[Cite as Edmands v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 2017-Ohio-8215.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

Christopher J. Edmands, D.O., : 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, : 

 No. 16AP-726 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 14CV-5644)

State Medical Board of Ohio, : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellee. : 

 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on October 17, 2017 

 

On brief: Elizabeth Y. Collis, for appellant. Argued: 

Elizabeth Y. Collis. 

On brief: Michael DeWine, Attorney General, James T. 

Wakley, and Katherine J. Bockbrader, for appellee. 

Argued: Katherine J. Bockbrader. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

KLATT, J. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, Christopher J. Edmands, D.O., appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas that affirmed an order of the State Medical 

Board of Ohio ("the Board") permanently denying Edmands' application for a certificate 

to practice medicine and surgery in Ohio. For the following reasons, we affirm that 

judgment. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

{¶ 2} This court set forth the factual background of this case in Edmands' 

previous appeal in this matter. Edmands v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-
No. 16AP-726 2 

778, 2015-Ohio-2658, ¶ 2-8 ("Edmands I"). As we noted in that decision, Edmands 

submitted to the Board an application for a license to practice osteopathic medicine and 

surgery in Ohio on August 2, 2013. At that time, Edmands was licensed to practice 

osteopathic medicine and surgery in West Virginia. However, in February 2013, the West 

Virginia Board of Osteopathic Medicine reprimanded Edmands and placed his license on 

probation for 12 months. That disciplinary action stemmed from Edmands' practice of 

pre-signing blank prescription forms, verbal-order forms, and face-to-face encounter 

forms, and allowing nursing staff to complete the forms. 

{¶ 3} Edmands attached a letter to his Ohio application in which he admitted 

that, while working as the medical director for Amedisys Hospice ("Hospice"), he presigned certain forms. Edmands explained that he did so to ensure that end-of-life 

Hospice patients would receive prompt, continuous medical care. Edmands believed that 

Hospice condoned this practice, but discovered otherwise when Hospice declined to 

renew his contract. Edmands acknowledged that he should not have pre-signed any 

forms, and he promised not to do so again. 

{¶ 4} Subsequently, in a letter dated March 12, 2014, the Board notified Edmands 

that it intended to determine whether to refuse to register him because of the disciplinary 

action against his West Virginia license. Pursuant to the version of R.C. 4731.22(B)(22) 

effective at that time, the Board could refuse to register an individual if another state's 

regulatory board has reprimanded or imposed probation on that physician. The Board's 

March 12, 2014 letter also advised Edmands that he was entitled to a hearing on the 

matter. On March 19, 2014, the Board received a reply letter from Edmands, which 

stated, in part, "I have no further information to present for the OH Board of Medicine's 

review and therefore, am not requesting a hearing." 

{¶ 5} At a May 14, 2014 meeting, the Board considered Edmands' application and 

voted to permanently deny it. The Board issued an order to that effect, which Edmands 

appealed to the trial court pursuant to R.C. 119.12. The Board moved to dismiss the 

appeal, arguing that Edmands waived his right to appeal the Board's order because he did 

not request an administrative hearing from the Board. In response, Edmands argued that 

the March 12, 2014 notice was so confusing, vague, and ambiguous that it denied him his 

due process right to a meaningful opportunity for a hearing. Edmands also challenged the 
No. 16AP-726 3 

evidence before the Board, contending that it was not reliable, probative, and 

substantial. The trial court dismissed the appeal, concluding that Edmands' failure to 

request a hearing prevented the court from reviewing the Board's order. The trial court 

also rejected Edmands' due process claim but did not address whether the Board's order 

was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. 

{¶ 6} In Edmands I, this court reversed that decision. We concluded that the trial 

court erred by dismissing Edmands' appeal based on his failure to request a hearing. Id. 

at ¶ 10-15. We also reviewed Edmands' due process claim and held that the Board's notice 

reasonably conveyed his right to a hearing and the purpose of the hearing, and complied 

with all due process requirements. Id. at ¶ 25-26. Accordingly, we reversed the trial 

court's decision dismissing Edmands' appeal and remanded the matter for the trial court 

to address his argument that the Board's order was not supported by reliable, probative, 

and substantial evidence. Id. at ¶ 27. 

{¶ 7} On remand, and after briefing by the parties, the trial court concluded that 

the Board's order was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. It 

rejected Edmands' argument that the Board did not have mitigating evidence because he 

failed to request a hearing and, therefore, forfeited his right to present such evidence. The 

trial court also rejected Edmands' argument that the Board's sanction was too harsh and 

inconsistent with other sanctions imposed in similar cases 

II. Edmands' Appeal 

{¶ 8} Edmands appeals and assigns the following error: 

The Court of Common Pleas, Franklin County, Ohio, erred by 

affirming the Findings, Order and Journal Entry dated 

May 14, 2014 * * * of the State Medical Board of Ohio. 

{¶ 9} In this assignment of error, Edmands argues that the Board's order was not 

supported by reliable, probative, or substantial evidence because: (1) the Board relied on 

incomplete and inaccurate information when it issued its order, (2) the Board did not 

review his application in accordance with R.C. 4731.17(A), and (3) the Board's order 

violates the public interest. 
No. 16AP-726 4 

A. Standard of Review 

{¶ 10} Pursuant to R.C. 119.12, when a common pleas court reviews an order of an 

administrative agency, it must consider the entire record to determine whether the 

agency's order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in 

accordance with law. Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad, 63 Ohio St.2d 108, 110-11 (1980); 

Andrews v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 164 Ohio St. 275, 280 (1955). "Reliable" evidence is 

dependable; that is, it can be confidently trusted. In order to be reliable, there must be a 

reasonable probability that the evidence is true. "Probative" evidence is evidence that 

tends to prove the issue in question; it must be relevant in determining the issue. 

"Substantial" evidence is evidence with some weight; it must have importance and value. 

Our Place, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 570, 571 (1992). The 

common pleas court's "review of the administrative record is neither a trial de novo nor 

an appeal on questions of law only, but a hybrid review in which the court 'must appraise 

all the evidence as to the credibility of the witnesses, the probative character of the 

evidence, and the weight thereof.' " Lies v. Ohio Veterinary Med. Bd., 2 Ohio App.3d 204, 

207 (1st Dist.1981), quoting Andrews at 280. In its review, the common pleas court must 

give due deference to the administrative agency's resolution of evidentiary conflicts, but 

the findings of the agency are not conclusive. Conrad at 111. On questions of law, the 

common pleas court conducts a de novo review, exercising its independent judgment in 

determining whether the administrative order is in accordance with law. Ohio Historical 

Soc. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 466, 471 (1993); Froehlich v. Ohio State 

Med. Bd., 10th Dist. No. 15AP-666, 2016-Ohio-1035, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 11} An appellate court's review of an administrative order is more limited. 

Bartchy v. State Bd. of Edn., 120 Ohio St.3d 205, 2008-Ohio-4826, ¶ 40-41. Instead of 

appraising the weight of the evidence, an appellate court determines whether the common 

pleas court abused its discretion in its examination of the record for reliable, probative, 

and substantial evidence. Id. at ¶ 41; Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 

(1993). Absent an abuse of discretion, an appellate court must affirm the common pleas 

court's judgment, even if the appellate court would have arrived at a different conclusion 

than that of the common pleas court. Bartchy at ¶ 41-42. When reviewing the trial 

court's judgment as to whether an agency's decision is in accordance with law, an 
No. 16AP-726 5 

appellate court's review is plenary. Spitznagel v. State Bd. of Edn., 126 Ohio St.3d 174, 

2010-Ohio-2715, ¶ 14; Hughes v. Ohio Bd. of Nursing, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-786, 2016-

Ohio-4768, ¶ 7. 

B. Edmands' Arguments 

1. Did the Board Rely on Incomplete and Inaccurate Information? 

{¶ 12} Edmands first argues that the Board based its decision on incomplete and 

inaccurate information. Specifically, the Board's meeting on this matter occurred on 

May 14, 2014. The Board had before it an affidavit from its senior executive staff attorney 

which stated that as of April 16, 2014, the date of the affidavit, the Board had not received 

any additional correspondence from Edmands. In the month between the preparation of 

the affidavit and the meeting, however, Edmands sent a letter to the Board in an attempt 

to supplement the contents of his application to indicate that his West Virginia 

probationary period had ended on April 30, 2014. Edmands argues that the Board should 

have considered the information in the letter because it is significant and could have 

impacted the Board's decision. 

{¶ 13} We first note that the affidavit was, in fact, correct when it stated that as of a 

certain date the Board had not received any further correspondence from Edmands. It 

was only after that date that Edmands sent his letter to the Board. Regardless, by not 

requesting a hearing, Edmands forfeited his right to present evidence to the Board, even 

under the guise of "supplementing" his application. Goldman v. State Med. Bd., 10th 

Dist. No. 98AP-238 (Oct. 20, 1998). Thus, the Board did not have to consider Edmands' 

letter. We note, however, that the Board had the authority to consider the letter if it came 

to their attention prior to the meeting. 

2. Did the Board Review Edmands' Application? 

{¶ 14} Next, Edmands argues that the Board did not review his application in 

making its decision as required by R.C. 4731.17(A).1 Specifically, he argues that in light of 

the enormous amount of details that he included in his application concerning his West 

Virginia licensure issues, the Board's limited discussion of that issue demonstrates that 

the Board did not review the application. Edmands, however, did not make this argument 

 

1 That statute, in relevant part, provides that "[t]he state medical board shall review all applications 

received under section 4731.19 of the Revised Code." 
No. 16AP-726 6 

to the trial court. The failure to raise the issue in the trial court forfeits this issue for 

appellate purposes. Parker's Tavern v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 195 Ohio App.3d 22, 2011-

Ohio-3598, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.); Abunku v. State Med. Bd., 10th Dist. No. 11AP-906, 2012-

Ohio-2734, ¶ 34. 

{¶ 15} Under this argument, Edmands also argues that his sanction was harsher 

than sanctions imposed on other physicians facing similar or worse violations. Edmands 

did raise this issue before the trial court and we shall therefore address it. Our review of 

this claim, however, is rather limited. Specifically, when the board's order is supported by 

reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law, a reviewing 

court may not modify a sanction authorized by statute. Henry's Café Inc. v. Ohio Bd. of 

Liquor Control, 170 Ohio St. 233 (1959); Shah v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 10th Dist. No. 

14AP-147, 2014-Ohio-4067, ¶ 17. As this court has noted, as a practical matter, courts 

have no power to review penalties meted out by an agency pursuant to Henry's Café. 

Thus, we have little or no ability to review a penalty even if it seems on the surface to be 

unreasonable or unduly harsh. Abunku at ¶ 29. 

{¶ 16} Here, R.C. 4731.22(B)(22) authorized the Board to permanently deny 

Edmands' application for a certificate to practice medicine and surgery in Ohio if another 

state's regulatory board reprimanded or imposed probation on Edmands. He does not 

dispute that this occurred in West Virginia. Therefore, because the Board was authorized 

to sanction Edmands, and the chosen sanction was authorized by statute, the trial court 

could not interfere with or modify the penalty imposed. Henry's Café; see also DeBlanco 

v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 78 Ohio App.3d 194 (10th Dist.1992); Shah at ¶ 17. 

 3. Does the Board's Order Violate the Public Interest? 

{¶ 17} Last, Edmands argues that the Board's order violates the public interest by 

"depriving Ohio citizens of a dedicated primary care physician to serve its rural 

communities." (Appellant's Brief at 29.) Again, Edmands did not make this argument to 

the trial court and has, therefore, forfeited it for purposes of appeal. Parker's Tavern. 

C. Conclusion 

{¶ 18} Having rejected each of Edmands' arguments in support of his assignment 

of error, we overrule his lone assignment of error. 
No. 16AP-726 7 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 19} For all these reasons, we overrule Edmands' assignment of error and affirm 

the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed. 

DORRIAN and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.