J-S02033-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.F., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.B.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2231 EDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered July 26, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000717-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 13, 2024

Appellant D.B. appeals from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of 

Philadelphia County, Juvenile Division, adjudicating his minor stepchildren

dependent and finding he was a perpetrator of child abuse pursuant to Section 

6303(b.1)(1) of the Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”).1 On appeal, D.B.

argues that the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) did not 

present clear and convincing evidence that he committed child abuse against 

his 13-year-old stepdaughter, T.F. We affirm.

The trial court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history, as 

follows:

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6387.
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S.M.[(“Mother”)] is the mother of child, T.F., and D.B. was 

Mother’s paramour.[2] T.F. is currently 13 years of age. T.F. 

resided in the family home with [Mother] and D.B., and her 

younger sister. [DHS] became involved with the family in May of 

2021 when it received allegations of domestic violence between 

D.B. and [Mother] as well as allegations concerning excessive and 

problematic alcohol consumption by [Mother]. On July 13, 2021, 

DHS received a Child Protective Services (“CPS”) report alleging 

that T.F. had been sexually abused by D.B. and had been 

physically abused by [Mother]. This report was indicated. (N.T. 

June 29, 2023, Pages 8 to 11).

Zoharmella Savoy is employed by DHS and assigned to the MDT 

Unit.[3] Her duties include investigating reports of child abuse. 

She testified that she visited the family home shortly after 

receiving the CPS report that initiated the child abuse 

investigation. She arrived at the residence and knocked on the 

door which was answered by [Mother]. D.B. was also present on 

the first floor and was dressed in his underwear [(later described 

as boxer shorts. D.B. put on pants before Investigator Savoy 

entered the home)]. T.F. and her sister were upstairs. After 

[D.B.] got dressed, Ms. Savoy provided D.B. verbal and written 

notification of the report and a review of his rights. D.B. 

responded by telling Ms. Savoy that he was already “cleared of 

____________________________________________

2 The record contains numerous references to D.B. as T.F.’s stepfather. 

Notably DHS Investigator Zoharmella Savoy testified that the initial CPS report 

filed in this matter referred to D.B. as Mother’s paramour, but she corrected 

the record to indicate that “[i]t was learned later that he was the stepfather 

[at the times in question].” N.T., 6/29/23, at 11. See also N.T. at 106. CUA9 Case Manager Nasir Ismail testified that he assumed a female voice he heard 

in the background during a phone conversation with D.B. belonged to Mother, 

“because at the time they allegedly were married.” For his own part, D.B.

identified himself to the trial court as “Stepfather” at the outset of the 

dependency hearing, See N.T., 6/29/23, at 11. Both Mother’s counsel and 

DHS counsel also referred to D.B. as “Stepfather.” See N.T., 7/7/23, at 5-6, 

30. Finally, we note that counsel for D.B. in his related appeal refers to D.B. 

as the children’s “Guardian.”

 

3

Investigator Savoy explained that the MDT unit handles ongoing cases that 

have had valid reports of fatalities, near fatalities, and sex abuse in the past. 

The case is “either open with the CUA or just has—had some recent activity.” 

N.T., 6/29/23, at 6-7.
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that.” It later became clear to Ms. Savoy that D.B. was speaking 

about prior allegations of sexual abuse that occurred in Delaware 

County and for which he was not prosecuted.[] During this 

discussion, D.B. and [Mother] brought out a binder containing 

documents related to a prior CPS report alleging sexual abuse by 

D.B. D.B. repeatedly told Ms. Savoy that he was never charged. 

[N.T. at 25].

Ms. Savoy also provided [Mother] verbal and written notifications 

as well as a review of her rights. [Mother] told her that she did 

not believe the allegations against D.B. were true. [N.T. at 52-

53]. She admitted that she subjected T.F. to physical discipline 

and that the discipline consisted of striking her with an open and 

closed hand. She denied harming or abusing the children. N.T. 

