UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

BOSTON MARKET CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

TYSON FOODS, INC.; TYSON CHICKEN, 

INC.; TYSON BREEDERS, INC.; TYSON 

POULTRY, INC.; PILGRIM’S PRIDE 

CORPORATION; KOCH FOODS, INC.; JCG 

FOODS OF ALABAMA, LLC; JCG FOODS 

OF GEORGIA, LLC; KOCH MEAT CO., INC.; 

SANDERSON FARMS, INC.; SANDERSON 

FARMS, INC. (FOOD DIVISION); 

SANDERSON FARMS, INC. (PRODUCTION 

DIVISION); SANDERSON FARMS, INC. 

(PROCESSING DIVISION); HOUSE OF 

RAEFORD FARMS, INC.; MAR-JAC 

POULTRY, INC.; PERDUE FARMS INC.; 

PERDUE FOODS LLC; WAYNE FARMS, 

LLC; FIELDALE FARMS CORPORATION; 

GEORGE’S, INC.; GEORGE’S FARMS, INC.; 

SIMMONS FOODS, INC.; SIMMONS 

PREPARED FOODS, INC.; O.K. FOODS, 

INC.; O.K. FARMS, INC.; O.K. INDUSTRIES, 

INC.; PECO FOODS, INC.; HARRISON 

POULTRY, INC.; FOSTER FARMS, LLC; 

FOSTER POULTRY FARMS; NORMAN W. 

FRIES, INC. d/b/a CLAXTON POULTRY 

FARMS, INC.; MOUNTAIRE FARMS, INC.; 

MOUNTAIRE FARMS, LLC; MOUNTAIRE 

FARMS OF DELAWARE, INC.; AMICK 

FARMS, LCC; THE AMICK COMPANY, 

INC., AMICK-OSI BROILERS, LLC; AMICKOSI PROCESSING, LLC; CASE FOODS, 

INC.; CASE FARMS, LLC; CASE FARMS 

PROCESSING, INC.; and AGRI STATS, INC,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT

Jury Trial Demanded

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Plaintiff Boston Market Corporation (“Boston Market”), brings this action for damages 

under the antitrust laws of the United States and the laws of Arizona, California, District of 

Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 

New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia and Wisconsin 

against Tyson Foods, Inc.; Tyson Chicken, Inc.; Tyson Breeders, Inc.; Tyson Poultry, Inc.; 

Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation; Koch Foods, Inc.; JCG Foods of Alabama, LLC; JCG Foods of 

Georgia, LLC; Koch Meat Co., Inc.; Sanderson Farms, Inc.; Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Food Division); 

Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Production Division); Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Processing Division); House 

of Raeford Farms, Inc.; Mar-Jac Poultry, Inc.; Perdue Farms Inc.; Perdue Foods LLC; Wayne 

Farms, LLC; Fieldale Farms Corporation; George’s, Inc.; George’s Farms, Inc.; Simmons Prepared 

Foods, Inc.; O.K. Foods, Inc.; O.K. Farms, Inc.; O.K. Industries, Inc.; Peco Foods, Inc.; Harrison 

Poultry, Inc.; Foster Farms, LLC; Foster Poultry Farms; Norman W. Fries, Inc. d/b/a Claxton 

Poultry Farms, Inc.; Mountaire Farms, Inc.; Mountaire Farms, LLC; Mountaire Farms of Delaware, 

Inc.; Amick Farms, LLC; The Amick Company, Inc.; Amick-OSI Broilers, LLC; Amick-OSI 

Processing, LLC; Case Foods, Inc.; Case Farms, LLC; Case Farms Processing, Inc.; and Agri Stats, 

Inc. (collectively, the “Defendants”), and alleges:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Defendants are horizontal competitors in the United States chicken market. 

Defendants and their co-conspirators conducted a long-running conspiracy (the “Conspiracy”) 

extending from at least January 2008 through at least 2017 (the “Conspiracy Period”) to restrain 

production, manipulate price indices, fix prices and rig bids, the purpose and effect of which was to 

fix, raise, stabilize and maintain prices of chicken meat throughout the United States.

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2. Chickens raised for meat consumption (“Broilers” or “Broiler”) 1 constitute 

approximately 98% of all chicken meat sold in the United States. Defendants are the leading 

suppliers of Broilers and control approximately 90% of the wholesale Broiler market. The Broiler 

industry is a highly concentrated market with over $30 billion in annual wholesale revenue. 

3. The commoditized nature of Broilers, in conjunction with the (a) significantly high 

barriers to entry, (b) access to competitors’ commercially sensitive data, (c) highly concentrated 

market dominated by vertically-integrated producers, (d) inelastic demand for the product, and (e) 

opportunities to conspire at trade association meetings, investor conferences, competitor plant tours, 

and other contacts among competitors made the Broiler industry particularly susceptible to 

anticompetitive manipulation. These factors, among others, enabled Defendants to effectively 

conspire to inflate the prices of Broilers above those that would prevail in a competitive market.

4. In 2007, the price of Broilers decreased. As a result—commencing as early as 

January 2008 and continuing throughout the Conspiracy Period—Defendants conspired to curtail 

competition in the market for Broilers by reducing the supply of Broilers, manipulating the price 

indices for wholesale Broilers, and fixing prices and rigging bids for Small Bird Broilers2 sold to 

Boston Market and other restaurants.

5. Defendants used multiple means to sustain the Conspiracy. First, beginning in 2008, 

Defendants engaged in a series of supply reductions at the start of the distribution chain. 

Defendants purposefully destroyed breeder hens and eggs to achieve these artificial decreases in 

1 Broiler chickens specifically refer to chickens raised for meat consumption to be slaughtered 

before the age of 10–13 weeks.

 Broilers can be sold fresh or frozen, raw or cooked, or whole or in 

parts, or as a meat ingredient in a value added product. As used in this Complaint the term 

“Broilers” excludes chicken grown, processed, and sold according to halal, kosher, free-range, or 

organic standards. 

2 Generally, Small Birds are defined as birds slaughtered between 7 and 9 weeks, weighing less than 

4 and 1/4 pounds.

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Broiler supply. Defendants also manipulated the price index associated with wholesale Broiler 

prices at the end of the distribution chain. Defendants’ conduct ensured that buyers purchased 

Broilers from Defendants at inflated non-competitive prices. 

6. In furtherance of the Conspiracy, Defendants reached anti-competitive agreements 

and understandings during regularly scheduled trade association meetings, investor conferences, 

competitor plant tours, and other contacts with one another. 

7. Defendants also coordinated their strategy for achieving their desired anticompetitive ends by exchanging confidential and commercially sensitive information regarding 

production, capacity, and pricing of Broilers. As part of this strategy, Defendants exchanged 

information regarding anticipated future production through Defendant Agri Stats, Inc. (“Agri 

Stats”). Defendants used this data to coordinate production outputs, monitor each other’s 

production figures for Broilers, and otherwise facilitate the Conspiracy.

8. Defendants also engaged in a conspiracy targeted at restaurants like Boston Market 

that purchased Small Bird Broilers (“Small Bird Conspiracy”). Boston Market, like many 

restaurants, contracted directly with Defendants for the purchase of their proprietary chicken 

products. Boston Market submitted requests for bids to multiple Defendants to supply the Boston 

Market system with Small Bird Broilers. 

9. Starting as early as 2012 and continuing until as late as 2017 (“Small Bird 

Conspiracy Period”), Defendants conspired to fix prices and submit artificially high bids to Boston 

Market and other restaurants in an effort to drive up Small Bird Broiler prices, and in turn, 

Defendants’ profits. 

10. As a result of Defendants’ Small Bird price-fixing and bid-rigging Conspiracy, 

Defendants were able to exact significant price increases from Boston Market and other restaurants 

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at the same time wholesale prices of Small Bird Broilers were decreasing.

11. Defendants adhered to their collusive agreements and understandings throughout the 

Conspiracy Period. Defendants reaped the benefits of their illegal conduct through their production 

and sale—directly and through their wholly-owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates—of 

Broilers at inflated non-competitive prices. Indeed, during key periods in the Conspiracy Period 

Defendants continuously urged one another to “lower supply in order to offset reduced demand and 

to support higher market prices.”

12. Through their collusive, anticompetitive actions, Defendants negated the economic 

benefits of increased competition. Defendants’ conduct resulted in their customers, including 

Boston Market, paying at least hundreds of millions of dollars in overcharges to Defendants.

13. Defendants concealed their anticompetitive and unlawful conduct from their 

customers, regulators, and the public. For instance, it was not publicly known until November 2016 

that certain Defendants and their co-conspirators manipulated and artificially inflated the George 

Dock price index. And, it was not until June 2020 with the Department of Justice’s Indictment of 

executives of Defendants Claxton and Pilgrim’s Pride that Defendants’ conspiracy to fix prices and 

rig bids of Small Bird Broilers to restaurants like Boston Market was revealed.

14. “Plus factors” are economic actions and outcomes, above and beyond parallel 

conduct by oligopolistic firms that are generally inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely 

consistent with explicitly coordinated action. Numerous “plus factors” existed in the Broiler 

industry during the Conspiracy Period including, but not limited to: (i) extensive information 

sharing through Agri Stats and other means; (ii) numerous opportunities for Defendants to collude 

in a variety of forums; (iii) inter-Defendant trades and purchases that often were against 

independent self-interest; (iv) increased exports of Broilers to other countries that were also often 

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against independent self-interest; (v) multiple industry characteristics that facilitated collusion, 

such as high vertical integration, high barriers to entry, high industry consolidation and 

concentration, inelastic supply and demand, a lack of significant substitutes for chicken, depressed 

economic conditions, and a history of government investigations and collusive conduct; and (vii) 

the manipulation of the Georgia Dock price index.

II. PARTIES

A. Plaintiff

15. Boston Market Corporation is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 

business in Golden, Colorado. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market operated over 450

stores across the country, and was registered to do business in each state in which it operated, 

including Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, 

Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South 

Carolina, Virginia and Wisconsin. 

16. Boston Market brings this action on its own behalf, and additionally and 

alternatively, as assignee of its purchasing agents, Ben E. Keith Company d/b/a Ben E. Keith Foods, 

HAVI Global Solutions, Mattingly Foods, Inc., and McLane Foodservice, Inc. f/k/a MBM 

Corporation, Willow Run Foods, Inc., and their respective affiliates (“Assignors”). During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers directly from Defendants, Defendants’ 

subsidiaries and affiliates, entities owned or controlled by Defendants, or agents Defendants or 

Defendants’ subsidiaries and affiliates controlled. 

17. Also during the Conspiracy Period, Assignors purchased Broilers on Boston 

Market’s behalf from Defendants and/or their co-conspirators, including Tyson and Pilgrim’s Pride.

Assignors have assigned their claims arising out of these purchases to Boston Market. 

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18. Boston Market and its Assignors purchased hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of 

Broilers from Defendants directly at artificially inflated prices throughout the Conspiracy Period. 

Boston Market contracted directly with Defendants for the purchase of Broilers, negotiating the 

price and quantity at which Defendants would supply Broilers to Boston Market. 

19. Boston Market also purchased Broilers indirectly from Defendants, Defendants’ 

subsidiaries and affiliates, entities owned or controlled by Defendants, or agents Defendants or 

Defendants’ subsidiaries and affiliates controlled for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s 

locations, and not for resale in unaltered form. 

20. The purchase orders for Broilers supplied to Boston Market restaurants were created 

and issued from Boston Market restaurant locations in multiple states, including Arizona, 

California, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, 

New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia 

and Wisconsin. Boston Market restaurants also received invoices for and shipments of Broilers. As 

such, Boston Market has suffered antitrust injury as a result of Defendants’ anticompetitive and 

unlawful conduct.

21. Boston Market was damaged by Defendants’ anticompetitive and illegal conduct by 

paying artificially inflated prices for Broilers. Boston Market brings this action to recover the 

overcharges it paid for Broilers purchased during the Conspiracy Period.

B. Defendants

(i) Tyson

22. Defendant Tyson Foods, Inc. is a publicly held Delaware corporation headquartered 

in Springdale, Arkansas.

23. Defendant Tyson Chicken, Inc. is a Delaware corporation headquartered in 

Springdale, Arkansas. Tyson Chicken, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Tyson 

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Foods, Inc.

24. Defendant Tyson Breeders, Inc. is a Delaware corporation headquartered in 

Springdale, Arkansas. Tyson Breeders, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Tyson 

Foods, Inc.

25. Defendant Tyson Poultry, Inc. is a Delaware corporation headquartered in 

Springdale, Arkansas. Tyson Poultry, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Tyson 

Foods, Inc.

26. Defendants Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Chicken, Inc., Tyson Breeders, Inc. and Tyson 

Poultry, Inc. are collectively referred to as “Tyson.” During the Conspiracy Period, Tyson, its 

predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through 

owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

27. Tyson reported a wide variety of data to Defendant Agri Stats including information 

about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in Virginia, Pennsylvania, 

North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, Missouri, Indiana, Tennessee, and 

Kentucky. Tyson was one of the ten Defendants that submitted false and artificially inflated price 

quotes to the Georgia Department of Agriculture (“GDA”). One of Tyson’s plant managers served 

on the Georgia Dock Advisory Board.

(ii) Pilgrim’s Pride 

28. Defendant Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation (“Pilgrim’s Pride”) is a publicly held 

Delaware corporation headquartered in Greeley, Colorado. 

29. In December 2008, Pilgrim’s Pride filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in the 

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas. Effective December 28, 2009, 

Pilgrim’s Pride was discharged from bankruptcy under a plan of reorganization that paid all 

creditors in full largely due to rising Broiler prices leading to increased profits at Pilgrim’s Pride.

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30. After its discharge from bankruptcy, Pilgrim’s Pride reaffirmed its participation in 

the Conspiracy.

31. Accordingly, Pilgrim’s Pride is liable for all conspiratorial acts undertaken during 

the entire Conspiracy Period.

32. During the Conspiracy Period, Pilgrim’s Pride, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or 

affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries 

and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

33. Pilgrim’s Pride reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information 

about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in Virginia, West 

Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Florida, South Carolina, Alabama, Texas, Arkansas, 

and Kentucky. Pilgrim’s Pride was one of the ten Defendants that submitted false and artificially 

inflated price quotes to the GDA. Pilgrim’s Pride’s Executive Vice President of Sales and 

Operations served on the Georgia Dock Advisory Board.

(iii) Koch

34. Defendant Koch Foods, Inc. is a privately held Delaware corporation headquartered 

in Park Ridge, Illinois.

35. Defendant JCG Foods of Alabama, LLC is an Alabama limited liability corporation 

headquartered in Park Ridge, Illinois. JCG Foods of Alabama, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary 

of Defendant Koch Foods, Inc.

36. Defendant JCG Foods of Georgia, LLC is a Georgia limited liability corporation 

headquartered in Park Ridge, Illinois. JCG Foods of Alabama, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary 

of Defendant Koch Foods, Inc.

37. Defendant Koch Meat Co., Inc. is an Illinois corporation headquartered in Chicago. 

Koch Meat Co., Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Koch Foods, Inc.

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38. Defendants Koch Foods, Inc., JCG Foods of Alabama, LLC, JCG Foods of Georgia, 

LLC and Koch Meat Co., Inc. are collectively referred to as “Koch.” 

39. During the Conspiracy Period, Koch, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold 

Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, 

to purchasers in the United States.

40. Koch reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about its 

breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in Georgia, Tennessee, and 

Alabama. Koch, through JCG Foods of Georgia, LLC, was one of the ten Defendants that 

submitted false and artificially inflated price quotes to the GDA. Koch’s Vice-President of Sales 

served on the Georgia Dock Advisory Board. 

(iv) Sanderson Farms

41. Defendant Sanderson Farms, Inc. is a publicly held Mississippi corporation 

headquartered in Laurel, Mississippi.

42. Defendant Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Foods Division) is a Mississippi corporation 

headquartered in Laurel, Mississippi. Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Foods Division) is a wholly-owned 

subsidiary of Defendant Sanderson Farms, Inc.

43. Defendant Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Production Division) is a Mississippi corporation 

headquartered in Laurel, Mississippi. Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Production Division) is a whollyowned subsidiary of Defendant Sanderson Farms, Inc.

44. Defendant Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Processing Division), a Mississippi corporation 

headquartered in Laurel, Mississippi. Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Processing Division) is a whollyowned subsidiary of Defendant Sanderson Farms, Inc.

45. Defendants Sanderson Farms, Inc., Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Foods Division), 

Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Production Division) and Sanderson Farms, Inc. (Processing Division) are 

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collectively referred to as “Sanderson Farms.” During the Conspiracy Period, Sanderson Farms, its 

predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through 

owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

46. Sanderson reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about 

its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in Georgia, Mississippi, and 

Texas. Sanderson Farms was one of the ten Defendants that submitted false and artificially inflated 

price quotes to the GDA. 

(v) Raeford 

47. Defendant House of Raeford Farms, Inc. (“Raeford”) is a privately held North 

Carolina corporation headquartered in Rose Hill, North Carolina. 

48. During the Conspiracy Period, Raeford, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates 

sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries and 

affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

49. Raeford reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about its 

breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its North Carolina and Louisiana complexes.

(vi) Mar-Jac

50. Defendant Mar-Jac Poultry, Inc. is a Georgia corporation headquartered in 

Gainesville, Georgia. Mar-Jac Poultry, Inc. and its subsidiaries are controlled by Sterling 

Management Group, Inc. 

51. Mar-Jac Poultry MS, LLC is a Mississippi limited liability company located in 

Gainesville, Georgia. 

52. Mar-Jac Poultry AL, LLC is an Alabama limited liability company located in 

Gainesville, Georgia.

53. Mar-Jac AL/MS, Inc. is a Delaware corporation located in Gainesville, Georgia.

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54. Mar-Jac Poultry, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company located in Gainesville, 

Georgia.

55. Mar-Jac Holdings, Inc. is a Delaware corporation located in Gainesville, Georgia and 

is the parent company of Mar-Jac Poultry, Inc., Mar-Jac Poultry MS, LLC, Mar-Jac Poultry AL, 

LLC, Mar-Jac AL/MS, Inc., and Mar-Jac Poultry, LLC (collectively, “Mar-Jac”). 

56. During the Conspiracy Period, Mar-Jac, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates 

sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries and 

affiliates, to purchasers in the United States. 

57. Mar-Jac reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about its 

breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its Gainesville, Georgia complex. Mar-Jac was 

one of the ten Defendants that submitted false and artificially inflated price quotes to the GDA. 

Mar-Jac’s Vice President of Operations served on the Georgia Dock Advisory Board. 

(vii) Perdue

58. Defendant Perdue Farms Inc. is a privately held Maryland corporation headquartered 

in Salisbury, Maryland.

59. Defendant Perdue Foods LLC, formerly known as Perdue Farms LLC, is a privately 

held Maryland limited liability corporation headquartered in Salisbury, Maryland. Perdue Foods 

LLC is a subsidiary of Defendant Perdue Farms Inc.

60. Defendants Perdue Farms Inc. and Perdue Foods LLC are together referred to as 

“Perdue.” During the Conspiracy Period, Perdue, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold 

Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, 

to purchasers in the United States.

61. Perdue reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about its 

breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in Delaware, Maryland, North 

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Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and Kentucky. Perdue was one of the ten Defendants that 

submitted false and artificially inflated price quotes to the GDA. 

(viii) Wayne Farms

62. Defendant Wayne Farms, LLC (“Wayne Farms”) is a Delaware limited liability 

corporation headquartered in Oakwood, Georgia. 

63. During the Conspiracy Period, Wayne Farms, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or 

affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries 

and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

64. Wayne Farms reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information 

about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in North Carolina, 

Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas. Wayne Farms was one of the ten Defendants that 

submitted false and artificially inflated price quotes to the GDA. Its Vice President of Fresh Sales 

served on the Georgia Dock Advisory Board. 

(ix) Fieldale 

65. Defendant Fieldale Farms Corporation (“Fieldale”) is a privately held Georgia 

corporation headquartered in Baldwin, Georgia. 

66. During the Conspiracy Period, Fieldale, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates, 

sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries and 

affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

67. Fieldale reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about its 

breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and its Gainesville, Georgia complex. Fieldale was one of the 

ten Defendants that submitted false and artificially inflated price quotes to the GDA. Its owner and 

CEO also served on the Georgia Dock Advisory Board. 

(x) George’s

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68. Defendant George’s Inc. is a privately held Arkansas corporation headquartered in 

Springdale, Arkansas.

69. Defendant George’s Farms, Inc., is a privately held Arkansas corporation 

headquartered in Springdale, Arkansas. George’s Farms, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 

George’s, Inc. 

70. Defendants George’s, Inc. and George’s Farms, Inc. are together referred to as 

“George’s.” During the Conspiracy Period, George’s, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates 

sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries and 

affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

71. George’s reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about 

its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in Harrisonburg, Virginia and 

Springdale, Arkansas.

(xi) Simmons 

72. Defendant Simmons Foods, Inc. is a privately held Arkansas corporation 

headquartered in Siloam Springs, Arkansas. Simmons Foods reported a wide variety of data to Agri 

Stats, including information about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its two 

Siloam Springs, Arkansas complexes.

73. Defendant Simmons Prepared Foods, Inc. is a privately held Arkansas company 

headquartered in Siloam Springs, Arkansas. Simmons Prepared Foods, Inc. is a wholly-owned 

subsidiary of Simmons Foods, Inc. 

74. During the Conspiracy Period, Simmons Foods, Inc. exclusively sold the Broilers it 

produced to Simmons Prepared Foods, Inc., which in turn resold the Broilers in various forms to its 

customers. Simmons Foods, Inc., its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates was engaged in the 

processing, distribution, sale, pricing, and/or marketing of Broilers, directly or through its owned or 

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controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States. Defendants Simmons 

Foods, Inc. and Simmons Prepared Foods, Inc. are collectively referred to as “Simmons.”

(xii) O.K. Foods

75. Defendant O.K. Foods, Inc. is an Arkansas corporation headquartered in Fort Smith, 

Arkansas.

76. O.K. Farms, Inc. is an Arkansas corporation headquartered in Fort Smith, Arkansas. 

O.K. Farms, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant O.K. Foods, Inc.

77. O.K. Industries, Inc. is an Arkansas corporation headquartered in Fort Smith, 

Arkansas. O.K. Industries, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant O.K. Foods, Inc.

78. Defendants O.K. Foods, Inc., O.K. Farms, Inc. and O.K. Industries, Inc. are 

collectively referred to collectively as “O.K. Foods.” During the Conspiracy Period, O.K. Foods, its 

predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through 

owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

79. The O.K. Foods entities are subsidiaries of the Mexican poultry conglomerate 

Industrias Bachoco. O.K. Foods reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information 

about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its Fort Smith, Arkansas complex.

(xiii) Peco Foods

80. Defendant Peco Foods, Inc. (“Peco Foods”) is a privately held Alabama corporation 

headquartered in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. 

81. During the Conspiracy Period, Peco Foods, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or 

affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries 

and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

82. Peco Foods reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about 

its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in Gordo, Alabama and 

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Sebastopol, Louisiana.

(xiv) Harrison

83. Defendant Harrison Poultry, Inc. (“Harrison”) is a Georgia corporation 

headquartered in Bethlehem, Georgia. 

84. During the Conspiracy Period, Harrison, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates 

sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries and 

affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

85. Harrison reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about 

its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its Bethlehem, Georgia complex. Harrison 

was one of the ten Defendants that submitted false and artificially inflated price quotes to the GDA. 

Harrison’s owner and CEO served on the Georgia Dock Advisory Board. 

(xv) Foster Farms

86. Defendant Foster Farms, LLC is a privately held California corporation 

headquartered in Modesto, California. Foster reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including 

information about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in Fresno, 

California, Livingston, California, and the Pacific Northwest.

87. Defendant Foster Poultry Farms is a privately held California corporation 

headquartered in Livingston, California. Foster Poultry Farms is a related entity of Foster Farms, 

LLC. 

88. Defendants Foster Farms, LLC and Foster Poultry Farms are collectively referred to 

as “Foster Farms.” During the Conspiracy Period, Foster Farms, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or 

affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries 

and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

(xvi) Claxton 

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89. Defendant Norman W. Fries, Inc. d/b/a Claxton Poultry Farms, Inc. (“Claxton”) is a 

Georgia corporation headquartered in Claxton, Georgia. 

90. During the Conspiracy Period, Claxton, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates 

sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries and 

affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

91. Claxton reported to Agri Stats a wide variety of data, including information about its 

breeder flocks and hatchery capacity and its Claxton, Georgia complex. Claxton was one of the ten 

Defendants that submitted false and artificially inflated price quotes to the GDA. Its CEO served on 

the Georgia Dock Advisory Board. 

(xvii) Mountaire Farms

92. Defendant Mountaire Farms, Inc. is a privately held Delaware corporation 

headquartered in Millsboro, Delaware.

93. Defendant Mountaire Farms, LLC is a privately held Arkansas limited liability 

corporation headquartered in Little Rock, Arkansas. Mountaire Farms, LLC is a wholly-owned 

subsidiary of Defendant Mountaire Farms, Inc.

94. Defendant Mountaire Farms of Delaware, Inc. is a privately held Delaware 

corporation headquartered in Millsboro, Delaware. Mountaire Farms of Delaware is a whollyowned subsidiary of Defendant Mountaire Farms, Inc.

95. Defendants Mountaire Farms, Inc., Mountaire Farms, LLC and Mountaire Farms of 

Delaware, Inc. are collectively referred to as “Mountaire Farms.” During the Conspiracy Period, 

Mountaire Farms, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, 

directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United 

States.

96. Mountaire Farms reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information 

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about its breeder flocks and hatchery capacity, and data for its complexes in Delaware and North 

Carolina.

(xviii) Amick

97. Defendant Amick Farms, LLC is a privately held Delaware limited liability company 

with its corporate headquarters in Batesburg-Leesville, South Carolina, and with facilities in South 

Carolina, Maryland and Delaware. Amick Farms, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of OSI 

Group, LLC, a privately held Delaware corporation with its corporate headquarters in Aurora, 

Illinois. During the Conspiracy Period, Amick Farms, LLC, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or 

affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through owned or controlled subsidiaries 

and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

98. Defendant The Amick Company, Inc. is a privately held South Carolina corporation 

with its corporate headquarters in Batesburg-Leesville, South Carolina, and is a wholly-owned 

subsidiary of OSI Group, LLC. During the Conspiracy Period, The Amick Company, Inc., its 

predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through 

owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States

99. Defendant Amick-OSI Broilers, LLC is a privately held Delaware limited liability 

company with its corporate headquarters in Batesburg-Leesville, South Carolina, and is a whollyowned subsidiary of OSI Group, LLC. During the Conspiracy Period, Amick-OSI Broilers, LLC, 

its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through 

owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States

100. Defendant Amick-OSI Processing, LLC is a privately held Delaware limited liability 

company with its corporate headquarters in Batesburg-Leesville, South Carolina, and is a whollyowned subsidiary of OSI Group, LLC. During the Conspiracy Period, Amick-OSI Processing, 

LLC, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or 

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through owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States

101. Defendants Amick Farms, LLC, The Amick Company, Amick-OSI Broilers, LLC, 

and Amick-OSI Processing, LLC are collectively referred to as “Amick.” During the Conspiracy 

Period, Amick, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, 

directly or through its owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United 

States.

102. Amick reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about its 

breeder flocks, hatchery capacity, and processing complexes. 

(xix) Case Foods

103. Case Foods, Inc. is a privately held Delaware corporation with its corporate 

headquarters in Troutman, North Carolina. During the Conspiracy Period, Case Foods, Inc., its 

predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through its 

owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

104. Case Farms, LLC is a privately held Delaware limited liability company with its 

corporate headquarters in Troutman, North Carolina, and with facilities and operations in Ohio and 

North Carolina. Case Farms, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Case Foods, Inc. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Case Farms, LLC, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold Broilers in 

interstate commerce, directly or through its owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to 

purchasers in the United States. 

105. Case Farms Processing, Inc. is a privately held North Carolina corporation with its 

corporate headquarters in Troutman, North Carolina, and with facilities and operations in North 

Carolina. Case Farms Processing, Inc. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Case Foods, Inc. During 

the Conspiracy Period, Case Farms Processing, Inc., its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold 

Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through its owned or controlled subsidiaries and 

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affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

106. Producer Co-Conspirators Case Foods, Inc., Case Farms, LLC, and Case Farms 

Processing, Inc. are collectively referred to as “Case Foods.” During the Conspiracy Period, Case 

Foods, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or 

through its owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

107. Case Foods reported a wide variety of data to Agri Stats, including information about 

its breeder flocks, hatchery capacity, and processing complexes. 

(xx) Agri Stats

108. Defendant Agri Stats, Inc. is an Indiana corporation headquartered in Fort Wayne, 

Indiana. Agri Stats is a subsidiary of Eli Lilly & Co., a publicly-held Indiana corporation 

headquartered in Indianapolis.

109. Agri Stats knowingly played an important and active role in Defendants’ collusive 

scheme. Agri Stats used the instrumentalities of interstate commerce to facilitate the Conspiracy, 

and its conduct was within the flow of, was intended to, and did have, a substantial effect on the 

interstate commerce of the United States, including in this District.

110. Agri Stats profited by its participation in the Conspiracy through its receipt of 

payments from Defendants of a share of the revenues earned from artificially supracompetitive 

prices charged for Broilers as a result of the Conspiracy. This resulted in Agri Stats collecting 

hundreds of thousands of dollars annually from Defendants.

111. In 2008 and 2010—two key periods in the Conspiracy—a representative from Agri 

Stats was elected to the board of the National Chicken Council, one of the industry’s most important

trade associations. 

112. Several Defendants, including Wayne Farms and Pilgrim’s Pride, hired former Agri 

Stats executives to work in senior sales positions, and Agri Stats employs or has employed several 

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former executives of Defendants.

III. CO-CONSPIRATORS

113. Various companies not named as Defendants also performed acts and made 

statements in furtherance of the Conspiracy. These co-conspirators who are not named as 

Defendants include the following: 

A. Producer Co-Conspirator Allen Harim

114. Harim USA, Ltd. is a privately held Delaware corporation with its corporate 

headquarters in Seaford, Delaware. 

115. Allen Harim Foods, LLC is a privately held Delaware limited liability company with 

its corporate headquarters in Seaford, Delaware, and with facilities and operations in Delaware, 

Maryland and North Carolina. Allen Harim Foods, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Harim 

USA, Ltd. 

116. Allen Harim Farms, LLC is a privately held Delaware limited liability company with 

its corporate headquarters in Seaford, Delaware, and with facilities and operations in Delaware, 

Maryland and North Carolina. Allen Harim Farms, LLC is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Harim 

USA, Ltd. 

117. Producer Co-Conspirators Harim USA, Ltd., Allen Harim Foods, LLC, and Allen 

Harim Farms, LLC are collectively referred to as “Allen Harim.” During the Conspiracy Period, 

Allen Harim, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, 

directly or through its owned or controlled subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United 

States.

B. Producer Co-Conspirator Keystone Foods

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118. Keystone Foods LLC is a subsidiary of Marfrig Alimentos, S.A., a Brazilian 

company. On November 30, 2018, Defendant Tyson Foods, Inc. announced it had completed its 

acquisition of Keystone Foods LLC from Marfrig. 

119. Keystone Foods Corporation was (now consolidated) a subsidiary of Keystone 

Foods, LLC and Marfrig Alimentos, S.A., a Brazilian company. 

120. Equity Group Eufala Division, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Bakerhill, Alabama and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Keystone Foods, LLC. 

121. Equity Group Kentucky Division LLC, formerly known as Cagle’s-Keystone Foods, 

L.L.C., is a Delaware limited liability company with its headquarters in Franklin, Kentucky and is a 

wholly-owned subsidiary of Grow-Out Holdings, LLC. 

122. Equity Group – Georgia Division LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with 

its headquarters in Camilla, Georgia and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Keystone Foods, LLC. 

123. Keystone Foods, LLC, Keystone Foods Corporation, Equity Group Eufala Division, 

LLC, Equity Group Kentucky Division LLC, and Equity Group – Georgia Division LLC are 

collectively referred to as “Keystone Foods.” 

124. During the Conspiracy Period, Keystone Foods, its predecessors, subsidiaries, or 

affiliates sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through its owned or controlled 

subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

125. Keystone Foods, Allen Harim, and the subsidiaries and affiliates identified above, 

are referred to collectively as the “Producer Co-Conspirators.”

C. The Defendant Family Co-Conspirators

126. Various subsidiaries and related entities of the Defendant families named herein 

actively participated in the Conspiracy and therefore are co-conspirators, including the following:

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(i) Koch

127. JCG Industries, Inc., is an Illinois corporation with its headquarters in Chicago, 

Illinois, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

128. JCG Properties, L.L.C. is an Illinois limited liability company with its headquarters 

in Chicago, Illinois, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

129. JCG Land Holdings, LLC is an Illinois limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Park Ridge, Illinois, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

130. JCG Foods LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its headquarters in 

Park Ridge, Illinois, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

131. Koch Foods of Cumming LLC, formerly known as Greko, L.L.C., is a Georgia 

limited liability company with its headquarters in Cumming, Georgia, and is a wholly-owned 

subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

132. Koch Foods of Gainesville LLC, formerly known as Gress Foods LLC, is a Georgia 

limited liability company with its headquarters in Gainesville, Georgia, and is a wholly-owned 

subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

133. JCG Farms of Georgia LLC is a Georgia limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Park Ridge, Illinois, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

134. Koch Foods of Mississippi LLC is a Mississippi limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Morton, Mississippi, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

135. Koch Farms of Mississippi LLC is a Mississippi limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Morton, Mississippi, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

136. Koch Freezers LLC is a Mississippi limited liability company with its headquarters 

in Morton, Mississippi, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

137. Koch Properties of Mississippi LLC was (presently dissolved) a Mississippi limited 

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liability company with its headquarters in Morton, Mississippi, and was a wholly-owned subsidiary 

of Koch Foods, Inc. 

138. Koch Foods of Alabama LLC is an Alabama limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Montgomery, Alabama, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

139. JCG Farms of Alabama LLC is an Alabama limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Park Ridge, Illinois, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

140. Koch Foods of Ashland LLC is an Alabama limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Montgomery, Alabama, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc.

141. Koch Farms of Ashland LLC is an Alabama limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Montgomery, Alabama, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

142. Koch Farms of Gadsden LLC is an Alabama limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Montgomery, Alabama, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc. 

143. Koch Foods of Gadsden LLC is an Alabama limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Montgomery, Alabama, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc.

144. Koch Foods of Cincinnati LLC, f/k/a Preferred Foods, LLC, is an Ohio limited 

liability company with its headquarters in Fairfield, Ohio, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 

Koch Foods, Inc. 

145. Koch Foods LLC, operating under the assumed names Koch Foods of Chattanooga 

and Koch Foods of Morristown, is a Tennessee limited liability company with its headquarters in 

Chattanooga, Tennessee, and is a wholly- owned subsidiary of Koch Foods, Inc.

(ii) Tyson

146. Tyson Sales and Distribution, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in 

Springdale, Arkansas, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tyson Foods, Inc. 

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(iii) Perdue

147. Perdue Foods, Inc. (now dissolved) was a Maryland corporation with its 

headquarters in Salisbury, Maryland, and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Perdue Farms Inc. 

148. Harvestland Holdings, LLC was a Maryland limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Salisbury, Maryland and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Perdue Farms Inc.

149. Perdue Food Products, Inc. was a Maryland limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Salisbury, Maryland and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Perdue Farms Inc. 

150. Perdue Farms Incorporated (now merged with Perdue Farms LLC) was a Maryland 

limited liability company with its headquarters in Salisbury, Maryland and a wholly-owned 

subsidiary of Defendant Perdue Farms Inc. 

(iv) Wayne Farms

151. WFSP Foods, LLC is a Georgia limited liability company with its headquarters in 

Decatur, Alabama, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Wayne Farms. 

(v) George’s

152. George’s Chicken, LLC is a Virginia limited liability company with its headquarters 

in Edinburg, Virginia, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant George’s, Inc. 

153. George’s Family Farms, LLC is a Virginia limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Edinburg, Virginia and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant George’s, Inc. 

154. George’s Foods, LLC is a Virginia limited liability company with its headquarters in 

Edinburg, Virginia, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant George’s, Inc. 

155. George’s of Missouri, Inc. is a Missouri corporation with its headquarters in 

Springdale, Arkansas, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant George’s, Inc. 

156. George’s Processing, Inc. is an Arkansas corporation with its headquarters in 

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Springdale, Arkansas, and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant George’s, Inc. 

(vi) Peco Foods

157. Peco Farms of Mississippi, LLC is a Mississippi limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Jackson, Mississippi and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Peco Foods, 

Inc. 

(vii) Pilgrim’s Pride

158. PFS Distribution Company is a Delaware company with its headquarters in 

Arlington, Texas and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation. 

159. Merit Provisions, LLC is a Texas limited liability company with its headquarters in 

Dallas, Texas and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation. 

160. GC Properties, LLC is a Georgia limited liability company with its headquarters in 

Powder Springs, Georgia and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Pilgrim’s Pride 

Corporation. 

161. Pilgrim’s Pride of Nevada, Inc. is a Nevada corporation with its headquarters in 

Greeley, Colorado and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation. 

162. PPC Marketing, Ltd. is a Texas company with its headquarters in Pittsburg, Texas 

and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation. 

163. Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation of West Virginia, Inc. is a West Virginia corporation 

with its headquarters in Greeley, Colorado and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Pilgrim’s 

Pride Corporation. 

(viii) Foster Farms

164. Napoleon Poultry Supply LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Livingston, California and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Foster 

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Farms, LLC. 

(ix) O.K. Foods

165. O.K. Broiler Farms Limited Partnership was (presently dissolved) an Arkansas 

limited partnership with its headquarters in Fort Smith, Arkansas and is a wholly-owned subsidiary 

of Defendant O.K. Foods, Inc. 

(x) Raeford

166. House of Raeford Farms of Louisiana, L.L.C. is a Louisiana limited liability 

company with its headquarters in Shreveport, Louisiana and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 

Defendant House of Raeford Farms, Inc. 

167. Johnson Breeders, Inc. is a North Carolina corporation with its headquarters in Rose 

Hill, North Carolina and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant House of Raeford Farms, Inc. 

168. Columbia Farms of Georgia, Inc. is a South Carolina corporation with its 

headquarters in Batesburgh-Leesville, South Carolina and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 

Defendant House of Raeford Farms, Inc. 

169. Raeford Farms of Louisiana, L.L.C. is a Louisiana limited liability company with its 

headquarters in Arcadia, Louisiana and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant House of 

Raeford Farms, Inc. 

170. Columbia Farms, Inc. is a South Carolina corporation with its headquarters in 

Columbia, South Carolina and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant House of Raeford Farms, 

Inc. 

171. During the Conspiracy Period, each of the Defendant family co-conspirators 

identified above sold Broilers in interstate commerce, directly or through its owned or controlled 

subsidiaries and affiliates, to purchasers in the United States.

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172. Various other persons, firms, and corporations not named as defendants have 

performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the Conspiracy. Defendants are jointly and 

severally liable for the acts of their co-conspirators whether or not named as defendants in this 

Complaint. Throughout this Complaint, the Producer Co-Conspirators, the Defendant family coconspirators identified above, and the other persons, firms, and corporations not named as 

defendants that performed acts and made statements in furtherance of the Conspiracy are 

collectively referred to as “Co-Conspirators.”

173. Whenever reference is made to any act of any corporation, the allegation means that 

the corporation engaged in the act by or through its officers, directors, agents, employees, or 

representatives while they were actively engaged in the management, direction, control or 

transaction of the corporation’s business or affairs.

174. Each of the Defendants acted as the agent of or joint-venturer for the other 

Defendants with respect to the acts, violations and common course of conduct alleged herein.

175. Defendants are also liable for acts done in furtherance of the alleged Conspiracy by 

companies they acquired through mergers or acquisitions.

IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

176. Boston Market brings this action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, 

and the state antitrust and consumer protection laws of the states listed herein to recover damages, 

including treble damages, costs of suit, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, arising from Defendants’ 

Conspiracy to restrain trade.

177. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1331, 1337(a). The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Boston Market’s state law claims 

listed herein under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because they arise from the same nucleus of operative facts 

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alleged in this Complaint. Boston Market’s state law claims are so related to its claims under 

Section 1 of the Sherman Act that they form part of the same case or controversy.

178. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Illinois under 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a), 22, and 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) because: (i) Defendants resided, transacted business, were found, or had 

agents in this District during the Conspiracy Period, (ii) a substantial portion of the events giving 

rise to Boston Market’s claim occurred in this District, or (iii) a substantial portion of Defendants’ 

alleged wrongful conduct affecting interstate trade and commerce during the Conspiracy Period was 

carried out in this District. 

179. This Court has jurisdiction over each Defendant named in this action, as Defendants 

transact business in the state of Illinois. Further, Defendants have substantial contacts in Illinois 

and engaged in a Conspiracy that was directed at and had a direct, foreseeable, and intended effect 

of causing injury to the business of persons and entities residing in, located in, or doing business in 

Illinois. 

V. TRADE AND COMMERCE

180. During the Conspiracy Period, Defendants collectively controlled the market for 

Broilers in the United States. 

181. The activities of Defendants and their co-conspirators, as described herein, were 

within the flow of, were intended to, and did have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 

effect on United States trade or commerce, including intrastate commerce, as well as on Boston 

Market’s operations in the states including Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida, 

Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New 

York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia and Wisconsin. 

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182. Each Defendant, or one or more of its affiliates, used the instrumentalities of 

interstate commerce to join or effectuate their Conspiracy. Specifically, during the Conspiracy 

Period, each Defendant, directly, or through one or more of its parents, affiliates, subsidiaries, or 

business units, knowingly and intentionally produced, shipped, and sold or delivered Broilers to 

United States purchasers, including Boston Market, in a continuous and uninterrupted flow of 

interstate commerce, including through and into this District.

183. Defendants’ Conspiracy directly and substantially affected the price of Broilers 

purchased by Boston Market during the Conspiracy Period. Such conduct was meant to produce 

and did in fact produce a substantial harmful effect on interstate commerce in the form of artificially 

high prices paid for Broilers by customers, including Boston Market, during the Conspiracy Period. 

