IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Cabon/Cabon's Central :

Auto Service, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 147 C.D. 2016

: Submitted: August 12, 2016

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Motor Vehicles :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE SIMPSON FILED: October 17, 2016

Robert Cabon/Cabon’s Central Auto Service (Cabon) asks whether 

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) erred in dismissing

its statutory appeal of two consecutive one-year suspensions of its Certificate of 

Appointment (Certificate) as an official emission inspection station as well as a 

fine of $5,000 imposed by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor 

Vehicles (PennDOT). Cabon asserts the trial court’s decision is not supported by 

substantial evidence and the trial court erred as a matter of law. He also contends 

PennDOT did not follow required procedures to justify an order upholding the 

suspension and fines. Upon review, we affirm.

I. Background

By official notice dated March 13, 2015, PennDOT notified Cabon of 

the imposition of two consecutive one-year suspensions of his Certificate and two 
2

fines of $2,500 each for: (1) furnishing, lending, giving, selling or receiving a 

certificate of inspection without inspection; and, (2) fraudulent recordkeeping. See

Section 4724 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §4724.

Cabon appealed to the trial court. The Honorable Robert C. Gallo

(now retired) held a hearing. After the hearing, Judge Gallo entered an order 

dismissing Cabon’s appeal. Cabon appealed to this Court, and the trial court 

directed it to file a concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal, which 

it did. The trial court, through Senior Judge Lester G. Nauhaus, then issued an

opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a), in which it set forth the following findings.

At the hearing, PennDOT presented the testimony of Quality 

Assurance Officer Aaron Dacko (QAO Dacko). QAO Dacko testified he was

employed with Parsons Subcontracting (Parsons), through PennDOT, as a quality

assurance officer for 10 years. He has also been certified by PennDOT as an 

official emissions inspector for 10 years. QAO Dacko conducts audits and 

investigates inspection emissions stations to ensure inspection stickers are properly

issued. Tr. Ct. Hr’g, Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 10/8/15, at 8; Reproduced Record 

(R.R.) at 8a.

An Onboard Diagnostic (OBD) test is required for emissions

inspections on all vehicles with a model year of 1996 or newer. N.T. at 8-9; R.R. 

at 8a-9a. The specific requirements to properly perform the OBD test are found in 

67 Pa. Code §177.203. The OBD test requires a station’s technician to plug a

cable from an emissions analyzer into the vehicle being tested so that the vehicle 
3

and the analyzer may communicate with each other. Id. The analyzer records the 

Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) of the vehicle that receives the inspection 

sticker.

PennDOT investigated Cabon because its station number was listed 

on a monthly printout that showed six discrepancies between a) the VINs Cabon’s 

technicians inputted or scanned into the analyzer from information on the owner’s 

vehicle registration card, and b) the VINs from the vehicles that were actually 

connected to the analyzer. These VINs should match, and when they do not, that

information is listed in the printout. N.T. at 9; R.R. at 9a.

The trial court explained the printout was Parson’s business record. 

Cabon objected to its admission, claiming it was a PennDOT record and there was 

no PennDOT witness present to testify. N.T. at 21; R.R. at 21a. The trial court 

explained it properly admitted the printout in light of QAO Dacko’s testimony that 

Parsons owns and operates the server that transmits all of the records from every 

emissions analyzer to Harrisburg. Parsons stores and processes all the data 

recorded from the analyzer for the printout. N.T. at 11; R.R. at 11a. Parsons does 

not provide the analyzers to inspection stations; rather, “[t]hey are independent 

analyzers and manufacturers.” N.T. at 27; R.R. at 27a. The printout contains a 

table that lists the make, year, model and VINs of vehicles from the vehicle 

owners’ registration cards, which are scanned or typed into the analyzer by the 

technician, and the OBD test VIN and model numbers of vehicles that are 

connected to the analyzer. The printout also contains the inspection station 

number, and the technician’s identification (ID) number. The technician ID 
4

number indicates which technician entered his number into the analyzer to begin 

the emissions testing process. N.T. at 12; R.R. at 12a.

Cabon’s station number is 1449. The printout listed six vehicles for 

which Cabon’s station issued emissions inspection stickers in which there were 

discrepancies between the VINs Cabon’s technicians entered or scanned from the 

vehicle owners’ registration cards and the VINs recorded by the analyzer from the 

vehicles actually connected during the OBD test. In other words, relying on QAO 

Dacko’s testimony and its documentary evidence, including the monthly printout, 

PennDOT claimed Cabon issued emissions inspection stickers to six vehicles that 

did not undergo the required OBD emissions testing. As such, the printout listed 

six mismatches for Cabon’s station with two technician ID numbers.

Dan Kardell (Kardell) was the technician assigned to two of the 

vehicles; the other four vehicles used the technician ID number for the station’s 

owner, Robert Cabon. N.T. at 18-19.

1

 Kardell performed inspections for 17 years, 

and Robert Cabon performed inspections for 19 years. N.T. at 60-61; R.R. at 60a61a. Neither Kardell nor Robert Cabon was previously involved with an 

inspection station violation. Further, it was stipulated that Robert Cabon was

recovering from surgery during the relevant period; thus, he was not personally 

 

1 On direct examination, QAO Dacko testified Robert Cabon’s technician identification

(ID) number was used in connection with four of the emissions inspections; however, on crossexamination, QAO Dacko acknowledged that Robert Cabon’s technician ID number was not the 

technician ID number used in connection with these four inspections. Tr. Ct. Hr’g, Notes of 

Testimony (N.T.), 10/8/15, at 18-19, 28-29; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 18a-19a, 28a-29a.

Nevertheless, the printout described above identified Cabon as the official inspection station that 

performed these four inspections, R.R. at 151a, and Cabon did not deny that these four 

inspections were performed at its station.
5

involved in any of the inspections. N.T. at 38-39; R.R. at 38a-39a. For his part, 

Kardell denied that he ever connected the analyzer to a vehicle other than the one 

subject to inspection. N.T. at 39; R.R. at 39a.

Through Kardell’s testimony, Cabon asserted a defective analyzer 

probably caused the VIN mismatches. Kardell testified that numerous times daily

the connection with the remote computer (the PennDOT computer) would 

terminate because the remote computer did not respond in a timely manner. N.T. 

at 42; R.R. at 42a. This would result in an error code. Kardell testified he 

previously observed a situation in which a VIN was in the analyzer and the error 

code appeared, which caused the same VIN to remain in the analyzer until it was 

cleared, and it could potentially remain there for the next vehicle tested. N.T. at 

43-44; R.R. at 43a-44a.

In its Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, Cabon claimed the trial court 

erred by finding in favor of PennDOT, asserting the trial court’s finding was 

against the weight of the evidence and the evidence was insufficient to sustain the 

trial court’s finding.

The trial court observed that this case involved a matter of credibility, 

and the trial court, as trier of fact, was free to make all credibility determinations. 

It is well-established that the fact-finder exclusively weighs the evidence, assesses 

the credibility of witnesses and may choose to believe all, part, or none of the 

testimony. Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24 (Pa. 2011).
6

Here, the trial court explained that it reviewed the evidence admitted 

at the hearing, and it determined the evidence supported a determination that 

Cabon committed the two violations PennDOT charged: furnishing, lending, 

giving, selling or receiving a certificate of inspection without inspection and 

fraudulent recordkeeping. In particular, the printout showed the discrepancy 

between the VINs. The trial court further stated Cabon’s explanation as to the 

cause of the discrepancy was merely a theory that was unsubstantiated by the 

evidence presented at the hearing. Thus, the trial court stated that this Court 

should affirm the trial court’s order that dismissed Cabon’s appeal of the 

suspension and fines. This matter is now before us for disposition.

II. Issues

On appeal,2 Cabon asserts: the trial court’s decision is not supported 

by substantial evidence; the trial court erred as a matter of law; and, PennDOT did 

not follow the requisite procedures for the suspension and fines to be upheld.

III. Discussion

A. Contentions

Cabon first argues the trial court’s order did not include any findings 

or analysis. Rather, its determination was limited to a single sentence that Cabon’s

appeal was dismissed after due consideration. Cabon further contends the trial 

court’s opinion notes Robert Cabon was recovering from surgery when the 

inspections at issue were conducted; thus, he was not personally involved in any of 

 

2 Our review in an inspection certificate suspension case is limited to determining 

whether the trial court committed an error of law or whether the trial court’s findings were 

supported by substantial evidence. McCarthy v. Dep’t of Transp., 7 A.3d 346 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2010).
7

the inspections. Cabon points out that Kardell performed inspections for 17 years,

and Robert Cabon had a license to perform inspections for 19 years. The trial 

court’s opinion indicates neither of these individuals was involved in prior 

violations. In fact, Kardell testified this was the first time he was aware that Cabon

was accused of connecting the analyzer to the wrong vehicle. Robert Cabon 

confirmed this fact.