6/29/23, at 19-24. 

D.B. told Ms. Savoy that Mother hits the children, especially T.F., 

and that he sometimes gets in the middle of it. He mentioned 

that Mother struck T.F. in the nose and that her nose was bloodied 

on one occasion. He also stated that when Mother drinks she 

becomes violent and strikes him as well. N.T. at 26, 27.

Ms. Savoy spoke with T.F. at the residence and during a walk 

around the neighborhood. She testified that they walked around 

the block because she wanted T.F. to feel safe while talking to her. 

Prior to speaking with Ms. Savoy, T.F. stated, “If I talk to you, you 

can’t leave me here because that’s what happened before. I said 

something and I was stuck here.” Ms. Savoy testified that T.F. 

implied that her home situation worsened the last time she spoke 

out. N.T. at 28.

T.F. told Ms. Savoy about physical abuse inflicted upon her by 

Mother but did not initially disclose the sexual abuse by D.B. 

However, T.F. did state that the physical abuse caused by Mother 

is often spurred by Mother accusing T.F. of having sexual contact 

with D.B. She told Ms. Savoy that Mother often accuses her of 

“doing something” with D.B. and sometimes sniffs her vaginal 

area to assess whether she has been sexual with D.B. N.T. at 42.

Ms. Savoy decided to acquire an Order of Protective Custody 

(“OPC”) for T.F. and her sister based upon the allegations of 

physical and sexual abuse as well as the fear expressed by T.F. 

during their conversation. N.T. at 28-31. T.F. stressed to Ms. 

Savoy that she never allows her younger sister to be alone with 
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D.B. and that if T.F. is relocated out of the home that under no 

circumstances can her sister be left there without her. N.T. at 45, 

46.

Later on, during July of 2021, it was brought to Ms. Savoy’s 

attention that T.F. wished to speak to her again. T.F. informed 

Ms. Savoy that she was “ready to talk” and wanted to tell Ms. 

Savoy everything about the situation concerning Mother and D.B. 

T.F. detailed several months of sexual abuse by D.B. the abuse 

included being shown pornography, being subjected to oral and 

digital penetration and giving and receiving oral sex. She told Ms. 

Savoy that she never liked any of the sexual acts and that the 

abuse was progressing. She stated that at first D.B. placed her 

hand on his genital area and told her how to touch him and what 

to do. She described being told to perform oral sex on him and 

his digitally penetrating her. T.F. told Ms. Savoy that she was 

scared she was going to be raped. T.F. also spoke of being 

physically assaulted by Mother on almost a daily basis and 

described a recent assault during which she thought her nose 

might have been broken. She also described Mother as drinking 

alcohol every day. This claim was corroborated by D.B. N.T. at 

58-61.

Mr. Ismail testified that he is a social worker who was assigned 

this case. He testified that there were two telephone calls made 

to his agency’s hotline regarding this case on October 15, 2021 

and October 18, 2021. A person who identified himself as Latia 

Badu claimed that he had gone through his daughter’s cell phone 

and saw months of texts between T.F. and his daughter. The 

caller stated that he saw a text sent by his daughter to T.F. and 

that the text read, “if you lie on your family, you can live with us.” 

In the second telephone call to the hotline, the caller stated, “I’m 

from Africa” and that T.F. “called [his] daughter and is making up 

lies.” Both calls to the hotline originated from the telephone 

number that the agency had on file for D.B. N.T. at 130, 131. 

This led Mr. Ismail and this court to conclude that D.B. telephoned 

his agency, claimed to be someone else, and alleged that T.F.’s 

allegations were fabricated to convince the agency that he did 

nothing wrong. [N.T. at 137-140]

Mother testified that she used corporal punishment while raising 

her children. She denied causing them injuries that required 

medical attention. She claimed that she did not know D.B. was 
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sexually assaulting T.F. and stated that she had no reason to 

suspect that he was a sexual abuser. She also told the court that 

she placed herself in alcohol treatment but attempted to minimize 

her drinking by saying that her alcohol use was an accusation that 

was not proven and that her daughters’ claims about her 

problematic alcohol use were lies. N.T. at 152-164.

T.F. testified about the nature and extent of the physical and 

sexual abuse she suffered. She stated that she was sexually 

abused by D.B. on multiple occasions and described that abuse as 

including his touching her vagina after removing her pants. She 

described touching her vagina, mouth, and buttocks with his 

penis. She told the court that D.B. placed his penis inside her 

mouth and up against, but not inside, her vagina and buttocks. 

She described being forced to do these things by D.B. and noted 

that the nature of the force was sometimes his words and other 

times by physically pulling her toward him. N.T., 2/16/23, 9-18. 

She testified that she did not believe that Mother was aware of 

this but also testified that Mother referred to D.B. as a pedophile. 

T.F. also testified that Mother beat her multiple times. She stated 

that Mother frequently beat her with her hands and hit her in the 

face, head, and stomach. She described an instance where she 

was beaten and she fell to the ground and Mother stood over top 

of her and choked her by squeezing her neck with her hands. She 

also mentioned that her mother smelled her vaginal area to check 

whether D.B. had done anything sexual to her. N.T. at 44-61. 

Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/23, at 2-6.

D.B. filed a timely appeal and through newly appointed counsel filed his 

Brief of Appellant. In his brief, D.B. presents the following question for this 

Court’s consideration:

Did the trial court err in concluding that the Appellant committed 

child abuse under 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1)(1), (b.1)(4), and 

(b.1)(6)?

Brief of Appellant, at 4.
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Before we may address D.B.’s appeal on its merits, we must review 

whether we have jurisdiction over this matter. In an August 30, 2023,

published decision, this Court found that a dependency court lacks the 

authority to make a finding of child abuse against a non-party under the CPSL 

in a dependency matter, despite culpability. See Interest of M.M., 302 A.3d 

189 (Pa. Super. 2023). In the case sub judice, it is not disputed that Appellant 

D.B. neither possessed nor sought recognized party standing in the underlying 

dependency matter. Given the decision in Interest of M.M., the Child 

Advocate acting on behalf of T.F. and the Department of Human Services each 

has notified this Court that it shall not submit briefs defending the trial court’s 

July 7, 2023, finding of child abuse against D.B. 

In Interest of M.M., this Court concluded that a juvenile court may not 

upgrade a DHS-created “indicated report” of an individual’s act of abuse to a 

judicially decided “founded report” of abuse if the individual was not a party 

to the dependency action. The case arose from a dependency action filed 

against the mother of three children: 11-year-old son, M.M., 13-year-old 

daughter C.S., who had died recently from complications related to chronic 

neglect and advanced anorexia,

4 and 13-year-old son Ch.S. who consequently 

fled the household and remained “AWOL.” 

A post-mortem investigation into the death of C.S. generated a CPS

report that an adult family friend, E.M., lived in Mother’s household, claimed 

____________________________________________

4 An autopsy report concluded that C.S. died from inanition, which was defined 

as starvation to the point of organ failure and death. Id. at 194.
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to have a “maternal aunt”-like relationship with the children, and routinely 

slept in the same bed as C.S. On the day C.S. died, E.M. told investigators 

that C.S. had been slow to respond to her prodding at 7 a.m., seemed 

disoriented, and had a racing heartbeat. E.M. said she returned two hours 

later to check on C.S., and C.S. was nonresponsive. EMTs were summoned 

and found C.S. unconscious and wearing an adult diaper. They transported 

C.S. to a local hospital where she was pronounced dead after failed efforts to 

revive her.

