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67910870v.4 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

DAWON A. WORDLAW, on behalf of 

herself and all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF 

CHICAGO, LLC; ENTERPRISE 

HOLDINGS, INC., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 20-cv-03200 

Hon. Manish S. Shah 

Hon. Magistrate Gabriel A. Fuentes 

ANSWER TO CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT 

Defendants ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF CHICAGO, LLC and 

ENTERPRISE HOLDINGS, INC., by and through their attorneys, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, hereby 

submit their Answer to Plaintiff’s Class Action Complaint as follows: 

INTRODUCTION 

COMPLAINT ¶1:

BIPA defines a “biometric identifier” as any personal feature that is unique to an 

individual, including handprints, fingerprints and palm scans. “Biometric information” is any 

information based on a biometric identifier, regardless of how it is converted or stored. 740 ILCS 

§ 14/10. Collectively, biometric identifiers and biometric information are known as “biometrics.” 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that this Paragraph purports to paraphrase portions of 740 ILCS 14/10. 

Answering further, Defendants state the cited statute speaks for itself and, accordingly, deny any 

remaining allegations in this Paragraph. 

COMPLAINT ¶2:

This case concerns the misuse of individuals’ biometrics by Defendants, providers of 

automobile rental services throughout Illinois. Using biometric enabled technology, Defendants 

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are capturing, collecting, storing, disseminating, or otherwise using the biometrics of Plaintiff 

and other Class members, without their informed written consent as required by law, in order to 

track their time at work. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 2. 

COMPLAINT ¶3:

BIPA provides, inter alia, that private entities, such as Defendants, may not obtain and/or 

possess an individual’s biometrics unless they first: 

(1) inform the person whose biometrics are to be collected in writing that biometric 

identifiers or biometric information will be collected or stored; 

(2) inform the person whose biometrics are to be collected in writing of the specific 

purpose and the length of term for which such biometric identifiers or biometric information is 

being collected, stored and used; 

(3) receive a written release from the person whose biometrics are to be collected, 

allowing the capture and collection of their biometric identifiers or biometric information; and 

(4) publish publicly available retention guidelines for permanently destroying biometric 

identifiers and biometric information. 740 ILCS 14/15(a). 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that this Paragraph purports to paraphrase portions of 740 ILCS 

14/15(a). Answering further, Defendants state the cited statute speaks for itself and, accordingly, 

deny any remaining allegations in this Paragraph. 

COMPLAINT ¶4:

Compliance with BIPA is straightforward and may be accomplished through a single, 

signed sheet of paper. BIPA’s requirements bestow a right to privacy in biometrics and a right to 

make an informed decision when electing whether to provide or withhold biometrics. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that this Paragraph purports to paraphrase portions of the BIPA. 

Answering further, Defendants state the cited statute speaks for itself and, accordingly, deny any 

remaining allegations in this Paragraph. 

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COMPLAINT ¶5:

Defendants use biometric timekeeping devices to track their employees’ work hours. 

Defendants’ system works by scanning their employees’ biometric identifiers, such as their 

fingerprints, and subsequently using the same for authentication and timekeeping purposes. On 

information and belief, the system includes the dissemination of biometrics to third parties, such 

as other Enterprise subsidiaries, data storage vendors, and payroll service providers.. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 5. 

COMPLAINT ¶6:

The Illinois Legislature has found that “biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers that 

are used to access finances or other sensitive information. For example, even sensitive 

information like Social Security numbers can be changed. Biometrics, however, are biologically 

unique to each individual and, once compromised, such individual has no recourse, is at a 

heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric facilitated 

transactions.” 740 ILCS 14/5. The risk is compounded when a person’s biometrics are also 

associated with their other personally identifiable information. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that this Paragraph purports to paraphrase portions of 740 ILCS 14/5. 

Answering further, Defendants state the cited statute speaks for itself and, accordingly, deny any 

remaining allegations in this Paragraph. 

COMPLAINT ¶7:

Plaintiff brings this action for statutory damages and other remedies as a result of 

Defendants’ conduct in violating Plaintiff’s biometric privacy rights. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Plaintiff brings this action for statutory damages and other 

remedies. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 7. 

COMPLAINT ¶8:

On Plaintiff’s own behalf, and on behalf of the proposed Class and Subclass defined 

below, Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to comply with BIPA, as well as an 

award of statutory damages to the Class and Subclass members, together with costs and 

reasonable attorneys’ fees. 

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ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Plaintiff purports brings this action on her own behalf and on 

behalf of a proposed Class and Subclass for statutory damages and other remedies. Defendants 

deny that Plaintiff or the proposed Class and Subclass are entitled to any relief, deny that class 

certification is appropriate, and deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 8. 

PARTIES 

COMPLAINT ¶9:

At all relevant times, Plaintiff Dawon A. Wordlaw has been a resident and a citizen of the 

state of Illinois. 

ANSWER:

Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 

truth of the allegations contained in this Paragraph, and therefore deny them. 

COMPLAINT ¶10:

Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the state 

of Missouri, with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, that conducts substantial 

business throughout Illinois, including within this District. Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. 

is the corporate parent, and sole member, of Defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, 

LLC. Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc.’s President and Chief Executive Officer, Christine 

Taylor, Executive Chairman, Andrew Taylor, and Chief Financial Officer, Rick Short, are 

registered with the Illinois Secretary of State as the managers of Enterprise Leasing Company of 

Chicago, LLC. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. is a corporation organized 

under the laws of the state of Missouri, with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. 

Defendants also admit that Enterprise Holdings, Inc. is the corporate parent, and sole member, of 

Defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC. Defendants further admit that 

Enterprise Holdings, Inc.’s President and Chief Executive Officer, Christine Taylor, Executive 

Chairman, Andrew Taylor, and Chief Financial Officer, Rick Short, are registered with the 

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Illinois Secretary of State as the managers of Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC. 

Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 10. 

COMPLAINT ¶11:

Defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC is a limited liability company 

organized under the laws of the state of Delaware, with its principal place of business in 

Lombard, Illinois, that conducts substantial business throughout Illinois, and is registered with 

and authorized by the Illinois Secretary of State to transact business in Illinois, including under 

the assumed name “Enterprise Holdings.” Defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, 

LLC is a regional subsidiary of Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC is a 

limited liability company organized under the laws of the state of Delaware, with its principal 

place of business in Lombard, Illinois, that conducts business throughout Illinois, and is 

registered with and authorized by the Illinois Secretary of State to transact business in Illinois. 

Defendants further admit that Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC is a subsidiary of 

Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 11. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 

COMPLAINT ¶12:

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the Class Action 

Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) et seq., because this case is a class action in which the matter 

in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs; there are 

greater than 100 putative class members; at least one putative class member is a citizen of a state 

other than Defendant; and none of the exceptions under subsection § 1332(d) apply. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter but deny 

that they have violated any federal or state law or that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief 

whatsoever. 

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COMPLAINT ¶13:

This Court may assert personal jurisdiction over Defendants, because Defendants do 

business within Illinois and transact business in Illinois such that they have sufficient minimum 

contacts with Illinois and/or have purposely availed themselves of Illinois markets to make it 

reasonable for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over Defendants, and because Plaintiff’s claims 

arise out of Defendants’ unlawful in-state actions. 

ANSWER:

Defendants state that the allegations in Paragraph 13 are legal conclusions to which no 

response is required, and therefore deny the allegations contained in this Paragraph. 

COMPLAINT ¶14:

Venue is proper in this District because Plaintiff resides in this District and a substantial 

part of the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in this District.. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that venue is proper in this Court but deny that they have violated any 

federal or state law or that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief whatsoever. 

GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 

COMPLAINT ¶15:

Defendants jointly operate automobile rental services in Illinois. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 15. 

COMPLAINT ¶16:

Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. exercises substantial control over its regional 

subsidiaries’, such as Defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC’s, business 

practices and employee management practices, including with respect to employee privacy and 

data protection matters.. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 16. 

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COMPLAINT ¶17:

In fact, Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. maintains a public Code of Conduct, 

addressing employee management matters, which refers to its regional subsidiaries’ employees 

as “our employees” and expressly governs its regional subsidiaries’ employee management 

practices, referring to itself and its subsidiaries as a collective “Company”: “The word 

‘Company,’ where used in the Code, refers to Enterprise Holdings, Inc., Enterprise Fleet 

Management, Inc., and/or, in their individual capacities, each subsidiary company.” 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Enterprise Holdings, Inc. maintains a public Code of Conduct. 

Defendants admit that this Paragraph purports to paraphrase portions of the Code of Conduct. 

Defendants deny the remaining allegations in this Paragraph. 

COMPLAINT ¶18:

The Code of Conduct expressly applies to all those within “the Company,” including, by 

definition, employees of Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc.’s regional subsidiaries: 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that this Paragraph purports to paraphrase portions of the Code of 

Conduct. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in this Paragraph. 

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COMPLAINT ¶19:

With respect to employee privacy, the Code of Conduct states that Enterprise Holdings, 

Inc. and its subsidiaries protect sensitive information, including employees’ personal 

information, “by limiting access to those who have a business need to know it, securing the 

systems that transmit or store it, and ensuring our use of the information complies with privacy 

laws”: 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that this Paragraph purports to paraphrase portions of the Code of 

Conduct. Answering further, Defendants state the cited document speaks for itself and, 

accordingly, deny any remaining allegations in this Paragraph. 

COMPLAINT ¶20:

The Code of Conduct also provides that Enterprise Holdings, Inc. and its subsidiaries are 

“committed to protecting the privacy of its employees’ private information”: 

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ANSWER:

Defendants admit that this Paragraph purports to paraphrase portions of the Code of 

Conduct. Answering further, Defendants state the cited document speaks for itself and, 

accordingly, deny any remaining allegations in this Paragraph. 

COMPLAINT ¶21:

As is evident from the Code of Conduct, Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. and its 

regional subsidiaries, including Defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC, 

subscribe to common policies, implemented by Enterprise Holdings, Inc., covering various areas 

of employee management, and do not observe corporate formalities with respect to employee 

management. Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. speaks for its regional subsidiaries when it 

comes to managing employee privacy, and has publicly stated both its intention and its regional 

subsidiaries’ intentions to comply with all privacy laws. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 21. 

COMPLAINT ¶22:

Thus, on information and belief, at all relevant times Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. 

has exercised primary, if not exclusive, control over its subsidiaries’, including Defendant 

Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC’s, practices with respect to employee privacy 

matters and other employment conditions. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 22. 

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COMPLAINT ¶23:

As is evident from its Code of Conduct, Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. had the 

exclusive final say as to whether its regional subsidiaries would comply with all privacy laws, 

including BIPA. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 23. 

COMPLAINT ¶24:

As is evident from its Code of Conduct, which does not differentiate between itself and 

its regional subsidiaries, Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. has engaged in an undertaking to 

ensure legally-compliant and sufficient working conditions, which includes ensuring workers 

within its facilities are not subject to illegal working conditions, such as non-compliant biometric 

timekeeping systems and conduct by its subsidiaries that jeopardizes health, safety, or personal 

data.. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 24. 

FACTS SPECIFIC TO PLAINTIFF 

COMPLAINT ¶25:

In 2016, while Plaintiff was working for Defendants at an Enterprise facility in Cook 

County, Illinois, Defendants implemented biometric scanning and time-tracking devices and 

technology to monitor and manage their workers’, including Plaintiff’s, work hours. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 25. 

COMPLAINT ¶26:

While Plaintiff received her paychecks from Defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of 

Chicago, LLC, the conditions of her work environment, including matters pertaining to 

employee timekeeping, employee privacy, employee discipline, and the scope of acceptable 

employee behavior, were controlled by Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Plaintiff received her paychecks from Enterprise Leasing 

Company of Chicago, LLC. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 26. 

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COMPLAINT ¶27:

Until Plaintiff left Defendants’ employ in March 2019, Plaintiff was required to scan her 

biometric identifiers, in the form of her fingerprints, each time Plaintiff clocked in and clocked 

out of a shift at work.. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Plaintiff left Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago, LLC’s 

employ in March 2019. Defendants deny the remaining allegations in Paragraph 27. 

COMPLAINT ¶28:

Plaintiff relied on Defendants to not only provide a lawful and legally compliant 

biometric timekeeping system, but to also disclose all material information regarding the 

technology and system, including all relevant retention, destruction, and dissemination policies. 

ANSWER:

Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 

truth of the allegations contained in this Paragraph, and therefore deny them. 

COMPLAINT ¶29:

Prior to taking Plaintiff’s biometrics, Defendants did not inform Plaintiff in writing that 

her biometrics were being collected, stored, used, or disseminated, or provide her with any 

disclosures relating to their collection, storage, or dissemination of her biometrics. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 29. 

COMPLAINT ¶30:

Defendants did not seek, and Plaintiff never provided, any written consent relating to the 

collection, use, storage, or dissemination of Plaintiff’s biometrics. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 30. 

COMPLAINT ¶31:

Prior to taking Plaintiff’s biometrics, Defendants did not make publicly available any 

written policy as to a biometric retention schedule, nor did Defendants disclose any guidelines 

for permanently destroying her collected biometrics.. 

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ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 31. 

COMPLAINT ¶32:

Additionally, Defendants did not obtain consent from Plaintiff to disseminate Plaintiff’s 

biometrics to third parties, including any data storage or payroll processing vendors. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 32. 

CLASS ALLEGATIONS 

COMPLAINT ¶33:

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this action individually 

and on behalf of a Class and Subclass defined as follows: 

Class: All individuals whose biometrics were captured, collected, stored, used, 

transmitted, or disseminated by or on behalf of Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. within the 

state of Illinois at any time within the applicable limitations period. 

Subclass: All individuals whose biometrics were captured, collected, stored, used, 

transmitted, or disseminated by or on behalf of Defendant Enterprise Leasing Company of 

Chicago, LLC within the state of Illinois at any time within the applicable limitations period.. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Plaintiff purports to bring this action on behalf of a Class and 

Subclass but deny that Plaintiff or any putative members of the Class or Subclass are entitled to 

any relief whatsoever, and deny that class certification is appropriate. 

COMPLAINT ¶34:

Excluded from the Class and Subclass are any members of the judiciary assigned to 

preside over this matter; any officer or director of Defendants; and any immediate family 

member of such officers or directors. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Plaintiff purports to bring this action on behalf of a Class and 

Subclass but deny that Plaintiff or any putative members of the Class or Subclass are entitled to 

any relief whatsoever, and deny that class certification is appropriate. 

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COMPLAINT ¶35:

Upon information and belief, there are at least hundreds of members of the Class, making 

the Class members so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. Although the exact 

number of Class members is currently unknown to Plaintiff, the members can be easily identified 

through Defendants’ personnel records. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 35. 

COMPLAINT ¶36:

Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members Plaintiff seeks to 

represent, because the factual and legal bases of Defendants’ liability to Plaintiff and the other 

members are the same, and because Defendants’ conduct has resulted in similar injuries to 

Plaintiff and to the Class. As alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Class have all suffered damages as 

a result of Defendants’ BIPA violations. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 36. 

COMPLAINT ¶37:

There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff and the 

Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that may affect individual members. 

Common questions for the Class include, but are not limited to, the following: 

a. Whether Defendants’ conduct is subject to BIPA; 

b. Whether Defendants made available to the public a written policy that establishes a 

retention schedule and guidelines for destroying biometrics; 

c. Whether Defendants obtained a written release from the Class before capturing, 

collecting, or otherwise obtaining their biometrics; 

d. Whether Defendants provided a written disclosure that explains the specific purposes, 

and the length of time, for which biometrics were being collected, stored and used before taking 

such biometrics; 

e. Whether Defendants’ conduct violates BIPA; 

f. Whether Defendants’ violations of the BIPA are willful or reckless; and 

g. Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to damages and injunctive relief. 

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ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 37. 

COMPLAINT ¶38:

Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their 

claims to be prohibitively expensive and would thus have no effective remedy. The class 

treatment of common questions of law and fact is superior to multiple individual actions in that it 

conserves the resources of the courts and the litigants and promotes consistency of adjudication.. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 38. 

COMPLAINT ¶39:

Plaintiff will adequately represent and protect the interests of the members of the Class. 

Plaintiff has retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting complex litigation and 

class actions. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action 

on behalf of the other members of the Class and have the financial resources to do so. Neither 

Plaintiff nor Plaintiff’s counsel have any interest adverse to those of the other members of the 

Class. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 39. 

COMPLAINT ¶40:

Defendants have acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and 

the other members of the Class, requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure 

compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Class and making injunctive or 

corresponding declaratory relief appropriate for the Class as a whole. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 40. 

COUNT I 

Violations of the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 720 ILCS 14/1, et seq. 

(On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class and Subclass) 

COMPLAINT ¶41:

Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein. 

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ANSWER:

Defendants incorporate their previous responses as if fully set forth herein. 

COMPLAINT ¶42:

Defendants are each a private entity under BIPA. 

ANSWER:

Defendants state that the allegations in Paragraph 42 are legal conclusions to which no 

response is required, and therefore deny the allegations contained in this Paragraph. 

COMPLAINT ¶43:

BIPA requires private entities, such as Defendants, to obtain informed written consent 

from individuals before acquiring their biometric information. Specifically, BIPA makes it 

unlawful to “collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s or 

customer’s biometric identifiers or biometric information unless [the entity] first: (1) informs the 

subject . . . in writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or 

stored; (2) informs the subject . . . in writing of the specific purpose and length of for which a 

biometric identifier or biometric information is being captured, collected, stored, and used; and 

(3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or biometric 

information . . . .” 740 ILCS 14/15(b). 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that this Paragraph purports to paraphrase portions of 740 ILCS 

14/15(b). Answering further, Defendants state the cited statute speaks for itself and, accordingly, 

deny any remaining allegations in this Paragraph. 

COMPLAINT ¶44:

BIPA also requires that private entities in possession of biometric identifiers and/or 

biometric information establish and maintain a publicly available biometric retention and 

destruction policy. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that this Paragraph purports to paraphrase portions of BIPA. 

Answering further, Defendants state the cited statute speaks for itself and, accordingly, deny any 

remaining allegations in this Paragraph. 

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COMPLAINT ¶45:

Plaintiff and the other Class and Subclass members have had their “biometric identifiers,” 

namely their fingerprints, collected, captured, or otherwise obtained by Defendants in order to 

track their work hours. Plaintiff and the other Class and Subclass members’ biometric identifiers 

were also used to identify them, and therefore constitute “biometric information” as defined by 

BIPA. 740 ILCS 14/10. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 45. 

COMPLAINT ¶46:

Each instance Plaintiff and the other Class and Subclass members were required to scan 

their fingerprints, Defendants captured, collected, stored, and/or used Plaintiff’s and the other 

Class and Subclass members’ biometric identifiers or biometric information without valid 

consent and without complying with and, thus, in violation of BIPA. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 46. 

COMPLAINT ¶47:

Defendants’ practice with respect to capturing, collecting, storing, and using biometrics 

fails to comply with applicable BIPA requirements: 

a. Defendants failed to inform Plaintiff and the members of the Class in writing that their 

biometrics were being collected and stored, prior to such collection or storage, as required by 

740 ILCS 14/15(b)(1); 

b. Defendants failed to inform Plaintiff and the Class in writing of the specific purpose 

for which their biometrics were being captured, collected, stored, and used, as required by 740 

ILCS 14/15(b)(2); 

c. Defendants failed to inform Plaintiff and the Class in writing the specific length of 

term their biometrics were being captured, collected, stored, and used, as required by 740 ILCS 

14/15(b)(2); 

d. Defendants failed to obtain a written release, as required by 740 ILCS 14/15(b)(3); 

e. Defendants failed to provide a publicly available retention schedule detailing the length 

of time for which the biometrics are stored and/or guidelines for permanently destroying the 

biometrics they store, as required by 740 ILCS 14/15(a); and 

f. Defendants failed to obtain informed consent to disclose or disseminate the Class’ 

biometrics to third parties, as required by 740 ILCS 14/15(d)(1). 

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ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 47. 

COMPLAINT ¶48:

By capturing, collecting, storing, and using Plaintiff’s and the Class’ biometrics as 

described herein, Defendants denied Plaintiff and the Class their right to statutorily required 

information and violated their respective rights to biometric information privacy, as set forth in 

BIPA. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 48. 

COMPLAINT ¶49:

BIPA provides for statutory damages of $5,000 for each willful and/or reckless violation 

of BIPA and, alternatively, damages of $1,000 for each negligent violation of BIPA. 740 ILCS 

14/20(1)-(2). 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that this Paragraph purports to paraphrase portions of 740 ILCS 

14/20(1)-(2). Answering further, Defendants state the cited statute speaks for itself and, 

accordingly, deny any remaining allegations in this Paragraph. 

COMPLAINT ¶50:

Defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that the biometric timekeeping 

systems used would be subject to the provisions of BIPA, a law in effect since 2008, yet wholly 

failed to comply with the statute. As is evident from Defendants’ Code of Conduct, Defendants 

represent that they strive to stay abreast of and comply with applicable privacy laws, but failed to 

do so with respect to BIPA: 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 50. 

