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PH I L L I P S DA Y E S

NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW FIRM

A Professional Corporation

3101 North Central Avenue, Suite 1500

Phoenix, Arizona 85012

Telephone: 1-800-JOB-LAWS

docket@phillipsdayeslaw.com

TREY DAYES, No. 020805

SEAN DAVIS, No. 030754

(602) 288-1610 ext. 301

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eric Meadows, individually; and Leslie 

Meadows, individually, and as husband and 

wife

 Plaintiffs,

 vs.

Second Chance Group Homes, LLC, an

Arizona limited liability company; Rudy 

Byron and Jane Doe Byron, husband and 

wife

Case No.: ________________________

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs Eric Meadows and Leslie Meadows, for their Complaint against 

Defendants, allege as follows:

NATURE OF THE CASE

1. The Fair Labor Standards Act is designed to eliminate “labor conditions 

detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, 

efficiency and general well-being of workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). To achieve its goals, 

the FLSA sets minimum wage and overtime pay requirements for covered employers. See 

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Complaint Page 2

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29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a).

2. Employers must compensate employees for all work that employers permit 

employees to perform. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.11. In such cases, it is the responsibility of 

employers’ management to ensure that work is not performed if management does not 

desire for such work to be performed. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.13. Employers may not accept 

the benefits of employees performing work without compensating the employees for their 

work. Id.

3. Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants for unlawful failure to pay 

overtime wages in direct violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et 

seq. (“FLSA”).

4. Defendants had a consistent policy and practice of requiring its employees to 

work well in excess of forty (40) hours per week without paying them time and a half for 

hours worked over forty (40) hours per week.

5. Plaintiffs seek to recover unpaid overtime compensation and an equal amount 

of liquidated damages, including interest thereon, statutory penalties, attorneys’ fees, and 

costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties hereto 

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

7. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendants reside within 

the State in which this District Court is located and because a substantial part of the 

events or omissions giving rise to this matter occurred in this District.

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Complaint Page 3

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8. The named Defendants, by virtue of their own acts and omissions or by 

virtue of the acts and omissions committed by one or more of their agents, employees or 

representatives, as described herein, have conducted business or caused events to occur 

within the District of Arizona and, more particularly, within Maricopa County, Arizona, 

as more particularly described herein so as to give rise to both subject matter and 

personal jurisdiction of this Court.

PARTIES

9. At all times material hereto, Plaintiffs were residents of Maricopa County, 

Arizona. 

10. At all times material hereto, Second Chance Group Homes, LLC was 

incorporated in the State of Arizona with its principal place of business in Maricopa

County, Arizona.

11. Upon information and belief, at all times material hereto, Defendant Rudy 

Byron, was and continues to be a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona.

12. Jane Doe Byron is Rudy Byron’s wife. Rudy and Jane Doe Byron have

caused events to take place giving rise to this Complaint as to which their marital 

community is fully liable.

13. Upon information and belief, and consistent with the information available 

from the Arizona Corporation Commission, Defendant Rudy Byron is the owner of 

Second Chance Group Homes, LLC.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

14. Second Chance Group Homes, LLC operates an assisted care facility in 

Surprise, Arizona. Defendants’ patients included individuals with developmental 

disabilities.

15. At all relevant times, Plaintiffs were employees of Second Chance Group 

Homes, LLC.

16. The provisions set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 207 of the FLSA apply to Defendants.

17. At all relevant times, each of the Defendants was and continues to be an 

“employer” as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 203(d).

18. Each of the Defendants should be deemed an “employer” for purposes of the 

FLSA including, without limitation, 29 U.S.C. § 216.

19. Defendant Rudy Byron is deemed an “employer” for purposes of the FLSA, 

including, without limitation, 29 U.S.C. §216.

20. All Defendants are co-equally liable for all matters.

21. Defendant Rudy Byron made all decisions on the daily activities of his 

employees.

22. Defendant Rudy Byron makes all decisions regarding pay policies for Second 

Chance Group Homes, LLC.

23. Defendant Rudy Byron exerted financial control over Second Chance Group 

Homes, LLC.

24. Defendant Rudy Byron exerted operative control over Second Chance Group 

Homes, LLC.

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25. Defendant Rudy Byron has the power to close Second Chance Group Homes, 

LLC.

26. Defendant Rudy Byron has the power to hire and fire employees. 

27. Defendant Rudy Byron hired managerial employees. 

28. On information and belief, Defendant Rudy Byron maintained employment 

records. 

