NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 22a0400n.06
No. 21

- 2826
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. DEONNE DOTSON , Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
OPINION

Before : SUTTON , Chief Judge; DONALD and MURPHY , Circuit Judges. MURPHY, Circuit Judge. While serving as a Detroit police officer, Deonne Dotson repeatedly took bribes from the owner of a local auto body shop . In exchange, Dotson pressur ed Detroiters with damaged cars to use th is body shop and fil ed false police reports facilitating the shop owner ’s insurance fraud. A jury convicted Dotson of six counts of Hobbs Act extortion

. Dotson challenges his conviction s on three grounds. He first argues that the district court wrongly refused to question potential jurors about their racial biases during jury selection. Yet the
court acted within its discretion by finding that Dotson’s case did not raise a reasonable possibility
that such biases c ould affect the verdict. Dotson next argues that the government wrongly relied

on evidence of his gamblin g . Yet the overwhelming evidence of his guilt apart from his gambling allows us to avoid this evidentiary issue

. Dotson lastly contends that the district court’s jury instructions and the government’s evidence confused extortion for bribery

. Yet , for better or

worse, the Supreme Court has long equated th e two under the Hobbs Act

. We thus affirm.No. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

2 I Norman Dehko inherited a Detroit auto body shop, Somerset Collision, from his father.
Somerset repaired vehicles damage d by crashes, thefts, vandalism, and the like. Insurance companies typically paid for th e repairs. In 2007, Dehko hatched a scheme to defraud the se insurers by listing nonexistent repairs on the body shop’s bills

. The police caught up with Dehko
f ive years later, at which time he pleaded guilty to insurance fraud and received a sentence of seven month s in jail and five years of probation

. While on probation, Dehko continued in his old insurance

- fraud ways. The police learned of his new round of misconduct

. In February 2014, t he y obtained a search warrant to perform what Dehko later called a “raid” of Somerset

. This time, Deh k o cooperate d

. H e identified several officers in the Detroit Police Department ’s “abandoned vehicle task force” who were involved in his crimes

. When officers in this task force c a me across a towable vehicle, department policy require d them to arrange for the tow through a central dispatch

. Yet rogue officers would quickly call Dehko and let him know that they ha d a vehicle for him. They would arrange for a tow directly to Somerset and attempt to convince the vehicle ’s owner to use this body shop

. The officers might also file false police report s listing fake damage on the vehicle to facilitate the insurance fraud. Dehko paid officer s about $1,0 00 for each referral and an extra $500 for a false police report

. According to Dehko, then

- Officer Dotson began participating in this scheme around 2010 or 2011. Having joined the department in 2001, Dotson eventually bec a me a member of the abandoned vehicle task force. Dehko alleged that Dotson had been making three to five referrals per month just before the search of Somers et

.No. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

3

A few months af

ter th is search , Dehko b e c a me a confidential FBI source. He agreed to continue accept ing referrals from the six to eight suspected task

- force officers. Now, however, t he
FBI would provide the funds for his bribes

. The FBI also asked Dehko to secretly record his conversations with the se officers

. Dehko’s efforts implicate d Dotson in the continued bribe ry scheme , a fact illustrated by their thirty

- three recorded conversations

. Dotson referred six vehicles to Dehko between May and September 2014, and Dehko paid him six times out of FBI

- supplied funds

. (Dotson denied taking
any money, but we must recount the facts in the light most favorable to the government at this stage

. See United States v. Maya , 966 F.3d 493, 496 (6th Cir. 2020).) Payment 1 : On May 19, a thief stole Carol Davenport’s Lincoln MKZ

. She found her car (without tires) a few blocks away . Davenport had it towed to Somerset. Deh k o called Dotson to get him to complete a police report so that Somerset could collect the insurance

. It turned out, however, that Davenport’s brother owned the car

. T he registered owner had to si gn the affidavit required for th e police report. Dotson falsely state d in the report that Davenport’s brother had reported the th eft and signed the affidavit

. Dehko paid Dotson $500 for this false report. Payment 2 : In the early hours of June 3 , a thief stole Thonekhanh Amnath’s Chrysler 300
outside a casino

