alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

*CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350*

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of GraniteCity Food & Brewery Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for thequarterly period ended September 29, 2009, as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, James G.Gilbertson, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adoptedpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

1.                                       the Report fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

2.                                       the information contained in the Reportfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

A signed original of this written statement requiredby Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained bythe Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or itsstaff upon request.

 
| Dated:    November 13,  2009 | By:    | /s/ James G. Gilbertson |   |
|--------------------------------------------------|--------|-------------------------|--------|
|                                             |   | James G. Gilbertson     |   |
|                                             |   | Chief Financial Officer |   |

 

----
H. R. 924

One Hundred Fifth Congress

of the

United States of America

AT THE FIRST SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,

the seventh day of January, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven

An Act

To amend title 18, United States Code, to give further assurance to the right

of victims of crime to attend and observe the trials of those accused of the crime.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Victim Rights Clarification Act

of 1997’’.

SEC. 2. RIGHTS OF VICTIMS TO ATTEND AND OBSERVE TRIAL.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 223 of title 18, United States Code,

is amended by adding at the end the following:

‘‘§ 3510. Rights of victims to attend and observe trial.

‘‘(a) NON-CAPITAL CASES.—Notwithstanding any statute, rule,

or other provision of law, a United States district court shall not

order any victim of an offense excluded from the trial of a defendant

accused of that offense because such victim may, during the sentencing hearing, make a statement or present any information in relation to the sentence.

‘‘(b) CAPITAL CASES.—Notwithstanding any statute, rule, or

other provision of law, a United States district court shall not

order any victim of an offense excluded from the trial of a defendant

accused of that offense because such victim may, during the sentencing hearing, testify as to the effect of the offense on the victim

and the victim’s family or as to any other factor for which notice

is required under section 3593(a).

‘‘(c) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the term ‘victim’

includes all persons defined as victims in section 503(e)(2) of the

Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990.’’.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 223 of title 18, United States Code, is amended

by adding at the end the following new item:

‘‘3510. Rights of victims to attend and observe trial.’’.

(c) CLARIFICATION OF GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION.—Section

3593(c) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting

‘‘For the purposes of the preceding sentence, the fact that a victim,

as defined in section 3510, attended or observed the trial shall

not be construed to pose a danger of creating unfair prejudice,

confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.’’ after ‘‘misleading

the jury.’’.
H. R. 924—2

(d) EFFECT ON PENDING CASES.—The amendments made by

this section shall apply in cases pending on the date of the enactment of this Act.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

JONATHAN G. GELB,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D23-2206

February 2, 2024

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for 

Pasco County; Mary M. Handsel, Judge.

Jonathan G. Gelb, pro se.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
9878.

#### MERIT MANUFACTURING COMPANY *v.*WHITELEY.

Where goods are purchased under an implied warranty that they are reasonably suited to the uses intended, and are accepted by the purchaser, ■ he will be precluded from pleading, in an action for the purchase-price, „ a partial failure of consideration, growing out of. a patent defect in the goods, or a latent defect which, by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, might have been discovered before the sale.

Decided October 15, 1918.

Complaint; from Glascock superior court—Judge Walker. May 20, 1918.

*M. L. Gfoss,*for plaintiff in error.

*E. P. Davis, E. B. Bogers,*contra.

Luke, J.

Merit Manufacturing Company brought suit against M. S. Whiteley upon an open account, for $124.50, alleged tó be the balance due upon a bill of merchandise. The evidence shows that the plaintiff sold to the defendant $599.50 worth of merchandise, which was originally shipped to the defendant, “order notify,” with draft and bill of lading attached. Upon the arrival of the goods the defendant refused to pay the draft and receive the shipment, without first being given an opportunity to inspect the entire shipment. He proposed that if the plaintiff would allow him ■ to inspect the goods, he would accept such of them as suited him, and forward a check to cover the.purchase-price of all goods accepted, and return such goods as were not 'satisfactory to him. The *678plaintiff accepted the proposition and authorized the bank to turn over the bill of lading to the defendant. The defendant received possession of the goods' according to his proposition and, immediately on inspection, discovered that certain. suits, 63 in number, contained no vests. The evidence shows .that notwithstanding the defendant had discovered this and agreed to pay for such as were satisfactory to him and return such as were not satisfactory to him, he took out the entire shipment,- placed the goods -in his store, and sold all of the two-piece suits, and did not return or offer to return any of the suits. In installments he paid all of the invoice price of the goods except $134.50. He pleaded that because of the shortage the plaintiff became indebted to him the value of the vests. The jury returned a verdict in favor of |he plaintiff for $30 principal and interest, which w¿s only a part of the amount justly due the plaintiff. A motion for a new trial was overruled by the court, and .on- the judgment overruling the motira error is assigned.

