COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

RUTH L. GENTRY 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 1340-97-3 PER CURIAM 

 MARCH 17, 1998 

HARRISONBURG-ROCKINGHAM 

 SOCIAL SERVICES DISTRICT AND 

 AMBER MARIE PRESGRAVES, AN INFANT 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 

John J. McGrath, Jr., Judge 

 (Thomas A. Howell, on briefs), for appellant. 

 (L. Quinn Kaylor; Christel L. Lewis, Guardian 

ad litem; Lewis, Ruple, Hart & Temeles, on 

brief), for appellees. 

 Ruth L. Gentry appeals the decision of the circuit court 

terminating her residual parental rights to her younger daughter. 

 Gentry contends that the trial court erred when it found that 

the Harrisonburg-Rockingham Social Services District (Social 

Services) presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient 

under Code § 16.1-283(B) and (C) to terminate her parental 

rights. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we 

conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we 

summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 

5A:27. 

 "Code § 16.1-283 embodies 'the statutory scheme for the 

. . . termination of residual parental rights in this 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

Commonwealth.'" Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 

538, 540 (1995) (citation omitted). "This 'scheme provides 

detailed procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents 

and their child,' balancing their interests while seeking to 

preserve the family. However, we have consistently held that 

'the child's best interest is the paramount concern.'" Id.

(citations omitted). 

 "In matters of a child's welfare, trial 

courts are vested with broad discretion in 

making the decisions necessary to guard and 

to foster a child's best interests." The 

trial court's judgment, "when based on 

evidence heard ore tenus, will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or 

without evidence to support it." 

Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 

128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991) (citations omitted). 

 The child was removed from Gentry's custody on December 22, 

1994, following allegations that Bruce W. Presgraves, the child's 

father, had physically abused the child. Presgraves was living 

with Gentry, the child, and Gentry's older daughter. By order 

entered April 20, 1995, Presgraves pleaded guilty to felony child 

abuse. His sentence was suspended with the condition, among 

others, that he not threaten, harm, or harass Gentry or the 

children for six months. Gentry regained physical custody of the 

child in August 1995. Pursuant to the agreement Gentry signed at 

that time, she agreed to continue counseling; cooperate with the 

in-home services provided; not allow any contact between the 

child and Presgraves; maintain a stable home; and keep Social 
 3 

Services informed of changes in her address or financial 

circumstances. In August 1995, however, after an eight-month 

absence, Presgraves began staying overnight with Gentry. Gentry 

testified at trial that she signed the agreement knowing that she 

was hiding the fact of her renewed relationship with Presgraves 

from Social Services. 

 In February 1996, the juvenile and domestic relations 

district court granted Presgraves' petition for visitation with 

the child, and two supervised visitations were held. In the 

February service plan, Social Services noted that Gentry was 

cooperating and that the child had adjusted to living with 

Gentry. However, on February 29, 1996, Social Services 

discovered Gentry and Presgraves arriving together with the child 

for Presgraves' visitation. Social Services stopped Presgraves' 

visitations, and, several days later, placed the child in foster 

care. In April 1996, Social Services began termination 

proceedings in district court. Gentry appealed the district 

court's termination order to the circuit court. Following two 

days of testimony, the circuit court entered an order terminating 

the parental rights of Presgraves and Gentry. Gentry appealed. 

Code § 16.1-283(B)

 The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence 

established that it was in the best interests of the child to 

terminate Gentry's parental rights because the neglect and abuse 

suffered by the child presented a serious and substantial threat 
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to her life, health or development. See Code § 16.1-283(B)(1). 

The trial court further found that it was "not reasonably likely 

that the conditions which resulted in the neglect or abuse 

[could] be substantially corrected or eliminated" to allow the 

child's safe return to Gentry within a reasonable period of time. 

See Code § 16.1-283(B)(2). The trial court also found that 

Social Services presented prima facie evidence of the conditions 

set out in Code § 16.1-283(B)(2) by presenting proof that Gentry 

"without good cause, [has] not responded to or followed through 

with appropriate, available and reasonable rehabilitative efforts 

. . . designed to reduce, eliminate or prevent the neglect or 

abuse of the child." Code § 16.1-283(B)(2)(c). 

 Gentry contends that there was insufficient evidence that 

her daughter was neglected. However, the removal order noted 

that Gentry "does not object to emergency placement due to 

threats against her" by Presgraves. At trial, Gentry could not 

remember if she agreed to the placement. Her testimony 

demonstrated that Presgraves was threatening her because she had 

reported that he broke the child's collarbone. As noted by the 

trial court, Gentry voluntarily relinquished custody of her 

daughter in December 1994 after Presgraves broke the child's 

collarbone. Gentry admitted that Presgraves "harassed" her to 

withdraw her incriminating comments, but defended him by 

asserting that he never physically abused her when harassing her. 

 The trial court found that the evidence was clear and convincing 
 5 

that the child was neglected. That finding was not plainly 

wrong. 

 Gentry also contends that there was insufficient evidence 

that she failed to respond to the rehabilitative efforts on the 

part of Social Services. The trial court found, based upon the 

evidence and the testimony of the parties, social workers, and 

expert witnesses, that Gentry suffers from a mental or emotional 

deficiency in that she is drawn to relationships with abusive 

men. Both her children were fathered by men who were 

demonstrably abusive. Gentry admitted that Presgraves was 

abusive, but she was unable or unwilling to avoid those 

relationships. Dr. Mario Dennis, a psychologist who evaluated 

Gentry, testified that it was likely that Gentry would continue 

to enter into abusive relationships in the future. 

 Gentry's service agreement with Social Services expressly 

prohibited contact with Presgraves. While Gentry suggests that 

she did not realize the consequences of continuing her 

relationship with Presgraves, it is abundantly clear from the 

record that Gentry knew that Presgraves was not to have contact 

with her and her children. Both Gentry and Presgraves admitted 

that he would hide in the woods behind her apartment if a 

caseworker or social worker arrived. 

 Despite receiving support through abuse counseling, in-home 

parenting services, and additional services, Gentry maintained 

her secretive relationship with Presgraves. While Gentry 
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completed the steps required in the Social Services' plan, 

attended weekly support groups, and appeared to be cooperating, 

she was violating the plan and placing herself and her child at 

risk for continued abuse by residing with Presgraves. 

 The child was placed in foster care because Gentry was 

unable to keep her safe. While the evidence does not indicate 

that the child was physically harmed during the time Gentry and 

Presgraves were secretly reestablishing their relationship, the 

record demonstrates that Presgraves threatened and abused 

Gentry's older daughter. The trial court found that Gentry "was 

unable or unwilling to remove herself from the abusive 

relationship with [Presgraves] and actively sought to conceal her 

on-going relationship with [Presgraves] from the case workers." 

The trial court found that Social Services established by clear 

and convincing evidence that it was in the child's best interests 

to terminate Gentry's parental rights because Gentry had been 

unwilling or unable to stay out of a relationship which was 

demonstrably abusive to herself and her children. This finding 

was not plainly wrong. 

Code § 16.1-283(C)

 The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, 

that it was in the best interests of the child to terminate 

Gentry's parental rights because Gentry had been unwilling or 

unable, without good cause and for a period exceeding twelve 

months, to remedy the conditions which led to the child's foster 
 7 

care placement, notwithstanding the "reasonable and appropriate 

efforts" of Social Services. See Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). The 

trial court also found that Social Services presented prima facie

evidence of the subsection (C)(2) conditions by proving that 

Gentry, without good cause, failed to make reasonable progress 

towards the elimination of the conditions which led to the 

child's foster care placement in accordance with a 

jointly-designed foster care plan. See Code § 16.1-283(C)(3)(b). 

 It is uncontested that Gentry received appropriate 

rehabilitative and support services through Social Services. 

Nevertheless, despite repeatedly stating her resolve to avoid 

Presgraves, repeatedly denying to Social Services and her 

counselors that she was continuing the relationship, and 

repeatedly being told of the consequences, Gentry resumed her 

relationship with Presgraves. From December 1994, when, 

according to her testimony, Gentry wanted to break up with 

Presgraves, until September 1996, Gentry continued to turn to 

Presgraves when the opportunity arose. Gentry's failure to end 

the relationship demonstrated that she was "unable to make 

reasonable progress towards the elimination of the conditions 

which led to the child's foster care placement." 

 Gentry contends that Social Services failed to adequately 

inform her that she faced the termination of her parental rights 

if she failed to satisfy the terms of her agreement with Social 

Services. That claim is without support. The record reflects 
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that Gentry was informed that she faced termination of her 

parental rights. Gentry's testimony established that she knew 

Social Services could "take" her children away if she failed to 

follow through on her responsibilities under the agreement. 

 Despite all the counseling, therapy, and support aimed at 

alerting Gentry to the seriousness of her situation and the risks 

faced by herself and her children, Gentry asserts that it took 

the actual termination order for her to realize the consequences 

of her action. Her child should not bear the burden of Gentry's 

unwillingness or inability to recognize the seriousness of the 

situation. "It is clearly not in the best interests of a child 

to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to find out when, or 

even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his 

responsibilities." Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Social 

Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990). 

Use of Less Drastic Alternatives

 Gentry contends that the trial court failed to consider less 

drastic alternatives to termination of her parental rights. See

Code § 16.1-278.2 "Those remedies, which merely effect 'a 

transitory change in the child's custodial status . . . without 

affecting other parental rights,' are specifically 'designed for 

the case of a parent who shows extenuating circumstances and 

demonstrates [her] potential for rehabilitation as a fit 

parent.'" Edwards v. County of Arlington, 5 Va. App. 294, 312-14 

S.E.2d 644, 654-55 (1987) (citation omitted). 
 9 

 The record demonstrates that Social Services explored 

placement with other relatives, but found such placement to be 

unavailable or unadvisable. The trial court's decision not to 

place the child with other relatives is fully supported by the 

evidence. 

 The trial court did not find convincing Gentry's stated 

intention to avoid abusive relationships in the future. Her past 

behavior did not demonstrate a strong potential for 

rehabilitation. We must rely on the inherent credibility 

determinations which underlie the trial court's decision, as it 

heard and saw the witnesses testify. The record demonstrates 

that the trial court considered less drastic alternatives, and we 

find no error in the trial court's decision to terminate Gentry's 

parental rights. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

Affirmed.