1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

LIONEL KELLEY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 

Defendant.

Case No. 20-CV-02881 

Judge Mary M. Rowland 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Lionel Kelley (“Kelley”) claims that his employer, Defendant Chicago 

Transit Authority (“CTA”), discriminated against him on the basis of his disability in 

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.,

the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., and the Illinois Human Rights Act 

(“IHRA”), 775 ILCS 5/2-101 et seq. The CTA has moved for summary judgment on all 

of Kelley’s claims. [61]. For the reasons explained below, this Court denies the CTA’s 

motion. 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts 

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are material. Id. After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, 

the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue 

for trial.” Id. at 250 (internal quotations omitted). 

The Court “consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party, and [] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that 

evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. 

Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotations omitted). The 

Court “must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence.” 

Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 255). In ruling on summary judgment, the Court gives the non-moving 

party “the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative 

inferences in [its] favor.” White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) 

(internal citations omitted). “The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier 

of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in 

support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Id. (citation 

omitted). 

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BACKGROUND1 

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.2

I. Kelley’s Employment with the CTA 

Kelley was hired by the CTA as a substation attendant in April of 2015. [64] ¶ 

2. Within a year, Kelley transitioned into the job of B Electrician (also known as 

substation maintenance) and is responsible for maintaining the rail equipment that 

supplies electricity to CTA’s rails and tracks. Id. ¶ 4. Since then, Kelley has been 

employed as a B Electrician and is also a member of the International Brotherhood 

of Electrical Workers, Local 134 (“Union”). Id. ¶ 2. 

II. Kelley’s Incident on June 28, 2018 

Kelley is a type 1 diabetic, which requires him to inject insulin and monitor his 

food intake and physical activity. Id. ¶ 19. Since 2017, Kelley has been monitoring 

his sugar level via a skin patch called Dexcom, and Dexcom notifies him through an 

app installed on his phone if his sugar level is low or high. Id. ¶ 22. Kelley receives a 

three-month supply of Dexcom from his medical supplier upon his doctor issuing a 

prescription to the medication provider. Id. 

1

 This Court takes these facts from the CTA’s Statement of Facts [64], Kelley’s Response to 

the CTA’s Statement of Facts [69], Kelley’s Statement of Additional Facts (“SOAF”) [70], the 

CTA’s Response to Kelley’s SOAF [79], and various exhibits and declarations the parties have 

submitted in connection with the CTA’s motion for summary judgment. 

2

 The CTA points out that Kelley's response and his Local Rule 56.1 statement do not comply 

with the requirements of the rule, and it contends, among other things, that the Court should 

treat all improperly controverted factual statements as admitted. [80] at 3–6. Where 

appropriate, the Court notes what evidence it relies upon in making its decision and ignores 

evidence that does not comport with the requirements of the Local Rules. 

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On June 28, 2018, Kelley was scheduled to install light fixtures with Julio 

Hernandez in the CTA’s Loomis substation. Id. ¶ 37. Kelley was not wearing a 

Dexcom patch because the last patch fell off in the shower the day before. Id. ¶ 35. 

Despite being able to request an overnight delivery for a replacement patch, Kelley 

admitted that he did not do so because the next regularly-scheduled supplies were 

already in process to be delivered—although that would not be until approximately 

three days after his patch fell off. Id. ¶ 35. Without the Dexcom patch, Kelley was 

testing his sugar level on test strips that day. Id. ¶ 37. 

After the light fixtures were installed, Hernandez left the Loomis substation 

and Kelley was documenting the work he performed that day alone. Id. ¶ 38. That 

was the last thing Kelley remembers before he was woken up by paramedics after 

passing out due to a low blood sugar level. Id. When Kelley did not call a Power 

Controller from Loomis substation at the end of his shift, a Power Controller sent out 

another employee to check on Kelley. Id. ¶ 39. That employee found Kelley on the 

ground in the Loomis substation and informed the Power Controller that he needed 

an ambulance. Id. After the paramedics arrived, Kelley ate a meal to increase his 

sugar level, refused to go to a hospital, and drove home. Id. Kelley admitted that he 

passed out and said, it was “my fault”, I “[did not] do [what] I was supposed to [do]” 

with my food intake and insulin, and I “just [do not have] any excuse for it.” Id. ¶ 40. 

Kelley testified that he did not consume the right amount of food that day and that 

he took too much insulin. Id. Kelley also admitted that he probably did not do enough 

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testing of his blood sugar level via test strips because he only did it three times that 

day, and he normally checks his sugar manually six or seven times per day. Id.

