NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 10a0439n.06 No. 09-3215 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. L AMONT SNEED, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEAL FRO M THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STRI CT CO UR T F OR

T H E S O U T HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

O P I N I O N

BEF ORE: NORRI S, MOORE, and McKEA GUE, Circuit Judges. McK eague, Circ uit Jud ge. L amont “Da nte” Snee d was c onvicted by a jury of conspira cy to v iol a te a

fe de ra l la

w a nd a idi ngand

a be tti ngarm e d b ank

ro bb e ry in c on nect io n with

his involvement in a 2007 bank robber y . Prior to trial, Sneed moved to suppress evidence that had bee n g a the re d f ro m hi s c ar. Sne e d c on te nd e d th a t th e a ff ida vit , use d to ob ta in t

he wa rr ant t o s e arc h h is
car , failed to e stablish probable c ause that ev i d en ce fr o m the robber y would be located in his car. The dist rict court reje cted this argument and admitt ed the incriminating evidenc e at trial. After the jur y re tur ne d a g uil ty ve rd ic t, S ne e d mo ve d at se nte nc ing fo r a do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e and ob je c te d to a sente nce e nhance ment fac tor on the g rounds that it violated his Si x th A m endment rights. The dis tr ic t c ourt

a lso re je c te d Sn e e d’ s SixthAm e ndme nt a rgume nt a nd se nte nc e d h im t o p ri so n te rm s
o f s i x t y m o n t h s o n t h e c o n s p i r a c y c o u n tan d e i g h t y m o n t h s o nt h e r o b b e r y c o u n t , t o r

u nc o n c u r r e n t l y.No. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 2 - Sne e d n owa

pp e a ls the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of his mot ion

to su ppre ss a

nd re je c tio n o f h is Si xth Amendment ar g ument. After car efully revie wing the sear ch war rant a ffidavit, we have de termined that the district court prope rly denied Snee d’s motion to suppress. We have fur ther de termined that the dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y re je c te d Sn e e d’ s SixthAm e ndme nt a rgume nt. Ac c or din g ly , w e AF F I RM Sneed’s c onviction and sentenc e. I. Ag ents with the Fe dera l Bure au of Investig ation wer e notified on May 3, 2007, of a r obbery at the Sky

Ba nk in Pickeringt o n, Ohio. Wit nesses a t the scene descr ibed a da rk-c olored Honda Acc ord, i ncluding license plate number, a nd three individuals. The witnesses we re a ble to descr ibe the robbe rs putting on masks prior to the robbery , the car i n question used during the r obbery , and two robber s exit ing the bank and g etting back into the vehicle afte r t he robbe ry . I n addition, bank employ ees infor

med ag ents that a suspicious-looking male, identifying himself a s Dante, e ntere d the bank a litt le over an hour befor e the robber y , asked a bout money

order s, and exited the bank without transac ting a

ny business. Video surve illance c apture d the suspicious-looking ma le. FB Iag ents sear ched ve hicle re g istration re co rd s for the lice nse plate numbe r re ported by wi tne sse s and

ide nti fi e d th e Ho nd a

a s b e lo ngin g t o Virg ini a Ca str o. B a se d o n th is l e a d, a g e nts questioned Castro about her wher eabouts on May 3. Castro informed investigators that her br other, Dante Snee d, borrowe d her c ar on Ma y 3 and re turned it later tha t n i gh t
. Bu t upon further qu e sti on ing , Ca str o c ha

ng e d h e r sto ry and tol d the a g e nts that sh e ha d u se d th e c ar o n M ay 3. Ag e nts had also re ceive d information about an April 27 robber y of a CME c redit union and de termined that

a c ar ma tc hin g the de sc ri pti on of Ca str o’ s wa s use d in th a t r ob be ry a s w e ll. Ca str o in fo rm e d a g e ntsNo. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

Ag ents subsequently

lear ned that Sneed boug ht ano t h er v eh i cle on Apr il 28, though the 1 rec ord is unclea

r as to whe n exactly

ag ents discover ed this information.

- 3 - that Sneed had use d her c ar on A pril 27; she also eve ntually confirme d that Sneed used he r ca r on M ay 3 d u r i n g t h e t i m e o f

t h e S ky B an k

r o b b e r y. Ba sed on the infor

mation provided by Castro as well as wit ness s tatements, age nts obtained and executed a

war rant to sea rch Castro’ s Honda Ac cord. Within the vehicle, they discovere d a Sky B ank bu sin e ss c ard

and a se t of g lov e s matc hin g tho se se e n in surv e ill anc e vid e o ta

ke n at th e tim e of the Sky Ba

nk robber y . Ag ents then decide d to inve stigate Sneed further

. They ran a c ri minal his tor y and mot or ve hic le c he c k and dis c ov e re d that a Ca dil la c wa s r e g ist e re d to his name . Witn e ss 1 statements conf

irmed that Sneed r eg ularly drove the Cadillac. Ag ents also deter mined that Sneed
wo rk e d th e nig ht s hif

t a t a G rey

ho und te rm ina l in

Col umb us and

that he lis te d th e a dd

re ss o f h is mother and Castro as his home addre ss. Castro informed the investigating ag ents t h at Sneed
occa sionally

stay ed at he r home, but that he did not per manently live there

. She also told a g ents that Sne e d h a d ch ild

re n with many wo me n an d tha t he s tay e d w iththe se wo me n at ti me s, tho ug h h e did not have a

ny perma nent re sidence

. Ag ents then dec ided to interview Snee d at his place of employ ment on May 1 6
. Upon
arr iving at t h e Grey

hound station, they

noticed a Ca dillac Seville with a license plate number matching the C adillac reg istered to Sneed. The ag ents parke d their vehic les around Snee d’s Cadillac and ente red the Gre y

hound station. A Grey

hound manag er state d that Sneed had c locked in ea rlier in the night, c onfirming that he wa s prese nt at the station. The manag er then pag ed Sneed over the loudspeake r, askinghim to report to the front de sk, but Sneed never repor ted to the front. With theNo. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 4 - aid of local l aw en fo rce ment office rs, ag ents sear ched the fac ility for Snee d for ove r an hour , but
wer e unable to locate him. A ma n matching Sneed’s de scription was see n near the Gre y hound station, though off

i cer s were unable to appr ehend him. Da nte Sneed ne ver r eturne d to the Gre y hound station that night to clock out or r etrieve his vehicle. After discontinuing the se arc h, the ag ents seized Sneed’s Cadillac from the Grey hound parkinglot and towed it to the Columbus Police Depa rtment. The next m orning they applied for

a
war rant to sea

rch the vehicle a

nd at tache d an af

fidavit signe d by

FB IAg ent Erik L auber . The aff idavit stated that witnesses to the Sky Ba nk robber y observe d two black males exit the bank a nd enter a Honda Ac co rd , d ri ven by a third blac k male, with Ohio plate number DWN 2893. The

a ff ida vit a lso state d th a t th e ve hic le wa s r e g ist e re d to V ir gini a Castr o a nd that an in te rv ie w w ith Castro reve aled that Castro’ s brother D ante Snee d had ac cess t o t h e Ho n d a Ac cord. I n addition, L auber ’s af

fidavit noted that a suspicious-looking male ente red S k y Ba n kin the hours leadingup to the robber

y , identified hi mself as “Da nte,” a nd asked que stions about money order s. Surveillance video reveale d the s uspicious-looking ma le to be Da nte Sneed. Spec ifically

in reg ards to Sneed’ s Ca dil la c , th e a ff

ida vit state d th a t th e ve hic le in qu estionwa s r e g ist e re d to Da nte Sne e d, pe r O hio mot or ve hic le re c or ds . T he a ff

ida vit the n w e nt o n to state the fo llo wi ng : 13. On 5/4/2007, Castro, Sneed’s sist er, stated that Sneed did not live at 2259 New Villag e Road, but instead lived in many d i ff erent place s. Castro did not know the e x a c ta d dr e s s w h e r e S n e e d s t ays , b e c a

u s e i tc h an g e s n i g h t l y. 14. On 5/16/2007, at approxim ately 10:15 pm, ag ents went to the Gr ey hound terminal to interview Sneed. Upon arr ival Sneed’s vehicle, Ohio Reg istration EBT65 23 , a fo ur do or , b la c k in

c olo r, Ca dil la c , wa s se e n in the Gr e y ho un d p ark inglot

. Ag ents parke d their vehi cl es n ex t to Sneed. Gre y hound manag ement advise d that Sneed had c locked in at 9:56 pm. Gre y hound manag ement attempted to find Sneed,No. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 5 - even pa g ing him over

the loud speake r. Sneed d i d n o t respond. Age nts and Columbus P olice Department officer s sear ched the entire terminal for Sneed but he had fle d the pre mises. A C P D o ff i ce r saw a black ma le, matchingthe heig ht of Sneed and ha

ving similar c lothing to what Snee d was wearing , walking on 4th Street awa y from th e Gr ey

hound terminal. Ag ents and CPD office r’s [sic] s urrounde d Sneed’s ve hicle. I t i s believed that Sneed did not return to the ve hicle in hopes of dis a sso c ia tin g him se lf

fr om t he c ar a nd its c on te nts
. 15 . O n 5 /17 /20 07 , G re y

ho un d ma na g e me nt c on fi rm e d th a t Snee d ne ve r r e tur ne d to wo rk to c loc k o ut. 16 . D ue to S ne e d h a vin g a ba nd on e d h is j ob and his ve hic le a g e nts se ize d th e ve hic le for sa fe ke eping . Fur

thermore , as Sneed doe s not have a full time residenc e it is the belief that evidence of the Sky Ba nk robber y may be in Sneed’ s vehicle. 17. Your a ffiant be lieves there is sufficient proba ble ca use to sear ch the 1996 Cadillac, f

o u r d o o r V in# : 1 G 6 K

D 5 2 Y 4 T U 2 1 4 4 2 3, with Ohio reg istration EBT- 6523. A mag istrate judg e author ized the searc h war rant on May 17. Prior to sear ching the Cadillac, ag ents made a

final at tempt to locate Sneed, but we re unsuc cessf ul. They there fore executed the
war rant the following day

. Wit hin Sneed’s vehic le, ag ents found the f ollowing: a ha

ndg un, simil ar in sty le to t h at used in the Sky Ba nk robber y ; hats and banda

nas, suspec ted of be ing w orn in the C M E b an k

r o b b e r y; a n d s e v e r a l p a i r s o f g l o v e s , a l s o b e l i e v e d t o h a v e b e e nu s e d i nt h e C M E r o b b e r

y. Prior to trial, Sneed moved to suppr ess the evidenc e seized fr om his Cadill ac. H e ar g ued that the wa rr an t l es s seizure of his Cadillac wa s not supported by exigent cir cumstance s and that the
sear ch wa rra nt affida vit did not establish probable cause to believe that e vidence from the r obberie s
wo uld be loc a te d in the ve hic le

. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt c on du c te d a

he ari ngon

the mot ion s. Duri ngthi s he ari ng , L a

ub e r t e sti fi e d th a t th e a g e nts “ tr uly be lie ve d w he n a su sp e c t, s uc h a s Mr . Sn e e d .

. . , d id
no t ha ve a re sid e nc e of

his ow n . . . that it

wa s mu c h e a sie r f

or him to p la c e evi dence in a

ve hic le

. . . .” Tr. of Hr’g on Def .’s Mot. to Suppress at 67:7–10, U nited States v. S n ee d , 2 : 0 7 -c r- 0 0 122No. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 6 - (S.D. Ohio Aug . 28, 2007). The court ultimately denied both motions. I t determined that a war rant
wa s n ot n e c e ssa

ry to s e ize the Ca dil la c , s o lo ng a s the a g e nts ha d p ro ba ble c a us e to b e lie ve that it contained c ontraba

nd. As to t h e s ea rc h war rant a ffidavit, the district cour t determined that the

a ff ida vit take n a s a

wh ole se t f

or th p ro ba ble c a us e to b e lie ve that it e ms r e la te d to the ro bb e ry wo uld be found in the Cadillac

. After a thre e day trial, the jury found Sneed g uilty on Count One of conspira cy to commit an
o f f e n s e a g a i n s tt h e U n i t e s S t a t e s an d o nC o u n tT w o o f

a i d i n g an d

a b e t t i n g i nar

m e d b an k r o b b e r y. The jury acquitted Snee d of t he charg es i n Count Three , aiding and abetting in the pos session of a firea rm in further ance of a c rime. The Pre sentenc e Investig ation Report (“PS R”) ca lculated Snee d’s total offense level to be 28, which included a five level enhance ment for use of a f irea rm in the Sky Ba nk robber y , and his criminal history cate g ory to be I I I
. Prior to sentencing , Sneed filed a motion f o r a d o w n w ar d

d e p artu r e . S n e e d

s p e c i f i c a l l y c o n t e n d e d

t h a ta c r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y c a t e g o r y o f III overstate d the s eriousness of his criminal hi story
. He also argued that the five le vel enha nceme nt for use of a f

irea rm in the robber

y violated his Six th Amendment ri g hts beca use the jury

had acquitted hi m of Count Three, w hich cha rg ed Sneed w ith aiding a nd abetting the possession of a fi re arm in f ur the ra nc e of a c ri me , thou g h Sne e d co nc e de d tha t this co ur t had a lr e a dy

a dd re sse d th is argument in Un ite d S

tat es v . W hite , 551 F.3d 381 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (en ba nc). The district court acknow ledg ed S need’ s Six th Amendment ar g ument and dete rmined that the fire arm e nhance ment was justified bec ause Count Two c harg ed that Sneed and his coconspirator s used a da

ng erous weapon in the S ky Ba nk robber y . The court then adjust ed the c riminal his tor y c a te g or y to I I and se nte nc e d Sne e d to sixty mon ths imp ri so nme nt on Count On e and e ig htyNo. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 7 - months o n Co u n t T w o , to b e s e r v e d c o n c u r

r e n tl y . Sn e e d n o w b r in g s th is a p p e a l, c h a ll e n g in g the district court’s de termination that the sea rch w arr ant af

fidavit was supported by

probable cause and the district court’s use of the fir ear m sentence enhanc ement. S need does not challeng e the district court’s de termination on the wa rra ntless seizure of his vehicle nor does he challeng e any other a spect of his sentenc e. II. W e b eg in by

addre ssing Snee d’s ar g ument that the war rant to sea

rch his Cadillac la cked probable cause . This court re views leg al conc lusions as to the ex istence of probable cause de novo. United States v. W

illiams , 544 F.3d 683, 685 ( 6th Cir. 2008). We uphold fac tual finding s unless the finding s are clea

rly err oneous. Id. We also g ive g reat defe renc e to the issuing judg e’s de termination
o f p r o b a b l e c a

u s e , a n d w e w i l l n o td i s tu r

b t h i s d e t e r

m i n a t i o nu n l e s s i tw a s ar r i v e d a tar b i t r a r i l y. United States v. Higgins , 557 F.3d 381, 389 ( 6th Cir. 2009). Furthe r, we wi l l u p hold the district court’s de cision to deny

a motion to suppress if any rea son exi sts to jus tify

the denial. Id. Th e Fo u rth Amendment re quires a show ing of probable cause , supported by oath or affi rmation, befor e a w arr ant may leg ally issue. United States v. Mc Phearson , 469 F.3d 518, 523 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I V). I n deter mining whe ther this require ment has bee n
satis fi e d, the iss uin g ma g istrate mus t “make a pr a c tic a l, c omm on -s e ns e de c isi on wh e the r, g ive n a ll the circ umstances se t forth in the affidavit

. . . there is a fair probability

that contra

band or e vidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Lapsins , 5 70 F .3 d 7 58 , 7 63 –6 4 ( 6th Cir. 2009)(interna l quotations omi tted). The mag istrate mus t have a substantial basis for conc luding that the sea

rch w ill uncover e vidence of wrong doing. McPhe arson , 469 F.3d at 523–24. I n applyingNo. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 8 - the proba ble ca use standar d, the mag istrate uses a practica l standard, based on fac tual and pra ctical considerations of ever

y day life, rather than a technica l standard. United States v. Brook s , 594 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2010). I n the event that a wa rra nt lacks proba

ble ca use, evide nce obta ined from the i ll e g a l se arc h ma

y sti ll b e us e d at tr ia l if

the se arc h me e ts the re qu ir e me nts of the g oo d f

a ith exception. McPhe arson , 469 F.3d at 523. A. Sneed cha lleng es the sea rch w arr ant af

fidavit for f

ailing to e stablish the re q u ired ne x us be tw e e n h is C a dillac and evid e nc e of the ba nk ro bb e ry . H e do e s n ot c on te nd that pr ob a

ble c a us e was lac king to e stablish his i nvolvement in the bank r obbery

. Nor does he challeng e the ve rac ity of the information conta ined in the af fidavit. Acc ording ly , o u r an al y s is focuses on the sole issue of whether L auber ’s affi d av it sufficiently set forth proba

ble ca use to believe that evidenc e of the robber y would be located in the Cadillac. Whe n a wa rr ant a pp lic a tio n s e e ks to s e arc h a pa rt ic ula r loc a tio n, the a ff

ida vit mus t e sta bli sh a suff icient “ne x us betwee n the pl ace to be searche d and the evidenc e to be soug ht.” Brooks , 594 F.3d at 492 ( internal quotations omitted). I t is not e noug h that the owner of the prope rty

is suspected of a c ri me ; r a the r, the a ff

ida vit mus t sh owre a so na

ble c a us e to b e lie ve that c on tr a

ba nd so ug ht w ill be found in the property to be sea rche d. Id. Th e Sixth C ir c uit , a lon g wi th n ume ro us oth e r C ir c uit s, has consistently

held that a ne x us can be inferr ed based on the nature of the e vidence soug ht and the ty pe of of fense that th e d efe ndant is suspected of having committed. See, e .g. , United States v. Gunter , 551 F.3d 472, 481 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (“[I ]t was re asonable t o i n fe r that evide nce of illega l activity would be found at Gunter’s r esidenc e.”) ; W illiams , 54 4 F .3 d at 68 8; see also United StatesNo. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 9 - v . S te ar n , 597 F.3d 540, 554 ( 3d Cir. 2010) (“Proba ble ca use ca n be . .

. inferr ed from ‘the ty pe of crime, the nature of the items soug ht, the suspect’s opportunity for conce alment, an d n o rm al inf e re nc e s a bo ut w he re a

c ri min al mi g ht h ide [ev ide nc e ].’ ” ); Un ite d S tat es v . Ta te , 586 F.3d 936, 94 3 ( 11 th C ir . 2 00 9) (“ ‘E vid e nc e that a de fe nd ant has st ol e n mate ri a l w hic h o ne no rm a lly wo uld
e xpe c t hi m to hid e a t his r e sid e nc e wi ll s up po rt a se a rc h o f h is r e sid e nc e .’ ” ); United States v. Orozc o , 576 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 2009) (“ ‘Warra nts may be issued eve n in the absenc e of dire ct evidenc e lin kin g c ri min a l ob

je c ts t o a pa rt ic ula r s ite .’ ” ); United States v. Thompson , 263 F. App’ x 374, 378 (4th Ci r . 2 0 0 8 ) ( p e r c u r ia m) ( “ [T ]h is c o u rt h a s o b s e r v e d th a t it is r e a s o n a

b le to a s sume that ind ivi du a ls sto re we a

po ns in t he ir ho me s. ” ); Un ite d S

tat es v . R ibe iro , 397 F.3d 43, 49 ( 1st Cir. 2005) (“ Th e pr ob a

ble -c a us e ne xus . . . ‘can be inf e rr e d f ro m th e ty

pe of c ri me , th e natur e of

the ite ms soug ht . . . .’”). I n applying the nexus requirement, this court ha s held that an a ffidavit esta blished the require d nexus between the de fenda nt’s home computer and imag es of c hild pornog raphy wher e the aff idavit showed that (1) the imag es wer e uploaded in the ear ly morning hours, at a time when the de fe nd ant w a s li ke ly

to b e ho me , ( 2) po rn og ra ph ic ima ges are mor e lik e ly to b e sto re d o n a

ho me computer, w here there is relatively more privac y , and (3) the I P a ddress connec ted with the imag es was tra ced to a

residential c able modem. Lapsins , 570 F.3d at 766. T h e affidavit in Lapsins established a ne x us even thoug h it did not s pecif ically state that the I P address was re g istered to the d e f e n d an t’ s n a me. Id. T h e nex us require ment was a lso met where the af fidavit stated that the defe ndant’s residenc e contained a strong odor of mar ijuana and that the defe ndant was a rre sted at his residenc e with $1,000 in his pocket. Brooks , 594 F.3d at 494–95. This i n fo rm at i o n providedNo. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 10 - p ro b ab l e c au s e t o b el i ev e t h at co n t rab an d wo u l d b e l o ca t edi nt h e de fe n d an t ’s h o m e, ev en t h o u gh the affidavit contained some amount of st ale infor mation. Id. at 489, 495. Fur thermore , this court has also held that a

mag istrate judg e could infer that instrumentalities of cr iminal activity would be fou n d at a de fenda

nt’s residenc e whe re the aff idavit contained infor

mation impli catingthe def endant in a robbe ry . W

illiams , 544 F.3d at 688. On the other

hand , p ro b ab l e ca

use wa s not established, and the a ffidavit fa iled to show a nexus between the r esidenc e and e vidence of drugactivity , in a ca s e wh ere the def endant wa s
arr ested at his residence on an assa ult charg e and cr ac k coca ine was discove red on his per son. M c P h earson , 469 F.3d at 524. The McPhe arson c ourt no te d th a t an in fe re nc e of dr uga c tiv ity

is permissible in s o m e ca s es , but was not permissible in that particula r ca se bec ause the re w as no independ en t corr oborating evidenc e that the de fenda nt was a know n drug deale r. Id. at 524–25. Simi larly , probable cause was not established where the af fidavit in support of the wa rra nt to searc h the def endant’ s residenc e conta ined uncor roborated statements from an informant that the informant had purchased drug s from the defenda nt. Higgins , 557 F.3d at 389–90. The Higgins court noted that the af fidavit containe d no information as to whe ther the infor mant had been i nside the def endant’ s apar tment or seen dr

ug s at the def

endant’ s home. Id. at 390. Ba sed on the above- survey ed ca se law, this ca se pre sents a close call as to whe ther L auber ’s aff idavit established a ne x u s b et we en S need’ s Cadillac and e vidence of the ba nk robber y . Yet
re a din g the a ff

ida vit a s a wh ole , a nd ba se d on the tot a lity of

the c ir c ums tanc e s, we c on c lud e that it set forth suff

icient fa cts to meet the ne x us require ment. See Lapsins , 570 F.3d at 763–64 (stating the standar d for e valuating whether probable cause exis ts). S n ee d d o es not dispute that theNo. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 11 - information containe d in L auber ’s af fidavit clea

rly established proba

ble ca use t o believe that Sneed
was c onnecte d with the Sky Ba nk robber y . A reading of t he affidavit in its entirety also supports an infere nce that Sneed would have kept instrumentalities from the robber y in his Cadillac. See G unter , 551 F.3d at 481 (stating that an infere nce can be draw n that a suspect will keep crimi nal instrumentalities in his pl ace of re sidence ). F ir st, the a ff

ida vit e sta bli sh e d that Sne e d did

no t li ve a t th e a dd

re ss t hat he ha d li ste d w ith motor vehicle rec ords and that his a ddress “ chang e[d] nightly .” The aff idavit also established that the Cadillac wa s reg istered to Sneed a nd that the vehicle was discovered at a location where Sneed
wa s k no wn to h a ve be e n o nly

mom e nts be fo re the ve hic le ’s dis c overy . In a dd iti on , th e a ff ida vit stated that the aff

iant believed that Sneed intentionally tried to “ disassociate” himself from the vehicle a nd its contents and that Sneed ne ver r eturne d for the vehicle once a g ents went in sea rch of him . F ur the r, Sne e d h a d a kn ow n his tor y of sto ri ngins tr

ume nta lit ie s f

ro m th e ro bb e ry

in v e hic le s, as the sear ch of Castro’ s Honda Ac cord r evea led. Moreove r, the a ffidavit stated that beca use Sneed d i d n o th a v e a p e r

m an e n t r e s i d e n c e , t h e a f

f i an t b e l i e v e d t h a t e v i d e n c e f r o m t h e S ky B an k

r o b b e r y, which occ u r

r e d o n ly f o u rte e nd ay s p r io r

to th e s e iz u r e o f

th e c ar , ma

y b e lo c a te d

in th e Ca d il la c. F ina ll y , c r i m i n a l i n s t r

u m e n t a l i t i e s f

r o m a r o b b e r

y ar e t h e t y

p e o f e v i d e n c e t h a t an i n d i v i du a l in Sneed’s position, who lacke d a perma nent re sidence , would likely keep in his vehic le. See W illiams , 544 F.3d at 688. Taken a s a whole, this information provide s a substantial basis from whic h a

ma g istrate jud g e c ou ld i nf e r t hat ins tr ume nta lit ie s fr om the Sky B ank ro bb e ry wo uld be loc a te d inNo. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 12 - Sneed’s Cadillac

. Se e Ste ar n , 5 97 F .3 d at 55 4; Tat e , 5 86 F .3 d at 94 3; Orozco , 576 F.3d at 749; Gunter , 551 F.3d at 481. Fur ther, the affidavit in this case is distinguishable from case s wher e the nexus requirement
was not satisfied. I n McPhe arson , we de te rm ine d tha t the a ff ida vit did no t est a

bli sh a ne xus b e c a

us e the af fidavit did not provide independe nt corrobor ating evidenc e that the de fenda nt was suspec ted of havingeng ag ed in the cr iminal activity for wh i ch evidenc e wa s sought. 469 F .3d at 524. Ho we ve r, the a ff

ida vit in t his c a se co nt ained

ple nty of ind e pe nd e nt c or

ro bo ratin g e vid e nc e to establish that Sneed wa s involved in the Sky Ba nk robber y . Specifica lly , the af

fi d av i t stated that Sneed had a cce ss to the ge t aw ay vehicle use d in the robber y , that Sneed suspiciously enter ed the bank a me re hour and one-half before the robbery , and that evidenc e of the Sky Ba nk robber y was found in the g etawa

y vehicle. Fur

ther, unlike the fa cts in Higgins , wher e the a ffidavit wa s based on
uncorr obo r a

te d in f o r ma nt s ta te ments, the aff

idavit in this case was ba sed on fa cts direc tly deter mined by the investig ating office rs. See 557 F.3d at 390. As a f i n a l m a t t e r , w e ar e u np e r s u a d e d b y t h e c a s e l awt h a tS n e e d

a d v an c e s t o s u

p p o rth is position. Sneed first re lies on United States v. Be thal , 24 5 F . App ’x 46 0 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) , w he re thi s court found that the affidavit, containing g ener al fa cts about the de fenda nt’s status as a g angmember

and c on ne c tin g him to o the r g angme mbe rs wh os e re sid e nc e s c on ta ine d w e a po ns , d id n ot e sta

bli sh probable cause to believe that we apons would be found in the defendant’s home . Howeve r, unlike the fa cts in Bethal , th e af fi d av i t in this case conta ined spec ific information linki ng Sneed to a sp e c if ic ro bb e ry and a lso c on ta ine d a sta te me nt that of fi c e rs be lie ve d th a t Sn e e d w a s in te nti on a llyNo. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 13 - distancing himself from incriminating evidenc e in his vehicle. F inally , Sneed cites to United States v. Savoc a , 761 F.2d 292 ( 6th Cir .1985), where this co u rt d eter mined that a nexus was not established betwe en a ba

nk robber y and a motel r oom. Yet in that case the motel room was located 2,000 miles away

from the r obbery

and the a ffidavit did not contain information on when the ba nk

r o b b e r y h a d o c c u rre d. Savoca , 761 F.2d at 295. I n this case, Snee d’s vehicle was located in the g ener al ar ea of the robbery and was sear ched only day s afte r t he robbery

. Ba sed on the totality of the c ir c ums tanc e s, a nd

us inga c omm on -s e ns e a

pp ro a c h, we ho ld that L a

ub e r’ s a ff ida vit su ff ic ie ntl y
e s t a b l i s h e d a n e x u s b e t w e e nS n e e d ’ s C a d i l l a c an d e v i d e n c e o f

t h e S ky B an k

r o b b e r y. B. Ev e n if the a ff ida vit do es not m e e t th e ne xus r e qu ir e me nt, we wo uld no ne the le ss u

ph old Sneed’s c onviction under the Leon g oo d f a ithe xce pti on . I tems rec ov e re d p ur su ant t o a n in va lid
sear ch warra

nt do not have to be e x cluded if the sear ch mee ts the g ood faith exception to the exclusionary

rule. See U

nited States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984); United States v. Carpenter , 36 0 F .3d 59 1, 59 5 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 4) (e n b anc ). Th e g oo d f a ithe xce pti on

a pp lie s if the e vid e nc e is “obtained in obje ctively rea sonable relianc e on a subsequently invalidated s ea rc h warrant.” Carpenter , 3 6 0 F. 3 d

at 5 9 5 (q u o t i n g Leon , 468 U. S
. at 9 2 2 ). The objec tively rea sonable re liance standard r equire s less than the showing require d for pr obable c ause. Id. We have r ecog nized four sit ua tio ns un de r w hic h th e g oo d f a ithe xce pti on

do e s n ot a

pp ly : ( 1) wh e n th e affi dav it c on ta ins a known or re ckless fa lsity ; (2) whe n the mag istrate who issued the war rant wholly

abandone d his or he r ro l e ; ( 3 ) w h e nt h e a f f i d a v i tl a c k s ani n d i c i a

o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e s u c h t h a tr e l i an c e o ni tisNo. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 14 - ob je c tiv e ly un re a so na

ble ; and (4 ) wh e n the wa

rr ant is fa c ia lly inv a lid su c h tha t it ca nn ot r e a so na

bly be pre sumed valid. McPhe arson , 4 69 F .3 d at 52 5. Sne e d ar g ue s th a t th e thi rd sit uatio n a pp lie s to this case. To de termine whe ther a g ents’ re liance on the aff idavit w as objectively unrea sonable, we
mus t in qu ir e int o w he the r t he war ra nt w a s is su e d o n th e ba sis of a “ ba re bo ne s” a ff

ida vit ; th a t is , whether the af fidavit mere ly

contained suspicions a

nd b el i ef s wi thout any

underlying f

actua l information on the ver acity or re liability

of the infor

mation. Id. at 525–26. I n a d d r e ssing whe ther off

icer s’ re liance on a

war rant wa s objectively

unrea sonable, this court has found that the g ood faith exception applied where the aff idavit contained at least some nexus betwee n the re sidence to be sea rche d and the illeg al ac tivity

. Carpenter , 360 F.3d at 595–96. The Carpenter

c ourt no te d th a t th e of

fi c e rs ’ r e lia

nc e on the inv a lid

se arc h w arr ant w a s o bje c tiv e ly
rea sonable be cause the af fidavit in support of the wa rra nt stated that marij u an a wa s g rowing near the re s i d en ce and that a r oad conne cted the r esidenc e to the g rowing marijuana plants. Id. There fore , rea sonable off icer s could have believed that the af fidavit supported the issuanc e of the
war rant. Id. at 596. Simil arly , the g ood faith exception a pplied wher e off

icer s could have inferr ed a nexus betwee n the residenc e to be sear ched and evidenc e of known drugactivities. Higgins , 557 F.3d at 391. The Hi

gg ins c ourt no te d th a t e ve n th ou g h th e a ff ida vit did no t me e t th e pr ob a

ble c a us e standard, a

rea sonably

well traine d office r would not have known the sea rch w as illeg al base d on information provided to the of fice rs. Id. On the oth e r h and , th e g oo d f a ithe xce pti on

did no t a pp ly wh e re the su

pp or tin g a ff ida vit provided no information establishing a connec tion be tween the place to be sea rche d and evide nceNo. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 15 - of drugactivity

. McPhe arson , 4 69 F .3 d at 52 6; United States v. Laughton , 409 F .3 d 7 44 , 7 51 (6 th Cir. 2005)

. As previously noted, the aff idavit in McPhe arson contained nothingmore than the fac t t h a t t h e d e f

e n d an t w a s ar

r e s t e d a t h i s r e s i d e n c e an d t h a t c r a c k c o c a i n e w a s f o u n d i n h is p oc ke t; i t contained no inf

ormation indicating that the def endant wa s known to have p ar t i ci pated in drug traff icking

. Id. Simi larly , the af fidavit in Laughton simply stated that a c onfidential informa nt had purcha sed drug s on multi ple occ asions, but did not contain information as to whethe r the infor mant had purc hased dr

ug s from the defe ndant or whether the informant had see n drug s at the par ticular location to be searche d. 409 F.3d at 751. Be cause the affidavit contained no information connec ting the drugactivity

to the residenc e, a r easona ble offic er c ould not have believe d th at i t established probable cause . Id. at 749, 751. Apply ing th e a

b o v e c a s e la

w to th is c a s e , w e b e li e v e th a t t h e g o o d f a it h e xc e p ti o na

pplies here . To beg in with, this court ha s noted that rea sonably well traine d offi ce rs may infer a nexus be tw e e n a pla c e to be se arc he d an d ite ms sou g ht, e ve n whe n th e a ff ida vit fa ils to e sta

bli shpr ob a

ble
cause . See H

iggins , 557 F.3d at 391. Furthe r, unlike the a ffidavits in McPhe arson and Laughton , the af fidavit in this c ase c ontained some indication of a nexus between Snee d’s Cadillac a nd evidenc e of the Sky

Ba nk robber y . Specifica lly , para g raph thirteen s tated that off icer s believed that S n ee d t ri edt o d i s t an ce h i m s el f f ro m t h e C ad i l l ac an d i t s co n t en t s . An d S n ee d d o es n o tch al l en ge the ver acity

of this statement. I n addi tion, parag raph sixteen stated that Sneed did not have a perma nent re sidence and that the a ffiant ther efor e believed that evidenc e of the robber y may be located in Snee d’s vehicle. Mor eover , the af fidavit conne cted Snee d to the vehicle by noting thatNo. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 16 - the vehicle was discove red at Sneed’s plac e of e mploy ment, only moments afte r S need r eporte d for work. In sum, this i s not the ty pe of “bare bones” a ffidavit which this cour t has found lac king in a

ny indicia of proba

ble ca use. See M

cPhe arson , 469 F.3d at 525–26.

III . We n owmov e to S ne e d’ s SixthAm e ndme nt a rgume nt re g ard inghis se nte nc e e nh anc e me nt. Sneed cla ims that his S ix th Amendment rights wer e violated by the district court’s use of the fir ear m enhanc ement because the jury acquitted him of the c harg e re lated to possession of a f irea rm. Sneed
conce des that this issue has bee n addre ssed by the en ba nc cour t in Un ite d S

tat es v . W hit e , 551 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008) (e n banc ), an d s t at es that he a dvance s the argument only for the pur

poses of prese rving it f

or further appellate revie w. I n W hite , this court noted that “[s] o long a s the defe ndant
rec eives a sentenc e at or below the statutory ceiling set by the jury ’s ver dict, the district court doe s
no t a br idg e the de fe nd ant’ s r ig ht t o a jur y tr ia l by loo kin g to oth e r fa c ts, inc lud inga c qu itt e d c on du c t, when se lecting a sente nce w ithin that st atutory rang e.” 551 F .3d at 385. I n this case , Sneed does not contend that his sentenc e excee ds the maxi mum allowed by the jury ’s ver dict. Fur

ther, the district
c o u rt p r o v id e d

a d e qu a te e xp la

n a ti o n a s to w h y it e n h an c e d Sn e e d ’ s s e n te n c e f o r u s e o f a f ir e ar m. We there fore aff

irm Sneed’s sente nce. IV. For the fore g oing r easons, we AFF I RM Sneed’s conviction and se ntence
.No. 09-3215

USA v. Sne ed

- 17 - KA REN NELSO N MOORE, Circuit Judge, c oncurring in the judgm ent. Ia g re e wi th Part I I I of the majority opinion upholding Sneed’s sentenc e in lig ht of Un ite d S tat es v . W hit e , 551 F.3d 381 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (en ba nc). I would uphold the sear ch of the Cadillac solely on the basis of the g ood-fa ith e x ception to the exclusionary rule articulated in United St ates v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 92 2 ( 19 84 ). Th e re fo re , I

c on c ur in t he jud g me nt.