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WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Rosario Parra Hernandez,

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-15-02186-PHX-DJH

ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 8) and the Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) issued by United States Magistrate Judge Bridget S. Bade 

(Doc. 19). In his Petition, Petitioner raises nine grounds for relief. (Doc. 8 at 7-20). In the 

R&R, Judge Bade found that Petitioner filed this Petition after the statute of limitations 

period set forth in The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 

had expired, that neither statutory nor equitable tolling applied, and that Petitioner failed 

to present new evidence supporting the claim for an actual innocence exception. 

(Doc. 19 at 7-15). Therefore, Judge Bade recommended that the Petition be denied and 

dismissed. (Id. at 15). 

 Petitioner filed an Objection to the R&R (“Objection”) on February 12, 2016. 

(Doc. 29). Respondents have not filed a Response. 

I. Standard of Review 

 The district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the 
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report or specified proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made.” 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(C)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (stating that “the district judge must 

determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly 

objected to”). The judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings 

or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). 

II. Background and Objections 

 The Magistrate Judge reported the full procedural background of this case in her 

R&R. (Doc. 19 at 1-6). Petitioner does not object to Judge Bade’s account of facts related 

to Petitioner’s charges, trial, sentence, or direct appeal; the Court thus adopts them here. 

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (stating that the relevant provision of the 

Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), “does not on its face require any review 

at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an objection”). 

 Petitioner does, however, object “in part” to the Magistrate Judge’s account of the 

facts relating to his first, second, third, and fourth post-conviction facts as being 

“incomplete and/or erroneous in part.” (See Doc. 29 at 1-5). The Court has reviewed the 

record and finds that the facts related to these post-conviction proceedings as provided by 

Judge Bade in her R&R are accurate. The Court thus overrules any objection to them. 

 Petitioner’s primary objection is to Judge Bade’s conclusion that Petitioner does not 

qualify for equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations or the actual innocence 

exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. (Doc. 29 at 6-15). Petitioner restates 

Grounds One, Two, Three, Four, and Nine from the Petition on ineffective assistance of 

counsel and argues that these claims warrant equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of 

limitations. (Doc. 29 at 6-12). Petitioner also restates Ground Five from the Petition that, 

based on newly discovered evidence, he is actually innocent, and thus should be excepted 

from AEDPA’s filing deadline. (Doc. 29 at 12-15). The Court will accordingly review 

these objections de novo. 
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III. Analysis

The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on state prisoners’ federal 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(1) states that 

the limitations period shall run from the latest of the date on which: (1) direct review 

becomes final, (2) an unlawful state-created impediment to filing is removed, (3) a new 

constitutional right is made retroactively available, or (4) the factual predicate of the claims 

presented could have been discovered with due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D); 

Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2011); Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2001). 

 After conducting its own de novo review, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge 

that this Petition is untimely because Petitioner filed it more than sixteen years after the 

AEDPA statute of limitations expired. (Doc. 19 at 9). 

A. Triggering Date For Petitioner’s Limitations Period 

In assessing the various triggering events under § 2244(d)(1), the Magistrate Judge 

determined that the statute of limitations for Petitioner’s habeas petition began to run on 

March 29, 1999. The Court agrees. 

“When, on direct appeal, review is sought in the state’s highest court but no petition 

for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is filed, direct review is considered to be 

final when the certiorari petition would have been due, which is 90 days after the decision 

of the state’s highest court.” Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, 

the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s direct appeal on January 18, 1996. 

(Doc. 18, Ex. O). Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States 

Supreme Court. Thus, direct review of his conviction became final for purposes of 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) on April 17, 1996. Because Petitioner’s conviction became final prior to 

AEDPA’s enactment on April 24, 1996, however, he had a one-year grace period from the 

date of the statute’s enactment to file his federal habeas corpus petition. Patterson v. 

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). As the Magistrate Judge noted, however, 

by the time the grace period started on April 25, 1996, Petitioner had already filed a petition 
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for post-conviction review; as such, when that one-year grace period began on April 25, 

1996, it was immediately subject to statutory tolling. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Lott v. 

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that, under AEDPA, “a prisoner is 

entitled to tolling for the pendency of a ‘properly filed application for State post-conviction 

or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim’”); see also Isley 

v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that, in Arizona, postconviction review is pending once a notice of post-conviction relief is properly filed). The 

trial court ultimately denied Petitioner’s post-conviction relief and gave Petitioner until 

March 27, 1998 to file a motion for rehearing or a petition for review in the appellate court. 

