[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-14019

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ANDREW CHRISTIAN HAMMOCK, 

a.k.a. playful_guy, 

a.k.a. Florida Guy, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-14019

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cr-00058-MMH-LLL-1

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Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Andrew Christian Hammock appeals his convictions after 

being found guilty at trial of one count of attempting to persuade a 

child to engage in unlawful sexual conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2422(b), and two counts of attempting to exploit a minor for the 

production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) 

and (e). Hammock challenges the sufficiency of the evidence provided by the government at trial and the district court’s denial of 

his Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. He argues that as 

a matter-of-law online messages alone cannot support a finding 

that he committed a substantial step towards the commission of 

the charged crimes. Alternatively, he argues that the evidence provided by the government in this case was legally insufficient.

I.

Ordinarily, we review de novo whether sufficient evidence 

supports a conviction, viewing the evidence and taking all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Fries, 

725 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2013). However, challenges raised 

for the first time on appeal are reviewed for plain error. United 

States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018).

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Section 2422(b) imposes criminal penalties on whoever uses 

interstate commerce and “knowingly persuades, induces, entices, 

or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years[] 

to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so.” 

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). We have noted that § 2251(a) and (e) proscribe 

the same conduct as § 2422 when the defendant is attempting to 

produce child pornography. United States v. Lee, 603 F.3d 904, 913

(11th Cir. 2010). We have also applied precedent regarding the 

scope of § 2422(b) to § 2251(a) and (e) considering the “material 

similarity” of the provisions. Id.

A conviction for attempt under § 2422(b) requires that the 

defendant (1) had the specific intent to persuade, induce, entice, or 

coerce a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity, and (2) took 

actions that constituted a “substantial step” toward the commission 

of the crime. United States v. Yost, 479 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 

2007). To prove intent, the government must show that the defendant intended to cause the minor’s consent, not that he acted 

with the specific intent to engage in sexual activity. Lee, 603 F.3d 

at 914. As to the substantial-step prong, the government must 

demonstrate that the defendant took a substantial step toward 

causing assent, not actual sexual contact. Id. We have noted that 

communications soliciting sexual activity can constitute a substantial step towards a violation of § 2422(b), particularly in cases requiring “persuading, inducing or enticing engagement unlawful activity–[as it] necessarily contemplates oral or written 

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communications as the principal if not the exclusive means of committing the offense.” United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 

626-27 (11th Cir. 2010).

We consider the totality of a defendant’s conduct when determining whether he took a substantial step under § 2422(b). Lee, 

603 F.3d at 916. A substantial step occurs when the defendant’s 

objective acts mark his conduct as criminal, such that his acts as a 

whole strongly corroborate the required culpability. United States 

v. Murrell, 368 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004).

In Lee, we upheld a defendant’s conviction under § 2422(b) 

and § 2251(a), (e), rejecting the defendant’s claim that the government failed to prove that he had taken a substantial step toward 

completing the crime. Lee, 603 F.3d at 915. There, the defendant 

had been in contact with a federal law enforcement agent who was 

posing as the mother of two young girls, and over the course of 

several months, the defendant sent nude photographs of himself 

and encouraged the agent to show them to the girls, promised to 

buy gifts for the girls, assured the agent that he would not harm the 

girls during any sexual encounters, and described in detail “how he 

wanted to complete the act.” Id. We concluded that this activity 

“supported a finding that he groomed the girls in an effort to facilitate a future sexual encounter,” which was sufficient to constitute 

a substantial step. Id.

Here, assuming arguendo that Hammock is entitled to full 

review of his arguments, we conclude that they fail regardless of 

which standard of review applies. First, the district court did not 

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err in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal as a matter of 

law, as our precedent indicates that online messages can support a 

finding that a defendant took a substantial step towards the commission of the charged crimes. Lee, 603 F.3d at 915. 

Second, we conclude that, in this case, the government provided ample evidence for a jury to conclude that the government’s 

evidence satisfied that element concerning Hammock and his actions involving a notional child. When viewed in the light most 

favorable to the jury verdict, as in Lee, the government’s evidence 

allowed the jury to conclude that Hammock was grooming 

“Maddy,” the notional child, to engage in a prohibited sexual activity, in this case the production of child pornography. Id. First, the 

chats produced by the government provided ample evidence that 

Hammock was attempting to build a relationship of trust with the 

child. He repeatedly emphasized the importance of trust in their 

communications, reassuring her that she could trust him with her 

photos and that anything she sent would be “completely confidential.” He later informed her that he was a police officer and sent 

her multiple photographs of himself in uniform, informing her that 

she should “[f]eel special” because he “rarely if ever” shows his face 

and “never ever in uniform.” He reassured her that that he would 

not judge her. The evidence also allowed the jury to find that he 

was building this relationship of trust for the purpose of convincing 

“Maddy” to send him child pornography. Hammock repeatedly 

encouraged her to be “daring” and to send him “naughty” photos 

if she was comfortable doing so.

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This escalated to Hammock directly requesting photos of 

“Maddy’s” “privates” on March 9 and 12. He instructed her on how 

to take and send these photographs to him. He encouraged her to 

send these pictures by sending a naked picture of his own penis and 

remarking that, “now that they trusted each other, he would show 

her more if she wanted him to.” Much as the sending of graphic 

photos and the promising of gifts did in Lee, the building of the 

relationship of trust and the direct request for her to send him pornographic images, along with instructions on how to produce 

them, provided sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Hammock 

took a substantial step towards the crimes charged. Id. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED. 

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