IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Weis Markets, Inc. :

:

v. :

:

Lancaster Township, : No. 54 C.D. 2020

Appellant : Argued: December 8, 2020

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge1

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: January 13, 2021

Lancaster Township (Township) appeals from an order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Lancaster County (trial court) that reversed the Township’s denial 

of an application by Weis Markets, Inc. (Weis) for an intermunicipal liquor license 

transfer (Transfer). The Transfer would allow Weis to sell alcoholic beverages in 

conjunction with an on-premises restaurant inside a grocery store located in the 

Township. The Township denied the Transfer based on its conclusion that the 

Transfer would adversely affect the health, welfare, peace, and morals of the

Township and its residents. After reviewing the record before the Township without 

taking additional evidence, the trial court reversed the Township’s denial of the 

1 The decision in this case was reached prior to January 4, 2021, when Judge Brobson 

became President Judge.
2

Transfer, finding the Township’s decision was not supported by substantial 

evidence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s order.

I. Background

A. Transfer Approval Requirement

The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) will normally approve 

an intermunicipal transfer of a liquor license, regardless of how many other licensed 

businesses are located in the transferee municipality, provided the transferee meets 

all statutory and regulatory requirements and the transfer will not adversely affect 

the health, welfare, peace, and morals of the transferee community within 500 feet 

of the transferee premises. See Section 404(a) of the Liquor Code,2 47 P.S. § 4-404; 

P&R Beverage, Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 219 A.3d 1227, 1235 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2019) (a restaurant is entitled to a liquor license if it satisfies the statutory criteria of 

the Liquor Code).

However, Section 461(b.3)3 of the Liquor Code provides that an 

intermunicipal transfer of a liquor license “must first be approved by the governing 

body of the receiving municipality when the total number of existing restaurant 

liquor licenses and eating place retail dispenser licenses in the receiving municipality 

equal or exceed one license per three thousand inhabitants.” 47 P.S. § 4-461(b.3). 

Section 461(b.3) of the Liquor Code expressly requires that an application to the 

PLCB for approval of an intermunicipal transfer must include documentation of the 

transferee municipality’s approval. Id.; see Giant Food Stores, LLC v. Penn Twp., 

167 A.3d 252, 254 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc). Thus, if the transferee 

2 Act of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, as amended, 47 P.S. §§ 1-101 – 10-1001.

3 Added by Section 9 of the Act of December 20, 2000, P.L. 992, 47 P.S. § 4-461(b.3).
3

municipality denies approval, the transfer cannot occur.4 See Giant Food, 167 A.3d 

at 260 (without prior municipal approval, an intermunicipal transfer application to 

the PLCB “would be fatally flawed”) (original emphasis deleted).

Here, it is undisputed that the number of businesses with liquor licenses 

in the Township exceeds 1 for each 3,000 residents. Accordingly, an intermunicipal

license transfer into the Township requires the Township’s approval before the 

PLCB will authorize the transfer.

B. Weis’s Transfer Application

Weis submitted an application to the Township for approval of the 

Transfer, which was the subject of a public hearing by the Township on July 11, 

2016. Notes of Testimony, Public Hearing – Petition by Weis Markets, Inc. for 

Intermunicipal Transfer of Liquor License (N.T.) at 1; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 

8.

5

 At the hearing, Weis presented information through its attorney, Mark Kozar, 

Esquire. Also present on behalf of Weis, and available to answer questions, was its 

Manager of Architectural Department, Alexander Ororbia. N.T. at 2; R.R. at 9. 

Attorney Kozar stated:

Weis Markets is a publicly traded company headed in 

Sunbury, Pennsylvania. Founded in 1912, Weis has 

grown to 165 stores in five states. Weis employs over 

18,000 associates, and the store here in Lancaster 

4 Notably, there is no mechanism for the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (PLCB) to 

review a municipality’s denial of approval; nor is there any means by which the applicant may 

request such review by the PLCB. Section 461 of the Liquor Code, 47 P.S. § 4-461(b.3); Giant 

Food Stores, LLC v. Penn Twp., 167 A.3d 252, 255-56 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (en banc) (no appeal 

is permitted under the Liquor Code from a municipality’s denial of a transfer application). As 

discussed below, however, a municipality’s denial of a transfer application is subject to judicial

review under the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §§ 551-555, 751-754.

5 The Township failed to number its reproduced record in the format (1a, 2a, 3a, etc.) as 

required by Pa. R.A.P. 2173. For clarity, in our references to the reproduced record, we use the 

Township’s page number format in this opinion.
4

Township has been open since 1962, and employs 115 full 

and part-time associates. Weis Markets is very active in 

the local community, is a very good community member. 

They support the Southern PA Food Bank, the Alpha 

Omega Food Pantry, Aerials Acres, Lancaster Educational 

Foundation, Lancaster Science Factory, the YMCA of 

Central Pennsylvania, and the Breast Cancer Coalition. 

Why is this important? It’s important because Weis has a 

reputation, and they [sic] have too much to lose to handle 

alcohol in a way that would diminish their [sic] reputation 

in the community in any way.

What we are requesting here is nothing new or unusual. 

Over the past nine years, the PLCB has approved liquor 

licenses to over 350 grocery store[-]based restaurants 

including [55] other Weis grocery stores. Here in 

Lancaster County, Weis has stores in Lititz, Ephrata, 

Lancaster, West Lampeter, that have liquor licenses and 

are selling beer. As you can see from the floor plan that 

was handed out, Weis is going to do a remodel and as part 

of that remodel will be to have a café in the left front of 

the store. . . . [A]ll food will be single servings to eat in or 

to go, prepared in the café. The café will be open for 

breakfast, lunch, and dinner. The hours of operation will 

be Monday through Friday, 7:00am to 11:00pm, and 

Sundays, 9:00am to 11:00pm. There will be a designated 

restaurant manager who will receive the bureau of liquor 

control enforcement developed responsible alcohol 

management program manager training. All café 

associates will also receive server training. Weis has a 

100% carding policy. Everybody gets carded. Weis uses 

either a card scanner or a cash register lock out system that 

requires a clerk to look at somebody’s ID, punch in their

[sic] birthdate before the cash register will take the SKU 

for beer sales.

And let me just back up a minute and talk about beer sales, 

because actually since the change in the law you probably 

all are aware that Act 39[6]signed by the [G]overnor on 

June 8th becomes effective August 8th and it will permit 

restaurants to get what are called extended wine licenses 

6 Act of June 8, 2016, P.L. 273.
5

which will permit them to sell up to four bottles of wine 

and Weis does plan on doing that. Weis will be offering 

single serve beers for on premise[s] consumption with 

selling limit of [2] beers for on[-]premise[s] consumption 

and up to 192 fluid ounces for take-out. All beer must be 

purchased at the cash register on the licensed premises. 

None of the other cash registers in the store will accept the 

SKUs for beer, and the same will be true with bottles of 

wine. Weis has rotating security cameras that cover the 

café area. These cameras are monitored by security 

personnel, in addition the manager and all the associates 

in the café are physically monitoring the café area. This is 

not the type of place where people are going to come and 

hang out and drink because there is a two beer limit. There 

is no entertainment in the form of video games or pool 

tables, and there’s no smoking. It will be a well-lit[] and 

secure place for customers, of which, 70% are women, 

where you can purchase prepared food, and a 6-pack of 

beer, and a bottle of wine to take home, or to dine in and 

have a drink. Weis is a responsible owner making a 

significant investment in the community that will be 

protected by responsible management and well-trained 

employees . . . .

N.T. at 3-4; R.R. at 10-11. 

In addition, the following colloquy took place between Attorney Kozar

and one of the Township supervisors concerning nearby businesses with liquor 

licenses:

Ms. Wasong: We have a Ruby Tuesday right there with a 

liquor license.

