FILED 


AUGUST 15, 2013 


In the Office ofthe Clerk ofCourt 


WA State Court of Appeals, Division III 


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 


DIVISION THREE 


STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 30220-2-III 

) 

Respondent, ) 

) 

v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

) 

JONA RENEE ZEIGLER, ) 

) 

Appellant. ) 

KULIK, J. - Jona Renee Zeigler appeals her conviction for attempting to elude a 

pursuing police vehicle. A CrR 3.5 hearing was held to assess the incriminating 

statements Ms. Zeigler made to an officer while she was in the hospital recovering from 

injuries she suffered during the incident. Ms. Zeigler did not appear at the hearing but 

was represented by her counsel. The statements were admitted. Ajury found Ms. Zeigler 

guilty of attempting to elude. She contends that her absence from the CrR 3.5 hearing 

violated her right to be present at all critical stages oftrial proceedings. She also alleges 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 
No. 30220-2-III 

State v. Zeigler 

We conclude that Ms. Zeigler fails to establish a manifest error and she waived her 

right to be present at the CrR 3.5 hearing. Her counsel was effective. Therefore, we 

affirm the conviction. 

FACTS 

Corporal Thomas Tufte approached Jona Zeigler while she was sitting in her truck 

in a parking lot near downtown Moses Lake. Corporal Tufte told her there was a warrant 

for her arrest, and that she was not free to go. After an additional conversation, Ms. 

Zeigler told him'" I'm not going,'" backed up her truck, and then drove out ofthe 

parking lot. Report of Proceedings (Aug. 24 & 25, 2011) (RP) at l39. Corporal Tufte got 

into his patrol car and followed her. 

During the pursuit, Corporal Tufte activated his siren. After turning on a 

residential street, Ms. Zeigler attempted to get out ofthe moving truck. She slipped, 

grabbed the steering wheel and tried to get back into the truck. As the truck bounced off 

the curb, Ms. Zeigler lost her grip and fell. The truck continued to roll until it high 

centered on a chain link fence. Ms. Zeigler became pinned under the rear wheel of her 

vehicle. 

Nearby neighbors came to the assist Corporal Tufte in getting Ms. Zeigler out from 

underneath the truck. After he had moved her away from the truck, Corporal Tufte found 

2 

No.30220-2-III 

State v. Zeigler 

Ms. Zeigler had a pulse but was not breathing. An ambulance took Ms. Zeigler to a 

nearby hospital, where Detective Kurt Adkinson interviewed her 10 days later. 

The State charged Ms. Zeigler with attempting to elude and reckless endangennent 

and sought an exceptional sentence based on an allegation of endangennent by eluding. 

The State proposed to introduce statements by Ms. Zeigler allegedly made to Corporal 

Tufte and Detective Adkinson. 

The trial court conducted a suppression hearing at which Ms. Zeigler did not 

appear. Defense counsel told the court that she had asked Ms. Zeigler to be present, but 

was prepared to proceed given the nature of the hearing. The court did not question the 

reason for Ms. Zeigler's absence. The hearing proceeded without Ms. Zeigler. 

At the outset ofthe suppression hearing, defense counsel told the court that she 

was not challenging the admissibility ofMs. Zeigler's statements to Corporal Tufte 

because she did not believe that her client was in custody at the time. She offered to 

stipulate to the admissibility ofthe statements in her client's absence, but ultimately 

agreed to the admissibility of a transcript ofthe corporal's previously recorded statement 

The trial court found that defense counsel had stipulated to the admissibility of Ms. 

Zeigler's statements to Corporal Tufte. 

3 

No. 30220-2-111 

State v. Zeigler 

As to the statements to Detective Adkinson, Ms. Zeigler contended that she was 

heavily medicated at the time she was questioned by Detective Adkinson and not capable 

of fully understanding her statements or the Miranda! warnings. The trial court found 

that Ms. Zeigler's coherent and thoughtful responses to Detective Adkinson's questions 

demonstrated that her waiver of rights was knowing and voluntary. The court ruled that 

her statements to law enforcement officers were admissible. 

