IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

ARIADNA RAMON BARO, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

LAKE COUNTY FEDERATION OF 

TEACHERS LOCAL 504, IFTAFT/AFL-CIO and WAUKEGAN 

COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL 

DISTRICT #60, 

 Defendants. 

No. 20-cv-02126 

Judge John F. Kness 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

On August 20, 2019, Plaintiff Ariadna Ramon Baro, a public-school English 

teacher, signed a membership agreement to join a teacher’s union under the mistaken 

belief that such membership was required. Under the terms of that agreement, 

Plaintiff authorized the union to deduct annual membership dues from her salary. 

When Plaintiff realized her mistake—that union membership and paying union dues 

were not, in fact, required—Plaintiff attempted to resign her membership and revoke 

her dues authorization. On September 13, 2019, Plaintiff received an email from the 

union asserting that “you will pay union dues regardless of whether or not you are a 

member,” which Plaintiff interpreted to mean that her request to resign was 

effectively denied. In January 2020, the school began to deduct dues from Plaintiff’s 

salary on the union’s behalf. 

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On April 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a § 1983 claim against her employer and the 

Union for violating her First Amendment rights under Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, 

Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). On April 10, 

2020, the Union sent Plaintiff a formal acknowledgment of her resignation, assurance 

that dues would no longer be deducted from her earnings, and a check for a full refund 

of the dues, plus five hundred additional dollars to compensate Plaintiff for her 

troubles. Plaintiff refused to accept the check and instead amended her complaint to 

add a claim for punitive damages. 

Now before the Court are Defendants’ fully briefed motions to dismiss. As 

explained below, Plaintiff’s voluntary choice to join her school’s local union—even if 

ill-informed—means that Plaintiff is bound by the terms of the union membership 

agreement and thus cannot show that the deduction of dues from her paycheck 

violated the First Amendment. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions are granted, and 

the case is dismissed. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Ariadna Ramon Baro, a citizen of Spain, relocated to Waukegan, 

Illinois in 2019 to begin work as an English-as-a-second-language teacher for high 

school students in the Waukegan Community Unit School District #60 (the 

“District”). (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Dkt. 7 ¶ 10.) On August 20, 2019, 

Plaintiff attended an orientation meeting at which a representative of Defendant 

Lake County Federation of Teachers, Local 504, IFT-AFT/AFL-CIO (the “Union”) 

presented information about the teachers’ union. (Id. ¶ 11.) Believing that 

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membership in the Union was required, Plaintiff filled out the union membership 

card and returned it to the representative. (Id.) Under the terms of that union 

membership agreement, Plaintiff agreed to authorize the Union “to deduct from 

[Plaintiff’s] earnings on a regular pro rata basis . . . [a]n amount equal to the current 

annual membership dues as certified by [the Union] . . . for a period of one year[.]” 

(FAC, Exh. A.) 

A few days later, Plaintiff “learned that union membership and paying the 

union was, in fact, not required,” contrary to her prior belief. (Id. ¶ 12.) She then sent 

letters to both the District and the Illinois Federation of Teachers (the Union’s 

affiliated entity) resigning her membership. (Id. ¶ 13.) In those letters, Plaintiff 

declared that her earlier dues-deduction authorization “was signed under a 

framework Janus declared unconstitutional.” (Id., Exhs. B & C.) On September 13, 

2019, Plaintiff received an unrelated email from “Mr. Weber,” a fellow teacher and a 

union representative, stating that “you will pay union dues regardless of whether or 

not you are a member.” (Id. ¶ 14.) This statement, Plaintiff admits, was not true. 

(Id. ¶ 14.) But Plaintiff believed at the time that this emailed statement “meant that 

her request to resign was effectively denied.” (Id. ¶ 15.) 

In January 2020, the District began deducting Union dues from Plaintiff’s 

paycheck and remitting them to the Union. (Id. ¶ 16.) On February 3, 2020, Plaintiff 

again contacted her Union representative and the District’s payroll department to 

explain that she wanted to resign her membership and stop paying dues. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

But the payroll department told her that it could not stop deducting the dues and 

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that she would have to speak to her Union representative. (Id.) The Union president 

then contacted Plaintiff and explained that she would have to wait until the 

withdrawal period in August 2020 to resign her membership and stop the deduction 

of dues. (Id.) 

Plaintiff filed her first complaint in this case on April 3, 2020, under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) against Defendants for violating her First 

Amendment rights by allegedly withholding Plaintiff’s dues without Plaintiff’s 

consent. (Id. ¶ 18; Dkt. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff sought various declarations 

regarding Defendant’s violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights under Janus, 

an injunction barring the further deduction of her Union dues, damages in the form 

of all dues collected from her, and costs and fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (See Dkt. 1.) 

On April 15, 2020, Plaintiff received a letter from the Union acknowledging her 

resignation and explaining that dues would no longer be deducted. (FAC ¶ 18.) The 

letter included a check for $829.30, which represented “a full refund of all [Plaintiff’s] 

dues plus an additional five hundred dollars for your efforts in pursuing this matter.” 

(Id. ¶ 18, Exh. F.) Plaintiff returned the check (id. ¶ 20) and filed an amended 

complaint on April 24, 2020 that added a claim for punitive damages (See FAC). Now 

before the Court are Defendants’ fully briefed motions to dismiss. (Dkts. 20, 22.) For 

the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) “challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police 

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of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Each complaint “must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Those allegations “must be 

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555. Put another way, the complaint must present a “short, plain, and plausible 

factual narrative that conveys a story that holds together.” Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, 

Inc., 23 F.4th 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation omitted). In evaluating a 

motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations 

and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But 

even though factual allegations are entitled to the assumption of truth, mere legal 

conclusions are not. Id. at 678–79.

III. DISCUSSION 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed under both 

12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). (Dkts. 21, 22.) Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s claim does 

not implicate the First Amendment because Plaintiff voluntarily entered into a 

private agreement with Defendants. (Dkt. 21 at 5–7; Dkt. 22 at 1–2.) Defendants also 

contend that their tender to Plaintiff, made after Plaintiff brought this action, 

eliminated any case or controversy between the parties. (Dkt. 21 at 9–14; Dkt. 22 at 

2–3.) As matter of jurisdiction, the Court first addresses the issue of mootness. 

A. Plaintiff’s case is not moot

If a case becomes moot at any point during the proceedings, it is “no longer a 

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Case or Controversy for purposes of Article III and is outside the jurisdiction of the 

federal courts.” Big Shoulders Cap. LLC v. San Luis & Rio Grande R.R., Inc., 13 F.4th 

560, 570 (7th Cir. 2021). A case is moot when “the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ 

or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” L.A. Cnty. v. Davis, 

440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). 

The party asserting mootness bears a “heavy burden of proof” in demonstrating it is 

“absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be 

expected to recur.” Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Concord Comm. Schs., 885 

F.3d 1038, 1051 (7th Cir. 2018). The proper test for mootness is “whether it is still 

possible to fashion some form of meaningful relief to the [Plaintiff] in the event [she] 

prevails on the merits.” Holder v. Ill. Dept. of Corrs., 751 F.3d 486, 498 (7th Cir. 2014). 

To answer this question, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff remains injured 

and what relief Plaintiff requests. 

At the crux of Plaintiff’s alleged injury is a constitutional deprivation; namely, 

that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights under Janus by 

withholding union dues from Plaintiff’s pay. To remedy this, Plaintiff requests: (1) a 

declaration that the union membership card she signed did not waive her First 

Amendment rights under Janus and that Defendants’ actions thereby violated 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) actual damages for all union dues collected from 

her; (3) punitive damages against the Union; and (4) costs and attorneys’ fees. (FAC 

at 8–9.) After Plaintiff filed this case, but before she filed the operative complaint, the 

District ceased withholding union dues from Plaintiff’s paycheck and remitting them 

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to the Union, and the Union voluntarily attempted to fully refund garnished dues 

plus a $500 check for Plaintiff’s “efforts in pursuing this matter.” (Id. ¶¶ 18–19, Exh. 

F.) Plaintiff returned the check, (id. ¶ 20) and filed an amended complaint with an 

added claim for punitive damages. 

As a general rule, an unaccepted settlement offer does not render a case moot. 

Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 162 (2016). And the Seventh Circuit has 

overruled a number of its decisions to the extent they hold that “a defendant’s offer 

of full compensation moots the litigation or otherwise ends the Article III case or 

controversy.” Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2015). 1

Chapman went so far as to suggest that “[e]ven a defendant’s proof that the plaintiff 

has accepted full compensation . . . is an affirmative defense rather than a 

jurisdictional bar.” Id. Under Chapman, Defendant’s attempted reimbursement 

cannot create a jurisdictional bar to Plaintiff’s claim for damages. As a result, 

Plaintiff’s claim for monetary relief is not moot. For the same reason, Plaintiff’s 

requested declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 also survives a Rule 12(b)(1) 

challenge. See NewPage Wis. Sys. Inc. v. United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., 

Energy Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO/CLC, 651 F.3d 775, 776 

(7th Cir. 2011) (“Declaratory judgment actions are authorized as long as there is an 

actual controversy between the two parties”). 

1 Chapman explained that “[i]f an offer to satisfy all of the plaintiff’s demands really 

moots a case, then it self-destructs. Rule 68 is captioned ‘Offer of Judgment.’ But a district 

court cannot enter judgment in a moot case. . . . So if [Defendant tendered an offer that] made 

this case moot, even if [Plaintiff] had accepted it the district court could not have ordered 

[Defendant] to pay.” Chapman, 796 F.3d at 786. 

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Without regard to whether any prospective injunction would provide 

meaningful relief to Plaintiff,2 Plaintiff’s claims for damages and declaratory relief 

satisfy the “Article III minima of injury-in-fact” to maintain “requisite standing.” 

Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 371 (1982). It is well established that 

“even the availability of a ‘partial remedy’ is ‘sufficient to prevent [a] case from being 

moot.’ ” Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996) (quoting Church of Scientology 

of Cal. V. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 13 (1992)). Thus, so long as Plaintiff has some 

available remedy—even if not “fully satisfactory”—Plaintiff’s case is not moot. Id.

In view of Chapman, Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages and declaratory 

relief are not rendered moot by Defendant’s voluntary attempts to provide a remedy. 

Because a case or controversy exists, the Court retains its jurisdiction under Article 

III and can proceed to address Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 

2 Before Plaintiff filed her operative complaint, the Union had already ceased the 

challenged conduct: the Union acknowledged Plaintiff’s request to become a nonmember and 

ceased deducting dues from her paycheck. (FAC, Exh. F.) Although a defendant’s voluntary 

cessation of challenge conduct “does not necessarily render a case moot,” if a defendant 

“sincerely self-corrects the practice at issue, a court will give this effort weight in its mootness 

determination.” Freedom From Religion Found., 885 F.3d at 1051 (citing Wis. Right to Life, 

Inc. v. Schober, 366 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2004)). Even viewed in the light most favorable 

to Plaintiff, the complaint does not suggest the Union’s conduct is reasonably expected to 

recur. Plaintiff admits that the statement she received—that she would have to “pay union 

dues regardless of whether or not [she became] a member”—“was not true.” (Dkt. 7 ¶ 14.) For 

its part, the Union disavows its “legally inaccurate” statement in the letter as a 

“misstatement.” (Dkt. 21 at 7.) Plaintiff further concedes that she “might not ever face the 

unconstitutional conduct alleged in her complaint again given [the Union’s] voluntary 

cessation,” and that the Union’s conduct “may make [Plaintiff’s] requested injunctive 

relief . . . moot.” (Dkt. 27 at 9.) Although the pleadings create no reason to believe that 

Defendant could “resurrect the older procedure in the future,” Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 

89 (7th Cir. 1975), Plaintiff, for the reasons identified in this opinion, maintains justiciable 

claims for damages and declaratory relief. Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150 (1996). 

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B. Plaintiff’s complaint does not implicate the First Amendment

In 2018, the Supreme Court held that “[n]either an agency fee for any other 

payment to the union may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other 

attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents 

to pay. By agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving their First Amendment rights, 

and such a waiver cannot be presumed.” Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486 (emphasis added). 

But “Janus said nothing about union members who . . . freely chose to join a union 

and voluntarily authorized the deduction of union dues, and who thus consented to 

subsidizing a union.” Bennett v. Council 31 of the Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. 

Emps., AFL-CIO, 991 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2021). 

