UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

AMALGAMATED BANK, on behalf of itself and all 

others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

- against - 

FAIR ISAAC CORPORATION,

Defendant. 

Docket No. 

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

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Plaintiff Amalgamated Bank (“Plaintiff”), on behalf of itself and all other similarly situated 

residents of the United States, complains upon knowledge as to itself and its acts and upon 

information and belief as to all other matters, against Defendant Fair Isaac Corporation (“Defendant” 

or “Fair Isaac”) for violations of the Sherman Act and state laws from at least January 1, 2006 through 

the date on which the anticompetitive effects of Defendant’s unlawful conduct ceased, but no sooner 

than the present (the “Class Period”). Based upon personal knowledge, information and belief, 

investigation by counsel, proceedings and admissions made in Fair Isaac Corp. v. Trans Union LLC, 17-

cv-08318 (N.D. Ill.), and related ongoing federal government investigations, Plaintiff alleges: 

INTRODUCTION 

1. “Credit Scores” rank or “score” creditworthiness within a range by applying certain 

algorithms to credit histories. This process results in a three digit Credit Score. Two distinct markets 

exist for Credit Scores in the United States: (1) the market for the sale of Credit Scores to lenders, 

financial institutions, and businesses in making risk management decisions (the “B2B Credit Score 

Market”); and (2) the direct market for the sale of consumers’ own Credit Scores to enable monitoring 

of their own credit records (the “business-to-consumer” or “B2C Credit Score Market”). 

2. This action relates to the B2B Credit Score Market, which Fair Isaac has unlawfully 

monopolized for years due to its dominant position with a 90% market share. 

3. Fair Isaac has leveraged its dominant market position by engaging in anticompetitive 

and exclusionary conduct including suppressing competition, obstructing innovation, and limiting 

access to credit for millions of Americans. Fair Isaac’s conduct is in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of 

the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1 and 2, in addition to state antitrust and unfair trade practices laws. 

4. Fair Isaac’s FICO Credit Scores (“FICO Scores”) have had a dominant market 

position for over two decades. Fair Isaac executives, including public affairs manager Craig Watts 

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(“Watts”), have bragged that their FICO Scores are “the 800- pound gorilla”1 and experts have opined 

that Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores are “deeply embedded in the U.S. financial system[.]”2 In 2017, Fair 

Isaac admitted that it has maintained a market share of 90% or more for at least 13 years. Fair Isaac 

advertises that “90% of top lenders use FICO® Scores when making lending decisions.”3 

5. Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion (collectively, the “Credit Bureaus”) are credit 

reporting agencies that collect, standardize, and distribute information concerning consumer credit 

activity. Credit Bureaus sell credit reports and Credit Scores, including Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores, to 

lenders, financial institutions, and other businesses. These businesses use the credit reports and Credit 

Scores to make decisions about whether to extend credit and on what terms. Credit Bureaus sell credit 

reports and Credit Scores to businesses in every state in the United States. Credit Bureaus have long 

acted as Fair Isaac’s agents and co-conspirators to broker sales of FICO scores between businesses 

and Fair Isaac. Fair Isaac has used distribution agreements with the Credit Bureaus to: (1) place 

restrictions on the Credit Bureaus’ ability to develop or distribute their own competitive Credit Scores; 

(2) prohibit Credit Bureaus from individually negotiating royalty prices for FICO Score access; (3) 

charge discriminatory royalty prices for FICO Scores when a Credit Bureau customer purchases a 

FICO Score while providing the consumer with a competing score; and (4) increase the royalty 

prices paid by Credit Bureaus. Despite these restrictions, the Credit Bureaus have agreed to and 

complied with Fair Isaac’s agreement conditions. 

                                                            

1

 Dana Dratch, What Does ‘Good’ Credit Really Mean?, BANKRATE, (published Oct. 30, 3008, 

updated Aug. 5, 2010), https://www.cnbc.com/id/27458815.

2

 Nina Zdinjak, Here is What Newbrook Capital Advisors Thinks of Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO), 

INSIDER MONKEY, (Apr. 15, 2019), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/newbrook-capitaladvisors-thinks-fair-162450887.html.

3 https://www.myfico.com/credit-education/fico-scores-bridge.

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6. In 2006, the Credit Bureaus jointly formed VantageScore Solutions, LLC 

(“VantageScore”), and launched VantageScore, an alternative competitive Credit Score. Since its 

creation, VantageScore was extremely accurate and was competitively priced, making it more attractive 

than Fair Isaac’s FICO products to large numbers of Americans. Now, through its full utilization of 

consumer data from the Credit Bureaus, including rental and utility payments, VantageScore can 

provide Credit Scores for 30 million more Americans than Fair Isaac’s FICO can. If businesses utilized 

VantageScore, because of its additional features, millions of additional creditworthy Americans would 

be able to obtain credit at more favorable rates and at a lower cost. 

7. Seeing the threat from VantageScore to its dominant market position, Fair Isaac has 

acted to discourage widespread adoption of VantageScore. To effectuate this, Fair Isaac has abused 

its monopoly power to prevent the Credit Bureaus from successfully launching a competitive 

alternative to FICO Scores and has utilized a public relations and advertising campaign to disparage 

VantageScore and create doubt about VantageScore’s accuracy with lenders and consumers alike. 

8. Fair Isaac has succeeded in preventing the growth of VantageScore or any other 

potential competing credit scoring system through its exclusionary conduct. By continually 

suppressing competition, Fair Isaac has been able to increase prices for its FICO Scores, d o i n g s o 

m o s t r e c e n t l y i n September 2019. Due to Fair Isaac’s suppression of competition, and its 

insistence that non-compete clauses be included in contractual agreements, VantageScore, or any 

another credit scoring system, was unable to thrive and gain market share despite creation of an 

innovative and arguably, superior product. The existence of VantageScore and similar competitive scoring 

systems would have yielded lower prices paid for B2B Credit Scores by Plaintiff and Class members. 

9. Through its anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct, Fair Isaac has harmed 

businesses by depriving them of competitive pricing and freedom of choice for Credit Score 

instruments that would allow them to evaluate credit risk. Eliminating Fair Isaac’s stranglehold on the 

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market by opening the market to competition is essential to ensure competitive prices, product 

innovation, freedom of choice, and widespread access to credit for all creditworthy Americans. 

10. On February 12, 2018, TransUnion filed antitrust counterclaims for monopolization 

and related claims against Fair Isaac in this District. See Fair Isaac Corp. v. Trans Union LLC, 1:17-cv08318, ECF No. 38 (redacted counterclaims). On March 27, 2019, Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman 

denied Fair Isaac’s motion to dismiss TransUnion’s antitrust counterclaims. See id., ECF No. 96. The 

matter is ongoing. 

11. On March 15, 2020, Fair Isaac disclosed that it w a s n o t i f i e d tw o d a y s 

e a r l i e r t h a t i t was being investigated by the United States Department of Justice Antitrust 

Division for exclusionary conduct relating to the same conduct alleged in the counterclaims upheld by 

Judge Coleman.4

PARTIES 

A. Plaintiff 

12. Plaintiff Amalgamated Bank is a New York state chartered commercial bank and trust 

company with a principal place of business at 275 Seventh Avenue, New York, New York 10011. 

13. Plaintiff is the largest union-owned bank in the United States. Workers United and 

affiliated organizations are the largest shareholders. Plaintiff provides financial services, including 

personal banking services for consumers, and services for businesses, non-profit organizations, and 

institutional investing services. 

14. During the Class Period, Plaintiff directly purchased B2B Credit Scores from 

Defendant and from members of the Credit Bureaus. 

                                                            

4 See Press Release, Fair Isaac Corporation, FICO Statement Regarding Antitrust Investigation, (Mar. 

15, 2020), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/fico-statement-regarding-antitrustinvestigation-301024452.html. 

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15. Plaintiff suffered injury in its business or property as a direct, proximate, and material 

result of Defendant’s violations of law. 

16. Plaintiff is at continual risk of additional injury to its business and property by reason 

of Defendant’s continuing violations of law. 

B. Defendant 

17. Defendant Fair Isaac Corporation is a Delaware corporation, with a principal place of 

business at 181 Metro Drive, Suite 700, San Jose, California 95110. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

18. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of the 

Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1 and 2, and Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 

15 U.S.C. §§15 and 26. 

19. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§1331, 1332(d), and 1337. 

20. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. §1367. 

21. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§15(a) and 22, and 28 U.S.C. 

§1391(b), (c) and (d). During the Class Period, Defendant resided, transacted business, was found, or 

had agents in the United States, including in this District, and a substantial portion of the affected 

interstate trade and commerce described in this Complaint was carried out in this District. 

22. During the Class Period, Defendant’s conduct was within the flow of, was intended to, 

and did have a substantial effect on the interstate commerce of the United States, including in this 

District. 

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23. During the Class Period, Defendant used the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 

including interstate wires, United States Postal Service mail, and wireless spectrum to effectuate its 

illegal scheme. 

24. Defendant’s conduct also had a substantial effect on the intrastate commerce of at 

least the following states: Arizona; Arkansas; California; Connecticut; Florida; Hawaii; Illinois; Iowa; 

Kansas; Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Michigan; Minnesota; Mississippi; Missouri; Montana; 

Nebraska; Nevada; New Mexico; New York; North Carolina; North Dakota; Oregon; Rhode Island; 

South Carolina; South Dakota; Tennessee; Utah; Vermont; West Virginia; and Wisconsin; as well 

as the District of Columbia. 

25. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant utilized this 

District to transact business, maintain substantial contacts, and commit unlawful conduct. Defendant’s 

unlawful scheme was directed at, and had the intended effect of, causing injury to persons residing in, 

otherwise located in, or doing business in this District. 

26. Plaintiff purchased at least one FICO Score from Experian, which employs Credit 

Score business personnel in this District. 

27. Defendant employs Credit Score business personnel in this District. 

28. Defendant is registered to do business in Illinois with the Illinois Secretary of State. 

29. Defendant selected this District to initiate litigation against Trans Union LLC, Case 

No. 1:17-cv-08318, to which this case is filed as related by Plaintiff. 

SUBSTANTIVE ALLEGATIONS 

I. Background 

A. Credit Scores 

30. Credit Scores are three-digit numbers that are meant to assess credit risk. Consumers 

with higher Credit Scores generally pose less credit risk than those with lower Credit Scores. Credit 

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Scores are created through the use of a credit scoring algorithm to provide a consumer credit report. 

Credit Scores are usually paired with “reason codes,” which detail information about what caused 

reductions to a particular consumer’s Credit Score. 

31. In the United States, Credit Scores are the most widely used indicators of consumers’ 

creditworthiness. Financial institutions, lenders, and other businesses use Credit Scores in making 

consumer credit decisions. Consumers rely on Credit Scores to determine their ability to procure a 

mortgage, auto loan, or credit card, in addition to the rate that they will pay. 

32. The Credit Bureaus collect and supply aggregated consumer credit data in consumer 

reports. The Credit Bureaus collect credit and financial data about consumers from creditors, 

collection agencies, governmental entities, public records, and other third parties. The Credit Bureaus 

then compile this information to create a credit file. The Credit Bureaus sell credit reports, which 

include consumer credit file information, to businesses and consumers. 

33. Although Credit Scores are sometimes bundled and sold together with credit reports, 

they are two different products and credit reports can be sold independently of Credit Scores. Credit 

reports have detailed information about the credit activity and current credit situation of consumers. 

A credit report could include information about a consumer’s mortgage payment history, credit card 

balances and payments, and credit inquiries. A Credit Score is based on the information provided in a 

credit report, which ultimately yields a single three-digit number assessment. 

B. The B2B and B2C Credit Score Markets in the United States 

34. In the United States, there are two markets for Credit Scores, the B2B Credit Score 

Market, and the B2C Credit Score Market. B2B Credit Scores and B2C Credit Scores serve different 

purposes and are priced and purchased differently. 

35. Financial institutions, lenders, and other businesses in the B2B Credit Score Market 

use Credit Scores to assess consumer creditworthiness and make lending decisions. These institutions, 

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lenders, and businesses do not consider credit reports or other borrower information to be a substitute 

for Credit Scores. 

36. In contrast, in the B2C Credit Score Market, consumers purchase their own Credit 

Scores to gauge their own creditworthiness and determine how they will be categorized by potential 

lenders and creditors. 

37. The United States is the relevant geographic market in which B2B Credit Scores are 

provided because the restraints on competition contained in Fair Isaac’s contracts relate to the 

provision of B2B Credit Scores to businesses across the United States. 

38. B2B Credit Score Market p u r c h a s e r s include financial institutions, lenders, and 

other businesses that purchase B2B Credit Scores to make risk management decisions (“B2B 

Purchasers”). Financial institutions, lenders, and other businesses that purchase Credit reports from 

Defendant and/or the Credit Bureaus generally do so to: (1) determine the identity and creditworthiness of qualified borrowers to whom a preapproved offer of credit offer will be extended; (2) 

make lending decisions, and (3) evaluate the risk for existing borrowers, including for purposes such 

as offering to extend additional credit or making changes to other account terms. 

39. In contrast, customers in the B2C Credit Score Market purchase Credit Scores to 

assess their likelihood of obtaining credit, otherwise manage their credit, or protect their identity. 

Presently, millions of American consumers have signed up for credit monitoring or identity protection 

services. Many of those credit monitoring accounts provide consumers with their Credit Score. 

40. The credit risk scoring industry, including industry and policy analysts, and investors 

distinguish the B2B Credit Score Market and the B2C Credit Score Market as two distinct markets. 

Fair Isaac also views the B2B Credit Score Market as distinct from the B2C Credit Score Market. In 

its 2019 Form 10-K, Fair Isaac described different components of its Scores reportable segment 

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including its “business-to-business scoring solutions and services” and the “myFICO® solutions for 

consumers.” 

41. The B2B Credit Score Market has high barriers to entry. B2B Purchasers face 

significant “switching costs” if they adopt a new Credit Score that has different score-to-risk 

relationships or that uses different reason codes, regardless of whether it is an updated version of the 

score they already use or an entirely new brand of Credit Score. This is not the case for B2C Credit 

Score Market consumers. Switching costs for B2B Purchasers arise because: (1) employees require 

training in the properties and elements of a new score; (2) B2B Purchasers must verify that the new 

score will adequately predict the creditworthiness of their existing customers; (3) B2B Purchasers 

often conduct extensive and costly validation tests to determine whether the new score is costeffective; and (4) B2B Purchasers often need to update their internal systems to ensure technical 

compatibility between their systems and a new score. 

42. The B2B Credit Score Market is also characterized by network effects. In certain 

industries, such as the industries for mortgages and auto loans, the use of Credit Scores with similar 

score-to-risk relationships and reason codes allows the bundling of mortgage and auto loans from 

different originators into securities that can be sold to investors. Consistent use of a single type of 

Credit Score allows the marketing materials for these securities to include data about the average 

Credit Scores of the borrowers associated with the underlying loans. 

C. Fair Isaac Has Maintained Monopoly Power in the B2B Credit Score Market 

for Decades 

43. Fair Isaac has maintained its monopoly over the B2B Credit Score Market in the 

United States for nearly three decades, largely through the anticompetitive dominant nature of its 

FICO product line, which includes several different types of FICO Scores. Introduced over thirty 

years ago, Fair Isaac’s “FICO Classic” Credit Scores are the most widely known and used B2B 

Credit Scores in the United States. FICO Classic applies an algorithm to each Credit Bureau’s data 

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and generates a score between 300 and 850 that purportedly provides an indication of the individual’s 

credit risk level. FICO Classic also generates “reason codes” that explain why the consumer has not 

been assigned the maximum score of 850. 

44. Fair Isaac does not attempt to hide its B2B Credit Score Market monopoly power. 

Instead, it advertises its monopoly power, stating that 90% of all lending decisions in the United States 

utilize FICO Scores, even boasting on its website that 100 billion FICO Scores have been sold. Fair 

Isaac also brags that its sales are four times the number of McDonald’s worldwide yearly 

sales of hamburgers, and its daily FICO Scores sales are more than double Starbucks’ worldwide 

daily coffee sales.5

45. Similarly, in its 2019 Form 10-K, Fair Isaac described its “FICO Scores” as “the 

standard measure in the U.S. of consumer credit risk” and reported that “FICO Scores are used in 

the majority of U.S. credit decisions, by nearly all of the major banks, credit card organizations, 

mortgage lenders, and auto loan originators.” 

46. Representatives for Fair Isaac, including Watts, have labeled Fair Isaac’s FICO score 

as “the 800- pound gorilla” in the market for B2B Credit Scores,6 and as previously noted, bragged 

about Fair Isaac’s dominant 90% market share. For example, in November 2017, Fair Isaac’s CFO 

and Executive Vice President, Michael Pung, stated that Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores are used by 

nearly every major lender and are the most widely used credit scoring system in the United States. 

47. Fair Isaac representatives have also recognized their benefit from the 

widespread use of FICO Scores throughout many different industries. On November 3, 2011, 

                                                            

5 FICO Knows A Lot About You But What Do You Know About FICO?, ADVISORBOX, 

http://advisorbox.com/fico-knows-lot-know-fico/ (citing http://www.fico.com/en/aboutus#at_glance). 

6 Dana Dratch, What Does ‘Good’ Credit Really Mean?, BANKRATE, (published Oct. 30, 2008, 

updated Aug. 5, 2010), https://www.cnbc.com/id/27458815.

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at Fair Isaac’s Analyst/Investor Day, Fair Isaac’s then-CEO, Mark Greene, explained that the 

network effect of FICO Scores being the industry standard and “having everybody . . . standardize 

on a FICO Score, that’s magic.”7

48. Fair Isaac’s monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score Market for Credit Scores has 

provided it with the power to control prices. Fair Isaac’s CEO, Will Lansing (“Lansing”), has stated 

that in the B2B Credit Score Market, Fair Isaac has the ability to decide where it wants its margins to 

be. 

II. Fair Isaac’s Monopoly in the B2B Credit Score Market Has Eliminated the Chances 

of any Potential Competitors 

49. Nearly 15 years ago, VantageScore introduced the VantageScore Credit Score and 

credit scoring system. VantageScore is a competitor to FICO Scores in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

50. From the time it was first released in March 2006, VantageScore has been able 

to score millions more consumers than the FICO scoring systems. VantageScore had more 

dynamic capabilities because it calculated scores for consumers that had not used credit for up to 

two years. It also had far-reaching access to many more consumers by using utility and telecommunications 

payment histories reported to the Credit Bureaus. In contrast, Fair Isaac’s FICO scoring systems would 

not generate a score if a consumer did not use credit in over six months or if a credit account was 

opened less than six months ago. 

51. Due to its expansive reach, VantageScore now issues Credit Scores for 30 million more 

Americans than traditional FICO scoring systems. Fair Isaac’s FICO Classic credit scoring systems, 

which are still used by many lenders, exclude large numbers of creditworthy Americans that can be 

reliably scored by VantageScore. Roughly 25 percent of American adults, or about 65 million people, 

                                                            

7

 Fair Isaac Corp. – Analyst/Investor Day Transcript, (Nov. 3, 2011), 

https://seekingalpha.com/article/307417-fair-isaac-corp-analyst-investor-day.

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do not have a traditional FICO score. Through widespread usage of VantageScore, the number of 

adults without a Credit Score would be cut nearly in half. Remarkably, approximately ten million of 

those newly scored individuals would be classified as “prime” borrowers that would be extremely 

attractive to financial institutions and lenders. 

52. For any consumers without a Credit Score, it is difficult if not impossible to 

successfully obtain a mortgage, car loan, or reasonable interest rates for personal lines of credit. The 

implications of not having a Credit Score can even affect a consumer’s ability to rent an apartment, 

as Credit Scores are increasingly used by landlords in their tenant screening process. 

53. Low-income and minority consumers make up a disproportionate percentage of the 

individuals excluded by Fair Isaac’s traditional FICO scoring systems. The lack of access for 

these affected individuals results in a greater likelihood of their being denied access to credit cards, 

auto and home loans, and apartment housing. 

54. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) published a report which stated 

that Black and Hispanic consumers are considerably more likely to be credit invisible or have unscored 

credit records than White consumers. About 15 percent of Black and Hispanic consumers are credit 

invisibles compared to just nine percent of White consumers. An additional 13 percent of Black 

consumers and 12 percent of Hispanic consumers have records that cannot be scored under the 

widely-used model, compared to just seven percent of White consumers. CFPB analysis suggests that 

these differences across racial and ethnic groups materialize early in the adult lives of these consumers 

and persist thereafter.8 However, through usage of VantageScore, a score could be calculated for 

                                                            

8 CFPB Report Finds 26 Million Consumers Are Credit Invisible, CFPB, (May 5, 2015), 

https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-report-finds-26-million-consumersare-credit-invisible/.

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roughly 9.5 million Hispanic and Black consumers who do not currently have a FICO score, with over 

2.5 million of these minority consumers qualifying for “prime” borrowing status. 

55. Despite the tremendous benefits that using VantageScore would provide to millions 

of consumers, Fair Isaac continues to maintain its monopoly position in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

On February 27, 2013, at a Morgan Stanley Technology, Media & Telecom Conference, Lansing 

explained that despite the presence of VantageScore in the market, “there’s not that much competition 

around our [B2B] scores business” because “[t]he FICO scores are very much part of the fabric of the 

banking industry.”9

III. Fair Isaac Has Contracted with the Credit Bureaus as Agents and Co-Conspirators to 

Monopolize the B2B Credit Score Market 

56. Despite the Credit Bureaus’ attempts to compete in the B2B Credit Score Market, due 

to its dominant market position, Fair Isaac is able to employ the Credit Bureaus in its scheme to extend 

the shelf life of its monopoly. Fair Isaac depends on the Credit Bureaus to help foster its relationship 

with B2B Purchasers. Fair Isaac enlists the Credit Bureaus for assistance with the sale of its FICO 

Scores to these B2B Purchasers. 

57. For B2B Purchasers that require a Credit Score, they purchase the report from the 

Credit Bureau, and the Credit Score jointly from the Credit Bureau and Fair Isaac. At times, payment 

may at times occur in a single transaction, but practically speaking, as expressly stated in B2B 

Purchasers’ contract terms, both the Credit Bureau and Fair Isaac serve as the provider of the FICO 

Score. 

                                                            

9

 Morgan Stanley Technology, Media & Telecom Conference Transcript, (Feb. 27, 2013), 

https://seekingalpha.com/article/1231981-fair-isaacs-ceo-presents-at-morgan-stanley-technologymedia-and-telecom-conference-transcript.

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58. B2B Purchasers’ FICO Scores contracts are often referred to as Credit Scoring 

Services Agreements (“CSSAs”). CSSAs provide for both the payment method and fee model for the 

delivery of Credit Score services. 

59. In Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ obtaining of FICO Scores, the Credit Bureaus serve 

as co-conspirators and agents of Fair Isaac. Pursuant to common terms of CSSAs, the Credit Bureaus 

often deliver subscriber invoices for Credit Scores that dictate payment should be made to Fair Isaac. 

IV. Fair Isaac’s Additional Anticompetitive and Exclusionary Conduct 

60. Fair Isaac utilized its monopoly power to coordinate a campaign to eliminate 

competition from VantageScore and has explicitly stated that this is its end goal. On April 23, 2015, 

Lansing informed investors on a quarterly earnings conference call that Fair Isaac’s strategic goal was 

to ensure that “the entire industry adopts FICO scores instead of [other] scores.”10 Remarkably, thanks 

to its dominant position in the B2B Credit Score Market, Fair Isaac has enlisted its competitors, the 

Credit Bureaus, which jointly own and control VantageScore, to sign anticompetitive contracts that: 

(1) prevent them from developing or selling alternative Credit Scores that could be seamlessly 

integrated into lenders’ systems, or at a minimum, could be used interchangeably with FICO Scores; 

(2) prevent them from competing with each other to negotiate better prices from FICO; and (3) create 

a pricing scheme effectively eliminating the possibility that B2B Purchasers choose to use FICO Scores 

in their lending decisions at the same time as providing customers with a competing Credit Score, 

such as VantageScore. Concurrently, Fair Isaac has smeared VantageScore in the media and has made 

false and misleading statements to establish doubt about VantageScore’s accuracy and reliability. 

Through such anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct, Fair Isaac has injured and essentially 

                                                            

10 Fair Isaac’s (FICO) CEO Will Lansing on Q2 2015 Results – Earnings Call Transcript, (Apr. 23, 

2015), https://seekingalpha.com/article/3097846-fair-isaacs-fico-ceo-will-lansing-on-q2-2015-

results-earnings-call-transcript.

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eliminated competition in the B2B Credit Score Market, drastically increased prices for Plaintiff and 

the Class, and severely limited access to credit for millions of Americans. 

A. Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus Have Executed Contracts with 

Anticompetitive Terms that Restrict the Credit Bureaus’ Ability to Compete 

and Sell VantageScore 

61. In January 2015, Fair Isaac and TransUnion entered into a contract, the Analytic and 

Data License Agreement. Fair Isaac utilized the December 31, 2014 contract expiration date to 

demand that the parties enter into a new contract rather than simply renew their existing contracts. 

Fair Isaac represented to TransUnion that the other Credit Bureaus, Experian and Equifax, 

already agreed to new contracts with Fair Isaac that were materially similar. If TransUnion did not agree 

to Fair Isaac’s desired terms, it would lose substantial business from customers that depend on FICO 

Scores. On information and belief, the Credit Bureaus all agreed to Fair Isaac’s terms and its plan to 

exclude competitors and maintain its monopoly. 

1. Through the Anticompetitive Agreements Fair Issac Restricted the 

Credit Bureaus’ Ability to Develop or Sell Other Credit Scores 

Compatible with B2B Purchasers’ Existing Systems 

62. Fair Isaac has imposed similar or identical “No Equivalent Products” clauses on each 

of the Credit Bureaus. By imposing the “No Equivalent Products” terms, Fair Isaac has sought to 

eliminate the Credit Bureaus’ ability to offer alternative Credit Score products, such as VantageScore, 

that would allow B2B Purchasers to easily switch from FICO Scores to VantageScore without 

incurring increases in costs to redesign their lending programs and systems, or to use VantageScore in 

addition to or interchangeably with FICO Scores. The Credit Bureaus have agreed to Fair Isaac’s 

demands in these anticompetitive agreements, terms, and the resulting anticompetitive effects. 

63. The “No Equivalent Products” clauses provide that the Credit Bureaus may not 

internally develop a credit scoring system that is aligned to the odds-to-score relationship of any Fair 

Isaac Analytic or that uses more than a limited number of reason codes that “match” reason codes 

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used by any Fair Isaac Analytic. These clauses also prohibit the Credit Bureaus from distributing 

any competing analytic, such as a credit scoring system, that is aligned with FICO Scores or uses too 

many of the same reason codes. These clauses expressly name Vantage Score Solutions LLC as a 

developer of such a scoring system that may not be distributed in the event that VantageScore ever 

offered an “Equivalent Product.” 

64. For example, if a competing Credit Score product used a 750 score to designate a lessthan-one-percent risk of credit delinquency, and if a 750 FICO score also designated the same risk of 

delinquency, then the “No Equivalent Products” clause prevents the Credit Bureaus from distributing 

the competing product. Similarly, if a competing Credit Score product used reason codes that match 

20% or more of the reason codes used by FICO scoring systems, the “No Equivalent Products” clause 

prohibits the Credit Bureaus from distributing the product. 

65. Ultimately, the “No Equivalent Products” clauses prevent the Credit Bureaus from 

developing or selling an alternative to FICO’s Credit Scores that would be compatible with many 

B2B Purchasers’ systems, models, and processes, and would allow B2B Purchasers to have a real choice 

between using FICO Scores and some alternative score. Many B2B Purchasers have expended 

substantial efforts and resources to develop systems, models, and processes that are designed for 

FICO Scores compatibility. B2B Purchasers’ systems, models, and processes are tailored to FICO’s 

odds-to-score relationship, providing a given ratio of non-defaulting consumers to defaulting 

consumers for each given score, and reason codes indicating the particular reasons listed for increased 

risk of default. An example of this tailoring is bank software designed to accept one or more FICO 

Scores and reason codes, that combines this information with internally collected data, and 

automatically produces a lending decision. 

66. The “No Equivalent Products” clauses in contracts with the Credit Bureaus allow Fair 

Isaac to maintain its monopoly. The odds-to-score relationship is simply an arbitrary mapping 

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between credit risk and score and does not constitute protectable intellectual property. Similarly, the 

reason codes that may not be used by any “Equivalent Product” were not invented by Fair Isaac but 

are instead based on well-established industry best practices for lending. 

2. Fair Isaac’s Anticompetitive Agreements Restrict the Credit Bureaus’ 

Ability to Develop or Sell Other Credit Scores Compatible with B2B 

Purchasers’ Existing Systems

67. Fair Isaac’s contracts with each Credit Bureau include a similar or identical “Dynamic 

Royalty Schedule” clause and a similar or identical “Pre-Qualification” royalty category. Through use 

of the “Pre-Qualification” royalty category, Fair Isaac has effectively eliminated lenders’ ability to 

purchase and utilize a FICO score in their lending decision while also providing a consumer with a 

competing Credit Score. This causes lenders to buy Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores exclusively rather than 

consider and potentially purchase competing Credit Scores, such as VantageScore. Due to Fair 

Isaac’s unilateral inclusion of the “Pre-Qualification” royalty category, TransUnion has lost massive 

amounts of sales of VantageScore to major banks so they can provide the scores to consumers. 

68. In the 2015 agreements, Fair Isaac demanded, and the Credit Bureaus have complied 

with, a new “Pre-Qualification” royalty category, which Fair Isaac describes as an End User’s 

qualification of a potential consumer customer for that End User’s own internal lending offering. The 

“Pre-Qualification” royalty category distinguishes between: (1) lenders that use FICO Scores for “PreQualification” without providing any Credit Score or credit data to consumers; and (2) lenders that 

use FICO Scores for “Pre-Qualification” in addition to providing Credit Scores or credit data to 

consumers related to the “Pre-Qualification.” Certain banks and lenders offer consumers 

opportunities to apply to qualify for credit opportunities (e.g., a credit card or loan) and, simultaneously, 

receive their personal Credit Score. In many instances, this offer of a free Credit Score can entice 

consumers to apply for credit opportunities. 

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69. The royalty price associated with a FICO score used for “Pre-Qualification” depends 

on whether other Credit Scores or credit data are provided to consumers. If a lender purchases a 

FICO score for use in “Pre-Qualification” and does not provide any Credit Score or credit data to the 

consumer “in connection” with the “Pre-Qualification,” there is one per-score royalty rate. If the 

lender purchases a FICO score for use in “Pre-Qualification” and provides any other Credit Score to 

the consumer “in connection” with the “Pre- Qualification,” a higher penalty per-score royalty rate is 

imposed. 

70. The penalty rate can be avoided through exclusive purchase of FICO Scores. In 

one example, the B2B Purchaser could purchase a FICO score for use in “Pre-Qualification” and 

provide no Credit Score or credit data to the consumer. In the alternative, the B2B Purchaser could 

purchase a bundled FICO product from Fair Isaac. Fair Isaac offers bundled products to lenders 

that combine the use of Credit Scores by lenders with the provision of Credit Scores to consumers. 

71. No legitimate business justification exists for the penalty rate agreed upon by Fair Isaac 

and the Credit Bureaus when the lender also purchases any other Credit Score to disclose to 

consumers. The only reason for the “Pre-Qualification” royalty category is to drive all B2B Purchasers 

engaging in “Pre-Qualification” to purchase FICO Scores exclusively and make it cost-prohibitive for 

B2B Purchasers engaging in “Pre-Qualification” to purchase a competing Credit Score to disclose to 

consumers. Fair Isaac’s scheme has been hugely successful, with very few B2B Purchasers opting to 

pay the penalty rate. 

3. Fair Isaac Has Extracted Monopoly Prices from B2B Purchasers 

Facilitated by its Anticompetitive Contracts with the Credit Bureaus 

72. In its Agreements, Fair Isaac requires a “Level Playing Field,” in which the prices that 

are made available to one Credit Bureau are made available to all of the Credit Bureaus. Combined 

with the “Dynamic Royalty Schedule” clause, the “Level Playing Field” clause enables Fair Isaac to 

unilaterally increase the royalty prices it charges for FICO Scores. Fair Isaac’s contracts with each of 

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the Credit Bureaus include similar or identical “Dynamic Royalty Schedule” and “Level Playing Field” 

provisions. 

73. B2B Purchasers have paid monopoly prices due to Fair Isaac’s implementation of the 

“Dynamic Royalty Schedule” and “Level Playing Field” provisions in its contracts with the Credit 

Bureaus. These provisions disincentivize the Credit Bureaus from negotiating for a lower price because 

each one knows that even the negotiation is successful, no competitive advantage over the other Credit 

Bureaus will be gained. 

B. Fair Isaac Disparaged VantageScore in an Aggressive Public Relations 

Campaign to Create Doubt About VantageScore’s Viability Among B2B 

Purchasers 

74. Unsatisfied with its successful implementation of anticompetitive restrictions that 

eliminated VantageScore’s ability to compete with FICO, Fair Isaac went even further and waged an 

aggressive public relations campaign to spread false statements and mislead B2B Purchasers about the 

qualities and characteristics of FICO Scores and VantageScore. Fair Isaac has disparaged 

VantageScore by calling it a “Fako” score, falsely claimed that VantageScore is an unreliable measure 

of creditworthiness, and misrepresented VantageScore’s credit scoring system and its overall process. 

