IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FREDERICK B.,1 

 Claimant,

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI,2

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Respondent.

No. 20 C 2371

Magistrate Judge Jeffrey T. Gilbert

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Fredrick B.’s (“Claimant”) Motion for 

Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).

[ECF No. 35]. The Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) opposes 

Claimant’s Motion, in part. [ECF No. 38]. For the following reasons, Claimant’s 

Motion is granted, and Claimant’s counsel is awarded $ 8,305.37 in attorney fees and 

costs.

I. Background and Procedural History

Claimant filed his applications for disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income on March 2, 2011, alleging a disability onset date of 

1 Pursuant to Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 8.1 and Internal Operating Procedure 

22, the Court will identify the non-government party by using his first name and the first 

initial of the last name.

2 Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on July 9, 2021. 

Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has substituted 

Acting Commissioner Kijakazi as the named defendant.

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December 6, 2010. His claims were denied initially, and again upon reconsideration. 

After an administrative hearing, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Melissa Olivero 

issued an opinion on September 21, 2012, finding Claimant was not disabled. 

Claimant then filed a civil action in the district court, and on October 28, 2015, the 

court reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded the case for further 

administrative proceedings. See Barr v. Colvin, 2015 WL 6530666 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 

2015). ALJ William Spalo held a hearing on April 18, 2016, and Claimant’s 

applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income were 

denied again on May 3, 2016. 

On January 17, 2018, Claimant filed a statement of exceptions, and the 

Appeals Council remanded the claims to the ALJ for further evaluation. Following 

the Appeals Council’s remand, ALJ Spalo held another hearing on July 23, 2018, and 

issued a decision on August 7, 2018. ALJ Spalo concluded that Claimant had become 

disabled on October 19, 2016, but he was not disabled prior to that date. Following 

another timely statement of exceptions, the Appeals Council declined to assume 

jurisdiction by notice dated February 22, 2020, thereby causing the opinion issued by 

ALJ Spalo on August 7, 2018 to become the final decision of the Commissioner. 

Claimant timely filed this action for judicial review on April 17, 2020, seeking 

reversal of the Commissioner’s decision and remand for further administrative 

proceedings. [ECF No. 1]. Claimant filed a Memorandum in Support of Summary 

Remand on October 23, 2020. [ECF No. 26]. The parties then filed an Agreed Motion 

for Reversal with Remand for Further Administrative Proceedings on February 2, 

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2021, which this Court granted on the same date. [ECF Nos. 31, 33]. Claimant now 

seeks $8,305.37 in attorney fees and costs pursuant to the EAJA.

II. Analysis

Under the EAJA, a court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs if: (1) 

the claimant was a prevailing party; (2) the Commissioner’s position was not 

substantially justified; (3) there are no special circumstances that would make an 

award unjust; and (4) the claimant files a complete and timely application. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2412(d)(1)(A)-(B); Stewart v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2009). The 

Commissioner does not dispute that Claimant was the prevailing party, that he filed 

a timely application, that no special circumstances exist that would make an award 

unjust, or that the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified. At issue 

here is solely whether the fee award Claimant seeks is reasonable.

The Commissioner takes issue with three aspects of Claimant’s requested fee 

award. First, the Commissioner argues that the hourly attorney rate requested by 

Claimant is unreasonable because Claimant used the national Consumer Price Index 

(“CPI”) rather than the Chicago regional CPI. According to the Commissioner, the 

EAJA award should be calculated using the regional CPI, which would result in a

slightly lower hourly rate. Second, the Commissioner argues that Claimant’s counsel 

should have used one-tenth billing increments instead of quarter-hour increments. 

Third, the Commissioner argues that Claimant forfeited his argument that the hourly 

rate for counsel’s paralegal should be $100. The Court is not persuaded by any of the 

Commissioner’s arguments.

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Under the EAJA, an award of attorney fees “shall be based upon the prevailing 

market rates for the kind and quality of services furnished, except that ... attorney 

fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour unless the court determines 

that an increase in the cost of living ... justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2412(d)(1)(A)(ii). Congress set the current $125 maximum hourly rate under the 

EAJA in 1996, but in more recent years, the Seventh Circuit determined that “given 

the passage of time since the establishment of the [$125] hourly rate, a cost-of-living 

adjustment is warranted.” Trump v. Colvin, 2015 WL 970111, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 

2015) (citing Tchemkow v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir. 2008)). The Seventh 

Circuit has since clarified the appropriate measure for calculating the cost-of-living 

adjustment for EAJA petitions. In Sprinkle v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2015), 

the Seventh Circuit determined that the CPI is sufficient “proof of an increase in the 

cost of living” and the court “should generally award the inflation-adjusted rate 

according to the CPI, using the date on which the legal services were 

performed.” Trump, 2015 WL 970111, at *2 (citing Sprinkle, 777 F.3d at 423). 

