IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

EDWARD T.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 2996

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Edward T.’s claim for

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). The parties have consented to the 

jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s 

decision [Doc. No. 18] is granted in part, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment [Doc. No. 21] is denied.

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security 

Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by his first name and the first initial of his last 

name.

2

 Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(d).

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BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed a claim for SSI, alleging disability since

November 3, 2016. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after 

which he timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), 

which was held on January 9, 2019. Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at 

the hearing and was represented by counsel. A vocational expert (“VE”) also 

testified.

On March 28, 2019, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding him

not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration 

Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s 

decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the 

District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 

(7th Cir. 2005). 

II. ALJ DECISION

Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential 

evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since the application date of January 11, 2017. At step 

two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:

bilateral osteoarthritis of the hips, status-post left hip arthroplasty; and 

degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine. The ALJ concluded at 

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step three that Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or 

medically equal a Listing. 

Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a range of light work with the following 

additional limitations: can lift and/or carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 

frequently, with sitting for 6 hours and standing/walking for 6 hours and 

pushing/pulling as much as lifting and carrying; limited to work that allows him to 

shift position for 1-2 minutes every 30 minutes while remaining on task; can never 

climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, kneel, or crawl; can occasionally climb ramps 

and stairs, stoop, and crouch; and can have occasional exposure to hazards and 

vibration.

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. At 

step five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform jobs existing in 

significant numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding that he is not 

disabled under the Social Security Act.

DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

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months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a plaintiff is 

disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff

presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does 

the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform her former 

occupation? and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4). 

An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that 

the plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 

389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, 

precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 

one to four. Id. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the 

burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

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to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even 

in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of 

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not 

high. Substantial evidence is . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and 

means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019)

(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in 

evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also 

Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision 

must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is 

adequately supported”) (citation omitted).

However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved 

of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838 

F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has 

adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every 

piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide 

some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. 

Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to 

a plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 

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conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate 

the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful 

appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 

2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to 

fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately 

articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 

1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons, 

including: (1) the ALJ erred by failing to explain the basis for the sitting and 

standing limitations; (2) the ALJ erred by not explaining her analysis of Plaintiff’s 

handling limitations; and (3) the ALJ erred by failing to analyze Plaintiff’s 

impairments in combination.

Pertinent to Plaintiff’s second argument, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s allegations 

that he suffered from “hand cramping” and “nerve damage in the hands” that 

caused him to “constantly drop[] things.” (R. 17.) The ALJ also noted consultive 

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examiner Dr. Dante Pimentel’s opinion (which the ALJ afforded partial weight) that 

“[t]he claimant’s ability to lift, carry, and handle objects is impaired due to disk 

displacement and left leg pain.” (Id. at 19.) Dr. Pimentel additionally found that 

Plaintiff had a “HISTORY OF NEUROPATHY IN BILATERAL HANDS, WITH 

CRAMPING” and had at least mild difficulty in both hands with opening doors, 

squeezing, picking up coins, picking up and holding cups, picking up pens, 

buttoning, zipping, and tying shoelaces. (Id. at 382, 386.) The record also reflects 

Plaintiff’s reports that he had “spasm[s] in the muscles and difficulty in moving 

hand for over 15 minutes before he can get moving.” (Id. at 365.) Despite this 

evidence and the consultive examiner’s opinion, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff 

retained the residual functional capacity to perform jobs as an Assembler, Hand 

Packer, and Sorter. (Id. at 21.)

The Court concludes that the ALJ did not build the requisite accurate and 

logical bridge from the evidence to her conclusion that Plaintiff had the residual 

functional capacity to perform jobs requiring considerable manipulative abilities. 

The ALJ noted Dr. Pimentel’s conclusion that Plaintiff was impaired in handling 

objects, but did not explain in particular whether and why she accepted or rejected 

that opinion. Similarly, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s complaints of hand cramping and 

spasms, but did not explain in particular whether those allegations lacked 

credibility. In light of the ALJ’s lack of any explanation on those topics, the Court 

finds that the ALJ’s determinations are not predicated on substantial evidence and 

remand is required. See Esin A. v. Berryhill, No. 18 C 1148, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

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12724, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2019) (“[T]he ALJ did not build the requisite 

‘accurate and logical bridge’ to support the RFC’s handling and fingering 

restrictions.”).

Based on its conclusion that remand is necessary for the above reasons, the 

Court need not explore in detail the remaining errors claimed by Plaintiff. The 

Court emphasizes that the Commissioner should not assume these issues were 

omitted from the opinion because no error was found. Indeed, the Court admonishes 

the Commissioner that, on remand, special care should be taken to ensure that 

Plaintiff’s sitting and standing restrictions are properly assessed and Plaintiff’s 

impairments are appropriately analyzed in combination.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s 

decision [Doc. No. 18] is granted in part, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment [Doc. No. 21] is denied. The Court finds that this matter should 

be remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this 

Order.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

DATE: November 30, 2021 ___________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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