1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

PIERRE G. THORSEN

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL 

DISTRICT 300, and LOCAL 

EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 

DISTRICT 300.

 Defendants.

 Case No. 3:20-cv-50132

 Honorable Iain D. Johnston

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Pierre Thorsen was a high school teacher employed by Community 

Unit School District 300 (“the District”). Thorsen’s third amended complaint 

(“TAC”), brings three claims against the District alleging religious discrimination in 

violation of Title VII (Count I), inducement of breach of fiduciary duty (Count II), 

and civil conspiracy (Count III). The TAC adds a new defendant, Local Education 

Association District 300 (“the Union”), Thorsen’s labor union. He brings two claims 

against the Union, breach of fiduciary duty (Count IV) and civil conspiracy (Count 

V). Before the Court is the District’s [128] and the Union’s [131] motion to dismiss 

the TAC. For the following reasons the motions are granted in part and denied in 

part. 

Case: 3:20-cv-50132 Document #: 155 Filed: 08/15/23 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:2665
2

I. Background1

From 1996 to 2019, Pierre Thorsen worked as a high school teacher for the 

District. Thorsen is a practicing Christian and at times during his teaching would 

teach about historical events and historical peoples in a “legitimate pedagogical 

way.” Thorsen states that the District placed undue restrictions against 

Christianity but there were no restrictions on teaching ancient Greek religion or 

Atheism and agnosticism. Thorsen also states the District limited his use of the 

phrase “bless you, my child.” In August 2019, the District called a fact-finding 

meeting with Thorsen “because of his talk of Christianity and religion made people 

uncomfortable” and told him that termination for “just cause” was imminent unless 

he resigned before the meeting ended. TAC ¶ 14(c)–(e). Thorsen believes that he 

was constructively terminated because he resigned “under duress” before leaving 

the meeting. Thorsen also takes issue with the Union not providing him with an 

attorney for the August 2019 meeting and feels it was unlawful for the District’s inhouse attorney, Ms. O’Keefe, to speak to him outside the presence of an attorney.

Thorsen believes that he was not provided an attorney by the Union for the August 

2019 meeting because the Union and the District were conspiring against him to

force him to resign his position. 

1 The Court draws these allegations from the TAC and are accepted as true for purposes of resolving 

the motion to dismiss. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Deerfield Constr. Inc., 933 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 

2019).

Case: 3:20-cv-50132 Document #: 155 Filed: 08/15/23 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:2666
3

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) challenges 

the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint. Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 

819, 826 (7th Cir. 2014). Under Rule 8, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to 

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For a complaint to be plausible, the plaintiff's factual 

allegations—as opposed to any legal conclusions—must allow “the court to draw the 

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court accepts as true all the 

plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and views them—and all reasonable 

inferences—in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Landmark Am. Ins. Co, 933 

F.3d at 809. Additionally, the Court “need not accept as true legal conclusions, or 

threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 587 (7th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff 

must show through his allegations that it is plausible rather than merely 

speculative that he entitled to relief. Indep. Trust Corp. v. Stewart Info. Servs. 

Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012). The moving party bears the burden of 

establishing the insufficiency of the plaintiff’s allegations. Gunn v. Cont’l Cas. 

Co. ̧968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(1) “tests whether the court has subject 

matter jurisdiction.” Johnson v. Illinois, No. 1:20-cv-05862, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

179674, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 21, 2021). When presented with both a Rule 12(b)(1) 

Case: 3:20-cv-50132 Document #: 155 Filed: 08/15/23 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:2667
4

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction along with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the 

Court should address the jurisdictional question first, as it is a threshold question. 

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). As the party invoking 

federal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that the Court has 

subject matter jurisdiction over their complaint. See Transit Express, Inc. v. 

Ettinger, 246 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir. 2001). If the Court concludes that it lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim, it must dismiss the claim in its entirety. 

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. ̧ 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 

III. Analysis

a. Count I – Title VII Religious Discrimination 

In the two previous versions of his complaint, Thorsen claimed that he was 

discriminated based on his religion in 2019 but in the TAC, Thorsen amends Count 

I by stating that the District discriminated against him beginning on or about April 

2017. Dkt. 12, TAC ¶ 6. The District argues that Count I should be dismissed 

because this new allegation expands the Title VII claim making it factually and 

legally deficient. Specifically, the District argues the expanded discrimination is not 

well plead because Thorsen fails to provide any factual basis for his claim that he 

was discriminated against starting in April 2017. The District also argues that this 

amendment presents an entirely new, unexhausted claim, and because he did not 

file a discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission within 

the agency’s 300-day reporting window, this claim is time barred. Dkt. 128-1, Mot. 

to Diss. at 2–3. 

Case: 3:20-cv-50132 Document #: 155 Filed: 08/15/23 Page 4 of 8 PageID #:2668
5

Thorsen counters by arguing that the scope of the discrimination claim 

remains unchanged by the TAC, and the factual allegation that the discrimination 

began in April 2017 is used merely as background evidence to support his otherwise 

timely discrimination claim. Dkt. 138, Resp. to District Mot. to Diss. at 2–3. Indeed,

a plaintiff may use “prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.” 

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002); Elzeftawy v. Pernix 

Grp., Inc., 477 F. Supp. 3d 734, 760 (N.D. Ill. 2020). The Court will hold Mr. 