Hpon this record a finding for the full amount sued for was demanded by the -evidence, and it was error for the court to overrule the motion for a new trial. See *Cook*v. *Finch,*117 *Ga.*541 (44 S. E. 95), and cases cited.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Wade, G. J., and Jenkins, J., concur.*
#### H. D. Frisbee *v.*Jno. T. Wall, &c.

Trespass — Damages—Possession as a Trespass.

Where a railroad company claimed land) in controversy, as a part of its depot grounds, and under such claim was. actually, at the time the fence was erected, applying the grounds to the general uses and purposes of a depot, this in law amounted to such a possession as would prevent a recovery for trespass.

APPEAL PROM HARRISON CIRCUIT COURT.

January 24, 1872.

Opinion oe the Court by

J'udg-e Lindsay:

The verdict for four hundred dollars in damages for the rifling trespass .complained of, is so excessive as to make it *472appear that the 'jury were influenced by passion or prejudice. The remission of all the damages except twenty-five dollars did not authorize the court to refuse the motion for a new trial.

*W. W. Trimble, A. R. Ward, for appellant.*

*J. 8. Boyd, W. 8. Wall, for appellees.*

Had the jury been free from the influence of passion or prejudice, the verdict might possibly have been in favor of appellant.

In any event appellant is entitled to have a verdict from an impartial and unprejudiced jury. Instruction No. 3 asked for by appellant is not so carefully worded as it might have been, but the principle' of law embodied in it, is correct.

If appellant had the actual possession of the land in controversy, he could not have been guilty of trespass in removing the fence. Possession of real estate is a mixed question of law and fact. Appellant had the right to ask the court to define what, in law, constituted actual possession of land, a portion of which was unenclosed.

If the railroad company claimed the land in controversy as part of its depot grounds, and under such claim was at the time the fence was erected, actually applying it to all the uses and purposes to which depot grounds are usually applied, this in law amounted to such a possession as would prevent a recovery in this action, and the jury should have been so instructed.

Instruction No. 4 was properly refused. It attaches too much importance to the construction of the road to the entrance of the cattle pen.

For the reasons pointed out the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
EXHIBIT 99.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Anworth Mortgage Asset Corporation (the Company) on
Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May 15, 2003 (the Report), I, Joseph Lloyd McAdams, Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended; and



2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



By:

/s/    JOSEPH LLOYD
MCADAMSJoseph Lloyd McAdams Chairman of the Board, President and Chief
Executive Officer


May 15, 2003
EXHIBIT 10.9

                                 PROMISSORY NOTE

$8,000.00                                                      11/21/02
                                                               Las Vegas, Nevada

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, Hunapu, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Maker"), promises
to pay to the order of Putun, LLC (hereinafter referred to as "Holder"), P.O.
Box 50464, Henderson, Nevada 89016, or at such other address as Holder may
designate in writing, the principal sum of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00)
until paid, at the rate of Five percent (5%) per annum.

The principal amount of the note shall be due and payable on or before 11/21/02.

Should the amount owing on this note not be paid when due, the entire unpaid
principal sum evidenced by this Note will, without notice to the Maker, become
due and payable.

Marker hereby waives presentment of payment, protect and demand, notice of
protest, demand and dishonor and nonpayment of this Note, and consents that the
holder may extend the time of payment or otherwise modify the terms of payment
or any part or whole of the indebtedness evidenced by this Note as the request
of any other person liable hereon, and consent shall not alter nor diminish the
liability of any party hereunder.

Maker may repay the indebtedness evidenced hereby in whole or in part fro the
time to time without premium or penalty.

As used herein, Holder shall include any subsequent holder of this Note. Maker
shall have no right to assign this Note without the consent of Holder, and in no
event shall any assignment of this Note by Maker act to release maker from any
obligations hereunder unless such release is evidenced in writing by Holder.

This Note shall be governed by the laws of the State of Nevada.

Witness and hand of the undersigned this 21 day of November 2002.


                                             Hunapu Inc.
                                             /s/  John C. Francis, President
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rochelle Goins,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-03907-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Niemeyer, Grebel & Kruse LLC

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 10/25/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: October 26, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8554 Filed 11/02/17 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8554 Filed 11/02/17 Page 2 of 2
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-1223

JOSEPH LAROSA; DOMINICK LAROSA,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

versus

JOAN LAROSA; VIRGIL B. LAROSA,

Defendants - Appellants,

and

WESBANCO; BANK ONE, WEST VIRGINIA, NA;

RUSSELL L. BONASSO; HARRISON COUNTY BANK,

Parties in Interest.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. John S. Kaull,

Magistrate Judge. (CA-02-9-1)

Submitted: August 23, 2004 Decided: September 3, 2004

Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael D. Crim, MCNEER, HIGHLAND, MCMUNN & VARNER, L.C.,

Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellants. Gregory H. Schillace,

SCHILLACE LAW OFFICE, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellees.
- 2 -

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
*

The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2000).

