UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

 THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

Alcoa Community Federal Credit Union, on behalf of 

itself and all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FAIR ISAAC CORPORATION, 

Defendant. 

Civil Action No. __________ 

 CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 

Plaintiff brings this class action to challenge an anticompetitive scheme by defendant Fair 

Isaac Corporation (“Fair Isaac”) to enhance and maintain Fair Isaac’s monopoly power in the 

U.S. market for business-to-business credit scores (“B2B Credit Scores”) in violation of the 

antitrust laws of the United States. Plaintiff purchased B2B Credit Scores directly from Fair 

Isaac or its co-conspirator agents, during the Class Period (defined below). Plaintiff brings this 

case on behalf of itself and a class of similarly situated direct purchasers of B2B Credit Scores, 

to recover overcharges resulting from the anticompetitive conduct alleged herein. 

INTRODUCTION 

1. Credit scores are derived from the application of algorithms to credit histories and 

are used for the purpose of assessing creditworthiness. There are two distinct domestic markets 

for credit scores: (1) the market for the sale of credit scores to lenders, financial institutions, and 

other businesses (the “B2B Credit Score Market”); and (2) the market for the sale of credit scores 

to consumers to monitor their own credit records (the “business-to-consumer” or “B2C Credit 

Score Market”). 

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2. Fair Isaac’s FICO Credit Scores (“FICO Scores”) have dominated the B2B Credit 

Score Market for decades. Fair Isaac stated in 2017 that it has “maintained a 90-plus percent 

market share for at least 13 years.” Fair Isaac executives have stated that their FICO Scores are 

“the 800-pound gorilla” and are “deeply embedded in the system in North America.” Fair Isaac 

advertises that its FICO Scores are used for 90% of all lending decisions in the United States. 

3. Fair Isaac has enjoyed monopoly power (i.e., the power to control price or exclude 

competition) in the United States B2B Credit Score Market since at least 2006. Fair Isaac has 

unlawfully maintained its monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score Market through 

anticompetitive and exclusionary agreements with TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax. 

TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax are the three dominant credit bureaus (collectively, the 

“Credit Bureaus”) in the U.S. They compile and sell information regarding consumer credit and 

on behalf of Fair Isaac, distribute to lenders, financial institutions, and other businesses Fair 

Isaac’s FICO Scores. The Credit Bureaus also distribute or sell competing B2B Credit Scores. 

Their ability to fairly and effectively do so, however, has been substantially impeded by 

anticompetitive contract terms imposed upon them by Fair Isaac. These anticompetitive contract 

provisions have allowed Fair Isaac to obtain or maintain its monopoly power over the U.S. B2B 

Credit Score Market. 

4. More specifically, the Credit Bureaus have contracted with Fair Isaac in ways that 

restrain the Credit Bureaus’ ability to develop or distribute competitive Credit Scores; prohibit 

the Credit Bureaus from individually negotiating royalty rates for access to FICO Scores; 

require that customers, such as Plaintiff, be charged discriminatory and prohibitively high Fair 

Isaac royalty rates if the customer also acquires a competing Credit Score; and also requires that 

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an increased royalty rate be paid by the Credit Bureaus. The Credit Bureaus have agreed with 

Fair Isaac to these restraints. 

5. The restraints set forth above were designed to impair, and have in fact impaired, 

Fair Isaac’s competition in the U.S. These anticompetitive and exclusionary contract terms have 

impeded the ability of all purchasers to obtain B2B Credit Scores from Fair Isaac’s competitors 

because they require the Credit Bureaus and the customer to incur substantial penalties if the 

Credit Bureau distributes to customers the B2B Credit Scores of Fair Isaac’s competitors. 

6. Fair Isaac has obtained and maintained its monopoly power by engaging in 

anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct including entering into the anticompetitive and 

exclusionary contract terms referenced above. Fair Isaac has suppressed competition, stymied 

innovation, and limited access to credit for millions of Americans – all in violation of Sections 1 

and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), as well as numerous state antitrust and unfair trade 

practices laws. 

7. In 2006, VantageScore Solutions, LLC (“VantageScore”) launched a competitive 

Credit Score it called VantageScore. VantageScore was reliable, competitively priced, and highly 

predictive. Moreover, VantageScore has access to the Credit Bureaus’ consumer data, which far 

exceeds the consumer data available to Fair Isaac. As a result, VantageScore maintains Credit 

Scores for 30 million domestic consumers who do not have FICO scores. VantageScore’s 

product was more widely disseminated, millions of creditworthy consumers who now have 

restrained access to credit would have the opportunity to apply for mortgages, loans, or other 

forms of credit, and at a lower cost. 

8. Fair Isaac responded to VantageScore’s entry into the B2B Credit Score Market by 

engaging in anticompetitive conduct that has persisted for over more than a decade. In particular, 

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Fair Isaac restrained the Credit Bureaus’ ability to distribute VantageScore, and publicly and 

falsely disparaged VantageScore’s viability and reliability, so as to discourage B2B Credit Score 

consumers from purchasing VantageScore. 

9. Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct has prevented the sales 

growth and market penetration that VantageScore would have achieved through competition on 

the merits and discouraged whatever other competition would have emerged. As a result, Fair 

Isaac has been able to significantly raise the price that customers, such as the Plaintiff, paid for 

FICO scores. But for Fair Isaac’s suppression of competition and exclusionary contracts with 

the Credit Bureaus, VantageScore or another credit scoring system would have earned 

substantial market share, which would have resulted in lower prices for B2B Credit Scores for 

Plaintiff and members of the Class. 

10. On March 15, 2020, Fair Isaac disclosed that the Antitrust Division of the United 

States Department of Justice had opened an investigation based at least in part on the 

exclusionary conduct alleged herein.1

 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

11. This action arises under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2) 

and section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15(a)) and seeks to recover treble damages, costs 

of suit, and reasonable attorneys’ fees for the injuries sustained by Plaintiff and members of the 

Class (defined below) resulting from Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive conduct. The Court has 

subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), 1407, and 15 U.S.C. § 15. 

1 See Press Release, Fair Isaac Corporation, FICO Statement Regarding Antitrust Investigation, 

https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/fico-statement-regarding-antitrust-investigation-301024452.html (Mar. 

15, 2020). 

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12. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a), 22 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 

1391(b), (c), and (d) because during the Class Period, the Defendant resided, transacted 

business, was found, or had agents in this District, and a substantial portion of the alleged 

activity affected interstate trade and commerce discussed below has been carried out in this 

District. 

13. During the Class Period, Defendant sold B2B Credit Scores in a continuous and 

uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce, including in this District. Defendant’s conduct had 

direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects on interstate commerce in the United 

States, including in this District. 

14. This Court has in personam jurisdiction over Defendant because it, either directly 

or through the ownership and/or control of its subsidiaries, inter alia: (a) transacted business 

throughout the United States, including in this District; (b) participated in the sale of B2B Credit 

Scores throughout the United States, including in this District; (c) had and maintained 

substantial aggregate contacts with the United States as a whole, including in this District; or (d) 

was engaged in an illegal price-fixing conspiracy or abuse of its monopoly power that was 

directed at, and had a direct, substantial, reasonably foreseeable and intended effect of causing 

injury to, the business or property of persons and entities residing in, located in, or doing 

business throughout the United States, including in this District. Defendant also conducts 

business throughout the United States, including in this District, and has purposefully availed 

itself of the laws of the United States. 

15. By reason of the unlawful activities alleged herein, Defendant substantially affected 

commerce throughout the United States, causing injury to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 

Defendant, directly and through its agents, engaged in activities affecting all states, to restrict 

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output and fix, raise, maintain and/or stabilize prices in the United States for B2B Credit Scores, 

which unreasonably restrained trade and adversely affected the market for B2B Credit Scores. 

16. Defendant’s unlawful conduct described herein adversely affected persons and 

entities in the United States who directly purchased B2B Credit Scores sold by Defendant, 

including Plaintiff and the members of the Class. 

THE PARTIES 

17. Plaintiff Alcoa Community Federal Credit Union is a Federal Credit Union with its 

principal place of business in Benton, Arkansas. Plaintiff makes loans and other credit-related 

facilities available to consumers. During the Class Period, Plaintiff directly purchased B2B 

Credit Scores from Defendant through a Credit Bureau. Plaintiff has been injured in its business 

or property as a proximate result of the unlawful conduct alleged herein. 

18. Defendant Fair Isaac Corporation is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place 

of business in San Jose, California. 

CREDIT BUREAUS 

19. Fair Isaac uses the Credit Bureaus to distribute its B2B Credit Scores to its 

customers. Fair Isaac’s relationship with B2B Purchasers is, therefore, contractually interrelated 

with its relationships with the Credit Bureaus. 

20. When a B2B Purchaser requires a Credit Score, it purchases a report from a Credit 

Bureau, and the Credit Score jointly from Fair Isaac, distributed by the Credit Bureau. Although 

a single transaction may encompass both purchases, the sale of the Fair Isaac Credit Scores to 

B2B Purchasers is made by Fair Isaac. In the alternative, the sale of the Fair Isaac Credit Scores 

is made jointly by both the Credit Bureau and Fair Isaac. 

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21. B2B Purchasers’ contracts for FICO Scores are referenced as Credit Scoring 

Services Agreements (“CSSAs”). CSSAs provide for both the method of payment and fee model 

for the delivery of Credit Score services. They also establish the relationship between Fair Isaac 

and the B2B Purchasers. 

22. For example, the CSSA between Plaintiff and its Credit Bureau, details performance 

due between Plaintiff and Fair Isaac. Plaintiff acknowledges that the FICO Scores are proprietary 

and the intellectual property of Fair Isaac, agrees not to reverse engineer the FICO Scores or 

Models, and agrees only to use them in the manner specifically permitted under the agreement, 

including requiring Plaintiff to explicitly obtain the approval of Fair Isaac for certain uses of the 

FICO Scores. Fair Isaac, in return, grants Plaintiff the limited license for the use of the FICO 

Scores, and issues representations and warranties that the scores are statistically sound and 

empirically derived. Finally, Plaintiff and its Credit Bureau explicitly agree that Fair Isaac has 

unconditional enforceable rights, which survive any termination of the agreement. 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 

Credit Scores 

23. Credit Scores are typically three-digit numbers that are designed to assess credit 

risk. Higher scores generally indicate that a consumer poses less credit risk. Credit Scores are 

produced using credit scoring systems that apply a credit scoring algorithm to a consumer credit 

report. Credit Scores are usually accompanied by “reason codes,” which inform the lender about 

the reasons that contributed most significantly to reducing a particular consumer’s Credit Score. 

24. Credit Scores are the most widely used indicators of consumers’ creditworthiness in 

the United States. Lenders, financial institutions, and other businesses rely on Credit Scores to 

decide whether and on what terms to extend credit to consumers. Consumers, in contrast, rely on 

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Credit Scores to determine whether they will be able to get a mortgage, credit card, auto loan, or 

other credit product and the rate they will pay. 

25. The Credit Bureaus collect and supply aggregated consumer credit data in the form 

of consumer reports. The Credit Bureaus continuously gather credit and financial data about 

consumers from creditors, governmental entities, public records, collection agencies, and other 

third parties. This information is then compiled into a “credit file.” The Credit Bureaus sell credit 

reports, which include information gathered from a consumer’s credit file, to businesses and 

consumers. 

26. While Credit Scores are sometimes sold together with credit reports, credit reports 

are different from Credit Scores and can be sold independently. A credit report is a statement that 

has detailed information about a consumer’s credit activity and current credit situation. A 

consumer’s credit report might, for example, include information about that consumer’s history 

of mortgage payments, credit card balances, credit card payments, and credit inquiries. A Credit 

Score takes the detailed information in a credit report and turns it into a single three-digit 

number. 

Credit Score Markets 

27. There are two distinct markets for Credit Scores in the United States: (1) the B2B 

Credit Score Market and (2) the B2C Credit Score Market. B2B and B2C Credit Scores are 

priced, purchased, and used very differently and serve very different purposes. The lenders, 

financial institutions, and other businesses in the B2B Credit Score Market that purchase and use 

Credit Scores to assess creditworthiness and make decisions about whether and on what terms to 

extend credit or otherwise take on risk do not consider credit reports, insurance scores, or any 

other information about borrowers, to be a substitute for Credit Scores. 

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28. Consumers in the B2C Credit Score Market purchase their own Credit Scores to 

better understand their own creditworthiness and how they likely will be viewed by potential 

lenders. 

29. The United States is the relevant geographic market in which B2B Credit Scores 

are provided. The restraints on competition in the B2B Credit Score Market contained in Fair 

Isaac’s contracts relate to the provision of B2B Credit Scores to businesses throughout the 

United States. 

