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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 108,062

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

DAVIN R. SPRAGUE,

Appellant.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. 

When a defendant is charged with a homicide in the death of one person, the facts 

cannot, under any circumstances, give rise to multiple counts of the charged crime and 

thus do not support a multiple acts appellate challenge.

2.

The summary denial of a motion arguing ineffective assistance of counsel is 

reviewed de novo, requiring the appellate court to determine whether the motions, files, 

and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief.

3. 

It is error for a prosecutor to tell the jury his or her personal belief as to the 

reliability or credibility of testimony given at trial.

4. 

The formal corpus delicti rule requires the State to make a prima facie showing of 

the corpus delicti independent of any extrajudicial admissions or confessions of a 
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defendant. The evidentiary threshold for making the required prima facie showing is 

slight and may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence.

5.

Under the facts of this case, the warrant authorizing the search of the defendant's 

home was sufficient in scope to authorize law enforcement's search of the defendant's 

outbuilding.

6. 

Kansas' statutory procedure for imposing a hard 50 sentence as provided in K.S.A. 

21-4635 violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted in 

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 2160-63, 186 L. Ed. 2d 

314 (2013), because it permits a judge to find by a preponderance of the evidence the 

existence of one or more aggravating factors necessary to impose an increased mandatory 

minimum sentence, rather than requiring a jury to find the existence of the aggravating 

factors beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appeal from Saline District Court; JEROME P. HELLMER, judge. Opinion filed December 4, 2015.

Conviction affirmed, sentence vacated, and case remanded.

Heather Cessna, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the briefs for 

appellant, and Davin Sprague, appellant, was on a supplemental brief pro se. 

Ellen Hurst Mitchell, county attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, and

Kris Ailslieger, of Office of the Kansas Attorney General, were with her on the briefs for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
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STEGALL, J.: A jury found Davin Sprague (Sprague) guilty of premeditated firstdegree murder for killing his wife, Kandi Sprague (Kandi). The district court sentenced 

Sprague to a hard 50 life sentence. Sprague raises numerous issues on direct appeal to 

this court, including four issues raised in a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm 

Sprague's conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. In so doing, 

we hold as follows: (1) Because there was only one killing here, this is not a multiple 

acts case requiring a unanimity instruction; (2) the district court properly denied 

Sprague's motion arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because Sprague failed to 

raise more than a conclusory claim; (3) during closing argument, the prosecutor erred 

when using the term "preposterous" and implying that two witnesses had "no motive," 

but the error was harmless; (4) Sprague was not convicted in violation of the corpus 

delicti rule because the State presented ample evidence that a homicide had occurred; (5) 

the district court did not err when it denied Sprague's motion for acquittal; (6) Sprague's 

argument on appeal concerning admission of gruesome images into evidence was not 

properly preserved for our review; (7) the district court did not err when it denied 

Sprague's motion to suppress the results of a search of Sprague's outbuilding because the 

search was within the scope of the authorizing search warrant; (8) Sprague was not 

denied a fair trial due to cumulative error; and lastly, (9) we have already declared the 

sentencing scheme under which Sprague was sentenced to a hard 50 term of 

imprisonment to be unconstitutional, and thus Sprague's sentence must be vacated and his 

case remanded to the district court for resentencing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Davin Sprague and his wife Kandi were living with their three children in a 

country home in rural Saline County, Kansas. On July 23, 2010, Sprague became aware 

that Kandi was on the verge of leaving him and filing for divorce. Sprague's mother, Ann 

Fleming, came to the Sprague home early that afternoon to take her grandchildren for the 
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weekend. Later that day, Kandi and her mother, Anna Christmas, had an hour-long phone 

conversation about the failing marriage. Kandi told her mother that she was thinking of 

divorcing Sprague. Kandi further confided that she had met another man online. A few 

minutes after the call ended, Kandi texted her mother, saying she was going to file for 

divorce. Her mother responded by asking if Sprague knew. Kandi replied: "'I don't think 

so. Love you.'" 

But Sprague was quickly becoming aware. That same day, Sprague had taken 

Kandi's cell phone and used it to contact the man—Steven Peacock—Kandi had met 

online. Peacock told Sprague that he had been led to believe by Kandi that she was 

divorced. Sprague told Peacock that she was in fact married, and in a subsequent phone 

call, Sprague and Peacock spent some time discussing the marital problems between 

Sprague and Kandi. Subsequently, that evening, Peacock and Kandi talked on the phone 

and communicated over the internet via a social game they played with another woman, 

Jennifer Helm. Kandi continued to communicate with Peacock and Helm through the 

online social game until she signed off at 11:32 that night. This was the last known 

communication from Kandi before she died.