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COMPLAINT ¶51:

Alternatively, Defendants negligently failed to comply with BIPA. 

ANSWER:

Defendants deny the allegations in Paragraph 51. 

COMPLAINT ¶52:

Accordingly, with respect to Count I, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the proposed 

Class, prays for the relief set forth below. 

PRAYER FOR RELIEF 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the proposed Class and Subclass, 

respectfully requests that this Court enter an Order: 

a. Certifying the Class and Subclass as defined above, appointing Plaintiff as class 

representative and the undersigned as class counsel; 

b. Declaring that Defendants’ actions, as set forth herein, violate BIPA; 

c. Awarding injunctive and equitable relief as necessary to protect the interests of 

Plaintiff and the Class by requiring Defendants to comply with BIPA; 

d. Awarding statutory damages of $5,000 for each willful and/or reckless violation of 

BIPA, pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(2); 

e. Awarding statutory damages of $1,000 for each negligent violation of BIPA, 

pursuant to 740 ILCS 14/20(1); 

f. Awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and other litigation expenses pursuant to 

740 ILCS 14/20(3); 

g. Awarding pre- and post-judgment interest, as allowable by law; and 

h. Awarding such further and other relief as the Court deems just and equitable. 

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ANSWER:

Defendants deny that Plaintiff has any viable claims against Defendants or that she is 

entitled to any relief, and deny that class certification is appropriate. 

JURY DEMAND 

Plaintiff requests trial by jury of all claims that can be so tried. 

ANSWER:

Defendants admit that Plaintiff demands a trial by jury but deny that Plaintiff has any 

viable claims against Defendants or that she is entitled to any relief. 

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

Defendants assert the following defenses without assuming any burdens of production or 

proof that, pursuant to law, belong to Plaintiff. Defendants reserve the right to amend their answer 

and to assert any additional affirmative defenses as may become available or apparent during the 

course of this litigation. 

First Affirmative Defense 

(Assumption of the Risk) 

Plaintiff had actual and constructive knowledge of the risks inherent in the use of the 

system alleged in the Complaint. Nonetheless, Plaintiff voluntarily undertook such risks and to 

the extent that Plaintiff suffered any injury, the proximate cause of such injury was not a negligent 

action nor omission by Defendants. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff allegedly suffered an injury 

from placing her hand or finger on a hand- or fingerprint-scanner, any recovery against Defendants 

should be barred or reduced by the degree to which Plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risks inherent 

in her use of the system alleged in the Complaint and any resulting injury therefrom. 

Second Affirmative Defense 

(Consent) 

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Plaintiff’s claims are barred in whole or in part because Plaintiff and other members of the 

putative Class and Subclass consented to the practices she challenges by expressly and/or 

impliedly agreeing to the use of the system alleged in the Complaint. 

Third Affirmative Defense 

(Waiver/Estoppel) 

Plaintiff’s claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of waiver. Upon 

information and belief, Plaintiff and the putative class members approved and, in some cases, 

participated in the conduct Plaintiff now complains of. As a result, Plaintiff and the putative class 

members are barred from bringing BIPA claims under the doctrine of waiver. 

Fourth Affirmative Defense 

(Statute of Limitations) 

Plaintiff and the purported class’s claims are barred to the extent that Plaintiff and the 

putative class members failed to bring their causes of action with respect to certain of the alleged 

violations within the periods required by the statutes of limitations, as Plaintiff and members of 

the putative class members utilized the timekeeping systems at issue in the Complaint outside of 

the applicable and appropriate limitations period(s). 

Fifth Affirmative Defense 

(Due Process) 

The individual and class claims for damages asserted in this case are barred in whole or in 

part by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff alleges that they and 

the putative class members she seeks to represent are entitled to recover $1,000 in statutory 

damages for each alleged negligent violation of BIPA and $5,000 in statutory damages for each 

alleged willful and/or reckless violation of BIPA. Plaintiff and the putative class members have 

not suffered any harm as a result of the conduct alleged. The statutory damages potentially 

available under BIPA are grossly excessive and disproportionate in light of the absence of any 

injury or harm to Plaintiff and the putative class members, and therefore any award of statutory 

damages to the Plaintiff or putative class members would violate Defendants’ due process rights. 

