The Honor able Char les S. Haig ht, J r., District Judge of the United States District Court * for the Souther

n District of Ne w York, sitting by desig nation. The Honor able Sonia Sotomay or, orig inally a member

of this panel, wa s elevated to the Supreme Court on August 8, 2009. The two rema ining membe rs of the pa nel, who ar e in agree ment, have de cided this appe al. See 28 U. S.C. § 4 6( d) ; L oc a l Ru le 0. 14 (b ); United States v. De simone , 140 F.3d 457 ( 2d Cir. 1998). 1 07-1948-pr Saunders v. Se nkowski 1 UN I TE D ST AT ES C OU RT O F APP EA L S 2 F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT 3 4 August Term, 2008 5 6 (Argued: Marc h 4, 2009 Dec ided: November 24, 2009) 7 8 Docke t No. 07-1948-pr 9

_____________________________________ 10 11 12 NA TH ANSAU ND ERS , 13 Petitioner-Appellant , 14 15 –v.– 16 1 7 D A N IE L S E N K O W S K I, 18 Respondent- Appellee

. 19

____________________________________ 20 21 22 Be fore : PARKER, Circuit Judge , and HAI GHT, Judge

. * 23 24

_____________________________________ 25 26 Petitioner Nathan Saunde rs appe als from the district c ourt’s orde r dismissing his petition 27 for a

writ of habe as cor

pus as untimely . Be cause we f ind the petition untim ely

upon our de novo 28 revie w, we hold that the district c ourt did not err in dismissing the pe tition. W e fur ther hold that 29 the district court a cted within its discretion in denying e quitable tolling. Af firmed. 30 31 FREDERI CK RENCH, Cli fton Park, Ne w York 32 (Stephanie J. Batc heller, A lbany , New Y ork, on the 33 brief ) for Pe tit ion e r-

Ap pe lla nt N ath an Sa un de rs . 342 1 L EI L ANI RODRI GUEZ , Offic e of the New Y ork 2 State Attorney Gene ral (Andre w M. Cuomo, 3 Attorney Gene ral of the State of Ne w York; B arba ra 4 D. U nd erwo od , S ol ici to r Gen eral ; R os eann B. 5 MacK echnie , Deputy Solicitor Genera l for Criminal 6 Matters; and A ly son J . Gill, Assist ant Attorney 7 Gene ral, of Counsel, on the brief ), for Re sp on de nt8 AppelleeDaniel Senk owski 9 10 11 PER

CU RIAM : 12 13 Pe tit ion e r N atha n Sa un de rs se e ks re vie w o f a

n o rd e r o f t

he Un ite d St a te s D istri c t Co ur t 14 for the N orthern D istrict of NewYork (K ahn, J. ), dismissing his petition for a wr it of habea s 15 corpus a s untimely . The pe tition, fil ed pursua nt to 28 U.S.C . § 2254, challeng ed Saunder s’s New 16 York State c onviction for two counts e ach of Kidnappingin the First De g ree and Enda ng ering 17 the Welfare of a Child, and one c ount eac h of Kidnappingin the Second De g ree , Assault in the 18 Second De g ree , Escape in the Second De g ree , and Unlaw ful I mprisonment in the First Degree . 19 Up on

dis mis sin g the pe tit ion , th e dis tr ic t c ourt su a s po nteissued a ce rtificate of appe alability on 20 the issue of whe ther e quitable tolling should apply to Saunders’s c ase. We amended the 21 cer

tificate to include the antec edent issue of whether the petition was timely . Upon de novo 22 revie w, we f

ind no error

in the district court’s de termination that the petition was untimely , and 23 hold that the district court did not abuse its discre tion in denying e quitable tolling. Af firmed. 24 BACK GR OUND 25 26 The followingfac ts are not in dispute. Saunder s was convic ted in Albany County Court 27 of