184. Defendants’ Conspiracy proximately caused antitrust injury to Boston Market in the 

form of the supracompetitive prices it paid for Broilers during the Conspiracy Period, and gives rise 

to Boston Market’s antitrust claims.

VI. OVERVIEW OF THE BROILER INDUSTRY

A. Broilers are a Commodity

185. According to a 2012 report by Focus Management Group, Broilers are “a commodity

product with little or no product differentiation based on the processors.” Defendants acknowledge 

that Broilers are a commodity. For instance, Pilgrim’s Pride CEO commented in February 2014 

that “the chicken business per se is a commodity business.” 

186. The commoditized nature of Broilers is evidenced by the fact that numerous 

Defendants purchased Broilers from each other to absorb excess supply in the market during the 

Conspiracy Period, and in turn, further their Conspiracy.

187. There is a lack of differentiation among Broiler suppliers because virtually all 

suppliers sell USDA Grade A chicken. As a result of the lack of product differentiation, Defendants 

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were forced to compete on price (absent collusion) such that the supply decisions of each Broiler 

producer impacted the market price for Broilers. 

188. While an individual producer often has the incentive to increase production to 

maximize profits, any increased production will ultimately reduce the profitability of the industry as 

a whole. Thus, the commoditized nature of Broilers facilitates the implementation of a price-fixing 

scheme and provides industry players with the incentive to agree to reduce overall supply.

B. The United States Broiler Market is a National Market Worth Tens of 

Billions of Dollars Annually.

189. According to the U.S. Poultry & Egg Association, the value of wholesale U.S. 

Broilers produced in 2014 was $32.7 billion, up 6 percent from 2013. The market value varied

between $21.8 and $30.7 billion from 2008-2013.

190. About 50-70% of Broilers are sold under contract with a customer, about 10-20% are 

sold on the spot market, and roughly 17-20% are exported.

191. Exports of Broilers from the United States account for approximately 45% of all

United States meat exports. Broilers produced in the U.S. are exported to well over 100 different

countries, with the major export markets including Mexico, Canada, Hong Kong, and China. Some

of the exports from the United States include products less desirable to United States consumers, 

such as chicken feet or dark meat, but exports also increasingly include white meats and other 

products widely consumed in the United States.

192. While this Complaint does not seek damages for Broilers sold into export commerce, 

Broilers exported from the United States decrease available supply and increase Broiler prices in the 

United States. Therefore, exports by Defendants were an important mechanism used by Defendants 

to effectuate their United States-based Broiler market conspiracy.

C. Defendants Control the Highly Concentrated Broiler Industry

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193. During the Conspiracy Period, Defendants collectively controlled nearly 90% of the 

single national market for Broilers in the United States. The Broiler industry was almost entirely 

vertically integrated, with producers owning, or tightly controlling, each of the six stages of the 

supply chain: breeding, hatching, chick-rearing and feeding, slaughtering mature birds, processing, 

and selling of Broilers.

194. At the top of the supply chain are Defendants’ “breeder flocks,” which include the 

hens that lay the eggs that, when hatched, become Broilers.

195. Once Defendants’ Broilers reach maturity, they are processed. Per the USDA, 

“processing is the term used by the poultry industry to describe the conversion of live poultry into 

raw poultry products fit for human consumption.” 

196. While some Broilers are sold without any further processing, some Broilers are then 

sometimes sent to affiliated companies for further processing, which, per the U.S. Poultry & Egg 

Association, is where “[t]he whole carcass or cut-up and deboned pieces are further processed for 

added value,” (i.e., pre-marinated chicken). Defendants’ Conspiracy involved both pure chicken 

and value-added products. 

197. In 2010, agriculture economist Dr. Michael Dicks observed that vertical integration 

in the U.S. poultry industry incentivizes producers of Broilers to implement supply restrictions, 

stating “vertical coordination allows integrators to manage excess capacity to manage price . . . . 

Because of the inelastic nature of the supply and demand a reduction in supply will produce an 

outcome more preferable to the industry than maintaining supply with a lower price.”

198. There were high barriers to entry into the market for Broilers. A new entrant into the 

market would face significant start-up costs, including multi-million dollar costs associated with 

research and development, construction of processing complexes, feed mills, hatcheries, equipment, 

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energy, transportation distribution infrastructure, skilled labor, experienced management, a skilled 

contract-farmer base in a specific geographic area, long-standing customer relationships, safety and 

quality assurance, and regulatory approvals for environmental, worker safety, and food safety 

issues. 

199. Prices for Broilers sold in the United States were quoted in “whole bird” or 

disassembled parts, with adjustments for transportation, product form (i.e., degree of processing or 

added value), and packaging at the time of sale.

200. Defendants sell both small and large Broilers. Small Birds (generally 4.25 pounds or 

less) are purchased primarily by restaurants like Boston Market that require quality and taste 

standardization for menu items across multiple locations. Birds larger than 4.25 pounds, by 

contrast, generally are sold in tray pack or bagged form for sale in the retail and grocery channel.

D. Top Broiler Industry Executives Are the Subject of a Criminal Antitrust 

Indictment

201. On June 3, 2020, the Department of Justice indicted Jayson Penn, President and CEO 

of Pilgrim’s Pride, Mikell Fries, President of Claxton, Scott Brady, Vice President of Claxton, and 

Roger Austin Vice President of Pilgrim’s Pride (the “Criminal Defendants”), in the District of 

Colorado. The Indictment charges the Criminal Defendants with conspiring “to suppress and 

eliminate competition by rigging bids and fixing prices and other price-related terms for broiler 

chicken products sold in the United States” in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 

202. Specifically, the Indictment alleges that from at least 2012 through at least 2017, the 

Criminal Defendants and at least seven broiler chicken suppliers conspired:

a) to reach agreements and understandings to submit aligned, though not necessarily 

identical, bids and to offer aligned, though not necessarily identical, prices, and 

3 United States of America v. Jayson Jeffrey Penn et al., Crim. Action No. 20-cr-00152-PAB (D. 

Col. June 2, 2020) [D.E. 1].

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price-related terms, including discount levels, for broiler chicken products sold in the 

United States;

b) to participate in conversations and communications relating to nonpublic information 

such as bids, prices, and price-related terms, including discount levels, for broiler 

chicken products sold in the United States with the shared understanding that the 

purpose of the conversations and communications was to rig bids, and to fix, 

maintain, stabilize, and raise prices and other price-related terms, including discount 

levels, for broiler chicken products sold in the United States; and

c) to monitor bids submitted by, and prices and price-related terms, including discount 

levels, offered by, Suppliers and co-conspirators for broiler chicken products sold in 

the United States.

203. The Indictment expressly identified as victims of the Criminal Defendants’ 

conspiracy “[r]estaurants, grocery retailers and others who purchased large volumes of broiler 

chicken” who “received bids from or negotiated prices or other price-related terms, including 

discount levels, with Suppliers directly.” 

204. Some of these victims, like Boston Market, purchased Broilers using a “cost-plus” 

pricing model “that varied month-to-month or period-to-period depending on the price of chicken 

feed and that also provided Suppliers with a per-pound margin and an ‘adjustment’ that was 

effectively an addition per-pound margin.” Still other victims purchased chicken products “tied to a 

market index, such as the Urner-Barry Index.”

205. The Indictment sets forth a series of communications between Defendant 

competitors—via phone, email and text messages—sharing and coordinating confidential bidding 

and pricing information in connection with multiple restaurant and grocer victims’ requests for bids. 

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E. The Broiler Industry Was Previously Subject to Antitrust Litigation 

206. In 1973, the United States Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust action against 

the National Broiler Marketing Association (“NBMA”) alleging the NBMA and its members 

conspired to fix prices and restrict the production of Broilers in violation of United States antitrust 

laws. That conspiracy involved a conference call program where NBMA members (and even some 

non-members) coordinated the pricing and production of Broilers. In response, numerous private 

civil antitrust actions were filed against NBMA and 42 individual defendants in the In re Chicken 

Antitrust Litigation case. The NBMA and the other Broiler producer defendants eventually settled 

the case for approximately $30 million.

207. More recently, several cases brought by contract-farmers against integrated Broiler 

producers have alleged violations of the Packers and Stockyards Act, including Adams v. Pilgrim’s 

Pride, No. 2:09-cv-00397 (E.D. Tex.), Been v. O.K. Industries, No. 08-7078 (E.D. Okla.), and 

Wheeler v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., No. 5:06-cv-00004 (E.D. Tex.). These cases also suggest an 

absence of true competition among Defendants in the Broiler industry. 

VII. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ CONSPIRACY

A. The Small Bird Price-Fixing and Bid Rigging Conspiracy

208. In addition to servicing domestic retail grocery channels and export markets, 

Defendants devote a substantial portion of their business to producing and selling branded chicken 

product for multi-unit restaurants like Boston Market. Defendants’ generally refer to their 

operations that supply Broilers to restaurants as “food service,” “fast food,” “QSR,” “fast casual” or 

“national accounts.” 

209. Beginning at least as early as 2012 and continuing at least into 2017, Defendants 

engaged in a conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids submitted for Small Bird Broilers sold to 

restaurants, including Boston Market, with the intent to artificially inflate the prices paid by Boston 

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Market and others for Small Bird Broilers.

210. Restaurants like Boston Market purchase Small Bird Broilers for a variety of 

reasons. First, there is a perception that Small Birds are more flavorful. Also, Defendants sell 

Broiler products by the pound. To remain competitive in the quick-service and fast-casual food 

sectors where customers expect value pricing, restaurants generally purchase smaller-sized birds 

and parts to reduce costs. 

211. Additionally, many restaurants offer chicken sandwich options and thus prefer 

smaller-sized breast meat that fits on a bun or piece of bread. Using larger breast meat often 

requires trimming, which leads to labor inefficiencies and product waste. Moreover, consistent 

weight limits are critical to ensuring that meat is properly cooked at the individual restaurants 

according to standardized food preparation guidelines provided to restaurant staff.

212. Restaurants like Boston Market serve their proprietary chicken products in multiple 

locations throughout the country. To ensure consistency in taste and quality of their products across 

hundreds of locations spanning multiple states, Boston Market, like many restaurants, negotiates

and contracts directly with Defendants for the production and supply of their proprietary chicken 

according to Boston Market’s unique recipes and specifications. 

213. Boston Market provides Defendants with instructions regarding each step of the 

preparation and packaging process for its chicken products, including the recipe for Boston 

Market’s marinade injection, and specific requirements for packaging and labeling Boston Market 

products.

214. It is precisely because the Small Bird Broilers that Defendants manufacture and sell 

to their restaurant customers are proprietary and unique to their customers’ brands that Defendants 

negotiate and contract directly with restaurants like Boston Market to supply their chicken products.

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215. The contracts between Boston Market and Defendants identify Boston Market as the 

purchaser or customer, and set forth the agreed formula pricing (as represented by Defendants) and 

the volume of proprietary chicken products to be sold to Boston Market. 

216. The contracts between Boston Market and Defendants further specify that Boston 

Market is responsible for all amounts due and owing to Defendants for proprietary Boston Market 

products. The agreements also state that should the agreement end, Boston Market must purchase 

all inventory of finished proprietary items and true up feed expenses purchased at Boston Market’s 

direction. These provisions are put in place because the proprietary product Defendants produce 

and sell to Boston Market cannot be sold to any other customer.

217. As part of its procurement process, Boston Market, like many restaurants, requests 

proposals or bids from Defendants for the volume of chicken needed to support Boston Market’s 

restaurant system. Boston Market received bids from Defendants throughout the Conspiracy 

Period. Defendants represented to Boston Market that the bids Defendants submitted to Boston 

Market were based on a pricing formula that purported to take into account various costs, such as 

Defendants’ production expenses (including a feed cost formula based on current corn and soymeal 

prices), plant costs, overhead, and a per-pound margin.

218. The formula pricing model Boston Market received from Defendants was updated 

quarterly, and in some cases monthly, to adjust for feed costs and margins. 

219. Boston Market expected Defendants to engage in a competitive bidding process, 

which when complete, would allow Boston Market to award its contracts to the most competitive 

bidder(s). Defendants, however, recognized that the Small Bird Broiler restaurant market offered 

an additional opportunity to effectuate their Conspiracy.

220. Beginning at least as early as 2012, Defendants participated in a scheme to fix prices 

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and rig bids to Boston Market and other restaurants. Indeed, between 2014 and 2017 alone, 

Defendants increased Boston Market’s prices for Small Bird Broilers across the board in excess of 

15 percent. This occurred notwithstanding the historic drop in corn and soybean prices during the 

same period, which constitute 50 – 70% of Broiler input costs. And, as discussed below, these price 

increases also occurred at the same time that Small Bird wholesale prices were decreasing 

significantly. The price-fixing and bid-rigging scheme for Small Bird Broilers continued at least 

into 2017.

221. Defendants’ Small Bird price-fixing and bid-rigging Conspiracy took multiple forms. 

At its most basic level, Defendants exchanged confidential information with each other regarding 

the bids they were submitting, or intended to submit, to specific identified restaurant customers like 

Boston Market, so that all supposedly competitive bids were aligned. In fact, during this period, bid 

prices submitted to Boston Market by Defendants often were so similar that there was no effective 

price differential among the bids. 

222. Defendants coordinated bids resulted in a dramatic increase in Small Bird Broiler 

prices to restaurants like Boston Market starting in 2012. This Small Bird price increase occurred 

even though, according to published industry reports, the number of Small Birds killed increased 

significantly in 2012 and remained elevated throughout the remainder of the Small Bird Conspiracy 

Period. This was true, moreover, notwithstanding the supply restriction discussed below that 

Defendants orchestrated generally for Broilers in the 2011-2012 timeframe.

223. Defendants were able to justify their price increases to restaurant customers like 

Boston Market through their messaging concerning the supply of Small Bird Broilers. In some 

instances Defendants threatened to shift production of plants from small birds to larger sized birds 

claiming profitability concerns, and in other instances Defendants simply misrepresented the 

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amount of their and the industry’s small bird production. Through these coordinated 

misrepresentations, Defendants were able to persuade restaurant chains like Boston Market to 

accept higher prices.

224. For example, when Boston Market inquired about the dramatic price increases that 

Defendants uniformly incorporated in their 2014 bids to Boston Market—and when Defendants 

maintained these same increases at least until 2017—each of the Defendants that submitted bids to 

Boston Market gave the exact same explanation: that the price increases were attributable to a 

shortage of Small Bird Broilers resulting from a supposed reduction of small bird production across 

the industry. 

225. Defendants also pointed their customers to the concomitant increase in Georgia Dock 

prices—that Defendants themselves manipulated and artificially inflated—as further justification 

for the Small Bird bid increases. Defendants independently could not have provided Boston Market 

with the same false explanation for price increases without coordinating prior to submitting bids to 

Boston Market. 

226. Defendants’ explanation for the 2014 price increases as purportedly due to a 

reduction of Small Bird production was false. According to published industry reports, the 

production of Small Birds in the second half of 2014 actually increased when compared to the first 

half of 2014. And, the production of small birds continued to increase during 2015 and 2016.

227. In fact, consistent with the increased production of small birds during the 2014-

2017 period, the wholesale prices of small birds progressively decreased beginning in the second 

half of 2014 and continuing through the first half of 2016. The following graph comparing the 

Urner Barry wholesale price index of small birds with the USDA National Composite price index 

shows this price decrease. Significantly, however, as discussed below, these wholesale prices 

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indices did not reflect prices that suppliers charged restaurant customers like Boston Market.

228. Defendants’ coordinated explanation to Boston Market and other restaurant chains of 

their price increases of Small Bird Broilers was part of their collusion to fix prices and rig bids to 

restaurant chains, including Boston Market, during the Small Bird Conspiracy Period. 

229. Then, in 2017—after the reports of the Georgia Dock conspiracy were made public 

and after the first class action complaints were filed in the Broiler Chicken case—the supposed 

shortage of Small Bird Broilers suddenly disappeared. Uniformly, Defendants’ bids to Boston 

Market dramatically reduced, although not quite to the level before the beginning of the Small Bird 

Conspiracy. Yet the actual production of both live and processed pounds of small birds during this 

period actually declined from their amounts in 2016. 

230. As a result of the Small Bird Conspiracy, Boston Market was injured in its business 

or property by paying more for Broilers than it would have paid in the absence of the Conspiracy.

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B. Defendants’ Conspiracy to Restrict the Supply of Broilers

231. Defendants’ Conspiracy also amounted to a modernized version of the antitrust 

conspiracy perpetrated in the chicken industry during the 1970s. 

232. The modern-day version of Defendants’ Conspiracy was instigated by an attempt by 

Pilgrim’s Pride and Tyson in 2007 to raise industry prices by cutting their production levels. 

Despite their combined 40% market share, Pilgrim’s Pride’s and Tyson’s 2007 production cuts were 

not enough to increase prices. 

233. As a result, in January 2008 Pilgrim’s Pride and Tyson changed tactics. Realizing 

that their actions alone were not enough, they sought broader cooperation to increase Broiler prices. 

In January 2008, both Pilgrim’s Pride and Tyson stated to the Broiler industry that the companies 

would not continue to cut production. A few days after attending an industry event in late January 

2008, however, Tyson’s CEO announced that Tyson had “no choice [but] to raise prices 

substantially.” And, only a day later, a Pilgrim’s Pride executive announced publicly that Pilgrim’s 

Pride would be cutting its production and “the rest [] of the market is going to have to pickup a fair 

share in order for the production to come out of the system.”

234. The other Defendants joined Pilgrim’s Pride and Tyson’s plan, making substantial 

cuts to their own production.

235. Defendants then went even further. Historically, when faced with low market prices, 

Defendants relied primarily on short-term production cuts at the middle or end of the supply chain, 

such as reducing eggs placements, killing newly-hatched chicks, or idling processing plants. These 

mechanisms allowed Defendants to increase production within weeks if prices for Broilers 

subsequently rose.

236. Here, Defendants purposefully inhibited their ability to ramp up production for 18 

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months or more by destroying breeder hens in their breeder flocks responsible for supplying the 

eggs Defendants raise into Broilers. This destruction of the breeder flocks was unprecedented and 

the consequences reverberated in the Broiler industry. 

237. Through press releases, earnings and investor calls and at investment bank 

conferences, events hosted by Agri Stats, and trade association meetings attended by many of their 

senior-most executives, Defendants preached that oversupply was decimating industry profits, and 

increased supply-side “discipline” was needed to halt the downward trajectory of prices for 

Broilers.

238. Nearly all Defendants were members of the following Broiler industry trade 

associations: National Chicken Council, United States Poultry & Egg Export Council, U.S. Poultry 

& Egg Association, Georgia Poultry Federation, North Carolina Poultry Federation, and Poultry 

Federation (representing Broiler producers in Arkansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma). Participation in 

these trade associations—regularly by Defendants’ top level executives—provided Defendants with 

opportunities to share information and coordinate the Conspiracy.

239. Defendants’ senior executives participated in numerous investor conferences each 

year, providing further opportunities to meet and communicate with one another. Such conferences

included the Goldman Sachs Global Staples Forum, Bank of America Merrill Lynch Global 

Agriculture Conference, BMO Capital Markets Annual Ag & Protein Conference, BMO Capital 

Markets Conference, BMO Farm to Market Conference, Urner Barry Annual Executive Conference 

and Marketing Seminar, and JP Morgan Basic Materials Conference.

240. Defendants also toured competitors’ Broiler complexes, which allowed Defendants 

to obtain confidential business methods employed by their competitors. While such tours were 

often framed as “best practices” information exchanges, they also provided Defendants’ senior 

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executives the opportunity to conspire.

241. In January 2008, Defendants attended the International Poultry Expo conference in 

Atlanta. Over 99.4% of major Broiler producers participated in the conference, including numerous 

Defendants, their employees, and some of Defendants’ senior executives.

242. A few days after attending the conference, both Pilgrim’s Pride and Tyson stated to 

the Broiler industry that the companies would not continue to cut production. Tyson’s CEO Dick 

Bond announced Tyson would be raising prices because “we have no choice [but] to raise prices 

substantially.” Bond’s comment does not make sense absent an intention (or knowledge) on his 

part that Defendants would coordinate an industry-wide reduction in supply, as the commodity 

nature of Broilers does not allow one producer to successfully raise market prices in the absence of 

widespread reductions in supply relative to the then-current demand.

243. The next day, Pilgrim’s Pride executive Rick Cogdill stated publicly on an earnings 

call that Pilgrim’s Pride had done its part in 2007 by reducing production 5% so “the rest [] of the 

market is going to have to pick-up a fair share in order for the production to come out of the 

system.” Cogdill explained that Pilgrim’s Pride alone could not reduce supply enough to help 

market prices recover, and that its past efforts to reduce supply had merely led to smaller players 

increasing their market share at Pilgrim’s Pride expense.

244. During the earnings call Cogdill also urged competitors to do their part in reducing 

Broiler industry supply, stating “[A]ctions are going to have to be taken one way or the other 

through the industry to pass along these costs . . . [W]e’ve got to make sure that we get the supply in 

line with demand at an acceptable price, not just in line with what the customer wants to buy at a 

cheap price.”

245. On a January 31, 2008 earnings call, Sanderson Farms CEO Joe Sanderson explained 

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that he anticipated the industry would cut production. Specifically, Mr. Sanderson predicted that a 

production cut was “probable” and “if it’s bad and ugly and deep in February, March and April, 

you’ll see the production cuts take place during that period of time. There’s still 25% of the 

industry still making money but I would expect to see those reductions come over the next 90 to 

120 days.”

246. In March 2008, senior executives from Defendants, including Pilgrim’s Pride’s 

newly-installed CEO, Clint Rivers, Tyson Senior Vice President Donnie Smith, Fieldale’s President 

Thomas Hensley, Amick’s President and CEO Ben Harrison, and Case Foods CEO Tom Shelton, 

met at an Executive Committee meeting of the National Chicken Council’s Board of Directors in 

Washington, D.C.

247. Shortly after that meeting, Pilgrim’s Pride again urged other producers to cut overall 

industry supply. Pilgrim’s Pride proceeded with the production cuts. On March 12, 2008, Pilgrim’s 

Pride’s CEO publicly announced the closure of seven Broiler facilities in order to reduce industry 

oversupply, stating “we believe [these] actions . . . are absolutely necessary to help bring supply and 

demand into better balance . . . . That portion of the demand for our products that exists solely at 

pricing levels below the cost of production is no longer a demand that this industry can continue to 

supply.” 

248. Under competitive conditions, other Broiler producers would typically respond to 

Pilgrim’s Pride’s substantial supply cuts by increasing their production. However, the other 

Defendants joined Pilgrim’s Pride and Tyson’s production reduction Conspiracy. 

249. Following Pilgrim’s Pride’s announcement, a series of production cuts were publicly 

announced by other Defendants between April 3 and April 11, 2008, specifically:

a) On April 3, 2008, Fieldale publicly announced a 5% production cut stating 

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that “We’re hoping this cut puts supply and demand back into better balance.” As a 

privately-held company, there was no reason—other than signaling to fellow 

producers that it was following through on the Conspiracy—to disclose its 

production plans.

b) Simmons publicly announced in a press release a 6% reduction in production 

throughout its processing plants. 

c) Cagle’s Inc. (later acquired by Koch) announced in a press release a 4% 

reduction in processing of Broilers, noting that the cut “will reduce product being 

sold through less profitable commodity outlets.”

d) Wayne Farms, O.K. Foods, and Koch each announced 2-8% reductions in 

production. 

250. Here again, there was no reason—other than to signal to fellow producers that they 

were following through on the Conspiracy—for these companies to publicly disclose their 

respective production plans. 

251. Several other Broiler producers cut their production between April 1, 2008 and May 

15, 2008, but did not publicly announce their actions. For instance, in May 2008 at a BMO Capital 

Markets Agriculture & Protein Conference presentation, Sanderson Farms CEO Joe Sanderson 

stated—in the presence of several competitors including Pilgrim’s and Tyson—that he had observed 

“for the last 6 or 7 weeks . . . some companies in our industry announce cutbacks. . . I know some 

companies have cut back and have not announced.” Such knowledge of non-public production cuts 

by competitors is highly suggestive of communications among Broiler producers through secret 

direct communications using Agri Stats as a facilitator.

252. Beginning in April 2008, the weekly hatchery data started to show declines in egg 

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sets and chick placements, confirming that Defendants had begun executing their announced 

intentions to reduce the production of Broilers.

253. In May 2008, the Wall Street Journal noted that conditions in the industry were 

starting to change: “Three things are making analysts more optimistic: Companies are cutting 

production, weekly egg-set numbers are declining (egg sets are fertile eggs placed in incubators), 

and prices are responding positively to the thinning supply lines.” The article also noted “[i]t is 

unusual for egg sets to decline at this time of year.” 

254. Despite the large number of coordinated production cuts (both announced and 

unannounced) by producers in April 2008, Pilgrim’s Pride CEO, Clint Rivers, encouraged further 

action by the industry at a May 15, 2008, speech at the BMO Capital Markets. Rivers announced 

that he hoped to see the Broiler industry continue to cut production to help the industry return to 

profitability, stating “he would like the industry to trim total production by 3%-4%.” 

255. Defendants collectively began making unprecedented cuts at the top of the supply 

chain in the form of jointly and collusively reducing the supply of “breeder flocks” in the market. 

Defendants’ collective actions effectively eliminated their ability to meaningfully increase Broiler 

supply for 18 months or more by destroying breeder hens in their breeder flocks responsible for 

supplying the eggs Defendants raised into Broilers. 

256. This reduction of industry capacity—particularly at the breeder flock level, where 

such efforts would be most effective—was a mechanism to increase Defendants’ profits. 

Defendants’ efforts were supported by public statements made by their executives in which they 

expressed their respective commitment to production cuts. Moreover, many of Defendants’ 

executives’ called for a new era of “discipline” by making public statements that deeper production 

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cuts were an industry-wide imperative that would pay dividends for “the industry” as a whole.4

257. Defendants’ public statements on the need for, and benefits of, industry-wide supply 

“discipline” marked a significant departure from past industry practice. Notably, a leading industry 

publication commented in early 2009 that Broiler “production in the U.S. used to be just like 

government spending, it never went down and cutbacks only resulted in slowing the rate of growth, 

but not anymore.” Yet in 2008, for “the first time in decades, total Broiler production [] remained 

virtually unchanged from the year before.” 

258. In June 2008, during a media conference call involving numerous Broiler industry 

executives, Mark Hickman, Chairman of the National Chicken Council and CEO of Peco Foods, 

told participants that “the poultry industry is entering a second phase of production cutbacks, 

following a 1 percent to 2 percent cutback in production earlier this year.” Mr. Hickman explained 

that previous cutbacks of Broiler breeder flocks were insufficient, “so liquidation is in round two.” 

259. On June 23, 2008, shortly after Peco Foods’ CEO publicly suggested that further 

production cuts were needed, Wayne Farms announced a 6% production cut. Like many other 

executives, Wayne Farms President & CEO Elton Maddox cited ethanol subsidies as the reason for 

the production cuts. Wayne Farms’ announcement came only four days after Peco Foods CEO 

Hickman suggested further cuts were needed.

260. On July 2, 2008, Foster Farms announced it was abandoning plans to build a new 

Broiler plant in northeastern Colorado that it had just announced in April 2008 would employ about 

4 While spearheaded by the CEOs and senior personnel of Defendants Tyson and Pilgrim’s Pride, 

public discussion of industry conditions was not limited to the executives of larger, publicly-held 

Defendants. For example, Harrison CEO Mike Welch and Sanderson Farms COO Lampkin Butts 

participated as panelists at a symposium hosted by industry journal WATT PoultryUSA, where the 

discussion topics included industry consolidation, efficiency, and bird size, with references to 

information gleaned from Agri Stats (whose Vice President, Mike Donohue, was in the audience).

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1,000 people. Foster Farms’ CEO, Don Jackson, blamed increased grain and fuel prices as the 

reason for the company’s decision.

261. On July 7, 2008, O.K. Foods announced a 7.5% reduction in egg sets, citing “record 

high prices for corn and soybean meal, which it attributes to the U.S. government’s mandated 

ethanol policies along with recent flooding in the Midwest ‘Corn Belt’ region.”

262. On August 11, 2008, Pilgrim’s Pride announced the closure of its Clinton, Arkansas, 

processing plant and a facility in Bossier City, Louisiana. Pilgrim’s Pride’s press release noted the 

closures “are part of the company’s ongoing effort to operate more efficiently and return to 

profitability amid high feed costs and an oversupply of chicken on the market.” The closure of the 

Clinton processing plant represented an additional 1.25% incremental increase of the company’s 

previously announced production cuts. Pilgrim’s Pride stated that it would keep both plants idle 

until “industry margins can be sustained at more normalized levels of profitability.”

263. In August 2008, Raeford announced publicly, as reported by the Charlotte Observer 

newspaper, that it would begin reducing its Broiler production by 5%. The company said in a 

statement to industry publication WATT PoultryUSA that “[t]he current obstacles that face our 

industry require that supply be brought in line with demand.” A production cutback was 

remarkable for Raeford, which had pursued a strategy of aggressive production growth that resulted 

in the company doubling its Broiler production from 2001 to 2007.

264. On an August 26, 2008, earnings call, Sanderson Farms CEO Joe Sanderson stated 

that “[s]o long as this weakness continues, the poultry industry will need to cut production further 

until supply is in line with demand.” By September 2008, Broiler industry publication WATT

PoultryUSA reported that “[m]ost U.S. chicken integrators ha[d] announced plans to close small 

operations, consolidate complexes and further processing plants and to reduce output by 3 percent 

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to 5 percent to ‘maximize efficiency.’”

265. On October 10, 2008, in response to a USDA report of falling egg sets in the Broiler 

industry, Pilgrim’s Pride told the Associated Press that “[t]his is very positive news for the industry 

and may signal that the industry is taking a more rationalized approach to production heading into 

the fall.”

266. During the fall of 2008, Sanderson Farms also implemented its previously 

announced “fall cuts” a month early and delayed the opening of a new deboning facility.

267. On October 18, 2008, Wayne Farms President & CEO Elton Maddox released a 

statement announcing the closure of the company’s College Park, Georgia plant, resulting in the 

layoff of over 600 employees. Maddox cited “changing market conditions” and a need to 

“maximize efficiencies” as justification for the plant closure.

268. By December 23, 2008, it was reported that Tyson had cut its production by 5%. 

Tyson also noted that it had reduced production “in recent years through the closing or sale of 

poultry plants and by running the company’s remaining operations at reduced capacity utilization.”

269. In a February 18, 2009 interview, Tyson Senior Group Vice President Donnie Smith 

noted that “[a]cross our industry, we’re down about six percent versus where we were a year ago. 

We’re seeing an impact from that on market prices . . . the industry fundamentals are improving.”

270. Seeing further cuts from smaller producers in the industry led Pilgrim’s Pride to 

announce historically large cuts to its production in February 2009. In a press release, Pilgrim’s 

Pride announced the closure of three processing plants located in Douglas, Georgia, El Dorado, 

Arkansas, and Farmerville, Louisiana, which reduced the total pounds of Broilers it produced by 9-

10%.

271. Overall, “[a]t least 11 companies reported reductions in weekly ready-to-cook 

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production in 2008,” including Defendants Tyson, Pilgrim’s Pride, Perdue, Simmons, Raeford, 

Cagle’s (later bought by Koch), George’s, O.K. Foods, Harrison, and GNP Company (now owned 

by Pilgrim’s Pride). Other companies reduced their planned production levels or delayed the 

planned opening of new Broiler complexes.

272. Defendants’ production cuts in 2008 and early 2009 did not just reduce the pounds of 

Broilers they produced. The vertically integrated Defendants had the ability to manipulate supply in 

the Broiler market at one or more stages of the supply chain. At the top of the supply chain, 

Defendants could most effectively manipulate supply by reducing the size of breeder flocks, and 

retiring or killing breeders at an earlier-than-optimum age. Reducing breeder flocks had the most 

significant and long-lasting effect on supply of Broilers in the market.

273. Because breeder flocks were created from a limited pool of so-called “grandparent” 

Broilers from one of only three genetics companies (Aviagen, Hubbard, and Tyson’s CobbVantress), it takes substantial time—anywhere from six to eighteen months, or more—to repopulate a breeder flock that has been reduced through early culling. While Defendants continued 

to use their traditional methods to affect their supply-reduction scheme (at the middle or end of the 

supply chain, such as by reducing eggs placements, killing newly-hatched chicks, or idling 

processing plants), the Conspiracy was cemented by the long-term effects of breeder flock 

reductions.

274. Defendants’ self-imposed restriction on their ability to ramp up production for years 

to come by substantially reducing their breeder flocks is shown in the highlighted section of the 

graph below:

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275. The effect of the supply cuts on Broiler pricing in 2008 and the first months of 2009 

was clear—during the worst recession in generations, Broiler prices rose through mid to late 2008, 

staying at or near all-time highs until late 2009. For instance, by May 2009, Sanderson Farms 

reported strong profits that were twice the estimates of Wall Street analysts, which according to one 

industry publication was “aided by production cuts and lower feed costs that offset still-weak 

demand.”

276. During 2009 and 2010, Defendants’ senior executives continued to meet with one 

another at trade association meetings and industry events, such as the National Chicken Council and 

the International Poultry Expo, and encouraged continued “production discipline,” Defendants’ 

euphemism for limiting Broiler supply.

277. As prices continued to rise during late 2009 and early 2010, producers started 

increasing production in response to the higher prices just as they had done in previous decades. 

The rising production by producers in early 2010 led to a reported oversupply of Broilers that began 

to depress prices by late 2010. Having learned the value of coordinated supply reductions in 2008, 

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Defendants were quick to react with a new round of publicly announced production cuts in the first 

half of 2011, which quickly helped prices recover.

278. Defendants engaged in a second wave of coordinated production cuts in 2011 and 

2012 that included further substantial destruction of industry breeder flocks. Defendants also 

continued to limit the United States Broiler supply in subsequent years by destroying eggs, relying 

upon one another’s production to meet customer needs, and exporting excess breeder flocks to 

Mexico—even when doing so was against their independent economic interest.

279. In addition to limiting its own production, in early 2011 Tyson, embarked on a 

strategy to absorb the excess supply of its competitors. Tyson called the strategy “Buy vs. Grow.” 

280. Tyson’s Buy vs. Grow strategy allowed Tyson to purchase excess production from

its competitors to avoid the depression of prices that would occur had the excess production been 

sold on the open market. The strategy also served the dual purpose of allowing Tyson to 

communicate the amount of Broilers it would be willing to purchase from competitors in the current 

and future months, thereby allowing Tyson’s competitors to calculate the amount of product that 

would not be purchased by Tyson and that should therefore be cut. 

281. It would have been cheaper (on a cost per pound basis) for Tyson to grow its own 

Broilers instead of buying them from a competitor. But, Tyson engaged in its Buy vs. Grow 

program because it allowed Tyson to control supply and production in the Broiler industry and reap 

the benefit of higher market prices for Broilers.

282. On January 24-26, 2011, Defendants’ senior executives, including Tyson CEO 

Donnie Smith, attended the International Poultry Expo (“IPE”) in Atlanta, Georgia. The IPE 

featured an annual market intelligence panel with Mike Donohue from Agri Stats and industryinsider Paul Aho. According to one report, Donohue noted that “the broiler industry is currently at 

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record high weekly slaughter volumes” and Aho warned “[t]his could be a very difficult year with 

cutbacks, rationalization, and consolidation . . . . The market is calling for around a 5% reduction in 

chicken production.”

283. On a February 16, 2011 Cagle’s5 earnings call, Cagle’s reportedly said it had begun a 

20% reduction in production at a deboning operation in an effort to balance supply and demand. 

Cagle’s told one publication that it was “optimistic that the industry will exhibit the production 

restraint necessary to support higher pricing for Cagle’s products allowing for return to profitable 

margins.” 

284. On March 7, 2011, Raeford announced a 10% reduction in egg sets that began in 

early February. 

285. On March 15, 2011, Simmons announced it was laying off 180 workers at its Siloam 

Springs, Arkansas processing plant, blaming high grain prices. 

286. On April 15, 2011, Mountaire announced the abandonment of a planned capacity 

increase. Mountaire’s President Paul Downes explained that “the only way to higher prices is less 

supply. The only way to less supply is chicken companies will shut down or cut back. . . . I think 

that’s what we’re going to see.” 

287. Downes’ view of the state of the Broiler industry was echoed, and amplified, by 

Sanderson Farms’ CEO, who stated on a May 24, 2011 earnings call that “the deal is that the 

industry . . . cannot sustain losses like they are sustaining for a long period of time . . . The only way 

to stop losses with $7 corn is to reduce production and get prices up.” Sanderson continued, “my 

judgment is that there will be some others that are going to have to make some adjustments that I 

believe cuts will be forthcoming in our industry based on the losses we see in Agri Stats.” 

5 Cagle’s is a Georgia-based integrator whose assets were bought by Koch in 2012 following 

Cagle’s bankruptcy.

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288. Sanderson Farms’ May 2011 comments came roughly one week after the BMO Farm 

to Market Conference in New York City. The conference included a presentation during which the 

CEO of Pilgrim’s Pride, Bill Lovette, noted Pilgrim’s Pride’s new focus on matching production to 

meet demand, including by adjusting “head,” i.e., breeder flocks, to better balance supply and 

customer demand. Lovette’s presentation noted Pilgrim’s Pride’s shift away from fixed-rate 

contracts to market-based pricing. 

289. On a June 6, 2011 earnings call, Cagle’s said that “the industry must lower supply in 

order to offset reduced demand and to support higher market prices.” Later that month, Cagle’s 

announced it was laying off 300 employees at its Pine Mountain Valley, Georgia plant to reduce 

Broiler volumes.

290. In 2011, Mar-Jac reduced its production 10% and reported that other Broiler 

producers were doing so as well. Fieldale also reduced its production by an unspecified amount.

291. In June 2011, Tyson began pulling eggs from its incubators to reduce Broiler 

volumes.

292. On June 27, 2011, Simmons announced it was laying off 223 employees by August 

at its Siloam Springs, Arkansas plant to “shift production to better address soaring corn prices.” 

293. On July 29, 2011, Pilgrim’s Pride announced the closure of its Dallas, Texas 

processing plant and the layoff of 1,000 employees. Pilgrim’s Pride’s President & CEO Bill 

Lovette explained that “we must make better use of our assets given the challenges facing our 

industry from record-high feed costs and an oversupply of chicken . . . A key component of that 

effort is improving our capacity utilization through production consolidation and other operational 

changes.”

294. On an August 1, 2011 earnings call, Sanderson Farms CEO, Joe Sanderson, 

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informed analysts that the company’s normal fall production cut of four percent beginning in 

November would remain in place beyond January 2012 or until such time as demand improved. 

Sanderson also stated that it “wouldn’t surprise me if the industry makes further, deeper reductions 

in egg sets in October or November . . . Nobody knows what cuts might be needed until we get to 

October, but I think that the cutbacks may need to be more than the 6% in head that the industry has 

in place.” 

295. A week later, on August 8, 2011, Tyson’s CEO said on an earnings call that 

“domestic availability must be in balance with demand before industry economics can improve. 

Tyson continuously strives to match our supply to demand and as a result we made a production 

adjustment in the third quarter . . . Our goal is to match supply to demand. And following overproduction the industry experienced, we cut production in the third quarter, but those cuts have not 

yet impacted the market.” 

296. On August 18, 2011, Cagle’s announced it was reducing 20% of its production at its 

large Pine Mountain Valley, Georgia plant.

297. On September 15, 2011, Case Foods began breaking eggs to reduce its production. It 

continued these production cuts into 2012. 

298. In early October 2011, Defendants’ senior executives attended the National Chicken 

Council’s Annual Conference in Washington, D.C. Among the discussion panels at the event was 

one about the “new paradigm” in the Broiler industry. The panel included senior executives from 

Perdue and Koch. Panelists said that “the industry is accustomed to cycles, but not one quite like 

the latest, and companies are going to need to adjust. Discipline on the supply side was one 

suggestion. Getting better prices from retailers was another.”

299. On November 17, 2011, Wayne Farms issued a press release announcing the closure 

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of its Decatur, Alabama plant and layoffs of 360 employees.

300. In early 2012, Sanderson Farms cut its production by 4%, which included a reduction 

in breeder flocks.

301. Throughout 2012, Defendants continued to meet at trade association meetings and 

industry events, giving them the opportunity to discuss the impact of their collective production cuts 

and otherwise monitor their Conspiracy. In the first quarter of 2012, for example, Defendants’ top 

executives attended the National Chicken Council’s board of directors meeting in Atlanta, which 

was held in conjunction with the IPE. On March 20-21, 2012, the National Chicken Council’s 

board of directors, which included many of Defendants’ senior executives, met again in 

Washington, D.C.

302. On August 28, 2012, Sanderson Farms announced a further 2% production cut that it 

blamed on corn and soybean prices.

303. Defendants’ actions, taken collectively and not in isolation, demonstrated an 

unprecedented level of coordination and industry “production discipline.” 

304. Defendants’ collective output-restriction caused a slowing in overall Broiler pounds 

produced during the Conspiracy Period, in sharp contrast to the historic trend of steady annual 

production increases. The overall effect is depicted in the graph below, drawn from USDA data, 

showing that while overall Broiler production grew a total of 21% from 2000 to 2008, it then 

slowed to a total of roughly 10% from 2008 through 2016:

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305. Indeed, Defendants’ cuts to the Broiler breeder flocks in 2011-2012 drove overall 

Broiler supply flocks down to levels not seen for almost two decades, as reflected in the highlighted

section of the following graph. Yet, at exactly the same time, Defendants’ production of Small Bird 

Broilers increased and continued to increase throughout the Small Bird Conspiracy Period. 

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306. Even with the overall reduction in Broiler supply, the higher broiler prices in the 

market by September 2012 were not justified because the costs of Defendants’ primary inputs, corn 

and soybean meal, which by the fourth quarter of 2012 had dropped significantly in price following 

near-record highs in the summer of 2012. 

307. Defendants adopted multiple additional strategies to strengthen and sustain the 

Conspiracy. 

308. Defendants directly purchased Broilers from one another and from smaller producers 

to meet their respective sales needs. This tactic allowed Defendants to absorb excess supply that 

could potentially depress market prices. These inter-Defendant purchases also allowed Defendants 

to maintain market share. 

