IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

E.R., a Minor, through her Guardian, L.H., 

K.M., a Minor, through her Guardian, C.M., 

D.M., a minor, through her Guardian, D.H., 

L.B., a minor, by and through his or her 

guardian, Molly Janik, H.S., a Minor, through 

her Guardian, J.S., each individually and on 

behalf of all others similarly situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

v. 

TIKTOK, INC. and BYTEDANCE, INC., 

 Defendants. 

 No. 1:20-cv-02810 

 CONSOLIDATED ACTION 

 Hon. John Z. Lee 

 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

Plaintiffs, E.R., a minor, by and through her Guardian L.H., K.M., a minor, by and through 

her Guardian C.M., D.M., a minor, by and through her Guardian D.H, L.B., a minor, by and 

through his or her Guardian Molly Janik, and H.S., a minor by and through her Guardian J.S., each 

individually and on behalf of a Class of all others similarly situated as defined below (the “Class”), 

by and through their attorneys, bring the following Consolidated Class Action Complaint 

(“Complaint”) pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, against Defendants 

TikTok, Inc. (“TikTok”) and ByteDance, Inc. (“ByteDance”) (collectively the “Defendants”). 

They allege the following based upon personal knowledge as to themselves and their own actions, 

and, as to all other matters, allege, upon information and belief and investigation of their counsel, 

as follows: 

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NATURE OF THE ACTION 

1. Defendants operate the social media platform TikTok (formerly Musical.ly), one of 

the most popular entertainment apps for mobile devices in the United States and the world. 

2. The TikTok app allows users to create and share 15-second videos - typically of 

people doing activities such as dancing, lip-syncing, and stunts - and boasts a fanbase of more than 

two billion worldwide, the vast majority of whom are teenagers and children.1

3. TikTok’s owner, ByteDance, was founded in 2012 and remains based in Beijing, 

China. ByteDance is well known as a hit app factory that has spent the last decade using 

technologies such as artificial intelligence and facial recognition.2

 TikTok currently has 

approximately 2.4 million active daily users, many of whom are minors. This action seeks to 

ensure that the privacy of Illinois minors who use TikTok is adequately protected. 

4. Plaintiffs and class members have particular concerns here given TikTok’s reported 

connections to the Chinese government, which have very recently come under close public 

scrutiny. Several U.S. Senators have formally requested that the Intelligence Community conduct 

an assessment of the national security risks posed by TikTok.3

 Recognizing the serious ongoing 

threat posed by TikTok, prominent U.S. Senators wrote to the FTC on May 29, 2020 that, “[f]aced 

1

 Paige Leskin, TikTok Surpasses 2 Billion Downloads and Sets a Record for App Installs in a 

Single Quarter, Business Insider (April 30, 2020), available at 

https://www.businessinsider.com/tiktok-app-2-billion-downloads-record-setting-q1-sensortower-2020-4 (last accessed June 12, 2020); see also Maryam Moshin, 10 TikTok Statistics That 

You Need To Know in 2020, Oberlo (February 17, 2020), available at

https://www.oberlo.com/blog/tiktok-statistics (last accessed June 12, 2020). 

2

 Shelly Banjo, Worries That TikTok Is A Threat To National Security Have Merit, at 

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2019-10-29/worries-that-tiktok-is-a-threat-tonational-security-have-merit (last accessed June 12, 2020). 

3

 See Letter to Acting Director Maguire, October 23, 2019, attached hereto as Exhibit A

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with compelling evidence that this wildly popular social media platform is blatantly flouting 

binding U.S. privacy rules, the FTC should move swiftly to launch an investigation and forcefully 

hold violators accountable for their conduct.”4

 

5. Because of data privacy concerns, some U.S. military branches have even banned 

the use of the app on government-issued phones. Republican Senator Josh Hawley called for a 

total ban on the use of the app across the United States.5 Reddit CEO and co-founder Steve 

Huffman called TikTok “fundamentally parasitic” due to privacy concerns.6

6. In fact, the Department of Defense recently expressed concern over TikTok’s 

“popularity with Western Users, and its ability to convey location, image and biometric data to its 

Chinese parent company, which is legally unable to refuse to share data to the Chinese 

Government,” going so far as to issue an internal memo to encourage its employees to avoid 

installing the app.7 

7. Plaintiffs bring this class action against TikTok for violations of Illinois’ Biometric 

Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS §14/1, et seq. BIPA prohibits, among other things, 

4

 See Letter to the Federal Trade Commission Chairman and Commissioners, May 29, 2020, 

attached hereto as Exhibit B (emphasis added). 

5

 TJ McCue, Is TikTok Raiding Your Privacy in 2020? Here Is How To Stop It, available at 

https://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2020/02/13/is-tiktok-raiding-your-privacy-in-2020-hereis-how-to-stop-it/#1e34f6b569c8 (last accessed June 12, 2020). 

6

 Chaim Gartenberg, Reddit CEO Says TikTOk Is “Fundamentally Parasitic,” Cites Privacy 

Concerns, available at https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/27/21155845/reddit-ceo-stevehuffman-tiktok-privacy-concerns-spyware-fingerprinting-tracking-users (last accessed June 12, 

2020). 

7

 Jason Aten, The Department of Defense Is Warning People Not to Use TikTok Over National 

Security Concerns, Forbes (January 9, 2020) (quoting internal memo), available at

https://www.inc.com/jason-aten/the-department-of-defense-is-warning-people-not-to-use-tiktokover-national-security-concerns.html (last accessed June 12, 2020) (emphasis added). 

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private entities from collecting, capturing, obtaining, disclosing, redisclosing, disseminating or 

profiting from the biometric identifiers or information of an individual without providing written 

notice and without obtaining a written release from the impacted individual or his or her authorized 

representative. BIPA also requires private entities in possession of biometric identifiers to adopt 

retention and destruction policies and to take measures to prevent the release of that information. 

8. As alleged in detail below, Defendants, through the TikTok app, collected, 

captured, obtained, stored and, upon information and belief, disclosed and otherwise disseminated 

Illinois resident minor TikTok users’ biometric information. 

9. Various features of the TikTok app, including its alleged “Face Swap” feature, 

automatically scan and collect user’s biometric identifiers, even for users who have not created 

accounts.

8

 

10. TikTok accesses its users’ data for various purposes, including tracking users by 

age, gender, location, operating system, and interest in order to attract marketing and ad sales. By 

collecting and filtering this user data, TikTok offers a sophisticated targeted ad and marketing 

platform that allows its ad clientele to hone into their target demographics with shocking 

precision.9 

8 See Peter Suciu, TikTok’s Deepfakes Just The Latest Security Issue For The Video Sharing App, 

Forbes (January 7, 2020), available at

https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2020/01/07/tiktoks-deepfakes-just-the-latest-securityissue-for-the-video-sharing-app/#707ead6970a2 (last accessed June 12, 2020). See also Jesse 

Hirsh, New Platform, Old Problems: How TikTok Recreates the Regulatory Challenge that Came 

Before It, Canadian Centre for International Governance Innovation (May 18, 2020) available 

at https://www.cigionline.org/articles/new-platform-old-problems-how-tiktok-recreatesregulatory-challenges-came-it (last accessed June 12, 2020). 

9 See Maria Mellor, Why is TikTok creating filter bubble based on your race?, Wired (February 

28, 2020), available at https://www.wired.co.uk/article/tiktok-filter-bubbles (last accessed June 

12, 2020). 

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11. Defendants engaged in this conduct: (a) without adequately informing the impacted 

minors, including minor Plaintiffs and their parents or lawful guardians, and the minor members 

of the proposed class (the “Class Members”) and their parents or lawful guardians, that biometric 

identifiers were being collected, captured, obtained, disclosed, redisclosed or otherwise 

disseminated; (b) without informing the impacted minors, and their parents or lawful guardians, in 

writing of the purpose of the collection, capture, obtainment, disclosure, redisclosure and 

dissemination of the biometric identifiers and information; and (c) without seeking and obtaining 

consent or written releases from such impacted minors and their parents or lawful guardians. 

12. As the Illinois General Assembly has found and both the Illinois Supreme Court 

and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals have confirmed, the harm to Plaintiffs and Class Members 

as a result of the BIPA violations alleged herein has already occurred. 

13. Further, as businesses worldwide compete to develop ever more advanced facial 

recognition technology, the race for data imperils the privacy of individuals everywhere. Public 

policy in Illinois provides that given the risks of unwanted data collection and disclosure, citizens 

need the power to make decisions about the fate of their unique biometric identifiers and 

information. Defendants’ actions robbed Plaintiffs and Class Members of that power. 

14. Defendants’ conduct is particularly brazen given that it is specifically directed at 

minors and involves the misuse of their biometric information without seeking parental consent. 

15. Plaintiffs bring this Class Action Complaint seeking: (a) statutory damages of 

$5,000 per BIPA violation, or, alternatively, if Defendants acted negligently, $1,000 per BIPA 

violation, along with attorneys’ fees and costs; (b) disgorgement of Defendants’ ill-gotten gains 

derived from the use of the unlawfully-acquired data; and (c) an injunction (i) barring Defendants 

from any further use of minors’ biometric identifiers and information; (ii) barring Defendants from 

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continuing to collect, capture, obtain, disclose, redisclose, disseminate and profit from Plaintiffs’ 

and Class Members’ biometric identifiers and information; (iii) requiring Defendants to delete and 

destroy all biometric identifiers and information in their possession, custody and control; and (iv) 

requiring Defendants to claw back the biometric identifiers and information from any third parties 

to whom Defendants disclosed, redisclosed or disseminated it. 

PARTIES

16. At relevant times, Plaintiff E.R., a minor, was and remains an Illinois resident. 

Plaintiff E.R.’s Guardian, L.H. was also, at relevant times, and is through the date of this filing an 

Illinois resident. Defendants performed facial geometric scans of Plaintiff E.R. through Plaintiff 

E.R.’s use of the TikTok app, while Plaintiff E.R. resided in Illinois. Like tens of thousands or 

more other Class Members in Illinois, Plaintiff E.R. downloaded the TikTok app in Illinois and 

uploaded videos to the app in Illinois. 

17. At relevant times, Plaintiff K.M., a minor, was and remains an Illinois resident. 

Plaintiff K.M.’s Guardian, C.M. was also, at relevant times, and is through the date of this filing 

an Illinois resident. Defendants performed facial geometric scans of Plaintiff K.M. through 

Plaintiff K.M.’s use of the TikTok app, while Plaintiff K.M. resided in Illinois. Like tens of 

thousands or more other Class Members in Illinois, Plaintiff K.M. downloaded the TikTok app in 

Illinois and uploaded videos to the app in Illinois. 

18. At relevant times, Plaintiff D.M., a minor, was and remains an Illinois resident. 

Plaintiff D.M.’s Guardian, D.H. was also, at relevant times, and is through the date of this filing 

an Illinois resident. Defendants performed facial geometric scans of Plaintiff D.M. through 

Plaintiff D.M.’s use of the TikTok app, while Plaintiff D.M. resided in Illinois. Like tens of 

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thousands or more other Class Members in Illinois, Plaintiff D.M. downloaded the TikTok app in 

Illinois and uploaded videos to the app in Illinois. 

19. At relevant times, Plaintiff L.B., a minor, was and remains an Illinois resident. 

Plaintiff L.B.’s Guardian, Molly Janik, was also, at relevant times, and is through the date of this 

filing an Illinois resident. Defendants performed facial geometric scans of Plaintiff L.B. through 

Plaintiff L.B.’s use of the TikTok app, while Plaintiff L.B. resided in Illinois. Like tens of 

thousands or more other Class Members in Illinois, Plaintiff L.B. downloaded the TikTok app in 

Illinois and uploaded videos to the app in Illinois. 

20. At relevant times, Plaintiff H.S., a minor, was and remains an Illinois resident. 

Plaintiff H.S.’s Guardian, J.S. was also, at relevant times, and is through the date of this filing an 

Illinois resident. Defendants performed facial geometric scans of Plaintiff H.S. through Plaintiff 

H.S.’s use of the TikTok app, while Plaintiff H.S. resided in Illinois. Like tens of thousands or 

more other Class Members in Illinois, Plaintiff H.S. downloaded the TikTok app in Illinois and 

uploaded videos to the app in Illinois. 

21. Defendant TikTok, Inc. is a California corporation with its principal place of 

business in Culver City, California. TikTok, Inc. has a registered agent in Illinois. 

22. Defendant ByteDance, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 

business in Palo Alto, California. ByteDance, Inc. has a registered agent in Illinois. 

23. Based on Plaintiffs’ investigation and the evidence obtained concerning the direct 

culpability of the U.S. based Defendants, Plaintiffs do not name, at this time, the following related 

foreign entities: Musical.ly n/k/a TikTok, Ltd. (a Cayman Islands corporation with its principal 

place of business in Shanghai, China), Beijing ByteDance Technology Co. Ltd. (“Beijing 

ByteDance”) (a privately held company headquartered in Beijing, China) or ByteDance Co., Ltd. 

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(the owner of Bejing ByteDance headquartered in Beijing, China) (together, the “Chinese 

Entities”). Plaintiffs reserve their rights to seek discovery from Defendants concerning the 

involvement of the Chinese Entities and to name them as defendants in the future should that 

discovery or further investigation reveal an appropriate jurisdictional basis for doing so. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

24. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (the “Class Action 

Fairness Act”) because sufficient diversity of citizenship exists between the parties in this action, 

the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and 

there are 100 or more members of the Class. Because it is estimated that the Class will have 

thousands of members and Defendants’ intentional and reckless violations of BIPA are punishable 

by statutory damages of $5,000 per violation, the amount in controversy is well in excess of 

$5,000,000. 

25. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants used and 

disseminated data derived directly from Illinois-based TikTok users and exposed residents of 

Illinois to ongoing privacy risks within Illinois based on the collection, capture, obtainment, 

disclosure, redisclosure and dissemination of their biometric identifiers and information. 

Furthermore, many of the images Defendants used for their unlawful collection, capture and 

obtainment of biometric identifiers and information were created in Illinois, uploaded from 

Illinois, and/or managed via Illinois-based user accounts, computers, and mobile devices. Because 

of the scope and magnitude of Defendants’ conduct, Defendants knew that their collection, 

capture, obtainment, disclosure, redisclosure and dissemination of impacted individuals’ biometric 

identifiers and information would injure Illinois residents and citizens. Defendants knew or had 

reason to know that collecting, capturing, obtaining, disclosing, redisclosing and disseminating 

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Illinois citizens’ and residents’ biometric identifiers and information without providing the 

requisite notice or obtaining the requisite releases would deprive Illinois citizens and residents of 

their statutorily-protected privacy rights, neutralize Illinois citizens’ and residents’ ability to 

control access to their biometric identifiers and information via their Illinois-managed devices and 

exposed minors in Illinois to potential surveillance and other privacy harms as they went about 

their lives within the state. 

26. Furthermore, through the TikTok app, Defendants actively collect information 

harvested from the Illinois-based devices of Illinois residents, including “location information” 

based on users’ “SIM card and/or IP address.”10 

27. Defendants use this harvested information to “provide [users] with location-based 

services, such as advertising and other personalized content” directed toward Illinois.11

28. Defendants’ deliberate gathering of Illinois users’ personally identifiable 

information is intentionally targeted toward Illinois residents, including Plaintiffs and the Class, 

and constitutes purposeful activity directed at devices and individuals in Illinois. 

29. Indeed, Defendants attract advertisers by touting the TikTok’s app’s ability to target 

users by, among other things, location, stating that “[i]t has never been easier to reach potential 

customers by precisely targeting your audience. Using TikTok Ads, you can target your audience 

10 https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en (last accessed June 12, 2020). 

11 Id. 

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by gender, location, age, interests, and other unique variables.”12 TikTok expressly targets its 

advertisements by State, including, upon information and belief, within Illinois.13 

30. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the acts 

or omissions giving rise to the claims alleged herein occurred in Illinois. Alternatively, venue is 

proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3) because this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

I. The Biometric Information Privacy Act 

31. BIPA seeks to safeguard individuals’ biometric identifiers and information. 

32. Biometric identifiers include a scan of an individual’s face geometry or voiceprint. 

740 ILCS § 14/10. 

33. Biometric information is “any information . . . based on an individual’s biometric 

identifier used to identify an individual.” 740 ILCS § 14/10. 

34. In the early 2000s, major national corporations started using Chicago and other 

locations in Illinois to test “new applications of biometric-facilitated financial transactions, 

including finger-scan technologies at grocery stores, gas stations, and school cafeterias.” 740 ILCS 

§ 14/5(c). Given its relative infancy, an overwhelming portion of the public became weary of this 

then-growing yet unregulated technology. See 740 ILCS § 14/5. 

35. In late 2007, a biometrics company called Pay by Touch, which provided major 

retailers throughout the State of Illinois with fingerprint scanners to facilitate consumer 

transactions, filed for bankruptcy. That bankruptcy was alarming to the Illinois Legislature because 

12 https://ads.tiktok.com/help/article?aid=6667447877242978309 (last accessed June 12, 2020). 

13 https://ads.tiktok.com/help/article?aid=6721969269619294213 (last accessed June 12, 2020) 

(describing “Ad Targeting” by “state/province”). 

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suddenly there was a serious risk that millions of fingerprint records – which, like other unique 

biometric identifiers, can be linked to people’s sensitive financial and personal data – could now 

be sold, distributed, or otherwise shared through the bankruptcy proceedings without adequate 

protections for Illinois citizens. The bankruptcy also highlighted the fact that most consumers who 

used the company’s fingerprint scanners were completely unaware that the scanners were not 

actually transmitting fingerprint data to the retailer who deployed the scanner, but rather to the 

now-bankrupt company, and that their unique biometric identifiers could now be sold to unknown 

third parties. 

36. Recognizing the “very serious need [for] protections for the citizens of Illinois 

when it [came to their] biometric information,” Illinois enacted BIPA in 2008. See Illinois House 

Transcript, 2008 Reg. Sess. No. 276; 740 ILCS § 14/5. 

37. Additionally, to ensure compliance, BIPA provides that, for each violation, the 

prevailing party may recover $1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater, for negligent 

violations and $5,000, or actual damages, whichever is greater, for intentional or reckless 

violations. 740 ILCS § 14/20. 

38. BIPA is an informed consent statute which achieves its goal by making it unlawful 

for a company to, among other things, collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or 

otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifiers or biometric information, unless 

it first: 

a. Informs the subject in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information 

is being collected, stored and used; 

b. Informs the subject in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which 

a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; 

and 

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c. Receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or 

biometric information. 

See 740 ILCS § 14/15(b). 

39. Biometric identifiers include retina and iris scans, fingerprints and handprints, and 

– most importantly here – facial geometry and voiceprints. See 740 ILCS § 14/10. Biometric 

information is separately defined to include any information based on an individual’s biometric 

identifier that is used to identify an individual. Id. 

40. BIPA establishes standards for how companies must handle Illinois citizens’ 

biometric identifiers and biometric information. See, e.g., 740 ILCS § 14/15(c)-(d). For example, 

BIPA prohibits private entities from disclosing a person’s or customer’s biometric identifier or 

biometric information without first obtaining consent for such disclosure. See 740 ILCS § 

14/15(d)(1). 

41. BIPA also prohibits selling, leasing, trading, or otherwise profiting from a person’s 

biometric identifiers or biometric information (740 ILCS § 14/15(c)) and requires companies to 

develop and comply with a written policy – made available to the public – establishing a retention 

schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric 

information when the initial purpose for collecting such identifiers or information has been 

satisfied or within three years of the individual’s last interaction with the company, whichever 

occurs first. 740 ILCS § 14/15(a). 

42. The Illinois legislature enacted BIPA due to the increasing use of biometric data in 

financial and security settings, the general public’s hesitation to use biometric information, and – 

most significantly – the unknown ramifications of biometric technology. Biometrics are 

biologically unique to the individual and, once compromised, an individual is at a heightened risk 

for identity theft and left without any recourse. 

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43. BIPA provides individuals with a private right of action, protecting their right to 

privacy regarding their biometrics as well as protecting their rights to know the precise nature for 

which their biometrics are used and how they are being stored and ultimately destroyed. Unlike 

other statutes that only create a right of action if there is a qualifying data breach, BIPA strictly 

regulates the manner in which entities may collect, store, use, and disseminate biometrics and 

creates a private right of action for lack of statutory compliance. 

44. Plaintiffs, like the Illinois legislature, recognize how imperative it is to keep 

biometric information secure. Biometric information, unlike other personal identifiers such as a 

social security number, cannot be changed or replaced if hacked or stolen. 

II. Defendants’ Unlawful Conduct 

45. ByteDance, Inc., the parent company of TikTok, Inc., first launched the TikTok 

app (then known as “Douyin”) in China in September 2016. The app ultimately became available 

in the United States in August 2018 following a merger between TikTok and Shanghai-based 

social media platform Musical.ly.14 While TikTok and Douyin are similar to each other and 

essentially the same app, they run on separate servers to comply with Chinese censorship 

restrictions. 

46. In 2019, Douyin introduced the “in-video” search function, which allows users to 

filter for individuals using facial recognition. This function “allows users to highlight and search 

14 In November of 2019, the New York Times reported that the United States government had 

opened a national security review of the 2017 acquisition of Musical.ly, the American predecessor 

of TikTok, by the Chinese company ByteDance based on concerns that data from TikTok was 

being shared with China. See Jack Nicas, Mike Isaac, and Ana Swanson, TikTok Said to Be Under 

National Security Review, The New York Times (November 1, 2019), available at

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/technology/tiktok-national-security-review.html (last 

accessed June 12, 2020). 

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the platform for the face of a person within a video.”15 While this function is not active in TikTok, 

Douyin users in China, or elsewhere, can perform in-video searches for Illinois citizens. 

47. In Illinois, and in direct violation of BIPA, the TikTok app’s proprietary facial 

recognition technology scans every video uploaded to the app for faces, extracts geometric data 

relating to the unique points and contours (i.e., biometric identifiers) of each face, and then uses 

that data to create and store a template of each face - all without ever informing anyone of these 

practices.

48. To accomplish this end, Defendants implemented the same artificial intelligence 

tool that is used in the Douyin app in order to automatically perform facial scans. This technology 

permits users to superimpose images onto their face or to use various “filters” that alter, distort, or 

enhance their facial features. 

49. This technology, known as Deepfake, extracts biometrics in order to “superimpose 

your face onto any video, or any picture, or anything” says Richard Jackson, Cybersecurity 

Division Chief at Fort Knox. 16

50. Similarly, the TikTok app also applies proprietary biometric recognition 

technology to scan every video uploaded to the app for voiceprints (i.e., biometric identifiers), 

extracting similar data points to create and store voiceprints of each user - all without ever 

informing anyone of these practices.

15 See Jessica Rapp, In-video search: A new opportunity for influencer marketing on Douyin?, 

PR Week (November 6, 2019), available at https://www.prweek.com/article/1664878/in-videosearch-new-opportunity-influencer-marketing-douyin (last accessed June 12, 2020). 

16 Eric Pilgic, Army Cybersecurity: Social media platforms offer children exciting, frightening 

environments, U.S. Army (January 22, 2020), available at

https://www.army.mil/article/231909/army_cybersecurity_social_media_platforms_offer_childre

n_exciting_frightening_environments (last accessed June 12, 2020). 

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51. As clearly stated in TikTok’s Privacy Policy, TikTok’s user data is subsequently 

transferred and shared with servers located outside the United States including backup servers 

located in Singapore.17 Further, prior to TikTok’s 2019 privacy changes, American user data was 

shared, stored, and processed in the “United States of America, Singapore, Japan or [] China.”18 

52. In addition, Defendants profit from the use of individuals’ biometric identifiers. 

Defendants extract users’ biometric identifiers in order to precisely categorize target audiences for 

advertisers, thus maintaining a competitive advantage over other social media advertising 

platforms. In effect, Defendants have surreptitiously created an immense commercial database, 

consisting of millions, if not billions, of users’ data - including Plaintiffs’ unique and personally 

identifiable biometric identifiers - that can be used for further commercial advantage and other 

harmful purposes.19

53. The TikTok app also allows users to sign into the apps through Facebook, Google, 

and Twitter – in turn allowing Defendants access to biometric identifiers stored in each 

individual’s social media accounts. 

17 See TikTok Privacy Policy as of January 1, 2020, available at

https://www.tiktok.com/legal/privacy-policy?lang=en (last accessed June 12, 2020). 

18 Helen Ehrlich, TikTok is Scamming People & Stealing Information, Affinity (November 4, 

2018), available at http://culture.affinitymagazine.us/tik-tok-is-scamming-people-stealinginformation/ (last accessed June 12, 2020). 

19 See Reindhart Krause, TikTok Raises Profile As Digital Ad Rival to Snap, Facebook, Google,

Investor’s Business Daily (May 18, 2020) (discussing TikTok’s rising popularity and stating that 

“big brands in digital advertising – such as restaurant chain Chipotle Mexican Grill (CMG), 

cosmetics firm Elf Beauty (ELF), Walmart (WMT) and Ralph Lauren (RL) — have 

experimented with ads on TikTok.”) available at 

https://www.investors.com/news/technology/tik-tok-video-app-digital-advertising/ (last accessed 

June 12, 2020). 

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54. By utilizing these biometric databases, TikTok maintains a competitive advantage 

over other social media apps and secures profits from its use of biometric data, all while failing to 

comply with the minimum requirements for handling users’ biometric data established by BIPA.20

55. In addition, former Musical.ly users who accessed the app prior to its consolidation 

with the current TikTok app have no idea to whom Musical.ly disclosed their biometric data or 

what third parties may have accessed their biometric data as a consequence of this consolidation. 

56. Having become ubiquitous among teenagers and children alike, TikTok puts 

millions of children’s biometric information at risk, without the consent or knowledge of their 

parents or lawful guardians. 

57. In collecting, capturing and otherwise obtaining the biometric identifiers and 

information of Plaintiffs and Class Members and, upon information and belief, subsequently 

disclosing, redisclosing and otherwise disseminating those biometric identifiers and information 

to other related corporate entities – all without providing the requisite notice, obtaining the 

requisite releases or satisfying any of BIPA’s other provisions that would excuse it from BIPA’s 

mandates – Defendants violated BIPA. 

58. In further violation of BIPA, as a private entity in possession of Plaintiffs’ and Class 

Members’ biometric identifiers and information, Defendants failed to adopt or make available to 

the public a retention schedule or guidelines for permanently destroying such biometric identifiers 

and information once the initial purpose for collecting them had or has been satisfied.

20 See Lauren Strapagiel, This Researcher’s Observation Shows the Uncomfortable Bias of 

TikTok’s Algorithm, Buzzfeed News (February 26, 2020), available at

https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/laurenstrapagiel/tiktok-algorithim-racial-bias (last 

accessed June 12, 2020). 

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59. Defendants’ violations of BIPA were intentional and reckless or, in the alternative, 

negligent.

III. Allegations Related to Plaintiffs 

60. Each Plaintiff, an Illinois minor, separately downloaded the TikTok app onto their 

mobile device(s). Initially, Plaintiffs were not required to disclose information about their age, nor 

were they required to enter a written release before receiving a TikTok account. 

61. Each Plaintiff uploaded and posted numerous videos to TikTok, which included 

images of their faces, and/or their faces have appeared in other users’ uploaded videos. Each 

Plaintiff has been subject to, either through their own videos or the videos of others in which they 

have appeared, TikTok’s face sticker, face filter, face tracker lens, and voiceprint filter 

technologies. 

62. Through these videos, Defendants have collected and stored Plaintiffs’ unique 

biometric identifiers or biometric information. Defendants have subsequently disclosed and/or 

disseminated these biometric identifiers or biometric information to third parties, including out of 

state servers which store the biometric information. 

63. Defendants shared Plaintiffs’ biometric identifiers without their or their legal 

guardians’ knowledge, or consent. 

64. Plaintiffs have continuously and repeatedly been exposed to the risks and harmful 

conditions created by Defendants’ multiple violations of BIPA alleged herein. 

65. No amount of time or money can compensate Plaintiffs if their biometric identifiers 

are compromised by the lax procedures through which Defendants captured, stored, used, and 

disseminated their and other similarly-situated individuals’ biometrics. Moreover, Plaintiffs would 

not have provided their biometric identifiers to Defendants, and their legal guardian would not 

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have consented to their use of TikTok, had they known that Defendants would retain such 

information for an indefinite period of time without consent. 

66. A showing of actual damages is not necessary in order to state a claim under BIPA. 

See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 40 (“[A]n individual need not allege 

some actual injury or adverse effect, beyond violation of his or her rights under the Act, in order 

to qualify as an “aggrieved” person and be entitled to seek liquidated damages and injunctive relief 

pursuant to the Act”). 

67. As Plaintiffs are not required to allege or prove actual damages in order to state a 

claim under BIPA, they seek statutory damages under BIPA as compensation for the injuries 

caused by Defendants. Rosenbach, 2019 IL 123186, ¶ 40. 

IV. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Subject to Arbitration 

68. Certain of TikTok’s Terms of Use purport to require users to submit to arbitration 

and to waive all rights to pursue legal proceedings against Defendants through the class action 

device. These terms are invalid and unenforceable against minors, including Plaintiffs and the 

Class. 

69. Under Illinois law, a minor is without legal capacity to enter into a contract and 

thus is legally incapable of contracting in the first place. Because Plaintiffs and Class members are 

all minors, Defendants cannot enforce any purported arbitration and/or class action waiver against 

Plaintiffs or the Class because no agreement was ever formed in the first place. 

70. Furthermore, while Defendants attempt to surreptitiously secure minor users’ 

“consent” to TikTok’s Terms of Use – which such users cannot legally provide -- Defendants do 

not make any attempt to secure the consent of parents or lawful-guardians. 

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71. Defendants have not obtained consent from the parents or lawful guardians of 

Class Members for their accounts. 

72. Defendants fail to make reasonable efforts to ensure that a parent or lawful guardian 

of Class Members receives direct notice of their practices regarding the collection, use, or 

disclosure of personal information. 

73. Defendants do not at any point contact the parents or lawful guardians of Class 

Members to give them notice and do not even ask for contact information for the parents or lawful 

guardians of Class Members. 

74. Thus, Defendants have no means of obtaining verifiable parental consent, or the 

consent of any lawful guardian, before any collection, use, or disclosure of the personal 

information of Class Members, nor do Defendants obtain verifiable parental consent to any alleged 

arbitration or class action waiver provisions. 

CLASS ALLEGATIONS 

75. Plaintiffs bring this action individually and as a class action under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 23, seeking damages and equitable relief on behalf of the following Class for 

which Plaintiffs seek certification: 

All Illinois residents under the age of 18 who had their facial geometry, 

voiceprint, or other biometric identifier collected, captured, received, or 

otherwise obtained, maintained, stored or disclosed by Defendants during the 

applicable statutory period. 

76. Excluded from the Class are: (a) Defendants; (b) any parent, affiliate or subsidiary 

of Defendants; (c) any entity in which Defendants have a controlling interest; (d) any of 

Defendants’ officers or directors; or (e) any successor or assign of Defendants. Also excluded are 

any judge or court personnel assigned to this case and members of their immediate families. 

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77. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend or modify the class definitions with greater 

specificity or division after having had an opportunity to conduct discovery. 

78. Numerosity. While the exact number of Class Members is not known at this time, 

Defendants collected, captured, obtained, disclosed, redisclosed and otherwise disseminated 

biometric identifiers and information from hundreds of millions of users, and Plaintiffs estimate 

the total number of Class Members to be, at least, in the tens of thousands. Consistent with Rule 

23(a)(1), the proposed Class is therefore so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 

Class Members may be identified through objective means, including objective data available to 

Defendants regarding their user data. Class Members may be notified of the pendency of this 

action by recognized, Court-approved notice dissemination methods, which may include U.S. 

mail, electronic mail, internet postings, social media and/or published notice 

79. Commonality and predominance. Common questions of law and fact exist as to 

all Class Members. These common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members of the proposed Class. Common questions include, but are not 

limited to, the following: 

a. Whether Defendants collected, captured and otherwise obtained the 

biometric identifiers and information of Plaintiffs and Class Members; 

b. Whether Defendants possessed the biometric identifiers and information of 

Plaintiffs and Class Members; 

c. Whether Defendants disclosed, redisclosed and otherwise disseminated the 

biometric identifiers and information of Plaintiffs and Class Members; 

d. Whether Defendants profited from the biometric identifiers and information 

of Plaintiffs and Class Members; 

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e. Whether Defendants provided the notice required by BIPA before 

collecting, capturing, obtaining, disclosing, redisclosing and otherwise 

disseminating the biometric identifiers and information of Plaintiffs and 

Class Members; 

f. Whether Defendants obtained enforceable written releases from Plaintiffs 

and Class Members or their authorized representatives before collecting, 

capturing, obtaining, disclosing, redisclosing and otherwise disseminating 

the biometric identifiers and information or Plaintiffs and Class Members; 

g. Whether Defendants had in place – and disclosed to the public – the written 

retention and destruction policies required by BIPA while in possession of 

Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ biometric identifiers and information; 

h. Whether Defendants protected Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ biometric 

identifiers and information from disclosure using the reasonable standard of 

care within Defendants’ industry and in a manner that was the same as or 

more protective than the manner in which Defendants protects other 

confidential and sensitive information; 

i. Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members suffered damages as a proximate 

result of Defendants; and 

j. Whether Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to damages, equitable 

relief and other relief. 

80. Typicality. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class because 

Plaintiffs and all members of the proposed Class have suffered similar injuries as a result of the 

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same practices alleged herein. Plaintiffs have no interests to advance adverse to the interests of the 

other members of the proposed Class. 

81. Adequacy. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the proposed 

Class and have retained as counsel attorneys experienced in class actions and complex litigation. 

82. Superiority. A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and 

efficient adjudication of this dispute. The injury suffered by each Class Member, while meaningful 

on an individual basis, may not be of such magnitude as to make the prosecution of individual 

actions against Defendants economically feasible. Even if Class Members could afford individual 

litigation, those actions would put immeasurable strain on the court system. Moreover, individual 

litigation of the legal and factual issues of the case would increase the delay and expense to all 

parties and the court system. A class action, however, presents far fewer management difficulties 

and provides the benefit of a single adjudication, economy of scale and comprehensive supervision 

by a single court. 

83. In the alternative, the proposed Class may be certified because: 

a. The prosecution of separate actions by each individual member of the 

proposed Class would create a risk of inconsistent adjudications, which 

could establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants; 

b. The prosecution of individual actions could result in adjudications that as a 

practical matter would be dispositive of the interests of non-party Class 

Members or which would substantially impair their ability to protect their 

interests; and 

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c. Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the 

proposed Class, thereby making final and injunctive relief appropriate with 

respect to members of the proposed Class. 

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 

Violation of 740 ILCS § 14/15(a): Failure to Institute, Maintain and Adhere to PubliclyAvailable Retention Schedule 

84. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 

85. BIPA mandates that companies in possession of biometric data establish and 

maintain a satisfactory biometric data retention – and, importantly, deletion – policy. Specifically, 

those companies must: (i) make publicly available a written policy establishing a retention 

schedule and guidelines for permanent deletion of biometric data (at most three years after the 

company’s last interaction with the individual); and (ii) actually adhere to that retention schedule 

and actually delete the biometric information. See 740 ILCS § 14/15(a). 

86. Defendants fail to comply with these BIPA mandates. 

87. Defendants qualify as “private entities” under BIPA. See 740 ILCS § 14/10. 

88. Plaintiffs and the Class are individuals who have had their “biometric identifiers” 

collected by Defendants (in the form of their facial geometry and/or voiceprints), as explained in 

detail in Sections II and III, supra. See 740 ILCS § 14/10. 

89. Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s biometric identifiers were used to identify them and, 

therefore, constitute “biometric information” as defined by BIPA. See 740 ILCS § 14/10. 

90. Defendants failed to publish a publicly available retention schedule or guidelines 

for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information as specified by BIPA. 

See 740 ILCS § 14/15(a). 

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91. Upon information and belief, Defendants lack retention schedules and guidelines 

for permanently destroying Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s biometric data and have not and will not 

destroy Plaintiffs’ or the Class’s biometric data when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining 

such data has been satisfied or within three years of the individual’s last interaction with the app. 

92. On behalf of themselves and the Class, Plaintiffs seek: (1) declaratory relief; (2) 

injunctive and equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiffs and the Class by 

requiring Defendants to comply with BIPA’s requirements for the collection, storage, and use of 

biometric identifiers and biometric information as described herein; (3) statutory damages of 

$5,000 for each intentional and/or reckless violation of BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS § 14/20(2) or, 

in the alternative, statutory damages of $1,000 for each negligent violation of BIPA pursuant to 

740 ILCS § 14/20(1); and (4) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and other litigation expenses 

pursuant to 740 ILCS § 14/20(3).

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 

Violation of 740 ILCS § 14/15(b): Failure to Obtain Informed Written Consent and Release 

Before Obtaining Biometric Identifiers or Information 

93. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 

94. BIPA requires companies to obtain informed written consent from individuals 

before acquiring their biometric data. Specifically, BIPA makes it unlawful for any private entity 

to “collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s 

biometric identifiers or biometric information unless [the entity] first: (1) informs the subject...in 

writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or stored; (2) informs 

the subject...in writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier 

or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and (3) receives a written release 

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executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric information...” 740 ILCS § 

14/15(b) (emphasis added). 

95. Defendants fail to comply with these BIPA mandates. 

96. Defendants are “private entities” under BIPA. See 740 ILCS § 14/10. 

97. Plaintiffs and the Class are individuals who have had their “biometric identifiers” 

collected by Defendants (in the form of their facial geometry and/or voiceprints), as explained in 

detail in Sections II and III, supra. See 740 ILCS § 14/10. 

98. Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s biometric identifiers were used to identify them and, 

therefore, constitute “biometric information” as defined by BIPA. See 740 ILCS § 14/10. 

99. Defendants systematically and automatically collected, used, stored and 

disseminated Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s biometric identifiers and/or biometric information without 

first obtaining the written release required by 740 ILCS § 14/15(b)(3). 

100. Defendants did not inform Plaintiffs and the Class in writing that their biometric 

identifiers and/or biometric information were being collected, stored, used and disseminated, nor 

did Defendants inform Plaintiffs and the Class in writing of the specific purpose(s) and length of 

term for which their biometric identifiers and/or biometric information were being collected, 

stored, used, and disseminated as required by 740 ILCS § 14/15(b)(1)-(2). 

101. By collecting, storing, and using Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s biometric identifiers 

and biometric information as described herein, Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s 

rights to privacy in their biometric identifiers or biometric information as set forth in BIPA. See 

740 ILCS § 14/1, et seq. 

102. On behalf of themselves and the Class, Plaintiffs seek: (1) declaratory relief; (2) 

injunctive and equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiffs and the Class by 

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requiring Defendants to comply with BIPA’s requirements for the collection, storage, and use of 

biometric identifiers and biometric information as described herein; (3) statutory damages of 

$5,000 for each intentional and/or reckless violation of BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS § 14/20(2) or, 

in the alternative, statutory damages of $1,000 for each negligent violation of BIPA pursuant to 

740 ILCS § 14/20(1); and (4) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and other litigation expenses 

pursuant to 740 ILCS § 14/20(3). 

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 

Violation of 740 ILCS § 14/15(d): Disclosure of Biometric Identifiers and 

Information Before Obtaining Consent 

103. Plaintiffs incorporate the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 

104. BIPA prohibits private entities from disclosing a person’s or customer’s biometric 

identifier or biometric information without first obtaining consent for that disclosure. See 740 

ILCS § 14/15(d)(1). 

105. Defendants fail to comply with this BIPA mandate. 

106. Defendants qualify as “private entities” under BIPA. See 740 ILCS § 14/10. 

107. Plaintiffs and the Class are individuals who have had their “biometric identifiers” 

collected by Defendants (in the form of their facial geometry and/or voiceprints), as explained in 

detail in Sections II and III, supra. See 740 ILCS § 14/10. 

108. Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s biometric identifiers were used to identify them and, 

therefore, constitute “biometric information” as defined by BIPA. See 740 ILCS § 14/10. 

109. Defendants systematically and automatically disclosed, redisclosed, or otherwise 

disseminated Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s biometric identifiers and/or biometric information without 

first obtaining the consent required by 740 ILCS § 14/15(d)(1). 

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110. By disclosing, redisclosing, or otherwise disseminating Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s 

biometric identifiers and biometric information as described herein, Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ 

and the Class’s rights to privacy in their biometric identifiers or biometric information as set forth 

in BIPA. See 740 ILCS § 14/1, et seq.

111. On behalf of themselves and the Class, Plaintiffs seek: (1) declaratory relief; (2) 

injunctive and equitable relief as is necessary to protect the interests of Plaintiffs and the Class by 

requiring Defendants to comply with BIPA’s requirements for the collection, storage, use and 

dissemination of biometric identifiers and biometric information as described herein; (3) statutory 

damages of $5,000 for each intentional and/or reckless violation of BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS § 

14/20(2) or, in the alternative, statutory damages of $1,000 for each negligent violation of BIPA 

pursuant to 740 ILCS § 14/20(1); and (4) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and other litigation 

expenses pursuant to 740 ILCS § 14/20(3). 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, Plaintiffs, E.R., a minor, by and through her Guardian L.H., K.M., a minor, by 

and through her Guardian C.M., D.M., a minor, by and through her Guardian D.H., L.B., a minor, 

by and through his or her Guardian Molly Janik, and H.S., a minor by and through her Guardian 

J.S., respectfully request that this Court enter an Order: 

A. Certifying this case as a class action on behalf of the Class defined above, 

appointing Plaintiffs as Class representatives and appointing undersigned counsel 

as Class Counsel; 

B. Declaring that Defendants’ actions, as set forth above, violate BIPA; 

C. Awarding statutory damages of $5,000 for each intentional and/or reckless 

violation of BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS § 14/20(2) or, in the alternative, statutory 

damages of $1,000 for each negligent violation of BIPA pursuant to 740 ILCS § 

14/20(1); 

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D. Declaring that Defendants’ actions, as set forth above, were intentional and/or 

reckless; 

E. Awarding injunctive and other equitable relief as is necessary to protect the 

interests of Plaintiffs and the Class, including an Order requiring Defendants to 

collect, store, use and disseminate biometric identifiers and/or biometric 

information in compliance with BIPA; 

F. Awarding Plaintiffs and the Class their reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs and 

other litigation expenses pursuant to 740 ILCS § 14/20(3); 

G. Awarding Plaintiffs and the Class pre- and post-judgment interest, to the extent 

allowable; and, 

H. Awarding such other and further relief as equity and justice may require. 

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

 Plaintiffs demand a jury trial on all claims so triable. 

Date: June 12, 2020 Respectfully Submitted, 

 /s/ Katrina Carroll

Katrina Carroll 

kcarroll@carlsonlynch.com 

Kyle A. Shamberg 

kshamberg@ carlsonlynch.com 

Nicholas R. Lange 

nlange@carlsonlynch.com 

111 W. Washington Street, Suite 1240 

Chicago, IL 60602 

Telephone: (312) 750-1265

Douglas A. Millen 

Brian M. Hogan 

FREED KANNER LONDON & 

 MILLEN LLC 

2201 Waukegan Road, Suite 130 

Bannockburn, Illinois 60015 

Tel.: (224) 632-4500 

Fax: (224) 632-4521 

dmillen@fklmlaw.com 

bhogan@fklmlaw.com 

 

Jonathan M. Jagher 

Kimberly A. Justice 

FREED KANNER LONDON & 

MILLEN LLC 

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923 Fayette St. 

Conshohocken, PA 19428 

Tel.: (610) 234-6487 

Fax: (224) 632-4521 

jjagher@fklmlaw.com 

kjustice@fklmlaw.com

Jennifer W. Sprengel 

Daniel O. Herrera 

Nickolas J. Hagman 

CAFFERTY CLOBES MERIWETHER 

& SPRENGEL LLP 

150 S. Wacker, Suite 3000 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

Telephone: 312-782-4880 

Facsimile: 318-782-4485 

jsprengel@caffertyclobes.com 

dherrera@caffertyclobes.com 

nhagman@caffertyclobes.com 

Joseph G. Sauder 

Joseph B. Kenney 

SAUDER SCHELKOPF LLC 

1109 Lancaster Avenue 

Berwyn, PA 19312 

Telephone: (610) 200-0580 

Fax: (610) 421-1326 

jgs@sstriallawyers.com 

jbk@sstriallawyers.com 

Richard R. Gordon 

Gordon Law Offices, Ltd. 

111 West Washington Street 

Suite 1240 

Chicago, Illinois 60602 

Tel: (312) 332-5200 

Fax: (312) 242-4966 

rrg@gordonlawchicago.com

James B. Zouras 

Ryan F. Stephan 

Andrew C. Ficzko 

Megan E. Shannon 

STEPHAN ZOURAS, LLP 

100 N. Riverside Plaza, 

Suite 2150 

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Chicago, Illinois 60606 

312.233.1550 

312.233.1560 f

rstephan@stephanzouras.com 

jzouras@stephanzouras.com 

aficzko@stephanzouras.com 

mshannon@stephanzouras.com 

Erik H. Langeland (pro hac vice 

forthcoming) 

733 Third Avenue, 15th Floor 

New York, N.Y. 10017 

(212) 354-6270 

elangeland@langelandlaw.com 

Jon A. Tostrud (pro hac vice forthcoming) 

TOSTRUD LAW GROUP, P.C. 

1925 Century Park East, Suite 2100 

Los Angeles, CA 90067 

(310) 278-2600 

jtostrud@tostrudlaw.com 

Counsel for Plaintiffs and the Putative 

Class 

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