IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RANDY LIEBICH, )

) No. 20 C 2368

Plaintiff, )

) Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman

v. )

)

PAUL SEVERIN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on the motions for summary judgment of defendants Drs. 

Paul Severin and Lorenzo Muñoz and Rush University Medical Center. For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court grants in part and denies without prejudice in part the doctors’ motion [309] and 

denies without prejudice Rush’s motion [308, 325]. 

Facts

In February 2002, plaintiff and his girlfriend, Kenyatta Brown, lived together with their 

infant daughter and Brown’s two-year-old son from a previous relationship, Steven Quinn, Jr. 

(Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(2) Stmt. ¶ 1.) On February 8, 2002, Brown left the children in plaintiff’s care 

while she worked from 10:00 a.m. to around 4:30 p.m. (Id. ¶ 2.) When Brown returned from 

work, she noticed that Steven was “breathing funny,” and she and plaintiff took Steven to Mount 

Sinai Hospital. (Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ¶ 4.) 

At Mount Sinai, Steven was treated by Drs. Paula Green and Tracy Boykin. (Id. ¶ 5.) The 

doctors noted that Steven was posturing, which is a sign of severe brain injury. (Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(2) 

¶ 4.) Dr. Boykin reviewed the CT scan of Steven’s head, which she said was consistent with severe 

traumatic brain injury. (Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(2) Stmt., Ex. C, Boykin Dep. at 26.) Dr. Green asked 

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Dr. Muñoz to evaluate Steven, and he told her to send Steven to Rush. (Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(2) Stmt. 

¶¶ 4-5.) 

After arriving at Rush, Steven was evaluated by Drs. Severin and Muñoz. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.) Dr. 

Muñoz decided to operate on Steven via craniectomy, opening a flap in his skull to relieve pressure 

in his brain. (Pl.’s 56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ¶ 7.) Dr. Muñoz’s record of operation states that the surgery 

was undertaken because: “Upon looking at the CT scan, there was a question of a right frontal 

parietal subdural hematoma. However, it was also thought that this could also be a rather profuse 

subarachnoid hemorrhage.” (Id., Ex. 12, Record of Operation at 1.) The surgery did not improve 

Steven’s condition because he had a subarachnoid hematoma, which cannot be evacuated by a 

craniectomy, not a subdural hematoma. (Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ¶ 7.) After the surgery, Drs. 

Severin and Muñoz determined that Steven was brain dead. (Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(2) Stmt. ¶ 9.)1

Dr. Severin said it was his opinion based on his examination of Steven and “review[ing] 

[the case] in detail with house staff, CPS, neurosurgery, neurology, and pediatric surgery” that 

Steven’s injuries were the result of non-accidental trauma. (Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(2) Stmt., Ex. D, 

Severin Dep. at 312-14.) Likewise, Dr. Muñoz said he concluded that Steven’s death was caused 

by a traumatic injury to the head. (Id., Ex. E, Muñoz Dep. at 226.) Both doctors say they did not 

consider whether Steven’s brain death could have been caused by anything other than head trauma. 

(Id. at 214-15; Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(2), Ex. D, Severin Dep. at 180.) Dr. Borgialli, one of plaintiff’s 

medical experts, says that Drs. Muñoz and Severin’s “opinions were incompatible with both basic 

medical training and emergency medicine standards in 2002.” (Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3) Stmt., Ex. 11, 

Borgialli Report at 6.) Dr. Auer, another of plaintiff’s medical experts, said, “[i]t is simply not 

possible, under any circumstance, for a clinician to conclude that a child’s death must have been 

1 Plaintiff purports to dispute the facts asserted in this paragraph but the evidence he cites does not controvert them. 

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caused by a particular mechanism and within a particular timeframe,” and Drs. Severin and 

Muñoz’s opinions about the timing of Steven’s injuries and his cause of death “lacked medical or 

scientific foundation and were inexplicable in light of their training and experience.” (Id., Ex. 8, 

Auer Report at 2, 33) (emphasis in original).

