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David Ali Chami

SBN: 027585

Price Law Group, APC 

1204 E. Baseline Road, Suite 102

Tempe, AZ 85283

Tel: (866) 881-2133

Fax: (866) 401-1457

david@pricelawgroup.com

Attorney for Plaintiff,

John Draper

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

TUCSON DIVISION

John Draper,

Plaintiff,

v.

Navient Solutions, Inc., f/k/a

Sallie Mae, Inc.,

 Defendant.

No. 4:15-at-99911

Plaintiff’s Complaint

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, JOHN DRAPER, (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff") brings this action for 

damages, and other legal and equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of NAVIENT 

SOLUTIONS, INC. f/k/a SALLIE MAE, INC. (“Defendant”) in negligently, knowingly, and/or 

willfully contacting Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s cellular telephone without his prior express consent 

within the meaning of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. ("TCPA"). 

The TCPA prohibits unsolicited voice calls to cellular telephones without prior express consent 

within the meaning of the TCPA. In an effort to enforce a fundamental right to privacy, Plaintiff 

alleges, by and through his counsel, Price Law Group, APC, the following against Defendant:

[INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]

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INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is based on the Telephone Consumer Protection Act., 47 U.S.C. 227, 

et seq. (“TCPA”).

2. The TCPA was designed to prevent calls and text messages like the ones described herein, 

and to protect the privacy of citizens like Plaintiffs. “Voluminous consumer complaints 

about abuses of telephone technology – for example, computerized calls dispatched to 

private homes – prompted Congress to pass the TCPA.” Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 

132 S. Ct. 740, 744 (2012). 

3. In enacting the TCPA, Congress intended to give consumers a choice as to how corporate 

similar entities may contact them, and made specific findings that “[t]echnologies that 

might allow consumers to avoid receiving such calls are not universally available, are 

costly, are unlikely to be enforced, or place an inordinate burden on the consumer. TCPA, 

Pub. L. No. 102–243, § 11. In support of this, Congress found that 

[b]anning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to the 

home, except when the receiving party consents to receiving the call 

or when such calls are necessary in an emergency situation affecting 

the health and safety of the consumer, is the only effective means of 

protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy 

invasion.

Id. at § 12; see also Martin v. Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, LLC, 2012 WL 3292838, 

at* 4 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 10, 2012) (citing Congressional findings on TCPA’s purpose). 

4. Congress also specifically found that “the evidence presented to the Congress indicates that 

automated or prerecorded calls are a nuisance and an invasion of privacy, regardless of the 

type of call....” Id. at §§ 12-13. See also, Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 744. 

5. As Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit recently explained in a TCPA case regarding 

calls to a non-debtor similar to this one:

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act ... is well known for its 

provisions limiting junk-fax transmissions. A less-litigated part of 

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the Act curtails the use of automated dialers and prerecorded 

messages to cell phones, whose subscribers often are billed by the 

minute as soon as the call is answered—and routing a call to 

voicemail counts as answering the call. An automated call to a 

landline phone can be an annoyance; an automated call to a cell 

phone adds expense to annoyance.

Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, 679 F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2012).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. This Court has federal question jurisdiction because this case arises out of violations of 

federal law. 47 U.S.C. §227(b); Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740 (2012). 

7. Venue and personal jurisdiction in this District are proper because Defendant does or 

transacts business within this District, and a material portion of the events at issue occurred 

in this District.

PARTIES

8. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein, was a citizen and resident of Tucson, Pima 

County, Arizona. 

9. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 

153 (10).

10. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant is, and at all times 

mentioned herein, was a corporation whose corporate headquarters are in Wilmington, 

Delaware.

11. Defendant is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and is a “person,” as 

defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). 

12. Plaintiff alleges that at all times relevant herein Defendant conducted business in the State 

of Arizona and in the County of Pima, and within this judicial district.

THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227

13. As noted above, in 1991, Congress enacted the TCPA in response to a growing number of 

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consumer complaints regarding certain telemarketing practices.

14. The TCPA regulates, among other things, the use of automated telephone equipment, or 

"autodialers."Specifically, the plain language of section 227(b)(l)(A)(iii) prohibits the use 

of autodialers to make any call to a wireless number in the absence of an emergency or the 

prior express consent of the called party.

15. According to findings by the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC''), the agency 

Congress vested with authority to issue regulations implementing the TCPA, such calls are 

prohibited because, as Congress found, automated or prerecorded telephone calls are a 

greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls, and such calls can be 

costly and inconvenient. The FCC also recognized that wireless customers are charged for 

incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used.

16. On January 4, 2008, the FCC released a Declaratory Ruling wherein it confirmed that 

autodialed and prerecorded message calls to a wireless number by a creditor (or on behalf 

of a creditor) are permitted only if the calls are made with the ''prior express consent" of 

the called party. The FCC "emphasize[d] that prior express consent is deemed to be granted 

only if the wireless number was provided by the consumer to the creditor, and that such 

number was provided during the transaction that resulted in the debt owed."

17. The TCPA prohibits the use of any "automatic telephone dialing systems" to call cellular 

telephones. It also prohibits the use of artificial or prerecorded messages.

a. "Automatic telephone dialing system" means any equipment that has the "capacity

to dial numbers without human intervention." Griffith v. Consumer Portfolio Serv., 

Inc., 2011 WL 3609012 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2011) (emphasis original).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

18. In or around June 2014, Defendant began communicating with Plaintiff regarding a debt 

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account allegedly owed by Plaintiff (“Account”).

19. In or around June 2014, Defendant began to utilize Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number, 

ending in 3580, to place virtually daily incessant calls to Plaintiff pertaining to the Account.

20. Defendant calls Plaintiff’s cellular telephone at an annoying and harassing rate, calling 

Plaintiff up to four (4) times per day. 

21. Defendant calls Plaintiff from the telephone number 317-550-5589, which is one of 

Defendant’s telephone numbers. 

22. On or about April 8, 2015, Plaintiff told Defendant to stop calling him. 

23. On or about April 14, 2015, Plaintiff sent an e-mail to Defendant telling Defendant to stop 

calling him. 

24. Nonetheless, Defendant continued to place repeated calls to Plaintiff, on his cellular 

telephone, using an “automated telephone dialing system,” calling Plaintiff more than 50 

times since Plaintiff revoked his consent to be called by Defendant.

25. Defendant made numerous telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone. The

telephone numbers that Defendant used to contact Plaintiffs with an "automatic

telephone dialing system," were assigned to cellular telephone services as specified in

47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l)(A)(iii).

26.The calls Defendant placed to Plaintiff's cellular telephone were placed using an

automatic telephone dialing system.

27. Defendant uses an “automatic telephone dialing system”, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 

227(a)(1), to place its repeated calls to Plaintiff.

28. Defendant’s calls constitute calls that are not for emergency purposes as defined by 47 

U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).

29. Defendant frequently uses skip-tracing services to locate telephone numbers used by

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consumers whom Defendant wishes to call.

30. Defendant’s calls are placed to a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service 

for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1). 

31. Under the TCPA and pursuant to the FCCs January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, the burden is

on the Defendant to demonstrate that the Plaintiff provided express consent within the

meaning of the statute because it isthe best entity to determine how numbers were attained.

32. Plaintiff is not a customer of Defendant’s services, and has never provided his cellular 

telephone number to Defendant for any purpose whatsoever. 

33. Even had Defendant received Plaintiff’s “prior express consent” to receive calls using an 

automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, “prior express 

consent” was revoked on or around April 8, 2015, when Plaintiff told Defendant to stop 

calling. 

34. The natural consequences of Defendant’s statements and actions was to produce an 

unpleasant and/or hostile situation between Defendant and Plaintiff.

35. The natural consequences of Defendant’s statements and actions was to cause Plaintiff

mental distress.

DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE 

TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

36. Defendant made unsolicited commercial phone calls to the wireless telephone number of

Plaintiff using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to

be called, using a random or sequential number generator, as evidenced by the prerecorded nature of the calls.

37. These phone calls were made without the prior express consent of Plaintiff.

38. Defendant’s conduct therefore violated the TCPA by:

a. Placing non-emergency telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone using an 

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automatic telephone dialing system and/or pre-recorded or artificial voice in 

violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(iii).

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JOHN DRAPER, respectfully requests judgment be entered 

against Defendant, NAVIENT SOLUTIONS, INC. f/k/a SALLIE MAE, INC., for the following:

39. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1), Plaintiff is entitled 

to and requests $500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 

U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B). 

40. As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1), 

Plaintiff is entitled to and requests treble damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, 

for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. 

227(b)(3)(C). 

41. Plaintiff is entitled to and seeks injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future.

42. Any other relief that this Honorable Court deems appropriate.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

DATED: November 17, 2015

 

By: /s/David Ali Chami ________________

 David Ali Chami 

 Price Law Group, APC

 Attorney for Plaintiff

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