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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Brian O. Claros-Bey, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

J.T. Shartle, Warden, 

Respondent. 

No. CV-15-00501-TUC-BGM 

ORDER 

 Currently pending before the Court is Petitioner Brian Claros-Bey’s pro se

Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal 

Custody (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). Respondent has filed his Return and Answer (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 10). Petitioner did not file a Reply, but rather filed a Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 16). Respondent filed a Response to Petitioner’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 17). 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner is an inmate currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary 

(“USP”) in Tucson, Arizona, serving a 500 month sentence. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons 

(“BOP”) Inmate Locater, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited September 16, 

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2016); Answer (Doc. 10), Huband Decl. (Exh. “1”), Superior Ct. of the Distr. of 

Columbia, Judgment in a Criminal Case (Attach. “2”) at 1. At sentencing, the Superior 

Court for the District of Columbia ordered Petitioner to pay $500 pursuant to the Victims 

of Violent Crime Compensation Act of 1996. Id. The Judgment indicates that these 

costs “ha[d] not been paid” at the time of sentencing. Id.

 On October 19, 2015, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in this Court. Petition (Doc. 1). Petitioner contends that 

“[b]y being subjected to the lowest score on ‘Responsibility’ on the Custody 

Classification Form (BP-338) in accordance with the United States Bureau of Prisons’ 

(‘BOP’) Security Designation and Custody Classification Manuel [sic] Program 

Statement, and receiving poor ‘program reviews’ for not participating in the BOP’s 

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (‘IFRP’) violates [sic] the treaty and/or contract 

that the District of Columbia has with the BOP (D.C. Code 24-101).” Petition (Doc. 1) at 

4. Petitioner further asserts that Section 24-101(b), of the District of Columbia code, 

gives “BOP authority to subject District of Columbia prisoners . . . ‘to any law or 

regulation applicable to persons committed for violations of laws of the United States 

CONSISTENT with the sentenced [sic] imposed.’” Petition (Doc. 1) at 4. Petitioner 

asserts that because BOP Program Statement Number P5380.08 regarding the Inmate 

Financial Responsibility Program “does not include the Victims of Violent Crime 

Compensation Act of 1996 (“VVCCA”) . . . [a]ssessments under the VVCCA is [sic] not 

an applicable IFRP assignment.” 

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II. ANALYSIS 

A. Jurisdiction 

 “Federal courts are always ‘under an independent obligation to examine their own 

jurisdiction,’ . . . and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no 

jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). “Generally, motions to 

contest the legality of a sentence must be filed under § 2255 in the sentencing court, 

while petitions that challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s 

execution must be brought pursuant to § 2241 in the custodial court.” Id. at 864. 

Therefore, before proceeding to any other issue a court must establish whether a habeas 

petition is filed pursuant to § 2241 or § 2255 to determine whether jurisdiction is proper. 

Id. at 865. 

 Here, Petitioner does not claim that the sentencing court imposed an illegal 

sentence; rather, he seeks relief with respect as to how the ordered criminal monetary 

penalties are being collected while he is incarcerated at a federal facility. Thus, Petitioner 

is challenging the manner, location, or condition of the execution of his sentence. When a 

petitioner challenges the “manner in which his sentence was executed,” the action is 

“maintainable only in a petition for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” 

Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 

1042 (9th Cir. 2012) (considering whether the district court impermissibly delegated its 

authority to BOP under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”) under § 

2241); United States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering validity of 

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IFRP requiring restitution payments at a greater rate than specified by the sentencing 

court under § 2241). Challenges brought pursuant to § 2241 must be brought in the 

custodial court. At the time of filing the Petition, Petitioner was incarcerated at USP–

Tucson in Arizona. Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over this matter. See 

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990). 

B. Exhaustion

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: 

[28 U.S.C. § 2241] does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust 

direct appeals before filing petitions for habeas corpus. [Footnote omitted.] 

However, we require, as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust 

available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 

2241. 

Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds 

by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 323 (2006). 

“The requirement that federal prisoners exhaust administrative remedies before filing a 

habeas corpus petition was judicially created; it is not a statutory requirement.” Brown v. 

Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 

515 U.S. 50, 54–55, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 2023–24, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995). “Nevertheless, 

‘[p]rudential limits like jurisdictional limits and limits on venue, are ordinarily not 

optional.’” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (alterations in original) 

(quoting Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other 

grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 

323 (2006)). 

 “Courts may require prudential exhaustion if ‘(1) agency expertise makes agency 

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consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) 

relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative 

scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own 

mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.’” Id. (quoting Noriega-Lopez v. 

Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust 

administrative remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition 

without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, 

unless exhaustion is excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 

2011) (citations omitted). Exhaustion may be excused if pursuing an administrative 

remedy would be futile. Fraley v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th 

Cir. 1993). 

 If a prisoner is unable to obtain an administrative remedy because of his failure to 

appeal in a timely manner, then the petitioner has procedurally defaulted his habeas 

corpus claim. See Nigro v. Sullivan, 40 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Francis, 

Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 

571 (9th Cir. 1986)). If a claim is procedurally defaulted, the court may require the 

petitioner to demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice from the 

alleged constitutional violation. See Francis, 894 F.2d at 355 (suggesting that the cause 

and prejudice test is the appropriate test); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492, 106 

S.Ct. 2639, 2647–48, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (cause and prejudice test applied to 

procedural defaults on appeal); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 

906–08 (9th Cir. 1986) (cause and prejudice test applied to pro se litigants). 

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 The BOP has established an administrative remedy process permitting an inmate 

to seek review of an issue relating to “any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28 C.F.R. 

§ 542.10(a). Here, Respondent asserts that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies prior to filing his Petition. Answer (Doc. 10) at 5. Indeed, 

Petitioner admits that he has not exhausted his claim, stating that “[i]t would be useless to 

exhaust administrative remedies, because this Ground raises only issues of law upon 

which the BOP has already assumed that the IFRP is applicable to VVCCA assessments 

and is using BOP Program Statement Number P5380.08 to articulate its position.” 

Petition (Doc. 1) at 4. “Because of the existence of official BOP policy—the IFRP—

exhaustion would be futile here[.]” Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 

2012). As such, this Court will reach the merits of Petitioner’s claim. 

C. Merits of the Petition 

 1. Statutory and Regulatory Background of the IFRP 

 a. District of Columbia Prisoners and the Victims of Violent 

Crime Compensation Act of 1996

 Section 24-101(b), District of Columbia Code, governs felons sentenced pursuant 

to the D.C. Official code and provides for their transfer “to a penal or correctional facility 

operated or contracted for by the Bureau of Prisons.” D.C. Code § 24-101(b). The 

statute further provides that “[s]uch persons shall be subject to any law or regulation 

applicable to persons committed for violations of laws of the United States consistent 

with the sentence imposed, and the Bureau of Prisons shall be responsible for the 

custody, care, subsistence, education, treatment and training of such persons.” Id.

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 The Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Act of 1996 provides in relevant part 

that: 

In addition to and separate from punishment imposed, an assessment of 

$100 for each violation of § 50-2201.05, an assessment of between $50 and 

$250 for other serious traffic or misdemeanor offenses, and an assessment 

of between $100 and $5,000 for each felony offense shall be imposed upon 

each person convicted of or pleading guilty or nolo contendere to the 

offense in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia or any other court 

in which the offense is charged. The decision of the sentencing court 

regarding assessments is final. If an offender is indigent at the time of 

sentencing and is later employed for salary, receives compensation while 

on probation or parole, or is incarcerated in a facility of the Department 

of Corrections or elsewhere and receives wages or compensation therein, 

the amount of assessments under this section shall be paid from such 

salary, wages, or other compensation. 

D.C. Code § 4-516(a) (emphasis added). As such, the Act clearly contemplates that 

incarcerated individuals shall be responsible for paying their assessment from prison 

“wages or compensation.” Furthermore, “[a]ssessments under this chapter shall be 

collected as fines.” D.C. Code § 4-516(c). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held 

that the scheduling of payment of fines may be delegated to the BOP. United States v. 

Gunning (Gunning II), 401 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Montano-Figueroa v. 

Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

 b. Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP) 

 The BOP “encourages each sentenced inmate to meet his or her legitimate 

financial obligations” through the IFRP. See 28 C.F.R. § 545.10. “As part of the initial 

classification process, [BOP] staff will assist the inmate in developing a financial plan for 

meeting those obligations.” Id. The financial plan is designed to meet the inmate’s 

financial obligations in the following order of priority: (1) special assessment; (2) courtCase 4:15-cv-00501-BGM Document 21 Filed 09/19/16 Page 7 of 10
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ordered restitution; (3) fines and court costs; (4) state or local court obligations; and (5) 

other federal government obligations. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(a). Payments for the 

aforementioned obligations may be made from institution resources, such as prison work 

assignments, or from community resources. 28 C.F.R. § 545.11(b). 

 Through the IFRP, the BOP encourages inmates with financial obligations to 

participate in the voluntary program, but does not force inmates to participate. United 

States v. Lemoine, 546 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008); see also 28 C.F.R. § 545.10. The 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has squarely addressed an inmate claims that the IFRP 

was “involuntary and that he only assented to the terms of his financial plan ‘to avoid the 

adverse consequences of not agreeing.’” Lemoine, 546 F.3d at 1049. The Lemoine court 

held that the IFRP “does not implicate [an inmate’s] constitutional rights[,]” because an 

inmate “ha[s] no entitlement, constitutional or otherwise, to any of the benefits agreeing 

to participate in the IFRP would provide, such as work detail outside the prison 

perimeter, a higher commissary spending limit, a release gratuity, or pay beyond the 

maintenance pay level.” Id. Accordingly, “[t]he BOP . . . ha[s] the authority to create a 

financial plan . . . through the IFRP and to impose penalties if [an inmate] fail[s] to accept 

its terms.” Id.

2. Petitioner’s Fine Pursuant to the Victims of Violent 

Crimes Compensation Act of 1996 is Being Lawfully 

Collected 

 At sentencing, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia assessed a $500 

penalty against Petitioner pursuant to the Victims of Violent Crime Compensation Act of 

1996. Answer (Doc. 10), Huband Decl. (Exh. “1”), Superior Ct. of the Distr. of 

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Columbia, Judgment in a Criminal Case (Attach. “2”) at 1. The VVCCA directs that 

assessments made pursuant to it “shall be collected as fines.” D.C. Code § 4-516(c). The 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the scheduling of the payment of fines may 

be delegated to the BOP. Gunning II, 401 F.3d at 1150 (citing Montano-Figueroa v. 

Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1998)). As such, the collection of Petitioner’s 

VVCCA obligations through the IFRP are valid. 

 Petitioner voluntarily enrolled in IFRP, and currently participates in the program. 

Answer (Doc. 10), Exh. “A,” Inmate Financial Plan (Attach. “3”) at 1–2. Petitioner is 

free to stop participating in the IFRP at any time. Petitioner claims that he is only 

participating in the program “to avoid receiving the lowest score on ‘Responsibility’ on 

the Custody Classification form (BP 338). Pet.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. 16) at 3. 

Petitioner “did not have a preexisting right to receive any of the benefits conditioned on 

his participation” in the IFRP, nor does he have any constitutional rights to those 

privileges. Lemoine, 546 F.3d at 1046–49. Moreover, the BOP is within its authority 

offer the IFRP, and Petitioner’s voluntarily participation allows the BOP to collect and 

allocate Petitioner’s funds to his fines and special assessment. Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

claims are without merit and his Petition (Doc. 1) shall be denied. 

D. Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

 On January 14, 2016, Petitioner filed his Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 

16). Motions for Summary Judgment are not contemplated by the statutes governing 

habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2241, et seq. As such, and based on the foregoing denial of 

Petitioner’s habeas petition on the merits, the Court will deny Petitioner’s motion for 

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summary judgment.1

III. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 

(1) Petitioner’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1) is DENIED; 

(2) Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16) is DENIED; and 

(3) The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment and close its file in this matter. 

 Dated this 16th day of September, 2016. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald 

United States Magistrate Judge 

 1

 In light of Petitioner’s failure to file a Reply, as well as the contents of the Motion for 

Summary Judgment, the Court treated Petitioner’s motion as his Reply in assessing the merits of 

his habeas petition. 

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