In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 19-3242 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

EMMANUEL L. HART, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:17-cr-00171(1) — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MARCH 2, 2021 — DECIDED APRIL 27, 2021 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. 

KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Emmanuel Hart was convicted by a 

jury of robbing two Chicago banks in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2113(a). On appeal, he argues that the district court erred 

when it precluded him from recalling two government witnesses during his case-in-chief. Finding no error, we affirm.
2 No. 19-3242 

I 

Emmanuel Hart was charged in a two-count indictment 

with robbing a branch of the Fifth Third Bank on April 29, 

2016, and a branch of the First American Bank on March 20, 

2017. The modus operandi of each robbery was similar. A 

man entered the bank and handed a teller a note that demanded stacks of $100 bills without tracking devices and 

warned that the robber had “full-blown AIDS” and nothing 

to lose. After the teller handed the man some cash, the man 

exited the bank leaving the note behind and boarded a nearby 

train to leave the scene of the crime. But the robberies differed 

in one important respect: The Fifth Third teller heeded the 

robber’s demand and did not include a tracking device, but 

the First American teller slipped such a device among the 

stacks of cash.

Shortly after the First American robbery, the tracking device was activated, eventually leading law enforcement to 

Hart. To explain how the tracking device investigation proceeded, the government called Chicago Police Detective Jason 

Motyka and FBI Special Agents Michael Lovernick and Ward 

Yoder. Agents Lovernick and Yoder testified that they received text notifications relaying, in real time, the direction 

that the tracking device was traveling—first south, then west, 

and finally south again before stopping near the intersection 

of 63rd and Halsted Streets. Based on this pattern, they testified that the tracking device likely traveled south on the “L” 

train’s Red Line, and then west and south on buses. Accordingly, law enforcement officers stopped several buses near the 

intersection of 63rd and Halsted Streets, including what the 

parties refer to as the 63rd Street bus and the No. 8 bus. At the 

intersection, Agent Yoder used a handheld device to pinpoint 
No. 19-3242 3

the tracking device’s location. The tracking device pointed to

the No. 8 bus, which Detective Motyka and Agent Lovernick 

then boarded. Using a surveillance photo from the First 

American Bank robbery, the pair identified Hart by his silver 

wristwatch and resemblance to the suspect in the photo. Both 

also noticed that Hart’s pockets were bulging. Detective 

Motyka and Agent Lovernick removed Hart from the bus, 

searched his pockets, found cash and the tracking device, and 

arrested him.

Along with the tracking device investigation, the government introduced a variety of other evidence connecting Hart 

with both robberies. For example, the government presented 

surveillance videos of Hart riding a southbound Red Line 

train that were consistent with the tracking device’s movement as it left First American Bank. And the government introduced public-transit records of cards registered to Hart 

that were used on the dates and around the time of both robberies. Additionally, a fingerprint expert testified that fingerprints on both demand notes left at the banks matched Hart’s.

Hart represented himself at trial and focused his defense 

on two arguments. First, the mere fact that law enforcement 

found Hart with the cash and tracking device on the No. 8 bus 

did not necessarily prove that he robbed the First American 

Bank. He could have come upon the cash and the tracking device another way. Second, he boarded two buses on March 

20—first the 63rd Street bus and then the No. 8 bus1—but law 

enforcement did not identify him on the 63rd Street bus when 

the bus was stopped at the intersection of 63rd and Halsted 

Streets. Hart did not connect his arguments at trial, but, as 

1 The government stipulated that Hart was, in fact, on both buses.
4 No. 19-3242 

discussed below, now attempts to do so on appeal by arguing 

that law enforcement was unable to identify him when he was 

on the 63rd Street bus because he was not yet in possession of 

the cash with the tracking device. 

To develop his second argument—that law enforcement 

did not identify him when he was on the 63rd Street bus—

Hart cross-examined Detective Motyka, Agent Yoder, and 

Agent Lovernick about their search for the robbery suspect. 

Hart questioned them about their investigative activities, the 

timeline of those activities, the methods used to pinpoint the 

tracking device’s location, and the process used to identify 

him on the No. 8 bus. Hart also asked each officer how many 

buses they had searched and whether they had seen Hart on 

any other bus. Detective Motyka testified that, in addition to 

the No. 8 bus, he “briefly boarded” the 63rd Street bus but did 

not “recall” seeing Hart on that bus. Agent Yoder stated that 

he only boarded one bus, the No. 8. Initially, Agent Lovernick 

testified that while he did not board the 63rd Street bus, several other law enforcement personnel did, including Detective 

Motyka and Agent Yoder. Moments later, however, after Hart 

repeated his questions, Agent Lovernick said that he “misunderstood” Hart’s initial question and that he did not know 

who boarded the 63rd Street bus. From this testimony, Hart 

established that Detective Motyka briefly boarded the 63rd 

Street bus and that Agent Lovernick did not. Further, there is 

no evidence, other than Agent Lovernick’s initial testimony 

based on a misunderstood question, that Agent Yoder was 

ever on the 63rd Street bus (which Agent Yoder denied). 

After cross-examination and just before the government 

rested, Hart asked for a three-day continuance and to recall 

eight government witnesses for his defense, none of whom he 
No. 19-3242 5

had subpoenaed. Among the eight were Agent Lovernick, Detective Motyka, and Agent Yoder. What followed was an extensive discussion between the district judge, Hart, and the 

government prosecutor, addressing one by one each witness 

and Hart’s reasons for recalling them. Over the government’s 

objection, the district court allowed Hart to recall Agent Lovernick, but not without hesitation. The district court told Hart 

that, when questioning Agent Lovernick, he would pay attention to whether Hart was “just trying to delay things.” The 

district court also warned Hart that he would sustain an objection to Hart’s question if Hart simply parroted his questions from cross-examination. 

The district court denied Hart’s request to recall Agent 

Yoder. During the discussion with the court, Hart explained 

that he wanted to ask Agent Yoder about whether he boarded 

the 63rd Street bus and when he boarded the No. 8 bus, hoping to impeach the timeline Agent Yoder established on direct 

examination. The government argued in opposition that the 

answers to Hart’s questions were already in evidence and that 

Agent Yoder had answered the questions. In denying Hart’s 

request, the district judge explained that: (1) it had allowed 

Hart’s cross-examination to go “well beyond” the scope of direct; (2) “all” of the evidence Hart sought to elicit “came out” 

on direct; (3) “other evidence” was in the record from which 

Hart could argue to fully support his theory; and (4) Hart was 

“trying to delay things.”

As for Detective Motyka, the district court initially granted 

Hart’s request and asked the government to attempt to recall 

Detective Motyka, who was out of state. Hart was hoping to 

show that Detective Motyka’s testimony—that he did not see 

Hart on the 63rd Street bus—was not true. More specifically, 
6 No. 19-3242 

Hart wanted to explore how Detective Motyka “could . . . not 

see” Hart on the bus if Hart had the tracking device on that 

bus and looked like the identification photo Detective Motyka 

had on his phone. When initially granting Hart’s request, the 

district court limited questioning to that issue alone. After a 

break, however, and a renewed government objection to recalling Detective Motyka, the district court denied Hart’s request to recall Detective Motyka. The district court reasoned 

that Hart had not subpoenaed any witnesses for his defense, 

and that each of Hart’s questions was repetitive and concerned testimony that was “already in evidence” from Hart’s 

cross-examination of Detective Motyka. 

II

Hart appeals the district court’s denial of his requests to 

recall Detective Motyka and Agent Yoder. On appeal, Hart introduces what appears to be a variation of his defense theory 

at trial: Hart asserts that law enforcement did not apprehend 

him when he was on the 63rd Street bus because he was not 

yet in possession of the stolen cash with the tracking device; 

rather, he found the cash after exiting the 63rd Street bus but 

before boarding the No. 8 bus.2 We are skeptical that Hart 

2 Hart’s theory sidesteps important details. Detective Motyka testified 

that law enforcement stopped several buses at the intersection. He also 

testified that the 63rd Street bus was stopped when he boarded. Thus, under Hart’s theory, the timeline is as follows: Hart was on the 63rd Street 

bus without the cash and tracking device when law enforcement stopped

the bus; Detective Motyka then boarded the bus, but did not see Hart; Hart 

then exited the 63rd Street bus, found the cash and tracking device, and 

then boarded the No. 8 bus; and this sequence occurred all while law enforcement officers were actively searching for the location of the tracking

device. 
No. 19-3242 7

pressed this theory at trial. During oral argument, Hart 

pointed to three pages of the multi-day trial transcript that he 

says supports his theory. From Hart’s few comments on the 

transcript pages he referenced, several logical leaps are required to arrive at his theory on appeal. But we will assume 

that Hart said enough to properly present the issue now.

Armed with this theory, Hart challenges the district 

court’s rulings limiting his ability to recall Detective Motyka

and Agent Yoder for further cross-examination. Hart argues 

that the district judge’s ruling violated his Sixth Amendment

rights to confront witnesses and to obtain witnesses in his favor. The government urges that Hart did not raise a Sixth 

Amendment argument at trial and, as a result, any argument 

on appeal is forfeited. 

To preserve an appellate issue, a criminal defendant “must 

make a timely and specific objection in the district court.” 

United States v. Hathaway, 882 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2018) 

(quotation omitted). This ensures that both the court and the 

government are aware “of the potential error and the ground 

for objection.” United States v. Burns, 843 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 

2016). But it is also true that, generally, courts require less of 

pro se defendants than licensed lawyers. See, e.g., Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); United States v. Clark, 774 F.3d 

1108, 1114 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding pro se defendant preserved 

a Rule 404(b) evidentiary argument when his pretrial brief 

generally objected to the government’s 404(b) motion); United 

States v. Smith, 332 F.3d 455, 458 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding pro se

defendant’s pre-sentencing letter to the court sufficiently notified the court and government of objection to guideline application, despite not raising objection at sentencing hearing); 

United States v. Sowemimo, 335 F.3d 567, 573–74 (7th Cir. 2003) 
8 No. 19-3242 

(finding pro se defendant “did enough” to raise drug quantity 

objection at sentencing because district court understood defendant’s pro se pre-sentencing filings to raise such an objection). 

Hart’s attempt to recall Detective Motyka and Agent 

Yoder notified the district court and the government of his objections to the rulings that form the basis of his Sixth Amendment challenge. To be sure, Hart did not mention the Sixth 

Amendment, the Confrontation Clause, or the Compulsory 

Process Clause. But the record demonstrates that both the district court and the government understood the Sixth Amendment issues lurking beneath Hart’s objections that he now 

presses on appeal. Thus, we address his arguments on the 

merits.

A 

Hart argues that the district court denied him the opportunity to confront Detective Motyka and Agent Yoder with 

testimony elicited after his initial cross-examinations. Specifically, Hart asserts that he planned to confront Detective 

Motyka with evidence that Hart was on both buses the day of 

the robbery and to confront Agent Yoder with Agent Lovernick’s testimony (based on a misunderstood question that 

Agent Lovernick quickly corrected) that Agent Yoder had 

boarded the 63rd Street bus. 

The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant an opportunity to confront witnesses against him, including the 

right to cross-examine them. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Delaware 

v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). But the right does not guarantee “cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, 

and to whatever extent, the defense might wish”—the district 
No. 19-3242 9

court may impose reasonable limits. Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20.

When a district court limits cross-examination, the first question is whether the limitation “directly implicates the Confrontation Clause’s core values” triggering de novo review. 

United State v. Groce, 891 F.3d 260, 267 (7th Cir. 2018); United 

States v. Williamson, 202 F.3d 974, 978 (7th Cir. 2000). Embedded in that question are two more—what are “core values” 

under the Confrontation Clause, and when are they “directly” 

implicated? This court has recognized that, among others, 

“[e]xposing a witness’s motivation, biases, or incentives for 

lying” and “[i]mpeaching a witness” are core values. Groce, 

891 F.3d at 267 (quotation omitted). And core values are “directly” implicated when the district court denies a defendant 

a “reasonable opportunity” to elicit impeaching or discrediting testimony. United States v. Trent, 863 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 

2017). We have held that an opportunity is reasonable if the 

defendant “merely ha[s] the chance to present a motive to lie,” 

Trent, 863 F.3d at 705, or to elicit impeachment testimony. See

United States v. Clark, 657 F.3d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 2011)

But what if a defendant’s argument indirectly implicates a 

core value—stated differently, what if the defendant was 

given a “reasonable opportunity” to impeach or discredit the 

witness? In that case, “any constitutional concerns vanish” 

and the court reviews the district court’s limitation for abuse 

of discretion. Clark, 657 F.3d at 584. To that end, the district 

court’s discretion to limit cross-examination is “wide,” and 

the limitations may be based on, among other reasons, “harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’s 

safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally 

relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). 
10 No. 19-3242 

Although Hart’s argument on appeal implicates core Confrontation Clause values, it does not do so directly; the district 

court provided Hart ample opportunity to impeach or discredit Detective Motyka and Agent Yoder on cross-examination in the government’s case-in-chief. The district court 

placed no limits on Hart’s initial cross-examinations of Detective Motyka and Agent Yoder, allowing Hart to ask questions 

beyond the scope of direct examination. The district court 

stressed to Hart during his extensive colloquy concerning recalling witnesses that Hart had asked—and Detective Motyka 

and Agent Yoder answered—the questions he wished to put 

to both if recalled.3 Hart has never explained (at trial or on 

appeal) how Detective Motyka’s answers would have differed 

if confronted with the fact of Hart’s presence on the 63rd 

Street bus—it made no difference because Detective Motyka 

had already testified that he did not see Hart on the 63rd 

Street bus when he briefly boarded it. Hart also has not explained how Agent Yoder’s answers would have differed had 

Hart confronted him with the substance of Agent Lovernick’s 

testimony—Agent Yoder testified that he only boarded the 

No. 8 bus. Given that Hart’s proposed cross-examination 

would have elicited no new information, his questions are 

merely “redundant” inquiries that, at most, may have 

“add[ed] extra detail” which the district court was well within 

3 In his reply brief, Hart poses eleven questions that he “could have 

asked” Detective Motyka and Agent Yoder. None of those questions were 

raised by Hart when he moved to recall both witnesses. We do not consider the questions for two reasons. First, Hart forfeited the line of questioning by not raising it at trial. See Burns, 843 F.3d at 685. Second, our 

analysis focuses on the district court’s decision to limit cross-examination 

in light of the evidence at trial, not an alternative line of questioning on 

appeal.
No. 19-3242 11

its discretion to refuse. United States v. Khan, 508 F.3d 413, 418 

(7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Stewart v. Wolfenbarger, 468 F.3d 338, 348–49 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the 

district court’s denial of defendant’s request to recall fact witness did not violate the Confrontation Clause because defendant’s proposed questions would not elicit new information, 

and defendant could impeach the fact witness’s testimony 

with that of later witnesses in closing). 

B 

Hart also argues that the district court’s denial of his request to recall Detective Motyka and Agent Yoder violated his 

Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to 

“have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Generally, that means a defendant has a right to “offer the testimony of witnesses, and to 

compel their attendance.” Makiel v. Butler, 782 F.3d 882, 907 

(7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 

(1967)). However, the right is not unlimited. “[A] defendant’s 

right to compulsory process is abridged only when a court 

denies the defendant an opportunity to secure the appearance 

at trial of a witness whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense.” Williamson, 202 F.3d at 979

(quotation and citation omitted). As the Supreme Court has 

described it, evidence is “material” if a “reasonable likelihood” exists that it “could have affected the judgment of the 

trier of fact.” United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 

873–74; see Makiel, 782 F.3d at 908. Evidence that is “merely 

cumulative to the testimony of available witnesses” does not 

meet the materiality requirement. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 

at 873.
12 No. 19-3242 

When reviewing a compulsory process claim that stems 

from the exclusion of evidence, like in this case, we apply an 

abuse of discretion standard of review. See United States v. 

Hoover, 246 F.3d 1054, 1061–62 (7th Cir. 2001); Williamson, 202 

F.3d at 979. The district court did not abuse its discretion

when it barred Hart from recalling Detective Motyka and 

Agent Yoder. As explained above, their testimony would have 

been cumulative to the testimony already in the record. Additionally, even if their testimony would have been exculpatory 

(which is doubtful), there is no reasonable likelihood that additional testimony from Detective Motyka or Agent Yoder 

could have affected the judgment of the jury. The evidence 

against Hart was overwhelming. Perhaps most significantly, 

neither witness could help Hart explain to the jury why his 

fingerprints were left on the demand notes at each bank. Hart 

failed to explain this evidence at trial, and he has not attempted to do so on appeal. 

AFFIRMED