DHS concluded its investigation by filing an “indicated” report finding

child abuse in Mother’s household and naming both Mother and E.M. as 

perpetrators for their failure to provide C.S. with necessary medical care. The 

circumstances surrounding the death of C.S. prompted DHS to file a

dependency action against Mother, alleging that her 11-year-old son, M.M.,

was without proper parental care or control.5 

E.M. appeared at the dependency action not as a named party but only 

in answer to a witness subpoena. After the first day, the court appointed 

counsel for E.M. in an “unassigned role.” 

The four-day dependency proceedings against Mother culminated with 

a substantive adjudicatory hearing held on the final day, at which Appellant 

E.M., through counsel, continued to raise objections that the juvenile court 

lacked authority under the CPSL to amend E.M.’s report of child abuse from 

____________________________________________

5

In March 2022, Ch.S. went “AWOL” two days after DHS obtained an order of 

protective custody for the Decedent’s surviving brothers. 
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an agency “indicated” report to a judicially-“founded” report where only the 

mother was named a party to the dependency action. Specifically, E.M. 

argued that because she neither was named a party to the underlying 

dependency action nor received a formal petition or other documentation 

notifying her that DHS sought to establish a judicial “finding” of child abuse 

against her through the juvenile court hearing, the court had no jurisdiction

over her. The juvenile court overruled E.M.’s objections, found she had 

committed child abuse for the purpose of deeming her report “founded”, and 

entered its adjudicatory order to that effect Id. at 203. E.M. appealed.

On appeal, we vacated the adjudicatory order “insofar as it pertains to 

Appellant’s [(E.M.’s)] report being ‘founded’” because E.M. was not a “party” 

to the dependency hearing, and a juvenile court has no authority over a nonparty to do those things it normally may do to parties, such as make a legal 

determination of child abuse under the CPSL that serves as a predicate to 

upgrading a child abuse report to judicially “founded.” Id. at 201-202.6 We 

explained that a “party” under governing authority may include only a parent 

of the juvenile whose dependency status is at issue, the legal custodian of the 

juvenile, and the person whose care and control of the juvenile is in question. 

Id.

____________________________________________

6 Interest of M.M. identifies what types of “judicial adjudications” may serve 

as a basis for a founded report under the CPSL and observes, “If an alleged 

perpetrator is not a party to one of these underlying causes of action, then it 

follows that the court lacks authority under the CPSL to make a finding of child 

abuse, such that the alleged perpetrator’s report could be deemed “founded.” 

Id. at 202. 
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Under the facts, we determined that E.M. obviously was not the parent, 

nor was she a custodian or a caregiver for purposes of the Juvenile Act. Id.

at 200 (setting forth definitions under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302).

7 Although E.M. 

admitted she moved in to help Mother care for the children, she “was 

ultimately not ‘a person whose care and control’ of the child was in question.” 

Id. As we observed, 

“None of Mother’s three Children was placed with Appellant

[(E.M.)]. Appellant was not the guardian of any of the three 

Children, nor had she obtained legal custody through a court 

order. Nor did Appellant stand in loco parentis, a status that would 

have required Mother to “discharge” her “parental duties,” and for 

Appellant to assume the same. 

. . . 

For example, a live-in nanny would similarly not qualify, nor would 

a teacher. Notably, the juvenile court, DHS, and the GAL concede 

that [E.M.] was not a party to the dependency proceedings. DHS 

even relied on this fact to explain to the juvenile court why it did 

not have to serve Appellant in accordance with the normal juvenile 

____________________________________________

7 Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act sets forth the following definitions: 

“Caregiver.” A person with whom the child is placed in an outof-home placement, including a resource family or an individual 

designated by a county agency or private agency. The resource 

family is the caregiver for any child placed with them.

. . .

“Custodian.” A person other than a parent or legal guardian, who 

stands in loco parentis to the child, or a person to whom legal 

custody of the child has been given by order of a court.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.
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court procedure reserved for parents, guardians, or other 

custodians. 

Id. at 201.

