UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MARILYN METHAVICHIT, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) No. 1:20-CV-02841 

 ) 

 v. ) 

 ) Judge Edmond E. Chang 

LINDA FOLLENWEIDER, JOHN JAY ) 

SHANNON, and COOK COUNTY, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Marilyn Methavichit, a nursing administrator formerly employed by the Cook 

County Health and Hospitals System, is suing the County (and others) for employment discrimination and related claims. Methavichit alleges that she suffered discrimination based on her race, national origin, age, and disability, in violation of Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination 

in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 

U.S.C. § 12112 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.1 She also 

claims that the Defendants violated her constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, retaliated against her for exercising her rights under the Family and Medical 

Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, and committed several state law torts. R. 26, Am. 

1This Court has jurisdiction over Methavichit’s federal-question claims under 28 

U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367. 

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Compl.2 The Defendants, Cook County, Linda Follenweider, and John Jay Shannon 

have moved to dismiss all claims except the FMLA retaliation claim (the Court will 

at times refer to the Defendants jointly as Cook County, for simplicity’s sake). R. 27, 

Mot. to Dismiss. For the reasons discussed in this Opinion, the motion is granted in 

part and denied in part. 

I. Background 

 As explained later in this Opinion, the Defendants’ motion is partially a motion 

to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), and partially a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). Either way, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as 

true and draws all reasonable inferences in Methavichit’s favor. Hayes v. City of Chicago, 670 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2012). 

 Marilyn Methavichit is a now-68-year-old Asian woman of Filipino origin, who 

suffers from Type II diabetes and related conditions, including, at relevant times, 

renal failure. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 109, 136. She began working for Cook County Health 

and Hospitals System (Cook County Health for short)in late November 2016. Id. ¶ 11. 

Cook County Health receives federal funding. Id. ¶ 132. At the time of Methavichit’s 

discharge nearly three years later, she was an Administrative Nursing Supervisor, 

Housing Administrator at Cermak Health Services of Cook County, which provides 

health care to detainees at the Cook County Jail. Id. ¶¶ 11, 47. As the Housing Administrator, Methavichit was expected to serve as a leader to hospital staff during 

2Citations to the record are noted as “R.” followed by the docket number and the page 

or paragraph number if applicable. 

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evening, night, weekend, and holiday shifts when the Chief Nursing Officer was absent, which included “autonomously making operational decisions, resolving discrepancies, and responding to hospital-wide emergences.” Id. ¶ 12. In this role, Methavichit reported to Defendant Linda Follenweider, a Nurse Practitioner and the Chief 

Operating Officer for Correctional Health at Cook County Health. Id. ¶ 14. Follenweider is white, younger than Methavichit, and Methavichit believes her to be of U.S. 

national origin. Id. ¶ 15. Follenweider became interim Director of Nursing at Cermak 

in April 2018. Id. ¶ 17. (It is not clear if she held this position concurrent with or 

separately from her Chief Operating Officer position.) 

 Methavichit started having problems with Follenweider in May 2018. Am. 

Compl. ¶ 18. That month, Follenweider called Methavichit into her office, where she 

berated her for performing poorly, and told her she did not deserve or belong at her 

job. Id. In accusing Methavichit of poor performance—an accusation that Methavichit 

was hearing for the first time—Follenweider referred to actions that fell within 

Methavichit’s job responsibilities. Id. A few months later, in September and October, 

Methavichit had to go to the hospital and receive dialysis to manage her diabetes and 

related kidney disease. Id. ¶ 19. While she was in the hospital, Follenweider inflicted 

“harassing telephone calls and text messages” on her. Id. ¶ 20. Then in December 

(still in 2018), Methavichit returned to the hospital for surgery and more dialysis. Id.

¶ 21. She applied for and received FMLA leave for this period. Id. ¶ 22. Again, during 

her hospitalization, Methavichit received unwanted phone calls and text messages 

from Follenweider. Id. ¶ 23. 

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 Methavichit returned to work in December 2018, and soon had to contend with 

Follenweider’s unsuccessful attempt to discipline her for taking sick leave. Am. 

Compl. ¶ 24. Then, later in December, Methavichit asked to “use her holiday off to 

get testing needed for kidney transplant.” Id. ¶ 25.3 Follenweider denied the request, 

which prevented Methavichit from being put on a kidney transplant priority list. Id. 

¶ 25. In January 2019, the two had another run-in, in which Follenweider told 

Methavichit that she did not deserve the $0.75 per hour raise she was automatically 

due to receive. Id. ¶ 26. Later that same month, Follenweider again told Methavichit 

that she did not deserve her job, “and made hostile, derogatory and negative insults 

targeting her age, race, and disability.” Id. ¶ 27. 

 In February 2019, Methavichit was called to Northwestern Hospital to receive 

a kidney transplant. Am. Compl. ¶ 28. She received the call at 7:30 a.m. and was told 

to get to the hospital by 9 a.m. Id. She followed nursing department procedure by 

immediately notifying the department to “place her on sick call,” which angered Follenweider. Id. Methavichit took FMLA leave and a leave of absence while she received 

treatment for her kidney transplant. Id. ¶ 29. In mid-May 2019, she returned to work, 

where her co-workers warned her that Follenweider disliked her and “wanted to get 

rid of her.” Id. ¶ 30. 

 On June 4, 2019, an incident took place and Follenweider used it, according to 

Methavichit, as a pretext to open disciplinary proceedings against Methavichit. Am. 

3This puzzling assertion will be discussed further in the Analysis. 

