2017 UT App 208

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CINDY L. THOMPSON,

Appellant,

v.

WARDLEY CORPORATION, WARDLEY PROPERTIES, LYNN E.

WARDLEY, KENNETH U. TRAMP, JOHN T. ANDERSON, AND 

ANDERSON & KARRENBERG PC,

Appellees.

Per Curiam Opinion

No. 20170675-CA

Filed November 16, 2017

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Andrew H. Stone

No. 160906509

Cindy L. Thompson, Appellant Pro Se

John T. Anderson, Attorney for Appellees

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, and 

DAVID N. MORTENSEN.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Appellant Cindy L. Thompson appeals the dismissal of 

her “Amended Complaint for Fraud Upon the Court.” That 

complaint sought a “declaratory judgment and relief from the 

numerous court orders which were obtained by the 

defendants/appellees by perpetrating fraud upon the court” in

several proceedings. Thompson seeks to challenge the June 27, 

2017 Order of Dismissal ruling that her claims for fraud upon the 

court were barred by claim preclusion and her lack of standing.

She also challenges the August 3, 2017 Ruling that denied her 

leave to file a post-judgment motion. This case is before the court 

on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition.
Thompson v. Wardley Corporation

20170675-CA 2 2017 UT App 208

¶2 The August 10, 2017 Notice of Appeal states that it 

challenges both the June 27, 2017 Order of Dismissal and August 

3, 2017 Ruling. However, because the notice of appeal was not 

filed within thirty days after the June 27, 2017 Order of 

Dismissal, it is timely only if one of the motions listed in rule 

4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure operated to 

suspend the time for appeal. Although Thompson claims that 

she filed a motion to set aside the judgment under rule 60(b) and 

a motion for rehearing under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure (the post-judgment motion), the motion was not 

accepted for filing and entered in the district court docket. 

Because no motion operated to extend the time for appeal from 

the June 27, 2017 Order of Dismissal under rule 4(b), this court 

lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that final judgment.

¶3 Thompson’s response to the sua sponte motion does not 

acknowledge that the district court denied her motion for leave 

to file the post-judgment motion, which was required as a result 

of the entry of a “vexatious litigant order” pursuant to rule 83 of 

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Thompson instead argues 

 

1. On May 16, 2017, Third District Court Judge Mark Kouris 

entered a vexatious litigant order in a Third District Court case,

number 150900489, finding by clear and convincing evidence 

that Thompson met the requirements of rule 83 of the Utah Rules 

of Civil Procedure and determining that she was a “vexatious 

litigant.” The order listed Thompson’s cases against the Wardley 

Corporation and related defendants, noting that she filed five 

suits against the same parties, with three filings alleging the 

same or similar conduct in each suit. See Utah R. Civ. P 

83(a)(1)(B)(allowing a court to find a person to be a vexatious 

litigant “if the person . . . without legal representation . . . after a 

claim for relief or an issue of fact or law in the claim has been 

finally determined, the person two or more additional times relitigates or attempts to re-litigate the claim, the issue of fact or 

law, or the validity of the determination against the same party 

in whose favor the claim or issue was determined”). The order 

(continued...)
Thompson v. Wardley Corporation

20170675-CA 3 2017 UT App 208

that she actually filed the post-judgment motion, which 

suspended the time for an appeal of the June 27, 2017 Order of 

Dismissal. She construes the August 3, 2017 Ruling denying 

leave to file the post-judgment motion as an order denying the 

motion on its merits. Thus, she claims her appeal is timely from 

both the June 27, 2017 Order of Dismissal and the August 3, 2017 

Ruling. This argument misrepresents the district court record. 

The post-judgment motion was not accepted and filed in the 

district court because the district court denied leave to file it. 

Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal of 

the June 27, 2017 Order of Dismissal because there was no timely 

appeal from that ruling.

¶4 This court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the 

August 3, 2017 Ruling because the notice of appeal was timely

filed from that ruling. The case was before the district court on a 

“Notice and Request for Leave to File Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) 

Motion to Vacate the Court’s June 27, 2017 Dismissal Order and 

Rule 59(a)(1) Motion for Rehearing.” The proposed postjudgment motion claimed that the district court should have 

granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. Thompson

sought leave to file a Second Amended Complaint while the 

motion to dismiss her Amended Complaint was pending. 

Although the motion to amend the complaint for a second time 

was effectively denied when the case was dismissed, it was not 

referred to in the June 27, 2017 Order of Dismissal. The August 3, 

2017 Ruling concluded that the second proposed amendment 

would be futile. See Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2003 UT 51, ¶ 139, 

82 P.3d 1076 (“It is well settled that a court may deny a motion to 

 

(...continued)

required Thompson to “obtain leave of court for any pleading 

she desires to file in [the district] court.” See id. R. 83(b)(4). Such a 

motion must demonstrate that said pleading is based upon good 

faith, is not redundant, and is warranted under the facts of the 

case. See id. R. 83(e)(2).
Thompson v. Wardley Corporation

20170675-CA 4 2017 UT App 208

amend as futile if the proposed amendment would not 

withstand a motion to dismiss[.]”). The district court ruled, 

As with her prior complaint, all of the claims in the 

proposed Second Complaint sought to be asserted 

by Plaintiff were actually or should have been 

litigated in prior actions. This was addressed at 

argument when the Court asked Plaintiff to 

identify any claim that did not involve matters 

litigated previously.

Because the motion to amend lacked merit and the postjudgment motion was based on the pendency of that motion to 

amend, the district court determined that the proposed postjudgment motion was also without merit and denied leave to file 

it. The district court did not err in denying the motion for leave 

to file the post-judgment motion.

¶5 We deny Thompson’s motion for summary reversal. This 

court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of an appeal from 

the June 27, 2017 Order of Dismissal and the appeal is 

summarily dismissed insofar as it seeks to appeal from that 

order. Insofar as the appeal is taken from the August 3, 2017 

Ruling, we affirm the district court’s ruling.