Mr. Kozar: And they don’t sell beer to go.

Ms. Wasong: No, but the House of Pasta that directly abuts 

Weis parking lot can, and a few blocks down the road there 

is another, and there is a beer distributor in the shopping 

center.

Mr. Kozar: But you can’t buy a six-pack of beer in a beer 

distributor, and that’s their point.
6

Ms. Wasong: But you can buy a 12-pack.

Mr. Kozar: What if I don’t want to buy a 12-pack?

N.T. at 6; R.R. at 13.

Attorney Kozar’s statements constituted the entirety of the evidence 

presented at the hearing;7 no evidence was offered to counter Weis’s evidence. See 

generally N.T. at 1-7; R.R. at 8-14. Notably, in its subsequent adjudication, the 

Township found Weis “presented testimony” at the hearing, and further found as a 

fact: “The evidence described the proposed café and the manner in which Weis . . . 

would operate the café in compliance with applicable Commonwealth laws and 

regulations for the sale of alcoholic beverages.” Adjudication, Finding of Fact Nos. 

7, 10; R.R. at 24.

One member of the public spoke in favor of the Transfer, pointing out 

the convenience of avoiding “an extra stop” by picking up a bottle of wine while at 

the grocery store. N.T. at 4-5; R.R. at 11-12. No member of the public opposed the 

Transfer. See generally N.T. at 1-7; R.R. at 8-14.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the Township’s supervisors declined 

the opportunity to ask questions or extend their time for making a decision. N.T. at 

6-7; R.R. at 13-14. Instead, they made comments expressing general concerns about 

the number of nearby licensed premises, without tying those concerns to any record 

evidence. See N.T. at 7; R.R. at 14. They then voted unanimously to deny the 

Transfer. Id. In its subsequent written adjudication, the Township listed the nearby 

businesses with liquor licenses and stated a bare conclusion that the Transfer was 

denied because it would adversely affect the health, welfare, peace, and morals of 

7 No one objected to the admission of Attorney Kozar’s statements as evidence.
7

Township residents.8 Adjudication at 3-4, Findings of Fact Nos. 12-14, Conclusion 

of Law No. 5; R.R. at 25-26. The adjudication did not cite any evidence in the record 

in support of that conclusion. See id.

Weis appealed the Township’s decision to the trial court, which decided 

the appeal on the Township’s record without taking additional evidence.9 Trial Ct. 

Op. at 1; R.R. at 138. After reviewing the record, the trial court entered an order 

reversing the Township’s denial of the Transfer. Trial Ct. Order; R.R. at 137. The 

trial court concluded there was no evidence in the record to support the Township’s

subjective concerns about the effect of the Transfer on the Township’s residents; to 

the contrary, all of the evidence demonstrated there would be no adverse effect. Trial 

Ct. Op. at 2-7; R.R. at 139-44.

This appeal by the Township followed.10

8 The Township also concluded the Transfer was not necessary to the Township’s economic 

development. Adjudication at 4, Conclusion of Law No. 5; R.R. at 26. However, the parties agree 

that conclusion is not relevant, as that was not the basis upon which Weis requested approval of 

the Transfer. Trial Ct. Op. at 3 n.2.

9 Neither party suggests there is additional evidence that the trial court should have 

admitted or considered.

10 The current version of Section 461(b.3) of the Liquor Code expressly provides there is 

no appeal from a municipality’s denial of a liquor license transfer application. However, in Giant 

Food, this Court determined that Section 751(a) of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 751(a), 

provides a right of appeal from an adjudication by a township as a local agency, including a denial 

of an intermunicipal transfer of a liquor license, even though Section 461(b.3) provides no appeal 

under the Liquor Code. See Giant Food, 167 A.3d at 256-61. The parties here do not dispute that 

this appeal is governed by the provisions of the Local Agency Law.

