IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RICHARD H.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 2089

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Richard H.’s claim for 

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction 

of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the 

reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s request to reverse or remand the Commissioner’s 

decision is granted in part, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment

[Doc. No. 30] is denied.

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security 

Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by his first name and the first initial of his last 

name.

2

 Andrew Saul has been substituted for his predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(d).

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BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 17, 2017, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, alleging disability 

since August 27, 2013, although the onset date was amended at the hearing to 

February 3, 2014. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after 

which he timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), 

which was held on August 16, 2018. Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at 

the hearing and was represented by counsel. A vocational expert appeared but did 

not testify. That hearing was continued to allow him and his representative to 

supplement the evidence regarding his work activity and medical treatment. A 

second hearing was held on February 13, 2019. Plaintiff was again represented by 

counsel, and a vocational expert provided testimony at this hearing.

On April 17, 2019, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding him

not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration 

Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s 

decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the 

District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 

(7th Cir. 2005). 

II. ALJ DECISION

Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential 

evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

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substantial gainful activity since his amended alleged onset date of February 3, 

2014. At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe 

impairments: cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease, urinary incontinence, 

osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, carpal tunnel syndrome, and chronic 

obstructive pulmonary disease. As for Plaintiff’s complaints of depression and panic 

disorder, the ALJ considered the mental impairments under the regulatory 

framework and determined that they were non-severe. The ALJ concluded at step 

three that his impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal 

a Listing. Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the Residual 

Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following additional 

limitations: never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally crouching; 

frequently reaching in all directions including overhead; handling and fingering 

bilaterally with the upper extremities; and no concentrated exposure to 

environmental irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts, and gases. 

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be unable to perform his 

past relevant work as a carpenter and construction superintendent. At step five, 

based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and 

RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform jobs existing in significant numbers 

in the national economy, leading to a finding that he is not disabled under the 

Social Security Act.

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DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if they have an “inability 

to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 

less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a 

Plaintiff is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is 

the Plaintiff presently unemployed? (2) Does the Plaintiff have a severe 

impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of 

specific impairments enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the Plaintiff unable to 

perform her former occupation? and (5) Is the Plaintiff unable to perform any other 

work? 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). 

An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the 

Plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 389 

(7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a 

finding of disability. Id. The Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 1-4. Id. 

Once the Plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts to 

the Commissioner to show the Plaintiff’s ability to engage in other work existing in 

significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

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II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even 

in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of 

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not 

high. Substantial evidence . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and 

means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)

(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in 

evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also 

Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision 

must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is 

adequately supported”) (citation omitted).

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However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved 

of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838 

F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has 

adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every 

piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide 

some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. 

Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to 

a Plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 

conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate 

the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful 

appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 

2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to 

fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately 

articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a Plaintiff is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 

1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). 

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III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons, 

including: (1) it failed to properly evaluate his mental impairments; (2) his 

consideration of Plaintiff’s physical symptoms was not supported by the record; and 

(3) the opinions of his treating physicians should have been given greater weight.

At step 2, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairments of 

depression and anxiety were non-severe. Plaintiff argues that (1) his impairments 

are in fact severe; and (2) the ALJ erred by failing to consider the effect of those 

impairments on his RFC. The ALJ analyzed the severity of Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments using the special technique to rate functional limitations in four broad 

areas, as described in the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. Going through the 

Paragraph B criteria, he found Plaintiff to be mildly limited in the areas of 

understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; and

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and not limited in the area of 

adapting or managing oneself. See id. § 404.1520a(d)(1) (“If we rate the degrees of 

your limitation as ‘none’ or ‘mild,’ we will generally conclude that your 

impairment(s) is not severe, unless the evidence otherwise indicates that there is 

more than a minimal limitation in your ability to do basic work activities.”).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s conclusion in the realms of understanding and 

concentration improperly relied on Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, concentrating 

during exams, and responding appropriately to questions, and he did not analyze 

the remaining functional areas. Defendant responds that Plaintiff denied 

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psychological complaints to multiple providers, his mental status exams were 

generally normal, and he was never advised to seek further mental health care.

The Court agrees that the ALJ should have included a more complete 

analysis of his mental impairments in the RFC finding, which included no 

limitations for mental symptoms. Indeed, the ALJ did not discuss Plaintiff’s mental 

or emotional symptoms at all in the RFC assessment. Defendant responds that the 

ALJ is not required to include a more detailed assessment if he does not intend to 

assess a claimant’s mental RFC. However, the ALJ did not explain why a mental 

RFC was deemed unnecessary in this case, so the Court is unable to evaluate the 

basis for that decision. 

Defendant suggests that a mental RFC was not necessary because Plaintiff’s

impairments were found to be non-severe and mild across three domains. This 

argument is unpersuasive. First, the ALJ’s findings appear to be improperly based 

on his own evaluation of the evidence rather than the testimony or opinion of a 

medical expert. See Alvin S. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-CV-3781, 2023 WL 2499860, at *4 

(N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2023). For example, he found Plaintiff’s allegation that he had 

problems completing tasks to be inconsistent with his “engaging in activities that 

require significant concentration, persistence, and pace, such as driving, preparing 

simple meals, managing funds, and handling his own medical care.” (R. 24) 

(emphasis added). The basis for the ALJ’s conclusion that driving and preparing 

meals requires significant concentration – equivalent to the concentration required 

in a potentially fast-paced work environment – is not apparent on its face and 

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needed further support from an expert in the relevant field. The ALJ also opined 

that Plaintiff demonstrated “no significant abnormalities” or no “overt 

abnormalities,” (R. 23, 25), but he did not explain why only “significant” or “overt” 

deficits are relevant to an RFC or a step 2 evaluation. See Lawonda P. v. Kijakazi, 

No. 20-CV-2573, 2021 WL 3418847, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2021) (citation omitted) 

(“‘While a mild, or even a moderate, limitation in an area of mental functioning does 

not necessarily prevent an individual from securing gainful employment, the ALJ 

must still affirmatively evaluate the effect such mild limitations have on the 

claimant’s RFC.’”).

Second, non-severe impairments need to be considered in the RFC, even if the 

ALJ ultimately concludes no accommodation is necessary. See id. (“[W]hen crafting 

a mental RFC, the ALJ must consider the impact of both a claimant’s severe and 

non-severe impairments.”) (citing Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 

2009); Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2014)). 

Based on its conclusion that remand is necessary for the above reasons, the 

Court need not explore in detail the remaining errors claimed by Plaintiff. The 

Court emphasizes that the Commissioner should not assume these issues were 

omitted from the opinion because no error was found. Indeed, the Court admonishes 

the Commissioner that, on remand, special care should be taken to ensure that she 

considers all of Plaintiff’s symptoms and properly evaluates the opinions of his 

treating physicians.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s request to reverse or remand the 

Commissioner’s decision is granted in part and denied in part, and the 

Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 30] is denied.

The Court finds that this matter should be remanded to the Commissioner for 

further proceedings consistent with this Order. 

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

DATE: March 24, 2023 ___________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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