IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

Gzim Selmani, 

 Plaintiff, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. ) 

)

) 

No. 20-cv-2097 

Village of Bartlett, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

) 

Memorandum Opinion and Order 

 Plaintiff Gzim Selmani, a police officer employed by the 

Village of Bartlett Police Department, brings this action against 

Defendants—the Village of Bartlett (the “Village”), the Village 

President, and several Bartlett Police Department officials—

seeking damages stemming from the Village’s decision to put Mr. 

Selmani on unpaid medical leave in 2019 after psychological 

symptoms caused by a 2014 training incident intensified. 

Defendants move to dismiss Mr. Selmani’s six-count Amended 

Complaint in its entirety [44]. For the reasons that follow, 

Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part. 

I. 

 In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a 

motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

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I “accept all well pled facts as true and draw all permissible 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate 

Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 334 (7th Cir. 2012). To survive a 

motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim “that is 

plausible on its face” after conclusory allegations are 

disregarded. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 

675 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–

79 (2009)). 

 Mr. Selmani was hired as a police officer by the Village of 

Bartlett Police Department in September 2012. In August 2014, he 

accepted an assignment as a member of the Specialized Police 

Emergency Action Response (“SPEAR”) team. Mr. Selmani took part 

in a SPEAR team training exercise involving simulated ammunition 

on or about August 11, 2014. After the exercise had concluded, 

Mr. Selmani removed his protective equipment. Mr. Selmani’s team 

members, including several of the defendants, then instructed Mr. 

Selmani to re-enter the training room and subsequently fired thirty 

to fifty rounds of simulated ammunition from their AR-15 rifles at 

Mr. Selmani at close range. As a result of this incident, which 

Mr. Selmani characterizes as “hazing,” Mr. Selmani suffered both 

physical and emotional injuries. He alleges that he “struggled 

for years from recurring and disturbing nightmares and flashbacks 

of the traumatic event.” ECF No. 37 ¶ 23. 

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 Mr. Selmani resigned from the SPEAR team in 2017, and 

ultimately reported the incident to his employer in early 2019. 

He sought counseling at that time, and as a result, he was 

eventually diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) 

and other psychological disorders. In February 2019, Mr. Selmani 

requested that he be put on paid leave. Instead, purportedly 

without explanation, the Village placed Mr. Selmani on unpaid leave 

in May 2019 and subsequently ceased providing employee benefits 

such as health care. Mr. Selmani complains that he is entitled to 

a year of salary and other benefits under the Public Employee 

Disability Act (“PEDA”), 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 345/1, but that the 

Village did not initially inform Mr. Selmani that he was eligible 

for those benefits, and then denied his application for reasons of 

timeliness and process. 

 The operative Amended Complaint (the “complaint”) was filed 

in October 2020 after I granted a motion to dismiss the initial 

complaint. See ECF No. 33. The Amended Complaint asserts six 

causes of action, including both federal claims pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law claims. Defendants now move to dismiss 

the complaint in its entirety. 

II. 

 In Count I, Mr. Selmani brings a claim for due process 

violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, he claims 

that he was deprived of due process when he was placed on unpaid 

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leave without a pre-decision hearing or other opportunity to be 

heard. 

 Due process claims such as Mr. Selmani’s present two “basic 

legal questions”: “(1) is there a property or liberty interest 

protected by due process; and (2) if so, what process is due, and 

when must that process be made available?” Bradley v. Vill. of 

Univ. Park, 929 F.3d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Simpson v. 

Brown County, 860 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2017)). Defendants 

argue that Mr. Selmani has failed to allege the first element—a 

protected property interest. “The basic characteristic of a 

property interest is the continued flow of benefits, which may not 

be interrupted without an opportunity to be heard.” Ceko v. 

