J-A12039-23

2023 PA Super 171

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BASILE OUTLAW 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1788 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 21, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): MC-51-MD-0000031-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 20, 2023

Basile Outlaw appeals the judgment of sentence imposed for his

conviction for direct criminal contempt.

1 He challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence. We affirm.

Outlaw attended a hearing on a motion to suppress, on June 16, 2022, 

as a spectator. As the judge finished announcing her findings on the motion, 

Outlaw stood up and yelled, “The judge is a cocksucker.” N.T., 6/16/22, at

10.

2 Outlaw left the courtroom, and the deputy sheriff went to look for him. 

Outlaw later voluntarily returned, and the sheriff placed him in custody. Id.

at 10-11. The court held a brief hearing the same day during which it obtained 

the deputy sheriff’s sworn testimony. Id. at 6, 11. The deputy testified that 

after the court made its decision on the suppression motion, Outlaw “got up 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(3). 

2 See also N.T., 6/21/22, at 4.
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and said, the judge is a cocksucker.” Id. at 6. Outlaw replied that he did not 

say “‘the judge,’ specifically.” Id. The court then took a brief recess to obtain 

counsel for Outlaw. Id. at 8. When the proceeding resumed, the court placed

a summary of the facts on the record and said it would be holding a contempt 

hearing. Id. at 10-11. Outlaw’s counsel stated that she “concede[d3] this 

contempt, the direct contempt, under Commonwealth v. Moody.”

4 Id. The 

court then continued the contempt hearing and set Outlaw’s bail at $75,000. 

Id. at 11-12. 

At the continued hearing, the court placed on the record its findings of 

fact. N.T., 6/21/22, at 4. The court said that after Outlaw’s outburst, it stopped 

the proceeding and asked, “What did you say?” Id. The court stated that 

Outlaw replied, “[N]ever mind,” and left the courtroom. Id. A sheriff went 

after him but could not find him, and “[s]ome discussions were held regarding 

the outburst, which interrupted the proceeding.” Id. at 5. The court stated 

that Outlaw then returned to the courtroom and was placed in custody. The 

court then afforded Outlaw an opportunity to speak on his own behalf, and he 

expressed remorse. Id. at 16. He said that when he returned to the courtroom 

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3 We will not treat counsel’s “concession” as a bar to appellate review of 

Outlaw’s sufficiency claim. Doing so would render the statement tantamount 

to a guilty plea, and nothing of record shows that Outlaw himself decided to 

concede guilt. It appears that counsel was attempting to express Outlaw’s 

acceptance of responsibility rather than effectively enter a guilty plea on his 

behalf. See Commonwealth v. Meehan, 235 A.3d 1284, 1288 (Pa.Super. 

2020). 

4 See Commonwealth v. Moody, 125 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2015). 
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on the day in question, he was “coming back to apologize for the outburst and 

disrespect.” Id. at 18. Outlaw’s counsel stated that Outlaw was “apologetic”

and asked the court to allow Outlaw to be released. Id. at 6, 18. The court 

imposed a sentence of 15 to 30 days’ incarceration with credit for time served. 

This timely appeal followed. 

Outlaw raises one issue in this appeal: “Did the trial court err in finding 

[Outlaw] guilty of direct criminal contempt because the evidence was 

insufficient to establish the elements of the offense because it did not in any 

way, let alone any significant way, obstruct the proceedings?” Outlaw’s Br. at 

3. 

“Direct criminal contempt consists of misconduct in the presence of the 

court or misconduct so near thereto as to interfere with the immediate 

business of the court or disobedience to the lawful process of the court.” In 

re Campolongo, 435 A.2d 581, 583 n.4 (Pa. 1981).

5 “[I]n considering an 

appeal from a contempt order, we place great reliance on the discretion of the 

trial judge. Each court is the exclusive judge of contempts against its process, 

and on appeal its actions will be reversed only when a plain abuse of discretion 

occurs.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 753 A.2d 856, 861 (Pa.Super. 2000)

