2013 I L App (2d) 120861 Nos. 2-12-0861 & 2-12-1072 c ons. Opinion filed September 25, 2013

______________________________________________________________________________ I N THE APPEL L ATE COURT OF I L L I NOI S SECOND DI STRI CT

______________________________________________________________________________ CHRI STOPHER S PRI

NGB ORN, ) Appea l from the Circuit Court ) of Ka ne County

. Plaintiff-Appellee , ) ) v. ) No. 12-MR-73 ) THE VI L L AGE OF SUGAR GROVE, ) ) Def endant- Appellant ) ) (B rent Eiche lberg er, I ndividually and in His ) Honora ble Offic ial Capac ity

as Villag e Administrator, ) Thomas E. Mueller , Def endant)

. ) J udg e, Presiding

.

______________________________________________________________________________ J OSEPH CECAL A, ) Appea l from the Circuit Court ) of Ka ne County

. Plaintiff-Appellee , ) ) v. ) No. 11-CH-3712 ) THE VI L L AGE OF CARPENTERS VI L L E, ) ) Def endant- Appellant ) ) Honora

ble (Mar k Rooney and L inda Morg ren, ) Thomas E. Mueller , Def endants). ) J udg e, Presiding

.

______________________________________________________________________________ J USTI CE BI RKETT deliver ed the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion. Presiding Justice Bur

ke and Justice McL are n concur red in the judg ment and opinion.2013 I L App (2d) 120861

OP INION

¶ 1 I n these consolidated appea ls, the Villag e of Suga r Grove and the Villag e of Carpe ntersville challeng e awa

rds of benef

its under section 10 of the Public Safety Employ ee Be nefits Act (Ac t) (820 I L CS 320/ 10 (West 2012)). F or the following rea sons, we af

firm. ¶ 2 I . BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 A. Gene ral B ackg round ¶ 4 Plaintiffs, Christopher Springbor n and J oseph Ceca la, wer e police office rs with, r espec tively , Suga r Grove and Carpente rsville. I n separ ate instances, they wer e injured while clea ring roadw ay obstructions in the course of their duties. Plaintiffs petitioned their respect ive employ ers for insurance benef

its under sec tion 10 of the Act, whic h provides in re levant par t: “(a ) An employ er who empl o y s a ful l-time law enfor ceme nt, corr ectional or

corr ectional probation office r, or firef ighte r, who, on or afte r the eff ective date of this Act suffe rs a cata strophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employ er’ s healt

h in s u r a n c e p la n f o r th e injured employ ee, the injured employ ee’ s spouse, and for e ach de pendent c hild of the injured employ ee ***. * * * (b) I n order for the law enfor ceme nt, corr ectional or corr ectional p ro b at i o n office r, firef ighte r, spouse, or depende nt children to be elig ible for insurance cover ag e under this Act, the injury or death must have occur red as the result of the office r’s response to fre sh pursuit, the office r or firef

ighte r’s response to what is rea sonably believed to be an em er gen cy , an unlawful act perpe trated by another , or during the investiga tion of a criminal act. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit health insurance cover ag e or pension benef its for

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which the office r, firef

ighte r, spouse, or depende nt children may otherwise be elig ible.” 820 I L CS 320/ 10(a) , (b) ( West 2012). The municipalities declined the reque sts for benef its. Eac h plaintiff then broug ht a complaint in the trial court for a decla

ratory judgme nt that he was entitled to the benef its. Eac h alleg ed that he clea red the roadw ay obstructions in response to what he rea sonably believed was an emer g ency . Springbor n additionally alleg ed that his injury resulted from “an unlawful act perpe trated by another ” (820 I L CS 320/10(b) (West 2012)). Ce cala made no a lleg ation of an unla wful ac t by

another

. ¶ 5 I n both case s, the parties filed cross-m o t i o n s for summary judgme nt. I n the sections that follow, we r ecount the subse quent proc eeding s in eac h case

. ¶ 6 B. B ackg round in No. 2-12- 0861—Springbor n ¶ 7 Attache d to the parties’ cross-motions for summ ary judgme nt were Springbor n’s discover

y deposition and his testimony from two appea ranc es befor e the Boa

rd of Trustee s for t h e Police Pension Fund of Suga

r Grove

. Fr om thes e s o u rce s we compile the following acc ount, noting any signific ant disparities betwe en the de position t estimony and the he aring

testimony

. ¶ 8 Springbor

n was on patrol on Aug ust 27, 2009, when, at 9:30 or 10 a.m., he rec eived a dispatch that an off- duty police office r was attempting to stop a Mey er Paving truck on Route 47 betwee n Bliss Road and Kede ka Road. Responding to the dispatch, Springbor n proce eded north on Route 47. I n the are a of Route 47 and Kede ka Road, Springbor n came acr oss chunks of asphalt on Route 47. That section of Route 47 has two southbound lanes and two northbound lanes. The asphalt chunks cover ed the “whole [i nside, or west, northbound] lane.” There was a lesser quantity of chunks in the outside,

or east, northbound lane. Ther e we re 1 0 to 15 chunks in all, eac h weig hing “betwe en 20 and 40 pounds.” I n his deposition testimony , Springbor n stated that the chunks “ra ng ed in siz e from about

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the siz e of a softball to about the siz e of—little bigg er than a piece of paper , about three inches thick.” I n his hear ing testimony , Springbor n descr ibed the siz e of the chunks as “a foot and a half to two fee t long by *** any wher e fr om three to six i nches thick.” ¶ 9 Springbor

n testified that Route 47 is “a major highw ay ” in Kane County , with “hea vy traff ic,” and that it was “rush hour” when he encounte red the asphalt. The speed limit for that section of Route 47 was 45 or 55 miles per hour. Springbor n stated that, upon spotting the asphalt, he asked the public works depar

tment in Suga

r Grove for assistance in removing the asphalt. T h e d epartment replied that the I llinois Depa rtment of Transpor

tation had responsib i l i t y fo r clea ring Route 47. Be lieving that the asphalt chunks prese nted an “eme rg ency ” an d an “im mediate safe ty hazard,” Springbor n activate d his emer g ency lights and parke d his squad car in the west northbound lane, wher e the majority of the asphalt chunks wer e located. He then remove d the asphalt chunks by hand, tossing them onto the shoulder or the median. Springbor n believed that the police depar tment’s “police and proce dure manual” require d office rs to remove roadw ay debris that might en d ang er motorists. S pring born suffe red no injury or discomfort in re moving these piece s of aspha lt. ¶ 10 Springbor

n testified that, as he continued driving on Route 47, he encounte red a second ma ss of asphalt chunks. I n his de position testimony , Springbor n stated that the “number s wer e about the same” as the first debris field but that “ther e wer e a few bigg er piece s.” I n his hear ing testimony , howeve r, Springbor

n descr ibed the second debris field as “much larg er” than the first debris field and opined that it prese nted an “eve n g rea ter hazard” than the first beca use it was “ac tually protruding into both lanes.” Most of the piece s, howeve r, wer e in the west northbound lane. Acc ording to Springbor n, the piece s in the second field “ra ng ed in siz e from softball siz e to two to three fee t [wide] , any

wher e from three to six inches thick

. ” As wi t h t h e first field, Springbor n activate d his

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emer g ency lights and parke d behind the piece s in the west northbound lane. Observing that some of the chunks in the west lane wer e too la rg e for him to lift, Spring born notified the dispatcher that he would need assistance

. Springbor n proce eded to clea

r the east lane without incident. Whil e clea ring the west lane, howeve r, he slipped and injured his back. Springbor n was alone at the scene when he was injured. ¶ 11 Springbor

n noted that the driver of the asphalt truck was char g ed with violating a state statute by spilli ng a load. ¶ 12 The trial court g rante d Springbor n ’s s u m mary judgme nt motion and denied Suga r Grove ’s motion. The court provide d no rationale for its dec ision. S ug ar G rove f iled this ti mely

appea l. ¶ 13 C. Bac kg round in No. 2-12- 1072—Ceca la ¶ 14 The parties fi led with their summary judgme nt motions the discovery deposition of Ceca la and the aff

