IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

MARCUS BARNES, et al., ) 

individually and on behalf of all others ) 

similarly situated, ) No. 20-cv-2137 

) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

v. ) Judge Virginia Kendall 

) 

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official ) 

capacity as the Director of the Illinois ) 

Department of Corrections, ) 

) 

Defendant. ) 

DEFENDANT’S UNOPPOSED MOTION 

FOR ENTRY OF PERMANENT INJUNCTION ORDER 

Defendant Rob Jeffreys, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC” or 

the “Department”), by his attorney, Illinois Attorney General Kwame Raoul, respectfully 

requests that the Court enter a permanent injunction order to memorialize its previous decision to 

grant Plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction on September 20, 2021. In support of this 

unopposed motion, Defendant states as follows: 

1. Plaintiffs’ original complaint was filed April 5, 2020. Dkt. 1. Plaintiffs allege that 

730 ILCS 5/3-3-7(a)(7.6) (the “One-Per-Address Statute”), which prohibits individuals on 

Mandatory Supervised Release (“MSR”) for sex offenses from living “at the same address or in 

the same condominium unit or apartment unit or in the same condominium complex or apartment 

complex with another person he or she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex 

offender or has been placed on supervision for a sex offense,” violates their constitutional rights 

under the Eighth Amendment and the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Dkt. 23 at 1-2. 

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2. Plaintiff Marcus Barnes filed a motion for temporary restraining order and 

preliminary injunction on that same date (Dkt. 3), which the Court granted on April 8, 2020. Dkt. 

11. 

3. Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on April 28, 2020 (Dkt. 16), as 

well as a second motion for preliminary injunction. Dkt. 18. The Court granted this second 

preliminary injunction motion on May 6, 2020. Dkt. 21. While the parties briefed class 

certification and the Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, the Court granted the Plaintiffs’ third 

through twelfth preliminary injunction motions. See Dkt. 29, 52, 60, 64, 69, 74, 78, 84, 86, 88, 

94. Each of these preliminary injunction motions sought relief for a different group of class 

members to reside at specific locations where other sex offenders were already living. 

4. The Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment with respect to their 

Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims on March 26, 2021. Dkt. 95. On April 12, 2021, 

Plaintiffs moved for entry of a permanent injunction. Dkt. 103. While the parties briefed the 

motion for a permanent injunction, the Court granted the Plaintiffs’ 13th through 20th 

preliminary injunction motions. Dkt. 101, 110, 119, 121, 127, 129, 132, 134, 

5. On September 20, 2021, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for a 

permanent injunction. Dkt. 137. Following that hearing, the Court entered a minute entry stating: 

“Plaintiff's Motion for permanent injunction . . . is granted. Parties are to provide the Court with 

a Proposed Order for review.” Id. 

6. On September 28, 2021, the parties submitted two different proposed orders to the 

Court—Plaintiffs’ proposed permanent injunction order (Dkt. 138-1) and Defendant’s proposed 

permanent injunction order (Dkt. 138-2), and the Plaintiffs filed a memorandum supporting 

Plaintiffs’ proposed order. Dkt. 138. The difference between the two proposed orders is a single 

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sentence regarding the Department’s discretion to deny host sites, a sentence that is a direct 

quote from the Court’s summary judgment ruling in this case. See Dkt. 140 at 1, Dkt. 95 at 25. 

7. On September 30, 2021, Defendant submitted a response (Dkt. 140) explaining 

why his proposed order (Dkt. 138-2) is preferable to Plaintiffs’ proposed order (Dkt. 138-1). As 

explained in that response, Defendant did not (and does not) agree to the entry of any permanent 

injunction order in this matter. Dkt. 140 at 2. However, because the Court has already granted the 

Plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction, Defendant respectfully requested that the Court 

include the additional sentence to provide greater clarity to the Court’s order. Id. at 3-4. 

8. While the Court considered the parties’ proposed permanent injunction orders, the 

Court granted the Plaintiffs’ 21st through 37th preliminary injunction motions. See Dkt. 139, 

142, 144, 147, 150, 152, 154, 156, 159, 160, 162, 164, 170, 172, 174, 176, 178. 

9. On March 25, 2022, the Court entered a minute entry stating that “Motion for 

Permanent Injunction 103 was granted as part of the Court's Minute Entry 137 dated 9/20/2021. 

The Court takes under advisement Plaintiff's Memorandum 138 and Defendant's Response 140.” 

Dkt. 179. 

10. After Minute Entry 179 was entered, Plaintiffs consulted with the Department 

regarding whether a formal permanent injunction order was necessary. As Plaintiffs explained in 

their 38th preliminary injunction motion: 

The parties have reviewed the Court’s minute order (ECF 179) granting Plaintiffs’ 

motion for a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs are filing this motion because in the 

absence of a formal order enjoining enforcement of the One-Per-Address Statute 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), the Department of Corrections believes that it 

still has a legal obligation to comply with the Statute. In addition, the parties 

believe that it is necessary for class members who will be residing at the same 

address as one another to have a formal court order that they can show to local 

registration authorities who may have questions regarding whether their residence 

is lawful in light of the restrictions imposed pursuant to the Statute. 

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Dkt. 180 at 1-2. 

11. Since entering Minute Entry 179, which took the parties’ submission regarding 

the proposed permanent injunction orders under advisement, the Court has granted the Plaintiffs’ 

38th through 50th preliminary injunction motions. See Dkt. 181, 183, 185, 187, 189, 191, 193, 

195, 197, 199, 201, 203, 205. 

12. Defendant respectfully requests that the Court enter a formal permanent 

injunction order compliant with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). Rule 65(d) requires that, 

“every order granting an injunction” must “state the reasons why it issued,” “state its terms 

specifically,” and “describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or other 

document—the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). 

13. As previously explained, Defendant does not agree to the entry of any permanent 

injunction order in this matter. However, because the Court has already granted the Plaintiffs' 

motion for a permanent injunction, Defendant respectfully requests that the Court enter a 

permanent injunction order as required by Rule 65(d)(1), adopting Defendant’s version of the 

court’s previous determination, which was attached to Plaintiffs’ memorandum as Dkt. 138-2, 

for the reasons set forth in Defendants’ response. See Dkt. 140. 

14. Entry of a Rule 65(d) permanent injunction order would provide specific 

instruction to the Department and its employees as to how to conform to the Court’s ruling. It 

would also provide guidance to outside entities such as registering agencies and other states that 

may accept Illinois parolees through the Interstate Compact. Entry of a permanent injunction 

would conserve judicial and State resources because the Plaintiffs would no longer need to 

submit preliminary injunction motions for individual parolees. Finally, entry of a permanent 

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injunction order would allow the Department to review its options regarding any possible appeal 

of the Court’s order. 

15. Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion, but request that the Court enter Plaintiffs’ 

proposed order (Dkt. 138-1) for the reasons stated in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum (Dkt. 138). 

For these reasons, Defendant respectfully requests the Court enter a formal permanent 

injunction order in this case. 

Respectfully submitted, 

KWAME RAOUL 

Attorney General of Illinois By: /s/ Sarah H. Newman

 Sarah H. Newman 

Michael T. Dierkes 

Assistant Attorneys General 

General Law Bureau 

100 W. Randolph St., 13th Fl. 

Chicago, Illinois 60601 

312-814-6131 

312-814-3672 

sarah.newman@ilag.gov 

michael.dierkes@ilag.gov 

Counsel for Defendant Rob Jeffreys 

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