J-S11001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: C.G.C., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: K.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 16, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 36 OCA 2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 07, 2023

K.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the November 16, 2022 decree, in the

Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, granting the petition of P.C. (“Father”) 

and A.C. (“Stepmother”), involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her 

twelve-year-old daughter, C.C. (“Child”), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). After careful review, we affirm.

In the opinion accompanying the decree, the orphans’ court set forth 56 

factual findings, which the evidence supports. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

11/16/2022, at 2-9. Therefore, we adopt those findings herein. Child was 

born in February 2011. See N.T., 8/18/2022, at 5. For approximately three 

years thereafter, Father and Mother lived together with Child. Upon 

separation, they shared physical and legal custody of Child. Id. at 7.
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Thereafter, numerous arrests led to Mother’s incarceration. In April 

2013, she was arrested and charged with driving while under the influence 

(“DUI”) and endangering the welfare of children because Child was present at 

the time of the incident. See N.T., 8/18/2022, at 7-8; Father’s Exhibit A. 

Approximately one year later, Mother was arrested for retail theft, and then 

again in November 2014 for recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”), 

disorderly conduct, and public drunkenness.

1

 Id. Ultimately, she was 

incarcerated in November 2014, and Father obtained sole legal and physical 

custody of Child. See N.T., 8/18/2022, at 7-8.

Mother was released around September 2016. See N.T., 8/18/2022, at 

8; N.T., 10/21/2022, at 79. Once released, Mother filed a petition to modify 

custody and by interim order dated August 29, 2016, she was awarded 

supervised partial physical custody once a week for a period not less than two 

hours. See Custody Order, 8/29/2016. After various conciliation conferences 

and orders, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 19, 2018. 

The court awarded Mother, inter alia, shared legal custody and partial physical 

custody of Child on the weekends. See Custody Order, 1/19/2018.

This arrangement was short-lived as Mother was arrested in July 2018 

for retail theft, and subsequently missed a conciliation conference. See 

Father’s Exhibit A. On September 4, 2018, the court adopted the interim order 

____________________________________________

1 Mother was charged with REAP because, again, Child was present in the 

vehicle when Mother was arrested. See Father’s Exhibit A.
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of August 27, 2018, awarding Father sole legal and physical custody. 

Thereafter, Mother did not attempt to alter custody until she filed a petition to 

modify on September 24, 2021, approximately three months after Father and 

Stepmother filed their petition to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to 

Child.2 See N.T., 8/18/2022, at 12, 34, 80.

Following the August 2018 interim custody order, Mother was arrested 

two more times. In January 2019, Mother was arrested and charged with 

theft by unlawful taking, and in June 2020, she was charged with retail theft. 

See N.T., 8/18/2022, at 25-26; N.T., 10/21/2022, at 78. Following her June 

2020 arrest, Mother began an outpatient methadone program at Miners 

Medical Center.3 See Mother’s Exhibit 8. 

On June 22, 2021, Father and Stepmother filed a petition for the 

involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

____________________________________________

2 Father and Stepmother have lived together since 2015, married in 2017, and 

Stepmother testified that she has performed parental duties for Child since 

2014. N.T., 8/18/2022, at 4-5, 94. 

3 Mother’s methadone program records indicate that during the six months 

preceding Father’s and Stepmother’s involuntary termination petition, Mother 

tested positive for a variety of substances including cocaine and fentanyl. 

Mother’s Exhibit 8.
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§ 2511(a)(1) and (b) (“TPR petition”) and a petition for adoption.

4, 5 The 

orphans’ court conducted hearings on August 18, 2022, and October 21, 2022. 

Mother was represented by counsel and testified on her own behalf. She also

presented the testimony of P.B., maternal grandfather, and E.P., maternal 

grandmother’s paramour.6 Father and Stepmother testified on their own 

behalf, and additionally presented the testimony of Sara J. Cornell. Psy.D., 

Child’s psychologist. Child, who was eleven years old at the time, was 

represented by legal counsel.7 The court conducted an in camera interview of 

Child in the presence of all counsel wherein she testified that she desires to 

be adopted by Stepmother. See N.T., 8/18/2022, at 100.

____________________________________________

4 Father and Stepmother filed an amended petition on December 21, 2021 

that included 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) as an additional ground for the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights.

5 At the request of the parties, the termination hearing was continued various 

times. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/16/2022, at 1. In the interim, the 

parties participated in a custody conciliation on December 20, 2021, at which 

time, by interim order, Father retained sole legal and physical custody of Child. 

See Custody Order, 12/20/2021. On February 24, 2022, the interim order 

was adopted by the court. See Order, 2/24/2022.

6 B.S. (“maternal grandmother”), with permission from Father, visited with 

Child until just before she passed away in May 2021.

7 Although the transcripts of testimony list Victoria Strunk, Esquire, as the 

guardian ad litem for Child, in its order appointing Attorney Strunk, the trial 

court specified that she is “legal counsel.” At the conclusion of the hearing on 

October 21, 2022, Attorney Strunk confirmed that Child’s position had not 

changed; Child does not want to see or speak with Mother. N.T., 10/21/2022, 

at 131. Attorney Strunk did not file a brief in response to Mother’s appeal.
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On November 16, 2022, the orphans’ court issued a decree involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights, as well as a contemporaneous opinion.

Thereafter, on December 15, 2022, Mother, through appointed counsel, filed 

a timely notice of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On December 16, 

2022, the orphans’ court filed a statement pursuant to Rule 1925(a), referring 

this Court to its memorandum opinion accompanying the decree.

On appeal, Mother presents the following issue for review:

1. Whether the court erred in finding that petitioner proved the 

elements of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), [(2), and (b)] by clear 

and convincing evidence?

Mother’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answer 

omitted).

We review involuntary termination orders for an abuse of discretion 

which our Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a determination of 

whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When 

applying this standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s findings 

of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. 

Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial 

court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may 

not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or 

abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K, 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021). 
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An appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon 

demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill-will.” Id. 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act. If the trial court determines the petitioner established grounds 

for termination under subsection 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, 

then the court must assess the petition under subsection 2511(b), which 

focuses on the child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 

2013).

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).

8

 We have long held that, 

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8 Section 2511(a)(2) is not applicable despite the orphans’ court’s discussion 

of the subsection in its memorandum accompanying the termination decree.

Significantly, to terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the 

following three elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has 

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. In re 

Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003).

No evidence suggests that Child has been without essential parental care, 

control, or subsistence while in the care of Father and Stepmother. See In 

re Adoption of L.A.K, 265 A.3d at 600 (finding termination of the father’s 

parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) was not appropriate where no 

evidence was presented that children, while in the care of the mother and 

stepfather, were without essential parental care, control, or subsistence). 

Accordingly, the record does not support termination of Mother’s parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
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in order to affirm a decree terminating parental rights, we need only agree 

with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

As such, we analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

. . . 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

As we have explained, this Court reviews a sufficiency challenge to a 

Section 2511(a)(1) termination in the following manner:

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(1), the moving 

party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, 

sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the 
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termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish 

parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental 

duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent demonstrate 

both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a 

child and refusal or failure to perform parental duties. 

Accordingly, parental rights may be terminated pursuant 

to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent either demonstrates a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or 

fails to perform parental duties.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, 

the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the 

parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the 

post-abandonment contact between parent and child; and 

(3) consideration of the effect of termination of parental 

rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).

This Court has instructed, “[I]t is the six months immediately preceding 

the filing of the petition that is most critical to our analysis. However, the trial 

court must consider the whole history of a given case and not mechanically 

apply the six-month statutory provisions, but instead consider the individual 

circumstances of each case.” In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Super. 

1999) (citations omitted). This requires the court to “examine the individual 

circumstances of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent 

facing termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, 

in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary 

termination.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted).

Further,
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[T]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact must 

be steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the 

psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious 

intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child 

relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and capacity 

to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish 

his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this 

question.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted); see 

also In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006 (Pa. Super 2008) (en 

banc).

Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has explained:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental 

duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to 

the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, 

guidance, and support. These needs, physical and 

emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive interest 

in the development of the child. Thus, this Court has 

held that the parental obligation is a positive duty 

which requires affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a 

financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in 

the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, 

parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to 

take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s 

life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in 

the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while 
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others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional 

needs.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (citations omitted).

Mother argues that Father did not present clear and convincing evidence

of Section 2511(a)(1) and (b). Regarding Section 2511(a)(1), Mother baldly 

asserts that Father prevented Mother from seeing Child. Mother’s Brief at 15; 

(citing In re J.G.J., Jr., 532 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Super. 1987) (affirming the trial 

court’s decree denying the father’s petition to involuntarily terminate the 

mother’s parental rights where father expressly prohibited the mother from 

physically visiting with the child)). Mother further contends that Child believes

Father would be angry if she told Father she wanted to see her. See Mother’s 

Brief at 15. 

Mother’s argument is without merit. Primarily, our review did not 

reveal, and Mother has not cited to, any evidence indicating that Father 

prevented Mother from seeing or contacting Child. It is true that Father 

blocked Mother’s cell phone number after he received harassing 

communications from her, including text messages in the early hours of the 

morning. See N.T., 8/18/2022, at 50-51, 65. While Father blocked Mother’s 

cell phone number after he received harassing communications from her, the 

record establishes that Mother had many ways of communicating with him. 

Id. at 50-51, 75-76. Father further testified on cross-examination that

whether Child wants to talk to Mother is up to her:
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Q: [] Okay. If [Child] wanted to contact [Mother] or [Mother] 

wanted to call and talk to [Child], would you allow it?

A: Would I allow it? It’s not my business to disallow it or not allow 

it. It’s her mother. So it’s entirely up to [Child], what [Child] 

wants to do.

Id. at 55. Child also testified that Father has asked her about contacting 

Mother. Child explained:

Q: Did you ever ask for [Mother’s telephone number], from 

[Father]?

A: No. But he’s asked me like, do you want to call her? Like, I 

can give you the phone number. And I’m like no I don’t want it . 

. . .

N.T., 8/18/2022, at 116. Accordingly, Mother’s argument that Father 

prevented Mother from seeing Child is without merit.

Mother also argues that she was focused on maintaining her sobriety 

before filing a petition to modify custody. Id. at 17 (citing L.A.K., 265 A.3d

at 580) (reinstating the trial court’s decree denying the petition to 

involuntarily terminate the father’s parental rights where the father distanced 

himself from the children until he could achieve sobriety)). Mother contends 

that she has been in treatment for years. See Mother’s Brief at 17. Mother 

argues that the orphans’ court should have considered the barrier of Mother’s 

addiction and her desire to be sober and stable prior to reestablishing her 

parental duties. Id. She also argues that she maintained contact with Child 

via Facetime, telephone conversations, and by sending cards and gifts. 
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Mother concludes that “[s]he did everything she could short of filing for a 

modification but provided a reasonable explanation for not doing so.” Id.

In its opinion accompanying the decree, the orphans’ court determined 

that Mother failed to perform parental duties for a period of at least six months 

prior to the filing of Father’s and Stepmother’s petition and, “[i]n fact, Mother 

had periods in which she failed to perform parental duties dating back to 2013 

when she was arrested and eventually incarcerated for DUI and endangering 

the welfare of [Child].” Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/2022, at 13. The court 

emphasized that “Mother’s explanation of why she did not file for custody 

between 2018 and September 2021, which was after the [involuntary 

termination] petition was filed, was unconvincing.” Id. at 15. 

The court continued, as follows:

In a rather candid moment, Mother also testified that her drug use 

led to a period of time she was unavailable as a parent. 

Unfortunately, this occurred from her 2013 arrest through 

September 2016, and again at some point in 2018 nearly through 

to the filing of the TPR petition in June 2021. Mother spent time 

in jail in 2018 for an arrest after a relapse. She admitted she 

slipped again in her use when charged with retail theft in June 

2020 and October 2020. While Mother’s drug use may explain her

being unavailable at times, it caused long absences from [Child’s] 

life. These absences continued even when Mother was supposedly 

sober from October 2020 through June 2021 when the TPR 

petition was filed. The explanation provides insight to Mother’s 

issues with drug addiction and the consequences thereof. But, it 

is an insufficient excuse for the lengthy period of time that Mother 

failed to be available as a parent to [Child].

Mother’s other explanation for her absence was that she did not 

want to infringe upon maternal grandmother’s visits with [Child]. 

Mother believed that if she filed for custody after 2018, maternal 

grandmother would somehow lose her ample visitation that Father 
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allowed with [Child]. That visitation was not court-ordered. But, 

somehow Mother believes Father would have stopped those visits, 

apparently out of spite for Mother. We saw no evidence that would 

have occurred. Mother also offered the alternative explanation 

that if she filed for custody, she would have upset maternal 

grandmother. Mother claims she had considered filing for custody 

about the time maternal grandmother died in May 2021, which is 

why she ultimately waited until September 2021. We find 

Mother’s explanation lacking in credibility, and is simply not 

supported by any other evidence. It appears more likely that 

Mother simply relied on maternal grandmother to provide Mother 

with phone/FaceTime contact while she battled her drug addiction, 

and only filed for custody when she realized Father and 

Stepmother were moving ahead with TPR and adoption.

Id. at 16-17. The court concluded that “Mother’s contacts and efforts between 

the September 2018 custody order awarding sole legal and physical custody 

to Father and September 2021, when Mother filed for custody (after the TPR 

petition was filed) were minimal to non-existent. As a result, the petitioners 

[] presented clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination of 

Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1).” Id. at 17.

We discern no abuse of discretion. Father testified that from September 

2018 to September 2021, Mother failed to perform any parental duties. Id.

at 16-17. He stated that Mother sent some letters, but “there were a few that 

. . . were inappropriate for [Child] to read[,]” including a story about “wicked 

stepparents.” Id. at 17; see also Father’s Exhibit I. He also stated that 

Mother sent gifts and Child “received the gifts and then said donate them or 

throw them away.” N.T., 8/18/2022, at 54. Father further testified that 

Mother only requested information on Child’s medical history in 2016, and last 

attended a doctor’s appointment for Child in 2012 or 2013. Id. at 66, 88-89. 
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He also asserted that Mother never attended any of Child’s school functions 

(e.g., parent teacher conferences, musical performances, etc.). Id. at 91.

Mother testified on direct examination that the only contact she had with 

Child from when Father was awarded sole legal and physical custody in 

September 2018, to when Father and Stepmother filed the termination 

petition in June 2021, was through maternal grandmother. She testified:

Q: Okay. So starting in 2018, what efforts did you make to 

maintain a relationship with [Child]?

A: Well, every single time my mom would get to visit her, which 

would at least, I think, be monthly, she would, you know say, 

[Child’s] in the car, call. And then [Child] would just answer. So 

anytime my mother had her, we talked probably two to three 

times a day.

N.T., 10/21/2022, at 85-86. Mother also confirmed that she only received 

updates about Child through maternal grandmother and last had contact with 

Child before maternal grandmother passed away in May 2021. Id. at 86-87,

128. Moreover, Mother failed to file a petition to modify custody until three 

months after Father and Stepmother filed their petition to involuntarily 

terminate Mother’s parental rights.

Child confirmed during the in camera interview that she received gifts 

and cards from Mother, but stated that she “didn’t really need cards. So I just 

[] threw them away.” N.T., 8/18/2022, at 112. Child also testified that the 

gifts were not age appropriate: “[] the toys that she gives me are [] for

three[-]year[-]olds.” Id. Child also testified regarding her conversations with 

Mother via FaceTime, as follows:
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Q: When you said that you sometimes had to answer the phone if 

[Mother] was calling?

A: Um-hmm.

Q: What would [maternal grandmother] say or do that made you 

answer the phone?

A: She’d be like come on it’s [Mother], answer it. Just answer it. 

Answer it and I didn’t -- and I just didn’t want her to start yelling 

because I am not a fan [of] being yelled at.

Q: [] So [maternal grandmother] would, if . . . you didn’t answer 

the phone and talk to [Mother] for a minute or two, [maternal 

grandmother] would get upset?

A: Probably. I just -- never actually saw what she would do. I 

would just answer the phone.

. . .

Q: Did you want to talk to [Mother]?

A: No. I never did.

Id. at 106-107. 

Mother provided two explanations for her failure to perform parental 

duties: (1) maintaining her sobriety, and (2) to appease the maternal 

grandmother who was concerned that Father would prevent her from seeing 

Child if Mother filed a petition to modify custody. Mother argues that her 

situation is analogous to the parent in L.A.K., supra. In that case, the trial 

court denied the petition to terminate and recognized that a parent’s addiction

to alcohol was a barrier to reuniting with his children. Id. at 583. The trial 

court determined that the parent stayed away from his children to achieve 

sobriety which was in the children’s best interest, and had filed a petition to 
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modify custody prior to the filing of the petition to involuntarily terminate his 

parental rights. Id. at 584, 586. This Court reversed and concluded that the 

trial court abused its discretion in denying the termination petition. Id. at 

588-589. Thereafter, our Supreme Court reversed this Court’s determination 

and remanded with instructions to reinstate the order of the trial court. Id.

at 601. In so doing, the L.A.K. Court determined that “alcohol addiction can

present a barrier to fulfilling parental obligations and as such, the 

determination of whether efforts to overcome the barrier are sufficient to 

overcome a finding of parental abandonment under Section 2511(a)(1) of the 

Adoption Act is a fact-specific determination that rests within the discretion of 

the trial court.” Id. at 583. 

In the instant matter, the orphans’ court determined that “Mother’s 

issues with drug addiction and the consequences thereof” are “an insufficient 

excuse for the lengthy period of time that Mother failed to be available as a 

parent to [Child].” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 11/16/2022, at 16. Additionally, 

contrary to the father in L.A.K. who filed a petition to modify custody prior to

the termination petition, Mother did not file her petition until three months 

after the instant petition was filed.

Moreover, unlike the father in L.A.K., on cross-examination, Mother 

proffered a second reason for her failure to perform her parental duties, as 

follows.

Q: So your attorney was in contact with you and then, correct me 

if I’m wrong, your testimony was that from that point, 2018, when 
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you knew you didn’t have any more custody rights under the 

order, you didn’t file because you were working on --

A: I was working on like my sobriety and myself, and I just knew 

I couldn’t be the best like me that I could be.

Q: Okay. So in your opinion does a parent have to have every box 

checked and have everything perfect in order to be of value to 

their child?

A: No. Honestly it was really a lot of my mom begging me not to, 

like begging me to wait, wait for more time, get more time under 

your belt, ‘cause she just thought once I filed papers that she 

wasn’t gonna be able to see [Child].

Q: Did your mom ever file anything to assert grandparents’ rights 

with you?

A: No. She wanted to and she said she was afraid if she lost, then 

[Father] would never let her see [Child]. So she just said, I’ll just 

take what I can get.

Q: So she had no rights under a court order to see [Child]?

A: No, ma’am.

Q: And she was seeing her regularly?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: And that was with [Father’s] permission?

A: Yes

. . .

Q: Was there any other reason than your mother telling you not 

to file, that you did not come to the court and file for some rights 

to see your daughter?

A: No. She just kept saying, you’re -- you’re going to ruin it, I’m 

not gonna be able to see her, I’m not gonna be able to see her, 

[Father] -- [Father] won’t let me see her any more if you do this, 

just wait a little longer, wait a little longer.
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N.T., 10/21/2022, at 120-124. Aside from this testimony, the record contains 

no corroborating evidence that Father would have stopped visits between 

Child and maternal grandmother and the orphans’ court did not find Mother’s 

explanation credible. See Orphan’s Court Opinion, 11/16/2022, at 16.

Based upon our review of the foregoing evidence, we find that the 

orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion. It is undisputed that Mother failed 

to perform her parental duties to Child well beyond the crucial six-month 

period. See In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d at 286. Moreover, Mother did not file a 

petition to modify the existing custody order until three months after Father 

and Stepmother filed their petition to involuntarily terminate her parental 

rights to Child. By her own admission, Mother chose to wait to file for custody 

of Child at the behest of maternal grandmother and relied upon her for what 

minimal contact she had with Child. See In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 

(finding that “parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable 

or convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while others 

provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional needs”); see also In 

re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010) (finding post-abandonment 

contact must be steady, consistent, and contribute to the psychological health 

of the child). Accordingly, as we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion, 

we will not disturb the orphans’ court’s finding of grounds for termination 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).
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We next must determine whether termination was proper under Section 

2511(b). Our Supreme Court has outlined this inquiry as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 

(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], 

this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between 

the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as 

discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an 

easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any 

bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on 

the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-

63 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). 

Moreover:

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the [Section] 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. . . . 
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In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted).

Mother contends that the testimony from Child’s psychologist, Dr. 

Cornell, was inconsistent and biased against her. Mother’s Brief at 24. She 

contends that Dr. Cornell was not aware that “[C]hild thought [F]ather would 

be upset if she told him she wanted to see [M]other.” Id. Mother concludes 

that an unbiased party should review whether severing Child’s bond with her

is in her best interest pursuant to Section 2511(b). Id.

In determining that Father provided clear and convincing evidence 

pursuant to Section 2511(b), the orphans’ court stated the following in its 

opinion accompanying the decree:

In this case, [Child] is bonded to Stepmother and wants to be 

adopted by her. Stepmother wants to adopt [Child]. Stepmother 

has been in [Child’s] life for over five years. [Child] is now 

[eleven], so she has known Stepmother for half of her life. [Child] 

has expressed clearly to the court, to [Father], and to Dr. Cornell, 

that she does not want to see Mother anymore. Dr. Cornell 

recommends that [Child] not visit or reunite with [] Mother for her 

emotional, physical and mental well-being. [Child] has no bond 

with Mother. It is unlikely this will change. Father has been 

supportive of [Child’s] feelings of what she wishes to have happen. 

[Child] is old enough and aware enough of things to express her 

own feelings and opinions on this subject.

Mother believes [Child] is lying, or at least being coerced into 

saying that she wants to be adopted. Mother states that what 

[Child] is saying now is not what she said to Mother in the past. 

Mother believes Dr. Cornell is lying and would say whatever she 

is paid for by Father. Mother believes Father is lying. Mother said 

she is the only one not lying in this matter. We do not agree with 
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Mother’s perception of this issue as there is no evidence to support 

it.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/16/2022, at 19. The trial court also found Child, 

Father, Stepmother, and Dr. Cornell credible regarding Child’s desire to be 

adopted by Stepmother and no longer see or speak to Mother. Id. at 20.

The orphans’ court’s determinations are supported by the record. 

Primarily, as related supra, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s 

findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the 

record. Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123. The orphans’ court 

determined that Child “has no bond with Mother.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

11/16/2022, at 19. During the in camera interview, on inquiry by Father’s 

attorney, Child stated as follows regarding whether she wants to see Mother 

again. 

Q: So you don’t think there’s anything in the whole wide world 

[Mother] could do that would make it, where you would want to 

see her again?

A: Nothing.

Q: Absolutely nothing?

A: No.

Q: You thought about this?

A: Um-hmm.

N.T., 8/18/2022, at 109. Additionally, as stated above, although Child spoke 

with Mother on the telephone or via Facetime during times with maternal 
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grandmother, she only acquiesced because she did not want maternal 

grandmother to yell at her. Id. at 106-17.

Dr. Cornell, Child’s psychologist since 2017, testified that Child often 

stated that she does not want to see Mother. N.T., 10/21/2022, at 13, 19. 

Dr. Cornell also performed an evaluation of Mother, after Father and 

Stepmother filed their petition to involuntarily terminate her parental rights. 

Id. at 19. In her report following the evaluation, Dr. Cornell concluded that 

it was not healthy for Child to have a relationship with Mother and that there 

is no bond between them. Id. at 22; see also Father’s Exhibit L. Contrary 

to Mother’s bald assertion, this Court found no evidence in the record to 

support her assertion that Dr. Cornell was biased against Mother.

Stepmother and Child, on the other hand, have a parent-child bond. As 

related supra, Stepmother has performed parental duties for Child since 

2014. N.T., 8/18/2022, at 94. Stepmother also testified that she loves Child, 

and that she believes Child loves her. Id. at 95. Child confirmed that she 

wants to be adopted by Stepmother and that they have a good relationship. 

Id at 100-101. Therefore, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion

in the court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best 

serve Child’s needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decree involuntarily terminating 

Mother’s parental rights.

Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/7/2023