idavits of Scott Adam s and Michae l Kilbourne, both of whom wer e commander s in the Carpente rsville police depa rtment on the eve ning tha t Cecala was injured. ¶ 15 Ceca la testified that he was on patrol o n De ce m b er 2 9 , 2 0 0 8 , wh en , at 9 p.m., he wa s dispatched to investig ate a traff ic ac cident and a pos sible case of driving under the i nfluenc e at the intersec tion of Route 31 and Sp ru ce Drive in Carpente rsville. Ceca la believed that the dispatcher might also have mentioned that a person was injured. Ceca la considere d the situation an “eme rg ency ” and heade d to the scene with his emer g ency lights and siren activate d. Ceca la explained that, at their intersec tion, Route 31 runs north-south and S pruce east-w est. The interse ction is controlled i n all fo ur direc tions by traff

ic signa ls. Route 31 and Spruce eac h have two lanes for straig ht traf fi c. Additionally , southbound Route 31 has west and east turn lanes onto Spruce. The west southbound
turn lane on Route 31, located at the nort hwest corne r of the intersec tion, is separ ated from the

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straig ht lanes by a concr ete triang le, on which, normally , a traffic signa l stands. On this occa sion, howeve r, Ceca la arr ived to find the traff ic signa l felled and ly ing on Route 31. Ceca la also observe d
a truc k ag ainst a tree at the southea st corner of the intersec tion. Ceca la surmised that the truck ha d struck the signa l pole and proce eded to strike the tree

. Ceca la estimated that the signa l pole was 10
to 15 fe et l ong . The pole was ly ing acr oss the entire west southbound straig ht lane of Route 31. Ceca la could not rec all whether or how much the pole was protruding into Route 31’s east southbound straig ht lane. Ceca la did rec all, howeve r, that it was “still possible for vehicles trave ling southbound on [R oute] 31 to g o throug h the intersec tion of Spruce.” Ceca la also noted that the east southbound turn lane on Route 31 would have aided vehicles in dr iving around the pole if indeed it was protr uding into the e ast straig ht lane. When he a rrived at the scene , Ceca la was conce rned not only beca use t he pole posed a roadw ay obstacle, but also beca use i ts wires, which had been pul led
out of the g round, wer e still live. Ceca la descr ibed Route 31 as a “major thoroug hfar e” and a “pre tty busy street a ll the time.” ¶ 16 Ceca la s t at ed t h at h e p ar k ed his squad car behind the signa l pole in the west southbound straig ht lane of Route 31. His purpose was to position his squad car as a barr ier betwee n the pole and
t h e s outhbound traff

ic. I n addition to his squad car ’s emer g ency lights, Ceca la activ at ed i t s direc tional lights to signa l traff ic to veer left (or east). As in al l s i t u at i o ns involving roadw ay obstructions, Ceca la’s “most important” task upon arr iving at the scene was to preve nt motorists from hitting the obstruction. There wer e sever al other police office rs prese nt (Ceca la could not rec all the order in which he and the others arr ived). Ceca la “knew that the pole neede d to be moved” and that it needed to be done “immediate ly .” His squad ca r, thoug h blocking the downed sig nal, was itself

a “hazar d” beca

use “it’s very dang erous for a police office r to be in the roadw ay even with the lights

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on.” Ceca la “kn[ew] that squad car s g et rea r-e nded with their lights on,” and he had seen “people g et hit while squad ca

rs ar e ther e.” Ce cala

had “a lway s [been] instructed to re move y ourself f rom that situation as soon as y ou can[,] which would mean y ou would have to eliminate [t he hazard].” Thus,

even w ith his squad car bloc king the pole, Ceca la still deemed the situation an “e merg ency .” ¶ 17 Ceca la testified that, in his 12 y ear s as a police office r, he had responde d to two or three prior incidents involving downed traff ic signa ls or telephone poles, and in eac h case police office rs moved them manually . Ceca la had a lso responded to “hundre ds” of instances of other objec ts obstructing roadw ay s, such as tree s and dead deer

. Ceca la acknow ledg ed that a pole need not be moved manually by a poli ce office r. Ceca la also noted t hat a tow truck had been called to the s ce n e. Whil e C eca la knew that a

tow truck ha s the ca

pacity to move a fe lled pole, he ha d never seen tha t done. ¶ 18 Acc ording to Ceca la, he spoke with Serg eant O’B rien at the scene about “how we wer e g oing
t o g et [t he pole] off the roadw ay .” He and O’B rien “we re standing next to the pole discussi n g, ‘We’ve g ot to move this pole.’ ” They then manually moved the pole and laid it acr oss the concr ete triang le from which it had fallen. Ceca la estimated that the pole weig hed 100 pounds. Once moved, the pole was no longe r obstructing Route 3 1 , b u t n ow one-third of it was protruding into Spruce Drive, and hence it was “still a problem.” Whil e O’B rien turned to other business at the scene , Ceca la confe rre d with Offic er Br own about the pole. They ag ree d that the pole neede d to be moved ag ain. Asked if there was “any

emer g ency

situation at that moment that require d [t hem] to move t he pole instead of wa iting for

somebody

else to move it,” Cec ala a nswere d: “Other than the fac t that it still prese nted a hazard in its location, t h ere is nothing else that would preve nt us from waiting for something, somebody else to come. Obviously [,] we could have sa t there a

nd waited f

or someone e lse to come, but we chose to move it at that point.”

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¶ 19 Ceca la and Br own decide d to manually move the pole off the roadw ay and into a parking lot. As they made the eff

ort, Ceca la was injured. Ceca la di d no t re call ever being ordere d to move t he pole. Ceca la estimated that he was a t the scene betwee n 5 and 10 minutes altog ether

. ¶ 20 I n his aff

idavit, Kilbourne stated that police depar tment rec ords ref

lected that two office rs had alre ady been at the scene for a

bout five minutes when Cec ala a rrived. ¶ 21 I n his aff

idavit, Adams aver

red that Route 31 was “one of the busiest thoroug hfar es that runs [ sic ] throug h the Vil lag e of Carpente rsville.” Acc ording to Adams, “the blockag e of traff ic of any ty pe on I llinois Route 31 would require an emer g ency response on behalf of the [pol ice depar tment] .” Adams noted: “[T] he traff

ic signa ls at the intersec tion of I llinois Route 31 and Spruce Drive, while heavy ,

can be lifted and moved out of the roadw ay if they pose an obstruction, much as I did on

numerous occ asions while employ ed by the Villag e of Car

penter sville Pol ice De partment. * * * *** [I ]f a downed traff

ic signa l impeding traff

ic on I llinoi s R o u t e 31 could not be quickly moved by [t he police depar tment] , an office r would be assig ned to provide emer g ency traff ic direc tion, c omplete with a squad car with activate d lights, until other village service s could respond to the scene to place lighted barr icade s and traff ic d i rec tion signa g e. The barr icad es an d s i g nag e would rema in in place until the traff ic signa l could be remove d by State of I llinois personne l. *** [W ]hen providing emer g e n c y tr a f f ic direc tion for an extended period of time, vital

resour ces a

re pr evente d from re sponding to other emer g ency

situations.

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*** [C eca la] *** was acting in acc ordanc e with law enfor ceme nt c u s to m a n d p r a ctices wi t h respe ct to his actions taken in reg ards to the downed traff ic signa l. [C ec al a] wa s responding to the emer g ency needs of the Villag e of Car

penter sville and its citiz enry .” ¶ 22 The trial court g rante d Ceca la’s motion for summary judgme nt and denied Carpente rsville’s motion. The court stated no r ationale f or its decision. Carpe ntersville filed this timely appea l. ¶ 23 I I . ANAL YSI S ¶ 24 Summary judgme nt is appropr iate only when “the pleading s, depositions, and admissions on file, toge ther with the aff

idavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law.” 735 I L CS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2012). We revie w de novo the propriety of a trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Earth Foods, Inc. , 238 I ll. 2d 455, 461 (2010). “When parties file cross-motions for summary judgme nt, they ag ree that only a questi o n o f l aw is involved and invite the court to decide the issues based on the rec ord.” Pielet v. Pielet , 2012 I L 112064, ¶ 28. “Howe ver, the mere filing of cross-motions for summary judgme nt does not establish that there is no issue of materia l fac t,

nor does it obliga te a court to rende r summary judgme nt.” Id. “A triable issue prec luding summary judgme nt exis ts wher e the materia l fac ts are disputed, or wher e, the materia l fac ts being undisputed,

rea sonable persons might draw differ ent infere nces from the undisputed fac ts.” Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co. , 211 I ll. 2d 32, 43 (2004). “The use of the summary j u d gm en t p rocedure is to be

encour ag ed as an aid in the expeditious dispositi on of a lawsuit.” Id. “Howe ver, it is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and, there fore , should be allowed only when the rig ht of the moving party is clear and fr ee f

rom doubt.” Id.