The next morning, July 24th, Kandi was gone. Sprague immediately began to tell 

friends, family, and law enforcement that Kandi had left him for another man while he 

was asleep that night. On August 2, while executing a search warrant related to Kandi's 

disappearance, police discovered her body buried in a shallow grave in the floor of a 

Morton building located on Sprague's property. Following this discovery, Sprague gave a 

new, and very different, description of the events that occurred between 11:30 at night on 

July 23rd and the next morning. Sprague's statement was recorded and that recording was 

eventually played to the jury during trial. Sprague stated that around midnight or 1 a.m., 

Sprague was working in his Morton building when Kandi walked into the building.

Sprague claimed Kandi then started to attack him, putting her hands around his neck to 
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choke him. Sprague claimed that he felt fearful and threatened because Kandi was larger 

and stronger than he was. In order to defend himself, Sprague alleged, he grabbed a large 

pipe and hit Kandi in the back of the head. 

After this, Sprague continued, Kandi fell down and "a bunch of blood and shit 

started coming out of her mouth." During the interview, Sprague made a gurgling noise 

to illustrate the noise he claimed Kandi was making. Sprague told police he saw Kandi in 

pain and believed she would die before an ambulance could arrive. Sprague explained 

that in order to spare her that fate, he took a rope and strangled Kandi until the "pain was 

gone." Sprague then decided he had better conceal Kandi's body for the sake of his 

daughters. He told police he spent the next 8 hours digging up the hard-packed dirt floor 

of the Morton building and burying his wife's body. 

Erik Mitchell, a forensic pathologist and the medical examiner who conducted the 

autopsy, also testified at trial. He told the jury that based upon the state of the recovered 

remains certain facts were lost, such as whether there were hemorrhages around the neck 

or in the brain. The autopsy did reveal that Kandi had two separate fractures to her skull 

in the back of her head. But Mitchell opined that Kandi did not die as a result of the head 

injury, because he did not find the kind of blood clotting in the brain that would lead to 

death. Mitchell said that brain swelling secondary to the primary blunt force brain trauma 

could also cause death but that death from brain swelling "takes time." He indicated that 

death from fractures like the ones in Kandi's skull would take "more than a day." Mitchell 

testified the typical symptoms associated with this type of fracture would be 

unconsciousness, localized bleeding, nosebleed, tearing of the scalp, and possibly 

bleeding from the mouth. While he could not be certain, Mitchell testified there was a 

"very good chance" Kandi's head injuries were survivable. 
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Finally, Mitchell opined that the blunt force necessary to inflict the head injury 

Kandi sustained could not be generated in the manner Sprague described—i.e., reaching 

around to strike the rear while face-to-face with Kandi and engaged in a struggle. While 

the autopsy report listed Kandi's head injury as the official cause of death, Mitchell 

testified that a subsequent strangling would be a "supervening" cause. However, due to 

the state of decomposition, he was unable to diagnose asphyxiation or strangling as a 

cause of death. 

Following the killing, in addition to hiding Kandi's body, Sprague attempted to 

bolster his story that she had left him for another man by using her cell phone to send text 

messages to Kandi's mother and brother indicating that she was alive and well and would 

talk to them soon. 

After hearing all of the evidence, a jury convicted Sprague of premeditated firstdegree murder. The district court, following a hearing on the State's motion, imposed a 

hard 50 sentence pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4635. Sprague now appeals his conviction and 

sentence. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3) (direct 

appeal to Supreme Court when life sentence imposed).

ANALYSIS

1. No unanimity instruction was required.

Sprague argues the district court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction 

after the State presented a case where multiple acts could have constituted first-degree 

murder. Sprague's claim is that he could have killed Kandi either by the blow to the head 

or the subsequent strangling. The State argues that anytime there is only one killing, no 

unanimity instruction is required. The district court did not give a unanimity instruction,

and the parties did not request one. 
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We have recently stated the appellate framework and standard of review for a 

unanimity instruction analysis:

"'Unanimity instruction errors are reviewed under a three-part framework. First, 

the reviewing court determines whether a multiple acts case is presented. The threshold 

question is whether jurors heard evidence of multiple acts, each of which could have 

supported conviction on a charged crime. State v. King, 299 Kan. 372, Syl. ¶ 1, 323 P.3d 

1277 (2014). This is a question of law subject to unlimited review. State v. Santos-Vega, 

299 Kan. 11, 18, 321 P.3d 1 (2014) (citing [State v.] Voyles, 284 Kan. [239,] 244, 160 

P.3d 794 [2007]). If the case is a multiple acts case, the next question is whether error 

was committed. To avoid error, the State must have informed the jury which act to rely 

upon or the district court must have instructed the jury to agree on the specific act for 

each charge. Failure to elect or instruct is error. Finally, the court determines whether the 

error was reversible or harmless. Santos-Vega, 299 Kan. at 18. When, as here, the 

defendant failed to request a unanimity instruction, the court applies the clearly erroneous 

standard provided in K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3414(3). See Voyles, 284 Kan. at 252-53. 