The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Sprinkle, however, does not create an 

automatic entitlement to a fee enhancement. In order to justify a higher rate, 

“claimants must still produce satisfactory evidence that the rate they request is in 

line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of 

comparable skill and experience.” Sprinkle, 777 F.3d at 428. Moreover, “courts may 

not award claimants inflation-adjusted rates that are higher than prevailing market 

rates.” Trump, 2015 WL 970111, at *3; see also Sprinkle, 777 F.3d at 429 (holding 

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that “to avoid the possibility of a ‘windfall,’ courts may not award an inflationadjusted rate that is higher than the prevailing market rate in the community for

comparable legal services”). The Seventh Circuit has left it to the discretion of the 

district courts whether to use the national or the regional CPI when calculating the 

inflation-adjusted hourly rate. Sprinkle, 777 F.3d at n.2. (“We ... leave to the 

discretion of the district courts whether to adopt the national or regional index in 

specific cases.”). Since then, district courts in the Seventh Circuit have continued to 

calculate the enhanced rate using both the national and regional CPI, and no uniform 

consensus has been reached on the issue. Compare Vasquez v. Colvin, 2016 WL 

687900, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2016), with Fox v. Colvin, 2016 WL 5402751, at *2 

(N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2016). 

In previous cases, this Court has analyzed the CPI issue and recently decided 

to use the national CPI measure. See e.g., Perez on behalf of Velez v. Berryhill, 2018 

WL 752316, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2018) Cummings v. Berryhill, 2017 WL 926766, at 

*3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2017); Rodriguez v. Colvin, 2013 WL 5221335, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. 

Sept. 16, 2013). Other district courts in this circuit have done the same.3 Often, 

3 See e.g., Laurel C. v. Saul, 2020 WL 5569830, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2020) (using the 

national CPI because it “results in a fee award more in line with the prevailing market rate”); 

Linda W. v. Saul, 2020 WL 1487281, at *2 n.1 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2020) (noting “some confusion 

in the case law over whether courts should use a regional CPI or the national CPI,” but using 

the national CPI as proposed by the plaintiff); Mark L. v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 7500520, at *2 

n.1 (C.D. Ill. June 5, 2019) (using national CPI as requested by the plaintiff and the motion 

for fees was unopposed); Spraggins v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 661553, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2018) 

(using national CPI when “the plaintiff’s counsel provided adequate support for their fee 

calculation in the form of itemized statements of time expended on the case, as well as several 

affidavits from other attorneys verifying that the quoted hourly rate is a reasonable one for 

social security work, as it is below the market rate for social security work.”); Abhsie v. 

Berryhill, 2017 WL 4804741, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2017) (“Because the government does 

not contend that the regional rate should apply here, the court uses the national CPI as 

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courts that adopt a national CPI measure do so in significant part because a national 

measure results in a fee award that “is more in line with the prevailing market 

rate.” Seefeldt v. Colvin, 2016 WL 5793683, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 30, 2016); see 

also Fox, 2016 WL 5402751, at *3 (“Moreover, plaintiff’s argument that we should use 

the index that results in an hourly rate that comes closest to approximating the 

prevailing market rate is not an unreasonable one.”). The Court finds this rationale 

persuasive, and the Court is not convinced by the Commissioner’s argument that 

using the regional CPI is a better approach in this district located in one of the largest 

metropolitan legal markets in the country.

Next, the Commissioner argues that Claimant’s counsel should have used onetenth billing increments instead of quarter-hour increments. The Court is not 

persuaded by the Commissioner’s argument in this respect either. The Commissioner 

contends that Claimant’s uniform use of one-quarter hour billing increments is 

proposed by [the plaintiff].”); Banks v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2017 WL 3634300, at *4 (N.D. 

Ind. Aug. 23, 2017) (regardless of whether the national or regional CPI is used, the rate the 

plaintiff seeks is consistent with other comparable cases, and there’s a “relatively small” 

difference between the national and regional CPI rates in any event); Williams v. Berryhill, 

2017 WL 1355876, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2017) (using the national CPI and holding that

“given the minuscule difference in the rates and the strength of plaintiff's evidence in support 

of a CPI adjustment, the Court opts for the higher hourly rate of $192.68 (for 2016)”); Fox v. 

Colvin, 2016 WL 5402751, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 2016) (recognizing that “plaintiff’s 

argument that we should use the index that results in an hourly rate that comes closest to 

approximating the prevailing market rate is not an unreasonable one. . . . Defendant has not 

cited any cases in which courts chose the regional over the national CPI in calculating the 

hourly rate in a contested EAJA fee matter, and has offered no evidence that the hourly rate 

sought in this case is out of line with the hourly rates awarded in other cases.”); Monk v. 

Colvin, 2016 WL 4445659, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2016) (finding “the rate derived from the 

national index is closer to the rates detailed in other supporting evidence submitted by [the 

plaintiff],” including affidavits, and “comparable to the hourly rates recently approved by 

other courts in this district”); Cobb v. Colvin, 2013 WL 1787494, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2013) 

(“This court agrees that [the plaintiff] may use the national CPI to show that the cost of living 

in this region has indeed increased to the degree of the requested adjustment.”).

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unreasonable because some of the tasks for which that increment of time was billed 

should have taken only a few minutes. The Commissioner identified 24 quarter-hour 

billing entries for Claimant’s attorney and four paralegal entries and says some of 

these entries likely are “exaggerated” while acknowledging that others likely are not.

See Commissioner’s Resp. Brief [ECF No. 38], at 6, fn.6. For that reason, the 

Commissioner says Claimant has not met his burden to show that a quarter-hour 

minimum billing rate is reasonable. In the Court’s view, however, Claimant has met 

his threshold burden and the Commissioner has not shown otherwise with a 

generalized argument that billing at a quarter-hour for the work actually performed

(as documented in those entries) is unreasonable and/or excessive. The Commissioner 

suggests that all those entries should be reduced across the board without any specific 

reasons why that should be done. The Court has reviewed the entries in question and 

cannot say that the time billed for each is unreasonable per se for an experienced 

lawyer or paralegal. 

The only case cited by Commissioner to support its argument, Schulten v. 

Astrue, 2010 WL 2135474 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2010), actually granted the plaintiff’s 

request for an attorney fees award based on quarter-hour increments. Id. at *5. 

Specifically, the district court noted that requiring a “reduction of charges merely 

because they were billed in quarter hour segments of time rather than one-tenth of 

an hour . . . . would make the inquiry turn solely on the way in which the time is 

recorded, rather than whether the time spent was excessive, unnecessary or 

redundant. And that, in turn, would be contrary to the text of the EAJA.” Id. at *3. 

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This Court agrees with that approach. The Commissioner has not offered any specific 

argument or evidence as to why the quarter-hour increments used by counsel here 

result in “excessive, unnecessary, or redundant” billing, and the Court is not 

persuaded by the Commissioner’s high level, generalized argument to that effect. 

Therefore, the Court declines to reduce Claimant’s quarter-hour billing entries to onetenth hour entries.

The Commissioner’s last challenge to the fee request is that Claimant forfeited 

his argument that the hourly rate of counsel’s paralegal should be $100. The Court 

again disagrees with the Commissioner. The Commissioner relies on two cases from 

over 15 years ago to argue for a $25 to $50 per hour paralegal rate. See 

Commissioner’s Resp. [ECF No. 38], at 5. In response, Claimant argues that district 

courts recently have held that $100 per hour is a reasonable rate for paralegal work

in this circuit. See, e.g., Wilson v. Saul, 2020 WL 6905531 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 24, 2020), 

Kevin H. v. Saul, 2020 WL 5893969, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 2, 2020). Indeed, “several 

recent decisions in this district have approved hourly rates ranging from $125 to $210 

for paralegals.” Herrera v. Grand Sports Arena, LLC, 2018 WL 6511155, at *3 (N.D. 

Ill. Dec. 11, 2018).

The issue here is whether the requested hourly paralegal rate is reasonable 

and in line with the prevailing market rate. Recent cases confirm that a $100 hourly 

rate for paralegal work is reasonable in this market. These cases, along with the 

affidavits submitted by Claimant’s attorneys and their paralegal, show that the $100 

per hour rate requested is reasonable, and the Commissioner has offered little by way 

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of evidence to support its claim that an experienced paralegal should only merit a 

billing rate of $25 to $50 per hour.

The Court also disagrees with the Commissioner that Claimant forfeited any 

argument that the prevailing market rate for counsel’s paralegal is $100. Claimant’s 

threshold showing was sufficient here. In addition, in previous cases before this 

Court, the Commissioner did not challenge a $95 hourly rate for paralegal work. See 

Perez, 2018 WL 752316 (approving a $95 hourly rate for paralegal work that was not 

challenged by the Commissioner); Cummings, 2017 WL 926766 (same). Therefore, 

the Court will approve the $100 hourly rate for the paralegal worked performed in 

this case.

Finally, Claimant’s attorneys represent that they expended 6.75 additional 

hours reading the Commissioner’s response brief and researching and drafting their

reply, and therefore, Claimant requests an additional $1,425.26, for a total of 

$8,305.37 in fees. Claimant states that this amount was reached by multiplying 6.75 

hours by $211.15, the adjusted EAJA hourly rate from February 2021. See [ECF No.

36-2] (Claimant’s fee calculation). Claimant also states that counsel used the 

February 2021 adjusted rate instead of calculating a new rate for June 2021 in an 

effort to reduce the cost of preparing the reply. The Court finds Claimant’s request 

for reimbursement of the time spent on the reply brief is reasonable. Accordingly, the 

Court will award the additional hours requested.

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III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, Claimant’s Motion for Attorney Fees Under 

the Equal Access to Justice Act [ECF No. 35] is granted, and Claimant’s counsel is 

awarded $ 8,305.37 in attorney fees and costs.

It is so ordered.

____________________________________

Jeffrey T. Gilbert 

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: September 10, 2021

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