alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 31.2**
**CERTIFICATIONS**
I, Lester C. Johnson, certify that:
     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of FelCorLodging Limited Partnership;
     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untruestatement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to makethe statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respectsthe financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrantas of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
     4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:
     a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, toensure that material information relating to the registrant, including itsconsolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;
     b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about theeffectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end ofthe period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
     c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) that occurred during the registrant’s most recentfiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of anannual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.
     5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, basedon our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, tothe registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
     a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the designor operation of internal control over financial reporting which arereasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and
     b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management orother employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting.   Date: May 7, 2004 */s/Lester C. Johnson*
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

GLENN F. STRAUB,

Appellant,

v.

CAROL CHAPUIS and JESSICA NICODEMO f/k/a JESSICA

SWERDLIN,

Appellees.

No. 4D 2 02 3

- 0 347

[ November 30, 2023 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm

Beach County; Richard Oftedal, Senior Judge; L.T. Case No.

502019CA001140.

Larry A. Zink of Zink, Zink & Zink Co., L.P.A., Hillsboro Beach, for

appellant.

Elizabeth L. Parker of George Feldman McDonald, PLLC, Lake Worth,

for appellees.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed.

K LINGENSMITH

, C.J., F ORST and K UNTZ

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
Exhibit 4.1


 


 


 


	
  COMMON
  STOCK

   

  NUMBER

  KAR

   

   

   

   

  THIS CERTIFICATE IS TRANSFERABLE  IN NEW YORK, NY OR SOUTH ST. PAUL, MN

  	
  

  Incorporated
  Under the Laws of the State of Delaware

  	
  COMMON
  STOCK

  SHARES

   

   

   

  SEE REVERSE FOR CERTAIN DEFINITIONS

  CUSIP

  



 


THIS CERTIFIES THAT


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


IS THE OWNER OF


	
  FULLY PAID AND
  NON-ASSESSABLE SHARES OF COMMON STOCK, NO PAR VALUE PER SHARE, OF

  	
  

  
	
  ADESA, INC.

  
	
   

  
	
  transferable on the books of the Corporation in person or by duly
  authorized attorney upon surrender of the Certificate properly endorsed.This
  Certificate is not valid until countersigned by the Transfer Agent and
  registered by the Registrar.

  
	
  WITNESS the facsimile seal
  of the Corporation and the facsimile signatures of its duly authorized
  officers.

  
	
  DATED:

   

   

   

   

   

   

   

  
	
   

  	
   

  	
   

  
	
  

  TREASURER

  	
  

  	
  

  EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND

  CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
#### Daniel J. McKenna, Plaintiff, *v.*Louise M. Meehan, Defendant.

Supreme Court, New York County,

November 11, 1925.

Partition — complaint affirming conveyance of real estate to defendant for benefit of defendant and plaintiff, and asking only for enforcement of trust, does not state action for partition — plaintiff not entitled to have issues framed for jury trial.

A complaint, which expressly affirms a conveyance of real estate to the defendant for the benefit of the defendant and of the plaintiff, and asks only for the enforcement of an alleged oral trust, does not state a cause of action in partition and, therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to have issues framed for a jury trial.

Motion by plaintiff to have issues framed for a jury trial in this equity action on the ground that it is an action in partition.

*McLaughlin & Stern [Martin Lippman*and *Max L. Stolz*of counsel], for the plaintiff.

*Hector M. Hitchings,*for the defendant.

Proskauer, J.

The complaint alleges that the real estate involved was the property of the mother of plaintiff and defendant; that it was transferred by the mother to the defendant upon the defendant’s promise to hold the same for the joint benefit of her brother and herself and that after the death of the mother she would divide the property equally with her brother. The complaint does not pray that this conveyance be set aside. On the contrary, it expressly affirms the conveyance and seeks to enforce the oral trust upon which the plaintiff claims the conveyance was made and accepted. Thus, the plaintiff does not claim to have legal title. By the complaint he concedes that the legal title is in the defendant and asks the enforcement of a trust. This does not constitute an action in partition. There are authorities holding that where it is sought to set aside a conveyance and the result of this would be to leave the legal title in the plaintiff and the defendant and the 0 complaint prays for partition, the action is deemed one in partition. *(Weston*v. *Stoddard,*137 N. Y. 119; *McGuire*v. *McGuire,*201 App. Div. 71; *Bryant*v. *Shaw,*190 id. 578; *Curran*v. *Hosey,*153 id. 557; *Leidenthal*v. *Leidenthal,*121 id. 269; *Drake*v. *Drake,*61 id. 1; *Holder*v. *Holder,*40 id. 255; *Wagstaff*v. *Marcy,*25 Misc. 121; *Best*v. *Zeh,*82 Hun, 232.)

But those cases proceed upon the theory of disaffirmance of the conveyance and not of its affirmance as here.