Janus held that the First Amendment prohibits unions from forcing 

compulsory payroll deductions—i.e., “fair share” fees—from workers who are not 

union members. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486. In Janus, the plaintiff was not a member 

of the union, but the collective bargaining agreement nevertheless required him to 

pay agency fees to the union, which in turn spent that money in part on lobbying and 

advertising on behalf of the union. Id. As the Supreme Court explained, compelling 

nonmembers to subsidize the activities of a public sector union by automatically 

deducting fair-share fees runs afoul of the First Amendment absent an employee’s 

affirmative consent and waiver of such right as shown by “clear and compelling 

evidence.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s claim presupposes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus

established a First Amendment right for all public employees—including union 

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members—not to subsidize a union by means of deduction of union dues without first 

affirmatively consenting to waive that right. But the Seventh Circuit expressly 

rejected that reading of Janus in Bennett v. AFSCME Council 31, joining instead “a 

swelling chorus of courts” that have held Janus does not, as a matter of law, require 

a constitutional waiver before union dues are deducted from employees who have 

chosen to join a public sector union. Bennett, 991 F.3d at 730–31. 

As here, the plaintiff in Bennett signed a union membership card and later 

asserted that the Janus decision voided her dues-deduction authorization. Id. at 730. 

But the Seventh Circuit held that the union and school district did not violate the 

plaintiff’s First Amendment rights by continuing to deduct union dues from her 

paychecks after she revoked her union membership, explaining that the signing of a 

union membership card authorized the deduction of union dues “in the context of a 

contractual relationship” and that “[t]he First Amendment does not confer a 

constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under 

state law.” Id. at 731 (cleaned up). 

Bennett fatally undermines Plaintiff’s claim that her “Janus rights” were 

violated by Defendants’ conduct. Indeed, Plaintiff’s own allegations establish that she 

signed the union membership agreement voluntarily, meaning that she is bound by 

the contract she entered. See Troesch v. Chi. Tchrs. Union, Loc. Union No.1, Am. 

Fed’n of Tchrs., 522 F. Supp. 425, 431 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (dismissing complaint for failure 

to state a Janus claim), aff’d, No. 21-1525, 2021 WL 2587783 (7th Cir. Apr. 15, 2021), 

cert. denied sub nom. Troesch v. Chi. Tchrs. Union, 142 S. Ct. 425 (2021). Although 

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the Court need look no further than Janus and Bennett to dispose of Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment claim, an exploration of the record is necessary to demonstrate why 

Plaintiff’s claim fails. 

1. Plaintiff Voluntarily Joined the Union 

 It is undisputed that Plaintiff signed the union membership agreement and 

that such membership was not a condition of Plaintiff’s employment. (See FAC ¶ 11–

12.) By its terms, the membership card was required to “authorize” the deduction of 

union dues and to “apply to be a member” in the union. (Id., Exh. A.) Union 

membership was thus on an opt-in basis, not opt-out. (Id. (“I hereby apply to be a 

member”; “I hereby authorize . . . the [union] to act as my exclusive representative 

with my employer[.]”).) 

Plaintiff now asserts that there is not “clear and convincing evidence that she 

provided affirmative consent to waive her right not to pay” union dues because, 

although she agreed to the terms of the membership agreement, Plaintiff did not 

specifically agree to give up her rights under Janus not to subsidize union speech. 

(Id. ¶ 3.) But this crabbed view finds no support in Janus or Bennett; Janus “said 

nothing about union members who, like [Plaintiff] voluntarily authorized the 

deduction of union dues.” Bennett, 991 F.3d at 732. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that she voluntarily signed the union membership 

card. (Dkt. 27 at 6 (Plaintiff “has never alleged that [the] September 13, 2019 

statement caused her to involuntarily sign the union card on August 20, 2019”).) 

Instead, Plaintiff alleges that “she filled out the union membership form” because she 

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“[b]eliev[ed] it to be required” and “was unaware of the Supreme Court’s Janus

decision.” (FAC ¶ 11.) A few days later, Plaintiff says, she realized her mistake and 

resigned her membership “[p]er the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Janus [sic].” 