Therefore, acknowledging that E.M. was not a party to the dependency 

proceedings and that the CPSL does not provide for an independent cause of 

action, we held, “The juvenile court had no authority under the CPSL to make 

a legal determination of abuse against Appellant [E.M.] to deem her report 

“founded” – no matter what process was given, no matter the evidence of her 

culpability, because Appellant [E.M.] was not a party to this case.” 

However, footnote 17 in Interest of M.M. acknowledged a possible 

exception to its holding:

“[i]n reaching this conclusion, we are cognizant of dependency 

cases where the juvenile court had made findings of child abuse 

against stepparents or parents’ significant others. . . . But among 

this line of cases, we have not discovered one in which the 

stepparent or significant other challenged the juvenile court's 

jurisdiction, as Appellant does here. Although we might fairly 

distinguish this line of cases as involving ‘guardians,’ ‘individuals 

with in loco parentis status,’ or other individuals whose ‘care and 

control’ of the child was in question (i.e., proper parties to 

dependency proceedings), those scenarios are not before us.” 

Id. at 203 n.17 (citations omitted).

In the case sub judice, Appellant was recognized by the trial court,

Mother, participating agencies, and all counsel as T.F.’s stepfather. As such, 

D.B.’s care and control of the child as co-head of T.F.’s household was a central 

issue at the dependency hearing, although the trial court did not name him a 

party as such. Nevertheless, D.B’s status as a stepfather residing in the 

household, which, he maintains in his appellate brief, confers upon him the 
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status of a “guardian”,

8 qualifies him as a “proper party to the dependency 

proceeding” under to the rationale of Interest of M.M.

Again, Interest of M.M. defined a party in a dependency hearing to 

include “(1) the parents of the juvenile whose dependency status is at issue; 

(2) the legal custodian of the juvenile whose dependency status is at issue; 

(3) the person whose care and control of the juvenile is in question.” 

Id. at 199 (emphasis added). E.M., the appellant in that case, challenged the 

court’s jurisdiction over her when she was neither a named party nor a “party” 

under any other definition accepted by pertinent authority. Indeed, the 

dependency adjudication implicated only the mother, not E.M. Id. 

In contrast, as an undisputed stepfather of T.F. during both the time of 

T.F.’s abuse and the dependency hearing in question, D.B.’s status in the 

household and relation to T.F. placed him within those “categories”, identified 

in Interest of M.M., “[that] logically stem from the fact that upon an 

adjudication of dependency, the court has the authority to remove a child from

the custody of his or her parents or legal custodian[,]” leaving the child 

“without a parent, guardian, or legal custodian.” Id. The lack of proper care 

or control may be based on evidence of conduct by the parent, guardian, or 

custodian that places child at risk. Id. at 200.

Therefore, we distinguish D.B.’s status from that of E.M. in Interest of 

M.M., as he was a person whose care and control of the juvenile T.F. qualified 

____________________________________________

8 We need not address the question of whether D.B. has accurately defined 

himself as a guardian.
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him as a party over whom the trial court had jurisdiction. Accordingly, we 

proceed to address his issue on appeal. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has set forth our standard of review 

for dependency cases as follows:

The standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate 

court to accept findings of fact and credibility determinations of 

the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not 

require the appellate court to accept the [trial] court's inferences 

or conclusions of law. We review for abuse of discretion[.]

In the Interest of L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015) (quotation marks 

and quotation omitted).

Where, as in the case sub judice, the trial court deems parents to be 

perpetrators of child abuse under the CPSL, we note that “[although] 

dependency proceedings are governed by the Juvenile Act[9]...the CPSL 

controls determinations regarding findings of child abuse, which the [trial] 

courts must find by clear and convincing evidence.”10 In the Interest of L.V., 

209 A.3d 399, 417 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and footnotes omitted) 

(footnote added). “[T]he [Juvenile] Act and the [CPSL] must be applied 

together in the resolution of child abuse complaints under the [CPSL and] 

____________________________________________

9 Pennsylvania Juvenile Act (“Juvenile Act”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6375.

10 “Clear and convincing evidence” is defined as evidence that is “so clear, 

direct, weighty[,] and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a 

clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In the Interest of C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) 

(quotation marks and quotation omitted).
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reference must be made to the definition sections of both the [Juvenile Act] 

and the [CPSL] to determine how that finding [of child abuse] is interrelated.” 

