### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 15, 200 3 S es sio n
ROS E MA RIE H AR PE R B RITT v. EL MERLEE BRIT T

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Madison Coun ty

No. 58837 Joe C. M orris, Chancellor

No. W2003-00430-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 17, 2003

This appea l arises fr om a divorce action in which the trial court gra nted wife an absolute divorce a nd open-e nded re habilitative alimony , order ed the parties marital property sold and the asse ts divided,
a nd e nte re d a pa

re nti ng pla n su bmi tte d by wi fe

. We a ff ir m in pa rt , mo dif y in p art , r e ve rs e in p art , and re mand.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed in p art; Modif ied in p art; Reve rsed in part and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

K. Do n B ish op , H e nd e rs on , T e nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, El me r L e e B ri tt. Mary J o Middlebrooks and Be tty S. Scott, J ackson, Te nnessee , for the a ppellee, Rose Ma

rie Ha rper B ri tt.

OP IN ION

Rose Marie Harpe r Britt (“Wife” ) and Elmer L ee Britt (“ Husband” ) we re ma rried in Ma

rch 1974. One child was born of the marria g e in July 1986. I n Aug ust 2001, W ife filed a complaint for absolute divorce based on irr econc ilable di ff er en ce s and inappr opriate ma rital conduc t. Husband
answe red a nd counter -cla imed on the g rounds of inappr opriate ma rital conduc t in March 2002.

Th e ma tte r w a s h e ard on July 30 , 200 2. On Au g us t 29 , 2 00 2, the c ou rt no tif ie d th e pa rt ie s’
a tto rn e y s, by

le tte r, of its ru lin g

. Th e c ou rt a wa rd e d Wif e a div or c e on the g ro un ds of ina pp ro pr ia te marital conduc t. The court found the parties could not r eac h a satisfa ctory ag ree ment reg arding the div isi on of

pr op e rt y , a nd or de re d it

to be so ld a nd the pr oc e e ds div ide d. I t a lso or de re d H us ba nd to pay Wife reha

bilitative alimonyof $800 per month until further order s of the court, and re fer ence d a pre viouslyapprove d pare nting plan.-2-

Husband’s a ttorney

filed a motion to withdraw f rom the lawsuit on Novembe r 5, 2002. Howeve r, the court did not g rant the motion until F ebrua ry 18, 2003, when it entere d an ag ree d order allowing substitut ion of counsel f or Husband.

I n J an u ar y 2 003, Wife’s attorney submitt ed an or der of

absolute divorce and mediate d pa re nti ng pla n to the c ourt

. W if e ’s a tto rn e y

inf or me d th e c ou rt

that sh e ha d f

or wa rd e d th e se documents to Husband’ s attorney on November 7, 2002. She further informed the court that she had made se vera l reque sts for re sponses from Husba nd’s attorne y , but had re ceive d none.

The c ourt enter ed the or der f or absolute divorc e and pe rmane nt pare nt i n g p l an on J anuary 24 , 2 00 3. Th e fi na l or de r re ite rate d the te rm s of the c ou rt ’s Au g us t 20 02 ru lin g , o rd e re d e a c h p art y to pa y their own a ttorney ’s fe es, and or dere d Husband to pay the costs of the c ause. H usband filed
a tim e ly app e a l to thi s Co urt.
Issues Presented

Hu sb a nd ra ise s th e fo llo wi ng iss ue s f or re vie w b y

thi s Co urt:
(1) Whether the parenting plan entered by the court without a hearing in January 20 03 su pe rs e de s a pa

re nti ng pla n that wa s a

pp ro ve d b ut n ot e nte re d in July 2002.
(2) Whether the c ourt err ed by awa rding reha

bilitative alimony to Wi fe w ithout setting a termination date.
(3) Whether the re habilitative alimony awa rd is excessive.
(4) Whether the trial c ourt err ed by ruling t h e p ar ties’ prope rty could not be divided and must be sold.
(5 ) Whe the r the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in ent eri ng the Or de r f or Ab so lut e D i v o r c e w i t h o u tt h e ap p r o v a l o f H u s b a n d o r

h i s a t t o r n e y. Wife reque sts attorney ’s fe es and c osts incurred on a ppeal.