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¶ 25 Sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Act impose two prec onditions for the aw ar d o f insurance benef its to a law enfor cemen t office r. Section 10(a) provides that such benef its are available only wher e the office r “suff

ers a cata strophic injury or is killed in the line of duty .” 820 I L CS 320/10(a) (West 2012). Section 10(b) further provides that “the injury or death must have occur red as the result of the office r’s response to fre sh pursuit, the office r[’s] *** response to what is rea sonably believed
to be an emer g ency , an unlawful act perpe trated by another , or during the investiga tion of a criminal act.” 820 I L CS 320/10(b) (West 2012). Carpente rsvi l l e an d S u gar Grove do not dispute in these appea ls t h at S p ri ng born and Ceca la suffe red “ca tastrophic injuries.” They dispute only that Springbor n and Cec ala met the r equire ments of sec tion 10(b). ¶ 26 The most rec ent publ ished decision on section 10(b) is Ga f f n ey v. B o a r d of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District , 2012 I L 110012, wher e the supreme court considere d consolidated appea ls of summary judgme nt ruling s on claims for section 10 benef its broug ht by firef

ighte rs Michae l Gaf

fney and Br ian L emmenes. I n neit h er ca se was it questioned that the firef ighte r was cata strophically injured; the i ssue was whether the firefig hter was injur ed “a s a result of *** [hi s] response to what is rea sonably believed to be an emer g ency ” (820 I L CS 320/10(b) (West 2012)). The court he ld that, unde r the undisputed fac ts, the “eme rg ency ” compone nt was met in Gaf fney ’s ca se but not in L emmenes’

. Id. ¶¶ 69, 79. ¶ 27 To rea ch these conclusions, the co u rt fi rs t h ad t o as cer tain section 10(b)’ s definition of “eme rg ency .” The court noted t his district’s decision i n DeRose v. C ity of Highland Park , 386 I l l

. App. 3d 658, 661 (20 0 8 ), wh ere, resor ting to dictionary definitions, we held that an “eme rg ency ”

u n d er s ection 10(b) means a situation that “is urg ent and calls for immediate action.” (I nterna l quotation marks omitted.) Reviewing primary and s ec ondary definitions of “eme rg ency ” from

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Webster’s Third New I nterna tional Dictionary (1993), the court deter mined that our conce pt o f “eme rg ency

” lacke d the nece ssary component of unfore seea bility

. We quote the court’s discussion
at leng th beca

use one of the definitional illust rations provided by Webster’s, and relied upon by the
court as elucidating the conce pt of fore seea bility , is exactly the fac tual situation prese nted in both of the appe als at hand:

“The primary definition from Webster’s Third New I nterna tional Dictionary states an ‘eme rg ency ’ is ‘ an unfore seen combination of circ umstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action <the y we re far from help when the [emerg ency ] overtook them>.’ Webster’s Third New I nterna tional D ictionary 741 (1993). As our appellate court has held,

an ‘eme rg ency ’ clea

rly require s an u rgent and immediate response . The definition also indicates, howeve r, that the urg ency or immediate action must result from an unfore seen circ umstance

. T h e require ment of an unfore seen event i s shown by the i llustration stating, ‘they wer e fa r fr om help when the [emer g ency ] overtook them.’ The other senses and illust rations also demonstrate that an unfore seen event is integ ral
to an ‘eme rg ency .’ Those senses and illust rations provide: ‘a: a pressing need: EXI GENCY

<a state of [emerg ency ] exis ted during wh ich any help was acc eptable> b: a sudden bodily altera tion such as is likely to require immediate medical attention (as a ruptured appendix or surg ical s h o ck ) c: a usu. distressing eve nt or condition that can often be anticipated or prepared for but seldom exac tly foreseen <wait until the [eme rgency ] is over, prices will go down then>< an [eme rgency ] water su p p ly > < [ e m e r ge n c y ] d o c k in g fa c il it ie s > <[em ergenc

y]

crews working to clear the roads>. ’ Webster’s Third New I nterna tional Dictionary 741 (1993). Whil e we ag ree with the appellate court that an ‘eme rg ency ’ includes an element of