Under this test, to find the error reversible:

"'"[a]n appellate court must be firmly convinced that under the facts the 

jury would have returned a different verdict if the unanimity instruction 

had been given. See State v. King, 297 Kan. 955, 979-80, 305 P.3d 641 

(2013); see also State v. Trujillo, 296 Kan. 625, 631, 294 P.3d 281 

(2013) (noting court's decision to omit the 'real possibility' language from 

Voyles test to avoid confusion with the constitutional harmless error 

test)." Santos-Vega, 299 Kan. at 18.' State v. De La Torre, 300 Kan. 591, 

596, 331 P.3d 815 (2014)." State v. Castleberry, 301 Kan. 170, 185-86, 

339 P.3d 795 (2014).

Sprague contends the State presented evidence of two acts that could have 

constituted first-degree murder: the hitting of Kandi on the head with the metal pipe or 

the strangling of her with a rope. "When a case involves multiple acts, the jury must be 
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unanimous in finding which specific act constitutes the crime." State v. King, 297 Kan. 

955, 977, 305 P.3d 641 (2013). The threshold question, however, is "whether the 

defendant's actions could have given rise to multiple counts of the charged crime or 

whether the alleged conduct was unitary." State v. Trujillo, 296 Kan. 625, 629, 294 P.3d 

281 (2013). In State v. De La Torre, 300 Kan. 591, 598, 331 P.3d 815, cert. denied 135 S. 

Ct. 728 (2014), we recently explained:

"'Multiple acts' are legally and factually separate incidents that independently satisfy the 

elements of the charged offense. See King, 299 Kan. at 379; State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 

111, 322 P.3d 334 (2014). Incidents are factually separate when independent criminal 

acts have occurred at different times or different locations or when a criminal act is 

motivated by a fresh impulse. Factually separate and distinct incidents are not unitary 

conduct. King, 299 Kan. 372, Syl. ¶ 2." 

Refining the point, in State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 111, 322 P.3d 334 (2014), we 

held: 

"Regardless of whether the State proved Soto acted as a principal or an aider and 

abettor, this case cannot be a multiple acts case because there was only one killing. Stated 

another way, none of the 'acts' Soto relies upon to support his multiple acts argument are 

factually and legally sufficient to satisfy all of the elements of first-degree premeditated 

murder." 

Likewise, while Sprague argues there were two possible ways he could have killed 

Kandi, there are not two possible incidents that could have been charged as premeditated 

first-degree murder because there was only one killing. Because the facts cannot, under 

any circumstances, give rise to "multiple counts of the charged crime," this is not a 

multiple acts case. Trujillo, 296 Kan. at 629; see Soto, 299 Kan. at 111. As such, it was 

not error to fail to give a unanimity instruction.
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2. The district court properly denied Sprague's motion for ineffective assistance of 

counsel.

Sprague filed a pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel prior 

to sentencing. At the same time, he filed a pro se motion for a new trial. The district court 

allowed Sprague an opportunity to argue the motions pro se during a discussion of 

posttrial motions and immediately before sentencing. Sprague argued primarily by 

reading his motions. The district court then ruled that Sprague's claim for ineffective 

assistance of counsel was essentially a complaint concerning trial strategy. The district 

court found that it could not "find any merit in the allegations that you have raised for the 

position that [counsel] was ineffective in her assistance in the defense of your case." The 

district court then denied the motion.

Sprague now argues the district court should have granted an evidentiary hearing 

based upon Sprague's claim that his counsel failed to present Sprague's daughters' police 

interviews at trial. Sprague argues this indicated a failure to investigate, which, in turn,

required an evidentiary hearing. The State first claims the motion was not timely and then 

argues that the claims Sprague raised in his motion were either conclusory or not 

supported by the record and the district court properly denied the motion. 

The State argues the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Sprague's motion for 

ineffective assistance of counsel. But posttrial claims for ineffective assistance of counsel 

are not jurisdictionally barred, though they may be procedurally barred. State v. Reed, 

302 Kan. 227, 235-36, 352 P.3d 530 (2015). The State's briefing on this point is sparse, 

simply mentioning Barker v. State, 297 Kan. 486, 303 P.3d 675 (2013) (window for 

filing K.S.A. 60-1507 motion opens when sentencing is final). When a litigant fails to 

adequately brief an issue it is deemed abandoned. See State v. Bowen, 299 Kan. 339, 355, 

323 P.3d 853 (2014). And because jurisdiction is not implicated, we will consider 
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Sprague's claim on appeal regarding his motion for ineffective assistance of counsel. See 

State v. Richard, 300 Kan. 715, 728, 333 P.3d 179 (2014).