(Id., Exh. B.) Plaintiff also alleges that the unrelated communication she received 

from “Mr. Weber” the following month—stating that Plaintiff “will pay union dues 

regardless of whether or not [Plaintiff is a] member”—caused her to believe that her 

request to resign “was effectively denied.” (Id. ¶ 15.) 

Although Plaintiff admits that the substance Weber’s email “was not true”—

Plaintiff concedes Defendants do not deduct union dues from nonmembers—Plaintiff 

maintains that she “did not know it was not true” at the time. (FAC ¶ 14.) This 

assertion is difficult to square with Plaintiff’s Exhibits B and C, which reflect, in 

detail, Plaintiff’s apparent certitude—two weeks before she received the Weber 

email—that she was not obligated to remain a union member or to pay dues as a 

nonmember: 

Effective immediately, I resign my membership from the Union 

and all affiliated unions and wish to be considered a 

nonmember. 

 

Per the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME, I cannot be 

required to pay any dues or fees to a union to maintain my job. 

Therefore, neither the Union nor my Employer is authorized to 

enforce any authorization I previously gave or may be perceived to 

have given pursuant to a signed authorization form, or any 

authorization that Employer has inferred on my behalf, allowing 

Employer to make an automatic payroll deduction for Union dues or 

fees. 

Furthermore, any restriction on the timing of revoking a 

dues/fees deduction is invalid because any previous 

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authorization was signed under a framework Janus declared 

unconstitutional. 

If you refuse to accept this letter as both an effective resignation and my 

immediate revocation of the automatic dues or fees deduction, please 

inform me immediately, in writing, of exactly what must be done to 

revoke my automatic dues or fees deduction authorization and resign 

my membership in the Union. 

Please respond promptly. Any further collection of dues or fees will 

constitute a violation of my rights under the U.S. Constitution. 

 (Id., Exhs. B & C.) 

Plaintiff’s assertion that she thought her resignation was rejected is also belied 

by Plaintiff’s allegation that, on February 3, 2020, she “again contacted her union 

representative and the payroll department of the District”—the details are sketchy—

“and explained that she wanted to resign her membership and stop paying dues.” 

(Id. ¶ 17.) If Plaintiff truly believed that her earlier resignation request was de facto

denied by the Weber email, it is odd that Plaintiff chose to reiterate that previouslyineffective request. 

These discrepancies may be immaterial, however, because the Court is bound 

to accept Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and to draw all reasonable inferences 

in Plaintiff’s favor. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Doing just that, the Court understands 

the essence of Plaintiff’s narrative to be as follows: 

 Plaintiff signed a union membership application form on August 20, 

2019, authorizing the Union to deduct dues from Plaintiff’s earning “for 

a period of one year from the date of authorization.” (FAC, Exh. A.)

 At the time she signed the form, Plaintiff did not know that joining the 

union was optional. (Id. ¶ 11.)

 On August 30, 2019, Plaintiff sent detailed letters to Defendants 

attempting to void her previously given authorization because “any 

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previous authorization was signed under a framework Janus declared 

unconstitutional.” (Id., Exhs. B & C.)

 On September 13, 2019, Weber, a union representative, responded “you 

will pay union dues regardless whether or not you are a member” to a 

group email that happened to include Plaintiff as a recipient. (Id., Exh. 

D.) Plaintiff interpreted the email to mean that her request to resign 

was denied. (Id. ¶ 15.)

 The District began deducting dues from Plaintiff’s paycheck in January 

2020. (Id. ¶ 16.)

 Plaintiff sent another letter to Defendants in February 2020 

“explain[ing] that she wanted to resign her membership and stop paying 

dues.” (Id. ¶ 17.)

 In response, the Union President explained to Plaintiff that, by signing 

the dues authorization card, Plaintiff “became a dues payer for at least 

1 year.” (Id., Exh. E.)

 On April 10, 2020, soon after Plaintiff filed her initial complaint in this 

case, the Union President sent Plaintiff a letter acknowledging 

Plaintiff’s resignation. (Id., Exh. F.) 

Even accepting Plaintiff’s erroneous beliefs as true, Plaintiff’s claim fails as a 

matter of law. As explained above, Plaintiff voluntarily joined the union. As for 

Plaintiff’s suggestion that her choice is not binding because it was ill-informed, the 

Court is aware of no authority (including Janus) that imposes a duty of informed 

consent to apply for membership in a union. Put differently, Janus did not mandate 

the workplace equivalent of Miranda warnings3 before an employee’s application to 

join a public-sector union could be presumed valid. See Bennett, 991 F.3d at 732 (“The 

Court [in Janus] made clear that a union may collect dues when an ‘employee 

affirmatively consents to pay.’ ”). 

2. Plaintiff is Contractually Bound by her Union Membership Agreement 

Plaintiff nonetheless insists that, because she “was not told that joining or 

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

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paying the Union was optional,” the withholding of union dues from her paycheck 

violated her First Amendment rights. (Dkt. 27 at 2–5, 11.) But the Seventh Circuit 

has explained that Janus “in no way created a new First Amendment waiver 

requirement for union members before dues are deducted pursuant to a voluntary 

agreement.” Bennett, 991 F.3d at 732 (quoting Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940, 952 (9th 

Cir. 2020)); id. (“one ‘cannot simultaneously choose to both join the Union and not 

pay union dues’ ”) (quoting Oliver v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Loc. 668 F. App’x 76, 79 

n.3 (3d Cir. 2020)). Plaintiff’s voluntary act of signing and submitting a union 

membership application card means that the concern in Janus—nonmembers being 

forced to pay union dues—is not present here. See Belgau, 975 F.3d at 952 (Supreme 

Court only “discussed constitutional waiver because it concluded that nonmembers’ 

First Amendment right had been infringed”); see also Bennett, 991 F.3d at 732–33 

(“[Plaintiff] is not a nonmember as the term was used in Janus. . . . [Plaintiff] does 

not fall within the sweep of Janus’ waiver requirement”). 

By signing the application card, Plaintiff was bound to the terms of the 

membership agreement. As Bennett explained, the First Amendment does not “render 

unenforceable any legal obligations or restrictions that are self-imposed through a 

contract.” Bennett, 991 F.3d at 731 (cleaned up). Nor does it “confer . . . a 

constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under 

state law.” Id. (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991)). In the 

time since Bennett was decided, many courts have recognized that “Janus does not 

articulate a path ‘to escape the terms’ of an agreement to pay union dues.” Troesch, 

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522 F. Supp. at 431 (collecting cases). Plaintiff voluntarily entered into a one-year 

contract with the Union, which necessarily included a dues-paying obligation for one 

year even if Plaintiff later wanted to escape those terms. (FAC, Exh. A (“This 

voluntary authorization and assignment shall be irrevocable . . . for a period of one 

year”).) Regardless of Plaintiff’s back-and-forth with the union and its 

representatives, and regardless of the union’s later decision to grant Plaintiff an early 

release from the agreement, Plaintiff can be held to that obligation without running 

afoul of Janus and the First Amendment. See Bennett, 991 F.3d at 731. 

* * * 

In sum, Plaintiff’s complaint does not raise a right to relief beyond the 

speculative level. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff may now regret her earlier 

decision to join the Union, but that does not render her knowing and voluntary choice 

nonconsensual. Unlike the proscribed conduct by Janus’ employer, the District’s 

deductions of dues from Plaintiff’s earnings were made in compliance with Plaintiff’s 

explicit written instructions. See Troesch, 522 F. Supp. at 431 (dismissing complaint 

where “Plaintiffs do not identify ‘even a whiff of compulsion’ that led them to sign the 

[union] agreements in the first place”). In the light of Plaintiff’s voluntary agreement 

to pay union dues, and in the absence of any legitimate claim of compulsion, Plaintiff 

has failed to state a First Amendment claim against Defendants.4

4 Because Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim does not implicate Janus, the Court need 

not address whether the Union is a “state actor” engaging in “state action.” 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons provided above, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss (Dkt. 20, 22). Because a plaintiff who affirmatively “consented to pay dues to 

the union . . . does not fall within the sweep of Janus’s waiver requirement,” Bennett, 

991 F.3d at 733, any amendment to the complaint would be futile. Accordingly, this 

dismissal is with prejudice. See Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2013) 

(leave to amend need not be granted “if it is clear that any amendment would be 

futile”). 

SO ORDERED in No. 20-cv-02126. 

Date: March 28, 2022 

 JOHN F. KNESS 

 United States District Judge 

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