III. CTA Response and Kelley’s Medical Examinations 

On July 2, 2018, Kelley returned to work at Loomis station but was informed 

that he needed to see his supervisor Jeannine Messina. Id. ¶ 43; [70] ¶ 5. Kelley met 

with Messina and his Union representative, Robert Casto, at Messina’s office where 

they discussed the June 28, 2018 incident. [64] ¶ 43. Messina testified that she 

became aware for the first time that Kelley was diabetic at that meeting. [70] ¶ 5. 

Messina informed Kelley that he was being removed from service and that he would 

be contacted by CTA’s Leave Management unit (“Leave Management”) to pursue 

getting a fit-for-duty evaluation from Concentra, the CTA’s third-party medical 

service provider. [64] ¶ 44. 

On July 5, 2018, Kelley reported to Concentra and saw Dr. David Kang. Id. ¶ 

50. According to Kelley, after Dr. Kang learned that Kelley was diabetic, he informed 

Kelley that he would not be medically cleared to return to work until he obtained a 

note from his doctor stating that he is in good condition to return to work. Id. Dr. 

Kang testified that he told Kelley to get a letter from his Primary Care Physician 

(“PCP”). [70] ¶ 8. Later that day, Kelley called his PCP, Dr. John Venetos, told him 

about the incident, and informed Dr. Venetos that he needed a note stating that he 

was in good condition to return to work. [64] ¶¶ 24, 53. On July 6, 2018, Dr. Venetos 

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drafted, signed, and faxed back Dr. Kang’s form to Concentra with a note that stated 

“pt [patient] clear to return to work.” Id. ¶¶ 55–56; [73], Pl.’s Ex. 19.3 

On July 9, 2018, Kelley’s supervisor Messina emailed Deshone Maddox, a CTA 

employee in Leave Management, that Kelley had called her about the clearance, but 

Messina believed Kelley had to bring the paperwork to Concentra and receive a final 

determination from a doctor there. [64] ¶ 30; [70] ¶ 9; [74], Pl.’s Ex. 21 at 2. Maddox 

responded that “we” asked Concentra to tell Kelley to report back to Concentra to 

“complete the exam” and said she would instruct Kelley to report back to Concentra. 

[70] ¶ 9; [74], Pl.’s Ex. 21 at 1–2. 

On July 13, 2018, Kelley returned to Concentra and saw Dr. Nicole Patino who 

took his sugar and gave him a physical. [70] ¶ 10; Pl.’s Ex. 24. Afterwards, Concentra 

staff gave Kelley a note that stated, “Result Status: No medical restrictions” and 

“Remarks: may RTW [return to work] without restrictions as of 7/13/18.” [70] ¶ 10; 

[74], Pl.’s Ex. 23. Concentra’s records show Dr. Patino’s signature on a document with 

“Service Date: 07/13/18” that has an “X” by “Job description was provided by the 

employer and has been reviewed by the examining provider” and says the “Fit for 

Duty Examination Results” are that Kelley “[m]ay work without 

limitations/restrictions.” [70] ¶ 10; [74], Pl.’s Ex. 24; see also [74], Pl.’s Ex. 25 (job 

description given to Concentra). That day, Messina received a call from Julio 

Hernandez, Kelley’s immediate foreman, “who notified [Messina] that Kelley was 

3

 Dr. Venetos’s clearance on July 6, 2018 indicated that Kelley “has not had any hypoglycemic 

episodes in the last three months” even though Kelley had such an episode on June 28, 2018. 

[73], Pl.’s Ex. 19. 

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cleared to return to work per CTA’s doctor.” [70] ¶ 12. An employee in Leave 

Management emailed Georgette Hampton, who oversees Leave Management, and 

Messina the following in response to emails from them: “I spoke to Mr. Kelley and he 

was advised not to report to work, and to expect a follow up call from Leave 

Management on Monday.” [64] ¶ 30; [70] ¶ 12; [74], Pl.’s Ex. 27. 

On July 16, 2018, at 10:15 a.m., Maddox emailed Carla Lowe, an operations 

director at Concentra, and stated, “Mr. Kell[e]y works in a safety sensitive position 

and is insulin dependent. Can you call me about this case?” [70] ¶ 14; [74], Pl.’s Ex. 

28; [74], Pl.’s Ex. 29 at 13:5–7. Less than an hour later at 11:09 a.m., Messina wrote 

an email to her boss, William Mooney, and five other people that stated: “Please be 

advised Mr. Kelley has been found unfit to return to work and should be carried as 

sick on the time sheets. If you should have any questions, please let me know.” [70] ¶ 

15; [72-1], Pl.’s Ex. 8. Less than 30 minutes later, Lowe emailed Dr. Patino: “Can you 

please update [Kelley’s] physical to reflect he is not qualified to RTW? I have already 

reached out to the patient to inform him of the updated status.” [70] ¶ 16; [74], Pl.’s 

Ex. 30 at 2. 

IV. Kelley’s Grievance and Return 

On July 23, 2018, Kelley’s Union filed a grievance alleging that “the [CTA] has 

constructively disciplined and/or suspended [Kelley] indefinitely, without the ability 

to return to work, despite several medical releases/reports verifying that he is 

medically clear to return to work full duty with no restrictions.” [70] ¶ 21; [75], Pl.’s 

Ex. 32. A couple days later, the grievance was shared with Messina and her boss 

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Mooney. [70] ¶ 22; [75], Pl.’s Ex. 33. Two days later, on July 27, 2018, Concentra’s 

assistant operations director, Joselyn Perez, emailed Maddox stating, “Here you go 

Deshone [Maddox], let me know if there is anything else I can assist you with,” and 

attached a document stating Kelley was “not cleared to RTW [return to work] 7.16.18 

CL.” [70] ¶ 22; [75], Pl.’s Ex. 34. Lowe, an operations director at Concentra, testified 

that she entered that comment in the document. [70] ¶ 22. Messina testified that she 

did not give the document to Kelley. [72-1], Pl.’s Ex. 7 at 52:20–53:3. Maddox 

acknowledged that this document contained no information that there was something 

Kelley needed to do to get back to work. [70] ¶ 22. 

On July 30, 2018, a week after the grievance, Maddox circulated a letter signed 

by Hampton to Messina and others that stated: 

On 7/13/18, our Third Party medical Service Provider released Mr. Kelly 

to RTW full duty. However, upon further review of Mr. Kelley’s current 

medical condition, our Third Party Medical Service Provider determined 

that Mr. Kelley could not perform the essential functions of his job 

safely. Therefore, Mr. Kelley is not medically fit to RTW[.] 

[70] ¶ 23; [75], Pl.’s Ex. 35. The letter was addressed to Bob Castro, Kelley’s Union 

representative, and Kelley asserts there is no evidence the letter was sent to Castro 

(or anyone else). [70] ¶ 23. On August 14, 2018, Casto wrote a letter to the CTA’s legal 

department stating that the CTA had “suspended [Kelley] indefinitely, without the 

ability to return to work, despite several medical releases/reports verifying that he is 

medically clear to return to work full duty with no restrictions.” [70] ¶ 24; [75], Pl.’s 

Ex. 37. Kelley’s EEOC intake form is dated August 15, 2018, and claims, among other 

things, that the CTA’s reason for keeping him off work was “that [he] ha[s] [d]iabetes 

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& this disability is not allowed in a [s]afety [s]ensitive [p]osition.” [70] ¶ 25; [75], Pl.’s 

Ex. 38. 

On August 16, 2018, the CTA’s labor representative wrote to Castro that 

“Kelley is still off work because he does not meet the requirements of his safetysensitive position (because of his diabetes).” [70] ¶ 26; [75], Pl.’s Ex. 40. On August 

22, 2018, Hampton, who oversees Leave Management, reiterated the CTA’s view: 

“Kelley was found unfit by Concentra due the nature of his condition in a safety 

sensitive position” and was “out on STD [short-term disability].” [70] ¶ 26; [75], Pl.’s 

Ex. 41. That same day, Messina wrote to the CTA’s unemployment coordinator that 

Kelley “was found unfit for his job duties.” [70] ¶ 26; [75], Pl.’s Ex. 42. 

About a year later, on August 14, 2019, a labor arbitrator issued a written 

opinion that ordered the CTA to give Kelley “a full and fair opportunity to medically 

qualify to return to his position as a substation B maintenance electrician,” and 

stated that “[t]he CTA must provide the Grievant with complete information about 

how he can medically qualify to return to his safety-sensitive situation.” [70] ¶ 31; 

[76], Pl.’s Ex. 46 at 38. The Union reached out three times to the CTA over the 

following four weeks to ask for instructions on how Kelley could “medically qualify” 

and return to work. [70] ¶ 33; [76], Pl.’s Ex. 47 (8/19/2019 email and letter), Pl.’s Ex. 