Thorsen to his representations that the reference to discrimination beginning 

around April 2017 will only be used for context and as background evidence for his 

discrimination claim. Because the Court previously held that the religious 

discrimination claim was sufficiently plead [46], and because the claim remains 

unchanged in the TAC, the District’s motion to dismiss Count I is denied. 

b. Count II & IV – Inducement of Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Breach of 

Fiduciary Duty

Invoking the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction, Thorsen brings a state law 

claim for inducement of breach of fiduciary duty against the District (Count II), and 

a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the Union (Count IV). Thorsen contends 

that the Union failed to meet its fiduciary duty to provide him with attorney

representation at a fact-finding meeting with the District in August 2019, and as a

result of the Union’s failure to “have an attorney present to protect [him],” Thorsen 

was persuaded by the District to immediately resign. TAC, ¶¶ 85–6. 

Case: 3:20-cv-50132 Document #: 155 Filed: 08/15/23 Page 5 of 8 PageID #:2669
6

The defendants argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear these claims

because the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (“IELRB”) has exclusive 

jurisdiction, and therefore Counts II and IV should be dismissed. Alternatively, the

defendants argue that Thorsen cannot state viable claims because he fails to

adequately plead an essential element of the claims, that a fiduciary duty existed

between him and the Union. Because the Court finds that it lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction over the claims, the merits of Count II and Count IV need not be 

addressed. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, the Court has “supplemental jurisdiction over other 

claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 

that they form part of the same case or controversy . . .” The Court, however, may 

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if “the claim raises a novel or complex 

issue of state law.” § 1367(c)(1). Thorsen’s claims relating to an alleged fiduciary 

duty conferred upon him as a member of the Union raises questions that appear to 

be unsettled by Illinois Courts. Although it is well settled that under the Illinois 

Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA), a union owed its members a duty of fair 

representation, there appears to be a dearth of authority supporting Thorsen’s 

claims that a common law fiduciary relationship exists between a union and an 

individual member. The Illinois legislature, however, has enacted a comprehensive 

statutory scheme on issues related to public education and labor disputes, 

conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the IELRB. 115 ILCS 5/14; Warren Twp. High 

Sch. Dist. 121 v. Local 504, 128 Ill. 2d 155, (1988). Thorsen has not cited any 

Case: 3:20-cv-50132 Document #: 155 Filed: 08/15/23 Page 6 of 8 PageID #:2670
7

authority for his claim that a common law fiduciary duty exists in addition to his 

statutory right for fair representation, nor has he provided any authority to suggest 

the IELRB does not have exclusive jurisdiction over his claims. The Court is weary 

about potentially breaking new ground in Illinois labor relations law without clear

authority to do so by Illinois law. Therefore, the court declines to exercise its 

supplemental jurisdiction over Counts II and IV as it raises complex and novel 

issues of state law. The defendants’ motions to dismiss are granted.

c. Count III & V - Civil Conspiracy 

Thorsen brings claims for civil conspiracy against the District and the Union 

alleging that they “worked together against [him], to force [him] to resign at the 

August 23, 2019, meeting.” Dkt. 139, Resp. to Union Mot. to Diss. at 8. The 

defendants argue the civil conspiracy claims should be dismissed because Thorsen’s 

allegations do not plead an essential element of a civil conspiracy, an unlawful act. 

Under Illinois Law, a civil conspiracy claim must allege “an agreement

between two or more persons for the purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful 

purpose or lawful purpose by unlawful means; and (2) at least one tortious act by 

one of the conspirators in furtherance of the agreement that caused an injury to the 

plaintiff.” Turner v. Hirschbach v. Motor Lines, 854 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2017). 

The focus of the inquiry “is not the agreement itself but the tortious acts performed 

in furtherance of the agreement.” Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54, 63 (Ill. 

1994). 

Case: 3:20-cv-50132 Document #: 155 Filed: 08/15/23 Page 7 of 8 PageID #:2671
8

Thorsen argues that the tortious act element of a civil conspiracy is satisfied 

by pleading that the attorney for the District, Ms. O’Keefe, violated her professional 

ethical obligations when she knowingly spoke to him outside the presence of his

attorney. The Court will hold Thorsen to his representation that the communication 

with Ms. O’Keefe is the alleged unlawful act and the basis for his conspiracy claims. 

Resp. to District Mot. to Diss. at 7; Resp. to Union Mot. to Diss. at 10. But Thorsen’s 

claims fail because under Illinois law, a violation of the Rules of Professional 

Conduct is not a tortious act; there is no “professional responsibility tort” in Illinois. 

Bay Grp. Health Care, LLC v. Ginsberg Jacobs, LLC, No. 15 C 0986, 2017 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 27423 at *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2017). If there is no tortious act, there is no 

civil conspiracy. So, the defendants’ motions to dismiss Counts III and V are 

granted. 

IV. Conclusion 

For the above reasons Community Unit School District 300’s motion to 

dismiss [128] is granted in part and denied in part. Thorsen’s Title VII religious 

discrimination claim (Count I) remains, Counts II and III are dismissed without 

prejudice. Local Education Association District 300’s motion to dismiss [131] is 

granted in its entirety, Counts IV and V are dismissed. The Clerk is directed to 

terminate Local Education Association District 300 from this case. 

Date: August 15, 2023

___________________________

Honorable Iain D. Johnston

United States District Judge

Case: 3:20-cv-50132 Document #: 155 Filed: 08/15/23 Page 8 of 8 PageID #:2672