In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 21-2701 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JEFFREY M. WEST, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 2:19-cr-20060-MMM-EIL-1 — Michael M. Mihm, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 20, 2022 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 22, 2022

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, HAMILTON, and BRENNAN, Circuit 

Judges. 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Appellant Jeffrey West was convicted of possessing child pornography and other sexual offenses against children. At trial, the district court admitted 

photographs and videos containing child pornography that 

were discovered on electronic devices seized from West’s 

home and business. Sixteen of those exhibits were shown to 

the jury. On appeal, West argues that the admission and 
2 No. 21-2701 

display of two exhibits were unfairly prejudicial and needlessly cumulative, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 

and his broad reading of Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 

172 (1997). We affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Police investigated a young boy’s report that West molested him and paid him for a nude photograph. Police 

searched West’s home and business and found a laptop computer and multiple flash drives. A detective searched the 

seized devices and discovered a total of roughly one thousand

still photographs and videos of child pornography. 

West was charged with one count of possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), 

two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e), two counts of receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) and (b)(1), 

and two counts of commission of an offense by a registered 

sex offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A. 

Before trial, West stipulated that certain images found on 

his devices—specifically, Government Exhibits 1F, 1G, 2B, 5C, 

and 6D—were part of known child pornography series identified by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. West stipulated that, if called to testify, an FBI agent 

would say that the agent participated in the investigation 

identifying the images in question, that the children portrayed were minors, that the images were produced outside 

Illinois, and that they were distributed widely on the internet. 

On the first day of trial, the court admitted dozens of exhibits offered by the government, including several photographs and videos containing child pornography that were 
No. 21-2701 3

found on West’s devices. The exhibits at issue in this appeal 

(Government Exhibits 5E and 6E) were among those admitted. Defense counsel did not object. 

Over the course of the trial, the government briefly 

showed images from West’s devices to the jury. In total, the 

government displayed sixteen of the roughly one thousand

photographs and videos containing child pornography that 

were stored on West’s devices. 

The defense did not object to the government’s publication 

of the images until the end of the government’s case in chief. 

The government’s final witness, an FBI agent, testified that six 

images found on West’s devices were from a child pornography series he had investigated. During direct examination of 

the agent, the government briefly published Exhibits 3B, 3C, 

3D, and 3E. For each exhibit, the prosecutor asked the agent 

to identify the child by first initial and to state the child’s age 

when the image was created. Defense counsel did not object. 

As the prosecutor began asking the agent about a fifth exhibit 

(5E), West objected. His counsel asserted that the images and 

facts were stipulated to and so there was no need to continue 

displaying the exhibits. The government countered that these 

facts were not stipulated. The court overruled the objection, 

and the government displayed two more exhibits (5E and 6E) 

before resting its case. The jury convicted West on all counts. 

West renews his objection on appeal, arguing that the admission and publication of child pornography images at his 

trial violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403 on the theory that 

the content of the images was not in dispute, so the exhibits’ 

admission was needlessly cumulative and unfairly prejudicial. He also argues that because he had stipulated that child 

pornography was found on the devices recovered from his 
4 No. 21-2701 

home and business, their admission at trial violated Old 

Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).

II. Analysis

A. Admission of the Exhibits

We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Resnick, 823 F.3d 888, 894 (7th 

Cir. 2016). We will reverse these rulings “only if no reasonable 

person could take the judge’s view of the matter.” United 

States v. Pulliam, 973 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2020), quoting 

United States v. Brown, 871 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 2017).

First, West’s challenge to the exhibits’ admission is 

waived. On the first day of trial, the government moved to 

admit into evidence dozens of exhibits, including those that 

are the subject of this appeal. When asked whether West had 

any objection to the government’s motion, defense counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” Because West affirmatively 

stated at trial that he had no objection to the admission of the 

exhibits, he cannot challenge their admission on appeal. 

United States v. Redditt, 381 F.3d 597, 602 (7th Cir. 2004) 

(“When trial counsel affirmatively represents that he has no 

objection to the admission of certain evidence, he has intentionally waived any argument to the contrary.”).

Even if West’s challenge were not deemed waived, we 

would reject it on the merits. West asks this Court to extend 

Old Chief and find that the trial court violated Federal Rule of 

Evidence 403 by admitting child pornography images at trial 

when he supposedly stipulated that the images contained 

child pornography. There are several problems with this theory.
No. 21-2701 5

Most generally, in Old Chief, the Supreme Court affirmed 

the general principle that “a criminal defendant may not stipulate or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the 

case as the Government chooses to present it.” 519 U.S. at 186‒

87. Old Chief actually held, narrowly, that that general rule has 

“virtually no application” where the issue in dispute is the 

defendant’s status as a felon. Id. at 190. In such cases, it violates Rule 403 to admit the record of conviction to prove the 

defendant’s status when the defendant is willing to stipulate. 

Id. at 191.1

The Court limited its holding in Old Chief to cases where 

the defendant’s felon status is at issue. 519 U.S. at 183 n.7; see 

also United States v. Phillippi, 442 F.3d 1061, 1064 (7th Cir. 

2006), citing Old Chief on this point. We consequently find 

West’s arguments for extending Old Chief unconvincing.

