Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed May 29, 2024.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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No. 3D23-0155

Lower Tribunal No. 20-174-M

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Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP,

Appellant,

vs.

Colleen Lamb-Ferrara, et al.,

Appellees.

An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Monroe

County, Mark H. Jones, Judge.

Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A., and David R. Atkinson and Lauren 

V. Purdy (Jacksonville), for appellants.

Hershoff, Lupino & Yagel, LLP, and Russell A. Yagel and Matthew O. 

Hutchinson, for appellees.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ.

LOGUE, C.J.

Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP (“Neal, Gerber”), an Illinois law firm,

appeals the trial court’s nonfinal order denying its motion to dismiss for lack 
2

of personal jurisdiction. Because we conclude Appellees adequately 

established sufficient facts demonstrating personal jurisdiction under 

Florida’s Long-Arm Statute and satisfying due process requirements, we 

affirm.

BACKGROUND

Neal, Gerber is a law firm organized pursuant to the Illinois Uniform 

Partnership Act. Its principal place of business and headquarters is in 

Chicago, Illinois, where it maintains a single office.

In 2008, Neal, Gerber was retained by Matthew Lamb and his wife to 

prepare their respective wills and update their estate plans. Mr. Lamb, a 

prominent artist owning considerable property and assets around the world, 

designated Florida as his domicile in his will and estate plans. He passed 

away on February 18, 2012, and his widow, in her capacity as executor of 

Mr. Lamb’s will, retained Neal, Gerber in connection with the Estate of 

Matthew Lamb.

Neal, Gerber advised that Florida counsel be retained to commence 

probate proceedings for the Estate in Florida. The executor thereafter 

retained Florida counsel and a probate action was filed on April 4, 2012, in 

the Circuit Court of Monroe County, Florida (the “Probate Action”).
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In August of 2012, Mr. Lamb’s widow resigned as executor and 

personal representative of the Estate of Matthew Lamb and was replaced by 

their daughter, Sheila Lamb-Gabler, pursuant to the terms of Mr. Lamb’s will. 

Neal, Gerber continued its engagement after Ms. Lamb-Gabler became the 

Estate’s personal representative. It formally terminated its engagement with

the Estate of Matthew Lamb on September 12, 2019.

On April 1, 2021, Appellees1filed suit against Neal, Gerber, alleging

claims for breach of fiduciary duty and professional malpractice. The 

complaint alleged that Neal, Gerber provided estate planning services to Mr. 

Lamb and his wife, the purpose of which was “to maximize the value of their 

respective estates, to minimize associated state and federal tax obligations 

arising out of the deaths of [Mr. Lamb] and [his wife] and to distribute their 

wealth as set forth in their estate planning documents.” Appellees alleged 

the estate planning services provided by Neal, Gerber included drafting Mr. 

Lamb’s will and trust. The complaint further alleged that Neal, Gerber 

provided legal services to Ms. Lamb-Gabler as personal representative of 

1 Appellees Colleen Lamb-Ferrara and Rosemarie Lamb are the daughters 

of Mr. Lamb and his wife, Rosemarie Lamb. They are suing in their capacities 

as successor personal representative of the Estate of Matthew Lamb and 

successor co-trustees of the Matthew Lamb and Rosemarie Lamb Trusts.
4

the Estate of Matthew Lamb, “including appearing in the Probate [Action] on 

her behalf.”

With respect to personal jurisdiction, Appellees’ amended complaint

alleged, in relevant part, as follows:

[Neal, Gerber] is a resident of the State of Illinois and 

subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for the 

following reasons:

a. [Neal, Gerber] has operated, conducted or carried 

on business in this State by appearing before the 

Court in the Probate Case and providing legal 

services to [Lamb-]Gabler as personal 

representative of Matthew’s Estate and/or for the 

putative benefit of Mathew’s Estate. Fla. Stat. § 

48.193(1)(a)1.

b. [Neal, Gerber] committed tortious acts within this 

State. Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)2.

