1

Filed 9/28/23 In re M.G. CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not 

been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re M.G et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

J.W. et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY,

Respondent,

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY 

CHILDREN AND FAMILY 

SERVICES BUREAU et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

 A167995

 (Contra Costa County

Super. Ct. Nos. 

J2100203, J2100204, 

J2100205 & J2100206)

J.G. (Mother) petitions for an extraordinary writ (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.452) in the juvenile dependency cases for 

her four children, M.G., B.G., L.G., and C.W. She challenges the 

juvenile court’s order after a contested 18-month review hearing 

wherein the court terminated family reunification services and 
2

set a Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 hearing. 

Mother asserts that the court erred because there was 

insufficient evidence that the children would be at a substantial 

risk of physical or emotional detriment in her care; she was not 

offered reasonable services during the review period; the court 

abused its discretion by limiting her educational rights for M.G., 

B.G., and L.G.; and the court abused its discretion with respect to 

its visitation order. 

J.W., the father of C.W., also petitions for an extraordinary 

writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) commanding the trial court 

to set aside its order reducing his visitation with his daughter. 

We find no error in the juvenile court’s orders and deny the 

petitions.

BACKGROUND2

The Bureau initially received referrals in this case alleging 

that Mother physically abused the children, engaged in domestic 

violence, abused drugs and alcohol, and Mother and J.W. had 

engaged in domestic violence in front of the children. When 

interviewed, M.G., B.G., and L.G. (collectively, the G. children) 

all articulated to the Bureau that Mother had substance abuse 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare & 

Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.

2 As the parties are familiar with the factual and 

procedural history of the case, and this opinion does not warrant 

publication, we need not recite the full history. (People v. Garcia

(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.) We instead summarize as 

necessary the parts of that history relevant to the issues raised 

by the petitions in light of our standards of review.
3

and violence problems, she hit them, and she had engaged in 

domestic violence with partners in their presence, including J.W.

On May 3, 2021, the Bureau filed section 300 petitions on 

behalf of M.G. (age 11), B.G. (age 10), L.G. (age 9), and C.W. (age 

3). On May 5, 2021, the court detained the children.

At the jurisdictional hearing, Mother pleaded no contest to 

amended counts in all cases, and J.W. pleaded no contest to an 

amended petition in C.W.’s case. For Mother, the sustained 

allegations for the G. children under section 300, subdivision (a) 

were that each was at risk of physical harm because Mother had 

hit each child. The sustained allegations for the G. children 

under section 300, subdivision (b) were that Mother failed to 

protect the children in that she had a chronic polysubstance 

abuse problem that impaired her ability to provide a safe, stable 

living environment and adequate supervision, and she placed the 

children at ongoing risk of physical harm by engaging in acts of 

interpersonal domestic violence in the children’s presence. For 

C.W., the sustained allegations under section 300, subdivision (b) 

were that Mother failed to protect C.W. in that she had a chronic 

polysubstance abuse problem that impaired her ability to provide 

a safe, stable living environment and adequate supervision, and 

she placed C.W. at ongoing risk of physical harm by engaging in 

acts of interpersonal domestic violence in her presence. 

For J.W., the court sustained allegations under section 300, 

subdivision (b) that he failed to protect C.W. from Mother’s 

ongoing polysubstance abuse, thus placing C.W. at serious risk of 
4

harm and neglect, and he placed C.W. at ongoing risk of physical 

harm by engaging in acts of domestic violence. 

At the dispositional hearing, Mother received family 

reunification services, and the court bypassed services for J.W. 

because of his prior conviction for a violent felony and courtrequired registration on a sex offender registry (§ 361.5, 

subds. (b)(12), (16)).3 At the six-month review hearing, the 

Bureau expressed significant concerns with Mother’s sobriety, 

her failure to participate in a substance abuse treatment 

program, her continued relationship with J.W., and her no-show 

to 13 of 16 random drug tests, but Mother’s family reunification 

services were continued. 

As of the 12-month review hearing on July 27, 2022, 

Mother had made significant progress with her case plan. She 

completed counseling and a domestic violence and anger 

management course. She began a substance abuse treatment 

program in May 2022 and finished it in July 2022, she was 

attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, she was working 

with her AA sponsor on a 12-step program, and she tested 

negative on 21 of 21 random drug tests. At the time, the Bureau 

believed that Mother could reunify with her children, and the 

court ordered another six months of reunification services. The 

18-month review hearing was set for October 19, 2022.

3 B.G., Sr. is the father of the G. children The court 

bypassed reunification services for B.G. Sr., due to a violent 

felony conviction (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(12)), and B.G., Sr. is not a 

party to this writ proceeding.
5

By the time of the 18-month review hearing, the Bureau 

had changed its recommendation and asked the court to 

terminate Mother’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 

hearing. The following transpired during the applicable review 

period. 

In August and early September of 2022, the children’s 

visits with Mother progressed to overnight visits. The Bureau 

reported that C.W. enjoyed visits with J.W., the children enjoyed 

their visits with Mother, and the G. children expressed their 

desire to return to Mother’s care as long as she stayed sober and 

J.W. was not around. Prior to the progression to overnight 

visitation, in July 2022, the social worker spoke to Mother to 

verify who was on Mother’s apartment lease, and Mother sent a 

copy of the lease that listed only Mother. The social worker 

verified this information with the leasing office at Mother’s 

apartment complex. 

On September 16, 2022, the social worker spoke with J.W.’s

parole officer. The parole officer had significant contact with 

Mother in the prior four months. In fact, the officer had spoken 

to Mother the day before regarding her providing birth 

certificates for C.W., B.G., and L.G. to get approval for J.W. to be 

around the children. The officer was unaware of M.G.’s 

existence, and her age of almost 13 concerned him because a 

condition of J.W.’s parole was that he not be around children 13 

to 17 who were not his own. Mother had insisted to the social 

worker that she had not been around J.W. in the past months, 

but the parole officer said he had met with J.W. inside Mother’s 
6

apartment once and outside on numerous occasions, Mother was 

the contact for J.W.’s parole, and J.W. had been sleeping in 

Mother’s car. 

The social worker discussed this new information with 

Mother, and Mother claimed that she had no idea who the parole 

officer was, did not know how J.W. got into her home, and she 

had not told him where she lived. The Bureau cancelled 

unsupervised and overnight visits. The next day, on September 

28, 2022, Mother showed up intoxicated at the house of C.W.’s 

caretaker, yelling that she wanted to kill the social worker. 

Mother missed a random drug test the following day.

In November 2022, the Bureau learned that Mother had 

unauthorized visitation with all four children on Halloween. 

Mother did not report this, despite meeting with the social 

worker the day after Halloween and being told that the case was 

where it was because of Mother’s dishonesty. When questioned 

later about the Halloween visit, Mother was reluctant to answer 

and told the social worker she could ask her questions in court. 

Mother did, however, address what had happened with her 

apartment lease. She explained that J.W. had been on her lease 

because she needed his pay stubs as proof of income to secure the 

apartment, but she had since received a raise at work and he was 

no longer on her lease. Mother acknowledged that J.W. helped 

her move items from shared storage into the apartment, but she 

said he would not be around, and she would not answer the door 

if he showed up. Mother started individual therapy at the social 

worker’s suggestion. She also revealed that she had not 
7

connected with her AA sponsor in some time, but she continued 

to test negative.

At Mother’s request, the Bureau arranged for a special visit 

with the G. children on Christmas Day, and it arranged for 

Mother to pick up presents for the visit on December 20, 2022. 

Mother did not show up to pick up the presents or to therapeutic 

visitation that day, so the social worker went to her apartment 

the next day to look for her. There were no sounds coming from 

Mother’s apartment, so the social worker went to speak to the 

property manager. The property manager reported that she had

not seen Mother in a couple of days, but, upon J.W.’s request, she 

had let him into Mother’s apartment the day before. He was 

drunk, but she let him in because he said he lost his keys, he 

showed identification, and he was on the lease. The social worker 

asked to see Mother’s lease and learned that J.W. was the 

primary tenant. The social worker showed the property manger 

a picture of the lease Mother previously sent to the Bureau, and 

the property manager confirmed that the lease was false. J.W.’s 

ankle monitor data showed that, in the past couple months, he 

was at Mother’s apartment once and in the complex’s parking lot 

once. When confronted with what the social worker had learned, 

Mother feigned surprise and said the situation was “baffling.”