West’s argument also fails for a reason more specific to this 

case. The exhibits at issue in this appeal were not actually subject to any stipulation. Before trial, West stipulated that Exhibits 1F, 1G, 2B, 5C, and 6D were part of known child pornography series, that the children depicted were minors, and that 

the images were produced outside Illinois and were widely 

distributed on the internet. On appeal, West argues that the 

district court was incorrect to overrule his objection to the introduction of Exhibits 5E and 6E shortly after the government 

displayed Exhibits 3B, 3C, 3D, and 3E. Because those exhibits 

1 The Court’s later decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 

(2019), has added a wrinkle to Old Chief stipulations in felon-in-possession 

cases. Under Rehaif, the government must also prove that the defendant 

knew, at the time of the possession, that he was a felon or had some other 

prohibited status under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), so an Old Chief stipulation now 

may need to extend to such knowledge. 
6 No. 21-2701 

were not subject to any stipulation, their admission did not

offend even defendant’s overly broad reading of Old Chief. It 

certainly did not run counter to the actual reasoning and holding of Old Chief. 

Nor did the admission of the challenged exhibits run 

counter to Rule 403 more generally. In relevant part, Rule 403 

provides that relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice” or “needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Because all probative evidence is 

to some extent prejudicial, we have consistently emphasized 

that Rule 403 balancing turns on whether the prejudice is unfair.” United States v. Eads, 729 F.3d 769, 777 (7th Cir. 2013), 

quoting United States v. McKibbins, 656 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir. 

2011). To determine whether an exhibit is unfairly prejudicial, 

we use a “sliding scale approach: as the probative value increases, so does our tolerance of the risk of prejudice.” United 

States v. Earls, 704 F.3d 466, 471 (7th Cir. 2012), quoting Whitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2012). Evidence should 

not be excluded as unfairly prejudicial simply because it is 

“graphic or disturbing.” United States v. Kapp, 419 F.3d 666, 

677 (7th Cir. 2005). Depending on the nature of the offense, 

graphic or disturbing evidence may be central to the government’s case.

Evidence may be deemed needlessly cumulative “when it 

adds very little to the probative force of the other evidence in 

the case,” such that its “contribution to the determination of 

truth would be outweighed by its contribution to the length 

of the trial.” United States v. Gardner, 211 F.3d 1049, 1055 (7th 

Cir. 2000), quoting United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1443 

(7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Hicks, 368 F.3d 801, 808 
No. 21-2701 7

(7th Cir. 2004) (evidence was not needlessly cumulative 

where it was important to the government’s case and its 

presentation took up a “comparatively small amount of time” 

at trial). 

The exhibits at issue here were neither unfairly prejudicial 

nor needlessly cumulative, considering their probative value. 

At trial, West argued that he did not know the child pornography files were on his devices. The government refuted this 

argument in two ways. First, it presented evidence showing 

that child pornography images were found on multiple devices recovered from West’s home and business. The fact that 

child pornography images were found on not just one but six 

devices made it more likely that West knew of their existence. 

To establish that child pornography was found on all of those 

devices, the government offered and the court admitted a 

small number of photographs or videos from each device. Exhibit 5E was one of three child pornography files shown to the 

jury from a red thumb drive, and Exhibit 6E was one of two 

files displayed from a SanDisk Cruzer thumb drive. 

Second, the government also presented evidence showing 

that West’s personal files—for example, medical bills and files 

related to his business—were saved on the same devices that 

contained child pornography. The SanDisk Cruzer thumb 

drive, on which investigators found Exhibit 6E, contained several files related to West’s business. A video containing child 

pornography was downloaded onto the thumb drive on the 

same day that files relating to West’s business were accessed. 

Thus, even if West had stipulated that the exhibits contained 

child pornography, their brief publication to the jury helped 

the government prove that a person accessing the images 

would be immediately aware of their illicit nature. See Eads, 
8 No. 21-2701 

729 F.3d at 777‒78 (explaining that showing child pornography images at trial “served a valid, non-cumulative, purpose” 

where the defendant stipulated that the images contained 

child pornography but argued that he did not know the images were in his possession).

The government and the district judge also took care to 

limit jurors’ exposure to child pornography images at trial, 

which had the effect of minimizing any risk of unfair prejudice and preventing their presentation from becoming cumulative. Over the course of the trial, the government showed 

only sixteen of the child pornography files found on West’s 

devices. When it presented the exhibits, it showed still photographs “briefly” and played only a “few seconds” of videos. 

Moreover, the government asked only two or three questions 

about Exhibits 5E and 6E. Their introduction did not needlessly lengthen West’s trial. 

To carry its burden in a child pornography case, the government ordinarily needs to present images containing child 

pornography to the jury, and it is ordinarily entitled to present them so that the jury understands the crimes. We recognize that this evidence can be disturbing—even traumatizing—for jurors and that there can be a risk of unfair prejudice 

to the defendant. District courts must use common sense to 

strike a balance between allowing the government to make its 

case and protecting jurors and the defendant’s right to a fair 

trial. Judge Mihm struck a balance here that was fair and 

sound. 

B. Publication of the Admitted Exhibits

To the extent that West challenges the display—as distinct 

from the admission—of Exhibits 5E and 6E at his trial, his 
No. 21-2701 9

argument fails. Jurors are “generally entitled to examine exhibits that are properly admitted into evidence.” United States 

v. Loughry, 738 F.3d 166, 170 (7th Cir. 2013). The district court 

may, however, prevent jurors from viewing exhibits that are 

“cumulative, prejudicial, confusing, or misleading.” Id., quoting Deicher v. City of Evansville, 545 F.3d 537, 542 (7th Cir. 

2008). We review the district court’s handling of properly admitted exhibits for a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 169‒70.

For the reasons set forth above, the district court also did 

not abuse its discretion when it allowed the government to 

show Exhibits 5E and 6E to the jury. The probative value of 

the exhibits outweighed their prejudicial effect, and, considering that the government showed only sixteen of the roughly 

one thousand images found on West’s devices, we could not 

conclude that the publication of Exhibits 5E and 6E was needlessly cumulative. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.