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Hyung S. Choi, State Bar 015669

Veronika Fabian, State Bar 018770

CHOI & FABIAN, PLC

90 S. Kyrene Rd., Suite #5

Chandler, Arizona 85226

tel: (480) 517-1400

fax: (480) 517-6955

Flagstaff: (928) 779-2226

hyung@choianfabian.com

veronika@choiandfabian.com 

 Attorneys for Plaintiff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kelly Nicole Cantu,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Stuart-Lippman and Associates, Inc.,

f/k/a or a/k/a Stuart Allan and

Associates, Inc., 

Defendant.

 NO. 

COMPLAINT

INTRODUCTION

1. Plaintiff’s sister was involved in an accident with a State Farm insured driver. 

State Farm apparently seeks to recover payments it made to its insured. On June

5, 2015, Defendant debt collector impermissibly accessed Plaintiff’s Experian

credit file. On June 9, 2015, Defendant debt collector sent a letter to Plaintiff

demanding conflicting amounts ($109,926.62 or $31,725.62). Plaintiff brings

Case 4:16-cv-00028-RM Document 1 Filed 01/15/16 Page 1 of 8
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this case to remedy Defendant’s impermissible access of Plaintiff’s credit

information in violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). 

JURISDICTION

2. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331

which confers jurisdiction over Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) claims

without regard to the amount in controversy. The sole claim asserted in this

case is for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. This Court has subject

matter jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1681p.

VENUE

3. Venue is proper in the this District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1337 because

Defendant’s principal place of business is located at 5447 E. 5 Street, Suite th

110, Tucson, Arizona 85711. 

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff is Kelly Nicole Cantu (hereinafter referred to as “Plaintiff”), who was

an individual residing in San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas when the harm

arose. 

5. Plaintiff now resides in Ocean County, New Jersey. 

6. Plaintiff is a consumer as that term is defined by the Fair Credit Reporting Act,

15 U.S.C. §1681a(c). 

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7. Based on information and belief, Defendant Stuart-Lippman and Associates,

Inc. (“SLA” or “Defendant”), is either the alternate trade name of or successor

in interest to Stuart Allan and Associates (“Stuart Allan”), and is a for-profit

corporation incorporated pursuant to the laws of Arizona with its principal

place of business at 5447 E. 5 Street, Suite 110, Tucson, Arizona 85711. 

th

FACTS

8. On January 1, 2015, Plaintiff’s sister was in a car accident while driving a vehicle. 

9. The car was titled in Plaintiff’s name, but Plaintiff had transferred the vehicle to

her sister on the express conditions that she obtain liability insurance and transfer

the title into her own name.

10. The driver of the other vehicle in the accident, Ms. Bertha Alicia Fuentes, was

insured by State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company (“State Farm”). 

11. State Farm appears to have paid certain insurance benefits to Ms. Fuentes.

12. State Farm appears to claim Plaintiff owes it money pursuant to subrogation

clause of the policy it issued to Ms. Fuentes.

13. State Farm engaged SLA to seek collection of the subrogation claim from

Plaintiff. 

14. On information and belief, Defendant Stuart-Lippmann now stands in the shoes

of Stuart Allan either as Stuart Allan’s alternate trade name or as its successor-ininterest.

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15. Plaintiff does not have, and never has had, any debtor-creditor relationship with

SLA.

16. Notwithstanding the fact that there has never been any debtor-creditor

relationship between Plaintiff and SLA, or between Plaintiff and State Farm, SLA

accessed Plaintiff’s credit file from Experian Information Solutions, Inc.

(hereinafter referred to as “Experian”) on June 5 , 2015. (Exhibit A). th

17. Experian is a “consumer reporting agency” as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C.

§1681a(f). 

18. In connection therewith Experian acts as a data repository, assembling and

storing information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer

reports to third parties.

19. On information and belief, SLA is a subscriber and user of consumer reports

issued by Experian.

20. On information and belief, SLA also furnishes data about its experiences with

consumers with whom it transacts business to Experian.

21. On information and belief, SLA is a furnisher of information as contemplated by 

the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §1681s-2(a) & (b), that regularly and in

the ordinary course of business furnishes information to one or more consumer

reporting agencies about its transactions or experiences with any consumer.

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22. On June 5, 2015, SLA accessed the contents of Plaintiff’s credit file from

Experian, doing what is colloquially known as a “hard pull”, or viewing the

Plaintiff’s entire credit history. 

23. In connection therewith, SLA made a general or specific certification to Experian

that Defendant sought the information because it had a legitimate business need

for the information in connection with a business transaction initiated by Plaintiff

or to review an account to determine whether Plaintiff continued to meet the

terms of said account.

24. On June 9, 2015, using the information contained within the impermissibly

accessed credit file, SLA sent a demand letter to Plaintiff demanding

conflicting amounts ($109,926.62 or $31,725.62). (Exhibit B).

CAUSE OF ACTION NO. 1: VIOLATION OF THE FCRA 

25. Plaintiff hereby re-alleges and incorporates herein by this reference the allegations

set forth in Paragraphs No. 1 through 23 of this Complaint.

26. SLA is a “person” as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. §1681a (b).

27. The FCRA establishes very specific rules placing limitations upon an entity (or

“person”) seeking to obtain a consumer’s credit history or the content of a

consumer’s credit file, as follows: 

(f) Certain use or obtaining of information prohibited. - A person shall not

use or obtain a consumer report for any purpose unless -

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(1) the consumer report is obtained for a purpose for which the

consumer report is authorized to be furnished under this section;

and

(2) the purpose is certified in accordance with section 1681e of this

title by a prospective user of the report through a general or specific

certification.

See 15 U.S.C. §1681b(f).

28. Section1681 b(a)(3) of the FCRA lists the all-inclusive purposes for which a

consumer report can be obtained, as follows:

(a) In General. - * * * [A] consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer

report under the following circumstances and no other:

***

(3) To a person which it has reason to believe -

(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit

transaction involving the consumer on whom the

information is to be furnished and involving the extension of

credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the

consumer; or 

***

(F) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information -

(i) in connection with a business transaction that is initiated

by the consumer; or (ii) to review an account to determine

whether the consumer continues to meet the terms of the

account.

29. The claim for which SLA sought collection is a subrogation claim, having nothing

to do with any permissible purpose as set forth under the FCRA. 

30. SLA had actual knowledge that it had no permissible purpose to obtain Plaintiff’s

credit information from Experian.

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31. For SLA to access the consumer credit history of a consumer whom is known by

it to not have any account with SLA constitutes willful non-compliance with the

FCRA.

32. As a direct and proximate result of SLA’s willful conduct as outlined above,

Plaintiff is entitled to $100-$1000 in statutory damages, plus punitive damages

and reasonable attorney’s fees together with the costs of this action as provided

by 15 U.S.C. §1681n.

33. Alternatively, the impermissible access of Plaintiff’s credit information constitutes

a negligent violation as set forth in 15 U.S.C. §1681o. In this regard, Plaintiff is

entitled to recover her actual damages in an amount to be proven at trial, plus

attorney’s fees together with the costs of this action.

JURY DEMAND

34. Plaintiff hereby requests a trial by jury.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that this Court enter Judgment in her favor and

against Defendants for the following:

a. Actual damages, 

b. Statutory damages, 

c. Punitive damages, 

d. Attorney’s fees and costs;

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e. Interest on the judgment rendered herein at the maximum lawful rate from

the date of its rendition until paid in full; and,

f. Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 15th of January, 2016.

CHOI & FABIAN, PLC

By: /s/ Hyung S. Choi 

 Hyung S. Choi

 Attorneys for Plaintiff

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