In January 2023, Mother sent the social worker a confusing 

text, and she also sent a confusing text to B.G. about letting C.W. 

rejoin therapeutic visitation. When L.G. and B.G. learned that 

J.W. had been at Mother’s apartment the month prior, they said 

that they did not want to live with Mother. That same month, 
8

Mother missed four out of six drug tests. B.G. also suspected 

that Mother was drunk with a black eye at a therapeutic visit at 

the end of the month, but the therapist did not make the same 

observation.

The following month, the court ordered no phone contact 

between Mother and the children as a result of her January texts, 

but Mother continued to text the children and the social worker 

had to remind Mother of the court’s order. Mother missed a 

therapeutic visit on L.G.’s birthday, and she was caught 

recording C.W.’s responses to questions Mother asked about the 

Bureau’s staff during a visit. At a check-in meeting, Mother told 

the social worker that she was still attending AA/Narcotics 

Anonymous (NA) meetings “here and there.” She reported 

needing to find a new AA sponsor because hers had relapsed.

The 18-month hearing was set for a contest, and the court 

heard the matter on multiple days over the course of many 

months, concluding on May 31, 2023. The court heard testimony 

from social workers Drenik and Thomas, who were assigned to 

the case at various times, Mother, and J.W.4 The documentary 

evidence admitted included exhibits from Mother; the Bureau’s 

October 19, 2022 18-month review report; and the Bureau’s 

update memoranda from December 2, 2022, January 26, 2022, 

and February 23, 2023.

The juvenile court rendered an oral statement of decision. 

It recited numerous instances in the review period where Mother 

deceived the Bureau, found the social workers’ testimonies

4 J.W. testified as to C.W.’s case only. 
9

credible, and found the testimonies of J.W. and Mother to be 

overall not credible. The court concluded that reasonable services 

had been provided to Mother and return of the children to 

Mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to 

their safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being. The 

court reduced visitation, limited Mother’s educational rights for 

the G. children, and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.

Mother and J.W. filed petitions for extraordinary writ 

relief. We stayed the section 366.26 hearing pending disposition 

of the petitions. 

DISCUSSION

I. The Substantial Risk of Detriment Finding

A. Governing Law

Until reunification services are terminated, there is a 

statutory presumption that a dependent child will be returned to 

parental custody. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 308.) 

At the 18-month review hearing, the court must return the child 

to the custody of the parent unless it determines, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that return of the child “would 

create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or 

physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.22, 

subd. (a).)

“In determining whether it would be detrimental to return 

the child . . . the court must consider whether the parent 

participated regularly in any treatment program set forth by the 

plan, the ‘efforts or progress’ of the parent, and the ‘extent’ to 

which the parent ‘cooperated and availed himself or herself of 
10

services provided.’ (§ 366.22, subd. (a).)” (Blanca P. v. Superior 

Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1748.) Thus, it is insufficient 

for the juvenile court to consider “the mere completion of the 

technical requirements of the reunification plan.” (In re Dustin 

R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1141.) However, the detriment 

standard is “ ‘a fairly high one. It cannot mean merely that the 

parent in question is less than ideal, did not benefit from the 

reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or seems 

less capable than an available foster parent or other family 

member.’ It must mean what it says: that return presents a 

substantial risk of detriment to the child.” (Rita L. v. Superior 

Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 495, 505.) “We are looking for 

passing grades here, not straight A’s.” (David B. v. Superior 

Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 790.)

