NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL THOMAS BALINT, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

KELLY SANTORO, Acting Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-55576 

D.C. No. 

2:11-cv-06307-BRO-PLA 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Beverly Reid O'Connell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 10, 2019

Pasadena, California

Before: PAEZ and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges, and KATZMANN,** Judge.

Michael Balint appeals the district court’s denial of his federal habeas 

petition. The district court issued a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) 

whether Balint was denied counsel and presence at a critical stage of the trial 

(Ground One) and (2) whether the trial court erred in responding to a question 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Gary S. Katzmann, Judge for the United States Court 

of International Trade, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 24 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

from the jury (Ground Two). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 

2253, and we affirm. 

1. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a petition for habeas 

relief. Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). Findings of fact are 

reviewed for clear error. Id. As the state court did not decide Ground One on the 

merits, section 2245(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”) does not apply. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 186 

(2011).

In Ground One, Balint argues he was denied his right to be present and the 

right to counsel at a critical stage of the trial when the trial court responded to the

jury’s question. The district court concluded this claim was procedurally defaulted 

under California’s Dixon procedural bar.1 

Balint argues that Dixon’s procedural bar is inapposite because he could not 

have raised this claim on direct appeal. The parties agree, however, that the trial 

record does not reflect that there were discussions between the trial judge and 

defense counsel regarding the jury’s question. Thus, Balint could have raised this 

claim on direct appeal. 

 

1 Dixon holds that in the absence of special circumstances, habeas relief is barred 

“where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely 

appeal from a judgment of conviction.” Ex parte Dixon, 264 P.2d 513, 514 (Cal. 

1953).
3 

Balint also argues that this claim is not procedurally defaulted because the 

California Supreme Court’s order cites mutually inconsistent procedural bars. Not 

so. The California Supreme Court’s order denying relief “clearly and expressly 

state[d] that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 263 (1989). Although the California Supreme Court cited both the Dixon and 

Clark procedural bars, these rules are not inconsistent.2 The district court correctly 

interpreted the order as signifying that Balint “could have raised the claim on direct 

appeal (Dixon), and in any event he also improperly raised the claim in a 

successive habeas application (Clark).” Moreover, as Balint did not raise multiple 

claims in his June 2013 California Supreme Court petition, there is no confusion as 

to which claim the bars apply. Cf. Calderon v. United States District Court 

(Bean), 96 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the California 

Supreme Court’s order was ambiguous because it did not “specify which of 

[petitioner’s] thirty nine-claims the court rejected under [one cited state doctrine],

and which it rejected under [another cited state doctrine]”). 

Balint argues that even if this claim is defaulted, he has demonstrated cause 

and prejudice to excuse any procedural default because his appellate counsel was 

 

2 Clark holds that “the court will not consider repeated applications for habeas 

corpus presenting claims previously rejected” and that the “court has also refused 

to consider newly presented grounds for relief which were known to the petitioner 

at the time of a prior collateral attack on the judgment.” In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 

740 (Cal. 1993).
4 

ineffective for failing to raise Ground One on direct appeal and that he was 

prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance. Ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel is evaluated under the Strickland standard. See Smith v. Murray, 

477 U.S. 527, 535–36 (1986). Under Strickland, a defendant must show that (1) 

counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To 

show prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Id. at 694. 

Even assuming Balint’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is 

exhausted, Balint cannot show prejudice. The California Court of Appeal 

concluded that even if Balint had objected to the trial court’s response to the jury’s 

question, the response was “a correct statement of law that could not have misled 

the jury and is not grounds for reversal.” We see no error in this conclusion. 

Because Balint cannot show prejudice, he cannot overcome California’s Dixon

rule. 

Finally, Balint argues that even if the procedural default is not excused by 

cause and prejudice, failure to consider Ground One on the merits would result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. To obtain review, he “must show that it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light 
5 

of [] new evidence.” Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 938 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “This exacting standard permits review 

only in the extraordinary case, but it does not require absolute certainty about the 

petitioner’s guilt or innocence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

 Balint argues that he has provided new evidence of constitutional error 

through his declaration that he was not present when the trial judge formulated an 

answer to the jury’s question. Nonetheless, he fails to demonstrate how, in light of 

the declaration, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him. 

Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment that Ground One is 

procedurally barred under California’s Dixon rule. 

2. Because Balint filed his petition after April 24, 1996, his claim in Ground 

Two is governed by AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). 

AEDPA “bars relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, 

subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2).” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). These exceptions 

require a petitioner to show that the prior litigation either “(1) resulted in a decision 

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “(2) 
6 

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. at 97–98 

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). 

In Ground Two, Balint argues that the trial court erred in responding to the 

jury’s question without clearing up the instructional confusion expressed by the 

jury. He contends that the California Court of Appeal’s decision was an 

unreasonable application of Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 608 

(1946).

3

 The California Court of Appeal’s decision on this issue was not an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the

United States Supreme Court in Bollenbach. 

He also argues that the California Court of Appeal’s determination was an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. The California Court of Appeal did not 

make a factual determination, but rather reached a legal conclusion that there was 

no reasonable likelihood that the jury conflated the two separate instructions into 

one. 

AFFIRMED.

 

3 Bollenbach states that “[w]hen a jury makes explicit its difficulties a trial judge 

should clear them away with concrete accuracy.” Bollenbach, 326 U.S. at 612–13.