(Doc. 18, Exs. JJ and KK). Because Petitioner opted not to proceed with either of these 

avenues, the tolling period ceased, and the one-year limitations period began to run on 

March 27, 1998, expiring one year later, on Monday, March 29, 1999. None of the 

subsequent notices of post-conviction relief further tolled the limitations period because all 

were filed well after March 29, 1999. (See Doc. 18, Exs. LL, UU, BBB, DDD). See also 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that, after the 

limitations period has ended, filing a petition for state post-conviction relief will not 

reinitiate the limitations period). 

Petitioner did not file his Amended Petition until October 29, 2015. As such, under 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A), and absent equitable tolling or an exception, the Amended Petition is 

untimely.1

 

 

1

 Although the Petitioner makes a general objection to the Magistrate’s findings regarding the start date for the statute of limitations (Doc. 29 at 6), he does not articulate a specific objection to her findings as they pertain to possible alternate start dates under 2244(d)(1)(C) or (D). The Court has reviewed the record and findings as they pertain to alternate start dates under these subsections and agrees with the Magistrate’s recommendation. As Judge Bade concluded, Section 2244(d)(1)(C) does not apply here because the Supreme Court did not create new constitutional rights in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) and Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012), the two cases cited by Petitioner in his Amended Petition. Moreover, section 2244(d)(1)(D), which provides that a limitations period starts on the date when the factual predicate of the claims presented could have been discovered through due diligence, also does not supply a new starting date for the limitations period here. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence on January 30, 1997. (Doc. 18, Ex. AA). Although Petitioner did not expressly make this argument in his Amended Petition, Judge Bade addressed it and appropriately noted that, even if the limitations period then began on January 30, 1997, Petitioner’s Amended Petition still would have been filed nearly fifteen years late. 
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B. Equitable Tolling 

The Court agrees with Judge Bade that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling, 

but because Petitioner makes specific objections to this finding, the Court will review it de 

novo. AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. 

Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648-49 (2010). For equitable tolling to apply, a 

petitioner must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some 

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented” him from timely filing the 

petition. Id. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). A petitioner must exercise “reasonable diligence, not maximum 

feasible diligence.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 653 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Equitable tolling is applied sparingly, as reflected by the “extraordinary circumstances” 

requirement, and is unavailable in most cases. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEPDA] is very 

high, lest the exception swallow the rule”) (citation omitted)). Some external force must 

cause the untimeliness rather than petitioner’s own “oversight, miscalculation or 

negligence.” Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011 (quoting Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 

1055 (9th Cir. 2008)). A petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling is 

appropriate in his case. Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 

2005). 

Because the Court finds that Petitioner has not shown any extraordinary 

circumstances that relate to his failure to timely file this Petition, the Court need not 

conduct an analysis of whether Petitioner diligently pursued his rights. Instead, the Court 

will address the “extraordinary circumstances” requirement. Egregious attorney 

misconduct can constitute extraordinary circumstances for tolling AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations. See, e.g., Luna v. Kernan, 784 F.3d 640, 646-47 (9th Cir. 2015) (stating that 

“affirmatively misleading a petitioner that a timely petition has been or will soon be filed” 

may be “egregious professional misconduct” that constitutes an extraordinary 
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circumstance to toll the limitations period, but “run-of the mill mistakes by one’s lawyer 

that cause a filing deadline to be missed do not rise to the level of extraordinary 

circumstances”); Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 803 (3rd Cir. 2013) (finding equitable 

tolling appropriate when an attorney misses deadlines, fails to communicate with his client, 

and gives misleading statements to his client).2

 However, the Supreme Court has held that 

an attorney’s negligence, such as miscalculating a deadline, will not statutorily toll 

AEDPA’s time limit. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 652 (2010). Moreover, a 

petitioner’s ignorance of the law and lack of representation during the applicable filing 

period generally do not constitute the extraordinary circumstances necessary to toll 

AEDPA’s limitations period. See Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 597-98 (8th Cir. 2004) 

(finding that delay caused by misunderstanding proper filing procedures is not sufficient 

to trigger equitable tolling); Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2000) 

(“Even in the case of an unrepresented petitioner alleging a lack of legal knowledge or 

legal resources, equitable tolling has not been warranted”). Even if an attorney has engaged 

in misconduct, that misconduct must also be the cause of the habeas petition’s 

untimeliness; in other words, the misconduct must have prevented the petitioner from 

timely filing the habeas petition. Luna, 784 F.3d at 649 (“Having concluded that [the 

attorney’s] professional misconduct constitutes an extraordinary circumstance, we must 

next determine whether that misconduct prevented [the defendant] from filing his . . . 

petition on time (what we have sometimes referred to as the ‘causation’ requirement”)); 

see also Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that equitable tolling 

is only available “when extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it 

impossible to file a petition on time and the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of 

the [petition’s] untimeliness”) (citing Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

 

2

 Courts have also found state action can constitute extraordinary circumstances that warrant tolling AEDPA’s statute of limitation. See, e.g., Sossa v. Diaz, 729 F.3d 1225, 

1256 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying a prisoner reasonable access to the library or his legal files); Spottsville v. Terry, 476 F.3d 1241, 1245-46 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirmatively misleading a prisoner to file incorrect documents or in an improper venue or at an improper time); Pliler 

v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 234 (2004) (affirmatively misleading a prisoner about the time he has left to file). 
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Here, Petitioner raises an equitable tolling argument for the first time in his 

Objection based on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Doc. 29 at 11). Petitioner 

specifically argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly explain a 

plea offer (Doc. 29 at 9), not presenting evidence that an identification witness was 

mistaken or made inconsistent statements (Id.), failing to challenge the trial court’s 

enhancement of the two kidnapping counts’ sentences (Doc. 29 at 10), failing to present 

testimony from a police officer that tended to support Petitioner’s alibi (Id.), and failing to 

adequately investigate the case (Id.). He argues that his post-conviction counsel had a 

conflict of interest with his trial counsel, which resulted in the post-conviction counsel’s 

failure to raise the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims during the first postconviction appeal. (Doc. 29 at 8). Petitioner argues that these claims constitute 

extraordinary circumstances for equitable tolling purposes. (Doc. 29 at 7). However, 

Petitioner does not establish how any of these alleged acts of ineffective representation 

prevented him from timely filing a federal habeas petition. Unlike those situations in which 

courts have found that extraordinary circumstances justified tolling the limitations period 

because an attorney’s conduct so egregiously affected a petitioner’s ability to timely file 

his petition, Petitioner here fails to make any allegation of misconduct affecting his ability 

to timely file his Petition. He does not, for example, state that his post-conviction counsel 

or trial counsel affirmatively misrepresented filing dates, gave him misleading information, 

or missed filing deadlines. In the absence of such facts, the Court agrees with Judge Bade 

that no extraordinary circumstances exist that prevented Petitioner from timely filing his 

Petition. 

C. Actual Innocence 

Petitioner has also not established a claim of actual innocence that would be an 

equitable exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Petitioner asserts that third party 

evidence and forensic testing would reveal an alternate perpetrator. (Doc. 8 at 12). In very 

limited circumstances, an actual innocence claim allows courts to consider otherwise 

untimely habeas corpus petitions. Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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The Supreme Court has held that, in order for a petitioner to successfully claim an actual 

innocence exception, he must be able to pass through the Schulp v. Delo actual innocence 

gateway by showing that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Schulp v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). 

The evidence must be reliable and must not have been presented at trial. Id. at 324. 

Reliable evidence includes exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, and critical physical evidence. Id. 

Here, Petitioner fails to present new, reliable evidence in support of his actual 

innocence claim. He alleges that new DNA testing procedures would prove his innocence 

and that the Arizona Department of Public Safety (“DPS”), as a law enforcement agency, 

used outdated DNA testing procedures, did not take proper precautions when handling the 

evidence, and was biased against him. (Doc. 29 at 14-15). As found by Magistrate Judge 

Bade, he has not presented any reliable evidence to establish this assertion. 

Likewise, there is no reliable evidence supporting Petitioner’s claims that the 

eyewitness testimony was unreliable or that Petitioner’s co-defendant testified falsely in 

exchange for a reduced sentence. (Doc. 29 at 13). The Maricopa County Superior Court 

found that the victim’s eyewitness testimony was reliable, and that the co-defendant’s 

subsequent recantation of his testimony in prison was not, especially because the codefendant had been deported to Mexico and thus could not be directly questioned. 

(Doc. 19, Ex. KK at 2-3). Further, the Maricopa County Superior Court found that neither 

Petitioner’s testimony about the recantation nor the affidavit from a prisoner who allegedly 

heard the co-defendant’s recantation were sufficient to support Petitioner’s claim of 

mistaken identity. Id. at 3. The court found that both men had strong incentives to lie, and 

the story seemed “incredible at best.” Id. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim for an actual 

innocence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations fails because Petitioner has not 

produced reliable evidence that shows that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable 

juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Schulp, 513 U.S. at 314-15. 

... 
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III. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Bade’s R&R (Doc. 19) is accepted and 

adopted. Petitioner’s Objections (Doc. 29) are overruled. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 8) is denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

on appeal are denied because dismissal of the Amended Petition is justified by a plain 

procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action and 

enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 29th day of March, 2019. 

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge