1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

TOBIAS B. )

 )

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) No. 20-cv-2959

v. ) 

 ) Magistrate Judge Jeffrey I. Cummings

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,1 )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

 )

 Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Tobias B. (“Claimant”) moves to reverse or remand the final decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his claim for disability insurance 

benefits (“DIBs”).2 The Commissioner brings a cross-motion seeking to uphold the decision to 

deny benefits. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(c). This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. §405(g). For the reasons that follow, Claimant’s motion to reverse the decision of the 

Commissioner, (Dckt. #21), is granted and the Commissioner’s motion to uphold the decision to 

deny benefits, (Dckt. #22), is denied. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

 Claimant first filed a DIBs application on September 15, 2014, alleging a disability onset 

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 - Privacy in Social Security Opinions, the Court 

refers to Claimant only by his first name and the first initial of his last name. Acting Commissioner of 

Social Security Kilolo Kijakazi has also been substituted as the named defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d). 

 

2

 Although Claimant’s motion states that he filed an application for both DIBs and Supplemental Security 

Income, (Dckt. #21 at 3), it appears he only applied for DIBs. 

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date of March 18, 2008. At the time of Claimant’s alleged onset date, he was forty-eight years 

old. His claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Claimant filed a timely request for 

a hearing, which was held on May 19, 2017, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Diane S. 

Davis. (Administrative Record (“R.”) 28-59). ALJ Davis issued a written decision denying 

Claimant’s application for benefits on October 3, 2017. (R. 13-22). Claimant appealed to this 

Court, which granted the parties’ agreed motion for reversal and remanded the case for further 

administrative hearings on June 26, 2019. (R. 1424). ALJ Kathleen Kadlec held a supplemental 

hearing on December 18, 2019, (R. 1311-54), and issued a second decision denying Claimant’s 

application for benefits on January 21, 2020. (R. 1270-86). This action followed. 

B. The Social Security Administration Standard to Recover Benefits

To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate that he is disabled, 

meaning he cannot “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death, or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). Gainful activity is defined as “the kind of work usually done for pay or 

profit, whether or not a profit is realized.” 20 C.F.R. §404.1572(b). 

The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) applies a five-step analysis to disability 

claims. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520. The SSA first considers whether the claimant has engaged in 

substantial gainful activity during the claimed period of disability. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(i). 

At step two, the SSA determines whether the claimant has one or more medically determinable 

physical or mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. §404.1521. An impairment “must result from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that can be shown by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” Id. In other words, a physical 

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or mental impairment “must be established by objective medical evidence from an acceptable 

medical source.” Id.; Shirley R. v. Saul, 1:18-cv-00429-JVB, 2019 WL 5418118, at *2 (N.D.Ind. 

Oct. 22, 2019). If a claimant establishes that he has one or more physical or mental impairments, 

the ALJ then determines whether the impairment(s) standing alone, or in combination, are severe 

and meet the twelve-month duration requirement noted above. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(ii). 

At step three, the SSA compares the impairment or combination of impairments found at 

step two to a list of impairments identified in the regulations (“the listings”). The specific 

criteria that must be met to satisfy a listing are described in Appendix 1 of the regulations. 20 

C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the claimant’s impairments meet or “medically equal” a 

listing, he is considered disabled and no further analysis is required. If the listing is not met, the 

analysis proceeds. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(iii). 

Before turning to the fourth step, the SSA must assess the claimant’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”), or his capacity to work in light of the identified impairments. Then, at step 

four, the SSA determines whether the claimant is able to engage in any of his past relevant 

work. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can do so, he is not disabled. Id. If the 

claimant cannot undertake his past work, the SSA proceeds to step five to determine whether a 

substantial number of jobs exist that the claimant can perform given his RFC, age, education, and 

work experience. If such jobs exist, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4)(v). 

C. The Evidence Presented to the ALJ 

Claimant seeks DIBs due to limitations from high blood pressure, high cholesterol, 

diabetes, right knee pain post surgeries, and hearing loss. (R. 242, 274). Claimant alleges an 

onset date of March 18, 2008, and his date last insured was December 31, 2014. (R. 1285). 

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Because Claimant’s arguments on appeal concern only his left shoulder and right knee 

impairments, (Dckt. #22 at 2), the Court limits its discussion of the evidence accordingly.

1. Medical Records Related to Claimant’s Knee 

On September 27, 2005, Claimant underwent an arthroscopy with medial meniscectomy 

and chondroplasty to repair a torn medial meniscus in his right knee. (R. 1256). After the 

surgery, Claimant returned to work as a corrections officer in a maximum-security prison. Over 

the next few months, Claimant continued to experience knee pain, which did not respond to a 

corticosteroid injection or Synvisc injections. (Id.). In June 2006, an updated MRI 

“demonstrated a recurrent medial meniscus tear.” (Id.). Although Claimant was capable of full 

extension and reported minimal tenderness, the MRI showed a “through and through tear of the 

posterior horn of the medial meniscus,” and Claimant’s treating provider recommended that he 

undergo a second arthroscopic medial meniscectomy. (Id.). Sherwin Ho, M.D., performed the 

operation with no complications on October 3, 2006. (R. 1224-25, 1248-49). 

Claimant did not report any knee pain from October 2006 through December 2013. 

Treatment notes from this period indicate that Claimant presented with no distress, normal gait, 

normal strength, and no edema. (R. 347, 403, 851, 853, 856-57, 861-62, 1145, 1154, 1157). On 

December 26, 2013, however, Claimant’s treating physician, Deirdra Greathouse-Williams, 

M.D., noted that Claimant complained of pain in his right knee, which was swollen. (R. 847). 

She prescribed Naprosyn and Ultram to treat the pain, gave Claimant an injection, and ordered 

an x-ray. (Id.). Imaging of the right knee showed: 

mixed underlying bony demineralization . . . some degenerative spurring and 

contour change at the margins of the patella and to a lesser extent at the distal femur 

and proximal tibia . . . some asymmetric narrowing of the medial femoral-tibial 

plateau . . . [and] some rounded sclerosis noted at the base of the tibial intercondylar 

eminence possibly reactive or degenerative. 

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(R. 877). Claimant was diagnosed with “degenerative bony changes with some mild by 

asymmetric narrowing of the medial femoral/tibial compartment and some sclerosis of the 

proximal tibia.” (R. 877). 

About two weeks later, on January 7, 2014, Claimant again reported right knee pain and 

stiffness. (R. 845). Dr. Greathouse-Williams observed marked warmth and edema of the knee 

and prescribed Claimant prednisone. (Id.). Claimant was told to follow up in one week if his 

knee pain did not improve, but he did not schedule another appointment until May 5, 2014, at 

which time he did not complain of any knee pain. (R. 844). There were no further complaints of 

knee pain in the record. Treatment notes after January 2014 consistently indicated that Claimant 

had no tenderness, swelling, or edema in his extremities and presented with no distress, a normal 

gait, normal range of motion, and normal strength. (R. 542, 571, 607, 1138, 1260, 1262, 1269). 

2. Medical Records Related to Claimant’s Shoulder 

Claimant began experiencing left shoulder pain in September 2012, for which Dr. 

Greathouse-Williams prescribed Vicodin. (R. 867). A September 17, 2012 MRI of the shoulder 

revealed “moderate arthrosis of the acromioclavicular (“AC”) joint with associated edema and 

inflammatory changes,” as well as reactive marrow changes within the AC joint and downsloping of the acromion laterally with narrowing of the supraspinatus outlet. (R. 870). The 

reviewing physician recommended clinical correlation “to exclude impingement syndrome.” 

(Id.). Claimant was scheduled for shoulder surgery to treat the issue in November 2012, (R. 

861), but he decided not to have the procedure, (R. 1369). 

At an appointment on February 9, 2013, Claimant informed Dr. Greathouse-Williams that 

“his shoulder [was] not bothering him anymore.” (R. 857). He credited his medication with 

relieving the pain. (Id.). On May 8, 2013, however, Claimant again reported shoulder pain. (R. 

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855). He was prescribed Propanolol for his resting tremor and referred to neurological and 

orthopedic consults. (Id.). No subsequent notes discuss Claimant’s shoulder impairment. 

3. Evidence from State Agency Consultants 

State agency consultant Young-Ja Kim, M.D., reviewed Claimant’s file on April 9, 2015. 

Dr. Kim noted that the record included no medical or opinion evidence and he concluded that 

there was insufficient evidence to evaluate the claim. (R. 63-64). State agency consultant 

Martin B. Lahr, M.D., reviewed Claimant’s file on August 7, 2015, and also found insufficient 

evidence to evaluate Claimant’s impairments. (R. 73). 

 4. Function Reports and Hearing Testimony 

In a function report completed on January 13, 2015, Claimant indicated that he was 

“unable to stand for long period of time.” (R. 262). Although he had no problem with personal 

care and was able to drive, cook, do laundry, load the dishwasher, and use a riding lawnmower, 

(R. 263-65), Claimant opined that he could only lift twenty pounds, would lose his balance when 

squatting or bending, experienced pain when reaching, and could not stand or walk for more than 

thirty minutes at a time. (R. 267). Claimant further noted that he required a cane and a brace for 

longer periods of walking. (R. 268). 

At Claimant’s initial hearing on May 19, 2017, Claimant testified that he could only stand 

for twenty to thirty minutes at a time before needing to rest and could only sit for fifteen to 

twenty minutes before his knee would stiffen. (R. 1373). He testified that he was unable to 

crouch or stoop and could only walk twenty minutes before needing to stop due to swelling in his 

knee. (R. 1376). The ALJ did not question Claimant regarding his impairments during the 2019 

hearing, which focused on the vocational testimony and how Claimant’s past work was 

performed. (R. 1314). 

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D. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ applied the five-step inquiry required by the Act in reaching her decision to 

deny Claimant’s request for benefits. At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant had not engaged 

in substantial gainful activity from his alleged onset date of March 18, 2008, through his date last 

insured of December 31, 2014. (R. 1275). At step two, the ALJ determined that Claimant 

suffered from the severe impairment of “degenerative joint disease of the right knee, status post 

arthroscopy.” (Id.). Among other impairments, the ALJ classified Claimant’s degenerative joint 

disease of the left shoulder as non-severe. (R. 1276-77). 

At step three, the ALJ concluded that Claimant did not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the Commissioner’s listed 

impairments. (R. 1278-79). Before turning to step four, the ALJ determined that, through his 

date last insured, Claimant had the RFC to perform medium work with the following limitations: 

[H]e can operate foot controls with right foot frequently; frequently climb ramps 

and stairs; occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently stoop, kneel, 

crouch, crawl; occasionally work at unprotected heights; frequently be exposed to 

moving mechanical parts and vibration; and frequently operate a motor vehicle. 

(R. 1279). Based on this conclusion, the ALJ determined at step four that Claimant was capable 

of performing his past relevant work as a food service supervisor/correctional officer, and as an 

EMT/correctional officer. (R. 1283). As such, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled at 

any time from March 18, 2008, through December 31, 2014. (R. 1285). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A claimant who is found to be “not disabled” may challenge the Commissioner’s final 

decision in federal court. Judicial review of an ALJ’s decision is governed by 42 U.S.C. 

§405(g), which provides that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any 

fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. §405(g). “Substantial 

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evidence is not a high threshold: it means only ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 

2021), quoting Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The Commissioner’s decision must also be based on the proper legal criteria and be 

free from legal error. Scheck v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 2004); Steele v. Barnhart, 

290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002). 

A court reviews the entire record, but it does not displace the ALJ’s judgment by 

reweighing the facts, resolving conflicts, deciding credibility questions, making independent 

symptom evaluations, or otherwise substituting its judgment for that of the Commissioner. 

McKinzey v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2011); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th 

Cir. 2008). Instead, the court looks at whether the ALJ articulated an “accurate and logical 

bridge” from the evidence to her conclusions. Craft v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2008). 

This requirement is designed to allow a reviewing court to “assess the validity of the agency’s 

ultimate findings and afford a claimant meaningful judicial review.” Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 

589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, even if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the claimant 

is disabled, courts will affirm a decision if the ALJ’s opinion is adequately explained and 

supported by substantial evidence. Elder, 529 F.3d at 413. 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. The ALJ erred by independently assessing medical evidence submitted after 

the state agency consultants had rendered their opinions. 

In his single-issue motion, Claimant contends that the ALJ erred by failing to seek a 

medical opinion regarding the July 2006 MRI of his right knee and the September 2012 MRI of 

his left shoulder. (Dckt. #21 at 4). Claimant alleges that by interpreting this evidence herself, 

the ALJ impermissibly “played doctor.” The Court agrees. 

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The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that an ALJ may not “play [] doctor and interpret 

new and potentially decisive medical evidence without medical scrutiny.” McHenry v. Berryhill, 

911 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 

Lambert v. Berryhill, 896 F.3d 768, 774 (7th Cir. 2018); Akin v. Berryhill, 887 F.3d 314, 317–18 

(7th Cir. 2018); Moreno v Berryhill, 882 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir. 2018). The Commissioner 

responds that the Seventh Circuit typically finds that an ALJ “played doctor” only when “the 

ALJ failed to address relevant evidence.” (Dckt. #22 at 8-9) (citing Dixon v. Massanari, 270 

F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2001)). Since Dixon, however, the Seventh Circuit has clarified that the 

relevant question when determining whether an ALJ should have sought additional medical 

review is not what evidence the ALJ considered, but whether she was qualified to do so. In

Kemplen v. Saul, the Seventh Circuit summarized its prior holdings as providing the following 

standard: “the ALJ must seek an additional medical opinion if there is potentially decisive 

evidence that postdates the state agency consultant’s opinion.” 844 Fed.Appx. 883, 888 (7th Cir. 

2021) (citing cases). In other words, the issue “comes down to whether the new information 

‘changed the picture so much that the ALJ erred by . . . evaluating [herself] the significance of 

[the subsequent] report.’” Id. (citing Stage v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 1121, 1125 (7th Cir. 2016)). 

Here, the evidence submitted after the state agency consultants’ review undoubtedly 

“changed the picture” enough to necessitate an updated medical assessment because the state 

agency consultants did not render any opinion as to Claimant’s limitations, citing insufficient 

evidence. (R. 63, 73). 3 See Sherry R. v. Saul, No. 1:20-cv-01116-TAB-TWP, 2021 WL 

3

 The Commissioner asserts that the Seventh Circuit “has upheld decisions in which ALJ’s have evaluated 

medical records.” (Dckt. #22 at 8) (citing cases). However, none of the cases cited involved situations 

where – as here – the ALJ either interpreted MRIs without the input of a medical professional or ignored 

MRIs altogether. This case is similarly distinguishable from those cases where the Seventh Circuit has 

“upheld the denial of benefits when MRI evidence post-dating the state agency consultant’s report 

showed only mild changes in the claimants’ . . . conditions,” Kemplen, 844 Fed.Appx. at 887 (citing Keys 

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1884426, at *5 (S.D.Ind. May 11, 2021) (finding the ALJ improperly played doctor where “the 

bulk of Plaintiff’s mental health records were not available for the state agency psychologists”); 

Without any medical opinions in the record – whether from a state agency consultant or treating 

physician – it is unclear what the ALJ relied on in determining Claimant’s RFC, aside from her 

own interpretation of medical evidence, which is an impermissible source. Moon v. Colvin, 763 

F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2014) (“ALJs are required to rely on expert opinions instead of 

determining the significance of particular medical findings themselves.”). Furthermore, even if 

the state agency consultants had rendered an opinion as to Claimant’s RFC, remand would be 

necessary because both the 2012 MRI of Claimant’s shoulder and the 2013 imaging of 

Claimant’s knee constitute “potentially decisive medical evidence,” which the ALJ was 

unqualified to interpret. The Court will address each in turn. 

1. The ALJ impermissibly assessed the 2012 MRI of Claimant’s 

shoulder without the assistance of a medical expert. 

The Seventh Circuit has been especially critical of ALJs’ attempts to deduce the meaning 

of complex medical documents, such as MRIs. See, e.g., McHenry, 911 F.3d at 871 (“We agree 

with McHenry that the ALJ impermissibly assessed the MRI report on his own without the 

assistance of a medical expert.”); Akin, 887 F.3d at 317 (“[W]ithout an expert opinion 

interpreting the MRI results in the record, the ALJ was not qualified to conclude that the MRI 

results were ‘consistent’ with his assessment.”); Goins v. Colvin, 764 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 

v. Berryhill, 679 Fed.Appx. 477 (7th Cir. 2017); Olsen v. Colvin, 551 Fed.Appx. 868 (7th Cir. 2014)). In 

Keys – unlike here – the agency physicians reviewed certain MRIs from the claimant but did not review 

the most recent MRIs and the Seventh Circuit found that there was no evidence that the unreviewed MRIs 

would have changed the physicians’ opinions. Keys, 679 Fed.Appx. at 480-81. In Olsen, the record 

contained findings from the physicians who ordered claimant’s MRIs and the Seventh Circuit found that 

claimant failed to show that the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the MRIs – which was consistent with the 

physicians’ findings – was incorrect. Olsen, 551 Fed.Appx. at 874-75. In this case, by contrast, the record 

contains no evidence from any physician regarding Claimant’s MRIs. 

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2014) (“Fatally, the [ALJ] failed to submit that MRI to medical scrutiny, as she should have done 

since it was new and potentially decisive medical evidence.”). This is especially true when the 

MRIs – and the notes accompanying them – are replete with the kind of “barely intelligible 

medical mumbo jumbo,” that the Seventh Circuit has warned against relying on. Goins, 764 

F.3d at 680 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Israel v. Colvin, 840 F.3d 432, 439-440 (7th Cir. 2016) 

(“Because no physician in the record has opined on whether these [MRI] results are consistent 

with Israel’s claim of disabling pain, and because the reports are replete with technical language 

that does not lend itself to summary conclusions, we cannot say whether the results support or 

undermine Israel’s claim.”). 

In this case, the 2012 MRI of Claimant’s shoulder revealed “moderate arthrosis of the 

[AC] joint with associated edema and inflammatory changes,” as well as reactive marrow 

changes within the AC joint and down-sloping of the acromion laterally with narrowing of the 

supraspinatus outlet. (R. 870). Although Claimant never received the surgery that was 

recommended to treat such a condition, the ALJ found that Claimant’s “left shoulder issue 

resolved . . . with no additional treatment.” (R. 1282). This finding was not based on the 

opinion of any medical professional, but rather on Claimant’s “normal extremity motion” and 

infrequent reports of shoulder pain. (R. 1276). 

Because normal extremity motion and infrequent pain are not necessarily inconsistent 

with Claimant’s reports that he could lift no more than twenty pounds, the ALJ’s explanation 

was insufficient to build the requisite logical bridge between the evidence and her conclusion 

that Claimant’s shoulder impairment did not prevent him from performing medium work. See 

Lambert, 896 F.3d at 774 (finding that the ALJ’s reliance on x-ray results to discount claimant’s 

reports of pain was improper where no medical source had opined that the x-ray findings were 

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inconsistent with complaints of disabling pain); Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 247, 253 (7th Cir. 

2016) (finding the ALJ improperly substituted his judgment for a doctor’s when the ALJ failed 

to explain why the claimant’s normal reflexes and mild to moderate range-of-motion limitations 

were inconsistent with the doctor’s opinions); Hoyt v. Colvin, 553 Fed.Appx. 625, 627 (7th Cir. 

2014) (finding ALJ played doctor by independently interpreting electromyography exam and 

lumbar MRI as inconsistent with claimant’s pain complaints). On remand, the ALJ should 

obtain a medical opinion regarding whether Claimant’s shoulder impairment – as documented in 

the 2012 MRI – would have prevented him from engaging in medium work, which involves 

“lifting no more than [fifty] pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing 

up to [twenty-five] pounds.” 20 CFR 404.1567(c). 

2. The ALJ impermissibly assessed medical images of Claimant’s knee 

without the assistance of a medical expert. 

The ALJ was similarly unqualified to interpret two medical images of Claimant’s right 

knee. First, a 2006 MRI of the knee showed a “through and through tear of the posterior horn of 

the medial meniscus.” (R. 1256). Even after Claimant underwent an arthroscopic medial 

meniscectomy to address the problem, his postoperative diagnoses were “recurrent medial 

meniscus tear, right knee,” and “grade 4 chondral injury of femoral trochlea.” (R. 1248). 

Although Claimant did not report knee pain for years following the surgery, his symptoms 

resurfaced on December 26, 2013. (R. 847). Updated images of the knee showed: 

mixed underlying bony demineralization . . . some degenerative spurring and 

contour change at the margins of the patella and to a lesser extent at the distal femur 

and proximal tibia . . . some asymmetric narrowing of the medial femoral-tibial 

plateau . . . [and] some rounded sclerosis noted at the base of the tibial intercondylar 

eminence possibly reactive or degenerative. 

(R. 877). The treating physician diagnosed “degenerative bony changes with some mildly 

asymmetric narrowing of the medial femoral/tibial compartment and some sclerosis of the 

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proximal tibia.” (R. 877). On January 7, 2014, Claimant again reported knee pain and stiffness 

and Dr. Greathouse-Williams observed marked warmth and edema of the knee. (R. 845). 

 As with the treatment notes summarizing Claimant’s shoulder MRI, the 2006 and 2013 

images of Claimant’s knee do not lend themselves to layperson interpretation. Accordingly, the 

ALJ’s finding that Claimant was capable of medium work despite his knee impairment was not 

adequately supported. Although the ALJ noted that Claimant’s condition improved following 

the 2006 surgery and that he frequently presented with normal muscle strength and normal gait 

throughout his period of disability, she again failed to explain how this evidence was necessarily 

inconsistent with Claimant’s reports of being unable to stand for more than twenty to thirty 

minutes at a time, sit for more than fifteen to twenty minutes at a time, or walk for only ten to 

twenty minutes at a time.4

 See Green v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 780, 781 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding the 

ALJ’s analysis did not provide a rational basis for the denial of benefits where he relied on 

portions of the medical record that did not obviously contradict the Claimant’s assertions, instead 

of soliciting the opinion of a physician); Charles B. v. Saul, No. 18 C 1377, 2019 WL 3557055, 

at *9 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 1, 2019) (remanding where the ALJ “improperly resorted to playing doctor 

when he found that evidence of full strength in [the claimant’s] extremities was inconsistent with 

[the treating physician’s] opinion on [the claimant’s] limitations and severe pain.”). 

No medical professional opined that Claimant was capable of medium work – which 

requires standing or walking, off and on, for approximately six hours of an eight-hour workday, 

SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 (Jan. 1, 1983) – despite his various knee diagnoses. For this 

reason, too, the ALJ’s RFC assessment is not properly supported. 

4

 The Court also notes that the ALJ mischaracterized the record regarding the speed with which 

Claimant’s knee improved following the December 2013 reports of swelling and edema. The ALJ stated 

that Claimant’s edema had resolved by February 2014, but cited a record from February 2012. (R. 1281) 

(citing R. 1154). 

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B. The proper remedy is reversal for further proceedings, rather than an award 

of benefits. 

Claimant asks that the Court not only reverse the decision of the Commissioner, but 

remand with instructions to grant benefits. (Dckt. #21 at 13). Such a remedy is only appropriate 

where “the record can yield but one supportable conclusion.” Martin v. Saul, 950 F.3d 369, 376 

(7th Cir. 2020), quoting Campbell v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1993). For the same 

reason that ALJs cannot interpret medical evidence without the assistance of medical 

professionals, neither can the Court. Accordingly, the Court is unable to find that Claimant is 

unquestionably disabled and the case must be remanded for further proceedings. See Martin, 

950 F.3d at 377 (“The vast majority of the time we will not award benefits and instead remand 

for further proceedings.”). 

CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reason, Claimant’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s decision to 

deny DIBs, (Dckt. #21), is granted and the Commissioner’s motion to uphold the denial of 

benefits, (Dckt. #22), is denied. The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the case is 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order. 

ENTERED: September 20, 2022 

 

 ______________________ 

 Jeffrey I. Cummings 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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