### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jun e 6, 200 6

JAN ALE E WILSON v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Madison Cou nty No. C-05- 89 RogerA. P age, Judge

No. W2005-01801-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Septem ber 26, 2006

Th e Pe tit ion e r, Jana le e Wils on , ap pe a ls as of ri g ht fr om the jud g me nt of the Ma dis on Cou nty Cir c uit Court deny ing he r petition for post-c onvict i o n relief. On appe al, the De fenda nt arg ues that she

rec eived the ine ffe ctive assistanc e of counsel and that her constitutional rig hts w ere violated by the involvement of the fe dera l prosecutor in the state proc eeding s. After revie w of the recor d, as to the in e f f e c tive assistance of counse l claim, the Petitioner’s brief fails to set forth a ny

specific contentions i n s u pport of the issue a nd, there fore , the issue is waived. A s to her cha lleng e to the fe dera l prosec utor’s involvement, this issue is waived due to the Petitioner’s failure to raise it in her dire ct appea l and, additionally , the ar g ument is without m erit. Ac cording ly
, we affirm the judgme nt of the trial court de ny ing post-c onviction relief.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J., del ive re d the op ini on of the c ou rt , in w hic h J.C. M C L IN , J ., joined. G AR Y R. W ADE , P

. J

. , n o tp ar t i ci p at i n g.

Mike Mosier, Jackson, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, J anale e Wilson.

Pa ul G. Sum me rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; John H. B le ds oe , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; J erry Woodall, District Attorney Gene ral; and Al Earls, Assist ant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On May 3 0
, 2 002, a Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner of first deg ree preme ditated murd er , an d s he wa s sentence d to life in prison with the possibil ity of par ole. The Petit i o n er ’s conviction was aff irmed on direc t appea l. See State v. J anale e Anne tte Wil son, 164 S.W. 3 d 3 5 5 ( T e n n

. Crim

. A p p

. 2 0 0 3 )

. O u r s u p r e me c o u r t d e n ie d p e r mi s s io n to ap p e a l on Marc h 8, 2004.-2-

On Marc h 3, 2005, the Petitioner filed a petition f or post-conviction relief

, alleg ing (1) that she re ceive d the i neff

ective assistance of counsel, (2) that the conviction wa s based on a violation of th e p r o te c ti o n a g a in s t d o u b le je o p ar d y , ( 3 ) th a t th e e v id e n c e w a s in s u f f ic ie n t to s u p p o rt the conviction, and ( 4) “a lso those claims from [the d i re ct ] ap p ea l . . . .” The Petitioner arg ued that

c ou ns e l w a s in e ff

e c tiv e ba se d u po n th e fo llo wi ng a lle g a tio ns :

[C]oun se l sh ou ld h a ve ob je c te d to the fe de ra l pr os e c uti on e r [s ic ] be ing able
to c o

- p r o s e c u te th e s tate c h ar g e s a s w e ll

. Co u n s e l s h o u ld n o t h a v e a g r eed to let prosec ution use certain testimonywher e this testimonywas pre judiced to her

in the fac t the prosec ution cut off the sta tements made on stand onc e their w anted a nswer
came out. Counsel should ha ve investigated further medical routes to expl ain re ason why petitioner was innocent of murder . Counsel should have objec ted to prosec ution

c omm e nts a t tr ia l.

The trial c ourt appointed c ounsel for the Petitioner and, thereaf ter, a n amende d petition was filed. I n the amended p et i tion, the Petiti oner a rg ued (1) ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, (2) tha t she wa s denied he r rig hts to due proce ss and equa l protection “by allowing the Fe dera l prosecutor to participate in the state court proce eding s[,] ” and ( 3) suffic iency of the evidenc e. As g rounds for her ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel claim, the Petitioner conte nded that Tria l Counsel failed to seek the app oin tme nt of a me dic a l expe rt to inv e sti g a te the c ir c ums ta nc e s o f the vic tim ’s de a th, fa ile d to meet with her

a suff icient number of

times in order to keep he r informe d of the de velopments in her

c a se a nddis c us s tria l st

rate g y , a ndfa ile d to se c ur e a c op y of the tr a ns c ri pt o f the fe de ra l tr ia l.

An evidentiary

hearing w as held on July13, 2005, and the tria l court denie d relief by written order on J uly 20, 2005. The trial c ourt conc luded that the Petitioner’s challeng e to the issues raised on direc t appea l was wa ived because those issues had bee n previously deter mined. Moreove r, the
tr ia l c ou rt

c on c lu ded that “ iss ue s to uc hin g su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e are imp ro pe r i n p os tconviction p r o c e e d in g s

. ” T h e tria l c o u r t th e n f o u n d th a t th e Pe ti ti o n e r ’ s in e f f e c ti v e a s s is ta n c e of counsel c laim was without merit. Reg arding the issue of the involvement of the fe dera l prosecutor
, the trial court determined tha t t h e i s s u e wa s wa ived for f ailure to ra ise it on direct appe al and, alternatively , that the issue was w ithout merit. This t imely appea led followed.

AN AL YSI S On appe al, the Petitioner ra ises two issues for our revie w: (1) “Whether or not the Petitioner

re c e ive d th e e ff

e c tiv e a ssi stanc e of c ou ns e l in he r t ri a l f or the c on vic tio n w hic h is the su bje c t of thi s
app e a l[,]” a nd (2 ) “ Whe the r or no t the pa rt ic ipatio n of a sp e c ia l pr os e c uto r in the or ig ina l tr ia l of thi s matter violated the [P etitioner’s] rig hts to equal protec tion an d d u e p ro cess of law.” To sustain a petition for post-conviction re lief, a petitioner must prove his or her f actua l alleg ations by

clea r and convincing ev i d en ce at an evidentiary hearing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-110(f ); Momon v. Sta te , 1 8 S. W.3 d 1 52 , 1 56 (T e nn . 1 99 9) . Upo n re vie w, thi s Court will no t re -w e ig h o r r e -e va luate the evidenc e below; a ll questions concer ning the cre dibilit y of witnesses, the w eig ht and value to be g iven their testimony , and the f actua l issues raised b y the evidenc e ar e to be r esolved by the trial-3-

judge , not the appellate courts. See Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 156; Henley v. State, 960 S.W .2d 572, 578-79 (Te nn. 1997). The trial judge ’s findi ng s of fact on a petiti on for post-c onviction relief a re aff orded the weig ht of a jury verdic t a nd are conclusive on appea l unle ss the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst those finding s. See Momon, 18 S.W .3d at 156; Henley , 960 S.W .2d at 578.

I. Inef fective Assistance To su c c e e d in a c ha lle ng e fo r ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta nc e of c ou ns e l, the Peti ti on er m us t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a tc o u n s e l ’ s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f e l l b e l o w t h e r a n g e o f

c o m p e t e n c e d e m a n d e d o f a t t o r n e ys in criminal ca ses. B axter v. Rose, 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975) . Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (198 4 ), the Petitioner must establish (1) de ficient re prese ntation, and (2) pr ejudice r esulting f

rom the deficiency

. A t rial court’s deter mination of an ineff ective a ssistance of counse l claim prese nts a mix ed question of law and fa ct on appe al. F i el d s v

. State, 40 S.W .3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001)

. T h i s C o u rt revie ws the trial court’s finding s of fa ct with reg ard to the

e ff e c tiv e ne ss o f c ou ns e l un de r a de no vo sta nd ard , a c c omp a nie d w ith a pr e su mpt ion that th os e finding s are corr ect unless the pr eponder ance of the e vidence is otherwise. I d. “Howe ver, a trial court’s c onclusions of law–such a s whether counsel’s pe rformance was de ficient or w hether that defic iency

was prejudicia l–are revie wed under a purely de novo standard, with no presumption of

corr ectne ss give n to the trial court’ s conclusions.” I d.

I n the Petitioner’s brief

, she provides two pa

rag raphs r eciting the g ener al law on inef fec tive assistance of counse l and this Court’s standard of r eview. T here afte r, she state s her a rg ument on the eff ectivene ss of counsel a s it speci fi ca l l y re l ates to her case . This arg ument in its entirety is as fo llo ws :

The Petitioner has r ais ed m an y s p ecif ic instance s in her pro se petition for post conviction relief

and her amende d petition for post conviction relief wher e she alleg es that trial counse l was ineff ective. Counsel r espec tfully submits t hat some of these issues we re he ard a nd deter mined on the Petitioner’s direc t appea l of her conviction. (T.I

– 15-16). How ever , there rema in other spec ific instances that we re rai sed at th e he ari ng on the pe tit ion a ndwh ic h s ho uldbe c on sid e re d b y thi s Honora ble Court

. I t m ay b e that any one of the alleg ed instance s of ineff ective assistance of counse l might not be suff icient to sustain the Petitio n er’ s reque st for relief
, but w hen considere d as a w hole in light of a ll the fac ts and circ umstances of this case the Petitioner ma y well be e ntitled to relief.

The Petitioner re spectfully submits t h at t his Honorable Court should view he r alleg ations in light of the totality of circ umstances of

this c as e an d enter

an orde r sustaining he r Petition and setting a side her c onviction.

The State a

rg ues that the Petitioner’s a rg ument is “completely

insufficient.” We ag ree

.-4-

The Petitioner made no specific claims of the inef fec tive assistance of counse l in her brief but merely

ref ere nced her pro se and amende d petitions and “other specific i nstance s raised at the h e ar i n g

. . . . ” W i t h i n t h e p e t i t i o n s , t h e P e t i t i o n e r r a i s e d m u l t i p l e a l l e g a t i o n s o f i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s

. In addition to the issues raised in the pe titions , the Petitioner raise d sever al additional ineff ective

a ssi sta nc e iss ue s d urin g h er tes tim on y a t th e e vid e nti ary

he ari ng . T he tr ia l c ou rt a dd re sse d s ix ineffe ctive assist ance alleg ations in its order deny ing relief. Moreover , we note tha t, after revie wing the transc ript in corre lation with the Petitioner’s one citation to the re cord, this citation is ambig uous at best and pr ovides no assistance in discerning her ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel claim.

First, Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 40-30-106 pr ovides, “The petition must contain a clea r and spe cific state ment of all g rounds upon which r elief is soug ht, including full disclosure of the fac tual basis of those g rounds.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106( d). “A mendments to the petition shall confor m substantiallyto the form for orig inal petitions, e x ce p t t h at matters alleg ed in the orig inal petition need not be r epeated.” I d. § 40-30-104( g ). Ther efor e, re g arding t h e additional issues raised by

the Petitioner at t he hearing and not addre ssed i n her pe titions or by the trial court in its order denying r elief, w e ag ree with the State that the Petitioner has wa ived these issues by failing to raise them in her orig inal or ame nded petition.

Second, Rule 27 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Proc edure provides in re levant part as fo llo ws :

The brief o f th e ap p e ll a n t s h a ll c o n ta in

. . . [a ]n ar g u me n t, w h ic h may be prec eded by

a summary

of ar g ument, setting f

orth the conte nt i o n s o f the appe llant with r espec t to the issues prese nted, and the rea sons the ref or, including the re asons why the contentions re quire a p pellate r elief, w ith citations to t he author ities and appropriate re fer ence s to the rec ord (whic h may be quoted ve rbatim) re lied on.

Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a) (7); see also Har vey v. State, 749 S.W .2d 478, 479 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

. “I ssues which a

re not supporte d by arg ument, citation to authorities, or appropriate refer ence s to the

rec ord will be treated as wa ived in this court.” Te nn. Ct. Crim . App. R. 10(b).

The “ Tenne ssee Rules of A ppellate Proc edure do not cont em p l at e t h at an a ppellant may submit one blanket issue as to the cor rec tness of a judg ment and ther eby open the door

to arg ument upon various issues which might aff ect the corr ectne ss of the judgme nt.” Quentin L ewis v. State, No. W20 00-01773-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 WL1011474, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App., J ackson, A ug . 21, 20 01 ); se e a lso L e sso n v . Ch e rn a u, 73 4 S. W.2 d 6 34 , 6 37 (T e nn . Ct. App . 198 7)

. Th e Sta te c or re c tly po int s o ut tha t, “ [w]itho ut a n a rg ume nt a s to wh ic h c la im( s) sh e no w se e ks to re ly up on , the Sta te

c a nn ot kno w w ha t iss ue s to a dd re ss on the me ri ts. ” Mo re ov e r, the Pe tit ion e r do e s no t pr ov ide thi s Court with any

explanation as to how her alleg ed cla ims of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel (1) w ere in f a c t d e f ic ie n t, o r ( 2 ) h o w , b u t f

o r th e s e d e f

ic ie n c ie s , th e r e w a s a r e a s o n ab le p r o b ab il it y th a t the jury ’s ver dict would have be en diffe rent.-5-

I n s um , th e P eti tione r h a s f a ile d to c omp ly

wi th R ule 27 , T e nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e lla te Procedur e, which r equire s that she “[set] forth the contentions . . . wi t h re spect to the issues pr e se nte d, and th e reason s th e re fo r, ” a s to wh y app e lla te re lie f i s r e qu ir e d. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 27(a) (7). F urthermor e, the Petitioner a dmits t hat “some of these iss ues we re he ard a nd deter mined on the Petitioner’s direc t appea l” and that “ any one of the alleg ed instances of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ou ns e l mi g ht n ot b e su ff ic ie nt to su sta in the Pe tit ion e r’ s r e qu e st f or re lie f .

. . .” We a

re un able
to revie w t his issue on the m erits and conclude that the Petitioner’ s claim of inef fec tive assistance of counse l is waived.

II. F ederal P rosec utor Next, the Petit ioner a

rg ues that participation of t he federa l prosec utor in her state mur der tria l vio la te d h e r c on sti tut ion a l g ua ra nte e s of e qu a l pr ote c tio n a nd du e pr oc e ss. Th e re c or d r e ve a ls tha t, prior to the state pr ocee dings, the Petitioner was convicted in f eder al court for mail f

raud, wire f

raud, and money l au n d er i n g. See United States v. Wilson, 345 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003). The f eder al prosec ution was based upon the same unde rly ing f acts, see id. at 44 9
, an d the fe dera l prosecutor involved was e mploy ed to assist in the state prosec ution fo r m u rd er. O n Marc h 26, 2002, Trial Counsel filed a motio n seeking to disqualify the spec ial prosec utor, arg uing tha t the fede ral prosec utor’s involvement in the state trial violated the doc trine of dua l sovereig nty . The trial c ourt denied the motion, and this issue was not ra ised on direc t appea l.

At the post-conviction leve l, the trial court fo und that the issue was w aived due to the Petitioner’s failure to raise the issue on dir ect appeal and, alternatively
, that the i ssue was w ithout

me ri t. O n a

pp e a l, the Pe tit ion e r m a ke s th e fo llo wi ng arg ume nt:

The Petitioner re spectfully reque sts that this Honora

ble Court re- evalua te the statute and the c ase law conc erning the appointment of a specia l prosecutor

on g rounds of denial of due proce ss a nd equal protec tion unde r the law . The Petitioner respe ctfully

submits t hat it should be all too obv i o u s t o this Honorable Court that specia l prosecutor s are only used by g overnme nts a nd wea lthy individuals who can aff ord to hire a s p ec i al p rosec utor. The f act that the pa

rticipation of a spe cial prosec utor is almost solely limit ed to the se circ umstances should c ast doubt on the fundame ntal fairne ss of the statute and de mands that this court re- evalua te the propriety of the proc edure

.

The State a

rg ues that the issue is waive d.

First, we ag ree th at the issue is waive d. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-30-106 pr ov ide s:

A g r o u n d f o r r e li e f is w a iv e d if th e p e ti ti o n e r p e r s o n a ll y o r th roug h an attorney fa i led to prese nt it for deter mination in any proce eding befor e a c ourt of

c omp e te nt j ur isd ic tio n in wh ic h th e g ro un d c ou ld h a ve be e n p re se nte d u nle ss:-6- (1) The claim for r elief is based upon a constitutional rig ht not recog nized as exi s ti n g a t th e ti me o f tria l if e ith e r th e f e d e r a l o r s tate c o n s ti tu ti o n require s retroa ctive application of that rig ht; or

(2) The failure to pr esent the g round was the result of state action in violation of the fe dera l or state constitution.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-106(g ). T he Petitioner’s c laim for re lief is not “base d upon a

c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht n ot r e c og nize d as exis tin g a t the tim e of tr ia l[,]” a nd the Pe tit ion e r’ s f a ilu re to prese nt thi s i s s u e o n d i rect appea l was not “the r esult of state a ction in violation of the fede ral or state constitution.” I d. We conclude tha t the claim should have be en broug ht on direct a ppeal; as such, i t is waived in the pos t-conviction setti ng . See Randy L . J ones v. State, No. M2005-00765- CCA-R3-PC, 2006 W L

1626931, at *22 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, J une 9, 2006).

I n addition, the trial court f ound that, notwithstanding a ny waiver
,
[t ]he Court has hear d no proof to sug g est th at t h e fede ral g overnme nt and state g overnme nt were not acting as indepe ndent sovere igns . . . .

. . . As [Trial Counsel] rec alled, [ the fe dera l prosecutor ’s] invol vement wa s
nece ssarily

due to the fac t tha t Jim Thompson, who would have been pr osecuting on behalf of the State, ha d applied for a fe dera l positi on and ther efor e would not be involved in the case

.

I t is also releva nt to mention that many of the dual sovere ignty case s involve a fa iled former

prosec ution and succe ssive prosec ution in [si c] by a dual sove reig n. That situation is not present in this case . . . .

Furthermore , the Petitioner’s due pr ocess a rg ument is unfounded.

We ag ree with the rationale of the trial c ourt.

O u r s u p r e m e c o u r th a s s p e c i f i c a l l y u p h e l d a n d a d h e r e d t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f d u a l s o v e r e i g n t y,
rea soning a s follows: “Ther e is no question but that such a procedur e does not subjec t the defe ndant to double jeopar dy

insofar a s the g uara nty

of due pr ocess in the 14t h am en d m en t of the fe dera l constitution i s conce rned.” State v. Thomas, 158 S.W .3d 361, 391 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Ba rtkus v. I llinois , 359 U.S. 121 (1959)). While the ra tionale of B artkus has be en criticiz ed,

a sim ila r a pp ro a c h ha s pr ov ide d the ba sis fo r a mor e re c e nt c a se , w hic h w ou ld i mpl y that Ba rtkus’ ana ly sis of the issue i s s t i l l valid. See United States v. Wheeler , 435 U. S. 3 13 (1 97 8) . T his c ou rt is b ou ndby the de c isi on s of the Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me-7-

Court conce rning the proper i nterpre tation of t he federa l constitution. Townsend v. Clover B ottom Hospit al and School, 560 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. 1978).

The double je opardy

provision of the Tenne ssee constitut ion, Article I , § 10, aff ords the def

endant no g reater prote ction.

Thomas, 158 S.W .3d at 391. Nothi ng in the rec ord supports the the c laim that the State in bring ing its prosecution “wa s merely a tool of the fe dera l authorities . . . .” B artkus, 359 U. S

. at 123. Furthermore , “any

modification or aba ndonment of the dua l sovereig nty doctrine must be

acc omplished through le g islative action.” Thomas, 158 S.W.3d at 391 (citing L avon v. State, 586 S.W .2d 112, 115 (Tenn. 1979) ).

T h e a p p o i n t m en to f a s p ec i al p ro s ec u t o r d o es n o tv i o l at e e i t h ert h e U n i t ed S t ates Cons tituti on or the Te nnessee Constit ution. Benne tt, 798 S.W.2d at 786. There is no require ment that a district attorney g ener al show cause for

the participation of a spec ial prosec utor. State v. Eldridg e, 951 S.W .2d 775, 781 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

. The P etitioner herself acknowledg es “that the prese nt state of law in Tennessee allows the pa rticipation of spec ial prosec utors in criminal ca ses.” P ar t i ci pation of the spec ial prosec utor in this case did not violate the Petitioner’s c onstitut ional rig hts. This iss ue is without merit.

CONCLUSION For the fore g oing rea sons, the judgme nt of the Madison County Circuit Court is a ff i rmed.

___________________________________ DAVI D H. WEL LES, J UDGE