IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

HELEN MILLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 20 C 2436

v. )

) Judge Robert W. Gettleman

COOK COUNTY, )

DEPUTY STEVE VALENZA, and )

DEPUTY MILES COOPERMAN, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff Hellen Miller brings a three-count complaint against defendants Deputy Steve 

Valenza, Deputy Miles Cooperman, and Cook County, based on alleged sexual harassment she 

experienced while working as a court reporter. Plaintiff alleges three claims: (1) an equal 

protection violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deputy 

Valenza and Deputy Cooperman; (2) unlawful seizure, violating her Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Deputy Valenza and Deputy Cooperman;1

and (3) an indemnification claim against Cook County. Defendants have moved to dismiss. 

(Doc. 25). For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

1 Plaintiff brings her unlawful seizure claim under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. To clarify, the Fourth 

Amendment prevents federal authorities from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fourteenth 

Amendment makes this requirement applicable to the states. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). An 

unreasonable seizure conducted by a state police officer is a constitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment as made 

applicable by the Fourteenth. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979). Consequently, the court evaluates 

Count II only as a Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim. See Molina v. Latronico, 430 F.Supp.3d 420, 433 

(N.D. Ill. 2019) (dismissing duplicative Fourteenth Amendment count because unlawful seizure claims fall under the 

Fourth Amendment). 
2

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that, between 2013 and April 2018, she was subject to verbal and 

physical harassment while working as a court reporter at the Circuit Court of Cook County 

courthouse in Skokie, Illinois. According to plaintiff, whenever Deputy Valenza was near 

plaintiff in the Skokie courtrooms, he would make sexually explicit remarks about plaintiff’s 

body, commenting on her appearance and making statements such as “I’m going to fuck you,” 

“I’m going to fuck you until you can’t walk,” etc. Plaintiff alleges that these remarks terrified 

and humiliated her. In addition to the sexual comments, plaintiff alleges that Deputy Valenza

would regularly block plaintiff in the hallways, often stretching his arms out and physically 

trapping her. Plaintiff claims that these comments and “physically menacing acts” occurred 

between one and five times per week. She further claims that Deputy Cooperman was often in 

the position to intervene and prevent Deputy Valenza’s harassment but failed to do so.

Plaintiff alleges that the harassment culminated on April 27, 2018, when, in a courtroom, 

plaintiff saw Deputy Valenza leering and snickering at something behind plaintiff. Plaintiff 

turned around and saw Deputy Cooperman making a vulgar gesture suggestive of cunnilingus. 

Plaintiff alleges that she was “sandwiched” between the two men and felt trapped. 

After the April 27, 2018, incident, plaintiff contacted the Sherriff’s office and filed 

complaints against both defendants. Plaintiff alleges that she was too traumatized to work near 

Deputy Valenza and Deputy Cooperman, and she went on medical leave in June of 2018. 

Plaintiff was terminated for an alleged violation of the employee handbook shortly thereafter.2

 

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on April 20, 2020. 

2 The termination is the subject of a separate lawsuit against the Circuit Court of Cook County’s administration, Miller 

v. Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook Cty., 19 C 4216. 
3

DISCUSSION

Defendants have moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff’s claims are untimely, and that 

plaintiff fails to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepts the facts stated in the complaint as true and draws 

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Bonnstetter v. City of Chicago, 811 F.3d 969, 973 

(7th Cir. 2016). To state a viable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

I. Statute of Limitations 

Defendants argue that the entire complaint should be dismissed because they are barred 

by the statute of limitations. The court will first address the Section 1983 claims in Count I and 

Count II. 

Section 1983 claims are governed by the forum state’s personal injury statute of 

limitations. Ashafa v. City of Chi., 146 F.3d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1998). Illinois personal injury 

actions are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Savory v. Lyons, 496 F.3d 667, 672 (7th 

Cir. 2006). An exception to the two-year statute of limitations exists, however, for continuing 

violations in situations such as hostile work environment and sexual harassment cases. Nat’l 

R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002). 

“Under the ‘continuing tort’ or ‘continuing violation’ rule, ‘where a tort involves a 

continuing or repeated injury, the limitations period does not begin to run until the date of the 

last injury or the date the tortious acts cease.’” Cothron v. White Castle Sys. Inc., 477 F.Supp.3d 

723, 729 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (quoting Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 

770 N.E.2d 177 (2002)). The continuing violation doctrine does not apply when the unlawful 

acts are “a series of discrete acts, each of which is independently actionable, even if those acts 
4

form an overall pattern of wrongdoing.” Rodriguez v. Olin Employees Credit Union, 406 F.3d 

434, 443 (7th Cir. 2005). “Sexual harassment claims may involve a series of discrete incidents 

that individually would not qualify as actionable claims but taken together form ‘an actionable 

pattern of harassing behavior.’” Rosa v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 2020 WL 7319584, at *7

(N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2020) (quoting Garner v. Nat’l Railway Corp., 2019 WL 414711, at *3 (N.D. 

Ill. Feb. 1, 2019)). The violation at issue does not need to be continuous, only cumulative. 

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. In a sexual harassment claim, a plaintiff may therefore invoke an act 

in the time-barred period, as long as it relates to actions within the limitations period. Id. at 117.

Plaintiff’s two Section 1983 claims are based on the sexual harassment plaintiff allegedly 

experienced over a five year period. These claims date back to 2013 and include allegations of 

sexual comments and physical intimidation that occurred one to five times per week until the end 

of April 2018. Plaintiff filed her suit on April 20, 2020. Under the two-year limitations period, 

most of the alleged conduct that occurred before April 20, 2018, would be barred as untimely. 

However, given the frequent occurrence of the alleged harassment by the same individual, 

involving similar comments and actions, the court finds that the complaint sufficiently alleges 

“an actionable pattern of harassing behavior.” Garner, 2019 WL 414711, at *3. The continuing 

violation doctrine applies, and plaintiff’s claim, at least at the pleading stage, includes incidents 

prior to the April 20, 2018, cutoff date.

Defendants next argue that the indemnification claim is also barred by the statute of 

limitations. Defendants claim that the applicable statute of limitations is one year from the date 

of the incident. 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a). Plaintiff counters (correctly) that the statute of 

limitations for an indemnification claim does not begin to accrue until a judgment has been 

entered against the municipality, not upon the date of the incident. See Am. Safety Cas. Ins. Co. 
5

v. City of Waukegan, 776 F.Supp.2d 670, 709 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Judgement has not yet been 

entered against Cook County. Consequently, the court declines to dismiss the indemnification 

claim on statute of limitations grounds.

II. Failure to State a Claim

a. Equal Protection Claim

In Count I, plaintiff brings a class-of-one equal protection claim against Deputy Valenza 

and Deputy Cooperman based on the alleged sexual harassment. She alleges that the deputies 

“intentionally, capriciously, and arbitrarily treated her differently from similarly situated persons,

including court reporters and male personnel, in violation of her rights under the equal protection 

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Plaintiff alternatively claims that she was discriminated 

against because she was a woman and there “was no rational basis or lawful justification for the 

discriminatory treatment.” 

Defendants move to dismiss Count I under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiff fails to 

identify a group of similarly situated individuals. However, the lack of a comparator does not 

doom plaintiff’s complaint. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly confirmed that “[p]laintiffs 

alleging class-of-one equal protection claims do not need to identify specific examples of 

similarly situated persons in their complaints.” Miller v. City of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1120 

(7th Cir. 2015) (citing Capra v. Cook Cnty. Bd. of Review, 733 F.3d 705, 717 (7th Cir. 2013)); 

see also Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 748 n.3 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Even in a case 

where a plaintiff would need to identify a similarly situated person to prove his case, ... we see 

no basis for requiring the plaintiff to identify the person in the complaint.”) (emphasis in 

original). 
6

Here, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a class-of-one equal protection claim. She need 

not identify similarly situated persons in her complaint; her general allegations are sufficient. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count I is denied. 

b. Fourth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff alleges that the deputy defendants violated the Fourth Amendment, enforceable 

through Section 1983, by “seizing” her at various points in time. The alleged seizures involve 

Deputy Valenza blocking plaintiff in the hallways by stretching his arms out, physically trapping 

plaintiff, and making lewd comments. Defendants argue that the Fourth Amendment does not 

apply in this context. The court agrees.

Defendants argue that the Fourth Amendment is an improper source of the claim, because

Deputy Valenza interacted with plaintiff as a coworker rather than as part of an investigation or a 

police-citizen encounter. The courts of appeals have generally held that a plaintiff alleging 

sexual harassment has no claim under the Fourth Amendment where the conduct at issue did not 

occur in the course of “a criminal investigation or other form of government investigation or 

activity.” Poe v. Leonard, 282 F.3d 123, 136 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Jones v. Wellham, 104 

F.3d 620. 628 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Because the harm inflicted did not occur in the course of an 

attempted arrest or apprehension of one suspected of criminal conduct...the claim was not one of 

a Fourth Amendment violation.”); Doe v. Luzerne Cty., 660 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 2011) 

(“Because [the officer] acted for personal reasons outside the scope of a governmental 

investigation, his actions do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.”).

Here, plaintiff alleges that Deputy Valenza interacted with her as a coworker by, among 

other things, making lewd comments and gestures, and occasionally stopping her in the hallways. 

The alleged harassment did not occur during a criminal investigation or a police-citizen 
7

encounter, and Deputy Valenza did not purport to act for a governmental or investigatory 

purpose. See Rosa v. Bd of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 2020 WL 7319584 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2020) 

(dismissing plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Section 1983 claim because the sexual harassment by 

the defendant police officer “took place independent of any government-authorized duty and 

served no governmental purpose”). Consequently, plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim for 

relief under the Fourth Amendment. Count II is dismissed.

c. Indemnification

Finally, defendants move to dismiss the indemnification claim on two grounds: (1) 

because the court should dismiss the federal claims; and (2) because the alleged conduct was 

outside the scope of the deputies’ employment. The court has declined to dismiss plaintiff’s 

Fourteenth Amendment claim. Consequently, defendants’ first argument is a nonstarter. For the 

second argument, in Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 672-73 (7th Cir. 2004), the Seventh 

Circuit warned district courts against determining indemnity prior to finding liability. There, the 

court recognized that determining a police officer’s scope of employment is challenging and 

must be undertaken with all the facts at hand. Id. at 673. Following the Seventh Circuit’s 

warning, this court will not decide the indemnity issue until a complete factual inquiry has taken 

place. See Rosa, 2020 WL 7319574, at *12 (declining to dismiss an indemnity claim in a sexual 

harassment suit against a police officer until after discovery). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 25) is granted in part 

and denied in part. The court dismisses Count II with prejudice. Defendants are directed to 
8

answer Counts I and II on or before June 15, 2021. The parties are directed to file a status report 

using this court’s form on or before June 23, 2021.

ENTER:

__________________________________________

Robert W. Gettleman

United States District Judge

DATE: May 24, 2021