*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under

the terms and conditions of the court’s General Order filed November 29, 1993. 151

F.R.D. 470.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 1/3/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

ERSKINE C. RAGLAND,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 95-1282

v. D. Colorado

ROY ROMER, Governor of the State of

Colorado; ARISTEDES ZAVARAS, Executive

Director of Colorado Department of Corrections;

FRANK RICE, Warden of the Denver Reception

and Diagnostic Center; INVESTIGATION,

COLORADO, BUREAU OF, Director of, John

Doe (1), John Doe (2), John Doe (3), John Doe

(4), individually and in their official capacity,

(D.C. No. 95-K-11)

Defendants - Appellees.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
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appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. This cause is therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument.

Erskine C. Ragland brought this in forma pauperis pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging various defendants violated his civil rights under the Fourth, Fifth, 

Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments when he and another inmate were singled out

to give a saliva sample for DNA testing. The district court referred Ragland’s complaint

to a United States magistrate judge, who recommended that the district court grant

defendant Zavaras’ motion for summary judgment and dismiss, with prejudice, Ragland’s

complaint against the other defendants. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s

recommendation, and dismissed Ragland’s case. We affirm. 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West

Communications, Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 781 (10th Cir. 1995). Applying the same legal

standards used by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), we determine if any

material fact is disputed; if not, we determine if the district court correctly applied the

substantive law. Muck v. United States, 3 F.3d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir. 1993). 

The undisputed facts indicate that on January 10, 1994, Ragland was taken to the

prison medical center for tests with other inmates. The inmates proceeded together

through the various medical stations until Ragland and Jeffrey Strom, another inmate,

were singled out for a DNA test, which consisted of putting paper in their mouths for

saliva samples. Strom and Ragland, convicted sex offenders, were singled out, pursuant
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to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 17-2-201(5)(g)(I), because only sex offenders are required to take

this particular test. The DNA analysis is used to detect and deter the commission of

crimes by recidivists by creating a databank of convicted sex offenders before they are

paroled.

On appeal, Ragland reasserts that his constitutional rights were violated and argues

that default judgments as to Roy Romer and J. Frank Rice were improperly denied. We

have carefully reviewed the record and affirm the dismissal substantially for the reasons

set forth in the district court’s Order filed on June 20, 1995, and the magistrate judge’s

Recommendation filed on May 8, 1995. In addition, however, Ragland contends that the

district court failed to address his Eighth Amendment claim. We accordingly address that

contention.

Ragland argues that by singling him out as a sex offender to other inmates, the

defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his safety. There are two primary

requirements for proving an actionable violation of the Eighth Amendment. First, an

inmate must demonstrate that the deprivation suffered was “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the inmate must establish that prison officials had a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind” in allowing the deprivation to take place. Id.

(quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302-03). “In prison-conditions cases that state of mind is

one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id. Thus, for the defendants
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to be held liable, they “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [they] must also draw that

inference.” Id. at 1979.

In his complaint, Ragland contended that the defendants “exposed plaintiff to

verbal and physical abuse from other prisoners thereby endangering his well being and

life. This continues to date.” R. Tab 3, Complaint at 23. In Ragland’s pleadings, he

argued that “it is common knowledge within the prison community that inmates convicted

of sex offenses are at least subject to the contempt and derision from the other inmates.” 

R. Tab 32, Br. in Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss and/or for Summ. J. at 9-10. In an affidavit

presented by Ragland, he alleged threats and name calling, but no physical harm. R. Tab

33, Aff. in Supp. of Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss and/or for Summ. J. at 3. Courts have

consistently held that acts or omissions resulting in an inmate being subjected to nothing

more than threats and verbal taunts do not violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g.,

Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979); Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950,

954-55 (6th Cir. 1987); McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146-47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

464 U.S. 998 (1983); Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Glick,

481 F.2d 1028, 1033 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). 

Ragland also failed to present any evidence establishing that the defendants

actually knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. See

Farmer, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. Notwithstanding our obligation to construe pro se pleadings
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liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), we will not supply additional

facts. Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059

(1990); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). A party

opposing summary judgment must present more than conclusory allegations to establish

the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Setliff v. Memorial Hosp., 850 F.2d 1384, 1392

(10th Cir. 1988) (citing McKibben v. Chubb, 840 F.2d 1525, 1528 (10th Cir. 1988)); see

also Swoboda v. Dubach, 992 F.2d 286, 289-90 (10th Cir. 1993) (vague, conclusory

allegations are insufficient to form the basis for a § 1983 cause of action). Thus, even if

we accept Ragland’s facts as true, we find no Eighth Amendment violation in this case

because, among other deficiencies, the admitted facts do not support the subjective

requirement of “deliberate indifference.” The defendants’ adherence to the mandates of a

Colorado statute, legitimately aimed at detecting and deterring crime, does not

demonstrate the requisite mens rea. 

The Order is AFFIRMED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Stephen H. Anderson

Circuit Judge