[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-10652

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-00549-WSD

MICHAEL KING, 

 Plaintiff – Appellant,

versus

ANTHONY LUMPKIN, 

individual and in his official capacity as a 

police officer for the City of Jonesboro, Georgia 

and as a resource officer for Clayton County Public Schools, 

 Defendant - Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(October 16, 2013)

Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael King appeals from the district court’s final order 

dismissing his complaint alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Officer 

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Anthony Lumpkin, in Lumpkin’s individual capacity and in his official capacity as 

a police officer for the City of Jonesboro and a resource officer for Clayton County 

Public Schools. On appeal, King argues that the district court erred in dismissing 

his § 1983 claims under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”), the Fourth 

Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment, as well as 

his state constitutional law claim. After thorough review, we affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), taking as true the factual allegations in 

the complaint and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). Dismissal for 

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if the factual allegations are 

not enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). We review a district court’s decision to 

decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for abuse of discretion. See

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). We also review the 

denial of a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. Green Leaf 

Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003).

The relevant background is this. On November 24, 2008, an ethics 

complaint was filed with the Clayton County Ethics Commission against King, an 

elected member of the Clayton County Board of Education (the “Board”). The 

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ethics complaint alleged violations of Georgia House Bill 1302, which was enacted 

“[t]o provide a code of ethics for the Clayton County School System; to provide 

for prohibited practices; to provide for disclosure; to provide for an ethics 

commission; . . . to provide for complaints; to provide for hearings and actions; to 

provide for sanctions; . . . and for other purposes.” 2008 Ga. Laws 400, pmbl. 

(“House Bill 1302”). Among other things, House Bill 1302 prohibits any elected 

official of the Clayton County School System, including the Board, from 

representing “private interests in any action or proceeding against the school 

system or any office, department, or agency thereof.” Id. § 2(a)(4). 

On February 16, 2009, the Commission found that King had violated House 

Bill 1302 by: (1) representing a litigant in a suit against the Clayton County Public 

Schools and certain of its employees while he was a member of the Board; (2) 

failing to disclose a financial interest related to the operation of the Clayton County 

Public Schools; and, (3) filing a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Clayton County 

against the Clayton County Public Schools and Board asking the court to review 

the actions of the Board in censuring him for representing a party against the Board 

and for failing to disclose an adverse financial interest. The Commission ordered 

that King immediately be removed from his position as a Board member. 

On February 23, 2009, King “appeared at the central office for the Clayton 

County Public Schools for the 7:00 p.m. school board meeting.” Before the start of 

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the meeting, King claims that Officer Lumpkin physically removed him from his 

seat on the Board, escorted him out of the building, and directed him not to return 

to his seat until he appealed his removal by the Commission. King sued, alleging: 

(1) a § 1983 claim for false arrest and wrongful removal from the School Board 

meeting in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) two § 1983 claims for 

violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment, respectively, as a result of 

his removal from a Clayton County School Board meeting; and, (3) a § 1983 claim 

for violations of his “federal constitutional and statutory rights” as a result of 

Officer Lumpkin’s enforcement of House Bill 1302, which King says was not 

precleared by the Department of Justice under Section 5 of the VRA. The district 

court dismissed King’s complaint. This timely appeal follows. 

First, we are unpersuaded by King’s argument that the district court erred in 

granting qualified immunity to Lumpkin on the § 1983 claims. To establish a § 

1983 claim, King must make a prima facie showing that: (1) an act or omission 

deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws 

of the United States, and (2) the act or omission was done by a person acting under 

color of law. Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 

1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). Qualified immunity protects government officials 

performing discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities, unless 

their conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

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which a reasonable person would have known.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 

(2002) (quotation omitted). “The purpose of this immunity is to allow government 

officials to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of personal liability 

or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one 

who is knowingly violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 

(11th Cir. 2002) (quotation and citation omitted). 

To be protected by qualified immunity, “the public official must first prove 

that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the 

allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Id. (quotation omitted). In order to determine 

whether the acts in question are discretionary acts protected by qualified immunity, 

we must look at “whether the government employee was (a) performing a 

legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through 

means that were within his power to utilize.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. 

Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). We agree with the district court 

that Officer Lumpkin was carrying out his discretionary duties as a law 

enforcement officer when he escorted King from his seat on the Board after King 

had been removed from the Board by the Ethics Commission for ethical violations. 

If a government official was acting within the scope of his discretionary 

authority, “the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the grant of qualified 

immunity is inappropriate.” McCullough v. Antolini, 559 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th 

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Cir. 2009). To do so, the plaintiff must demonstrate: one, that the facts viewed in 

the light most favorable to the plaintiff establish a constitutional violation by the 

officers, and, two, that it was clearly established at the time of the incident that the 

actions of the defendant were unconstitutional. Id. We need not conduct this 

qualified immunity analysis in any specific order; rather, we are permitted to 

exercise our sound discretion in deciding which prong of this inquiry to address 

first. Id. In assessing the clearly-established prong, we ask “whether it would be 

clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 

confronted.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation 

omitted). Thus, in order for a plaintiff to show that a constitutional violation was 

clearly established, she must show (1) “that a materially similar case has already 

been decided, giving notice to the police”; (2) “that a broader, clearly established 

principle should control the novel facts in this situation”; or (3) “this case fits 

within the exception of conduct which so obviously violates [the] constitution that 

prior case law is unnecessary.” Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 766 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). 

Here, King claims that Officer Lumpkin should have read the entirety of 

House Bill 1302 prior to “escorting plaintiff out of the building and directing him 

not to return to his seat on the school board until he appealed a removal 

recommendation by the [Ethics Commission Order].” However, the Ethics 

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Commission Order expressly provided that “the Clayton County School System 

Ethics Commission hereby ORDERS that Michael B. King be, and he hereby is, 

REMOVED from his seat as the member of the Clayton County Board of 

Education from District 4, effective immediately.” Further, although House Bill 

1302 says that “the accused member shall remain a voting member of the board 

until [all appeals are exhausted],” House Bill 1302 also gives the commission the

power to sanction unethical behavior by “order[ing] the removal of the board 

member from office.” House Bill 1302 § 4(h), (k). King cites to nothing that 

would have given Officer Lumpkin fair warning that enforcing a valid Ethics 

Commission Order recommending removal -- with or without ascertaining King’s 

appeal status at the time he escorted him out of the meeting -- was a violation of a 

clearly established constitutional right under the Fourth, Fourteenth, or Fifteenth 

Amendments. Indeed, King does not even make any specific legal argument about 

any due process rights that might have been affected. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City 

of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that passing 

references to issues are insufficient to raise a claim for appeal, and such issues are 

deemed abandoned).1 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that 

Officer Lumpkin is entitled to qualified immunity for King’s § 1983 claims. 2

 1 King has also abandoned any challenge to the district court’s finding that Officer 

Lumpkin’s actions were reasonable because Officer Lumpkin had probable cause to believe that 

a valid removal order was being violated. 

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Nor are we convinced by King’s argument that the district court erred in 

dismissing his § 1983 claim against Officer Lumpkin in his official capacity. “A 

claim asserted against an individual in his or her official capacity is, in reality, a 

suit against the entity that employs the individual.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 

F.3d 1291, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009). A government entity is only liable under 

Section 1983 for the actions of its employees “when execution of a government’s 

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts 

may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury . . . .” Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “A policy is a decision that is 

officially adopted by the municipality, or created by an official of such rank that he 

or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the municipality. A custom is a 

practice that is so settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law.” Cooper 

v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). 

Here, King’s complaint failed to state a claim against Officer Lumpkin in his 

official capacity because: (1) House Bill 1302 is not an official policy of the City 

of Jonesboro, but rather is a bill passed by the Georgia legislature; and (2) the 

 

2 Moreover, all of King’s claims based on Section 5 of the VRA -- including whether a 

three-judge panel was required, whether a declaratory judgment was warranted, and whether an 

injunction was warranted -- were properly dismissed. This is because, among other things, the 

United States Supreme Court recently held, in Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 

(2013), that the preclearance requirements of Section 5 of the VRA cannot be enforced until 

Congress amends the coverage formula in Section 4 of the VRA. Id. at 2631.

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Clayton County Public Schools Ethics Commission Order is not an official policy 

of the City of Jonesboro. Id. Thus, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

King’s claim against Officer Lumpkin in his official capacity.

We also reject King’s claim that the district court should take supplemental 

jurisdiction of his state law claims. As we’ve already determined, the district court 

properly dismissed all of King’s federal claims. Therefore, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 

King’s state law claims. 

Finally, to the extent King argues that the district court abused its discretion 

in denying King’s request to amend his complaint, we disagree. Because King is a 

licensed attorney, he does not have the right to have his pleading liberally 

construed. See Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1194 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977) 

(licensed attorneys proceeding pro se not entitled to have pleadings liberally 

construed).3

AFFIRMED.

 3

 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we 

adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981.

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