J-S11007-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RICHARD LEWIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 778 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 8, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-23-CR-0004890-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 14, 2024

Richard Lewis appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of sentence of 

two and one-half to seven years of imprisonment imposed upon his 

convictions for theft by unlawful taking and receiving stolen property. We 

affirm. 

The trial court accurately summarized the testimony offered by each 

witness at Appellant’s trial as follows:

Victim Elizabeth McCabe testified [that] on July 3, 2015, she 

was living with her parents and siblings at 239 Hilldale Road, 

Villanova, Pennsylvania. On July 5, 2015, she returned from 

vacation in Avalon, New Jersey in the early afternoon. When she 

arrived at the house, she noticed the open garage door which was 

unusual, and she went inside. No one was supposed to be inside 

the house while the family was away. When she was inside, she 

noticed the mudroom door was open and the window above the 

kitchen was wide open, which was unusual. She called her mother 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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and then 911. The police arrived and checked the house and 

began an investigation, and they noticed an outdoor chair was 

below the open kitchen window and not with the set. 

. . . .

Victim Deborah McCabe testified she lives with her family at 

239 Hilldale Road in Villanova. She testified the family went to 

the shore in Avalon, New Jersey for the July 4th holiday weekend, 

and no one was given permission to enter her home. [When she 

left for vacation, the chair was not near the kitchen window, the 

kitchen window was closed, and the garage door was closed.] 

When she was traveling home, she received a phone call from her 

daughter about the unusual state of the house. She directed her 

daughter to call 911 and go the neighbor’s house. Not much had 

been disturbed downstairs but upstairs the pillows from the 

master bedroom had been disturbed, and the closet was emptied 

including the drawers and the antique jewelry box was dumped 

on the floor and it was obvious[ that] someone had ransacked her 

home. A lot of her jewelry was missing, including jewelry left from 

her mother and grandmother, the jewelry from the jewelry box, 

and the jewelry from the drawer in her closet. The approximate 

value of the missing jewelry totaled more than six figures. Pieces 

of her grandmother’s jewelry were 18 carat gold, diamond, and 

sapphires and other family heirlooms. Also missing was her duffel 

bag, the pillowcase, and her Mercedes Benz car and keys. She 

began looking online for her jewelry, and located some on a New 

York site using Ebay. She emailed Detective [James] Santoloquito 

and the Delaware detective who were working on the 

investigation. The pieces were recovered in New York. Several 

weeks later, she learned a lot of her jewelry was recovered in a 

storage facility in Delaware. On October 27, 2015, she went to 

identify her jewelry. She also was able to get her car returned. 

. . . .

Detective Santoloquito testified he works for the Radnor 

Township Police Department and he has investigated around one 

hundred burglaries. On the night of July 4, 2015, he received a 

phone call from Detective [David] DiNardo in Newcastle County, 

Delaware concerning an investigation and a part of the 

investigation there [wa]s a GPS tracker on . . . a white Lexus [that 

was] parked on Aldwyn Lane in the parking lot of TD Bank. He 

notified the on-duty supervisor Detective Maguire to discuss 
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setting up a surveillance of the Lexus to try to identify anybody 

who approaches it. The surveillance began and the next day a 

white Jeep drove up to the Lexus; a female got out from the Jeep 

and into the Lexus and drove away. At 2:15 p.m. the Lexus was 

stopped, and Appellant’s girlfriend Letitia Rochester was identified 

as the driver. Detective DiNardo had told him about Letitia 

Rochester and Appellant during their phone call, and Detective 

Santoloquito identified Appellant. Letitia Rochester said she left 

the Lexus in the parking lot the night before after she had been 

drinking and did not want to drive it. On July 5, 2015, at 2:30 he 

was called to investigate the Hilldale Road burglary. He spoke 

with Elizabeth McCabe, and walked into the house to investigate. 

He saw the open window and outdoor chair, he noticed the master 

bedroom was ransacked. Aldwyn Lane is very close to Hilldale 

Road. He processed the Hilldale Road house and the next day he 

contacted Detective DiNardo in Newcastle County to discuss the 

investigation. On August 3, 2015, Deborah McCabe advised on 

Ebay she located a link to a New York City jewelry store and some 

of her jewelry was listed for sale on the site. He relayed this 

information to Detective DiNardo and they went to the store in 

New York City. Those items were recovered. Other items were 

recovered in a storage facility in Wilmington, Delaware.

