alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 628

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to restore a 100 percent

deduction for business meals and entertainment and the deduction for

the travel expenses of spouses and others accompanying the taxpayer

on business.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 6, 1997

Mr. ABERCROMBIE (for himself, Ms. HARMAN, and Mr. FROST) introduced the

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to restore

a 100 percent deduction for business meals and entertainment and the deduction for the travel expenses of

spouses and others accompanying the taxpayer on business.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•HR 628 IH

1 SECTION 1. RESTORATION OF DEDUCTION FOR BUSINESS

2 MEALS AND ENTERTAINMENT AND FOR

3 TRAVEL EXPENSES OF SPOUSES AND OTHERS

4 ACCOMPANYING THE TAXPAYER ON BUSI5 NESS.

6 (a) RESTORATION OF DEDUCTION FOR BUSINESS

7 MEALS AND ENTERTAINMENT.—

8 (1) GENERAL RULE.—Paragraph (1) of section

9 274(n) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relat10 ing to only 50 percent of meal and entertainment ex11 penses allowed as deduction) is amended by striking

12 ‘‘50 percent’’ and inserting ‘‘100 percent’’.

13 (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The sub14 section heading for section 274(n) of such Code is

15 amended by striking ‘‘50’’ and inserting ‘‘100’’.

16 (3) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made

17 by this subsection shall apply to taxable years begin18 ning after December 31, 1996.

19 (b) REPEAL OF SPECIAL LIMITATION ON DEDUCTION

20 FOR TRAVEL EXPENSES OF SPOUSES, ETC.—

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (m) of section

22 274 of such Code is amended by striking paragraph

23 (3).
3

•HR 628 IH

1 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made

2 by this subsection shall apply to amounts paid or in3 curred after December 31, 1996.

Æ
#### JOHN CARLOTZ, Jr., BY HIS NEXT FRIEND, JOHN CARLOTZ, Sr., AND JOHN CARLOTZ, Sr., INDIVIDUALLY, RESPONDENTS, v. RICHARD GAVIN, TRADING AS ORANGE CRUSH BOTTLING WORKS, AND JOSEPH HAMMERSTONE, APPELLANTS.

Submit led February 16, 1945

Decided May 10, 1945.

For the appellants, *Lewis S. Beers.*

For the respondents, *Francis L. Thompson*and *Peier Friedman.*

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Bodustr, J.

The judgment of the Supreme Court is affirmed, for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Perskie whose opinion is reported in 132 *N. J. L.*52; 38 *Atl. Rep. (2d)*441.

It was urged before us that the learned trial judge unduly limited counsel in the examination of a witness under fourteen years of age. The majority of the court does not think so.

The following is the rule of law applicable: “The adjudication as to capacity and responsibility” (of an infant under fourteen years of age to testify) “is to be made by the trial court. Its judgment is often said to be an exercise of judicial discretion. Whether that phrase properly describes the nature of the judicial act in admitting infant children as witnesses *62need not be determined. Whatever its nature may be, it is well settled that the judgment will not be reviewed on error unless it is plainly shown to have been made without any evidence to support it. *State*v. Cracker, 65 *N. J. L.*410; *State*v. Tolla, 72 *Id.*515.” *State*v. *Labriola,*75 *N. J. L.*483.

The court granted cross-examining counsel the right to inquire as to the qualifications of the infant to testify, although the judge expressed himself as satisfied. In the exercise of this right counsel asked the following question: “Who told you that you would not go to Heaven if you did not tell the truth ?” This question was properly overruled because it was obviously objectionable. There can be no profit in probing into the source of theological beliefs. The matter was not further pursued. The exclusion of an objectionable question is unavailing on error, even though there was an exception to the ruling.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

*For affirmance*— The Chancellor, Parker, Bodine, Wells, Raeeerty, Dill, JJ. 6.

*For reversal*— Case, Heher, Colie, Freund, JJ. 4.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

Getten Credit Company

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:20−cv−02651

Honorable Edmond E. Chang

Fair Isaac Corporation

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Monday, November 23, 2020:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Edmond E. Chang: This entry is being

posted on the docket of the related FICO cases: (1) Sky Federal Credit Union v. Fair Isaac

Corp., No. 20−cv−02114; (2) First Choice Federal Credit Union v. Fair Isaac Corp., No.

20−cv−02516; (3) Amalgamated Bank v. Fair Isaac Corp., No. 20−cv−02533; (4) Alcoa

Community Federal Credit Union v. Fair Isaac Corp., No. 1:20−cv−02559; (5) Getten

Credit Co. v. Fair Isaac Corp., No. 20−cv−02651; (6) Kenmore NY Teachers Federal

Credit Union v. Fair Isaac Corp., No. 20−cv−02755;(7) Alternative Finance, Inc. v. Fair

Isaac Corp., No. 20−cv−03204; (8) City of Boston Credit Union v. Fair Isaac Corp., No.

20−cv−03315; (9) Holmes County Bank & Trust Co. v. Fair Isaac Corp., No.

20−cv−03395; and (10) Garner Properties & Management v. Fair Isaac Corp., No.

20−cv−04575. On review of the proposals advanced by Alternative Finance [61] and the

Consensus Plaintiffs [64], as well as the defense response, R. 74, it would assist the

Court�39;s deliberations to allow both Alternative Finance and the Consensus

Plaintiffs to file separate replies to each other's responses and to the defense's response, R.

74. The replies shall be limited to 10 pages each and are due by 12/04/2020. The Court

notes that, although it is important to take substantive considerations into account in

crafting an efficient litigation plan, two other goals are important: (1) to avoid making, in

effect, definitive substantive decisions that really deserve and require full adversarial

briefing; and (2) to avoid getting bogged down just at the planning stage of the cases. The

Court also notes that the disagreements between Alternative Finance and the Consensus

Plaintiffs might be addressed via pleading in the alternative or pleading multiple classes

(or subclasses), or all or some combination of those approaches. The tracking status

hearing of 11/27/2020 is reset to 12/18/2020 at 8:30 a.m., but to track the case only (no

appearance is required, the case will not be called). Emailed notice (mw, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

Case: 1:20-cv-02651 Document #: 29 Filed: 11/23/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:101
criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cv-02651 Document #: 29 Filed: 11/23/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:102
YONI CALHOUN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

CASE NO. 1D16-2417

_____________________________/

Opinion filed October 10, 2017.

An appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.

Michael Flowers, Judge.

Philip J. Massa, West Palm Beach, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Julian E. Markham, Assistant Attorney

General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

BILBREY, WINSOR, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
#### MURRAY B. STONE ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. WILLIAM STEINEN MFG. CO., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

Argued October 3, 1944

Decided April 30, 1945.

Before Brogan, Chief Justice, and Justices Donges and Pbrsicie.

For the plaintiffs-appellants, *Milton*M. *Unger.*

For the defendant-respondent, *Pitney, Hardin*& *Ward.*

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Donges, J.

This appeal brings up a judgment of the Essex County Circuit Court in favor of defendant, in a suit to recover two weekly installments of $400 each, on an agreement admittedly executed by the parties.

The case was tried before Judge William A. Smith, sitting without a jury. His findings are reported in 22 *N. J. Mis. R.*353; 39 *Atl. Rep. (2d)*241.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of Judge Smith and need not be gone into at length herein.

Two questions are raised on this appeal, namely, that it was error to refuse to grant plaintiff’s motion to strike the first and second defenses of defendant’s answer alleging that the contract was illegal and contrary to public policy, and *17that it was error to enter judgment for defendant instead of for the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs argue that, inasmuch as the trial court struck the defendant’s counter-claim seeking to recover the amount of payments made under the contracts between the parties, upon the ground of illegality of the contract, the defenses should have been struck. No appeal is taken by the defendant from the striking of the counter-claim and we are not called upon to pass upon its propriety. The court struck the counterclaim on the ground of the illegality of the contract, and the parties were thereby left where the court found them, denying to both any right of recovery inasmuch as they were *in pari delicto.*This, however, did not affect the validity and sufficiency of the defenses raised in the answer of defendant as to the legality of the contracts. We conclude that there was no error in the' court’s refusal to strike the designated defenses.

Judge Smith properly held that the instant case was to be determined by him as one of fact upon the testimony and evidence presented. He concluded that the provision of the contract for employment of plaintiffs on a salary basis instead of a percentage, bas'ed upon the contracts obtained from the United States Navy Department, was a mere blind, and that the contract sued on and the consideration on which it was based is void as against public policy. This conclusion is amply supported by the evidence and the applicable law. *Weehawken Realty Co.*v. *Hass,*13 *N. J. Mis. R.*231; *Noble*v. *Mead-Morrison Manufacturing Co.,*129 *N. E. Rep.*669; *Brooks*v. *Cooper,*50 *N. J. Eg.*761.

The judgment under review is affirmed, with costs.
#### Geo. Allgaier and Milton *v.*Jas. M. Scott, Guardian, et al.

Principal and Surety — Pelease of Surety.

An agreement by the obligee in a note for forbearance, without a specified time of payment, of a note, or payment of interest in advance, will not operate to release the sureties.

APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT.

December 21, 1869.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Hardin:

In this action the appellants were sued as the co-obligors of J. T. Daviess on a promissory note, executed to the appellee as guardian to Ella P. Offutt, for $281.92, and in their defense they claimed exoneration on the ground that the plaintiff had, after the maturity of the note, without their consent, stipulated with their said co-obligor, for whom they were sureties in the debt, to give indulgence thereon for a specific time, in consideration of the payment of usurious interest.

The court rendered a judgment for the plaintiff, and the sureties have brought the case to this court.

It appears that shortly after the maturity of the note the appellee required payment of Daviess, who begged for further indulgence, and was thereupon told by the appellee that he could not *269afford to wait on him for legal interest, and that if he did wait, he must have ten per cent, which Daviess offered to pay, and asked indulgence for one year upon his agreement to pay that rate of interest. But although it appears that suit was not brought for over one year, and that interest was paid on the note up to January 1, 1865, at some rate, not definitely proved, but exceeding six per cent., it does not appear that the appellee agreed to suspend his right of action for one year, or to forbear to sue on the note for any specific time. Neither does it appear that the interest, legal or usurious, was paid in advance; and as the appellee did not put himself under any legal obligation to extend the time of payment — though the hope of receiving interest at a usurious rate may have induced his delay, it seems to us, according to the case of *Robinson, etc., v. Miller, 2 Bush, 179,*and other decisions of this court on the same subject, that the appellants were not released, and it was properly so adjudged by the circuit court.

*Polk, for appellants.*

*Prewitt, for appellees.*

Wherefore, the judgment is *affirmed.*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE Northern District of Illinois − CM/ECF LIVE, Ver 6.3.3

Eastern Division

Michael Sporleader

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 1:20−cv−02388

Honorable Steven C. Seeger

Everalbum, Inc

Defendant.

NOTIFICATION OF DOCKET ENTRY

This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Monday, September 28, 2020:

 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Steven C. Seeger: The Court reviewed the

Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice (Dckt. No. [29]), which reported that the named

Plaintiff and Defendant have agreed to dismissal of the named Plaintiff's claims (only)

with prejudice and without costs or attorneys' fees under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). In light of

the dismissal of the named plaintiff, the claims by the putative class members are

dismissed without prejudice. Civil case terminated. Mailed notice. (jjr, )

ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was

generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and

criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please

refer to it for additional information.

For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our

web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.

Case: 1:20-cv-02388 Document #: 30 Filed: 09/28/20 Page 1 of 1 PageID #:96
9644.

#### Farmers Warehouse Company *v.*Butts.

Decided October 22, 1918.

- Trover; from Baldwin superior court—Judge Park. February 12, 1918.

*D. 8. Sanford, E. R. IHnes,*for' plaintiff.

*Allen &*Pottle,. for defendant.

Broyees, P. J.

1. A formal power of attorney is subject to a strict construction. General terms in it are restricted to consistency with the controlling purpose, and will not extend the authority so as to add new and distinct powers different from the special powers expressly delegated. *White*v. *Young,*122 *Ga.*830 (51 S. E. 28).

*(a)*General words in a power of attorney must be construed with reference to the specified objects to be accomplished, and limited t® the recitals made in regard thereto. *Born*v. *Simmons,*111 *Ga.*869 (36 S. E. 956), and cases there cited.

2. A power of attorney to execute “a mortgage and a lien” on crops Js no authority for the execution of a bill of sale conveying the title to the property for the purpose of securing a debt. This is true although the power of attorney may contain the general expression, “to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises.” *White*v. *Young,*supra.

3. The hill of sale offered in evidence was. properly excluded on the ground that the power of attorney relied on as authorizing it’did not authorize its execution.

4. The bill of sale having been properly excluded from the evidence, the direction of a verdict for the defendant was not error.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Bloodworth and Harwell, J.J., concur.*
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Honorable Glen Aaron, Jr. Opinion No. M- 635 

County Attorney 

Tom Green County Re: Questions relating to proSan Angelo, Texas cedure for purchases by a 

county under the amount of 

Dear Mr. Aaron: $2,000. 

Your request for an opinion on the above subject 

matter states that the county auditor has questioned the procedure used by the commissioners court in making certain purchases under the amount of $2,000. Your request states: 

"It has been our procedure heretofore that 

in all purchases by Commissioners under the 

amount of $2,000 the Commissioners would go 

ahead and make such purchase at the time needed. 

At the Commissioner's Court session immediately 

following said purchase, purchase would be submitted to the Court for subsequent ratification. 

We desire to know at this point whether this is 

a proper procedure under the Laws of the State 

of Texas." 

Article 2351, Vernon's Civil Statutes, provides in 

part: 

"Each commissioners court shall: 

. _. . 

. . . 

"10. Audit and settle 

the county and direct their 

all accounts against 

payment. 

"15. Said court shall have all such other 

powers and jurisdiction, and shall perform all 

such other duties, as are now or may hereafter 

be prescribed by law. . . .'I 

-3041- 
Hon. Glen Aaron, Jr., page 2 (M-635) 

Pursuant to the powers granted under Subdivision 10 

of Article 2351. Vernon's Civil Statutes. it is well settled 

that the commissioners court may ratify that which it oould approve in the first instance. Angelina County v. Kent, 374 S.W.Zd 

313 (Tex.Civ.App. 1963, no wrk t);,State v. Carries, 106 S.W.2d 

397 (Tex.Civ.App. 1937, no writ); i :ameron County v. FOX, 61 

S.W.Zd 483 (Tex.Comm.App. 1933). 

Since the expenditure in question is~ not in excess of 

$2,000, the provisions of Article 2368a, Vernon's Civil Statutes, 

requiring certain contracts to be let on competitive bids, are 

not applicable to the purchases described in your request. 

In answer to your question, therefore, you are advised 

that the procedure outlined in your request is a lawful procedure. 

SUMMARY 

Since the commissioners court may ratify 

that which it could approve in the first instance, 

purchases.by commissioners under the amount of 

$2,000 may be subsequently ratified at a meeting 

of the, commissioners court. 

Prepared by John Reeves 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Kerns Taylor, Chairman 

W. E. Allen,~Co-Chairman 

Austin Bray 

J. W. Broadhurst 

Terry Goodman 

Ray McGregor 

MEADE F. GRIFFIN 

Staff Legal Assistant 

ALFRED WALKER 

Executive Assistant 

NOLA WHITE 

First Assistant 

-3042-
### **EXHIBIT 11.1**

### ** **

**COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS (LOSS)PER COMMON SHARE**

** **
| ** **                                                                     | ** ** | **Three months ended September 30,** | ** ** | **Nine months ended September 30,** | ** ** |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| ** **                                                                     | ** ** | **2007**                                                 | ** ** | **2006**                                                | ** ** | **2007** | ** ** | **2006** | ** ** |
| Diluted earnings  (loss) per share from continuing operations:                 |       |                                                     |       |                                                    |       |   |   |   |   |
| Net income  (loss) from continuing operations available to common shareholders |       | $                                                        | 65,000     |                                                    | $          | (868,000 | ) | $ | (9,505,000 | ) | $ | (3,669,000 | ) |
|                                                                           |       |                                                     |       |                                                    |       |   |   |   |   |
| Weighted average  number of shares outstanding                                 |       | 7,957,428                                                |       | 7,957,428                                               |       | 7,957,428 |   | 7,957,428 |   |
| Net effect of  dilutive stock options based on treasury stock method           |       | —                                                   |       | —                                                  |       | — |   | — |   |
| Total average  shares                                                          |       | 7,957,428                                                |       | 7,957,428                                               |       | 7,957,428 |   | 7,957,428 |   |
|                                                                           |       |                                                     |       |                                                    |       |   |   |   |   |
| Fully diluted  earnings (loss) per share from continuing operations            |       | $                                                        | 0.01       |                                                    | $          | (0.11 | ) | $ | (1.19 | ) | $ | (0.46 | ) |

 

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