1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

BENJAMIN WILLIAMS, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) No. 20 CV 1537 

 v. ) 

) Judge Sara L. Ellis 

COOK COUNTY, Cook County Jail ) 

Correctional Officers DANIEL WEYER, Star ) 

17565, ANTONIO HUGHES, Star Unknown, ) 

MARIO SPIZZIRRI, Star Unknown, and ) 

THOMAS J. DART, Cook County Sheriff, ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

 

OPINION AND ORDER

 Plaintiff Benjamin Williams, a pretrial detainee at the Cook County Jail (“CCJ”), which 

the Cook County Department of Corrections (“CCDC”) operates, sued Defendants—Officers 

Daniel Weyer, Antonio Hughes, and Mario Spizzirri; Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart; and 

Cook County—under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged violations of his constitutional right to be 

free of excessive force. Williams alleged that Weyer and Spizzirri used excessive force against 

him by sexually assaulting him on three separate occasions (Count I); that each of the defendant 

officers failed to protect Williams from the sexual assaults at the hands of the other officers

(Count II); that Sheriff Dart created a culture of allowing officers to sexually harass inmates 

without oversight, making him liable under Monell (Count III); and that Cook County must 

indemnify the other defendants from damages (Count IV). The undisputed facts show that 

Weyer did not sexually assault Williams, the officers did not fail to protect Williams, and Sheriff 

Dart did not create a culture that resulted in the officers violating Williams’ constitutional rights. 

The Court will enter judgment for the Defendants on these claims. However, because the Court 

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finds a material dispute of fact regarding one of Williams’ sexual assault claims against Spizzirri, 

the Court denies in part and grants in part Spizzirri’s motion for summary judgment with respect 

to Williams’ excessive force claims and denies Cook County’s motions for summary judgment 

with respect to Williams’ indemnification claim.

BACKGROUND1

I. CCDC Policies

CCDC maintains several policies governing its staff’s conduct, including policies related 

to prison rape elimination, inmate searches, and inmate grievances. 

A. Prison Rape Elimination

The prison rape elimination policy states that there is “zero tolerance for sexual abuse or 

sexual harassment of persons in Sheriff’s Office custody.” Doc. 106-15 at 2. In part, the policy 

defines sexual abuse as “[a]ny other intentional contact, either directly or indirectly or through 

the clothing, of or with the genitalia . . . . that is unrelated to the official duties or where the staff 

member . . . has the intent to abuse, arouse, or gratify sexual desire.” Id. at 3. 

B. Searches

The inmate search policy details when and how CCDC officers physically search 

inmates. The policy defines a “[p]at-down search” as one where an officer engages in “a 

thorough patting down of clothing to locate any weapons or dangerous items that could pose a 

danger to members, inmates and visitors.” Doc. 106-16 at 2. It states that pat-down searches 

“shall occur frequently within the Department.” Id. at 3. This include all times that an inmate 

1 The Court derives the facts in this section from the Joint Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. The 

Court has considered the parties’ objections to the statements of fact and supporting exhibits and included 

in this background section only those portions of the statements and responses that are appropriately 

presented, supported, and relevant to resolution of the pending motion for summary judgment. The Court 

takes all facts in the light most favorable to Williams, the non-movant.

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leaves their living unit, whenever a cell search occurs, when inmates encounter inmates from 

other living units, when an officer believes an inmate has contraband, and when an inmate is 

“turned over” from one officer to another. Id. 

Weyer and Spizzirri both testified to their understandings of how they should perform 

pat-down searches. Weyer testified that he:

would have the detainee put his hands on the wall. His feet would be about 

approximately 18 inches from the wall, shoulder length apart. His arms 

would be raised on the wall kind of like an arc. And from there I would 

take a visual before I approach the inmate. I would ask him questions for 

my safety and his own safety. And I would go from one arm, up and down 

to the next arm, get the back to the chest, check the waistline of the pants, 

run my hands along the–his legs on the inner thigh and the outer thigh, both 

legs, all while watching, looking for anything that was abnormal.

Doc. 106-3 at 41:9–20. Spizzirri, who oversaw a more restrictive part of the jail, said that he:

would secure [the detainee] in handcuffs, which is something a little 

different than they do in general population. Once [he was] in handcuffs 

and secured there, I would unsecure the cell door. [The detainee was] 

brought out. [He was] instructed to turn around, put [his] hands on the wall, 

facing the wall. Once that was done, [I] would start with [my] hands at the 

top of the shoulders and feel out. Obviously [I] come to the bottom of the 

arms, feel back into the armpit. Okay. [I] would reach across the chest. [I] 

would feel across the chest and like the stomach area, come down the sides. 

And obviously all these–what [I am] doing while [I am] conducting these, 

[I am] actually feeling for any type of foreign object, something that doesn't

belong in that nature on [my] hands.

Secondly, I would–obviously when they would first come out, [I] would 

also have them spread their feet apart. You would come down the–I would 

go down the right side leg first, usually on the inner–on the inside of the leg 

and have one hand on the outside of the leg and hit the other hand. I would 

come down to the ankle, and I would come up almost into the groin area. 

Where the groin area gets hit, just the very bottom of the groin would bump 

the back of my hand. Then I would switch to the other leg, perform the 

same thing.

Doc. 106-5 at 33:6–34:12. CCDC informs inmates in the Inmate Information Handbook 

that they may be “subject to pat down frisk searches at any time.” Doc. 106-8 at 23.

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C. Inmate Grievances

CCDC provides information about the grievance policies to inmates in the Inmate 

Information Handbook. See Doc. 106-8 at 31–34. The inmate grievance policy allows CCDC 

inmates to obtain a “a formal review regarding the conditions of their confinement.” Doc. 106-

19 at 2. It creates “a grievance process for resolving complaints arising from department matters 

with one level of appeal.” Id. Inmates who wish to file a grievance obtain grievance forms from 

CCDC employees. Inmates must file a grievance within fifteen days of the offending incident. 

If the reviewing authority denies the grievance, the inmate has another fifteen days to appeal the 

initial decision. The CCDC cautions inmates against filing frivolous grievances, which “may 

result in disciplinary action.” Id. at 4. The Director of Inmate Services performs annual audits 

of inmate grievances to identify policy changes to help reduce the need for future grievances. 

The Executive Director of the Training Academy ensures that CCDC employees receive initial 

and ongoing training about the grievance policy, which includes testing to ensure 

comprehension.

CCDC maintains a related policy regarding grievances about allegations of sexual abuse. 

Inmates may file grievances with any staff member. Grievances alleging sexual abuse receive 

expedited attention from the reviewing authorities. The policy also warns inmates that frivolous 

grievances related to sexual assault will result in discipline.

II. February 1, 2019 Allegations

A. Witness Accounts

Williams’ complaint alleges that Weyer assaulted him during a routine search while 

Williams waited for a guard escort to take him to a medical appointment. Williams complains of 

three specific actions. First, Weyer “suddenly pushed [Williams] into the wall and forcefully 

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handcuffed” him. Doc. 22 ¶ 13. Second, Weyer “pulled the back of [Williams’] pants and 

underwear away from his body and penetrated [Williams’] rectum with his finger.” Id. at ¶ 14. 

Third, Weyer “reach[ed] around to [Williams’] crotch area and grabbed and squeezed 

[Williams’] genitals over [Williams’] pants.” Id. at ¶ 15. Williams asked Weyer to return him to 

his cell so he could file a grievance for this misconduct, but Weyer taunted him instead. 

Williams then went into an interlock area to return to his cell and told Hughes about Weyer’s 

assault—Hughes brushed off Williams’ complaints, communicating that he “did not want 

anything to do with [Williams’] complaint against Weyer.” Id. at ¶ 23. After Williams raised his 

concern to Hughes, Weyer approached Williams again. Williams asserted that he would file a 

grievance. Weyer pushed him into a wall and forcefully re-cuffed him. After Williams attended 

his medical appointment, he filed a complaint against Weyer.

Williams testified, while performing an “indicating” motion, see id. at 90:7, that Weyer 

put his thumb in his anus “through my pants,” Doc. 106-6 at 89:20. Williams said that the 

contact was “quick,” id. at 90:9, and acknowledged that the purpose of any contact around his 

anus would be “to see do you have a knife in between your ass or up under your nuts so you 

don’t hurt nobody. That’s what he was looking for,” id. at 90:17–20. Williams said that he 

considered it a sexual assault when a correctional officer “cup[s] somebody’s nuts or genitals, 

testicles . . . . That’s sexual assault.” Id. at 93:22–24. When asked if he thought Weyer was 

touching him to derive sexual gratification, Williams decided “to keep it real. No. [Weyer] was 

probably really, really looking for something.” Id. at 97:3–4. 

Williams also testified that when he attempted to return to his cell after the search, he 

“told Hughes that Weyer grabbed my nuts, squeezed my nuts and my genitals, and put his finger 

by my ass.” Id. at 99:12–14. Williams said Hughes did not help him with his complaint against 

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Weyer. Then, as Weyer was removing the handcuffs from Williams’ wrists, Williams “told him 

I’m finna write him up and whatever.” Id. at 101:23–24. Weyer became angry, re-cuffed 

Williams, and sent him “to the hole.” Id. at 102:3.

In Weyer’s recounting of the events, prior to Williams’ pat-down, he told “Williams to 

place his hands on the wall, stand” and then he “searched his body on the outer of his clothing. 

And after that, I handcuffed him . . . .” Doc. 106-3 at 53:10–14. After Williams went to the 

interlock area while asking to be returned to his cell, Weyer said that Williams threatened “to kill 

my kids. On his mom he was going to kill my kids.” Id. at 56:2–3. Weyer denied threatening 

Williams, denied putting his hands down Williams’ pants, and denied inserting his finger into 

Williams’ anus. Weyer also said he did not recall adjusting the waistbands of Williams’ pants or 

underwear. He further denied asking anyone, including Spizzirri, to threaten or abuse Williams.

Hughes testified that he did not recall his interactions with Williams on February 1, 2019, 

or the details of any conversations regarding the events of that date, but admitted that he had a 

conversation with Williams while they were in the interlock. See Doc. 106-4 at 26:8–13 (“It was 

just basically, I believe – I don’t know exactly what was said in the video or exactly what he was 

saying in the video, but I just saw the video of him talking to me about something, but I don’t 

know exactly – recall what he was talking about.”). Hughes denied recalling any conversations 

with Weyer about the incident.

B. Video Evidence

Exhibits 1 and 2 captured Williams’ interactions with CCDC officers during the incident. 

The camera shows Williams putting on his uniform shirt in the interlock and waiting to enter the 

main hallway. Ex. 2 at 00:08–20. He exits the interlock, id. at 00:20–24, and then appears in the 

hallway at the bottom of the frame visible in the recording captured in Exhibit 1, walking

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towards the top of the frame. Ex. 1 at 15:24. Weyer enters the hallway walking towards 

Williams with a pair of handcuffs in his left hand, pausing to set some papers down or hand them 

off to another officer out of view. Id. at 15:28–33. Weyer then approaches Williams and 

gestures at him to turn around to face the wall. Id. at 15:34–36. Williams, wiping his glasses 

with his hands, ignores Weyer’s order until Weyer stands directly in front of him. Id. at 15:37–

44. Williams then places his glasses on his face, turns to the wall, and places his hands against it 

to prepare for Weyer’s search. Id. at 15:45–48. Weyer begins his pat-down, starting with 

Williams’ shoulders and sides, moving down to pat the outside of Williams’ legs. Id. at 15:48–

52. Weyer then hooks his finger inside Williams’ waistband, pulls his waistband out, and runs 

his hands along the inside of Williams’ pants before pulling them further up on Williams. Id. at 

15:52–54. Weyer then pats the sides of Williams’ legs before running his right hand along 

Williams’ left buttock, concluding the first search. Id. at 15:54–56. This search lasted nine 

seconds, see id. at 15:48–56.

2

 Weyer then taps Williams on the back twice, and Williams lowers 

his arms to his side in response, stepping back from the wall. Id. at 15:57–16:00. Weyer grabs 

Williams’ right wrist, locks one handcuff on it, and then secures Williams’ left wrist in the other 

cuff. Id. at 16:00–08. Weyer then pats Williams down a second time, grabbing his outer left 

thigh, his inner left thigh, his inner right thigh, and outer-right thigh, finishing with a light tap on 

the left buttock. Id. at 16:08–10. The second search lasted two seconds. See id. 

C. Williams’ Grievance

Williams filed a grievance against Weyer on February 1, 2019 complaining about the patdown. Williams, who testified that he is illiterate, said Weyer “fondling and squeeze my 

2 According to Williams’ testimony, this search constituted the entirety of the alleged sexual assault. See

Doc. 106-6 at 119:19–21. For completeness’ sake, the Court describes the remainder of the video footage 

related to the pat-down.

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Genitals . . . And Put his finger And my rectum.” Doc. 106-7 at 2. Williams also reported that 

“As I walk To The interlock To Tell Sheriff hughes I Need help I was sexual Assault I will Like 

medical help And To call my mom Sheriff Lombardi Say No You going To Shu.” Id. The 

reviewing officer denied Williams’ grievance on February 5, 2019, and Williams appealed the 

same day. The CCJ’s Superintendent and Assistant Executive Director denied Williams’ appeal. 

They wrote that the video footage did not show that Weyer sexually assaulted Williams and 

found that Williams’ “grievance is frivolous in nature . . . .” Id. at 6.

III. February 2, 2019 Allegations

Williams’ complaint alleges that Spizzirri first assaulted him on February 2, 2019. 

According to the complaint, Spizzirri handcuffed Williams, patted him down, and, “like Weyer 

had done before him, . . . squeezed [Williams’] genitals[.]” Doc. 22 ¶ 36. Spizzirri also 

allegedly threatened Williams with death at the hands of other correctional officers for filing a 

complaint against Weyer. Williams testified that “Spizzirri basically did me like this too 

(indicating). As he patted me down, he did me like that, the same shit Weyer did, same stuff.” 

Doc. 106-6 at 127:2–4. Williams also said that Spizzirri would always “say some . . . slick shit 

in my ear,” id. at 86:17–19, and that Spizzirri said he touched Williams the way he did because 

“because of [Williams] reporting Weyer[,]” id. at 128:13–14. Williams further testified that he 

considered Spizzirri’s touching a sexual assault, although he acknowledged that “they search you 

like that in special housing unit anyway so they can make sure you don’t got nothing.” Id. at 

128:17–18. Williams could not tell if Spizzirri was deriving sexual gratification from the search. 

Id. at 129:10–11. Spizzirri did not recall interacting with Williams on February 2, 2019. See 

Doc. 106-5 at 39:2–5. Spizzirri also testified that Weyer never asked him to retaliate against 

Williams for filing a grievance form against him. Id. at 48:9–14.

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There is no evidence that Williams filed a grievance related to the February 2, 2019 

alleged assault.

IV. February 6, 2019 Allegations

Williams’ complaint alleges that Spizzirri assaulted him for a second time on February 6, 

2019. According to the complaint, Spizzirri once again grabbed Williams’ genitals while patting 

him down and threatened to kill him for filing a grievance against Weyer. Williams testified that 

Spizzirri “squeezed [his] nuts” during the pat-down, Doc. 106-6 at 136:2, but could not 

remember whether Spizzirri threatened him, id. at 135:6–8. Spizzirri has no recollection of his 

interaction with Williams on February 6, 2019. 

Williams filed a grievance against Spizzirri regarding the February 6 alleged assault on 

February 10, 2019, claiming only that Spizzirri threatened to kill him. See Doc. 106-7 at 17. 

The reviewing official denied this grievance and Williams’ subsequent appeal after CCDC staff 

investigated the allegations. Id. at 18 (indicating that the “Administrator/Designee” did not 

accept Williams’ appeal). Williams filed another grievance against Spizzirri on February 17, 

2019, claiming that Spizzirri sexually assaulted him on “2-12-2019” in retaliation for his 

grievance against Weyer. See id. at 11. The CCJ’s Superintendent and Assistant Executive 

Director dismissed this grievance after an investigation and subsequent appeal, finding it 

“frivolous[.]” Id. at 16.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment obviates the need for a trial where “there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). To determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court must pierce the 

pleadings and assess the proof as presented in depositions, documents, answers to 

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interrogatories, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits or declarations that are part of the record. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); A.V. Consultants, Inc. v. Barnes, 978 F.2d 996, 999 (7th Cir. 1992). 

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine 

dispute of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Bunn v. Fed.

Deposit Ins. Corp. for Valley Bank Ill., 908 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 2018). “A genuine issue of 

material fact exists when ‘there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to 

return a verdict for that party.’” Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545, 549 (7th Cir. 