- 3 -

PER CURIAM:

Joan LaRosa and Virgil B. LaRosa appeal from the

magistrate judge’s order*

 determining that an “Order of Court”

entered in the District Court for the District of Maryland was a

final judgment in that action. The magistrate judge therefore

concluded that the Maryland judgment was properly registered in the

Northern District of West Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963

(2000), and accordingly denied Joan and Virgil’s motion to quash

the registration of judgment. We have reviewed the parties’ briefs

and the record on appeal and find no reversible error.

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the magistrate

judge. See LaRosa v. LaRosa, No. CA-02-9-1 (N.D.W. Va. Jan. 23,

2004). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

JULIUS RUSSELL KIRVEN, )

)

 Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D17-2489

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

 Appellee. )

___________________________________)

Opinion filed June 6, 2018.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Polk

County; Glenn T. Shelby and Kelly P. 

Butz, Judges.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, 

and Richard P. Albertine, Jr., Assistant 

Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,

Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. 

SILBERMAN, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.
EXHIBIT 32 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002   Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officers of the registrant certify, to the best of their knowledge, that the registrant's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2010 (the "Form 10-QSB") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information contained in the Form 10-Q, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the registrant.  Date:  November 22, 2010  Avani International Group, Inc.  /s/Dennis Robinson Dennis Robinson President, and Principal Executive Officer   /s/Dennis Robinson Dennis Robinson Principal Financial Officer
#### G. W. Slaughter *v.*Wm. A. Looney.

War — Military Authority.

One taking property, without compensation to the owner, acting under a superior offiteer, can not excuse himself on the ground that he was acting in obedience to orders actual or constructive, unless it was under coercion.

APPEAL PROM CALLOWAY CIRCUIT COURT.

September 9, 1871.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Hardin:'

Neither the pleadings nor the evidence presented any question as to the existence of a public or military necessity for the taking and appropriation by the appellant of the mare in controversy to the public use; hence there was no reason for giving any instruction on that question. Nor was it proper to instruct the jury, if there had been any evidence to authorize the conclusion that appellee took the mare under the orders of a superior officers, that such orders protected him from responsibility in any event. If the mare was the private property of the appellant, and not the subject of capture, as being used in the war by an antagonist enemy, and the appellee, though acting in a military service of the United States, took lier without compensation to the owner, and without his consent, there being no military necessity for doing so, he *576could, not excuse himself on the ground that he acted in obedience to orders, actual or constructive, unless the power under which he acted amounted to coercion, and forced him to do what he did; for, as a general rule, an unlawful act can not be justified or excused by unlawful command to do it. Therefore, according to the facts disclosed in this record, the appellee could only have excused himself for taking and appropriating, or causing to be appropriated the mare ridden by Jackson Slaughter, on the ground that she was captured by Slaughter, being used by him in the service of the army in the war against'the United States (Hague vs. Penn, 3 Bush 663, and authorities there cited).

*Brown &*Miller, *for appellant.*

Wherefore, the instructions and rulings of the court being inconsistent with the foregoing views of the law of the case, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial and further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan



### May 27, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice


### 135309 Michael F. Cavanagh Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan 

### PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices



### v SC: 135309 COA: 279093 Wayne CC: 00-011010-02 LARRY WESLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 23, 2007 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant has failed to meet the burden of establishi ng entitlement to relief under MCR 6.508(D).

s0519 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

May 27, 2008

Clerk
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-17-00851-CV

Herman ADAMS,

Appellant

v.

MACLAMAR MANAGEMENT,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 10, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CV04194

Honorable David J. Rodriguez, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 31, 2018

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

The trial court signed a final judgment on November 16, 2017. Because appellant did not 

file a motion for new trial, motion to modify the judgment, motion for reinstatement, or request 

for findings of fact and conclusions of law, the notice of appeal was due to be filed on December 

16, 2017. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(a). A motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal 

was due on December 31, 2017. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3. Although appellant filed a notice of 

appeal within the fifteen-day grace period allowed by Rule 26.3, he did not file a motion for 

extension of time. 
04-17-00851-CV

- 2 -

A motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant, acting in good 

faith, files a notice of appeal beyond the time allowed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 

but within the fifteen-day grace period provided by Rule 26.3 for filing a motion for extension of 

time. See Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (construing the predecessor to 

Rule 26). However, the appellant must offer a reasonable explanation for failing to file the notice 

of appeal in a timely manner. See id.; TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3, 10.5(b)(1)(C). 

We, therefore, ordered appellant to file a response presenting a reasonable explanation for 

failing to file the notice of appeal in a timely manner. We warned that if appellant failed to respond 

within the time provided, the appeal would be dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c). Appellant 

failed to respond. Therefore, this appeal is dismissed. 

PER CURIAM