Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the 

case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

THOMAS P. KELLER GREGORY F. ZOELLER

South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

SHAWN LAMONT ALEXANDER, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 71A03-1109-CR-424

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE ST. JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Jerome Frese, Judge

Cause No. 71D03-1011-FA-43

June 19, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BARNES, Judge
2

 Case Summary

Shawn Alexander appeals his sentence for two counts of Class A felony attempted 

murder and two counts of Class C felony attempted robbery. We affirm. 

Issues 

Alexander raises two issues, which we restate as:

I. whether the trial court abused its discretion in

sentencing him; and 

II. whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

1

Facts 

On November 6, 2010, Alexander and an accomplice encountered two young men 

in a McDonald’s restaurant on South Michigan Street in South Bend. Alexander and his 

accomplice had an argument with these men, became agitated, and left the restaurant. 

Alexander and his accomplice met the men again later in the night and forced 

them into an abandoned building. Alexander and his accomplice searched the two men’s 

pockets with the intention of taking any property that they found. Alexander found a 

knife in one of the men’s pockets. The two men were instructed to kneel. Then, standing 

behind them, Alexander sliced their throats with the intention of killing them. 

 

1 Alexander applied an incorrect standard of “manifest abuse of discretion,” but for the sake of argument, 

we will apply the correct standard of inappropriateness. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) was amended 

effective January 1, 2003, to replace the “manifestly unreasonable” standard with the current 

“inappropriate” standard. 
3

On November 9, 2010, the State charged Alexander with two counts of Class A 

felony attempted murder and two counts of Class A felony attempted robbery. On June 

16, 2011, Alexander pled guilty to two counts of Class A felony attempted murder and 

two lesser included counts of Class C felony attempted robbery. 

At the sentencing hearing on August 24, 2011, the trial court found as aggravating 

circumstances: Alexander’s pretrial release at the time of the instant offenses, the nature 

of the offense, and Alexander’s criminal history. The trial court found as mitigating 

circumstances Alexander’s age, his troubled childhood, and his guilty plea. Upon 

weighing these factors, the trial court found that the circumstances justified enhanced 

sentences and that all sentences should be served consecutively. Alexander was 

sentenced to fifty years for each count of Class A felony attempted murder and eight 

years for each count of Class C felony attempted robbery. All counts were to be served 

consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 116 years. Of that total, thirty-two years were 

suspended to probation. Alexander now appeals. 

Analysis

We engage in a four-step process when evaluating a sentence under the current 

“advisory” sentencing scheme. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), 

clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218. First, the trial court must issue a sentencing statement 

that includes “reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances for imposing a particular 

sentence.” Id. Second, the reasons or omission of reasons given for choosing a sentence 

are reviewable on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Id. Third, the weight given to those 
4

reasons, i.e. to particular aggravators or mitigators, is not subject to appellate review. Id. 

Fourth, the merits of a particular sentence are reviewable on appeal for appropriateness 

under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Even if a trial court abuses its discretion by not 

issuing a reasonably detailed sentencing statement or in its findings or non-findings of 

aggravators and mitigators, we may choose to review the appropriateness of a sentence 

under Rule 7(B) instead of remanding to the trial court. See Windhorst v. State, 868 

N.E.2d 504, 507 (Ind. 2007).

I. Abuse of Discretion

Alexander argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering his sentences 

to be served consecutively. Sentencing decisions are within the sound discretion of the 

trial court. Anglemyer, 808 N.E.2d at 491. However, a trial court may be found to have 

abused its sentencing discretion in a number of ways, including: (1) failing to enter a 

sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that explains reasons for 

imposing a sentence that the record does not support; (3) entering a sentencing statement 

that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for 

consideration; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that considers reasons that are 

improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. The reasons or omission of reasons given for 

choosing a sentence are reviewable. Id. The weight given to those reasons is not subject 

to appellate review. Id. 

A trial court is not obligated to accept a defendant’s claim as to what constitutes a 

mitigating circumstance. Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ind. 2000). A claim that 
5

the trial court failed to find a mitigating circumstance requires the defendant to establish 

that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. 

Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. 

The trial court adequately acknowledged and extensively reviewed the information 

relating to Alexander’s age and the troubles he experienced as a young child. The trial 

court found that Alexander had not gotten a “fair shake” and showed great sympathy for 

Alexander’s troubled childhood. Tr. p. 46. The trial court stated that it spent an “awful 

lot” of time thinking about Alexander and his situation as a child. Id. Alexander’s 

mother testified at sentencing, and the trial court again showed great sympathy for 

Alexander’s circumstances. 

The trial court was aware of Alexander’s decision to enter into an open plea before 

the court, but Alexander also substantially benefitted from his decision to plead open to 

the court. A decision to plead guilty may weigh in a defendant’s favor when ascertaining

mitigating factors, but this weight is diminished when the defendant gains a substantial 

benefit from the plea. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Alexander 

was facing the possibility of new charges against him at the time of the sentencing. The 

State proposed a delay on the filing of these charges in exchange for Alexander’s open 

plea. Alexander benefited substantially from the delay of these charges and the 

possibility of only serving sentences for previously convicted offenses and the instant 

offense. 
6

The trial court adequately found and stated Alexander’s aggravating and 

mitigating factors as evidenced by the record. The weight assigned to these factors is not 

reviewable. The trial court showed no abuse of discretion in determining these factors or 

imposing consecutive sentences. 

II. Appropriateness

Alexander argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the 

offense and the character of the offender. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we 

may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s 

decision, we find that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and the character of the offender. Although Rule 7(B) does not require us to be 

extremely deferential to the trial court, we still must give due consideration to that 

sentence. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We also 

recognize the unique perspective that the trial court provides in delivering its sentence. 

Id. 

The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, 

and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement 

of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” 

Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. We “should focus on the forest—the aggregate 

sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length 

of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. Whether a sentence is inappropriate 

ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage 
7

done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case. Id. at 1224. 

When reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence under Rule 7(B), we may consider all 

aspects of the penal consequences imposed by the trial court in sentencing the defendant, 

including whether a portion of the sentence was suspended. Davidson v. State, 926 

N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010).

The nature of this offense is particularly shocking and heinous. Alexander and his 

accomplice coerced two young men into an abandoned building. Alexander then forced 

the men to kneel on the ground before slitting their throats with the intention of killing 

them. The trial court focused on Alexander’s active role in the use of the knife. 

Alexander escalated the violence of the situation, and his accomplice had no contact with 

the knife. 

As for the character of the offender, Alexander has shown repeatedly that he is 

prone to violence. Alexander was sixteen years old at the time of the instant offense, but 

Alexander had been arrested three times prior for Class A misdemeanor battery. His first 

arrest for battery came when he was only ten years old. Alexander also has an extensive 

juvenile criminal history and first entered the custody of the Department of Correction

when he was twelve. At the time of the instant offense, Alexander was on pretrial release 

for Class B felony robbery. Despite Alexander’s youth, his character is very troubling. 

We note that the trial court requested that Alexander receive mental health 

treatment and counseling while incarcerated to address any mental health issues he may

have. Also, the trial court suspended thirty-two years of Alexander’s sentence, making 
8

the executed portion of his sentence only eighty-four years. In light of the nature of the 

offense and Alexander’s character, we cannot say that the sentence is inappropriate. 

Conclusion

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing Alexander and the 

sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the 

offender. We affirm. 

Affirmed.

FRIEDLANDER, J., and MAY, J., concur.