The burden is on the movant to show a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

warrants an evidentiary hearing. "[T]he movant must make more than conclusory 

contentions and must state an evidentiary basis in support of the claims or an evidentiary 

basis must appear in the record." Swenson v. State, 284 Kan. 931, 938, 169 P.3d 298 

(2007). In determining whether that burden has been met, a district court has three 

options:

"First, the court may determine that the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively 

show that the movant is entitled to no relief and summarily deny the movant's motion. 

Second, the court may determine from the motion, files, and record that a substantial 

issue or issues are presented, requiring a full evidentiary hearing with the presence of the 

movant. Finally, the court may determine that a potentially substantial issue or issues of 

fact are raised in the motion, supported by the files and record, and hold a preliminary 

hearing after appointment of counsel to determine whether in fact the issues in the motion 

are substantial. In the event the court determines that the issue or issues are not 

substantial, the court may move to a final decision without the presence of the movant. If 

the issue or issues are substantial, involving events in which the movant participated, the 

court must proceed with a hearing in the presence of the movant." Trotter v. State, 288 

Kan. 112, 132, 200 P.3d 1236 (2009).

Sprague and the State both argue this matter should be treated as a summary denial

of the motion, and we agree. "The standard of review for the summary dismissal of 

K.S.A. 60-1507 motions is de novo, requiring an appellate court to determine whether the 

motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no 

relief." Trotter, 288 Kan. at 132.

Sprague presented five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his motion:
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"1. Defense [counsel] refused to act on the defendant[']s request, to exhibit the 

supporting evidence and witnesses to the court and jury in support of the defense prior to 

resting the defense. In this acting on her own will, and not of the defendants, without the 

defendant[']s approval!

"2. Defense [counsel] refused repeatedly all the requests made by the defendant 

to voice necessary objections to the court on the defendant[']s behalf. Throughout the 

course of the trial.

"3. Defense [counsel] refused to use court admitted evidence which 

contradict[ed] the testimony of a key [S]tate[']s witness during the defense cross 

examining. 

"4. Defense [counsel] made no attempts to have the defendant aided for the 

p[sych]ological breakdown the defendant has suffered under since the unplan[n]ed 

tragedy of July 23rd 2010. 

"5. Defendant suspects the defense [counsel], purposefully and intentionally 

refused to defend the defendant and misused defendant[']s trust in [counsel] in asking 

defendant not to testify though defendant voiced he wanted to and was prepared to. The 

defense [counsel] clearly acted on behalf of the county attorney[']s benefit for unknown 

personal reason."

On appeal, Sprague also highlights his oral argument to the district court that his counsel 

failed to introduce the police interview with his daughters. 

To show deficient performance of counsel, a criminal defendant must establish

"'"(1) counsel's performance was deficient, which means counsel made errors so serious 

that counsel's performance was less than that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and 

(2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires showing counsel's 
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errors were so serious they deprived defendant of a fair trial. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's 

performance in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be highly deferential. To 

show prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 

A court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before 

the judge or jury." [Citations omitted.]'" Robertson v. State, 288 Kan. 217, 225, 201 P.3d 

691 (2009) (quoting Haddock v. State, 282 Kan. 475, 512-13, 146 P.3d 187 [2006]). 

As stated earlier, the burden is on Sprague to establish counsel was ineffective. In 

order to meet this burden, he must do more than make conclusory remarks with no 

evidentiary support. See Trotter, 288 Kan. at 131-32. On appeal, Sprague attempts to 

reframe his claim as one that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether the 

evidence relating to Sprague's daughters was admissible. Sprague relies on cases in which 

counsel failed to investigate the possibility of interviewing child victims. See Mullins v. 

State, 30 Kan. App. 2d 711, 46 P.3d 1222, rev. denied 274 Kan. 1113 (2002). Sprague's 

claims before the district court, however, were not as he now characterizes them.

Moreover, Sprague failed to proffer any evidentiary basis that his counsel's performance 

was constitutionally deficient. Sprague's motion was insufficient to require an evidentiary 

hearing, and the district court did not err by denying it summarily. 

