NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CHERYL JACKSON, Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v.

CLARA HARRIS, Personal Representative of the Estate of

Mark D. Harris, Defendant/Appellee. 

No. 1 CA-CV 17-0402 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2016-054510 

The Honorable Aimee L. Anderson, Judge

APPEAL DISMISSED

COUNSEL

Macqueen & Gottlieb PLC, Phoenix

By Patrick R. MacQueen, Benjamin L. Gottlieb

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Berk Law Group PC, Scottsdale

By Daphne J. Reaume, Kent S. Berk

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

FILED 5-31-2018
JACKSON v. HARRIS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Cheryl Jackson appeals the superior court’s entry of final 

judgment under Rule 54(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., and the adverse award of costs 

and attorney’s fees. We lack jurisdiction and thus dismiss the appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 This case concerns the sale of real property. Clara Harris was 

the personal representative of her son’s estate, the Estate of Mark D. Harris. 

She sold his residence to Joshua Sanders in that capacity. 

¶3 Sanders sued various defendants involved in the transaction, 

including Ms. Harris in her individual capacity and as personal 

representative. He claimed that Harris knowingly failed to disclose several 

defects in the residence, including roof defects, water damage, mold, 

foundation cracks and soil expansion. He asserted four claims against 

Harris as personal representative of the estate, including breach of contract, 

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent 

misrepresentation/non-disclosure and consumer fraud; and two claims 

against Harris as an individual, including negligent 

misrepresentation/non-disclosure and consumer fraud. 

¶4 Sanders later filed an amended complaint that named his 

wife, Cheryl Jackson, as a second plaintiff and added a common law fraud 

claim against Harris as personal representative. Jackson and Sanders 

asserted the same contract and tort claims, premised on identical facts and 

law. 

¶5 Harris moved to dismiss several claims against her as 

personal representative, including (1) all of Jackson’s claims because 

Jackson was not a party to the real estate contract and related transactions

and (2) Jackson and Sanders’ breach of contract and covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing claims as time barred under A.R.S. §§ 14-3803, -3804. 

Harris also moved, in her individual capacity, to join the personal 

representative’s motion to dismiss Jackson’s claims for negligent 

misrepresentation/non-disclosure and consumer fraud. 
JACKSON v. HARRIS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3 

¶6 The superior court granted both motions to dismiss in favor 

of Harris as personal representative, but never reached or granted her 

request to join the motions in her individual capacity. Accordingly, the 

court dismissed Jackson’s claims against Harris as personal representative, but 

did not dismiss Jackson’s claims against Harris as an individual. The court 

further granted Harris’ request for “attorneys’ fees incurred [by Harris as 

personal representative] in responding to Plaintiff Cheryl Jackson’s 

Amended Complaint,” and ordered Harris to submit a proposed form of 

judgment.1

¶7 The court signed Harris’ proposed judgment without 

modification, over Jackson’s objection. The court entered judgment against 

Jackson and in favor of Harris, but only as personal representative; 

awarded Harris $15,386.77 in attorney’s fees and $1,233.10 in costs, the full 

amount requested; and included Rule 54(b) language to certify “there is no 

just reason for delay in the entry of this Judgment as a final judgment, and 

the Court expressly directs that this Judgment be entered at this time as a 

final judgment against Plaintiff Cheryl Jackson.” Jackson timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

¶8 Jackson does not contest the merits of the judgment, but 

instead challenges the award of attorney’s fees and Rule 54(b) certification. 

We first consider the certification issue because we lack jurisdiction when a 

Rule 54(b) certification is not “substantively warranted.” Sw. Gas Corp. v. 

Irwin ex rel. County of Cochise, 229 Ariz. 198, 202, ¶ 12 (App. 2012). We 

review the propriety of Rule 54(b) certification for an abuse of discretion. 

Id. at 201, ¶ 7. 

¶9 Our jurisdiction is generally limited to final judgments that 

dispose of all claims and all parties, leaving no questions open for judicial 

determination and clearly fixing the parties’ rights and liabilities. Musa v. 

Adrian, 130 Ariz. 311, 312 (1981); Decker v. City of Tucson, 4 Ariz. App. 270, 

272 (1966). 

¶10 At issue here is an exception to the general rule, found in Rule 

54(b), Ariz. R. Civ. P., which authorizes the superior court to certify a final 

judgment disposing of fewer than all claims or parties “only if the court 

expressly determines there is no just reason for delay.” To find no just 

reason for delay, the court must find “some hardship or injustice would 

 

1 The court also dismissed Sanders’ breach of contract and breach of 

the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims against Harris as personal 

representative.
JACKSON v. HARRIS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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result from a delay in entering a final judgment.” S. Cal. Edison Co. v. 

Peabody W. Coal Co., 194 Ariz. 47, 53, ¶ 19 (1999); see Pulaski v. Perkins, 127 

Ariz. 216, 218 (App. 1980) (“The phrase ‘no just reason for delay’ in Rule 

54(b) means that there must be some danger of hardship or injustice 

through delay which would be alleviated by immediate appeal.”) (quoting 

Campbell v. Westmoreland Farm, Inc., 403 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1968)). 

¶11 Rule 54(b) judgments “should not be entered routinely,” but 

instead limited to “the infrequent harsh case as an instrument for the 

improved administration of justice.” S. Cal. Edison Co., 194 Ariz. at 53, ¶ 19 

(quotation omitted) (Rule 54(b) represents “a compromise between the 

policy against interlocutory appeals and the desirability, in a few cases, of 

an immediate appeal to prevent an injustice.”). In addition, the superior 

court should not certify a partial judgment under Rule 54(b) if the surviving 

litigation might result in successive appeals that require the appellate 

courts to relearn the same facts. See Sw. Gas Corp., 229 Ariz. at 202, ¶ 12. 

¶12 Rule 54(b) certification was not proper here. First, Harris 

suffers no greater hardship or injustice if required to await litigation’s end 

to press or defend any issues on appeal. She is presently defending herself 

in the superior court proceedings, both as personal representative and 

individually. An express pass to appeal (and presumably enforce) the 

court’s partial judgment under Rule 54(b) does not change that.

¶13 Second, Arizona courts have long disfavored piecemeal 

appeals because they tend to undermine judicial efficiency. Musa, 130 Ariz. 

at 312. If we accept this first appeal, we should expect a second appeal once 

Jackson’s remaining claims against Harris are resolved, and more appeals 

from there, including a final appeal at the end of the litigation in the 

superior court. At each successive appeal, we would need to reacquaint 

ourselves with the same facts and issues. Indeed, a second appeal of 

Jackson’s remaining claims would presumably require us to again examine 

the fees incurred by Harris “in responding to Plaintiff Cheryl Jackson’s 

Amended Complaint,” but only the fees incurred in her individual 

capacity.2

 

2 We do not decide whether Rule 54(b) certification would be proper

if the court resolves all pending claims between Harris and Jackson, leaving 

only the claims between Harris and Sanders. As a practical matter, 

however, we note that Jackson and Sanders are married and Sanders has 

conveyed Jackson a community property interest in the house. Given that 

backdrop, Harris’ fee award against Jackson might ultimately be reduced 

by offsets if Sanders prevails on the surviving claims.
JACKSON v. HARRIS, et al.

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¶14 Appellee offers Continental Casualty v. Superior Court, 130 

Ariz. 189 (1981), to support Rule 54(b) certification. We are not persuaded. 

There, unlike here, the parties stipulated to entry of a Rule 54(b) judgment, 

yet the superior court refused to enter one. The Court emphasized the 

stipulation in concluding the superior court abused its discretion. Id. at 192.

CONCLUSION

¶15 For these reasons, the superior court erroneously certified its 

partial dismissal of Jackson’s claims as a final judgment under Rule 54(b). 

We lack jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal. In our discretion, we deny 

both parties’ requests for attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.