se ve ra l c ounts of

kid na pp ing , e nd ang e ri ngthe we lf are of a c hil d, e sc a

pe , a nd a ssa ult in 28 violation of New Y ork State law a rising f rom an incide nt that occur red while he wa s an inmate at 29 the Hudson Corre ctional Fa cility in Colum bia County , New Y ork. In the morningof August 29,3 1 1994, Saunders wa lked awa y from his work de tail at the Depa rtment of Corre ctional Service s 2 TrainingAca demy in Albany , New Y ork, without permission and takinga knife , and we nt to the 3 home of Passion J ones, his fiftee n-y ear -old ex-gir lfriend a nd mother of his child. He assaulted 4 J ones and he ld her, their e ight- month-old baby , and Jones’s mother hostag e. The police we re 5 called, a

nd a fifte en-hour

standoff e nsued. Saunder s eventua lly fell aslee p, and the police 6 sto rm e d th e a

pa rtme nt, re sc ue d th e ho sta g e s, and c a ptu re d Sa un de rs . A s a

re su lt o f t

ho se e ve nts , 7 Saunders wa s indicted and c onvicted of the char g es listed above. H e wa s sentence d on J uly 25, 8 1995 to a term of twe nty -nine y ear s to life in prison. 9 Saunders a ppeale d his conviction to the New Y ork State Appe llate Division, Third 10 Depa

rtment, raisingsix arguments: 1) the conviction for kidnapping in the first deg ree was 11 a g a ins t th e we ig ht o f t he e vid e nc e ; 2) pr os e c uto ri a l mi sc on du c t ba se d o n a n a lle g e d f

a ilure to 12 tur

n o ve r c e rt a in p ho togra

ph ic e vid e nc e and

a lle g e dly imp ro pe r r e mark s to the jur y duri ngvo ir 13 dire a

nd summation; 3) juror misconduct; 4) that he wa s not permitted to testify at his g rand jury 14 proce eding s, and there by deprive d of his rig ht to counsel; 5) the trial c ourt err oneously admitted 15 evidenc e of his prior c riminal history ; and 6) that his sentenc e wa s unduly harsh a nd excessive. 16 The Appe llate Division affirme d his conviction on May 13, 1999, but ag ree d that the sentenc e 17 was e x cessive a

nd reduc ed it to twenty

y ear s to life. Pe op lev . S au nd e rs , 261 A.D.2d 718, 722 18 (3d De pt. 1999). The Ne w York State Court of A ppeals on Nove mber 18, 1999 de nied 19 Saunders’ s application for leave to appea l. Pe op lev . S au nd e rs , 94 N.Y.2d 829, 829 (1999)

. 20 On Fe bruar y 13, 2001, almost a y ear

and thre e months after

the New York Court of 21 Ap pe a ls’ s d e nia l of le ave to a

pp e a l, S a un de rs fi le d w iththe Al ba ny County Court a mot ion to 22 vacate his conviction pursuant to Ne w York Criminal Proce dure L aw § 440.10. On Ma y 30,4 1 2001, the County

Court denied the § 440.10 motion, but gr anted pe rmission to appeal that denia l 2 to t

he Ap pe llate Di vis ion . O n Jan ua ry 23 , 2 00 3, the Ap pe llate Di vis ion a ff ir me d th e County 3 Court’s denial of Saunde rs’s § 440.10 motion. Saunders soug ht permission to appeal the de nial 4 of his § 440.10 motion to t he Ne w York Court of A ppeals, but per

mission was denied by

order 5 dated Ma

y 20, 2003. Pe op lev . S

au nd e rs , 100 N.Y.2d 542, 542 (2003) . Notice of the orde r wa s 6 sent to Saunders by mail, and he c ontends that he did not rec eive the notice until May 27, 2003. 7 On May

27, 2003, the same da

y that he cla ims to have rec eived the notice of the fina l 8 state cour

t decision reg ardinghis § 440.10 moti on, Saunders, r epre sented by counsel, filed a 9 petition for a wr it of habea s corpus with the United States District Court for the Northe rn District 10 of Ne w York pur suant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging(1) that he was de nied the ef fec tive 11 assistance of counse l during the g rand jury proce edingand (2) that information about his prior 12 criminal history

had bee n admitted into evidence in violation of his right to due proc ess. The 13 district court direc ted Saunder s to file an Amende d Petition s o that the cour t could deter

mine 14 whether

Saunders’ s petition had been timely filed, which Saunde rs did on J uly 9, 2003. The 15 responde nt on September 15, 2003 submitted filings in opposition to S aunder s’s petition. On 16 Dec ember

