when he caused the death of Warren.2 See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 302; see also Kitchens, 

823 S.W.2d at 258. As such, we cannot say that the jury charge was erroneous. See 

Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 302; Kitchens, 823 S.W.2d at 258; see also Hutch, 922 S.W.2d at 170. 

We therefore overrule appellant’s second issue. 

 

2

In any event, in his brief, appellant relies heavily on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ 

decision in Ngo v. State to support his contention that the charge in this case was erroneous because it did 

not require unanimity with regard to the underlying felonies alleged. See 175 S.W.3d 738, 745, 755 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2005) (en banc). This case is distinguishable from Ngo. In Ngo, the State sought one 

conviction for credit-card abuse with evidence that at different times the defendant committed three 

different acts that the applicable statute defined as separate criminal offenses and not as means of 

committing a single criminal offense. See Ngo, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743. However, in this case, the State 

sought one conviction for capital murder, alleging two different acts—burglary of a habitation and 

robbery—that section 19.03 of the Texas Penal Code defines as means for committing a single criminal 

offense and not as two separate criminal offenses. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (West Supp. 

2013). 
Bukowski v. State Page 16

III. APPELLANT’S STATEMENT TO POLICE

In his third issue, appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by 

failing to suppress his September 21, 2011 written statement, wherein appellant 

confessed to being present and taking part in the incident. Specifically, appellant 

argues that his written statement was not voluntary and should have been suppressed.

A. Applicable Law

It is the State’s burden to establish a valid waiver of Miranda rights by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) 

(citing Joseph v. State, 309 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). “There are two facets to 

any inquiry with respect to the adequacy of a purported waiver of Miranda rights . . . .” 

Id. 

First, the waiver must be “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of 

a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or 

deception.” Second the waiver must be made “with a full awareness both 

of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the 

decision to abandon it.” 

Ripkowski v. State, 61 S.W.3d 378, 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (quoting Colorado v. Spring, 

479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S. Ct. 851, 857, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1987) (footnotes omitted)). 

“Before it may be said that a waiver of a Miranda right is involuntary, however, there 

must be some element of official intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Leza, 351 S.W.3d 

at 349 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70, 107 S. Ct. 515, 523, 93 L. Ed. 2d 

473 (1986); Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). Moreover, 

regarding the requirement that the waiver must also be knowing and intelligent, the 

United States Supreme Court has noted: 
Bukowski v. State Page 17

Once it is determined that a suspect[ ] . . . at all times knew he could stand 

mute . . ., and that he was aware of the State’s intention to use his 

statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver 

is valid as a matter of law.

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-23, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L .Ed. 2d 410 (1986). A 

waiver is knowingly and intelligently made if the accused has been made aware and 

fully comprehends that he has the right to remain silent in the face of police 

interrogation and to discontinue the dialogue at any time, and that the consequence of 

his waiver is that his words may be used against him later in a court of law. Leza, 351 

S.W.3d at 350.

Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, when a 

written statement is obtained as a result of custodial interrogation, the statement must 

show on its face that: (1) the accused received the required warning; and (2) prior to 

and during the making of the statement, the accused knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily waived his rights. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2(a)-(b) (West 

Supp. 2013). If these requirements are not met, then the statement is inadmissible. See 

id.

“Article 38.22 requires merely that the accused receive the statutory warnings 

before giving a statement.” Brooks v. State, 991 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

1998, pet. ref’d) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2(a)). “‘Because a 

written statement is not obtained (because it is not admissible) until it is signed, giving 

the required warnings before the accused signs the statement meets the statutory 

requirements.’” Id. (quoting Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 
Bukowski v. State Page 18

1996)). In Garcia v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that an accused 

receives the warnings where they are located at the top of the page above his statement. 

919 S.W.2d 370, 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (op. on reh’g); see Brooks, 991 S.W.2d at 41. 

“[T]he appearance of [appellant’s] initials . . . is evidence that he received them.” Garcia, 

919 S.W.2d at 386. Moreover, “the presence of a valid waiver of the rights contained in 

section 2(a) can be ascertained from considering the totality of an accused’s statement, 

and the waiver (required by section 2(b)) is sufficient if it substantially complies with 

section 2(b).” Gutierrez v. State, 945 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no 

pet.) (citing Garcia, 919 S.W.2d at 387). A waiver can be inferred from the language 

contained in the written statement itself. See, e.g., Smith v. State, AP-75,793, 2010 Tex. 

Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 582, at *13 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 29, 2010) (per curiam) 

(citing Garcia, 919 S.W.2d at 385-86).

B. Discussion

In this issue, appellant specifically complains about State’s exhibit 1, which is the 

written, voluntary statement appellant gave to Johnson County Sheriff’s Office 

Detective Leona Yocham. Specifically, appellant contends that the statement was not 

voluntary because Detective Yocham only included appellant’s identifying information 

on the first page of the seven-page document. Appellant argues that this oversight and 

the fact that the video of appellant’s interrogation by police is missing suggests that his 

statement was neither voluntary nor knowing. We disagree.

A review of the seven-page statement shows that appellant provided information 

about the incident to Yocham, who documented appellant’s statements on a form 
Bukowski v. State Page 19

generated by the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office. At the top of the first page of the 

document, Yocham included the date and time of the statement and appellant’s 

identifying information. Yocham did not include this information on the other six 

pages contained in the statement. 

Nevertheless, on each page of the seven-page statement, the following warnings 

were provided:

FIRST[:] THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND 

NOT MAKE ANY STATEMENT AT ALL AND THAT ANY STATEMENT 

I MAKE MAY BE USED AGAINST ME AT MY TRIAL[.]

SECOND[:] THAT ANY STATEMENT I MAKE MAY BE USED AS 

EVIDENCE AGAINST ME AT COURT.

