IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MARY V., on behalf of L.V., a minor, )

) No. 20 C 3420

Plaintiff, )

) Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman

v. )

)

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner )

of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Mary V., on behalf of minor child L.V., appeals the Commissioner’s decision denying 

L.V.’s application for Social Security benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms 

the Commissioner’s decision. 

Background

Plaintiff, on behalf of L.V., applied for supplemental security income on July 25, 2014, 

alleging a disability onset date of July 1, 2014. (R. 50.) The application was denied initially, on 

reconsideration, and after a hearing before an ALJ. (R. 13-24, 58, 68.) The Appeals Council 

denied review (R. 1-3), and plaintiff appealed to this Court, which remanded the case to the 

Commissioner for further proceedings. (R. 524-34.) After another hearing, the ALJ once again 

denied L.V.’s claim. (R. 404-15.) Plaintiff did not seek review by the Appeals Council and the 

Appeals Council did not otherwise assume jurisdiction over this case, leaving the ALJ’s decision 

as the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1484(d).

The ALJ used the three-part, sequential test for determining whether a child is disabled, 

considering whether: (1) L.V. had performed any substantial gainful activity during the period for 

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which she claims disability; (2) she has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; and 

(3) her impairment meets, medically equals, or functionally equals a listed impairment. (R. 14); 

see 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b)-(d). In determining whether an impairment functionally equals a 

listing, the ALJ must consider the child’s functioning in six domains: (1) “[a]cquiring and using 

information”; (2) “[a]ttending and completing tasks”; (3) “[i]nteracting and relating with others”; 

(4) “[m]oving about and manipulating objects”; (5) “[c]aring for [one]self”; and (6) “[h]ealth and 

physical well-being.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). An impairment or combination of impairments 

functionally equals a listing if the child has “marked” limitations in two of the domains or an 

“extreme” limitation in one of the domains. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d). A “marked” limitation is 

one that is “‘more than moderate’ but ‘less than extreme.’” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). A child 

has a “marked” limitation when her “impairment(s) interferes seriously with [her] ability to 

independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.” Id. An “extreme” limitation is the “rating 

. . . give[n] to the worst limitations,” though it does not “necessarily [require] a total lack or loss 

of ability to function.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i).

At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since the date of her application. (R. 405.) At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff has the severe 

impairments of “attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD); a learning disorder; an 

adjustment disorder and anxiety.” (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff does not have 

an impairment that meets, medically equals, or functionally equals a listed impairment. (R. 405-

12.) Thus, the ALJ concluded, plaintiff is not disabled. (R. 415.)

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Discussion

The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially, affirming if it is supported by 

“substantial evidence in the record,” i.e., “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” White v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1992) 

(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “Although this standard is generous, 

it is not entirely uncritical,” and the case must be remanded if the “decision lacks evidentiary 

support.” Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination that L.V. is not markedly limited in the 

domain of interacting and relating with others is not supported by substantial evidence. “In this 

domain, [the ALJ] consider[s] how well [the claimant] initiate[s] and sustain[s] emotional 

connections with others, develop[s] and use[s] the language of [her] community, cooperate[s] with 

others, compl[ies] with rules, respond[s] to criticism, and respect[s] and take[s] care of the 

possessions of others.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(i). “Interacting means initiating and responding to 

exchanges with other people, for practical or social purposes . . . . by using facial expressions, 

gestures, actions, or words.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(i)(1)(i). “Relating to other people means 

forming intimate relationships with family members and with friends who are [the same] age, and 

sustaining them over time.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(i)(1)(ii).

In discussing this domain, the ALJ acknowledged that L.V. has “anger issues,” “was easily 

frustrated,” and “would cry out and negatively react when she had a conflict with a peer.” (R. 

411.) However, the ALJ concluded that L.V. is not markedly limited in this domain because:

[A]t the December 2014 consultative examination, [L.V.] was described as 

having no behavior problems; she had few friends; she was cooperative during the 

examination; and her demeanor was friendly and outgoing.

In addition, within [L.V.’s] IEPs, there were also reports of positive social 

behavior. For example, in March 2016, [L.V.] was described as quiet, respectful 

and kind. As another example, [L.V.’s] May 2018 IEP indicates that [L.V.] 

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interacted appropriately with her peers and teachers; she was well behaved and 

well-liked by her classmates; she was very helpful around the classroom; and she 

had appropriate independent functioning skills. Similarly, in 2019, [L.V.’s] IEP 

stated that [L.V.] interacted appropriately with her peers and with adults in the 

classroom; and she participated in class and volunteered to do so.

Moreover, in September 2019, Sarah Kelly, [L.V.’s] diverse learner teacher, 

and Scott Fogel, [L.V.’s] Algebra teacher, reported that [L.V.] has no problems 

interacting and relating to others. Likewise, [L.V.’s] freshman seminar co-teacher 

reported that [L.V.] has no problems in interacting and relating to others.

(R. 411-12) (citations omitted). 

The ALJ did not consider L.V.’s speech and language skills in this domain, which plaintiff 

contends is error. The Commissioner’s guidance on evaluating this domain states, in part: 

The ability to interact and relate with others requires the ability to communicate in 

an age-appropriate manner. To communicate with others, a child needs both speech 

and language. Speech is the production of sounds for the purpose of oral 

communication. Language provides the message of communication. It involves 

understanding what is heard and read (receptive language) and expressing what one 

wants to say to others, either orally or in writing (expressive language). Within 

age-appropriate expectations, a child must speak clearly enough to be understood, 

understand the message that another person is communicating, and formulate 

sentences well enough to convey a message.

SSR 09-5P, 2009 WL 396026, at *3 (Feb. 17, 2009) (footnotes omitted).

As plaintiff points out, there is evidence that L.V. has struggles with reading and writing, 

which negatively impact her academic performance. (See, e.g., R. 738 (2017 IEP stating that L.V. 

“is inconsistent in her ability to fluently read grade level passages and books with independence,” 

which causes her to “struggle with comprehension,” and she “struggles to write with sufficient 

detail”); R. 703 (2016 IEP stating that L.V. “has a difficult time recalling facts” and needs 

“assistance when learning new vocabulary words”); R. 902 (2014 IEP stating that L.V. can 

“verbally communicate her needs and/or wants” but “struggles with written communication” and 

“has trouble writing complete, coherent grammatically correct sentences”).) But there is no 

evidence to suggest that L.V.’s speech cannot be understood, she cannot understand what others 

say to her, or she “[h]as difficulty communicating with others,” the hallmarks of a limitation in 

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this domain. SSR 09-5P, 2009 WL 396026, at *3, *7. Because the record does not show that 

L.V.’s difficulties with reading and writing inhibit her ability to communicate with other people, 

the ALJ’s failure to consider them in evaluating the domain of interacting and relating with others, 

if error, was harmless. See Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 924 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that the 

doctrine of harmless error applies to judicial review of administrative decisions).

Alternatively, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s evaluation of L.V.’s subjective symptoms is 

flawed. She argues that: (1) L.V.’s IEPs, Vanderbilt assessments,

1 and the testimony of expert 

witness Dr. Anderson are consistent with “marked limitations in the domain[] of . . . Attending 

and Completing Tasks”; (2) evidence that L.V. improved with medication is not “per se

inconsistent” with a finding of disability; and (3) the teacher questionnaires the ALJ cites are 

unreliable because the teachers had only known L.V. for three weeks when they completed the 

forms. (ECF 25 at 13-14.) The ALJ found that all of this evidence, including the teacher 

questionnaires, supported a finding that L.V. was markedly limited in the domain of acquiring and 

using information but not in the domain of attending and completing tasks. (R. 409-11.) Plaintiff 

does not substantively contest the ALJ’s finding with respect to the latter domain, and thus has 

waived the issue. See Scarberry v. Astrue, No. 1:11-CV-00816-MJD, 2012 WL 3579916, at *7 

(S.D. Ind. Aug. 17, 2012) (“Scarberry makes no argument here why res judicata should not have 

applied to any of these instances in the medical record and therefore waives such argument.”).

Given that waiver, any symptom evaluation error the ALJ may have made related to the domain

of attending and completing tasks is harmless. Parker, 597 F.3d at 924.

1 The Vanderbilt assessment “is a psychological assessment tool for parents of children aged 6 to 12 designed to 

measure the severity of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms” and “also includes items related 

to other disorders which are frequently comorbid with ADHD.” Vanderbilt ADHD Diagnostic Rating Scale (VADRS) 

(psychology-tools.com) (last visited May 6, 2021).

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Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision and 

terminates this case.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED: March 31, 2022

M. David Weisman

United States Magistrate Judge

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