19, 2006, the cour

t refe rre d the matter to Mag istrate Judge B ianchini for a Report and 17 Recommendation (“R&R” ). 18 The mag istrate’s R& R of Marc h 8, 2007 rec ommended that the pe tition be dism issed as 19 untimely , finding that the statute of limitations ex pired on May 23, 2003, four da

y s befor e 2 0 S a

un d e r s f i l e d h i s h a b e a s p e t i t i o n . T h e R & R

n o t e d th a tS a un d e r s , “ th r o u g hh i s a t t o r n e y, 21 essentially

conce de[d] that the Petition is time barre d,” but soug ht equitable tolling, a nd 22 rec ommended ag ainst such tolling. Saunder s filed objections to the R&R in which he argued that5 1 the pe tit ion

wa s n ot t ime -b arr e d, and , in the a lte rn a tiv e , a

rgue d th a t e qu ita

ble tol lin g sh ou ld a

pp ly 2 to his case. The district court adopte d the R&R in full and dismissed the petition pursuant to 28 3 U. S.C. § 2 25 4( d) (1 ). Th e dis tr ic t c ourt su a s po nteg rante d a ce rtificate of appe alability “for the 4 limit ed purpose of dete rmining whether equitable tolling is a

ppropriate under the fac ts presente d 5 in the case at bar

—since the Repor

t and Recommendation did not reach or consider the merits of 6 this case.” 7 8 DI SCU SSIO N 9 10 The Antiterr orism and Eff ective D eath Pena lty

Act of 1996 ( “AED PA”), Pub. L . No. 11 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), e stablished a one- y ear statute of limitations for the filing of 12 petitions for writs of habe as cor pus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The 13 limit ations period beg ins running on the latest of seve ral e vents, in this case, the date upon which 14 the cha lleng ed state c ourt conviction bec ame f inal. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)( A). The district 15 court found that in Saunders’s ca se, the statute of limit ations expi red f

our day s prior to the filing 16 of his petition for a wr it of habea s corpus . On a pp e a l, t he pla int if

f p re se nts tw o ma in a

rgume nts : 17 (1) the district c ourt err ed in findinghis habea s petition unti mely ; and, (2) if the petition was 18 untimely , the district court e rre d in refusingto equitably toll the statute of limit ations. We affirm 19 the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on s o n b oth po int s. 20 I. Time liness of the petition 21 22 Th is C ourt re vie ws the de nia l of

a wr it o f h a

be a s c or pu s de novo , but is bound by the 23 district court’s finding s of fa ct unless they are clea rly err oneous. Cook v. N.Y

. State Div. Of 24 Pa ro le , 321 F.3d 274, 277 ( 2d Cir. 2003). The de termination of whe ther a limit ations period has6 1 expired, based on undisputed fa cts, is a question of law. Un ite d S tates v . A le

ssi , 599 F.2d 513, 2 515 (2d Cir. 1979). 3 A. Cer tificate of App ealability 4 5 In th is c a se , th e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d a c e rt if ic a te of a pp e a la bil ity “ fo r t he lim ite d p ur

po se 6 of dete rmining whether equitable tolling is a

ppropriate under the fac ts presente d in the case at 7 bar— since the Report and Re commendation did not rea ch the mer its of this case.” Saunders v. 8 Senkowski , No. 03-CV-0660, 2007 WL1017310, at *6 (N.D .N.Y. Mar ch 30, 2007). The 9 Go ve rnme nt a

rgue s th at th is C ourt

may no t r e vie w the tim e lin e ss o f t he ha be a s p e tit ion

be c a us e 10 it i s o uts ide the sc op e of the c e rt if ic ate g ra nte d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt . B ut whe the r t he pe tit ion

is 11 timely

is a question antec edent to the que stion of whether equitable tolling is a

ppropriate , and 12 Saunders on a

ppeal ha s challeng ed the district cour t’s deter mination that the petition was not 13 timely . We theref ore c onstrue his notice of a ppeal a s a re quest to amend the c ertificate of 14 appea lability

to rea ch the issue of

the timeliness of the petition, and we g rant that re quest. See 15 Smaldone v. Se nkowski , 273 F.3d 133, 135- 36 (2d Cir. 2001) (a mending cer

tificate of 16 a pp e a la bil ity to r e a c h is su e of

tim e lin e ss, wh e re c e rt if

ic a te wa s g ra

nte d o nly on iss ue of e qu ita ble 17 tolling); Fe d. R. App. P. 22(b)(2) ( authorizing the c ourt of appe als to construe a Notice of Appea l 18 as a r equest for

a ce rtificate of appe alability). 19 B. T he Di st r ic t C our t' s C alc ula ti ons 20 21 The district cour t considere d the limitations period to beg in running upon the expiration 22 of the 90-da

y period duringwhich Saunder s could have filed for direc t reviewof his conviction, 23 pursuant to this Court’s decision in W illiams v. Artuz , 2 37 F .3 d 1 47 (2 d Ci r. 20 01 ), wh ic h h e ld 24 that “dire ct re view” of a state c riminal conviction includes re view by the Supreme Court of the7 1 United States and “ that the limitations period for state prisoner s theref

ore be g ins to run only

afte r 2 the denial of

cer tiorari or the expiration of time for see king c ertiora ri.” Id. at 151. The c ourt thus 3 conclude d that the limitations period be g an to run on F ebrua ry 16, 2000, 90 day s after

the New 4 York State Court of Appe als denied le ave to a ppeal on Nove mber 18, 1999. The limit ations 5 period would have expired on F ebrua ry 16, 2001, but Saunders on F ebrua ry 13, 2001 filed a 6 motion in s tate cour t pursuant to New Y ork Criminal Procedur e L aw § 440.10, whic h had the 7 eff ect of tolling the limitations period until t he Ne w York Court of A ppeals de nied the motion 8 and denie d leave to appea l its denial of the motion, on May 20, 2003. The limitations period 9 th e nb e g anr

un n i n g a g a i n , a c c o r d i n g t o th e d i s tr i c tc o urt , an d e x p i r e d o nM ay 2 3 , 2 0 0 3 , f

o ur d ays 10 befor e Saunder s filed his petition for habe as cor pus. 11 C. M anda to r y To lli ng 12 13 1. The thirty-day wi ndow for f ilin g a m otion f

or re consideration 14 15 Sa

un de rs argue s th at hi s p e tit ion wa s ti me ly

fi le d b e c a

us e the lim itatio ns pe ri od fo r h is 16 petition for habe as cor pus should have bee n tolled for the thirty -day period duringwhich he 17 could have filed a motion for r econside ration of de nial of leave to appe al his post-conviction 18 c ha lle ng e , e ve n th ou g h h e did no t a c tua lly

fi le su c h a

mot ion . We re

je c t th is a rgume nt. 19 The AED PA one-y ear statute of limitations begins to run, a s releva nt in this case , on the 20 date on

wh ic h Sa un de rs ’s state c onvic tio n b e c ame fi na l. 2 8 U .S. C. § 22 44 (d )( 1) (A ). Th e statut e 21 provides that the limitations period shall be tolled for the time “duringwhich a properly filed 22 application for

