IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

ARTHUR B., 

 Claimant,

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Respondent.

No. 20 C 2762

Magistrate Judge Jeffrey T. Gilbert

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Arthur B.1 (“Claimant”) seeks review of the final decision of Respondent Kilolo 

Kijakazi,2 Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 

(“Commissioner”), denying his application for disability insurance benefits under 

Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) 

and Local Rule 73.1, the parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction of a United 

States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including entry of final judgment. [ECF 

No. 6]. This Court, therefore, has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 

1383(c), and this matter is fully briefed and ripe for review. See [ECF Nos. 13, 19, 20]. 

1 Pursuant to Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 8.1 and Internal Operating Procedure 

22, the Court will identify the non-government party by using his first name and the first 

initial of the last name.

2 Kilolo Kijakazi became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on July 9, 2021. 

Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has substituted 

Acting Commissioner Kijakazi as the named defendant.

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For the reasons discussed in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Claimant’s 

Brief in Support of Reversing the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

[ECF No. 13] (construed as a motion) is granted, and the Commissioner’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment [ECF No. 19] is denied. This matter is remanded to the Social 

Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum 

Opinion and Order.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 10, 2017, Claimant filed an application for disability insurance 

benefits, alleging a disability beginning on October 1, 2017. (R.149-155). His

application was denied initially on November 20, 2017 (R.65-69), and again on 

reconsideration on April 9, 2018 (R.75-78), after which Claimant requested a hearing 

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R.80-81). On February 28, 2019, 

Claimant appeared and testified at a hearing before ALJ Lana Johnson. (R.26-48). At 

the hearing, Claimant was represented by attorney Meaghan Doyle. (R.14, 29). 

During the hearing, the ALJ also heard testimony from vocational expert Richard T. 

Fisher. (R.42-47). 

On April 3, 2019, the ALJ issued her decision denying Claimant’s application 

for disability insurance benefits. (R.14-20). In finding Claimant was not disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the ALJ followed the five-step 

evaluation process required by the Social Security Regulations for individuals over 

the age of 18. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant 

met the insured status requirement of the Social Security Act through December 31, 

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2022, and that Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 

17, 2017, the alleged onset date of his disability. (R.16). At step two, the ALJ found 

that Claimant has severe impairments, including causalgia/chronic pain status post 

perirectal abscess surgeries in 1979 and 1995 and inguinal hernia. (R.16). At step 

three, the ALJ found that Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed 

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 

404.1525, 404.1526). (R.17). The ALJ then determined that Claimant has the residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1567(b) except for the following limitations, including frequent stooping, 

kneeling, crouching, and crawling and frequent climbing of ramps and stairs, but only 

occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. (R.17).

At step four, the ALJ found that Claimant is capable performing his past 

relevant work because “this work does not require the performance of work-related 

activities precluded by” his RFC. (R.20). For all these reasons, the ALJ found 

Claimant was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R.20). The Appeals Council 

declined to review the matter on March 4, 2020 (R.1-6), making the ALJ’s decision 

the final decision of the Commissioner. Therefore, this Court now has jurisdiction to 

review this matter. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 

1775 (2019); Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

A decision by an ALJ becomes the Commissioner’s final decision if the Appeals 

Council denies a request for review. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). 

Judicial review is limited to determining whether an ALJ’s decision is supported by 

substantial evidence in the record and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal 

standards in reaching her decision. See Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 

2009). The reviewing court may enter a judgment “affirming, modifying, or reversing 

the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the 

cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial evidence “means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. 

Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotations omitted); see also

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A “mere scintilla” of evidence is not 

enough. Biestek, 139 S.Ct. at 1154; Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 

2002). Even when there is adequate evidence in the record to support the decision, 

the findings will not be upheld if the ALJ does not “build an accurate and logical 

bridge from the evidence to the conclusion.” Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th 

Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, if the Commissioner’s 

decision lacks evidentiary support or adequate discussion of the issues, it cannot 

stand. See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Though the standard of review is deferential, a reviewing court must “conduct 

a critical review of the evidence” before affirming the Commissioner’s decision. 

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Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). 

The reviewing court may not, however, “displace the ALJ’s judgment by reconsidering 

facts or evidence, or by making independent credibility determinations.” Elder v. 

Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).

