IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

LINDA VERBOOM CURRY and 

ALLEN CHEUNG,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE BOEING COMPANY,

Defendant.

No. 1:20-cv-03088

NOTICE OF REMOVAL

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333(1), 1332(a), 1441, and 1446, 

The Boeing Company (“Boeing”) hereby removes to the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois the case styled Curry v. The Boeing Co., currently pending in the 

Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois County Department, Law Division, as Case No. 2020 L 

000695. In further support of this Notice of Removal, Boeing states as follows: 

I. Background and Procedural History

1. Plaintiffs, citizens and residents of Florida, filed their complaint against Boeing, a

Delaware corporation headquartered in Chicago, on January 17, 2020, in the Circuit Court of Cook 

County, Illinois, County Department, Law Division, as Case No. 2020 L 000695. See Ex. A, 

Compl., ¶¶ 1–2, 22.

2. Plaintiffs assert claims arising from an alleged “contaminated air event” while

working as flight attendants aboard a Boeing aircraft during United Airlines Flight 71 on January 

19, 2018. Ex. A ¶¶ 15–21. 

3. According to the Complaint, “[a]bout 45 minutes into the flight,” which had

departed Amsterdam, Netherlands, destined for Newark, New Jersey, “there was a contaminated 

air event onboard when flight crew and passengers reported a ‘dirty sock’ smell.” Ex. A ¶¶ 15, 

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17. The Complaint states that the flight diverted back to Amsterdam, where medical personnel 

provided treatment to flight crew and passengers who had fallen ill. See id. ¶¶ 18–19. Plaintiffs 

allege the bleed air system of the Boeing aircraft was defective in design and allowed “toxic” 

chemicals to circulate in the aircraft cabin, which allegedly caused them to suffer short- and longterm health effects and economic injury. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. They assert claims for strict liability, 

negligence, fraud, and res ipsa loquitur. Id. ¶¶ 65–94.

4. Copies of all other process, pleadings, and orders served on Boeing in the state 

court action are attached as Exhibit B.1

5. Venue is proper for removal to this Court because it is the United States District 

Court for the district and division embracing the place where the state action was pending. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1441(a).

6. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), Boeing is today serving this Notice of 

Removal on Plaintiffs’ counsel and filing a copy of this Notice with the Clerk of the Circuit Court 

of Cook County, Illinois.

II. Grounds for Removal

7. A civil action brought in state court is removable if the district court has original 

jurisdiction over it. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). As set forth below, this Court has jurisdiction based on 

admiralty, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), and diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

A. Admiralty Jurisdiction

8. Federal district courts “have original jurisdiction . . . of . . . [a]ny civil case of 

admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they 

 

1 Not included are various administrative orders of general applicability entered by the Circuit Court relating to 

COVID-19 and certain clerk-generated electronic “post cards” giving notice of rescheduled hearing dates as a 

consequence of court closures stemming from that emergency.

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are otherwise entitled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). A civil case is one of “admiralty jurisdiction” if (1) 

the alleged “tort occurred on navigable water,” and (2) the activity in question bears a “substantial 

relationship to traditional maritime activity.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & 

Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995); see also Lu Junhong v. The Boeing Co., 792 F.3d 805, 813–

17 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding admiralty jurisdiction removal by Boeing was proper in case involving 

alleged torts occurring during transoceanic flight). Both requirements are satisfied here. 

9. With respect to the location of the alleged tort, Plaintiffs allege that they were 

injured by aircraft cabin air contamination during a flight that departed from Amsterdam and was 

destined for Newark. Ex. A ¶ 15. The Complaint does not identify the whereabouts or trajectory 

of the aircraft at any point in time, although it alleges reports of a “‘dirty sock’ smell” in the cabin 

“[a]bout 45 minutes into the flight,” id. ¶ 17, and that the flight captain made the decision at some 

point to divert the plane back to Amsterdam. Id. ¶ 18. 

10. Because the Complaint is silent, it is necessary to consult sources outside the 

Complaint, such as automatic dependent surveillance–broadcast (“ADS-B”) position data, in order 

to determine the aircraft’s location when the alleged “dirty sock” smell occurred and the location 

where the aircraft diverted. While in flight, aircraft equipped with ADS-B equipment periodically 

broadcast information, including the aircraft’s current position, altitude, and velocity, through an 

onboard transmitter to suitably equipped air traffic control ground stations and/or ADS-B 

transceivers on satellites. This data can be used by air traffic control services to monitor aircraft 

and manage air traffic flow. It can also later be used to reconstruct an aircraft’s flight path and 

determine its approximate location at particular points in time.

11. As plotted on the Google Earth Pro application, ADS-B data for the flight in 

question (United Airlines Flight 71 on January 19, 2018) shows that the flight headed northwest 

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out of Amsterdam, and that at approximately 45 minutes after takeoff, the aircraft was travelling 

over the North Sea, the navigable northeastern arm of the Atlantic Ocean running between the 

British Isles to the west and southwest and the mainland of northwestern Europe to the east, south, 

and southeast,

2

as shown in the below graphic. The marker identifies the location of the flight as 

it was outbound from Amsterdam and had been flying for approximately 45 minutes.

12. Thereafter, according to the ADS-B data, the aircraft continued on a northwest 

trajectory, across Great Britain, and out over the Atlantic Ocean. While traveling at some point 

over the area identified within the “estimated diversion area” depicted as the grey-shaded area 

between the blue lines in the graphic below, the aircraft diverted from its original outbound flight 

 

2 See “North Sea,” ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, available at: https://www.britannica.com/place/North-Sea. 

45 Minutes 

into Flight

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path, turned around, and began a return that took it on an approximately parallel, southeastern 

return path over the Atlantic Ocean, across the British Isles and the North Sea, to Amsterdam, as 

shown below.

13. The green lines in the above graphic show the flight’s outbound and inbound paths 

as captured in the ADS-B data, including the last outbound data point and the first inbound data 

point. There is no publicly available ADS-B data for the grey-shaded area between the two blue 

lines delineated as the “estimated diversion area” where the aircraft was flying over open water, 

due likely to the limits of transmission technologies and distance from land stations. The estimated 

diversion area was plotted by estimating the distance that the aircraft traveled between the last 

outbound and first inbound locations captured in the ADS-B data (approximately 606 miles), based 

on (1) the time lapse between those two locations (63 minutes) and (2) assuming that during that 

Last outbound 

ADS-B data point 

First inbound 

ADS-B data point

Inbound flight 

path

Outbound flight 

path

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time the aircraft traveled at the median between the outbound and inbound speeds (577.5 miles per 

hour). With that information, and based on the outbound heading of the flight as indicated by the 

ADS-B data, the “estimated diversion area” estimates the area over which the flight diverted and 

began its return to Amsterdam. As indicated in the above graphic, the aircraft was flying over the 

Atlantic Ocean, west of Great Britain, at the time it diverted.

14. Thus, the ADS-B data captures that when Plaintiffs allegedly noticed a “dirty sock 

smell,” at approximately 45 minutes from takeoff, Ex. A ¶ 17, the aircraft was traveling over the 

North Sea, and when the aircraft thereafter diverted back to Amsterdam, id. ¶ 18, it was flying over 

the Atlantic Ocean. Accordingly, the alleged “tort occur[ed]” at least in part “on navigable 

waters.”3 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534. The first requirement for establishing admiralty jurisdiction 

is therefore satisfied. Id.; Lu Junhong, 792 F.3d at 815–16 (explaining that § 1333(1) does not 

“require[] the whole tort to occur on the water,” and finding admiralty jurisdiction based on claims 

relating to Boeing’s aircraft autothrottle system design and performance while aircraft was over 

navigable water). 

15. In addition, the activity giving rise to the incident in this case—a flight from 

Amsterdam bound for the United States—has a “substantial relationship to traditional maritime 

activity.” Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534. As explained in Lu Junhong, before the advent of aircraft, 

such a journey would have been made by an ocean-going vessel and is sufficiently related to 

 

3 For purposes of admiralty law, “a tort is deemed to occur where the injury occurs.” Taghadomi v. Extreme Sports 

Maui, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1269 (D. Haw. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080 (9th 

Cir. 2005). The same is true under any potentially applicable state law. See, e.g., ISN Software Corp. v. Richards, 

Layton & Finger, P.A., 2020 WL 762493, at *3 (Del. Feb. 17, 2020) (Delaware); Beigel & Sandler v. Weinstein, 1992 

WL 357523, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1992) (Illinois); Lewis v. Bours, 835 P.2d 221, 225 (Wash. 1992) (Washington). 

Accordingly, this particular issue does not require the Court to examine or choose among any potentially applicable 

bodies of substantive law, and Boeing does not waive, but rather expressly reserves, the right to invoke and/or object 

to the application of any particular body of substantive law in the future, as may be appropriate to the facts and posture 

of the case. By filing this Notice of Removal, Boeing does not waive any other rights, privileges, or defenses and 

does not concede that this is an appropriate or convenient forum for resolution of these or any other claims.

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traditional maritime activity to warrant the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. Lu Junhong, 792 

F.3d at 816 (“Asiana 214 was a trans-ocean flight, a substitute for an ocean-going vessel—as 

flights from the contiguous United States to and from Alaska, Hawaii, and overseas territories also 

would be—and thus . . . this situation ‘might be thought to bear a significant relationship to a 

traditional maritime activity.’”); see also Miller v. United States, 725 F.2d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 

1984) (flight from Bahamas to Florida within admiralty jurisdiction); Williams v. United States, 

711 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1983) (flight from California to Hawaii within admiralty jurisdiction); 

Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir. 1974) (flight from California to Vietnam 

within admiralty jurisdiction).

B. Diversity Jurisdiction

16. The district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 

controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is diversity between the plaintiffs, on the one hand, and the 

defendants, on the other. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Ashenden v. Lloyd’s of London, 934 F. Supp. 992, 

995 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“Section 1332 has been interpreted to require ‘complete diversity,’ that is, 

each and every defendant must have different citizenship from each and every plaintiff.”). Both 

requirements are satisfied here.

17. According to the Complaint, Plaintiffs seek damages in excess of $50,000 on each 

of their five claims, totaling in excess of $250,000. Ex. A ¶¶ 67, 70, 77, 85, 94. Therefore, the 

amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied. 

18. Plaintiffs allege they are both domiciled in and citizens of the state of Florida. 

Ex. A ¶¶ 1–2. Boeing is a Delaware corporation with its corporate headquarters in Illinois. Id. 

¶¶ 2, 22. Therefore, there is complete diversity of citizenship. 

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19. Notably, the federal removal statute provides that a “civil action otherwise 

removable solely on the basis of [diversity jurisdiction] . . . may not be removed if any of the 

parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such 

action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). 

20. Here, Boeing has removed based on the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, as well as 

diversity. Therefore, the forum state defendant prohibition of § 1441(b)(2)—which applies only 

to removal “solely” on diversity—is inapplicable. See Lu Junhong, 792 F.3d at 817–18; Crisanto 

v. Caladan Oceanic, LLC, 2018 WL 3641703, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2018) (defendants 

removing admiralty cases under §§ 1333 and 1441 need only show that they meet the jurisdictional 

requirements of diversity jurisdiction; forum-defendant rule is inapplicable in this scenario); 

Boakye v. NCL (Bah.) Ltd., 295 F. Supp. 3d 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (“Whereas before the 

amendment [to 28 U.S.C. § 1441], no case could be removed if a defendant was in his home state, 

unless there was a federal question, now all cases involving a home state defendant in which a 

federal court could have original jurisdiction can be removed unless jurisdiction is based solely on 

diversity.”) (emphasis in original). 

III. Removal Is Timely

21. This removal is timely.

22. Whereas the removal statutes set forth certain potentially applicable deadlines for 

removal, including that a defendant has 30 days to remove after service of the complaint, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1446(b)(1), “[t]he 30-day removal clock is triggered” only if the complaint “affirmatively and 

unambiguously reveals that the case is or has become removable.” Walker v. Trailer Transit, Inc., 

727 F.3d 819, 821 (7th Cir. 2013). That it might be possible to infer or deduce a potential basis 

for removal is not enough. See, e.g., Copeland v. N. Am. Pipe Co., 2018 WL 557928, at *2 (W.D. 

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Wis. Jan. 24, 2018) (in light of Walker, prior decisions holding that the 30-day deadline is triggered 

“from a reasonable and commonsense reading of the complaint” or from “conspicuous clues” “are 

no longer good law”). Moreover, it is only the complaint that matters for purposes of triggering 

the 30-day clock—“[t]he defendant’s subjective knowledge of any of th[e] [jurisdictional] facts is 

immaterial.” Hostetler v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 2016 WL 3662263, at *3 (N.D. Ind. July 11, 

2016) (citing Walker, 727 F.3d at 825). Instead, the 30-day clock does not begin to run unless and 

until the defendant receives some “pleading or other litigation paper facially revealing that the

grounds for removal are present.” Walker, 727 F.3d at 823–24; see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Aside 

from the complaint, the only “other paper” that counts is “litigation materials actually received by 

the defendant or filed with the state court during the course of litigation.” Id. at 825. If the 

defendant does not receive such a paper, “the removal clock never actually start[s] to run.” Id. 

23. Boeing has not, to date, been served with a qualifying pleading or “other paper”

unambiguously revealing the grounds for this Court to exercise admiralty jurisdiction. As noted 

above, the Complaint is silent as to the location of the aircraft at the time of the alleged 

contaminated-air event and thus whether the alleged tort “occurred on navigable water.” Grubart, 

513 U.S. at 534. 

24. Only through its own plotting and analysis of the aircraft’s flight path and position

data was Boeing able to determine that the aircraft was travelling over the North Sea at the time of 

the alleged “dirty sock” smell in the aircraft cabin and that it diverted back to Amsterdam while 

flying over the Atlantic Ocean. Those grounds for removal did not appear “affirmatively and 

unambiguously” on the face of the Complaint or other paper served to Boeing. Therefore, the 

30-day clock has not begun to run. See, e.g., Ayotte v. The Boeing Co., 316 F. Supp. 3d 1066,

1074 (N.D. Ill 2018) (30-day clock was not triggered by general allegations in complaint, which 

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did not give “‘unambiguous’ notice to Boeing that it had a right to remove based on federal officer 

jurisdiction”); Gross v. FCA U.S., LLC, 2017 WL 6065234, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2017) (police 

report listing plaintiff’s residence did not trigger removal clock because residence is not 

synonymous with citizenship). Boeing’s removal is therefore timely. 

IV. Conclusion

WHEREFORE, Boeing hereby removes to this Court the case styled Curry v. The Boeing 

Co., currently pending in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois County Department, Law 

Division, as Case No. 2020 L 000695.

Dated: May 25, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Dan K. Webb__________

Perkins Coie LLP

V.L. Woolston

Todd W. Rosencrans

(pro hac vice applications forthcoming)

1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900

Seattle, WA 98101

T. (206) 359-8000

VWoolston@perkinscoie.com

TRosencrans@perkinscoie.com

Winston & Strawn LLP

Dan K. Webb

Christopher B. Essig

Joseph L. Motto

35 W. Wacker Dr. 

Chicago, IL 60601

T. (312) 558-5600

F. (312) 558-5700

DWebb@winston.com

CEssig@winston.com

JMotto@winston.com

Sandra A. Edwards 

(pro hac vice application forthcoming)

101 California Street 

San Francisco, CA 94111

T. (415) 591-1000

F. (415) 591-1400

SEdwards@winston.com

Attorneys for The Boeing Company

Case: 1:20-cv-03088 Document #: 1 Filed: 05/25/20 Page 10 of 11 PageID #:10
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

LINDA VERBOOM CURRY and 

ALLEN CHEUNG,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE BOEING COMPANY,

Defendant.

No. 1:20-cv-03088

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Joseph L. Motto, hereby certify that on May 25, 2020, I served a copy of the foregoing 

NOTICE OF REMOVAL on counsel for Plaintiffs via email as follows: 

Joseph A. Power, Jr. 

joepower@prslaw.com

Kathryn L. Conway

kconway@prslaw.com

POWER ROGERS & SMITH, LLP

Three First National Plaza

70 West Madison Street, 55th Floor

Chicago, IL 60602

Rich Friedman

rfriedman@friedmanrubin.com

Alisa Brodkowitz

alisa@friedmanrubin.com

Rachel M. Luke

rachel@friedmanrubin.com

FRIEDMAN RUBIN

1126 Highland Ave.

Bremerton, WA 98337

Zoe Littlepage

zoe@littlepagebooth.com

Rainey Booth

rainey@littlepagebooth.com

Matt Leckman

matt@leckmanlaw.com

LITTLEPAGE BOOTH LECKMAN

1912 W. Main St.

Houston, TX 77098

By: /s/ Joseph L. Motto

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