1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

AUGUSTUS SANFORD, )

Petitioner, )

) No. 20 CV 50131

v. ) Judge Iain D. Johnston

)

CHRISTOPHER RIVERS, )

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner Augustus Sanford seeks the restoration of 41 days’ good conduct time that he 

lost as a result of a disciplinary proceeding. For the reasons that follow, Mr. Sanford’s petition

[1] is denied.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Sanford is serving a 240-month sentence for kidnapping and conspiracy to commit 

kidnapping. See United States v. Augustus Sanford, No. 11 CR 303 (D. Colo.). The Bureau of 

Prisons has calculated his release date to be September 13, 2029.

1

 He is currently serving his 

sentence at FCI Marianna in Florida, but the incident and disciplinary proceedings underlying 

this petition occurred while he was at USP Victorville in California, and he filed this petition 

while at USP Thomson within the Western Division.

2

On October 30, 2018, Officer V. Valdez completed an incident report describing a fight

that occurred that day in Unit 6A between Mr. Sanford and another inmate, Deion Lockhart. See 

Petition [1] at 10 (the Incident Report). According to the report, Officer Valdez observed the 

inmates striking each other with closed fists and directed the inmates to stop. When they failed 

to stop, Officer Valdez deployed pepper spray. Backup arrived and separated the inmates. 

Officer Valdez observed stab wounds on Mr. Lockhart, and he was transported to a local hospital 

for treatment. The incident report alleged violations of Prohibited Act Codes 101 (assaulting any 

person, or an armed assault on the institution’s secure perimeter) and 307 (refusing to obey an 

order of any staff member). See Bureau of Prisons’ Program Statement 5270.09 (“Inmate 

Discipline Program”) at Table 1.

For reasons not clear from the record,3 Mr. Sanford first received the incident report on 

September 4, 2019, nearly a year after the incident. See Petition [1] at 10; Supporting 

1 https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited May 26, 2022) 2 A habeas petition is properly filed in the district where the inmate is located at the time of filing. See al–Marri v. 

Rumsfeld, 360 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir.2004). “[A] prisoner’s transfer from one federal facility to another during the 

pendency of a habeas corpus proceeding does not affect the original district court’s jurisdiction.” In re Hall, 988 

F.3d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 2021).

3 The Disciplinary Hearing Officer Report notes that “a delay occurred in the processing of the incident report,” but 

does not explain the reason for the delay, and that “this incident report was referred to an outside agency for possible 

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Memorandum [2] at 2. Officer Godwin then conducted a disciplinary hearing on September 18, 

2019, and issued his written report on October 4, 2019. Response [11] at 22–25. In the report, 

Officer Godwin concluded that Mr. Sanford had committed a violation of Prohibited Act Code 

101, “the Serious Assault of Any Person,” and sanctioned him with 41 days’ loss of good 

conduct time plus 6 months’ loss of commissary privileges. Id. at 23, 25. In support of that 

conclusion, Officer Godwin set out the evidence on which the conclusion was based, including

the description of the fight in the incident report, medical reports about deep puncture wounds 

found on Mr. Lockhart after the fight and Mr. Lockhart’s statement to a clinician that his pain 

and injuries were from a “fight,” pictures of Mr. Lockhart’s injuries, a medical report and a 

picture of Mr. Sanford from after the fight depicting him as unscathed, and pictures from the 

scene of the fight showing a sharpened piece of metal crafted into a “blade style weapon,” blood 

on the blade and at the scene, and blood splattered on the walls and floor. Id. at 23-24. Officer 

Godwin also relied on statements from three staff members who witnessed the fight, and drew an 

adverse inference from Mr. Sanford’s decision to remain silent during the disciplinary hearing. 

Id. at 24. Officer Godwin determined that the greater weight of the evidence including the 

incident report supported a conclusion that Mr. Sanford “did Seriously Assault Any Person, in 

violation of Code 101.” Id.

Mr. Sanford appealed the disciplinary decision twice. On October 16, 2019, he filed his 

first administrative appeal with the Regional Director, alleging that during the hearing Officer 

Godwin dropped his violation from Prohibited Act Code 110 to the less serious Prohibited Act 

Code 224, but then in the written decision found him guilty of a Prohibited Act Code 110 

violation. See Response [11] at 108-10. He contends that Officer Ahmed will verify that during 

the hearing Officer Godwin dropped the 100-series violation. Id. at 108. He further alleges that 

the evidence does not support the disciplinary hearing officer’s decision. For instance, he notes 

that the disciplinary hearing officer apparently believed that the incident occurred in unit 2B, 

when in fact it occurred in unit 6A. He also notes that when asked, Mr. Lockhart stated only that 

he had been in a “fight,” not that he had been stabbed. Finally, he alleges that no witness saw 

him with a weapon, and that witness statements were inconsistent with one another. Attached to 

his appeal form were two additional handwritten pages. On November 6, 2019, the Regional 

Director rejected the appeal stating that only one additional page may be attached to the appeal 

form. See Petition [1] at 12. Mr. Sanford did not further appeal to the General Counsel.

On March 9, 2020, Mr. Sanford initiated a second appeal to the Regional Director. See

id. at 14. This time he stated that he had been denied due process because he never got a copy of 

the Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s Report. On March 10, 2020, the Regional Director rejected 

the appeal because he failed to include a copy of the DHO Report—the report he alleged he 

never received. See id. at 16. The rejection notice advised him to contact his unit team for a 

copy of the DHO Report and gave him 10 days to resubmit his appeal with the DHO Report 

attached. Mr. Sanford never resubmitted and did not further appeal to the General Counsel.

criminal prosecution,” but does not explain what if any portion of the delay is attributable to the referral. Response 

[11] at 23. Mr. Sanford suggests the delay may have been because he was in a Special Housing Unit for the 11 

months preceding his hearing. Response [11] at 108. But the delay is not the basis of any of his arguments that he 

was denied due process.

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On April 6, 2020, Mr. Sanford initiated this case by submitting his petition for habeas 

relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In his petition, he contends that he did not receive due process 

during the disciplinary proceedings because he did not receive advance written notice of the 

violation for which he was disciplined, never received a written report of the disciplinary hearing 

officer’s decision, and because his disciplinary hearing officer was biased.

ANALYSIS

Persons in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons have a liberty interest in good conduct 

time, and can challenge the loss of good conduct time by filing a motion for habeas relief under 

28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Jackson v . Carlson, 707 F.2d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 1983). Although 

prisoners have due process rights in prison disciplinary proceedings, such proceedings “are not 

part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings 

does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). As a result, a prisoner has 

received due process if each of the following requirements are met: the prisoner (1) receives 

written notice of the disciplinary charges at least 24 hours before a disciplinary hearing; (2) has 

an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker; (3) is able to call witnesses and 

present evidence that will not be unduly hazardous to safety or correctional goals; (4) receives a 

written statement of the evidence relied on and the reason for the decision; and (5) receives 

disclosures of any exculpatory evidence. Id. at 564-66.

The disciplinary decision will be upheld as long as it is supported by “some evidence in 

the record,” which is a meager standard. Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 941 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(“once the meager threshold has been crossed our inquiry ends.”). On habeas review, the court 

does not reweigh the evidence or determine credibility. See Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 720 

(7th Cir. 1996). Rather, the court merely looks to whether there is any evidence in the record 

supporting the disciplinary decision. See Henderson v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 

(7th Cir. 1994) (a court can overturn a disciplinary decision only if no reasonable adjudicator 

could have found the inmate guilty of the offense based on the evidence presented).

A federal prisoner must exhaust his federal administrative remedies before seeking 

habeas relief in court. See Richmond v. Scibana, 387 F.3d 602, 604 (7th Cir. 2004) (“A 

common-law exhaustion rule applies to § 2241 actions even though § 1997e(a) does not.”). The 

requirement is not jurisdictional and so is waived if not raised by the respondent. See Del Raine 

v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 1987). Here, the government has raised the defense. See 

Response [11] at 4-8.

Proper exhaustion requires compliance with the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative 

Remedy Program, which is set out at 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 

U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006) (“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and 

other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without

imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.”). Under the program, an 

inmate must first attempt to resolve an issue informally. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13. Within 20 days 

of the date on which the basis of the request occurred, an inmate may initiate administrative 

review by filing a written Administrative Remedy Request using form BP-9. Id. § 542.14. The 

warden must respond within 20 days. Id. § 542.18. If the inmate is not satisfied with the 

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response, within 20 days he may submit an Appeal to the Regional Director using form BP-10, 

which must be “accompanied by one complete copy or duplicate original of the institution 

Request and response.” Id. § 542.15(a), (b). The Regional Director has 30 days to respond. Id. § 

542.18. If the inmate is still not satisfied, he must take a final appeal to the Office of General 

Counsel in Washington, D.C. using form BP-11, which must be “accompanied by one complete 

copy or duplicate original of the institution and regional filings and their responses.” Id. § 

542.15(a), (b). The General Counsel must respond within 40 days. Id. § 542.18. If an inmate 

does not receive a timely response to his informal request, grievance, or appeals, he “may 

consider the absence of a response to be a denial at that level.” Id.

The government contends that Mr. Sanford never fully exhausted his first appeal because, 

as the Regional Director noted when it rejected the appeal, he attached more than the single 

continuation page allowed under 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(b)(3). Although the basis for rejecting the 

appeal may seem overly picky, if Mr. Sanford was unsatisfied, he was required to appeal to the 

General Counsel. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). Mr. Sanford does not allege he appealed to the 

General Counsel, and nothing in the record suggests that he did. As a result, he did not 

administratively exhaust his first appeal.

The government contends that Mr. Sanford also failed to fully exhaust his second appeal 

because, as the Regional Director noted when it rejected the appeal, Mr. Sanford failed to attach 

to his appeal a copy of the DHO Report he was appealing. The Regional Director’s response is 

curious given that the basis of the appeal was that Mr. Sanford never received a copy of the DHO 

Report. However, the response also directed Mr. Sanford to obtain a copy of the DHO Report 

from his unit team and resubmit his appeal within ten days. Mr. Sanford alleges that after 

receiving the Regional Director’s response he asked his case manager for a copy, but was told it 

was unavailable because it “was located in the Freedom of Information Act section of his file,” 

Memorandum in Support [2] at 3, and that he never received a response to his Freedom of 

Information request. Reply [13] at 5. Runarounds of this sort can excuse an inmate’s failure to 

exhaust. See McCarthan v. Krueger, No. 2:18 CV 195, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112466 (S.D. 

Ind. July 6, 2018) (exhaustion before filing § 2241 petition is excused where “‘prison 

administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through 

machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation,’” quoting Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 644 

(2016)). Mr. Sanford contends that this runaround establishes cause and prejudice for his failure 

to exhaust, and therefore his failure to exhaust should be excused. But the Administrative 

Remedy Program allowed Mr. Sanford to appeal the response of the Regional Director to the 

General Counsel, and nothing in the record suggests that he availed himself of that required step. 

Accordingly, he did not exhaust his second appeal.

Because Mr. Sanford did not fully exhaust his administrative appeals, his petition must be 

dismissed for failure to exhaust. However, even if he had exhausted or was excused from 

exhausting, his petition would still fail because he has not established that he was denied due 

process. He attempts to establish a violation of due process by contending that he never received 

a copy of the DHO report. But his first appeal references statements in the DHO Report. For 

instance, he premises his first appeal on a document he received in the mail on October 10, 2019, 

which contains “fabricated lies,” including that the incident happened in unit 2B, when in fact it 

occurred in unit 6A. Response [11] at 109. The government contends the statement shows that 

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Mr. Sanford received the DHO Report on October 10, 2019. In response, Mr. Sanford contends 

that he was referring to the Incident Report, not the DHO Report. But the Incident Report never 

refers to unit 2B, only to unit 6A. Petition [1] at 10. Therefore, his contention that the document 

he received on October 10, 2019, was the Incident Report is not credible. Rather, it must have 

been a copy of the DHO Report, which according to the DHO Report itself was mailed to him on 

October 7, 2019, see Response [11] at 25, and which is the only document that refers to unit 2B.

Next, Mr. Sanford attempts to establish a violation of due process by contending that his 

disciplinary hearing officer was biased against him. In support of his allegation of bias, Mr. 

Sanford asserts that the same disciplinary hearing officer found that the other inmate involved in 

the fight, Mr. Lockhart, violated the less serious offense of Prohibited Conduct Code 224, 

fighting with another person, even though both disciplinary proceedings were based on the same 

Incident Report.

To establish a due process violation based on bias, Mr. Sanford must show that his 

decision-maker was involved in the investigation of the underlying charge. See Temple v. Davis, 

84 Fed. Appx. 642, 644 (7th Cir. 2003). Mr. Sanford does not allege that Officer Godwin was 

involved in the investigation of the fight. Indeed, it not clear that Officer Godwin disciplined 

Mr. Lockhart. The DHO Report for Mr. Lockhart is not in the record so the Court cannot 

determine which disciplinary hearing officer prepared it. But according to a declaration from 

Disciplinary Hearing Administrator Joseph Brian Wilson, the disciplinary proceeding was 

handled by Disciplinary Hearing Officer Richard Bourn. Supplemental Response [17] at 6. But 

even if they were both handled by Officer Godwin, the evidence supported the decision to treat 

the inmates differently: Mr. Lockhart was found with stab wounds, while Mr. Sanford was 

unscathed. Mr. Sanford has not established bias.

Next, Mr. Sanford contends that he was denied due process because he was “found guilty 

of a code violation that was not reported on the incident report,” and because the disciplinary 

decision was not supported by “some evidence.” Petition [1] at 6; Memorandum In Support [2] 

at 1. Due process entitles an inmate to at least 24 hours’ advance written notice of the charges he 

faces. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. Mr. Sanford acknowledges that he received the Incident 

Report on September 4, 2019, see Memorandum in Support [2] at 2, and the Incident Report 

gave him notice that he faced a charge of violation Prohibit Act Code 101, see Petition [1] at 10. 

He claims that Officer Ahmed would be willing to state that Disciplinary Hearing Officer 

Godwin promised to reduce Mr. Sanford’s violation to the less serious Code 224, but Mr. 

Sanford offers no such statement from Officer Ahmed. Due process requires advance notice of 

the charges an inmate faces. The Incident Report gave Mr. Sanford advance notice of the 

allegation that he committed a Code 101 violation, the same code violation for which he was 

disciplined. Therefore, Mr. Sanford has not established a lack of advance notice.

As for the evidence of guilt, Mr. Sanford initially contends that he could be found in 

violation of Code 101, assaulting any person, only if he was also found in violation of Code 104, 

possession of a weapon. See Memorandum in Support [2] at 4. But he provides no support for 

that contention, the Court’s review of the Inmate Discipline Program’s list of prohibited acts 

found no support, and in his reply brief Mr. Sanford concedes that there is no such requirement, 

see Reply [13] at 6. Code 101 states that the assault must have involved the attempt to inflict or 

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the infliction of serious physical injury. It is silent on the means of inflicting the injury, and Mr. 

Sanford is incorrect when he contends that Code 101 is “the assault of another with serious 

injury through the use of a weapon.” Memorandum in Support [2] at 4. The DHO Report 

identifies the evidence on which the hearing officer relied to determine that Mr. Sanford violated 

Code 101, including the description of the fight in the incident report, witness statements, 

medical reports about deep puncture wounds found on Mr. Lockhart after the fight, Mr. 

Lockhart’s statement that his injuries were the result of the fight, pictures of Mr. Lockhart’s 

injuries and Mr. Sanford lack of injuries, and pictures from the scene of the fight depicting blood 

splatters on the walls and floor, and a sharpened piece of metal crafted into a “blade style 

weapon.” Response [11] at 24. The disciplinary hearing officer’s decision satisfies the “some 

evidence” standard under the due process clause. 

 Finally, the Court notes that for the first time in his reply brief Mr. Sanford contends that 

he intended to ask his disciplinary hearing officer to review video of the fight, which he contends 

would show that Mr. Lockhart sustained the stab wounds during an earlier fight, not during the 

fight with Mr. Sanford. Mr. Sanford asserts that he decided against asking Officer Godwin to 

review the video in reliance on Officer Godwin’s promise to reduce his violation to the less 

serious Prohibit Act Code 224. Mr. Sanford never raised that argument in any of his 

administrative appeals, in his petition, or in the supplemental brief the Court allowed so that he 

could add his claim of bias. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are dirty pool and 

are forfeited. See Narducci v. Moore, 572 F. 3d 313, 324 (7th Cir. 2009). 

CONCLUSION

 For the reasons given, Mr. Sanford’s petitioner [1] is denied. 

Date: May 26, 2022 By: ____ ___________________________________ 

 Iain D. Johnston 

 United States District Judge

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