ANALYSIS

Claimant raises three arguments challenging the ALJ’s decision: (1) the ALJ

incorrectly assessed Claimant’s RFC; (2) the ALJ’s evaluation of Claimant’s treating 

physician was deficient; and (3) the ALJ improperly evaluated Claimant’s subjective 

symptoms. See Claimant’s Brief [ECF No. 13]. In response, the Commissioner 

contends that there is very little objective medical evidence in the record that 

supports Claimant’s claimed impairments and allegations of disability, and the ALJ 

did what she was required to do in reaching her conclusions. See Commissioner’s Brief 

[ECF No. 19]. The Commissioner essentially argues that the medical evidence in the 

record does not corroborate Claimant’s assertions of limited functionality, and so the 

ALJ reasonably concluded that Claimant is not disabled. The Court will address the 

parties’ arguments in turn. 

The Court begins with the ALJ’s assessment of the medical opinion evidence 

in the record. As the Commissioner points out, the Social Security Administration 

recently amended the Regulation applying to medical source opinions. The new 

Regulation applies to all applications filed after March 27, 2017, which includes this 

case, and eliminates the treating source rule. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. It provides in 

pertinent part that the agency “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, 

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including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative 

medical finding(s), including those from your medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c.

The new Regulation also identifies specific factors for an ALJ to consider, including

supportability, consistency, relationship to the claimant (length, frequency, purpose, 

and extent of the relationship), specialization, and other factors. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520c(c)(1). The Regulation specifies that the supportability and consistency of a

physician’s opinion are the most important factors and that the ALJ will explain how 

she considered these two factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(1). But the ALJ need not 

explain how she considered the remaining factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(1).

In this case, the ALJ first discussed the medical opinion provided by Claimant’s 

treating physician, Ramil Francisco, M.D., who completed a Chronic Pain Residual 

Functional Capacity Questionnaire for Claimant. (R.19-20,405-07). After 

summarizing Dr. Francisco’s opinion and treatment records, the ALJ concluded that 

she did not find Dr. Francisco’s opinion persuasive. (R.19). To support that conclusion, 

the ALJ explained that Claimant saw Dr. Francisco on only three occasions, and 

during those physical examinations of Claimant, the ALJ noted that Dr. Francisco’s 

findings were normal. (R.19) (citing R.268, 275-77, 362-64). The ALJ furthered noted 

that Dr. Francisco recorded Claimant’s subjective assertions of pain, but did not 

record any observed deficits in Claimant’s functioning. (R.19). In addition, the ALJ 

noted that on March 1, 2018, Claimant’s report to Dr. Francisco was that his pain 

was only a three out of ten. (R.19, 365). Yet, that note was inconsistent with Dr. 

Francisco’s assessment on the opinion form he filled out that very same day that 

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Claimant’s pain ranged from five to ten on a ten-point scale. (R.19) (comparing R.365 

with R.405). For these reasons, the ALJ explained that Dr. Francisco’s opinion of 

Claimant’s significant functional deficits were unsupported by and inconsistent with 

the medical evidence, and she found Dr. Francisco’s opinion was unpersuasive.3

(R.19).

In the Court’s view, the ALJ reasonably and sufficiently explained why she 

found Dr. Francisco’s opinion unpersuasive. The ALJ discussed the supportability 

and consistency of his opinion as required by the new Regulation, and the ALJ 

reasonably concluded that there is very little, if any, objective medical evidence in the 

record that supports Dr. Francisco’s opinion of Claimant’s extreme limitations. The 

ALJ did what she was required to do under the governing regulations, and the Court 

cannot say her analysis is deficient. Therefore, remand is not warranted on this issue. 

Although this Court is not persuaded by Claimant’s argument that remand is 

required because the ALJ incorrectly assessed the medical source opinion evidence, 

the Court does agree with Claimant’s arguments that the ALJ’s RFC determination 

and her analysis of Claimant’s subjective complaints require remand here. The Court 

will address these two issues together. The standard of review for these two 

arguments is clear and not controversial. The ALJ’s analysis of a claimant’s RFC 

“must say enough to enable review of whether the ALJ considered the totality of a 

claimant’s limitations.” Lothridge v. Saul, 984 F.3d 1227, 1233 (7th Cir. 2021). An

3 The record also includes medical source opinions from the state agency physicians who also 

provided opinion evidence in this case. Claimant, however, does not challenge the ALJ’s 

analysis of those medical source opinions. The Court, therefore, will not address those 

opinions. 

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ALJ is not required to provide a complete and written evaluation of every piece of 

testimony and evidence, but she must build a logical bridge from the evidence to her

conclusion. Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 929, 935 (7th Cir. 2015). 

Here, the ALJ began her RFC analysis discussing two Function Reports 

submitted by Claimant and then briefly summarized Claimant’s hearing testimony. 

