[Cite as State v. Quickle , 2020-Ohio-4262.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT HANCOCK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 5-20-11

v. DAVID J. QUICKLE, O P I N I O N

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 2019 CR 00370 Judgment Affirmed Date of Decision: August 31, 2020

APPEARANCES: 

### Brian A. Smith for Appellant



### Steven M. Powell for AppelleeCase No. 5-20-11

-2- ZIMMERMAN, J. {¶1} Defendant-appellant, David J. Quickle (“Quickle”) appeals the February 18, 2020 judgment entry of sentencing of the Hancock C ounty Common Pleas Court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. {¶2} On September 10, 2019, the Hancock County Grand Jury indicted Quickle on two counts of failure to register as an arson offend er in violation of R.C. 2909.15, a fifth-degree felony. 1 (Doc. No. 1). {¶3} On September 18, 2019, Quickle appeared for arraignment and ent ered a plea of not guilty. (Doc. No. 5). {¶4} On November 18, 2019, Quickle withdrew his pleas of not guilty and entered a guilty plea to Count One, under a negotiated-plea agr eement. (Doc. Nos. 13, 15). Specifically, in exchange for his guilty pleas, the S tate agreed to dismiss

Count Two. 2 ( See Doc. Nos. 13, 18). (Doc. No. 27). The trial court accepted Quickle’s guilty plea and ordered the preparation of a presente nce-investigation report (“PSI”). (Doc. No. 18).

1 Quickle had previously been convicted of three counts of burgl ary and five counts of aggravated arson in the Hancock County Common Pleas Court, General Division in case number 2005 CR 153 for which he served a 9-year aggregate prison term. (Doc. No. 28); (PSI at 8). See R.C. 2909.13(B)(2). Quickle failed to register as an arson offender “for a two-year period”. (Feb. 3 , 2020 Tr. at 6, 14-15). 2 The trial court dismissed Count Two on February 3, 2020 at the sentencing hearing. (Feb. 3, 2020 Tr. at 4); (Doc. Nos. 27, 56).Case No. 5-20-11

-3- {¶5} On February 3, 2020, the trial court sentenced Quickle to an 11 -month prison term. 3 (Doc. No. 28). Quickle timely filed his notice of appeal. ( Doc. No. 33). He raises one assignment of error for our review. Assignment of Error Because the record, as shown by clear and convincing evidence, does not support the trial court’s findings, pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), the trial court’s sentence of Appellant was not supported by the record. {¶6} In his assignment of error, Quickle argues that the record does not clearly and convincingly support the trial court’s findings und er R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), and therefore, is contrary to law. Standard of Review {¶7} Under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court will reverse a sen tence “only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence that th e record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes or t hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum , 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “‘which will produc e in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts soug ht to be established.’” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

3 Quickle was given 91 days’ jail-time credit. (Doc. No. 28).Case No. 5-20-11

-4- Analysis {¶8} “It is well-established that the statutes governing felony sent encing no longer require the trial court to make certain findings before imposing a maximum

sentence.” State v. Maggette , 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-16-06, 2016-Ohio-5554, ¶ 29, citing State v. Dixon , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-67, 2016-Ohio-2882, ¶ 14 (“Unlike consecutive sentences, the trial court was not require d to make any particular ‘findings’ to justify maximum prison sentences.”) an d State v. Hinton , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102710, 2015-Ohio-4907, ¶ 9 (“The law no lon ger requires the trial court to make certain findings before imposing a maximum sentence.”). Rather, “‘“trial courts have full discretion to impose any sent ence within the statutory range.”’” State v. Smith , 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-15-17, 2015-Ohio-4225, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Noble , 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-06, 2014-Ohio-5485, ¶ 9, citing

State v. Saldana , 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-12-09, 2013-Ohio-1122, ¶ 20, quoting

State v. Mathis , 109 Ohio St.3d 54, 2006-Ohio-855, ¶ 37. In this case, as a fifthdegree felony, failure to register as an arson offender carries a non-mandatory sanction of 6-months to 12-months imprisonment. R.C. 2909.15(H ); R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(b)(ix); 2929.14(A)(5). Because the trial court s entenced Quickle to 11 months in prison on Count One, the trial court’s sentence fa lls within the statutory range. “[A] sentence imposed within the statutory ra nge is ‘presumptivelyCase No. 5-20-11

-5- valid’ if the [trial] court considered applicable sentencing fa ctors.” Maggette at ¶ 31, quoting State v. Collier , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95572, 2011-Ohio-2791, ¶ 15. {¶9} “R.C. 2929.11 provides, in pertinent part, that the ‘overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crim e and to punish the

offender.’” Smith at ¶ 10, quoting R.C. 2929.11(A). “In advancing these purpose s, sentencing courts are instructed to ‘consider the need for inca pacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilita ting the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both.’” Id. , quoting R.C. 2929.11(A). “Meanwhile, R.C. 2929.11(B) states that felon y sentences must be ‘commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of t he offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim’ and also be consistent with sentences imposed in similar cases.” Id. , quoting R.C. 2929.11(B). “In accordance with these principles, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E) relating to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and the l ikelihood of the

offender’s recidivism.” Id. , citing R.C. 2929.12(A). “‘A sentencing court has broad discretion to determine the relative weight to assign the sente ncing factors in R.C.

2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 15, quoting State v. Brimacombe , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1179, 2011-Ohio-5032, ¶ 18, citing State v. Arnett , 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215 (2000), State v. Fox, 69 Ohio St.3d 183, 193, and R.C. 2929.12(B)(1).Case No. 5-20-11

-6- {¶10} “Although the trial court must consider the purposes and princi ples of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, the sentencing court is not required to ‘state on the record that it considered the statutory criteria or discuss[ed] them.’” Maggette at ¶ 32, quoting State v.

Polick , 101 Ohio App.3d 428, 431 (4th Dist.1995). “A trial court’s s tatement that it considered the required statutory factors, without more, is sufficient to fulfill its obligations under the sentencing statutes.” Id. , citing State v. Abrams , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103786, 2016-Ohio-4570, ¶ 14, citing State v. Payne , 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, ¶ 18. {¶11} In Quickle’s sentencing entry, the trial court considered the R .C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 factors. (Doc. No. 28). Specifically, the trial court considered “the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 29 29.11,” and in exercising its discretion, the trial court considered those fac tors “relating to the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism” provided in division ( D) as required by R.C. 2929.12(A) when the court considered the need to deter or incap acitate Quickle. (Feb. 3, 2020 Tr. at 12-13); (Doc. Nos. 28, 56). R.C. 2929.12( A). {¶12} In assessing whether Quickle was likely to commit future crimes , the trial court considered Quickle’s prior record and determined th at Quickle had a juvenile court record that was “fairly extensive”. (Feb. 3, 20 20 Tr. at 13); (Doc. No. 56). Specifically, the trial court focused on Quickle’s “very extensive” adult recordCase No. 5-20-11

-7- noting his history of arson convictions (defined as offenses of violence), which excluded him from targeted-community alternatives to prison. ( Id .); ( Id .). See R.C. 2929.12(D)(2). Moreover, the trial court noted that the instan t case was Quickle’s eleventh felony conviction since 2001. (Feb. 3, 2020 Tr. at 14 ); ( Id. ). See id. {¶13} The trial court also found that Quickle hadn’t responded favora bly to the sanctions it previously imposed and noted that “the PSI ver y clearly indicates is [Quickle’s] history indicates that [he] is not good at that.” (Feb. 3, 2020 Tr. at 17- 18); (Doc. No. 56). See R.C. 2929.12(D)(3). Further, Quickle’s Ohio Risk Assessment System score 26 indicated a high risk of reoffending . (Feb. 3, 2020 Tr. at 4); (PSI at 18). The trial court did not find that any of t he factors under R.C. 2929.12(B) or (C) applied regarding the seriousness of Quickle’ s conduct. Moreover, the trial court did not find any factors in R.C. 2929 .12(E) mitigating that Quickle is not likely to commit future crimes applied. {¶14} After weighing the recidivism factors, the trial court conclude d that there was a neutral presumption favoring neither community cont rol sanctions nor a prison term. (Feb. 3, 2020 Tr. at 18); (Doc. No. 56). Ultim ately, the trial court determined that Quickle was not amenable to community control s anctions and that a prison term was justified under R.C. 2929.11. ( See Feb. 3, 2020 Tr. at 18); ( Id. ).

See R.C. 2929.12(A).Case No. 5-20-11

-8- {¶15} In our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the reco rd. Specifically, the PSI details Quickle’s prior record revealing that Quickle has l engthy criminal record dating back to 1987 when he committed his first act of delinque ncy as a juvenile. (PSI at 3-9). {¶16} We conclude that it was within the trial court’s discretion to impose a prison sentence as “the most effective way to comply with the p urposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the Re vised Code.” R.C. 2929.12(A). Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Quickle’s sen tence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law because it is within the permi ssible statutory range, and the trial court properly considered the criteria found in R .C. 2929.11 and

2929.12. See Maggette , 2016-Ohio-5554, at ¶ 36. {¶17} For these reasons, Quickle’s sole assignment of error is overru led. {¶18} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in th e particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Judgment Affirmed PRESTON and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur. /jlr