309. Additionally, the inter-Defendant sales provided an opportunity for Defendants to 

discuss prices with competitors. In many instances large inter-Defendant purchases were negotiated 

by Defendants’ senior level executives, thereby providing additional opportunities to conspire.

310. Tyson’s implementation in 2011 of its “Buy vs. Grow” strategy is a prime example 

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of how inter-Defendant sales were part and parcel of the Conspiracy. Indeed, only a few years prior 

to adopting the “Buy vs. Grow” strategy, Tyson had derided a similar strategy as a “stupid” 

subsidization of competitors’ growth. 

311. In a November 5, 2012 interview, Fieldale’s President, Thomas Hensley, noted his 

company was also pursuing a strategy to purchase excess supply from its competitors, stating that 

“[i]f you don’t have a home for your chickens on Monday morning, you shouldn’t have those

chickens. Now we know where all our chickens are going. So we are buying chickens in that lower 

price area instead of selling them.”

312. Broiler prices significantly increased during the Conspiracy Period as a result of 

Defendants’ conduct. This is contrary to pricing patterns prior to the Conspiracy Period, and 

contrary to what would be expected in a competitive market. The rise in Broiler prices relative to 

input costs led to record profits for Defendants.

C. Defendants’ Collusive Manipulation of the Georgia Dock Price Index

313. Wholesale broiler prices were reported primarily by three entities: Urner Barry (a 

commodity price reporting service), the GDA, and the USDA. In addition to these reports, Agri 

Stats also collected detailed pricing information through its subsidiary Express Markets, Inc. 

(“EMI”). 6

314. The Georgia Dock, USDA Composite, and Urner Barry all measured the same (or 

very similar) size and grade of Broilers. These three indices set prices for both the “whole bird” and 

various parts of the Broiler (wings, tenders, leg quarters, thighs, drumsticks and breasts) using the 

same pricing methodology.

6 EMI was formed around 2000 to compete with the price reporting service of Urner Barry. 

Unlike Agri Stats’ reports for Defendants, EMI released daily pricing data to both Defendants

and potential purchasers of Broilers, though the reporting service costs thousands of dollars and 

was not publicly available. EMI reports captured all transactions by Broiler producers, who 

automatically transmitted transactional invoice information electronically to EMI. 

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315. Urner Barry, a subscription-based report, collected and published daily price 

information for Broilers. The USDA’s Composite price index published Broiler price information 

on a weekly basis. USDA’s Composite price index was publicly available at no cost. 

316. The USDA and Urner Barry’s Broiler price indices were based upon a system of 

double verification, which includes telephonic and written surveys of all or nearly all Broiler 

producers, but also verification of reported prices from purchasers such as brokers and customers. 

Significantly, however, the reported prices were wholesale prices, and did not include prices that 

suppliers charged restaurant customers like Boston Market.

317. The most detailed price report was not publicly available and was produced by Agri 

Stats and its subsidiary, EMI. According to a May 2010 FarmEcon study, EMI’s pricing report 

included “pricing data on whole birds and chicken parts that is considerably more detailed 

than the USDA,” Urner Barry, or Georgia Dock reports, as it was based on actual sales invoices 

from Broiler companies.

318. Compared to the other two indices available to Broiler purchasers, the Georgia Dock 

benchmark price index was highly susceptible to manipulation by the Georgia Dock Producers. 

319. Unlike the USDA Composite or Urner Barry indices that used data from numerous 

producers and buyers on both sides of the market, the Georgia Dock benchmark price was a selfreported number from a handful of producers including the Georgia Dock Producers. 

320. The GDA used the Georgia Dock Producers’ price quotes to determine the Georgia 

Dock index using a formula based on each company’s respective market share in Georgia.7

321. In compiling the Georgia Dock benchmark price, there was no team of economists or 

7 During the Conspiracy Period, the Georgia Dock Producers’ respective Georgia market shares 

were: Pilgrim’s Pride (33%); Tyson (14%); Fieldale (14%); Perdue (9%); and Sanderson Farms, 

Koch, Claxton, Mar- Jac, Harrison, and Wayne Farms, each with a 5% market share.

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statisticians surveying buyers and sellers in the national Broiler market. To compile the Georgia 

Dock price index, a GDA employee simply contacted participating Broiler producers each week to 

collect verbal price quotes, which were supposed to reflect their actual sales prices. A single price 

was given by each Broiler producer company and it was accepted without any verification of actual 

invoices or any other form of auditing to verify accuracy.8

322. Historically, the Georgia Dock benchmark price was highly correlated to the USDA 

Composite and Urner Barry indices. However, during the Conspiracy Period, and after at least a 

decade of high correlation with the USDA Composite and Urner Barry indices, the Georgia Dock’s 

price volatility virtually disappeared.9 The following graph compares prices of the various indices

both before and during the Conspiracy Period, and depicts the Georgia Dock’s divergence from the 

other indices: 

8 In response to a press inquiry, the GDA explained its failure to audit any self-reported data from 

Defendants by stating, “We don’t see any reason they would submit information that wasn’t 

truthful.”

9 The USDA Composite and Urner Barry indexes remained positively correlated with each other.

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323. The GDA used the “one cent Rule” where outlier prices deviating by more than one 

cent from the initial dock price were excluded from the final Georgia Dock price. Therefore, the 

significant difference between the Georgia Dock price index and other Broiler price indices in 

recent years cannot be explained by only one or two outlier companies reporting artificially high 

Broiler prices to the GDA. Instead, the deviation of the Georgia Dock price index from other 

indices can only be attributed to all or nearly all of the Georgia Dock Producers participation in 

collectively submitting artificially high and nearly identical Broiler prices to the GDA.

324. Despite the GDA’s public statements about confidence in the Georgia Dock price 

index, the GDA employee who collected prices each week from Broiler companies, Arty Schronce, 

was deeply concerned. In a September 2016 internal GDA memorandum—disclosed publicly for 

the first time on November 17, 2016 in a Washington Post article—Schronce wrote that he 

“continue[d] to have concerns about” the Georgia Dock, had “voiced concerns in the past,” and that 

he thought the Georgia Dock price index was “a flawed product that is a liability to the Georgia 

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Department of Agriculture.” Schronce also noted, “I was told that poultry companies know what 

they are doing and all I need to do is to gather and consolidate the info I am provided. However, I 

have come to question the validity of some of the information provided.” 

325. Until late 2016, the Georgia Dock pricing methodology was not publicly available. 

Broiler purchasers, whose transactions with Defendants were based on the Georgia Dock wholebird price, mistakenly believed it reflected the actual market price of Broilers. Moreover, because 

(until August 2016) the USDA also published the Georgia Dock benchmark price alongside the 

USDA Composite, many Broiler purchasers erroneously believed the Georgia Dock price to be a 

USDA price.

326. The reality was that the Georgia Dock price was simply whatever the Georgia Dock 

Producers said it was. Hypothetically, if one week the Georgia Dock price was $1.75, and the 

following week the Georgia Dock Producers told the GDA that the sales price of their Broilers was 

now $2, the Georgia Dock price was $2—and the prices that purchasers paid for Broilers increased 

commensurately.

327. Senior executives from eight of the ten companies who participated in the Georgia 

Dock price submissions were members of a non-public, non-governmental “Georgia Dock Advisory 

Board,” that advised the GDA on the Georgia Dock price. 

328. The Advisory Board played a role in the compilation and manipulation of the 

Georgia Dock benchmark price index. From at least September 2012 through 2016, the Advisory 

Board included Gus Arrendale (CEO, Fieldale), Mike Welch (CEO and President, Harrison), Jerry 

Lane (CEO, Claxton), Jayson Penn (EVP Sales and Operations, Pilgrim’s Pride), Pete Martin (VP 

of Operations, Mar-Jac), Vernon Owenby (Manager of Tyson’s facility in Cumming, Georgia), 

Steve Clever (VP of Fresh Sales, Wayne Farms), and Dale Tolbert (VP of Sales, Koch). 

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329. The Advisory Board gave the Georgia Dock Producers a vehicle to discuss and 

artificially set price quotes to ensure compliance with their price-fixing agreement.

330. The existence and conduct of this Advisory Board was not known to Broiler 

purchasers until November 2016 when it was first made public following a press report about a 

September 2016 memorandum written by Schronce that was highly critical of the Georgia Dock 

methodology. 

331. In December 2015, the GDA began an internal review process of the Georgia Dock 

pricing methodology, in large part, because the agency had “serious concerns” about the way the 

index was compiled. The GDA’s internal review was not made public at the time it began, and was 

not revealed until it was described in a series of press reports beginning in November 2016. 

332. On July 19-20, 2016, high-level USDA officials met with GDA representatives in 

Atlanta, Georgia to discuss the Georgia Dock price. The USDA officials shared their conclusion 

that GDA could no longer simply accept Broiler prices obtained from Defendants and their CoConspirators without verification, and instead would have to verify invoice-level data to confirm 

reported prices. USDA officials requested that the GDA provide the USDA with data from Broiler 

producers to “test and review” the Georgia Dock price for accuracy.

333. In 2016, high-level officials within the GDA began to raise antitrust concerns 

regarding the Georgia Dock. For instance, in a July 27, 2016 report, GDA Director of Regulatory 

Compliance & Budget, Alec Asbridge, concluded that “[t]he top 10 poultry producing companies 

now control over 80% of the industry output. The combination of vertical integration, limited 

competition and lowered production periods has led to steady prices that have shown to be fairly 

resistant to changing market conditions. These factors alone illicit [sic] anti-trust review.” 

334. On August 5, 2016 a revised and highly sanitized version of the July 27, 2016 report 

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from Director Asbridge to GDA Commissioner Black was circulated internally at GDA. The 

sanitized August 5 report removed references to the existence of factors in the Broiler industry 

eliciting “anti-trust review” and to the fact that the Georgia Dock price was reported for decades by 

GDA “without regulatory oversight.”

335. In the fall of 2016, under pressure from the USDA and realizing that the Georgia 

Dock pricing methodology raised significant antitrust concerns, the GDA considered revising the 

methodology. After the Georgia Dock Producers balked at the GDA’s new methodology—which 

required them to verify and attest to the accuracy of their price quotes—the GDA halted the Georgia 

Dock benchmark price index altogether, citing a “lack of submissions” under the new reporting 

requirements. 

336. In November 2016, following intense scrutiny from the USDA and news media, the 

GDA suspended reporting the Georgia Dock benchmark price index.

D. Agri Stats Actively Facilitated Defendants’ Conspiracy by Providing 

Data Necessary to Effectuate, Monitor and Enforce the Conspiracy

(i) Agri Stats Reports

337. Defendants’ Conspiracy was successfully facilitated, monitored, and policed by 

using reports purchased, at significant cost, from Agri Stats. 

338. Every Defendant and Co-Conspirator participated in Agri Stats. Additionally, 

certain entities acquired by Defendants participated in Agri Stats, including Cagle’s, Inc., BC 

Natural Chicken, Peterson Farms, and Townsend’s. 

339. Agri Stats described itself as a service that “allows organizations to develop plans on 

how to adopt best practice, usually with the aim of increasing some aspect of performance.” 

340. Agri Stats collected detailed, proprietary data from all Defendants, including 

housing used, breed of chicks, average size, and production and breeder flock levels on a regular 

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basis, typically weekly. Agri Stats audited and verified the data, and ultimately reported back to 

Defendants detailed statistics on nearly every operating metric within the industry, including the 

size and age of breeder flocks.

341. Although certain Defendants purchased information provided by Agri Stats before 

2008, the output restriction part of Defendants’ Conspiracy began when Tyson—which had stopped 

using Agri Stats sometime in the wake of a $1.3 billion jury verdict in 2004 against it for a 

conspiracy to manipulate pay to cattle farmers—became a subscriber again in early 2008, around 

the start of the Conspiracy Period.

342. Tyson’s resubscription in early 2008 resulted in significantly increased fee income to 

Agri Stats as Tyson was by far the largest and most lucrative subscriber. 

343. Agri Stats’ survey methodology involved direct electronic data submissions from 

and to Defendants of financial, production, breeder flock size and age, capacity, cost, and numerous 

other categories of information by each Broiler producer on a weekly and monthly basis. 

344. Each Defendant received numerous types of Agri Stats reports, including separate 

targeted reports for each major area of operations, such as breeding, hatching, hauling, feeding, 

processing, selling, and administration. Defendants’ top executives received Agri Stats’ monthly 

“Bottom Line” Reports (which, for a period of time was called the “Executive Report”) that 

contained one row for each Broiler company reporting to Agri Stats with columns for certain 

categories of information, such as operating profit dollars, profit percentage, corporate SG&A (i.e., 

overhead), interest expense, and other key operational information related to sales, revenues and 

costs.

345. The information available to Defendants in these Agri Stats reports would not 

typically be disclosed among competitors in a competitive market. Although the USDA and various 

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other entities published aggregated weekly, monthly, and annual supply and pricing information 

concerning the U.S. Broiler industry, Agri Stats was unique in that it contains detailed information 

to accurately determine producer-specific production, costs, and general efficiency. 

346. Agri Stats purported to maintain the confidentiality and anonymity of individual 

companies’ data by giving each company a report identifying only that company’s specific Broiler 

complexes by name. The report would not identify other Broiler producers’ complexes by name, 

but instead would list competitors’ complexes by number. Sanderson Farms CEO Joe Sanderson 

claimed “Agri Stats is a benchmarking service that we submit data to. Almost everyone in our 

industry does as well. And we get the data back. It’s anonymous—the data is anonymous, so we 

don’t know whose numbers the numbers belong to, but we can see performance indicators all over 

the industry.”

347. While the Agri Stats reports superficially “anonymized” individual producer 

information, they were sufficiently detailed so that any reasonably-informed producer could discern

the identity of its competitors’ Broiler complexes. For example, Case Foods was able to deanonymize Agri Stats’ bottom line reports and determine its competitors’ rankings.

348. Agri Stats reports included facility-level data for over 100 of Defendants’ Broiler 

integrated production facilities. Most of these vast facilities, referred to as “complexes,” included 

housing for Defendants’ breeder flocks and hatcheries where breeder flock hens lay the eggs that 

would ultimately become Broilers. 

349. Specifically, Agri Stats’ reports identified each complex with unique numbers, 

including a coding system identifying the region and sub-region, for each Broiler complex, with the 

cover pages of each sub-regional report identifying by name the companies whose complexes are 

covered in the report itself. For example, “Region 20” includes “Sub-Region 21 – Upper Mid 

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Atlantic,” identifying, with a unique number, sixteen Broiler complexes, including four Tyson 

complexes, four Perdue complexes, three Mountaire complexes, two Pilgrim’s Pride complexes, 

and one George’s complex.10

350. Agri Stats’ coding system made it easy for Defendants’ employees—some of whom, 

including senior executives at both Wayne Farms and Pilgrim’s Pride, used to work at Agri Stats—

to decipher production, feed, sales and other competitively-sensitive metrics for their competitors’ 

facilities. 

351. In fact, Agri Stats’ coding system never changed (e.g., the Tyson complex in 

Cummings, Georgia has always been identified as complex “222”), meaning that once a Defendant 

deciphered the numeric code for a given competitor’s complex, that Defendant had the ability to 

know their competitor’s data indefinitely.

352. According to an expert witness for Pilgrim’s in contract-farmer litigation against 

Pilgrim’s, “[p]robably no one in the industry would know better than [Agri Stats economist] Mike 

Donahue [as to whether Broiler production increased in 2008] because EMI is the same company as 

Agri Stats, which is the company that gathers operating statistics from virtually every company in 

the broiler industry. And they know definitively how many breeders are out there, how many 

pullets are out there, how many broilers are produced every week, and head count and pounds, 

10 Agri Stats reports also included specific data for Defendants’ Broiler complexes (listed by 

producer and location) in: North Carolina (“Sub-Region 22”); Northern Georgia and Tennessee 

(“Sub-Region 31”); Southern Georgia, Florida and South Carolina (“Sub-Region 32”); Alabama 

and Mississippi (sub-regions 41 and 42); lower Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas (“Sub-Region 51”); 

upper Arkansas and Missouri (“Sub-Region 52”); Kentucky, Ohio, Minnesota, Indiana and 

Wisconsin (“Sub-Region 60”); and California and the Pacific Northwest (“Region 10”) (which is 

composed solely of Defendant Foster Farms’ three complexes). While Agri Stats reports were 

sufficiently detailed such that any reasonably informed producer could discern its competitors’ 

information, Defendant Foster Farms’ identity is particularly obvious because Foster Farms is the 

only producer in its region included in the reports. 

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everything else. They have massive amounts of statistics. And that’s why they’re so effective at 

reporting all of this [production information].”

353. Information helping Defendants assess the size and age of breeder flocks was 

available in the “Growth Rate Report” section of Agri Stats, which included complex-by-complex 

numbers showing the average age of the breeder hens whose eggs, when hatched, become Broilers. 

This data showed how close a given breeder flock is to the end of its egg-laying lifespan, giving 

Defendants insight into how much longer that flock’s capacity to lay eggs will impact the supply of 

Broilers available for slaughter further down the supply chain. In addition, because the “Growth 

Rate Report” was available each month, knowing the average age of a given flock from month to 

month helped Defendants determine when flocks are being slaughtered and removed from the 

supply chain.

354. Similarly, in some reports, Agri Stats showed the number of egg-laying hens, or 

pullets, that a competitor is placing on farms. This largely determined the number of eggs that 

would be laid, and therefore how many Broilers would be hatched and grown – a key marker of 

future production.

355. Other sections of Agri Stats reports included similar, sub-region data for a range of 

competitively sensitive metrics, such as bird age and mortality, “chick cost per settled flock,” and 

“grower expense.” Knowing the number of complexes each Defendant operated in each sub-region 

allowed Defendants to assess the performance of all competing complexes in a sub-region on a 

variety of important industry metrics.

356. When given access to Agri Stats’ reports in connection with litigation where he 

served as an expert witness, an agricultural economist expressed his “shock[] at the incredible 

detail” of the information presented in the reports.

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357. Thus Agri Stats facilitated Defendants’ access to “massive amounts” of each other’s 

competitively sensitive information, including detailed information concerning their competitors’ 

breeder flocks, and other production, capacity, feed, sales, and cost data. 

358. Defendants knew that when they provided internal, confidential information to Agri 

Stats, other subscriber producers would be able to access that information and identify the 

Defendant that submitted it. 

359. Providing such specific, commercially-sensitive information to Agri Stats, in 

conjunction with Agri Stats’ dissemination of the information in a manner where producers can 

identify each competitor’s data, constituted an unreasonable, anticompetitive restraint of trade.

(ii) The Confidential Nature of Agri Stats Reports

360. Agri Stats’ reports were not publicly available and Defendants closely guarded from 

those outside the industry the reports’ contents and the degree of Defendants’ participation in Agri 

Stats’ data-gathering and data-dissemination processes. 

361. While Agri Stats reports were closely guarded by Defendants, after an extensive 

investigation, Boston Market believes that Agri Stats reports included at a minimum the following 

categories of information:

a) Name of genetics company used for primary breeder stock;

b) Hatchery capacity, costs, and age of Broiler breeder flocks;

c) Feed Manufacturing, Delivery and Formulation data, including corn and 

soybean meal costs;

d) Growout information for Broiler “flocks” provided to contract farmers, 

including the number of Broilers placed, chick mortality by week and overall 

percentage, chick cost, days between flocks provided to contract farmers 

(aka, “down time”), feed conversion rate (pounds of feed per pound of 

Broiler), average daily weight gain by chicks, live pounds produced per 

square foot of grower house, grower compensation, including average 

grower payment in cents per pound and cents per square foot, breed 

composition of flock (breed or cross-breed of flocks), detailed information on 

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numerous mechanical aspects of Broiler housing, and numerous other 

detailed cost, mortality, and operational information about disease, 

transportation, labor, and other grow out related information;

e) Slaughter, processing, and further processing information, including pay for 

processing plant workers, total production volume, market age of Broilers at 

slaughter, weight of Broilers at slaughter, birds per man hour, processing line 

speeds, and labor hours per pound;

f) Inventory levels of Broilers;

g) Sales data for finished product form and type, such as type of cut (whole bird, 

cut-up, deboned), various packaging forms (such as bulk, tray pack, etc.), and 

data segmented into various categories (such as exports, retail, foodservice, 

etc.); and

h) Financial information, such as monthly operating profit per live pound, sales 

per live pound, and cost per live pound.

362. Portions of Agri Stats’ reports have found their way into the public record. One such 

instance is a presentation by Dr. Steve Bolen, an executive with Cobb-Vantress, a bird genetics 

company wholly-owned by Tyson Foods, Inc., in which Dr. Bolen disclosed a portion of an Agri 

Stats report illustrated below: 

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363. The above table includes data from Broiler production complexes, which are 

typically located within a 50-mile radius of a Broiler company’s feed mill and processing plant. 

The table contains data for a single month – March 2014. The report provided the various yields of 

the Defendants’ facilities for various cuts of meat (breast, fillets and tenders). 

364. Defendants rarely mentioned their exchange of proprietary information with one 

another through Agri Stats. However, on occasion (such as during earnings or investor conference 

calls) Defendants have provided glimpses into their use of Agri Stats information. 

365. For example, in May 2008, Sanderson Farms reported “every year we review our 

operations and every facet within Agristats. . . we set operational goals every year . . . and [we] try 

to improve our operations within this benchmarking service we call Agristats.”

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366. In December 2009, Sanderson Farms CEO Joe Sanderson commented “based on 

what I see in Agr[i] stats nobody is planning on . . . ramping up. I see a lot of information from 

Agr[i] stats that tells me that nobody is going to ramp up.”

367. In May 2011, Mr. Sanderson stated on an earnings call, “my judgment is that there 

will be some others that are going to have to make some adjustments that I believe cuts will be 

forthcoming in our industry based on the losses we see in Agri Stats.” Sanderson also stated that he 

felt “confident that we are going to see cutbacks” based on Agri Stats data. Sanderson also 

explained “[t]ypically in my experience the first cut is not enough and you go back and look at 

2008, I think the industry started cutting back maybe in June and that cut back was not enough and 

then they made another cut in the late fall and I believe the industry became profitable in January.”

368. Tyson noted in a December 2014 investor presentation that “when you talk about the 

chicken cycle, most people will look at the cyclicality. It’s very profitable right now. And we will 

not hit the top of the top, because within the profitability segmentation right now, the most 

profitable segments are in fact big bird, and secondly, tray pack. We can tell that through Agri 

Stats. Now at the same time, when there is more poultry available and the industry may not be as 

profitable, we would not expect to be anywhere close to what the bottom of that cycle would be.”

(iii) Agri Stats Allowed Defendants to Monitor Competitors to Prevent Cheating 

369. Agri Stats’ critical importance to the Conspiracy lies not only in the fact that it 

supplied data necessary for Defendants to coordinate production limitations and manipulate prices, 

but also in its market-stabilizing power. Price-fixing or output-restricting conspiracies, regardless 

of industry, are subject to inherent instability in the absence of policing mechanisms. This is true 

because each individual member of the Conspiracy has the incentive to “cheat” other group 

members—for example, by boosting Broiler production to capture higher prices even as other 

producers heed their conspiratorial duty to limit production.

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370. Agri Stats knowingly participated in the producer Defendants’ policing efforts. The 

specific type or size of breeder flock housing, breed of chick, average bird size, and production 

levels listed in Agri Stats data for Defendants’ complexes aided Defendants in determining which 

complexes are cutting back, and by how much.

371. For example, if in January a Defendant publicly stated its intention to reduce 

production, its competitors would be able to tell from the February and March Agri Stats reports 

whether that Defendant was following through on its conspiratorial agreement. Additionally, 

Defendants Tyson, Pilgrim’s Pride, and Sanderson are public companies that reported aggregated 

data publicly, which competitors could use to match up against the detailed information in the Agri 

Stats reports in order to identify other specific data from their competitors.

372. Such detailed statistics—coupled with their regular, in-person meetings with one 

another, and routine participation in trade association events widely attended by Defendants’ senior 

executives—allowed Defendants to monitor each other’s production figures for any signs of 

“cheating.” 

(iv) Agri Stats Meetings & Conferences

373. Agri Stats’ role in the Broiler industry Conspiracy extended beyond the collection 

and dissemination of competitively-sensitive data. It was also an active and knowing participant in, 

and facilitator of, the Conspiracy. 

374. Agri Stats held regular meetings with each Defendant, which allowed Agri Stats to 

share non-public, proprietary production information with Defendants. For example, during the 

Conspiracy Period, Tyson personnel working at complexes in the Mid-Atlantic region were advised 

by their complex managers about competitors’ non-public production information following 

quarterly meetings between the Tyson complex managers and Agri Stats account managers.

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375. The regular Agri Stats meetings took place at both the production-plant level, where 

Agri Stats personnel met with Defendants’ complex managers, and at the executive level, where 

Agri Stats personnel met with the leadership of Defendants’ hatchery, breeder and feed 

departments. 

376. During the meeting with Defendants’ executives, Agri Stats led detailed discussions 

about industry profitability and the key contributing factors, including size and average age of 

Broiler breeder flocks, average hatchability of eggs, mortality rates, average bird rate, feed cost, and 

other performance factors based on data Defendants provided. Agri Stats also led discussions about 

the overall profit of the company and industry, including rankings of companies, overall industry 

average, and the top and bottom third of the industry. Agri Stats also told Defendants’ executives 

how much the industry was over- or under-supplying the market and estimated demand, and shared 

other information based on data Defendants provided.

377. Agri Stats’ employees also confirmed production data for Defendants at the 

numerous trade association meetings where Agri Stats executives present on a regular basis. For 

example, mid-level Tyson personnel working at complexes in the Mid-Atlantic region were advised 

by their complex managers about competitors’ production following quarterly meetings between the 

Tyson complex managers and Agri Stats account managers.

378. For each of their Defendant customers, Agri Stats account managers created a series 

of data compilations known as “books,” based on the competitively-sensitive data that a particular 

Defendant had submitted to Agri Stats. Agri Stats maintained at least six “books” for each 

Defendant: (1) the light-blue “Live” book, with information on the Defendant’s breeders, hatchery 

feed and grow-out; (2) the red “Sales” book, with information on the Defendant’s current and yearto-date sales; (3) the light-green “Production” book, with information on the Defendant’s yields; (4) 

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the brown “Profit” book, with information on the Defendant’s profits and losses; (5) the mustardyellow “Rendering” book, with information on the Defendant’s rendering facilities; and (6) the 

“Bottom Line” book, with information on the totality of the Defendant’s sales, revenues and costs.

379. On a number of occasions, Agri Stats personnel sent copies of one Defendant’s 

“books” to other Defendants. 

380. Agri Stats also held regular “poultry outlook conferences” for meat industry 

executives. Agri Stats employees, including Vice President Michael Donohue and account 

managers Paul Austin, Paul Bunting and Dana Weatherford, regularly hosted, or presented at, 

Broiler industry events and investor conferences. For instance, Agri Stats hosted an April 23, 2015 

conference in Atlanta, Georgia which included a presentation by Agri Stats Vice President Sue 

Trudell concerning the “broiler market situation and outlook,” as well as an analysis of feed and 

macroeconomic factors. Such presentations were restricted from circulation and were not publicly 

available outside the invited participants to the poultry outlook conference hosted by EMI. 

381. Sanderson Farms also invited Agri Stats employees to make presentations about the 

industry to Sanderson’s own investors. One such presentation was made by Agri Stats Vice 

President Sue Trudell on October 18, 2013.

382. EMI also held regular invitation-only “Analytics Web Conference” calls.

(v) Agri Stats Encouraged Defendants’ Collusive Behavior

383. In many instances, Agri Stats played the role of industry cheerleader rather than 

industry benchmarking service, with Agri Stats suggesting specifically how much Broiler 

production should be cut based on Agri Stats data.

384. July 2012 trial testimony in a lawsuit against Pilgrim’s by contract farmers revealed 

that a November 2008 Agri Stats report “made statements to the effect that it thought the industry 

was 5-percent oversupplied . . . relative . . . to demand.”

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385. Agri Stats’ Vice President Donohue also frequently appeared at industry events, such 

as the Spring 2011 IPE conference. Donohue provided comments as part of an annual “market 

intelligence” forum about various industry performance metrics. Additionally, Donohue’s copanelist, Broiler industry insider Paul Aho, explicitly suggested “[t]he market is calling for around a 

5% reduction in chicken production” in order for producers to achieve higher prices in 2011.

386. Donohue also authored articles for the Agri Stats publication EMI Vital Signs. For 

instance, the sole “sample” publication available on EMI’s website is a May 2013 article in EMI 

Vital Signs by Donohue, which analyzed whether Broiler producers could continue to achieve high 

profit levels. Donohue carefully analyzed Agri Stats data concerning pricing, inventory, and 

production levels, ultimately concluding “[w]hen supply and demand factors are in good shape the 

industry can get a good return on investment and for the short and medium term it appears that there 

is certainly room for optimism in these factors.”

387. Donohue helped forecast supply and demand for the Broiler industry by using Agri 

Stats data on breeder placements and inventory. At the US Poultry & Egg Association’s HatcheryBreeder Clinic in January 2012, Donohue noted that chicken breast prices were at a particularly 

high level and “[i]t’s not just cutbacks in production that have already occurred but seasonal 

demand later this year which may set the industry up for an even better first half of 2012.” 

Donahue further commented “I hope this carries over into the latter half of 2012 based on some of 

the production forecasts that can be made based on breeder placements and inventories.” Donohue 

also noted a concern that “if the industry chose to do so, it could ramp up production within a 10-

week period of time. The industry could blow apart any recover[y] in the short term by filling up 

incubators again,” but noted that Agri Stats data indicates the industry was managing its production 

carefully.

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(vi) Agri Stats Served as a Vehicle for Collusion

388. Defendants’ use of Agri Stats to secretly share detailed, highly confidential and 

proprietary information about their breeder flock size and age, pricing, capacity, production, and 

costs constitutes an unreasonable and anticompetitive restraint of trade. In a competitive market, 

such proprietary, competitively sensitive information should be a closely guarded secret. 

389. Defendants exchanged de-anonymized Agri Stats information and reports with one 

other, identifying for their competitors which data pertained to their respective companies. 

390. The FTC’s and DOJ’s 2000 Guidelines For Collaborations Among Competitors 

(“FTC/DOJ Guidelines”) suggest that Agri Stats is far outside the scope of permissible information 

sharing among competitors. The FTC/DOJ Guidelines note the high risk of antitrust issues for 

information sharing programs in industries with a history of collusion.

391. The more competitively sensitive the information being shared, the higher the 

antitrust concern for such information sharing. Upon information and belief, the weekly and 

monthly Agri Stats reports included dozens of categories of detailed information that in a 

competitive industry would be considered trade secrets. The competitive sensitivity of Agri Stats’ 

reports suggests a particularly high level of antitrust concern.

392. Moreover, Agri Stats reports were issued weekly and/or monthly, and its EMI 

reports were issued daily, so as to provide nearly current production, sales, and other data to 

Defendants. The nature of Broiler breeder flocks is that they predict future Broiler supply. By 

sharing such information in a way that permits company-by-company identification, Defendants 

were in fact sharing future anticipated production information with one another, which clearly 

causes high antitrust concern.

393. The FTC/DOJ Guidelines also provide a “safety zone” (i.e., presumptively 

permissible) for collaborations among competitors that account for no more than 20% of each 

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relevant market in which competition may be affected. Here, Defendants account for approximately 

90-95% of Broiler production.

394. One Broiler industry expert testified in a case brought by contract farmers against 

Broiler producers that the sharing of information through Agri Stats by Broiler producers regarding 

pay for contract-farmers creates “a potential vehicle for collusion” and presents a “classical antitrust 

concern.” The same expert also remarked that Agri Stats was unusual even among other price 

surveys, noting “[t]he sharing of price and other market information by so-called competitors is well 

known as a significant antitrust issue. Grower payout and cost information shared by most 

integrators is incredibly detailed and comprehensive. As such it could provide critical data for 

competition investigations and analyses of oligopoly and oligopsonistic behavior far more complex 

and advanced than available for any other agricultural industry. An intensive inquiry is needed.”

395. A sworn declaration from a poultry and egg industry expert in Freedom of 

Information Act litigation seeking disclosure of competitively-sensitive FDA egg-farm reports 

stated, with respect to Agri Stats, that:

Individual disclosure is not required when industry participants are familiar enough 

with the industry to connect the information supplied with the individual companies 

at issue. My experience is that competitors . . . are prolific at quantifying their 

competitor’s business information on their own. For example, industry processors 

share commercial data through companies such as AGRISTATS (Fort Wayne, IN), a 

shared business database company . . . started for the poultry industry in 1985. 

AGRISTATS has the following mission statement: “IMPROVE THE BOTTOM 

LINE PROFITABILITY FOR OUR PARTICIPANTS BY PROVIDING 

ACCURATE AND TIMELY COMPARATIVE DATA WHILE PRESERVING 

THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF INDIVIDUAL COMPANIES.” Note the mission is 

to share comparative data while protecting individual companies. I can speak 

personally that I have seen and read these broiler industry reports, and, based on my 

familiarity with the industry, I can easily connect the information supplied with the 

individual companies whose confidentiality is supposedly preserved. Therefore, it is 

my opinion that virtually everyone in the industry can connect the information 

supplied in AGRISTATS with the individual companies who supplied the data.

396. A 2017 Bloomberg News article titled “Is the Chicken Industry Rigged? Inside Agri 

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Stats, the Poultry Business’s Secretive Info-Sharing Service,” highlighted the role Agri Stats played 

in Defendants’ efforts to monitor and police their conspiratorial activity:

Peter Carstensen, a law professor at the University of Wisconsin and former Justice 

Department antitrust lawyer who has studied Agri Stats while researching the 

modern poultry industry, casts the level of plant-by-plant detail in the company’s 

reports as “unusual.” He explains that information-sharing services in other 

industries tend to deal in averaged-out aggregated data – for example, insurance rates 

in a given state. Such services run afoul of antitrust law, he says, when they offer 

projections or provide data so detailed that no competitor would reasonably share it 

with another. Getting detailed information is a particularly useful form of collusion, 

Carstensen says, because it allows co-conspirators to make sure they’re all following 

through on the agreement. “This is one of the ways you do it. You make sure that 

your co-conspirators have the kind of information that gives them confidence – so 

they can trust you, that you’re not cheating on them,” he says. “That is what creates 

stability for a cartel.”

VIII. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS ARE TIMELY

A. Boston Market Did Not, and Could Not, Discover the Conspiracy Until 

2016 or Later

397. Boston Market did not have actual or constructive knowledge of, and could not have 

discovered, Defendants Conspiracy to restrict the supply of Broilers and to manipulate the Georgia 

Dock price index until approximately 2016 at the earliest. Boston Market did not have actual or 

constructive knowledge of, and could not have discovered, Defendants Small Bird Conspiracy until 

June of 2020 when the Department of Justice issued its Indictment. 

398. Throughout the Conspiracy Period, Defendants effectively, affirmatively, and 

fraudulently concealed their unlawful Conspiracy to fix Broiler prices from Boston Market through 

various means, including: (1) non-public meetings; (2) surreptitious communications between 

Defendants via electronic communications and in-person meetings at trade association meetings 

(and elsewhere); (3) limiting any explicit reference to competitor pricing or supply restraint 

communications in documents; (4) communicating competitively sensitive data to one another 

through Agri Stats, a “proprietary, privileged, and confidential” system that kept both the content 

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and participants in the system secret; and (5) keeping the existence and nature of their competitor 

supply restraint and price discussions from non-conspirators (including customers).

399. Moreover, Defendants used code words including “capacity discipline” in their 

public statements to signal one other in furtherance of their Conspiracy to restrain production while 

shielding their Conspiracy from detection by the public. 

400. Defendants also used pretexts to conceal the Conspiracy. Defendants affirmatively 

and falsely attributed rising prices during the Conspiracy Period to, among other things, increases in 

the price of inputs costs. However, the price increases were actually the result of Defendants’ 

collusive and clandestine conduct.

401. During the Conspiracy Period, Defendants affirmatively made numerous misleading 

public statements falsely portraying the market for Broilers as a competitive one. 

402. By virtue of Defendants actively and intentionally concealing their above-described 

wrongful conduct, the running of any applicable statute of limitations has been (and continues to be) 

tolled and suspended with respect to Boston Market’s claims and causes of action resulting from 

Defendants’ unlawful combination and Conspiracy under the fraudulent concealment doctrine 

and/or doctrine of equitable estoppel.

403. With respect to the manipulation of the Georgia Dock, a January 18, 2016 Wall 

Street Journal article regarding Defendants’ possible manipulation of the Georgia Dock benchmark 

price raised the possibility of collusion to artificially raise, fix, or maintain Broiler prices using the 

Georgia Dock. Subsequently, a series of articles in various publications published between 

November 3 and 17, 2016, detailed for the first time that the USDA had discontinued its reliance on 

the Georgia Dock benchmark price because its input prices could not be verified.

404. Yet even when faced with these public revelations, Defendants continued to assert 

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the fairness and reliability of the Georgia Dock benchmark price. Not until November 2016 was it 

disclosed publicly that the Georgia Dock Producers had formed a secret Georgia Dock Advisory 

Board that facilitated opportunities for executives to meet and also discuss their scheme to fix the 

Georgia Dock benchmark price, or that the Florida Attorney General’s Office was investigating the 

Georgia Dock benchmark price and its calculation and manipulation by the Georgia Dock 

Producers. Accordingly, a reasonable person under the circumstances would not have been alerted 

to begin investigating the legitimacy of Defendants’ Broiler prices before these recent events. 

405. The November 2016 disclosure of Defendants’ conduct was precipitated by the 

following series of events. From late 2014 into 2016, Broiler input costs fell significantly. 

Economic theory predicts that in a competitive market, all else being equal, Broiler prices similarly 

would fall. However, Broiler prices remained artificially inflated due to Defendants’ agreement to 

artificially restrict production and their manipulation of the Georgia Dock Broiler price index, 

published by the GDA. In November 2016, it became public that the United States Department of 

Agriculture (“USDA”) had requested in July 2016 that the GDA investigate and verify the accuracy 

of the Broiler prices provided to the GDA by several Defendants. When the GDA declined to do 

so—citing the industry’s and its own lack of interest in verifying prices— USDA began publishing 

its own Broiler price statistics.

406. Boston Market’s claims based on Defendants’ supply restrictions and manipulation 

of the Georgia Dock price index were tolled under American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 

U.S. 538 (1974), and related authorities during the pendency of direct and indirect purchaser class 

actions asserted against Defendants, commencing as early as September 2, 2016.

407. The statute of limitations relevant to Boston Market’s claims have also been tolled as 

a result of the criminal indictment filed by the Department of Justice in June 2020. 

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IX. ANTITRUST IMPACT

408. Defendants’ Conspiracy, including the Small Bird Conspiracy, had the following 

effects, among others: 

a) Price competition was restrained, suppressed and/or eliminated with respect to 

Broilers;

b) The supply of Broilers was artificially restrained, manipulated and/or suppressed;

c) The prices of Broilers were fixed, raised, stabilized or maintained at artificially 

inflated levels; and

d) Purchasers of Broilers have been deprived of free and open competition among 

Defendants.

409. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from certain 

Defendants, their subsidiaries and affiliates, and entities owned or controlled by Defendants or 

Defendants’ subsidiaries and affiliates. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ abovedescribed illegal conduct, Boston Market was compelled to pay, and did pay, artificially inflated 

prices for Broilers than would have prevailed in a competitive market. Boston Market sustained 

substantial losses and damage to its businesses and property in the form of overcharges for Broilers. 

The full amount and forms and components of such damages will be calculated after discovery and 

presented upon proof at trial.

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X. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF AND CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT I

Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act

15 U.S.C. § 1

410. Boston Market incorporates paragraphs 1 through 409 above as if fully set forth 

herein. 

411. Defendants and their Co-Conspirators entered into and engaged in a combination or 

conspiracy in unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1.

412. Defendants’ anticompetitive and unlawful acts in furtherance of the Conspiracy were 

authorized, ordered or executed by their respective directors, officers, agents, employees or 

representatives, within the course and scope of their duties and employment, or with Defendants’ 

actual, apparent or ostensible authority.

413. At least as early as January 1, 2008, and continuing until at least as late as 2017, the 

exact dates being unknown to Boston Market, Defendants entered into a continuing agreement, 

understanding and conspiracy in restraint of trade to fix, raise, stabilize, and maintain prices for 

and/or restrain supply of Broilers, and rig bids and allocate markets for Small Birds, thereby 

creating anticompetitive effects.

414. The conspiratorial acts and combinations have caused unreasonable restraints in the 

market for Broilers.

415. As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Boston Market was harmed because it 

was forced to pay inflated, supracompetitive prices for Broilers.

416. In formulating and carrying out the alleged agreement, understanding and 

conspiracy, Defendants did those things that they combined and conspired to do, including but not 

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limited to the acts, practices and course of conduct set forth in this Complaint. Defendants’ 

Conspiracy had the following effects, among others: 

• Price competition in the market for Broilers was restrained, suppressed and/or 

eliminated in the United States;

• The supply of Broilers was restrained, manipulated and/or suppressed in the 

United States;

• Prices for Broilers sold by Defendants, their divisions, subsidiaries, and 

affiliates and all of their Co-Conspirators were fixed, raised, stabilized, and 

maintained at artificially high, non-competitive levels throughout the United 

States; and

• Boston Market directly purchased Broilers from Defendants and their CoConspirators. Boston Market and its divisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates, 

were therefore deprived of the benefits of free and open competition in the 

purchase of Broilers.

417. Defendants took all of the actions alleged in this Complaint with the knowledge and 

intended effect that their actions would proximately cause the price of Broilers to be higher than 

they would be but for Defendants’ conduct. Defendants also knew and intended that such an 

artificial inflation of Broiler prices would cause Boston Market to pay higher prices for Broilers.

418. Defendants also knew and intended that the coordinated increase in bids submitted to 

Boston Market—and their coordinated false explanation for the increase—would increase the prices 

paid by Boston Market.

419. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct, Boston 

Market was injured in its business or property and will continue to be injured in its business and 

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property by paying more for Broilers than it would have paid and will pay in the absence of the 

Conspiracy.

420. The alleged contract, combination, or conspiracy is a per se violation of the federal 

antitrust laws.

COUNT II

Violation of Arizona’s Uniform State Antitrust Act,

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1401, et seq.

421. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

422. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Arizona and was registered to do business in Arizona. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in Arizona from its locations in Arizona. As a result of Defendants’ 

Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store 

locations in Arizona. 

423. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Arizona locations, 

and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to customers 

in Arizona. 

424. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Arizona and the substantial business it 

conducted in Arizona—including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, and 

receiving shipment of Broilers in Arizona—Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the laws 

of Arizona.

425. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated Arizona Rev. 

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Stat. § 44-1401, et seq. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy between two 

or more persons in restraint of, trade or commerce in the Broilers market, substantial part of which 

occurred within Arizona.

426. Defendants’ Conspiracy, a substantial part of which occurred within Arizona, was

for the purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in the Broiler 

market.

427. Defendants’ violations of Arizona law were flagrant. Defendants’ unlawful conduct 

substantially affected Arizona’s trade and commerce.

428. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Boston Market 

has been injured in its business or property and is threatened with further injury. Plaintiffs therefore 

are entitled to seek all forms of relief available under Arizona Revised Statute § 44-1401, et seq.

429. In accordance with the requirements of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1415(A), notice of this 

action was mailed to the Arizona Attorney General by Boston Market and proof of service has been 

filed with the Court.

COUNT III

Violation of California’s Cartwright Act,

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700, et seq.

430. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint. 

431. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of California and was registered to do business in California. As a result of 

Defendants’ Conspiracy, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for, received shipments of, and 

took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at Boston Market restaurants in California. 

432. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all 

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shipments of Broilers it received at store locations in California from its locations in California. As 

a result of Defendants’ Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated 

prices at its store locations in California. 

433. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s California 

locations, and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to 

customers in California. 

434. As are result of Boston Market’s presence in California——including the submission 

of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, and receiving shipment of Broilers in California—

Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the laws of California under California Business & 

Professional Code §§ 16700-16770.

435. During the Conspiracy Period, Defendants and their co-conspirators entered into and 

engaged in a continuing unlawful trust in restraint of the trade and commerce described above in 

violation of the Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720. Defendants have acted in 

violation of Section 16720 to fix, raise, stabilize, and maintain prices of, and rig bids and allocated 

markets for Broilers at supra-competitive levels. Defendants knew or should have known that their 

Conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids for Broilers would cause prices for Broilers to rise. 

Defendants’ conduct substantially affected California commerce.

436. The abovementioned violations of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720 consisted, 

without limitation, of a continuing unlawful trust and concert of action among Defendants and their 

co-conspirators, the substantial terms of which were to rig the bids for, and fix, raise, maintain and 

stabilize the prices of, and to allocate markets for, Broilers.

437. For the purpose of forming and effectuating the unlawful trust, Defendants and their 

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co-conspirators have done those things that they combined and conspired to do, including but in no 

way limited to the acts, practices, and course of conduct set forth above and the following:

a) Participating in meetings and conversations, in California and elsewhere, to 

fix, raise, maintain, and/or stabilize the price of Broilers;

b) Communicating in writing, in California and elsewhere, to fix, raise, 

maintain, and/or stabilize the price of Broilers sold to Boston Market in California;

c) Restricting the supply of Broilers in order to artificially inflate the price of 

Broilers sold to Boston Market in California; 

d) Issuing price announcements in California and elsewhere, in accordance with 

illegal conspiratorial conduct that inflated the price of Broilers sold to Boston Market it California;

e) Negotiating and entering into agreements with Boston Market to sell Broilers 

to Boston Market in California at artificially inflated prices;

f) Selling Broilers to Boston Market and/or its vendors in California at 

artificially inflated prices;

g) Exchanging information, in California and elsewhere, on bids for Broilers 

sold to Boston Market and its vendors for the purpose of monitoring and enforcing adherence to 

illegal agreements;

h) Providing false statements to Boston Market, in California and elsewhere, to 

explain increased bids and prices for Broilers sold to Boston Market in California;

i) Fixing, raising, maintaining, and stabilizing the price of Broilers sold to 

Boston Market in California;

j) Allocating markets for Broilers amongst themselves; and

k) Submitting rigged bids for the award and performance of certain Broiler 

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contracts, including contracts with Boston Market for the sale and delivery of Broilers to Boston 

Market in California.

438. The combination and Conspiracy alleged herein has had, inter alia, the following 

effects:

a) Price competition in the sale of Broilers has been restrained, suppressed, 

and/or eliminated in the State of California;

b) Prices for Broilers sold by Defendants, their co-conspirators, and others have 

been fixed, raised, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high, non-competitive levels in the State 

of California; and

c) Boston Market, who purchased Broilers from Defendants, their coconspirators, and others have been deprived of the benefit of free and open competition.

439. As a direct and proximate result of the alleged unlawful conduct of Defendants, 

Boston Market paid supra-competitive, artificially inflated prices for the Broilers it purchased 

during the Conspiracy Period. But for Defendants’ conduct set forth herein, the price of Broilers 

would have been lower.

440. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Boston Market has been 

injured in its business and property by paying more for Broilers sold by Defendants, their coconspirators, and others than they would have paid in the absence of Defendants’ combination and 

Conspiracy. As a result of Defendants’ violation of Section 16720 of the California Business and 

Professional Code, Boston Market is entitled to treble damages and the costs of suit, including 

reasonable attorneys’ fees, pursuant to Section 16750(a) of the California Business and Professional 

Code.

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COUNT IV

Violation of California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”)

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.,

441. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

442. Defendants have engaged in unfair competition in violation of California’s Unfair 

Competition Law, California Business and Professional Code § 17200 et seq., by engaging in the 

acts or practices specified above.

443. This Complaint is filed, and these proceedings are pursuant to Sections 17203 and 

17204 of the California Business & Professions Code, to obtain restitution from Defendants of all 

revenues, earnings, profits compensation, and benefits which they obtained as a result of their 

unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent conduct.

444. The unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices of Defendants, as alleged 

above, injured Boston Market, other restaurants, and members of the public in that Defendants’ 

conduct restrained competition, causing Boston Market to pay supra-competitive and artificially 

inflated prices for Broilers.

445. Defendants’ Unlawful Business Practices: As alleged, Defendants violated Section 1 

of the Sherman Act and the California Cartwright Act by entering into and engaging in a continuing 

unlawful trust in restraint of trade and commerce. Defendants illegally conspired, combined, and 

agreed to fix, raise, maintain, and/or stabilize prices, to restrict the output of, and to rig bids and/or 

allocate markets for Broilers.

446. Defendants’ Fraudulent Business Practices: As alleged above, Defendants took 

affirmative actions to conceal their collusive activity by keeping communications with coconspirators secret and making false statements publically and to Boston Market about the reasons 

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for artificially inflated prices of Broilers. Boston Market was likely to be deceived, and Boston 

Market was in fact deceived, by Defendants’ fraudulent actions. As a result of Defendants’ unfair 

competition, Boston Market suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property.

447. The acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures of 

Defendants, as described above, constitute a common, continuous, and continuing course of conduct 

of unfair competition by means of unfair, unlawful, and/or fraudulent business acts or practices with 

the meaning of Section 17200 et seq.

448. Defendants’ acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices, and non-disclosures are 

unfair, unconscionable, unlawful, and/or fraudulent independently of whether they constitute a

violation of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act.

449. Defendants’ acts or practices are fraudulent or deceptive within the meaning of 

Section 17200 et seq.

450. Defendants’ conduct was carried out, effectuated, and perfected within the state of

California. 

451. By reason of the foregoing, Boston Market is entitled to full restitution and/or 

disgorgement of all revenues, earnings, profits, compensation, and benefits that may have been 

obtained by Defendants as result of such business acts and practices described above.

COUNT V

Violation of the District of Columbia Antitrust Act

D.C. Code § 28-4501, et seq.

452. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

453. The policy of District of Columbia Code, Title 28, Chapter 45 (Restraints of Trade)

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is to “promote the unhampered freedom of commerce and industry throughout the District of 

Columbia by prohibiting restraints of trade and monopolistic practices.”

454. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the District of Columbia and was registered to do business in the District of Columbia. 

During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of 

Broilers it received at store locations in the District of Columbia from its locations in the District of 

Columbia. As a result of Defendants’ Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at 

artificially inflated prices at its store locations in the District of Columbia. 

455. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s District of 

Columbia locations, and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken 

meals to customers in the District of Columbia. 

456. But for Defendants’ conduct set forth herein, the price of Broilers paid by Boston 

Market would have been lower.

457. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted substantial business in the 

District of Columbia—including submitting purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, and 

receiving shipments of Broilers in the District of Columbia—suffered injury in the District of 

Columbia, and is entitled to the protection of the laws of the District of Columbia. 

458. Under District of Columbia law, Boston Market has standing to maintain an action 

under the antitrust provisions of the D.C. Code based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. See

D.C. Code§28-4509(a).

459. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to act in restraint of trade within the 

District of Columbia, and to rig bids and allocate markets for Broilers sold within the District of 

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Columbia, in violation of D.C. Code §§ 28-4501—28-4581. Defendants’ conduct substantially 

affected District of Columbia commerce.

460. Boston Market was injured with respect to its and/or its vendors’ purchases of 

Broilers in the District of Columbia and is entitled to all forms of relief, including actual damages, 

treble damages, and interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

COUNT VI

Violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”)

Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201 et seq.

461. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

462. During the Conspiracy Period, each of the Defendants named herein, directly, and 

through affiliates or subsidiaries or agents they dominated and controlled, sold Broilers in 

commerce in the United States, including Florida. Defendants’ conduct, including but not limited 

to, their violations of the Sherman Act and various state laws as described herein, and fraudulent 

concealment caused injury to Boston Market, as Boston Market paid supra-competitive prices for 

Broilers. 

463. Based on the foregoing, Defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive acts in violation 

of Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201 et seq.

464. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Florida and was registered to do business in Florida. During the Conspiracy 

Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it received at store 

locations in Florida from its locations in Florida. As a result of Defendants’ Conspiracy, Boston 

Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store locations in Florida. 

465. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

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directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Florida locations, 

and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to customers 

in Florida. 

466. In violation of Section 501.204, Defendants agreed to act, and did in fact act, in 

restraint of trade or commerce by affecting, fixing, controlling and/or maintaining at artificial and 

non-competitive levels, the bids for and prices at which Broilers were purchased, sold, distributed or 

obtained by Boston Market and/or its vendors in Florida, and took efforts to conceal their 

agreements from Boston Market. These acts constitute a common and continuous course of conduct 

of unfair competition by means of unfair, unlawful and/or fraudulent business acts or practices.

467. The conduct of the Defendants described herein—including but not limited to their 

violations of the Sherman Act—constitutes unfair and deceptive acts or practices within the 

meaning of FDUTPA, which is intended to “protect the consuming public and legitimate business 

enterprises from those who engage in unfair methods of competition, or unconscionable, deceptive, 

or unfair acts or practices in the course of any trade or commerce.” Fla. Stat. § 501.202(2). 

FDUTPA is also intended to “make state consumer protection and enforcement consistent with 

established policies of federal law relating to consumer protection.” Fla. Stat. § 501.202(3).

468. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) price competition was 

restrained, suppressed, and eliminated for Broilers sold to Boston Market and/or its vendors in 

Florida; (2) Broiler bids and prices to Boston Market were raised, fixed, maintained and stabilized 

at artificially high levels for Broilers sold to Boston Market and/or its vendors in Florida; (3) Boston 

Market was deprived of free and open competition in the market for Broilers; and (4) Boston 

Market paid supra-competitive, artificially inflated prices for Broilers sold to it and/or its vendors in 

Florida. 

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469. During the Conspiracy Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct in violation of FDUTPA 

substantially affected Florida trade and commerce, and injured Boston Market in Florida, causing 

financial losses.

COUNT VII

Violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act,

740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/1, et seq.

470. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

471. The Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/1, et seq., aims “to promote 

the unhampered growth of commerce and industry throughout the State by prohibiting restraints of 

trade which are secured through monopolistic or oligarchic practices and which act or tend to act to 

decrease competition between and among persons engaged in commerce and trade . . . .” 740 ILCS 

10/2.

472. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Illinois and was registered to do business in Illinois. During the Conspiracy 

Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it received at store 

locations in Illinois from its locations in Illinois. As a result of Defendants’ Conspiracy, Boston 

Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store locations in Illinois. 

473. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Illinois locations, 

and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to customers 

in Illinois. 

474. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Illinois and the substantial business it 

conducted in Illinois—including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, and 

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receiving shipment of Broilers in Illinois—Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the laws of 

Illinois.

475. Under the Illinois Antitrust Act, Boston Market has standing to maintain an action 

for damages based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. 740 ILCS 10/7(2).

476. Defendants made contracts or engaged in a combination or conspiracy with each 

other, though they would have been competitors but for their prior agreement, for the purpose of 

fixing, controlling or maintaining prices for Broilers sold to Boston Market and/or its vendors in 

Illinois, and/or for rigging bids and allocating customers or markets for Broilers within the intrastate 

commerce of Illinois.

477. Boston Market was injured with respect to purchase orders placed, invoices received, 

and deliveries received for Broilers in Illinois and is entitled to all forms of relief, including actual 

damages, treble damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

COUNT XIII

Violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act,

815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 505/1, et seq.

478. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

479. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 815 Ill. Comp. 

Stat. Ann. § 505/1, et seq.

480. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more 

persons in restraint of, trade or commerce in the Broilers market, a substantial part of which 

occurred within Illinois, for the purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing, or 

maintaining prices or rigging bids to Boston Market, and allocating markets in the Broiler market.

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481. Defendants’ conduct was unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive within the conduct of 

commerce within the State of Illinois.

482. Defendants’ conduct misled Boston Market, withheld material facts, and resulted in 

material misrepresentations to Boston Market. 

483. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected Illinois’s trade and commerce. 

As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Boston Market has been injured 

in its business or property and is threatened with further injury.

484. Boston Market is within the scope of the Illinois statute. By reason of the foregoing, 

Boston Market is entitled to seek all forms of relief, including actual damages or any other relief the 

Court deems proper under 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 505/10a, et seq.

COUNT IX

Violation of the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-101, et seq.

485. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

486. The Kansas Restraint of Trade Act aims to prohibit practices which, inter alia, “tend 

to prevent full and free competition in the importation, transportation or sale of articles imported 

into this state.” Kan. Stat. Ann. §50-112.

487. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Kansas and was registered to do business in Kansas. During the Conspiracy 

Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it received at store 

locations in Kansas from its locations in Kansas. As a result of Defendants’ Conspiracy, Boston 

Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store locations in Kansas. 

488. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

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directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Kansas locations, 

and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to customers 

in Kansas. 

489. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Kansas and the substantial business it 

conducted in Kansas—including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, and 

receiving shipment of Broilers in Kansas—Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the laws of 

Kansas.

490. Under the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act, Boston Market has standing to maintain an 

action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. See Kan. Stat. Ann §50-161(b).

491. Defendants combined capital, skill or acts for the purposes of creating restrictions in 

trade or commerce of Broilers, increasing the price of Broilers sold to Boston Market and/or its 

vendors in Kansas, preventing competition in the sale of Broilers, rigging bids and allocating 

markets for the sale of broilers to Boston Market and/or its vendors in Kansas, in a manner that 

established the price of Broilers and precluded free and unrestricted competition among themselves 

in the sale of Broilers to Boston Market and/or its vendors in Kansas, in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. 

§50-101, et seq.

492. But for Defendants’ conduct set forth herein, the price of Broilers paid by Boston 

Market would have been lower. As a result, Boston Market was injured with respect to its and/or its 

vendors purchases of Broilers in Kansas and is entitled to all forms of relief, including actual 

damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and injunctive relief.

COUNT X

Violation of the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act

Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.771, et seq.

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493. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

494. The Michigan Antitrust Reform Act aims “to prohibit contracts, combinations, and 

conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce...to prohibit monopolies and attempts to monopolize 

trade or commerce...[and] to provide remedies, fines, and penalties for violations of this act.” Mich. 

Act 274 of 1984.

495. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Michigan and was registered to do business in Michigan. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in Michigan from its locations in Michigan. As a result of Defendants’ 

conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store 

locations in Michigan. 

496. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Michigan locations, 

and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to customers 

in Michigan. 

497. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Michigan and the substantial business it 

conducted in Michigan—including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, 

and receiving shipment of Broilers in Michigan—Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the 

laws of Michigan.

498. Under the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act, Boston Market has standing to maintain 

an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. Mich. Comp. Laws. § 452.778(2).

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499. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to restrain or commerce in the market 

for Broilers, in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.772, et seq.

500. Defendants’ violations of Michigan law were flagrant. But for Defendants’ conduct 

set forth herein, the price of Broilers paid by Boston Market would have been lower. 

501. As a result, Boston Market was injured with respect to its and/or its vendors’ 

purchases of Broilers in Michigan and are entitled to all forms of relief, including actual damages, 

treble damages for flagrant violations, interest, costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and injunctive or 

other appropriate equitable relief.

COUNT XI

Violation of Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971,

Minn. Stat. §325D.49, et seq.

502. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

503. The Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971 aims to prohibit any contract, combination or 

conspiracy when any part thereof was created, formed, or entered into in Minnesota; any contract, 

combination or conspiracy, wherever created, formed or entered into; any establishment, 

maintenance or use of monopoly power; and any attempt to establish, maintain or use monopoly 

power, whenever any of these affect Minnesota trade or commerce.

504. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Minnesota and was registered to do business in Minnesota. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in Minnesota from its locations in Minnesota. As a result of Defendants’ 

Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store 

locations in Minnesota. 

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505. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Minnesota 

locations, and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to 

customers in Minnesota. 

506. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Minnesota and the substantial business it 

conducted in Minnesota—including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, 

and receiving shipment of Broilers in Minnesota—Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the 

laws of Minnesota.

507. Under the Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971, Boston Market has standing to maintain 

an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. See Minn. Stat. §325D.57.

508. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired in unreasonable restraint of trade or 

commerce in the market for Broilers within the intrastate commerce of and outside of Minnesota 

and fixed prices, rigged bids and allocated markets for Broilers sold to Boston Market and/or its 

vendors within the intrastate commerce of and outside of Minnesota, in violation of Minn. Stat. 

§325D.49, et seq.

509. But for Defendants’ conduct set forth herein, the price of Broilers paid by Boston 

Market and/or its vendors would have been lower. As a result, Boston Market was injured with 

respect to its and/or its vendors’ purchases of Broilers in Minnesota and are entitled to all forms of 

relief, including actual damages, treble damages, costs and disbursements, reasonable attorneys’ 

fees, and injunctive relief necessary to prevent and restrain violations hereof.

COUNT XII

Violation of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act,

Minn. Stat. § 325F.68, et seq.

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510. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

511. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Minnesota and was registered to do business in Minnesota. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in Minnesota from its locations in Minnesota. As a result of Defendants’ 

conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store 

locations in Minnesota. 

512. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Minnesota 

locations, and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to 

customers in Minnesota. 

513. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Minnesota and the substantial business it 

conducted in Minnesota—including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, 

and receiving shipment of Broilers in Minnesota—Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the 

laws of Minnesota.

514. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated the Minnesota 

Consumer Fraud Act, Minn. Stat. §325F.68, et seq.

515. Defendants engaged in a deceptive trade practice with the intent to injure 

competitors and consumers through supra-competitive profits.

516. Defendants established, maintained, or used, or attempted to establish, a conspiracy 

in restraint of trade or commerce in the Broilers Market, a substantial part of which occurred within 

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Minnesota, for the purpose of controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices and rigging bids for Broilers 

sold to Boston Market in Minnesota, and allocating markets in the Broilers Market.

517. Defendants’ conduct was unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive within the conduct of 

commerce within the State of Minnesota.

518. Defendants’ conduct, specifically in the form of fraudulent concealment of their 

horizontal agreements, created a fraudulent or deceptive act or practice committed by a supplier in 

connection with a consumer transaction.

519. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected Minnesota’s trade and 

commerce.

520. Defendants’ conduct was willful. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ 

unlawful conduct, Boston Market has been injured in its business or property and is threatened with 

further injury. Boston Market is within the scope of the Minnesota statute.

521. By reason of the foregoing, Boston Market is entitled to seek all forms of relief, 

including damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under Minn. Stat. §325F.68, et seq. and 

applicable case law.

COUNT XIII

Violation of the Nebraska Junkin Act,

Neb. Rev. Stat. §59-801, et seq.

522. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

523. Chapter 59 of the Nebraska Revised Statute generally governs business and trade 

practices. Sections 801 through 831 thereof, known as the Junkin Act, prohibit antitrust violations 

such as restraints of trade and monopolization.

524. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

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business in the State of Nebraska and was registered to do business in Nebraska. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in Nebraska from its locations in Nebraska. As a result of Defendants’ 

Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store 

locations in Nebraska. 

525. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Nebraska locations, 

and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to customers 

in Nebraska. 

526. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Nebraska and the substantial business it 

conducted in Nebraska —including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, 

and receiving shipment of Broilers in Nebraska —Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the 

laws of Nebraska.

527. Under Nebraska law, Boston Market has standing to maintain an action under the 

Junkin Act based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §59-821.

528. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired in restraint of trade or commerce of 

Broilers within the intrastate commerce of Nebraska, by agreeing to fix prices and rig bids for 

Broilers sold to Boston Market and/or its vendors in Nebraska, and to allocate markets and 

otherwise control trade, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. §59-801, et seq.

529. Boston Market was injured with respect to its or its vendors’ purchases of Broilers in 

Nebraska and are entitled to all forms of relief, including actual damages or liquidated damages in 

an amount which bears a reasonable relation to the actual damages which have been sustained, as 

well as reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and injunctive relief.

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COUNT XIV

Violation of the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act,

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1602, et seq.

530. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

531. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Nebraska and was registered to do business in Nebraska. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in Nebraska from its locations in Nebraska. As a result of Defendants’ 

Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store 

locations in Nebraska. 

532. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Nebraska locations, 

and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to customers 

in Nebraska. 

533. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Nebraska and the substantial business it 

conducted in Nebraska —including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, 

and receiving shipment of Broilers in Nebraska —Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the 

laws of Nebraska.

534. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§59-1602, et seq.

535. Defendants have entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or 

more persons in restraint of trade or commerce in the Broilers Market, a substantial part of which 

occurred within Nebraska.

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536. Defendants established, maintained, or attempted to establish, conspiracy in restraint 

of trade or commerce in the Broilers Market, for the purpose of excluding or limiting competition or 

controlling or maintaining prices or rigging bids for Broilers sold to Boston Market and/or its 

vendors in Nebraska, and allocating markets, a substantial part of which occurred within Nebraska.

537. Defendants’ conduct was conducted with the intent to deceive Boston Market 

regarding the nature of Defendants’ actions within the stream of Nebraska commerce.

538. Defendants’ conduct was unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive within the conduct of 

commerce within the State of Nebraska.

539. Defendants’ conduct misled Boston Market, withheld material facts, and had a direct 

or indirect impact upon Boston Market’s ability to protect itself. Defendants’ unlawful conduct 

substantially affected Nebraska’s trade and commerce.

540. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Boston Market 

has been injured in its business or property and is threatened with further injury. Boston Market is

within the scope of the Nebraska statute.

541. By reason of the foregoing, Boston Market is entitled to seek all forms of relief 

available under Neb. Rev. Stat. §59-1614

COUNT XV

Violation of the Nevada Unfair Trade Practices Act,

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598A.010, et seq.

542. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

543. The Nevada Unfair Trade Practice Act (“NUTPA”) states that “free, open and 

competitive production and sale of commodities...is necessary to the economic well-being of the 

citizens of the State of Nevada.” Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 598A.030(1).

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544. The policy of NUTPA is to prohibit acts in restraint of trade or commerce, to 

preserve and protect the free, open and competitive market, and to penalize all persons engaged in 

anticompetitive practices. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 598A.030(2). Such acts include, inter alia, price 

fixing, division of markets, allocation of customers, and monopolization of trade. Nev. Rev. Stat. 

Ann. § 598A.060.

545. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Nevada and was registered to do business in Nevada. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in Nevada from its locations in Nevada. As a result of Defendants’ 

Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store 

locations in Nevada. 

546. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Nevada locations, 

and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to customers 

in Nevada. 

547. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Nevada and the substantial business it 

conducted in Nevada —including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, and 

receiving shipment of Broilers in Nevada —Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the laws 

of Nevada.

548. Under Nevada law, indirect purchasers have standing to maintain an action under

NUTPA based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §598A.210(2).

549. Defendants fixed prices for Broilers sold to Boston Market and/or its vendors in 

Nevada, rigged bids and divided Nevada markets, allocated Nevada customers, and engaged in a 

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contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 

598A, et seq.

550. But for Defendants’ conduct set forth herein, the prices of Broilers paid by Boston 

Market and/or its vendors for Broilers in Nevada would have been lower. Boston Market was 

injured with respect to the Broilers purchased in Nevada at supra-competitive prices caused by 

Defendants’ conduct. 

551. Accordingly, Boston Market is entitled to all forms of relief, including actual 

damages, treble damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and injunctive relief.

552. In accordance with the requirements of § 598A.210(3), notice of this action was 

mailed to the Nevada Attorney General by Plaintiff.

COUNT XVI

Violation of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act,

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0903, et seq.

553. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

554. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Nevada and was registered to do business in Nevada. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in Nevada from its locations in Nevada. As a result of Defendants’ 

conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store 

locations in Nevada. 

555. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Nevada locations, 

and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to customers 

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in Nevada. 

556. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Nevada and the substantial business it 

conducted in Nevada —including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, and 

receiving shipment of Broilers in Nevada —Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the laws 

of Nevada.

557. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated Nev. Rev. Stat. § 

598.0903, et seq.

558. Defendants engaged in a deceptive trade practice with the intent to injure Boston 

Market and to substantially lessen competition.

559. Defendants established, maintained, or used or attempted to establish a conspiracy in 

restraint of trade or commerce in the Broilers Market, a substantial part of which occurred within 

Nevada, for the purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices of 

Broilers sold to Boston Market in Nevada. 

560. Defendants’ conduct was unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive within the conduct of 

commerce within the State of Nevada.

561. Defendants’ conduct amounted to a fraudulent act or practice committed by a 

supplier in connection with a consumer transaction.

562. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected Nevada’s trade and commerce.

563. Defendants’ conduct was willful. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ 

unlawful conduct, Boston Market has been injured in its business or property and are threatened 

with further injury. 

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564. By reason of the foregoing, Boston Market is entitled to seek all forms of relief, 

including damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and a civil penalty of up to $5,000 per 

violation under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.0993.

COUNT XVII

Violation of New Hampshire’s Consumer Protection Act

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. XXXI, § 358-A, et seq.

565. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

566. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of New Hampshire and was registered to do business in New Hampshire. 

During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of 

Broilers it received at store locations in New Hampshire from its locations in New Hampshire. As a 

result of Defendants’ Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated 

prices at its store locations in New Hampshire. 

567. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s New Hampshire 

locations, and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to 

customers in New Hampshire. 

568. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in New Hampshire and the substantial 

business it conducted in New Hampshire —including the submission of purchase orders for, 

receiving invoices for, and receiving shipment of Broilers in New Hampshire —Boston Market is 

entitled to the protection of the laws of New Hampshire.

569. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated N.H. Rev. Stat. 

Ann. tit. XXXI, §358-A, et seq.

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570. Defendants have entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or 

more persons in restraint of, trade or commerce in the Broilers Market, a substantial part of which 

occurred within New Hampshire.

571. Defendants established, maintained, or used, or attempted to establish, a conspiracy 

in restraint of trade or commerce in the Broilers Market, for the purpose of excluding or limiting 

competition or controlling or maintaining prices of Broilers sold to Boston Market in New 

Hampshire, a substantial part of which occurred within New Hampshire.

572. Defendants’ conduct was conducted with the intent to deceive Boston Market 

regarding the nature of Defendants’ actions within the stream of New Hampshire commerce.

573. Defendants’ conduct was unfair or deceptive within the conduct of commerce within 

the State of New Hampshire.

574. Defendants’ conduct was willful and knowing. Defendants’ conduct misled Boston 

Market, withheld material facts, and had a direct impact upon Boston Market’s ability to protect 

itself.

575. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected New Hampshire’s trade and

commerce.

576. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Boston Market 

has been injured in its business or property and is threatened with further injury. Boston Market is 

within the scope of the New Hampshire statute.

577. By reason of the foregoing, Boston Market is entitled to seek all forms of relief 

available under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. XXXI, §§358- A:10 and 358-A:10-a.

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COUNT XVIII

Violation of New Mexico Antitrust Act

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-1, et seq.

578. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

579. The New Mexico Antitrust Act aims to prohibit restraints of trade and monopolistic

practices. N.M. Stat. Ann. 57-1-15.

580. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of New Mexico and was registered to do business in New Mexico. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in New Mexico from its locations in New Mexico. As a result of 

Defendants’ Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its 

store locations in New Mexico. 

581. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s New Mexico 

locations, and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to 

customers in New Mexico. 

582. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in New Mexico and the substantial business 

it conducted in New Mexico —including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices 

for, and receiving shipment of Broilers in New Mexico —Boston Market is entitled to the 

protection of the laws of New Mexico.

583. Under New Mexico law, Boston Market has standing to maintain an action based on 

the facts alleged in this Complaint. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-3.

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584. Defendants contracted, agreed, combined or conspired to restrain trade for Broilers 

sold to Boston Market and/or its vendors within the intrastate commerce of New Mexico, in 

violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-1, et seq.

585. Boston Market was injured with respect to purchases of Broilers in New Mexico and 

are entitled to all forms of relief, including actual damages, treble damages, reasonable attorneys’ 

fees, costs, and injunctive relief.

COUNT XIX

Violation of the New Mexico Unfair Practices Act,

N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-12-3, et seq.

586. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

587. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of New Mexico and was registered to do business in New Mexico. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in New Mexico from its locations in New Mexico. As a result of 

Defendants’ Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its 

store locations in New Mexico. 

588. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s New Mexico 

locations, and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to 

customers in New Mexico. 

589. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in New Mexico and the substantial business 

it conducted in New Mexico —including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices 

for, and receiving shipment of Broilers in New Mexico —Boston Market is entitled to the 

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protection of the laws of New Mexico.

590. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated N.M. Stat. Ann.

§§57-12-3, et seq.

591. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more 

persons in restraint of trade or commerce in the Broilers market, a substantial part of which 

occurred within New Mexico.

592. Defendants established, maintained, or used, or attempted to establish a conspiracy 

in restraint of trade or commerce in the market for Broilers, a substantial part of which occurred 

within New Mexico, for the purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining 

prices and rigging bids for Broilers sold to Boston Market in New Mexico and allocating markets 

for Broilers.

593. Defendants’ conduct was unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive within the conduct of 

commerce within the State of New Mexico.

594. Defendants’ conduct misled Boston Market, withheld material facts, and resulted in 

material misrepresentations to Boston Market. 

595. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected New Mexico’s trade and 

commerce.

596. Defendants’ conduct constituted “unconscionable trade practices” in that such

conduct, inter alia, resulted in a gross disparity between the value received by Boston Market and 

the price paid by them for Broilers as set forth in N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-12-2E. 

597. Defendants’ conduct was willful. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ 

unlawful conduct, Boston Market has been injured in its business or property and is threatened with 

further injury.

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598. By reason of the foregoing, Boston Market is entitled to seek all forms of relief, 

including actual damages or up to $300 per violation, whichever is greater, plus reasonable 

attorney’s fees under N.M. Stat. Ann. §§57-12-10.

COUNT XX

Violation of the Donnelly Antitrust Act,

N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340, et. seq.

599. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

600. Article 22 of the New York General Business Law general prohibits contracts or 

agreements in restraint of trade, with the policy of encouraging competition or the free exercise of 

any activity in the conduct of any business, trade or commerce in New York. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law 

§340(1).

601. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of New York and was registered to do business in New York. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in New York from its locations in New York. As a result of Defendants’ 

Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store 

locations in New York. 

602. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s New York 

locations, and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to 

customers in New York. 

603. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in New York and the substantial business it 

conducted in New York —including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, 

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and receiving shipment of Broilers in New York —Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the 

laws of New York.

604. But for Defendants’ conduct set forth herein, the price of Broilers sold to Boston 

Market and/or its vendors in New York would have been lower.

605. Under New York law, Boston Market has standing to maintain an action based on 

the facts alleged in this Complaint. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §340(6).

606. Defendants established or maintained a conspiracy within intrastate commerce of 

New York for the trade or commerce of Broilers sold to Boston Market and/or its Vendors and 

restrained competition in the free exercise of the conduct of the business of Broilers within the 

intrastate commerce of New York, in violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §340, et seq.

607. Boston Market was injured with respect to Broilers sold to Boston Market and/or its 

vendors in New York and is entitled to all forms of relief, including actual damages, treble 

damages, costs not exceeding $10,000, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.

608. In accordance with the requirements of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340(5), notice of this 

action was mailed to the New York Attorney General by Plaintiff.

COUNT XXI

Violation of the North Carolina Unfair Trade and Business Practices Act,

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1, et seq.

609. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

610. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of North Carolina and was registered to do business in North Carolina. During 

the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in North Carolina from its locations in North Carolina. As a result of 

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Defendants’ Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its 

store locations in North Carolina. 

611. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s North Carolina 

locations, and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to 

customers in North Carolina. 

612. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in North Carolina and the substantial 

business it conducted in North Carolina—including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving 

invoices for, and receiving shipment of Broilers in North Carolina —Boston Market is entitled to 

the protection of the laws of North Carolina.

613. Defendants established, maintained, or used, or attempted to establish, a conspiracy 

in restraint of trade or commerce in the market for Broilers, for the purpose of affecting competition 

or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices and rigging bids for Broilers sold to Boston Market 

and/or its vendors in North Carolina, a substantial part of which occurred within North Carolina.

614. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected North Carolina’s trade and 

commerce.

615. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Boston Market 

has been injured in its business or property and is threatened with further injury.

616. By reason of the foregoing, Boston Market is entitled to seek all forms of relief 

available, including treble damages, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1, et seq.

COUNT XXII

Violation of the Rhode Island Antitrust Act

R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §6-36-1, et seq.

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617. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

618. The Rhode Island Antitrust Act aims to promote the unhampered growth of 

commerce and industry throughout Rhode Island by prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade and 

monopolistic practices that hamper, prevent or decrease competition. R.I. Gen. Laws §6-36-2(a)(2).

619. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Rhode Island and was registered to do business in Rhode Island. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in Rhode Island from its locations in Rhode Island. As a result of 

Defendants’ Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its 

store locations in Rhode Island. 

620. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Rhode Island 

locations, and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to 

customers in Rhode Island. 

621. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Rhode Island and the substantial business 

it conducted in Rhode Island —including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices 

for, and receiving shipment of Broilers in Rhode Island —Boston Market is entitled to the 

protection of the laws of Rhode Island.

622. But for Defendants’ conduct set forth herein, the price of Broilers sold to Boston 

Market and/or its vendors would have been lower.

623. Under the Rhode Island Antitrust Act, as of July 15, 2013, Boston Market has 

standing to maintain an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. See R.I. Gen. Laws §6-

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36-11(a). In Rhode Island, Boston Market’s claims alleged herein run from July 15, 2013, through 

the date that the effects of Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct cease.

624. Defendants contracted, combined and conspired in restraint of trade of Broilers

within the intrastate commerce of Rhode Island, and established, maintained or used, or attempted

to establish, maintain or use, a conspiracy in restrain of trade of Broilers for the purpose of 

excluding competition or controlling, fixing or maintaining prices and rigging bids for Broilers sold 

to Boston Market and/or its vendors in Rhode Island, and allocating markets for Broilers within the 

intrastate commerce of Rhode Island, in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws §6-36-1, et seq.

625. Boston Market was injured with respect to its and/or its vendors’ purchases of 

Broilers in Rhode Island and are entitled to all forms of relief, including actual damages, treble 

damages, reasonable costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief.

626. In accordance with the requirements of R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 6-36-21, notice of this 

action was mailed to the Rhode Island Attorney General by Boston Market and proof of service has 

been filed with the Court.

COUNT XXIII

Violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act,

S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10, et seq.

627. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

628. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated S.C. Code Ann.

§§39-5-10.

629. Defendants have entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or 

more persons in restraint of trade or commerce in the Broilers Market, a substantial part of which 

occurred within South Carolina.

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630. Defendants established, maintained, or used, or attempted to establish, a conspiracy 

in restraint of trade or commerce in the market for Broilers, for the purpose of excluding or limiting 

competition or controlling or maintaining prices, or rigging bids for Broilers sold to Boston Market 

and/or its vendors in South Carolina, and allocating markets, a substantial part of which occurred 

within South Carolina.

631. Defendants’ conduct was conducted with the intent to deceive Boston Market 

regarding the nature of Defendants’ actions within the stream of South Carolina commerce.

632. Defendants’ conduct misled Boston Market, withheld material facts, and had a direct 

or indirect impact upon Boston Market’s ability to protect itself. Boston Market is within the scope 

of the South Carolina statute.

633. Defendants’ unlawful conduct was unfair or deceptive and substantially affected 

South Carolina trade and commerce.

COUNT XXIV

Violation of Virginia Consumer Protection Act

VA Code Ann. § 59.1, et seq.

634. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

635. By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated Va. Code Ann. 

§ 59.1-196, et seq.

636. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Virginia and was registered to do business in Virginia. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in Virginia from its locations in Virginia. As a result of Defendants’ 

Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store 

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locations in Virginia. 

637. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Virginia locations, 

and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to customers 

in Virginia. 

638. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Virginia and the substantial business it 

conducted in Virginia —including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, and 

receiving shipment of Broilers in Virginia —Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the laws 

of Virginia.

639. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more 

persons in restraint of trade or commerce in the Broilers market, a substantial part of which 

occurred in Virginia.

640. Defendants conspired for the purpose of excluding or limiting competition or 

controlling or maintaining prices, or rigging bids for Broilers sold to Boston Market and/or its 

vendors in Virginia, and allocating markets, a substantial part of which occurred within Virginia.

641. Defendants’ conduct was unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive within the conduct of 

commerce within the State of Virginia.

642. Defendants’ conduct amounted to a fraudulent act or practice committed by a 

supplier in connection with a consumer transaction.

643. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected Virginia’s trade and commerce.

644. Defendants’ conduct was willful. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ 

unlawful conduct, Boston Market has been injured in its business or property.

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645. By reason of the foregoing, Boston Market is entitled to seek all forms of relief 

available, including treble damages, under Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-204(A), et seq.

Count XXV

Violation of Wisconsin Antitrust Act

Wis. Stat. Ann. § 133.18(1)(1), et seq.

646. Boston Market incorporates and realleges, as though fully set forth herein, each and 

every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.

647. Chapter 133 of the Wisconsin Statutes governs trust and monopolies, with the intent 

“to safeguard the public against the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and 

encourage competition by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory business practices which destroy or 

hamper competition.” Wis. Stat. § 133.01.

648. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market conducted a substantial volume of 

business in the State of Wisconsin and was registered to do business in Wisconsin. During the 

Conspiracy Period, Boston Market submitted purchase orders for all shipments of Broilers it 

received at store locations in Wisconsin from its locations in Wisconsin. As a result of Defendants’ 

Conspiracy, Boston Market took delivery of Broilers at artificially inflated prices at its store 

locations in Wisconsin. 

649. During the Conspiracy Period, Boston Market purchased Broilers from Defendants, 

directly and through its vendors, for use in food preparation in Boston Market’s Wisconsin 

locations, and not for resale in unaltered form. Boston Market then sold prepared chicken meals to 

customers in Wisconsin. 

650. As a result of Boston Market’s presence in Wisconsin and the substantial business it 

conducted in Wisconsin —including the submission of purchase orders for, receiving invoices for, 

and receiving shipment of Broilers in Wisconsin—Boston Market is entitled to the protection of the 

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laws of Wisconsin.

651. Under Wisconsin law, Boston Market has standing under the antitrust provisions of 

the Wisconsin Statutes to maintain an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. See Wis. 

Stat. § 133.18(a).

652. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired in restraint of trade or commerce of 

Broilers, with the intention of injuring or destroying competition therein, in violation of Wis. Stat. 

§133.01, et seq.

653. Defendants’ and their co-conspirators’ anticompetitive activities have directly, 

foreseeably and proximately caused injury to Boston Market. Its injuries consist of: (1) being 

denied the opportunity to purchase lower-priced Broilers from Defendants in Wisconsin, and (2) 

paying higher prices for Defendants’ Broilers than it would have in the absence of Defendants’ 

conduct. These injuries are of the type of the laws of Wisconsin were designed to prevent, and flow 

from that which makes Defendants’ conduct unlawful.

654. Boston Market was injured with respect to Broilers sold to Boston Market and/or its 

vendors in Wisconsin. Accordingly, Boston Market is entitled to all forms of relief, including 

actual damages, treble damages, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, and injunctive relief. 

Defendants are jointly and severally liable for all damages suffered by Boston Market.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court:

A. Enter joint and several judgments against Defendants in favor of Plaintiff;

B. Award Plaintiff damages in an amount to be determined at trial to the maximum 

extent allowed under federal antitrust laws, and enter a joint and several judgment in favor of 

Plaintiff against Defendants in an amount to be trebled as provided by law;

C. Award Plaintiff post-judgment interest as provided by law, with such interest to be 

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awarded at the highest legal rate;

D. Award Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and costs, as provided by law; 

and

E. Grant Plaintiff such other and further relief that the Court may deem just and proper.

JURY DEMAND

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all 

issues so triable.

Dated: June 12, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

BOSTON MARKET CORPORATION 

By: /s/ Lori P. Lustrin

Robert W. Turken (pro hac vice)

Lori P. Lustrin (pro hac vice)

Scott N. Wagner (pro hac vice)

BILZIN SUMBERG BAENA PRICE &

AXELROD LLP

1450 Brickell Ave., Suite 2300

Miami, Florida 33131-3456

Telephone: 305-374-7580

Facsimile: 305-374-7593

rturken@bilzin.com

llustrin@bilzin.com

swagner@bilzin.com

Andrew P. Bleiman

Mark I. Fishbein

MARKS & KLEIN, LLP

1363 Shermer Road, Suite 318

Northbrook, Illinois 60062

Telephone: 312-206-5162

Facsimile: 312-420-5568

andrew@marksklein.com

mark@marksklein.com

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