30. Purchasers in the B2B Credit Score Market are comprised of lenders, financial 

institutions, and other businesses that purchase B2B Credit Scores in order to make risk 

management decisions (“B2B Purchasers”). Lenders, financial institutions, and other businesses 

that purchase Credit Reports from Defendant and/or the Credit Bureaus generally purchase 

Credit Scores in order to determine the credit-worthiness and identity of qualified borrowers to 

whom a preapproved credit offer will be extended (“pre-screening”), make lending decisions 

(“lending”), or review the risk associated with existing borrowers for purposes such as extending 

additional credit or changing other account terms (“account management”). 

31. Customers in the B2C Credit Score Market, in contrast, purchase Credit Scores in 

order to manage their credit, protect their identity, or assess their likelihood of obtaining credit. 

Today, American consumers have signed up for over 160 million credit monitoring or identity 

protection accounts from businesses such as Capital One, Credit Karma, and LifeLock. Many of 

those accounts include access to the consumer’s own Credit Score. 

32. The credit risk scoring industry, industry analysts, policy analysts, and investors 

recognize the B2B Credit Score Market as distinct from the B2C Credit Score Market. Fair Isaac 

also regularly acknowledges that the B2B Credit Score Market is distinct from the B2C Credit 

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Score Market. For example, in its 2019 Form 10-K, Fair Isaac distinguished between its 

“business- to-business scoring solutions and services” and “business-to-consumer scoring 

solutions and services including myFICO solutions for consumers.” 

33. The B2B Credit Score Market is characterized by significant barriers to entry. B2B 

Purchasers encounter significant “switching costs” if they adopt a new Credit Score that has 

different score-to-risk relationships or that uses different reason codes – regardless of whether it 

is an updated version of the score they already use or an entirely new brand of Credit Score 

(unlike consumers in the B2C Credit Score Market). These switching costs arise because 

employees have to be trained in the properties and characteristics of a new score; B2B 

Purchasers must ensure that the new score will be adequately predictive of the creditworthiness 

of their own customer base; B2B Purchasers often conduct extensive, costly, and timeconsuming validation tests to determine whether the new score is cost-effective; and B2B 

Purchasers may need to invest in updating their internal systems to ensure technical 

compatibility between those systems and a new score. 

34. Network effects also characterize the B2B Credit Score Market. For example, in the 

mortgage and auto loan industries the consistent use of particular Credit Scores with similar 

score-to-risk relationships and reason codes facilitates the bundling of large groups of mortgage 

and auto loans from different originators into securities that can be sold to investors. Because of 

the consistent use of a single type of Credit Score, marketing materials for these securities can 

include data on the average and stratified Credit Scores of the borrowers associated with the 

underlying loans. 

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Fair Isaac’s Monopoly Power 

35. Fair Isaac has maintained monopoly power over the B2B Credit Score Market in the 

United States for roughly three decades, largely through the unlawfully achieved dominance of 

its FICO product line, which includes many different types of FICO Scores. Introduced in the 

1980s, Fair Isaac’s “FICO Classic” Credit Scores are the best known and most widely used B2B 

Credit Scores in the United States. FICO Classic applies an algorithm to each Credit Bureau’s 

data and generates a score between 300 and 850 that purports to be an indicator of the 

individual’s credit risk. It also generates a set of “reason codes” that explain the reasons the 

consumer has not been assigned the maximum score. 

36. Fair Isaac advertises its monopoly share of the B2B Credit Score Market. On its 

website, Fair Isaac advertises: 10 billion FICO Scores are sold each year, which is four times the 

number of hamburgers that McDonald’s sells worldwide each year; 27.4 million FICO Scores 

are sold every day, which is over twice the number of cups of coffee Starbucks sells worldwide 

in a day; and 90% of all lending decisions in the United States rely on FICO Scores. 

37. Similarly, in its 2019 Form 10-K, Fair Isaac described its “FICO Scores” as “the 

standard measure in the U.S. of consumer credit risk” and reported that “FICO Scores are used . . 

. by nearly all of the major banks, credit card organizations, mortgage lenders, and auto loan 

originators.” 

38. Fair Isaac representatives have described Fair Isaac’s FICO score as “the 800- 

pound gorilla” in the market for B2B Credit Scores and bragged about Fair Isaac’s 90% market 

share. For example, in November 2017, at the JPMorgan Ultimate Services Investor Conference, 

Fair Isaac’s CFO and Executive Vice President, Michael Pung, stated that Fair Isaac’s FICO 

Scores are: 

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 The “most widely used credit scoring system here in the U.S.”; 

 Used by “[v]irtually every major lender in the U.S.”; and that 

 Fair Isaac has “maintained a 90-plus percent market share for at least . . . 13 

years.” 

39. Fair Isaac representatives have also recognized that FICO Scores have benefited 

from the network effects created by the widespread use of FICO Scores in many industries. For 

example, in November 2011, then-CEO of Fair Isaac, Mark Greene, explained that the “network 

effect” of “FICO Scores . . . being sort of the standard language” and “having everybody . . . 

standardize on a FICO Score, that’s magic.” 

40. Fair Isaac’s monopoly position in the B2B Credit Score Market for Credit Scores 

has given it the power to control prices. Indeed, Fair Isaac’s CEO, Will Lansing, has noted that 

in the B2B Credit Score Market Fair Isaac has “quite a bit of discretion in whether we want our 

margins to be higher or lower or where they are.” Fair Isaac’s monopoly position has also given 

it the power to exclude competition from competitors, such as VantageScore. 

Fair Isaac’s Anticompetitive and Exclusionary Conduct 

41. In March 2006, VantageScore introduced the VantageScore Credit Score and credit 

scoring system. VantageScore is a competitor to FICO Scores in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

42. From the time it was first released in 2006, VantageScore scored millions more 

consumers than the FICO scoring systems. Whereas Fair Isaac’s FICO scoring systems would 

not generate a score if a consumer had not used credit in more than six months or if a credit 

account was fewer than six months old, VantageScore calculated scores for consumers that had 

not used credit for up to two years. It also reached more consumers by using utility and 

telecommunications payment histories when reported to the Credit Bureaus. 

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43. Today, VantageScore scores 30 million more Americans than traditional FICO 

scoring systems. Fair Isaac’s outdated FICO Classic credit scoring systems – which are still used 

by many lenders – exclude many creditworthy Americans that VantageScore can reliably score. 

