*As of March 31, 1995, the Social Security

Administration became an independent agency from the

Department of Health and Human Services. Therefore,

the court has substituted Shirley S. Chater for Donna

E. Shalala pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c).

 The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, Chief Judge, United States 1

District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.

_____________

No. 95-1499

_____________

Robert Lorenzen, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Southern District of Iowa.

*

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner *

of Social Security, *

*

*

Defendant-Appellee. *

_____________

 Submitted: September 15, 1995

 Filed: December 8, 1995

_____________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, McMILLIAN and HANSEN, Circuit

Judges.

_____________

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Robert Lorenzen appeals from the district court's grant of summary 1

judgment, which affirmed the Social Security Administration's decision to

deny his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental

security income. We affirm.

In his applications, Lorenzen alleged a disability onset date
2

of July 2, 1987, due to back trouble. The Social Security Administration

denied his applications both initially and upon reconsideration. After a

hearing held in 1992, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) also denied

Lorenzen's applications for benefits. Subsequently, the appeals council

of the Social Security Administration remanded the case to an ALJ for

further proceedings.

On March 22, 1994, following a supplemental hearing, the ALJ rendered

a decision denying benefits upon finding that Lorenzen was not disabled.

The ALJ found that Lorenzen has severe lumbosacral stenosis with a history

of two surgeries for the problem, the second of which showed a marked

reduction of pain; a personality disorder; and a history of alcohol abuse.

The ALJ concluded, however, that these impairments are not severe enough

to meet or, in combination, to equal a listed impairment. 

The ALJ discredited Lorenzen's testimony concerning the extent of his

limitations, finding that Lorenzen took no medication for his alleged pain,

that he has refused all but the briefest treatment for alcoholism, and that

nothing in the record indicates that his inactivity is medically necessary.

Medical records indicated that Lorenzen was doing well after his second

lumbar surgery, and the only limitations specifically imposed upon him were

to avoid heavy lifting and heavy activity for six weeks. While the

residual functional capacity assessments made by two physicians indicated

some severe pain and limitations, the ALJ discounted these assessments

because they were made during a relapse which occurred before Lorenzen's

second surgery. Similarly, although the ALJ did not specifically

articulate this with regard to her testimony, the testimony of Lorenzen's

past employer, Carol Bennett, concerning Lorenzen's pain and limitations

was also based upon Lorenzen's condition prior to his second surgery. 

The ALJ posed three hypothetical questions to a vocational
 Since the ALJ's decision denying benefits in this case, 2

Lorenzen submitted another application for disability insurance

benefits, and the Administration awarded benefits on that

application. Thus, only a 3 1/2 year period is in dispute here.

3

expert (VE), asking the VE to determine the potential employment

opportunities available to a person with Lorenzen's impairments, education,

age, and capabilities and who could tolerate a stress level of either 3 or

4 on a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being the greatest level of stress). The VE

concluded that while such a person would be unable to return to past

relevant work as a cook or maintenance engineer, the person would retain

the residual functional capacity to engage in substantial gainful unskilled

employment that exists both in the national economy and statewide. The VE

listed some specific jobs as examples. Adding the consideration of two to

three unscheduled absences per month to the hypothetical question, the VE

concluded that this limitation alone would preclude all employment. 

Based upon this record, the ALJ determined that Lorenzen was not

under a disability at any time through the date of the decision and,

accordingly, denied Lorenzen's applications for benefits. The appeals

2

council denied Lorenzen's request for review of this decision. 

Lorenzen sought judicial review. The district court determined that

the decision of the Social Security Administration was supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Lorenzen appeals,

contending that the ALJ erred (1) by excluding certain relevant limitations

from the hypothetical question posed to the VE (namely those reported prior

to his second surgery and those resulting from absences and related

problems attributable to his alcohol abuse); (2) by using a numerical

stress scale in the hypothetical question; and (3) by failing to make a

specific determination of the credibility of the testimony of Carol

Bennett, Lorenzen's past employer. 
4

We review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits by determining

the limited question of whether the decision is supported by substantial

evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Harris v. Shalala,

45 F.3d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir. 1995). If supported by substantial evidence,

the Commissioner's findings and decision must be affirmed. Id. 

After careful consideration of the record, we conclude that

substantial evidence on the whole record supports the ALJ's decision to

deny benefits in this case. First, the hypothetical question that the ALJ

asked of the VE properly set forth all of Lorenzen's impairments that are

supported in the record. See Chamberlain v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 1489, 1495

(8th Cir. 1995) (hypothetical question must include all credible

impairments). Since Lorenzen has been unwilling to accept treatment for

his alcoholism, his claimed limitations based upon alcohol abuse need not

be credited by the ALJ or included in the hypothetical question. See

Shelltrack v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 1991) (disability based

on alcoholism requires, in part, a showing that claimant is unable, not

merely unwilling, to seek and use means of rehabilitation). 

Second, the ALJ did not commit error by using the numerical stress

scale or by labeling the level of stress that Lorenzen could endure as a

level 3 or 4 on a scale of 1 to 10, because the record supports the

conclusion that Lorenzen had a "fair" ability to deal with work stresses

when he was not drinking. See Montgomery v. Chater, No. 95-1387, slip op.

at 4 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 1995) (use of a numerical stress scale "is an

acceptable shorthand for identifying a claimant's stress tolerance," when

supported by the evidence). 

Third, although the ALJ failed to list specific reasons for

discrediting the testimony of Carol Bennett, it is evident that most of her

testimony concerning Lorenzen's capabilities was
5

discredited by the same evidence that discredits Lorenzen's own testimony

concerning his limitations. See Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 841

(8th Cir. 1992) (arguable deficiency of failing to specifically discredit

witness has no bearing on outcome when the witness's testimony is

discredited by the same evidence that proves claimant's claims not

credible). 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.