Five days later, Ms. Zeigler appeared at a hearing on the State's motion to amend 

the information. The trial court did not ask her anything about her failure to appear at the 

suppression hearing nor did Ms. Zeigler mention her nonappearance. Ms. Zeigler also did 

not object when the findings of fact and conclusions of law from the suppression hearing 

were presented to the court on the first day of trial. 

Ms. Zeigler appeared at a readiness hearing on Monday, August 22. Ms. Zeigler 

acknowledged that she should be ready to proceed to trial on Wednesday. The trial began 

as scheduled on Wednesday, August 24. 

During the State's case, Corporal Tufte told the jury that Ms. Zeigler initially lied 

about her identity and that as she began to drive away, she said to Corporal Tufte, "'No, 

rm not going.'" RP at 139. Detective Adkinson related several ofMs. Zeigler's 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 

4 

No.30220-2-III 

State v. Zeigler 

statements made during his interview with her, including her admission that she told 

Corporal Tufte that she '" can't go to jail'" and was '" going to try and run.'" RP at 196, 

198. 

Ms. Zeigler testified at trial. Her trial testimony did not address the statements 

made to the officers. Instead, Ms. Zeigler testified that she left the parking lot quickly. 

About one-half mile later, she saw the officer was following her with his lights on. She 

said she knew the officer was behind her but was ignoring his signal. She also said that 

she thought about stopping but her husband needed her care at home. 

A jury found Ms. Zeigler guilty of eluding and answered "yes" on the special 

verdict form that Ms. Zeigler's actions of eluding threatened other persons with physical 

injury or harm. Ms. Zeigler appeals. 

ANALYSIS 

Whether a defendant's constitutional right to be present has been violated is a 

question of law reviewed de novo. State v.lrby, 170 Wn.2d 874, 880,246 P.3d 796 

(2011). 

In reviewing a trial court's decision regarding whether a defendant is voluntarily 

absent from trial, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Garza, 150 Wn.2d 

360, 365-66, 77 P.3d 347 (2003). The determination whether the defendant is voluntarily 

5 

No. 30220-2-111 

State v. Zeigler 

absent from trial is dependent upon an inquiry into the facts and the totality of the 

circumstances, and the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to pass on 

the question. Id. at 366. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision is 

manifestly unreasonable or is based on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. Id. 

(quoting State v. Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561,626,23 P.3d 1046 (2001)). 

erR 3.5 Suppression Hearing. Generally, appellate courts will not consider an 

issue raised for the first time on appeal unless the issue involves a manifest error affecting 

a constitutional right. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322,333,899 P.2d 1251 (1995) 

(quoting RAP 2.5(a)(3)). The burden is on the defendant to "identifY a constitutional 

error and show how, in the context of the trial, the alleged error actually affected the 

defendant's constitutional rights; it is this showing of actual prejudice that makes the 

error 'manifest', allowing appellate review." Id. 

"[P]ermitting every possible constitutional error to be raised for the first time on 

appeal undermines the trial process, generates unnecessary appeals, creates undesirable 

retrials and is wasteful ofthe limited resources of prosecutors, public defenders and 

courts." State v. Lynn, 67 Wn. App. 339,344, 835 P.2d 251 (1992). 

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of 

the proceedings. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522,526, 105 S. Ct. 1482,84 L. Ed. 

6 

No. 30220~2~III 

State v. Zeigler 

2d 486 (1985). "The core of the constitutional right to be present is the right to be present 

when evidence is being presented." In re Pers. Restraint ofLord, 123 Wn.2d 296, 306, 

868 P.2d 835 (1994). A defendant may waive his rights under the constitution, provided 

that such waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. State v. Thomson, 123 Wn.2d 

877,880, 872 P.2d 1097 (1994). Constitutional rights can be waived by conduct. State v. 

