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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMARR TOWERS,

 Plaintiff, 

 

 v.

TEAM CAR CARE, LLC, TEAM CAR 

CARE WEST, LLC., 

 Defendants. 

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No. 20 C 2653

Judge Virginia M. Kendall

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Jamarr Towers (“Towers”) brings this lawsuit against his former employer, Team 

Car Care LLC and Team Car Care West, LLC (“Defendants”), alleging Defendants failed to 

remedy or prevent the sexual harassment of Towers by a coworker and later terminated Towers in 

retaliation for filing a sexual harassment claim, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1956 (“Title VII”) 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq. (Dkt. 1). Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment on both counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the 

following reasons, Defendants’ motion [35] is granted.

Towers, who is proceeding pro se in this action, filed no response to Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment or statement of undisputed facts, nor did he submit any additional facts.1

1 The Court set a briefing schedule for dispositive motions via teleconference that Towers participated in on June 14, 

2021. The Court advised Towers on the record at that teleconference that his deadline to respond to Defendants’ 

summary judgment motion would be August 23, 2021 and that helpful documents for responding to summary 

judgment motions could be found on the Court’s website. Counsel for Defendants subsequently sent the order setting 

forth the briefing schedule to Towers via email. (Dkt. 39, Ex. 1). Defendant’s Motion [35] was filed July 26, 2021. 

The next day, Towers e-mailed counsel for Defendants requesting a copy of the summary judgment motion, which 

counsel provided a OneDrive link. (Dkt. 39, Ex. 2). Counsel for Defendants also mailed a copy of the motion and 

related filings to Towers (Id.). Defendants did not provide Towers with the required Notice to Unrepresented Litigants 

Opposing Summary Judgment until September 1, over a week after Towers’ response was due. See Local Rule 56.2; 

see also Dkt. 38. It is important that parties timely comply with Local Rules, particularly when it involves a pro se

litigant. However, the communication with the Court and with Defendants reflects that Towers was aware that the 

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) allows that if a party “fails to properly support an assertion 

of fact or fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact” the Court may consider the 

facts undisputed for purposes of the motion and grant summary judgment if the motion and 

supporting materials show that the movant is entitled to it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2-3). Towers, 

by not responding to Defendants’ motion, has failed to properly address Defendants’ assertions of 

fact. Even as a pro se litigant, Towers has had ample time since receiving Defendants’ Local Rule 

56.2 Notice to Unrepresented Litigants and has not made any responsive pleading. See Collins v. 

Illinois, 554 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[E]ven pro se litigants must follow procedural rules.”) 

Therefore, the Court will consider the facts presented by Defendants as undisputed for the purposes 

of this motion as permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Towers, a resident of Aurora, Illinois, is a former employee of Jiffy Lube Store 

1100 located in Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois. (Dkt. 37, Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed 

Material Facts (“SOF”) at ¶¶ 1, 6, 8). Defendants are one of the nation’s largest franchisees of Jiffy 

Lube, operating approximately 500 Jiffy Lube locations including Store 1100. (SOF ¶¶ 5-6). 

Towers was hired as a Customer Service Advisor for Store 1100 on or around June 20, 

2018. (Id. ¶ 9). He was advised of the open position by Mike Poppleton, the manager of Store 

1100, who Towers met during a previous training with Jiffy Lube while working at the Glendale 

Heights Jiffy Lube location (Id. ¶ 8). A Customer Service Advisor was primarily responsible for 

motion was filed. Following the Local Rule 56.2 Notice more than five months ago, Towers has made no effort to 

communicate with the Court or otherwise respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment.

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greeting customers, going over the reviews of their vehicles with customers, dealing with 

payments, and walking customers to their vehicles. (Id. ¶ 10). 