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urg ency and t h e n ee d for immediate action, we also believe it involves an unfore seen circ umstance or

event r equiring that immediate ac tion. Fur ther, section 10(b) cover s situations ar ising in the perf ormanc e of a public safe ty employ ee’ s job. The four fac tors from section 10(b) involve potentially dang erous situations

occur ring in the course of employ ment. A firef

ighte r’s employ

ment includes responding to situations involving imminent danger to a person or proper ty

. The term ‘eme rg ency ’ in section 10(b) , as applied to a firefig hter, connotes the s ense that either a person or proper ty is in some form of imminent dang er. We, there fore , conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of the term ‘eme rg ency ’ in section 10(b) is an unfore seen circ umstance involving imminent dang er to a p er s o n o r proper ty requiring an urg ent response . To be entitled to continuing health cover ag e benef its under section 10(b), the injury must occur in response to what is rea sonably believed to be an unfore seen circ umstance involving imminent dang er to a p er s o n or proper ty requiring an urg ent re sponse.” ( Emphasis added.) Id. ¶¶ 61- 64. Be low, we return to the emphasized lang uag e. First, we rec ount the fac ts and rea soning in Gaf fney ’s and L emmenes’ case s. ¶ 28 Ga ffne y was inj ured during a t raining exercise involvi ng an actual fire on the t hird floor o f

a building. Gaf

fney wore full fire g ear for the exercise, and his battalion chief instructed him to trea t the exercise as an actua l emer g ency . As the cre w was moving the fire hose betwee n the second and third floors, it beca

me stuck. Due to smoke, there was no visibil ity

. Gaf fney followed the hose back down to the second floor and discovere d that it was hooked around a ch ai r. I n moving the chair , Gaf fney injured his shoulder. Id. ¶¶ 6- 8.

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¶ 29 T h e supreme court held that Gaf fney ’s training exercise beca me an emer g ency when ther e

arose the unfore seen event of the hose becoming stuck. Id. ¶ 66. This event cre ated imminent dang er and re quired a

n urg ent re sponse, as “ the cr ew wa s stranded on the stairwell to the third floor of the burning building with no visibil ity and no water to put out the fire.” Id. Moreove r, when Gaf fney
went to fre e the hose, he “put himself at risk of becoming l o st and disoriented in the smoke-filled building.” Id. ¶ 67. The court not ed that Gaf fney had no “option of ending his participation in the exercise a fter it bec ame a n emer g ency .” Id. ¶ 30 I n L emmenses’ case , he, too, was injured during a training exercise. The exercise took pla ce at an a bandoned f

actor y . The firef

ighte rs wer e require d to wear full fire g ear . There was no a ctual fire, but the firef

ighte rs’ masks wer e blacke ned in order to simulate live fire conditions, and they wer e told to act as if there was an emer g ency . The firef ighte rs wer e instructed that a fellow firef ighte r was trappe d ins i d e t h e building, was running out of air, and would die if not found and resc ued. The firef ighters we re g iven specific instructions for the exercise, including a prede termined path for running the fire hose into the building. Fire depar tment supervisors testified that the individual acting
as t he trapped firefig hter was never in rea l dang er dur ing the exercise, whic h was pe rfor med under “ ‘c ontrolled conditions.’ ” Id. ¶¶ 21- 24. ¶ 31 L emmenes was injured when he attempted to fre e the trappe d firef ighte r. Id. ¶ 22. The c ourt held that L emmenes could not ha ve rea sonably believed that he was re sponding to a n “eme rg ency ” under section 10(b). The court noted that the exercise was co n d u ct ed under “ ‘controlled conditions,’ ” no one was in imminent dang er at any point during the exercise, and “[n] o unexpected or unfor esee n developments a rose dur ing th[e] drill, unl ike t he situation in Gaffney wher e the hose line beca me entang led in an unknown objec t.” Id. ¶ 77.

