THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

) No. 20 CR 211-1

v. ) No. 20 CR 211-2

) No. 20-CR-211-3

PAUL DELONG, )

NICHOLAS PANCOSKA, and )

SEAN MCGUIRE, ) Judge Jorge Alonso

)

Memorandum Opinion and Order

This case stems from a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) drug trafficking 

investigation. A grand jury indicted Defendants Paul DeLong and Nicholas Pancoska for various 

felonies related to drug trafficking, firearm possession, and money laundering. Co-Defendant 

Sean McGuire was also indicted on money laundering charges. DeLong and Pancoska filed a 

joint motion under Franks v. Delaware challenging the truth of statements contained in affidavits 

submitted in support of several search warrants. Pancoska and DeLong also filed motions to 

suppress the evidence obtained from those warrants. McGuire filed a motion to sever his case 

from the others. For the reasons below, the Court denies the Franks motion [109], the motions to 

suppress [94] [95] [96] [97] [103] [104], and the motion to sever [101].

Background

Defendants are charged with the following:

Count One Conspiracy to possess and distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §846

(DeLong and Pancoska)

Count Two Conspiracy to engage in concealment, money laundering in violation of 18 

U.S.C. §1956(h) (DeLong and McGuire)

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Count Three Engaging in a monetary transaction in property derived from buying and 

selling marijuana in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2 (DeLong and 

Pancoska)

Count Four Money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2 

(McGuire)

Count Five Money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2 

(McGuire)

Count Six Money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2 

(McGuire)

Count Seven Money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2 

(McGuire)

Count Eight Money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 2 

(McGuire)

Count Nine Possession with intent to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§841(a)(1) (DeLong)

Count Ten Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g) 

(DeLong)

Count Eleven Possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c) (DeLong)

Count Twelve Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(g) 

(DeLong)

I. Arrest of Timothy Goodwin

On September 21, 2017, DEA agents arrested Timothy Goodwin. After his arrest, agents 

obtained and executed a search warrant for Goodwin’s residence at 16653 W. 135th Street in 

Lemont, Illinois. The search recovered: (1) approximately one gram of cocaine; (2) a Bersa .380

handgun magazine with six live rounds; (3) a Ruger .380 handgun magazine with 6 live rounds; 

(4) a box of six live rounds of Winchester ammunition; (5) a black/silver Bersa Thunder .380, 

semi-automatic handgun; and (6) 2,240 grams (approximately six pounds) of marijuana. 

Following his arrest, Goodwin spoke with drug enforcement agents. At first, Goodwin denied 

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that the contraband belonged to him and attempted to minimize his criminal activity. After being 

pressed by agents, however, Goodwin admitted that the contraband was his. The State of Illinois 

charged him for the six pounds of marijuana and firearms that were found in the residence. He 

agreed to cooperate with law enforcement in exchange for consideration in his criminal case.

Goodwin told law enforcement that DeLong was his main cannabis supplier and that 

DeLong distributed roughly 1,000 pounds of cannabis a month. He also told agents that DeLong 

had a trucking business that he used to ship legal and illegal loads. Goodwin gave law 

enforcement information about DeLong’s associates, including Bruce Liepart and Pancoska. 

Goodwin typically bought 20 pounds (for $1,800 per pound) from DeLong at a time, except for a 

one-year period where he bought marijuana from another source. A week before his arrest, 

Goodwin bought 16 pounds of marijuana from DeLong. Goodwin also told agents that DeLong 

owned a black Range Rover and silver Tahoe.

On October 11, 2017, Goodwin spoke with the DEA again. He told agents that, following 

his arrest, he met with DeLong and Pancoska and that Pancoska wanted him to move out of the 

Lemont home and into an apartment Pancoska owned at 505 N. McClurg Court in Chicago. 

Pancoska told Goodwin he wanted him to move because police could be watching the Lemont 

residence and he didn’t want anything coming back to him. Goodwin also repeated information 

that he previously gave to law enforcement, including that DeLong used trucking companies to 

transport marijuana and that Pancoska owned a legal business, so he only trafficked smaller 

amounts of marijuana for extra spending money. Goodwin also described his first-hand 

experiences with DeLong and Pancoska, telling agents that about one year prior he helped

DeLong and Pancoska unload roughly 700 pounds of marijuana from a private jet at Palwaukee 

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airport. He also described another instance where he helped DeLong hide money in a basement 

wall in DeLong’s parents’ house.

On November 9, 2017, Goodwin met with law enforcement for a third time. During this 

interview, Goodwin told agents that DeLong had a warehouse in the South Loop area of 

Chicago. He then directed agents to 1850 W. Fulton Street in Chicago (which is in the West 

Loop). Goodwin identified a warehouse that appeared similar to Delong’s but stated he couldn’t 

be certain this was the correct address. 

II. Dog Sniff

Based on Goodwin’s statements, DEA agents began surveilling Pancoska and DeLong. In 

March 2018, agents went to the 505 N McClurg Court address and saw a white Jeep registered to 

Pancoska in the building’s parking area. The building contains public parking on its first two 

levels, and residential parking on levels three and four. Agents saw Pancoska’s Jeep on three 

separate occasions. On the last occasion, on March 26, 2018, agents got verbal consent from 

parking garage employees for both the parking garage’s public and private floors and, with a 

canine enforcement unit, conducted an open-air sniff of the Jeep and surrounding area. The 

canine made a positive alert for the presence of narcotics. 

III. GPS Tracking 

On April 4, 2018, a Will County judge issued an order authorizing the DEA to install and 

monitor a GPS tracking device on Pancoska’s Jeep for 45 days from the date of installation. In 

support, the DEA submitted an affidavit from DEA Task Force Officer Christopher Marshall, 

which described the information discussed with a confidential informant (i.e., Goodwin). The 

affidavit stated that the informant told agents, among other things, that DeLong and Pancoska 

received approximately 1,000 pounds of marijuana per month that they stored in a warehouse in 

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the South Loop area of Chicago; that the informant observed DeLong and Pancoska traffic 

narcotics first-hand; that following his arrest, Pancoska asked the informant to move out of his 

Lemont residence and into an apartment at 505 N. McClurg Court; and that the informant guided 

law enforcement to the warehouse’s general location, but was unable to identify the specific 

warehouse that belonged to DeLong and Pancoska. The affidavit further stated that law 

enforcement conducted physical surveillance at 505 McClurg Court on three occasions where 

they observed a white Jeep registered to Pancoska parked in the building and that, on one 

occasion, a canine enforcement unit conducted an open-air sniff of the Jeep that alerted positive 

to the presence of narcotics. 

On June 18, 2018, a Will County judge issued another order authorizing GPS tracking of 

Pancoska’s Jeep for 45 days from the date of installation. An affidavit from agent Marshall was 

also included, containing the same information from the prior affidavit. In addition, the affidavit 

described law enforcement’s electronic and physical surveillance to date. The affidavit noted that

Pancoska travelled to the Lemont address, that this address was the location where agents 

recovered a large amount of cannabis during a search warrant, and that the informant advised law 

enforcement that Pancoska owned the property. 

A similar search warrant was issued on August 3, 2018. Again, the affidavit in support 

included all the information from the prior affidavits. It also recapped electronic and physical 

surveillance information law enforcement had obtained since the last affidavit. A similar order 

was issued on October 9, 2019. The affidavit in support included all information from and 

summarized law enforcement surveillance since the last affidavit. 

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IV. Traffic Stops

On April 18, 2018, agents conducted a traffic stop of Richard Pancoska, Nicholas 

Pancoska’s father, after seeing the son exit a building at 345 N. Canal St., drive his Jeep 

alongside a silver Dodge truck, remove a brown cardboard box from the rear of his Jeep and 

place it in the truck bed. Believing the box contained narcotics, agents stopped the truck, driven 

by Richard Pancoska, after the cars departed the area in different directions. During the stop, 

agents asked Richard if they could search the boxes in the truck’s bed. Richard agreed and the 

agents found truck mirrors and packaging materials in the boxes.

On August 14, 2018, a DEA task force officer watched Pancoska exit a building at 3716 

Belmont Ave., enter his Jeep, pull up to the garage door, park and exit the vehicle, and return 

carrying two white shopping bags that he placed in the Jeep’s rear before departing. About 30 

minutes later, at the DEA’s request, Chicago Police Department officers conducted an 

investigatory stop of Pancoska. Officers reported that they did not see any white bags in the Jeep. 

Neither the April nor August stops were included in any affidavits submitted in support of the 

various search warrants.

V. Search Warrants

A. 2113 West Grand Avenue and 947 West 32nd Street

On October 18, 2018, a Will County judge issued search warrants for 2113 West Grand 

Avenue (the warehouse) and 947 West 32nd Street (“Chiscapes,” the premises for Pancoska’s 

business). In support of these warrants, the government attached an affidavit describing

Goodwin’s statements to law enforcement, Goodwin’s pending criminal case and criminal 

history, and that he was helping law enforcement in exchange for consideration in his pending 

criminal case. The affidavit summarized the information Goodwin gave about DeLong and 

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Pancoska’s trafficking activities. It also recapped the open-air sniff of Pancoska’s Jeep (included 

in the GPS tracking device affidavits as well), Pancoska’s travel to banks and certain addresses, 

Pancoska’s meetings with DeLong and other individuals, and Pancoska’s travel to Chiscapes and 

the Lemont address. 

The affidavit also summarized law enforcement’s physical surveillance on October 17, 

2018, at 2113 West Grand Avenue. The affidavit stated that agents saw Pancoska drive to 2117 

W. Grand Avenue, where they watched Daniel Dillon, one of Pancoska’s associates, get into his 

Jeep. Agents saw DeLong’s vehicle arrive and enter a garage door at the warehouse’s rear. Over 

the next several hours, agents saw Pancoska, DeLong, and two of their associates enter and exit 

the warehouse. They also saw, at various times, Pancoska, DeLong and the associates place 

garbage into cans in the building’s rear. No one else approached or placed anything into these 

garbage cans. Around 8:30 p.m. law enforcement performed a trash pull and found: (1) 25 

clear/black open heat-sealed bags with a strong odor of marijuana and marijuana residue; (2) one

empty box of 100 count rubber gloves; (3) one pair of used rubber gloves; (4) one large empty 

box with a shipping label from Hong Kong addresses to “Max Pothoff”; (5) four brown boxes, 

two were labeled “California Grown, True OG, contains 100 single prerolled of full nugg 

flower” and the other two were labeled “California Grown, sour diesel, contains: 100 single 

prerolled full nugg flower”; (6) one white piece of paper rolled up, broken in half, containing a 

green leafy substance, found in one of the True OG boxes; (7) one empty commercial grade 

vacuum bag box, 100 count; (8) rubber bands; (9) torn pieces of heat seal bags; and (10) torn 

sheets of paper with labels stating, “California Grown Sour Diesel”. The leafy substance fieldtested positive for marijuana.

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After the warrant was issued, law enforcement searched the warehouse. As agents 

searched the warehouse, they found a white Ford van inside. A search of the van recovered: (1) a 

black hard case with different sizes of ammunition, one Springfield semi-automatic rifle, one 

Kel-Tec double barrel shotgun, one Palmetto Armory AR-15 assault rifle, one Smith and Wesson 

AR-15 assault rifle, one FN Herstal semi-automatic handgun, and additional loaded gun 

magazines, (2) a large amount of cash, (3) three large orange metal boxes, one of which 

contained 5 large heat-sealed bags, each labeled “California Grown”, containing a total of 2,786 

grams of marijuana, and (4) registration paperwork for Delong at 15101 Kostner Avenue in 

Midlothian, Illinois. Searching the rest of the warehouse, agents seized: (1) one Glock handgun, 

(2) one Sig Sauer 9mm pistol with scope, (3) money order receipts, (4) around 215 grams of 

marijuana, (5) an “undetermined” amount of cash, (6) two jars containing 953 pills that fieldtested positive for MDMA, (7) drug ledgers with large price values and cannabis strain types, (8) 

large wooden crate with a false bottom, (9) two digital scales, (10) multiple heat sealers and 

boxes of heat seal bags, (11) several empty gun cases, (12) more loaded gun magazines, (13) 

packing materials including tape, heat seal bags, garbage bags, and marijuana brand labels, and 

(14) a shipping label attached to a box addressed to Paul Delong at 420 East Waterside Drive, 

Unit 1312, Chicago, Illinois.

That same day, agents searched Pancoska’s Chiscapes business at 947 W. 32nd Street. 

Upon arriving, agents explained to Pancoska that he was not under arrest and asked for his 

consent to search the residence located at 505 N. McClurg Court. The parties dispute whether 

this consent was voluntary—which is the subject of Pancoska’s motion to suppress—but agree 

that, before the McClurg search, Pancoska called and spoke with Peter Garbis, an attorney. Law 

enforcement then drove to and searched Pancoska’s McClurg residence. While searching the 

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property, agents located cannabis packaging, heat sealers, scales, cannabis residue, and vapor 

pens locked in the office.

B. 15101 Kostner Avenue

The next day, on October 19, 2018, law enforcement obtained a search warrant for 15101 

Kostner Avenue in Midlothian, Illinois. The affidavit summarized the warehouse search results. 

It further stated that Goodwin told law enforcement that 15101 S. Kostner was DeLong’s 

parents’ address and that Goodwin once assisted DeLong in hiding over $140,000 behind 

basement walls in the home. Like the prior affidavits, this affidavit contained a disclaimer about 

Goodwin’s criminal history and other information about his pending lawsuit and agreement to 

cooperate with law enforcement in exchange for consideration. 

C. 420 E. Waterside Drive

That same day, law enforcement also obtained a search warrant for 420 E. Waterside 

Drive. The affidavit in support contained all the information provided in the Kostner affidavit. It 

also described Goodwin’s statements to law enforcement that DeLong resided near the area of 

Upper Wacker Drive and Lake Shore Drive. The affiant represented that this area was close in 

proximity to 420 E. Waterside Drive. The affidavit further stated that, during the warehouse 

search, law enforcement found a shipping label addressed to DeLong at 420 E. Waterside Drive. 

The affidavit also stated that law enforcement went to that address and spoke with a maintenance 

worker who told agents they were familiar with DeLong and unit 1312, and that they had seen 

DeLong in the building the previous day. The worker also told law enforcement that they 

smelled a marijuana odor coming from unit 1312 within the last year.

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Discussion

Defendants DeLong and Pancoska filed a joint motion to quash under Franks v. 

Delaware, arguing that law enforcement’s affidavits in support of the various search warrants 

contain material falsities and omissions that render the probable cause determination invalid. 

Relatedly, DeLong filed motions to suppress evidence obtained during the searches of the 

premises at 2113 W. Grand Avenue and 420 E. Waterside Drive. Likewise, Pancoska filed 

motions to suppress evidence obtained from the dog sniff [94], the GPS vehicle tracking device 

warrants [95], the search warrant for Chiscapes (947 W. 32nd St.) [96], and the warrantless 

search of 505 N. McClurg, Unit 3202 [97].1 Pancoska also filed a motion for a bill of particulars

[86]. McGuire filed a motion to sever his case from DeLong and Pancoska’s [101]. 

I. Pancoska’s Motion for a Bill of Particulars [86].

Pancoska filed a motion for a bill of particulars with respect to counts one and three of 

the indictment. He argues that the indictment does not provide all the necessary information to 

determine what evidence is relevant to his charges for the time period alleged in the indictment. 

Pancoska maintains that, although the Government produced lots of discovery, he shouldn’t be 

required to sift through mountains of evidence to divine the precise evidence relevant to his case. 

In response, the Government argues that the indictment need only apprise the defendant of the 

charged offense’s elements, the time and place of the accused’s conduct, and the citation or 

statute violated. The Government contends that the indictment does just that, and that it intends 

to file a Santiago proffer before trial, which abates the need for a bill of particulars.