State post-conviction re lief or other collater al re view with re spect to the pe rtinent 23 jud g me nt o r c la im is pending .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (empha sis added). It is clear f rom the 24 statutory

languag e that the possibility of filing an application for post-conviction re lief is notAt the tim e that Ge ra c i was de cided, Ne w York la w prohibited the a

ppeal of 1 c oram no bis petitions to t he Court of Appe als. On Nove mber 1, 2002 such a ppeals we re authorized by

new leg islation. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. L aw § 450.90( 1). 8 1 enoug h to toll t he limitations period; inst ead, a n application must be “pr operly filed” a nd 2 “pending .” Id. 3 We h ave pr e vio us ly he ld t hat a state c ourt

pe tit ion “ is ‘ pe nd ing ’ f

ro m th e tim e it i s f

ir st 4 filed until [ the time it is] finally disposed of and f

urther a ppellate r eview is unavailable unde r the 5 particula

r state’ s proce dures.” Benne tt v. Artuz , 199 F.3d 116, 120 ( 2d Cir. 1999). In Be nn e tt , 6 we he ld t

hat a § 4 40 .1 0 mo tio n is “ pe nd ing ” fo r p ur po se s o f A ED PA at le a st f ro m th e tim e it i s 7 fi le d thro ug h th e tim e in whic h th e pe tit ion e r c ou ld f ile an a pp lic a tio n f

or a c e rt if ic a te fo r l e ave to 8 appea l the Appellate D ivision’s denial of the motion. Id. Be nn e tt did not address whe ther the § 9 440.10 motion shoul d also be c onsidered to be “pending ” duringthe time in which a pe titioner 10 could—but did not—file a motion for re consideration of the state cour t’s denial of the § 440.10 11 motion, and we have found no other c ase a ddressingthis iss ue. 12 In Gerac i v. Senk owski , 211 F.3d 6 ( 2d Cir. 2000), we he ld that a c oram no bis petition 13 cea ses to be pendingon the date it is denied by the Appellate Division because “[w]i th the filing 14 of

the Ap pe llate Di vis ion ’s c oram no bis or de r, the do or of the Ne w Y or

k Co ur t of Ap pe a ls [is ] 15 closed a

nd further appellate revie w unava ilable.” Id. at 9. That de cision sugg ests, but does not 1 16 expressly

hold, that the post-conviction motion would not be considere d “pending ” duringthe 17 thirty

day s in which the petitioner c ould have f iled, but did not file, a motion for rec onsideration. 18 The Court ca

me closer to addre ssing this issue in Hizbullahankhamon v. W alker , in which we 19 considere d arguendo whether the exist ence of a thirty -day period duringwhich a motion for 20 rec onsideration could be filed mea nt that a c oram no bis p et i t i o ns h o u l d b e c o n s i d er ed“p en d i n g”9 1 fo r a

n a dd iti on a l th ir

ty da y s a ft e r i t w a s d e nie d. 25 5 F .3 d 6 5, 74 (2 d Ci r. 20 01 ). We u lti mate ly 2 deter

mined it was not nece ssary to answer

that question, but noted in dicta that a de cision that the 3 pe tit ion

wa s st ill “ pe nd ing ” duri ngthat pe ri od wo uld “ be in s ome te ns ion

wi th o ur ho ldi ngin 4 Gerac ithat a c oram no bis mot ion c e a se s to be pe nd ingon

the date it i s d e nie d b y

the Ap pe llate 5 Division.” Id. at7 4 n . 8 (qu o t i n g Gerac i, 211 F.3d at 9)

. 6 Simi larl y , w e have he ld t hat th e AE DPAlim itatio ns pe ri od is n ot t oll e d d

ur ingthe tim e in 7 which a pe tition for a writ of c ertiora ri to the United States Supreme Court c ould have be en filed 8 with respec t to a state collate ral motion, Smaldone, 273 F.3d at 138, even thoug h the limitations 9 period is tolled duringthe time in which a de fenda nt could file a pe tition for cer tiorari see king 10 direc t reviewof the state c ourt conviction, W illiams , 2 3 7 F. 3 d

at1 5 1

. T h i s i s b ec au s e t h e t i m i n g11 related languag e of 28 U .S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A ) expressly provides that the limitations period 12 beg ins to run on “the date on which the judg ment beca me final by

the conc lusion of direct re view 13 or the ex

piration of

the time for seek

ing such revie w ,” whe rea s § 2244(d)(2) provides for tolling 14 only

duringthe time in which “a proper ly filed application for State post-conviction or othe r 15 c oll a te ra l r e vie w w ithre sp e c t to a pe rt ine nt j ud g me nt o r c la im is pending .” 28 U.S.C. § 16 2244(d)( 1-2) ( emphasis adde d). 17 The Te nth Circuit has held that the fifte en-da y window for f

iling a motion for r ehea

ring 18 afte r the de nial of leave to appe al does toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. See Serrano v. 19 W

illiams , 3 8 3 F. 3 d

1 1 8 1 , 1 1 8 5 (1 0 thC i r. 2 0 0 4 ). W e a re p er s u ad ed , h o we v er , th atth e l an gu age 20 of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) , as construe d by our pre cede nts, compels the conc lusion that the 21 one-year

AEDPA limitations period is not t olled by the thirty -day

period in which the petitioner 22 could have filed, but did not file, a motion for re consideration of the NewYork State c ourt’sSa un de rs c on te nd s th at hi s c a se is d ist inguis he d f ro m Gerac i , beca

use at the time Gerac i 2 was de cided, Ne w York la w prohibited the a

ppeal of c oram no bis petitions to t he Court of Appea ls. On Novembe r 1, 2002, those appe als wer e author ized by new leg islation. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. L aw § 450.90( 1). Howe ver, this does not af fec t the application of Ge ra c i to t his case , beca use a motion for r econside ration wa s equally as ava ilable to the petitioner in Ge ra c i as it was to Saunders. 10 1 denial of his post-convic tion moti on under N ew Yor k Criminal Procedure L aw § 440.10. 2 2. Se r vic e -b y- M ailRul e s 3 4 Saunders c ontends that the statute of limitations must be tolled for the five-da y period of 5 time allowed by

New Y ork law to a ccount f or the de lay

in rec eiving service by

mail. See N.Y. 6 C.P.L .R. § 2103(b)(2) . Alternatively , he ar g ues that F ed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) compels tolling, for the 7 same re ason. These arguments fail bec ause the y are prec luded by

our holding in Gerac i v. 8 Senkowski , 211 F.3d 6 ( 2d Cir. 2000). 2 9 We held in Gerac ith ats t atu t o ry t o l l i n g fo r t h e p urp o s es o f A E DP A e n d s wi thth e “ fi l i n g” 10 of

the state c ourt ’s fi na l or de r, and e xpre ssl y

re je c te d G e ra c i’ s a

rgume nt t hat hi s c oram no bis 11 petition remained “ pending ” until he re ceive d notice of the state cour t’s order

. Id. at 9. In Diaz 12 v . Ke lly , 515 F.3d 149, we aff irmed that dec ision and applied its rule to a sig nificantly longe r 13 delay

betwee n filing a

nd mailing, of

three months. Id. at 155 n.2 (“ Gerac i. . . ruled that the 14 statut or

y tol lin g pr ov isi on

of the AE DPAlim itatio ns pe ri od e nd e d u po n th e e ntr

y of a state 15 court’s or der, r ather than its subsequent rec eipt.”). Ser vice- by -mail rules a ffe ct the date upon 16 which the or der is dee med to have be en ser ved, not the date upon which it is considere d filed. 17 Be cause this Court has held that a motion cease s to be “pe nding” for the pur poses of AED PA on 18 the date of

fi lin g , Sa un de rs ’s argume nt i s w ith out me ri t. 19 II. Equit abl e Tol ling 2011 1 The pa

rties disag ree as to the standar d of re view that applies to the district c ourt’s 2 decision to deny

equitable tolling. I

n Belot v. Burge , 490 F.3d 201 ( 2d Cir. 2007), this Court 3 established a thr ee- level standa rd for revie wing a district cour

t’s decision not to equitably toll the 4 AEDPA limitations period, dependingon what aspe ct of the lowe r cour t’s decision is challeng ed. 5 Id. a t 20 6- 07 . I f t