. The next day , Dotson alerted Amnath that the police had found her car without tires or a radio and with broken windows. Dotson suggested that she take her car to Somerset. He then mentioned the Chrysler to Dehko and provided him with Amnath’s phone number

. Deh k o then called Amnath to convince her to use his shop

. When Amnath got her car back, she realized that the thief had not really taken the radio because the “new” radio had her old stations still programmed in to it

. Dehko paid Dotson $1,300 for this referral

.No. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

4

Payment 3 : On the morning of July 6, Dennal Bond s discovered that a thief had taken his Chrysler 300 f

rom his mother’s driveway. A couple days later, an acquaintance spotted this ( now largely dismantled) Chrysler in a vacant house’s backyard. Bonds called the polic e and headed to th e house

. When Dotson arrived , he told Bonds “I got a shop you can send it to

. ” Bonds Tr., R.154, PageID 2314. Dotson also called Dehko to let him know that “I might have one, I’m about to make it right now.” Dotson Tr., R.157, PageID 285 3

. Bonds had the car taken to Somerset, but the insurance company ultimately paid him for the car’s value because it was a total loss

. Dehko still gave Dotson $1,250 for the referral. Payment 4 : Later in July, Dotson convinced Dehko to front him $1,000 for a future referral
because he needed vacation money . That referral came on August 12

. After a rainy night, Calvin Ellis awok e to find his brand

- new Ford Escape gone . The police found his car’s “shell ” that day. Ellis Tr., R.154, PageID 2366. Just before knocking on Ellis’s door, Dotson let Dehko know that he might have a vehicle for the shop

. According to Ellis, Dotson then told him that the police were taking the car to Somerset. Id. , PageID 2367. Ellis originally agre ed to have Somerset fix his car but later had it towed to his dealer for the repairs

. Payment 5 : When Maxine Langford and her longtime companion Vernard Wardlaw woke up on August 25, they found that someone had taken the ir new Chrysler 30 0

. Langford’s son saw the ir stripped car in a vacant field near their home. When they arrived there, Dotson had already beat en them to the scene. Although Wardlaw wanted the dealer to repair the Chrysler, Dotson said that the car would be shipped to Somerse t

. Dotson falsified the police records for this theft by stating that Langford had completed an affidavit . Dehko thus paid Dotson $1,600 for this referral

. Payment 6 : On September 3, Dotson told Dehko that he would speak shortly with LaTanya Williams about her recovered Ford Fusion , which might be a referral candidate

. Dotson put herNo. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

5

in contact with Dehko , who convinced her to tow her car to Somerset. Although Williams had her car repaired elsewhere , Dehko still paid Dotson $1,000. A grand jury indicted Dotson on six counts of Hobbs Act extortion for these payments and

on one count of Hobbs Act conspiracy for a similar scheme with another body

- shop owner

— a ll in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). T he jury issued a split verdict. It found Dotson guilty of each of the six acts of extortion with Dehko but acquitted him of the separate conspiracy with the other body

- shop owner . The court sentenced Dotson to a total of 80 months’ imprisonment.
II Dotson raises three issues on appeal

. He challenges the district court’s refusal to ask questions about racial bias during jury selection. He challenges the admission of evidence about his gambling. And he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the jury instructions

. A. Jury Selec tion
Dotson criticizes the way in which the district court select ed his jury. The court question ed the jur y pool itself but allowed the parties to propose questions . Dotson , an African American, requested that the court ask potential jurors whether the y believe that “white supremacy still continues in this country [

. ] ” Req. Voir Dire , R.66, PageID 329. Dotson further requested that the
court ask white members of the jury pool , among other questions, whether they believe that “our history and society including the justice system ” have cause d the racial disparities in the prison population and whether they ha ve “ever used the ‘N’ word” or heard “ a fellow

- White person” use
t he word without objecting

. Id. The c ourt refused to ask these questions, which it described as “inappropriate, immaterial and inflammatory [.] ” Tr., R.150, PageID 168 6

– 8 7

. It reasoned that Dotson’s questions would “risk” “sensationalizing” a trial that otherwise “has absolutely nothingNo. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

6

to d o with racial characteristics or animosities [

. ] ” Id. , PageID 168 7

. According to Dotson, the
court wrongly refus ed to ask potential jurors questions about racial prejudice. To show why Dotson is mistaken, we begin with the legal ground rules

. When viewed from o u r perspective o n the appellate bench , Dotson’s jury

- selection claim implicates two principles that tug in different directions

. The first principle has both constitutional and prudent ial
roots: All c ourts should strive to ensure that defendants receive a fair trial in front of jurors who do not harbor improper biases

. See Mu’Min v. Virginia , 500 U.S. 415, 422

– 24 (1991). As a constitutional matter, t he Sixth Amendment (incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment against the state s ) gives defendants the right to an impartial jury. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. T his right requires federal and state court s to ask potential jurors about racial prejudice
if a case ’s “extraordinary racial tension” creates a risk that a juror’s biases could affect the verdict

. Daniels v. Burke , 83 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir. 1996) ; see Rosales

- Lopez v. United States , 451 U.S. 182, 1 89

– 90 (1981) (plurality opinion). Yet s uch a constitutionally excessive risk does not automatically arise when a defendant of one race has harm ed a victim of another. See Ristaino

v. Ross , 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8, 597

– 98 (1976). A defendant instead must point to something more
concrete about the fact s of the case . For example, t h e Constitution required a court to ask potential jurors about racial prejudice when the defendant

— a n African American civil

- rights advocate

— alleged that the police had framed him because of his civil

- rights activi ties

. See H am v. South Carolina , 409 U.S. 524, 525

– 27 (1973). It also required a court to ask jurors about racial prejudice in the unique death

- penalty context when an African American defendant faced a potential death
sentence for murdering a white storekeeper

. Tu rner v. Murray , 476 U.S. 28, 36

– 37 (1986). As a prudential matter, the Supreme Court more thoroughly regulate s jury selection in the federal court s using its “supervisory power” over the federal judiciary. See Mu’Min , 500 U.S. atNo. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

7

422 ; cf. United States v. Tsarnaev , 142 S. Ct. 1024, 1035

– 36 (2022)

. Exercising this power, the
Court has told district courts that, as the “wiser course,” they generally should ask potential jurors about racial bias when a defendant requests the inquiry

. Ristaino , 424 U.S

. at 597 n.9; s ee Rosales

Lopez , 451 U.S. at 191

– 92 (plurality opinion)

. Yet a court need not always ask such question s . Rather, we may reverse a district court for refusing to do so only if a “reasonable possibility” exists
that racial bias could have affect ed the verdict. Rosales

- Lopez , 451 U.S. at 191 (plurality opinion).
If the government accuses a defendant of one race of engaging in a “violent crime” against a victim
of another race , this possibility presumptively exists

. Id. at 192 ; see Aldridge v. United States , 283 U.S. 308, 313

– 14 (1931). If , by contrast, the government accuses the defendant of a nonviolent crime, district co urt s ha ve discretion to decide on a “case

- by

- case” basis whether the possibility exists. Rosales

- Lopez , 451 U.S. at 192 (plurality opinion) ; United States v. Tocco , 200 F.3d 401,
411

– 13 (6th Cir. 2000); cf. United States v. Borders , 270 F.3d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Barber , 80 F.3d 964, 96 7

– 70 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Brown , 938 F.2d 1482,
148 5

– 86 (1st Cir. 1991). This fact leads us the second principle that we must respect: District courts on the front lines of jury trials

— not circuit courts view ing things after the fact

—have the primary duty t o

ensur e an impartial jur y . See Rosales

- Lopez , 451 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion). Like the jury evaluating witnesses during the trial itself, the trial court a t the jury

- selection stage must watch , and assess the honesty of , potential jurors while they respond to live question ing in real time

. See id. Given the nature of th is task , t he Supreme Court has long provided t rial courts with broad discretion over how to manage it

. Tsarnaev , 142 S. Ct. at 1034 ; Ristaino , 424 U.S. at 594. As in Dotson’s case, district courts commonly exercise th is discretion by examining prospective jurors themselves rather than ask ing the parties’ counsel to do so

. See Fed. R. Crim.No. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

8

P. 24(a)(1); 2 Charles A. Wright & Peter J. Henning , Federal Practice and Procedure § 380, at 564 (4th ed. 2009 ). A co urt that handles the jury selection must give the parties the chance to submit additional questions, but the court need only ask th e proposed questions that it “considers ”

“ proper.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(a)(2)(B). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure , in other words, make clear that the district court’s general discreti on over jury selection includes the specific discretion to pick the questions to ask a pool of potential jurors. See Tsarnaev , 142 S. Ct. at 1036. This allocation of authority matters on appeal. We may reverse a district court for failing to ask a part icular question only if the court’s failure amounts to an abuse of discretion. See id. at 1034. Th at deferential standard means that cases will arise in which we cannot say that the district
court committed reversible error even though we might have aske d the defendant’s proposed questions if we had conducted the jury selection ourselves

. See, e.g. , Tocco , 200 F.3d at 412

– 13. Against this legal backdrop , Dotson has established neither error under the Constitution nor error under the Supreme Court’s supervisory

- power instructions

. To begin with, Dotson has not shown that this case involved any racial tension s , let alone the type of “extraordinary” tension s necessary for the Constitution to require a trial court to ask potential jurors about racial prejudices. Daniels , 83 F.3d at 766 ; cf. Ristaino , 424 U.S. at 597

– 98. Nor did the Court’s supervisory

- power directions automatically require these questions

. This case involved public

- corruption crimes, not “violent” ones. Rosales

- Lopez , 451 U. S. at 192 (plurality opinion). These conclusions leave Dotson with the argument that , under all of the circumstances, a “reasonable possibility” existed that racial prejudice might have affect ed his verdict. Cf. i d. at 193. For three reasons, though, the district court’s contrary finding did no t abuse its discre tion

. First , Dotson identifies no non - speculative reason why a juror might have viewed his public

- corruption case through a “racial ” lens

. United States v. Walker , 491 F.2d 236, 239 (9thNo. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

9

Cir. 1974). T o suggest that possibility, Dotson point s to the fact that he is African American, whereas Dehko and the other body

- shop owner alleged to have conspired with Dotson are not. Yet these body

- shop owners were not traditional “victims , ” so this case does not involve the type of
interracial crimes that might heighten racial tensions

. Cf. Rosales

- Lopez , 451 U.S. at 192 (pluralit y opinion); Ristaino , 424 U.S. at 597

– 98. Rather, Dehko and the other owner s were alleged to be knowing accomplices

. Cf. Ocasio v. United States , 578 U.S. 282, 287

– 92 (2016). If anything, Dotson’s victims were the vehicle owners whom he steered to Somer set. The y provided plenty of incriminating evidence against him. Notably, however, Dotson does not identify their races, let alone claim that the ir races might have influenced the jury. In these circumstances, any “racial or ethnic differences” between Dotson and the body

- shop owners , the “key Government witness [es] ,” do not establish a reasonable possibility of an improperly biased verdict

. Rosales

- Lopez , 451 U.S. at 193

– 94 (plurality opinion). Indeed, the “jury saw fit” to acquit Dot s on on the conspi racy charge involving the other body

- shop owner

. Brown , 938 F.2d at 1485. Second , when a defendant cannot point to a case

- specific reason why a district court needs to ask about racial bias, appellate courts have held that a district court does not abuse its discretion by making “general inquiries” about improper bias during jury select ion

. Border s , 270 F.3d at 1184; see United States v. Diaz , 854 F. App’x 386, 387

– 90 (2d Cir. 2021) (order); Brown , 938 F.2d at 1485

– 86. T he district court undertook such an inquiry here

. I t warned the jury pool at the outset that courts expect jurors to be free from “improper bias” and “improper prejudice[.]” Tr., R.151, PageID 172 0

– 2 1. It later asked potential jurors whether any of them had “any other reason” why they “may not be able to be a fair and impartial juror [.] ” Id. , PageID 1809. Third , the “form” of Dotson’s proposed questions makes th e district court’s rejection of
them understandable

. Turner , 476 U.S. at 37. Dotson did not want the court to conduct a discreteNo. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

10

inquir y into racial prejudice

. H e wanted the court to ask about the prevalence of “white supremacy” in the country, how structural racism affects the justice system , and the use of racial slurs. Req. Voir Dire , R.66, PageID 329. The court could reasonably conclude that these questions would risk “sensationalizing” th e trial, Tr., R.150, PageID 168 7 , and counterproductively “heighten” ( rather than minimize) the “role” of rac e in the “decisionmaking process,” Barber , 80 F.3d at 967

– 68 ; see also Rosales

- Lopez , 451 U.S. at 190 (plurality opinion)

. Dotson counters that the persistence of racism in America necessitated question ing the potential jurors on racial bias

. T he Supreme Court has rejected that view. It has long admonished courts that they must begin with “no constitutional presumption of juror bias for or against members of any particular racial or ethnic groups.” Tocco , 200 F.3d at 413 (quoting Rosales

Lopez , 451 U.S. at 190 (plurality opinion) ). So g eneral concerns about bias do not provide grounds for an appellate court to second

- guess a trial court in its evaluation of the case - specific risks of bias

. Cf. United States v. Escobar

- de Jesus , 187 F.3d 148, 165

– 66 (1st Cir. 1999)

. B . Gambling Evidence
Dotson next challenges the admission of evidence about his gambling. Before trial, the district court denied his motion to exclude this evidence, reasoning that his gambling habit was relevant (because it show ed his motive for taking money from Dehko ) and not unduly prejudic ial ( because “[g]ambling is a legal and common pastime” ). Order, R.68, PageID 341

– 42. At trial, a Greektown Casino employee testified about Dotson’s gambling by introducing the casino ’s records of his “player’s card” us age . This evidence suggested that Dotson visited the casino shortly after each of the six time s that he took money from Dehko in 2014

. It also indicated that he visited the casino 163 times in 2014 even though other evidence showed that he made less than $5 0 ,000 that year as a police officer

. Dotson now argues that his gamblin g history was irrelevant underNo. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

11

Federal Rule of Evidence 401, that it was unduly prejudicial under Rule 403, and that it qualified

as inadmissible “ prior acts” evidence under Rule 404(b). Ultimately, we need not resolve these evidentiary issues

. Even assuming that the federal

ru les did not permit this evidence, t he district court would have committed only a harmless error by admitting it . A district court’s mistaken evidentiary ruling does not warrant a new trial when the error did not affect a defendant’s “substantial rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). For the government t o show the harmless nature of a non

- constitutional error, we have sometimes stated that t he government must prove that it is more likely than not tha t the error did not change the verdict. See United States v. Kettles , 970 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2020). Other times, we have stated that the government must create a “fair assurance” that the error would not have “substantially sway ed ” the jury. Id. (c itation omitted); see Kotteakos v. United States , 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) ; United States v. Christian , 925 F.3d 305, 314 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc). Th e two standards may (or may not) convey the same basic idea. See Kettles , 970 F.3d at 644

– 45, 644 n.4. Yet we need not consider whether daylight exists between them. M easured under either standard , Dotson’s gambling habits would not have mattered to the outcome. Cf. id. a t 645. Most obviously , as in many other cases in whic h we have f ou nd an error harmless, the government presented “ overwhelming ” evidence that Dotson took money from Dehko on the six occasions underlying his six convictions

. See, e.g. , id. ; United States v. Dimora , 750 F.3d 619,
628

– 29 (6th Cir. 2014); cf. U nited States v. Addario , 662 F. App’x 61, 63

– 64 (2d Cir. 2016) (order) (finding gambling evidence harmless); United States v. Swan , 250 F.3d 495, 501 (7th Cir. 2001) ( same ). Dehko, a confidential FBI informant, described in detail each of his six payments to Dotson and the reasons for the payments

. Substantial “corroborative evidence” reinforced Dehko’s directly incriminating testimony

. Kettles , 970 F.3d at 645. As the prosecution noted inNo. 21

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12

closing, “Dotson essentially convict[ed] himself” in the thirty

- three recorded conversations with Dehko. Tr., R.157, PageID 2932. The FBI agent in charge of the investigation likewise explained the meticulous manner in which he recorded the transfer of funds to Dehko for his use in brib ing
Dotson. But that is not all. M ost of the vehicle owners testified about the way s in which Dotson kept his end of the deal by pressuring them to use Somerset Collision or by falsifying police reports . As Carol Davenport explained with respect to the first payment, she cal led the police about her stolen Lincoln, but Dotson falsely stated on the police report that her brother (the registered owner) had done so. H er brother confirmed that he had never spoke n to Dotson about the car despite what the police report said

. Or as Calvin Ellis explained with respect to the fourth payment, Dotson gave him no choice but to tow his Ford to Somerset: “the officer told me that that’s where they were going to take it and that’s

. . . where it went.” Ellis Tr., R.154, PageID
236 7

. The gambling evidence, by comparison, played a minor supporting role when viewed in the context o f “all else that happened” at trial. Kotteakos , 328 U.S. at 76 4 . Th e presentation of the gambling evidence takes up only 40 of the roughly 800 pages of trans cript for the government’s

case - in

- chief, and the prosecution spent about one page of a 35

- page closing argument on this evidence

. And it was unlikely that the mere mention of th e evidence would automatically turn jur ors against Dotson for emotional reaso ns. Unlike, say, the government’s use of a defendant’s
racist and sexist co m ments that are “ antithetical to the sensibilities of decent people, ” United States v. Hazelwood , 979 F.3d 398, 415 (6th Cir. 2020), the government relied on evidence showing only that Dotson was engaged in lawful , common entertainment

. For this reason , courts often hold that gambling evidence would not unduly prejudice a party (and thus that its introduction wouldNo. 21

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13

not even qualify as erro r when it is otherwise relevant )

. See, e.g. , United States v. Blanchard , 618 F.3d 562, 570 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Jackson

- Randolph , 282 F.3d 369, 379

– 80 (6th Cir. 2002) ; United States v. Shrum , 655 F.3d 782, 786 (8th Cir. 2011). Lastly, t h e jury’s acquittal of Dotson on the conspiracy charge reinforces that it carefully picked through the evidence and did not get swept up in improper passion s due to his gambling. Cf. United States v. Phillips , 872
F

. 3d 803, 81 0

– 1 1 (6th Cir. 2017).

C. Jury Instructions and Sufficiency of the Evidence For three decades, t he Supreme Court has held that Hobbs Act extortion includes bribery

. See Evans v. United States , 504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992)

. Dotson argues that a recent decision , McDonnell v. United Sta tes , 579 U.S. 550 (2016) , overruled this view. He argues both that the jury instructions in his case conflicted with McDonnell and that the evidence did not satisfy it s revised standards

. Dotson’s claims fail because he overreads that decision.
1
Becau se Dotson’s jury

- instruction and evidence

- sufficiency claims turn on the meaning of the Hobbs Act, we start with its elements

. The Hobbs Act imposes punishment on anyone who

“ obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion [.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The Act goes on to define “ extortion ”
to mean “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” Id. § 1951(b) (2)

. Here, Dotson did not acquire money from Dehko by the use of force, violence, or fear, so the government needed to convince the jury that he did so “under color of official right.” Id.
Th e phrase “under c olor of official right” has an established

— if controversial

— meaning dat ing back to Evans

. All agree that th is phrase narrowly covers the “well

- recognized” situationNo. 21

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14

in which a public officer falsely says that the law requires a victim to give the officer money when , in fact, the officer has no legal right to the payment

. Evans , 504 U.S. at 26 9 ; see id. at 280

– 84 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This type of extortion did not occur in this case , however, because Dotson made no claim that he had a right t o Dehko’s money . Yet Evans held that this view did not exhaust the way s in which a n offic er could extort a victim

. Under Evans , a n officer also obtains money “under color of official right” if the officer ’s conduct looks like “what we would now describe as ‘taking a bribe.’” Id. at 260

. A n officer thus commits extortion if the officer takes money in exchange for an “agreement to perform specific official acts” when the officer has no right to collect that “fee.” Id. at 2 68, 2 70

. In other words , a

“ quid pro quo ” (money in exchange for an “official act”) violates the Hobbs Act

. McCormick

v. United States , 500 U.S. 257, 273

– 74 (1991) ; see Ocasio , 578 U.S. at 296

– 97.
Because Evans subjects an officer to liability for taking money in exchang e for “official

act s, ” its holding raises an important question : W hat qualifies as an “official act” under the Hobbs Act (which does not use th at phrase) ? T he Supreme Court ’s decision in Mc D onnel l implicates th is question

. There , the government charged a former Virginia g overnor with Hobbs Act extortion for receiving “over $175,000 in gifts and loan s” from a CEO who sought the governor’s help in getting Virginia universities to conduct a research study of his company’s nutritional supplement. 579 U.S

. at 561

– 62 . In exchange for the money , the governor allegedly arranged for official meetings , hosted official event s , and made official phone calls , but he did not order or pressur e
any state offic ers to agree to th e study

. Id. at 5 59, 5 63

– 64

. The parties in McDonnell agreed that
Evans ’s “ official act ” element f or Hobbs Act extortion incorporated a separate federal bribery statute’s definition of “official act

. ” Id. at 562

– 63 . This bribery statute defined “official act” to mean “ any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy,No. 21

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15

which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such o fficial ’ s official capacity, or in such official ’ s place of trust or profit. ” 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3). Applying this definition , the Court in McDonnell established a two

- part test for an “official act.” The government must first prove that a “question ” or “ matter ” came before a public

- official defendant (or could have by law come before the defendant)

. McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 567 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)). The government then must prove that the defendant “ made a decision or took an action ‘ on ’” this question or matter. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)). The Court held that an official meeting, call, or event does not itself typically qualify as a n independent “question”

or “ matter ” separate from the subject o f the meeting, call, or event ( for example, the research study
in McDonnell itself

)

. Id. at 569. The Court next held that merely arranging a meeting, m aking a call, or organizing an event about a “matter”

— as the governor allegedly did with respect to the research study

— a lso d id not qualify as a decision or action on th e matter

. Id. at 571

– 72. The prosecution instead has to show more

— for example, that the governor in McDonnell accepted or rejected the research study or that he pressured other state officers to accept or reject it. Id. at 572.
2 Although McDonnell rested on the parties’ case

- specific concession that the bribery statute’s definition of “official act” extended to the Hobbs Act (which, again, does not use that phrase), we have applied McDonnell in Hobbs Act cases more generally. See, e.g. , United States v. Hills , 27 F.4th 1155, 1177

– 79 (6th Cir. 2 022); United States v. Henderson , 2 F.4th 593, 599

- 600 (6th Cir. 2021); Dimora v. United States , 973 F.3d 496, 502

– 05 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Dotson and the g overnment thus agree that McDonnell provide d the proper framework for this

case . T hey disagree over whether Dotson’s trial satisfied it

.No. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

16

Jury Instructions

. Dotson initially argues that the jury instructions failed to adequately account for McDonnell . But he did not preserve this object ion in the district court, so w e review it only fo r plain error. See United States v. Semrau , 693 F.3d 510, 527 (6th Cir. 2012) ; see also United States v. Hatton , 643 F. App’x 574, 580

– 81 (6th Cir. 2016)

. Under our precedent , the plain

- error test in this context requires a defendant to show that the collective instructions

so obviously misstated the law that the resulting conviction creates a “grave miscarriage of justice. ” Semrau , 693 F.3d at 528 (citation omitted); see United States v. Piccolo , 723 F.2d 1234,
1 241 (6th Cir. 1983) (adopting this test ).
W e see no obvious misstatement of law. Indeed, t he district court relied on our pattern instructions for Hobbs Act extortion. Cf. Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 6th Cir. Ch. 17.02 (Oct. 1, 2021). The court’s instructions identified the basic elements under Evans , including that Dotson must have known that “ the property ” that he took from Dehko “ was being accepted in exchange for an offic ial act. ” Tr., R.157, PageID 2910. The instructions also define d “official act” using McDonnell ’s two

- part test

. Id. , PageID 2911. And they contained additional “clarifying” guidance that we have since suggested, Dimora , 973 F.3d at 503, including that “setting up a meeting, calling another public official, or hosting an event does not” suffice on its own, Tr., R.157, PageID 2911. In truth, Dotson’s jury

- instruction argument itself rests on a n obviously mistaken view of McDonnell

. He argues that his in structions wrongly equated extortion with bribery

. But Evans adopted this very connection thirty years ago . 504 U.S. at 260. And contrary to Dotson’s claim,
McDonnell did not overrule Evans and replace it with Justice Thomas’s narrower view of the Hobbs Act

. See Evans , 504 U.S. at 280

– 84 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Mc D onnell clarified only what qualifies as an “official act” under the bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3).No. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

17

Dotson’s other instructional argument suffers from a s imilar flaw. He su ggests that the
court should have instructed the jury that it must find that he obtained money from Dehko “by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2) . This case, however, involved the se cond part of the Hobbs Act ’s definition of extortion: extortion “under color of official right [.] ” I d. The court thus had no reason to instruct the jury on a distinct type of extortion that played no part in the litigation

. Sufficiency of the Evidence

. Dotson alternatively argues that the evidence did not suffice
to establish Hobbs Act extortion after Mc D onnell

. To preserve this sufficiency challenge , Dotson should have moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the prosecution’s case

- in

- chief and again at the close of the evidence. United States v. Sease , 659 F.3d 519, 522 (6th Cir. 2011)

. And if he raised a specific ground for a judgment of acquittal at trial, we generally will not consider other non

- raised grounds on appeal. See United States v. Hamm , 952 F.3d 728, 740 (6th Cir. 2020). Yet Dotson sought a directed verdict at the close of the g overnment’s case on a distinct ground applicab le only to a single c ount, and he did not even renew that narrow request at the close of the evidence. It is thus not clear that we should review this claim at all. See id. At the least , Dotson ’s forfeiture requires him to establish that the trial recor d is so “devoid of evidence” that an objective observer could describe a n appellate decision uphold ing his convictions as a “manifest miscarriage of justice

. ” United States v. Woods , 14 F.4th 544 , 555 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted) ; see United States v. Price , 134 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir. 1998) (borrowing “devoid of evidence” test from the Fifth Circuit); United States v. Faymore , 736 F.2d 328, 334 (6th Cir. 1984) (adopting “manifest miscarriage of justice” test) ; cf. United States v. Burris , 999 F.3d 973, 976

– 78 (6th Cir. 2021).No. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

18

Dotson cannot satisfy this demanding test

. He argues that, like the governor in McDonnell , he merely arranged meetings between Dehko and vehicle owners and so never took an “action” on a “matter” within the meaning of th a t case’s “official act” test

. W e need not decide whether Dotson is correct that arranging these types of meetings alone would have sufficed to show an “official act.” The evidence allowed the jury to conclude that Dotson did far more than set up calls be tween vehicle owners and Dehko “to talk about” repairs. McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 573. The evidence, for example, showed that he falsified police reports during at least two of the six referrals. And
Dotson does not argu e that falsifying reports would fall outside McDonnell ’s test (so we need not
decide th at issue ). Cf. Hills , 27 F.4th at 1178

– 79; Henderson , 2 F.4th at 599

– 600

. Likewise , Dotson does not argue that pressuring vehicle owners to tow their vehicles to
Somerset

— or making that towing decision himself without their consent

— w ould fall outside McDonnell ’s test (and so we need not decide that issue either). Cf. Ocasio , 578 U.S. at 284

– 85; United States v. Chastain , 979 F.3d 586, 591

– 92 (8th Cir. 2020). Here too , the jury could have reasonably found that Dotson engaged in these types of pressure tactics. Dennal Bonds testified , for example, that Dotson told Dehko over the phone that “I got a car coming to you” when discussing Bond s ’s Chrysler and arranged for a tow truck to take the car to Somerset without any real input from Bonds himself . Bonds Tr., R.154, PageID 2314

– 15. As noted, other vehicle

owners testified similarly

. See, e.g. , Ellis Tr., R.154, PageID 2367; Langford Tr., R.155, PageID 239 6

. So t he tr ial record is teeming with

— not “devoid” of

— evidence showing Dotson’s guilt. Woods , 14 F.4th at 555 (citation omitted).

* * *
As Dotson correctly notes, Justices and commentators alike have criticized Evans ’s broad interpretation of the Hobbs Act on th e ground that it confuses bribery for extortion. See SilverNo. 21

- 2826 , United States v. Dotson

19

v. United States , 141 S. Ct. 656, 656

– 57 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). But he is making this pitch to the wrong entity . As a lower court, we must follow that inter pretation until the Supreme Court tells us otherwise. See State Oil Co. v. Khan , 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
W e affirm.