Myers, 86 Wn.2d 419, 426~27, 545 P.2d 538 (1976). Voluntarily absenting oneself from 

a proceeding may waive a defendant's right to be present. See Taylor v. United States, 

414 V.S. 17,20,94 S. Ct. 194,38 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1973). 

Washington requires courts to conduct a hearing pursuant to CrR 3.5 to determine 

the admissibility of a defendant's statements to law enforcement. State v. Williams, 137 

Wn.2d 746, 749~50, 975 P.2d 963 (1999). A CrR 3.5 hearing tests the voluntariness of an 

incriminating statement prior to its admission at trial. Williams, 137 Wn.2d at 754. Even 

after incriminating statements are admitted following a CrR 3.5 hearing, a defendant is 

not precluded from presenting evidence that casts doubt on the credibility or weight to be 

given to the statements. CrR 3.5(d). 

"A violation of the due process right to be present is subject to harmless error 

analysis." Irby, 170 Wn.2d at 885. '" [T]he burden ofproving harmlessness is on the 

State and it must do so beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. at 886 (quoting State v. 

7 

No.30220-2-III 

State v. Zeigler 

Caliguri, 99 Wn.2d 501,509,664 P.2d 466 (1983)). 

Ms. Zeigler contends that the trial court violated her due process right to be present 

at all critical stages ofthe trial proceedings by conducting the erR 3.5 hearing in her 

absence. She maintains that the evidence fails to establish a knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent waiver of her rights. She also contends that this error is not harmless because 

she could have objected at the hearing to the testimony regarding her confessional 

statements. 

Ms. Zeigler ~aises this due process challenge for the first time on appeal. Despite 

several other complaints, Ms. Zeigler never approached the trial court with the issue of 

her absence from the erR 3.5 hearing. The preliminary question is whether Ms. Zeigler 

raises a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. 

In this situation, Ms. Zeigler's erR 3.5 hearing is a critical stage of the trial 

proceedings because it involved the taking of testimony. Detective Adkinson testified at 

the hearing regarding Ms. Zeigler's confessional statements, and the trial court ruled that 

this evidence was admissible. Ms. Zeigler's alleged error involves a constitutional right. 

However, the trial court's decision to conduct the hearing without Ms. Zeigler's 

presence was not a manifest error. Ms. Zeigler fails to show actual prejudice from the 

error. Ms. Zeigler's constitutional right to have incriminating statements assessed was 

8 

No. 30220-2-III 

State v. Zeigler 

protected despite her absence. Ms. Zeigler's attorney represented her and questioned 

Detective Adkinson about Ms. Zeigler's statements. 

Moreover, Ms. Zeigler does not establish how the outcome of the hearing would 

have been different with her presence. There is no indication that the court's findings and 

conclusions from the hearing were erroneous or would not have been admissible at trial. 

Ms. Zeigler does not assign error to the trial court's findings from the erR 3.5 hearing. 

Nor did Ms. Zeigler object to the entry of these findings, even though she was in the 

courtroom when her attorney presented the findings and conclusions from the erR 3.5 

hearing to the trial court. Ms. Zeigler did not contradict Detective Adkinson's testimony 

at trial. In sum, no actual prejudice resulted from Ms. Zeigler's absence because she was 

afforded the right to have her incriminating statements assessed, and she does not contend 

that the statements are false. She fails to establish a manifest error? 

Even ifwe were to decide that Ms. Zeigler raises a manifest error affecting a 

constitutional right, her contention still fails. Under the circumstances, the trial court did 

not err in conducting the erR 3.5 hearing despite Ms. Zeigler's absence. Ms. Zeigler 

voluntarily waived her right to be present, as evidenced through her conduct. Ms. Zeigler 

knew ofthe hearing and failed to appear. She was not in custody. Ms. Zeigler's attorney 

2 But see Irby, 170 Wn.2d 874. 

9 

No.30220-2-III 

State v. Zeigler 

implied that Ms. Zeigler was waving her right to appear by telling the trial court that it 

should proceed without Ms. Zeigler, given the nature of the hearing. When Ms. Zeigler 

appeared at the next court proceeding, she did not offer an explanation for her absence or 

object to the hearing being held. Nor did she complain at trial when the findings and 

conclusions from the CrR 3.5 hearing were presented to the court. 