In an appeal under the Local Agency Law, where the agency record is complete, the trial 

court decides the appeal based on the agency record, without holding a de novo hearing. See 2 Pa. 

C.S. § 753(b). In that instance, the trial court’s review is limited to determining whether the local 

agency’s adjudication violated the appellant’s constitutional rights, was not in accordance with 

applicable law, or violated the rules of practice and procedure before local agencies, or whether a 

necessary finding of fact was not supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa. C.S. § 754(b).

Our review is similarly limited. In an appeal concerning a local agency’s adjudication, 

where a complete record was developed before the agency, our review on appeal from the trial 
8

II. Issues

Section 461(b.3) of the Liquor Code provides that a municipality “may” 

approve an application for an intermunicipal license transfer. 47 P.S. § 4-461(b.3). 

Section 461(b.3) imposes no express limitation on a municipality’s exercise of its 

discretion in granting or denying approval of a transfer. The two interrelated central 

issues of this appeal are whether the Township was required to support its denial of 

the Transfer with substantial evidence, and whether it abused its discretion by 

denying the Transfer in the absence of such evidence.

III. Discussion

A. Substantial Evidence

The Township based its denial of the Transfer on its conclusion that the 

Transfer would adversely affect the health, welfare, peace, and morals of the 

Township’s residents. The trial court found the Township’s denial of the Transfer 

was not supported by substantial evidence. We agree.

Granting a liquor license is not inherently detrimental to a community’s 

health, welfare, peace, and morals. K&K Enters., Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 602 

A.2d 476, 480 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992); In re 23rd St., Inc., 517 A.2d 581, 582 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1986). Rather, this Court has found that specific, objective evidence from 

a municipality is required to support a finding that a liquor license transfer will have 

a detrimental effect on the community; statements of general concern, without 

specific details, do not constitute substantial evidence in support of a transfer denial. 

See, e.g., AWT Beaver Indep. Deli, Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 876 A.2d 500, 

505 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); Boston Concessions Grp., Inc. v. Logan Twp. Bd. of 

court is limited to determining whether the agency violated constitutional rights, committed errors 

of law, failed to adhere to statutory procedure requirements, or made necessary findings of fact not 

supported by substantial evidence. Id.; Kovler v. Bureau of Admin. Adjudication, 6 A.3d 1060, 

1062 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
9

Supervisors, 815 A.2d 8, 13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (testimony asserting saturation of 

existing businesses with liquor licenses, and raising concerns that transfer of an 

additional license would increase traffic and parking issues and devalue other local 

licenses “was at most, general and speculative” and did not demonstrate the transfer 

would be adverse to the local welfare, health, and morals); 23rd St., 517 A.2d at 582 

(objections asserting potential problems and perceived threats to the character of the 

neighborhood from additional liquor consumption did not constitute substantial 

evidence for a license denial); cf. Manayunk Dev. Corp. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 

715 A.2d 518, 521-22 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (substantial evidence supported denial of 

transfer where there was testimony of city council member describing extensive 

efforts to control local parking, civil engineer who performed traffic study, and urban 

planner who stated any increase in seating capacity at local restaurant would 

exacerbate existing parking deficit).11

Additionally, although Section 404(a) of the Liquor Code allows the 

PLCB to consider whether other licensed businesses are within 200 feet of a 

proposed transferee business, there is no parallel provision where a municipality is 

considering an intermunicipal license transfer request. Moreover, and contrary to 

the Township’s argument, even where a transfer denial is permissibly based on the 

proximity of other licensed properties to the premises at issue, there must be 

evidence to establish precisely the relevant distance. See, e.g., P&R Beverage, 219 

A.3d at 1229-30 (the 200-foot measurement is from the nearest point of the proposed 

licensed premises to the nearest point of each existing licensed business; for a 

11 This Court decided the cited cases under the previous version of Section 461(b.3) of the 

Liquor Code, former 47 P.S. § 4-461(b.3). As discussed in the next section, the current version of 

the statute contains different language concerning the Township’s discretion to approve or deny a 

license transfer. However, for purposes of what constitutes substantial evidence, the cited 

authorities are still applicable.
10

grocery store proposing to install a restaurant area where alcohol can be purchased, 

the measurement is from the nearest point of the restaurant area, not from the edge 

of the grocery store building); Arrington v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 667 A.2d 439, 

445 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (error by the PLCB, and subsequently by the reviewing 

court, in relying on close proximity of other licensees to demonstrate adverse effect 

of proposed transfer, were “manifest” where there was no evidence of relevant 

distance measurements).

Here, Weis offered evidence that it is active in supporting the local 

community and has a good reputation; it has 55 other grocery stores with liquor 

licenses, including 4 locations in Lancaster County; the designated restaurant 

manager will receive training from the Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement in

responsible alcohol management program manager training, and all café associates 

will receive server training; Weis will use either a card scanner or a cash register 

lock out system that requires a clerk to look at each customer’s identification and

punch in the birthdate before the cash register will take the SKU for beer sales; there 

will be a selling limit of 2 beers for on-premises consumption and no more than 192 

fluid ounces (by our calculation, the equivalent of two 6-packs of 16-ounce cans or 

bottles) for take-out; and rotating security cameras, monitored by security personnel, 

will cover the café area in addition to restaurant personnel who are physically 

monitoring the café area. N.T. at 3-4; R.R. at 10-11. Notably, the Township did not 

reject any of Weis’s evidence; to the contrary, the Township found Weis offered 

evidence that “described the proposed café and the manner in which Weis . . . would 

operate the café in compliance with applicable Commonwealth laws and regulations

for the sale of alcoholic beverages.” Adjudication, Finding of Fact No. 10; R.R. at 

24 (emphasis added). We agree with Weis that it presented substantial evidence that 
11

the Transfer would not adversely affect the health, welfare, peace, and morals of the 

Township or its residents.

By contrast, the Township offered neither its own evidence nor any 

challenge to Weis’s evidence. The Township supervisors’ comments were general 

expressions of concern of the type deemed insufficient in AWT, Boston Concessions, 

and 23rd St. To the extent those comments related to the alleged proximity of other 

licensed businesses, no supporting measurements were presented as required by 

Arrington.

12

 In any event, the Township supervisors’ comments did not constitute 

evidence. Accord Howell v. City of Erie Blighted Prop., 87 A.3d 949, 953 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2014) (comments by members of city’s rental license appeal board at the 

end of a hearing, expressing their concerns regarding safety, did not constitute

substantial evidence supporting a finding of a distinct hazard or safety and welfare 

issue on the licensed property). Thus, the record does not contain any evidence 

establishing the number of other licensed businesses in the area or their alleged 

proximity to the Weis store at issue.

Because the record contains no evidence of any adverse effect on the 

Township or its residents, we need not determine the sufficiency of the evidence. 

We find the trial court correctly determined there was not substantial evidence to 

support the Township’s denial of the Transfer. Indeed, there was no evidence that 

supported denying the Transfer. To the extent the Township was required to base 

its decision on substantial evidence, its denial of the Transfer was in error.

12 Moreover, Weis correctly observes that the Township did not mention Section 404(a) of 

the Liquor Code in its adjudication, nor did it base its adjudication on any finding that other 

licensed businesses were within 200 feet of the proposed location of the restaurant inside Weis’s 

grocery store in the Township.
12

B. Abuse of Discretion

However, the absence of substantial evidence does not end our inquiry. 

The Township argues it had unfettered discretion to deny the Transfer, even if the

denial was not supported by any evidence.

