alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-50490

c/w No. 15-50493

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JOSE PABLO BARTOLO-GUERRA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:15-CR-20-1

USDC No. 1:15-CR-52-1

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appealing the judgments in criminal cases, Jose Pablo Bartolo-Guerra

raises an argument that is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 

523 U.S. 224, 228, 235 (1998), which held that convictions used to enhance a 

sentence under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) need not be set forth in the indictment. 

The motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, the alternative motion for 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 17, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-50490 Document: 00513384642 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/17/2016
No. 15-50490

c/w No. 15-50493

2

an extension of time to file a brief is DENIED, and the judgments of the district 

court are AFFIRMED. 

 Case: 15-50490 Document: 00513384642 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/17/2016
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

January 30, 2012 

y0123 

Order 

 

January 30, 2012 

143474 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 143474 

 COA: 299964 

Wayne CC: 05-004843-FC 

MYRON JACKSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 8, 2011 order of 

the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to 

meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).
Exhibit 10.110


 


 


AMENDMENT NUMBER ONE TO

PACIFICARE OF CALIFORNIA MEDICAL GROUP/IPA SERVICE AGREEMENT

(PROFESSIONAL CAPITATION)


 


The undersigned parties to the
PacifiCare IPA Medicare Services Agreement dated June 1, 1999 (the “Agreement”)
by and between PacifiCare of California (“PacifiCare”) and Professional Care
IPA Medical Group, (“IPA”) do hereby amend the Agreement as set forth
herein.  Except as otherwise
specifically provided, terms utilized herein shall have the meanings set forth
in the Agreement.  Except as
specifically amended herein, the Agreement shall remain unchanged and in full
effect.


 


1.                                       Product Attachment C, Article 3, Paragraph
3.1.2., ADJUSTMENT FOR ADDITIONAL SERVICES is added to read as follows:


 


3.1.2 ADJUSTMENT FOR ADDITIONAL SERVICES.  In addition to Capitation Payments, “
IPA”, shall receive an adjustment for providing or arranging the following
Covered Services for Secure Horizons Members:


 


Vision - *** Per Secure
Horizons Member per month.  


 


Such Covered Services are
further discussed in the Provider Manual.


 


The
effective date of this Amendment is June 1, 1999.  The amendment will terminate effective September 30, 1999.


 


By
signing below, both parties hereto have executed and agreed to this Amendment.


 


 


	
  PacifiCare
  of California

  	
  Professional
  Care IPA Medical Group

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  By: 

  	
  /s/ Brian Jeffrey

  	
   

  	
  By:

  	
  /s/ Ed Rotan

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Brian Jeffrey

  	
  Ed Rotan

  
	
  Vice President Network
  Management

  	
  President

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
   

  	
   

  
	
  Date:

  	
  8/17/01

  	
  Date: 3-29-01

  
							



 












*** Confidential Information
omitted and filed separately with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman

, Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

Octo ber 19 , 2018 

# Order

Clerk Octo ber 19 , 2018

15826 9

- 70 (7 5 )

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY

COMPANY,

Plaintiff

- Appell ant

, SC: 15826 9

- 70

v COA: 332454

, 333281

Sanilac CC : 14

- 035646

- NZ

DETROIT EDISON CO., a / k

/ a DTE

ELECTRIC COMPANY,

D efendant

- Appell ee

.

____________________________________ __/

On order of the C hief Justice

, the motion of defendant

- appellee to extend the time

for filing its answer to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED

. The answer

submitted on October 1 1 , 2018 , is accepted for filing

.
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**EXHIBIT10.1**

 

**AMENDMENT NUMBER TWO**

**TO XPONENTIAL, INC.**

**CAPITAL INCENTIVE PROGRAM**

 

This AmendmentNumber Two (“Amendment”) to the Xponential, Inc. Capital Incentive Programdated January 1, 2003, as amended February 28, 2003 (the “Program”), is datedas of October 1, 2004.

 

WHEREAS,Section 2(l) of the Program defines the terms and conditions of the ElectiveDeferral Agreement under which a Participant for a Program Year may defer apercent of his Salary that would otherwise be paid to the Participant duringthe Program Year absent his deferral election; and

 

WHEREAS,Section 2(l) limits the amount of deferral of a participant’s Salary (asdefined in the Program) to an amount up to fifty percent (50%) of suchparticipant’s Salary; and

 

WHEREAS, theAdministrator of the Program desires to increase the Salary deferral limit fromfifty percent (50%) to one hundred percent (100%) of each participant’s Salary;

 

Now,therefore, Section 2(l) is hereby amended by deleting it in its entirety andsubstituting in lieu thereof the following:

 

ElectiveDeferral Agreement means a written agreement entered into by and between theAdopting Employer and a Participant for a Program Year, which agreementdescribes the terms and conditions of such Participants arrangement to defer(i) up to one hundred percent (100%) of his Bonus that may be awarded withrespect to such Program Year and/or (ii) up to one hundred percent (100%) ofhis Salary that would otherwise be paid to the Participant during the ProgramYear absent his deferral election.  TheElective Deferral Agreement shall be executed and dated by the Participant andshall specify the amount of Bonus and/or Salary, by percentage or dollaramount, to be deferred under the Program for the Program Year.

