United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted August 18, 2017*

Decided November 9, 2017 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 16-2941 

MICHAEL S. WILSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DONALD GAETZ and 

MICHELLE CREWS, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the 

United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 14-CV-71-NJR-DGW 

Nancy J. Rosenstengel, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Michael Wilson, an Illinois inmate, claimed that the warden and law librarian at 

Pinckneyville Correctional Center violated his First Amendment right to access the 

courts. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the 

defendants, reasoning that they were shielded by qualified immunity. Wilson appeals. 

 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 16-2941 Page 2 

The underlying facts are undisputed. Wilson asked to use the law library in 

March 2012 while litigating against his ex-wife in state court over his involvement with 

their son. Wilson contended that his ex-wife was hindering his communication with the 

boy and he was working on a petition asking the state judge to intervene in this dispute. 

Michelle Crews, the law librarian, denied Wilson’s request, explaining that inmates 

working on criminal and civil-rights matters are given priority to use the library. The 

library is not equipped to assist with family-law matters, Crews explained, though she 

promised to “see about getting you in” if space became available. Wilson filed a 

grievance contesting this answer, but Warden Donald Gaetz rejected it. 

The following month Wilson asked Crews for the address of the Peoria County 

courthouse as well as a form to request a hearing before a judge. Crews complied but 

reminded him that criminal and civil-rights cases are the priority of library staff. 

Wilson then filed a petition in state court asking for a hearing on his allegation 

that his ex-wife was violating an order authorizing him to communicate with his son. 

The judge denied the first petition in June 2012 because Wilson had not appeared in 

court or served his ex-wife. Eight months later, in February 2013, Wilson filed another 

petition in state court, this time demanding full parental rights. He asked the judge to 

set the matter for a hearing and issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. The 

record does not disclose how the judge responded, though prison administrators told 

Wilson that the state court had not issued a writ requiring his presence. 

In January 2014 Wilson filed this suit against Gaetz and Crews, accusing them of 

depriving him of access to the courts by (1) refusing his March 2012 request to use the 

law library; (2) prioritizing criminal and civil-rights matters over his case; and (3) not 

transporting him to court in June 2012 when his first petition was considered. At 

summary judgment the defendants principally contended that they were entitled to 

qualified immunity on the ground that Wilson did not have a clearly established right 

to legal resources or assistance in family-court matters. A magistrate judge accepted 

that contention, and the district judge agreed, reasoning that there is no controlling 

precedent recognizing a prisoner’s right to use a law library for matters other than 

criminal and civil-rights cases. 

On appeal Wilson contends that his right of access to the courts encompassed 

family-law matters and so his request to use the law library for that purpose should not 

have been denied. He also contends that he had a right to be present for hearings in 

state court on such matters. 
No. 16-2941 Page 3 

Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability as long as 

their actions do not “violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 

(2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); see Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 

850 F.3d 335, 340 (7th Cir. 2017). We undertake a two-step analysis to determine 

whether government officials are entitled to qualified immunity. First, we determine 

whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show a violation of 

a constitutional right. Gill, 850 F.3d at 340. We then evaluate whether the constitutional 

right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See id.

Prisoners have a constitutional right to access the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 

518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 824 (1977). This right requires 

that prison officials give inmates the tools to attack their sentences and to challenge the 

conditions of their confinement. See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 553 (7th Cir. 2009);

Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 290 (7th Cir. 2004). The right to access the courts also 

protects “the right to file other civil actions in court that have a reasonable basis in law 

or fact.” Snyder, 380 F.3d at 290. We assume for the sake of argument that this right 

covers Wilson’s requests for assistance in his family-court case. 

Still, the district court was correct to enter summary judgment because a jury 

could not reasonably find from the evidence that Wilson’s inability to use the law 

library prevented him from pursuing a nonfrivolous, or potentially meritorious, legal 

action. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414–15 (2002); Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 

664, 671 (7th Cir. 2009). Wilson filed two petitions in state court asking for specific relief 

in his dispute with his ex-wife. He also knew enough to seek a writ from the state judge 

compelling his appearance. As far as this record shows, the state court never issued a 

writ, and there is no evidence that the defendants prevented Wilson from seeking relief 

from the state judge or appearing in court. Wilson’s submissions to the state court 

demonstrate that his access to the courts was unimpeded. Accordingly, a reasonable 

jury could not find the defendants liable for interfering with or otherwise depriving 

Wilson of his right to access the courts. See Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th 

Cir. 1996). 

We have considered Wilson’s other contentions but none has merit. The 

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.