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Compl. ¶ 32. Methavichit had allowed a clerk to enter an office to get a key to open 

the cardiology clinic, and then supervised the clerk in helping to deal with a paper 

jam. Id. The clerk had no access to confidential information, but Follenweider accused 

Methavichit of insubordination, and said she had compromised confidentiality by letting the clerk into the office. Id. (How an alleged violation of confidentiality policies 

morphed into an insubordination charge is not explained in the Complaint.) Eight 

days later, Methavichit was told that there would be a hearing the next day, June 13, 

about the June 4 incident. Id. ¶ 33. She asked for more time so that she could find a 

lawyer and prepare a defense, but her request was denied. Id. The hearing went forward on June 13, and included an interview of the clerk, whom Methavichit was not 

permitted to confront or cross-examine. Id. Methavichit was not permitted to call witnesses. Id. Four days later, on June 17, Methavichit complained of harassment and 

discrimination to Nick Krasucki, the Equal Employment Opportunity director for 

Cook County Health. Id. ¶ 36. At some point in June, Follenweider “expressed her 

dislike of personnel taking FMLA leave” in a management meeting. Id. ¶ 34. 

 On June 20, one week after the hearing and three days after she first complained of harassment and discrimination, Methavichit was given notice of a one-day 

suspension that she would serve on June 27 for the June 4 incident. Am. Compl. ¶ 35. 

On June 25, Methavichit lodged another complaint, this time through counsel. Id. 

¶ 37. She complained to Krasucki, and Defendant Jay Shannon, Cook County 

Health’s CEO, as well as Timothy Hopa, Cook County Health’s Counsel, that she had 

been subjected to harassment, bullying, and intentional infliction of emotional 

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distress, all due to her national origin, disability, and age, and that she had been 

retaliated against for using FMLA leave. Id. Krasucki asked her to provide more details, and the next day, June 26, she submitted a memorandum detailing her allegations. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. The Defendants did not respond to her allegations or improve her 

working conditions. Id. ¶ 39. Instead, when she returned to work on June 28, after 

serving her one-day suspension, Methavichit received a formal Notice of Pre-Disciplinary Hearing, which was dated June 27. Id. ¶ 40. The Notice cited violations of personnel rules, but Methavichit alleges that the purported violations were “false and 

pretextual accusations.” Id. 

 The disciplinary proceedings were so distressing to Methavichit that a few days 

after her suspension, on or around July 1, she had to be taken to the hospital for 

emergency treatment to prevent her body from rejecting her kidney. Am. Compl. ¶ 41. 

Meanwhile, her counsel responded to the allegations in the June 27 Notice, and told 

the Defendants that Methavichit was hospitalized. Id. ¶ 42. On July 5, Methavichit 

filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC. R. 32-1 at 1, Pl.’s Exh. A, EEOC 

Charge. On July 10, Methavichit returned to work, where she immediately faced a 

hearing on the June 27 charges. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43–44. Two months later, on September 11, the Defendants “issued a Disciplinary Action Form, for dismissal of Dr. 

Methavichit, on the false and pretextual grounds of the June 27/28 charges.” Id. ¶ 46. 

On September 19, Methavichit received notice of her dismissal. Id. ¶ 47. A month 

later, she received notice of her ineligibility for rehire anywhere in the Cook County 

Health system. Id. ¶ 48. Methavichit received her right-to-sue letter from the EEOC 

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in February 2020 and filed this lawsuit in May 2020. R. 32-1 at 4–5, Pl.’s Exh. B, 

Right to Sue Letter; R. 1, Original Compl. 

II. Legal Standard 

A. Rule 12(b)(6) 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only 

include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (cleaned up).4

The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading 

regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on 

technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 

580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)). 

 “A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police 

of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 570). These allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

4This opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations, 

and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations, 

18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017). 

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speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to the 

assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. 

B. Rule 12(c) 

The County argues that Methavichit failed to exhaust administrative remedies 

on certain claims, and styles that part of the dismissal motion as a motion to dismiss 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), just like its other arguments based on 

alleged defects in the pleadings. But a failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense 

and thus a Rule 12(b)(6) motion—which tests the adequacy of the allegations to state 

a valid claim—is inapt, because plaintiffs need not plead around affirmative defenses 

in a complaint. Mosely v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 

2006). Instead, the proper vehicle to assert lack of exhaustion (if it is to be considered 

at the pleading stage) is a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. If discovery is not needed to resolve the exhaustion defense, and “if the allegations of the complaint [viewed] in the light most favorable to the plaintiff show that there is no way 

that any amendment could salvage the claim,” id., then the Court may consider the 

motion at the pleading stage. Neither Methavichit nor Cook County disputes the propriety of addressing the exhaustion defense at this stage. Methavichit asserted in her 

Complaint that she filed an EEOC Charge “alleging discrimination based on age, 

race, disability, and retaliation,” the same claims she brings in this lawsuit. Am. 

Compl. ¶ 54. She also attached the EEOC Charge and Right to Sue Letter as exhibits 

to her response brief. R. 32-1. She has not suggested in the Complaint or brief that 

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any facts are missing from the record that would affect the exhaustion defense. So 

the Court can decide the exhaustion defense because “the allegations of [Methavichit’s] complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense.” United States v. Lewis, 411 F.3d 838, 842 (7th Cir. 2005). Put another way, 

“when all relevant facts are presented, the court may properly dismiss a case before 

discovery—typically through a Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings—on 

the basis of an affirmative defense.” Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 

F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). 

Generally speaking, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by the 

same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Hayes v. City of Chicago, 

670 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir. 2012). In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 

the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as true and view the alleged facts 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. Judgment on the pleadings 

is proper if it appears beyond doubt that the non-moving party cannot prove any set 

of facts sufficient to support the claim for relief. Id. In deciding a motion for judgment 

on the pleadings, the Court considers the pleadings alone, which consist of the complaint, the answer, and any documents attached as exhibits. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor 

Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998). 

III. Analysis 

 Before addressing the Defendants’ arguments, it is necessary to pause and survey the claims at issue. The First Amended Complaint lists 14 separate counts, although they are not numbered one through 14. Also, two of the 14 counts are carbon 

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copies of one another. The defense’s attempt to bring order to the pleading further 

complicated things by conflating claims that should have remained separate, resulting in the defense’s assertion that there are 11 separate claims. Mot. to Dismiss at 2. 

For clarity’s sake, the Court will assign each count its own number (even the duplicates) and cite to its paragraph numbers, while also specifying the nature of the claim. 

This Opinion will thus not always refer to counts by the same numbers that the parties used. 

A. Exhaustion 

Cook County argues that Methavichit’s claims of discrimination based on race, 

national origin, age, and discrimination (under the ADA),5 as well as retaliation, must 

be dismissed insofar as they depend on her termination from her position with Cook 

County Health, because she did not present them in her EEOC Charge, which she 

filed before she was terminated. R. 36, Defs.’ Reply at 4–5; EEOC Charge. Therefore, 

the defense argues, Methavichit has failed to exhaust those claims. Id. Methavichit 

did not attach her EEOC Charge to her Amended Complaint, so the Defendants’ opening brief simply “prudentially assert[ed] that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies” based on the theory that she might not have timely filed an 

EEOC Charge or included all the claims now before this Court. Mot. to Dismiss at 3–

4. Methavichit responded by attaching her EEOC Charge and Right to Sue Letter to 

5For some reason, the defense does not appear to target Methavichit’s claim under the 

Rehabilitation Act. This may have been an error based on the confusing proliferation of 

claims in the First Amended Complaint and the defendants’ renumbering of them. If so, however, it does not matter, because the Court rejects the exhaustion defense at this stage. 

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her response brief, R. 32-1, and asking the Court to consider those documents and 

reject the exhaustion defense. Pl’s. Resp. at 5. Based on the current record, the Court 

cannot conclusively determine that Methavichit failed to exhaust her administrative 

remedies. 

Before presenting a particular claim in an employment discrimination lawsuit, 

the plaintiff must present it to the EEOC (or the parallel state antidiscrimination 

agency). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f); see also Cheek v. W. and S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 

500 (7th Cir. 1994); Cervantes v. Ardagh Group, 914 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2019). 

The purpose of this requirement is to put the employer on notice of what accusations 

it faces, and also to give the employer and the administrative agency the chance to 

resolve the employee’s grievances before the employee turns to litigation. Cheek, 31 

F.3d at 500. Because most employees who file discrimination charges are not attorneys, however, the Seventh Circuit instructs that allegations in EEOC Charges 

should be viewed expansively when deciding whether a particular claim is within the 

scope of the Charge. Id. “A Title VII plaintiff need not allege in an EEOC charge each 

and every fact that combines to form the basis of each claim in her complaint.” Id. 

(cleaned up). Instead, a claim should be considered exhausted if it is “like or reasonably related to the EEOC charge, and can be reasonably expected to grow out of an 

EEOC investigation of the charges.” Cervantes, 914 F.3d at 565 (cleaned up). To be 

considered “reasonably related” to the original charge, “the claims should involve the 

same conduct and implicate the same individuals.” Miller v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 525 

F.3d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 2008). 

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The question is whether Methavichit can bring claims based on alleged discrimination that took place after she filed her EEOC Charge. She filed her EEOC 

Charge on July 5, 2019, based on alleged mistreatment that she had experienced before that date, but was not fired from her job until September 19, 2019. EEOC Charge; 

Am. Compl. ¶ 47. She did not file an additional EEOC Charge. Based on the facts in 

this case, the Court concludes that this was not a fatal error—Methavichit may well 

be able to show that she exhausted her remedies even on the claims related to events 

that took place after she filed her Charge. 

The key point is that Methavichit’s EEOC Charge includes a lengthy narrative 

in which she describes the harassment by Follenweider while she was receiving medical care, Follenweider’s insults, and her own complaints to Krasucki about harassment and discrimination. EEOC Charge. It also refers to a “Notice of Pre-disciplinary 

Hearing” she received on June 28, 2019, “based on false accusations of violations of 

CCHHS Personnel rules,” which her Complaint alleges ultimately formed the basis 

for her termination. EEOC Charge; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40, 43–47. It is important, too, 

that the EEOC issued Methavichit her Right to Sue letter on February 12, 2020, several months after her termination. Right to Sue Letter. This means that Methavichit 

was fired while the EEOC had jurisdiction over her charge. If the Commission had 

investigated the allegations in her Charge, it would doubtless have learned that she 

was ultimately fired based on the disciplinary hearing that she alleged—in the EEOC 

Charge—was pretextual. 

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Seventh Circuit precedent on when a claim is “reasonably related” to the allegations in an EEOC charge supports rejecting the exhaustion defense to Methavichit’s discrimination claims. (There is a separate basis for rejecting the defense to her 

retaliation claims, which will be addressed next.) For one thing, the Seventh Circuit 

has consistently held that claims based on different kinds of discrimination than 

those asserted in the EEOC Charge have not been exhausted—but this is not that 

type of case. See Sitar v. Indiana Dept. of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 726–27 (7th Cir. 

2003) (plaintiff whose EEOC charge listed only retaliation could not later file a case 

based on sex discrimination and sexual harassment); Vela v. Village of Sauk Village, 

218 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2000) (sexual harassment claim not the same as sex discrimination charge); Green v. National Steel Corp., Midwest Div., 197 F.3d 894, 898 

(7th Cir. 1999) (EEOC charge based on disparate treatment did not exhaust plaintiff’s 

remedies on a failure to accommodate claim because “a failure to accommodate claim 

is separate and distinct from a claim of discriminatory treatment under the ADA” 

(cleaned up)). The appellate court has explained that a plaintiff cannot advance a 

different type of legal theory than the types that she brought to the EEOC when “the 

two types of claims are analyzed differently under the law.” Green, 197 F.3d at 898. 

In other words, the EEOC would conduct its investigation differently if it knew that 

the employee was claiming sexual harassment rather than, say, disparate treatment. 

But this is not a case where the plaintiff brings claims on an entirely new theory at trial. On her EEOC Charge, Methavichit checked the boxes for discrimination 

based on race, national origin, disability, age, hostile work environment, and 

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retaliation, and she provided a narrative in support of those claims. EEOC Charge. 

