1

Filed 11/30/22 P. v. Vanhorn CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ERIC JOHN VANHORN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A164107

 (Lake County Super. Ct. 

 No. CR5401)

 ORDER MODIFYING

 OPINION AND DENYING

 REHEARING

 [NO CHANGE IN

 JUDGMENT]

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the unpublished opinion filed on November 1, 2022, 

be modified as follows:

On page 9 and continuing onto page 10, the following paragraph is 

deleted:

In deciding whether to grant a petition for conditional release, the trial 

court must consider whether the director of the state hospital or other 

treatment facility advises that the petitioner “would no longer be a danger to 

the health and safety of others, including themselves . . . while under 
2

supervision and treatment in the community, and will benefit from that 

status” (§ 1603, subd. (a)(1)), and whether the “community program 

director . . . advises the court that the [petitioner] will benefit from that 

status, and identifies an appropriate program of supervision and treatment.” 

(Id., subd. (a)(2).) The court must also consider “the circumstances and 

nature of the criminal offense leading to commitment” and the petitioner’s 

“prior criminal history.” (§ 1604, subd. (c).)

On page 10, the paragraph beginning with the sentence “Van Horn 

cannot satisfy this high burden” and ending with “Each factor weighed 

against VanHorn” is replaced with the following paragraph:

VanHorn cannot satisfy this high burden. When ruling on the petition, 

the trial court considered Dr. Morgan’s opinion regarding whether VanHorn 

would be a danger under conditional release; the opinion of the hospital’s

conditional release liaison that VanHorn was not ready for conditional 

release because he continued “to experience active psychiatric symptoms 

including religious and conspiratorial delusional thinking, being internally 

preoccupied, and presenting with paranoia”; and VanHorn’s criminal history 

and the circumstances and nature of the commitment offenses. These factors 

weighed against VanHorn.

There is no change in the judgment.

Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.

Dated: _______________ ____ Fujisaki ______________, Acting P. J.
1

Filed 11/1/22 P. v. VanHorn CA1/3 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ERIC JOHN VANHORN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A164107

 (Lake County Super. Ct. 

 No. CR5401)

Eric John VanHorn stabbed his brother in the chest. The trial court 

found VanHorn not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to a state 

hospital with a maximum life term. Since his commitment, VanHorn has 

been placed into a conditional outpatient release program (conditional release

or conditional release program) several times, but each time he was

readmitted to the hospital due to a deterioration in his level of functioning 

or rules violations.

In 2021, the trial court denied VanHorn’s petition for conditional 

release. It determined he failed to prove he does not pose “a danger to the 

health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder, if 
2

under supervision and treatment in the community.” (Pen. Code, § 1026.2, 

subd. (e), all statutory references are to this code.) The court did not abuse 

its discretion in so concluding, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Between 1995 and 2001, VanHorn was arrested eight times for 

substance abuse-related crimes. He began experiencing auditory 

hallucinations in his early 20s; he was prescribed antipsychotic medication

but did not take it. On a February 2002 evening, VanHorn, then 29 years 

old, consumed 12 beers and ingested methamphetamine. The following 

morning — while suffering from a delusion that he was kidnapped as a baby 

and that his brother was a werewolf — VanHorn stabbed his brother in the 

chest, puncturing his lung. The prosecution charged VanHorn with 

attempted first degree murder and assault with a deadly weapon. The trial 

court found VanHorn not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to 

a state hospital with a maximum life term.

VanHorn has spent almost two decades in a state hospital — the 

exception being time spent in a conditional release program, during which 

he was supervised and treated in the community. Since 2010, VanHorn 

has been on conditional release eight times. In seven instances, he was 

readmitted to the hospital after he “psychiatrically decompensated.” In 2020,

a three-year period of conditional release was revoked due to his use of 

alcohol and methamphetamine; once again, he returned to the hospital.

I.

In June 2021, VanHorn — then 48 years old — petitioned for 

conditional release. Pursuant to a court order, his psychologist, Camille 

Morgan, PsyD., prepared a report opining he should not be placed in
3

a conditional release program because “he would be a danger to the health 

and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder, even while 

under supervision and treatment in the community.”

According to the report, VanHorn suffers from schizophrenia. He has 

also been diagnosed with moderate amphetamine-type stimulant use disorder

and severe alcohol use disorder, both of which are in remission in a controlled 

environment. VanHorn has an extensive medication regimen, but he has

expressed reluctance to take certain prescribed medication. While on 

medication, VanHorn experiences “delusions which are entrenched and 

identical to those” underlying the commitment offenses — e.g., “that he was 

stolen . . . as an infant and that he may be royalty.” He has a “psychotic 

preoccupation with religion and the occult,” drawing “symbols on walls and 

property in an effort to protect himself from ‘negative energy.’ ” In an 

interview with Dr. Morgan, VanHorn questioned his diagnosis, expressed 

doubt regarding the need for — and effectiveness of — his medication, and 

persisted in the delusion that he was kidnapped as an infant.

The report catalogued VanHorn’s eight prior conditional releases 

beginning in 2010, as well as the circumstances resulting in his readmission

to the state hospital. In seven instances, VanHorn was readmitted for 

“psychiatric decompensation.”

1 In 2017, he was placed in a conditional 

release program for the eighth time. In 2019 — and while on conditional 

release — he abused his antianxiety and antipsychotic medications, and he 

twice tested positive for methamphetamine. In February 2020, VanHorn 

submitted a cold urine sample that tested positive for adulteration and 

1 For example, while on conditional release in 2016, VanHorn set fire 

to cardboard and other materials in a barbeque. VanHorn initially claimed 

he was cleaning the barbeque, but he later admitted he was conducting 

a “ ‘spiritual cleansing.’ ”
4

methamphetamine. When asked about it, VanHorn initially claimed naiveté. 

Eventually, however, he admitted trying “to ‘cheat’ the test by storing clean 

urine in his refrigerator because he planned to drink alcohol.”

According to the report, VanHorn’s response — which reflected

“antisocial and criminal thinking of trying to ‘game the system’ or beat the 

odds” — “places him at risk for destabilization and ultimately dangerous 

behavior. It also impairs [the program’s] ability to successfully supervise him 

and monitor his functioning in the community, as so much of [the program’s] 

supervision relies on an individual’s transparency with the treatment team, 

not to mention one’s practice of sound judgment.” VanHorn’s methamphetamine use, the report concluded, placed him at risk of psychiatric 

destabilization and increased his risk of violence “substantially beyond that 

which [the program] can safely monitor in the community.” As the report 

explained, VanHorn’s mental state was “extremely fragile,” and he had

“distortions, religiosity, and bizarre ideation that approach delusional 

ideation. Historically, he has psychiatrically decompensated quickly and 

severely in the community under [conditional release]. Engagement in 

any substance use place[d] him at considerable risk for psychiatric 

decompensation given the delicacy of his psychiatric stability,” which in 

turn placed him at risk of “dangerous behavior.”

Dr. Morgan opined that while VanHorn did not meet the criteria for an 

involuntary medication order based on dangerousness, he would benefit from 

the structure provided in the state hospital. The report noted he had

“engaged in several rule-breaking incidents and one aggressive act” since 

March 2020. The most recent incident occurred in January 2021 when he left 

“the dining room and forcefully and aggressively kicked the . . . doors leading 

outside of the building.”
5

Dr. Morgan evaluated VanHorn’s risk of violence. She noted he 

continued to exhibit symptoms of schizophrenia, “including paranoid and 

grandiose delusions which are . . . similar, to those he exhibited around the 

time of his instant offense,” and “psychotic preoccupation with the occult.” 

She also opined VanHorn possessed “poor insight” into “his current 

psychiatric symptoms, and . . . the nature of his psychiatric diagnosis,” as he 

believed his “symptoms were drug-induced and not due to a chronic psychotic 

illness.” According to Dr. Morgan, he also possessed “incomplete insight into 

his need for ongoing substance recovery treatment” because he had not 

meaningfully participated in treatment since his rehospitalization in 2020.

Finally, she opined VanHorn might be unable to maintain stability in a “more 

stressful community environment” because his medication regimen had not 

been stabilized and he refused to take clozapine, a suggested medication.

Finally, the report noted the hospital’s conditional release liaison

determined VanHorn was “NOT . . . Ready” for conditional release because he 

continued “to experience active psychiatric symptoms including religious and 

conspiratorial delusional thinking, being internally preoccupied, and 

presenting with paranoia.”

II.

VanHorn testified at the hearing on his petition for conditional release. 

He acknowledged his schizophrenia diagnosis but believed the stabbing was

the result of “drug-induced psychosis.” VanHorn has a fixed false belief he 

was stolen at birth, and he has experienced mania, depression, and psychosis. 

VanHorn was using drugs and alcohol — and not taking his medication —

when he stabbed his brother. He expressed regret for what he had done to 

his brother.
6

VanHorn has been confined in the state hospital for approximately 20 

years, except for a “few times” when he was in a conditional release program.

Each time, he was readmitted because he experienced delusions. On his most 

recent conditional release, VanHorn used methamphetamine and drank 

alcohol. He was ingesting “caffeine substances” because he craved energy, 

and he claimed things “got out of hand” — he took methamphetamine 

and drank alcohol. But VanHorn acknowledged he planned to use

methamphetamine; he stored clean urine because he “wanted to be able 

to continue to stay out in the community after just one usage.” VanHorn 

did not think he did anything “unsafe,” but he acknowledged using 

methamphetamine is illegal and violated the terms of his conditional release.

Until he used methamphetamine, he had been sober for 18 years.

Back at the state hospital, VanHorn regained sobriety but did not

engage with substance abuse programming. After attending 20 hours of 

substance abuse programming each week for 20 years, VanHorn felt he had 

learned everything the hospital had to offer. He decided to take a “vacation” 

from the programming and do some “inner reflecting” instead, even though 

he knew his participation was required to attain conditional release. He 

planned to resume programming eventually. In the meantime, VanHorn 

planned to use “coping strategies” to stay sober. He participates in group 

therapy for his mental illness, and he attends weekly sessions with a

psychologist.

VanHorn takes his prescribed medication because he needs it to 

manage his mental illness. He has not had violent or aggressive thoughts 

since he stabbed his brother — he considers himself a “reserved and quiet” 

person who tries to be “appropriate and peaceful.” At the hospital, he keeps 

to himself and stays in his room, in part because of a perception that hospital
7

staff “are the police.” He decorated his room with drawings of crosses to 

“keep the holy spirit present in [his] life.” VanHorn kicked the dining room 

doors because he “was hearing” imaginary things, felt threatened, and “was 

trying to get out of the chow hall.” When he is in a “good environment” — one 

free of “rough talk” and a “prison mentality” — he feels “no need to try to 

escape.”

If released, VanHorn would live with his 80-year-old mother and seek 

mental health treatment from a county agency. He was willing to take 

prescribed medication if it did not adversely affect him. VanHorn had

a negative response to at least one antipsychotic medication, and he had 

declined to take clozapine because he feared it would weaken his immune 

system. VanHorn acknowledged alcohol interferes with his medication, but 

he hoped that when his “mental illness [was] under control,” he could have an 

alcoholic drink at dinner. He, however, had no immediate plans to consume 

alcohol and knew it was unlikely he could have just one drink.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the petition. 

The court found VanHorn failed to establish, “by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that he is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others if

supervised and treated in the community.” It acknowledged the only 

“significant incident of violence” occurred in 2002 but reasoned VanHorn 

committed the incident while under the influence of drugs and alcohol and 

while experiencing delusions directed at his family. VanHorn, the court 

observed, continued to exhibit “active” and “expanded” symptoms of 

schizophrenia “similar to the ones he was having” when he stabbed his 

brother. The court opined VanHorn had “poor insight” into his symptoms —

illustrated in part by his refusal to take certain prescribed medication — and 

limited insight into his substance abuse disorder — evidenced by his 
8

premeditated decision to use methamphetamine and to discontinue substance 

abuse programming upon his readmission to the state hospital.

Next, the trial court noted VanHorn had been released into the 

community — and returned to the state hospital — eight times. This 

evidence, the court found, supported an inference he did not cope well in 

a community environment. On the seven occasions when he returned to the 

hospital after decompensating, he regained stability by “getting back into his 

programs, back on his regimen, conducting his therapy” and getting his 

“symptoms into remission.” When VanHorn was readmitted in 2020, he did 

not engage with substance abuse programming. In the court’s view, his 

failure to do so created a risk that, “out in the community facing . . . stressors 

and anxiety and paranoia-invoking situations that come with dealing with 

others,” he would present a danger to others. The court suggested that if 

VanHorn “gets back into the programming and active treatment . . . he will 

again be eligible, in the eyes of the department,” for conditional release.

DISCUSSION

A defendant found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity may be 

committed to the Department of State Hospitals. (§ 1026, subd. (a).) “The 

purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal . . . is to treat the 

individual’s mental illness and protect him and society from his potential 

dangerousness.” (Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S. 354, 368.) As 

relevant here, a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity may petition 

the trial court to be released from a state hospital before the expiration of his 

maximum term of commitment “upon the ground that sanity has been 

restored,” i.e., that he will “not be a danger to the health and safety of others, 

due to mental defect, disease, or disorder, while under supervision and 

treatment in the community.” (§ 1026.2, subds. (a), (e); People v. Cross (2005) 
9

127 Cal.App.4th 63, 72 [listing methods by which a defendant may be 

released from commitment].)

This process has two steps. At the first step, the trial court holds 

a hearing at which the petitioner has the burden to prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence that, as relevant here, he is “ ‘not dangerous.’ ” (People v. 

McDonough (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1472, 1491.) If the court determines the 

petitioner will not be a danger to the health and safety of others, he is placed 

on conditional release, “which may consist of outpatient supervision and 

treatment . . . . ‘ “Outpatient status is not a privilege given the [petitioner] to 

finish out his sentence in a less restricted setting; rather it is a discretionary 

form of treatment to be ordered by the committing court only if the medical 

experts who plan and provide treatment conclude that such treatment would 

benefit the [petitioner] and cause no undue hazard to the community.” 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.] While in the outpatient program, the [petitioner] may 

be returned to the state facility after a hearing if determined dangerous to 

others.” (People v. Dobson (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1433.)2

In deciding whether to grant a petition for conditional release, the trial 

court must consider whether the director of the state hospital or other 

treatment facility advises that the petitioner “would no longer be a danger to 

the health and safety of others, including themselves . . . while under 

supervision and treatment in the community, and will benefit from that 

status” (§ 1603, subd. (a)(1)), and whether the “community program 

director . . . advises the court that the [petitioner] will benefit from that 

status, and identifies an appropriate program of supervision and treatment.” 

2 The second step — the restoration of sanity trial — is reached only if 

the petitioner has been approved for, and successfully completed, “one year of 

outpatient treatment (or less if the community program director recommends

release sooner).” (People v. Endsley (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 93, 101.)
10

(Id., subd. (a)(2).) The court must also consider “the circumstances and 

nature of the criminal offense leading to commitment” and the petitioner’s 

“prior criminal history.” (§ 1604, subd. (c).)

We review the trial court’s ruling on a petition for conditional release

for abuse of discretion. That phrase “ ‘implies the absence of arbitrary 

determination, capricious disposition, or whimsical thinking. [Citation.] 

“When the question on appeal is whether the trial court has abused its 

discretion, the showing is insufficient if it presents facts which merely afford 

an opportunity for a difference of opinion. An appellate tribunal is not 

authorized to substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge. [Citations.]” 

[Citation.] Discretion is abused only if the court exceeds all bounds of 

reason[], all of the circumstances being considered.’ ” (People v. Diggs (2022) 

80 Cal.App.5th 702, 709.) To establish an abuse of discretion, VanHorn must 

show the evidence compelled a finding in his favor as a matter of law, i.e., 

that his “evidence was uncontradicted and unimpeached and of such 

character and weight that there is no room for a trial court determination 

that it was insufficient to support a finding in [his] favor.” (In re D.C. (2021) 

60 Cal.App.5th 915, 921 [reviewing “failure of proof finding”].)

VanHorn cannot satisfy this high burden. As described above, the trial 

court was obligated to consider three factors when ruling on the petition: the 

hospital director’s opinion regarding whether VanHorn would no longer be 

a danger under outpatient treatment; the program director’s opinion on

whether there is an appropriate outpatient program for him and whether he 

would benefit from outpatient status; and VanHorn’s criminal history and the 

circumstances and nature of the commitment offenses. (§§ 1603, 1604.) Each

factor weighed against VanHorn.
11

The trial court also found the circumstances prompting VanHorn’s 

most recent state hospital readmission — his calculated use of alcohol and 

methamphetamine and his dishonesty following his apprehension — along 

with his lack of insight into the symptoms of his mental illness and his 

alcohol and substance abuse disorders, weighed against conditional release. 

(People v. Bartsch (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 896, 900, 903.) “[P]ractical issues 

[such] as the amount of stress” VanHorn might face in the community (and 

whether he would be able to manage that stress) also supported the court’s 

finding that VanHorn had failed to show he was no longer dangerous. (People 

v. Sword (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 614, 630.) It is undisputed VanHorn’s

substance use and delusions triggered the commitment offenses, that his 

current mental state is extremely fragile and he continues to suffer from 

delusions, and that methamphetamine and alcohol have the potential to 

intensify those delusions. On this record, we cannot say the court abused its 

discretion by concluding VanHorn failed to demonstrate his suitability for 

conditional release.

VanHorn’s principal contention is the evidence supporting the trial 

court’s dangerousness finding is speculative because he has not engaged in 

“dangerous behavior” since his commitment. To support this argument, he 

relies on several cases, including People v. Cheatham (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 

782 (Cheatham). There, the prosecution moved to extend the defendant’s 

commitment under section 1026.5, which requires the prosecution to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant both “ ‘represents a substantial 

danger of physical harm to others’ ” by reason of a mental disease, defect, or 

disorder and “ ‘has serious difficulty controlling his . . . potentially dangerous 

behavior.’ ” (Cheatham, at p. 789, italics added.) At trial, the prosecution 

offered expert testimony that the defendant experienced symptoms related to 
12

his diagnosed schizoaffective disorder, that he might self-medicate if 

released, and that if he used drugs, “it would likely increase his mental 

health symptoms, decrease his control, and decrease his compliance with 

taking medications.” (Id. at p. 787.) Another expert opined that if the 

defendant stopped taking his medications and resumed using drugs and 

alcohol, “ ‘he would become more dangerous’ as he could become delusional 

and think others meant him harm.” (Id. at pp. 787–788.) But there was no 

evidence the defendant engaged in dangerous behavior nor any evidence he 

“might engage in this type of behavior.” (Id. at p. 786.)

Cheatham reversed the commitment extension order. It accepted the 

premise that the defendant “could relapse into drug and alcohol use if 

released, which could then increase his mental health symptoms,” but

reasoned “this speculative outcome [was] insufficient in itself to support 

continued commitment due to substantial risk of danger.” (Cheatham, supra, 

82 Cal.App.5th at p. 793.) The court noted the defendant had experienced 

periods when he “used drugs and periods when his mental health symptoms 

were ‘pretty bad’ and yet the record includes not one instance in which [the 

defendant] evidenced any propensity to engage in dangerous or threatening 

behavior toward others because of his mental disorder.” (Ibid.) Cheatham

acknowledged a “person’s potential for relapse and the consequences of such 

are, of course, meaningful considerations” but cautioned, “we cannot assume 

that people without a record of dangerous behavior will struggle to control 

dangerous behavior simply because they have, or are likely to have, active 

mental health symptoms—whether triggered by drug use, alcohol use, or 

something else.” (Id. at pp. 793–794.)

We have no quarrel with the holding in Cheatham — that to satisfy its 

burden of proof on a petition to extend a defendant’s commitment, the 
13

prosecution must provide an evidentiary nexus between the defendant’s 

mental illness and his dangerousness, and speculation about what might 

happen if the defendant uses drugs or decompensates is insufficient, by itself, 

to support continued commitment under section 1026.5. But Cheatham does 

not compel reversal. There, the prosecution had the burden to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt the defendant poses a substantial danger of physical 

harm to others and that the defendant has serious difficulty controlling his

potentially dangerous behavior. (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1).) Here, it was 

VanHorn’s burden to prove he will not be a danger to the health and safety of 

others (§ 1026.2, subd. (e)), a standard that does not require a threat of 

physical harm. (People v. Woodson (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 1, 4.) Thus, at the

hearing on his petition for conditional release, VanHorn was presumed to be 

suffering from a mental illness that rendered him a danger to society if 

released, and it was his burden to prove otherwise. (People v. Sword, supra,

29 Cal.App.4th at p. 624; People v. Nance (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 784, 787.) 

Cheatham is also factually distinguishable. Unlike Cheatham, where the 

defendant had never engaged in dangerous behavior, VanHorn’s commitment 

offenses were violent and dangerous, and there was evidence he had recently 

committed an aggressive act — forcefully kicking the hospital’s dining 

room doors — attributable to his mental disorder. (Cheatham, supra, 

82 Cal.App.5th at p. 790.)

VanHorn’s reliance on two other cases — People v. Johnson (2020) 

55 Cal.App.5th 96 and People v. Redus (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 998 — is 

likewise unavailing. Johnson reversed a commitment extension order where 

the record was devoid of evidence suggesting the 69-year-old mentally 

disordered offender’s decompensation in an unsupervised setting would lead 

to violence, particularly in light of the fact that he had spent 11 years in the 
14

community and had stopped taking his medication for periods of time with no 

violent repercussions. (Johnson, at pp. 108–109.) Additionally, some of the

defendant’s delusions “had ‘gone away’ ” and there was no “evidence of recent 

violence or aggression.” (Id. at pp. 99, 101, 110.) In Redus, the appellate 

court concluded the prosecution failed to “provide the required link” between 

the defendant’s “mental illness and his purported difficulty in controlling his 

potentially dangerous behavior.” (Redus, at p. 1013.) Redus noted there had

“not been a hint of violence, threatening behavior, or aggressiveness of any 

kind” by the 73-year-old defendant — a “ ‘fragile old man’ ” — for more than 

four decades, “even through [conditional] releases and medication lapses.” 

(Id. at pp. 1011, 1012.) Here and in contrast to these cases, VanHorn 

continued to experience delusions, and he had recently engaged in aggressive 

conduct in response to those delusions.

VanHorn’s other arguments do not convince us the trial court abused 

its discretion. For example, VanHorn maintains the offenses leading to his 

commitment are dissimilar from his relapse in 2020, and he suggests there is 

a plausible justification for his preoccupation with his family tree. He also 

insists his act of kicking the dining room doors does not evince an intent to 

harm others. This strategy is not persuasive. As discussed above, we are not 

permitted to reweigh the evidence. Given Dr. Morgan’s report, which the 

trial court credited, we cannot conclude it was an abuse of discretion for the 

court to infer VanHorn had the potential to react dangerously if placed on 

conditional release. Nor are we persuaded by VanHorn’s suggestion that the 

prosecutor must demonstrate he is unable to control his behavior. Assuming 

a defendant’s inability to control his behavior — a consideration under 

section 1026.5 — is relevant when evaluating dangerousness under section 

1026.2, the burden is on the petitioner, not the prosecution.
15

In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying VanHorn’s petition for conditional release.

We offer two closing observations. First, the question before us is not 

whether we might have ruled differently. Rather, we decide only whether the 

trial court abused its discretion in denying the petition. The answer is no. 

Second, we observe that over the last two decades of his commitment, 

VanHorn has made progress managing his mental illness and substance use 

disorders; in the future — as the court observed — he may well demonstrate 

his suitability for conditional release. (See People v. Endsley, supra, 

28 Cal.App.5th at pp. 106–107 [a defendant seeking conditional release 

is entitled to the appointment of an independent expert to assist in

demonstrating readiness for outpatient treatment].)

DISPOSITION

The September 2021 order denying VanHorn’s petition for conditional 

release is affirmed.
16

_________________________

Rodríguez, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

_________________________

Petrou, J.

A164107