[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Allen, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4757.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2019-O HIO -4757
T HE S TATE OF O HIO , A PPELLANT , v . A LLEN , A PPELLEE . [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State v. Allen, Slip Opinion No. 2019-Ohio-4757.] Criminal law—R.C. 2929.18(A)(1)—A bank that cashes a forged check and then recredits the depositor’s account is a victim to which the forger may be required to pay restitution—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed. (No. 2018-0705—Submitted May 8, 2019—Decided November 21, 2019. )
A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 17AP-296, 2018-Ohio-1529.

_________________ D E W INE , J. {¶ 1} A statute authorizes a trial cour t to order an offender to pay restitution
to a “victim” who suffers an economic loss. See R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). Under this law, is a bank that cashes a forged check and then recredits th e depositor’s account a victim to which the forger can be required to pay restitution ? We say yes. The court of appeals held otherwis e, so we reverse its judgment.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 I. A check-cashi ng scheme and a restituti on order {¶ 2} Zachary Allen cashed seven forged checks at branches of three different banks. He pleaded guilty to seven counts of forgery, and the trial court ordered Allen to pay restitution to the banks in the amount of the forged checks. In the process the trial court rejected Allen’s argument that the banks were not victims and hence not possible beneficiaries of a restitution order und er R.C. 2929.18. Allen appealed, and the Tenth Di strict Court of Appeals reverse d the trial court’s judgment and vacated the restitution order. The court of appea ls reasoned that the banks were not “victims” for purposes of R.C. 2929.18 but inste ad were third parties who had reim bursed the true vic tims—the account holders

. II. R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) authorizes restitution to a victim
that suffered an economic loss {¶ 3} We must determine the proper construction of R.C. 2929.18(A)(1)

. R.C. 2929.18(A) allows a trial court to impose various “financi al sanctions” against
a defendant who committed a felo ny, including “[r]estitution by the offender to the victim.” R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) states:

Financial sanctions that may be imposed pursuant to this sectio n include, but are not limite d to, the following: (1) Restitution by the offender to the victim of the offender’ s crime or any survivor of the victim, in an amount based on the
victim’s economic loss.

Thus, the statute authorized the trial court to order Allen to pay restitution to the bank if the bank (1) was a victim and (2) suffered an economic loss.
III. The banks were victims {¶ 4} “Victim” is not defined in R.C. 2929.18. When a word is not de fined in a statute, we look to its ordinary meaning—that is, how it w ould commonly beJanuary Term, 2019

3 understood in the context in which it occurs. Great Lakes Bar Control, Inc. v.
Testa , 156 Ohio St.3d 199, 2018-Ohio-5207, 124 N.E.3d 803, ¶ 8-9. A s a useful starting point for our analysis, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “victim” as a person or entity “harmed by a crime, tort, or other wrong.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1798 (10th Ed.2014). {¶ 5} The court of appeals acknowle dged this definition, but conclude d that “it was the account holders, not the banks, who suffered the di rect economic harm
from Allen’s actions.” 2018-Ohio-1529, 101 N.E.3d 734, ¶ 16. T he banks, it held, were merely third parties that were indirectly harmed by Allen’ s actions after recrediting the accounts of the actual victims, the account hol ders. Id . As we explain, the court of appeals’ holding is premised on a misunde rstanding of how the banks were harmed by Allen’s check-cashing scheme. When pr operly considered, it is apparent that the banks were victims of Allen ’s crimes under any plausible, common-sense understa nding of the word “victim.” Th ere are three main
considerations that s upport this conclusion. {¶ 6} Start with the relationship between a bank and a checking-accou nt holder. When a customer deposits money with a bank, the bank t ypically gains a property interest in the money a nd in exchange, gives the custo mer a contractual right to payment on demand. Union Properties, Inc. v. Baldwin Bros. Co. , 141 Ohio St. 303, 311, 47 N.E.2d 983 (1943). The relationship betw een the account holder and the bank, therefore, is that of a creditor and a deb tor. Id

. {¶ 7} As noted by the United States Supreme Court, because of this relationship, “a scheme fraudulentl y to obtain funds from a ban k depositor’s account normally is also a scheme fraudulently to obtain proper ty from [the bank].”
Shaw v. United States , ___U.S.___, 137 S.Ct. 462, 466, 196 L.Ed.2d 373 (2016). When a bank is presented with a check, it pays out money (in wh ich it has a property interest), and it simultaneously adjusts the depositor’s accoun t to reflect less available money for on-demand payment. Thus, the bank loses so mething in whichS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 it has a property interest as soon it pays the fraudulent check

. Id . The loss occurs at the moment of payment to the thief, not at the later point i n time when the bank corrects the error by recreditin g funds back to the depositor’s account. {¶ 8} Second, by statute, the bank has a duty to correct its erroneou s deduction from the depositor’s account. R.C. 1304.30 (UCC 4-40 1) states that “[a] bank may charge against the account of a customer an item that is properly payable * * *. An item is properly payable if it is authorized by the customer and is in accordance with any agreement between the customer and bank,” R .C. 1304.30(A). R.C. 1303.43(A) (UCC 3-403(a)) states that an “unauthorized sig nature is ineffective except as the signature of the unauthorized signer. ” In other words, the signature on a forged check is inoperative as the signature of the account holder. Thus, for a bank to charge a depositor’s account, it must be th e case both that the depositor actually authorized the payment and also that the bank complied with any agreement between the bank and the depositor. Based on these r equirements, we have held that a bank is strictly liable to its customer for pa yment of a forged check. Ed Stinn Chevrolet, Inc. v. Natl. City Bank , 28 Ohio St.3d 221, 226-227, 503 N.E.2d 524 (1986), modified on other grounds on rehearing , 31 Ohio St.3d 150, 509 N.E.2d 945 (1987). As a result, in a fraudulent-check case, th e Revised Code places
the economic loss on the ba nk and not on the account holder. {¶ 9} Third, the banks were the targets of Allen’s crimes because All en defrauded and tricked the banks when he presented the forged ch ecks to the bank teller. The account holders, on the other hand, never interact ed with Allen and were never duped by him. {¶ 10} Taken together, these three cons iderations—the banks having los t something in which they had a property interest at the moment o f the crime, the banks bearing the economic loss by operation of s tatute, and th e banks having been the targets of Allen’s crimes—establish that the banks are vict ims under any common-sense understanding of that term. A person or a busines s entity isJanuary Term, 2019

5 paradigmatically a victim when they are duped into giving their property to a thief, and they suffer an economic loss as a result. {¶ 11} In arguing that restitution is improper, Allen looks to caselaw involving insurance companies. W e have suggested that under th e current version of R.C. 2929.18(A)(1), insurance companies may not receive rest itution for economic losses after they reimburse a customer for a loss cove red by an insurance policy. See, e.g. , State v. Aguirre , 144 Ohio St.3d 179, 2014-Ohio-4603, 41 N.E.3d 1178, ¶ 1. But there is a significant difference between an in surance company, which might ultimately suffer a n economic loss, and a bank that is hoodwinked by a fraudulent-check scheme. When an insurance company makes a pa yment owed under a contract, it is merely fulfilling an obligation that it voluntarily took on to protect another against a loss. In such a case, it is hard to describe the insurer as a victim of a crime when it was not the target of the crime and w hen it was merely providing the service that it had agreed to perform in return f or the payment of an insurance premium. An insurer contracts to take on a risk. It does not become a victim merely because tha t risk comes to pass. {¶ 12} In contrast, in a fraudulent-check case, it is the bank that is defrauded and hence, it is the bank that is object of the crime; it is th e bank that suffers the economic loss; and, it is the bank that loses property in which it has an interest at the moment of the fraud. Under any plausible understanding, th at is enough for the
bank to count as a victim. {¶ 13} In addition to proffering that its preferred reading of the sta tute would make better public policy, the dissent advances two other arguments. First, it tries to appropriate the definition of “victim” contained in the victim’s rights chapter of the Revised Code, R.C. 2930. This argument is refut ed by simply reading the statute. Under R.C. 2930.01’s express terms, the d efinitions in the victim’s rights chapter are limited to that chapter and do not govern the provisionsS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 in R.C. 2929.18—“As used in this chapter: * * * ‘Victim’ means * * *,” R.C. 2930.01(H). {¶ 14} Second, the dissent notes that the former version of R.C. 2929. 18 expressly allowed restitution to be paid to third parties, and jumps to the conclusion that by removing this language the legislature somehow meant to bar restitution to banks that were the victims of a crime. But, the current versi on of the statute draws no distinction between victims and third parties. It simply re quires a court to assess whether the would-be beneficiary of a restitution order is a vi ctim that suffered an economic loss. As we have expl ained, under any plausible under standing of the term, the bank was a victim of Allen’s fraud that suffered an e conomic loss thereby. {¶ 15} For the reasons stated above, we reverse the Tenth District’s judgment and reinstate the trial court’s order imposing restitu tion. Judgment reversed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F RENCH , F ISCHER , and S TEWART , JJ.,

concur. D ONNELLY , J., dissents, with an opinion.

_________________ D ONNELLY , J., dissenting. {¶ 16} The majority holds that a bank that cashed a forged check is a victim entitled to restitution under R.C. 2929.18. I disagree and the refore dissent. {¶ 17} R.C. 2929.18(A) governs the imposition of restitution as part o f a felony sentence. R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) provides that restitution may be provided to “the victim of the offender’s crime” and may be “made to the vi ctim in open court, to the adult probation department that serv es the county on beh alf of the victim, to the clerk of courts, or to another agency designated by the cou rt.” The majority rightly finds that “victim” is not defined in R.C. 2929.18. Bu t the majority then
fails to note that “victim” i s defined in R.C. 2930.01, in the chapter of the criminal code setting forth victims’ rights. And we have repeatedly hel d that felony-January Term, 2019

7 sentencing statutes must be read as a whole. State v. Amos, 140 Ohio St.3d 238, 2014-Ohio-3160, 17 N.E.3d 528, ¶ 12. {¶ 18} R.C. 2930.01(H)(1) provides that a “victim” is “[a] person who is
identified as the victim of a cr ime * * * in a police report or in a complaint, indictment, or information that charges the commission of a cri me and that provides the basis for the criminal prosecution.” {¶ 19} In this case, the indictment does not identify the individual b anks as victims for any of the forgery counts. And nothing in the reco rd indicates that the banks were identified as victims in a police report, complaint, or information. Therefore, those banks have no claim to restitution. And becau se no victim is ever identified in the charging instrument, there is no legal predic ate for ordering
restitution. It was therefore error for the trial court to ord er appellee, Zachary Allen, to pay restitution. {¶ 20} But even if a defendant were ordered to pay restitution to an unnamed victim, a bank would not qualify as a victim entitled t o restitution. Former R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) provided that a restitution order “may inclu de a requirement
that reimbursement be made to third parties for amounts paid to or on behalf of the victim * * * for economic loss resulting from the offense.” See 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8674, 8767. On June 1, 2004, however, the legislature amended R.C.
2929.18 to delete all references t o restitution for third parti es. See 2003 Sub.H.B. No. 52, 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3865, 3913-3914. {¶ 21} In State v. Aquirre, 144 Ohio St.3d 179, 2014-Ohio-4603, 41 N.E.3d 1178, ¶ 1, this court recognized tha t the General Assembly remo ved the references to third parties from R.C. 2929.18, noting that “[g]iven these deletions, ‘the legislative intent to disallow payment to victims’ [third party ] insurance companies
is clear.’ ” Id. , quoting State v. Johnson , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-100702, 2011- Ohio-5913, ¶ 5. Several of Ohio’s appellate districts have con sidered the issue since the references to third parties were removed from R.C. 29 29.18 and haveS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 uniformly held that when a bank reimburses its customer for fun ds that were fraudulently withdrawn from the customer’s account, that bank i s a third party and
is not entitled to restitution. See State v. Kiser , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24419, 2011-Ohio-5551, ¶ 16; State v. Stump , 4th Dist. Athens No. 13CA10, 2014-Ohio1487, ¶ 12; State v. Harris , 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-14-069, 2015-Ohio-4412, ¶ 8. Indeed, like the courts of appeal s in the cases cited above, th e Tenth District Court of Appeals held, in this case, that the banks were third partie s and not victims and
therefore not entitled to restitu tion. I see no error in the T enth District’s analysis. {¶ 22} A bank does not automatically rec redit a customer’s account for an improper withdrawal. R.C. 1304.30 (Ohio’s codification of Unif orm Commercial Code 4-401) states:

A bank may charge against the account of a customer an item that is properly payable from that account * * *. An item is p roperly payable if it is authorized by the customer and is in accordance with any agreement between the customer and bank.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 1304.30(A). {¶ 23} Therefore, by its very terms, the statute does not necessarily obligate a bank to always reimburse its customer. And any account holde r who has been the victim of a fraudulent withdrawal knows it is not an easy f eat to ensure that the
unauthorized withdrawal is recredited to his or her account. J ust like an insurance company looks to its insurance-policy contract before reimbursi ng a client for a covered loss, so too does a bank look to its agreement with its customer before recrediting stolen funds to a cu stomer’s account. And just as an insurance company will cover losses only as defined in its contract, a bank will surely refer to the specific language in its agreement with its customer in order t o determine whetherJanuary Term, 2019

9 reimbursement should occur. Thus, depending on the agreement b etween the bank and its customer, re imbursement for a su ffered loss may not be such a sure thing. {¶ 24} By deliberately deleting statutory language that previously per mitted restitution to a third party that reimbursed the actual victim of an offense, the General Assembly perhaps realized that our overworked and resou rce-strapped probation departments should not continue to bear the burden of also serving as collection agencies for private commercial entities such as ban ks, which have other civil processes available for recovering a loss incurred or col lecting a debt owed. A bank operates with the obligation to examine the signature ca rds on file for its
customers’ accounts. It is there fore arguable that in this cas e, Allen’s unauthorized
withdrawals would not have occurred in the accounts for Park Cl ub Apartments, Tuttle’s Grove Apartme nts, and Progressive Flooring Services, I nc., had the banks examined the signature cards on file for each of the businesses

. . {¶ 25} Taxpayer money funds our probation departments. Taxpayer money should not be used to recover losses caused by a third party’s negligence. Banks are well aware of available civil processes for loss recovery. Relieving a bank from fault for charging against a customer’s account without the cus tomer’s authorization puts the bank’s burden squarely on the backs of t he taxpayers. {¶ 26} And to what end? Many times, issuing a restitution order is practically futile. Indigent defendants are not the most relia ble payors. With collectability uncertain at best, most restitution orders may a s well be prestamped
“returned for nonsufficient funds.” {¶ 27} I see no statutory authority for the restitution ordered in thi s case. Moreover, probation officers’ valuable time and limited resourc es are better spent devoting their efforts to work toward financial recovery for th ose victims that the General Assembly has designate d. I would affirm the judgment o f the Tenth
District Court of A ppeals. I dissent.

_________________S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Barbara A. Farnbacher, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and Robert D . Essex, Assistant Public Defe nder, for appellee.

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