Her Complaint now brings claims on all of those theories—the only difference is that 

it includes events that took place after the Charge was filed. But those events, on her 

alleged facts, are “reasonably related” to the events alleged in her EEOC Charge. Her 

Charge included allegations that she was wrongfully accused of violating Cook 

County Health policies, and was being targeted for discipline—that turned out to be 

the very discipline that culminated in her termination. EEOC Charge; Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 46–47. The relationship is clear. 

Two cases with facts similar to but distinguishable from Methavichit’s further 

illuminate her case. First, in Conner v. Illinois Dept. of Natural Resources, the plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge on November 1, 2002, and was passed over for promotion 

in December. 413 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2005). The Seventh Circuit held that Conner 

had not exhausted her claim based on non-promotion because: “There was no way for 

the EEOC to undertake preliminary investigation as contemplated by Title VII’s statutory design.” Id. But crucially, the EEOC had already issued its right-to-sue letter 

almost immediately after receiving the Charge, on November 6, 2002. Id. at 678. By 

the time Conner was fired, her charge was no longer within the jurisdiction of the 

EEOC. By contrast, Methavichit’s charge was still open with the EEOC when she was 

terminated, based on the very disciplinary action that she had claimed was discriminatory. The reasoning of Conner thus supports a finding that Methavichit did exhaust 

her remedies. 

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Second, in Moore v. Vital Products, Inc., the plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge 

alleging race and sex discrimination in the form of a hostile work environment and 

retaliation, but not alleging wrongful discharge, because he did not realize he had 

been fired. 641 F.3d 253, 256–58 (7th Cir. 2011). The Seventh Circuit agreed with the 

district court that Moore could not bring a discriminatory discharge claim because he 

had not exhausted it in his charge, and “Moore’s discriminatory discharge claims were 

not like or reasonably related to the allegations in his EEOC charge.” Id. at 257–58. 

The court noted that he described harassment by coworkers and retaliation by his 

supervisor in the type of work he was given. Id. He did not complain that he had been 

wrongfully disciplined or accused of violating policies, as Methavichit does. Meanwhile, Moore himself did not really argue that the discharge was related to the claims 

in his EEOC Charge, instead presenting a confusion-based argument “that he could 

not have included discharge allegations because he did not know he had been discharged.” Id. at 257. The Seventh Circuit noted the lack of any precedent for creating 

an exception to the exhaustion requirement for a plaintiff’s confusion. Id. Moore 

shows the importance of examining the facts underlying both the charge and the complaint. In this case, that examination leads to the conclusion that Methavichit has 

exhausted her claims. It is also worth noting that Moore was decided on summary 

judgment, not at the dismissal stage.6 

6In its reply brief, Cook County cites Lucas v. Chicago Transit Authority to further 

support its exhaustion argument. 367 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2004). But that case addressed the 

continuing violation doctrine and the relatedness of claims in the context of when a claim is 

time-barred because it concerns events that happened too long before the filing of the EEOC 

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The exhaustion defense also will not work against Methavichit’s retaliation 

claims, based on a different line of precedent. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly 

affirmed that a plaintiff need not file a separate EEOC charge to allege retaliation 

for filing a previous EEOC charge. See Ford v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office, 942 

F.3d 839, 857 n.11 (7th Cir. 2019); McKenzie v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 

482–83 (7th Cir. 1996). The court explained that this rule exists “for practical reasons, 

to avoid futile procedural technicalities and endless loops of charge/retaliation/charge/retaliation, etc. ....” Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 

1030 (7th Cir. 2013). So, to the extent that Methavichit now claims that she was fired 

from her job and barred from being rehired in retaliation for filing her July 5 EEOC 

Charge, she has exhausted that claim. 

The Court rejects Cook County’s exhaustion defense for now, although it can 

be raised again at the summary judgment stage if discovery somehow reveals a disconnect between the EEOC Charge and the claims in the lawsuit. 

B. Race, National Origin, and Age Claims 

1. Discrimination and Hostile Work Environment 

Methavichit claims that Cook County Health fired her based on her age, race, 

and national origin in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 

and Title VII. Am. Compl. Counts 1 (¶¶ 55–67), 2 (¶¶ 68–80) 3 (¶¶ 81–106), 6 

charge. Id. at 723–24. That is a different inquiry than the one now before the Court, about 

whether an EEOC Charge can be said to have exhausted claims related to events that came 

after the Charge. 

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(¶¶ 158–75), 8 (¶¶ 201–18), and 9 (¶¶ 219–36). She is Asian and Filipina and was 66 

years old when she was fired in September 2019. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 47. Generally 

speaking, the same overall analysis applies to claims under Title VII and the ADEA. 

See David v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 

225 (7th Cir. 2017); Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 

2016). A plaintiff seeking to recover for disparate treatment under these statutes 

must plead (and eventually show) that their protected characteristic caused the challenged adverse employment action. Carson v. Lake County., Indiana, 865 F. 3d 526, 

532 (7th Cir. 2017). 

The defense does not challenge Methavichit’s direct discrimination claims—

only her hostile work environment claims. Mot. to Dismiss at 4. In a hostile-environment case under Title VII and the ADEA, the employee must allege that: “(1) [the 

employee] was subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based 

on ... national origin or religion (or another reason forbidden by Title VII); (3) the 

harassment was severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and 

create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there is basis for employer 

liability.” Huri v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 804 F.3d 

826, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2015). The problem for Methavichit’s hostile work environment 

claims based on age, race, and national origin is that she has not adequately pleaded 

either a connection to those characteristics, or harassment severe enough to support 

her claim. 

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Methavichit leans heavily on the Huri case to support her claims, but as the 

defense points out, her own case is devoid of the facts that supported Huri’s claims. 

Defs’. Reply at 5–6. Huri pleaded several concrete facts that painted a picture of a 

hostile work environment based on her religion and national origin: her supervisor 

referred to other employees as “good Christians” (in contrast to Huri, a Muslim), 

called Huri “evil,” ambushed her with a Christian prayer circle, falsely accused her 

of misconduct, “screamed at her,” and otherwise treated her worse than others in the 

workplace. Huri, 804 F.3d at 830. Other supervisors later subjected Huri to uniquely 

stringent rules including barring her from entering her office early, refusing to let 

her daughter wait for her in the lobby, and prohibiting her from keeping non-work 

items in her office—all in contrast to non-Muslim, non-Arab employees. Id. This is a 

litany of concrete allegations tied to Huri’s faith and ethnicity. Methavichit, by contrast, makes exactly one allegation directly tied to her protected characteristics, and 

it is broad and vague: “Later in January, 2019, Defendant Follenweider told Dr. 

Methavichit that she did not deserve to be in her current position, and made hostile, 

derogatory and negative insults targeting her age, race, and disability.” Am. Compl. 

¶ 27. Methavichit alleges that Follenweider was unkind to her before late January 

2019, but she describes a series of encounters in which Follenweider was rude and 

accused her of incompetence, with no hint of racial or age-based animus. Id. ¶¶ 17–

18, 24, 26, 31. Even if the Court accepts as true the vague paragraph alleging that 

Follenweider insulted Methavichit based on her protected characteristics, that one 

insulting conversation is not enough to create a hostile work environment. 

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Methavichit does not even claim that that conversation had any particular effect on 

her. Id. ¶ 27. It is true that the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly affirmed that for hostile work environment purposes, “even one act of harassment will suffice if it is egregious,” but this requires a truly egregious act, such as a sexual assault. Lapka v. 

Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983 (7th Cir. 2008). 

To be sure, at the dismissal stage, a plaintiff need not set forth detailed allegations and most certainly need not offer evidence in support of the allegations. But 

she must allege some facts in support of her claim beyond generalized conclusions. 

Methavichit has not done so, and the hostile work environment claims of discrimination based on her age, race, and national origin are dismissed. 

2. Retaliation 

Cook County does not challenge Methavichit’s retaliation claims under Title 

VII or the ADEA, except on exhaustion grounds. Mot. to Dismiss at 3. As already 

discussed, the exhaustion argument fails at this stage, and the retaliation claims survive the motion to dismiss. 

C. Disability Claims 

 Next up are the disability claims. Methavichit brings one claim of discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and another under the Rehabilitation 

Act, Am. Compl. Count 5, ¶¶ 132–57. She appears to have accidentally pleaded the 

ADA claim twice, as Count 4 (id. ¶¶ 107–31) and Count 7 (id. ¶¶ 176–200), so Count 

7 is stricken as redundant. Methavichit alleges both disparate treatment and a hostile work environment under each statute. Each type of claim will be addressed in 

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turn, but as an initial matter, the Court rejects the defense’s argument that Methavichit is not even disabled, which is the threshold requirement for a person seeking 

disability-discrimination relief under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. 

Contrary to the defense’s arguments, Mot. to Dismiss at 7–8, diabetes and kidney failure can constitute a disability under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 

The ADA defines a disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially 

limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). In addition to the 

obvious examples such as seeing, hearing, walking, breathing, and so on, “a major life 

activity also includes the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, 

neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” 

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) and (B). As the defense points out, Methavichit did not explicitly allege how her diabetes impaired her life activities (although she did describe 

periods of hospitalization to treat her kidney failure). See Mot. to Dismiss at 8. And 

there are some conditions that are obscure or ambiguous enough that a plaintiff 

would need to plead more facts to establish her disability—but diabetes is not one of 

those conditions, at least not when paired with allegations of active kidney disease 

and failure. See, e.g., Cloutier v. GoJet Airlines, LLC, 311 F. Supp. 3d 928, 936–37 

(N.D. Ill. 2018) (holding that diabetes can constitute a “disability” because, under the 

ADA, disabilities include impairments that substantially limit the operation of major 

bodily functions, such as the endocrine system). At the pleading stage, Methavichit 

has sufficiently alleged that she suffers from a qualifying disability. 

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1. Disparate Treatment 

A plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim (sometimes referred to as an 

intentional-discrimination claim) under the ADA “must allege that he is disabled 

within the meaning of the Act, is nevertheless qualified to perform the essential functions of the job either with or without reasonable accommodation, and has suffered 

an adverse employment action because of his disability.” Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 

809 F.3d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 2015). As already explained, Methavichit has adequately 

alleged that she was disabled. The defense does not challenge the sufficiency of any 

other aspect of her pleading as to her ADA claim for disparate treatment, so that 

claim, Count 4 of the Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 176–200, survives. 

The elements of a discrimination claim under the Rehabilitation Act are 

largely the same as those under the ADA, with one difference: “the Rehabilitation Act 

prohibits discrimination only if it is ‘solely by reason of’ a person’s disability.” Reed v. 

Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital, 915 F.3d 473, 484 (7th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added); 

see also 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The defense here argues that the Rehabilitation Act claim 

must be dismissed because Methavichit has not adequately pleaded that she was 

fired solely because of her disability. Mot. to Dismiss 8–9. To the defense’s way of 

thinking, because Methavichit claims to have been fired because of not just her disability, but also her age, race, and national origin, she cannot bring a Rehabilitation 

Act claim. Id. There are several problems with this argument. First and foremost, 

plaintiffs are permitted to plead in the alternative, and on this ground alone, the 

Rehabilitation Act claim survives Cook County’s motion. Even if the defense is correct 

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that disability must literally be the sole motive for the termination in order for 

Methavichit to bring a Rehabilitation Act claim, discovery could reveal that Methavichit’s claims based on race, national origin, and age were not motivations for the 

employment decisions, leaving disability as the one protected characteristic that motivated the defendants’ decision. 

The defendants’ argument is otherwise unpersuasive, too. The Seventh Circuit 

has tended to analyze ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in the same breath. See, 

e.g., Reed, 915 F.3d at 484; Monroe v. Indiana Dept. of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 503–05 

(7th Cir. 2017); Doll v. Brown, 75 F.3d 1200, 1205 (7th Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs claiming 

disability discrimination under the ADA must claim (and eventually prove) that their 

disability was the “but for” cause of the adverse action they experienced. Serwatka v. 

Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010); but see Monroe, 871 

F.3d at 504 (applying but-for standard to ADA claim, but noting that “it is an open 

question whether the change [to the statute] from ‘because of’ to ‘on the basis of’ 

changes the ‘but for’ causation standard”). In a but-for analysis, a defendant may 

have had other motivations for firing the employee, but if the employer would not 

have fired her if not for the disability, the disability is the but-for reason—and arguably the sole reason—the person was fired. Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 962. The defense 

has cited no case that explicitly de-links the Rehabilitation Act from the ADA and 

explain why the “solely” standard should be viewed as higher than the “but for” standard under the ADA. It is also worth noting that a “mixed-motive” claim, as the defense 

labels the Rehabilitation Act claim, is by definition one in which “an employer is 

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alleged to have used both discriminatory and legitimate grounds in taking an adverse 

employment action against an employee.” Silk v. Bd. of Trustees, Moraine Valley 

Cmty. Coll., Dist. No. 524, 795 F.3d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Price Waterhouse 

v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 229 (1989). Methavichit does not concede that her former 

employer had a legitimate reason to fire her; she specifically alleges that the proffered 

reasons were pretextual. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 40. This leaves the defense to argue that 

a plaintiff cannot bring a Rehabilitation Act claim if she was also discriminated 

against because of her protected characteristics apart from her disability. So far, the 

defense has cited no case law to support this unusual argument. 

The Defendants are welcome to renew their challenge to Methavichit’s Rehabilitation Act claim at the summary judgment stage or at trial (perhaps case law will 

have addressed the issue by then), but for now the claim, which is Count 5 of the First 

Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 132–57, survives. 

2. Hostile Work Environment 

 Hostile work environment claims can be brought under the Americans with 

Disability Act just like under Title VII. Ford v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office, 942 

F.3d 839, 851 (7th Cir. 2019). The elements of a hostile work environment claim are 

the same under the ADA as under Title VII. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle 

Parish, Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968, 977 (7th Cir. 2021) (en banc). But where Methavichit failed under Title VII, she succeeds under the ADA—and, given the statutes’ 

similarity, under the Rehabilitation Act, too. Remember that to plead a hostile work 

environment claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) unwelcome harassment; (2) based on 

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a protected characteristic; (3) that was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions 

of employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) a basis 

for employer liability.” Id. Methavichit has successfully alleged all four elements, 

though with little room to spare. 

 The disability-based hostile work environment claim survives because of the 

harassing calls and texts that Methavichit received from Follenweider while in the 

hospital. The defense correctly points out that Methavichit’s allegations of being insulted based on her disability are extremely vague. Mot. to Dismiss at 5. But the 

defense does not address the part of the complaint in which Methavichit alleges that 

while she was in the hospital, on dialysis, Follenweider harassed her with calls and 

text messages. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19–20. Similarly, while Methavichit was on FMLA 

leave, Follenweider sent harassing communications. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. Once again, 

Methavichit provides no detail about the content of these alleged harassing messages, 

but this time, their existence alone is enough to plead a hostile working environment. 

At the pleading stage, the Court is accepting all of Methavichit’s well-pleaded facts 

and making reasonable inferences in her favor. A reasonable inference is that it was 

unnecessary for Follenweider to contact Methavichit at all while she was out on leave, 

receiving necessary medical treatment. An employee who cannot take time away from 

work to receive life-saving healthcare due to her disability without receiving unwanted texts and calls from her supervisor has pleaded a hostile work environment 

based on her disability. 

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 Methavichit can also draw further support for her hostile work environment 

claim based on her allegation that Follenweider prevented her from accessing testing 

that Methavichit needed to get on the list for a kidney transplant. Am. Compl. ¶ 25. 

The allegation is admittedly confusing as pleaded: “In December, 2018, Dr. Methavichit requested to use her holiday off to get testing needed for kidney transplant. Without explanation Defendant Follenweider rejected her request, preventing her placement on the priority list for kidney transplant.” Id. Why would Follenweider have 

any say on what Methavichit did with holiday time she already had off of work? Perhaps supervisors can require work on holidays, and Follenweider was requiring that 

Methavichit show up for work? Or is the claim that Methavichit was asking for additional time off around the holidays to get testing? Although this particular allegation 

is not clear, and these questions will need to be resolved during discovery and perhaps 

at summary judgment, at the pleading stage the Court accepts that Follenweider 

somehow interfered with Methavichit’s ability to move forward in the process of obtaining a kidney transplant. This is a very serious allegation and would certainly 

support Methavichit’s claim that Follenweider harassed her because of her disability, 

along with the harassing texts and phone calls while Methavichit was in the hospital 

and on FMLA leave. 

 Methavichit’s hostile work environment claims under the ADA, Am. Compl. 

Count 4, ¶¶ 107–31, and Rehabilitation Act, id. Count 5, ¶¶ 132–57, survive the motion to dismiss. 

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D. Section 1983 

 Next, Methavichit brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Cook 

County Defendants, defined as Shannon and Follenweider in their official capacities 

and Cook County, Illinois. Am. Compl. at 1, and Count 11, ¶¶ 260–66. To begin, the 

claim against Shannon and Follenweider is dismissed because it is redundant with 

the claim against Cook County. Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973, 977 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(“Actions against individual defendants in their official capacities are treated as suits 

brought against the government entity itself.”) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 

(1991)). 

The claim against Cook County fares no better. It is true that municipalities, 

like individuals, are suable “persons” under Section 1983, as the Supreme Court held 

in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of 

Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (“We held in Monell ... that municipalities and other local governmental bodies are ‘persons’ within the meaning of 

§ 1983.”) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 

(1978)). To adequately state a Monell claim—that is, to allege that a municipality 

caused a deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights—the plaintiff must allege 

“that an official policy or custom not only caused the constitutional violation, but was 

the moving force behind it.” Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. Cnty. of Bureau, 506 F.3d 

509, 514 (7th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). That requires, practically speaking, three 

things. 