In the Interest of J.R.W., 631 A.2d 1019, 1023 (Pa. Super. 1993).

As part of [a] dependency adjudication, a court may find a parent...to 

be the perpetrator of child abuse[ ] as defined by the...CPSL.” In the 

Interest of S.L., 202 A.3d 723, 728 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quotation marks and 

quotations omitted). Under the CPSL, “child abuse” is defined as 

“intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly doing” one of many acts, including 

causing bodily injury11 to a child through any recent act or failure to act. See

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303(b.1) (defining “child abuse”).12 

____________________________________________

11 The CPSL defines “bodily injury” as “[i]mpairment of physical condition or 

substantial pain.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303(b.1) (defining “bodily injury”).

12 The CPSL directs to 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b) to define “intentionally”, 

“knowingly”, and “recklessly.” 

(1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element 

of an offense when:

(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or 

a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in 

conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and

(ii) if the element involves the attendant 

circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such 

circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.

(2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of 

an offense when:

(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or 

the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his 

conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances 

exist; and

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Nevertheless, we have observed that Section 6381(d) provides for an 

“attenuated” standard of evidence in making a legal determination as to the 

abuser in child abuse cases when the serious injury suffered would not 

ordinarily occur except by acts or omissions of the parent or other person 

responsible for the child’s welfare. Specifically, in Interest of C.B., 264 A.3d 

761, 773 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) this Court held that a trial court's 

culpability determination as to whether the child abuse was intentional, 

knowing, or reckless is “superfluous”:

Under Section 6381 of the CPSL, a petitioning party is not required 

to establish that the parent or caregiver perpetrated the abuse 

“intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.” Rather, in Section 6381 

cases, “the fact of abuse suffices to establish prima facie evidence 

of abuse by the parent or person responsible,” permitting 

petitioners to “prove their case with only the physical evidence of 

injuries that would not ordinarily be sustained but for the action 

[or inaction] of the parents or responsible person and the 

implausible statements of the parents and responsible persons.”

Id. (quotation and citations omitted). See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6381(d).

____________________________________________

(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he 

is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct 

will cause such a result.

(3) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of 

an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result 

from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree

that, considering the nature and intent of the actor's conduct and 

the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross 

deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person 

would observe in the actor's situation.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b).
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We observed, further, how in Interest of J.R.W. this Court recognized:

This lessened standard of establishing abuse by 

the caretakers [under Section 6381(d)], coupled 

with the clear and convincing evidence 

necessary to find dependency, has been 

imposed by the Legislature as the standard 

which the [trial court] must apply in deciding 

abuse cases. Prima facie evidence is not the 

standard that establishes the child has been abused, 

which must be established by clear and convincing 

evidence; it is the standard by which the court 

determines whom the abuser would be in a given 

case. There is no conflict, constitutional or otherwise, 

with the clear and convincing evidence standard 

imposed by the Act to establish child abuse. The 

Legislature has determined that the likelihood 

clearly established abuse has occurred, other 

than at the hands of the custodian, is so small 

that prima facie evidence the custodian has 

caused the injury, either by acts or omissions, is 

all that is required. We find no defect in this 

reasoning. Such a standard provides maximum 

protection for the child victim or other children in the 

community who might be subject to similar abuse if 

the alleged abuser was not identified and permitted 

free access to the victim or other vulnerable children. 

It is not equivalent to a finding of guilt in a criminal 

proceeding which could result in deprivation of 

freedom. Thus[,] the [L]egislature has balanced the 

needs of society and children for protection against 

the abuser's possible patterned behavior and his/her 

right to freedom unless found guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

Interest of J.R.W., 631 A.2d at 1024.