. . . .

Witness [Alexander] Kataev testified in relevant part he is a 

jeweler and owner of Metals NY, a shop on 47th Street between 

5th and 6th Avenues in midtown Manhattan, New York City, also 

known as the Diamond District. Witness Kataev identified 

Appellant as the person who in July 2015 came into his office to 

sell jewelry, scrap jewelry and silver. He put it for sale online 

through Ebay. He has seen Appellant on other occasions and he 

recognizes Appellant. In July 2015, a Delaware detective 

contacted him about the items Appellant had brought him. On 

August 6, 2015, Detective DiNardo came to the store in New York 

City and the items were seized. When he makes a purchase, he 

takes the seller’s identification as part of record keeping. 

Appellant gave him identification. He identified the jewelry 

Appellant sold to him and subsequently taken by the police. 

Appellant’s identification was a driver’s licenses with an address 

at 201 East 12th Street, Chester, P[ennsylvania] 19013. 

. . . .
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Detective DiNardo testified he works for the Newcastle 

Co[u]nty Police Department. On July 4, 2015, he was conducting 

electronic surveillance on Appellant, a burglary suspect in 

Delaware. He identified Appellant. There was a tracking device 

installed [pursuant to a warrant] on a Lexus they knew Appellant 

drove, and the vehicle was tracked to a bank in Villanova. He 

realized the bank was near a residential facility, and this was 

similar to the burglaries he was investigating. He contacted 

Radnor Police Department and told Detective Santoloquito he was 

investigating burglaries in Delaware and he determined the Lexus 

was used in the burglaries; he tracked the Lexus to Villanova. The 

GPS tracking data showed the next day the Lexus was tracked 

back to the storage facility Sentinel Storage in Newport, 

D[elaware]. Appellant was known to have several contacts with 

the storage facility, and he personally had seen Appellant at the 

facility. On July, 9, 2015, the vehicle was tracked to 47th Street 

in New York City. [Detective DiNardo] met with Alexander Kataev 

at his store and took the items from the Hilldale Road burglary.

In October 2015, he interviewed Appellant and told Appellant 

about his investigation[ and] how he followed Appellant; Appellant 

commented he thought he was being tailed and he goes to great 

lengths to keep his girlfriend clean. [Detective DiNardo] obtained 

a search warrant for the Sentinel Storage unit and recovered 

many items, mostly jewelry. Several pieces were identified as the 

jewelry from the McCabe home. A search warrant was executed 

on the Lexus and it had flashlights, a lock, a deadbolt lock, a 

master lock, and a black sweatshirt, pry bar, screwdriver were 

found. 

Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/23, at 4-11 (cleaned up, some punctuation added).

Appellant was arrested and charged with burglary, criminal trespass, 

theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and unauthorized use of a 

motor vehicle. He moved to suppress all of the evidence obtained through 

the use of the GPS tracking device. The trial court denied the motion after a 

hearing and a jury convicted Appellant of the two theft offenses but acquitted 

him of the remaining charges. Appellant was sentenced as indicated above 

on March 3, 2018.
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Appellant pro se filed an untimely direct appeal, which this Court 

quashed. He filed a timely pro se petition pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”) which the court granted by order entered February 3, 

2023, to the extent that it requested the reinstatement of his direct appeal 

rights. PCRA counsel did not file a notice of appeal on Appellant’s behalf, and 

instead moved to withdraw to allow for “more qualified” appellate counsel to 

be appointed. See Application for Appointment of Appeal Counsel, 2/28/23, 

at ¶ 7. By order of March 3, 2023, the court granted the application and 

instructed newly-appointed counsel to file a notice of appeal within thirty days. 

Counsel filed the notice of appeal on March 28, 2023, as well as a timely courtordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 

This Court noted that the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days 

of the order reinstating Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc and 

issued a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be quashed as 

untimely. See Order, 5/31/23 (citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 846 A.2d 

730, 734 (Pa.Super. 2004) (“When the trial court issues an order reinstating 

an appellant’s appeal rights, the appellant must file the appeal within [thirty] 

days of the order reinstating the appeal rights.”)). Appellant filed a response 

observing that the order reinstating his appellate rights, just as the one in 

Wright, did not inform him that he had thirty days to file the appeal. 

Therefore, Appellant argued that this Court should, like the Wright Court, 

decline to quash the appeal and accept it as timely filed in accordance with 
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the trial court’s subsequent order. See Response to Rule to Show Cause, at 

4-5. This Court discharged the rule, but noted that this panel would make the 

final determination of the issue. We do so now, agreeing with Appellant that 

the trial court’s initial failure to inform him of the need to file the appeal within 

thirty days, as well as its subsequent misinformation about when the thirtydays began to run, was a breakdown that excuses the late filing of the appeal. 

See Wright, 846 A.4d at 735, 

Accordingly, we proceed to the questions presented by Appellant, which 

he states as follows:

1. Whether the verdict of guilty of theft by unlawful taking is 

based upon insufficient evidence, in violation of Appellant’s 

right to due process of law under the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 

[§§] 8 and 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, where no 

evidence was introduced to show that Appellant committed 

the actual taking of items belonging to the victim[.]

2. Whether the verdict of guilty of receiving stolen property is 

based upon insufficient evidence, in violation of 

[Appellant’s] right to due process of law under the Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution and Article 1 [§§] 8 and 9 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, where no evidence was introduced to show 

that Appellant received, retained, or disposed of property 

belonging to the victim, knowing the property had been 

stolen, or believing that it had probably been stolen[.]

3. Whether [Appellant] was subjected to an unlawful search, 

denied rights guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 

1 [§§] 8 and 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and 

subjected to a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 5761, where police 

in Pennsylvania obtained information about [Appellant] as 

the direct result of the use by out-of-state police of an 

electronic tracking device within the Commonwealth of 
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Pennsylvania, without a warrant first having been issued in 

Pennsylvania[.]

Appellant’s brief at 4-5 (cleaned up). 

We begin with an examination of the law applicable to Appellant’s 

sufficiency challenges:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence 

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for a fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by 

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and 

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be 

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record 

must be evaluated and all evidence received must be considered. 

Finally, the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of 

witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to 

believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Haahs, 289 A.3d 100, 104 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned 

up). “Furthermore, in conducting our analysis, we consider all of the evidence 

actually admitted at trial and do not review a diminished record.” 

Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa.Super. 2011).

Appellant first assails the evidentiary support for his conviction of theft 

by unlawful taking—movable property. Our legislature has defined that crime 

as follows: “A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises 

unlawful control over, movable property of another with intent to deprive him 
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thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a). Appellant argues that “there is no evidence 

accompanying [his] possession and sale of items taken from the McCabe 

home, sufficient to justify a finding that Appellant actually stole the items.” 

Appellant’s brief at 21. He highlights the fact that the Commonwealth did not 

offer any witness or physical evidence, such as DNA or fingerprints, to connect

him with the McCabe residence, their stolen Mercedes Benz, or the storage 

facility where stolen items were found. Id. at 21-22. 

However, the question is not whether additional evidence that the 

Commonwealth did not produce would have more completely established 

Appellant’s guilt. The query is whether the evidence that was proffered, 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to 

allow the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant unlawfully 

took or exercised control over the McCabes’ movable property. Plainly it was. 

As detailed above, the jury heard that a Lexus owned by Appellant’s partner, 

and was being tracked by Delaware law enforcement due to its association 

with Appellant, was parked near the McCabes’ home on the date of the theft. 

Police subsequently tracked the vehicle to New York City, where Appellant sold 

some of the McCabes’ jewelry. More of the McCabes’ property was found in a 

Delaware storage locker leased by the sister of Appellant’s partner. The 

execution of a search warrant on the Lexus produced flashlights, a black 

sweatshirt, a pry bar, and a screwdriver. The stolen Mercedes was recovered 

in Chester County, Pennsylvania near the address on Appellant’s driver’s 
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license. From this, the jury could rationally conclude that Appellant had 

unlawfully taken and exercised control over not only the McCabes’ jewelry that 

he sold to Mr. Kataev, but all the movable property taken from their residence. 

Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for theft by 

unlawful taking.

Appellant also contends that the evidence failed to establish his guilt for 

receiving stolen property. The statute defining that offense provides: “A 

person is guilty of theft if he intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of 

movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that 

it has probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or 

disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a). 

In furthering this challenge, “Appellant would repeat arguments set out 

above regarding the dearth of evidence that he was in possession of the stolen 

items.” Appellant’s brief at 25. As for the jewelry Appellant sold to Mr. Kataev, 

Appellant concedes the proof of possession, but asserts that there was 

insufficient proof of his knowledge that they were stolen. He posits that, on 

the contrary, “[o]ne would expect that a person with guilty knowledge of the 

stolen nature of such items . . . would not sell them to a legitimate business, 

already having provided that business with a traceable identification, and 

knowing full well that the business would place the items into public channels 

for sale.” Id. 
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Since, as we detailed above, the evidence was sufficient to establish that 

Appellant was the person who stole the McCabes’ property, it was sufficient to 

prove that he possessed and retained them with knowledge that they were 

stolen. Further, the jury was free to reject Appellant’s argument that a wiser 

thief would have disposed of the jewelry differently. In assessing evidentiary 

sufficiency, it is not our place to reweigh the evidence. Thus, Appellant’s 

second sufficiency challenge fails for the same reason as the first.

Appellant’s remaining issue concerns the trial court’s ruling on his 

suppression motion. In that vein:

[O]ur standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s 

denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether 

the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the 

legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are 

bound by the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they 

are supported by the record; our standard of review on questions 

of law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the 

ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence 

of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense 

as remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression 

rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes 

evidence elicited at trial.

Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79, 82 (Pa.Super. 2017) (cleaned 

up). 

The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution and Article I, § 8 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution both protect against unreasonable searches 

and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be 

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
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upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); 

Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8 (“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no 

warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without 

describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported 

by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.”). While there are

instances in which the Pennsylvania Constitution affords greater protections 

than the Fourth Amendment, we will treat the constitutional safeguards as 

coextensive where, as here, the defendant does not contend otherwise. See, 

e.g., Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 83 A.3d 94, 99 n.3 (Pa. 2013). 

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that “the Government’s installation of 

a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the 

vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search’” for purposes of the Fourth 

Amendment. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012). “In order 

to either search a constitutionally protected area for evidence or seize a 

criminal defendant, law enforcement is generally required to obtain a warrant 

supported by probable cause, with limited exceptions.” Commonwealth v. 

McLean, 302 A.3d 211, 216 (Pa.Super. 2023). Stated differently, “a search 

is reasonable when it is conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by 

probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Merkt, 600 A.2d 1297, 1299 

(Pa.Super. 1992). 
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With these principles in mind, we turn to Appellant’s arguments. He 

asserts that the entire time that the Lexus in question was “within the borders 

of this Commonwealth and [wa]s monitored by way of a GPS device attached 

by police, the vehicle [wa]s subject to an ongoing search that [wa]s of 

constitutional dimension and controlled by very strict statutory conditions.” 

Appellant’s brief at 41. Specifically, Appellant cites the provision of the 

Wiretap Act (“the Act”), 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5701-5782, that states as follows:

§ 5761. Mobile tracking devices

(a) Authority to issue.--Orders for the installation and use of 

mobile tracking devices may be issued by a court of common 

pleas.

(b) Jurisdiction.--Orders permitted by this section may 

authorize the use of mobile tracking devices if the device is 

installed and monitored within this Commonwealth. The court 

issuing the order must have jurisdiction over the offense under 

investigation.

(c) Standard for issuance of order.--An order authorizing the 

use of one or more mobile tracking devices may be issued to an 

investigative or law enforcement officer by the court of common 

pleas upon written application. Each application shall be by 

written affidavit, signed and sworn to or affirmed before the court 

of common pleas. The affidavit shall:

(1) state the name and department, agency or address of 

the affiant;

(2) identify the vehicles, containers or items to which, in 

which or on which the mobile tracking device shall be 

attached or be placed, and the names of the owners or 

possessors of the vehicles, containers or items;

(3) state the jurisdictional area in which the vehicles, 

containers or items are expected to be found; and
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(4) provide a statement setting forth all facts and 

circumstances which provide the applicant with probable 

cause that criminal activity has been, is or will be in progress 

and that the use of a mobile tracking device will yield 

information relevant to the investigation of the criminal 

activity.

(d) Notice.--The court of common pleas shall be notified in 

writing within [seventy-two] hours of the time the mobile tracking 

device has been activated in place on or within the vehicles, 

containers or items.

(e) Term of authorization.--Authorization by the court of 

common pleas for the use of the mobile tracking device may 

continue for a period of 90 days from the placement of the device. 

An extension for an additional 90 days may be granted upon good 

cause shown.

(f) Removal of device.--Wherever practicable, the mobile 

tracking device shall be removed after the authorization period 

expires. If removal is not practicable, monitoring of the mobile 

tracking device shall cease at the expiration of the authorization 

order.

(g) Movement of device.--Movement of the tracking device 

within an area protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy 

shall not be monitored absent exigent circumstances or an order 

supported by probable cause that criminal activity has been, is or 

will be in progress in the protected area and that the use of a 

mobile tracking device in the protected area will yield information 

relevant to the investigation of the criminal activity.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5761.

Appellant maintains that when the Delaware police tracked his vehicle 

into Pennsylvania and monitored its movements here, § 5761’s requirements, 

including authorization by a Pennsylvania court of common pleas in the 

jurisdiction, were triggered. See Appellant’s brief at 46. He argues that since 

the Delaware police did not comply with § 5761, they illegally obtained the 
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information that they then shared with the Radnor Township Police. Id. Thus, 

he concludes, the evidence that the Radnor Township Police uncovered by 

acting upon that information was the fruit of the poisonous tree and must be 

suppressed. Id. at 46-47. 

While Appellant references the provisions of the federal and state 

constitutions that prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures in stating his 

appellate issue, he does not base his suppression argument on a constitutional 

violation, but only upon the alleged violation of § 5761 of the Act. We observe 

at the outset that it does not appear that § 5761 has any application in this 

case. The statute allows Pennsylvania common pleas courts to “authorize the 

use of mobile tracking devices if the device is installed and monitored within 

this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5761(b) (emphasis added). Since the 

device was not installed in Pennsylvania, by its plain terms § 5761 is not 

implicated. 

Furthermore, while Subchapter B of the Act contains an exclusionary 

rule for non-constitutional violations of the statute’s requirements for 

intercepting wire, electronic, or oral communications,1there is no such 

provision in Subchapter D, which governs mobile tracking devices such as the 

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 5712.1(b) (“Any aggrieved person who is a party to any 

proceeding in any court, board or agency of this Commonwealth may move to 

exclude the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or 

evidence derived therefrom, on any of the [grounds enumerated in the 

subsection].” (emphasis added). 
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GPS tracker at issue in this case. Accordingly, in the absence of authority for 

the proposition that the requirements of § 5761 are coextensive with the 

mandates of the Fourth Amendment or Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution, Appellant cannot prevail without demonstrating that the 

evidence he seeks to exclude was otherwise obtained from an unreasonable 

search or seizure.

2

 

Here, the trial court found that the Delaware police installed and 

monitored the GPS device pursuant to a properly-issued warrant and, 

therefore, there was “nothing unlawful about Radnor police receiving 

information from Delaware police concerning its investigation and the GPS 

tracker on the Lexus.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/23, at 20. Appellant presents 

no constitutional challenge to the existence of probable cause or the validity 

____________________________________________

2

If suppression could be warranted by a failure of the police to obtain an order 

in accordance with the non-constitutional requirements of the Act, in addition 

to the warrant pursuant to which the Delaware police placed and monitored 

the tracking device, we would nonetheless affirm for the reasons stated in the 

trial court’s opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/14/23, at 19-20 (concluding 

that no order issued under the Act was necessary based upon our decision in 

Commonwealth v. Cole, 167 A.3d 49 (Pa.Super. 2017)); Cole, 167 A.3d at 

65-67 (concluding that a Maryland police department’s sharing with 

Pennsylvania police information they acquired through the live tracking of a 

cell phone pursuant to a Maryland court order did not violate the appellant’s 

expectation of privacy codified in Subchapter E of the Act where, inter alia, 

the Maryland order was obtained upon a showing of probable cause and not 

as a deliberate attempt to circumvent the Act, and the defendant’s privacy 

expectations did not change when he crossed the border from Maryland into 

Pennsylvania).
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of the warrant. Accordingly, we have no basis to conclude that the trial court 

erred or abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s suppression motion. 

Having determined that none of Appellant’s issues merits relief, we 

affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Date: 6/14/2024