On April 12, 2021, Neal, Gerber filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 

Personal Jurisdiction. In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Neal, Gerber 

submitted various affidavits from its attorneys. Collectively, these affidavits 

attested that all the services Neal, Gerber performed throughout its 

engagement were performed from its office in Chicago, Illinois. Neal, Gerber 

denied any of its lawyers were ever physically present in the State of Florida 

while performing legal services related to the Estate of Matthew Lamb. It also 

denied appearing as counsel of record in the Probate Action and denied filing 

or serving any pleadings or papers, including any notices of appearance, in 
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the Probate Action. Neal, Gerber did admit, however, that on some 

occasions, at the request of the Estate and its Florida counsel, it attended 

hearings in the Probate Action by telephone “to remain apprised of details 

that might impact its work outside of Florida.”

In opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Appellees submitted the 

affidavit of the Estate’s Florida counsel who attested that:

5. [Neal, Gerber] was the lead counsel for [the 

personal representative] and I took my instructions 

and directions from [attorneys] at [Neal, Gerber], in 

connection with the representation of [the personal 

representative] in the Probate [Action].

6. All pleadings I filed and activities I undertook on 

behalf of [the personal representative] in the Probate 

[Action] were at the direction and control of [Neal, 

Gerber].

7. I never had direct communications with [the 

personal representative] without [the two Neal, 

Gerber attorneys that directed me] or other [Neal, 

Gerber] attorneys’ participation nor did I take any 

instructions from [the personal representative].

8. [Neal, Gerber] prepared the majority of all filings 

and reviewed and approved any filings I prepared 

and filed in the Probate [Action].

9. During the course of my representation of [the 

personal representative], I had hundreds of 

communications, via telephone, text, e-mail, letters 

or otherwise, with representatives of [Neal, Gerber].
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Appellees also submitted the deposition of a Neal, Gerber attorney who 

testified that Neal, Gerber “worked closely with the personal representative’s 

Florida counsel to ensure that matters were coordinated.” In addition 

Appellees submitted a hearing transcripts which showed that a Neal, Gerber 

lawyer attended hearings (remotely) and, on behalf of the personal 

representative, answered questions of the judge. Finally, Appellees filed 

account records from the Estate of Matthew Lamb showing amounts paid 

and owed to Neal, Gerber for attorneys’ fees and costs.

By agreement, the trial court conducted a non-evidentiary hearing on 

Neal, Gerber’s Motion to Dismiss.2 After the hearing, the trial court issued its 

Order denying Neal, Gerber’s Motion to Dismiss. The trial court concluded it 

had personal jurisdiction over Neal, Gerber pursuant to section 

48.193(1)(a)(1), Florida Statutes (“Operating, conducting, engaging in, or 

carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office 

or agency in this state”), and section 48.193(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes 

(“Committing a tortious act within this state”).

The trial court found Neal, Gerber acted as “lead counsel” in the 

Probate Action and performed most of the work with respect to the Probate 

Action. The trial court further found that on at least one occasion, Neal,

2 The hearing was not transcribed.
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Gerber had one of its attorneys attend a hearing in the Probate Action on 

behalf of the then-personal representative. The trial court also found Neal, 

Gerber billed a very substantial amount of fees for the legal services it 

provided with respect to the Probate Action.

On the issue of minimum contacts, the trial court found Neal, Gerber 

had sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Florida because it 

performed the bulk of the legal work for an estate being probated in Florida. 

The trial court concluded that, as a result, Neal, Gerber could reasonably 

anticipate being haled into court in Florida.

ANALYSIS

A. The Two Step Inquiry. 

A trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 

jurisdiction is subject to de novo review. Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 

1256 (Fla. 2002). See also Concordia Lutheran Ministries v. Wills, 359 So. 

3d 396, 400–01 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023) (“When the trial court does not conduct 

an evidentiary hearing, our review of an order on a motion to dismiss for lack 

of personal jurisdiction is strictly de novo.” (citing Stonepeak Partners, LP v. 

Tall Tower Cap., LLC, 231 So. 3d 548, 552 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); Rautenberg 

v. Falz, 193 So. 3d 924, 928 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016))).
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The facts are to be derived “from the affidavits in support of the motion 

to dismiss, and the transcripts and records submitted in opposition to the 

motion to dismiss.” Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1254.

Florida courts conduct a two-step inquiry to determine whether a court 

has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See Belz Investco 

Ltd. P'ship v. Groupo Immobiliano Cababie, S.A., 721 So. 2d 787, 789 (Fla. 

3d DCA 1998) (citing Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 

502 (Fla. 1989)).

First, it must be determined that the complaint 

alleges sufficient jurisdictional facts to bring the 

action within the ambit of the statute; and if it does, 

the next inquiry is whether sufficient “minimum 

contacts” are demonstrated to satisfy due process 

requirements.

The first prong—i.e., the statutory prong—of the 

Venetian Salami standard is governed by Florida's 

long-arm statute and bestows broad jurisdiction on 

Florida courts. . . . The second prong—i.e., the 

constitutional prong—is controlled by United States 

Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Due 

Process Clause and imposes a more restrictive 

requirement. A court can exercise personal 

jurisdiction only if the foreign [defendant] maintains 

“certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such 

that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 

‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.’”

Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1257 (quoting Execu–Tech Bus. Sys., Inc. v. New Oji 

Paper Co., 752 So. 2d 582, 584 (Fla. 2000)). “Moreover, a showing of 
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specific jurisdiction ‘requires a causal connection between the defendant's 

activities in Florida and the plaintiff's cause of action, a requirement known 

as “connexity.”’” Kapila v. RJPT, Ltd., 357 So. 3d 241, 246 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2023) (quoting Stonepeak Partners, LP, 231 So. 3d at 552).

B. The Long-Arm Statute.

Appellees alleged sufficient facts to satisfy Florida’s Long-Arm Statute, 

section 48.193, Florida Statutes. As Florida courts have previously held, 

personal jurisdiction under Florida’s Long-Arm Statute may extend to nonresident defendants that perform estate services for an estate probated in 

Florida, even where those legal services may have been performed outside 

of Florida.

For example, in Rogers & Wells v. Winston, 662 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 1995), the Fourth District held the Florida court had personal jurisdiction 

over a New York law firm employed by the personal representative of a 

Florida estate to perform legal services for the Florida estate. Id. at 1304. 

The court reasoned that the law firm “was doing business in Florida and 

should have foreseen that it would be haled into a Florida court in the event 

of litigation over the services performed for the estate.” Id. The court further 

held this was true “[e]ven if virtually all of the services provided by [the law 

firm] were performed in New York, because [the law firm] was employed to 
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perform these services by an estate being probated in Florida[.]” Id. See also

In re Estate of Vernon, 609 So. 2d 128, 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (holding 

that non-resident partners of a New York law firm were subject to Florida 

jurisdiction because of their work on an estate being probated in Florida).

Additionally, in Beta Drywall Acquisition, LLC v. Mintz & Fraade, P.C., 

9 So. 3d 651 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), the Fourth District held the Florida court 

had personal jurisdiction over a New York law firm that had been sued for 

legal malpractice arising from legal work it performed solely in New York. Id.

at 653. The New York law firm was alleged to have negligently created two 

Florida limited liability companies for the acquisition of assets of a Florida 

corporation doing business in Florida. Id. The court held that the law firm’s 

actions giving rise to the plaintiff’s malpractice and breach of fiduciary claims 

were within the scope of section 48.193(1)(a)(2)3 because the law firm 

“caused allegedly faulty Acquisition Articles to be filed in Florida[.]” Id.

In Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th Cir. 1996), 

the Eleventh Circuit (applying Florida law) held there was personal 

jurisdiction over a Michigan law firm that provided estate planning services 

to a Florida decedent. The court concluded the complaint sufficiently alleged 

3 Prior to 2013, section 48.193(1)(a)(2) was numbered as section 

48.193(1)(b), Florida Statutes. See Ch. 13-164, § 1, Laws of Fla.
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personal jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)(2) because it alleged “the 

attorneys negligently drafted . . . the will and the trust documents, which they 

intended to be administered in Florida under Florida law[, and] [t]heir 

negligence [ ] allegedly caused damage to an estate in Florida.” Id. at 257.

Here, Appellees’ amended complaint alleged Neal, Gerber committed 

tortious acts in Florida by breaching its fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of 

the Estate of Matthew Lamb and by committing professional malpractice in 

the performance of estate planning services, drafting of estate documents, 

and the provision of legal services in connection with the administration of 

the Estate of Matthew Lamb. Appellees contended these tortious acts 

damaged the Estate of Matthew Lamb and its beneficiaries.

In opposition, Neal, Gerber did not deny that it (1) provided estate 

planning services to Matthew Lamb prior to his passing, including drafting 

his will and subsequent codicils, and was aware at the time that the estate 

would be probated in Florida; (2) was retained by the personal representative 

of the Estate of Matthew Lamb to provide legal services to the Estate of 

Matthew Lamb; and (3) drafted, reviewed, and/or approved filings made in 

the Probate Action. Instead, Neal, Gerber simply denied it ever filed any 

pleadings or filings in the Probate Action or that it ever filed a notice of 

appearance.
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A Neal, Gerber partner testified, however, that Neal, Gerber “worked 

closely with the personal representative’s Florida counsel to ensure that 

matters were coordinated.” And the Florida attorney handling the Probate 

Action submitted an affidavit attesting that (1) Neal, Gerber was lead counsel 

for the personal representative of the Estate, (2) Florida counsel took 

directions from Neal, Gerber in connection with his representation of the 

personal representative in the Probate Action, (3) Neal, Gerber prepared the 

majority of the filings in the Probate Action and reviewed and approved any 

filings prepared by Florida counsel, and (4) Florida counsel exchanged 

hundreds of communications, via telephone, text, e-mail, letters or otherwise, 

with Neal, Gerber regarding the Probate Action.

Neal, Gerber’s opposition instead focused on facts that did not 

sufficiently rebut the jurisdictional basis set forth in Appellees’ amended 

complaint and supporting evidence. For example, Neal, Gerber attested that 

all the services it provided were performed in Chicago. But the physical 

location of the lawyers working on a Florida probate case is not dispositive. 

Rogers & Wells, 662 So. 2d at 1304 (“Even if virtually all of the services 

provided by Rogers & Wells were performed in New York, because Rogers 

& Wells was employed to perform these services by an estate being probated 

in Florida, it was doing business in Florida and should have foreseen that it 
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would be haled into a Florida court in the event of litigation over the services 

performed for the estate.”).

Neal, Gerber also attested that it never filed a notice of appearance or 

pleading or appeared as counsel of record in the Probate Action. But 

transcripts indicate that its lawyers attended at least one telephonic hearing 

and answered questions on behalf of the personal representative. A 

defendant’s physical presence in Florida is not required, and telephonic 

communications into Florida may form the basis for personal jurisdiction 

under section 48.193(1)(a)(2), if the alleged cause of action arises from the 

communications. Wendt, 822 So. 2d at 1260. Here, Appellees have alleged 

a claim for legal malpractice arising from the legal services provided by Neal, 

Gerber to the personal representative. Reiss v. Ocean World, S.A., 11 So. 

3d 404, 406 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (“Cases interpreting Wendt have held that 

the communication into Florida must be tortious in and of itself, such as . . . 

negligent legal advice to a client.”).

