Filed 3/19/14 P. v. Leonardo CA2/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
RAMON LEONARDO,
Defendant and Appellant. B247926
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA387357)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County. Drew E. Edwards, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Andy Miri and Andy Miri, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorn ey General, Victoria B. Wilson and Brendan Sullivan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________ __________2 A jury convicted appellant Ramon Leonardo of four felonies: Sodomy of a child under 10 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)); 1 oral copulation and sexual penetration of a child under 10 years of age (§ 288.7, subd. (b)); and two counts of performing lewd acts upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a)). Appella nt was sentenced to a total state prison term of 48 years to life. Appellant contends the trial court co mmitted error by failing to (1) suppress statements he made to police, and (2) appoin t him a Nahuatl interpreter at trial. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND Appellant’s victim was his seven-year-old stepdaughter, A. L. (A.). Because he does not challenge the evidence supporting his convictions and because the details of his crimes are thoroughly set forth by the parties, we disc uss only the relevant procedural background at issue here.
The Interview After he was taken into custody, appella nt was interviewed by Detective Frank Ramirez of the Los Angeles Police Depart ment. The interview was conducted in Spanish. The jury rece ived a transcript of the intervie w and a video of the interview was played for the jury. Appellant’s handcuffs we re removed before a ny questioning began. Detective Ramirez testified that he spent nearly the first hour—“a great deal of time”— asking appellant general backgr ound questions to ensure that appellant could understand him. He asked appellant such questions as his age (25), where he was from (Mexico), when he came here (19), where he worked (carwash), who he liv ed with (wife and stepdaughters), and if he had been in jail before (once). After concluding ge neral questioning, Detective Ramirez read appellant each of
his Miranda 2 rights in Spanish. After reading each right, Detective Ramirez asked

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 ( Miranda )

.3 appellant if he understood. Appellant respon ded “Si” each time. Appellant agreed to continue talking with Detective Ramirez. Detective Ramirez then asked appellant to sign a Miranda waiver form that was written in Spanish. Detective Ramirez first asked appellant if he read Spanish and if he knew how to sign. Appellant responded, “Yea h.” Detective Ramirez explained the form, which lists each of appellant’s rights and as ks if he understands each one. Appellant initialed his rights and marked that he understo od each one. Appellant marked “Si” to the question asking if he wanted to conti nue talking, and he signed the form. Detective Ramirez then began the interr ogation. Appellant eventually admitted sexually assaulting A. on two occasions. Alth ough he initially stated that he was just playing with her, he later adm itted performing specific sexual acts. He stopped touching
A. because he realized what he was doing was wrong. Motion to Suppress, Hearing, and Ruling Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppr ess the statements he made to Detective Ramirez, on the ground that appellant di d not voluntarily , knowingly and intelligently
waive his Miranda rights. At the hearing, defense counsel argued that appellant did not understand the questions as ked because of his low education level and limited understanding of the Spanish language. Accord ing to defense counsel, appellant’s native language was the Aztec dialogue of Nahuatl. Defense counsel also argued that appellant was confused, as demonstrated by the fa ct that he said “so many ums, . . .”
The trial court denied the motion. Th e court noted that it had the benefit of reading the interview transcript and that appe llant “was able to carry out a conversation quite well in the entirety of the interview in Spanish.” The court found that the Miranda waivers were valid because they were volunta ry and there was no si gn of any coercion.
DISCUSSION I. The Trial Court Properly Denied the Motion to Suppress
A. Applicable Law Statements obtained during custodial interr ogation are only admissible in evidence if police informed the suspect of his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney4 present during questioning and obtained fro m the suspect a voluntary, knowing and intelligent wavier of those rights. ( Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 475.) A valid waiver may be express or implied. ( People v. Whitson (1998) 17 Cal.4th 229, 246.) In determining whether a defendant waived his Miranda rights, a court must consider “the totality of the circumst ances surrounding the interrogation.” ( Fare v.
Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707 , 724–725.) In Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, the Supreme Court identified two distinct co mponents of the inquiry: “‘First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product
of a free and deliberate choice rather than in timidation, coercion, or deception. Second,
the waiver must have been ma de with a full awareness of bo th the nature of the right being abandoned and the conseque nces of the decision to abandon it. Only if the ‘totality
of the circumstances surroundi ng the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension ma y a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.’” ( Id. at p. 421.) On appeal, we accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluation of cr edibility, if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Whitson, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 248.)
B. Analysis Appellant argues that his Miranda waivers were not voluntarily made because
Detective Ramirez used a “ruse” to obtain hi s confession, by falsely stating that the hospital had physical evidence linking him to the crimes. Appellant also argues that his waivers were not knowingly and intelligently made because he has only a sixth-grade education, a limited understanding of th e Spanish language, worked in “menial employment” at a carwash, is from “Aztec peasant stock,” and was “obviously highly upset being faced with the charge that he had molested his seven year old step daughter.” According to appellant, these facts made his admissions “suspect” and “tend to demonstrate that [he] did not understand what he was doi ng when he spoke to the detective[] without counsel.” Appellant ’s arguments are wh olly unpersuasive. As to the voluntariness of appellant’s waiv ers, “‘A statement is involuntary if it is not the product of ‘“a rational intellect a nd free will.”’ [Citation.] The test for5 determining whether a confession is volun tary is whether the defendant’s “will was overborne at the time he confessed.” [Citation.]’” ( People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 346–347.) There is no eviden ce in the record that Detective Ramirez resorted to physical or psychological pre ssure to elicit a waiver of appellant’s Miranda rights. Appellant’s handcuffs were removed at the outset of his interview. Before appellant was read his Miranda rights, Detective Ramirez only asked general questions about appellant’s job, family and where he was from. Detective Ramirez did not ask questions or engage in conduct that would elicit an incriminating response from appellant
before he was read his Miranda rights. Only after appellant was read his Miranda rights and signed the waiver form , did Detective Ramirez use a “ruse.” But even so,
“Numerous California decisions confirm that deception does not necessarily invalidate a confession.” ( People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 167.) Nothing here supports the finding that appellant’s w ill was so overborne that his confession was not voluntarily
made. As to whether appellant made knowing a nd intelligent waivers, the record shows that appellant expressly waived his Miranda rights. Detective Ramirez read to appellant
each of his Miranda rights and asked, after each one was read, whether appellant understood them. Appellant res ponded in the affirmative, and agreed to continue talking with Detective Ramirez. Before interroga ting appellant, Detective Ramirez went over appellant’s Miranda rights once more by having appella nt read and sign a waiver form written in Spanish. Appellant initialed all of the questions, marked that he understood each right, and signed the form. At no time did appellant ma ke any statements that he was confused as to what the waivers meant, or indicate an interest in invoking any of the listed rights. Appellant’s claim that he has a limited unde rstanding of the Spanish language is not supported by the record. As the trial c ourt noted, appellant “was able to carry out a conversation quite well [during] the entirety of the interview in Spanish.” Detective Ramirez also asked appellant if he read Sp anish and knew how to si gn before having him complete the waiver form, and appellant responded, “Yeah.”6 Similarly, appellant’s claim that he did not make an intelligent and knowing
waiver of his Miranda rights because he has a limited education and worked at a car wash in menial employment does not assist him. As the People note, even if appellant possessed relatively low intelligence, he was su fficiently intelligent to attempt to deceive Detective Ramirez by initially claiming that he was just playing with A. There is no evidence that appellant lacked suffici ent intelligence to understand his Miranda rights or the consequences of his waivers. Accordingly, the trial court did not e rror in denying appellant’s motion to

suppress. II. The Trial Court Properly Denied Appe llant’s Request for A Nahuatl Interpreter At the start of trial, appellant requested that a Nahuatl interpre ter be appointed. The trial court denied the request, and appe llant was assisted at trial by a Spanish interpreter. Appellant contends the trial court erred in denyi ng his request. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law Interpreters perform three interrelated but distinct roles in a criminal proceeding: (1) as a “witness interpreter” to enable que stioning of non-English speaking witnesses; (2) as a “proceedings interp reter” to enable a non-En glish speaking defendant to understand exchanges at trial am ong the witnesses, the attorney s, and the court; and (3) as a “defense interpreter” to en able a non-English speaking de fendant to communicate with his or her English-speaking attorney. ( People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 410.) “The right to an interprete r has its underpinnings in a number of state and federal constitutional rights. These include a defendant’s rights to due process, to confrontation, to effective assistance of counsel, and to be present at trial.” ( People v. Romero, supra
, 44 Cal.4th at p. 410.) The California Constitution provides that a crim inal defendant who does not understand English “has a right to an interpreter through out the proceedings.” (Cal. Const., art I, § 14.)
B. Analysis Appellant’s claim that he was not suffici ently competent in th e Spanish language such that he should have been appointed a Nahuatl interpreter is not supported by the7 record. In denying appellant’s request, the trial court noted that since 2011, appellant had made at least 15 court appearances, includi ng the preliminary hearing, and had used a Spanish language interpreter at every appearan ce. At one point, appellant entered into a plea agreement and used the services of the Spanish interprete r to do so—directly answering all questions posed to him by the trial court. The trial court noted that appellant had “never indicate d at any time until this moment that he needed any other interpreter.” The trial court also noted that it had read th e transcript of appellant’s
interview with Detective Rami rez and found that appellant addressed all the questions directly and did not indicate that he could not unde rstand Spanish. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of appellant’s request for a Nahuatl interpreter.
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

___________________ __________, Acting P. J. ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

___________________ ___________, J. CHAVEZ

___________________ ___________, J. * FERNS

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.