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Sixth Affirmative Defense 

(Good Faith) 

The claims are barred in whole or in part by Defendants’ good faith, and the absence of 

negligent, intentional, or reckless conduct. To the extent that BIPA applies to one or both of 

Defendants’ conduct, Defendants are not liable because they both relied in good faith upon a 

reasonable interpretation of BIPA’s statutory language and any alleged violation was not negligent, 

intentional, or reckless. 

Seventh Affirmative Defense 

(Ratification/Acquiescence) 

The claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrines of ratification and acquiescence. 

Upon information and belief, Plaintiff and the putative class members approved and, in some cases, 

participated in the complained-of conduct, by agreeing to and assisting in implementing the system 

as alleged in the Complaint. As a result, they are barred from bringing their claims under the 

doctrines of ratification and acquiescence. 

Eighth Affirmative Defense 

(Substantial Compliance) 

The claims are barred in whole or in part because, to the extent that BIPA applies to the 

conduct alleged (which Defendants deny), Defendants substantially complied with the 

requirements of BIPA. 

Ninth Affirmative Defense 

(Intervening/Superseding Cause) 

Plaintiff’s claims, or a portion of them, if any, are barred because any damages incurred 

were caused by intervening or superseding causes, and not as a result of any action or omission of 

Defendants. Such intervening or superseding causes include but are not limited to any actions or 

omissions by third-parties. 

Tenth Affirmative Defense 

(Unenforceable Penalty) 

Plaintiff’s prayer for relief is barred in whole or in part because the recovery of statutory 

damages would not be a reasonable estimate of actual damages. Instead, such recovery amounts 

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to a disparate penalty, akin to punitive damages for strict liability, and should be deemed 

unenforceable. 

Eleventh Affirmative Defense 

(BIPA is Special Legislation) 

Plaintiff’s claims and the claims of putative class members are barred because the 

Biometric Information Privacy Act is “special legislation” and, therefore, violates the Illinois’ 

State Constitution. See Allen v. Woodfield Chevrolet, Inc., 208 Ill. 2d 12, 802 N.E.2d 752 (2003). 

Twelfth Affirmative Defense 

(Failure to Mitigate Damages) 

Plaintiff’s claims and the claims of putative class members should be reduced due to 

Plaintiff’s and the putative class members’ failure to failure to mitigate damages. 

Thirteenth Affirmative Defense 

(Traceability and Redressability) 

Each class member’s claims are barred in whole or in part to the extent that any purported 

injury, if any, is not fairly traceable to the alleged violation of BIPA or negligence, and the relief 

sought would not redress any such injury. Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ alleged 

noncompliance with BIPA’s notice and consent provisions disregarded her privacy rights and 

caused informational injury, economic harm and mental anguish with a constant risk of exposure 

and dissemination of their biometric identifiers and biometric information. Yet, to the extent that 

one of both Defendants failed to comply with the requirements of the statute relative to Plaintiff 

or any other putative class member, strict compliance with the statute (including obtaining 

advance written consent for the collection, storage, and use of such data, and/or disclosing the 

purpose and length of term for same) would not have stopped Plaintiff or any putative class 

member from knowingly and voluntarily using finger scan devices and therefore, would not have 

prevented the collection, storage, and use of any such data or otherwise mitigate against such 

purported injuries. 

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Fourteenth Affirmative Defense 

(Mootness) 

Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, to the extent they are or become moot as 

to Plaintiff and some or all members of the putative Class. Settlements or dispositive rulings in 

overlapping BIPA actions may moot the claims at issue here. 

Fifteenth Affirmative Defense 

(Statutory Damages) 

Plaintiff’s claims for damages (and certain categories of damages, and the amounts thereof 

recoverable) are limited by the applicable limits on statutory damages, including but not limited to 

those limits set forth in the BIPA. 

Sixteenth Affirmative Defense 

(After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine) 

Plaintiff and putative class members may be barred, in whole or in part, from recovery of 

damages as alleged and prayed for in the Complaint by the after-acquired evidence doctrine. 

Seventeenth Affirmative Defense 

(No Ascertainable Class) 

The putative class asserted in the Complaint is inappropriate for class certification because 

there is no ascertainable class. 

Eighteenth Affirmative Defense 

(Numerosity) 

The putative class asserted in the Complaint is inappropriate for class certification because 

the class is not so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. 

Nineteenth Affirmative Defense 

(Predominance) 

The putative class asserted in the Complaint is inappropriate for class certification because 

common issues of law and fact do not predominate over individual issues, as many members of 

the class signed consent forms relative to the conduct alleged in the Complaint. 

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Twentieth Affirmative Defense 

(Common Questions of Law and Fact) 

The putative class asserted in the Complaint is inappropriate for class certification because 

there is no well-defined community of interest in or commonality between the questions of law 

and fact in this putative class action. 

Twenty-First Affirmative Defense 

(Typicality) 

The putative class asserted in the Complaint is inappropriate for class certification because 

Plaintiff’s claims are not typical of the claims of other members of the putative class. 

Twenty-Second Affirmative Defense 

(Superiority) 

The putative class asserted in the Complaint is inappropriate for class certification because 

a class action is not superior to other methods for fair and efficient adjudication of this matter. 

Twenty-Third Affirmative Defense 

(Adequate Representation) 

The putative class asserted in the Complaint is inappropriate for class certification because 

neither Plaintiff nor her counsel are able to fairly and adequately protect the interest of all members 

of the putative class. 

Twenty-Fourth Affirmative Defense 

(Impropriety of Class-Wide Injunctive Relief) 

Injunctive relief is barred because Plaintiff and the members of the putative class have not 

suffered irreparable harm and there is no real or immediate threat of injury. 

Twenty-Fifth Affirmative Defense 

(No Retention/Storage/Collection/Possession/Capture/Purchase/Reception/Transimission/ 

Disclosure) 

Plaintiff’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, because Defendants did not retain, 

store, collect, possess, capture, purchase, receive, transmit, or disclose biometric identifiers or 

biometric information as defined under BIPA. 

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Twenty-Sixth Affirmative Defense 

(Employment) 

Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. is not liable for Plaintiff’s claims because it was not 

Plaintiff’s employer and, to the extent any of Plaintiff’s allegations are true, Enterprise Holdings, 

Inc. did not direct or control any of the alleged conduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims, nor did it 

collect, capture, possess, or disclose Plaintiff’s information. 

Twenty-Seventh Affirmative Defense 

(No Participation) 

Defendant Enterprise Holdings, Inc. is not liable for Plaintiff’s claims because, to the 

extent any of Plaintiff’s allegations are true, Enterprise Holdings, Inc. did not participate in any 

of the alleged conduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims. 

Twenty-Eighth Affirmative Defense 

(Workers’ Compensation Preemption) 

To the extent that Plaintiff suffered injuries from using the system alleged in the 

Complaint, such injuries occurred in the workplace and in connection with her employment. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff and the class’s claims are preempted or otherwise barred by the Illinois 

Workers’ Compensation Act, which provides the exclusive remedy for injuries that arise in the 

workplace or in connection with employment. 

Twenty-Ninth Affirmative Defense 

(Labor Preemption) 

Plaintiff’s claims and the claims of putative class members are barred and preempted by 

the Labor Management Relations Act, and comparable statutes, to the extent they are subject to a 

collective bargaining agreement. 

Thirtieth Affirmative Defense 

(Government Exemption) 

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Plaintiff’s claims and the claims of putative class members are barred to the extent that 

their claims arise out of Defendants work as a contractor, subcontractor, or agent of government. 

740 ILCS 14/25. 

Defendants reserves the right to assert additional defenses in the event that discovery 

reveals additional defenses are appropriate. 

DATED: February 2, 2021 Respectfully submitted, 

ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY OF 

CHICAGO, LLC and ENTERPRISE 

HOLDINGS, INC. 

By /s/ Thomas E. Ahlering

 One of Their Attorneys 

Erin Dougherty Foley 

edfoley@seyfarth.com

Thomas E. Ahlering

tahlering@seyfarth.com 

Alexandra S. Oxyer 

aoxyer@seyfarth.com 

SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 

233 S. Wacker Dr., Suite 8000 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

Telephone: 312-460-5000 

Facsimile: 312-460-7000

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67910870v.4 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of February, 2021, a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing document was filed with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system which will 

send notification to the e-mail addresses of all counsel of record denoted on the electronic Mail 

Notice List. 

/s/Thomas E. Ahlering_____

Thomas E. Ahlering 

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