Defendants shared a number of documents with new employees upon hiring, including the 

Employee Handbook, the Code of Conduct, and the Harassment, Discrimination and Retaliation 

Policy. (SOF ¶ 11, SOF Ex. 8-11). The Teammate Handbook includes a Respect in the Workplace 

provision that states: 

Our company will not tolerate disrespectful or threatening 

treatment. Please see the anti-discrimination/anti-harassment policy, 

and the safety/workplace violence policy, for additional 

information. Disrespectful or abusive treatment includes, but is not 

limited to, repeated use of obscene, profane, or foul language; 

screaming or offensive gestures; the display or distribution of 

offensive materials; threats of violence, hitting or shoving; stalking 

or unwelcome phone calls; and the intentional destruction or 

defacement, or the threat of such destruction or defacement, of 

company or teammate property.

(SOF, Ex. 9). The policy also states that “[r]eports of violations of this policy will be promptly 

and thoroughly investigated” and that Defendants will “take action as needed to ensure that any 

improper conduct ceases, including, where appropriate, corrective action up to and including 

termination of employment.” (Id.). Defendants also provide a Teammate Code of Conduct to its 

employees. The Code of Conduct contains provisions that teammates “will treat our guests, 

vendors, and teammates with civility and professionalism,” that teammates will treat teammates 

and managers respectfully, avoid language that may be deemed “offensive, humiliating or 

discriminatory,” and that teammates will work the hours scheduled. (SOF ¶ 15, SOF Ex. 10 at ¶¶ 

3, 23, 26). The Harassment, Discrimination and Retaliation Policy includes language that:

Harassment, discrimination and retaliation, either intentional or 

unintentional, of, or against any employee, teammate, third party, 

applicant, volunteer, contractor, or intern has no place in the work 

environment and will not be tolerated. Accordingly, the Company 

will not authorize and will not tolerate any form of harassment, 

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discrimination or retaliation by employees, coworkers, supervisors, 

or managers (or third parties, vendors, visitors, clients, contractors, 

etc.). Prohibited conduct includes, but is not limited to, verbal, 

physical, visual, and/or derogatory comments based on protected 

characteristics including: race, color, national origin, mental and 

physical disability, legally protected medical condition or 

information, genetic information, family care status, military 

caregiver status, religion (including religious creed, dress, and 

grooming), ancestry, age, sexual orientation, gender/sex (including 

pregnancy, perceived pregnancy, childbirth, breastfeeding, or 

related medical conditions), gender identity and/or expression, 

marital or domestic partner status, 

military/veterans/reserve/national guard status, citizenship status, 

discharge status from the military and any other characteristic 

protected by federal, state and local laws.

(SOF ¶ 16, SOF Ex. 11 at 147). The Harassment, Discrimination and Retaliation Policy also states 

that upon receiving a complaint pursuant to the policy, the company will timely respond and 

conduct an impartial and timely investigation by qualified personnel. (SOF ¶ 18, SOF Ex. 11 at 

150). Towers acknowledged receipt of each of the policies and handbooks using an online portal. 

(SOF ¶ 19, SOF Ex. 8).

In the fall of 2018, Towers told Mike Poppleton, the manager of Store 1100, that he had a 

complaint against a female coworker (also referred to as a “teammate”) for sexual harassment. 

(SOF ¶¶ 20-22, see also Compl. ¶¶12-13). Towers claimed that over the course of several months, 

the female teammate had made unwanted advances towards him during work and sent him 

inappropriate text messages. (SOF ¶ 21). Poppleton notified Ray Perez, the District Manager (SOF 

¶¶ 20-22, see also Compl. ¶¶12-13). 

Perez subsequently conducted interviews of all Store 1100 teammates between September 

29, 2018, and October 10, 2018, concerning Towers’ sexual harassment claim. (SOF ¶ 23). Towers 

made an official complaint to Perez on October 15, 2018, who then advised the Defendants’ human 

resources of the allegation. (¶ 25). On October 16, 2018, Rosibel Romero (Defendants’ senior 

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human resources generalist) began an investigation into Towers’ allegations against his teammate. 

(¶¶ 26, 33). The same day, Romero spoke with Towers. Romero spoke to the teammate accused 

of harassing Towers a few days later on or about October 21, 2018. (¶ 28). Through the 

investigation into Towers’ complaint, Romero learned and was provided with proof that Towers 

was in a relationship with the teammate he had accused of harassment. (¶ 29). The teammate 

documented the relationship in a written statement and the statement was corroborated with several 

other Store 1100 employees. (¶¶ 30-31). Perez (the district manager) and Romero (human 

resources) concluded that Towers was in a consensual relationship with the teammate and that 

because the relationship was consensual it would not be investigated any further. (¶ 32). 

Defendants’ investigation into Towers’ complaint was extensive and included at least seven 

interviews. (¶ 33). 

During the investigation, a pattern emerged suggesting Towers was negatively impacting 

his Store 1100 teammates. (¶ 34). Several teammates indicated that Towers routinely used coarse 

language and made several comments to the teammate he accused of sexual harassment. (¶ 35). 

One teammate also submitted a statement that Towers utilized his relationship with Poppleton, his 

manager, to his advantage including leaving Store 1100 with Poppleton on one occasion to go to 

Poppleton’s son’s football game without clocking out to account for his absence from the store. 

(¶¶ 36-38). Another teammate at Store 1100 submitted a statement that Towers would intimidate 

her and force her to buy him meals. (¶ 39). Towers forced this teammate to write another statement 

recanting her previous statement, and the recantation was notarized. (¶¶ 40-41). It was then 

discovered that the recantation was coerced and that Towers, not the teammate, had brought the 

statement to a notary public to have the statement notarized. (¶ 42). The same teammate contacted 

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Perez to report that she was coerced into writing the recantation and that she was not present at the 

notary public when the statement was notarized. (¶ 43). 

The Investigation File spans nearly 90 pages and includes statements from seven 

teammates at Store 1100, contemporaneous notes from Romero’s interviews, and email 

correspondence with teammates and Perez regarding the findings. (¶ 44; see also SOF Exs. 12-A 

and 12-B, Investigation File). The investigation into Towers’ behavior resulted in findings that 

Towers was frequently verbally abusive to fellow teammates, forced one teammate to provide a 

false statement, attempted to interfere with the investigation into his complaint despite explicit 

instructions not to discuss the investigation while it was ongoing, and committed time keeping 

fraud by failing to clock out when he attended a football game with his manager, Poppleton. (SOF 

¶ 45). 

After the investigation was complete, Romero and Perez concluded that Towers had 

committed several violations of the Code of Conduct (SOF ¶ 48). Defendants made the 

recommendation to terminate Towers based on evidence gathered during the investigation into his 

conduct. (SOF ¶ 49). Defendants terminated Towers from his position on November 14, 2018. 

(SOF ¶ 50).

Towers filed his Complaint in this case on May 1, 2020, asserting two counts under Title 

VII. (Dkt. 1). Count I alleges sexual harassment in violation of Title VII, based on Defendants’ 

failure to remedy or prevent Towers’ alleged harassment by a female co-worker after learning of 

her inappropriate behavior (Compl. ¶¶ 26-27). Count II for retaliatory discharge alleges that 

Defendants unlawfully terminated Towers’ employment in retaliation for raising his complaint 

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against the female co-worker (Compl. ¶¶ 21-24). Defendants moved for summary judgment on 

July 26, 2021, following the close of fact discovery (Dkt. 35). 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sorensen

v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712, 722 (7th Cir. 2015). In determining whether a genuine issue of fact 

exists, the Court must take the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party 

opposing the motion. Bennington v. Caterpillar Inc., 275 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001); see

also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The party

opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 586 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving 

party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably 

find for [that party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The Court “limit[s] its analysis of the facts 

on summary judgment to evidence that is properly identified and supported in the parties' [Local 

Rule 56.1] statement.” Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th

Cir. 2000). Where a proposed statement of fact is supported by the record and not adequately 

rebutted, the Court will accept that statement as true for purposes of summary judgment.

DISCUSSION

I. Count I: Sexual Harassment 

To prevail on his Title VII claim of sexual harassment, Towers must show that (1) he 

endured unwelcome sexual harassment; (2) he was harassed because of his sex; (3) the harassment 

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was so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile work environment; and (4) there is a basis for 

employer liability. Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 982 (7th Cir. 2008). If the alleged harassment 

was at the hands of a coworker, as here, the employer is liable only if the employer was negligent 

in either discovering or remedying the harassment. Nischan v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC, 865 F.3d 

922, 930 (7th Cir. 2017); Longstreet v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 276 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2002). 

An employer is negligent in remedying harassment if it “failed to take prompt and 

appropriate corrective action reasonably likely to prevent the harassment from recurring.” Cole v. 

Bd. of Trs. of N. Ill. Univ., 838 F.3d 888, 898 (7th Cir. 2016). The undisputed facts here show that 

Defendants were not negligent in taking corrective action. After Towers made a complaint to his 

store manager Mike Poppleton, Poppleton notified district manager Ray Perez. (SOF ¶¶ 20-22). 

Perez promptly conducted interviews of all Store 1100 teammates over the course of two weeks, 

from September 29, 2018, until October 10, 2018, concerning Towers’ claim of harassment. (Id. ¶ 

23). Towers did not make a formal complaint until October 15, 2018. When he did, Perez 

immediately advised Defendants’ human resources department of the allegation. A human 

resources specialist, Rosibel Romero, began an investigation into the allegation and spoke to 

Towers that same day. (Id. ¶¶ 25-26, 33). Within a few days Romero had also spoken to the 

teammate accused of harassment. (Id. ¶ 28). The Investigative File is close to 90 pages long and 

contains the notes and interviews with seven employees. This reflects prompt effort by Defendants 

to investigate Towers’ claim. Porter v. Erie Foods Int'l Inc., 576 F.3d 629, 636 (7th Cir. 2009)

(finding that a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude that the Defendant was negligent in 

remedying harassment where the facts showed promptness in instituting an investigation, 

conducting interviews with other employees, and meeting with the Plaintiff about his complaint).

In addition, Defendants’ investigation concluded that Towers was in a consensual relationship with 

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the employee he accused of sexual harassment and there is no evidence of further alleged 

harassment after the investigation. For Defendants to be liable, Towers needed to put forth 

sufficient facts to establish Defendants were negligent because they failed to take prompt and 

corrective action to remedy Towers’ alleged harassment. Towers failed to refute any of the facts 

in spite of being given five months to do so. Absent disputed facts and considering the evidence 

that Defendants were prompt and reasonable in their investigation, Defendants are not liable for 

Towers’ sexual harassment claim. Defendants are granted summary judgment on Count I.

II. Count II: Retaliation 

Title VII prohibits retaliation against employees who engage in statutorily protected 

activity. To survive summary judgment on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must offer evidence of 

“‘(1) a statutorily protected activity; (2) a materially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) 

a causal connection between the two.’” Baines v. Walgreen Co., 863 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.

2017) (quoting Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 403–04 (7th Cir. 2007)), aff'd, 553

U.S. 442 (2008). There is no dispute that Towers’ complaint of sexual harassment is a protected 

activity, nor is there a dispute that termination is a materially adverse employment action. The 

issue is whether there was a causal connection between Towers’ complaint and Defendants’ 

decision to terminate his employment. 

A causal connection between the protected act and the adverse employment action exists 

when the evidence is sufficient “to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that retaliatory 

motive caused the [action].” Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir.

2016). Where there is no direct evidence of retaliation (as here), circumstantial evidence that 

retaliatory motive exists can include “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, ... other bits and 

pieces from which an inference of [retaliatory] intent might be drawn, [and] evidence, but not 

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necessarily rigorous statistical evidence, that similarly situated employees were treated 

differently.” Lambert v. Peri Formworks Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted).

There is no direct evidence in the record of a causal link between Towers’ complaint and 

his termination. Therefore, the Court looks to circumstantial evidence. Towers’ termination came 

on November 14, 2018—within a month of his sexual harassment complaint. And the 

investigation into Towers’ behavior came about because of the sexual harassment complaint. (SOF 

¶ 34; see also SOF Ex. 12A at TCC 1). Suspicious timing is one factor identified in Lambert, but 

alone does not create a triable issue of fact. Gracia v. SigmaTron International, Inc., 842 F.3d

1010, 1021 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that “suspicious timing alone is rarely enough to create an 

inference of retaliatory motive”). There is no other evidence of a causal link required to make out 

a prima facie case for retaliation. Mollet v. City of Greenfield, 926 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2019)

(the question is not whether the underlying protected activity was “a but-for cause of the adverse 

action, rather whether the protected activity was the but-for cause of the adverse action.”)

(emphasis in original). Towers has not provided any evidence that the protected activity, his 

complaint against his coworker, was the but-for cause, not just a but-for cause, of his termination.

Defendants have certain policies and procedures in place for employees, and Towers had 

previously confirmed receipt of those policies. (SOF Ex. 8). The “Policy Acknowledgement Status 

Report” shows that Towers acknowledged receipt of Defendants’ Code of Conduct, Handbook, 

and Harassment, Discrimination and Retaliation Policy on June 26, 2018, shortly after he was hired 

at Store 1100. Violations of those policies can result in termination. See, e.g., Dkt. 37, SOF Ex. 9 

(Handbook stating that Defendants will investigate violations and take corrective action up to and 

including termination). The undisputed facts show that Defendants investigated reports that 

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Towers violated company policies, including that Towers used inappropriate language, left work 

without clocking out, intimidated coworkers into buying him meals, and when they complained 

coerced them into recanting those complaints and filed false notarized documents to cover up the 

recantation. While Towers’ actions came to light while Defendants were interviewing coworkers 

about his sexual harassment complaint, that behavior—which Towers was aware was punishable 

by termination per the Handbook—took place before the complaint was filed. Then, during the

investigation, coworkers reported that Towers continued to negatively impact the workplace by 

coercing a coworker to recant her previous statement about Towers’ behavior. The evidence thus

supports that it was Towers’ own conduct, not the protected activity, that was the but-for cause of

termination.

Even if Towers had established a prima facie case for retaliatory discharge, Defendants 

have offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory purpose for his termination. Specifically, as 

described above, Defendants have offered evidence that Towers was terminated for multiple 

violations of the Code of Conduct that were uncovered into an investigation into his conduct. Those 

violations included time keeping fraud, verbal abuse to coworkers, and coercing a teammate into

making a false statement. 

Because Defendants have offered a non-discriminatory reason for termination, the burden 

shifts to Towers to prove the reason given by Defendants is pretextual. O'Leary v. Accretive

Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir. 2011). “Pretext involves more than just faulty reasoning 

or mistaken judgment on the part of the employer; it is a lie, specifically a phony reason for some 

action.” Tibbs v. Admin. Office of the Ill. Courts., 860 F.3d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2017). Nothing in 

the record establishes a genuine dispute of material fact on the issue of pretext. While Towers’ 

complaint alleges that Defendants’ “stated reason for terminating Towers’ employment was 

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pretextual,” (Compl. at ¶ 12), Defendants have stated that Towers was terminated for his own 

conduct, and Towers has done nothing to meet his burden to show pretext. Robertson v. Dep't of

Health Servs., 949 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2020) (“In determining whether the employer's reason 

can be characterized as pretextual, we do not evaluate whether the employer's proffered 

justification was accurate or even whether it was unfair. Our sole focus is on whether the 

employer's stated reason can be characterized as a falsehood rather than an honestly held belief.”) 

Defendants are granted summary judgment on Count II.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [35] is granted.

____________________________________

Virginia M. Kendall

United States District Judge

Date: February 10, 2022

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