29. On information and belief, Defendant Rudy Byron dictated the corporate 

message in pending labor investigations. 

30. At all times material to this action, Second Chance Group Homes, LLC was 

and continues to be an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 

commerce.

31. Plaintiffs engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.

32. Plaintiffs handled supplies, such as medicine, that originated out of state.

33. Plaintiffs were involved in transacting business across state lines via 

interstate telephone calls or the U. S. Mail which included taking new orders from 

customers.

34. Plaintiffs were involved in ordering or receiving goods from out-of-state 

suppliers.

35. Plaintiffs were involved in handling the accounting or bookkeeping for the 

ordering or receiving of goods from out-of-state suppliers.

36. Plaintiffs also handled credit card and check transactions that involved the 

interstate banking and finance systems.

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37. On information and belief, at all relevant times, the annual gross revenue of 

Defendants exceeded, and continues to exceed, $500,000.00.

38. Second Chance Group Homes, LLC hired Plaintiff Eric Meadows in January 

of 2009 as a caregiver.

39. Second Chance Group Homes, LLC hired Plaintiff Leslie Meadows in May 

of 2008 as a caregiver. 

40. As caregivers, Plaintiffs responsibilities included medication administration, 

medication refills, patient care, patient file review, accompanying patients to doctor 

visits, cooking, cleaning, changing, dressing, and bathing of patients, and assisting

patients with personal hygiene.

41. Second Chance Group Homes, LLC compensated Plaintiffs at an hourly rate 

ranging from $10.50 per hour to $12.50 per hour during the course of their employment. 

42. Defendants withheld taxes out of Plaintiff’s paycheck pursuant to IRS 

regulations. 

43. Plaintiffs were non-exempt employee. 

44. Each Plaintiff had no supervision or management responsibilities. 

45. Each Plaintiff could neither hire nor fire employees.

46. Each Plaintiff had no authority to exercise significant independent judgment 

on issues that affect the whole company when carrying out her job responsibilities.

47. Defendants managed, supervised, and directed all aspects of each Plaintiff’s 

job duties and responsibilities.

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48. Each Plaintiff’s primary duty was not the performance of work directly 

related to the management or general business operations of Second Chance Group 

Homes, LLC or its’ customers. 

49. Each Plaintiff’s primary duty was not the performance of work requiring 

advanced knowledge in a field of science or learning that was acquired by a prolonged 

course of specialized intellectual instruction. 

50. Each Plaintiff did not perform work requiring advanced knowledge. 

51. Each Plaintiff did not perform work in a field of science or learning. 

52. Each Plaintiff did not have an advanced degree and was not required to have 

one to perform the work.

53. The knowledge required to perform the each Plaintiff’s job responsibilities is 

not acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual study.

54. Each Plaintiff’s work did not require consistent exercise of discretion and 

judgment. 

55. Each Plaintiff’s work did not require them to analyze, interpret, or make 

deductions from varying facts or circumstances.

56. Each Plaintiff’s duties were carried out in a mechanical and routine manner 

and he had no authority to make independent decisions in performing those duties. 

57. Each Plaintiff’s work did not require invention, imagination, originality, or 

talent.

58. Each Plaintiff’s work did not require creative or original analysis and 

interpretation. 

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59. Each Plaintiff’s regular schedule was Sunday through Friday, 10 p.m. to 8:30 

a.m.

60. Plaintiffs were required to administer medication at all times of the night.

61. During the six days per week Plaintiffs were working, they were not allowed 

to leave the facility for any reason. 

62. Each and every week that Plaintiffs have worked their regular schedule, they 

have worked over forty hours in a week. 

63. Defendants did not pay Plaintiffs overtime. 

64. Plaintiffs were not commissioned employees. 

65. Defendants would only compensate Plaintiffs at their regular rate for all their

hours worked. 

66. Defendants did not compensate Plaintiffs at one and a half times their regular 

rate for hours worked over 40 in week.

67. In September of 2015, the Department of Labor concluded an investigation 

into Defendants in which the DOL determined that Defendants were improperly 

compensating Plaintiffs. 

68. Plaintiff Leslie Meadows left her employment with Defendants in 2013. 

69. After the DOL investigation, Defendants began compensating Plaintiff Eric 

Meadows at time and one half for hours worked over forty in a week. 

70. Plaintiffs have retained the law firm of Phillips Dayes National Employment 

Law Firm to prosecute their claims against Defendants on their behalf and have agreed to 

pay reasonable costs and attorney’s fees in the prosecution of this matter.

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COUNT ONE

OVERTIME VIOLATION—29 U.S.C. § 207

71. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt the preceding paragraphs as if fully set 

forth herein. 

72. While employed by Defendants, Plaintiffs regularly worked multiple hours of 

overtime per week.

73. Plaintiffs were non-exempt employees.

74. Defendants have intentionally and willfully failed and refused to pay 

Plaintiffs overtime according to the provisions of the FLSA.

75. On information and belief, Defendants further engaged in a widespread 

pattern and practice of violating the provisions of the FLSA by failing to pay Plaintiffs in 

accordance with 29 U.S.C. § 207.

76. As the direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violations of the FLSA, 

Plaintiffs have suffered damages by failing to receive compensation in accordance with 

29 U.S.C. § 207.

77. Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for an amount 

equal to one and one-half times their regular pay rate for each hour of overtime worked 

per week.

78. In addition to the amount of unpaid wages owed to each Plaintiff, each 

Plaintiff is also entitled to recover an additional equal amount as liquidated damages 

pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

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79. On information and belief, Defendants’ conduct in failing to properly 

compensate Plaintiffs, in violation of the FLSA, was willful.

80. Defendants have not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA.

Plaintiffs have been required to bring this action to recover their overtime compensation, 

and their statutory liquidated damages, and as the direct and foreseeable result of 

Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiffs have incurred costs and attorneys’ fees.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that judgment be entered in their

favor against Defendants:

a. Awarding Plaintiffs overtime compensation in the amount due for all of 

their time worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week at a pay rate 

equal to one and one-half times each Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay while 

at work for Defendants, in an amount proved at trial;

b. Awarding each Plaintiff liquidated damages in an amount equal to the 

overtime award;

c. Awarding each Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses 

of the litigation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b);

d. Awarding each Plaintiff pre-judgment interest, at the highest legal rate, 

on all amounts awarded under subsections (a) and (b) above from the 

date of the payment due for that pay period until paid in full;

e. Awarding each Plaintiff post-judgment interest, at the highest legal rate, 

on all awards from the date of such award until paid in full; and

f. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

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COUNT TWO

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

81. Plaintiffs incorporate and adopt the preceding paragraphs as if fully set 

forth herein. 

82. Plaintiffs and Defendants have an overtime compensation dispute pending.

83. The Court has jurisdiction to hear each Plaintiff’s request for declaratory 

relief pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02.

84. Plaintiffs are entitled to declarations, and request that the Court make 

declarations as to the following matters and as to other matters deemed appropriate by the 

Court:

a. Defendants employed each Plaintiff.

b. Defendants are engaged in an enterprise covered by the overtime provisions 

of the FLSA.

c. Each Plaintiff individually is covered by the overtime provisions of the 

FLSA.

d. Each Plaintiff was not an exempt employee pursuant to the FLSA.

e. Defendants failed and refused to make payments of overtime compensation 

to each Plaintiff, in violation of the provisions of the FLSA.

f. Defendants’ failures to pay overtime compensation to each Plaintiff were 

willful.

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g. Each Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of overtime 

compensation not paid by Defendants at the rate of one and one-half times 

each Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay.

h. Each Plaintiff is entitled to an equal amount as liquidated damages.

i. Each Plaintiff is entitled to recover his costs and a reasonable attorney’s fee 

incurred in prosecuting his claim.

85. It is in the public interest to have these declarations of rights recorded as each

Plaintiff’s declaratory judgment action serves the useful purposes of clarifying and 

settling the legal relations at issue, preventing future harm, and promoting the remedial 

purposes of the FLSA.

86. The declaratory judgment action further terminates and affords relief from 

uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceeding.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that judgment be entered int heir

favor against Defendants:

a. Declaring, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 

2201–02, that the acts and practices complained of herein are in 

violation of the overtime and wage provisions of the FLSA;

b. Awarding Plaintiffs their reasonable attorney’s fees and the costs and 

expenses of the litigation pursuant to the FLSA; and

c. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper

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Dated: December 3, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

PHILLIPS DAYES NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW 

FIRM PC

By: /s/ Trey Dayes

Trey Dayes

Attorney for Plaintiffs

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