75. On December 12, 2017, Fair Isaac placed a full-page advertisement in The Wall Street 

Journal addressed to “Lenders, Policymakers and Consumer Advocates” that criticized VantageScore, 

despite not identifying it by name. The advertisement presented Fair Isaac as independent from the 

Credit Bureaus and stated that Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores have been used by lenders and 

securitization investors for decades. In contrast, the advertisement described an alternative Credit 

Score, owned by the Credit Bureaus as less reliable than FICO Scores in evaluating credit risk. The 

advertisement unambiguously conveyed the false message that VantageScore weakened scoring 

standards, and harmed both consumers and the market, particularly the B2B Credit Score Market. 

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76. Fair Isaac’s advertisement in the Wall Street Journal also directed readers to view a 

Fair Isaac-owned website that connects visitors to articles and blog posts that f u r t h e r disparage 

VantageScore d i r e c t l y by name. A November 15, 2016 blog post asserts: “Despite claims by 

VantageScore, weakening the minimum scoring criteria will not empower millions of low-risk 

mortgage credit seekers.”11

77. Fair Issac’s implication that FICO Classic scoring systems provide Credit Scores for 

as many consumers as VantageScore is erroneous and misleading to the B2B Credit Score Market and 

consumers. As described supra, VantageScore provides Credit Scores for millions of American 

consumers that are not scored by FICO Classic scoring systems. 

78. Fair Isaac’s website includes numerous posts that disparage VantageScore and make 

false or misleading statements about VantageScore’s features. A November 16, 2015 blog post claims 

that “[r]esearch results consistently showed that scoring models relying solely on sparse or old credit 

data were weak and did a poor job forecasting future performance.”12 This statement is false and 

misleading because it attempts to present VantageScore’s scoring model as “weak” and as doing a 

“poor job forecasting future performance” because it considers a consumer’s full credit history even 

if the consumer has not used a traditional credit line in the last six months. Despite Fair Isaac’s claims, 

studies have shown that VantageScore is strongly predictive. 

79. Fair Isaac’s blog post from February 6, 2017 asserts that whereas “FICO Score 9 

differentiates medical from non-medical collections,” “VantageScore does not.”13 Fair Isaac’s 

                                                            

11 Joanne Gaskin, Truth Squad: Will Looser Scoring Standards Help Millions More Americans Get Mortgages?, 

FICO BLOG, (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.fico.com/blogs/truth-squad-will-looser-scoringstandards-help-millions-more-americans-get-mortgages. 

12 Ethan Dornhelm, Why Bureau Data Alone Can’t Score More Consumers, (Nov. 16, 2015), FICO 

BLOG, https://www.fico.com/blogs/why-bureau-data-alone-can-t-score-more-consumers. 

13 Joanne Gaskin, Truth Squad: Is FICO Score 700 the Same as VantageScore 700?, (Feb. 6, 2017), FICO 

BLOG, https://www.fico.com/blogs/truth-squad-fico-score-700-same-vantagescore-700. 

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statement conveys the false message that VantageScore does not differentiate medical from nonmedical collections. Despite this assertion, the opposite is true. Notably, VantageScore 3.0 was the 

first credit scoring system to address medical debt. VantageScore 4.0, the most recent version of 

VantageScore, distinguishes medical collection accounts from non- medical collection accounts and 

attributes lower penalizes to medical collections than non-medical ones. 

80. Fair Isaac’s campaign against VantageScore has been ongoing for nearly fifteen years. 

In 2006, just months after VantageScore’s launch, Fair Isaac filed a frivolous lawsuit against the 

Credit Bureaus and VantageScore in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. 

See Fair Isaac Corp. v. Equifax Inc., No. 06-cv-04112 (D. Minn.). This was the Fair Isaac’s initial attempt 

to eliminate its competitive threat. 

81. Fair Isaac’s lawsuit included claims that the development of VantageScore violated the 

antitrust laws and that the development of VantageScore constituted trademark infringement. In its 

prayer for relief, Fair Isaac sought dissolution of VantageScore. Not only did all of Fair Isaac’s claims 

fail, the jury justly determined that Fair Isaac was the wrongdoer. In support of its trademark 

infringement claim, Fair Isaac had alleged that VantageScore’s 501-990 scoring range constituted 

trademark infringement because it was similar to FICO’s scoring range of 300-850. The Credit Bureaus 

and VantageScore issued counterclaims for fraud on the United States Patent and Trademark Office 

(“PTO”), alleging that Fair Isaac misrepresented to the PTO that only FICO used the 300-850 score 

range. The jury concluded that Fair Isaac committed fraud on the PTO by making false statements in 

its application to register the score range of 300-850 as a trademark. 

82. The public statements described in the foregoing paragraphs were transmitted to and 

seen by a substantial number of businesses and consumers nationwide. 

C. Fair Isaac Eliminates Competition Through its Extensive Anticompetitive and 

Exclusionary Conduct 

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83. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary conduct seeking to maintain and expand its monopoly 

power has harmed for years and continues to harm participants in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

Fair Isaac’s unlawful conduct, including that which has been taken in concert with the Credit Bureaus, 

has eliminated competition in the B2B Credit Score Market by foreclosing opportunities for the Credit 

Bureaus to sell VantageScore or any other similar competitive products. Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive 

and exclusionary conduct has allowed it to maintain its monopoly and charge monopoly prices for 

B2B Credit Scores to B2B Purchasers throughout the Class Period. 

84. Fair Isaac’s conduct, in concert with the Credit Bureaus, including by the contracts 

entered into by the Credit Bureaus, has drastically reduced choice for B2B Purchasers. The 

anticompetitive terms agreed to between Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus have frustrated the ability 

of B2B Purchasers to purchase VantageScore or any other competitive Credit Score that could be 

seamlessly integrated into lenders’ existing processes and systems. Fair Isaac’s media and advertising 

campaign against VantageScore has successfully instilled uncertainty, and doubt about VantageScore 

among B2B Purchasers in the marketplace. 

85. Through blog posts and the media, Fair Isaac has spread its message to consumers 

that VantageScore is a “Fako” score solely because it is not a FICO score. In a post on 

thebalance.com that was originally posted in February 2017, and that Fair Isaac continues to display 

today: “If you purchased your Credit Score anywhere but MyFICO.com, then it’s a FAKO score.”14

                                                            

14 Latoya Irby, FICO & FAKO Credit Scores, THE BALANCE, (updated Aug. 18, 2020), 

https://www.thebalance.com/fico-and-fako-credit-scores-960497. 

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CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS 

86. Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, on its own behalf and as representative of the following Class:15

All B2B Purchasers residing in the United States that directly purchased a 

FICO Score from Fair Isaac and/or a Credit Bureau during the Class Period. 

Excluded from the Class are: Defendant, its directors, officers, management, 

employees, subsidiaries, and affiliates. Also expressly excluded from the Class 

are any natural persons that purchased their own Credit Score for personal use 

solely via myFico.com, the Credit Bureaus, or other entities.

87. The Class is so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder of all members is 

impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, 

members of the Class are readily identifiable from information and records in the possession of 

Defendant. 

88. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff 

and members of the Class sustained damages from the same wrongful conduct of Defendant. The 

injuries and damages of each member of the Class were directly caused by Defendant’s wrongful 

conduct in violation of the laws described herein. 

89. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of members of 

the Class. Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and has no interest which is adverse to 

the interests of absent Class members. Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in 

class action antitrust litigation, including class actions in the financial services industry. 

                                                            

15 Plaintiff has defined the Class based on currently available information and herby reserves the right 

to amend the definition of the Class, including, without limitation, membership criteria and the Class 

Period.

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90. Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, which 

predominate over questions affecting solely individual members of the Class. These common 

questions of law include, without limitation: 

1. whether Defendant monopolized, conspired to monopolize, or 

unreasonably restrained trade in violation of federal law; 

2. whether Defendant monopolized, conspired to monopolize, or 

unreasonably restrained trade in violation of certain state antitrust laws; 

3. whether Defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices in violation 

of certain state laws; 

4. the duration of the alleged unlawful conduct; 

5. injury suffered by Plaintiff and members of the Class; 

6. the appropriate measure of damages suffered by Plaintiff and Class members; 

and 

7. whether Defendant acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to 

Class members, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or 

corresponding declaratory relief with respect to Class members as a whole. 

91. A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 

controversy because joinder of all Class members is impracticable. Treatment as a class will permit 

a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum 

simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous 

individual actions would engender. 

92. Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of claims by many Class members 

who could not afford individually to litigate claims such as those asserted in this Complaint. The cost 

to the court system of adjudication of such individualized litigation would be substantial. The 

prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of inconsistent 

or varying adjudications establishing incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants. 

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93. Plaintiff is unaware of any difficulties that are likely to be encountered in the 

management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. 

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND TOLLING 

94. The applicable statutes of limitations relating to the claims for relief alleged herein 

were tolled because of fraudulent concealment involving both active acts of concealment by 

Defendant and inherently self-concealing conduct. Due to Defendant’s affirmative acts, 

misrepresentations, and nondisclosures as alleged herein, any applicable statutes of limitation on 

claims asserted by Plaintiff and members of the Class have been and are tolled, and Defendant is 

equitably estopped from raising statutes of limitations as a defense. 

95. Any applicable statutes of limitations were tolled until at least February 12, 2018, the 

date that TransUnion filed its Counterclaim against Defendant. 

96. The federal government’s antitrust investigation of Defendant’s unlawful conduct 

also operates to toll any federal statute of limitations under 15 U.S.C. § 16. 

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

(Monopolization) 

(15 U.S.C. § 2) 

97. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully 

set forth herein. 

98. The relevant product market is the market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores. 

99. The relevant geographic market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores is the United 

States. 

100. The B2B Credit Score Market is the relevant market. 

101. Fair Isaac has had and maintains at least 90% market share in the B2B Credit Score 

Market. 

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102. Fair Isaac has had and maintains monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

103. Fair Isaac has had and maintains the power to control prices or exclude competition 

in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

104. Fair Isaac, through unlawful, anticompetitive and exclusionary acts and agreements, 

has substantially eliminated any competition in the market for B2B Credit Scores in the United States 

in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. 

105. Fair Isaac has demonstrated its monopoly position through its ability to control prices 

and exclude competition by raising prices to supracompetitive levels despite no corresponding increase 

in demand. 

106. Fair Isaac’s monopoly power is not due to its growth or development or because of 

a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. 

107. Fair Isaac’s monopoly of the market has injured and will continue to injure 

competition. 

108. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts substantially affect interstate 

commerce and injure competition nationwide. 

109. Fair Isaac’s monopolistic conduct raised the prices for FICO Scores above the 

competitive level and otherwise injured competition without any offsetting procompetitive benefit to 

consumers. 

110. Plaintiff and Class members have been injured in their business or property by 

Defendant’s violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act within the meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton 

Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. 

111. Plaintiff and Class members are threatened with future injury to their business and 

property by Defendant’s continuing violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act within the meaning of 

Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. 

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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

(Conspiracy to Monopolize) 

(15 U.S.C. § 2) 

112. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully 

set forth herein. 

113. The relevant product market is the market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores. 

114. The relevant geographic market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores is the United 

States. 

115. The B2B Credit Score Market is the relevant market. 

116. Fair Isaac has had and maintains at least 90% market share in the B2B Credit Score 

Market. 

117. Fair Isaac has had and maintains monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

118. Fair Isaac has had and maintains the power to control prices or exclude competition 

in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

119. Fair Isaac, through unlawful anticompetitive and exclusionary acts and agreements, 

has substantially foreclosed competition in the market for B2B Credit Score Market in the United States 

in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. 

120. Fair Isaac has demonstrated its monopoly position through its ability to control prices 

and exclude competition by raising prices to supracompetitive levels despite no corresponding increase 

in demand. 

121. Fair Isaac entered into a combination or conspiracy with the Credit Bureaus to 

maintain its monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score Market. Fair Isaac created and maintained this 

conspiracy through a series of agreements with each of the Credit Bureaus. In these agreements, 

the parties agreed that the Credit Bureaus would not offer or sell VantageScore or any other competing 

Credit Score to Plaintiff and Class members. Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus further agreed that the 

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Credit Bureaus would act as Fair Isaac’s agent in the sale of FICO Scores to Plaintiff and Class 

members. 

122. These agreements eliminated competition in a substantial portion of the B2B Credit 

Score Market and unlawfully allowed Fair Isaac to maintain its monopoly, resulting in Fair Isaac 

receiving supracompetitive prices for FICO Scores from Plaintiff and Class members. 

123. Fair Isaac’s monopoly power is not due to its growth or development or because of 

a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. 

124. Fair Isaac’s monopoly of the market has injured and will continue to injure 

competition. 

125. Fair Isaac has acted with the specific intent of monopolizing the market for B2B 

Credit Scores in the United States. 

126. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts substantially affect interstate 

commerce and injure competition nationwide. 

127. Fair Isaac’s conspiracy to monopolize raised the prices for FICO Scores above 

the competitive level and otherwise injured competition without any offsetting procompetitive benefit 

to consumers. 

128. Plaintiff and Class members have been injured in their business or property by 

Defendant’s violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act within the meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton 

Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. 

129. Plaintiff and Class members are threatened with future injury to their business and 

property by Defendant’s continuing violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act within the meaning of 

Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. 

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THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

(Unreasonable Restraint of Trade) 

(15 U.S.C. §1) 

130. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully 

set forth herein. 

131. The relevant product market is the market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores. 

132. The relevant geographic market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores is the United States. 

133. The B2B Credit Score Market is the relevant market. 

134. Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus have had and collectively maintain at least 90% market 

share in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

135. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score 

Market. 

136. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have the ability to control prices and exclude 

competition in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

137. Fair Isaac entered into separate agreements with TransUnion, Equifax, and 

Experian that contained anticompetitive terms whereby each Credit Bureau agreed not to offer or 

sell VantageScore or other competing products to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 

138. Fair Isaac’s agreements with the Credit Bureaus had substantial anticompetitive 

effects. The agreements excluded VantageScore, a significant competitor, from a substantial portion 

of competition in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

139. Fair Isaac’s agreements with the Credit Bureaus raised the price for FICO Scores 

above the competitive level and otherwise injured competition without any offsetting procompetitive 

benefit to consumers. 

140. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts substantially affect interstate 

commerce and injure competition nationwide. 

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141. Plaintiff and Class members continue to suffer damage, and will continue to do so, if 

Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive conduct does not cease. 

142. Plaintiff and Class members have been injured in their business or property by 

Defendant’s violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, within the meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton 

Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. 

143. Plaintiff and Class members are threatened with future injury to their business and 

property by Defendant’s continuing violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, within the meaning of 

Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. 

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

(State Antitrust Laws) 

144. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully 

set forth herein. 

145. By reason of the foregoing alleged herein, Defendant has violated, and Plaintiff and 

members of the Class are entitled to relief pursuant to the antitrust laws of the States of Arizona, 

California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, 

Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, 

Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, as well as 

the District of Columbia, as follows: 

i. Arizona Revised Statutes § 44-1401, et seq.; 

ii. California Cartwright Act, California Business & Professions Code § 

16700, et seq.; 

iii. Connecticut Antitrust Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 35-24, et seq.; 

iv. District of Columbia Code § 28-4501, et seq.; 

v. Hawaii Revised Statutes § 480-2, et seq.; 

vi. Illinois Antitrust Act, Illinois Complied Statutes § 740, Ill. Comp. Stat. 

1011, et seq.; 

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vii. Iowa Competition Law, Iowa Code § 553.1, et seq.; 

viii. Kansas Statutes Annotated § 50-101, et seq.; 

ix. Maine Revised Statutes Annotated, tit. 10, § 1101, et seq.; 

x. Maryland Code Annotated, Commercial Law, § 11-204, et seq.; 

xi. Michigan Compiled Laws § 445.771, et seq.; 

xii. Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971, Minnesota Statutes § 325D.49, et 

seq.; 

xiii. Mississippi Code Annotated § 75-21-1, et seq.; 

xiv. Nebraska Revised Statutes § 59-801, et seq.; 

xv. Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated § 598A.010, et seq.; 

xvi. New Mexico Statutes Annotated § 57-1-1, et seq.; 

xvii. New York Donnelly Act, New York General Business Law § 340, et 

seq.; 

xviii. North Carolina General Statutes § 75-1, et seq.; 

xix. North Dakota Century Code § 51-08.1-01, et seq.; 

xx. Oregon Revised Statutes § 646.705, et seq.; 

xxi. Rhode Island General Laws § 6-36-4, et seq.; 

xxii. South Dakota Codified Laws § 37-1-3.1, et seq.; 

xxiii. Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-25-101, et seq.; 

xxiv. Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-3104, et seq.; 

xxv. Vermont Statutes Annotated, tit. 9, § 2451, et seq.; 

xxvi. West Virginia Code § 47-18-1, et seq.; and 

xxvii. Wisconsin Statutes § 133.01, et seq. 

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FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

(State Unfair Trade Practices Laws) 

146. Plaintiff hereby incorporates each preceding and succeeding paragraph as though fully 

set forth herein. 

147. By reason of the foregoing alleged herein, Defendant has violated, and Plaintiff and 

Class members are entitled to relief pursuant to the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 

Laws of the States of Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, 

New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont, and the 

District of Columbia, as follows: 

i. Arkansas Code Annotated, § 4-88-101, et seq.; 

ii. California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.; 

iii. Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn Gen. Stat. § 42-110a, et 

seq.; 

iv. District of Columbia Code § 28-3901, et seq.; 

v. Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 

501.201, et seq.; 

vi. Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 93A, et 

seq.; 

vii. Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010, et seq.; 

viii. Montana Code, §30-14-103, et seq., and § 30-14-201, et seq.; 

ix. New Mexico Statutes Annotated § 57-12-1, et seq.; 

x. New York General Business Law § 349, et seq.; 

xi. North Carolina General Statutes § 75-1.1, et seq.; 

xii. Rhode Island General Laws § 6-13.1-1, et seq.; 

xiii. South Carolina Code Annotated § 39-5-10, et seq.; and 

xiv. Vermont Statutes Annotated, tit. 9, § 2451, et seq. 

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

Plaintiff, on behalf of itself and members of the Class, respectfully demands relief as follows: 

A. That the Court certify this lawsuit as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Plaintiff be designated as Class Representative, that the 

undersigned be named Lead Class Counsel, and that reasonable notice of this action, as provided by 

Rule 23(c)(2), be given to members of the Class; 

B. That Defendant’s unlawful conduct alleged herein be adjudged and decreed to violate 

the federal antitrust laws as set forth herein; 

C. That Defendant’s unlawful conduct alleged herein be adjudged and decreed to violate 

the state antitrust and unfair trade practices laws as set forth herein; 

D. That the Court award Plaintiff and members of the Class actual, treble, and exemplary 

damages; 

E. That the Court award Plaintiff and members of the Class their costs of suit, including 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses, and including expert fees, as provided by law; 

F. That the Court award Plaintiff and members of the Class pre- and post-judgment 

interest at the maximum rate allowable by law; 

G. That the Court enjoin Defendant from its violations of law; and 

H. That the Court directs such further relief as it may deem just and proper. 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 

Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff demands a jury trial 

as to all issues triable by a jury. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02533 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/24/20 Page 34 of 35 PageID #:34
34 

Dated April 24, 2020 

 CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER & 

 SPRENGEL LLP 

 

 s/ Jennifer W. Sprengel 

 Jennifer W. Sprengel (Ill. Bar No. 06204446) 

150 S. Wacker, Suite 3000 

 Chicago, IL 60606 

 Telephone: 312-782-4880 

 jsprengel@caffertyclobes.com 

 Designated as Local Counsel 

Barbara J. Hart (pro hac vice forthcoming) 

 Christian Levis (pro hac vice forthcoming) 

Frank Strangeman (pro hac vice forthcoming) 

Andrea Farah (pro hac vice forthcoming) 

LOWEY DANNENBERG, P.C. 

44 South Broadway, Suite 1100 

 White Plains, New York 10601 

 Telephone: 914-997-0500 

 bhart@lowey.com 

clevis@lowey.com 

fstrangeman@lowey.com 

 afarah@lowey.com 

 

 Counsel for Plaintiff Amalgamated Bank 

Case: 1:20-cv-02533 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/24/20 Page 35 of 35 PageID #:35