NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FELICIANA PABLO-PABLO; JAMES 

ARNOLDO PABLO-PABLO, 

Petitioners, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-71531 

Agency Nos. A216-386-675 

A216-386-676 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 13, 2020**

San Francisco, California

Before: SILER,*** TALLMAN, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.

Feliciana Pablo-Pablo (“Pablo”) and her minor son, J.A.P.P., petition for 

review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and move for 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 27 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 19-71531 

remand to the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“EOIR”).1 Our jurisdiction 

is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition for review because the BIA’s 

decision denying asylum is supported by substantial evidence.2 See Lopez-Cardona 

v. Holder, 662 F.3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining the standard of review). 

We also deny the motion to remand based on Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 

(2018), because Pablo failed to exhaust administrative remedies by neglecting to 

raise this argument in her appeal to the BIA.

Pablo claims that she is entitled to asylum because she has demonstrated that 

she cannot return to Guatemala “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 

persecution on account of . . . membership in [] particular social group[s].” See 8 

U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A).

To establish past persecution, Pablo must show “(1) an incident, or incidents, 

that rise to the level of persecution; (2) that is on account of one of the statutorilyprotected grounds; and (3) is committed by the government or forces the government 

1 Pablo’s son’s asylum claim is derivative of his mother’s. Thus, we refer only to 

Pablo’s application throughout the disposition.

2 Nexus issues are generally reviewed for substantial evidence, see Parussimova v. 

Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 738-39 (9th Cir. 2009), but this court has also suggested 

that nexus issues are questions of law, reviewed de novo, when the petitioner is 

deemed credible, see Baghdasaryan v. Holder, 592 F.3d 1018, 1022 n.4 (9th Cir. 

2010). Here, Pablo was found credible as to only one of her two asserted particular 

social groups, but the parties have not raised any issue regarding the applicable 

standard of review, and we do not address it.
3 19-71531 

is either unable or unwilling to control.” Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 877-78 (9th 

Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Only the second element is disputed here. Pablo claims that she was 

persecuted on account of her membership in two particular social groups: 

indigenous Guatemalan women and immediate family members of Antonio (Pablo’s 

former partner). Even so, the BIA’s conclusion that Pablo failed to show past 

persecution on account of her membership in these social groups is supported by 

substantial evidence.

First, the BIA reasonably concluded that abuse by Pablo’s ex-husband, 

Marcelino, was “meant to humiliate and control [Pablo] as an individual,” not 

because she is an indigenous Guatemalan woman. The BIA acknowledged that 

“[t]he evidence reflects that Marcelino (and his mother) criticized the respondent for 

being ‘ugly’ and ‘dark’ [skinned].” Even so, the BIA observed that “Marcelino and 

his parents were also indigenous Mam speakers . . . , and there is nothing in the 

record to indicate that Marcelino mistreated other indigenous Guatemalan women 

or harbored hostility toward them as a group.” Moreover, the record indicates that 

Marcelino abused Pablo to control her as a person based on jealousy and misogyny, 

all unrelated to her indigenous heritage. As a result, while Marcelino’s domestic 

harm to Pablo was disturbing and cruel, we cannot say that any reasonable 

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that Pablo suffered harm on account of 
4 19-71531 

her indigenous Guatemalan ancestry. Doe, 736 F.3d at 877 (holding reversal is 

warranted under substantial evidence review only if the evidence compels a contrary 

result).

Second, the BIA’s conclusion that Pablo was not attacked on account of her 

membership as an immediate family member of Antonio is similarly supported by 

substantial evidence. Pablo contends that she was attacked and extorted because of 

her romantic relationship with a man named Antonio, who owed unidentified men 

100,000 quetzals. But, as the BIA noted, the demand of 100,000 quetzals by Pablo’s 

attackers, while identical to the debt owed by Antonio, is a round number that could 

easily have been chosen at random as part of an indiscriminate extortion attempt. 

Further, the alleged attack and extortion attempt occurred approximately two-and-ahalf years after Antonio had left Guatemala, with no evidence of violence or 

demands before the 2017 attack. Finally, Pablo acknowledged that her attackers 

spoke a different dialect of Mam than that spoken in Todos Santos, the area where 

Antonio’s creditors were located. Taken together, this evidence does not compel the 

conclusion that Pablo was attacked because of her relationship with Antonio. 

In sum, the BIA’s finding that Pablo failed to establish a nexus between the 

harm she suffered and her purported social groups is supported by substantial 

evidence. The record supports a reasonable conclusion that Pablo suffered severe 

domestic violence and was the victim of an indiscriminate attack and extortion 
5 19-71531 

attempt. While tragic, the BIA permissibly concluded that these events occurred 

independent of Pablo’s membership as an indigenous Guatemalan woman and as an 

immediate family member of Antonio.

As a final matter, we do not reach the merits of Pablo’s motion to remand to 

the EOIR for lack of immigration court jurisdiction based on Pereira v. Sessions, 

138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), because she failed to exhaust the jurisdictional claim in her

brief to the BIA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); see also Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 

674, 677 (9th Cir. 2004).

3

The petition for review and motion to remand are DENIED.4

3 Even if it had been exhausted, Pablo’s claim would fail in light of Fermin v. Barr, 

958 F.3d 887, 894-95 (9th Cir. 2020), and Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158 

(9th Cir. 2019).

4 Pablo’s motion to stay proceedings is denied as moot.