On February 8, 2002 at 10:40 p.m., DuPage County Detective Gregory Figiel spoke with 

Dr. Severin at Rush. (Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ¶ 23.) The police report states that Dr. Severin 

“guess[ed]” that “the bruising on Steven’s body occurred sometime between 24 to 48 hours 

[earlier].” (Id., Ex. 29, DuPage Cnty. Sheriff’s Report at 3.) DuPage County Children’s Center 

Investigator Boris Vrbos spoke to Dr. Muñoz for ten or fifteen minutes that night as well. (Pl.’s 

LR 56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ¶ 23. ) Vrbos said Dr. Muñoz told him Steven had a brain bleed on the right 

side, internal abdominal injuries, bruises on his head, marks on his back and legs, blood in his 

urine, and signs of severe brain trauma. (Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(2), Ex. G, Vrbos Dep. at 91.)

Plaintiff was arrested for Steven’s murder on February 28, 2002, and tried in 2004. (Pl.’s 

LR 56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 39, 41.) At the DuPage County State’s Attorney’s request, Drs. Severin 

and Muñoz testified at the trial. (Id. ¶¶ 41, 46.) Both doctors testified that Steven’s injuries 

occurred four to six hours before he arrived at Mount Sinai. (Id. ¶¶ 76-77.) On July 16, 2004, 

plaintiff was found guilty of murdering Steven and was sentenced to a sixty-five-year prison term. 

(Defs.’ LR 56.1(a)(2) Stmt. ¶ 50.) The conviction was vacated and plaintiff was released from 

prison in September 2018. (Id. ¶ 51.) On April 17, 2019, the State dropped the charges against 

plaintiff. (Id.)

Discussion

To prevail on a summary judgment motion, “the movant [must] show[] that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The court views the evidence, and draws all reasonable inferences, in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Driveline Sys., LLC v. Arctic Cat, Inc., 936 F.3d 

576, 579 (7th Cir. 2019). Summary judgment is appropriate only when no reasonable jury could 

find for the nonmovant. Blasius v. Angel Auto., Inc., 839 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2016). 

In Counts I and III-V, plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Drs. 

Severin and Muñoz for their alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.2 

To succeed on these claims, plaintiff must show, inter alia, that Drs. Severin and Muñoz acted

under color of state law. Tom Beu Xiong v. Fischer, 787 F.3d 389, 397-98 (7th Cir. 2015). In this 

case that means plaintiff must show that the doctors reached an understanding with the police to 

deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights and the doctors willfully participated in joint activity 

with the police. Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 1998) (“To establish § 1983 liability 

through a conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a state official and private 

individual(s) reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and (2) 

those individual(s) were willful participants in joint activity with the State or its agents.”) (cleaned

up).

Plaintiff contends a conspiracy among the doctors and police to deprive him of his 

constitutional rights can be inferred from: (1) the fact that the police told Dr. Severin when they 

arrived at Rush that Steven had been in plaintiff’s care that day; (2) the fact that Dr. Severin told

the police, while Steven was in surgery, that he would guess “the bruising on Steven’s body was 

twenty-four to forty-eight hours old,” but later said Steven’s injuries occurred within hours of his 

admission to Mount Sinai; (3) Dr. Muñoz’s opinion that Steven’s injuries occurred within six hours 

of his admission to Mount Sinai; (4) the fact that investigators told plaintiff, apparently based on 

2 Judge Seeger dismissed the section 1983 claims plaintiff asserted against Rush. (See ECF 252.) 

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information from Dr. Severin, that “the bruises on Steven’s head were inconsistent with what 

[plaintiff said happened]”; (5) Detective Szalinski’s testimony that one of the doctors said “the 

onset of injury would have been pretty recent” and “something about the amount of fresh blood in 

Stephen’s [sic] brain and that had the injuries occurred prior to the previous morning, [he] would 

have not been able to function in the way that Randy described”; (6) Dr. Muñoz’s assessment of 

the CT scans of Steven’s head as showing a right subdural hematoma, when surgery revealed there 

was none; (7) the fact that the police did not document their February 21, 2002 conversation with 

Dr. Muñoz until May 2002, and they did so after the prosecuting attorney asked Dr. Muñoz to 

confirm the investigators’ recollection of that conversation; (8) Dr. Severin’s opinion that Steven’s 

injuries were the result of non-accidental trauma; and (9) the testimony of plaintiff’s medical 

experts that Drs. Severin and Muñoz’s opinions on the timing and cause of Steven’s injuries have 

no basis. (Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 47-48, 54-56; id., Ex. 29, Follow-Up Police Report at 2-3, 

6; id., Ex. 24, Szalinski Dep. at 94-95; id., Ex. 12, Muñoz Operation Report; id., Ex. 15, 5/14/02 

Letter to Muñoz from Reidy; id., Ex. 10, Severin Dep. at 177-79, 260; id., Ex. 16, 5/14/02 Letter 

to Reidy from Muñoz; id., Ex. 8, Auer Report at 33-37; id., Ex. 11, Borgialli Report at 5-6, id., Ex. 

28, Teas Report at 4-5.) Viewed favorably to plaintiff, these facts support the inference that the 

doctors gave the police false information about the timing and cause of Steven’s injuries and the 

police used that information to interrogate and arrest plaintiff. 

These facts do not, however, support the inference that the doctors and police agreed to, or 

did, frame plaintiff for Steven’s murder. First, there is no direct evidence from any source that the 

doctors conspired with the investigating officers to frame plaintiff. Plaintiff’s own submission of 

evidence on this point demonstrates the lack of direct evidence of any unlawful agreement. (See

Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ¶¶ 35-59.) The majority of evidence offered by plaintiff is of alleged 

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police misconduct in the interviewing of plaintiff and gathering and disclosing of evidence in the 

criminal case. (See id. ¶ 35 (reciting plaintiff’s view of the “correct explanation for Steven’s 

injuries); ¶¶ 36-41, 43-44 (describing law enforcement’s alleged efforts to “pursue a confession” 

from plaintiff); ¶¶ 42, 45 (referring to the doctors but not evidencing a conspiracy); ¶¶ 46-59 

(focusing on the exchange of information between the doctors and law enforcement).)

Plaintiff argues that direct evidence of an agreement between private and public actors to 

violate constitutional rights is often lacking, citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 

(1970). (ECF 315 at 17.) Plaintiff’s reliance on that case is misplaced for a number of reasons. 

First, the Adickes Court’s application of summary judgment standards was clarified in Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett: 

[W]e do not think the Adickes language ... should be construed to mean that the 

burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to produce evidence showing 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with respect to an issue on 

which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof. Instead, as we have 

explained, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by “showing”—that 

is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support 

the non-moving party’s case.

477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Arguably, the Adickes court’s application of summary judgment 

standards would allow for cases to proceed past summary judgment based on the failure to disprove 

a key fact (there, the defendant failing to prove that no police officer was present at the scene), as 

opposed to the more modern view as articulated in Celotex that the non-moving party’s lack of 

evidence on a key issue justifies the granting of summary judgment. 

Moreover, in Adickes, unlike the instant case, the non-state actor admitted that he violated 

the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Specifically, Adickes involved a white teacher, who was with 

her students of color at a restaurant, and all were denied service because of the racial composition 

of the class. The restaurant manager admitted that he ordered the food counter supervisor to refuse 

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to serve Miss Adickes because he feared there would be violence from customers angered at seeing 

white and black people eating together. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 154. Thus, the combination of direct 

evidence of an unlawful act by the private actor with circumstantial evidence of the state actors’ 

involvement is far different than the situation presented here, where there is no direct evidence of 

an unlawful agreement or illegal conduct. 