(R.18). The ALJ continued her discussion with the familiar boilerplate language used 

by many ALJs: “After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds 

that the claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause the allege symptoms; however, the claimant’s statements 

concerning the intensity persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not 

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the 

reasons explained in this decision.” (R.18). Next, the ALJ provided a brief recitation 

of Claimant’s treatment history, which objectively is sparse, and discussed some 

specific treatment records. (R.18-19). After summarizing the medical source opinion 

evidence and explaining how she evaluated those opinions, the ALJ ultimately 

concluded: “In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported 

by the medical records. The claimant has been diagnosed with causalgia and perianal 

abscesses that cause burin pain and paresthesia (5F) and right inguinal hernia 

(7F/14). As a result of the combination of these impairments, the claimant is limited 

to performing a restricted range of light work activities.” (R.20). 

It is well-settled law that mere boilerplate statements and conclusions cannot 

support an ALJ’s decision and an ALJ must set forth “specific reasons” for discounting 

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subjective reports of symptoms. See Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2009), 

citing Moss v. Astrue, 555 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir. 2009); Steele v. Barnhart, 290 F.3d 

936, 941-42 (7th Cir. 2002). An ALJ’s sparse explanation frustrates a court’s ability 

to engage in a meaningful review of the ALJ’s decision. Eakin v. Astrue, 432 Fed.

Appx. 607, 611 (7th Cir. 2011). 

As discussed above, the ALJ stated that her RFC finding is “supported by the 

medical records” and then she cited a few exhibits in the record presumably as 

support for her assessment. (R.20). The ALJ, however, failed to articulate any 

analysis she conducted of the evidence or explain how she reached her conclusion that 

Claimant is not as disabled as he claims. The ALJ’s decision contains no markers for 

the Court to follow to discern the path the ALJ followed in reaching her conclusion. 

The Court cannot assume or speculate what the ALJ was thinking when she cited a 

few exhibits and said the medical records support her conclusion. Simply citing a few 

specific medical facts or exhibits in the record is not enough. See SSR 96-8p (requiring 

that the “RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the 

evidence supports the conclusion”). In the Court’s view, the ALJ erred by not 

providing a narrative discussion of how the record evidence supported her 

determination that Claimant is limited to performing a restricted range of light work 

activities. The Court is left with two critical and dispositive questions: (1) how does 

the clinical evidence support the ALJ’s RFC assessment; and (2) how does the ALJ 

account for Claimant’s subjective complaints in that RFC assessment? Nowhere in 

her opinion does the ALJ answer these questions.

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The Court recognizes there is minimal medical record evidence in this case and 

it appears that Claimant did not receive significant treatment during the relevant 

period for the impairments he alleges cause his disability, and that those 

impairments and the resulting pain existed for many years prior to his application 

for disability benefits. Nonetheless, Claimant testified he had “intense pain” from 

past surgeries that made it difficult for him to sit, stand, walk, and lay down. (R.33). 

He testified that he worked through the pain and then retired in September 2017 

because he no longer could perform his duties. (R.32). There is some additional

evidence in the record that Claimant reported that he could not sit, walk, or stand for 

more than 30 minutes without experiencing severe pain (R.210) and that typically he 

only could sit for 15 to 20 minutes (R.39) and walk for 20 to 30 minutes before needing 

to rest for 15 to 20 minutes (R.38, 215). Claimant reported being unable to work 

because his chronic rectal pain impeded his ability to sit, stand, and walk for 

prolonged periods. (R.267, 297-98, 363). Another record notes that Claimant could 

walk or sit for 30 minutes before he needed to lie down for 30 minutes. (R.220). 

Claimant also testified that he relied on his wife to prepare meals and do chores due 

to his pain. (R.37-38). 

The ALJ may not have been persuaded by Claimant’s testimony or the record 

evidence, but she did not provide adequate explanation of her rationale for rejecting 

that evidence and reaching the conclusions she reached. It is well-settled that an ALJ 

cannot cherry pick which evidence to evaluate and disregard other critical evidence. 

See Scrogham v. Colvin, 765 F.3d 685, 696-99 (7th Cir. 2014); Myles, 582 F.3d at 678. 

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The Court cannot, and will not, make assumptions about how the ALJ evaluated and 

weighed the medical evidence and Claimant’s testimony when there is evidence in 

the record that is inconsistent with the ALJ’s evaluation. See Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 352 

(finding that an ALJ must explain how the evidence supports their specific functional 

restrictions); Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 740-41 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that an 

ALJ must consider claimant reports on the limiting pain of their medically 

determinable impairments). Therefore, the case must be remanded for further 

explanation from the ALJ. 