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¶ 32 We note that, though Gaffney modified DeRose ’s d ef i n i t i o n o f wh at i s o b

j ectively an

emer g ency , Gaffney did not abrog ate DeRose ’s holding that section 10(b) require s the claimant to have subjectively believed that he was fa ci n g an em erge ncy . See DeRose , 386 I ll. App. 3d at 661 (sec tion 10(b) require s a deter mination “(1 ) wh et h er [ the claimant] believed that he was fac ing an

emer g ency

and (2) whether

that belief w as re asonable ”). ¶ 33 Apply ing section 10(b) as construed in Gaffney , we note that the aff idavits, depositions, a

nd hear ing t es t i m o n y submitt ed by the parties do not disclose any issue of materia l fac t in either case befor e us. The parties draw conflicting infere nces from those fac ts, but on the materia l points the only

rea sonable infere nces are draw n by Springbor n and Ceca la. That is, the undisputed fac ts in eac h case show that (1) the officer b el i eved that he was responding to an emer g ency ; and (2) his belief was

rea sonable. ¶ 34 First, both of

fice rs actua lly believed that they wer e fac ing emer g encie s. Eac h char acte rized the road obstruction as a “hazar d” or an “eme rge n cy .” Ceca la also believed that his squad car , stopped in a lane of traff

ic, was itself a hazard justified only by the pressing need to block traff ic from the sig nal pole. ¶ 35 Carpente rsville, howeve r, contends that, if Ceca la believed that the signa l pole neede d to be moved immediately , he would not have taken time to speak, first with O’B rien and then with Br own, about moving the pole. Rather, Ceca la “would have immediately moved [t he pole].” This point lacks merit. First, the appar ent rea son Ceca la confe rre d wi t h a co l l ea g ue in both instances was that he neede d help lifting the pole. Second, the evidenc e sug g ests that the confe rments about the pole wer e not casua l and meandering , but fo cused on the obvi ous logistica l problem of moving the unwieldy pole.

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¶ 36 The rec ord further establi s h es t h at S p ri n g born’s and Ceca la’s subjective beliefs about the prese nce of an emer g ency wer e rea sonable. Carpente rsville disputes that the felled traff ic signa l was

an unfore seen circ umst a

n c e g iv e n Ce cala ’s and Adams’ statements of prior experience s with roadw ay obstructions such as t ra ff ic signa ls, light poles, tree s, and dead deer

. Carpente rsville, howeve r, overlooks a particula

r sense of fore seea

bility that the supreme court in Gaffney noted was expressed in dictionary definitions of “eme rg ency .” An “emerge n cy ” includes “ ‘a usu. distressing event or condition that can often be anticipat ed o r prepa red for but seldom exactly fore seen <wa it until the [eme r g e n c y

] is o ver, price s will g o down then>< an [emerg ency ] water supply ><[emer g ency ] docking fac iliti es>< [ eme rgency

] crews working to clear the roads >.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Gaffney , 2012 I L 1 1 0 0 1 2 , ¶ 62 (quoting Webster’s Third New I nterna tional Dictionary 741 (1993))

. Thus, an event is no less dire if it falls within the kinds of events that police office rs oug ht to anticipate encounte ring in their daily duties. Coincidentally , the dictionary entry that the supreme court quoted as illust rative of t he nua n ce s of foresee ability cites t he ex ample of roadw ay obstructions as a ty pe of emer g ency . We do not sug g est that any roadw ay debris is per se an emer g ency under section 10(b); eac h ca se must be decide d on its own fac ts. We are simply reje cting the sug g estion that past police experience with a certain kind of event rend er s a particular inst ance of such an event fore seea ble for purposes of section 10(b). Her e, as explained below, the roadw ay obstructions “involv[ed] imminent dang er to a person or proper

ty requi ri n g an urg ent response ” ( id. ¶ 64). The additional require ment of fore seea bility was satisfied beca

use the particula

r circ umstances of the events wer e not fore seea ble,

even as much as the police wer e prepa red by their training and experience to a ddress those ty pes of
events.

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¶ 37 Carpente rsville and S ug ar Grove each arg ue that there was no “imminent dang er” beca use the squad car blocked the roadw ay obstruction and there was an open lane throug h which traff ic could pass. Her e we note that C ar p en t ersvill e questions not the need to move the pole once it was p ro t ru d i n g i n to Spruce Drive, but the need to move i t in the first instance, after Ceca la had parke d behind it. Ceca la testified that, in his experience , a squad car stopped on a roadw ay , while a nece ssary immediate prec aution, poses its own “hazard” and, there fore , the roadw ay obstruction should be quickly remove d. Adams av er re d t h at it is the policy of the Carpente rsville police that roadw ay obstructions should be “quickly moved” by office rs. Adams explained that the provision of

emer g ency traff

ic direc tion “for an extended period of time” consumes “vital resour ces.” There wer e