Interest of C.B., 264 A.3d at 771-72 (emphasis in original).

Under Section 6381(d), a parent or other responsible caregiver may 

rebut the prima facie presumption with evidence:
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[d]emonstrating that the parent or responsible person did not 

inflict the abuse, potentially by testifying that they gave 

responsibility for the child to another person about whom they had 

no reason to fear or perhaps that the injuries were accidental 

rather than abusive. The evaluation of the validity of the 

presumption would then rest with the trial court evaluating the 

credibility of the prima facie evidence presented by...[DHS]...and 

the rebuttal of the parent or responsible person.

Interest of C.B., 264 A.3d at 772 (quoting In re L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1185) 

(acknowledging, further, that a parent does not actually have to be physically 

present with the child at the time of the abuse for the presumption to apply 

to that parent). Id. at 1185-86.

The totality of D.B.’s argument on appeal states that because the history 

of the DHS investigation shows that T.F. initially denied in her interview that 

she was sexually abused by Appellant, and Investigator Savoy testified that 

T.F. presented as truthful during this interview, the trial court erred in 

deeming credible T.F.’s second interview in which she said she was now ready 

to reveal that D.B. had sexually abused her. To this end, Appellant contends 

baldly that DHS influenced this testimony.

With this argument, Appellant asks this Court to do what it cannot do, 

which is to upset the evidence-based credibility determinations of the trial 

court. Our standard and scope of review in dependency cases is well-settled:

[W]e must accept the facts as found by the trial court unless they 

are not supported by the record. Although bound by the facts, we 

are not bound by the trial court's inferences, deductions, and 

conclusions therefrom; we must exercise our independent 

judgment in reviewing the court's determination, as opposed to 

its findings of fact, and must order whatever right and justice 

dictate. We review for abuse of discretion. Our scope of review, 

accordingly, is of the broadest possible nature. It is this Court's 
J-S02033-24

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responsibility to ensure that the record represents a 

comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied the 

appropriate legal principles to that record. Nevertheless, we 

accord great weight to the court's fact-finding function because 

the court is in the best position to observe and rule on the 

credibility of the parties and witnesses.

Interest of K.M., 305 A.3d 116, 121 (Pa. Super. 2023).

 The evolution of T.F.’s willingness to accuse D.B. of sexual assault was 

addressed first by Investigator Savoy, who indicated that T.F. was afraid to 

talk about D.B. that day “but was adamant that she never left her younger 

sister alone with D.B.” N.T., 6/29/23, at 46. The second conversation 

between Ms. Savoy and T.F. occurred sometime in late July of 2021, within 

the first couple week of T.F.’s placement. Instantly, T.F. said she was ready 

to talk, that there was more that she wanted to say. N.T. at 57-58. From 

there, she detailed several months of sexual abuse, from being shown 

pornography, which, T.F. explained, began when D.B. told her that he wanted 

to show her about boys. According to Savoy, T.F. described the videos in 

detail and said the same was done to her. N.T. at 59. To Savoy, T.F.’s switch 

from an initial denial of sexual abuse to her accusation simply reflected that 

T.F. Was not willing to talk about the sexual abuse yet. That is why she said 

at the second meeting, “Now I’m ready to talk.” N.T. at 70.

The trial court considered this testimony and found, 

T.F.’s statements made to the DHS investigator, CUA, and during 

her testimony were credible. Despite her failure to initially 

disclose the sexual abuse inflicted upon her by D.B., T.F. was 

consistent and unwavering in the allegations she made against 

him. She was also consistent in credibly describing the physical 

abuse she suffered at the hands of [Mother].
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Trial Court Opinion, at 8.

Applying our standard of review, we find no abuse of discretion in the 

trial court’s assessment that T.F.’s accusation against D.B. provided clear and 

convincing evidence of his child abuse. Accordingly, D.B.’s claim fails.

Order affirmed.

Date: 3/13/2024