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5 See also Commonwealth v. Patterson, 308 A.2d 90, 92 (Pa. 1973) (“‘A 

direct criminal contempt consists of misconduct of a person in the presence of 

the court, or so near thereto to interfere with its immediate business, and 

punishment for such contempts may be inflicted summarily[.]’” (quoting 

Knaus v. Knaus, 127 A.2d 669, 671 (Pa. 1956)); Williams, 753 A.2d at 861.
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(citation omitted). Our review is confined to examining the record to 

determine if the facts support the trial court’s decision. Id.6

Pennsylvania courts have “inherent power and statutory authority to 

impose summary punishment for direct criminal contempt[.]” Moody, 125 

A.3d at 9. The applicable statutory provision empowers courts “to issue 

attachments and to impose summary punishments for” certain circumstances, 

including “[t]he misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, 

thereby obstructing the administration of justice.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(3). A

conviction for direct criminal contempt under Section 4132(3) requires “proof 

beyond reasonable doubt (1) of misconduct, (2) in the presence of the court, 

(3) committed with the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) that obstructs 

the administration of justice.” Moody, 125 A.3d at 5 n.4. 

Outlaw concedes that there was sufficient evidence of the first three 

elements – misconduct in the presence of the court with the intent to obstruct 

the proceedings. He only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish 

the fourth element: the obstruction of the administration of justice. See

Outlaw’s Br. at 22-24. He disputes the court’s findings that when he 

committed his outburst it stopped the suppression proceeding, and that 

certain events happened during the suppression hearing before the court 

called a recess. He maintains that the record from the underlying suppression 

hearing does not show that the court stopped the proceeding or that the 

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6 See also Commonwealth v. Mutzabaugh, 699 A.2d 1289, 1292 

(Pa.Super. 1997). 
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matter was paused, delayed, or altered due to Outlaw’s conduct. Id. at 26.

He also argues that his conduct did not “demonstrate a refusal to accept the 

court’s power to decide the motion[.]” Id. at 36. He claims that his actions 

did not disrupt the court from doing its job and that there is no evidence that 

he refused to comply with the court’s orders or warnings to him. 

The Commonwealth agrees that Outlaw’s outburst did not constitute an 

obstruction of the administration of justice. It concedes that there was an 

interruption in the proceedings but is of the astounding opinion that the 

interruption was “de minimis.” Com. Br. at 10. It argues that “the hearing on 

the motion to suppress was adjourned in a timely manner and that the 

proceedings only continued as necessary to locate[] an attorney to represent 

defendant and to hold his contempt hearing.” Id. at 9.

To the extent Outlaw challenges the lower court’s findings of fact, his

arguments turn on the transcript of the underlying suppression hearing, which 

he repeatedly cites. See Outlaw’s Br. at 25-30. But we cannot determine if 

that transcript supports the trial court’s findings because it is not in the 

certified record of the instant case.

Our standard of review directs us to conduct an “examination of the 

record to determine if the facts support the trial court’s decision.” Williams, 

753 A.2d at 861 (citation omitted). We are unable to perform that function 

here without the notes of testimony from the underlying suppression hearing. 

The transcript on which Outlaw relies is not from the present matter. It relates 

to a separate criminal case to which Outlaw was not a party, and the lower 
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court would not, in the ordinary course, have placed it in the record of this 

case on its own. Nor did Outlaw ever attempt to put it into evidence in the 

contempt proceeding below or otherwise take steps to ensure that it would be 

before us.7It was ultimately Outlaw’s duty as appellant to make sure that the 

certified record contained all items necessary for this Court to decide his issue 

on appeal. Outlaw waived his factual arguments by failing to ensure that the 

notes of testimony from the suppression hearing were in the certified record 

of this case. See Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 675 A.2d 268, 275 (Pa. 

1996). We therefore accept the trial court’s factual recitation for purposes of 

this appeal. 

We can, however, review Outlaw’s legal argument that the events here 

– the facts as the trial court found them – were insufficient to constitute direct 

criminal contempt. He maintains this is so because, in his view, the conduct 

at issue did not prevent, and was not likely to prevent, the court from “doing 

its job.” Outlaw’s Br. at 31.8

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7 See, e.g., Mutzabaugh, 699 A.2d at 1291-92 (holding that transcripts of 

proceedings at which contumacious conduct occurred were admissible at 

subsequent contempt hearing over hearsay and confrontation objections). 

8 Outlaw makes a further argument that only “where the defendant’s actions 

directly undermined the court’s authority by encouraging others to disrupt 

proceedings or ignore orders is contempt sustained.” Outlaw’s Br. at 33. That 

contention, as we understand it, goes to the misconduct element, which 

Outlaw has conceded. Insofar as he discusses Mutzabaugh’s treatment of 

the obstruction element, we find that case highly apposite here, as explained

below. See id. at 35-36.
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The evidence here was sufficient. An obstruction of the administration 

of justice occurs where the conduct at issue “significantly disrupt[s] judicial 

proceedings,” either by “actual, imminent prejudice to a fair proceeding or 

prejudice to the preservation of the court’s orderly procedure and authority.” 

Williams, 753 A.2d at 863 (citation and emphasis omitted). While “[n]either 

injudicious remarks nor affronts to the dignities or sensibilities of the court,” 

without more, constitute an obstruction to the administration of justice, the 

element is met where there has been a “significant disruption” of proceedings. 

Mutzabaugh, 699 A.2d at 1293. 

The requisite “significant disruption” can be met in varied 

circumstances, including those occurring “even [after] the judicial proceeding 

has concluded.” Commonwealth v. Falana, 696 A.2d 126, 129 (Pa. 1997). 

In Falana, the conduct at issue occurred at a sentencing hearing, after the 

court had pronounced sentence but while the judge was still on the bench. As 

the sheriffs were taking the defendant from the courtroom, he said to the 

victim, who had just testified against him, “I’ll be out one day.” Id. at 127-

28. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that 

he had not obstructed the administration of justice because he made the 

remark after the sentencing hearing had ended. The Court found it sufficient 

that “[t]hrough his words” he had “belittled the trial court’s attempt to 

administer justice and protect” the victim. Id. at 129. It explained, “To have 

permitted the Appellant to use the courtroom to intimidate his victim, and 

thereby possibly deter others from testifying in the future, would clearly 
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obstruct the efficient administration of justice and demean the court's 

authority.” Id.

Similarly, in Williams, this Court sustained a finding of direct criminal 

contempt for conduct that occurred after the court had finished sentencing. 

There, as the defendant was being led from the courtroom, “he apparently 

elected to express his dissatisfaction” with his sentence “by raising his middle 

finger and stating, ‘F--k You’” to the judge. Williams, 753 A.2d at 859. We 

pointed out that the obstruction element can be shown by “prejudice to the 

preservation of the court’s orderly procedure and authority.” Id. at 863

(citation and emphasis omitted). We found that standard satisfied there 

because the defendant’s “reaction to the [c]ourt’s imposition of sentence in 

open court was a clear effort on his part to brazenly demonstrate his 

repudiation of the [c]ourt’s sentencing choice.” Id. We stressed that if the 

court had been unable to summarily punish the defendant’s misbehavior, “it 

would have eroded the [c]ourt’s authority in the eyes of all those present”:

The ability to issue a criminal contempt citation empowers a trial 

judge with the ability to maintain command over his or her 

courtroom. Effectively, the criminal contempt sanction gives

credence to a judge’s status as commander in chief over his or her 

courtroom. If we continually carve away at this power, the sanctity 

and balance of the courtroom may be in jeopardy.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Martorano, 563 A.2d 1193, 1200

(Pa.Super. 1989)).

In another case similar to the present case, we found sufficient an 

interruption in which a criminal defendant used profane language toward the 
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judge and then attempted to leave the courtroom, requiring a deputy sheriff 

to chase after the defendant. In Mutzabaugh, while the court was colloquying 

the defendant in a criminal matter, the defendant became enraged and 

claimed he had been treated unfairly. The judge said, “We’re done,” and the 

defendant got up and started toward the door. Mutzabaugh, 699 A.2d at 

1290. As he passed the judge, he said, “You can go to hell. Fuck you.” Id. A 

deputy sheriff pursued him and caught him. We considered the defendant’s 

remark, coupled with his attempt to leave the courtroom, sufficient to 

establish a significant disruption. We explained that “it was necessary for a 

deputy sheriff to pursue appellant and prevent his exit.” Id. at 1293.

On the other hand, where there has been no disruption, a finding of 

direct criminal contempt cannot stand. For example, in Behr v. Behr, 695 

A.2d 776, 777 (Pa. 1997), a pro se party in a child custody and support matter

left in the courtroom a storage box that had the word “DEATH” written on its 

lid. It had been under counsel’s table during the hearing but the judge had 

not seen it until a member of courtroom staff called it to his attention after 

the hearing. Id. at 777-78. The judge took testimony, but no one testified to 

seeing the word on the box lid during the original hearing. Id. at 778. 

The Supreme Court found the evidence insufficient to prove direct 

criminal contempt because the “behavior [had] fail[ed] to disrupt courtroom 

proceedings[.]” Id. at 777. To the extent the trial court had found a significant 

disruption based on its reconvening of the hearing and the sheriff’s search of 

the box, the Court found that reliance unavailing. It explained that if a court’s 
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investigation of alleged misconduct were sufficient, then in every such case

where the court has investigated misconduct, the obstruction element of direct 

criminal contempt would “automatically” be met. Id. at 779.

Similarly, momentary or transient delay, without more, does not rise to 

the level of significant disruption. In Commonwealth v. Rubright, 414 A.2d 

106, 107 (Pa. 1980), the court overruled an objection and asked the attorney 

making the objection if he understood “the difference between hearsay for 

truth and falsity[.]” Id. The lawyer replied, “Yes I do. Do you understand it, 

Your Honor?” Id. The court responded that it would deal with counsel’s 

“impertinence” later, and proceeded with the hearing. The Supreme Court 

found the evidence insufficient to prove direct criminal contempt. It explained 

that counsel’s remarks were “of momentary nature” and the Court did “not 

find the progress of the hearing to have been impeded thereby.” Id. at 110.

Likewise, in Williams v. Williams, 721 A.2d 1072, 1074 (Pa. 1998), a 

mere momentary break in proceedings was insufficient. There, when the trial 

judge sustained opposing counsel’s objection, an attorney representing 

himself in a custody dispute said under his breath, “He’s such a [f------- a---

---].” Id. at 1073, 1074 (alteration in Williams v. Williams). The trial judge 

did not hear the comment until opposing counsel called it to his attention. The 

court then briefly took the testimony of two witnesses about the remark and 

proceeded with the custody hearing. Afterward it held the attorney in direct 

criminal contempt. The Supreme Court concluded that the remark had caused 

no significant disruption as there had been only a “momentary break in the 
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proceedings.” Id. at 1074 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 681 A.2d 181, 183 

(Pa.Super. 1996)).

Other cases are in a similar vein. In In re Campolongo, 435 A.2d at 

583, the only identifiable misconduct preceding the contempt citation was 

counsel’s rhetorical question, while objecting to opposing counsel’s

examination of a witness, “Is there any reason why he’s hostile to her?” The 

Supreme Court found an insufficient basis for a finding of direct criminal 

contempt because other than a short recess, there was “no disruption of the 

proceedings.” Id. at 584. In Meehan, 235 A.3d at 1290, this Court found that 

despite an attorney’s “laughter and snide comments,” the judge proceeded 

with the matter at hand without significant disruption. 

Here, the trial court did not commit a plain abuse of discretion in holding

Outlaw in direct criminal contempt. This case is distinguishable from 

Rubright, Williams v. Williams, Campolongo, and Meehan, in that the 

disruption was not a passing comment standing alone or in combination with 

whatever investigation the trial court may have conducted. See Behr, 695 

A.2d at 779. Rather, after Outlaw used profanity toward the trial judge, the 

judge interrupted the suppression hearing to ask him what he had said. A 

deputy sheriff was then taken away from his courtroom duties to look for 

Outlaw, and discussions in court about Outlaw’s outburst further interrupted 

the proceedings. This case is much more like Mutzabaugh. There, we found 

the defendant’s profane comments to the judge, together with his attempt to 

exit the courtroom that required a deputy sheriff to go after him and stop him, 
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sufficient to establish a significant disruption in the proceedings.

Mutzabaugh, 699 A.2d at 1293. This was not an instance of a brief or 

momentary interruption.

Calling a judge an indecent name in open court undermines the court’s 

authority and does obvious harm to its ability to conduct an orderly 

proceeding. See Falana, 696 A.2d at 129. Outlaw made his outburst in such 

a way that those in the courtroom heard the statement. In so doing, he not 

only demonstrated his own utter disrespect for the court and its command of 

the courtroom. He also potentially encouraged others to commit similar 

disruptions. Outlaw’s conduct absolutely caused “actual, imminent prejudice”

to “the preservation of the court’s orderly procedure and the court’s 

authority.” Williams, 753 A.2d at 863. We affirm the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/20/2023