Martin, 753 F. Supp. 1418, 1423 (N.D. Ill. 1990). “For public 

employees, a ‘protected property interest in employment can arise 

from a state statute, regulation, municipal ordinance, or an 

express or implied contract.’” Bradley, 929 F.3d at 882 (citing 

Crull v. Sunderman, 384 F.3d 453, 460 (7th Cir. 2004)). 

 In his Amended Complaint, Mr. Selmani asserts that the 

property interest in his employment stems from three independent 

sources: (1) an Illinois state statute, 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-

2.1-17, (2) the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that was 

in effect at the time, and (3) the PEDA statute. I turn first to 

the Illinois state statute, which provides: 

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Except as hereinafter provided, no officer or member of 

the fire or police department of any municipality 

subject to this Division 2.1 shall be removed or 

discharged except for cause, upon written charges, and 

after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. The 

hearing shall be as hereinafter provided, unless the 

employer and the labor organization representing the 

person have negotiated an alternative or supplemental 

form of due process based upon impartial arbitration as 

a term of a collective bargaining agreement. Such 

bargaining shall be mandatory unless the parties 

mutually agree otherwise. Any such alternative agreement 

shall be permissive. 

65 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/10-2.1-17. 

Defendants deny that the statute creates a property interest 

in Mr. Selmani’s position. First, they contend that the statute 

does not apply by its terms because Mr. Selmani was placed on 

unpaid leave, not “removed” or “discharged.” It is true that the 

statute does not provide any explicit protections regarding leaves 

or suspensions. See Spring-Weber v. City of Chicago, No. 16 C 

8097, 2017 WL 1316267, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2017) (contrasting 

65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-2.1-17 with another statute explicitly 

referring to suspensions). However, “[e]ven in the absence of 

explicit statutory protection, . . . removal or suspension—even a 

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suspension with pay—from a statutorily protected employment 

position ‘might produce . . . economic effects that trigger the 

protection of the Due Process Clause.’” Luellen v. City of East 

Chicago, 350 F.3d 604, 613-14 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Townsend v. 

Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 676 (7th Cir. 2001)). In such cases, the 

due process clause is implicated where “the property lost due to 

the suspension is so integral to the employee’s position such that 

loss of the property could be deemed a loss of the employee’s 

position.” Spring-Weber, 2017 WL 1316267, at *5. 

In Ceko v. Martin, for example, a 911 police dispatcher 

complained that he was deprived of due process when he was placed 

on an unpaid medical leave of absence without an opportunity to 

contest the decision. 753 F. Supp. at 1421. The dispatcher argued 

that his property right arose from another Illinois statute that 

provided that a police employee could not be “removed or 

discharged, or suspended . . . except for cause.” Id. at 1422. 

The court found that while the dispatcher was not suspended or 

removed “in the strict sense of the term,” his due process rights 

were implicated because “he was effectively deprived of his 

salary.” Id. at 1422-23. The court explained: “The interest in 

continued employment would be hollow indeed if it did not secure 

payment, the primary benefit of being employed.” Id. at 1423. 

Here, just like the plaintiff in Ceko, Mr. Selmani was placed 

on unpaid leave. The denial of Mr. Selmani’s salary constituted 

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an effective denial of his employment, which is protected under 65 

Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-2.1-17. Accordingly, although Mr. Selmani 

was placed on unpaid leave rather than removed or terminated, he 

has adequately alleged a protected property interest. See also 

Spring-Weber, 2017 WL 1316267, at *5 (fire paramedic placed on 

involuntary medical leave had property interest in employment 

under 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-2.1-17 despite statute’s failure to 

mention suspension or leave); Bauchard v. Martin, No. 91 C 7839, 

1993 WL 79259, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 1993) (police officer 

placed on involuntary leave of absence had protected property 

interest in employment). Because I conclude that Mr. Selmani 

alleged a property interest stemming from the Illinois statute, I 

need not consider whether the CBA or the PEDA statute also creates 

a property interest. 

