In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 99-3499

Audrey McBrearty, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Brian Perryman, District Director,

mmigration and Naturalization Service;

and United States of America,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 99 C 5561--Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

Argued April 25, 2000--Decided May 11, 2000

 Before Posner, Chief Judge, and Easterbrook and Evans,

Circuit Judges.

 Posner, Chief Judge. The plaintiffs sought

judicial review of the refusal by the district

director of the immigration service to adjust

their status to that of lawful permanent

residents of the United States. 8 U.S.C. sec.

1255. The district court dismissed the suit for

want of jurisdiction, noting that 8 U.S.C. sec.

1252(a)(2)(B) provides that "notwithstanding any

other provision of law, no court shall have

jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment

regarding the granting of relief under" section

1255. The plaintiffs were winners in the "visa

lottery" that the government operates (see 8

U.S.C. sec.sec. 1153(c), 1154(a)(G), 1255(i); 62

Fed. Reg. 45004, 45005), but winners do not

automatically become lawful permanent residents.

They must petition the Attorney General under

section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality

Act, 8 U.S.C. sec. 1255, for adjustment of their

status to that of permanent resident. The

district director denied the plaintiffs’

applications on a variety of grounds, primarily

as untimely--they had sought to have their

applications to participate in the visa lottery,

though filed with the State Department (as

required), treated as the applications to the

Attorney General for adjustment of status after
they won the lottery that are required by 8

U.S.C. sec. 1255(i).

 The suit was premature, since, as the plaintiffs

acknowledge, they could obtain review of the

district director’s decision by the Board of

Immigration Appeals if and when the immigration

service institutes removal (i.e., deportation)

proceedings against them. See 8 U.S.C. sec.

1252(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. sec.sec. 240.15,

245.2(a)(5)(ii). They thus have failed to exhaust

their administrative remedies. The suit is also

barred by the door-closing statute quoted above.

Although such statutes are often interpreted as

being inapplicable to constitutional challenges,

e.g., Czerkies v. U.S. Department of Labor, 73

F.3d 1435, 1439 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc);

LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1040 (7th Cir.

1998); Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 934 (3d

Cir. 1996), the plaintiffs acknowledge that their

suit presents no constitutional issue. The doorclosing statute therefore means what it says.

 The suit and appeal are thoroughly frivolous,

and these abuses of judicial process are

compounded by a flagrant violation of our Rule

30, which requires an appellant to include in the

appendix to his opening brief the opinion,

whether written or (as in this case) oral, of

which appellate review is sought. It is not

included; nor even the district court’s order

dismissing the suit; yet the brief contains the

sworn assurance of the plaintiffs’ counsel that

everything required by the rule is contained in

the appendix. We direct him to show cause within

14 days why he (and/or the plaintiffs) should not

be sanctioned for filing a frivolous appeal and

for violating our rules.

 The dismissal of the suit is

Affirmed.