alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 11-50287 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus JOSE TORRES-DUENAS, Also Known as Joe Angel Torres, Also Known as Leonardo Duenia-Torres, Also Known as Leonard Torres, Also Known as Joe Torres, Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas No. 5:10-CR-814-1

Before SMITH, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D Sep tem ber 2 4, 2 012 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the cour t has d ete rm inedt hat this op inion sho uld not * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t for th in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 11-50287 Document: 00511997279 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/24/2012No. 11-50287

Jose Torres-Duenas appeals the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation. The seventy-one-mo nth s e nt e nc e w a s within the properly calculated guidelines range and is presumed reasonable. See United States v. Alonzo , 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006). Torres-Duenas’s contention that the presumption of reasonableness should not apply because the applicable guideline is not founded on empirical data is foreclosed. See United States v. Duarte , 569 F.3d 528, 529-31 (5th Cir. 2009). His disa greement with t he district court’s weighing of the sentencing factors does not rebut t h e p r e sumption of reasonableness. United States v. Ruiz , 621 F.3d 390, 398 (5th Cir. 2010). His contention that a federal court may not order a sentence to run consecutively to a yet-to-be-determined state sentence is foreclo s e d b y Setser v. United States , 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1466-73 (2012). The district court imposed a reasonable sent e n c e . See Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007). Because there was no error, plain or otherwise, with regard to the sentence, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

2 Case: 11-50287 Document: 00511997279 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/24/2012
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, et al., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 20-cv-2137

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official ) Hon. Virginia M. Kendall

capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ 51st

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

The members of the class identified below have completed their sentences of 

imprisonment and are entitled to be released from the custody of the Illinois 

Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) to serve their Mandatory Supervised Release

time in the community, provided that they are able to submit a host site that is 

acceptable to the IDOC. Each of the class members has identified housing that 

would otherwise be approved by IDOC, but for the “One Person Per Address” 

provision in 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6). This Court has already determined that it is 

unconstitutional to imprison sex offenders after their period of incarceration has 

been completed solely because they are unable to find suitable host sites. See

Barnes v. Jeffreys, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57432 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2021).

The following class members have identified host sites that will be supportive of 

their transition back into the community:
2

1401 Sheridan Rd.

Winthrop Harbor, IL 60096

• Patrick Ryan, R73186

• Robert Dillon, B28994

4220 W. Carroll St.

Chicago, IL 60624

• George Ashetzie, N14214

• Aaron Green Y46942

2500 S. Throop St.

Chicago, IL 60608

• Roy Dennis, M48342 

5350 S. Winchester St.

Chicago, IL 60636

• Jarvis Beane, M48126

Next Available Bed at Future Foundation Addresses

• Raphael Hagler, M51801

Next Available Beds in the Intensive Community Reintegration Program

• Cantrell Cordova, Y48078

• Jonathan Zanardelli, M51572

• Skyler Roudis, Y36483

• David Maldonado, Y36888

• Jacob Kahle, B88425

• John Marshall, R64355

At each of these proposed housing locations, the class member would be residing 

in the same building as another person who has been convicted of a sex offense, and 

therefore Defendant cannot approve these individuals to reside at the proposed 

locations because of its obligation to follow 730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6).
3

There has been no legitimate public interest articulated in only having one 

registrant live at an address. Therefore, the Court finds that the statute is 

unconstitutional as it applies to the individuals identified above, and Defendant is 

enjoined from enforcing the “One Person Per Address” provision in 730 ILCS 5/3-3- 

7(a)(7.6) as to these individuals to the extent they seek release to the locations 

identified above.

The release of the above-identified class members is subject to the approval of 

the host, program operator, or landlord at each housing location; and subject to the 

proposed housing locations otherwise being approved by IDOC as meeting all 

requirements and satisfying applicable provisions of Illinois law.

___________________________ _8/16/2022__________ 

Hon. Virginia M. Kendall, Date

Judge Presiding
CERTIFICATIONS OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

(18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Most Home Corp., a Nevada corporation (the "Company"), on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended April 30, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), Kenneth Galpin, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, does hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that to his knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





|Date: June 15, 2006 | /s/ Kenneth Galpin
Kenneth Galpin
President and Chief Executive Officer
|------------------- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------

[A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Most Home Corp. and will be retained by Most Home Corp. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.]
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                       3,102,068
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                             3,700,000
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                 10,030,129
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                     33,747,141
<ALLOWANCE>                                    443,486
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              54,959,471
<DEPOSITS>                                  41,620,066
<SHORT-TERM>                                 4,260,777
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                            111,871
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        11,821
<OTHER-SE>                                   8,954,936
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>              54,959,471
<INTEREST-LOAN>                              1,318,400
<INTEREST-INVEST>                              289,370
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                63,419
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                             1,671,189
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                             642,515
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             759,234
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                          911,955
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                   45,000
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                              1,112,801
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (159,521)
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                    (159,521)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (159,521)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.13)
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                       0
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                     0
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        0
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                    0
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Nichole Campbell, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Conn Appliances Incorporated, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-16-00158-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

 The Court has reviewed the parties' Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice. (Doc. 

19.) For good cause shown, 

IT IS ORDERED that this case is dismissed with prejudice and with each party to 

bear its own attorneys' fees and costs. 

 Dated this 20th day of July, 2017. 

Douglas L. Rayes 

United States District Judge 

Case 2:16-cv-00158-DLR Document 20 Filed 07/20/17 Page 1 of 1
{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"NASA","provider_url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov","author_name":"Heather Deiss","author_url":"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/author\/heather-s-deissnasa-gov\/","title":"STS-110","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"cPhSARC8QQ\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/mission\/sts-110\/\">STS-110<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/www.nasa.gov\/mission\/sts-110\/embed\/#?secret=cPhSARC8QQ\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"“STS-110” — NASA\" data-secret=\"cPhSARC8QQ\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n<\/script>\n","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/images-assets.nasa.gov\/image\/0302516\/0302516~large.jpg?w=600&h=1920&fit=clip&crop=faces%2Cfocalpoint","thumbnail_width":600,"thumbnail_height":1920}
#### J. W. Laughlin *v.*Thos. H. Moore, &c.

Pleading.

Where the proof shows one is entitled to a credit larger than that claimed in his pleading, the proper remedy is hy an amended petition, and not to try to correct the error by an appeal.

APPEAL EROM CLARKE CIRCUIT COURT.

May 16, 1871.

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Lindsay:

Appellant’s counsel call our attention to three rulings of the circuit court which they insist are each erroneous. They complain that Laughlin was twice charged with the check for $1,090, deposited in Poston’s Bank. If the amount of the.same was cm-*599braced in tbe $12,608.00, tbe proceeds of tbe sales of the stock, then he should have received no separate credit for the amount of the check. If upon the contrary, it was not embraced in said amount, as it was a part of the firm assets, and as he received an individual credit therefor by the bank, he was properly chargeable with the amount of the same on a settlement of the partnership.

*Brown & Julian, for appellant.*

*Bginton, Simpson, for appellee.*

As to the expense account, we do not think there can be any real difficulty. Appellant, in his original petition, claimed on that account the sum of $795.05, which amount was allowed him. He now insists that the proof shows that he was, in point of fact, entitled to nearly double that sum, and hence that the court erred in restricting his recovery on said account to the amount claimed. He had the right to amend his pleadings to make them conform tó the proof, but inasmuch as he did not see proper to do so, it is mo ground of complaint upon his part that the court did not allow him more than he asked for.

This leaves for consideration only the $418.40, paid to Quisen • berry, and for which appellant insists he should have received a credit. This debt was paid by a check on Poston’s Bank. In the settlement, appellant was credited by the entire amount of firm assets deposited by him in said bank, and it is perfectly manifest that he should not also be credited for the same money as he drew it out in the payment of debts contracted in partnership purchases. We do not regard either of the rulings complained of as prejudicial to the appellant.

Wherefore, the judgment-of the circuit court must be affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                       1,011,685
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                3,987,526
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                  1,810,944
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             6,810,155
<PP&E>                                         836,983
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               7,647,138
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,493,318
<BONDS>                                        100,000
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        67,329
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,986,491
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 7,647,138
<SALES>                                      7,717,557
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             7,717,557
<CGS>                                        6,934,706
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  658,399
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 2,810
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,684
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                118,578
<INCOME-TAX>                                    40,300
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             78,278
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    78,278
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.01
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.01
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2




CERTIFICATION PURSUANT
TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Annual Report of Gramercy Capital Corp. (the “Company”) on
Form 10-K as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the “Report”), I, Jon W. Clark, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




1.     The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and




2.     The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


/s/ JON
      W. CLARKName:
      Jon
      W. ClarkTitle:  
      Chief
      Financial Officer




March 16,
2010
#### Margaret Gartin *v.*James H. Lucker, Sr’s. Ad.

January 3, 1872.

Trial — Duties of the Court — Jury.

Sec. 34 of the Civil Code makes the jury the triers of questions of fact, but it does not take away from the Judge the right to determine whether or not any fact conducing to establish the cause of action, or the grounds of defense, has been proved. This should be determined by his instructions.

Bills and Notes — Charge of fraud — Not sustained by facts.

APPEAL EROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT.

December 8, 1871.

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Lindsay:

The only issue raised by the pleadings in this case is, that the note sued on was procured by deceit, fraud and covin.

The onus was upon the appellant. She utterly failed to establish a state of case exciting even a suspicion of fraud on the part of Dr. Lucker. She showed that near six hundred and thirty dollars of the consideration for the note had actually been paid for her benefit by Dr. Lucker, and she bases her allegation of *443fraud upon the ground that she failed to show what the balance of the consideration was.

*B. & F. for appellant.*

Harrison, *Bussell & A, for appellee.*

The witness to the note did not see it drawn, nor was he present when the settlement or calculation was made. The son of Mrs. Gartin, one of the signors on the note, who could both read and write, was present when the calculation was made and the note written and yet he with a full knowledge of all the facts signed it without hesitation.

Fraud is not to be presumed. The balance of the consideration for the note not only might have existed without the witness, Wray, knowing anything about what it was, but in fact he states that Tucker had, before the note was executed, had wood hauled to the appellant. Section 34, of the Civil Code, makes the jury the triers of questions of fact, but it does not take away from the judge the right to determine whether or not any fact conducing to establish the cause of action, or the ground of defense has been proved. This question he must determine when he is called upon to instruct the jury. His instructions must be based upon evidence.

Appellant having proved no evidence conducing to sustain her defense, he properly refused all instructions she asked, and properly instructed the jury to find for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

The testimony of the deputy sheriff and his receipt to Tucker show that the execution to Mattingly was paid off on the 7th of October, 1867. The note of appellants to Tucker was given on the same day. His statement to Mrs.' Gartin that he had satisfied such execution was therefore true. The money was not paid by the sheriff to Mattingly till the 10th . of the same month. If Tucker then took an assignment of the judgment, and afterwards attempted to collect it from Mrs. Gartin, it was a violatión of his contract with her. She does not rely on this violation of the contract, as a defense to the suit on the note, and so can not be made to relate back to the execution of the same, and sustain the plea of fraud in its procurement,.

Petition overruled.
#### Wm. James *v.*J. & W. F. Kuykendall.

Adverse Possession — Elder Patent.

Where the evidence shows that a survey was made of a portion of lands, held under a prior patent, possession taken and entry made, this constitutes an adverse holding which can not he defeated.

APPEAL EROM WEBSTER CIRCUIT COURT.

March 5, 1870.

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Peters :

The evidence shows conclusively that within one or two years after Holeman procured his patent, which covers the land in controversy, by a parol agreement, the surveyor of Union county went on the land and surveyed and set apart 25 acres, part of the land patented to Holeman, to Mrs. C. James, that was done according to the evidence of Pearson, who made the survey as early as 1842, and Mrs. James was then in possession of the land, *503claiming it as her own, which she continued to do till 1853 when she sold it to appellee, and executed to him a bond for a conveyance, describing the land by metes and bounds. The execution of the bond is proved by the surviving witness, who proves that the other subscribing witness and draftsman of the bond was dead.

*Rodman &' McBlroy, for appellant.*

*Givens, for appellees.*

. Appellee toot possession and seems to have retained it, except that appellant, in 1854, got possession of it, or a part of it, and appellee "then brought a warrant of forcible entry and detainer against him, and finally succeeded, in the circuit court, ion a traverse of the inquisition in gaining the possession, which he then seems to have retained continuously till 1866. AVhón appellant brought an action of trespass against AVilliam K. Kuykendall, alleging that he was in the possession of the land and' that the defendant had entered upon said land, cut the corn stalks and plowed it up, and prayed damages for the wrongful entry. To that action no defense was made and a judgment was rendered against said W. E. Kuykendall for the recovery of the land. It appears from the weight of the evidence, even if the petition authorized the judgment, that the defendant was not in. the possession either as tenant of appellee, or otherwise, and the judgment could not effect his rights. Prior to the commencement of this last named action, appellee and those under whom he claimed, had been in possession long enough to have acquired possessory title paramount to that under which appellant claims.

Moreover it is clearly shown by the proof that when the conveyance was made to appellant, the land was adversely held, as it was when it was conveyed to Lynn, his vendor, and consequently the title did not pass to him.

AYherefore the judgment is affirmed.