The Commissioner attempts to provide a more detailed explanation of the 

ALJ’s analysis and to explain how the record evidence supports the ALJ’s

determination of Claimant’s RFC and how she assessed Claimant’s subjective 

complaints. See Commissioner’s Brief [ECF No. 19], at 9-15. While ultimately the 

Commissioner may be correct about what the ALJ was thinking, the Court will not 

speculate about what was in the ALJ’s mind based on the Commissioner’s 

explanation rather than an explanation from the ALJ herself. The Court must 

consider solely what the ALJ said, or did not say as the case may be, when 

determining whether her decision is supported by substantial evidence. The 

Commissioner’s post-hoc attempt to substantiate the ALJ’s decision cannot save the 

day here, and the Commissioner’s explanation is not what the Court must review. In

advancing a reason not relied upon by the ALJ, the Commissioner violates 

the Chenery doctrine. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). “Under 

the Chenery doctrine, the Commissioner’s lawyers cannot defend the agency’s 

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decision on grounds that the agency itself did not embrace.” Kastner v. Astrue, 697 

F.3d 642, 648 (7th Cir. 2012)

As one example, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ considered Claimant’s 

testimony that he had experienced pain since the 1990s, but continued to work fulltime for years until he retired in September 2017. See Commissioner’s Brief [ECF No. 

19], at 9-10. The Commissioner seems to suggest that because Claimant experienced

pain for many years, but continued to work, his ongoing complaints of pain and 

inability to work do not support a finding of current disability because he worked for 

many years under similar conditions. The Court acknowledges that could be a 

reasonable explanation for the ALJ’s determination as the Commissioner seems to 

suggest. The problem is that ALJ does not say that; the Commissioner does. This 

Court must consider only the ALJ’s explanation for her decision to find a claimant 

not disabled. In this case, the ALJ’s opinion is sorely lacking in that respect.

The Court also acknowledges that some of the arguments the Commissioner 

relies upon to argue that Claimant’s subjective complaints and testimony should not 

be credited fully may well have been considered by the ALJ. Again, without any 

explanation from the ALJ, it is impossible for the Court to understand how the ALJ 

assessed Claimant’s testimony and if that assessment was reasonable. The ALJ 

simply did not sufficiently describe her decisional process and did not sufficiently

explain her RFC determination nor did she sufficiently address Claimant’s subjective 

complaints in reaching her RFC determination. Because the Court cannot decipher 

how the ALJ reached her conclusion that Claimant can perform a restricted range of 

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light work, it cannot connect the dots to determine whether there is substantial 

evidence to support her conclusions, and the Court will not speculate about that

important issue. Ultimately, the ALJ’s brief summary of Claimant’s testimony and 

her chronological recitation of the contents of Claimant’s medical records and 

treatment history is not legally sufficient, without more from the ALJ as opposed to 

the Commissioner, and it does not provide any explanation of how Claimant’s 

subjective complaints have been taken into account. Therefore, remand is required.

The Court is mindful of the deference that is owed to an ALJ’s decision under 

the substantial evidence standard and that a reviewing court should not substitute 

its judgment for that of the ALJ’s by reweighing the evidence. Although this standard 

is generous, it is not entirely uncritical. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000). In this case, the ALJ’s explanation of Claimant’s RFC and her assessment of 

Claimant’s subjective complaints and testimony are deficient, and remand is required

for those reasons. This is not an instance in which the Court is reweighing the 

evidence. Here, the ALJ simply recited the record evidence without explaining how 

she weighed it in the first place. That does not mean the Court agrees with Claimant 

that he is disabled and cannot work within the meaning of the applicable law. Rather, 

it means that the ALJ did not explain her decisional process sufficiently for the Court 

to be able to conclude that her ultimate decision is supported by substantial evidence 

under the controlling standard of review. When an ALJ’s decision “lacks evidentiary 

support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent meaningful review,” as is the case 

here, the case must be remanded. Steele, 290 F.3d at 940.

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The Court expresses no opinion about the decision to be made on remand but 

encourages the ALJ to provide a more fulsome explanation of her analysis, the 

evidence she took into account, and the weight she gave to it, and to do what is 

necessary to build a logical bridge between the evidence in the record and her

ultimate conclusions, whatever those conclusions may be. See Myles, 582 F.3d at 678 

(“On remand, the ALJ should consider all of the evidence in the record, and, if 

necessary, give the parties the opportunity to expand the record so that he may build 

a ‘logical bridge’ between the evidence and his conclusions.”); Smith v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 

433, 437 (7th Cir. 2000).

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons discussed above, Claimant’s Memorandum in Support of 

Summary Remand [ECF No. 13] is granted, the Commissioner’s Motion and 

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 19] is denied. 

This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum 

Opinion and Order.

It is so ordered.

 ____________________________________ 

 Jeffrey T. Gilbert

United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: September 8, 2022

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