48 (8/30/2019 email), Pl.’s Ex. 49 (9/11/2019 email). Afterwards, Maddox instructed 

Kelley to go to Concentra on September 13, 2019. [70] ¶ 34; [72-1], Pl.’s Ex. 6 at 71:4–

13. Kelley reported as instructed and was found fit to return to work. [70] ¶ 34; [76], 

Pl.’s Ex. 50. Later that day, Maddox emailed Messina and others that “Ms. Carla 

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Lowe at Concentra is taking a closer look into how [Kelley] was found fit.” [76], Pl.’s 

Ex. 50. Kelley returned to work on October 3, 2019. [64] ¶ 80. 

ANALYSIS 

Kelley alleges that the CTA took an adverse employment action against him 

because of his disability in violation of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the 

IHRA. The parties agree that these claims are governed by the same standards.4 [63] 

at 2–3; [68] at 8; see also Vargas v. DeJoy, 980 F.3d 1184, 1190 n.4 (7th Cir. 2020) 

(courts “resolve Rehabilitation Act claims by looking to the same standards and 

provisions that govern the [ADA]”); Bilinsky v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d 565, 569 

(7th Cir. 2019) (“Illinois courts have looked to the standards applicable to analogous 

federal claims when evaluating IHRA claims, so we consolidate our analysis of both 

counts”). Thus, the Court analyzes all three claims together for the purposes of 

summary judgment, and Kelley may defeat summary judgment by relying on two 

frameworks to show discrimination. 

First, Kelley may proceed under the burden-shifting framework the Supreme 

Court developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Lewis 

v. Ind. Wesleyan Univ., 36 F.4th 755, 759 (7th Cir. 2022). Under McDonnell Douglas, 

a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that “(1) he belongs to a 

protected class; (2) he met his employer's legitimate expectations; (3) he suffered an 

adverse employment action; and (4) another similarly situated employee outside of 

4

 The Rehabilitation Act also requires Kelley to show that the CTA “received federal financial 

help.” Thurmon v. Mount Carmel High School, 191 F. Supp. 3d 894, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2016) 

(cleaned up). The CTA does not raise this issue in its motion or argue that it is not federally 

funded. [63] at 3. 

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his protected class received better treatment from his employer.” Igasaki v. Ill. Dep't 

of Fin. & Pro. Regul., 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021). If the plaintiff establishes a 

prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to present a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the decision. Bless v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 9 F.4th 565, 

574 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Formella v. Brennan, 817 F.3d 503, 511 (7th Cir. 2016)). 

If the employer presents a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, “the burden shifts 

back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's stated reason was a pretext.” Igasaki, 

988 F.3d at 957 (quoting Purtue v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 963 F.3d 598, 601–02 (7th Cir. 

2020), reh'g denied (July 31, 2020)). 

Alternatively, Kelley may rely on the framework articulated by the Seventh 

Circuit in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). Under Ortiz, 

this Court’s inquiry is “simply whether the evidence would permit a reasonable 

factfinder to conclude that [Kelley’s] ... [disability] caused the ... adverse employment 

action.” 834 F.3d at 765. Here, Kelley proceeds under the Ortiz framework, not the 

McDonnell Douglas framework.5 [68] at 8. In making this determination, “all 

evidence belongs in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole.” Ortiz, 834 F.3d 

at 766. Thus, this Court asks whether a reasonable juror could conclude that Kelley 

5

 The CTA frames many of its arguments under the McDonald Douglas framework: (1) Kelley 

was not meeting the CTA’s legitimate expectations, (2) Kelley failed to identify any similarly 

situated non-disabled employees who were treated more favorably, and (3) Kelley failed to 

establish pretext. [63] at 6–8, 13–15; [80] at 8–11, 13. However, Kelley is not required to 

utilize the McDonald Douglas framework and relies on the Ortiz framework. See Igasaki, 988 

F.3d 948 at 957–58 (“a plaintiff need not use the McDonell Douglas framework after Ortiz.”). 

Ultimately, the issue at summary judgment is whether Kelley “presented enough evidence 

to allow the jury to find in [his] favor.” Id. (quoting Vega v. Chicago Park Dist., 954 F.3d 996, 

1004 (7th Cir. 2020). 

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would have kept his job if he did not have a disability, and “everything else had 

remained the same.” Id. at 766. 

Kelley’s discrimination claims arise from a nearly fifteen-month period where 

the CTA did not reinstate him after he was cleared to return to work. [68] at 8, 8 n.2. 

The Court finds that Kelley has put forth evidence to support a reasonable inference 

that the CTA discriminated against him. 

First, the CTA acknowledges there are disputed facts regarding CTA’s policy 

as applied to Kelley, a person with diabetes serving as a B Electrician: “While there 

is testimony from just two CTA employees that CTA’s policy was that insulindependent diabetics could not work in a safety-sensitive position, this was not the 

case and the overwhelming evidence, including that Plaintiff was hired while taking 

insulin, shows this.” [63] at 14. Kelley’s supervisor, Jeannine Messina, learned that 

Kelley had diabetes for the first time after the incident. [64] ¶ 44. Messina testified 

that she believed that “type 1 diabetics were not allowed to be in safety-sensitive 

positions at the CTA.” [72-1], Pl.’s Ex. 7 at 17:9–12. The CTA notes that Messina was 

informed that there was exemption for type 1 diabetics in a safety sensitive position, 

but Messina could not recall when she received this information. Id. at 18:3–19:4. 

Additionally, Georgette Hampton, who oversaw CTA’s Leave Management, also 

believed (at least before August 2019) that “CTA policy was that people who used 

insulin were not allowed to work in safety sensitive positions.” [70] ¶ 20; [72-1], Pl.’s 

Ex. 9 at 62:2–7. Neither Messina nor Hampton could define “safety sensitive” or say 

where the phrase comes from. [70] ¶ 20. 

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Second, it is undisputed that Kelley was cleared to return to work on July 13, 

2018. [70] ¶ 10. Three days later, Maddox, another CTA employee in Leave 

Management, emailed Carla Lowe, an operations director at Concentra, and stated, 

“Mr. Kell[e]y works in a safety sensitive position and is insulin dependent. Can you 

call me about this case?” [70] ¶ 14; [74], Pl.’s Ex. 28; [74], Pl.’s Ex. 29 at 13:5–7. Less 

than an hour later, Messina wrote an email to her boss and five other people that 

stated: “All, please be advised Mr. Kelley has been found unfit to return to work and 

should be carried as sick on the time sheets. If you should have any questions, please 

let me know.” [70] ¶ 15; [72-1], Pl.’s Ex. 8. Less than 30 minutes after that, Lowe 

emailed Dr. Patino: “Can you please update [Kelley’s] physical to reflect he is not 

qualified to RTW? I have already reached out to the patient to inform him of the 

updated status.” [70] ¶ 16; [74], Pl.’s Ex. 30 at 2. Additionally, on July 30, 2018, 

Maddox sent a letter from Hampton to Messina and others stating that a medical 

service provider released Kelley to return to work but “upon further review” that 

provider “determined that Mr. Kelley could not perform the essential functions of his 

job safely.” [70] ¶ 23; [75], Pl.’s Ex. 35. 

The CTA argues that Kelley “present[ed] a direct threat to [his] own health 

and safety or that of others.” [63] at 7 (quoting Kirincich v. Illinois State Police, 196 

F. Supp. 3d 845, 850 (N.D. Ill. 2016)). “In order to prevail on its summary judgment 

motion asserting that [Kelley] posed a direct threat to himself and others, [the CTA] 

must show that the evidence on the question of direct threat is so one-sided no 

reasonable jury could find for [Kelley].” Pontinen v. United States Steel Corp., 26 

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F.4th 401, 408 (7th Cir. 2022). The determination that an employee poses a direct 

threat to his own health and safety or that of others must be premised upon “a 

reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge 

and/or the best available objective evidence, and upon an expressly individualized 

assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the essential functions 

of the job.” Darnell v. Thermafiber, Inc., 417 F.3d 657, 660 (7th Cir. 2005). As 

discussed, Kelley has presented evidence that the CTA determined that Kelley could 

not return to work. At the same time, it is undisputed that Dr. Venetos and Dr. Kang 

cleared Kelley based on incorrect information that Kelley “ha[d] not had any 

hypoglycemic episodes in the past three months.” [64] ¶¶ 53, 56. Further, Kelley 

acknowledges that he never told Dr. Patino he was in a “safety-sensitive” position, 

but the parties dispute the importance of the designation and its impact on the fitfor-duty evaluation. [69] ¶ 58. Nevertheless, the CTA has not presented evidence of 

a “direct threat [that] is so one-sided no reasonable jury could find for [Kelley].” 

Pontinen, 26 F.4th at 408. 

In sum, Kelley has raised a triable issue of fact on whether the CTA’s failure 

to reinstate him was discriminatory. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons explained above, this Court denies the CTA’s motion for 

summary judgment [61]. This Court notes that Kelley requests sanctions because he 

believes some of the facts offered by the CTA’s are unsupported or disputed. [68] at 

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12–14. This Court does not find sanctions appropriate, and thus, denies Kelley’s 

request. 

Dated: January 2, 2024 

E N T E R: 

 MARY M. ROWLAND 

United States District Judge

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