“[T]he easy cases are ones where there is a clear failure by 

the parent to comply with material aspects of the service 

plan[,] . . . for example, a mother continued to test positive for 

illegal drug use, continued to move from place to place, failed to 

‘regularly’ attend therapy, and failed to complete her parenting 

class. This was obviously enough to support a finding of 

detriment. [¶] The harder cases are . . . where the parent has 

complied with the service plan, but for some reason has not 

convinced a psychologist or social worker that it would be safe to 

return the child to the parent. The problem is not, as it were, 

quantitative (that is, showing up for counseling or therapy or 

parenting classes, or what have you) but qualitative (that is, 

whether the counseling, therapy or parenting classes are doing 
11

any good). These are sensitive cases, fraught with emotional 

overtones, because they invariably deal with an evaluation of the 

personality, character and attitudes of the parent.” (Blanca P., 

supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1748, italics omitted.)

In all cases, the Bureau has the burden of establishing 

there is a substantial risk of detriment. (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) The 

reviewing court considers the entire record to determine whether 

there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s 

conclusions. The reviewing court reviews the record in a light 

“most favorable to the court’s order and we indulge every 

inference in favor of the court’s decision so long as those 

inferences . . . ‘ “rest on the evidence” [citation]’ not ‘mere 

speculation or conjecture.’ ” (In re R.M. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 

986, 988–989.)

B. Analysis

The pertinent question is whether substantial evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s conclusion that the Bureau 

established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that returning 

the children to Mother would “create a substantial risk of 

detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional wellbeing of the [children].” (§ 366.22, subd. (a).) The answer is yes.

Regarding Mother’s substance abuse problems, the 

evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mother did not 

get “passing grades” with her case plan. The sustained 

allegations here established that Mother had a substance abuse 

problem, and Mother herself attributed her violence to her 

alcohol abuse. Mother was ordered to attend a substance abuse 
12

treatment program, including a 12-step program, and to submit 

to random drug tests. Mother had made substantial progress by 

the 12-month review hearing, but she later became 

noncompliant. Mother came intoxicated to C.W.’s caretaker’s 

home on September 28, 2022, and threatened to kill the social 

worker. Mother was a no-show to a random drug test on 

September 29, 2022, which was considered a positive test under 

her case plan. As of November 2022, Mother had not seen her AA 

sponsor in a couple months, and she was not working on her 12-

step program. The social worker instructed Mother to reach out 

to her sponsor or to find a new sponsor and report back. As of 

March 2023, Mother’s prior sponsor had relapsed and Mother did 

not have a new sponsor. In January 2023, Mother was a no-show 

to 4 of 6 (67%) of her random drug tests. Mother testified that 

she had been sober since January 2022, but the court found that 

her testimony was not credible. 

Mother claims that she completed substance abuse 

treatment, C.W.’s caretaker’s report of her intoxication should be 

discounted, and her missed drug tests were insignificant. We are 

unpersuaded. Mother’s drinking was a key issue from the 

beginning of the case, and the evidence indicating her continued 

drinking was of serious concern. Mother participated in services 

and achieved substantial progress during the 6- to 12-month 

review period, but she did not show she had reached her goal of 

remaining free from alcohol use and dependency. The evidence of 

ongoing instability in Mother’s life in this area during the 

pertinent review period called into question her ability to keep 
13

the children safe and adequately supported the court’s detriment 

finding.

As to Mother’s ability to protect the children from domestic 

violence, the court also found that Mother did not understand the 

risk of danger posed by J.W. Mother testified that she 

understood this risk, but the court concluded that she was not 

credible. The court’s findings were supported by evidence 

showing that, during the pertinent review period, Mother lied 

about having no contact with J.W., she was in frequent contact 

with his parole officer, and she discussed providing birth 

certificates for C.W., L.G., and B.G. to get approval for J.W. to be 

around them. While the Bureau did not believe that J.W. lived 

with Mother, he was the primary tenant on her apartment lease, 

he had access to her apartment, and Mother went to elaborate 

lengths to conceal this. The court believed that Mother had a 

financial reason for initially putting J.W. on the lease, but it also 

found that her actions established that she did not understand 

the risk posed to the children by J.W.’s legal access to the 

apartment. The court found that J.W. intended to reengage with 

Mother based on his statements to family members that they 

could give C.W. back to Mother and him after court proceedings 

ended, and it was undisputed that the G. children were terrified 

of, and traumatized by, J.W. The record thus includes sufficient 

evidence to support the finding that there would be a substantial 

risk of detriment to the children if they were returned to Mother’s 

care.
14

Mother relies on Blanca P., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, to 

argue that the Bureau’s opinion about her lack of insight into the 

problems that led to removal is not substantial evidence, but 

Blanca P. is distinguishable. The juvenile court there had erred 

by assuming, without proof, that the father had engaged in child 

molestation. (Id. at p. 1747.) Against that backdrop, the 

appellate court found that the social worker’s subjective opinion 

that the mother had failed to “ ‘internalize’ ” what she learned in 

parenting classes because she refused to believe the father was a 

child molester was insufficient to support a substantial risk of 

detriment finding. (Id. at p. 1751.) Here, the court did not rely 

on the Bureau’s speculative and subjective opinion. Instead, 

evidence of Mother’s own actions served as a factual basis for the 

court’s conclusion that she failed to appreciate the risk posed by 

J.W., and hence there was a substantial risk of detriment.

While Mother made progress on many aspects of her case 

plan between the 6- and 12- month review period, that is not 

enough to justify reversal of the court’s finding in this case. 

Sufficient evidence from the pertinent review period supports the 

court’s orders.

II. Reasonable Services

Mother next contends that the Bureau’s failure to offer her 

reasonable reunification services during the pertinent review 

period requires reversal of the court’s orders. The Bureau 
15

counters that the court’s reasonable services finding was 

sufficiently supported. We agree with the Bureau.5

“[At the 18-month review hearing,] [t]he court shall 

determine by clear and convincing evidence whether reasonable 

services have been offered or provided to the parent or legal 

guardian.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) “The juvenile court’s finding 

that reasonable services were provided is reviewed for 

substantial evidence.” (T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 

21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238, disapproved on other grounds in 

Michael G. v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 631, fn. 8.) 

“Substantial evidence is that which is reasonable, credible and of 

solid value.” (T.J. v. Superior Court, at p. 1238.) In applying this 

standard, we “bear in mind that clear and convincing evidence 

was required in the trial court.” (Id. at p. 1239.)

Reasonable services are “responsive to the unique needs of 

each family, and the plan must be ‘ “ ‘specifically tailored to fit 

the circumstances of each family’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘designed to eliminate 

those conditions which led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional 

finding.’ ” ’ ” (Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016) 

5 Citing to section 352 and Michael G. v. Superior Court

(2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, Mother maintains that the juvenile court 

had discretion to continue the section 366.26 hearing and to order 

additional family reunification services. The Bureau argues that 

additional family reunification services were not allowed in this 

case because, at the time the court issued its orders, more than 

24 months had passed since the children were removed from 

Mother’s physical custody. Given our disposition, we need not 

decide if a court can extend family reunification services when 

more than 24 months have passed since the child was removed 

from the parent’s physical custody.
16

244 Cal.App.4th 397, 420.) “Specifically, the record must show 

the agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, 

offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained 

reasonable contact with the parents during the duration of the 

service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents 

when compliance was difficult.” (Ibid.) Nonetheless, the 

“standard is not whether the services provided were the best that 

might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services 

were reasonable under the circumstances.” (In re Misako R.

(1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) Further, “[r]eunification services 

are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent 

parent.” (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220.)

Mother argues that services were unreasonable because the 

Bureau failed to assist her with finding housing or obtaining a

restraining order against J.W. to allow her to stay in her 

apartment, the Bureau failed to assist her with the creation of a 

safety plan, it failed to provide adequate therapy services, and it 

failed to re-refer her for substance abuse treatment. As set forth 

below, these contentions lack merit.