In general, an abuse of discretion in relation to a license transfer request 

consists of a misapplication of the law, a manifestly unreasonable exercise of 

judgment, or a decision resulting from partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

Arrington, 667 A.2d at 441 (citing Centrum Prime Meats, Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control 

Bd., 455 A.2d 742, 745 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983)); see Mielcuszny v. Rosol, 176 A.2d 236, 

237 (Pa. 1934); Pa. Liquor Control Bd. v. George Roscoe, Inc., 431 A.2d 1119, 1121 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1981). In Arrington, this Court found the PLCB abused its discretion 

by denying a license transfer based on a finding that the transfer would adversely 

affect the health, welfare, peace, and morals of the neighborhood, where there was 

no evidence in the record to support that finding. Arrington, 667 A.2d at 447.

Here, Weis contends the Township abused its discretion by denying the 

Transfer based on a finding, not supported by evidence, that the Transfer would 

adversely affect the health, welfare, peace, and morals of the Township’s residents. 

As the party asserting an abuse of discretion, Weis has the burden of proving such 

an abuse; it is not the Township’s burden to further support its decision. See Malt 

Beverage Distribs. Ass’n v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 900 C.D. 

2009, filed Jan. 7, 2010), slip op. at 32, 2010 Pa. Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 272 

(unreported)13 (citing Leckey v. Lower Southampton Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 864 

A.2d 593, 596 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)). 

13 We cite this unpublished decision as persuasive authority pursuant to our Internal 

Operating Procedures. 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
13

As discussed above, Weis is correct in asserting that the record contains 

no evidence in support of the Township’s decision. Therefore, if the Township’s

exercise of its discretion pursuant to Section 461(b.3) of the Liquor Code requires 

support by record evidence, then it abused its discretion in denying Weis’s 

intermunicipal license transfer request.

The Township, however, insists the legislature, by amending the 

language of Section 461(b.3) of the Liquor Code, has given municipalities unfettered 

discretion to deny intermunicipal license transfers. We disagree. 

Section 461(b.3) previously provided, in pertinent part: “The 

municipality must approve the request unless it finds that doing so would adversely 

affect the welfare, health, peace and morals of the municipality or its residents.” 

Former 47 P.S. § 461(b.3) (emphasis added). However, the legislature amended 

Section 461(b.3) in 2006. It now provides, in pertinent part: “The municipality may 

approve the request.” 47 P.S. § 461(b.3) (emphasis added). Moreover, the 

legislature eliminated the requirement of a finding, before denying a request, that the 

requested transfer would adversely affect the welfare, health, peace, and morals of 

the municipality or its residents. See id.

The Township argues that its discretion is now unfettered and it requires 

no evidence to support its decision denying the Transfer. Accordingly, we must 

determine whether there are any limits on the discretion conferred to the Township

in Section 461(b.3) the Liquor Code.14

14 We note that this case involves only potential statutory limits on the Township’s 

discretion; as Weis does not question the constitutionality of the legislature’s alleged conveyance 

of unfettered discretion to municipalities to deny intermunicipal license transfers, we do not 

consider any constitutional issues here. Accord Malt Beverage Distribs. Ass’n v. Pa. Liquor 

Control Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 900 C.D. 2009, filed Jan. 7, 2010), slip op. at 32 n.5, 2010 Pa. 

Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 272 (unreported) (noting, in regard to an intermunicipal license transfer 
14

The trial court relied on SSEN, Inc. v. Borough Council of Eddystone, 

810 A.2d 200 (Pa. 2002), in which this Court affirmed a trial court’s reversal of a 

municipality’s adjudication denying an intermunicipal liquor license transfer, 

finding the municipality’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. 

However, the Township correctly asserts that because our decision in SSEN predated 

the 2006 amendment of the language of Section 461(b.3) of the Liquor Code, that 

decision does not resolve the question of whether a municipality’s discretion to deny 

an intermunicipal transfer remains subject to any limitations under the amended 

language of Section 461(b.3).

We find guidance instead in Giant Food, in which this Court considered 

the interplay of Section 461(b.3) of the Liquor Code with Section 751(a) of the Local 

Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 751(a). The issue in Giant Food was whether an appeal 

to a court would lie from a township’s denial of an intermunicipal license transfer 

request, notwithstanding the express provision in Section 461(b.3) that there is no 

appeal from such a denial. This Court concluded that Section 751(a) of the Local 

Agency Law provided a right of appeal, pointing to its applicability “regardless of 

the fact that a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal from an 

adjudication of an agency . . . .” 2 Pa. C.S. § 751(a); see Giant Food, 167 A.3d at 

256-57.

Of significance here, the dissent in Giant Food took the same position 

advocated here by the Township, arguing that the legislature’s 2006 amendment of 

Section 461(b.3), by making municipal approval of license transfers discretionary 

to allow the sale of beer for takeout in connection with a grocery store business, that this Court 

would not consider any constitutional issues regarding the Liquor Code’s failure to impose 

statutory limits on the Board’s discretion to approve interior connections between the licensed area 

and the rest of the grocery store, where the petitioners did not challenge the constitutionality of the 

PLCB’s unlimited discretion in that regard).
15

and expressly stating there could be no appeal from denial of a transfer, intended to 

confer unfettered discretion on municipalities in approving or denying transfer 

requests. See Giant Food, 167 A.3d at 261 nn.22-23, 264 (summarizing dissent’s

conclusion that the legislature intended to convey to municipalities the exclusive 

right to approve or deny intermunicipal license transfers as they see fit, and not 

subject to any review, as long as they follow the statutory process). The majority 

rejected this argument. Observing that “[s]uch unfettered discretion would permit a 

municipality to deny an intermunicipal transfer of a liquor license for any reason, 

even an unlawful one[,]” the majority explained: 

[We agree that Section 461(b.3)] reflects the General 

Assembly’s intention that local government should decide 

this local issue. However, the General Assembly also 

promulgated the Local Agency Law which provides for 

review even where a statute denies a right to appeal. Thus, 

the General Assembly clearly intended that local agency 

adjudications may not remain isolated and insulated from 

any review, especially where such decisions may be 

improperly impacted by abuses of discretion or motivated 

by unlawful discrimination.

Id. at 261 & n.22 (emphasis added).

Although this Court’s discussion in Giant Food related to whether there 

was a right of appeal, rather than a municipality’s level of discretion, the two issues 

are related. Our analysis in Giant Food is equally applicable here. In Giant Food, 

we essentially concluded the legislature could not have intended to allow a 

municipality to abuse its discretion with impunity. Applying that principle here, we 

similarly find that despite the absence of express limiting language in Section 

461(b.3), the legislature could not have intended to confer unfettered discretion on 
16

municipalities to deny intermunicipal license transfers. Thus, although broad, 

municipalities’ discretion in making such transfer decisions is not unlimited.15

Because we find the Township’s discretion is not unfettered, we 

conclude that in the absence of any supporting evidence to support its determination 

that the Transfer would have an adverse effect on the Township and its residents, the 

Township’s adjudication constituted a misapplication of the law and a manifestly 

unreasonable exercise of judgment, and therefore was an abuse of discretion. See

Arrington, 667 A.2d at 441. Thus, the trial court correctly reversed the Township’s 

denial of the Transfer.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing discussion, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

15 By providing that a municipality “may” approve a license transfer, the language of 

Section 461(b.3) implies a degree of discretion. Potentially, there could be a number of valid bases 

on which a municipality might approve or deny a transfer request. However, we need not 

determine or enumerate those various bases here. The sole basis of the Township’s denial of the 

Transfer was its conclusion that the Transfer would adversely affect the health, welfare, peace, and 

morals of the Township and its residents. Adjudication at 4, Conclusion of Law No. 5; R.R. at 26. 

Therefore, that is the only basis at issue here.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Weis Markets, Inc. :

:

v. :

:

Lancaster Township, : No. 54 C.D. 2020

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 13th day of January, 2021, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Lancaster County is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge