SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5017-18T3

TARA LUEDDEKE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

VINCENT MAZZA and NATIONAL 

SECURITIES CORP., 

Defendants-Respondents.

________________________________

Submitted January 8, 2020 – Decided January 29, 2020

Before Judges Mayer and Enright.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L-4771-18.

Bruce E. Baldinger, LLC, attorneys for appellant

(Bruce Eric Baldinger, on the briefs).

Baker & Hostetler, LLP, and Freeman Mathis & Gary, 

LLP, attorneys for respondent National Securities 

Corp. (Daniel J. Buzzetta, Erica Barrow, and Joshua G. 

Ferguson, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Plaintiff Tara Lueddeke appeals from a July 15, 2019 order compelling 

arbitration and dismissing her complaint without prejudice. We affirm.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants National Securities Corp. (NSC) and 

Vincent Mazza for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, violation 

of state and federal securities laws, violation of the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, 

Warranty and Notice Act (TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18, invasion of 

privacy, and emotional distress. Plaintiff transferred funds she received from 

an inheritance to NSC for investment. Mazza, a stockbroker employed by NSC, 

assisted plaintiff with opening her NSC accounts and made investment trades on 

her behalf. At the time, Mazza was in a long-term relationship with plaintiff's 

stepdaughter. 

To open investment accounts with NSC, plaintiff was required to sign an 

Arbitration Agreement.1 The document, entitled "Pre-Dispute Arbitration 

Agreement" in large font, is two pages in length. NSC will not open an

investment account without a client executing the Arbitration Agreement. 

Pursuant to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement "[b]y signing an

arbitration agreement, the parties agree[d]" to: (1) relinquish "the right to sue 

1

 Plaintiff signed two identical arbitration agreements associated with her two 

investment accounts at NSC.
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each other in court, including the right to a trial by jury, except as provided by 

the rules of the arbitration forum in which a claim is filed;" (2) accept an 

arbitration award as final and binding; (3) conduct limited discovery; (4) waive 

an explanation by the arbitrator in support of an award, unless all parties so 

request; (5) use arbitrators familiar with the securities industry; (6) agree upon 

time limits for asserting a claim; and (7) incorporate "[t]he rules of the 

arbitration forum in which the claim is filed and any amendments thereto." 

The Arbitration Agreement also stated:

All controversies that may arise between me and my 

Broker/Dealer concerning any subject matter, issue or 

circumstance whatsoever (including, but not limited to, 

controversies concerning any account, order or 

transaction, or the continuation, performance, 

interpretation or breach of this or any other agreement 

between me and my Broker/Dealer whether entered into 

or arising before, on or after the date this investment is 

made[)], shall be determined by arbitration in 

accordance with the rules then prevailing of the 

Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) or 

any United States securities self-regulatory 

organization or United States securities exchange of 

which the person, entity or entities against whom the 

claim is made is a member, as I may designate.

A few months after Mazza began handling her investments with NSC, 

plaintiff alleged defendants made unauthorized purchases of securities contrary 

to her best interests and stated wishes. According to plaintiff, the unauthorized 
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transactions resulted in significant financial losses to her and substantial 

commissions to defendants. In addition, plaintiff claimed defendants 

improperly disclosed her investment account information to third parties.

After plaintiff filed her complaint, NSC moved to dismiss the complaint 

and compel arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Agreement. 2 In a July 

15, 2019 memorandum of decision, Judge Kimberly Espinales-Maloney

dismissed plaintiff's complaint without prejudice and compelled arbitration in 

accordance with the parties' signed agreement. The judge concluded the 

Arbitration Agreement signed by plaintiff was unambiguous and clearly 

encompassed "all controversies" between plaintiff and NSC, involving "any 

subject" matter, would be submitted to arbitration. She further held that the 

parties were giving up the right to sue each other in court, including a right to a 

trial by jury. 

On appeal, plaintiff claims the Arbitration Agreement failed to 

specifically advise of the waiver of her right to pursue statutory claims in court. 

2

 When NSC filed its motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, Mazza had not yet 

answered the complaint. The parties entered into a consent order extending 

Mazza's time to file an answer depending on the outcome of NSC's motion. In 

the event NSC prevailed on its motion, the consent order provided Mazza would 

be entitled to the same relief. 
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In addition, she argues the Arbitration Agreement was unenforceable because it 

was confusing on its face.

We review the enforceability of an arbitration agreement de novo. Goffe 

v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 238 N.J. 191, 207 (2019) (citing Hirsch v. Amper Fin. 

Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013)). Because "[t]he enforceability of 

arbitration provisions is a question of law," the trial court's decision is not given 

deference. Ibid. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 

N.J. 366, 378 (1995) ("A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal 

consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special 

deference."). 

Plaintiff relies on Moon v. Breathless Inc., 868 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017) in 

support of her argument that the Arbitration Agreement is invalid and 

unenforceable. In Moon, the Third Circuit, applying New Jersey law, 

established a three-part test to determine arbitrability of New Jersey statutory 

claims. Id. at 214. The Moon court held that for an arbitration clause to be 

valid, it must: (1) "identify the general substantive area that the arbitration 

clause covers"; (2) "reference the types of claims waived by the provision"; and 

(3) "explain the difference between arbitration and litigation." Ibid. (citing 

Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124 
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(2001)). "[T]he clause, at least in some general and sufficiently broad way, must 

explain that the plaintiff is giving up her [or his] right to bring her [or his] claims 

in court or have a jury resolve the dispute." Ibid. (quoting Atalese v. U.S. Legal 

Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430, 447 (2014)). 

We reject plaintiff's argument that the Arbitration Agreement failed to 

satisfy the Moon test. Here, the parties expressly consented to arbitrate "[a]ll 

controversies that may arise between [the investor] and [their] 

Broker/Dealer . . . ." By agreeing to the broad language "all controversies," 

plaintiff's statutory causes of action were encompassed within the Arbitration 

Agreement. The Arbitration Agreement also governed claims "concerning any 

subject matter, issue or circumstance whatsoever []including, but not limited to, 

controversies concerning any account, order or transaction, or the continuation, 

performance, interpretation or breach of this or any other agreement between me 

and my Broker/Dealer . . . ." This language unambiguously incorporated all 

claims asserted by plaintiff, including her statutory claims. 

Moreover, the Arbitration Agreement clearly and explicitly explained the 

difference between arbitration and litigation in court. By signing the Arbitration 

Agreement, "[a]ll parties . . . [gave] up the right to sue each other in court, 

including the right to a trial by jury . . . ." The Arbitration Agreement further 
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noted that "[a]rbitration awards are generally final and binding; a party's ability 

to have a court reverse or modify an arbitration award is very limited." 

Having reviewed the record, for reasons stated by Judge EspinalesMaloney in her thorough written decision issued with the order under appeal, 

we are satisfied the Arbitration Agreement adequately, broadly, and 

unambiguously set forth the claims to be arbitrated by the parties, and expressly 

waived the parties' right to proceed in court by way of a jury trial. It is therefore 

valid and enforceable.

Affirmed.