3. The prosecutor erred during closing arguments, but the error was harmless.

Sprague next argues the prosecutor committed two instances of misconduct during 

closing argument by using the word "preposterous" and by implying two witnesses had 

"no motive" when testifying. The State concedes the use of "preposterous" went outside 

the wide latitude allowed to prosecutors but contends the statement referring to "no 

motive" was allowable rebuttal. The State goes on to argue that even if the statements 

were improper, they did not prejudice Sprague and did not constitute reversible error.
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Our review of prosecutorial misconduct claims entails a two-step process:

"We first decide whether the comments were outside the wide latitude a prosecutor is 

allowed, e.g., in discussing the evidence. If so, there was misconduct. Second, if 

misconduct is found, we have said the court 'must determine whether the improper 

comments prejudiced the jury and denied the defendant a fair trial.' State v. Bridges, 297 

Kan. 989, 1012, 306 P.3d 244 (2013) (citing State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, 856, 281 

P.3d 1112 [2012]).

"For years we have considered several factors in analyzing this second step: (1) 

whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant; (2) whether it was motivated by 

prosecutorial ill will; and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct and 

overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds 

of jurors. No single factor controls the outcome of this inquiry. Bridges, 297 Kan. at 1012

(citing Marshall, 294 Kan. at 857)." State v. Akins, 298 Kan. 592, 599, 315 P.3d 868 

(2014).

Should we find error, we must determine whether the misconduct meets the dual 

standard of constitutional and statutory harmless error. Akins, 298 Kan. at 599.

Sprague claims two instances of misconduct occurred during closing arguments. 

First, when discussing Sprague's version of events, the prosecutor stated:

"Does it make sense to you, ladies and gentlemen, that if you accept the Defendant's 

statements to officers he is struggling with this lady that he wants to point out to the 

officers is much larger and stronger than him, she has her hands around his neck and he's 

just able to reach down, grab this pipe and hit her in the head with it. Does that make 

sense? Does the Defendant's story make sense in that regard that he had to defend himself 

in that fashion? Preposterous, ladies and gentlemen." (Emphasis added.) 
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The State concedes this statement was improper because a "prosecutor may not 

state his or her personal belief as to the reliability or credibility of testimony given at a 

criminal trial." State v. Brinklow, 288 Kan. 39, Syl. ¶ 6, 200 P.3d 1225 (2009). 

The second statement occurred during the State's rebuttal portion of closing 

argument:

"Because Kandi Sprague may have spent more time on the internet, and many people do, 

doesn't justify her death, that she may not have been the parent that some people may 

have wanted her to be in that timeframe, doesn't justify her death. Steven Peacock and 

Jennifer Helm, you are not asked to judge whether they are good people or bad people, 

whether you like them or don't like them. But I submit they don't have any motive in 

coming in here and testifying." (Emphasis added.)

We have consistently held that it is "improper for a prosecutor to attempt to bolster 

the credibility of the State's witnesses." State v. Donaldson, 279 Kan. 694, 708, 112 P.3d 

99 (2005). In Donaldson, the State improperly bolstered the testimony of a detective by 

stating he received no additional pay for testifying as he did and if he was making 

testimony up he could ruin his career and two other trials. In contrast, we have also stated 

it was not misconduct for the prosecution to say:

"'No police officer benefits from this investigation, no police officers benefit 

from concocting stories and making Mr. McReynolds agree to those stories. There's only 

one person in the courtroom right now who benefits from coming into this room, 

concocting a story and testifying under oath about that and you know who that person 

is.'" State v. McReynolds, 288 Kan. 318, 325, 202 P.3d 658 (2009).

The latitude given to the State includes "explaining to juries what they should look 

for in assessing witness credibility, especially when the defense has attacked the 

credibility of the State's witnesses." McReynolds, 288 Kan. at 325. Since McReynolds, 
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however, we have clarified that "a prosecutor commits misconduct by making an 

improper argument, even if the improper argument is made in response to arguments or 

statements by defense counsel. The open-the-door rule does not insulate a prosecutor 

from a finding of misconduct." State v. Marshall, 294 Kan. 850, 860, 281 P.3d 1112 

(2012); see also State v. Stimec, 297 Kan. 126, 130, 298 P.3d 354 (2013) ("In short, 

defendants do not open the door to prosecutorial misconduct.").

Here, whether or not the State was improperly bolstering the credibility of its 

witnesses, the prosecutor was commenting on facts outside of the evidence and was 

injecting her personal opinion regarding witnesses' motives. This was improper. See State 

v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, 848, 257 P.3d 272 (2011) (a prosecutor cannot comment on facts 

outside the evidence); Brinklow, 288 Kan. 39, Syl. ¶ 6.

Having found two instances of prosecutorial error during closing arguments, we 

must next look to the factors indicating prejudice: "(1) whether the misconduct was gross 

and flagrant; (2) whether it was motivated by prosecutorial ill will; and (3) whether the 

evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely 

have had little weight in the minds of jurors." Akins, 298 Kan. at 599. In applying this 

analysis, no single factor controls the outcome of the inquiry. 298 Kan. at 599.

"In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct was gross and flagrant, among 

the things an appellate court considers are whether the comments were repeated, 

emphasized improper points, were planned or calculated, or violated well-established or 

unequivocal rules." Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, Syl. ¶ 18. The record does not indicate the 

statements of the prosecution were repeated, planned, or emphasized. To the contrary, 

they are isolated and short. There is nothing to indicate a deliberate attempt to emphasize 

anything improper. We hold the comments do not qualify as gross and flagrant.
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"In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct was motivated by ill will, 

among the things an appellate court considers are whether the conduct was deliberate, 

repeated, or in apparent indifference to a court's ruling." Bridges, 297 Kan. 989, Syl. ¶ 19. 

Here, the prosecutor's errors do not appear deliberate, repeated, or in disregard of a court 

ruling. We hold the comments were not the product of ill will.

Finally we look to "whether the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming 

nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of 

jurors."Akins, 298 Kan. at 599. "Before the third factor can ever override the first two 

factors, an appellate court must be able to say that the harmlessness tests of both K.S.A. 

60-261 and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), 

have been met." Akins, 298 Kan. 592, Syl. ¶ 2. In analyzing both constitutional and 

nonconstitutional error, an appellate court need only address the higher standard of 

constitutional error. 298 Kan. 592, Syl. ¶ 3. The constitutional standard for harmless error 

provides:

"[T]he error may be declared harmless where the party benefitting from the error proves 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the 

outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., where there is no reasonable 

possibility that the error contributed to the verdict." State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 

256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012).

Here, the evidence was overwhelming. Sprague confessed to police that after 

hitting Kandi in the head he strangled her with a piece of rope while she was still alive. 

The State's medical expert testified that given the nature of the fracture's in Kandi's skull, 

she was likely still alive—and could have survived for more than a day if not fully 

recovered—after she was hit on the head. Of the prosecutor's two improper statements, 

the second went solely to the statements of witnesses that had nothing to do with the 

actual evidence of the killing. The State's single utterance of "preposterous," while 
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improper, was in the middle of argument tied to facts relating to whether Sprague could 

have reached around Kandi's body and struck her with sufficient blunt force to cause the 

injuries she sustained. The State's argument—though perhaps not its characterization—

was supported by testimony from the State's medical expert. As such, we have no 

difficulty concluding that there is no reasonable possibility that the improper statements 

affected the outcome of the trial.

4. Sprague was not convicted in violation of the corpus delicti rule.

Sprague argues in his pro se appellate brief that his statements to the police that he 

strangled his wife were uncorroborated extrajudicial statements and that their admission 

into evidence violated the corpus delicti rule. We have recently given the Kansas corpus 

delicti rule extensive treatment and clarified its application. See State v. Dern, 302 Kan. 

___, ___ P.3d ___ (No. 106,406, filed November 25, 2015). In Sprague's case, we need 

not look beyond what we described in Dern as the "'formal'" application of the rule. 302 

Kan. at ___, slip op. at 23. "In a homicide case, the corpus delicti is the body or substance 

of the crime which consists of the killing of the decedent by some criminal agency, and is 

established by proof of the two facts, that one person was killed, and that another person 

killed him [or her]." State v. Doyle, 201 Kan. 469, Syl. ¶ 1, 441 P.2d 846 (1968). The 

formal corpus delicti rule requires the State to make a prima facie showing of the corpus 

delicti independent of any extrajudicial admissions or confessions of a defendant. Dern, 

302 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 23-24. The evidentiary threshold for making the required 

prima facie showing is slight and may consist entirely of circumstantial evidence. See 

302 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 24, 35.

Here, the State far exceeded the evidentiary threshold necessary to establish the 

corpus delicti of the charged crime—the murder of Kandi Sprague. Law enforcement 

found her body in a shallow grave in the floor of a Morton building, and the subsequent 
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medical examination indicated that she had suffered significant head injuries caused by 

blunt force trauma to the back of her skull. Sprague was not convicted in violation of the 

corpus delicti rule.

5. The district court did not err when it denied Sprague's motion for acquittal.

Sprague next argues in his pro se appellate brief that the district court erred when 

it denied Sprague's motion for acquittal because the State failed to present sufficient 

evidence to convict him of first-degree premeditated murder. K.S.A. 22-3419 permits a 

district court to enter a judgment of acquittal if, at the close of evidence, there is 

insufficient evidence to support a charged crime. In reviewing any ruling on such a 

motion, we examine whether sufficient evidence supports the conviction. State v. Ta, 296 

Kan. 230, 236, 290 P.3d 652 (2012). "When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged 

in a criminal case, this court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to 

determine whether a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt." State v. Brooks, 298 Kan. 672, 688, 317 P.3d 54 (2014). 