2022) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). In response, the 

non-moving party cannot rest on mere pleadings alone but must use the evidentiary tools listed 

above to identify specific material facts that demonstrate a genuine dispute for trial. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c)(1); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 627 

(7th Cir. 2014). The Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Wehrle v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 719 

F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2013). However, a bare contention by the non-moving party that an issue 

of fact exists does not create a factual dispute, Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 492 (7th 

Cir. 2000), and the non-moving party is “only entitled to the benefit of inferences supported by 

admissible evidence, not those ‘supported by only speculation or conjecture,’” Grant v. Trs. of 

Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

I. Excessive Force

Pretrial detainees bring excessive force claims under the Fourteenth Amendment because 

“their detention is unrelated to punishment.” Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 

2019). As such, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used 

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against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 

(2015). A plaintiff meets this standard by showing “objective evidence that the challenged 

governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is 

excessive in relation to that purpose.” Id. at 398. “However, the Due Process Clause affords 

pretrial detainees at least as much protection as the Eighth Amendment provides to convicted 

prisoners.” Edwards v. Byrd, 750 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2014); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 

520, 535 (1979) (“[T]he Government concededly may detain [a suspect] to ensure his presence at 

trial and may subject him to the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as 

those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise violate the 

Constitution.” (emphasis added)). “Therefore, if the use of force in this case would have violated 

the Eighth Amendment had the plaintiff[] been [a] prisoner[], that conduct necessarily violated 

the plaintiff[‘s] rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Edwards, 750 F.3d at 732.

An officer does not violate a detainee’s constitutional rights if the officer’s “force was 

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 

U.S. 1, 7 (1992). “In the context of searches of prisoners, only searches that are maliciously 

motivated, unrelated to institutional security, and lack a legitimate penological justification 

violate the Eighth Amendment.” Rivera v. Drake, 497 F. App’x 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing 

Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2004)). Although “de minimis uses of force are 

non-actionable,” Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 2009), an “‘unwanted 

touching’ of a prisoner's private parts can violate Eighth Amendment rights if the officer 

‘intended to humiliate the victim or gratify [his own] sexual desires,’” Holloway v. Doe, --- F. 

App’x ---, 2023 WL 7412949, at *1 (7th Cir. Nov. 8, 2023) (quoting Washington v. Hively, 695 

F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2012)), regardless of the amount of time the unwelcome contact lasts, see 

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Hively, 695 F.3d at 642 (holding that “five to seven seconds [of] gratuitously fondling the 

plaintiff’s testicles and penis” violated pre-trial detainee’s constitutional rights).

A. Weyer

Weyer is entitled to summary judgment on Williams’ excessive force claim because the 

video evidence of his February 1, 2019 search uncontrovertibly shows that no assault occurred, 

meaning that Weyer did not use “objectively unreasonable” force. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. at 

397; see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“[Plaintiff]’s version of events is so utterly 

discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him.”). Although it is “a 

rare case where video evidence leaves no room for interpretation by a fact finder,” Kailin v. Vill. 

of Gurnee, 77 F.4th 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2023), the video in this case, as described above, proves 

conclusively that Weyer did not sexually assault Williams.

The video evidence uniformly disproves each of Williams’ three excessive force 

allegations. First, Weyer allegedly “pushed [Williams] into the wall and forcefully handcuffed” 

him. Doc. 22 ¶ 13. The video shows that Weyer never pushed Williams into the wall—

Williams only touched the wall one time when he placed his hands against the cinderblocks. See 

Ex. 1 at 15:45–48; see also id. at 15:57–16:10. Second, Weyer allegedly “pulled the back of 

[Williams’] pants and underwear away from his body and penetrated [Williams’] rectum with his 

finger.” Doc. 22 ¶ 14. The video shows that Weyer never pulled Williams’ underwear off his 

body nor penetrated Williams’ rectum—Weyer only pulled the waistband of Williams’ pants 

back while running his hands along the seam, and never inserted his fingers or thumbs into 

Williams’ rectum. See Ex. 1 at 15:52–54; see id. at 15:48–16:10. Third, Weyer allegedly 

“reach[ed] around to [Williams’] crotch area and grabbed and squeezed [Williams’] genitals over 

[Williams’] pants.” Doc. 22 at ¶ 15. The video shows that Weyer never reached around 

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Williams to grab Williams’ genitals over his pants—Weyer only places his hands on the inside 

and outside of Williams’ thighs twice during the search, which follows CCDC’s policy of how 

officers should search inmates for contraband. See Ex. 1 at 15:54–56; see also Doc. 106-16 at 2–

4 (defining “pat-down search[es]” and discussing their use). Each of Williams’ allegations 

flounders in the face of the video evidence, see Scott 550 U.S. at 380. Consequently, he cannot 

show that Weyer’s conduct was “objectionably unreasonable,” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397.

In response to this overwhelming evidence refuting his allegations, Williams only claims

that the camera that captured Exhibit 1’s video feed was poorly placed and that the Court must 

therefore accept his version of the events. Doc. 127 at 6. As reflected by the Court’s 

comprehensive description of the video exhibits above, the footage presents a clear and 

unobstructed view of the events as they unfolded on February 1, 2019. The videos’ clarity 

makes this the “rare case” where summary judgment is warranted despite Williams’ conflicting 

testimony. Kailin, 77 F.4th at 481. But even if Williams was correct that the Court could not

properly evaluate Weyer’s search due to the camera angle, his claim against Weyer would still 

fail summary judgment. Williams himself admitted that Weyer “was probably really, really 

looking for something,” Doc. 106-6 at 97:3–4, and that any incidental contact with his anus or 

genitals would be “to see [if] you have a knife in between your ass or up under your nuts so you 

don’t hurt nobody[,]” id. at 90:17–20. Williams does not allege that Weyer’s search was 

“intended to humiliate the victim or gratify [Weyer’s] sexual desires.” Hively, 695 F.3d at 643.

Rather Williams acknowledged that Weyer’s search constituted a standard pat-down “rationally 

related to a legitimate governmental objective,” namely safety, Hendrickson, 576 U.S. at 398; 

see Doc. 106-16 at 3 (describing circumstances where officers must search inmates). Thus, 

although it is unfortunate that Williams felt discomforted and violated by Weyer’s search, the 

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Court cannot say that it violated his constitutional rights because Weyer’s conduct was 

objectively reasonable.

The Court grants Weyer summary judgment on Williams’ excessive force claim.

B. Spizzirri

Williams alleges that Spizzirri sexually assaulted him twice—first on February 2, 2019 

and then again on February 6, 2019—in retaliation for his administrative complaint against 

Williams.3

a. February 2, 2019

Unlike the February 1, 2019 incident, the Court has no video to review that would allow 

it to objectively analyze the propriety of Spizzirri’s conduct. With respect to the February 2, 

2019 alleged assault, the Court only has conflicting deposition testimony where, on the one hand,

Williams alleges that Spizzirri “squeezed [his] nuts,” Doc. 106-6 at 136:2, and threatened him 

for filing a complaint against Weyer, and, on the other hand, Spizzirri simply denies that any of 

this happened in that he failed to recall whether he engaged in such conduct. If Williams’ 

version of events is true, and Spizzirri squeezed his genitals to deliberately inflict pain in 

retaliation for Williams’ grievance against Weyer, it unquestionably constitutes sexual assault

and a violation of Williams’ constitutional rights. See Rivera, 497 F. App’x at 637 (finding 

maliciously motivated searches violate Eighth Amendment); Hively, 695 F.3d at 642 (finding 

3 Whether Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to the February 2 and 

February 6, 2019 alleged assaults is an open question, especially given that there is no evidence of a 

grievance related to the February 2, 2019 incident and the grievance Williams filed on February 10, 2019 

only relates to threats Spizzirri allegedly made against Williams. See Doc. 106-7 at 17; see also 42 

U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (requiring incarcerated individuals to exhaust available administrative remedies before 

filing lawsuit claiming violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law). 

The Court, having no briefing from the parties regarding Williams’ potential non-compliance with the 

administrative exhaustion requirements, will not answer it here.

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sexual assault violates pre-trial detainee’s constitutional rights); Edwards, 750 F.3d at 732 

(holding Eighth Amendment violations necessarily violate pre-trial detainee’s rights).

4

Although Spizzirri martials several arguments as to why the Court should grant his 

motion, they all boil down to mere contradictions of Williams’ testimony, which crystalize the 

material dispute of fact between the parties. First, Spizzirri argues that he would never conduct a 

pat-down search that conflicted with his training. This is a simple denial of Williams’ versions 

of events: when confronted with “a swearing contest” between two parties, Chittum v. Hare, No. 

21-2129, 2022 WL 3584667, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 2022), the non-movant always wins, see 

Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Where the material facts specifically 

averred by one party contradict the facts averred by a party moving for summary judgment, the 

motion must be denied.”). Second, Spizzirri argues that Williams cannot show that Spizzirri 

made more than a brief contact with his genitals. This only attempts to minimize Williams’ 

testimony, compare Doc. 104 at 17 (“Plaintiff must do more than show that Defendant Spizzirri 

made brief contact with his private areas.”), with Doc. 106-6 at 136:2 (testifying that Spizzirri 

“squeezed [his] nuts”), which is impermissible, see Gupta, 19 F.4th at 996. Finally, Spizzirri 

claims that Williams’ testimony is all self-serving. This does not give the Court reason to 

disregard or discredit it. See Chittum, 2022 WL 3584667, at *4 (“In court, credibility is a jury 

4 Indeed, because case law long-establishes that an inmate has the right to be free from abuse at the hands 

of correctional officers, see, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–34 (1994) (inmates have right to 

be free from being “violently assaulted in prison”); Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2005) 

(noting that right to be free from deliberate indifference to sexual assault is clearly established); Schwenk 

v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In the simplest and most absolute of terms, the Eighth 

Amendment right of prisoners to be free from sexual abuse was unquestionably clearly established prior 

to the time of this alleged assault [in the mid-1990s], and no reasonable prison guard could possibly have 

believed otherwise.”), the Court denies Spizzirri’s request for qualified immunity. See Gonzalez v. City of 

Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009) (considering “(1) whether the facts, taken in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the 

constitutional right was clearly established at [that] time”).

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question, and there is nothing wrong with providing [Williams’] own testimony in opposition to 

a summary judgment motion.”).

A reasonable jury could resolve this swearing contest in Williams’ favor, believing that 

Spizzirri violated his constitutional rights by maliciously squeezing Williams’ genitals in 

retaliation for filing a complaint against a fellow correctional officer. See Hively, 695 F.3d at 

644 (“We don't see how the defendant's conduct if correctly described by the plaintiff could be 

thought a proper incident of a pat down or search, and the defendant doesn't contend that it could 

be; his defense rather is that his conduct has been misdescribed.”). Because Spizzirri’s alleged 

misconduct on February 2, 2019, if it occurred, would have violated Williams’ Eighth 

Amendment rights, it necessarily would have violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights as well. 

Edwards, 750 F.3d at 732. Thus, the Court allows Williams to pursue this claim.

b. February 6, 2019

However, Williams claim against Spizzirri for his alleged misconduct on February 6, 

2019, fails because Williams could not answer in his deposition whether Spizzirri threatened him 

while performing the pat-down. See Doc. 106-6 at 135:6–8. A correctional officer’s pat-down, 

without evidence that shows the officer is performing it for a malicious purpose, is objectively 

reasonable and does not violate a pre-trial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. See

Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398 (holding that pre-trial detainee must show “objective evidence that the 

challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or 

that it is excessive in relation to that purpose”); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (good-faith 

application of force to inmate does not violate constitutional rights); Drake, 497 F. App’x at 637 

(“In the context of searches of prisoners, only searches that are maliciously motivated, unrelated 

to institutional security, and lack a legitimate penological justification violate the Eighth 

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Amendment.”) CCDC policy requires officers to conduct “a thorough patting down of clothing 

to locate any weapons or dangerous items that could pose a danger to members, inmates and 

visitors.” Doc. 106-16 at 2. They must “frequently” perform these searches. Id. at 3. Even 

though Williams claims that he felt discomfort during the pat-down, that does not mean that 

Spizzirri’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. Cooper, 589 F.3d at 890 (holding that “de 

minimis uses of force are non-actionable”). While Williams alleges in his complaint that 

Spizzirri said that he was mistreating Williams because of the grievance against Weyer, Williams

must point to evidence, not allegations, supporting his claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Sterk, 770 F.3d at 627. Because Williams failed to point to objective 

evidence that Spizzirri’s conduct on February 6, 2019 was improper, the Court grants Spizzirri’s 

motion for summary judgment on that claim. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398.

Accordingly, the Court grants in part and denies in part Spizzirri’s motion for summary 

judgment on Williams’ excessive force claims. 

II. Failure to Protect

Wilson’s second claim charges Weyer, Spizzirri, and Hughes with failing to protect him 

from excessive force. Doc. 49 ¶ 53. A failure-to-protect claim consists of four elements: “(1) 

the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the 

plaintiff was confined; (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious 

harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate the risk, even though 

a reasonable officer under the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk 

involved, making the consequences of the defendant's inaction obvious; and (4) by not taking 

such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.” Thomas v. Dart, 39 F.4th 835, 841 

(7th Cir. 2022) (citing Kemp v. Fulton County, 27 F.4th 491, 496 (7th Cir. 2022)). “[T]he 

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defendant officer must intend to carry out a certain course of actions; negligence is not enough. 

At that point, the remaining question is whether that course is objectively reasonable. If not, 

there is a Fourteenth Amendment violation.” Kemp, 27 F.4th at 497. “A failure to protect claim 

requires ‘a ‘strong likelihood’ rather than a ‘mere possibility’ that violence will occur’ in order to 

impose liability.” Hamilton v. Gavin, No. 22 C 2285, 2023 WL 2161663, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 

22, 2023) (quoting Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879, 889 (7th Cir. 2006)).

A. Weyer

Weyer moves for summary judgment against Williams’ claims that Weyer failed to 

protect him from the assault he allegedly committed on February 1, 2019, or the assaults 

Spizzirri allegedly committed on February 2, 2019 and February 6, 2019. Weyer argues that 

Williams’ first claim is “inherently deficient,” and that he was never on notice of the heightened 

risk that Spizzirri would allegedly retaliate against Williams for filing a grievance. Doc. 114 at 

10–11. In response, Williams denies bringing a failure to protect claim related to the February 1, 

2019 incident (instead saying his claim only relates to the February 2 and 6, 2019 alleged 

assaults). Instead, he argues that the fact Spizzirri learned of the February 1, 2019 incident 

permits the inference that Weyer spoke with him about the grievance, meaning Weyer 

appreciated that there was a heightened risk of Spizzirri assaulting Williams in retaliation. Doc. 

127 at 8–10.

Williams’ failure to protect claims fails against Weyer because none of the facts show 

that Weyer made decisions regarding Williams’ confinement or that Weyer was aware of a 

heightened risk that Spizzirri would harm Williams. See Thomas, 39 F.4th at 841; Kemp, 27 

F.4th at 497 (“The defendants also argue persuasively that [plaintiff] did not present any 

evidence showing that any of them was on notice of a serious risk of harm to him.”). Even if the 

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Court credits Williams with the inference he asks it to draw, it does not mean that Weyer failed 

to protect Williams against Spizzirri’s alleged assault. For the Court to find that Williams can 

bring this claim, it must also infer that it was obvious that a reasonable officer would have 

known or believed that Spizzirri would interact with Williams in the near-future and would 

retaliate against Williams on his behalf, and that Weyer ignored this risk. See Thomas, 39 F.4th 

at 841 (holding that officer needs to appreciate heightened risk of harm to inmate to be held 

liable for failure to protect). There is no evidence in the record that suggests Weyer asked 

Spizzirri to retaliate on his behalf, or that Spizzirri had a history of retaliating against inmates for 

filing grievances. Without such evidence, the inference that a reasonable officer would have 

been aware of the risk that Spizzirri posed is not “supported by admissible evidence,” so 

Williams is not entitled to it. Grant, 870 F.3d at 568. Williams’ only evidence to support his 

failure to protect claim against Weyer is an inference that Weyer told Spizzirri about his 

grievance (allegedly leading to the assault), and his own testimony that Spizzirri retaliated 

against him on Weyer’s behalf. Standing alone, this evidence does not support a failure to 

protect claim. See Thomas, 39 F.4th at 841; see also Hamilton, 2023 WL 2161663, at *5 (failure 

to protect claim requires more than “a mere possibility” that harm would result). The Court, 

thus, grants summary judgment to Weyer on Williams’ failure to protect claims.

B. Spizzirri

Spizzirri moves for summary judgment against Williams’ claim that Spizzirri failed to 

protect Williams against Weyer’s assault on February 1, 2019. Doc. 104 at 7. In response—and 

similar to his response to Weyer—Williams claims that he does not bring a failure to protect 

claim against Spizzirri for the February 1 incident, but rather brings claims against him for the 

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February 2 and 6, 2019 assaults. Doc. 128 at 7. These claims are incompatible with Williams’ 

excessive force claim, so the Court will grant Spizzirri’s motion for summary judgment.

At the heart of a failure to protect claim is the question, failure to protect from what? 

Here, Williams answers that Spizzirri himself was both the danger and his guardian. This simply 

cannot be right. The elements of a failure to protect claim presuppose a “risk” of which a 

reasonable officer would be aware and seek to abate for the inmate’s safety. See Thomas, 39 

F.4th at 841. These risks generally concern harm arising from other inmates, see Brown v. Budz, 

398 F.3d 904, 911 (7th Cir. 2005) (“a beating suffered at the hands of a fellow detainee . . . 

clearly constitutes serious harm[.]”), other correctional officers, see Jackson v. Baldwin, No. 18

C 6457, 2021 WL 3142172, at * (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2021) (failure to protect claim can arise from 

“placing an inmate in the proximity of correctional officers that have threatened to harm him”), 

or the inmate himself, see Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 349 (7th Cir. 2018) (“failure 

to protect an inmate from self-harm [is] one way of establishing deliberate indifference to a 

serious medical need”). Notably, these examples all reflect external sources of risk—absent 

from these categories is harm from the correctional officer whom a plaintiff accuses of posing 

the risk from which other officers must protect. The Court will not break new ground to permit 

Williams’ attempt to double-dip his claims.5

Because Williams fails to identify an external risk against which Spizzirri failed to 

protect him, the Court grants Spizzirri summary judgment on Williams’ failure to protect claims. 

See Thomas, 39 F.4th at 841.

5 In any event, bringing this claim against Spizzirri does Williams no good because his excessive force 

and failure to protect claims are completely intertwined. If a jury determines that Spizzirri did not 

sexually assault Williams, then there would have been no risk against which Spizzirri could have 

protected Williams. The reverse is also true: if a jury finds Spizzirri liable for the alleged assault, then he

also would have necessarily failed to protect Williams against the threat that he posed.

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C. Hughes

The Court now turns to Hughes’ motion for summary judgment on Williams’ failure to 

protect claim. Hughes makes a threshold argument that Williams failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies, meaning his claim must be dismissed under the Prisoner Litigation 

Reform Act (“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (requiring incarcerated individuals to exhaust 

available administrative remedies before filing lawsuit claiming violation of constitutional rights 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law). Hughes claims that because the grievance 

Williams filed related to the February 1, 2019 incident with Weyer is “substantially different 

than the allegations in his lawsuit,” Doc. 104 at 3–4 (citing Bowers v. Dart, 1 F.4th 513, 517 (7th 

Cir. 2021)), the Court should bar the complaint against him. However, Williams (once again) 

disavows any claim that Hughes failed to protect him from the events on February 1, 2019, so 

the Court need not consider whether Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with 

respect to that incident. See Doc. 128 at 7. Instead, Williams asserts that Hughes failed to 

protect him against Spizzirri’s alleged assaults on February 2, 2019 and February 6, 2019, and 

that Hughes failed to seek summary judgment on his claims related to these events.6

 See id. 

Williams thus contends that his failure to protect claims against Hughes must move forward.

This argument is baseless. Aside from being a patently incorrect reading of Hughes’ 

summary judgment briefing, see Doc. 104 at 12 (“[T]here is nothing in the record to show 

Defendant Hughes was present for, or observed, the pat down searches that occurred on 

February 2, 2019 and February 6, 2019. Thus, summary judgment should be granted . . . .”

6 Hughes does not address in his reply whether Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 

with respect to his failure to protect allegations related to the February 2, 2019 or February 6, 2019 

incidents. Thus, the Court does not consider whether Williams waived these claims by failing to raise 

them in his grievances. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 211–12 (finding that failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised by a defendant).

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(emphasis added)), there are no facts in the record that would suggest that Hughes had any 

knowledge that Spizzirri would threaten or physically assault Williams on these dates. The only 

material fact in the record regarding Hughes is that he spoke with Williams on February 1, 2019 

after Weyer’s pat down. See Doc. 106 ¶¶ 43, 68; see also Doc. 106-4 at 26:8–13 (recounting that 

Hughes did not “know exactly what was said in the video or exactly what [Williams] was saying 

in the video, but I just saw the video of him talking to me about something, but I don’t know 

exactly – recall what he was talking about.”). The record is silent as to Hughes’ actions on 

February 2, 2019 or February 6, 2019; is barren regarding any conversations between Hughes 

and Weyer or Spizzirri that might have alerted Hughes to plans Spizzirri might have had to 

retaliate against Williams; and is devoid of any evidence that suggests that Hughes was in a 

position to protect Williams from the risk Spizzirri posed. See generally Doc. 106; see also

Thomas, 39 F.4th at 841 (officer must be in position to take action to mitigate risk to inmate to 

be liable on failure to protect theory). Given that § 1983 claims require “personal involvement in 

the alleged constitutional deprivation,” Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 2010), 

and that Williams has not pointed to any evidence showing that Hughes participated in any of the 

events of which he complains, see Bellaver, 200 F.3d at 492 (mere contention without supporting 

evidence by non-moving party is insufficient to defeat summary judgment), the Court grants 

summary judgment to Hughes on Williams’ failure-to-protect claims.

III. Monell Liability

In his complaint, Williams alleges that Sherrif Dart is liable under Monell for 

implementing policies allowing excessive force against CCDC pretrial detainees; failing to 

adequately supervise and discipline officers; failing to appropriately investigate complaints and 

grievances against correction officers for misconduct; and failing to deter correctional officers 

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from engaging in misconduct by failing to adequately supervise and discipline them. To advance 

these allegations Williams must satisfy the three elements of his prima facie case. First, he must 

show that an unconstitutional policy exists. He can do this with evidence of “(1) an express 

policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread practice that is so 

permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or practice; or (3) an allegation that the 

constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking authority.” Spiegel v. 

McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. Cty. Of 

Bureau, 506 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 2007)). Second, Williams must show that Sherrif Dart was 

deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious risk that the unconstitutional policy would lead to 

violations of constitutional rights. See Board of Com’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 

407, 410 (1997). Third, Williams must show that Sherrif Dart’s policy “directly caused a 

deprivation of [his] federal rights.” Id. at 415. Because Williams cannot show the existence of 

an unconstitutional policy, his Monell claim fails, and the Court grants Sherrif Dart’s motion for 

summary judgment. 

Several CCDC policies govern correctional officers’ conduct, interactions with inmates, 

and discipline. The CCDC maintains robust policies prohibiting sexual abuse of inmates at the 

hands of correctional officers, see Doc. 106-15, dictating when inmates must be searched by 

correctional officers and how those searches should be conducted, see Doc. 106-16; see also 

Doc. 106-3 at 41:9–20 (Weyer’s testimony regarding how he would conduct searches); Doc. 

106-5 at 33:6–34:12 (Spizzirri’s testimony regarding the same), and how inmates may obtain 

redress for mistreatment they experience at the hands of correctional officers, see Doc. 106-19. 

The evidence shows that, with the exception of Spizzirri’s alleged inappropriate contact with 

Williams, the relevant parties followed these policies. Weyer’s search was above-board, and 

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Williams successfully filed several grievances regarding the alleged sexual assaults and received 

timely decisions. Thus, Williams can only show that Sherrif Dart implemented unconstitutional 

policies that directly lead to his constitutional injury by proving the existence of a “widespread 

practice” of permitting officers to sexually assault inmates, failing to investigate the officers and

incidents when inmates complain, and failing to discipline the officers who engage in such 

conduct. Spiegel, 916 F.3d at 617. 

Williams argues that evidence regarding Spizzirri’s February 2 and 6, 2019 alleged 

assaults are sufficient to show that such a culture exists,7 and that even a “single violation of 

federal rights can trigger municipal [Monell] liability if the violation was a ‘highly predictable 

consequence’ of the municipality's failure to act.” Doc. 128 at 12 (quoting Woodward v. Corr.

Med. Servs. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 929 (7th Cir. 2004)). In Woodward, a deceased inmate’s 

grandmother sued the medical provider at the facility in which Lake County incarcerated her 

grandson after he hanged himself with a bedsheet while awaiting trial on attempted sexual 

assault of a minor charges. Although the medical provider had policies in place to prevent 

inmate suicide, an expert testified that it “systematically ignored its own suicide prevention 

procedures.” Woodward, 368 F.3d at 926. Woodward’s facts present a stark contrast with the 

facts of this case, which show that Weyer complied with the CCDC’s policy regarding inmate 

searches and that CCDC staff followed the CCDC’s inmate grievance policy. Moreover, in 

rejecting the medical provider’s argument that a single suicide could not create Monell liability, 

the court noted that “there was a direct link between CMS’s policies and [the inmate’s] suicide. 

That no one in the past committed suicide simply shows that [the medical provider] was 

7 Williams argues that Weyer’s pat-down on February 1, 2019 contributes to the evidence supporting his 

Monell claim, but the Court will not consider it in light of its decision to grant summary judgment to 

Weyer on the excessive force claim.

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fortunate, not that it wasn’t deliberately indifferent.” Id. at 929. Here, Williams does not point 

to any evidence that shows Spizzirri’s alleged assault resulted from the Defendants’ ignoring 

CCDC policy rather than Spizzirri’s subjective desire to take revenge against Williams on 

Weyer’s behalf. The record simply does not support Williams’ contention that these isolated 

events “show[] that the culture within Cook County Jail was so indifferent to detainee 

wellbeing.” Doc. 128 at 12. Accordingly, because Williams cannot show “a direct link between 

[CCDC’s] policies and [Spizzirri’s assaults on Williams],” Woodward, 368 F.3d at 929, he 

cannot hold Sherrif Dart liable for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights, see Spiegel, 

916 F.3d at 618 (affirming dismissal of Monell claim in part because “[t]wo [offenses] by 

officers do not constitute a widespread policy or practice”). 

Because Williams cannot show that Sherrif Dart implemented an unconstitutional policy, 

his Monell claim fails and the Court grants Sherrif Dart’s motion for summary judgment.

IV. Indemnification

Since some of Williams’ claims survive against Spizzirri, and “Cook County is a nominal 

defendant in this action only for the purpose of indemnification[,]” Doc. 52 at 1, the Court denies 

Cook County’s motion for summary judgment, see 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/9-102 (“A local 

public entity is empowered and directed to pay any tort judgment . . . for which it or an employee 

while acting within the scope of his employment is liable . . . .”).

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CONCLUSION

 The Court grants Weyer’s motion for summary judgment [107]. The Court grants in part 

and denies in part the remaining Defendants’ motions for summary judgment [103]. The Court 

enters judgment in favor of Sherrif Dart and Officers Hughes and Weyers on Williams’ first 

amended complaint and dismisses them from this case. The Court enters judgment in favor of 

Officer Spizzirri on Williams’ failure to protect claim. Williams’ sole remaining claims are his 

excessive force claim against Spizzirri, and his indemnification claim against Cook County. 

Dated: December 4, 2023 

SARA L. ELLIS

United States District Judge

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