With respect to housing, Mother sought the Bureau’s 

assistance with her case plan’s suitable housing requirement 

during the 6- to 12-month review period. The Bureau provided 

referrals, Mother obtained an apartment on her own, and the 

court’s 12-month reasonable services finding stands 

unchallenged. In this review period, Mother maintained her 

apartment, and she never informed the Bureau that she needed 

housing assistance because of finances. Instead, in November
17

2022, Mother disclosed that J.W. had been on her apartment 

lease initially for financial reasons, but she claimed she had since 

received a raise and his name was off the lease. The Bureau did 

not learn that J.W.’s name remained on the lease until the end of 

December 2022. Mother moved sometime in January 2023, and 

she told the Bureau that she would rent a house if the children 

were coming back, but she did not want to pay for a bigger home 

if they were not. Nothing in the record suggests that Mother’s 

financial state after November 2022 was such that she required 

assistance finding housing, or that the Bureau was aware of, and 

ignored, a need with respect to housing during the review period.

With respect to the safety plan, Mother contends that the 

Bureau should have provided her with a sample plan when she 

struggled to articulate her plan. But the Bureau’s concern was 

not that Mother did not have a safety plan, it was that Mother 

could not readily articulate the points in her plan and Mother did 

not want to talk about her safety plan. The Bureau was not 

tasked with forcing Mother to discuss and fully grasp her safety 

plan. (In re Jonathan R., supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 1220 

[“[r]eunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on 

an unwilling or indifferent parent”].)

Next, Mother’s contention that the Bureau should have 

arranged for separate family therapy sessions with the G. 

children and been quicker to initiate more sessions for C.W. 

highlights, at most, that services were not perfect. “In almost all 

cases it will be true that more services could have been provided 

more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect.” 
18

(In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.) Family therapy 

was part of Mother’s case plan, the Bureau provided referrals, 

and the G. children had family therapy throughout the review 

period. Social worker Drenik, who was on the case before going 

on leave in July 2022, made a referral for C.W., and a clinician 

was assigned. The services provider recommended combining the 

therapeutic visits. C.W. participated in two group therapy 

sessions, but Mother and the G. children requested that she stop 

due to her disruptive behavior. The social worker did not 

thereafter refer C.W. for more sessions until Mother asked for 

services because of the therapist’s feedback that the G. children 

had the bigger issues and her feedback about how sessions with 

C.W. had gone. Considering the provider’s election to proceed 

with group therapy and feedback, the court’s conclusion that 

services were reasonable under the circumstances is sufficiently 

supported.

Mother’s final claim that the Bureau could have re-referred 

her for an assessment when it became concerned about her 

sobriety in January 2023 also highlights, at most, less than 

perfect services. Mother had been given referrals for, and 

completed, a substance abuse program. She maintained that she 

was sober during this review period, she was connected with 12-

step program, and she randomly drug tested. The Bureau 

monitored Mother’s drug tests, and it checked in with her on AA 

compliance. When Mother disclosed that she had not seen her 

sponsor for a while, the social worker counseled her to contact her 

sponsor or seek out a new one if necessary. In January 2023, 
19

Mother missed numerous drug tests. The continued 18-month 

review hearing began in February 2023. In an ideal world, the 

Bureau may have re-referred Mother after January 2023, but, 

given the services already provided and the timing, the Bureau’s 

actions in following up on Mother’s AA compliance and providing 

drug testing were reasonable.

In sum, Mother’s claims regarding the court’s reasonable 

services finding lack merit. Furthermore, even assuming that 

the court could order additional family reunification services in 

this case, Mother does not establish entitlement to such services 

in light of the court’s unchallenged finding that additional 

reunification services were not in the best interests of the 

children. (See Michael G., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 634–635 

[before extending family reunification services beyond the 

presumptive 18-month maximum, court must find additional 

family reunification services are not contrary to child’s 

interests].) 