There is no prejudicial effect from the trial court's failure to question Ms. Zeigler 

as to whether she knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived her right to be present 

during the CrR 3.5 hearing. As we have previously stated, Ms. Zeigler's attorney made 

her arguments for suppression ofthe statements. Ms. Zeigler did not contest any of the 

fmdings or conclusions ofthe trial court from the CrR 3.5 hearing or contradict Detective 

Adkinson's testimony. Ms. Zeigler does not establish that her presence at the hearing 

would have changed the evidence presented at trial or the outcome of her trial. 

In any case, the error was harmless. The outcome of Ms. Zeigler's trial would not 

have been different ifshe was present at the CrR 3.5 hearing. Corporal Tufte's 

statements were still admissible at trial. Ms. Zeigler's attorney told the court that she did 

not plan on contesting the statements because the statements were not made while Ms. 

Zeigler was in custody. Corporal Tufte's statements established that Ms. Zeigler knew 

she was not free to leave when she exited the parking lot. 

10 

No.30220-2-III 

State v. Zeigler 

As for the statements made to Detective Adkinson, even if Ms. Zeigler's presence 

would have somehow convinced the court to suppress these statements, there was still 

ample evidence to support the verdict that Ms. Zeigler attempted to evade the police. In 

addition to Corporal Tufte's testimony, Ms. Zeigler testified that she was aware that a 

police car was following her and that she did not stop. The videotape of the police 

pursuit also established that Ms. Zeigler failed to stop for police. Ms. Zeigler's absence 

at the suppression hearing was a harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 

We decline to review Ms. Zeigler's alleged error for the first time on appeal 

because she fails to establish a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. Even ifwe 

were to address Ms. Zeigler's contention that her constitutional right to be present at all 

crucial stages of trial proceedings was violated, her contention fails. Ms. Zeigler waived 

her right to be present at the proceeding. Any alleged error is not prejudicial and is 

harmless. 

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR REVIEW 

E{(ectiveness ofCounsel. In her statement of additional grounds for review 

(SAG), Ms. Zeigler claims ineffective assistance of counsel. Ms. Zeigler contends that 

defense counsel's performance was defective when counsel (1) admitted in closing 

arguments that Ms. Zeigler was eluding, (2) told Ms. Zeigler that she did not need to be 

11 

No.30220-2-III 

State v. Zeigler 

present during the CrR 3.5 hearing, and (3) misled Ms. Zeigler about the date ofthe trial, 

causing Ms. Zeigler to rush horne from an out-of-townjob opportunity. 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, two prongs need to be satisfied: 

(1) counsel's conduct must be deficient, and (2) counsel's acts must have prejudiced the 

defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 

674 (1984). "[S]crutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Id. at 689. 

Where the evidence of guilt on a particular count is overwhelming and there is no 

reason to suppose that any juror doubts it, conceding guilt on that count in closing can be 

a sound trial tactic. State v. Silva, 106 Wn. App. 586, 596, 24 P.3d 477 (2001) (quoting 

Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473,474 (7th Cir. 1991)). This approach may help win 

the jury's confidence, preserve the defendant's credibility, and lead the jury toward 

leniency by conceding that the defendant is guilty of a lesser charge. See id. at n.3 7. If 

the concession is a matter oftrial strategy or tactics, it is not ineffective representation. 

Id. at 599. 

We conclude that Ms. Zeigler fails to establish that defense counsel was 

ineffective. Defense counsel's statement during closing argument was not unreasonable. 

Defense counsel could not deny the allegation of attempting to elude because Ms. Zeigler 

admitted to all ofthe elements ofthe offense in her testimony. Also, the videotape 

12 

No. 30220-2-III 

State v. Zeigler 

evidence clearly showed Ms. Zeigler's failure to stop. At this point, it is reasonable to 

conclude that defense counsel's strategy was to minimize the impact ofthe evidence by 

admitting that the evidence established the offense of eluding, but denying that the 

evidence supported the recklessness charge or the special allegation of endangerment. 

This strategy of focusing on charges where reasonable doubt could be established was a 

sound trial tactic. The strategy was effective, as Ms. Zeigler was found not guilty of 

reckless endangerment. 

As for the erR 3.5 hearing, the record does not establish that defense counsel 

advised Ms. Zeigler that she did not need to attend. However, even ifthis was true, 

defense counsel did not act unreasonably in advising Ms. Zeigler. Ms. Zeigler's presence 

would not have changed the outcome ofthe proceeding. The testimony would still have 

been admitted. The trial court recognized the clear admissibility ofthe statements. 

Defense counsel was reasonable in telling Ms. Zeigler that her presence was not 

necessary. There is no prejudice to Ms. Zeigler. 

The alleged confusion over the trial date did not amount to ineffective assistance. 

The trial court addressed this issue and recognized that it could not confirm that defense 

counsel advised Ms. Zeigler of an incorrect trial date. Even so, the court correctly found 

that the action was not prejudicial to Ms. Zeigler. The court found that Ms. Zeigler 

13 

No.30220-2-II1 

State v. Zeigler 

appeared at the pretrial hearing, was advised of the trial date, and had an obligation to 

appear on that date. Defense counsel's failure to confer with Ms. Zeigler immediately 

before trial does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel 

presented a coherent argument and was well prepared. Ms. Zeigler was not prejudiced by 

the alleged error. 

Defense counsel effectively represented Ms. Zeigler. 

Jury Instructions. Next, Ms. Zeigler contends that the jury confused the 

instruction on reckless endangerment with the instruction on the special allegation of 

endangerment on the eluding charge. She contends that the instructions appear to charge 

her twice for the same offense and the jury's confusion may have resulted in Ms. Zeigler 

being convicted of the wrong offense. Ms. Zeigler did not object to the jury instructions 

at trial. 

Generally, a defendant's failure to object to jury instructions at trial results in a 

waiver ofthe right to challenge the instruction on appeal. However, an error may be 

raised for the first time on appeal if it '" invades a fundamental right ofthe accused.' " 

State v. Levy, 156Wn.2d 709, 719, 132 P.3d 1076 (2006) (quoting State v. Becker, 132 

Wn.2d 54, 64,935 P.2d 1321 (1997)). Also, a double jeopardy violation is an error of 

constitutional magnitude and can be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Mutch, 

14 

No. 30220-2-111 

State v. Zeigler 

171 Wn.2d 646,661,254 PJd 803 (2011). The constitutional guaranty against double 

jeopardy protects a defendant against multiple punishments for the same offense. U.S. 

CONST. amend. V; CONST. art. I, § 9. 

Ms. Zeigler failed to object to the jury instructions at trial. Thus, she waived her 

right to challenge the jury instructions on appeaL Admittedly, Ms. Zeigler alludes to a 

double jeopardy violation in her challenge to the jury instructions. However, no double 

jeopardy violation occurred because she was not convicted of both ofthe separate 

charges. The jury answered affirmatively on the special endangerment allegation, but 

found Ms. Zeigler not guilty ofthe count of reckless endangerment. Thus, she did not 

receive multiple punishments for the same offense. 

In her last SAG issue, Ms. Zeigler suggests that she cannot be found guilty of 

eluding ifthe act takes place on private property. Ms. Zeigler does not cite to legal 

authority to support this position. In any case, the eluding statute does not require the 

offense to occur on public highways. 

Ms. Zeigler waived her right to challenge the jury instructions on appeal. 

15 

No.30220-2-II1 

State v. Zeigler 

We affirm the conviction. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

Kulik, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

Korsmo, C.J. 

("J Sidd~Llr16