Finally, Neal, Gerber attested that it did not generally carry on business 

in Florida, as it did not maintain a Florida office, its attorneys were not 

licensed to practice law in Florida, and its Florida clients and Florida revenue 

were a minimal percentage of their total business. “But these factors are not 

dispositive. For example, there is no question that there need be no local 
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office nor agent, no lease, no meeting, no presence of corporate offices in 

Florida to warrant a finding of engagement in a business venture.” Kapila, 

357 So. 3d at 247 (internal citations omitted). “The Florida Supreme Court 

has held that engaging in a single act for profit can amount to a business 

venture.” Labbee v. Harrington, 913 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). 

And Rogers & Wells v. Winston, 662 So. 2d at 1304, held that a law firm 

employed to perform legal services by an estate being probated in Florida 

was doing business in Florida.

Accordingly, Appellees’ complaint sufficiently alleged facts 

establishing jurisdiction under Florida’s Long-Arm Statute, and Neal, Gerber 

did not sufficiently rebut these allegations. Thus, the first jurisdictional test 

under Venetian Salami is met.

C. Constitutional Due Process

As to minimum contacts, the trial court properly concluded that 

sufficient minimum contacts were shown. The test is whether “the 

defendant's conduct and connection with the forum are such that he should 

reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World–Wide Volkswagen 

Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287 (1980).

The Beta Drywall court held that the New York law firm had sufficient 

minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy due process because:
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[The law firm] performed the necessary legal work for 

the formation of two Florida LLCs created for the 

purpose of acquiring the assets of an existing Florida 

corporation. [Plaintiff] claims [the law firm was] 

negligent in [its] performance, and thus, that [it is]

liable for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary 

duty. [Plaintiff’s] claims arise from the activity [the law 

firm] directed into the state of Florida. A reasonable 

person having conducted the activities conducted by 

[the law firm] in the present case would reasonably 

foresee being haled into court in Florida should an 

issue regarding the very formation of [the Florida 

LLCs] arise.

9 So. 3d at 653.

In Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d at 259, moreover, the 

Eleventh Circuit held that the requirements of due process were satisfied 

because the attorneys rendered estate planning services to the decedent 

knowing that he resided in Florida, and the defendants all knew that the will 

would be probated, and the trust administered, in Florida. The court 

concluded minimum contacts with the forum had been established because 

the attorneys “drafted documents intending for Florida law to govern the 

disposition of assets located in Florida.” Id. The court further explained:

The defendants are not being haled into a Florida 

court as the result of any random, fortuitous, or 

attenuated contacts, or because of any unilateral 

activity by the Decedent. The nature of the 

professional services rendered in this case was such 

that the defendants were fully aware that their actions 

or omissions would have a substantial effect in 

Florida. They should have reasonably anticipated the 
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possibility of a suit arising from conduct directed 

towards the Florida Decedent. We conclude each 

defendant has purposefully directed his activities at 

the forum sufficient to establish minimum contacts.

Id.

Here, Neal, Gerber rendered estate planning services to Matthew 

Lamb with full awareness that he was domiciled in Florida and that his will 

would be probated in Florida. As part of its representation of the personal 

representative of the Estate of Matthew Lamb, moreover, Neal, Gerber 

admitted it “worked closely with the personal representative’s Florida 

counsel[.]” Neal, Gerber also did not expressly deny the allegations 

contained in the affidavit submitted by Florida counsel, namely that Neal, 

Gerber was “lead counsel,” that it directed Florida counsel’s actions in the 

Probate Action, and that it prepared the majority of filings and reviewed and 

approved all filings prepared by Florida counsel in the Probate Action.

As such, Neal, Gerber should have reasonably foreseen being haled 

into court in Florida for issues arising from the activities it directed into 

Florida, including the estate planning services it provided Matthew Lamb, 

domiciled in Florida, and the legal services it provided the personal 

representative of the Estate of Matthew Lamb, including telephonically 

appearing on her behalf during a hearing in the Probate Action in Florida.

Affirmed.