alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Durham *v.*The State.

In an indictment, under the statute of 1816, charging the defendant in the same count with playing cards in a tavern and betting, the jury found him guilty of the playing, but not guilty of betting: *Held,*that the verdict was sufficient.

It is not material of what part of the charge the defendant is acquitted, if that part, of which he is found guilty, constitutes a specific, indictable offence.

ERROR to.the *Jackson*Circuit Court. — This was an indictment charging *Durham*with unlawfully playing a game of cards called Loo, and betting on the game, at *Craig’s*tavern in *Brozms*tozen, contrary to the statute, &c. Plea, not guilty. The jury found the defendant guilty of playing as charged, but not guilty of betting. A motion to stay the entering up of judgment was made and overruled, and judgment was rendered upon the verdict..

The error relied upon was, that the jury had only found .the defendant below guilty of a part of the charge; and that upon such an imperfect verdict, no judgment ought to have been rendered against him.

Holman, J.

In determining the sufficiency of the verdict, it cannot be material of what part of the indictment the defend*34ant is found not guilty, if the charge of which he is convicted, contains in itself a full and specific offence. By the 4th section 'of the act to prevent gaming, approved the 30th of *December,*1816, it is enacted, that if any person shall at any time play in any ordinary, tavern, &c., at any game or games whatsoever, except of athletic exercise; or shall bet on the hands or sides of those that do play, &c., he shall on conviction be fined, &c. It appears very clearly from these provisions, that playing and betting are two distinct offences, and not constituent parts of the same offence, on either of which an indictment may be maintained. This indictment would have been substantially sufficient, if there had been no allegation about betting; nor does that allegation, in any respect, affect the balance of the indictment, whether it is considered as surplusage, or a distinct charge which was unsupported by evidence. The charge of card-playing, of which the plaintiff in error has been convicted, has no necessary connexion with the unsupported allegation of betting; but standing in the law, and in the indictment, as a complete definite offence, it is in itself sufficient to authorize the judgment of the Court (1).

*Meek*and Stevens, for the plaintiff.

*Dewey,*for the state.

*Per Curiam.*

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

(1)

 The jury may convict the defendant upon one count of the indictment, and acquit him upon another. So upon one part of a count capable of division : as, on a count for composing and publishing a libel, the defendant may be found guilty of publishing only. So, where the accusation includes an of-fence of inferior degree, the jury may discharge the defendant of the higher crime, and convict him of the less. 1 Chitt. Crim. Law, 637, 638.
<PAGE>
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.13

                                 AMENDMENT NO. 2
                                       TO
                          AT&T WIRELESS SERVICES, INC.
                          2001 LONG TERM INCENTIVE PLAN

Section 14(i) of the AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. 2001 Long Term Incentive Plan
(the "Plan") is hereby amended and restated in its entirety to read as follows:

            The Committee shall be authorized to establish procedures pursuant
            to which the payment of any Award may be deferred. Subject to the
            provisions of the Plan and any Award Agreement, the recipient of an
            Award (including, without limitation, any deferred Award) may, if so
            determined by the Committee, be entitled to receive, currently or on
            a deferred basis, cash dividends, or cash or Share payments in
            amounts equivalent to cash dividends on Shares ("dividend
            equivalents") with respect to the number of Shares covered by the
            Award, as determined by the Committee, in its sole discretion, and
            the Committee may provide that such amounts (if any) shall be deemed
            to have been reinvested in additional Shares or otherwise
            reinvested. Any amounts from such deferral program payable in Shares
            relating to Awards granted under the Plan or under the Company's
            Adjustment Plan shall be paid from Shares available for issuance
            under the Plan.
October 30, 2015

Hon. Keith Hottle, Clerk

Fourth Court of Appeals

300 Dolorosa Ste 3200

San Antonio, Texas 78205-3037

Re: Lieber v. State; No. 04-14-00818-CR

Dear Mr. Hottle:

Mr. Schulman, who appeared for the State at oral argument on October 13, 2015, reported that Justice

Martinez asked questions regarding whether expecting the defendant in a criminal case to introduce

evidence of the value of stolen property constituted a shifting of the burden of proof. Please advise the

members of the Court that the State does not believe the defendant is required to put on any evidence of

value, and that it remains the State’s burden to establish the value of the stolen items beyond a reasonable

doubt.

However, as was recently stated by the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Bullock v. State, S.W.3d 

 (Tex.App. - Houston [14th] No. 14-14-00304-CR; October 20, 2015): 

In a theft case, the State has the burden to prove the property’s value through evidence of

either “(1) its fair market value at the time and place of the offense, or (2) the cost of

replacing it within a reasonable time after the theft if fair market value could not be

ascertained.” Smiles v. State, 298 S.W.3d 716, 719 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009,

no pet.) (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.08). “Fair market value is the amount of money

that the property would sell for in cash, given a reasonable time for selling it.” Id. When an

owner of the property testifies about value, we “presume that an owner’s testimony

regarding the value of property is an estimation of the property’s fair market value.” Id. An

owner may testify about fair market value “in terms of purchase price or the cost to him of

replacing the stolen property.” Id. “Because such testimony is an offer of the owner’s best

knowledge of the value of his property, it is legally sufficient evidence for the trier of fact

to make a determination as to value based on the owner’s credibility as a witness.” Id. “If

a defendant wishes to rebut the owner’s opinion evidence as to value he must do more than

merely impeach the witness’s credibility during cross-examination; he must actually offer

controverting evidence as to the value of the stolen item.” Id.

Bullock, slip op. at 3.

ACCEPTED

04-14-00818-CR

FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

10/30/2015 8:50:23 AM

KEITH HOTTLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 4th COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 10/30/15 8:50:23 AM KEITH E. HOTTLE Clerk
It is the State’s position that the defendant is entitled to introduce evidence controverting the evidence

produced by the State as to the value of the stolen property if he or she chooses to do so. The defendant is

never required, however, to introduce any evidence. The jury, of course, is free to accept either the

evidence introduced by the State or that introduced by the defendant. 

In the instant case, Appellant chose to introduce what he perceived to be controverting evidence as to value. 

The jury rejected that evidence, as it was free to do. 

Please accept this letter as a supplemental post-submission letter brief. 

Enclosures

cc: M. Patrick Maguire
#### Mat Worthington *v.*P. J. Green, &c.

Mortgages — Plea in Bar — Former Judgment.

Where the records in the lower court shows that the hirer of personal property was not made a party to a foreclosure of a mortgage on same, therein, he can not plead said record and judgment in bar to a recovery in the circuit court.

APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT. C. P. C.

March 8, 1872.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Lindsay:

The conditions of the mortgages having been broken, appellees had the right in this action to recover possession of the mortgaged property, unless the contract of hiring between appellant and the mortgagor invested the former with a right of possession superior to that of the mortgagees, or unless the proceeding in *521the quarterly court, deprived the common pleas court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy.

*Williams &*Turner, *for appellant.*

*A. B.*Stubblefield, *for appellees.*

The affidavit of Worthington which was admitted to be true, shows that he hired the mules and wagon, for the year 1871, from the mortgagor Morris, before the institution of this action. It does not show that the hiring was made prior to the execution of the mortgages to appellees. Other testimony conduces to show that such hiring was made subsequent thereto. Such being the case Worthington like-the party under whom he claims held the property subject to the rights iof appellees.

The record of tbe proceeding in the quarterly court, was not presented as evidence to the common pleas judge. The testimony of the quarterly judge shows that the Imortgages were foreclosed, in a suit vs. the mortgagor, Morris, but there is nothing to show that Worthington was before that court, or that he can be disposessed of the property under that judgment, unless he was a party and his right to the possession of the property, as against these appellees, was determined in the suit in the quarterly court, its judgment cannot be relied upon .by him as a bar to a recovery in this action. Perceiving no error in the proceedings in the court below prejudicial to the rights of appellant, the judgment must be affirmed.
**EXHIBIT 31.2****CERTIFICATION**     I, Robert W. Schleizer, certify that:     1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Xponential, Inc.;     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report;     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information includedin this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented inthis report;     4. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishingand maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:     (a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries,is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;     (b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report basedon such evaluation; and     (c) Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer’s most recent fiscalquarter (the small business issuer’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the smallbusiness issuer’s internal control over financial reporting; and     5. The small business issuer’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer’sauditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions):     (a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe small business issuer’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and     (b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the small business issuer’s internal control over financialreporting.        Date: February 19, 2007   /s/ Robert W. Schleizer    Robert W. Schleizer, Executive    Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                       9,703,203
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                          0
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                              0
<ALLOWANCE>                                          0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,773,979
<DEPOSITS>                                           0
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             37,627
<LONG-TERM>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        11,821
<OTHER-SE>                                  10,724,531
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>              10,773,979
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                      0
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                    0
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                87,978
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                87,978
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           87,978
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                        0
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                165,184
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (77,204)
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (77,204)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.09)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.09)
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                       0
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                     0
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        0
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                    0
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
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```

[Congressional Bills 105th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 675 Introduced in House (IH)]

105th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 675

 To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to clarify the authority of 
 the Secretary of Education with respect to eligibility standards for 
                    short-term educational programs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 11, 1997

  Mr. Frank of Massachusetts introduced the following bill; which was 
        referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to clarify the authority of 
 the Secretary of Education with respect to eligibility standards for 
                    short-term educational programs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ELIGIBLE PROGRAMS: PLACEMENT RATES.

    Section 481(e)(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
1088(e)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph:
    ``(C) In prescribing regulations pursuant to subparagraph (A)(ii), 
the Secretary shall provide for the exclusion from the calculation of 
placement rates, graduates who are--
            ``(i) aliens not authorized to accept employment in the 
        United States;
            ``(ii) individuals with medical conditions precluding 
        employment; and
            ``(iii) individuals who transfer credits from the program 
        to the program of an accredited degree-granting institution or 
        who otherwise immediately enroll in such a program.''.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
 Washington, D.C. 20549
 FORM 10-Q/A
 (Amendment No. 1)
 þ
    
    QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
 For the Quarterly Period Ended June 30, 2005
 or
 o
    
    TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
 Commission File Number: 000-50798
 COLOR KINETICS INCORPORATED
 (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)
 DELAWARE
    
    04-3391805(State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization)
    
    (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.)
 10 Milk Street, Suite 1100
Boston, Massachusetts 02108  (Address of principal executive offices)  (617) 423-9999  (Registrants telephone number, including area code)
 þ o
 o þ
 o þ




---



##### 



EXPLANATORY NOTE
    PART II
 Item 5. Other Information
  Number ofShares
    
    
    ExerciseUnderlying
    
    
    PriceNonqualified
    
    
    PerName
    
    Title at Date of Grant
    
    
    Date of Grant
    
    
    Stock Options
    
    
    ShareAbele, John E.
    
    Director
    
    
    4/25/2005
    
    
    
    25,000
    
    
    $
    11.32Afeyan, Noubar
    
    Director
    
    
    5/25/2005
    
    
    
    7,500
    
    
    $
    11.61Hawley, Michael
    
    Director
    
    
    5/25/2005
    
    
    
    7,500
    
    
    $
    11.61OConnor, James F
    
    Director
    
    
    5/25/2005
    
    
    
    7,500
    
    
    $
    11.61




---



##### 



SIGNATURES
  COLOR KINETICS INCORPORATEDBy: /s/ William J. SimsWilliam J. Sims
Chief Executive OfficerBy: /s/ David K. JohnsonDavid K. Johnson
Chief Financial Officer
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-05-00726-CV

Appellant, Free Sacred Trinity Church//Cross-Appellants, Bastrop Central Appraisal

District and Bastrop County Appraisal Review Board

v.

Appellees, Bastrop Central Appraisal District and Bastrop County Appraisal Review

Board//Cross-Appellant Free Sacred Trinity Church

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BASTROP COUNTY, 335TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 23,343, HONORABLE TERRY L. FLENNIKEN, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The parties have informed the Court that they no longer wish to pursue their appeals.

We dismiss the parties’ appeals on appellant’s unopposed motion.

 

Bea Ann Smith, Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices B. A. Smith and Puryear

Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion

Filed: February 17, 2006
No. 87-1304.

#### Rosee *v.*Commodity Futures Trading Commission et al.

C. A. 7th Cir. Certiorari denied.

Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-6520

RONALD MILES,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

RONALD ANGELONE,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, District

Judge. (CA-00-204-AM)

Submitted: August 23, 2001 Decided: August 30, 2001

Before WILKINS and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ronald Miles, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Drummond Bagwell, Assistant

Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

Certiorari dismissed, March 22, 2010
2

PER CURIAM:

Ronald Miles seeks to appeal the district court’s order

denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West

1994 & Supp. 2000). We have reviewed the record and the district

court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny

Miles’ motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the

appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Miles v. Angelone,

No. CA-00-204-AM (E.D. Va. filed Mar. 17, 2001; entered Mar. 19,

2001). In addition, we deny Miles’ motions for appointment of

counsel, for discovery, and to supplement the record, and his

numerous motions for general relief. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED