United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 9, 2017 Decided March 14, 2017

No. 16-5020

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 

MULTIJURISDICTION PRACTICE, (NAAMJP), ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

JOSE JUHUDA GARCIA AND HERBERT HOWARD DETRICK, II,

APPELLEES

v.

BERYL A. HOWELL, CHIEF JUDGE, U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-01963)

Joseph Robert Giannini argued the cause and filed the 

briefs for appellants. Raymond Carignan entered an 

appearance.

Brian P. Hudak, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellees. With him on the brief was R. Craig 

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.
2

Before: BROWN and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by BROWN, Circuit Judge.

BROWN, Circuit Judge: The National Association for the 

Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice (“NAAMJP”) has 

conducted a thirty-year campaign to overturn local rules of 

practice limiting those who may appear before a particular 

state or federal court. See NAAMJP v. Simandle, 658 F. 

App’x 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2016) (noting NAAMJP has 

“crisscrossed the United States, challenging local bar 

admission rules”); Blye v. California Supreme Court, No. 11-

cv-5046, 2014 WL 229830, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 

2014) (collecting cases dating back to 1987). We now join 

the chorus of judicial opinions rejecting these futile 

challenges. See, e.g., Simandle, 658 F. App’x 127; NAAMJP 

v. Lynch, 826 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2016); Giannini v. Real, 911 

F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990).

In the present case, NAAMJP and two of its members 

allege bar admission conditions for the United States District 

Court for the District of Columbia, established in the identical 

text of Local Civil Rule 83.8 and Local Criminal Rule 57.21 

(collectively, the “Local Rule”), violate statutory and 

constitutional legal standards. Specifically, the Local Rule 

provides:

Admission to and continuing membership in the Bar 

of this Court are limited to: (1) attorneys who are 

active members in good standing in the District of 

Columbia Bar; or (2) attorneys who are active 

members in good standing of the Bar of any state in 

which they maintain their principal law office; or (3) 

in-house attorneys who are active members in good 
3

standing of the Bar of any state and who are 

authorized to provide legal advice in the state in 

which they are employed by their organization client.

D.D.C. LOCAL CIV. R. 83.8(a); D.D.C. LOCAL CRIM. R.

57.21(a). NAAMJP focuses its challenge on the second 

option, the Primary Office Provision.

Defendants—Judges of the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia (the “District Court”) and former 

Attorney General Loretta Lynch—moved to dismiss 

NAAMJP’s complaint; the district court granted the motion in 

a thorough and thoughtful opinion.1 Nonetheless, NAAMJP 

argues on appeal that the Local Rule (1) violates the Rules 

Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071 and 2072; (2) runs afoul of

the Supreme Court’s decision in Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 

641 (1987); (3) improperly applies rational basis review; and 

(4) violates 28 U.S.C. § 1738, admission requirements of 

other federal courts and administrative agencies, and the First 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Because each of these 

arguments lacks merit, we affirm.

I.

As an initial matter, the district court properly concluded 

it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate (1) all 

claims brought by Patent Lawyer Doe (“Doe”) and (2) all 

claims asserted against the Attorney General. 

Both the Amended Complaint and Doe’s Declaration fail 

to articulate any actual and imminent injury, which is 

necessary to establish Article III standing in this case. See

 1 The Honorable Nathaniel M. Gorton of the United States District 

Court for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation, 

presided over this case below.
4

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562–64 (1992).

Indeed, Doe does not describe where he practices law or 

otherwise suggest the Local Rule’s Principal Office Provision 

has inhibited his legal practice. Conclusory assertions of 

harm, or reference to Doe’s practice at a “Big Law firm in 

San Diego” in briefing on appeal, see NAAMJP Br. 7, do not 

remedy this deficiency. 

Additionally, NAAMJP has failed to identify any role 

whatsoever of the Attorney General—or any member of the 

executive branch, for that matter—in promulgating or 

enforcing the District Court’s local rules. Accordingly, the 

district court properly dismissed Doe and the Attorney 

General.

II.

On the merits, NAAMJP argues the district court 

improperly applied the Rules Enabling Act, which permits 

judges to prescribe rules governing practice before their court. 

Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 states,

The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act 

of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules 

for the conduct of their business. Such rules shall be 

consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of 

practice and procedure prescribed under section 2072 

of this title.

28 U.S.C. § 2071(a). The “rules of practice and procedure 

prescribed under section 2072 of this title” are rules adopted 

by the Supreme Court of the United States:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe 

general rules of practice and procedure and rules of 

evidence for cases in the United States district courts 
5

(including proceedings before magistrate judges 

thereof) and courts of appeals. . . . Such rules shall 

not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.

28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b).

The Local Rule at issue here is indisputably “for the 

conduct of [the District Court’s] business,” id. § 2071(a); it 

explains which attorneys may practice before the District 

Court. Moreover, as explained below, the Principal Office 

Provision does not contravene any Act of Congress or “rules 

of practice and procedure” adopted by the Supreme Court. 

See id. § 2072(a). As the Third Circuit recently remarked, 

“The matter is no more complicated than that.” Simandle, 

658 F. App’x at 134 (adopting the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in 

Lynch, 826 F.3d at 197).

Nonetheless, NAAMJP argues Sections 2071 and 2072 

interlock, contending rules promulgated pursuant to Section 

2071 must comply with Section 2072’s mandate that “[s]uch 

rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). Several courts of appeals have 

summarily rejected this argument. See Lynch, 826 F.3d at 

197. Here, it suffices to note NAAMJP has failed to identify 

any substantive right—whether constitutional, statutory, or 

derived from national federal rules—that has been infringed 

by the Local Rule. Accordingly, NAAMJP cannot sustain its

Rules Enabling Act challenge.

III.

NAAMJP relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision 

in Frazier v. Heebe, claiming it directly invalidates the Local 

Rule. But in Frazier, the Supreme Court exercised its own

unique supervisory authority to overturn a local rule regarding 

bar admission in the Eastern District of Louisiana and, in so 
6

doing, made no constitutional ruling. 482 U.S. at 645 

(“Pursuant to our supervisory authority, we hold that the 

District Court was not empowered to adopt its local Rules to 

require members of the Louisiana Bar who apply for 

admission to its bar to live in, or maintain an office in, 

Louisiana where that court sits. We therefore need not 

address the constitutional questions presented.”). No similar 

authority vests in a single district court judge. Rather, “[a] 

rule of a district court . . . remain[s] in effect unless modified 

or abrogated by the judicial council of the relevant circuit.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1) (emphasis added). The “judicial 

council,” in turn, is a body comprised of “the chief judge of 

the circuit” and “an equal number of circuit judges and district 

judges of the circuit.” Id. § 332(a)(1). A single district court 

judge or an appellate panel may not usurp that body’s 

authority.2 While this point may be “hyper-technical[],” 

NAAMJP Reply Br. 7, it is the law.

IV.

Although NAAMJP does not identify the district court’s 

equal protection holding as an issue under review, or 

otherwise clearly argue the district court erred in dismissing 

the Fifth Amendment claim, it nonetheless argues Judge 

Gorton erroneously applied “rational basis review” to resolve 

its claims.

To assess an equal protection claim, this Court begins by 

determining the appropriate standard of review. If a rule does 

not infringe a fundamental right or disadvantage a suspect 

class, no more than rational basis review is required. FCC v. 

 2 NAAMJP argues Frazier created a standard of review requiring 

district court rules to meet a two-pronged “rational” and 

“necessary” test. NAAMJP Br. 17–18. The contention finds no 

support in the Frazier majority opinion, and we easily reject it.
7

Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). Such a rule 

“comes . . . bearing a strong presumption of validity, and 

those attacking the rationality of the [rule] have the burden to 

negative every conceivable basis which might support it.” Id. 

at 314–15. Accordingly, “[w]here there are plausible reasons 

for [the challenged rule], our inquiry is at an end.” Id. at 313–

14. 

Here, the Principal Office Provision is properly subject to 

rational basis review. For purposes of the Equal Protection 

Clause, it neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a 

suspect class. See Lynch, 826 F.3d at 196; Simandle, 658 F. 

App’x at 137. It distinguishes among attorneys based on 

whether they have been admitted to the bar of the state where 

their principal law office is located, not on the basis of 

residency or any protected characteristic. See NAAMJP 

Reply Br. 5 (conceding the Local Rule discriminates “on the 

basis of office location”). For the same reason, any claim of 

heightened scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities 

Clause also fails. Cf. Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 

(1989) (invalidating a rule requiring Virgin Islands bar 

applicants to establish year-long residence and intent to 

remain in the Virgin Islands under the Privileges and 

Immunities Clause).

Here, the Principal Office Provision ensures attorneys 

who practice before the District Court—but who avoid

supervision by the District of Columbia Bar—are subject to 

supervision by the state to which their practice is most 

geographically proximate. The Principal Office Provision

embodies a reasonable assumption: local licensing control is 

better positioned to facilitate training sessions, conduct 

monitoring programs, and field complaints from the public—

all rational bases for the Local Rule. Indeed, much more 

restrictive district court rules have passed rational basis 
8

review in other circuits. See, e.g., Simandle, 658 F. App’x at 

130 (District of New Jersey admits only New Jersey bar 

members); Lynch, 826 F.3d at 194–95, 197 (District of 

Maryland’s principal office provision is limited to those 

jurisdictions with reciprocity for District of Maryland bar 

members).3

V.

NAAMJP raises a number of additional claims under the 

Constitution and federal statutes. Each fails for the reasons 

discussed below.

First, NAAMJP asks this Court to declare the Local Rule 

invalid because it abridges the full faith and credit owed to 

State actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. But NAAMJP does not

identify any state action that should compel the D.C. District 

Court to allow attorneys admitted in other jurisdictions to 

handle cases in that court. Indeed, there is none, and 

NAAMJP’s Section 1738 claim must fail. See, e.g., Real, 911 

F.2d at 360 (“Giannini’s claim lacks merit because no act, 

record or judicial proceeding, in New Jersey or Pennsylvania, 

states that Giannini is entitled to practice law in California.”); 

Simandle, 658 F. App’x at 134 n.11 (“Of course, New York’s 

judgment that an individual should be admitted to its own bar 

establishes only that fact (i.e., admission to the state bar of 

New York), and does not even purport to require nationwide 

bar membership.”).

 3 NAAMJP also claims this case involves structural error. But structural 

error does not refer to a heightened standard of review. Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991) (discussing structural error, 

which “def[ies] analysis by harmless error standards” because it “affec[ts] 

the framework within which the trial proceeds” and is not “simply an error 

in the trial process itself”). Accordingly, the claim lacks merit.
9

Second, NAAMJP alleges the Local Rule violates 

admission requirements of other courts and governmental

bodies, including Supreme Court Rule 5, setting forth rules 

for admission to the Supreme Court Bar; Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 46, establishing general procedures for 

admission to the bars of the U.S. Courts of Appeals; and rules 

governing practice before federal administrative agencies. By 

their plain text, these rules apply only to the bodies that 

promulgated them, and they do not control the admission

requirements of federal district courts. See, e.g., Real, 911 

F.2d at 360 (“The Supreme Court’s Rule only concerns 

admission to practice before that court. It does not prescribe 

the requirements to practice before federal district courts. The 

district court admission rules differ from the Supreme Court 

admission rules but are not inconsistent in that they each deal 

with separate courts. Local District Court Rules are not 

required to mirror Supreme Court Rules.”). NAAMJP fails to 

identify a single rule that reaches beyond its promulgating 

tribunal to apply to the District Court.

Third, and finally, NAAMJP mounts a First Amendment 

challenge to the Local Rule, arguing it violates both speech 

and petition rights. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.

Contrary to NAAMJP’s suggestion, the Local Rule is not 

an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech. 

Generally, the government may “license and regulate those 

who would provide services to their clients for compensation 

without running afoul of the First Amendment.” Moore-King 

v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2013); see 

also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 459 

(1978) (“A lawyer’s procurement of remunerative 

employment is a subject only marginally affected with First 

Amendment concerns. It falls within the State’s proper 

sphere of economic and professional regulation.”). 
10

Accordingly, “[i]f the government enacts generally applicable 

licensing provisions limiting the class of persons who may 

practice the profession, it cannot be said to have enacted a 

limitation on freedom of speech or the press subject to First 

Amendment scrutiny.” Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232

(1985) (White, J., concurring in the result). “Regulations on 

entry into a profession, as a general matter, are constitutional 

if they ‘have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness 

or capacity to practice’ the profession.” Id. at 228 (quoting 

Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)).

Indeed, our sister circuits have rejected NAAMJP’s First 

Amendment challenges to local rules in other district courts

for this very reason, finding “the First Amendment does not 

come into play” when considering restrictions on admission 

similar to the Principal Office Provision. Lynch, 826 F.3d at 

196; see also, e.g., NAAMJP v. Castille, 799 F.3d 216, 220–

21 (3d Cir. 2015). Here, the Local Rule “does not 

discriminate on the basis of the subject matter or viewpoint of 

any bar applicant’s speech, the area of law an applicant would 

practice, or the clients an applicant would represent.” 

Castille, 799 F.3d at 220. Nor does it “regulate when, where, 

or how attorneys speak, [or] prohibit a category of 

professional speech.” Id. at 221. The Principal Office 

Provision merely regulates the profession in a manner that, as 

described above, passes rational basis review.

Further, as the district court noted, “[t]he Petition Clause 

of the First Amendment [as it is invoked here] protects the 

rights of individuals to access the courts for the resolution of 

legal disputes.” NAAMJP v. Roberts, 180 F. Supp. 3d 46, 63 

(D.D.C. 2015); see Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 

379, 387 (2011). But the Local Rule affects only attorneys 

wishing to appear before the District Court. And NAAMJP 

has not established that the Principal Office Provision has 
11

prevented private litigants from accessing courts. See Lynch,

826 F.3d at 196 n.7 (dismissing NAAMJP’s challenge to the 

rule at issue as “meritless and utterly inapplicable”). 

Accordingly, NAAMJP’s First Amendment arguments fail.

4

VI.

The Court does not doubt the sincerity of NAAMJP’s 

convictions or its eagerness to reduce barriers to legal practice 

in the various state and federal courts across the country. 

Indeed, there may be good policy reasons for the outcomes 

NAAMJP urges. But, as has been amply demonstrated in 

dozens of legal opinions penned by judges across the country, 

NAAMJP has identified no legal basis upon which to compel 

federal or state courts to adopt the rules it desires. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

 4 While NAAMJP raises the district court’s determination with 

respect to the right to free association, it does not develop this 

argument in its opening brief. Accordingly, the claim is forfeited. 

See Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. EPA, 255 F.3d 855, 869 (D.C. 

Cir. 2001) (“A litigant does not properly raise an issue by 

addressing it in a cursory fashion with only bare-bones 

arguments.”). In any event, as Judge Gorton clearly held, these 

claims are baseless. See Lynch, 826 F.3d at 196 n.7. NAAMJP’s 

members are free to associate with D.C. District Court Bar 

members—but they must follow one of the multiple paths set forth 

in the District Court’s rules in order to do so.