 

----
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert Singer,

Plaintiff,

v.

Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. and C. R. 

Bard, Inc., et al.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-01690-PHX-DGC

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL

To: The clerk of court and all parties of record

I am admitted or otherwise authorized to practice in this court, and I appear in this case as counsel for:

Defendants C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.

Date: October 26, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Attorney's signature

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed name and bar number

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6000

Telephone number

(404 322-6050

FAX number

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8549 Filed 11/02/17 Page 1 of 1
#### G. W. Luckett, &c. *v.*Chas. Beavon, &c.

Bonds — Supplying New Bond, for Former One Burnt — Court’s Discretion.

When the burnt record of a will and the probate thereof, is supplied in the county court by oral testimony, the same court has jurisdiction either to supply, in the same way, the executorial bond, executed at the time of the probate, or take a new bond, with the same or other sureties.

Same — Principal and Surety.

The new bond thus taken, binds its sureties, to pay all legacies; and it is therefore immaterial whether the amount of the legacy was collected since or before the date of the new bond.

*403Principal and Surety — Contribution From Old Sureties — Parties.

To entitle the sureties in a new bond, to contribution from the sureties in the former bond, they must be brought before the court, in the action in which they are defendants. It is not the auty of the plaintiff in the action to do this for them.

APPEAL EROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT.

October 11, 1870.

Russell, Averilt, *for appellants.*

*R. &*F., *for appellees.*

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Robertson :

When the burnt record of the will and probate was supplied in the county court by oral testimony, the same court had jurisdiction either tó supply, in the same way, the executorial bond executed at the time of probate, or to take a new bond with the same or other securities. The court chose to take a new bond in *lieu*of the original. If this discharged the original sureties from all liability, the sureties in the substantial bond are liable from the .date of the burnt bond. But however this may be,' the new bond expressly binds its sureties to pay all legacies, including that to the lunatic for life, and afterwards to others; and therefore it is immaterial to this liability whether the amount of that legacy was collected since or before the date of the new bond.

Nor is it in this case material whether the new bond was in legal effect a discharge of the sureties on the burnt bond, or only a supplemental obligation. If merely supplemental, the sureties in it may be entitled to contribution' by those in the first bond; but the appellants have not either shown who were the first parties, or requested them to be made parties, or asked any judgment against them. And it was not the duty of the appellee to do this for them.

We also think, and especially as the will so directed, that.the circuit court properly ordered the $1,000.00 to be paid to the committee of the lunatic.

We perceive no substantial error in the record.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.
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#### Martin and Another *v.*Kennard.

If a declaration on a bond for the prison limits set out the condition of the bond, it must aver the existence of the judgment and execution under which the bond was given.

APPEAL from the *Marion*Circuit Court.

Blackford, J.

This was an action of debt by *Kennard*against *Marlin*and *Landis,*on a bond for the prison bounds. The declaration states that *Martin*and *Landis*executed their bond, payable to *Kennard,*in the penal.sum of 132 dollars. It also states, that there is a condition to the bond, which recites that *Martin*had been delivered to the custody of the sheriff, by virtue of a *capias ad satisfaciendum*issued by a justice of the peace in favour o.f *Kennard,*and which concludes with stating, that the bond is to be void if *Martin*continues a prisoner. *Martin*suffered judgment by default. *Landis*pleaded several pleas in bar. The pleas were demurred to, and judgment on the demurrefs was rendered for the plaintiff below.

It is not necessary to examine the pleas, as we consider the declaration to be substantially defective. The declaration shows, that the obligation was given under the statute relative to the prison bounds. Itshould appear, therefore, by the declaration, that the obligee had previously obtained a judgment, and caused a *capias ad satisfaciendum*to issue, against the principal obligor. As the declaration shows the nature of the bond, it should have also shown the existence of a case, in which its execution was authorised by the statute. A declaration on a bail bond, setting out the condition, must show that a writ requiring bail, had previously issued against the person, for whose *431appearance the bond was given. *2*Chitt. Pl. 215. A decíaration on a replevin bond in the case of a distress, if it set out the condition, must show that the goods,'for the return of which the bond was given, had been distrained for rent. 2 Chitt. Pl. 218. So, in a suit on a bond for the prison limits, if the declaration describe the nature of the bond, it must aver the existence of the judgment and execution, .which gave occasion for the execution of the bond. •

*J.*Morrison, for the appellants.

*J. H.*Scott, for the appellee.

The declaration states,, that it is recited in the bond that a *capias ad satisfaciendum*had issued; but the statement of there being such a recital, is very far from an averment by the plaintiff of the existence of the writ.

The judgment for the plaintiff below must be reversed, and leave be given him to amend his declaration.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.
#### The State, ex rel. Kay, Appellant, *v.*Nixon, Appellee.

(No. 228

Decided May 14, 1947.)

*Mr. Charles U. Wilson,*for appellant.

*Mr. James W. Lang, Jr.,*and *Mr. Vernon L. Young,*for appellee.

Metcale, J.

Relator filed a petition in mandamus in the Court of Common Pleas of Adams county praying for a peremptory writ compelling the respondent to turn over to relator the office of clerk of the board of education of Monroe township in that county. The *265petition sets forth the election of the relator by the board of education, his qualifying therefor by taking the oath of office and furnishing bond and further alleges “that the defendant [respondent] herein has usurped and unlawfully held and exercised and still holds and exercises said office as such usurper, assumes to do and perform all and singular the duties pertaining to said office, and to receive the fees and emoluments therefor, but that said defendant [respondent] has refused to surrender said-office or any of the property belonging to the same to this relator.”

To such petition the respondent filed a general demurrer claiming that the petition does not state a cause of action.

The Common Pleas Court sustained the demurrer and, the relator not caring to plead further, judgment was entered dismissing the petition, from which judgment relator appeals on questions of law.

The only error complained of is that the court should not have sustained the demurrer and entered final judgment in favor of the respondent.

It is clear from that part of the petition herein quoted that the title to the office of clerk of the board of education in the instant case is drawn into question and under such.circumstances quo warranto and not mandamus is the proper remedy. 33 Ohio Jurisprudence, 955, Section 7.

Section 12303, paragraph 1, General Code, being the first section enumerated in the proceedings in the chapter on quo warranto, provides that a civil action may be brought in the name of the state ‘ ‘ against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a public office * * *.”

We think the allegations in the petition bring the instant case within the provisions of that chapter and section. It has been repeatedly held in Ohio that quo warranto is the only proper proceeding by which to *266test the title to an office. Of course, mandamus will lie if the title is not drawn into question, such as the failure on the part of certain officials or parties to perform the necessary ministerial duties prerequisite to-the induction of the party entitled to the office.

It follows that the judgment of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer to the petition should be-affirmed.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Gillen, P. J., and McCurdy, J., concur.
#### L. O. Peeler, et al *v.*R. White, et al.

Courts — Jurisdiction of Quarterly Court.

A petition in the circuit court on a judgment for $77.78, without allegations that the defendant owns real estate in the State, subject to the debt, is erroneous*. The action, could onlly be brought in the quarterly court.

APPEAL PROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT.

December 13, 1870.

*Stubblefield, for appellants.*

*Brown &*Miller, *for appellees.*

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Peters:

A judgment was recovered by Peeler in tbe quarterly court of Calloway county against appellants for $77.78, and tbis suit was brought in tbe Circuit Court of Calloway county by Peeler’s assignee against said party for a discovery, and to garnishee debts alleged to be owing to some one of tbe defendants by other persons.

There is no allegation in tbe petition that appellants own any rea.1 estate in tbis Commonwealth subject to said debt, and tbe quarterly court could have afforded all tbe relief claimed in tbe petition, and tbe allegations of tbe petition are not sufficient under *Sec. 474 of Civil*Code, to give tbe Circuit Court jurisdiction.

Wherefore the judgment dismissing tbe petition is *affirmed.*
# Fourth Court of Appeals **San Antonio, Texas**

N ovember 1, 2018

No. 04

- 18

- 00738

- CV

IN RE JJH, A CHILD,
From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2017

- PA

- 02764 Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

The trial court signed a final judgment on September 11, 2018 . Therefore, because this is an accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal was due to be filed October 1, 2018. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.1(b). A motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal was due on October 16, 2018

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 26.3. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on October 11, 2018. Although appellant filed a notice of appeal within the fifteen

- day grace period allow ed by Rule 26.3, she did not file a motion for extension of time.

A motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant, acting in good faith, files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by Rule 26.1 but within the fifteen

- day gra ce period provided by Rule 26.3 for filing a motion for extension of time. See Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (construing the pre decessor to Rule 26). However, appellant must offer a reasonable explanation for failing to file the notic e of appeal in a timely

manner. See id. ; T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 10.5(b)(1)(C).

It is therefore ORDERED that appellant file, within fifteen days from the date of this order, a response presenting a reasonable explanation for failing to file the notice of ap peal in a timely manner. If appellant fails to respond within the time provided , the appeal will be dismissed. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.3( c). All other appellate deadlines are suspended until further order of this court.

_________________________________ Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief JusticeIN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 1st day of November, 2018

.

___________________________________ KEITH E. HOTTLE
, Clerk of Court