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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

$50,460.00 in United States Currency, 

Defendant.

No. CV-15-02596-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff United States of America’s motion for default 

judgment, against $50,460.00 in United States Currency pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 

(b). (Doc. 10). No response has been filed. The Court will grant the motion. 

I. 

This case is a civil action in rem to forfeit money seized by law enforcement from 

Jamar Jackson. (Doc. 1). On February 24, 2016, the Clerk of the Court entered default as 

to the defendant property, Jackson, and all other persons or entities who may claim an 

interest in the defendant property. (Doc. 9). Plaintiff thereafter filed the pending motion 

for default judgment. (Doc. 10). At no point has Jackson, or any other entity or individual 

purporting to have an interest in the defendant property, responded to this action. 

Upon entry of default, the factual allegations of the Complaint, except those 

relating to the amount of damages, are taken as true. Yoo v. Arnold, 615 Fed. Appx. 868, 

870 (9th Cir. 2015); Fair Housing of Marin. v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002); 

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Televideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court thus 

accepts as true the well-pleaded facts contained in the Complaint. (Doc. 1). 

II. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) establishes that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for 

affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 

rules . . . the clerk shall enter the party’s default.” Once a default has been entered, and a 

defendant fails to appear to move to set aside the default, then the Court may enter a 

default judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). The “general rule” with respect to 

default judgments is that they “are ordinarily disfavored,” as “[c]ases should be decided 

upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 

(9th Cir. 1986) (citing Pena v. Sequros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 

1985)). Nonetheless, “[g]ranting default judgment is within the court’s discretion.” 

EEOC v. Recession Proof United States LLC, No. 11-CV-01355-PHX-BSB, 2013 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 171524, at *8 (D. Ariz. Aug. 19, 2013). 

 Plaintiff moves the Court to exercise its discretion and enter default judgment in 

its favor with respect to $50,460.00 in United States Currency. In exercising this 

discretion, the Court is guided by consideration of the following factors: “(1) the 

possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) 

the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the 

possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 (citation 

omitted). The Court will address each of the applicable factors in turn. 

A. Possible Prejudice to Plaintiff 

The first Eitel factor weighs in favor of granting Plaintiff’s motion, as Plaintiff 

will be prejudiced if default judgment is not entered in its favor. As noted supra, at no 

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point has Mr. Jackson—or any other individual or entity purporting to have an interest in 

the defendant property—responded to this action, and the record reflects that Plaintiff 

gave proper notice. (Docs. 6, 7). If the motion for default judgment is not granted, 

Plaintiff “will likely be without other recourse for recovery.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. 

Cans., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002); see also United States v. $86,496.00 

in United States Currency, No. CV-07-1693-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115052, 

at *4-5 (D. Ariz. July 1, 2008) (citation omitted). 

B. Merits of Plaintiff’s Forfeiture Claims 

The Court next considers the merits of Plaintiff’s substantive claim. “The 

procedures governing civil forfeiture actions are set forth in various forfeiture statutes, 

the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA), 18 U.S.C. § 983, the 

Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions 

(“Supplemental Rules”) and this District Court’s Local Rules, if any.” United States v. 

$50,000 in United States Currency, No. CV-10-2004, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63448, at 

*3 (D. Ariz. June 16, 2011). Under CAFRA, “the burden of proof is on the Government 

to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is subject to 

forfeiture.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1); United States v. $79,010.00 in United States Currency, 

No. CV-10-0244-PHX-DGC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48148, at *3 (D. Ariz. April 4, 

2012); see also United States v. $80,180.00 in U.S. Currency, 303 F.3d 1182, 1184 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (“CAFRA transferred the burden of proof from the claimant to the government 

and required the government to establish forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence 

rather than by the lower probable cause standard[.]”). 

In the instant matter, Plaintiff alleges that the defendant property was intended to 

be furnished in exchange for a “controlled substance in violation of Title II of the 

Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801, et seq.,” and that the defendant property 

“constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to . . . the movement of the proceeds of 

trafficking in controlled substances . . . in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952.” (Doc. 1 at 15). 

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Thus, based on violations of these two statutory provisions, the defendant property is 

subject to forfeiture under to 18 U.S.C. § 181(a)(1)(A),(C). Having reviewed Plaintiff’s 

Complaint—accepting the well-pleaded facts contained therein as true—the Court finds 

that Plaintiff has met its burden under CAFRA and demonstrated by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the defendant property is subject to forfeiture. 

The Complaint establishes that Jamar Jackson was initially approached by law 

enforcement at Philadelphia International Airport after purchasing a one-way ticket to 

travel to Phoenix the prior day. (Doc. 1 at 2-3). Plaintiff was carrying $50,460.000 in 

United States Currency on his person. (Id. at 2). After being approached prior to boarding 

his flight in Philadelphia, Jackson told law enforcement that he had $30,000 in his 

possession for the purpose of buying a vehicle in Phoenix, Arizona. (Id.). Jackson further 

claimed that his friend “Charles,” in Phoenix, had identified the vehicle for him to 

purchase at an auction. (Id.). Law enforcement permitted Jackson to board his flight, and 

turned to investigating Jackson’s claims. 

 Investigation determined that Jackson’s friend, “Charles” had not spoken with 

Jackson “in over two years” and knew nothing of a vehicle purchase from an auction in 

Phoenix. (Id.). After Jackson landed at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, law 

enforcement made contact with him in the airport terminal. At this time, Jackson told law 

enforcement that he had “a little over $30,000 on his person,” (Id. at 5), and then 

$35,000, and claimed that the Currency was generated from a janitorial service business 

that he owned in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (Id.). Investigation determined that no such 

entity was licensed to do business in Pennsylvania at that time, and that the amount of 

Currency Jackson was carrying was well outside any reasonable amount a purported 

business of that nature could generate over the applicable period of time. 

As law enforcement continued to interact with Jackson, he revised the amount of 

Currency he was carrying, claiming that it was $38,000, and then “closer to $40,000.” 

(Doc. 1 at 5). While Jackson maintained that he had withdrawn this money from his 

Wells Fargo Bank account and a TD Bank account, law enforcement determined that the 

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balance of his Wells Fargo account had “never exceeded a few hundred dollars” and that 

immediately before flying from Philadelphia to Phoenix, Jackson made a cash deposit of 

$14,200 to his TD Bank account “and immediately withdrew cash in the amount of 

$13,500.” (Id. at 8). When law enforcement advised Jackson of the $10,000 discrepancy 

between what he asserted that he was carrying and what was actually in his possession, 

Jackson responded by saying that “he was just trying to buy a car.” (Id.). 

Jackson also has an established criminal history based on controlled substances 

offenses, (Doc. 1 at 7), which the Court may consider in an in rem forfeiture action. Law 

enforcement uncovered a series of text communications between Jackson and his 

girlfriend in Philadelphia, utilizing code words that appeared to direct his girlfriend to 

dispose of the remaining drugs at his residence and rent a hotel room for safekeeping 

narcotics and currency. (Id. at 10-11). Another text conversation in Jackson’s cell phone 

stated that “someone needed ‘100 white’” which Jackson affirmed was cocaine. (Id. at 

11). Jackson maintained that he was “using” cocaine when law enforcement asked if he 

was selling it. (Id.).

In sum, the facts show that Jackson bought a one-way, last minute plane ticket to 

travel to Phoenix, United States v. $124,700 in U.S. Currency, 458 F.3d 822, 826 (8th 

Cir. 2006) (noting that the purchase of a one-way ticket can be evidence of “highly 

suspicious” travel circumstances “in favor of forfeiture”), and made false statements to 

law enforcement concerning the purpose of his visit. Jackson has a history of violating 

controlled substances law, United States v. U.S. Currency $83,310.78, 851 F.2d 1231, 

1236 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that a claimant’s prior arrests and convictions on drug 

charges “are circumstances demonstrating more than mere suspicion of his connection 

with an illegal drug transaction”), United States v. $79,010.00 in United States Currency, 

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48148, at *18-19 (finding that even under “the newer 

preponderance of the evidence standard, the relevancy of looking to prior drug related 

activity is without question”), he made numerous (additional) false statements to law 

enforcement, United States v. $22,474.00 in United States Currency, 246 F.3d 1212, 

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1217 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (discussing the claimant’s “false statements 

regarding the currency’s source and his employment record”), and was carrying an 

exceedingly large amount of money. United States v. $93,685.61 in U.S. Currency, 730 

F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that the discovery of a large quantity of cash can be 

“strong evidence that the money was furnished or intended to be furnished in return for 

drugs”). Moreover, Jackson neither knew the exact amount of nor could account for its 

origins, and was carrying the money for a purpose that appeared to be a cover for illicit 

activity. Finally, evidence recovered from Jackson’s cell phone corroborates these facts, 

and strengthens the claim that Jackson was traveling to Phoenix to engage in the purchase 

or trafficking of controlled substances. 

18 U.S.C. § 1952 outlaws proceeds traceable to the trafficking in controlled 

substances with the intent to promote and carry on trafficking in controlled substances, 

and subjects them to civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Based on the 

aforementioned pleaded facts, taken as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established 

by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant property is proceeds related to the 

trafficking in controlled substances. It follows that the second Eitel factor favors granting 

Plaintiff summary judgment. 

C. The Sufficiency of the Complaint 

The Court previously found that the Complaint established by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the defendant property is subject to forfeiture. The Ninth Circuit has 

suggested that the third Eitel factor requires that Plaintiff’s Complaint “state a claim on 

which the [plaintiff] may recover.” Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 

1978). Based on the Court’s analysis of the merits of Plaintiff’s claim, nothing suggests 

that the Complaint fails to “state a claim on which the [plaintiff] may recover,” or that it 

fails to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). The third Eitel factor thus favors granting the motion for default judgment. 

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D. Amount at Stake 

Under the fourth Eitel factor, the Court must examine “the sum of money at stake 

in relation to the seriousness of [the individual’s] conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 

2d at 1176-77. “If the sum of money at stake is completely disproportionate or 

inappropriate, default judgment is disfavored.” Gemmel v. Systemhouse, Inc., No. CIV 

04-198-TUC-CKJ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81469, at *12 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2008). Here, 

the $50,460.00 subject to forfeiture is a substantial amount of money. Nonetheless, the 

money was more likely than not being utilized in the trafficking of a sizable amount of 

illicit narcotics. In light of the “serious nature of the crimes at issue,” the Court finds that 

the amount Plaintiff seeks to forfeit is reasonable, and is neither “completely 

disproportionate” nor “inappropriate.” See United States v. $86,496.00 in United States 

Currency, No. CV-07-1693-PHX-DGC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115052, at *5-6 (finding 

that the forfeiture of $86,496.00 in “proceeds related to illegal drug trafficking” was 

“reasonable”); 

E. Possible Dispute Concerning Material Facts 

Jackson, and any other individual or entity purporting to hold an interest in the 

defendant property, have failed to answer this action at any point. On February 26, 2016, 

the Clerk of the Court entered default pursuant to Rule 55. (Doc. 9). In the intervening 

one hundred plus days, no answer was filed, and no relief was sought from the Clerk’s 

entry. Upon entry of default, the factual allegations of a Complaint, except those relating 

to the amount of damages, are taken as true. Yoo, 615 Fed. Appx. at 870; Fair Housing of 

Marin., 285 F.3d at 906; Televideo Systems, Inc., 826 F.2d at 917. There is no dispute 

concerning material facts, and this factor weighs in favor of granting default judgment. 

F. Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect 

Jackson has not responded to this action since it was filed, and, through his 

counsel, was served with proper notice. (Doc. 6). Neither Jackson, nor his counsel, have 

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offered any explanation for the failure to meet the deadlines associated with Plaintiff’s 

action. It is therefore highly unlikely that Jackson’s “failure to answer and the resulting 

default was a result of excusable neglect.” Gemmel, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81469, at 

*13; Shanghai Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 

2001) (finding that no excusable neglect occurred where the defendants “were properly 

served with the Complaint, the notice of entry of default, as well as the papers in support 

of the instant motion”). 

G. Policy Underlying Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

The final factor—the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure favoring decisions on the merits—at least initially appears to weigh against 

default judgment. “Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably 

possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. But the mere presence of Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) 

indicates that “this preference, standing alone, is not dispositive.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1177. Rule 55 permits termination of a case before the Court hears the merits 

whenever a defendant fails to defend against an action. Moreover, the failure of anyone 

with an interest in the property at issue to contest the Complaint “makes a decision on the 

merits impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 

Accordingly, the final Eitel factor is not sufficient to preclude the Court from entering 

default judgment. 

Having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment and analyzed the 

applicable factors set forth in Eitel, the Court finds that factors one through six weigh in 

favor of granting Plaintiff’s motion. The final Eitel factor—deciding cases on their merits 

where reasonably possible—is not sufficient to outweigh the aforementioned six factors.

Therefore, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to 

default judgment. Jamar Jackson, and all other individuals or entities, forfeit any and all 

interest in defendant property, $50,460.00 in United States Currency. Judgment will be 

entered accordingly.

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III. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, (Doc. 

10), is hereby GRANTED, and the interest of Jamar Jackson and all others in defendant

property $50,460.00 in United States Currency, is forfeited to the United States of 

America in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 881 and 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) and (C). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the $50,460.00 in defendant property at issue 

in this in rem action be disposed of according to law. 

 Dated this 15th day of June, 2016. 

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