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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Dianne Dearmon )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No.:20 CV 2543

v. )

)

Lilly Dermatology )

and Lilly Aesthetics, S.C., )

)

)

Mercy Odueyungbo and ) Plaintiff Demands Trial By Jury

Tony Jackson are named as a Defendant )

Based upon FLSA, IMWL and IWPCA )

)

Defendants. )

COMPLAINT

COMES NOW Plaintiff Dianne Dearmon (“Plaintiff” or “Dearmon”), by and through her 

attorney, and for her Complaint against Defendants Lilly Dermatology, Lilly Aesthetics,

(collectively referred to herein as “Corporate Defendants”) Tony Jackson and Mercy 

Odueyungbo (Collectively “Individual Defendants”), states as follows:

NATURE OF CLAIMS

1. Plaintiff brings this individual action to challenge Defendants’ violations of the Fair 

Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”). This case is filed 

to recover unpaid wages for minimum wage and overtime work performed for which Plaintiff was 

not compensated.

2. Due to Defendants’ wage violations, Plaintiff was deprived of overtime wages in 

violation of the FLSA and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), as well as minimum wages 

in violation the FLSA and the IMWL.

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3. Plaintiff also brings claims of employment misclassification, in that after Plaintiff 

began to ask for her wages, Defendants suddenly claimed the Plaintiff was an “Independent 

Contractor”, thus Plaintiff brings misclassification claims pursuant to the FLSA, IMWL, and 

IWPCA. 

THE PARTIES

4. Plaintiff Dianne Dearmon resides and is domiciled in this judicial district.

5. Defendant Lilly Aesthetics is an Illinois Company is located at 2500 S Highland 

Ave STE 220, Lombard, IL 60148. Lilly Aesthetics Articles of Organization were filed with the 

Illinois Secretary of State.

6. Defendant Lilly Dermatology, while having Michigan locations, also uses and does 

business in Illinois at 2500 S Highland Ave STE 220, Lombard, IL 60148. Lilly Aesthetics website 

lists the Highland address as its “Chicago Location”. 

7. Defendant Mercy Odueyungbo is the owner and operator of both corporate 

Defendants and supervised directly the work of the Plaintiff. 

8. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Mercy Odueyungbo was involved in the 

day-to-day business operations of both corporate Defendants, having the authority to hire and fire 

employees, directed and supervised the work of employees (including Plaintiff), has/had authority 

to sign business checks, made business decisions regarding Plaintiff’s compensation, and has/had

a responsibility to act in the interest of the corporate Defendants in devising, directing, 

implementing, and supervising the wage and hour practices and policies relating to Plaintiff.

9. Tony Jackson is the spouse of Defendant Odueyungbo and worked as a manger and 

operator of both corporate Defendants and supervised directly the work of the Plaintiff. 

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10. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant Tony Jackson was involved in the day-today business operations of both corporate Defendants, having the authority to hire and fire 

employees, directed and supervised the work of employees (including Plaintiff), has/had authority 

to sign business checks, made business decisions regarding Plaintiff’s compensation, and has/had

a responsibility to act in the interest of the corporate Defendants in devising, directing, 

implementing, and supervising the wage and hour practices and policies relating to Plaintiff.

11. At all material times hereto, Defendants were “employers” of Plaintiff as defined 

in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), the IMWL, and the IWPCA, 820 ILCS § 115/2.

12. At all material times hereto, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as “employees” 

within the meaning of § 3(e)(1) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) and within the meaning of the 

IMWL and the IWPCA, 820 ILCS § 115/1 et seq.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

13. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1337 and 28 

U.S.C. § 1331. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s IMWL, IWPCA, and 

unjust enrichment claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

14. At all times relevant to this action, Defendants were engaged in commerce and/or 

the production of goods for commerce and/or Defendants were engaged in commerce or in the 

production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a).

15. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in that the Defendants are located 

in this Judicial District and a significant part of the conduct that gives rise to this claim occurred 

within the Northern District of Illinois.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

16. On or around 7/19/18 Plaintiff began doing work for Lilly Dermatology via the directions 

and suggestions of Tony Jackson and Mercy Odueyungbo.

17. From July 19, 2018 until July of 2019 Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff any 

compensation.

18. During this twelve-month period Plaintiff performed hundreds of hours of work for 

Defendants, and received zero compensation, therefore Plaintiff pleads an FLSA minimum

wage violation for each and every week from July 2018 to July 2019. 

19. The work performed included the following:

a. Creating website content,

b. attending a mandatory spa conference,

c. attending and working a Michigan networking event,

d. working with a realtor to obtain a lease space for LA,

e. interviewing and scheduling candidates for interviews for individual Defendants

f. managing the contractors to get the Highland Ave. retail space ready for opening,

g. creating spa menus,

h. coordinating parties at the clinic

i. and managing day-to-day business at the Highland Ave. spa location.

j. wrote and created an educational syllabus to help Defendant Odueyungbo receive

approval by the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation as a CEU Sponsor.

k. managed and built Defendants’ social media presence giving exposure forsales and

other personal ventures.

l. performed esthetician work on clients.

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20. On July 1, 2019 Plaintiff informed Defendants that she could not continue to financially 

survive being paid zero dollars. 

21. Plaintiff asked for $5000 compensation per month.

22. In July of 2019 Defendants told Plaintiff they couldn’t do more than $3000 per month. 

23. Plaintiff began receiving $1500 every two weeks ($3000 per month) until January 2020. 

24. While finally paying Plaintiff some compensation, Defendants paid Plaintiff as a 

contractor rather than as an employee. Defendants did not deduct taxes from her wages, 

hold unemployment insurance, nor workers compensation coverage for Plaintiff.

25. As a result of the misclassification Plaintiff incurred added tax costs and was damaged in 

other ways. 

EXPENSE REPAYMENT CLAIMS

26. Plaintiff also incurred expenses for Defendants and Plaintiff was not paid back for these 

expenses in violation of the FLSA, IMWL and IWPCA.

27. Plaintiff incurred approximately $3,000 in expenses for office and clinic supplies that she

provided for the location for over a year.

28. Additionally, Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for travel and lodging for a seminar

and events, this amounts to approximately an additional $1,500.

29. Lastly, Defendants did not compensate Plaintiff for mileage of over 1000 miles incurred

for driving travel to Michigan’s upper peninsula and various travel for the clinic. This

travel/mileage expense amounts to approximately another $600.

30. Defendants also had Plaintiff pay for a portion of classes she attended to bring back and

teach Defendants’ staff. This amount was approximately another $1,000.

31. In total Defendants have not compensated Plaintiff for over $6,000 in expenses.

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MISCLASSIFICATION FACTS

32. At some point Defendants attempted to have Plaintiff sign an independent contractor

contract and pay Plaintiff as an independent contractor.

33. Plaintiff refused to sign the contract.

34. While Defendants likely will continue to claim Plaintiff was a contractor, documentation

demonstrates that Plaintiff was an employee and Defendants were Plaintiff’s employers.

35. Defendants controlled all aspects of her work and how she managed the location. 

36. Plaintiff had no investment in the company. 

37. Defendants called Plaintiff a manager on many occasions in text and email.

38. Plaintiff pleads this misclassification claim under the FLSA, IMWL and IWPCA.

39. However, Plaintiff was clearly an employee under the Illinois Wage Payment and

Collection Act (“IWPCA”), 820 Ill. Com. Stat. 115/2. 

40. The IWPCA creates a presumption that the Plaintiff is an employee, and to rebut that

presumption Defendant bears the burden of establishing each of three specific criteria set

forth in the IWPCA to rebut that presumption. 

41. Specifically, Defendants must establish that 1) Plaintiff was free from Defendant’s

control; 2) the Plaintiff perform work outside of Defendants’ usual course of business or

outside all the places of the business of Defendants; and 3) Plaintiff was engaged in an

independently established business. 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/2. 

42. The IWPCA defines an “employee” broadly to include “any individual permitted to work

by an employer in an occupation,” and excludes only an individual:

(1) who has been and will continue to be free from control and direction over the

performance of his/her work.

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(2) who performs work which is either outside the usual course of business or is

performed outside of all of the places of business of the employer unless the employer is

in the business of contracting with third parties for the placement of employees; and

(3) who is in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business

43. In this case, none of these three apply to demonstrate the Plaintiff was an Independent

Contractor.

44. Plaintiff pleads the following in support of this claim:

(1) who has been and will continue to be free from control and direction over the

performance of his work, both under his contract of service with his employer

a. Here Plaintiff was not free of control of Defendants.

(2) who performs work which is either outside the usual course of business or is

performed outside of all of the places of business of the employer unless the employer

is in the business of contracting with third parties for the placement of employees

a. the usual course of business was medical treatment of patients, and Plaintiff

did that exact work for nearly all the work done for Defendants

(3) who is in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business

a. Plaintiff did not have “an independently established trade, occupation,

profession, or business”

COUNT I

Fair Labor Standards Act – Overtime Wages

(Individual Action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b))

45. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs contained within 

this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein.

46. At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, “employers” 

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engaged in interstate commerce and/or in the production of goods for commerce within the 

meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203. 

47. At all relevant times, Defendants have employed, and continues to employ, 

“employee[s],” including the Plaintiff, that have been, and continue to be, engaged in interstate 

“commerce” within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203.

48. During the 3 years immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint, Defendants 

failed to pay minimum wages and overtime wages to Plaintiff for all time worked in excess of 

forty (40) hours in individual work weeks in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201. 

49. At all relevant times, Defendants engaged in a willful policy, pattern, or practice of 

requiring or permitting Plaintiff to be employed by Defendants, and failed to pay the necessary 

compensation to Plaintiff.

50. Plaintiff makes a claim for all “Compensable Time” including all work suffered or 

permitted by employer, including all work allowed to occur or Defendants failed to prevent.

51. Plaintiff’s unpaid work performed was known to employer and/or which the 

employer, through reasonable diligence, could have discovered and prevented, even if not 

authorized. 

52. At all relevant times, the work performed by Plaintiff as for service to Defendants

and were required or permitted by Defendants, for the benefit of Defendants, directly related to 

such employee’s principal employment with Defendants, and as an integral and indispensable part 

of such employees’ employment of Defendants.

53. As a result of the Defendants’ willful failure to record or compensate Plaintiff,

employed by Defendants’ for all hours worked, Defendants have violated, and continue to violate, 

the records hours provision of the FLSA.

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54. As a result of the Defendants’ willful failure to record, report, credit, and/or 

compensate its employees employed at Defendants, including Plaintiff, Defendants have failed to 

make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of their employees sufficient to determine 

the wages, hours and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of the FLSA, 

including 29 U.S.C. §§211(c) and §§ 215(a).

55. The foregoing conduct, as alleged, violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq 

Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of his respective unpaid overtime compensation, plus 

liquidated damages, as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and such other legal and 

equitable relief as the Court deems just and proper

56. Plaintiff seeks recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs of action to be paid by 

Defendants, as provided by the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

57. Plaintiff was also misclassified as plead elsewhere in this complaint, incorporated 

herein in this count.

58. Plaintiff incurred business expenses which Defendants failed to repay.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgement against Defendants as follows:

a. Payment of unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages pursuant to the 

FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. and the supporting United States Department of Labor regulations;

b. An injunction requiring Defendants to pay all statutorily required wages 

pursuant to Illinois law;

c. Attorneys’ fees and costs of this litigation; and

d. Such other relief as this Court shall deem just and proper.

COUNT II

Fair Labor Standards Act – Minimum Wages

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Individual Action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)

59. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs contained within 

this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein.

60. Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee entitled to the statutorily mandated minimum 

hourly wage.

61. Defendants failed to pay the federal minimum wage of $7.25 for the 3 years 

immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint.

62. Defendants’ failure to pay minimum wage to Plaintiff was willful. Defendants

knew Plaintiff was not earning an average hourly wage at least equal to the required minimum 

wage and had no reason to believe their failure to pay minimum wage was not a violation of the 

FLSA.

63. Plaintiff is entitled to statutory remedies provided pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), 

including but not limited to liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees.

64. Plaintiff was also misclassified as plead elsewhere in this complaint, incorporated 

herein in this count.

65. Plaintiff incurred business expenses which Defendants failed to repay.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgement against Defendants as follows:

a. Payment of unpaid minimum wages and liquidated damages pursuant to the 

FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. and the supporting United States Department of Labor regulations;

b. An injunction requiring Defendants to pay all statutorily required wages 

pursuant to Illinois law;

c. Attorneys’ fees and costs of this litigation; and

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d. Such other relief as this Court shall deem just and proper.

COUNT III

Illinois Minimum Wage Law – Overtime Wages

66. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs contained within 

this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein.

67. Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff at the overtime rate for all hours worked 

in excess of forty (40) per work week in violation of IMWL, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/1 et seq.

68. Defendants willfully failed to pay overtime wages due to Plaintiff. 

69. Plaintiff seeks all overtime and other wages due, liquidated damages, statutory 

damages, prejudgment interest and any other damages due.

70. Plaintiff was also misclassified as plead elsewhere in this complaint, incorporated 

herein in this count.

71. Plaintiff incurred business expenses which Defendants failed to repay.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgement against Defendants as follows:

a. Payment of unpaid overtime wages and a penalty in the amount of 2% or 

5% of the amount of the unpaid overtime for each month the wages remain unpaid;

b. An injunction requiring Defendants to pay all statutorily required wages 

pursuant to Illinois law;

c. Attorneys’ fees and costs of this litigation; and

d. Such other relief as this Court shall deem just and proper.

COUNT IV

Illinois Minimum Wage Law – Minimum Wages

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72. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs contained within 

this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein.

73. Defendants were aware of their obligation to pay state minimum wages pursuant to 

the IMWL, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/1 et seq.

74. Defendants failed to pay the Illinois minimum wage of $8.25 for the 3 years 

immediately preceding the filing of this Complaint.

75. Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff minimum wage as required by IMWL, 

820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/1 et seq.

76. Defendants willfully failed to pay minimum wage due to Plaintiff. 

77. Plaintiff was also misclassified as plead elsewhere in this complaint, incorporated 

herein in this count.

78. Plaintiff incurred business expenses which Defendants failed to repay.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a judgement against Defendants as follows:

a. Payment of unpaid minimum wages and a penalty in the amount of 5% or

2% of the amount of the unpaid overtime for each month the wages remain unpaid;

b. An injunction requiring Defendants to pay all statutorily required wages 

pursuant to Illinois law;

c. Attorneys’ fees and costs of this litigation; and

d. Such other relief as this Court shall deem just and proper.

COUNT V

Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (IWPCA)

79. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all paragraphs contained within 

this Complaint, as if fully set forth herein.

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80. Plaintiff worked for and was employed by Defendants from at July 2018 to January

2020.

81. Plaintiff incurred business expenses which Defendants failed to repay.

82. Plaintiff was also misclassified as plead elsewhere in this complaint, incorporated 

herein in this count.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff individually requests the following:

1. That the Court find the Defendants’ violations of the FLSA and IMWL were 

willful;

2. A declaratory judgment that the practices complained of herein are unlawful under 

the FLSA, IMWL and IWPCA.

3. Restitution for all minimum wages, overtime payments, and compensation that are 

due to Plaintiff;

4. Restitution for all other benefits due to Plaintiff to which she was entitled as an 

employee;

5. Attorney’s fees and costs; and

6. Any other relief to which the Plaintiff may be entitled.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Dated: April 24, 2020 Respecfully submitted,

for Dianne Dearmon

By: /s/ John C. Ireland

Plaintiff’s attorney

John C. Ireland 

The Law Office of John C. Ireland 

636 Spruce Street 

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South Elgin ILL 60177

T: 630-464-9675 

F: 630-206-0889

Attorneyireland@gmail.com 

Attorney Number 6283137

NOTICE OF LIEN AND ASSIGNMENT

Please be advised that we claim a lien upon any recovery herein for 33/50% or such

amounts as a court awards. All rights relating to attorney fees have been assigned to counsel.

Dated: April 24, 2020 Respectfully Submitted,

By: /s/ John c. Ireland

Attorney for the Plaintiff

John C. Ireland

Attorney for the Plaintiff

The Law Office Of John C. Ireland 

636 Spruce St.

South Elgin IL

60177

630-464-9675 Facsimile 630-206-0889

attorneyireland@gmail.com

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