About one-quarter of American adults – some 65 million people – do not have a traditional FICO 

score. VantageScore is capable of reducing the number of adults without a Credit Score by 

almost half. Ten million of those newly scored individuals are “prime” borrowers that should be 

attractive to traditional lenders. 

44. Without a Credit Score, it is difficult or impossible to apply for or successfully 

obtain a mortgage, car loan, or reasonable interest rates on personal lines of credit. Not having a 

Credit Score can also have drastic effects outside of the credit market. For example, Credit 

Scores are increasingly used by landlords to screen potential tenants. 

45. Those excluded by Fair Isaac’s traditional FICO scoring systems – who face an 

increased risk of being denied access to credit in the form of credit cards, auto and home loans, 

and apartment housing – include disproportionate numbers of low-income and minority 

consumers. 

46. Indeed, one advocacy group focused on making it possible for people with limited 

incomes, especially people of color, to achieve financial security has observed: “Black and 

Hispanic individuals are . . . significantly more likely than white individuals to be credit 

invisible” – meaning that they have “no established credit history,” are “unscored,” and “lack[] 

sufficient or recent enough credit history to be given a [FICO] Credit Score.” VantageScore 

calculates a score for 9.5 million Hispanic and Black consumers who do not have a FICO score, 

including 2.7 million minority consumers who should be considered “prime” borrowers. 

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47. Despite the potential advantages of using VantageScore, Fair Isaac continues to 

maintain its monopoly and monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score Market. In February 2013, 

at a Morgan Stanley Conference, Fair Isaac’s CEO, Will Lansing, explained that despite the 

existence of VantageScore, “there [is] not that much competition around our [B2B] scores 

business” because “FICO scores are very much part of the fabric of the banking industry” and 

“really deeply imbedded.” 

48. Fair Isaac has used its monopoly power to coordinate a multi-faceted campaign to 

prevent and eliminate competition from VantageScore and/or other competitors. Fair Isaac has 

been explicit that this is its goal. In April 2015, Will Lansing informed investors on a quarterly 

earnings conference call that Fair Isaac’s strategic goal was to ensure that “the entire industry 

adopts FICO scores instead of [other] scores.” To achieve this goal, Fair Isaac has enlisted the 

Credit Bureaus to agree to anticompetitive contract terms that: prevent them from developing or 

selling alternative Credit Scores that could be seamlessly integrated into many lenders’ systems 

or used interchangeably with FICO Scores; prevent them from competing with each other to 

negotiate better terms from FICO; and create a pricing scheme that effectively forecloses B2B 

Purchasers from choosing to use FICO Scores in their lending decisions at the same time as 

providing customers with a competing Credit Score, including VantageScore. Fair Isaac also has 

waged a media campaign against VantageScore that makes false and misleading statements 

about the quality and reliability of VantageScore’s Credit Score product. By its anticompetitive 

and exclusionary conduct, Fair Isaac has injured competition in the B2B Credit Score Market, 

increased prices for Plaintiff and the Class, and limited access to credit for millions of 

consumers. 

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Exclusion of Other Credit Scores 

49. Fair Isaac has imposed a similar or identical No Equivalent Products clause on each 

of the Credit Bureaus. By imposing a No Equivalent Products term, Fair Isaac has sought to 

block the Credit Bureaus from offering alternative Credit Score products, such as VantageScore, 

that would allow B2B Purchasers to easily switch from FICO Scores to VantageScore without 

incurring the cost of redesigning their lending programs and systems, or to use VantageScore 

alongside or interchangeably with FICO Scores. The Credit Bureaus have agreed to these 

anticompetitive terms, with the resulting anticompetitive effects. 

50. The No Equivalent Products clause provides that a Credit Bureau may not internally 

develop a credit scoring system that is aligned to the odds-to-score relationship of any Fair Isaac 

Analytic or that uses more than a limited number of reason codes that “match” reason codes used 

by any Fair Isaac Analytic. It also prohibits a Credit Bureau from distributing any competing 

analytic (i.e., credit scoring system) that is aligned with FICO Scores or uses too many of the 

same reason codes, and the clause expressly names VantageScore Solutions LLC as a developer 

of such a scoring system that may not be distributed if VantageScore were to offer an 

“Equivalent Product.” 

51. For example, if a competing Credit Score product used a 700 score to indicate a 

less-than-five-percent risk of credit delinquency, and if a 700 FICO score also indicated the same 

risk of delinquency, then the No Equivalent Products clause prevents a Credit Bureau from 

distributing the competing product. Similarly, if a competing Credit Score product used reason 

codes that match 20% or more of the reason codes used by FICO scoring systems, the No 

Equivalent Products clause prohibits a Credit Bureau from distributing the product. 

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52. The No Equivalent Products clause effectively prevents a Credit Bureau from 

developing (contrary to the original goal of VantageScore and the easy ability to do so) or selling 

an alternative to FICO’s Credit Scores that would (i) be compatible with many B2B Purchasers’ 

systems, models, and processes; and (ii) allow B2B Purchasers to have a legitimate choice 

between using FICO Scores and an alternative score. Many B2B Purchasers have spent 

substantial effort and resources to develop systems, models, and processes that are designed for 

FICO Scores. B2B Purchasers’ systems, models, and processes are tailored to FICO’s odds-toscore relationship (i.e., each given score has a given ratio of non-defaulting consumers to 

defaulting consumers), and reason codes (the particular reasons cited for increased risk of 

default). For example, a bank’s software might be designed to accept one or more FICO Scores 

and reason codes, combine this information with data it collects internally, and automatically 

produce a lending decision. 

53. The No Equivalent Products clause protects and sustains Fair Isaac’s monopoly 

power. The odds-to-score relationship is an arbitrary mapping between risk and score and does 

not reflect protectable intellectual property. Similarly, the reason codes that may not be used by 

an Equivalent Product were not invented by Fair Isaac but reflect well-established industry best 

practices for lending. 

Bundling and Penalty Pricing 

54. Fair Isaac’s contracts with each Credit Bureau include a similar or identical 

Dynamic Royalty Schedule clause and a similar or identical Pre-Qualification royalty category. 

Through the Pre-Qualification royalty category, Fair Isaac has effectively foreclosed lenders 

from purchasing and using a FICO score in their lending decision while also providing a 

consumer with a competing Credit Score, which drives lenders to exclusively purchase Fair 

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Isaac’s FICO Scores and not purchase competing Credit Scores. As a consequence of Fair 

Isaac’s imposition of the Pre-Qualification royalty category, VantageScore has lost sales of 

Credit Scores to major banks to provide to consumers. 

55. In 2015, Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus agreed to a new Pre-Qualification royalty 

category, which Fair Isaac defines as an End User’s qualification of a potential consumer 

customer for an End User’s own internal lending offering. This royalty category distinguishes 

between: (1) lenders that use FICO Scores for Pre- Qualification without providing any Credit 

Score or credit data to consumers; and (2) lenders that use FICO Scores for Pre-Qualification 

while also providing Credit Scores or credit data to consumers in connection with the PreQualification. Certain banks and lenders offer consumers opportunities to apply to qualify for 

credit opportunities (e.g., a credit card or loan) and, at the same time, receive their personal 

Credit Score. The offer of a free Credit Score to a consumer can entice consumers to apply for 

credit opportunities. 

56. The royalty price associated with a FICO score used for Pre-Qualification depends 

on whether other Credit Scores or credit data are provided to consumers. If a lender purchases a 

FICO score for use in Pre-Qualification and does not provide any Credit Score or credit data to 

the consumer “in connection” with the Pre-Qualification, there is one per-score royalty rate. If 

the lender purchases a FICO score for use in Pre-Qualification and provides any other Credit 

Score (such as a VantageScore) to the consumer in connection with the Pre- Qualification, there 

is a different per-score royalty rate that is higher – a penalty rate. 

57. The penalty rate can be avoided in one of two ways, both of which involve 

purchasing exclusively FICO Scores. First, the B2B Purchaser could purchase a FICO score for 

use in “Pre-Qualification” and provide no Credit Score or credit data to the consumer. Second, 

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the B2B Purchaser could purchase a bundled FICO product from Fair Isaac. Fair Isaac offers 

bundled products to lenders that combine the use of scores by lenders with the provision of 

scores to consumers. 

58. There is no legitimate business justification for the penalty rate agreed upon by Fair 

Isaac and the Credit Bureaus when the lender also purchases any other Credit Score to disclose to 

consumers. The transparent purpose of the Pre-Qualification royalty category is to drive all B2B 

Purchasers engaging in Pre-Qualification to purchase exclusively FICO Scores and make it costprohibitive for B2B Purchasers engaging in Pre-Qualification to purchase a competing Credit 

Score for disclosure to consumers. This scheme has been effective, and few, if any, B2B 

Purchasers have opted to pay the penalty rate. 

Fair Isaac’s Prices are Supracompetitive 

59. Fair Isaac’s Level Playing Field requires that pricing made available to one Credit 

Bureau be made available to the other Credit Bureaus. Taken together, the Dynamic Royalty 

Schedule and the Level Playing Field clauses enable Fair Isaac to increase above the competitive 

level the royalty prices it charges for FICO Scores. Fair Isaac’s contracts with TransUnion, 

Equifax, and Experian include similar or identical Level Playing Field and Dynamic Royalty 

Schedule provisions. 

60. Fair Isaac has used the Level Playing Field and Dynamic Royalty Schedule 

provisions in its contracts with the Credit Bureaus to extract supracompetitive monopoly prices 

from B2B Purchasers. These provisions disincentivize a Credit Bureau from negotiating for 

lower pricing terms because each knows that even if it succeeds, it will not gain a competitive 

advantage over the other Credit Bureaus. 

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Fair Isaac’s Disparagement of VantageScore 

61. Despite having successfully induced the Credit Bureaus to agree with Fair Isaac to 

restrain VantageScore’s ability to compete with FICO, Fair Isaac has gone further and has waged 

an aggressive campaign to spread false and disparaging statements about VantageScore and 

mislead B2B Purchasers about the qualities and characteristics of FICO Scores and 

VantageScore. In advertisements, letters, and blog posts, Fair Isaac has disparaged VantageScore 

by calling it a “Fako” score, falsely claimed that VantageScore is an unreliable measure of 

creditworthiness, and misrepresented the information considered by VantageScore’s credit 

scoring system. 

62. On December 12, 2017, Fair Isaac took out a full-page advertisement in The Wall 

Street Journal addressed to “Lenders, Policymakers and Consumer Advocates” that disparaged 

VantageScore without identifying it by name. The advertisement contrasted Fair Isaac, which “is 

not owned by the credit bureaus” and whose FICO Scores have been used “by lenders and 

securitization investors for decades,” with an alternative Credit Score, which is “owned by the 

credit bureaus,” is less reliable than FICO Scores in evaluating credit risk, and fails to use “sound 

practices” or “science-based credit evaluation.” To anyone familiar with the market for Credit 

Scores, the advertisement unambiguously conveys the false message that VantageScore is 

“[w]eakening scoring standards, [and] harm[ing] consumers, and the lending system,” 

particularly in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

63. The Wall Street Journal advertisement directed readers to “Learn more at 

FICO.com/independent,” a Fair Isaac-owned website that connects visitors to articles and blog 

posts that disparage VantageScore by name. One such blog post asserts: “Despite claims by 

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VantageScore, weakening the minimum scoring criteria will not empower millions of low-risk 

mortgage credit seekers.” 

64. Moreover, the implication that FICO Classic scoring systems provide Credit Scores 

for as many consumers as VantageScore is false and misleading. VantageScore provides Credit 

Scores for millions of American consumers that are not scored by FICO Classic scoring systems. 

65. Fair Isaac’s website includes numerous posts disparaging VantageScore and making 

false or misleading statements about VantageScore’s features. For example, one blog post claims 

that “[r]esearch results consistently showed that scoring models relying solely on sparse or old 

credit data were weak and did a poor job forecasting future performance.” This statement is false 

and misleading because it conveys the message that VantageScore’s scoring model is “weak” 

and does a “poor job forecasting future performance” because it considers a consumer’s full 

credit history even if the consumer has not used a traditional credit line in the last six months. In 

fact, studies have shown that VantageScore is strongly predictive. 

66. Another blog post claims that whereas “FICO Score 9 differentiates medical from 

non-medical collections,” “VantageScore does not.” This statement conveys the false message 

that VantageScore does not differentiate medical from non-medical collections. In fact, 

VantageScore 3.0 was the first credit scoring system to address medical debt. VantageScore 4.0, 

the most recent version of VantageScore, distinguishes medical collection accounts from nonmedical collection accounts and penalizes medical collections less than non-medical ones. 

67. Fair Isaac’s campaign against VantageScore is not new. In 2006, just months after 

the launch of VantageScore, Fair Isaac filed a meritless lawsuit against the Credit Bureaus and 

VantageScore in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. See Fair Isaac 

Corporation v. Equifax Inc., No. 06-cv-04112 (D. Minn.). This was the monopolist’s first 

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attempt to kill the nascent competitor. Fair Isaac’s numerous claims included a claim that the 

development of VantageScore violated the antitrust laws and a claim that the development of 

VantageScore constituted trademark infringement. In its prayer for relief, Fair Isaac sought 

nothing less than the end of VantageScore: it requested that the “Defendants be ordered to 

dissolve VantageScore.” 

68. All of Fair Isaac’s claims failed. In fact, the jury concluded that Fair Isaac was the 

wrongdoer. In support of its trademark infringement claim, Fair Isaac had alleged that 

VantageScore’s use of a scoring range of 501-990 constituted trademark infringement because it 

was similar to FICO’s scoring range of 300-850. The Credit Bureaus and VantageScore 

counterclaimed for fraud on the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), alleging 

that Fair Isaac had misrepresented to the PTO that only FICO used the 300-850 score range. The 

jury concluded that Fair Isaac had committed fraud on the PTO by making false statements as 

part of its application to register the score range of 300-850 as a trademark. 

69. The public statements described in the foregoing paragraphs were transmitted to and 

seen by a substantial number of businesses and consumers nationwide. 

Harm to Competition 

70. Fair Isaac’s campaign of anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct to maintain and 

expand its monopoly power has harmed and continues to harm competition and participants in 

the B2B Credit Score Market. Fair Isaac’s unlawful conduct, including that which has been taken 

in concert with the Credit Bureaus, has foreclosed competition in the B2B Credit Score Market 

by restraining the Credit Bureaus from selling VantageScore or any other competitive products. 

The anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct has allowed Fair Isaac to maintain its monopoly 

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power and charge supracompetitive monopoly prices for B2B Credit Scores to B2B Purchasers 

during the Class Period. 

71. Fair Isaac’s conduct, in concert with the Credit Bureaus, has reduced choice for 

B2B Purchasers. The anticompetitive terms to which Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus agreed 

have frustrated the ability of B2B Purchasers to purchase VantageScore or any other competitive 

Credit Score that could be seamlessly integrated into lenders’ existing processes and systems. 

Fair Isaac’s disparagement campaign against VantageScore has been successful in sowing fear, 

uncertainty, and doubt about VantageScore in the marketplace and has resulted in fewer sales by 

VantageScore and a lesser degree of competition from VantageScore. 

72. Media sources, financial blogs, and consumers have absorbed Fair Isaac’s false and 

disparaging message that VantageScore is a “Fako” score merely because it is not a FICO score. 

For example, thebalance.com – a website devoted to personal finance issues – posted in February 

2017, and continues to display as of the date of this filing: “If you purchased your Credit Score 

anywhere but MyFICO.com, then it’s a Fako score.” 

FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND TOLLING 

73. A cause of action accrued for Plaintiff each time Fair Isaac and/or a Credit Bureau 

sold a B2B Credit Score to plaintiff at a supracompetitive price made possible by their 

anticompetitive conduct. Each such sale constituted an overt act in furtherance of their 

anticompetitive scheme. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to recover all damages on all sales that 

Fair Isaac and/or its co-conspirators made to Plaintiff at supracompetitive prices within four 

years of the filing of this action. 

74. Due to Fair Isaac’s concealment of its unlawful conduct, however, Plaintiff and 

members of the Class are entitled to recover damages reaching back even beyond the four-year 

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statute of limitations period. Fair Isaac’s violations were not reasonably discoverable until 

February 12, 2018, when TransUnion disclosed the misconduct in a suit against Fair Isaac. 

Plaintiff and members of the Class had no knowledge of the unlawful self-concealing scheme 

and could not have discovered the scheme and conspiracy through the exercise of reasonable 

diligence more than four years before the filing of this action. 

75. That is true, at least in part, because the nature of the scheme was self-concealing 

and because Fair Isaac employed deceptive tactics and techniques of secrecy to avoid detection 

of, and to conceal, its scheme. 

76. Because the scheme was both self-concealing and affirmatively concealed by Fair 

Isaac, Plaintiff and members of the Class had no knowledge of the scheme more than four years 

before the filing of this complaint; nor did they have the facts or information that would have 

caused a reasonably diligent person to investigate. 

77. Plaintiff and members of the class also lacked the facts and information necessary to 

form a good faith basis for believing that any legal violations had occurred. Reasonable diligence 

on the part of Plaintiff and members of the class would not have uncovered those facts more than 

four years before the filing of this complaint. 

78. As a result of Fair Isaac’s fraudulent concealment, all applicable statutes of 

limitations affecting Plaintiff’s and class members’ claims have been tolled. 

79. The federal government’s antitrust investigation of Fair Isaac’s unlawful conduct 

also tolls any federal statute of limitations pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 16. 

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CLASS ALLEGATIONS 

80. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and all others similarly situated 

pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as representative of a class (the 

“Class”) defined as follows: 

All persons or entities in the United States and its territories that purchased B2B 

Credit Scores directly from Fair Isaac and/or a Credit Bureau, or any of their 

respective divisions, subsidiaries, predecessors, or affiliates, during the period 

from January 1, 2006, through such time as the effects of Fair Isaac’s illegal 

conduct have ceased, and excluding all governmental entities, Fair Isaac, and Fair 

Isaac’s divisions, subsidiaries, predecessors, and affiliates. 

81. On information and belief, hundreds or thousands of entities in the U.S. have 

purchased B2B Credit Scores directly from Fair Isaac and/or its co-conspirators, the Credit 

Bureaus. Thus, the Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable. 

82. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class. 

83. Plaintiff and all members of the Class were injured in the form of overcharges by 

the same conduct of the Defendant. 

84. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class. 

The interests of the Plaintiff are not antagonistic to the Class. 

85. Plaintiff is represented by counsel who are experienced and competent in the 

prosecution of complex class action antitrust litigation. 

86. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class predominate over 

questions, if any, that may affect only individual members because Fair Isaac has acted and 

refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class. Such generally applicable 

conduct is inherent in Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive conduct in monopolizing and 

attempting to monopolize the B2B Credit Score Market, as more fully alleged herein. 

87. Questions of law and fact common to the Class include: 

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a. whether Fair Isaac intentionally and unlawfully impaired or impeded competition 

in the B2B Credit Score Market; 

b. whether Fair Isaac maintained or enhanced monopoly power in the B2B Credit 

Score Market through anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct; 

c. whether Fair Isaac engaged in anticompetitive conduct in order to unlawfully 

disadvantage its competitors and maintain monopoly power in the B2B Credit 

Score Market; 

d. whether Fair Isaac had and has monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score Market; 

e. whether Fair Isaac had any legitimate, procompetitive reasons for its conduct; 

f. the effects of Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive conduct on in the B2B Credit Score 

prices; 

g. whether Plaintiff and other members of the Class have been overcharged and thus 

damaged by paying artificially inflated prices for B2B Credit Scores as a result of 

Fair Isaac’s unlawful behavior; and 

h. the proper measure of damages. 

88. Class action treatment is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of 

the controversy in that, among other things, such treatment will permit a large number of 

similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, 

efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that numerous 

individual actions would engender. The benefits of proceeding through the class mechanism, 

including providing injured persons or entities with a method for obtaining redress for claims 

that might not be practicable for them to pursue individually, substantially outweigh any 

difficulties that may arise in management of this class action.

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89. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the maintenance of this action 

as a class action. 

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT 1 

Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Monopolization 

90. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding 

paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 

91. The relevant product market is the market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores. 

92. The relevant geographic market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores is the United 

States. 

93. The B2B Credit Score Market in the United States is the relevant market. 

94. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have at least a 90% market share in the B2B 

Credit Score Market in the United States. 

95. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score 

Market. 

96. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have the power to control prices or exclude 

competition in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

97. Through unlawful, interconnected, and mutually reinforcing anticompetitive and 

exclusionary acts and agreements, Fair Isaac has substantially foreclosed competition in the 

market for B2B Credit Scores in the United States in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 

15 U.S.C. §2. 

98. Fair Isaac has demonstrated its ability to control prices and exclude competition by 

raising prices without a corresponding increase in demand and to supracompetitive levels. 

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99. Fair Isaac’s monopoly power is not due to growth or development because of a 

superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. 

100. Fair Isaac’s acts of monopolization have injured and will continue to injure 

competition in the relevant market. 

101. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts substantially affect interstate 

commerce and injure competition nationwide. 

102. The anticompetitive conduct raised the prices for FICO Scores above the 

competitive level and otherwise injured competition without any offsetting procompetitive 

benefit to consumers. 

103. Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured in their business or property 

by reason of Defendant’s violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act within the meaning of 

Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §15. 

104. Plaintiff and members of the Class are threatened with future injury to their business 

and property by reason of Defendant’s continuing violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 

within the meaning of Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. 

COUNT 2 

Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Conspiracy to Monopolize 

105. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding 

paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 

106. The relevant product market is the market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores. 

107. The relevant geographic market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores is the United 

States. 

108. The B2B Credit Score Market in the United States is the relevant market. 

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109. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have at least a 90% market share in the B2B 

Credit Score Market. 

110. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score 

Market. 

111. Fair Isaac has demonstrated its ability to control prices and exclude competition by 

raising prices without a corresponding increase in demand and to supracompetitive levels. 

112. Through unlawful, interconnected, and mutually reinforcing anticompetitive and 

exclusionary acts and agreements, Fair Isaac has substantially foreclosed competition in the 

market for B2B Credit Score Market in the United States in violation of Section 2 of the 

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §2. 

113. Fair Isaac combined, conspired or agreed with the Credit Bureaus so as to maintain 

its monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score Market. Fair Isaac created and maintained this 

conspiracy through a series of agreements with the Credit Bureaus. In these agreements, the 

Credit Bureaus and Fair Isaac agreed that the Credit Bureaus would not offer or sell 

VantageScore or any other competing Credit Score to Plaintiff and members of the Class. Fair 

Isaac and the Credit Bureaus further agreed that the Credit Bureaus would act as Fair Isaac’s 

agent in the sale of FICO Scores to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 

114. These agreements foreclosed competition in a substantial portion of the B2B Credit 

Score Market and unlawfully maintained Fair Isaac’s monopoly, resulting in Fair Isaac 

extracting supracompetitive prices for FICO Scores from Plaintiff and members of the Class. 

115. Fair Isaac’s monopoly is not due to growth or development because of a superior 

product, business acumen, or historic accident. 

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116. Fair Isaac’s conspiracy to monopolize has injured and will continue to injure 

competition in this market. 

117. Fair Isaac has acted with the specific intent of monopolizing the market for B2B 

Credit Scores in the United States. 

118. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts substantially affect interstate 

commerce and injure competition nationwide. 

119. The conspiracy raised the prices for FICO Scores above the competitive level and 

otherwise injured competition without any offsetting procompetitive benefit to consumers. 

120. Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured in their business or property 

by reason of Defendant’s violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act within the meaning of 

Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. 

121. Plaintiff and members of the Class are threatened with future injury to their business 

and property by reason of Defendant’s continuing violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 

within the meaning of Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. 

COUNT 3 

Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Attempt to Monopolize 

122. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding 

paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 

123. Fair Isaac’s actions as alleged herein constitute attempted monopolization in 

violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 

124. Fair Isaac’s activities as alleged herein were and are within the flow of interstate and 

foreign commerce and have substantially adversely affected interstate and foreign commerce. 

125. The relevant product market is the market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores. 

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126. The relevant geographic market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores is the United 

States. 

127. The B2B Credit Score Market in the United States is the relevant market. 

128. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have at least a 90% market share in the B2B 

Credit Score Market in the United States. 

129. Fair Isaac’s conduct was specifically intended to acquire monopoly power in the 

relevant market. Fair Isaac has acted with the specific intent of monopolizing the market for B2B 

Credit Scores in the United States. 

130. There is a dangerous probability that Fair Isaac will succeed in obtaining monopoly 

power in the relevant market. 

131. Fair Isaac’s monopoly power is not due to growth or development because of a 

superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. 

132. Fair Isaac’s attempt to monopolize has injured and will continue to injure 

competition in this market. 

133. Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured in their business or property 

by reason of Defendant’s attempt to monopolize the relevant market. 

134. Plaintiff and members of the Class are threatened with future injury to their business 

and property by reason of Defendant’s continuing violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 

within the meaning of Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. 

COUNT 4 

Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Unreasonable Restraint of Trade 

135. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding 

paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 

136. The relevant product market is the market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores. 

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137. The relevant geographic market for the sale of B2B Credit Scores is the United 

States. 

138. The B2B Credit Score Market in the United States is the relevant market. 

139. Fair Isaac had and continues to have at least a 90% market share in the B2B Credit 

Score Market in the United States. 

140. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score 

Market. 

141. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have the power to control prices or exclude 

competition in the relevant market. 

142. Fair Isaac entered into agreements with TransUnion, Experian, and Equifax that 

contained anticompetitive and exclusionary terms whereby each Credit Bureau agreed not to 

offer or sell VantageScore as a competing product to Plaintiff and members of the Class. 

143. The agreements between Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus had substantial 

anticompetitive effects. The agreements excluded VantageScore, a significant competitor, from a 

substantial portion of competition in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

144. The agreements raised the price for FICO Scores above the competitive level and 

otherwise injured competition without any offsetting procompetitive benefit to consumers. 

145. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts substantially affect interstate 

commerce and injure competition nationwide. 

146. Plaintiff and members of the Class continue to suffer damage, and will continue to 

do so, if Fair Isaac does not cease its anticompetitive conduct. 

147. Plaintiff and members of the Class have been injured in their business or property 

by reason of Defendant’s violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, within the meaning of 

Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §15. 

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148. Plaintiff and members of the Class are threatened with future injury to their business 

and property by reason of Defendant’s continuing violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 

within the meaning of Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. 

COUNT 5 

Violations of State Antitrust Laws 

149. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding 

paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 

150. By reason of the foregoing, Defendant has violated, and Plaintiff and members of 

the Class are entitled to relief under, the antitrust laws of the States of Arizona, California, 

Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, 

Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 

Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, 

as well as the District of Columbia, as follows: 

a. Arizona Revised Statutes § 44-1401, et seq.; 

b. California Cartwright Act, California Business & Professions Code § 16700, et 

seq.; 

c. Connecticut Antitrust Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 35-24, et seq.; 

d. District of Columbia Code § 28-4501, et seq.; 

e. Hawaii Revised Statutes § 480-2, et seq.; 

f. Illinois Antitrust Act, Illinois Complied Statutes § 740, Ill. Comp. Stat. 1011, et 

seq.; 

g. Iowa Competition Law, Iowa Code § 553.1, et seq.; 

h. Kansas Statutes Annotated § 50-101, et seq.; 

i. Maine Revised Statutes Annotated, tit. 10, § 1101, et seq.; 

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j. Maryland Code Annotated, Commercial Law, § 11-204, et seq.; 

k. Michigan Compiled Laws § 445.771, et seq.; 

l. Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971, Minnesota Statutes § 325D.49, et seq.; 

m. Mississippi Code Annotated § 75-21-1, et seq.; 

n. Nebraska Revised Statutes § 59-801, et seq.; 

o. Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated § 598A.010, et seq.; 

p. New Mexico Statutes Annotated § 57-1-1, et seq.; 

q. New York Donnelly Act, New York General Business Law § 340, et seq.; 

r. North Carolina General Statutes § 75-1, et seq.; 

s. North Dakota Century Code § 51-08.1-01, et seq.; 

t. Oregon Revised Statutes § 646.705, et seq.; 

u. Rhode Island General Laws § 6-36-4, et seq.; 

v. South Dakota Codified Laws § 37-1-3.1, et seq.; 

w. Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-25-101, et seq.; 

x. Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-3104, et seq.; 

y. Vermont Statutes Annotated, tit. 9, § 2451, et seq.; 

z. West Virginia Code § 47-18-1, et seq.; and 

aa. Wisconsin Statutes § 133.01, et seq. 

COUNT 6 

Violation of State Unfair Trade Practices Laws 

151. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding 

paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 

152. By reason of the foregoing, Defendant has violated, and Plaintiff and members of 

the Class are entitled to relief under, the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Laws 

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of the States of Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, 

New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Vermont, as well as 

the District of Columbia, as follows: 

a. Arkansas Code Annotated, § 4-88-101, et seq.; 

b. California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.; 

c. Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, Conn Gen. Stat. § 42-110a, et seq.; 

d. District of Columbia Code § 28-3901, et seq.; 

e. Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201, et seq.; 

f. Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 93A, et seq.; 

g. Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010, et seq.; 

h. Montana Code, § 30-14-103, et seq., and § 30-14-201, et seq.; 

i. New Mexico Statutes Annotated § 57-12-1, et seq.; 

j. New York General Business Law § 349, et seq.; 

k. North Carolina General Statutes § 75-1.1, et seq.; 

l. Rhode Island General Laws § 6-13.1-1, et seq.; 

m. South Carolina Code Annotated § 39-5-10, et seq.; and 

n. Vermont Statutes Annotated, tit. 9, § 2451, et seq. . 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief and judgment as follows:

A. The Court determine that this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, that Plaintiff be appointed as class representative, and that 

Plaintiff’s counsel be appointed as counsel for the Class; 

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B. The conduct alleged herein be declared, adjudged, and/or decreed to be unlawful 

under Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2. 

C. Plaintiff and the Class recover their overcharge damages, trebled, and the costs of 

the suit, including reasonable attorneys’ fees as provided by law; and 

D. Plaintiff and the Class be granted such other, further, and different relief as the 

nature of the case may require or as may be determined to be just, equitable, and proper by this 

Court. 

JURY DEMAND 

 Plaintiff demands trial by jury of all issues so triable. 

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Dated: April 27, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

 /s/ Paul E. Slater . 

Paul E. Slater 

Joseph M. Vanek 

Michael G. Dickler 

Matthew T. Slater 

SPERLING & SLATER 

55 West Monroe Street 

Suite 3200 

Chicago, IL 60603 

(312) 641-3200 

pes@sperling-law.com 

jvanek@sperling-law.com 

mdickler@sperling-law.com 

mslater@sperling-law.com 

 Linda P. Nussbaum 

Bart D. Cohen 

NUSSBAUM LAW GROUP, P.C. 

1211 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor 

New York, NY 10036 

(917) 438-9102 

lnussbaum@nussbaumpc.com 

bcohen@nussbaumpc.com 

Michael L. Roberts 

Karen Sharp Halbert 

ROBERTS LAW FIRM, P.A. 

20 Rahling Circle 

Little Rock, AR 72223 

(501) 821-5575 

mikeroberts@robertslawfirm.us 

karenhalbert@robertslawfirm.us 

Counsel for Plaintiff Alcoa Community 

Federal Credit Union and the Proposed Class

 

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