PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No s . 1 6

- 2602 & 16

- 2669

____________

IN RE: ASBESTOS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION (No. VI)

ROBERTA G. DEVRIES, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. Devries, Deceased, and Widow in her own right,

Appellant in 16

- 2602

_____________
IN RE: ASBESTOS PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION (No. VI)

SHIRLEY MCAFEE

, Executrix of the Estate of Kenneth McAfee

, Deceased, and Widow in her own right,

Appellant in 16

- 26 69

_____________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania District Judge: Hon orable Eduardo C. Robreno (D.C. Nos. 5

- 13

- cv

- 00 474

, 5

- 13

- cv

- 06856, 2

- 01

- md

- 00 875)2 ______________ Argued March 29 , 201 7

______________ Before: VANASKIE, SHWARTZ , and RESTREPO

, Circuit Judges

( Opinion Filed: October 3, 2017 )

Richard P. Myers [ ARGUED ] Robert E. Paul Paul Reich & Myers 1608 Walnut Street Suite 500 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Counsel for Appellant s

John S. Howarth Wilbraham Lawler & Buba 1818 Market Street Suite 3100 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Counsel for Appellee Buffalo Pumps

, Inc

. Shay Dvoretzky [ARGUED] Emily J. Kennedy Jones Day 51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20001 Counsel for Appellee CBS Corp.3 Le e J. Janiczek Reilly Janiczek McDevitt Herich & Cholden, PC One South Penn Square Suite 410, Widener Building Philadelphia, PA 19107

Christopher J. Keale Afigo I. Okpewho

- Fadahunsi Sedgwick 1085 Raymond Boulevard One Newark Center, 16th Floor Newark, NJ 07102 Counsel for Appellee Foster Wheeler LLC

Timothy E. Kapshandy John A. Heller Sidney Austin One South Dearborn Chicago, IL 60603

Rebecca K. Wood Wen W. Shen Sidley Austin 1501 K Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 2000 6 Counsel for General Electric Co.

Joseph I. Fontak Leader & Berkon 1515 Market Street Two Penn Center Building, Suite 1200 Philadelphia, PA 19102 Counsel for IMO Industries

, Inc.4 Laurie J. Hepler Greines Martin Stein & Richland One Embarcadero Center Suite 500 San Francisco, CA 94111 Counsel for Appellee Warren Pumps

Carol A. VanderWoude Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin 18th Floor 2000 Market Street Sui te 2300 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Counsel for Appellee Ingersoll Rand Co.

___________
OPINION OF THE COURT

___________ VANASKIE, Circuit Judge

.
These asbestos cases involve the availability of the “bare

- metal defense” under maritime law. The defense’s basic idea is that a manufacturer who delivers a product “bare metal”

— that is without the insulation or other material that must be added for the product’s proper operation

— is not generally liable for injuries caused by asbestos in later

- added

m aterial s

. A classic scenario would be if an engine manufacturer ships an engine without a gasket, the buyer adds

a gasket containing asbestos, a nd the asbestos causes injury to a worker

. May the manufacturer be held liable? Some cou rts5 s ay no

— never . O ther s rely o n a more fact

- specific standard and ask whether the facts of the case made it foreseeable that hazardous asbestos materials would be used

. N either this Court nor the Supreme Court has confronted the issue

. In that void, we survey bedrock principles of ma ritime law and conclude that they permit a manufacturer of even a bare

- metal product to be held liable for asbestos

- related injuries when circumstances indicate the injury was a reasonably foreseeable result of the manufacturer’s actions

— at least in the context of a negligence claim. The District Court had instead applied the bright line rule approach and entered summary judgment against the plaintiffs. We will vacate the entry of summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, affir m the entry of summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ product liability claims (which we conclude were abandoned on appeal), and will remand, for further proceedings.

I.
Appellants Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of deceased husbands wh o served in the United States Navy. Each couple filed a C omplaint in Pennsylvania state court alleging that the husband contracted cancer caused by exposure to asbestos. Devries alleges that on the U.S.S. Turner from 1957

- 60, her husband was exposed to a sbestos

containing insulation and components that were added onto the ship’s engines, pumps, boilers, blowers, generators, switchboards, steam traps , and other devices

. McAfee alleges her husband was similarly exposed through his service on two ships and in the Philadelphia Naval Ship yard

.
Devries and McAfee named a number of defendants, of which Appellee manufacturers (“Manufacturers”) are a6 subset. 1 The M anufacturers each made their products “bare metal

, ” in that if they manufactured an engine, they s hipped it without any asbestos

- containing insulation materials that would later be added.

Devries and McAfee’s C omplaints each allege claims of negligence and strict liability. The Manufacturers removed to the E astern District of Pennsylvania and invoked the bare

metal defense in support of their respective summary judgment motions , arguing that because they shipped their product s bare metal, they could not be held liable for the sailors’ injuries. The District Court agreed and granted the Manufacturers summary judgment motions.

Devries and McAfee each appealed separately

, raising an issue as to whether the District Court’ s decision addressed their negligence claims . W e summarily remanded with instructions that the District Court address the negligence issue and also consider a split in authority as to whether a bright

- line rule or a fact

- specific standard governed the bare

- metal defense ’s availability

. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. , No. 15

- 2667 , Order (3d Cir. May 12, 2017) (McAfee); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. , No. 15

- 1278 , Order (3d. Cir. Feb. 5, 2016) (Devries)

. On remand, the District Court applied the bright

- line

rule version of the bare

- metal defense , and clarified that summary judgment had been entered in favor of the

1 The Appellee

- Manufacturers are Air & Liquid Systems Corp ., CBS Corp., Foster Wheeler LLC, General Electric Co., IMO Industries Inc., Warren Pumps LLC , and Ingersoll Rand Co.7 Ma nufacturers on both the strict liability and negligence claims

. The C ourt reasoned that the rule approach was best because, according to the C ourt’s view of the precedents, maritim e law favors uniformity and the rule approach was the majority view.

Devr ies and Mc Afee appealed for a second time . We consolidated the ir appeals and ordered coordinated briefing.

II.

The District Court had federal

- officer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), and maritime jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)

. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo

. Faush v. Tues

. Morning, Inc. , 808 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015)

.
III.

The key question in this case is the ba re

- metal defense ’s availabilit y: When

, if ever

, should a manufacturer of a product that does not contain asbestos be held liable for an asbestos

related injury most directly caused by parts added on to the manufacturer’s product ? Neither the Third Circuit nor the Supreme Court has addressed the question, and t he c ourts from other jurisdictions that have are split. Some courts apply a bright

- line rule, holding that a manufacturer of a bare

- metal product is never liable for injuries caused by later

- added asbestos

- c ontaining materials

. See, e.g.

, Lindstrom v. A

- C Prod. Liab. Tr. , 424 F.3d 488, 492 , 494

- 97 (6th Cir. 2005); Cabasug v. Crane Co.

, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1038

- 43 (D. Haw. 2013). Others apply a more fact

- specific standard

, stating

, for example, that a bare

- metal manufacturer may be8 held liable if the plaintiff’s injury was a reasonably foreseeable result of the manufacturer’s conduct

. See, e.g.

, Quirin v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. , 17 F. Supp. 3d 760, 76 8

- 70 (N.D. Ill. 2014) ( determining whether the addition of asbestos material was “foreseeable” by asking whether addition of asbestos

containing materials was “inevitable,” and whether th ose added materials were “necess [ary] ” or “essential” to the manufacturer’s product ); Chican o v. Gen. Elec. Co. , 2004 WL 2250990, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2004) (asking if the addition of asbestos

- containin g materials was “foreseeable”). 2

In addressing this question, we (1) examine the doctrinal roots of the bare

- metal defense , and (2) address how

2 Illustrative of the unsettled status of this issue, w e recently certified to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court the question of whether under Pennsylvani a law a manufacturer of a product can assert the bare metal defense in the context of a negligent failure to warn claim arising out of exposure to asbestos. See In re Asbestos Products Liability Lit. (No. VI), Crane Co., No. 16

- 3704 (3d Cir. Sept. 27, 201 7) (Petition for Certification of Question of State Law).

Whether, under Pennsylvania law, a manufacturer has a duty to warn about the asbestos

- related hazards of component parts it has neither manufactured nor supplied.

If such a duty exists, what is th e appropriate legal test to determine whether the company is in fact liable for failing to warn about the risks of asbestos?

Id. at 11.9 it should be applied in Devries and McAfee’s negligence actions

.
A.

The doctrinal root of the bare

- metal defense has proved to be a particularly vexing question . Some courts have root ed the defense in causation : When if ever c an it be said that a ba re

- metal manufacturer causes an asbestos

- related injury? See, e.g.

, Thurmon v. Ga. Pac., LLC , 650 F. App’x 752, 756 (11th Cir. 2016) (“the ‘bare metal defense’ is, essentially, a causation argument ” ). Others locate the defense in duty : Can a manufacturer’s duty to act with reasonable care with respect to reasonably foreseeable risks and plaintiffs

, be said to extend
to asbestos

- related injuries ? See, e.g.

, Quirin , 17 F. Supp. 3d
at 767

- 70 (reviewing the issue as one of “legal duty”). T he question is more than academic. I f the elemental root is duty, the defense should be expected to operate differently in strict liability as compared to negligence, because a defendant’s duty of course differ s between the two types of actions

. See Ches her v. 3M Co.

, 234 F. Supp. 3d, 693, 700

- 03 (D.S.C. 2017) (holding that the defense should apply in a weaker fashion in a negligence action, as compared to strict liability). T he opposite might be true too

— the defense should operate in similar fashion in both negligence and strict liability if it is rooted in causation, because the proximate cause inquiry cuts across the two types of actions

. See, e.g.

, Lindstrom , 424 F.3d at 492 (suggesting the defense applies similarly under “both negligence and strict liability theories”)

.
We find that both approaches are correct : the defense is rooted in both duty and cause because its keystone is the concept of foreseeability

. When parties debate the bare

- metal defense , they debate when and whether a manufacturer c ould10 reasonably foresee that its actions or omissions would cause the plaintiff’s asbestos

- related injuries. The bright

- line rule approach says it is never reasonably foreseeable, and the fact

specific standard approach says it sometimes is. This debate over f oreseeability sounds in both duty and cause, because foreseeability is a concept embedded in each element

. See Gibbs v. Ernst , 647 A.2d 882, 891 (Pa. 1994) (highlighting “the common law notion of foreseeability as found in the concepts of duty and proximate cause”). In the duty element in a negligence action, f

oreseeability limits a defendant’s liability
to only the risks and p laintiffs that are reasonably foreseeable

. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 7, cmt. j (2010 Am. Law Inst. ) ( acknowledging “widespread use” of foreseeability as an aspect of the duty of reasonable care, despite the Restatement’s disa greement with such an approach) . A nd in proximate cause

, foreseeability limits a defendant’s liability to only the injuries that are a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s actions. I d. § 29, cmt. j (discussing foreseeability as an aspect of p roximate cause in both negligence and strict

- liability actions). 3 Thus, the bare

-

3 Instead of starting from subject

- specific asbestos
cases, we begin our focus with the ordinary and traditional prin ciples of maritime and tort law, as exemplified in the most reliable treatises and restatements

. Cf. M &G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett , 135 S. Ct. 926, 929

- 30 (2015) ( abrogating a circuit’s labor

- law

- specific rule for contract interpretation, and calling on lower courts in labor

- law cases to still adhere to “ordinary” and “traditional” principles of contract law ) ; Paroline v. United States , 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719

- 20 (2014) (citing, as authority for the federal common law of proximate11 metal defense is nothing more than the concept of foreseeability, as embedded in the duty of reasonable care in a negligence action and the proximate cause standard in a negl igence or stric t

- liability action , as applied to the facts of a certain subset of asbestos cases.

This dual

- elemental home for the defense does not, however, totally explain when or whether the defense’s application should differ from strict

- liability to negligence. It might be that the defense could apply the same in both types of actions, because of the shared proximate

- cause element. Or the differences in the two actions’ duty element s might mean the defense is more forceful in one action than the oth er

. See,
e.g. , Chesher

, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 700

- 03 (holding that the defense is weaker in negligence and stronger in strict liability, because in strict liability the manufacturer’s duty is limited to the product, but with negligence the duty extends furth er) ; Bell v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp. , No. 15

- 6394 , 2016 WL 5780104, at *5

- 7 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2016) (same). And of course the facts of a given case could be the most important variable.

We need not settle t hese doctrinal distinctions today

, because D evries and McAfee waived their strict liability claim in this appeal

. As a general matter, a n appellant waives an
argum ent in support of reversal if it is not raised in the opening brief. McCray v. Fidelity Nat ’l Title Ins. Co. , 682 F.3d 229, 241 (3d Cir. 2012). Here, in this appeal Devries and McAfee focused the entirety of their briefing on their negligence claims, yet attempted to also incorporate their strict

- liability

cause, the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Prosser and Keeton’s treatise on torts, and LaFave’s treatise on criminal law).12 claim through a footnote : “By concentrating on [neglig ence] issues in this brief , Appellants do not waive any issues argued in their original briefs as to Defendants’ liability under [the strict liability claims].” (Appellants’ Br. at 2 n. 1 )

. This attempt to shoehorn in an argument outside the briefs is in sufficient to raise an issue on appeal. See John Wyeth & Brother Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 119 F.3d 1070, 1076 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that “arguments raised in passing (such as, in a footnote), but not squarely argued, are considered waived”); see also Skretvedt v. E. I . DuPont De Nemours , 372 F.3d 193, 202

- 04 (3d Cir. 2004) (declining to consider arguments not properly raised and therefore waived). In particular, i t fails to give fair notice of the claims being contested on appeal. Thus, Devries ’s and McAfee’s waiver of their strict

- liability arguments means that we will affirm the District Court’s decision to that extent , and need not fully explore the precise contours of the defense’s distinctions in strict liability and negligence, beyond the un ifying principle of foreseeability.

B.

For the negligence claims, r ooting the bare

- metal defense in foreseeability does not on its own resolve the issue, because the split in authority can be characterized as a debate over what a bare

- metal manufacturer could reasonably foresee

— no asbestos

- related injuries

, s ee, e.g. , Lindstrom , 424 F.3d at 492, 494

- 97, or some , see, e.g. , Quirin , 17 F. Supp. 3d at 769

- 70.13 These two choices raise familiar tradeoffs between rules and standards

. 4 A rule is a legal directi ve that attempts to capture a background principle into an easy

- to

- apply form that is predictable and efficient . A speed limit is a good example: its goal is road safety, but because liability turns on speed rather than the amorphous definition of “safet y” itself, it is easier for drivers, police, and insurers to shape their conduct accordingly . R ules have downside s though too , in that they necessarily result in errors of over

- and under

- inclusi on . In the case of the speed limit, it further s the policy of road safety

, but does so imperfectly : speedy drivers get punished even if they speed safely, and slow drivers go free even if they amble along haphazardly

.
A s tandard, on the other hand

, collapses the background principle into the actual legal direc tive , resulting in better accuracy and “fit” with the underlying purpose, and fewer errors of over

- and under

- inclusion

. Another road

- safety example would be a reckless

- driving prohibition that simply prohibits driving that is “reckless

. ” Such a prohibition is less predictable and efficient than the speed limit, in that it is harder to predict what a decisionmaker will find to be “reckless” than whether he or she will agree that 76 miles per hour exceeds a

4 For a review of the characteristics and tradeoffs of rules and standards

, see Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 78 (2016) (noting that “ rules and standards

. . . denote different levels of specifi ci ty for norms” and “judicial holding[s]”); Kat hleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term

—

Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards , 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 58

- 59 (1992).14 70 m.p.h. speed limit. But liab ility better tracks the actual goal of road safety, because almost all “reckless” drivers are unsafe.

