This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the *

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I LED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

November 9, 2006

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

ROYCE GILREATH, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 06-3132

v. (D.C. No. 05-CV-2282-KHV)

L-M FUNDING LLC, A Kansas

Limited Liability Company;

ROXANNE MITCHELL; DAVID

MITCHELL; MARGEE HAMILTON;

JIMMY HAMILTON; EVELYN

HAMILTON; SEBRING CAPITAL

CORPORATION, A Delaware

Corporation; CLIFFORD WILEY;

JOANN BUTAUD,

(D. Kan.)

Defendants,

 and

BANK ONE, National Association, as

Trustee,

 Defendant-Appellee.

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

*

Before KELLY, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
 Appellant believes, incorrectly, that the Kansas Court of Appeals 1

determined, as a matter of law, that “since Plaintiff did not know of the contents

of the letter that Mr. Wiley sent to L-M Funding, and Plaintiff did not informed

[sic] L-M Funding that Mr Wiley was his agent, thus was not authorized to cancel

plaintiff contract.” (Appellant Br. at 3, 3a.) Appellant is fundamentally mistaken

regarding the Kansas Court of Appeal’s decision. Rather, that court found that no

uncontroverted evidence supported LMF’s position.

-2-

After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Appellant Royce Gilreath, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s

determination that his complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as

well as its denial of his motion to amend his complaint to add additional

defendants and new claims. Mr. Gilreath originally filed a breach of contract and

Kansas Consumer Protection Act claim in Kansas state court against L-M

Funding, LLC (“LMF”) after a failed land deal. The trial court awarded LMF

summary judgment, but the Kansas Court of Appeals found trial necessary to

resolve issues of fact, specifically whether Mr. Gilreath knowingly authorized his

attorney, defendant Clifford Wiley, to cancel the contract. Mr. Gilreath then 1

amended his state court complaint a third time to add, inter alia, defendant Bank

One. The trial court granted Bank One’s motion for summary judgment, as Mr.

Gilreath had not alleged any claims against it. At a subsequent bench trial, Mr.
 Appellant’s complaint lists the following claims: 2

Plaintiff claim 1

That defendants Jimmy Hamilton, Margee Hamilton, Evelyn

Hamilton and Bank One have yet to show that plaintiff pleading in

his third amended petition required plaintiff to elect a remedy, thus

for the state courts to order plaintiff to elect was error.

Plaintiff claim 11

Plaintiff was denied his due process of finality of a Judgment or

decision of a competence court thus deprived plaintiff of his

U.S.C.A. 14; especially since the stateappeal court in Gilreath 1 had

made afinal decision in regards to the two attorney having authority

to write letters to cancel the contract.

Plaintiff count 111

Plaintiff paid #4,000,00 dollars earnest money after signing the

contract with Dave Landis, of L-M Funding, however the contract

fail but plaintiff have not receive his earnest money back which is

inconstant with what the contract state. Plaintiff contends that this

is another mean by the state courts of impairing the oblig- of a

contract, which violate provisions of the federal constitution.

(Compl., Appellee’s App. at 18 (errors in original).)

-3-

Gilreath presented no evidence, and the trial court ruled in favor of the remaining

defendants. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.

Appellant then filed an action in federal district court asserting that the

Kansas state court decision violated his constitutional due process rights and

constitutional rights to contract. A magistrate judge recommended that the 2

motion to amend be denied and the case dismissed for failure to meet even the

liberal pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Over Appellant’s objection,

the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. 
-4-

The district court denied Appellant’s motion to amend on grounds of

futility. It determined that Appellant failed adequately to allege any

circumstances justifying the federal statutory discrimination claims against the

numerous additional defendants, all of whom were attorneys that represented

either Appellant or defendants in the state court action. The district court also

granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

First, it found that complete diversity was absent where nine of eleven defendants

were residents of the same state as Appellant. Second, the district court

concluded that Appellant’s federal claims were, under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, an impermissible attempt to seek review of a fully adjudicated state

court judgment.

We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction de novo. See Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 473

(10th Cir. 2002). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine operates as a jurisdictional limit

on federal courts, precluding “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284

(2005); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (stating

that Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents “a party losing in state court . . . from

seeking what in substance would be appellate review of [a] state judgment in a
-5-

United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state

judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights”).

Based on our careful review of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal,

including Appellant’s complaint and proposed amendment thereto, we conclude

that the district court properly dismissed this action for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Appellant’s claims clearly

seek reversal of the state courts’ final resolution of this action. His attempt to

add to his federal action the lawyers who appeared in the state court proceedings

only reinforces our conclusion. Cf. Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1257 (10th Cir.

2006) (noting that the “addition of new defendants in federal court . . . does not

change the nature of the underlying state court ruling”). Accordingly, the district

court’s dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Monroe G. McKay

Circuit Judge