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First, the plaintiff must allege that he or she has suffered the deprivation of a 

constitutional right. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Second, the plaintiff must adequately allege that the municipality’s “policy or custom” at issue in fact exists. Estate of Sims, 

506 F.3d at 514. There are three ways to do this: a plaintiff can allege “an express 

policy, a widespread practice which, although unwritten, is so entrenched and wellknown as to carry the force of policy, or ... the actions of an individual who possesses 

the authority to make final policy decisions on behalf of the municipality or corporation.” Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 675 (7th Cir. 2012). Finally, 

the plaintiff must allege causation, that is, the plaintiff must connect the policy or 

custom to the constitutional deprivation by alleging that the former was the “moving 

force” behind the latter. Estate of Sims, 506 F.3d at 514. 

 Here, Methavichit falls short of alleging the facts necessary to state a Monell 

claim against Cook County. She has not pleaded facts to establish the existence of a 

municipal policy that caused her constitutional rights to be violated. The only facts—

as distinct from generalized conclusions—that she offers in the Amended Complaint 

are about her own experiences. Her attempt to allege a broader policy or practice of 

discrimination based on race, national origin, and disability is vague, conclusory, and 

based on information and belief. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51–53. Sweeping assertions that 

other members of protected groups have “suffered discrimination” are not enough to 

support a Monell claim. Who suffered the discrimination? What kind of discrimination? When did this happen? Who inflicted the discrimination? A plaintiff need not 

have detailed facts at her disposal at the pleading stage, but she must plead some 

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concrete facts. And a plaintiff typically cannot state a Monell policy claim without at 

least alleging that an unconstitutional policy was applied multiple times. Gable v. 

City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 2002). Methavichit does not mention any specific victim aside from herself that she can connect with the alleged discrimination at 

Cook County Health. Her argument that she has alleged that Cook County discriminated against her “on more than three occasions” does not hold water. Pl’s. Resp. at 

9. The “occasions” are just different stages of the same, single, discipline process 

which forms the basis of her complaint. Id. 

 Methavichit tries to draw an equivalency between this case and City of Canton, 

Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), but her argument is unpersuasive. Pl’s. Resp. at 

10–11. The Supreme Court in Harris held that municipalities could be held liable 

under Section 1983 when they had failed to provide training that was obviously necessary to avert constitutional violations, thereby demonstrating their “deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Harris, 

489 U.S. at 388–90. Liability could lie against the municipality even if the plaintiff 

had not established a pattern of violations, because the training itself was so clearly 

inadequate as to lead to violations. Id. Methavichit also cites a recent Seventh Circuit 

case reiterating that a municipality can be held liable based on a policy that is obviously likely to lead to lead to constitutional violations, even in the absence of actual 

violations prior to those suffered by a plaintiff. Fields v. City of Chicago, 981 F.3d 

534, 562 (7th Cir. 2020). In that case, the Chicago Police policy at issue was one of 

poor record-keeping and failure to produce records necessary for a defendant to 

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receive a fair criminal trial. Id. at 543, 562. But here Methavichit did not allege a 

failure to train, as originally contemplated by Harris. Methavichit also has not coherently alleged any other policy that could support a claim under the Harris standard. 

She seems to be arguing now that Cook County has a policy of not investigating complaints of discrimination, and of failing to intervene when a supervisor acts inappropriately. Pl’s Resp. at 10–12. But Methavichit’s own complaint says that Cook County 

did respond to her complaint of discrimination. Am. Compl. ¶ 37. She was clearly not 

satisfied with the response, or with the disciplinary process that preceded and continued after her complaints. Id. ¶¶ 35–48. But she has not pleaded the kind of facts 

that support a Monell claim under Harris and Fields. 

Nor does Methavichit make any real effort to allege that Follenweider or Shannon was a final policymaker for Monell purposes. Follenweider was certainly Methavichit’s supervisor, and apparently had some authority over Methavichit’s conditions 

of employment. Id. ¶ 14. Shannon was the CEO of Cook County Health, though Follenweider does not allege what kind of authority that position carries. Id. ¶ 37. “Not 

every municipal official with discretion is a final policymaker; authority to make final 

policy in a given area requires more than mere discretion to act.” Milestone v. City of 

Monroe, Wis., 665 F.3d 774, 780 (7th Cir. 2011). If an official’s decisions are not reviewed by a higher authority within the organization, that official is likely the final 

policymaker. Id. Methavichit does not allege that any county ordinance named either 

Follenweider or Shannon as final policymakers, or that they in fact created or instituted discriminatory policies, or that either of them, alone, had the final say on 

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decisions related to her employment. She has thus not stated a Monell claim on the 

basis of a decision by a policymaker. 

In sum, Methavichit has not put Cook County on notice about the basis of her 

Monell claim, and the claim, which is Count 11 of the Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 260–

66, cannot move forward. 

E. State Law Claims

 Finally, Methavichit brings three state law tort claims: tortious interference 

with prospective economic advantage against Follenweider individually, Am. Compl. 

Count 12, ¶¶ 267–80; tortious interference with contract, also against Follenweider 

individually, id. Count 13, ¶¶ 281–91; and intentional infliction of emotional distress 

against all the defendants, id. Count 14, ¶¶ 292–96. The defense argues that all of 

these claims should be dismissed because the defendants are protected by the Illinois 

Tort Immunity Act, and the defense also raises a separate substantive defense to the 

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Mot. to Dismiss at 12–15. Neither 

argument succeeds.7 

1. Illinois Tort Immunity Act 

 First, Cook County argues that all three state law claims should be dismissed 

against all defendants, invoking three sections of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. 745 

7The defense also argues that Methavichit has partially waived her opposition to their 

arguments on these claims by failing to address them. Def’s. Reply at 2. But Methavichit’s 

response brief clearly attempts to defend her state-law claims, and the Court will not dismiss 

them because she did not respond as directly as possible to each argument by the defense. 

Pl’s. Resp. at 13–15. 

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ILCS 10/2-201, 2-106, and 2-107. The Act bars tort claims that are based on discretionary decisions of government employees: “a public employee serving in a position 

involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an 

injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the 

exercise of such discretion even though abused.” 745 ILCS 10/2-201. The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted this immunity to its full extent, explaining that “Section 

2-201 provides absolute immunity for both negligence and willful and wanton conduct.” Andrews v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 160 N.E.3d 895, 

905 (Ill. 2019). The Defendants argue that Follenweider and Shannon are the kinds 

of public employees contemplated by Section 2-201—individuals who make discretionary policy decisions that affect employees like Methavichit—and are therefore 

immune from the tort claims that challenge their decision to fire her. Mot. to Dismiss 

at 13. But Section 2-201 does not protect public employees who fire employees in retaliation for exercising their legal rights. See Smith v. Waukegan Park Dist. 231 Ill.2d 

111, 119 (Ill. 2008) (holding that “under established Illinois law, public entities possess no immunized discretion to discharge employees for exercising their workers’ 

compensation rights.”). As the Illinois Supreme Court has explained: “We cannot 

identify what legitimate competing interests are involved when a public entity decides to violate the clear prohibition of another enactment of the legislature ....” Id. 

at 120. This reasoning applies just as forcefully in a case where the plaintiff alleges 

she was retaliated against for reporting employment discrimination as it did in 

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Smith, which was about an employee who had exercised their workers’ compensation 

rights. 

It is important to remember once again that for purposes of this motion, the 

Court accepts Methavichit’s facts as true. Methavichit alleges that Follenweider decided to discriminate against her on unlawful grounds, harassing her and instigating 

discipline that led to Methavichit’s termination. Pl’s. Resp. at 14. This is exactly the 

kind of decision that is not protected by the Illinois Tort Immunity Act.8

The defense also argues that Cook County is immunized from claims under 

Sections 2-106 and 2-107 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, but those sections do not 

apply to this case. Mot. to Dismiss at 14. Section 2-106 protects public entities from 

tort suits based on their employees’ oral promises and misrepresentations, while Section 2-107 protects public entities from tort suits based on their employees’ slander 

and libel of plaintiffs. Methavichit does not bring any claims based on oral promises 

or misrepresentations, or slander or libel. Accordingly, the Illinois Tort Immunity Act 

does not protect Cook County at the pleading stage. 

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Dismiss 

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Methavichit 

must assert that: “(1) the defendant’s conduct was truly extreme and outrageous; (2) 

the defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress (or knew that there was 

8In response to Cook County’s motion, Methavichit argued that Follenweider was not 

immune under a separate section of the Tort Immunity Act, 743 ILCS 10/2-202. Pl’s. Resp. 

at 13–15. But the defendants did not invoke this section of the Act, so the argument is inapposite. 

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at least a high probability that its conduct would cause severe emotional distress); 

and (3) the defendant’s conduct did in fact cause severe emotional distress.” Richards 

v. U.S. Steel, 869 F.3d 557, 566 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 

N.E.2d 75, 80 (Ill. 2003)). Cook County argues that Methavichit has not pleaded facts 

to support her claim, against all the Defendants, that she was subjected to “truly 

extreme and outrageous” conduct. Mot. to Dismiss at 14–15. In making this argument, Cook County asks the Court to disregard conclusory factual statements and 

focuses on Follenweider’s alleged insulting comments to Methavichit. Id., citing Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 18, 16–27. But, as in its attack on the hostile work environment claim 

based on disability, the defense overlooks Methavichit’s allegations that Follenweider 

harassed her while she was seeking and receiving medical treatment related to her 

disability. The Complaint pleads more than the type of “personality conflicts and 

questioning of job performance [that] are unavoidable aspects of employment” and 

thus not contemplated by intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Richards, 869 F.3d at 567. Just as Methavichit’s allegations support a claim of a hostile 

work environment based on her disability, they support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. A supervisor who sends unnecessary, harassing communications to an employee who is in the hospital and on approved time off for a medical 

crisis is behaving in an extreme and outrageous way (at least a reasonable jury could 

so find), and should know that this behavior will cause emotional distress. And 

Methavichit has explicitly alleged that she suffered emotional and physical distress 

stemming from Follenweider’s actions. Am. Compl. ¶ 64. 

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Shannon’s connection to the incidents is more attenuated, but at this stage the 

claim can remain alive against him, too. Methavichit alleges that she complained to 

Shannon about the discriminatory treatment she felt she had endured at Follenweider’s hands, including during her illness, on June 25 and 26, 2019. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37–

38. She further alleges that the additional discipline she received after those dates 

was “based on false and pretextual accusations of violations of CCHHA [sic] Personnel Rules.” Id. ¶ 40. Accepting, for now, that Methavichit notified Shannon of the 

abuse she had endured, and Shannon, as CEO, greenlighted further discipline 

against her that was really grounded in discriminatory motives, she has stated a 

claim against him for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Methavichit’s state law tort claims, specifically Counts 12, 13, and 14 of her 

Amended Complaint (¶¶ 267–96), survive in full. 

IV. Conclusion 

 The Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in 

part. The following claims from the First Amended Complaint are dismissed: Count 

1, ¶¶ 55–67, race discrimination under Title VII (hostile work environment); Count 

2, ¶¶ 68–70, national origin discrimination under Title VII (hostile work environment); Count 3, ¶¶ 81–106, age discrimination under the ADEA (hostile work environment); Count 7, ¶¶ 176–200, disability discrimination (as redundant with Count 

4); Count 11, ¶¶ 260–66, equal protection violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The dismissal is with prejudice given that the complaint has already been amended. But the 

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remaining claims survive, including Counts 1 through 4 to the extent they raise a 

hostile work environment claim. 

 The Defendants’ answer to the First Amended Complaint is due on January 

12, 2022. The parties shall confer and file a proposed discovery schedule by January 

14, 2022. The tracking status hearing of January 7, 2022, is reset to January 21, 2022, 

at 8:30 a.m., but to track the case only (no appearance is required). Instead, the Court 

will review the discovery status report and set a schedule based on the report. 

 ENTERED: 

 s/Edmond E. Chang 

 Honorable Edmond E. Chang 

 United States District Judge 

DATE: December 21, 2021 

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