However, the lack of direct evidence will not doom plaintiff’s claims if there is evidence 

from which an agreement between the doctors and police can be inferred. Plaintiff says such an 

agreement can be inferred from the fact that: (1) the police and prosecutors sought to convict 

plaintiff “at all costs;” (2) Drs. Severin and Muñoz changed their medical opinions and worked 

with the police and prosecutors to cover-up inconsistent evidence; and (3) Drs. Severin and Muñoz 

had a motive to join the scheme. (ECF 315 at 19-24.) 

As to the police and prosecutors’ alleged conduct, the relevance of that information is 

tangential at best. While the Court can consider circumstantial evidence, the alleged unlawful 

conduct of the law enforcement actors sheds no light on the doctors’ conduct or liability. Indeed, 

plaintiff’s view that law enforcement was corruptly determined to frame him both by using medical 

evidence provided by defendants and fabricating evidence may place law enforcement in a poor 

light, but this conduct does nothing to further plaintiff’s argument that there is circumstantial 

evidence of an agreement by the doctors to engage in misconduct. 

As to plaintiff’s theory that the doctors worked with law enforcement to create false 

evidence and cover-up favorable evidence, that argument lacks the logical consistency necessary 

to be meaningful. Plaintiff argues that the police failed to document obviously important and 

favorable medical evidence (supporting the police’s allegedly fabricated view of plaintiff’s guilt) 

provided by the doctors. (Id. at 21.) Even if that is true, how does law enforcement’s failure to 

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include in their reports the favorable but false medical information the doctors gave them evidence 

an agreement between the doctors and police to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights? 

The same is true for plaintiff’s assessment of Dr. Munoz’s February 21, 2002 interview 

with law enforcement wherein he provided additional information as to his treatment of Steven. 

Despite the information’s “obvious importance in [corruptly] implicating” plaintiff, plaintiff notes 

that, “Munoz’s account of his surgical observations or other information about Steven’s care” was 

not included in the officers’ 3-months delayed report of the interview. (ECF 315 at 21.) Once 

again, plaintiff fails to explain how this set of facts suggests an agreement between the doctors and 

law enforcement.3

 

Plaintiff next leans into motive as an explanation for the doctors forming an agreement 

with the state actors. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the doctors wanted to avoid malpractice 

allegations, so they framed plaintiff instead of admitting their own errors. (Id. at 22.) Even if the 

doctors fabricated their opinions about Steven’s injuries, neither doctor knew with any level of 

certainty that their opinions would implicate plaintiff. At best, Dr. Severin knew that plaintiff was 

with Steven on February 8, 2002, but he had no reason to know that plaintiff was the only person 

with Steven that day.4 (Defs.’ LR 56.1(a) Stmt. ¶ 16; Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ¶ 31 & Ex. 29 at 3

3 While plaintiff need only show a material question of fact necessary for the jury to consider, and as we have explained 

supra, the officers’ accuracy of their own reports (among other points raised by plaintiff) fails to show an agreement 

with the doctors, we feel compelled to note an even more fundamental question. If the doctors had conspired with 

law enforcement to frame plaintiff, one would expect that the doctors’ allegedly fabricated medical observations and 

conclusions would be front and center in the police reports, not delayed, omitted, or not recorded at all. Yet, plaintiff’s 

argument is that law enforcement’s decision “not to document Munoz and Severin’s incriminating opinions, combined 

with [the doctors’] coverup of the true findings during Steven’s surgery, together indicate a coordinated scheme to 

hide evidence inconsistent with the police theory that [plaintiff] killed Steven.” (ECF 315 at 21) (emphasis added). In 

essence, plaintiff’s argument is that the doctors agreed to provide false medical information to support law 

enforcement’s false theory of criminal liability, and that agreement is evidenced by law enforcement’sfailure to report, 

or months-long delay in reporting, the false but incriminating evidence. This argument is nonsensical and does not 

(alone or in conjunction with other evidence) create a material issue of fact. 