THIRD[:] THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE A LAWYER 

PRESENT TO ADVISE ME PRIOR TO AND DURING ANY 

QUESTIONING[.]

FOURTH[:] THAT IF I AM UNABLE TO EMPLOY A LAWYER, I HAVE 

THE RIGHT TO HAVE A LAWYER APPOINTED TO ADVISE ME PRIOR 

TO AND DURING ANY QUESTIONING[.]

FIFTH[:] THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE THE 

INTERVIEW AT ANY TIME[.]

PRIOR TO AND DURING THE MAKING OF THIS STATEMENT, I 

HAVE AND DO KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND 

VOLUNTARILY WAIVE THE ABOVE EXPLAINED RIGHTS AND I DO 

MAKE THE FOLLOWING VOLUNTARY STATEMENT TO THE 

AFOREMENTIONED PERSON OF MY OWN FREE WILL AND 

WITHOUT ANY PROMISES OR OFFERS OF LENIENCY OR FAVORS, 

AND WITHOUT COMPULSION OR PERSUASION BY ANY PERSON 

OR PERSONS WHOMSOEVER . . . .

(Emphasis in original). On all of the seven pages of the statement, appellant initialed 

the above-mentioned warnings, indicating that he waived his Miranda rights and that 
Bukowski v. State Page 20

his statement was voluntary. Furthermore, each page of the statement also included the 

following language after which appellant signed as “SIGNATURE OF PERSON 

MAKING VOLUNTARY STATEMENT”: “I HAVE READ THIS STATEMENT 

CONSISTING OF 7 PAGE(S), EACH PAGE OF WHICH BEARS MY SIGNATURE AND 

I DO AFFIRM THAT ALL FACTS AND STATEMENTS CONTAINED HERIN ARE 

TRUE AND CORRECT.” (Emphasis in original). This language indicates that the 

written statement appellant gave to police comprised seven pages, and appellant’s 

identity on each of the pages is clear from the context of the document. Additionally, 

appellant’s signature at the bottom of each page as the “SIGNATURE OF PERSON 

MAKING VOLUNTARY STATEMENT” combined with his initials regarding the 

Miranda warnings at the top of each page sufficiently conveys by a preponderance of 

the evidence that appellant understood his constitutional rights and that he knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 

38.22, § 2(a)-(b); see also Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 349-50. Moreover, appellant does not direct 

us to evidence in the record demonstrating official intimidation, coercion, or deception. 

See Leza, 351 S.W.3d at 349; see also Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 170. 

Accordingly, a review of the totality of appellant’s written statement 

demonstrates that the requirements of article 38.22, section 2(b) were met. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2(b); Garcia, 919 S.W.2d at 386-87; Gutierrez, 945 

S.W.2d at 289; see also Smith, 2010 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 582, at *13. As such, 

we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion to 
Bukowski v. State Page 21

suppress State’s exhibit 1. See Crain, 315 S.W.3d at 48; see also Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 88-

89. We overrule appellant’s third issue. 

IV. HEARSAY

In his fourth issue, appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

overruling his hearsay objection to testimony provided by Texas Ranger Michael Don 

Stoner. In particular, appellant argues Ranger Stoner’s testimony that Adams told him 

that appellant may have wanted to hurt her brother should have been excluded on 

hearsay grounds.

A. Standard of Review

We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of 

discretion. De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); McDonald v. 

State, 179 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “Under an abuse of discretion 

standard, an appellate court should not disturb the trial court’s decision if the ruling 

was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 367 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). 

B. Applicable Law

With the exception of privileges, the Texas Rules of Evidence do not apply to 

suppression hearings because they involve only the determination of preliminary 

questions. Graves v. State, 307 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d) 

(citing Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). In Granados, 

appellant complained that, at the suppression hearing, the trial court erred in admitting 

into evidence a police officer’s testimony of what another officer told him about what 
Bukowski v. State Page 22

the victim’s family said about the victim’s whereabouts. Id. at 226-27. Appellant 

claimed that testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 227. The Granados Court 

concluded that the officer’s testimony where “he testified as to the facts that 

he . . . believed constituted probable cause,” was not hearsay and, thus, admissible. Id.

at 230. Moreover, the Granados Court noted that the testimony would have been 

admissible, even if it had been hearsay, because courts are permitted to rely on hearsay 

and other inadmissible evidence in suppression hearings even though it would not 

otherwise be admissible at trial. Id. at 227 n.29 (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 

667, 679, 100 S. Ct. 2406, 2414, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1980) (“At a suppression hearing, the 

court may rely on hearsay and other evidence, even though that evidence would not be 

admissible at trial.”)).

Here, appellant complains about Ranger Stoner’s testimony during a 

suppression hearing. Even if Ranger Stoner’s testimony constituted hearsay, because 

the Texas Rules of Evidence do not apply to suppression hearings, we cannot say that 

the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony.3 See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 

679, 100 S. Ct. at 2414; Granados, 85 S.W.3d at 227; Graves, 307 S.W.3d at 489; see also De 

La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343; McDonald, 179 S.W.3d at 576. As such, we overrule 

appellant’s fourth issue.

V. CONCLUSION

 

3 We also question whether the complained-of testimony is really hearsay given that the content 

of Ranger Stoner’s testimony about what Adams told him described how appellant became a suspect in 

this case. See Lee v. State, 29 S.W.3d 570, 577 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.) (“Police officers may testify 

to explain how the investigation began and how the defendant became a suspect.”); see also Zamora v. 

State, No. 13-10-00146-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 10246, at *22 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 30, 2010, 

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same).
Bukowski v. State Page 23

Having overruled all of appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of 

the trial court.

AL SCOGGINS

Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed January 9, 2014

Do not publish

[CRPM]