no simil ar repr esenta tions in Springbor n’s case , but the safe ty fac tor applies there as well. The rec ord sug g ests that Route 47, like Route 31, is a major, heavily traff icked roadw ay . Parking a squad car on either r oad would pre sent dang er, most obviously from inattentive dr ivers. ¶ 38 Carpente rs v i l l e an d S u gar Grove also question whether attempted manual remova l of the obstructions was appropr iate. We note that , i n ea ch case , manual remova l was the most rea dily available means and so the most suited to the pressing need to clea r the roadw ay of both the obstruction and the squad car . I n C ec al a’ s ca s e, Adams confirme d in his aff idavit that manually removing a signa l pole from the roadw ay is within the phy sical capa city of a pol i ce o ff icer , and Adams implied that manual re moval oug ht to be tried bef ore a ssistance is summoned. ¶ 39 Carpente rsville claims that there was circ umstantial evidenc e of the lack of imminent dang er in the fac t that the office rs who prec eded Ceca la to the scene “did not immediately move the downed traff ic signa l.” The rec ord is silent, howeve r, as to what these office rs we re d o i n g befor e Ceca la

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arr ived. They might well have attempted, unsucce ssfully , to move the signa l pole. Or, perha ps they devoted their

attention to the driver w ho cra shed. ¶ 40 Carpente rsville also finds it telling that (in its words) “[Cecala] conce ded that he could have waited for s o m eo n e o r s omething to move the downed traff ic signa l, but he decide d not to wait.” Carpente rsville fails to acknow ledg e the e ntirety of Ceca la’s stateme nt, which was:

“ Other than the fact that it [the signal pole] still presented a hazard in its location , there is nothing else that would preve nt us from waiting for something, somebody else to come. Obviously [,] we could have sat there and waited for someone e lse to come, but we chose to move it at that point.” (Emphasis adde d.) Ceca la’s conce ssion was simply that it wo u l d h av e b een possible (in a loose sense) to wait for assistance

. Ceca la did not conce de that waiting would have been appropr iate g iven the hazards of the situation. ¶ 41 Suga

r Grove contends that, beca use Springbor

n had alre ady deter

mined that the second field of asphalt contained piece s that he could not lift without assistance , and indeed told dispatch as much, he simply could have waited for assis tance befor e clearing any of t he aspha lt. By clea ring what he could, howeve r, Spring born re asonably attempted to shorten the time that the hazards would be on the roa dway

. ¶ 42 For the fore g oing rea sons, we conclu d e t h at , u nder the undisputed fac ts, Springbor n and Ceca la ea ch re asonably

believed tha t he fa ced a

n emer g ency . ¶ 43 Carpente rsville makes the further contention t h at C ec al a’ s i n j u ry was not sustained in “re sponse to *** an emer g ency ” (820 I L CS 320/10(b) (West 201 2 )) beca use, at the moment he attempted to move the signa l pole, he “wa s not rea cting or responding to any thing,” either “a call for

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help” or “an order to move the traff ic control signa l.” This rea ding of section 10(b) finds no support in Gaffney

. Ceca la’s decision to move the signa l pole was no less a “re sponse” under section 10(b) than was Gaf

fney ’s decision to fre e the fire hose by moving t h e ch ai r. Ceca la’s “re sponse” was initiated when he complied with t h e d i s p at ch, and that “re sponse” was ong oing when he opted to move the tra ffic sig nal pole. ¶ 44 L astly , Carpente rsville urg es us to consider the financ ial impact an aff irmance would have on municipalities going forwa rd. This is not a proper fa ctor for our dec ision. W e apply

section 10(b) as interpr eted by Gaffney , come wha t may

. ¶ 45 We note that Springbor n’s complaint soug ht section 10 benef its on the additional g round that he was injured “as the result of *** an unlawful act perpe trated by another ” (820 I L CS 320/10 (West 2012)). (Ceca la alleg ed no such additional g round.) On appeal , S u gar Grove disputes that Springbor n met this g round. Since our h o l d i n g u n der the “eme rg ency ” prong of section 10(b) is ad equate to sustain the trial court’s summary judgme nt ruling , we need not addre ss wh et h er Springbor n met this additional ground unde r sec tion 10(b). ¶ 46 For

the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the judg ments of the cir cuit court of K ane County

. ¶ 47 Affir

med.

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