The point is there are tradeoffs, and courts face those tradeoffs in choosing an approach to the bare

- meta l defense. The rule

- based approach is efficien t and predictable

— bare

metal manufacturers are simply not liable

— but the downside is some deserving sailor

- plaintiffs will not receive their due. On the other hand, the standard

- based approach is bound to be less predictable and less efficient, because th e standard’s fact

centered nature will push more cases into discovery, see, e.g. , Quirin , 17 F. Supp. 3d at 771

- 72 (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss after applying the standard), but the most

- deserving sailor

- plaint iffs are less likely to be denied co mpensation.

T hankfully, we do not weigh these tradeoffs in a vacuum. Maritime law is undergirded by established principles, at least four of which are implicated here . First and perhaps foremost, maritime law is deeply concerned with the protection of s ailors, due to a historic and “special solicitude for the welfare of those men who undertook to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages.” Moragne v. States Marine Lines , Inc. , 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970). T his “special solicitude” developed “un known to the common law,” and so maritime law is at times more lenient toward a sailor than a state’s common law may be to a similarly

- situated plaintiff. Id. This divergence is acceptable if not appropriate because the “humane and liberal character of” maritime law counsels that it is better “to give than to w ithhold the remedy” wherever “established and inf

lexible rules” do not require otherwise

. Id. (quoting The Sea Gull , 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (C.C. Md. 1865)). For example, in Mora g ne v. States Marine Lines , the Supreme Court made it permissible for maritime plaintiffs to bring wrongful death ac tions even though the c ommon law15 disapproved of such actions . 398 U.S . at 38 1

- 88, 408

- 09. In arriving at that holding

, the Court explicitly referenced and discussed maritime law’s special solicitude for sailor safety and how that solicitude permitted maritime law to have more sailor

- friendly rules than the common law. Id. at 38 6

- 88. 5

Here, maritime law’s special solicitude for sailors’ safety similarly favors the adoption of the s tandard

- like approach to the bare

- metal defense

. A standard will permit a greater number of deserving sailors to receive compensation, and com pensation that is closer to what they deserve. Given that results for sailor

- victims will differ under a rule as compared to a standard

, and since n o “established” or “inflexible” rule prohibits the more forgiving standard, the “humane and liberal character” of maritime law counsels that we follow the standard . Even if certain states’ common laws would call for a more stringent rule, maritime law’s more liberal attitude permits us to diverge from that path.

Second, m aritime law is built on “tradit ions of simplicity and practicality

, ” Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique , 358 U.S. 625, 631 (1959), but that principle

c uts in both directions and does not provide much guidance

. On one hand, “simplicity” might be seen as favoring the rule

bas ed approach, because simplicity is related to predictability, and it is easier to predict how a rule will apply than a standard

.

5 Moragne ’s holding was based most directly on principles other than the special solicitude for sailor safety, but the special solicitude was still crucial to the Court’s decision because it explained why the Court’s ruling was appropriate even though it likely diver ged from the common law. Moragne , 398 U.S. at 38 6

- 88.16 On the other hand, “simplicity” could also be seen as favoring

a foreseeability

- based stand ard, because simpl icity is related to familiarity

, and foreseeability is such a familiar and key part of tort law

. See id. at 631

- 32 ( choosing to adopt a familiar standard over a “foreign” and “alien” rule while invoking maritime law’s “traditions of simplicity and practicality” ).

The third and fourth principl e s implicated in this case

are also not particularly helpful. M aritime law has a “fundamental interest” in “the protection of maritime

commerce , ” Exxon Corp. v. Cent

. Gulf Lines, Inc. , 500 U.S. 603, 608 (1991) (quoting Sisson v. Ruby , 497 U .S. 358, 367 (1990)), and seeks out “uniform rules to govern conduct and liability,” Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson , 457 U.S. 668, 674

- 75 (1982). Here, the parties all argue these two principles
encourage the Court to side with whatever sid e is winning in the split in authority . T he idea is that the sooner one side wins
out over the other , the sooner the split in authority is ended and the goals of seamless commerce and uniformity of rules will be achieved . The rub, however, is determining which view is the majority. T he bright

- line rule could be said to be in the lead because it has on its side the Sixth Circuit, the only court of appeals to weigh in

. Lindstrom , 424 F.3d at 492 , 494

- 97

. T he standard could similarly be said to be the majority view because the courts that have confront ed the question most recently have generally favored the standard, and have done so after a much more thorough analysis than that found in the Sixth Circuit ’s opinion in Lindstrom , which was decided much

e arlier in the debate over the bare

- metal defense

. Compare Chesher

, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 696

- 712 (analyzing in painstaking detail the split in authority and adopting a version of the standard); Bell , 2016 WL 5780104, at * 3

- 7 (same), with Lindstrom , 424 F.3d at 49 4

- 97 ( not mentioning the split in17 authority ). We need not decide which approach is winning in terms of wins and losses

— it is enough that the score is too close for us to say that the goal s of seamless commerce and rule

- uniformity push in one way or t he other.

In sum, the special solicitude for the safety and protection of sailors is dispositive , because it counsels us to follow the standard

- based approach

, and none of the other principles weigh heavily in either direction

. The standard

based approac h is the one we will therefore follow : foreseeability is the touchstone of the bare

- metal defense ; a manufacturer of a bare

- metal product may be held liable for a plaintiff’s injuries suffered from later

- added asbestos

containing materials if the facts show the plaintiff’s injuries were a reasonably foreseeable result of the manufacturer’s failure to provide a reasonable and adequate warning ; and although c ases will nec essarily be fact

- specific, already

decided precedents show, for example, that a bare

- metal manufacturer may be subject to liability if it reasonably could have known

, at the time it placed its prod uct into the stream of

commerce , that

(1) asbestos is hazardous, 6 and

(2) its product will be used with an asbestos

containing part, 7 because

6 See Bell , 2016 WL 5780104, at *5.

7 See id

.18 (a) the product was originally equipped with an asbestos containing part that could reasonably be expected to be replaced over the product’s lifetime, 8

(b) the manufacturer specifically directed that the product be used with an asbestos

containing part, 9 or
(c) the product required an asbestos

containing part to function properly. 10

The se may or may not be the only facts on which liability can arise. The finer contours of the defense, and how it should be applied to various sets of facts, must be decided on a case

- by

case basis.

I V.
Finally, the Manufacturers advanced two alternative arguments in support of an affirmance on the negligence claims

. T hey argued (1) insufficient evidence had been presented as to causation and was fatal to Devries and McAfee’s claims, and (2) the govern ment

- contractor defense should insulate the Manufactur er s from liability. T hese arguments were also presented below, but the District Court

8 See Chesher

, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 714 ; Quirin , 17 F. Supp. 3d at 7 69

- 7 1.

9 See Bell , 2016 WL 5780104, at * 5, 7

.

10 See Chesher

, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 714 ; Quirin , 17 F. Supp. 3d at 769

- 70.19 declined to rule on them because its bare

- metal

- de fense holding was sufficient to enter summary j udgment in favor of the Manufacturers. The Manufacturers urge us to address them now, on the grounds that we may affirm a judgment for any reason supported by the record. Brightwell v. Lehman , 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). Addressing alternative grounds for affirmance, however, is a matter left to our discretion

. See Gov’t of the V.I. v. Walker , 261 F.3d 370, 376

- 77 (3d Cir. 2001) (declining to reach arguments raised before but not decided by the lower court, and instead remanding). Given that we are without the benefit of the District Court’s well

- regarded expertise, and the parties’ briefing and oral argument was

a ppropriately focused on the bare

- metal defense, we will leave the insufficient

- evidence and contractor

- defense arguments to be dealt with on remand.

V.

In conclusion, m aritime law’s special solicitude for the safety and protection of sailors counsels us to adopt a standard

based approach to the bare

- metal defense that permits a plaintiff to recover , at least in negligence, from a manufacturer of a bare

- metal product when the facts show the plaintiff’s injuries were a reasonably foreseeable result of the manufacturer’s conduct . We will affirm the decision of the District Court with respect t o Devries and McAfee’s strict liability claims, and remand for further proceedings on their negligence claims consistent with this O pinion.