alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Muir *v.*Craig.

Thé purchaser at sheriff’s sale of land, to which the'execution-debtor had no title, but which belonged at the time to the *United-States,*can recover from the debtor, in equity, the' amount of the purchase-money paid to the sheriff, . though no fraud in relation to the sale.be imputed to the debtor.

ERROR to the *Ripley*Circuit Court.

Blackford, J.

This was a bill in chancery filed by *Muir*against *Craig.*The bill charges, that one *Jennings*had obtained judgment against *Craig*for 379 dollars and 92 cents; that, execution was taken out on that judgment; that the sheriff levied the execution on a certain tract of land supposed to be the property of *Craig;*that the complainant, believing the land to be Craig’s, purchased the 'same at the sheriff’s sale, for 295 dollars, paid the purchase-money, and received the sheriff’s deed. The bill further charges- that Craig, both on and before the *day*of sale, represented the land to be. his; that the land in reality belonged to the *.United States*and not to *Craig;*and that the sheriff’s sale and deéd.conveyed no title to the complainant. The object of the bill is to compel the defendant, who is.the judgment-debtor, to refund to the complainant the amount of the purchase-money for the land, paid by the latter to- the sheriff. • ; . .

The answer denies all the particulars of fraud charged, but it admits the other material facts stated in the -bill. There was a supplemental bill filed, but the cause does hot require a particular notice of it. There are a number of depositions in the record, but they leave the case in the same situation, substantially, in. which it previously stood'upon the bill and answer.

The Circuit Court dismissed the bill at the complainant’s costs. ■' -

The question which is presented by this case is, whether the purchaser at sheriff’s sale of land, to which the execution-debtor had no title, but which belonged at the-time to the *United*States, can recover from the debtor, in equity, the amount of the phrchase-monéy paid to the sheriff,, though no fraud in relation to the sale be imputed to the debtor?

We find this question^ so far as it could arise in a case of the *294sale. of a negro, decided in the affirmative by the Court of Appeals in Kentucky, in *M'Ghee*v. Ellis, 4 Littell, 244. Our opinion is in accordance with that decision, the principle of which must, we conceive, be applicable to a case of the sale of land. *Crdig’s*debt to Jennings, as to 295 dollars, has been paid by *Muir.*' The consideration- for that payment, — viz. the land sold by the sheriff *to'Muir*as *Craig’s*property, — has entirely *failed.Muir*must-be entitled, under the circumstances of the case, to recover in equity from Craig, who has received the' benefit, the purchase-money paid to the sheriff for the land, with interest. The decree of the Circuit Court, in favour of ■the defendant^ is erroneous and must be-reversed.

J. *Test and A. Lane,*for the plaintiff,

*G. H. Dunn,*for the defendant.

*Per Curiam.*

The decree is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

April 13, 2022

No. 04

- 22

- 00116

- CR

James STRIBLIN

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 186th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013CR4270

Honorable Sid L. Harle , Judge Presiding

ORDER

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the appeal is DISMISSED FOR LACK

OF JURISDICTION.

It is so ORDERED on April 13, 2022

.

_____________________________ Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 13th day of April, 2022

.

_____________________________ Michael A. Cruz , Clerk of Court
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 229 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 229

 Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to limit admission 
 of ex-Members of the House of Representatives to the House floor and 
rooms leading thereto in certain instances where personal or pecuniary 
                        interests are involved.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 11, 1997

 Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Barrett of Wisconsin, Mr. Meehan, Mr. 
 Fazio of California, Mr. Bonior, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Gejdenson, and Mr. 
   Farr of California) submitted the following resolution; which was 
                   referred to the Committee on Rules

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Amending the Rules of the House of Representatives to limit admission 
 of ex-Members of the House of Representatives to the House floor and 
rooms leading thereto in certain instances where personal or pecuniary 
                        interests are involved.