1 Pancoska also filed a motion to suppress the statements made during the search of Chiscapes, the 

McClurg residence, and during his subsequent interview with law enforcement. [98]. The Court will rule

on this motion after a limited evidentiary hearing.

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The critical question for a bill of particulars is whether the defendant has been 

“sufficiently apprised of the charges against him in order to enable adequate trial preparation.” 

United States v. Vaughn, 722 F.3d 918, 927 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A bill of particulars is unnecessary if the indictment “includes each of the elements of the 

charged offense, the time and place of the accused’s allegedly criminal conduct, and a citation to 

the applicable statute or statutes.” Id. Also, “a bill of particulars is unnecessary if the information 

the defendant seeks is readily available through alternate means such as discovery.” Id.; see also 

United States v. Blanchard, 542 F.3d 1133, 1140 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hernandez, 

330 F.3d 964, 975 (7th Cir. 2003).

Here, the Court finds that a bill of particulars is unnecessary. Pancoska challenges two 

counts of the indictment: count one charges him with conspiracy to violate 21 U.S.C. §§ 

841(a)(1) and 846; and count three charges him with knowingly engaging in a monetary 

transaction in and affecting interstate commerce in criminally derived property of a value greater 

than $10,000. See [28]. Both counts apprise Pancoska of the charged offense’s elements, the time 

and place of the accused conduct, and cite to the applicable statute. A bill of particulars, 

therefore, is not necessary. Moreover, the Court agrees with the Government that a bill of 

particulars should not be used as a discovery device, as it appears to be intended here, and that a 

Santiago proffer, in addition to the Government’s prior communications with Defendant’s 

counsel, will adequately advise the Defendants of how the Government intends to prove its case. 

Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for a bill of particulars. 

II. McGuire’s Motion to Sever [101].

McGuire moves to sever his case from DeLong and Pancoska’s under Rule 14 of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. McGuire argues his case has minimal overlap with the 

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charges levied against DeLong. He argues that the charges against him span four months 

compared to a 54-month total for the conspiracy charges against DeLong. He also argues that a 

joint trial risks inviting jury confusion because there are three separate conspiracy charges 

against the other co-defendants, but none against him, and that limiting instructions will not cure 

this potential prejudice. He further argues that a jury might unfairly impute the gun and drug 

trafficking charges onto him even though he has only been charged with money laundering—

thus unfairly prejudicing his ability to have an impartial and fair trial. 

The Government responds that there is a strong presumption in favor of joint trials, and 

that severance is particularly inapt in conspiracy cases like this one. It further argues that a single 

trial would avoid duplicative efforts, repetitive testimony, risk to cooperating witnesses 

testifying, and would not randomly favor the last-tried defendant. The Government disagrees that 

a joint trial presents a risk of unfair prejudice or that jury confusion cannot be alleviated by a 

properly instructed jury. 

The law prefers trying co-defendants together, especially when co-conspirators are 

indicted together. United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 276 (7th Cir. 2018); see also United States 

v. Morales, 655 F.3d 608, 624 (7th Cir. 2011). “[J]udicial economy, consistency of verdicts, and 

systematic efficiency” inform this preference. Morales, 655 F.3d at 624–25. Courts have

discretion to order separate trials of properly joined co-conspirators if joinder appears to 

prejudice a defendant, but “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a 

specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment 

about guilt or innocence.” Morales, 655 F.3d at 625 (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 

534, 539 (1993)). Even if a defendant shows prejudice, “Rule 14 does not require severance”; 

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instead, the rule “leaves the tailoring of the relief to be granted, if any, to the district court’s 

sound discretion.” Id. (quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39).

In this case, the Court denies McGuire’s motion to sever. The Court finds that McGuire 

has not demonstrated a sufficient level of prejudice to warrant severance. First, a properly 

instructed jury will alleviate any concerns related to confusion about the different conspiracy 

counts. Second, the Defendants were indicted together and are charged with participating in the 

same series of acts and transactions. Judicial economy and efficiency interests, therefore, are best 

served by a joint trial. In short, any risk of prejudice to McGuire is too slight when weighed 

against the problems created by separate trials, and any other issues can be alleviated by a 

properly instructed jury.

III. Defendants’ Motion to Quash under Franks v. Delaware [109].

The Fourth Amendment states that “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” 

U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Probable cause for issuance of a search warrant exists if there is ‘a fair 

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” United 

States v. Bacon, 991 F.3d 835, 839-40 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 

238 (1983)). If law enforcement seizes evidence without probable cause, then, absent an 

exception, it should be excluded, under what is known as the exclusionary rule. Herring v. 

United States, 555 U.S. 135, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009). Because the ability of a judge to 

determine probable cause depends on the accuracy of the police’s submissions, “a search warrant 

is invalid if the police obtain it by deliberately or recklessly presenting false, material 

information to the issuing judge.” Bacon, 991 F.3d at 841.

The Supreme Court held in Franks v. Delaware that a defendant may challenge the truth

of statements made in an affidavit seeking a search warrant. 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). To obtain 

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an evidentiary hearing on the truth of the information submitted in support of a search warrant 

(also known as a “Franks hearing”), a defendant must make a “substantial preliminary showing 

of (1) a material falsity or omission that would alter the probable cause determination, and (2) a 

deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth.” United States v. Glover, 755 F.3d 811, 820 (7th 

Cir. 2014). In addition to these requirements, the defendant must also show that, absent the false 

statements or omissions, probable cause would have been absent. United States v. Santiago, 905 

F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 509 (7th 

Cir. 2013)). “[I]f probable cause to issue the warrant would still exist even if the false statement 

or material omission were corrected, then no Franks hearing is required.” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Carmel, 548 F.3d 571, 577 (7th Cir. 2008)). “Franks hearings are ‘rarely held’ because 

‘[t]hese elements are hard to prove.’” United States v. Dessart, 823 F.3d 395, 402 (7th Cir. 2016) 

(quoting United States v. Swanson, 210 F.3d 788, 790 (7th Cir. 2000)).

Defendants DeLong and Pancoska jointly move to quash the various search warrants 

issued by the Twelfth Judicial Circuit in Will County, Illinois. Defendants contend that these 

warrants violate the principles set forth in Franks because these warrants relied on information 

that was knowingly and intentionally false and, furthermore, because agents omitted material 

information that would’ve shown that Goodwin was not a credible cooperating witness. The 

Government, for its part, argues that Goodwin’s statements were not false or inaccurate, that 

agents did not knowingly or recklessly mislead the judges, that the omissions from the law 

enforcement affiant’s affidavit were not material, and that the good faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule applies here.

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A. Omissions

Defendants identify several statements they contend are misrepresentations or omissions. 

With respect to omissions, Defendants argue that the Government omitted the following material 

information: (1) Goodwin’s statements to task force agent Marshall regarding the narcotics and 

firearm found in his home; (2) the extent of Goodwin’s drug trafficking history; (3) the nature of 

his prior conviction; (4) the length of his prior prison sentence (5) the fact that narcotics, a 

firearm, and over 100 rounds of ammunition were recovered from Goodwin’s home on 

September 21, 2017, pursuant to a search warrant; (6) the fact that Goodwin admitted to owning 

two firearms despite being a convicted felon; (7) the fact that Goodwin was a subject and/or 

witness in a homicide investigation,; (8) the fact that Goodwin had previously been a 

confidential informant for law enforcement; (9) the fact that Goodwin provided information, 

including a third-party admission by his friend Esteban “Steven” Rodriguez to participation in 

the homicide victim’s death, to law enforcement during an interview at his attorneys’ office in 

August 2017; (10) the fact that a videotaped recording existed of Goodwin’s interview by TFO 

Marshall; and (11) the results of the traffic stops of Richard Pancoska and Nicholas Pancoska. 

The Court finds that Defendants have not made the necessary showing for a Franks

hearing. First, Goodwin’s initial statements about denying responsibility for the narcotics and 

firearms are not material to the probable cause determination. It is hardly surprising that an 

individual under investigation would try to downplay his own involvement in criminal activity. 

Goodwin, however, eventually confessed and took responsibility for the narcotics and firearms. 

The Court finds that omitting these prior efforts to minimize Goodwin’s criminal activity does

not negate his credibility given that, in the same interview, he took responsibility for this 

conduct, provided information based on his own first-hand involvement, and provided 

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information that was against his penal interest. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 

583 (1971) (“Admissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own 

indicia of credibility—sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search”).

Second, with respect to Goodwin’s prior criminal history, the Seventh Circuit recognizes

that a Franks hearing is not required every time some substantial adverse information about an 

informant’s credibility is omitted from a probable cause affidavit. United States v. Clark, 935 

F.3d 558, 565 (7th Cir. 2019). A detailed description of Goodwin’s prior narcotics trafficking, 

prison sentence, witnessing another crime involving a death, prior cooperation with law 

enforcement, or any similar information was not necessary or critical to a judge’s probable cause 

determination. Nor is the Court convinced that a review of the videotaped portions of Goodwin’s 

interview would have changed the probable cause determination. Although the Will County 

judges might have had the opportunity to review Goodwin’s manner in response to law 

enforcements’ questions, that is merely one factor to consider. What’s more, given that the Court 

does not find any of the omissions material, the Court is not persuaded that a review of these 

videotapes would have altered the outcomes. 

Moreover, law enforcement included information that advised the judge that Goodwin 

had a pending criminal matter, that he was receiving consideration in exchange for his 

cooperation with law enforcement, and that he had prior convictions. The Will County judges, 

therefore, had sufficient information about Goodwin’s prior criminal history and motivations to 

cooperate with law enforcement to assess his credibility. 

Third, with respect to the traffic stops, the Court does not find these omissions to be 

material nor of the kind that negate a probable cause finding —much less that law enforcement 

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intentionally or recklessly omitted this information. Even if this information had been included, 

law enforcement possessed sufficient evidence of probable cause to justify issuing the warrants.

B. Falsities 

Defendants identify the following as false statements included in law enforcement’s 

affidavits: that DeLong resided at 505 N. McClurg Court; that Pancoska owned the Lemont 

home where law enforcement recovered a significant amount of narcotics when Goodwin was 

arrested—implying that agents discovered Pancoska’s stash house; and that Goodwin told law 

enforcement that Defendants’ warehouse was in the South Loop, not in the West Loop where law 

enforcement eventually searched.

The Court finds that none of these statements were necessary to a finding of probable 

cause or that law enforcement intentionally or recklessly included these statements. First, 

regarding the warehouse location, this was not an intentional or reckless misstatement. To be 

sure, Goodwin told law enforcement that the warehouse was located in the South Loop. But 

when he led law enforcement to where he thought the warehouse was, he led them to the West 

Loop neighborhood—approximately two blocks from the warehouse that law enforcement 

eventually searched based on their physical surveillance. At best, Goodwin’s statement shows his 

unfamiliarity with Chicago neighborhoods. Goodwin acknowledged that he couldn’t be sure that 

the building he identified was the correct warehouse, which was included in the affidavit. 

Instead, law enforcement corroborated Goodwin’s information about a warehouse and its general 

location with their own physical observations. 

Second, as for the other statements Defendants identify, the Court finds that these 

statements, even if false, were not material to the probable cause determination. With respect to 

the statement that DeLong resided at 505 N. McClurg, this is the address Goodwin identified as 

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associated with DeLong. Law enforcement also observed DeLong at the residence from time to 

time, albeit for brief periods. In any event, the search warrants related to other properties, so this 

statement was not material to a probable cause finding for any of those properties. Defendants do 

not demonstrate how the probable cause calculus would have been different if this statement had 

been corrected. Moreover, the affidavits describe another conversation between Goodwin and 

Pancoska where Pancoska told Goodwin he wanted him to move into an apartment he owned at 

505 N. McClurg Court—the clear inference from which is that Pancoska owns that apartment. 

The Will County judges, therefore, had sufficient information to make that distinction. 

Similarly, the Court does not find the other statement identified by Defendants to be 

material. Defendant takes issue with the statement that a large quantity of narcotics was 

recovered from the Lemont address that Pancoska owns. Defendants argue that this statement 

implies that Pancoska owned the Lemont home and that agents discovered Pancoska’s stash 

house—but this argument overstates this statement’s inferences. The affidavits do not imply that 

agents identified Pancoska’s stash house—indeed, they state elsewhere that Pancoska and 

DeLong stored their narcotics in a different place altogether. Thus, though the affidavit implies 

that Pancoska owned the Lemont property, it does not imply that law enforcement discovered 

Pancoska’s stash house as Defendant argues. Moreover, the statement that Pancoska owned the 

property was consistent with what Goodwin told law enforcement. Furthermore, the affidavits 

state the Pancoska supplied the informant (i.e., Goodwin) with the cannabis, implying that the 

cannabis found at the address belonged to the informant. But, even if the statement that Pancoska 

owned the property was inaccurate, the affidavits contained enough other evidence to establish 

probable cause for the various search warrants. To wit, these affidavits detail the other statements 

Goodwin made about Pancoska and DeLong’s operation and the surveillance and evidence

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recovered from the trash pull at the 2113 W. Grand Ave. warehouse. In short, the Court does not 

find this statement material to the probable cause finding.

C. Probable Cause

Defendants must also show that even if the misstatements were corrected and the omitted 

information included, that the probable cause finding would have changed. Santiago, 905 F.3d at 

1025. The Court finds that Defendants fail to carry that burden. Unlike in the cases cited by 

Defendants, Goodwin’s statements were corroborated by law enforcement’s physical 

surveillance. For instance, law enforcement saw Defendants entering and exiting the back of the 

warehouse located at 2113 W. Grand Ave. and putting trash into the garbage. Defendants and 

Bruce Leipart (an associate) were the only individuals who placed trash into the garbage while 

law enforcement conducted their surveillance. Law enforcement already knew, based on 

Goodwin’s statements, that Defendants operated their trafficking activities out of a warehouse in

the same area of town. And after law enforcement performed the trash pull, they found heatsealed bags containing residue that field tested positive for marijuana; vacuum bags, rubber 

bands, and rubber gloves; two boxes labeled “California Grown, True OG, contains 100 single 

prerolled of full nugg flower” and two boxes labeled “California Grown, sour diesel, contains: 

100 single prerolled full nugg flower”, and torn sheets of paper with labels stating, “California 

Grown Sour Diesel.” This evidence, when combined with Goodwin’s statements about DeLong 

and Pancoska running a high-volume narcotics operation, gave agents enough evidence to 

support a probable cause finding for the warehouse and residence search warrants.

D. Good Faith Exception

Lastly, the Government appeals to the good-faith warrant exception. “An officer’s 

decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence that he or she was acting in good faith.” 

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United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 868 (7th Cir. 2002). A defendant may rebut this prima 

facie case by presenting evidence showing either that: (1) the warrant-issuing officer “wholly 

abandoned his judicial role” and failed to “perform his neutral and detached function,” serving 

“merely as a rubber stamp for the police”; or (2) the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant 

was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 

unreasonable.” United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Defendants do not argue that the judge issuing the warrants abandoned his neutral and 

detached function. Thus, the Court focuses on the second element.

As discussed above, the Court does not find that the affidavit submitted in support was so 

lacking in indicia of probable cause that law enforcement could not have reasonably relied on the 

information contained within it. Again, the statements given by Goodwin along with law 

enforcement’s physical surveillance were sufficient to establish probable cause for the search 

warrants that were issued for the various properties. Accordingly, the Court also finds that the 

good-faith exception applies.

IV. Pancoska’s Motions to Suppress [94] [95] [96] [97].

Next, the Court turns to Pancoska’s motions to suppress the evidence from the dog sniff, 

the GPS vehicle tracking device warrants, the search warrant for Chiscapes, and the warrantless 

search of 505 N. McClurg, Unit 3202 (Pancoska’s residence). The Government argues that it 

does not intend on introducing any evidence obtained from the GPS tracking devices, the 

searches of Chiscapes or Pancoska’s residence, or the dog sniff. It argues, therefore, that the 

motions to suppress with respect to those events are moot. The Government also argues, in the 

Franks briefing, that the searches of the warehouse and DeLong’s residence were sufficiently 

attenuated from the other searches. Defendants disagree, arguing that the warehouse and 

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subsequent search warrants relied on fruits of the poisonous tree obtained from illegal warrants 

and that attenuation does not apply.

The attenuation doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule that allows a court to 

deny a motion to suppress where the causal link between the constitutional violation and 

evidence obtained is remote or where suppression would not serve the interests protected by the 

constitutional guarantee. United States v. Street, 917 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir. 2019). In other 

words, this exception applies in situations where “the connection between the illegal conduct and 

the subsequent discovery of evidence becomes so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the 

exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” United States v. Conrad, 673 F.3d 728, 732 (7th 

Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine whether attenuation applies, the 

Court considers” “(1) the time elapsed between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence; 

(2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official 

misconduct.’” United States v. Ramos-Guerro, Case No. 13-CR-464, 2016 WL 3067801, at *6 

(N.D. Ill. 2016) (citing United States v. Ienco, 182 F.3d 517, 526 (7th Cir. 1999)).

A. Lapse of time

The Court finds that this factor weights in favor of attenuation. To start, the dog sniff 

occurred several months before the search warrants for the warehouse and residence were 

obtained and executed. Even if the dog sniff were improper, the length of time between when it 

occurred and when agents searched the warehouse favors attenuation. 

Similarly, the Court finds that the temporal factor weights in favor of attenuation as it 

relates to the GPS tracking data. Although this data was obtained continuously over the course of 

several months, it was merely used on October 17, 2018 to locate Defendants so that agents 

could conduct physical surveillance. Thus, the Court agrees with the Government that United 

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States v. Martin, 712 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2013), controls the GPS tracking data aspect of this 

case in that the data appears to have simply aided law enforcement in tracking down Defendants 

on the day that law enforcement saw them at the warehouse. After that, law enforcement’s 

physical surveillance, in conjunction with Goodwin’s prior statements and the trash pull, 

established the necessary link between the Defendants and the alleged illegal activity. Law 

enforcement did not, unlike in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), cited by Defendants, 

rely on the GPS data to establish the necessary link between the Defendants and the alleged 

illegal activity. 

B. Intervening Circumstances

With respect to intervening circumstances, this factor looks to whether any intervening 

circumstances occurred that may have severed the causal connection between the violation and 

the discovery of the evidence. Conrad, 673 F.3d at 734. This is a highly fact-intensive inquiry 

precluding “sweeping generalizations about the circumstances that will be relevant for any 

particular case.” Id.

The Court finds that this factor favors attenuation too. Although the dog sniff may have 

added additional evidence supporting a finding of probable cause, the Court finds, as stated 

above, that there was sufficient evidence aside from the dog sniff to support a finding of 

probable cause for those search warrants. For instance, law enforcement’s physical observations 

and the trash pull corroborated Goodwin’s statements. Thus, even without the positive canine 

alert, law enforcement had sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause for the 

search warrants for DeLong’s warehouse and residence.

As for the GPS tracking data, again this information merely assisted officers with 

locating Pancoska on the day that agents surveilled the warehouse. Aside from that, the Court 

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finds that the GPS data merely provided background on law enforcement’s investigation, but that

Goodwin’s statements as well as agent’s physical surveillance and the trash pull provided

enough evidence for a probable cause finding.

C. Flagrancy of misconduct

Lastly, the Court considers the flagrancy of the misconduct. This final factor is the most 

important because it is tied directly to the primary goal of the exclusionary rule: deterrence of 

police misconduct. Conrad, 673 F.3d at 735. This factor considers both the before and after 

conduct related to the alleged constitutional violation. Id.

This factor strongly favors attention. Agents obtained search warrants before each of the 

alleged constitutionally deficient search warrants, demonstrating a conscious regard for 

Defendants’ constitutional rights. The goal of deterring police misconduct would not be 

furthered here since agents obtained search warrants before executing these searches. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the balance of factors favors an attenuation finding between the 

dog sniff and GPS tracking warrants and the later search warrants. For those reasons, Pancoska’s 

motions [94] [95] [96] [97] are denied.

V. DeLong’s Motions to Suppress [103] [104].

Next, the Court considers DeLong’s motions to suppress the evidence from the search 

warrants for 2113 W. Grand Ave and 420 E. Waterside Drive. Making similar arguments to 

those in the Franks motion, DeLong argues that the search warrants lacked probable cause 

because they relied on Goodwin’s false information and omitted material information, and 

because law enforcement did not have other sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable 

cause. DeLong further argues, with respect to the warehouse warrant, that the time that elapsed 

between Goodwin’s statements and the court’s order did not support a finding of probable cause, 

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that agents never set up a controlled buy despite Goodwin’s offer to do so, that the trash pull was 

inconclusive, and that Goodwin did not testify in person before the judge. With respect to the 

residence warrant, DeLong also argues that the anonymous tip from the maintenance worker was 

insufficient, that the warrant only relied on a single day of surveillance at the warehouse, and that 

the shipping label found at the warehouse was insufficient to establish probable cause to search 

his residence. 

Probable cause requires more than mere suspicion, but less than certainty. United States 

v. Ellery, 678 F.2d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1982). When assessing probable cause based on an 

informant’s tip, courts employ a totality-of-the-circumstances approach looking at: (1) the degree 

of police corroboration; (2) the informant’s firsthand knowledge; (3) the detail provided; (4) the 

time between the reported events and the warrant application; and (5) whether the informant 

appeared before the judge. United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 2011). As 

explained below, the Court finds that both warrants were supported by probable cause.

A. Warehouse Warrant

For this warrant, several factors support a finding of probable cause. The first are 

Goodwin’s statements that DeLong and Pancoska operated their drug activities from a 

warehouse in the same area of the city. In fact, Goodwin led officers to a location that was less 

than two blocks from the actual warehouse. At a minimum, law enforcement was put on notice 

that DeLong and Pancoska may have had a warehouse in the West Loop that they operated drug 

activities out of. Agents corroborated this information by watching DeLong, Pancoska, and their 

associates enter and exit the warehouse located at 2113 W. Grand Ave. 

Goodwin also gave first-hand accounts of DeLong and Pancoska’s drug activities—

describing events that he participated in. The fact that law enforcement never set up a controlled 

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buy does not mean that they lacked evidence sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. 

See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 208 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2000). Moreover, the information 

Goodwin gave was specific and detailed. And though Goodwin gave this information over the 

course of a few interviews that occurred roughly one year before the search, he described a largescale and ongoing narcotics operation indicating a reasonable likelihood that these activities were 

still occurring, especially considering the evidence law enforcement recovered from the trash 

pull. See United States v. Spry, 190 F.3d 829, 836 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Passage of time is less 

critical when the affidavit refers to facts that indicate ongoing continuous criminal activity”). 

Likewise, although Goodwin was not presented to the judges during the warrant procedure, the 

Court attributes little weight to this factor in light of the other factors that the Court finds more 

substantial.

In addition to Goodwin’s statements, law enforcement performed a trash pull where they 

found evidence indicating significant drug activities. Defendants compare this case to United 

States v. Abernathy, a Sixth Circuit case where the court found that a single trash pull of garbage 

cans outside the defendant’s residence was not enough, standing alone, to establish probable 

cause to search the residence. 843 F.3d 243 (6th Cir. 2016). But Abernathy is distinguishable. To 

start, unlike in Abernathy, this case contains additional evidence beyond just a single trash pull. 

It contains Goodwin’s specific statements about DeLong and Pancoska’s drug operations. 

Indeed, the absence of additional evidence was a key point the Abernathy court relied on in 

reaching its holding that probable cause was lacking. Id. at 254. 

Also, Abernathy recognized that a single trash pull might be enough to establish probable 

cause for a search warrant if police recover a large quantity of drug waste indicating ongoing 

drug activity. Id. at 255. That is precisely the case here. Agents suspected that DeLong and 

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Pancoska were involved in high-volume narcotics operations based on Goodwin’s information, 

and the items recovered from the trash pull corroborated those suspicions. Law enforcement, 

therefore, had enough information to believe that this warehouse contained evidence of narcotics 

trafficking.

B. Residence Warrant

With respect to DeLong’s residence at 420 E. Waterside Drive, the Court finds that 

probable cause also supported issuance of this warrant. For starters, the same information 

regarding Goodwin’s statements, law enforcement’s physical observations, and the trash pull for 

the warehouse all informed law enforcement’s evaluation about whether evidence of criminal 

activity might be found at DeLong’s residence. Moreover, during the warehouse search, law 

enforcement found a shipping label addressed to DeLong at the Waterside address. To be sure, 

this label was seven months old. But again, given the information indicating that these drug

activities were ongoing, the Court attributes little weight to the age of this information. The same 

applies to Defendants’ argument that the warrant was issued long after Goodwin’s statements. 

Although it was nearly a year between the warrant and Goodwin’s interviews, the Court 

attributes little weight to that factor since the evidence demonstrates ongoing and high-volume

narcotics activities.

What’s more, the probable cause finding was bolstered by a statement from a 

maintenance worker that they were familiar with DeLong, that they had seen DeLong at the 

building a day prior, and that they smelled marijuana coming from DeLong’s unit on multiple 

occasions. Thus, law enforcement’s suspicions were further corroborated that evidence of 

criminal activity likely would be found inside the residence. Also, law enforcement provided 

evidence, through the agent’s training and experience, that drug dealers are likely to keep 

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evidence of illicit activities where they live. The judge was entitled to rely on the agent’s 

experience on that matter. See United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1189 (7th Cir. 1991).

Lastly, the Government argues that the good-faith exception should apply to both the 

warehouse and residence warrants. The Court agrees. The Defendants do not argue that the judge 

issuing the warrants abandoned his neutral and detached role. And, for the reasons set out above, 

the Court finds that the warrants were not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that law 

enforcement’s belief in the existence of probable cause was unreasonable. As such, the Court 

denies the motions to suppress [103][104]. 

Conclusion

For the reasons above, the Court denies Pancoska’s motion for a bill of particulars [86], 

McGuire’s motion to sever [101], DeLong’s motions to quash [103][104], DeLong and 

Pancoska’s motion to quash under Franks v. Delaware [109], and Pancoska’s motions to 

suppress [94] [95] [96] [97]. 

SO ORDERED. ENTERED: March 18, 2022

_________________________________

JORGE L. ALONSO

United States District Judge

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