IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-0137

Filed March 4, 2020

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TREVION DUPRI SMITH-TOLES,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Jeffrey L. 

Larson, Judge.

Trevion Smith-Toles appeals the sentence imposed upon his conviction of 

first-degree robbery. AFFIRMED. 

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mullins and Ahlers, JJ.
2

MULLINS, Judge.

Trevion Smith-Toles was sixteen years of age when he and three other 

individuals engaged in conduct resulting in Smith-Toles being charged with firstdegree robbery. Following Smith-Toles’s guilty plea, the matter proceeded to 

sentencing and consideration of juvenile sentencing factors. See, e.g., Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477–78 (2012); State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 n.10 

(Iowa 2014). 

At the hearing, the court received conflicting recommendations from both 

witnesses and counsel as to whether Smith-Toles should be incarcerated or 

released to engage in community-based rehabilitation services. It also received 

an abundance of evidence specific to Smith-Toles concerning the mitigating 

features of his youth, his home and family environment, the circumstances of the 

crime and how youth may have played a role in its commission, the challenges he 

would face in going through the criminal process, and his prospects for 

rehabilitation. Smith-Toles’s statement of allocution and his counsel’s arguments 

also included mitigating information. 

In imposing sentence, the court was torn, noting “prison is not a great option 

for you because of your young age and all of the mitigating circumstances that the 

attorneys talked about.” The court proceeded to Smith-Toles’s poor track record 

and the need for protection of the community, both of which the court indicated 

weighed against placing Smith-Toles on probation. The court noted residential 

correctional facilities would not be a workable option for rehabilitation given the 

level of supervision Smith-Toles required, which the facilities could not provide. 

Ultimately, the court sentenced Smith-Toles to a term of imprisonment not to 
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exceed twenty-five years. As to its option of imposing a mandatory minimum of 

seventy percent of the sentence prior to parole or work release eligibility,1the court 

declined to impose the minimum given Smith-Toles’s young age.

Smith-Toles appeals, arguing the court improperly considered 

characteristics of youth as aggravating, rather than mitigating, factors in imposing 

sentence.2 Specifically, he maintains the factors cited by the court in its decision 

to send him to prison “were immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks 

and consequences,” which “cannot be used to justify a harsher sentence.” 

We agree that considering the features of youth as aggravating 

circumstances in sentencing would amount to an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 

Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 402 n.8; State v. Pearson, 836 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Iowa 2013). 

Here, however, to put it simply, we agree with the State that the court considered 

the features of Smith-Toles’s youth as mitigating circumstances. The reasons for 

the court’s decision to send Smith-Toles to prison were protection of the 

community, his need for rehabilitation, and his poor prospects for rehabilitation 

without going to prison. While Smith-Toles attempts to put words in the district 

 

1

Iowa Code section 902.12(1)(e) (2018) requires denial of parole or work release 

for individuals convicted of first-degree robbery until they have served seventy 

percent of their maximum prison sentence. While the court can impose a minimum 

term, the mandatory nature is unconstitutional as to juvenile offenders. See Lyle, 

854 N.W.2d at 404.

2 As the State points out, recent legislation, effective July 1, 2019, limits our ability 

to consider appeals of convictions when a defendant has pled guilty. See 2019 

Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 28(a)(3) (codified at Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2019)). 

However, the State filed its brief before our supreme court decided whether the 

legislation is retroactive. The court recently ruled the new legislation does “not 

apply to a direct appeal from a judgment and sentence entered before July 1, 

2019.” State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Iowa 2019). 
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court’s mouth, we conclude the court considered the features of his youth as 

mitigating, not aggravating, and we find no abuse of discretion.

Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the sentence imposed upon SmithToles’s conviction of first-degree robbery. 

AFFIRMED.