[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 16-10552

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D.C. Docket No. 1:03-cv-22046-KMW

JUAN A. SALINAS, 

LUCILA FUENTES, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 versus

SUE ANN RAMSEY, 

HILDA RAMSEY, 

 Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(May 2, 2017)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and DUFFEY,∗ District 

Judge.

MARTIN, Circuit Judge: 

 ∗ Honorable William S. Duffey, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District 

of Georgia, sitting by designation.

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A federal jury found Sue Ann Ramsey violated the Fair Labor Standards 

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., by not paying Juan Salinas and Lucila Fuentes time 

and a half for overtime work. On the day of the verdict, September 23, 2004, the 

District Court entered a money judgment against Ms. Ramsey in favor of Mr. 

Salinas and Ms. Fuentes. The clerk of the court then issued two writs of execution 

on the judgments, the first on November 24, 2004, and the second on April 6, 

2005. Then nothing happened in the case for over ten years. 

On May 15, 2015, Mr. Salinas and Ms. Fuentes came back to the federal 

court where they got the judgment, and filed a motion to compel post-judgment

discovery, which the District Court denied as untimely. In doing so, the court 

relied on Balfour Beatty Bahamas, Ltd. v. Bush, 170 F.3d 1048 (11th Cir. 1999). 

This Court held in Balfour that a request for post-judgment discovery made almost 

seven years after the judgment was entered was barred by the five-year limitations 

period established in Fla. Stat. § 95.11(2)(a). Id. at 1049, 1051. The facts here are 

nearly identical to those in Balfour.

In seeking a different outcome than the judgment holder got in Balfour, Mr. 

Salinas and Ms. Fuentes tell us that since this Court decided Balfour, a Florida 

intermediate appellate court has affirmatively stated that Balfour was wrongly 

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decided.

1

 See Burshan v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 805 So. 2d 

835 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). And Mr. Salinas and Ms. Fuentes are not the first to 

make our Court aware of the Florida court’s criticism of Balfour. Indeed even 

before Burshan was decided, this Court sought the aid of the Florida Supreme 

Court in deciding which Florida statute set the statute of limitations in this 

circumstance. First, in Leasco Response, Inc. v. Wright, 99 F.3d 381 (11th Cir. 

1996) (per curiam), a panel of this Court asked the Florida Supreme Court (by way 

of certified question) which Florida statute set the limitations period for an action 

to enforce a judgment brought in the federal district court located in Florida, where 

the judgment originated. Id. at 383. However, the parties in Leasco settled their 

dispute before the Florida Supreme Court could answer the question we certified. 

See Balfour, 170 F.3d at 1050.

Then in Buse v. Kuechenberg, 325 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated, 337 

F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2003), a panel of this Court acknowledged the conflict 

between our Court’s decision in Balfour and the Florida District Court of Appeal’s

discussion of why our Balfour decision was wrong. Id. at 1251–52. Again, we 

certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court, seeking guidance about how to 

properly enforce statutes of limitations set by Florida law. See id. at 1252. But 

 1 Our Court rule requires us to follow prior panel precedent, but there is an exception for 

when a state appellate court tells us we interpreted its state law incorrectly. EmbroidMe.com, 

Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 845 F.3d 1099, 1105 (11th Cir. 2017).

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this time too, the parties in Buse settled and their appeal was dismissed before the 

Florida Supreme Court could answer our question. 337 F.3d at 1250–51. Now the 

appeal brought by Mr. Salinas and Ms. Fuentes gives us yet another chance to seek 

guidance from the Florida Supreme Court on this subject.

Of course the lower Florida courts are routinely called upon to apply the 

various statutes of limitations set by Florida law. For example, in Kiesel v. 

Graham, 388 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), the holders of a judgment obtained 

in federal court came to Florida state court seeking a writ of mandamus to aid in 

collection of their judgment that was more than five years old. Id. at 595. The

Kiesel court was presented with the question of which limitations period from Fla. 

Stat. § 95.11 applied. Id. As relevant here, § 95.11 says:

Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced 

as follows:

(1) Within twenty years.—An action on a judgment or decree of a 

court of record in this state.

(2) Within five years.—

(a) An action on a judgment or decree of any court, not of record, of 

this state or any court of the United States, any other state or territory 

in the United States, or a foreign country.

Fla. Stat. §§ 95.11(1)–(2)(a). The Kiesel court concluded the five-year statute of 

limitations governed. 388 So. 2d at 596. In Balfour, our Court “adopt[ed]” the

holding from Kiesel. See Balfour, 170 F.3d at 1051. 

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After this Court signed onto the rationale of Kiesel, another Florida District 

Court of Appeal (the Fourth) set out why we were both wrong. Burshan, 805 So. 

2d at 843–44. It said that neither limitations period in § 95.11 applied. Id. at 843. 

Rather, the Burshan court reasoned that the limitations periods established by 

§ 95.11 apply to an “action on a judgment.” Id. at 840. The court opined that 

under common law, “action on a judgment” referred to a new action filed by a

judgment creditor, which would restart the limitations clock on his judgment 

without having to relitigate the merits of the original cause of action. Id. at 840–

41. The Burshan court relied on the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Young v. 

McKenzie, 46 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 1950), which held that § 95.11 did not apply to 

certain post-judgment discovery proceedings because those proceedings were 

meant to help the holder of an existing judgment execute that judgment, and not 

“to bring new life to the judgment itself.” Id. at 185; see also Burshan 805 So. 2d 

at 842–43. Burshan and Kiesel show that, even among Florida courts, there are

differing views about which limitations period applies in which cases. 

“When substantial doubt exists about the answer to a material state law 

question,” a federal court should “avoid making unnecessary state law guesses and 

[] offer the state court the opportunity to explicate state law.” Forgione v. Dennis 

Pirtle Agency, Inc., 93 F.3d 758, 761 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). The conflict 

between our precedent and the Florida appellate court’s decision in Burshan

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creates “substantial doubt” about the meaning of §§ 95.11(1) and 2(a). See id. In 

order to resolve it, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:

What limitations period, if any, applies to a request for post-judgment 

discovery brought in federal district court in Florida on a judgment 

entered by that same federal district court?

We appreciate the assistance of the Florida Supreme Court with this 

question. Neither our presentation of the issue, nor the phrasing of our question 

are intended to restrict the Florida Supreme Court’s analysis of this or any other 

issue it chooses to address. See City of Marietta v. CSX Transp., Inc., 196 F.3d 

1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999); Edmonds v. Bronner, 864 F.2d 752, 753–54 (11th 

Cir. 1989). While we hope the Florida Supreme Court will answer our question, 

we also recognize that it has no obligation to do so. That said, “we would greatly 

prefer to hear from the state’s highest court on this unsettled and important area of 

state law.” Butler v. The Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1266 

(11th Cir. 2001).

QUESTION CERTIFIED.

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