    Resolved, That clause 3 of rule XXXII of the Rules of the House of 
Representatives is amended by inserting after the first sentence the 
following new sentence: ``Ex-Members of the House of Representatives, 
former Parliamentarians of the House, and former elected officers and 
former elected minority employees of the House shall also be excluded 
from admission to the Hall of the House and rooms leading thereto if 
they have a direct personal or pecuniary interest in any measure or 
matter under consideration in any committee or subcommittee, unless 
that measure or matter contains any provision that affects such 
individuals solely because they belong to the class of ex-Members.''.
                                 <all>
```
(i)
    
    the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December
31, 2008 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and(ii)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Dated: February 12, 2009
    /s/ ALAN D. GOLDAlan D. GoldChief Executive Officer    (i)
    
    the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended December
31, 2008 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section
15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and(ii)
    
    the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 Dated: February 12, 2009
    /s/ KENT GRIFFINKent GriffinChief Financial Officer
#### ABRAHAM SCHENERMAN, RESPONDENT, v. MANHATTAN TRANSIT COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT.

Argued May 15, 1945

Decided September 27, 1945.

Por the appellant, *Charles A. Rooney*and *Gustave A. Peduto.*

Por the respondent, *Ilarhary & Lieb (Abraham I. Ilar-Tcavy*and *Jerome 8. Lieb).*

The o]3inion of the court was delivered by

Bodine, J.

The plaintiff was injured by the defendant’s bus while seated in his parked truck. Error is claimed because of the charge of the court. The court said: “You have heard the medical testimony, which is undisputed by the defendant, as to the conditions resulting to this plaintiff, Mr. Schenerman, as a result of the injuries he suffered in this accident.”

' The defendant called no medical witnesses but was content to rest upon the cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses. Prom an examination of the whole charge, it is clear that the jury could not have misunderstood the court’s meaning that they must weigh and evaluate all the testimony given.

Viewed as a whole, the charge was without error. The judgment will be affirmed.

*For affirmance*— The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Parker, Case, Bodine, Donges, Perskie, Colie, Oliphant, Wells, Rafferty, Dill, Preund, McGeehan, JJ. -14.

*For reversal*— Heher, J. 1.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-83,695-01

EX PARTE NICHOLAS G. HEINTZ, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR AN ORIGINAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 15-0959-A 

IN THE 7 DISTRICT COURT OF SMITH COUNTY TH

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus, Applicant

presents a motion for leave to file an original application for a writ of habeas corpus. TEX. CONST.

art. V, § 5(c); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 4.04 § 1. Among other things, Applicant alleges that he

has been restrained for over one year, on bond, based on charges that have not yet resulted in an

indictment. 

Applicant contends that he filed an original habeas corpus application in the District Court1

in May 2015, but the court has not issued the writ or taken any other action. 

 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 11.05. 1
2

Before this Court considers whether exercising jurisdiction in this case is appropriate, the

District Court is invited to respond to Applicant’s claims that an original writ has been pending with

no action. Additionally, the response shall state whether Applicant is still restrained, and whether

charges have been filed against him. If an original habeas corpus application is pending in

Respondent’s court, the response shall specify whether the writ has issued and include any

supporting documentation. 

Applicant’s motion for leave to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be held

in abeyance for 30 days from the date of this order. The parties may submit any response during that

time. 

Filed: November 18, 2015

Do not publish
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 21-0082

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

DANIEL HUNTER FLANSBURG,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including June 30, 2022, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

May 24 2022

05/24/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0082
0

50

100

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250

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3/15/20203/16/20203/17/20203/18/20203/19/20203/20/20203/21/20203/22/20203/23/20203/24/20203/25/20203/26/20203/27/20203/28/20203/29/20203/30/20203/31/2020

4/1/20204/2/20204/3/20204/4/20204/5/20204/6/20204/7/20204/8/20204/9/2020

4/10/20204/11/20204/12/20204/13/20204/14/20204/15/20204/16/20204/17/2020

CCDOC Detainees - COVID-19 Testing

March 15, 2020 - April 17, 2020 (as of 10:00 am)

Positive Detainees in Isolation in Custody Convalescent Detainees in Custody

Case: 1:20-cv-02134 Document #: 62-3 Filed: 04/17/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:1682
Date

Positive Detainees in 

Isolation in Custody

Convalescent 

Detainees in Custody 

3/15/2020 0

3/16/2020 0

3/17/2020 0

3/18/2020 0

3/19/2020 0

3/20/2020 0

3/21/2020 0

3/22/2020 0

3/23/2020 2

3/24/2020 3

3/25/2020 17

3/26/2020 24

3/27/2020 38

3/28/2020 89

3/29/2020 101

3/30/2020 134

3/31/2020 159

4/1/2020 167

4/2/2020 167

4/3/2020 210

4/4/2020 220

4/5/2020 234

4/6/2020 230 33

4/7/2020 249 34

4/8/2020 251 31

4/9/2020 276 36

4/10/2020 289 36

4/11/2020 265 39

4/12/2020 274 32

4/13/2020 185 129

4/14/2020 179 144

4/15/2020 181 156

4/16/2020 174 168

4/17/2020 180 170

Case: 1:20-cv-02134 Document #: 62-3 Filed: 04/17/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:1683
Case: 1:20-cv-02250 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/20 Page 1 of 3 PageID #:1
Case: 1:20-cv-02250 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/20 Page 2 of 3 PageID #:2
Case: 1:20-cv-02250 Document #: 1 Filed: 04/10/20 Page 3 of 3 PageID #:3
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

Inconnection with the Annual Report of River Rock Entertainment Authority (the “Authority”)on Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2006 as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Shawn S. Smyth,Chief Executive Officer of the Authority, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)      The Reportfully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)      Theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Authority.

 
| By:                                      | /s/ SHAWN S. SMYTH |   |
|------------------------------------------|--------------------|--------|
| Shawn S. Smyth                           |               |   |
| Chief Executive Officer, General Manager |               |   |
| April 17, 2007                           |               |   |
|                                          |                    |        |  |  |

A signedoriginal of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided tothe River Rock Entertainment Authority and will be retained by the River RockEntertainment Authority and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commissionor its staff upon request.

 

----
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

COSTA DEL MAR, INC., 

 Plaintiff,

v.

SHOP5369069, et al.,

 Defendants.

Case No. 20-cv-02934

Judge John Robert Blakey

Magistrate Judge Beth W. Jantz

SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT

WHEREAS, a judgment was entered in the above action on August 3, 2020 [51], in favor 

of Plaintiff Costa Del Mar, Inc. ( “Plaintiff”) against the Defendants Identified in Schedule A in 

the amount of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000) per Defaulting Defendant, and Plaintiff 

acknowledges payment of an agreed upon damages amount, costs, and interest and desires to 

release this judgment and hereby fully and completely satisfy the same as to the following 

Defendants:

Defendant Name Line No.

Colin Xu 23

zouzhichao 25

youshilong 26

zhusonglin 27

loudyangling 30

YangGirl 32

lantianwe 35

YangFun 36

highflyke 37

taoshiye 38

djh888 39

dongyihuer 40

MuSunLove 61

mkh67r 80

ecae92gd 84

Case: 1:20-cv-02934 Document #: 52 Filed: 08/07/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:2137
2

LL8885 133

THEREFORE, full and complete satisfaction of said judgment as to the above-referenced 

Defendants is hereby acknowledged, and the Clerk of the Court is hereby authorized and directed 

to make an entry of the full and complete satisfaction on the docket of said judgment.

Dated this 7th day of August 2020. Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jake M. Christensen

Amy C. Ziegler

Justin R. Gaudio

Jake M. Christensen

Thomas J. Juettner

Greer, Burns & Crain, Ltd.

300 South Wacker Drive, Suite 2500

Chicago, Illinois 60606

312.360.0080 / 312.360.9315 (facsimile)

aziegler@gbc.law

jgaudio@gbc.law

jchristensen@gbc.law

tjjuettner@gbc.law

Counsel for Plaintiff Costa Del Mar, Inc.

Case: 1:20-cv-02934 Document #: 52 Filed: 08/07/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:2138
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                              5
<CIK>                                  1017522
<NAME>                                 BENEDEK COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
       
<S>                                    <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                          12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                         JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                           DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                   4,291,354
<SECURITIES>                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                           27,853,116
<ALLOWANCES>                               480,175
<INVENTORY>                                      0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                        39,355,891
<PP&E>                                 139,473,509
<DEPRECIATION>                          76,846,348
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                         447,462,535
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                   35,526,917
<BONDS>                                358,904,681
<COMMON>                                    74,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                  162,643,832
<PREFERRED>                                      0
<OTHER-SE>                            (147,336,693)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>           447,462,535
<SALES>                                157,244,831
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                       160,661,228
<CGS>                                   20,828,626
<TOTAL-COSTS>                           20,828,626
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                       120,428,665
<LOSS-PROVISION>                           552,357
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                      44,022,137
<INCOME-PRETAX>                        (24,676,657)
<INCOME-TAX>                            (8,051,674)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                    (16,624,983)
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                           (16,624,983)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                (6.42)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                (6.42)
        

<PAGE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

Midwest Operating Engineers Welfare Fund, et

al.

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:20−cv−02685

Honorable Mary M. Rowland

Wright Concrete Recycling, Inc., et al.

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Thursday, July 16, 2020:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Mary M. Rowland:A notice of voluntary

dismissal (Dkt. [16]) has been filed. This case is dismissed without prejudice. Any

pending schedules in this case are stricken as moot. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice.

(dm, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cv-02685 Document #: 17 Filed: 07/16/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:102
#### Norton Strunk and Others *v.*Daniel Dulton and Wife.

Wills — Testimentary Capacity,

On account of the testator’s extreme age Ms mental faculties were considerably impaired and lie exhibited evidences of a disordered intellect. But on the day of the execution of Ms will he was sufficiently in possession of his intellectual powers to dictate the provisions of the instrument and sufficiently self’ possessed to investigate and understand its contents.

APPEAL PROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT.

April 28, 1871.

Opinion by

Judge Lindsay:

There is no evidence in this record showing that David Dulton was induced to make the will being contested by reason of undue influence exercised over him by the appellees or their family, nor do we think the circumstances connected with the transaction tend to establish any such conclusion.

The testimony as to the capacity of the testator is conflicting. It seems pretty clear that on account of his extreme age his mental faculties were considerably impaired, and that when conversing upon certain subjects he exhibited evidence of a disordered intellect, and the witnesses generally agree that he was not capable of transacting or attending to business. Still we do not regard the testimony as prepondering in favor of the con*301elusion that at the time the will was made, he did not possess sufficient mental capacity to decide as to what was a proper disposition to be made of his estate.

*James, for appellant.*

From the testimony of the draftsman of the paper and of the subscribing witnesses thereto, it is evident that on the day of its execution he was sufficiently in possession of his intellectual powers to dictate the provisions of his will, and sufficiently self-possessed to investigate and understand its contents. Nor do we think the paper upon its face presents intrinsic evidence of want of testimentary capacity upon the part of the testator. It is probable in view of the condition of some of his daughters and grandchildren that a more equitable disposition of his property would have been made, but the will as made is neither irrational nor inexplicable. It seems that ten years prior to the time it was made, and when his mind was unclouded, he had indicated his intention to give all his property to his son, Daniel, and his wife, and that he gave a reason for such intention which if not satisfactory, was certainly a sensible one.

This reason continued to exist up to the time his will was made and doubtless continued to exert a controlling influence over his mind, considering all the evidence in the case, we. are not prepared to disturb the action of the courts below.

Judgment affirmed.
#### Peyton *v.*Bowell.

Incumbrances on real estate, sufficient to warrant a vendee in refusing a conveyance, and rescinding the contract, are not limited to deeds and matters of record. A written lease for any number of years, without seal, ia such an incumbrance. So is a lease by parol for a term not exceeding three years,

it must be presumed — the record not showing the evidence — that the instructions given to the jury were applicable to the case, and had an influence oa the verdict.

ERROR to the *Clark*Circuit Court.

*Thompson*and Naylor, for the plamii/K

Howk, for the defendant.

Blackford, J.

Debt by *Bowell*against Peyton, on a sealed note for the payment of money. Pleas, 1st, *per fraudem;*2dly, failure of consideration. *Bowell*had *Harrodis*bond, conditioned for the execution of a good title to a tract of land, fie sold to Peyton, and assigned him the title bond. The note in question was given by *P-eyton.ia*payment. Yerdict and judgment for the plaintiffbelow.

The instructions which the Court gave to the jury, are assigned for error. So far as those instructions go to state, that an incumbrance on real estate must be of record, or by deed, to, authorize the vendee in refusing a conveyance and rescinding the contract, they cannot be supported. Thus, for example, a lease for years, outstanding at the time the title is to be executed, is a sufficient incumbrance to warrant the purchaser, without notice, in disaffirming the sale. *Tucker*v. Woods, 12 Johns. R. 190. And a lease for any number of years is valid, if in writing, although not under seal. *Farmer*v. Rogers, 2 Wils. 26. — Rob. on Fr. 246. It is even good for any term not exceeding three years, without any writing, by an exception in the statute of frauds (1). The unqualified opinion of the Circuit Court, therefore, that the incumbrance must be by deed or matter of record, seems to have been too hastily expressed.

The record does not inform us what the evidence in this case was; hut we must presume that the instructions given to the jury were applicable to the case, and had an influence on the verdict.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is reversed, and the verdict set; aside, with costs. Cau$e remanded, &c.

(1)

 Stat. 29 Car. Ind. Stat. 1817, p. 118;-1823, p. 216.