The motion must, therefore, be denied. Order signed.
DIRECTOR'S MATCHING GIFT PROGRAM DESCRIPTION



 












Exhibit 10.13



VIAD CORP DIRECTOR’S CHARITABLE MATCHING PROGRAM




     The Director’s Charitable Matching Program provides for corporate
matching of charitable contributions made by nonemployee directors, on a
dollar-for-dollar basis, up to an aggregate maximum of $5,000 per year.
**EXHIBIT 32.1****CEO CERTIFICATION**     Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(18 USC §1350, as adopted), Lowell R. Selvin, theChief Executive Officer of PlanetOut Inc. (the“Company”), hereby certifies that, to the best of hisknowledge:          1. The Company’s Annual Report on    Form 10-K for the    period ended December 31, 2005, and to which this    Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.1 fully complies    with the requirements of Section 13(a) or    Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of    1934, and           2. The information contained in the Annual Report fairly    presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and    results of operations of the Company for the periods presented    therein.     **In Witness Whereof,** the undersigned has set his handhereto as of the 15th day of March 2006.     /s/ Lowell R. Selvin       Lowell R. Selvin     Chief Executive Officer     The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuantto 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and is not being filed aspart of this report. A signed original of this written statementrequired by Section 906 has been provided to PlanetOut Inc.and will be retained by PlanetOut Inc. and furnished to theSecurities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
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#### J. W. Smith *v.*Granville Smith, &c.

Mortgages — Foreclosure—Notice of Prior Conveyance — Record.

In the absence of record notice, a mortgagee of an undivided interest, in lands is held to be entitled to a foreclosure, as against an unrecorded, bond for title executed prior to the mortgage.

APPEAL EROM BREATHITT CIRCUIT COURT.

October 5, 1870.

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Hardin.:

A,. B. Patrick and the appellant, J. W. Smith, owned jointly a large tract of land lying on both sides of the North Fork of the Kentucky Kiver, including coal lands on the South side of the river, and on the 26th of November, ‘I860, Patrick sold and conveyed to Smith and A. P. Williams jointly, his interest in the whole tract, describing it as an undivided moiety in all the land and coal lands on both sides of the river, and on the 11th of December, 1865, Williams made a deed of mortgage of his interest in the land so acquired to the appellee, Granville Smith, to secure a debt of about $1500, and this suit was brought by Smith for a foreclosure of that mortgage.

The appellant filed an answer resisting the relief sought as to the land on the South side of the river, on the ground that in 1859, he and Patrick, then the joint owners, had divided the land between them, making the river the line, and he taking the land on the South side and Patrick that lying on the North side of the river, and he set forth a bond from Patrick covenanting to convey his title to the land on the South side of the river accordingly, and alleged 'that he had executed a bond also for a conveyance to Patrick of the land on the North side, except his interest in certain mills.

On the pleadings and exhibits only, no testimony being taken by either party, the court adjudged a foreclosure of the mortgage, and decided that Williams’ interest, embraced and conveyed by the mortgage, was an undivided fourth part of all the land as described in the deed of Patrick, and the mortgage, and was not *323restricted to tbe North side of tbe river by tbe alleged agreement between tbe appellant and Patrick, made in 1859. And to reverse that judgment tbis appeal is prosecuted.

Lindseys, *for appellant.*

*Craddock &*Trabue, *for appellees.*

As tbe appellant, as well as Williams, derived and claimed title under tbe deed of Patrick, to one fourth of tbe land, described as an undivided interest in tbe whole tract, and it does not appear that tbe appellee when be accepted tbe mortgage from Williams, bad notice of tbe alleged contract between tbe appellant and Patrick, nor even that Williams bad such notice when be became a joint purchaser with tbe appellant, of tbe title and interest of Patrick, describing as extending throughout tbe whole of tbe land; tbe rights of tbe appellant under bis contract with Patrick, however available they may have been against him, could not be successfully asserted as against the appellee, who must be presumed to have accepted tbe mortgage on tbe faith of Williams’ recorded evidence of title, which tbe appellant as a co-grantor with Williams, was equitably estopped from controverting.

Wherefore tbe judgment is affirmed.
#### 860 West 181st Street Corporation, Appellant, *v.*David Perlberg, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,

February 10, 1926.

Landlord and tenant — hold-over tenant — repeal of Laws of 1920, chap. 136, § 12, did not affect Civil Practice Act, § 1410, subd. 1-a —• plaintiff entitled to rent upon renewed term where tenant held over.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the rent of premises upon the theory of a renewal for one year, under subdivision 1-a of section 1410 of the Civil Practice Act, where the tenant held over, since said subdivision was unaffected by the repeal of section 12 of chapter 136 of the Laws of 1920.

Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of the Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Eighth District, entered in favor of the defendant.

*Gold & Maran [Louis J. Gold*of counsel], for the appellant.

*Benjamin Antin,*for the respondent.

Per Curiam.

As the provisions of subdivision 1-a of section 1410 of the Civil Practice Act were not affected by the repeal of section 12 of chapter 136 of the Laws of 1920, as last amended by chapter 664 of the Laws of 1922, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for the rent as upon a renewal for one year upon the holding over by the defendant. *(12 East 86th St. Corp.*v. *Berstein,*124 Misc. 125; affd., by Appellate Term, April, 1925; *Ceri Realty Co.*v. *Kyprianidi,*126 Misc. 273.)

Judgment reversed, with $30 costs, and judgment directed for plaintiff for the sum of $250, with interest and costs.

All concur; present, Bijur, Delehanty and Wagner, JJ.
#### Gerald Alexander, Dennis L. Hurt v. State of Indiana.

[No. 2-175A13.

Filed August 11, 1975.

Rehearing denied September 18, 1975.]

*310
      *Palmer K. Ward,*of Indianapolis, for appellant.

*Theodore L. Sendak,*Attorney General, *Wesley T. Wilson,*Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Per Curiam

The only issue presented for review by this appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Gerald Alexander and Dennis L. Hurt’s convictions of First Degree Burglary.1

We affirm.

The facts of this case, viewed most favorably to the State, are as follows:

In the morning of July 16, 1974, an apartment at 3349 N. Capitol in Indianapolis, occupied by Jesse C. Whitley was broken into and, a color television set, among other things, was taken. Lee D. Jones, Whitley’s landlord and occupant of the other apartment in the building, testified that he observed two men come out of the rear entrance to Whitley’s apartment, one carrying a television set wrapped in a red blanket, get in a car and drive away. He positively identified Alexander and Hurt as these two men.

On appeal, they challenge only the conclusiveness of this identification, emphasizing his inaccurate description of the getaway car and his inability to state which of the two was actually carrying the television. These matters affect only the weight to be given Jones’s testimony, which is a determination within the exclusive province of the trial court. *Dockery*v. *State*(1974), 161 Ind. App. 681, 317 N.E.2d 453.

At trial Jones testified as follows:

> “Q. Mr. Jones, are these two gentlemen seated over here, the defendants, the same people that you saw on August 16,1974?

> A. Yes, it is.

> Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that these two people are the people?

> *311A. No.”

This positive eyewitness identification testimony permitted the trial court to conclude that Alexander and Hurt were the two men Jones observed removing property from Whitley’s forcibly entered apartment and thus to sustain their convictions. *Sargent*v. *State*(1973), 156 Ind. App. 469, 297 N.E.2d 459.

The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed.

Note. — Reported at 332 N.E.2d 116.

. IC 1971, 35-13-4-4, Ind.Ann.Stat. §10-701 (Burns 1956).
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Pamela Marie Ybarra, * From the 161st District Court

of Ector County,

Trial Court No. B-19-0156-CR.

Vs. No. 11-23-00021-CR * April 30, 2024

The State of Texas, * Memorandum Opinion by Trotter, J. 

(Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.)

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is no 

error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, 

the judgment of the trial court is in all things affirmed.
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#### Nathan Musgrave et al *v.*James P. Powel et al.

Courts — Reasonable Time to Comply With Mandate.

An opinion of the Appellate Court, revising a judgment below, implies that the litigant shall have a reasonable time to comply with the man- • date, and discharge the order.

Same — Trial.

Ordinarily actions do not stand for trial at the term of the court at which a mandate of the Appellate Court, reversing a former judgment in the ease, is filed.

Same — Process.

Nor can a decree thereon, in the court below, be entered until process is served on the litigants.

APPEAL PROM m’lEAN CIRCUIT COURT.

May 22, 1871.

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Lindsey:

By a former opinion of this court reversing a judgment’ of the court below, it was directed that upon the return of the cause, that unless either Sharp or Higden removed the lien held on the land by Griffith’s executors, the contract of sale by Higden to the Powers should be rescinded, upon equitable terms. Such an order implied that the parties were to have a reasonable time within which to discharge said lien. Ordinarily, actions do not stand for trial at the term of the court at which a mandate of this court reversing a former judgment in the case is filed, but it seems that in this case the court proceeded at once to render a judgment rescinding the contract of sale to the Powers and enforcing the lien of Griffith’s executors. Whether or not this fact of itself would be sufficient to authorize a reversal of the judgment by this court it is not necessary to decide, as the judgment must be reversed for another reason. It does not appear from the record, that either Sharp, the vendee of Griffith’s executors, nor Higden, his vendee, were before the court by service of process, nor that either of them were parties to the former appeal. It was, therefore, erroneous to render a judgment at all, as the rights of the *24parties could not be finally determined. Wherefore, said judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for proper proceedings.

*Little, for appellant.*

*Turner, for 'appellee.*