alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit      21.1**

**LIST      OF SUBSIDIARIES OF OTELCO INC.**

| **EXACT                NAME OF SUBSIDIARY AS****SPECIFIED                IN ITS CHARTER** | **STATE                OR OTHER JURISDICTION OF****INCORPORATION                OR ORGANIZATION** |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                                      |                                                                                              |
| Brindlee                Holdings LLC                                                      | Delaware                                                                                          |
| Brindlee                Mountain Telephone Company                                        | Alabama                                                                                           |
| Blountsville                Telephone Company Inc.                                        | Alabama                                                                                           |
| Hopper                Holding Company, Inc.                                               | Alabama                                                                                           |
| Hopper                Telecommunications Company, Inc.                                    | Alabama                                                                                           |
| Imagination,                Inc.                                                          | Missouri                                                                                          |
| Mid-Missouri                Telephone Corp.                                               | Missouri                                                                                          |
| Otelco                Holdings LLC                                                        | Delaware                                                                                          |
| Otelco                Telecommunications LLC                                              | Delaware                                                                                          |
| Otelco                Telephone LLC                                                       | Delaware                                                                                          |
| Page                & Kiser Communications, Inc.                                      | Alabama                                                                                           |

----
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DISTRICT

RIVERPORT INSURANCE COMPANY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:20-cv-02679

)

AREA #1 OUTDOOR CLUB, an Illinois )

non-profit corporation, and SHIRLEY COLE, )

individually and as Special Administrator of )

the Estate of Jerry A. Cole, deceased, )

)

Defendants. )

PLAINTIFF RIVERPORT INSURANCE COMPANY’S MOTION

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2) FOR DISMISSAL

NOW COMES Plaintiff Riverport Insurance Company, by and through its attorneys 

Terry A. Fox and Christopher L. Galinari, and moves this Honorable Court for an order 

dismissing this matter with prejudice based on the following reasons: 

1. This dispute involves an insurance policy and claim by estate of an officer of 

Defendant Area #1 who suffered a tragic accident. That officer and others were excluded by 

endorsement from the Workers Compensation/Employers Liability Policy issued by Riverport, 

after each officer submitted their election to be excluded from coverage. 

2. The Defendant Area #1, a party who has not yet appeared, initiated discussions 

with Plaintiff that have culminated with the attached stipulation withdrawing its tender of the 

claim for coverage to Plaintiff. Based on that stipulation, no issues remain in dispute between 

Defendant Area #1 Outdoor Club and Plaintiff. 

3. A default judgment was previously entered against Defendant Shirley Cole, the 

only other party to the suit, and no other issues remain in this case. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02679 Document #: 16 Filed: 10/19/20 Page 1 of 2 PageID #:101
2

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, in reliance on Area #1’s stipulation, prays for dismissal of this 

action with prejudice, the parties to bear their own costs and expenses. 

Respectfully submitted, 

RIVERPORT INSURANCE CO.

By: /s/ Terry A. Fox___ 

 One of Its Attorneys

Terry A. Fox (ARDC No. 6208039)

tfox@fylegal.com

Christopher L. Gallinari

cgallinari@fylegal.com

Flaherty & Youngerman, P.C. 

321 S. Plymouth Court, 14th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Tel. – (312) 782-4700

Fax – (312) 782-4725

Case: 1:20-cv-02679 Document #: 16 Filed: 10/19/20 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:102
```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 197 Engrossed in House (EH)]

                 In the House of Representatives, U.S.,

                                                         July 25, 1997.
    Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker 
may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the 
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the 
bill (H.R. 2209) making appropriations for the Legislative Branch for the fiscal 
year ending September 30, 1998, and for other purposes. The first reading of the 
bill shall be dispensed with. Points of order against consideration of the bill 
for failure to comply with section 302 or 308 of the Congressional Budget Act of 
1974 are waived. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not 
exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking 
minority member of the Committee on Appropriations. After general debate the 
bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule and shall be 
considered as read. Points of order against provisions in the bill for failure 
to comply with clause 2 or 6 of rule XXI are waived. No amendment shall be in 
order except those printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying 
this resolution. Each amendment may be considered only in the order printed in 
the report, may be offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be 
considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report 
equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be 
subject to amendment except as specified in the report, and shall not be subject 
to a demand for division of the question in the House or in the Committee of the 
Whole. All points of order against amendments printed in the report are waived. 
The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may: (1) postpone until a time during 
further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded 
vote on any amendment; and (2) reduce to five minutes the minimum time for 
electronic voting on any postponed question that follows another electronic vote 
without intervening business: Provided, That the minimum time for electronic 
voting on the first in any series of questions shall be fifteen minutes. At the 
conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise 
and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted. 
The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments 
thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to 
recommit with or without instructions.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
## UNITED STATES ARMY COUR T OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before TOZZI, CAMPANELLA, and CELTNIEKS Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v. Specialist BILLY J. WHISMAN, JR. United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20121096

Headquarters, Fort Hood Kirsten Brunson, Military Judge Colonel Stewart W. Risch, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Colone l Kevin Boyle, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Kageleiry, Jr., JA; Major Vincent T. Shuler, JA; Captain Patrick J. Scudieri, JA (on brief).

For Appellee: Colonel John P. Carrell, JA ; Lieutenant Colonel James L. Varley, JA; Major Matthew T. Grady, JA; Captain Sean P. Fitzgibbon, JA (on brief).

12 August 2014

---------------------------------- SUMMARY DISPOSITION

----------------------------------

Per curiam:

Upon review of the entire record pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, including the matters personal ly submitted by appe llant purs uant to United States v. Grostefon

, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), we note that the convening authority took action 417 days after the sentence was adjudged. Alth ough we find no due pr ocess violation in the post-trial processing of ap pellant’s case, we must still review the appropriateness of the sentence in light of the unjustifie d dilatory post-trial pr ocessing. UCMJ art. 66(c); United States v. Tardif , 57 M.J. 219, 224 (C.A.A .F. 2002) (“[Pursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, service courts are] required to de termine what findings and

sentence ‘should be a pproved,’ based on al l the facts and circum stances reflected in the record, including the unexplained and unreasonable post-trial delay.”). See generally United States v. Toohey , 63 M.J. 353, 362- 63 (C.A.A.F. 2006); United States v. Ney , 68 M.J. 613, 617 (Arm y Ct. Crim. App. 2010); United States v.
Collazo , 53 M.J. 721, 727 (Army Ct. Crim. Ap p. 2000). The go vernment has not explained the reasons for th e post-trial delay, either with a memorandum from theWHISMAN, JR.—ARMY 20121096

2 staff judge advocate or an affidavit attached to the government’s brief. Given this unexplained and un reasonable delay, we grant 30 days of sentence credit as a remedy.

The findings of guilty as approved by the convening authority are AFFIRMED. We affirm only so much of th e sentence as extend s to a bad-conduct discharge, confinemen t for 120 days, and re duction to the grade of E-1. All rights, privileges, and property, of which appellan t has been deprived by virtue of this decision setting aside th e findings and sentence are ordered restored. See UCMJ arts. 58a(b), 58b(c), and 75(a).

FOR THE COURT:

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.

Clerk of Court MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.

Clerk of Court FOR THE COURT:
**Exhibit 21.1**

**Subsidiaries**
| **Name**                                                       | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** | **Jurisdiction of Incorporation** |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|-----------------------------------|
| McCormick &  Schmick Acquisition Corp. II             |       | Delaware   |
| McCormick &  Schmick Acquisition Corp.                |       | Delaware   |
| McCormick &  Schmick Restaurant Corp.                 |       | Delaware   |
| McCormick &  Schmick Maryland Liquor, Inc.       |       | Maryland   |
| McCormick &  Schmick Acquisition I Texas, Inc.   |       | Texas      |
| McCormick &  Schmick Acquisition II Texas, Inc.  |       | Delaware   |
| McCormick &  Schmick Acquisition Texas, LP            |       | Texas      |
| McCormick &  Schmick Acquisition III Texas, Inc. |       | Texas      |
| McCormick &  Schmick’s Hackensack, LLC           |       | Delaware   |
| McCormick &  Schmick’s Atlanta II, LLC           |       | Delaware   |
| McCormick &  Schmick Orlando, LLC                     |       | Delaware   |
| McCormick &  Schmick Dallas, LP                       |       | Texas      |
| McCormick &  Schmick Dallas Liquor, Inc.         |       | Texas      |
| McCormick &  Schmick Austin, LP                       |       | Texas      |
| McCormick & Schmick Austin  Liquor, Inc.         |       | Texas      |

 

 

 

----
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS

Appeals of - )

)

Head Inc. - Diaz Joint Venture ) ASBCA Nos. 63476, 63477

)

Under Contract No. W9126G-15-C-0253 )

APPEARANCES FOR THE APPELLANT: Michael H. Payne, Esq. 

Ryan Boonstra, Esq.

 Cohen Seglias Pallas Greeenhall & Furman PC

 Philadelphia, PA

APPEARANCES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Michael P. Goodman, Esq.

 Engineer Chief Trial Attorney

Jeanelle S. Patel, Esq.

 Engineer Trial Attorney

 U.S. Army Engineer District, Fort Worth

OPINION BY ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE THRASHER

The parties have resolved their dispute and request that the Board enter judgment 

in favor of appellant.

It is the Board’s decision, pursuant to 41 U.S.C. §§ 7105(e), 7108(b), and the 

parties’ stipulation and agreement, that the appeal is sustained. In the nature of a consent 

judgment, the Board makes a monetary award to appellant in the amount of $4,500,000. 

This amount is inclusive of Contract Disputes Act interest. No further interest shall be 

paid.

Dated: February 2, 2023

JOHN J. THRASHER

Administrative Judge

Chairman

Armed Services Board

of Contract Appeals

(Signatures continued)
2

I concur

RICHARD SHACKLEFORD 

Administrative Judge

Vice Chairman

Armed Services Board

of Contract Appeals

I concur

OWEN C. WILSON

Administrative Judge

Vice Chairman

Armed Services Board

of Contract Appeals

I certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the Opinion and Decision of the 

Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals in ASBCA Nos. 63476, 63477, Appeals of 

Head Inc. - Diaz Joint Venture, rendered in conformance with the Board’s Charter.

Dated: February 2, 2023

PAULLA K. GATES-LEWIS

Recorder, Armed Services

Board of Contract Appeals
**Exhibit 12.1**

STATEMENT OFCALCULATION OFRATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES(Dollars in Thousands)

For the purpose ofcalculating the ratio of earnings to fixed charges, “earnings” represent incomebefore income taxes plus fixed charges. “Fixed charges” consist of(a) interest expensed and capitalized; (b) amortized premiums,discounts and capitalized expenses related to indebtedness; and (c) anestimate of the interest within rental expenses.
| ** **                                 | ** ** | **Fiscal Year Ended** | ** ** |
|--------------------------------------------|------------|---------------------------------|------------|
| ** **                                 | ** ** | **2003**                        | ** ** | **2004** | ** ** | **2005** | ** ** | **2006** | ** ** |
| **Earnings:**                              | ** ** | ** **                      | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** | ** ** |
| Earnings before Fixed  Charges             |       | $                               | 8,865      |   | $ | 12,447 |   | $ | 18,276 |   | $ | 20,229 |   |
|                                       |       |                            |       |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| **Fixed Charges:**                         |       |                            |       |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Exp (Inc Amort of Debt  Costs)             |       | 8,553                           |       | 22,822 |   | 22,406 |   | 22,243 |   |
| Less Capitalized  Interest                 |       | (1,489                          | )          | (4,017 | ) | 0 |   | 0 |   |
| Estimated Interest  within Rental Expenses |       | 0                               |       | 0 |   | 0 |   | 0 |   |
| Total Fixed Charges                        |       | 7,064                           |       | 18,805 |   | 22,406 |   | 22,243 |   |
|                                       |       |                            |       |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Amort of Capitalized  Interest             |       | 39                              |       | 318 |   | 318 |   | 318 |   |
| Less Capitalized  Interest                 |       | (1,489                          | )          | (4,017 | ) | 0 |   | 0 |   |
| Total                                      |       | (1,450                          | )          | (3,699 | ) | 318 |   | 318 |   |
|                                       |       |                            |       |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Total Earnings                             |       | 15,968                          |       | 31,569 |   | 41,000 |   | 42,970 |   |
| Fixed Charges                              |       | 8,553                           |       | 22,822 |   | 22,406 |   | 22,243 |   |
| Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges         |       | 1.87x                           |       | 1.38x |   | 1.83x |   | 1.92x |   |
|                                            |            |                                 |            |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

 

----
#### BOHLAND v. SMITH et al.

No. 712-D.

District Court, E. D. Illinois.

April 18, 1947.

*230See also 7 F.R.D. 364.

Ralph Swanson, of Danville, Ill., for plaintiff.

John A. Appleman, of Urbana, Ill., for defendants.

LINDLEY, District Judge.

The averments of the complaint against the two defendants are m the alternative. There is no direct averment that both defendants or each defendant committed the acts complained of. For this reason the complaint is insufficient.

Defendants contend also that the complaint must negative the fact that any action has been begun by the United States. I do not so understand the law. Section 205(e), Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, § 925(e), provides that a person who buys a commodity for use other than in the course of trade or business may, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation, bring an action against the seller. The complaint avers that the violation occurred on or about July 28, 1946; the suit was filed February 5, 1947. Consequently, on its face, the complaint is sufficient in this respect.

Defendants rightfully insist further that, under the same section, in case the buyer does not bring suit within 30 days, the Administrator may institute such suit in behalf of the United States and that after such suit is instituted by the Administrator, the buyer is barred from bringing an action. But I do not think it follows that there is any necessity of plaintiff negativing these conditions. On the face of the complaint there is no showing that the Administrator has begun any action on behalf of the United States to recover damages. A criminal charge is not within the language of the section covering suits in behalf of the United States.

The motion to dismiss is allowed because of the failure to aver directly a violation by each defendant It is overruled on all other grounds. Plaintiff may have 10 days within which to amend the complaint in the respect mentioned.
**Exhibit 31.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

I,Saed Mohseni, certify that:

1.     I havereviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of McCormick &Schmick’s Seafood Restaurants, Inc.;

2.     Based onmy knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, notmisleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.     Based onmy knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financialcondition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, andfor, the periods presented in this report;

4.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

a)               Designed suchdisclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;

b)              [Reserved.]

c)               Evaluated theeffectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and

d)              Disclosed in thisreport any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reportingthat occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting;

5.     Theregistrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)               All significantdeficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting  whichare reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and

b)              Anyfraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.
| Date: April 8, 2005 | By:    | /s/ SAED  MOHSENI         |
|--------------------------|--------|---------------------------|
|                     |   | Saed Mohseni              |
|                     |   | *Chief Executive Officer* |
|                          |        |                           |  |

 

----
#### Graham Brothers Aktiebolag (a Corporation), Plaintiff, *v.*St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company and Another, Defendants.

Supreme Court, New York County,

October 22, 1925.

Costs — security for costs — motion by plaintifE to vacate order requiring it to give security for costs —■ intervening defendant obtaining order compelling plaintiff to give said security not “ tb,e defendant,” within meaning of Civil Practice Act, § 1522 —■ order vacated.

Plaintiff’s motion to vacate an order, obtained by an intervening defendant, made a party defendant herein on his own motion, requiring it to give security for costs, should be granted, since said defendant is not, within the meaning of section 1522 of the Civil Practice Act, “ the defendant ” entitled to compel a , plaintiff to give security for costs. The words “ the defendant ” mean the defendant originally sued or brought in on motion by the plaintiff.

Moreover, security for costs should not be allowed a defendant whom plaintiff had no desire to bring in as a party defendant.

Motion by plaintiff to vacate order requiring it to give security for costs.

*Gustav*Lange, for the plaintiff.

*Hornblower, Miller & Garrison [Lindley M. Garrison*and *John C. Banser*of counsel], for the defendant Berg.

Proskauer, J.

This action was originally brought against the defendant insurance company only. Berg applied for leave to intervene. His application was resisted by the plaintiff and he finally succeeded in the Appellate Division. (213 App. Div. 810.) He has filed .an answer containing some denials and setting up an affirmative cause of action against his codefendant. He obtained an order compelling plaintiff to give him security for costs and plaintiff moves to vacate that • order. Its contention is that it did not sue this defendant and that it should not be prejudiced in maintaining the action against the defendant it did sue by the circumstance that Berg had himself made a party defendant on his own motion. The situation appears to be novel and no authority is cited by either side. While the defendant may bring himself within the language of section 1522 of the Civil Practice Act, literally construed, it seems to me highly unreasonable that he should be allowed to subject the plaintiff to the necessity of giving this undertaking in spite of the circumstance that the plaintiff had no desire whatever to sue Berg or bring him in as a party. A reasonable construction of section 1522 seems to me to require a holding that the words *“*the defendant *”*mean the defendant originally sued or brought in on motion of the plaintiff.

Motion to vacate order for security for costs granted,