4 Plaintiff attempts to raise a material question of fact by repeatedly suggesting otherwise. Yet, a closer examination 

of the cited evidentiary material shows that either the doctors did not know that plaintiff was the only person who 

could have injured Steven, or they did not identify plaintiff as the person who injured Steven. (Compare Pl.’s LR 

56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ¶ 42 (“[Investigating detectives] told [plaintiff] that the medical evidence against [plaintiff] showed 

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(“[T]hese investigators arrived at the John L. & Hellen Kellogg Pavilion pediatric critical care unit 

floor of the hospital and me with the Chicago Police Officers, registered nurse Tammy Smith and 

attending physician Paul Severin in a conference room marked 537. The Chicago Police Officers 

related further that the mother, Kenyatta Brown was at work all day and her boyfriend Randy

Liebich was watching the kids at their apartment”). Thus, plaintiff’s argument regarding motive 

is speculative at best.5 

To be clear, the doctors’ opinions as to Steven’s cause of death clearly played an important 

part in the decision to prosecute plaintiff. Yet, the question before the Court is not whether the 

doctors’ opinions were significant to the prosecution. Rather, the issue is whether the doctors’ 

allegedly improper medical assessments as to Steven’s cause of death was part of an unlawful 

agreement to violate plaintiff’s constitutional rights. On that front, plaintiff has not raised a 

material fact for a jury to consider. There is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that raises a 

reasonable inference that any unlawful agreement between the doctors and law enforcement 

existed. Concisely stated, the record does not suggest that Drs. Severin and Muñoz acted under 

that he was responsible for Steven’s death, indicating that [the doctors] had told police that [plaintiff] was 

responsible),” with the cited material (“[Plaintiff] was advised of the medical evidence against him. That [law 

enforcement] knew he was responsible for the tragedy to Steven. That [plaintiff] was at the apartment by himself with 

the children.”)); compare Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ¶ 48 (investigating detectives “had newly decided that [Steven’s] 

bruises must have been caused while Steven was in [plaintiff’s] care on the day he came to the hospital” based on 

“information . . . from Severin”), with the cited materials (showing only that Dr. Severin had the opportunity to speak 

with law enforcement officers during the relevant time period); compare, Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3) Stmt. ¶ 52 (doctors told 

law enforcement “that the injuries to Steven must have occurred while [plaintiff] was caring for Steven”), with the

cited material, deposition testimony of the detective overseeing Steven’s death investigation (“[O]ne of the doctors 

that examined Stephen that night, that it was his opinion that the – that the time of the onset of injury would’ve been 

pretty recent.”).) 5 The importance of this alleged fact – that the doctors knew plaintiff was the only person with Steven during the sixhour period prior to Steven’s treatment at Mt. Sinai hospital – is apparent if plaintiff’s theory of liability has any merit. 

Thus, plaintiff asserts that “[the doctors] obtained information they would need to fabricate an opinion inculpating 

[plaintiff] when Severin first met with police on February 8, 2002 while Steven was in surgery. Specifically, police 

told Severin that [plaintiff] was alone watching Steven during the day while Brown at work.” (Pl.’s LR 56.1(b)(3) ¶

31.) Yet, the information cited for this proposition does not show that the doctors knew plaintiff was alone with 

Steven all day, or that others were not with Steven during the relevant period. (Id. ¶ 31 & Ex. 29 at 3.) The reasonable 

inference to be drawn from the actual evidence is that the doctors knew that plaintiff might have injured Steven.

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color of state law. Accordingly, their motion for summary judgment on the section 1983 claims

asserted against them is granted.

In Counts VI, VII, and X, plaintiff asserts state-law claims against the doctors and Rush 

for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. 

Because the Court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” 28 U.S.C. § 

1367(c)(3), it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state-law claims. 

Conclusion 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judgment 

as to the federal claims in Counts I and III-V and denies it without prejudice as to the state-law 

claims in Counts VI, VII, and X, which are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court. 

SO ORDERED. ENTERED: August 9, 2023 

 

 

 M. David Weisman 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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