Murder in the first degree requires the killing of a human being committed 

"[i]ntentionally and with premeditation." K.S.A. 21-3401. The State presented ample 

evidence to support such a conviction. Investigators found Kandi's body buried in the 

floor of Sprague's Morton building. Medical testimony indicated she had two fractures on 

her skull consistent with being struck. Sprague confessed he struck Kandi when she 

attacked him and he then choked her to death. Such evidence, taken in a light most 

favorable to the State, is sufficient for a rational factfinder to find Sprague guilty of 

premeditated first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
19

6. Sprague's argument on appeal concerning admission of gruesome images into 

evidence was not properly preserved for our review.

Sprague's pro se appellate brief goes on to argue that the district court erred in 

refusing to suppress gruesome images. Sprague asserts a motion to suppress these photos 

was filed. Sprague, however, provides no citation to the record to show that a motion to 

suppress was actually filed or any citation to a timely objection to the admission of such 

evidence. The State contends that no motion to suppress was filed and no objection was

made to the images. The State's position is consistent with our review of the record. Prior 

to trial, Sprague filed a motion in limine, requesting the suppression of gruesome images. 

In the hearing on that motion, however, it was indicated the ruling would be delayed so 

defense counsel could come to an agreement with the State over the images. The district 

court then took the issue under advisement. There was no contemporaneous objection at 

trial to the admission of any images. K.S.A. 60-404 requires a timely and specific 

objection to the admission of evidence at a trial in order to preserve issues arising from 

that admission for appeal. This claim on appeal was not preserved for our review and is 

therefore dismissed. 

7. The district court did not err when it denied Sprague's motion to suppress the results 

of a search of Sprague's outbuilding.

Sprague's final pro se appellate argument is that the district court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress the results of law enforcement's search of his Morton building.

Sprague's basic claim is that the search was warrantless because the Morton building was 

outside the scope of the search warrant. The State contends this claim was not preserved 

by a contemporaneous objection. Contrary to the State's assertion, however, Sprague did 

request and was granted a continuing objection regarding his motion to suppress prior to 

the admission of evidence regarding the discovery of Kandi's body. 
20

On August 1, 2010, the district court issued a search warrant for items related to 

Kandi's disappearance, including a human body. The warrant stated, after a list of those 

items:

"Which items are contraband, or are fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of such offense 

and are located in or upon the following described persons, places, thing or means of 

conveyance, to wit:

"The home located at 2660 East Shipton Road, located in Saline County, Kansas. The 

home is a gray in color with brick one story ranch style home with a walk out basement 

in the back yard. It has white trim with a two car open drive way that leads to the walk 

out basement. The numbers of 2660 are painted on a gray in color mail box at the 

entrance to the driveway of E. Shipton Road." 

Upon the second day of searching the premises at that address, investigator 

Michael Rogers discovered Kandi's body buried in the dirt floor of a Morton building on 

the lot. Sprague filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the discovery of Kandi's body,

arguing that the search warrant did not support the search of the Morton building as the 

warrant specified the "home" at the location. The district court held an evidentiary 

hearing on the matter. 

At that hearing, Rogers described the property as a plot of approximately 2 acres 

with one fence stretching north and south along the east property line and another 

stretching east and west along the south property line. Rogers described the Morton 

building itself as approximately 40 feet wide by 50 feet long. Rogers estimated the 

distance between the Morton building and the house was "[t]hirty, thirty-five yards, 

something like that, maybe more." The buildings were not separated from one another by 

a fence. 
21

At the end of the hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress. The 

district court ruled that "home" as used in the warrant referred to "the large sense of the 

curtilage of the home." The district court noted that with a rural or suburban home such 

as this "the home is the homestead, not simply the building used as a residence, but the 

entire home and all of the things associated with that residence in this setting." As such, 

the district court ruled that the premises were adequately described in the warrant by the 

street number and location and the Morton building was included. 

"When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, an appellate court determines 

whether the factual underpinnings of the district judge's decision are supported by 

substantial competent evidence. The ultimate legal conclusion to be drawn from those 

facts raises a question of law requiring application of a de novo standard. An appellate 

court does not weigh evidence to find facts." State v. Ransom, 289 Kan. 373, Syl. ¶ 1, 212 

P.3d 203 (2009).

Sprague asserts the investigating officers did not have a search warrant for the 

Morton building, which he refers to as his auto repair business. The actual question is 

whether the search warrant's location description was adequate in scope to include the 

Morton building. We hold that it was.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that "no 

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 

"The scope of Section 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights is identical to that of 

the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. . . .

"To satisfy the specificity requirement of the constitutions the search warrant 

must describe the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity to permit the 
22

executing officer to locate the same from the face of the warrant. [Citations omitted.]"

State v. LeFort, 248 Kan. 332, 334-35, 806 P.2d 986 (1991).

See also Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S. Ct. 414, 69 L. Ed. 757 (1925) 

("It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with 

reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended."). "[W]arrants and their 

supporting affidavits are interpreted in a common sense, rather than a hypertechnical, 

fashion. To do otherwise would tend to discourage police officers from submitting their 

evidence to a judicial officer before acting." LeFort, 248 Kan. at 335-36.

This court has historically held that "the term 'premises' as used in the warrant 

included all property necessarily a part of and appearing so inseparable as to be 

considered a portion thereof." State v. McClelland, 215 Kan. 81, 84, 523 P.2d 357 (1974). 

While the warrant here uses the term "home" rather than premises, the warrant's inclusion 

of the address of the premises and description of areas outside the home such as the 

driveway and the mailbox are sufficient to authorize a search of the premises. The district 

court's ruling that Sprague's Morton building was sufficiently "associated with [Sprague's 

home] in this setting" to permit the search was both supported by substantial competent 

evidence and legally correct. Sprague's argument to the contrary would require that we 

read the warrant in a hypertechical fashion rather than with an eye towards a common 

sense and ordinary interpretation. The district court did not err in denying Sprague's 

motion to suppress.

8. Sprague was not denied a fair trial due to cumulative error.

Sprague contends cumulative error denied him a fair trial. The test for cumulative 

error is "'whether the totality of circumstances substantially prejudiced the defendant and 

denied the defendant a fair trial. No prejudicial error may be found upon this cumulative 

effect rule, however, if the evidence is overwhelming against the defendant.'" State v. 
23

Edwards, 291 Kan. 532, 553, 243 P.3d 683 (2010) (quoting State v. Ellmaker, 289 Kan. 

1132, Syl. ¶ 12, 221 P.3d 1105 [2009]). "The presence of one error is obviously 

insufficient to accumulate." State v. Houston, 289 Kan. 252, 277, 213 P.3d 728 (2009). 

Here we have found only two instances of prosecutorial error which occurred during 

closing arguments, both of which we have deemed harmless. Considered together, these 

errors are likewise harmless. We find no cumulative error.

9. The sentencing scheme under which Sprague was sentenced to a hard 50 term of 

imprisonment is unconstitutional.

Finally, Sprague appeals the imposition of a hard 50 term of imprisonment.

Following Sprague's sentencing, we have determined that the statutory scheme under 

which Sprague was sentenced is unconstitutional. In State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, Syl. ¶ 9, 

322 P.3d 334 (2014), we held:

"Kansas' statutory procedure for imposing a hard 50 sentence as provided in 

K.S.A. 21-4635 violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as 

interpreted in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 2160-63, 

186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), because it permits a judge to find by a preponderance of the 

evidence the existence of one or more aggravating factors necessary to impose an 

increased mandatory minimum sentence, rather than requiring a jury to find the existence 

of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt."

As such, Sprague's hard 50 sentence was unconstitutionally imposed and must be 

vacated, and the case is remanded to the district court for resentencing. Accordingly, the 

question of whether the State presented sufficient evidence for the district court to 

determine sufficient aggravating factors existed is now moot. See State v. Roeder, 300 

Kan. 901, 942, 336 P.3d 831 (2014). In Roeder, we concluded:
24

"Moreover, the retroactive provision speaks to applying the new statute where a 

sentence under the old statute has been 'vacated for any reason other than sufficiency of 

the evidence as to all aggravating circumstances.' (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 

21-6620(e). The Sixth Amendment violation that requires us to vacate Roeder's hard 50 

sentence would fit within the category of 'any reason other than sufficiency of the 

evidence.' In other words, the plain language of the provision purports to apply the new 

sentencing scheme to this case because the old sentence is being vacated for a reason 

other than the insufficiency of the aggravating circumstances evidence. Whether the 

sentence might also have been subject to being vacated based upon an insufficiency of 

the evidence if the sentencing scheme had not been found unconstitutional is an academic 

question we need not answer." 300 Kan. at 942-43.

The State encourages this court to address whether the new hard 50 statute, K.S.A. 

2013 Supp. 21-6620, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when retroactively applied under 

subsection (f). The State, however, acknowledges the issue is "arguably" not ripe for 

review. We have previously found the issue unripe and refrained from issuing an 

advisory opinion regarding the point, and we do so again today. See Soto, 299 Kan. at 

129. 

Sprague's conviction is affirmed. His sentence is vacated, and this matter is 

remanded to the district court for resentencing.