he de c isi on

no t to tol l is ma de a s a

matte r o f l aw, the n th e sta nd ard of re vie w i s 6 de novo . I f the de cision is based on a f actua l finding, the standard is c lear err or. I f the c ourt has 7 understood the law corr ectly , and has ba sed its decision on finding s of fa ct supported by 8 evidenc e, then the sta ndard is abuse of discre tion. Id. 9 There are two require ments for e quitably tolling the statute of limitations: “‘(1) that 10 [petit ioner] has bee n pursuing his rights dilig ently , and (2) that some extraordinary circ umstance 11 stood in his way ’ and pr evente d timely filing.” Lawrence v. F

lorida , 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) 1 2 (q u o t i n g Pacev. Guglielmo , 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). In this case, the district c ourt g ave thr ee 13 rea sons in support of its finding that equitable tolling was ina ppropriate

. 14 The fir st reason that the district court g ave f or deny ing e quitable tolling wa s that the delay 15 in rec eipt of the orde r occ asioned by it being ma iled to petitioner over the Memorial Da y 16 we e ke nd

did no t c on sti tut e an “ e xtra or din ary c ir c ums tanc e .” Pe tit ion e r c on te nd s th a t th is i s a 17 question of law that should be r eviewe d de novo . The mag istrate’s R& R, adopted by the district 1 8 c o urt , s t a t e d

th at“ [ a ] s a

th r e s h o l d m at t e r , th i s C o urti s un w i l l i n g t o d e c l ar e th a tm a i l d e l ays 19 occa sioned by

fede ral holiday s, which occ ur seve ral times throug hout the y ear , are 20 ‘extraordinar

y .’” Saunders v. Se nkowski , No. 03-CV-0660, 2007 WL1017310, at *5 (N.D .N.Y. 21 Marc h 3 0, 20 07 ). Ev e n if we a ssume that th e dis tr ic t c ourt thu s d e e me d a

de lay in m a ili ngdu e to 22 a fe dera l holiday not to constitut e an “ extraordinary” cir cumstance as a matter of law , and12 1 there fore revie w de novo , we f ind no error

in the district court’s c onclusion. In Di az v . Ke lly , 2 515 F.3d 149 ( 2d Cir. 2008), this Court held that a delay in mailing ca

n qualify as an 3 extraordinary

circ umstance w arr anting equitable tolling, id. a t 15 5– 56 , b ut t he de lay in t hat c a se 4 betwee n the filing of the orde r and its mailing to the pe titioner was seve ral months. Id. We are 5 awa

re of no case holding that a

delay occa sioned by

the normal c ourse of

the mail, as leng thened 6 by a re g ularly

schedule d holiday , constitutes an “e x traordina ry” cir cumstance for pur

poses of 7 equitable tolling, a nd we de cline to so hold now. We theref ore a ffirm the district c ourt’s 8 deter

mination that the delay

betwee n the filing of the state c ourt’s orde r and Saunde rs’s re ceipt of 9 the or de r d id n ot w arr ant e qu ita ble tol lin g of

the AE DPAstatut e of

lim itatio ns . 10 Th e dis tr ic t c ourt a lso g ave tw o o the r r e a so ns fo r d e nyinge qu ita ble tol lin g , b a se d o n it s 11 deter

mination that the petitioner did not dili g ently pursue his rig hts: first, that Saunders waited 12 until three day s befor e the e x piration of the statute of limit ations befor e filinghis state court 13 c oll a te ra l mo tio n; a nd se c on d, that he fa ile d to take ste ps to e ns ur e that he wo uld re c e ive the state 14 c ourt ’s or de r a s p ro mpt ly a s p os sib le . B e c a

us e we fi nd

that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s c or re c t in its 15 deter

mination that the ordinary course of the mail does not constitute an “ extraordinary 16 circ umstance” for the pur poses of e quitable tolling, howe ver, w e nee d not determine whether 17 those g rounds also would justify denying e quitable tolling. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the district 18 c ourt ’s de c isi on

de c lin ingto e qu ita

bly tol l th e AE DPAstatut e of lim itatio ns . 19 20 CO NC LU SION 21 22 For

the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the district cour t is AFF I RMED.