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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

David Sena, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Uber Technologies Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-15-02418-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

 

 Plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s April 7, 2016 Order 

granting Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. 27.) For the reasons below, 

the motion is denied. 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff David Sena filed a class action lawsuit against Defendants Uber 

Technologies Incorporated and Raiser LLC challenging Defendants’ classification of 

Uber drivers as independent contractors. (Doc. 1-1.) Citing Uber’s terms and conditions, 

which contain an arbitration provision, Defendants moved to compel arbitration and 

dismiss the case. (Doc. 12.) Sena responded, arguing that the Court should follow the 

Northern District of California’s decision in Mohamed v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 109 F. 

Supp. 3d 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2015), which found Defendants’ arbitration provision 

unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable. (Doc. 20.) 

 On April 7, 2016, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. 

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(Doc. 27.) In declining to follow Mohamed’s reasoning, the Court concluded that the 

arbitration provision clearly and unmistakably delegates questions of arbitrability to the 

arbitrator because similar language had been found clear and unmistakable by the 

Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit. (Id. at 6.) Mohamed’s conclusion was at odds 

with these decisions. Moreover, the Court was not persuaded that it could look beyond 

the four corners of the arbitration provision in order to find ambiguity; engaging in such 

analysis risks transforming a challenge to the arbitration provision into a challenge to the 

entire agreement, which the Court is to avoid. 

Confining its analysis to the four corners of the arbitration provision and treating 

the arbitration provision as a separate contract, the Court concluded that the delegation 

clause was not unconscionable. The Court found that Arizona law governed the issue 

because the arbitration provision contained no choice of law clause. Ultimately, the 

Court found that the delegation clause was not procedurally unconscionable because it 

contained a conspicuous opt-out provision. (Id. at 9-11.) The Court also found no 

substantive unconscionability. (Id. at 11-13.) Plaintiff now seeks reconsideration of the 

Court’s decision. 

LEGAL STANDARD

 Motions for reconsideration should be granted only in rare circumstances. 

Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). 

“Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly 

discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly 

unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” School Dist. No. 1J, 

Multnomah Cty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). Such motions 

should not be used for the purpose of asking a court “to rethink what the court had 

already thought through—rightly or wrongly.” Defenders of Wildlife, 909 F. Supp. at 

1351 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

ANALYSIS

 Much of Plaintiff’s motion raises the same arguments set forth in his response to 

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Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. The motion identifies no new evidence, nor 

does it cite an intervening change in law. Thus, because the Court has already addressed 

those arguments, it will not restate its analysis here. Plaintiff argues, however, that the 

Court clearly erred by: (1) declining to follow Mohamed and, (2) concluding that it must 

confine its analysis to the four corners of the arbitration provision. The Court will 

address each argument in turn. 

 Plaintiff states: “In granting Defendants’ motion, the Court incorrectly determined 

that [Mohamed] was not controlling authority.” (Doc. 27 at 3.) Plaintiff appears to argue 

that Mohamed is binding authority because Uber’s terms and conditions contain a 

California choice of law clause. But “district court decisions cannot be treated as 

authoritative on issues of law. The reasoning of district judges is of course entitled to 

respect, but the decision of a district judge cannot be a controlling precedent.” Bank of 

Am., N.A. v. Moglia, 330 F.3d 942, 949 (7th Cir. 2003). “Where a second judge believes 

that a different result may obtain, independent analysis is appropriate.” Threadgill v. 

Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991). Furthermore, “[e]ven 

where the facts of a prior district court case are, for all practical purposes, the same as 

those presented to a different district court in the same district, the prior resolution of 

those claims does not bar reconsideration by another district judge of similar 

contentions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, 

the existence of a California choice of law clause does not transform Mohamed into 

binding authority, and the Court did not err in declining to follow its analysis. 

 Plaintiff argues the Court “improperly confined its analysis to the arbitration 

provision only” and “did not provide any support” for this decision. (Doc. 27 at 4-5.) 

But Plaintiff failed to convince the Court that it could look outside the four corners of the 

arbitration provision, which is a separate agreement from the remainder of the contract. 

Indeed, the arbitration provision spans five pages and was clearly marked with its own 

header. (Doc. 26 at 7.) The Court found Mohamed’s approach of selecting other terms 

within the contract as a whole and using them to invalidate a clearly marked arbitration 

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provision was inconsistent with Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authority requiring 

courts to distinguish between challenges to the arbitration provision and the agreement as 

a whole. Relying on language outside of the arbitration provision blurs this distinction, 

and the Court found no controlling guidance on this issue. Plaintiff’s argument is 

unpersuasive. 

 Plaintiff argues the Court “misinterpreted Buckeye Check Cashing and Rent-ACenter.” (Doc. 27 at 6.) Both Buckeye Check Cashing and Rent-A-Center reaffirm the 

notion that challenges to the contract as a whole are to be decided by the arbitrator, and 

the Court’s decision squares with both cases. Moreover, Buckeye Check Cashing states 

that arbitration provisions “are enforceable apart from the remainder of the contract.” 

Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). This language 

suggests that arbitration provisions must be analyzed separate from the contract as a 

whole. Should courts fail to heed this principle, they risk infringing on the role of the 

arbitrator and undermining the “national policy favoring arbitration and plac[ing] 

arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other contracts[.]” Id. at 443. 

 In addition, Plaintiff’s contention that the Court is not prohibited “from consulting 

other contractual provisions when evaluating whether a delegation clause is enforceable” 

is unpersuasive. (Id.) Plaintiff cites the California state court cases relied upon by 

Mohamed as support, but these decisions are not persuasive, and the Court disagrees with 

their analysis. Plaintiff also relies on Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257 (9th 

Cir. 2006) and WB, the Building Company, LLC v. El Destino LP, 257 P.3d 1182 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 2011) in demonstrating that Arizona law permits courts to look beyond the four 

corners of a conspicuous arbitration provision to terms within a larger contract when 

analyzing a specific challenge to the arbitration provision. Neither case stands for such a 

proposition. In fact, the Arizona Court of Appeals has concluded that “the enforceability 

of an arbitration provision is to be determined by considering the provision as an 

independent agreement, separate from the underlying contract[.]” 

Stevens/Leinweber/Sullens, Inc. v. Holm Development & Mgmt., Inc., 795 P.2d 1308, 

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1312 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit. 

 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to identify clear error in the Court’s April 7, 2016 

Order granting Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, (Doc. 27), is 

DENIED. 

 Dated this 3rd day of May, 2016. 

Douglas L. Rayes 

United States District Judge 

 

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