Defendants also argue that applicable CBA includes a 

grievance procedure that effectively supersedes the Illinois 

statute such that the statute does not provide Mr. Selmani with a 

protectable property interest. Defendants point to the statutory 

language: “[N]o officer or member of the . . . police department 

. . . shall be removed or discharged except for cause, upon written 

charges, and after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. 

The hearing shall be as hereinafter provided, unless the employer 

and the labor organization representing the person have negotiated 

an alternative or supplemental form of due process based upon 

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impartial arbitration as a term of a collective bargaining 

agreement.” 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-2.1-17 (emphasis added). By 

its terms, however, the statute simply provides that labor 

organizations may negotiate for an arbitration proceeding instead 

of a hearing in the form specified by the statute. The provision 

does not, as Defendants seem to contend, provide that where a CBA 

includes a grievance procedure, there is no longer any need to 

remove police officers “for cause, upon written charges, and after 

an opportunity to be heard.” See Parisi v. Jenkins, 603 N.E.2d 

566, 572-73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (labor agreement provision 

allowing for termination without an opportunity to be heard was 

“clearly inconsistent with section 10-2.1-17,” which controlled). 

Accordingly, the CBA here does not and cannot abrogate the property 

interest afforded by the statute. 

Finally, Defendants argue that Count I should be dismissed 

because Mr. Selmani has adequate state-law remedies for the alleged 

due process deprivations, including the right to challenge by way 

of a common-law writ of certiorari or writ of mandamus. Mr. 

Selmani correctly notes, however, that this argument is foreclosed 

by the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Bradley v. Village of 

University Park, which held in the context of procedural due 

process claims that “the simultaneous violation of both federal 

and state law does not provide defendants with a defense to 

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liability, nor does the existence of a state remedy bar aggrieved 

plaintiffs from pursuing federal claims.” 929 F.3d at 884. 

Because I find that Mr. Selmani has adequately alleged a 

protected property interest in his position, I decline to dismiss 

Count I. 

III. 

 In Count II, Mr. Selmani brings a Monell claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Monell stands for the proposition that “[w]hile a 

municipality is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts 

of its employees, a constitutional deprivation may be attributable 

to a municipality ‘when execution of a government’s policy or 

custom . . . inflicts the injury.’” Montano v. City of Chicago, 

535 F.3d 558, 570 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). In order to maintain a Monell

claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must establish either 

“(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional 

deprivation; or (2) that the constitutional injury was caused by 

a person with final policymaking authority.” Id. (citing Gable v. 

City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2002)). 

 Defendants argue that Mr. Selmani’s Monell claim must be 

dismissed because he does not allege an underlying constitutional 

deprivation. See Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 493–94 (7th 

Cir. 2008) (Monell claim failed where plaintiff did not “establish 

that she was deprived of a constitutional right”); King v. East 

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St. Louis School Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 817 (7th Cir. 2007) (“It 

is well established that there can be no municipal liability based 

on an official policy under Monell if the policy did not result in 

a violation of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.”). 

However, as noted above, Mr. Selmani has adequately alleged a due 

process violation. Accordingly, I cannot dismiss the Monell claim 

on that basis. 

 Defendants also move to strike Count II’s prayer for punitive 

damages against Defendant Kevin Wallace, the President of the 

Village, and Defendant Patrick Ullrich, the Police Chief of the 

Village. In that respect, Defendants’ motion is granted. 

“[P]unitive damages are not recoverable under a Monell claim.” 

Awalt v. Marketti, No. 11 C 6142, 2012 WL 1161500, at *12 (N.D. 

Ill. Apr. 9, 2012) (citing Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 

U.S. 247 (1981)); see also Brigham v. Coles Cty., No. 19-CV-1300, 

2020 WL 6946447, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2020) (striking prayer 

for punitive damages against individuals for Monell claims).1 

IV. 

 Both Count I and Count II were asserted against the Village, 

Mr. Wallace, and Mr. Ullrich. Defendants assert that to the extent 

1 I need not strike the prayer for punitive damages in Count I as 

Mr. Selmani has clarified that those damages are sought from 

Defendants Ullrich and Wallace only in their individual 

capacities, rather than in their official capacities, such that 

Monell is not implicated. See ECF No. 47 at 19; ECF No. 48 at 13. 

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Mr. Wallace and Mr. Ullrich were sued in their official capacities, 

those claims should be dismissed as duplicative of the claims 

against the Village. I agree. Official-capacity suits are simply 

“another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an 

officer is an agent.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. Accordingly, 

because the Village has also been named as a defendant, the claims 

against Mr. Ullrich and Mr. Wallace are duplicative and are 

properly dismissed. See Colon v. McLaughlin, No. 16-cv-10581, 

2018 WL 4898880, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 2018). 

V. 

 In his third claim, Mr. Selmani seeks a declaratory judgment 

that Defendants have violated PEDA, 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 345/1. That 

Act provides in relevant part: 

Whenever an eligible employee suffers any injury in the 

line of duty which causes him to be unable to perform 

his duties, he shall continue to be paid by the employing 

public entity on the same basis as he was paid before 

the injury . . . during the time he is unable to perform 

his duties due to the result of the injury, but not 

longer than one year in relation to the same injury . . 

. . 

5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 345/1(b). 

 Defendants argue that because the statute says that an 

eligible employee should “continue to be paid . . . on the same 

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basis as he was paid before the injury,” it does not apply to cases 

such as Mr. Selmani’s, where the injured employee claims to be 

unable to perform his job duties only some time after the injury 

took place. I disagree. Illinois courts have repeatedly held 

that PEDA entitles an employee to a year of pay “during the time 

he is unable to perform his duties,” even if the incapacity does 

not occur in the calendar year following the injury. See Bahr v. 

Bartlett Fire Protection Dist., 889 N.E.2d 760, 765–66 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 2008); Albee v. City of Bloomington, 849 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 

(Ill. App. Ct. 2006).2 The statute’s use of the word “continue” 

does not suggest otherwise, as the employee is meant to continue 

to be paid after he is incapacitated, and neither does the 

statute’s requirement that the benefits be paid at the employee’s 

compensation rate “before the injury.” See Bahr, 889 N.E.2d at 

764. 

2 Defendants attempt to distinguish Albee and Bahr because the 

plaintiffs in those cases experienced an initial period of 

incapacity immediately after the injury, returned to work, and 

then experienced a subsequent period of incapacity related to the 

initial injury. Bahr, 889 N.E.2d at 762; Albee, 849 N.E.2d at 

1096. I am not convinced, however, that the fact that Mr. Selmani 

did not take time off of work immediately after the injury 

meaningfully distinguishes his case, especially given the courts’ 

reasoning that a “use-it or lose-it” interpretation of the statute 

“is contrary to the legislative intent as evidenced by the 

statute’s plain language.” Bahr, 899 N.E.2d at 766; see also 

Albee, 849 N.E.2d at 1097 (“[A]n officer who is able to return to 

work should not be given an incentive not to return, with the ‘useit-or-lose-it’ argument that the year of continuing compensation 

begins to run immediately.”). 

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 Defendants also contend that Mr. Selmani’s PEDA claim is 

barred by the five-year statute of limitations. See 735 Ill. Comp. 

Stat. 5/13-205. They argue that the cause of action accrued at 

the time of the 2014 injury, especially given that Mr. Selmani 

alleges he experienced immediate symptoms, see, e.g., ECF No. 37 

¶ 23. But a limitations period generally “begins to run when facts 

exist that authorize one party to maintain an action against 

another.” Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 85 (Ill. 2003). 

PEDA requires not just that an employee suffer an injury, but that 

he suffer an injury that “causes him to be unable to perform his 

duties,” 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 345/1(b). Mr. Selmani alleges that it 

was not until 2019 that he had to miss work as a result of his 

injury. See ECF No. 37 ¶ 90. Accordingly, I conclude that Mr. 

Selmani plausibly alleged his claim accrued at the time he became 

incapacitated in 2019. Claim III may proceed. 

VI. 

 Mr. Selmani next asserts, in Count IV, an Illinois state law 

claim for a writ of certiorari, seeking judicial review of the 

Village’s denial of Mr. Selmani’s PEDA benefits.3 

 “The common law writ of certiorari provides a means whereby 

a party who has no avenue of appeal or direct review may obtain 

3 Mr. Selmani does not appear to seek judicial review of any alleged 

due process violations in this count; accordingly, I need not 

consider Defendants’ arguments on that point. See ECF No. 44 at 

12. 

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limited review over action by a court or other tribunal exercising 

quasi-judicial functions.” Reichert v. Ct. of Claims, 786 N.E.2d 

174, 177 (Ill. 2003). “The purpose of certiorari review is to 

have the entire record of the inferior tribunal brought before the 

court to determine, from the record alone, whether the tribunal 

proceeded according to applicable law.” Id. 

 Defendants argue that a writ of certiorari would be improper 

here because there was no underlying quasi-judicial proceeding for 

this court to review. I decline, however, to dismiss the claim on 

that basis. There is no absolute requirement that an 

administrative hearing precede a petition for a writ of certiorari. 

See Meylor v. Boys, 427 N.E.2d 1023, 1024-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 

Mr. Selmani has asserted that there is a “record of proceedings . 

. . pertaining to entry of [the] decision” to deny him PEDA 

benefits, ECF No. 37 ¶ 108, and, if that is true, the court can 

determine from the record “whether there is any evidence fairly 

tending to support the order [or whether] it is palpably or 

manifestly against the weight of the evidence.” Jones v. Lazerson, 

561 N.E.2d 151, 154 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (citing Nowicki v. 

Evanston Fair Hous. Review Bd., 338 N.E.2d 186, 188 (Ill. 1975)). 

Accordingly, I decline to dismiss Count IV. 

VII. 

 In Count V, Mr. Selmani asserts a claim under the Attorneys 

Fees in Wage Actions Act (the “Fee Act”), 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 

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225/1, seeking attorneys’ fees in connection with Mr. Selmani’s 

“wages earned and due and owing” in the amount of $80,639.20. That 

figure corresponds to the benefit Mr. Selmani claims he is owed 

under PEDA for the period of May 22, 2019 to May 22, 2020. ECF 

No. 37 Ex. B. 

 The Fee Act provides, in its entirety: 

Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, servant or 

employee brings an action for wages earned and due and 

owing according to the terms of the employment, and 

establishes by the decision of the court or jury that 

the amount for which he or she has brought the action is 

justly due and owing, and that a demand was made in 

writing at least 3 days before the action was brought, 

for a sum not exceeding the amount so found due and 

owing, then the court shall allow to the plaintiff a 

reasonable attorney fee of not less than $10, in addition 

to the amount found due and owing for wages, to be taxed 

as costs of the action. 

705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/1. 

 Defendants first argue that Mr. Selmani cannot recover 

attorneys’ fees because PEDA benefits are statutory disability 

benefits rather than “wages earned and due and owing” for work 

actually performed as required by the Fee Act. But Illinois courts 

do not interpret “wages” so narrowly; indeed, fees have been 

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awarded under the Fee Act where the plaintiff sought PEDA benefits. 

See Bahr, 889 N.E.2d at 768–69; cf. Vendetti v. Compass Env’t, 

Inc., No. 06 C 3556, 2008 WL 1774983, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 

2008) (“[T]here is nothing in the Fee Act limiting the definition 

of ‘wages’ to include only compensation for work actually 

performed.”). Accordingly, I decline to conclude that PEDA 

benefits are not “wages” under the Fee Act. 

 Second, Defendants contend that defects in the plaintiff’s 

demand letter foreclose his claim under the Fee Act. They argue 

that because the demand letter, which was sent on March 20, 2020, 

sought benefits continuing to the then-future date of May 22, 2020 

(one year after Mr. Selmani stopped working), it was not a demand 

for wages then “due and owing,” and accordingly did not comply 

with the Fee Act’s demand requirements. See ECF No. 44 at 14. 

When read in the context of the prior clause, however, the Fee Act 

requires only that the demand be made for a sum not exceeding the 

amount “found due and owing” “by the decision of the court or 

jury.” 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/1 (emphasis added). It does not 

impose a requirement that the plaintiff request only benefits due 

at the time of the demand; rather, it establishes the demand amount 

as a threshold above which the factfinder at an eventual trial 

must award damages in order for a plaintiff to be eligible to 

collect fees. See, e.g., Catania v. Local 4250/5050 of the 

Communic’ns Workers of Am., 834 N.E.2d 966, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 

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2005) (“A plaintiff can only recover attorneys’ fees under the 

statute if the amount recovered at trial is equal to or greater 

than the amount contained in the pre-trial demand letter.”). In 

other words, the time when wages must be found “due and owing” is 

at trial, not at the time the demand letter is sent. Accordingly, 

Count V may proceed. 

VIII. 

 In Count VI, Mr. Selmani asserts a claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress based on the conduct of three 

individual defendants—Defendants Steven Winterstein, Will 

Naydenoff, and Michael Rummell—who were present during the SPEAR 

team incident on August 11, 2014. Defendants move to dismiss Count 

VIII on the grounds that it is untimely under the applicable oneyear statute of limitations. See 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/8-101(a). 

 In Illinois, under the discovery rule, “a cause of action 

accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, when the party 

seeking relief knows or reasonably should know of an injury and 

that it was wrongfully caused.” Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota 

Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 177, 192 (Ill. 2002). Mr. 

Selmani argues that it was not until he was diagnosed with PTSD in 

June 2019 and it was attributed to the SPEAR team incident that he 

first understood his injury’s cause. ECF No. 47 at 17. But that 

is inconsistent with what he alleged in his complaint. Mr. Selmani 

pleaded that after the injury in 2014, he “struggled for years 

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from recurring and disturbing nightmares and flashbacks of the 

traumatic event of being a target of his fellow officers, of losing 

control, and causing an intense and persisten[t] sense of fear, 

humiliation, and shame.” ECF No. 37 ¶ 23 (emphasis added). After 

years of experiencing psychological symptoms centered around the 

SPEAR team incident, it is implausible to suggest that Mr. Selmani 

did not know or should not have known that his symptoms were caused 

by the event. That Mr. Selmani consulted a psychiatrist years 

later and received a formal diagnosis is inapposite. See, e.g., 

Hertel v. Sullivan, 633 N.E.2d 36, 41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (that 

plaintiff consulted with mental health specialist who helped her 

understand cause of injuries years after conclusion of sexually 

abusive relationship with priest did not toll statute of 

limitations under discovery rule). Nor is it significant that Mr. 

Selmani’s symptoms may have worsened over time. See Gen. Auto 

Serv. Station v. City of Chicago, No. 00 C 0368, 2004 WL 442636, 

at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2004) (“[A] plaintiff’s cause of action 

accrues at the time its interest is invaded; the mere fact that 

the extent of its damages is not immediately ascertainable does 

not postpone the accrual of a plaintiff’s claim.”). Accordingly, 

because the claim is untimely under the applicable statute of 

limitations, Count VI is dismissed.

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X. 

 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is 

granted as to Count VI and denied as to Counts III-V. Counts I 

and II survive in major part, but are dismissed to the extent they 

assert claims against Defendants Ullrich and Wallace in their 

official capacities. The prayer for punitive damages in Count II 

is stricken. 

 ENTER ORDER: 

 ________________________ 

 Elaine E. Bucklo 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: January 27, 2021 

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