III. Educational Rights

The trial court signed JV-535 orders limiting Mother’s right 

to make educational decisions for the G. children.6 Mother 

6 Mother notes an ambiguity in the record. The court’s oral 

pronouncement at times mentions an educational rights 

limitation and at times refers to Mother’s rights to make 

educational and developmental services decisions. Boxes “1a.” on 

the first pages of the signed JV-535 orders, which indicate 

whether the orders implicate Mother’s right to make 

“educational” and/or “developmental services” decisions, are 

unchecked, however, the following pages in those orders confer 

authority upon the designated third parties for only educational 

decisions. The Bureau’s request was also limited to educational 
20

argues that the court abused its discretion when it limited her 

educational rights on the facts of this case. We disagree, “bearing 

in mind [that] ‘[t]he focus of dependency proceedings is on the 

child, not the parent.’ ” (In re R.W. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1268, 

1277.) 

“Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest 

in directing their children’s education. [Citations.] However, 

when a child is a dependent . . . , a court may limit a parent’s 

ability to make educational decisions on the child’s behalf.” (In re 

R.W., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1276.) At every review 

hearing in dependency proceedings, the juvenile court must 

decide whether it is appropriate to limit the rights of the parent 

to make educational decisions for the child. (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 5.649(a).) The Bureau must provide the court with 

information regarding the parent’s unwillingness or inability to 

make educational decisions for the child. (§ 366.1, subd. (e).) A 

court may limit a parent’s educational decision-making rights for 

a dependent child “[i]f necessary to protect [the] child.” (Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 5.649(a).) Any limitations on the parent’s 

educational rights “shall be specifically addressed in the court 

order. The limitations may not exceed those necessary to protect 

the child.” (§ 361, subd. (a)(1).) 

rights. Circumstances thus dictate that we deem the court’s 

orders to limit only Mother’s educational rights and not her 

rights with respect to developmental services. (Cf. In re Merrick 

V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 249 [conflicts between reporter’s 

and clerk’s transcripts are resolved in favor of reporter’s 

transcript unless particular circumstances dictate otherwise].)
21

The court did not abuse its discretion. The G. children 

needed active adult engagement in, and supervision of, their 

academic progress. M.G. had a 504 plan, with a requested 

reassessment for an Independent Education Plan (IEP) pending, 

and B.G. had an IEP. Mother was unable to communicate with 

the children on a daily basis given the court’s order of no phone 

contact. Mother had missed some school meetings and failed to 

schedule educational meetings and submit educational 

paperwork expeditiously. Further, when the social worker 

requested a copy of B.G.’s IEP for his new school, Mother referred 

the social worker to her attorney and did not send the IEP. On 

this record, the court could reasonably order the limitation of 

Mother’s educational rights to ensure prompt and consistent 

attention to the children’s educational needs. 

Mother argues the contrary—that there was no reasonable 

basis to limit her control over the children’s education, and she is 

capable of directing the children’s education. As the juvenile 

court noted, there was evidence that Mother engaged in some of 

the educational components of the children’s lives. While we 

agree that there is evidence in the record that could support a 

decision granting Mother continued control over the G. children’s 

education, our review in this case is limited. The court found, on 

balance, that Mother was unavailable, unwilling, or unable to 

exercise educational rights for the children.7 Where, as here, 

7 In its statement of decision, the juvenile court referenced 

section 319, which provides the legal standard applicable to 

orders limiting a parent’s educational rights before the child is 

adjudged a dependent. Section 361 governs thereafter. (§ 361, 
22

there is more than one reasonable inference that may be drawn 

from the record before us, we have no authority to displace a 

rational decision of the trial court. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 

7 Cal.4th 295, 319.) 

Mother also contends that the juvenile court erred in 

issuing an overbroad order because shared educational rights 

would be more appropriate. We disagree that the court acted 

outside of the bounds of reason. In its statement of decision, the 

court highlighted instances of Mother’s uncooperative attitude 

with the social workers, and it was not unreasonable for the court 

to impliedly conclude that shared rights, if even allowed by 

statute, might engender additional conflict and would not be in 

the best interests of the children. 

IV. Visitation

Finally, Mother and J.W. claim that the court abused its 

discretion with its visitation orders. J.W. had one-hour visits 

subd. (a)(1).) Section 319 required the court to find that the 

parent “is unavailable, unable, or unwilling to exercise 

educational” rights, and the child’s educational needs “cannot be 

met” without appointment of a responsible adult. (§ 319, 

subd. (j)(1)(A)–(C).) Mother forfeited any claim that the court 

used an incorrect legal standard by failing to raise the issue on 

appeal. (See People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9.) 

There would also be no reasonable probability of a more favorable 

result had the court used the “necessary to protect” (§ 361, subd. 

(a)) standard, considering the court’s express and implied 

findings that Mother was unavailable, unwilling, or unable to 

make educational decisions, and that the children’s needs could 

not be met without the court’s order. (See In re Celine R. (2003) 

31 Cal.4th 45, 59–60 [dependency judgments subject to harmless 

error analysis].) 
23

with C.W. three times per month, and Mother had two-hour visits 

with all children four times per month. For C.W., the court 

reduced J.W.’s minimum visitation to a single one-hour visit, 

once a month, and it reduced Mother’s minimum visitation to 

one-hour visits, twice a month. For the G. children, the court 

reduced Mother’s visitation to two-hour visits, twice a month. 

The court also ordered the Bureau to consider the children’s 

wishes, input from the children’s counsel, and input from the 

children’s therapists in establishing the frequency, time, and 

place of visits. Neither parent shows that the court abused its 

discretion. (In re J.P. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1119 

[visitation orders reviewed for abuse of discretion].)

The parents contend that the court erred because the 

evidence showed that their visits went well, and Mother argues 

that the evidence shows that the children were bonded to her, 

and meaningful visitation is pivotal to the parent-child 

relationship, citing In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497, 

1504. J.W. also appears to suggest that there must be a showing 

of detriment to reduce visitation. Hunter S., however, involved 

issuance of a visitation order that gave a child unfettered 

discretion to prevent visitation by refusing to see his parent. The 

court there recognized that the law required visitation to 

continue even after family reunification services are terminated 

unless the court finds that visitation would be detrimental to the 

child. (Ibid., citing § 366.21, subd. (h).) Here, the court ordered 

continued visitation, so there was no statutory violation. 

(§§ 366.21, subd. (h), 366.22, subd. (a)(3).)
24

As for the frequency of visitation, the juvenile court has 

“great discretion in deciding issues relating to parent-child 

visitation,” the exercise of which “we will not disturb on appeal 

unless the juvenile court has exceeded the bounds of reason.” (In 

re S.H. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1542, 1557–1558.) When 

reunification services end, “the parents’ interest in the care, 

custody and companionship of the child [is] no longer 

paramount,” and “ ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for 

permanency and stability.’ ” (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th 

at p. 317.) 

There was no abuse of discretion in the court’s visitation 

orders. C.W.’s therapist recommended reduced visitation because 

C.W. displayed anxiety on the day before, and dysregulated 

behavior on the day of, visits with J.W. and Mother. C.W. told 

the social worker that Mother asked her to keep the most secrets, 

the social worker reported that Mother coached C.W. during 

visits, and Mother was caught recording C.W.’s responses to 

Mother’s questions about the Bureau during a visit. The social 

worker testified that the Bureau considered the children’s needs 

when making the visitation recommendation, and that frequent 

visits make them think they are going home, giving them false 

hope and preventing them from settling down. Mother had 

missed some visits, and the G. children said they were okay with 

some decreased visitation with Mother as long as they continued 

to be able to see C.W. After the court decided to terminate 

reunification services, it became appropriate to fashion a 

visitation order that balanced the parents’ right to contact with 
25

the children’s interest in moving towards permanency. The court 

reasonably reduced visitation here, and its orders allowed the 

Bureau the flexibility necessary to accommodate the evolving 

needs of the children. 

DISPOSITION

The petitions are denied on the merits. (See § 366.26, 

subd. (l)(1)(C); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(h).) This court’s 

stay of the section 366.26 hearing (which was previously set for 

September 13, 2023) is lifted. Our decision is final as to this 

court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) 

BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J.

HIRAMOTO, J.

In re M.G. et al. (A167996)

 Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of 

Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article 

VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.