Sta nda rd of Re v ie w

To the e xten t th e se iss ue s in vo lve qu e sti on s o f f a c t, our re vie w of the tr ia l cou rt ' s rul ing is de novo wi th a

pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Sullivan v . Sullivan , 107 S.W .3d 507, 509 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). We may not reve rse the trial court' s fac tual finding s unless they are co n t ra ryto the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Id. a t 5 1 0

. Wi th r e s p e c t to th e c o u r t' s leg al
c on c lus ion s, ho we ve r, ou r r e vie w i s de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Id.-3- Pa re nting Pl

an
Husband submits the trial court e rre d by enter ing a

pare nting plan w hich di ffe red from a plan previously

ag ree d b y t h e parties and appr oved by the court in J uly

2002. Upon re view of the two plans, we f

ind the only

substantive differ ence to be the amount of c hild s u p p o rt to be paid by Husband. The pare nting plan e ntere d by the court in J anuary

2003 set child su p p o rt at $ 655 per month. The plan ag ree d upon in J uly 2002 provided for

child support of $580 per month.

Husband doe s not arg ue that t h e amount of child support set in the J anuary 2003 order deviates f rom the statutory

g uidelines, or that the c ourt err ed in ca lculating his income in determining child support. Further, the a mount of child support set by the trial court has not been r aised a s an issue on appea l. Thus any err or in enter ing one pare nting plan ove r the other is harmless. We aff

irm the par enting plan as e ntere d in J anuary 2003.

Alim ony Award

H u s b a n d c o n t e n d s t h a ta l t h o u g h t h e t r i a l c o u r tp r o p e r l y a w a r d e d W i f e r e h ab i l i t a t i v e a l i m o n y, it erre d by leaving the duration of the awa rd open-e nded. Wife, on the other hand, submits the aw ard was withi n the t rial court’s discretion and, further , that the court properly should have a war ded her
a l i m o n y in f

utu ro . We ag ree with wife that a limony in futuro is appropria te in this case, a nd
acc ording ly

modify the trial court’s awa

rd.
We beg in our

analy sis of this is sue by

noting that, c ontrary

to Wi fe’ s assertion, this Court’s
o p in io n in Per ry v . P e rry , No. W2001-01350-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 1751407 (Tenn. Ct. App. Marc h 21, 2002)(F arme r, J., di ssenting) , rev’ d , 114 S.W .3d 465 (Tenn. 2003), does not stand for the proposition that a court may awa rd re habilitative alimony

without setting a duration for the awa rd. I n Pe rry , the trial court awa rded Ms. Per

ry reha bilitative a limony for a period of two y ears , and order ed the pa

rties to return to c ourt befor e the e nd of that time for a revie w of the a war d. Pe rry , 114 S.W .3d at 468. The issue on a ppeal in P e rry wa s wh et her a showing of a substantial a nd materia l chang e of c ircumstance was re quired to modify the awa rd. The Tenne ssee Supreme Court
reve rsed this Court, holding that, a lthough the tr ial court re tains jurisdiction to m odify an aw ard of reha bilitative alimo n y for the dur ation of the a war d, such modification re quires a show ing of substantial and mater ial chang e of c ircumstance

. Id. B oth thi s Co urt a nd the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court, however , specific ally declined to opine on the propriety of the orig inal awa rd of r ehabilitative alimony

. Id. Thus the re asoning of Pe rry is inapplicab l e t o t h i s case. Further, in lig ht of our
c o n c l u s i o n t h a ta l i m o n y in futuro is ap p r o p r iate in th is c a s e , w e d e c li n e to a d d r e s s the issue of whether a trial c ourt may

proper ly awa rd re habilitative alimony

without setting a spe cific dur ation for the a war d.
Despite the pr efe renc e for reha bilitative alimony , afte r re viewing th e re co rd befor e us, we b e l i e v e a n a w ar d o f

a l i m o n y in futuro i s ap p r o p r i a t e i n t h i s c a s e

. T h e s e p ar t i e s w e r e m arr i e d in 1974, when Wife was six teen y ear s of age

. They wer e mar ried for twenty -eig ht y ear s and have one child. During the cour se of the marria g e, Wife wa s primarily a homemake r, althoug h she worke d-4-

intermittentlypart-time a s a substitute teache r and teache r’s a ide. Wife has a hig h-school educ ation, and cur rently works at Wal-Mart earning approximately $7.28 per hour . Wife testified that her hour s a t Wal -M art are lim ite d to tw e nty -f ive pe r we e k be c a us e of Wal -M art ’s c ut- back s o n p ay ro ll. Husband testified tha t his gross income from his employ ment as a mecha nic at Sonoco and fa rming is in ex cess of

$50,000 per y ear . We acc ording ly modify the award of alimony to Wife to an aw ard
o f a l i m o n y in f

utu ro . We re ma nd fo r a

de te rm ina

tio n o f the a mou nt o f al imo ny in a c c or da nc e wi th the fa c tor s e nu me rate d in Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 5- 10 1(d )(1 ). I n li g ht o f the fo re g oin g , it is
unnece ssary

for us to addr ess Husband’ s assertion th at t he amount of the alimony awa rd wa s excessive. Division of Property

Both Husba nd and Wife submit the trial court err ed by order ing the prope rty in this case sold,
rathe r tha n d ivi din g the pr op e rt y . A s w e pe rc e ive it, the pr ima ry dis pu te he re c on c e rn s w ho sh ou ld
rec eive a new home on L iberty Road, which is mortg ag ed for $91,500, a nd who should rec eive a n old e r, bu t de bt- fr e e , ho me on Willo ug hb y Roa d. B oth pa rt ie s su bmi t the y sh ou ld re c e ive the L ibe rt y Roa d h ome . T he or de r o f the tr ia l c ou rt re a ds :
Th e Cou rt

ha s not been abl e to r e a c h a sa tis fa c tory

c on c lus ion fr om the pr op os a ls prese nted in the above cause

. There fore , all property , both rea l and personal, will be
so ld a nd the c a sh de ri ve d th e re fr om w ill be div ide d e qu a lly be tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s.

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fu rthe r o rd e red t hat de bts of $9 1, 59 1. 91 to F arm

Cr e dit Se rv ic e s a nd $2 ,9 79 .8 9 to WFS Financia l would be paid out of proc eeds f rom the sale.

We ag ree with the parties that this is unsatisfac tory . Although unde r Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 4- 12 1 it is within the dis c re tio n of the tr ia l cou rt to or de r the sa le of pr op e rt y , we do no t be lie ve thi s case calls for

the sale of

all propert y , b o th rea l and per sonal. Moreove r, the c ourt has made no fi nd ing s r e g arding wh a t pr op e rt y , if a ny , is se pa

rate pr op e rt y . A lth ou g h th e e qu iti e s o f this c a se mig ht r e qu ir e the sa le of the pa rt ie s’ re a l pro pe rt y , w e do no t be lie ve e qu ity de ma nd s th e sa le of

a ll property , both rea l and per sonal. Moreove r, we believe the totality of t he property can be divided in s u c h a w a y a s to b e e q u it ab le to b o th p ar ti e s u p o n ap p li c a ti o n o f th e s tatu to r y c o n s id e r a ti o n s

. We
acc ording ly

reve rse the order requiring the sale of all property . We remand f or a de termination of what prope rty , if any , is separa te prope rty , and for an equitable division of property pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §36-4- 121.

Conc lusion
We affir m the trial court’ s judgme nt awar ding Wife a n absolute divorce and the pa renting plan as e ntere d in J anuary 2003. We modify

the awa rd of r ehabilitative alimony to Wi fe to an aw ard of alimony

i n f u t u ro , an d rema nd for a

deter mination of the amount of alimony . We reve rse the order requiring all property

of the pa rties sold, and re mand for a n equitable division of prope rty

.-5-

I n light of our

holdings on the f

oreg oing, the propriety

of the e ntry of the absolute divorc e wi tho ut H us ba nd ’s app ro va l is pr e te rm itt e d. We de c lin e Wif e ’s re qu e st fo r at torne y ’s fe e s. Cos ts of t his appea l are taxed to the appellant, Elmer L ee Britt, and his surety , for whic h execution may i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER, J UDGE