Cabon maintains QAO Dacko, PennDOT’s sole witness, admitted he 

had no personal knowledge that Robert Cabon, Kardell, or anyone else actually 

connected the analyzer to the wrong vehicle. Rather, PennDOT based its entire 

case on the printout it submitted to suggest the wrong vehicle was connected to the 

analyzer. QAO Dacko also admitted that the error code referenced by Kardell 

would occur with some frequency indicating the PennDOT computers were not 

connecting. Further, QAO Dacko admitted that when the error code occurred, the 

previous VIN remained in the analyzer for the next vehicle. Cabon contends this 

testimony was significant as the allegations were based on a mismatch of the VINs

in the printout.

Cabon also contends Kardell testified about the difficulty the station 

experienced with the connection to the remote PennDOT computer. It offered a

photograph of the analyzer into evidence to show the connection would terminate 

when the remote PennDOT computer did not timely respond. Kardell testified 

when this occurred, the VIN of the last vehicle inspected would remain in the 

analyzer. Cabon argues it offered Kardell’s testimony to explain why the printout 

PennDOT presented was inaccurate. It contends Kardell’s testimony was not 
8

inconsistent with QAO Dacko’s testimony that the last VIN would remain in the 

analyzer when an error occurred.

Further, Kardell confirmed the period at issue coincided with the 

period in which the computer problem existed. Kardell testified he observed the 

error message many times, and it appeared when Parson’s representatives were 

present. Cabon contends the analyzer at its station was in use since 1996. Cabon 

argues this fact prompted the trial court to ask QAO Dacko whether analyzers were 

inspected or calibrated. QAO Dacko responded that the analyzers were serviced

by the manufacturer based on complaints from station owners.

Cabon maintains the issues here also involve the question of whether 

the trial court’s findings were adequately supported. It argues the evidence 

presented establishes it was in business for many years and this was the first time it

was accused of violations of this nature. Cabon asserts Section 4724(c) of the 

Vehicle Code provides that a court, on appeal from a suspension, may consider the 

volume of inspections conducted by a station and provide the owner of the station 

an opportunity to correct any inaccurate records. 75 Pa. C.S. §4724(c). Cabon 

contends no evidence was presented that it received this opportunity.

Cabon further maintains PennDOT did not present any evidence that it 

satisfied its obligation to offer Cabon points in lieu of suspension, as it must do 

when a station owner has no knowledge of an employee’s violations, as long as 

proper supervision is shown. See McCarthy v. Dep’t of Transp., 7 A.3d 346 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2010); 67 Pa. Code §175.51(b).
9

Cabon argues the fines and suspensions here were based on two 

conclusions: that the wrong vehicle was connected to the analyzer and that its

records were fraudulent. Cabon asserts a finding of fraud requires more than 

speculation based on computer printouts of VIN mismatches. Rather, fraud 

requires proof of intent. It contends QAO Dacko’s testimony that he had no such 

evidence and the fact that Robert Cabon, the station owner, was home recovering 

from surgery, require the trial court’s order be reversed as it was not supported by

sufficient evidence. Cabon asserts the charges here mirror those in Snyder v. 

Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 970 A.2d 523 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2009), in which, it argues, this Court noted that PennDOT did not explain

how a mechanic’s innocent mistake could constitute proof of charges similar to 

those at issue here.

B. Analysis

The trial court’s role in an inspection certificate appeal is limited 

“solely to a de novo determination of whether the person charged with the violation 

has indeed committed the violation for which the sanction was imposed.” Snyder, 

970 A.2d at 527 (quoting Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Verna, 351 

A.2d 694, 695 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976)). Matters of witness credibility are exclusively 

within the province of the trial court. Firestone Tire & Serv. Ctr., O.I.S. # 798 v. 

Dep’t of Transp., 871 A.2d 863 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

The Vehicle Code requires PennDOT to license and regulate vehicle 

inspection stations. Section 4724(a) of the Vehicle Code states, in relevant part:

(a) General rule.--[PennDOT] shall supervise and inspect 

official inspection stations and may suspend the certificate of 
10

appointment issued to a station which it finds is not properly 

equipped or conducted or which has violated or failed to 

comply with any of the provisions of this chapter or regulations 

adopted by [PennDOT]. ...

75 Pa. C.S. §4724(a). We construe this provision as imposing strict liability on a 

station owner for all acts of its employees conducted within the scope of their 

employment. McCarthy; Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Stahl, 460 

A.2d 1223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983). For an act to fall within the “scope of 

employment,” the employee’s conduct must: (1) be of the kind he was employed to 

perform; (2) occur within authorized time and space limits; (3) and must be done at 

least in part to serve the employer. McCarthy, 7 A.3d at 351 (citations omitted). 

The station owner can defend an enforcement action by showing the employee 

acted outside the scope of his employment. Id.

Pursuant to Section 177.427(3) of PennDOT’s regulations: “A person 

may not ... [f]urnish, loan, give or sell certificates of emission inspection and 

approval to any ... other person except upon an emission inspection performed in 

accordance with this chapter.” 67 Pa. Code §177.427(3); see also 67 Pa. Code 

§177.602(a) (setting forth penalty for furnishing, lending, giving, selling or 

receiving of certificate of emission inspection without inspection). In 2014, the 

year Cabon conducted the emissions inspections at issue here, an OBD test was 

required for emissions inspections on all vehicles with a model year of 1996 or 

newer. N.T. at 8-9; R.R. at 8a-9a.

In addition, “fraudulent recordkeeping” is defined as:
11

A recordkeeping entry not in accordance with fact, truth or 

required procedure that falsifies or conceals one or more of the 

following:

(i) That a certificate of inspection was issued without 

compliance with the required inspection procedure.

(ii) The number of inspections performed.

(iii) The individuals or station that performed the 

inspection.

67 Pa. Code §177.601 (emphasis added).

Each of the above violations is punishable by a one-year suspension 

and a fine of $2,500 for a first offense. 67 Pa. Code §177.602(a).

Here, the trial court determined PennDOT properly suspended 

Cabon’s Certificate and imposed fines for providing emissions inspection stickers 

without performing inspections and fraudulent recordkeeping. The record supports 

the trial court’s determinations as to these violations.

More specifically, the trial court credited the testimony of QAO 

Dacko, who served as a quality assurance officer with Parsons, a PennDOT

subcontractor, for 10 years. N.T. at 8; R.R. at 8a. QAO Dacko has been certified 

by PennDOT as an official emissions inspector for 10 years. Id. QAO Dacko 

explained that in 2014, the year at issue, emissions inspections on vehicles with 

model years of 1996 or newer required an OBD test, which requires the technician 

to connect a cable from the analyzer to the vehicle being tested. N.T. at 8-9; R.R. 

at 8a-9a. QAO Dacko further explained that in June 2014, he conducted an 
12

investigation into possible violations by Cabon after receiving a monthly printout 

that showed certain instances in which Cabon conducted emissions inspections 

where the VINs from the vehicle owners’ registration cards did not match the VINs 

of the vehicles that were connected to the analyzer. N.T. at 9; R.R. at 9a. QAO 

Dacko identified the printout, which the trial court admitted over Cabon’s 

objection. R.R. at 9a-10a. The printout listed six vehicles for which the VINs on 

the vehicle owners’ registration cards did not match the VINs for the vehicles that 

were connected to Cabon’s analyzer and for which Cabon issued emissions 

stickers. N.T. at 12-15, 17-20; R.R. at 12a-15a, 17a-20a; see R.R. at 151a.3 Thus, 

Cabon reported that six vehicles passed emissions inspections, which were not the 

vehicles actually inspected. As such, no error is apparent in the trial court’s 

determination that PennDOT proved Cabon was subject to a suspension of its 

Certificate for one year and a fine of $2,500 for furnishing emissions inspection 

stickers to six vehicles without conducting the required testing. See 67 Pa. Code 

§177.602(a).

Further, while Cabon maintains Kardell explained that the mismatches 

on the printout arose because of an error that occurred resulting in the VIN for the 

 

3

In particular, the printout shows the technician typed or scanned the following 

information from the vehicle registration cards: 2002 Chevrolet Impala, VIN 

2G1WF55E829375887; 2001 Ford Ranger shortbed truck, VIN 1FTZR15E01PA28056; 2010 

Chevrolet Impala, VIN 2G1WD5EM7A1206535; 2001 Toyota Camry Solara, VIN 

2T1CF22P71C456215; 1996 Mazda UMR, VIN 1YVGE31C3T5577701; and, 1997 Pontiac 

Grand AM, VIN 1G2NE52T1VM549125. In contrast, the following OBD test information was 

transmitted to the analyzer (for each vehicle respectively): 2010 G6, OBD VIN 

1G2ZA5EB6A4108780; 2002 Silverado, OBD VIN 1GCGK29U52Z134625; 2006 Equinox, 

OBD VIN 2CNDL73F466118324; 2012 Toyota Venza, OBD VIN 4T3BK3BB6CU067091; 

2005 Xterra, OBD VIN 5N1AN08W75C609070; 2012 Civic, OBD VIN 

2HGFB2F90CH580387. R.R.151a.
13

prior vehicle remaining in the analyzer, the trial court did not credit Kardell’s 

testimony. Rather, it credited the testimony of QAO Dacko and PennDOT’s 

documentary evidence. In any event, as the trial court recognized, Kardell only 

testified that this error “could” or “possibly could” occur, and Kardell only 

inspected two of the six vehicles at issue. N.T. at 39, 43, 44; R.R. at 39a, 43a, 44a. 

Further, Kardell could not say that this error occurred on the two vehicles he 

inspected, see N.T. at 56-57; R.R. at 56a-57a, and Cabon did not offer evidence 

that this error occurred on the remaining four vehicles at issue.

In addition, our review of QAO Dacko’s testimony, together with 

PennDOT’s documentary evidence, reveals support for the trial court’s 

determination that Cabon also committed a violation for fraudulent recordkeeping. 

In particular, QAO Dacko testified the emissions inspection records generated by 

Cabon for the six vehicles at issue were false in that they reported that the vehicles 

passed emissions inspections when, in fact, they had not (in light of the fact that 

the analyzer was connected to a different vehicle in each instance). N.T. at 20-25; 

R.R. at 20a-25a, 153a-58a.

Contrary to Cabon’s assertions, a charge of fraudulent recordkeeping 

does not require proof of intent. See Orji v. Dep’t of Transp. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 

153 C.D. 2013, filed November 8, 2013), 2013 WL 5973937 (unreported).4 

Rather, the applicable regulation defines fraudulent recordkeeping, in part, as “[a] 

recordkeeping entry not in accordance with fact, truth or required procedure that 

 

4

Pursuant to Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure 414, 210 Pa. Code 

§69.414, an unreported panel decision of this Court, issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited 

for its persuasive value.
14

falsifies or conceals ... [t]hat a certificate of inspection was issued without 

compliance with the required inspection procedure.” 67 Pa. Code §177.601(i). 

Further, “[a]n entry made to mislead anyone inspecting the record into believing 

that the record was correct is deceitful.” Firestone Tire & Serv. Ctr., 871 A.2d at 

867 (citation omitted). Here, as set forth above, the record supports the trial 

court’s determination that Cabon generated emissions inspections records that 

indicated six vehicles passed emissions tests, when, in fact, they had not. Under 

the express language of Section 177.601(i), Cabon’s record of these six emissions 

inspections was fraudulent. See McCarthy.

Nevertheless, Cabon argues PennDOT should not have suspended its

Certificate in light of the fact that its owner, Robert Cabon, was at home 

recovering from surgery when the violations at issue occurred, and, therefore, he 

was not personally involved in any of the inspections at issue. Contrary to this 

assertion, and as set forth above, in McCarthy, this Court explained that Section 

4724(a) of the Vehicle Code, “has been construed to impose strict liability on a 

station owner for all acts of its employees conducted within the scope of their 

employment.” McCarthy, 7 A.3d at 350 (citation omitted). To that end, the 

applicable regulation on the station owner’s liability is set forth in 67 Pa. Code 

§177.421. It states, in pertinent part:

(a) Personal liability. It is the responsibility of the owner of an 

emission inspection station to:

* * * *

(6) Assume full responsibility, with or without actual 

knowledge, for:
15

(i) Every emission inspection conducted at the emission 

inspection station.

(ii) Every emission inspection waiver delivered by a 

certified repair technician at the emission inspection station.

(iii) Every certificate of emission inspection issued to the 

emission inspection station.

(iv) Every violation of the Vehicle Code or this chapter 

related to emission inspections committed by an employee of 

the emission inspection station.

(v) Maintaining an adequate supply of current certificates 

of emission inspection and inserts for issuance.

67 Pa. Code § 177.421(a)(6) (emphasis added). Thus, the regulation imposes strict 

liability on station owners for “[e]very emission inspection conducted at the 

emission inspection station” as well as “[e]very violation of the Vehicle Code [or 

its attendant regulations] related to emission inspections committed by an 

employee of the emission inspection station.” Here, Cabon make no assertion that 

Kardell acted outside the scope of his employment. Therefore, Robert Cabon, as 

station owner, is subject to strict liability for the violations of his employees. See

McCarthy.

In short, because the record supports the trial court’s factual 

determinations, and those findings, in turn, support the trial court’s legal 

determinations, we will not disturb the trial court’s decision.

Moreover, this case is distinguishable from Snyder, relied on by 

Cabon. In Snyder, we declined to disturb a trial court’s factual finding that a 

mechanic made “an unintentional mathematical error” in calculating a vehicle’s 
16

mileage driven since the prior emissions inspection when he issued a 5,000-mile

exempt emissions sticker. Thus, in Snyder, “[the mechanic] did not admit that he 

furnished a certificate of inspection without performing an inspection or that he 

committed fraudulent recordkeeping, the two charges against him. In fact, he did 

not furnish a certificate of inspection; rather, he furnished a certificate of 

exemption from inspection.” Id. at 528. Unlike Snyder, the trial court here did not 

credit Kardell’s testimony or afford any weight to Cabon’s documentary evidence. 

Instead, it credited QAO Dacko’s testimony and PennDOT’s documentary 

evidence, which revealed Cabon did, in fact, issue emissions inspections stickers 

for six vehicles without conducting the required emissions inspections on those 

vehicles as well as generating fraudulent records to that effect. Thus, Synder does 

not compel the result Cabon seeks here.

Nevertheless, Cabon relies on Section 4724(c) of the Vehicle Code, 

which states:

[PennDOT] prior to suspending a certificate of appointment of 

an official inspection station on the grounds of careless 

recordkeeping or the court on appeal from a suspension may 

consider the volume of inspections conducted by the inspection 

station and provide to the owner or operator of the inspection 

station the opportunity to correct any inaccurate records.

75 Pa. C.S. §4724(c).

Here, the trial court expressly considered the volume of inspections 

Cabon conducted. Tr. Ct., Slip Op., at 4. However, it did not permit Cabon an 

opportunity to correct its records. This is not surprising in light of the trial court’s 

determinations that Cabon committed violations by providing emissions 
17

inspections stickers without performing the required inspections and fraudulent 

recordkeeping. Additionally, Section 4724(c) of the Vehicle Code expressly states 

a court may consider the volume of inspections conducted by the inspection station 

and provide the owner or operator of the inspection station with the opportunity to 

correct any inaccurate records. Id. Thus, this provision is discretionary.

Finally, while Cabon points out that in McCarthy, this Court stated 

that in all inspection certificate suspension cases, PennDOT must at least consider 

the use of the points system (in lieu of suspension) and provide evidence of this 

consideration, and it did not do so here, our review of the record here reveals 

Cabon did not raise this issue in either its appeal of PennDOT’s suspension notice5

or at the hearing before the trial court. See N.T. at 1-73; R.R. at 1a-73a (hearing 

transcript); R.R. at 78a-80a (petition for appeal). Therefore, this issue is waived.

See Pa. R.A.P. 302(a) (issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot 

be raised for the first time on appeal).

 

5 Although Cabon notes that its petition for appeal of PennDOT’s suspension notice 

generally asserted the suspension and fine violated its due process rights, R.R. at 79a, the petition 

contained no assertion that PennDOT did not follow required procedure by considering an offer

of points to Cabon in lieu of suspension. R.R. at 78a-80a.

Further, although Cabon points out that the trial court’s opinion (authored by a different 

trial judge than the judge who presided over the hearing) mentioned that PennDOT did not 

present evidence as to whether it considered an offer of points in lieu of suspension, as set forth 

above, Cabon did not raise this issue in its petition for appeal of PennDOT’s suspension notice or 

at the hearing before the trial court. See N.T. at 1-73; R.R. at 1a-73a (hearing transcript); R.R. at 

78a-80a (petition for appeal).
18

Accordingly, we affirm.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

Judge McCullough did not participate in the decision in this case. 
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robert Cabon/Cabon's Central :

Auto Service, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 147 C.D. 2016

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Motor Vehicles :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 17th day of October, 2016, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Allegheny County is AFFIRMED.

 

ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge