Filed 10/24/13 P. v. Kuhn CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
MICHAEL ERIC KUHN,
Defendant and Appellant. B243792
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA385064)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Su perior Court of Los Angeles County, Patricia M. Schnegg, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Joseph Shemaria a nd Joseph Shemaria for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorn ey General, Scott A. Taryle and Stacy S. Schwartz, Deputy Attorn eys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 Defendant and appellant Michael Eric Kuhn appeals from the judgment entered following his no contest plea to possession of child pornography, entered after the trial court denied his motion to quash and traverse a search warrant and suppress evidence. Kuhn contends the trial court erred by denying his motion. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND
1. Facts.

a. Issuance of search warrant for Kuhn’s apartment. On August 31, 2010 , Los Angeles Police Department (L.A.P.D.) Officer Eric Good sought and obtained a wa rrant to search Kuhn’s Culver City apartment, vehicle, computer systems, and electroni c equipment for child pornography and related materials. As pertinent here, the 19-page affidavit in support of the warrant stated the following. Officer Good had been empl oyed by the City of Los Angeles since 2002, began working for the L.A.P.D.’s Juvenile Division in December 2008, and, when the affidavit was prepared, was assigned to the Juvenile Division’s Internet Crimes Against Children Unit (ICACU). One of the ICAC U’s tasks was investigation of “child sexual predators who use computers and the Internet to pursu e their sexual interest in children.” The affidavit described Good’s formal training and experience in the investigation of child abuse and exploitation, which included over 120 hours of training on crimes related to sexual exploitation of ch ildren on the Internet. Officer Good provided background informa tion about users of child pornography.
His affidavit stated: “I am aware that the following characte ristics are generally found in varying combinations in people who produce, trade, distribute or possess images of child pornography: These people view children as se xual objects. They receive gratification from sexually explicit images of minors. They collect sexually explicit images of minors, which they use for their own sexual gratificati on and fantasy. They use these images as a means of reliving fantasies or actual sexual en counters. They rarely, if ever, dispose of sexually explicit images of minors because the images are treated as prized possessions. [¶] They store such images in many different formats includi ng photographs, printouts, magazines, videotapes, and many other form s of digital media such as hard drives,3 diskettes, CDs and/or DVDs and other st oring devices,” and st ore them “in many different locations such as their home, their vehicle, their work areas, and other areas under their control.” Collectors of child porn ography generally prefer to store images in electronic format as computer files. Offi cer Good had “personally witnessed collectors going to great lengths to protect their collection from discovery.” Such persons maintain im ages of minors with whom they had sexual contact; use the Internet to gain access to children for the purposes of sexual exploitation; and chat online with other suspects to share information on the sexual exploitation of children. Predators “will often exchange or purchase ch ild pornography on th e Internet or will
entice children to meet with them for sexual purposes.” The affidavit described, in considerable detail, the technical process whereby investigators are able to identify persons who possess ch ild pornography. Briefly summarized, that information included the following. The “Secu re Hash Algorithm Version 1,” or “SHA1,” is a mathematical encryption method used to produce a unique digital signature of a computer file. No two files produce the same SHA1 value unless their contents are identical. Various gove rnment and private agencies cooperate to
maintain a list of “verified positive child pornography SHA1 values.” Thus, the contents of computer files can be positively establis hed without viewing the content, “once a
known file with a certain SHA1 value has been identified.”
Persons with an interest in child pornography frequently use peer-to-peer networks
to trade and share such files. One such network is Gnute lla, an “open-source,” publicly
available network. Gnutella uses SHA1 values in its operation. On July 26, 2009, Detec tive Schlund identified a comp uter with the Internet Protocol, or IP, address of 76.171.169.96 as distributing images of child pornography via file sharing. Schlund observed that the computer was sharing a folder with 20 video files,
all of which had titles that were indicative of child pornography. Schlund was unable to
download files at that time due to a slow Internet connec tion. On July 28, 2009, by comparing the contents of the shared file with the library of known child pornography,4 Schlund confirmed that at least one of the files in the shared fo lder depicted minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, as defined by Penal Code section 311. Also on July 28, 2010, Schlund determin ed the Internet Serv ice Provider for the computer was Time Warner Roadrunner. Sc hlund prepared a federal customs subpoena
to obtain subscriber information. On September 8, 2009, Time Warner no tified Schlund that Michael Kuhn, residing at an apartment located at 7 777 West 91st Street in Playa Del Rey, was the subscriber assigned to the IP addr ess of 76.171.169.96. On March 9, 2010, Officer Good matche d the SHA1 signatures of known child pornography files with the files identified in th e shared folder and confirmed that at least one of the files appeared to depict minors enga ged in sexually explicit conduct. The file in question was a video entitled “ ‘14 ki ds teens women (porno-lolitas-preteensreelkiddymov-r@ygold-hussyfa ns-underage-girls-childre n-pedofilia-pthc-ptsc-xxxsexy).avi’ ” (hereinafter “14 kids”). (Bold in original omitted.) It was approximately 30 minutes long and showed a montage of youn g girls between the ages of 3 to 11 years, orally copulating and “being vaginally pe netrated by unknown adult male penises.” On May 4, 2010, an investig ator checked to see if ther e was any further activity on IP address 76.171.169.96. By comparing SHA1 values, the investigator learned that the
IP address “76.171.169.96 was identified 3 times on January 7, 2010, as flagged for having SHA1 values of kn own child pornography.” On July 22, 2010 , Officer Good learned from a homeowners’ association representative at the Playa Del Rey apartmen t complex that Kuhn was not living at the apartment. On August 24, 2010 , Good contacted Postal Inspector Harjala and asked if any change of address records existed for Kuhn. Harjala advised that Kuhn had filed a form on March 16, 2010, changing his address from the West 91st Street apartment to an apartment on Culver Boulevard, in Culver City. Harjal a stated that Kuhn had not subsequently filed any additional change of address form s. Additionally, Harjala advised that three other persons—Felipe Serrano, Je ffrey Pederson, and Douglas Nicholas—had5 also filed changes of address forms from the same Playa Del Rey apar tment to the Culver Boulevard apartment. Based upon the foregoing, Officer Good opined that probable cause existed to show the crime of possession of child pornogr aphy in violation of Penal Code section 311.11, subdivision (a), had be en committed by a person residi ng at the Culver Boulevard address. Good then set forth, in consider able detail, information regarding the special
circumstances related to search es of digital devices, explai ning why they generally must be seized and examined by expe rts in a police laboratory, rath er than at the scene of the search. Good also explained that “[e]lectroni c files or remnants of such files can be recovered months or even years after they have been downloaded onto a hard drive,
deleted or viewed via the Internet.”
b. Search of Kuhn’s Culver City Apartmen t and discovery of child pornography. On September 1, 2010, Officer Good, al ong with other officers, executed the search warrant at Kuhn’s apartment in Culv er City. Good seized two laptop computers, five hard drives, batteries a nd adaptors, memory ca rds, compact discs, a camera, a Time Warner bill, and a receipt, all found in Kuhn’ s bedroom. A forensic examination of those items disclosed images of child pornography on one or more of the seized devices. When Good executed the search, he conducted a reco rded interview of Kuhn . Kuhn admitted to Good that he had downloaded child pornography. 1 Kuhn was arrested and charged with violating Penal Code secti on 311.11, subdivision (a) 2 (possession of matter depicting a minor engaged in sexual conduct).

c. Motion to quash and traverse th e warrant and suppress evidence. Kuhn thereafter filed a motion pursuant to section 1538.5 to quash and traverse the search warrant and suppress th e seized evidence and his stat ements. He alleged, inter alia, that the warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause because: (1) it

1 Because Kuhn pleaded no contest before trial, we glean these facts from the transcript of the preliminary hearing.

2 All further undesignated statutor y references are to the Penal Code.6 was based upon stale information and the “ima ges in question were located at a different residence”; (2) the warrant affidavit contai ned intentionally misl eading and/or false statements; (3) the warrant was a “prohibite d general warrant” in that it was overbroad; and (4) the warrant was obtained without a good faith belief the affidavit provided sufficient probable cause to justify the search. On April 20, 2012, the trial court heard and denied Kuhn’s motion. The court credited Officer Good’s opinion that persons who possess child pornography rarely delete such files. It therefore rejected the ar gument that the information was too stale to establish probable cause, observing that child pornography was detected on Kuhn’s computer initially in Ju ly 2009 and again in January 2010. The cour t discounted Kuhn’s argument that the term “collector,” as used by Good in the warrant affidavit, was misleading, explaining the de fense contention was “a lingui stic argument that I do not find persuasive. [¶] . . . [¶] People who colle ct illegal material, I th ink it is reasonable to infer that they are going to be disinclined to dele te such material and therefore there was nothing misleading provided to the issuing magist rate in that regard.” Furthermore, one
week before issuance of the warrant, Good learned from Ha rjala that Kuhn had filed a change of address form. The court reasone d: “So this is a situation where law enforcement is not simply re lying on information learned m onths before they enter the property in question but, in fact, take a very significant step to try and make sure that Mr. Kuhn has not moved to any new location a nd that investigation was done one week prior to the search.” The court expressed th e view that people do not normally distance themselves from their personal computers, which are both highly portable and valuable. Common sense dictated that a computer ow ner would take his computer to his new residence. The court also rejected the ar gument that the warrant was overbroad: given the fact child pornography was discovered in Ju ly and again in January, “the investigation would suggest that there is a sufficient scope or breadth of material that needs to allow the investigating officer some degree of latit ude to make sure that they’re not missing something. To suggest that they can only look for one particular title strikes this court as simply absurd.”7 2. Procedure. After the trial court denied his suppressi on motion, Kuhn pleaded no contest to possession of child pornogra phy (§ 311.11, subd. (a)). The court placed Kuhn on probation for three years, on the condition he serve two days in jail, with credit for two days served. It ordered that Kuhn register as a sex offe nder, and imposed a restitution fine, a suspended probation revocation restitu tion fine, a criminal conviction assessment, a court operations assessment, and a sex offender fine. Kuhn appeals.
DISCUSSION Kuhn contends the trial court erred by de nying his motions to quash and traverse the warrant and suppress evidence seized in the search, as well as his statements. He argues the affidavit in support of the search warrant failed to state facts sufficient to establish probable cause because it was based on stale information and contained unsupported conclusions and recklessly misl eading misstatements; and the warrant was an overbroad “general warra nt.” We disagree.
1. Applicable legal principles. A search warrant may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; § 1525.) Pr obable cause exists where ther e is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a cr ime will be found in a particul ar place, at the time of the search. ( Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238; People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 161; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1040-1041; People v. Gibson (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 371, 380.) The prob able cause showing mu st appear in the affidavit offered in support of the warrant. ( Carrington , at p. 161.) “ ‘The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a pr actical, common-sense decision whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affi davit before him [or her], including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay info rmation, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime w ill be found in a particular place.’ ” ( Ibid. ; Illinois v. Gates, supra , at p. 238; People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 483.) Probable cause may be shown by eviden ce that would not be competent at trial,8 and a magistrate may reasonably rely on the special experience and expertise of the affiant officer. ( People v. Varghese (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1103.) On review, we defer to the trial court’ s express and implied factual findings if supported by substantial eviden ce, but independently determine the lega lity of the search under the Fourth Amendment. ( People v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 133; People v.
Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1119; People v. Hirata (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1504.) “Because courts accord a preference to searches and seizures conducted pursuant to a search warrant, ‘in a doubtful or margin al case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall.’ ” ( Eubanks
, at p. 133.) Any challenge to the admissibility of a search or seizure mu st be evaluated solely under the Fourth Amendment. ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1141; People v. Stipo (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 664, 668.)
2. The search warrant affidavit suppor ted the probable cause finding.

a. Purportedly stale information.
Kuhn contends the information in the a ffidavit did not supply probable cause because (1) there was a lengthy delay between the date investigators first identified files containing child pornography on his computer and sought issuance of the warrant; and (2) he moved during that pe riod, but Officer Good failed to take sufficient steps to determine that he was living at the Culver Ci ty address and had taken the computer with
him. These contentions lack merit. To justify issuance of a warrant, “[t]here must be probable cause to believe that the material sought to be seized will be on th e premises to be sear ched when the warrant is served.” ( People v. Gibson, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 380; People v. Hirata, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.) Information in a warrant affidav it that is remote in time, or “stale,” does not establish present probable cause for a search. ( People v. Jones (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 735, 741-742; People v. Hulland (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646, 1652;
Gibson
, at p. 380.) There is no bright line rule indicating when information becomes stale. ( People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 163; Jones , at pp. 741-742; Hirata , at p. 1504.) However, delays of more th an four weeks are generally considered9 insufficient to demonstrate present probable cause. ( Jones , at pp. 741-742; Hirata , at p. 1504.) Longer delays are nonetheless justif ied where there is evid ence of an activity continuing over a long peri od of time, or the nature of the ac tivity is such as to justify the
inference that it will continue until the time of the search. ( Carrington , at p. 164, and cases cited therein; Jones , at p. 742; People v. Stipo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 672;
Hulland
, at p. 1652.) The question of staleness tu rns on the facts of each particular case. ( Carrington , at p. 163; Gibson
, at p. 380; Jones , at p. 741.) “In the context of child pornography cases, courts have largely concluded that a delay—even a substantial delay—between di stribution and the issuance of a search warrant does not render the underlying information stale.” ( U.S. v. Richardson (4th Cir. 2010) 607 F.3d 357, 370 [2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11928]; see, e.g., U.S. v. Lacy (9th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 742, 745-746 [affidavit provi ded non-stale informat ion despite 10-month lapse between computer download and issuance of the warrant]; U.S. v. MoralesAldahondo (1st Cir. 2008) 524 F.3d 115, 119 [t hree-year delay between acquisition of child pornography and application for warra nt did not render supporting information stale]; U.S. v. Irving (2d Cir. 2006) 452 F.3d 110, 125 [“ When a defendant is suspected of possessing child pornography, the staleness determination is unique because it is well known that ‘images of child pornography are lik ely to be hoarded by persons interested in those materials in the privacy of their homes’ ”]; U.S. v. Allen (5th Cir. 2010) 625 F.3d 830, 842 [2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 22920] [18-month-old information was not stale]; U.S.
v. Newsom (7th Cir. 2005) 402 F.3d 780, 783 [one year not stale]; U.S. v. Lemon (8th Cir. 2010) 590 F.3d 612, 614-615 [18-month-old in formation was not stale].) Computers and computer equipment are “not the type of evid ence that rapidly dissipates or degrades.” ( U.S. v. Vosburgh (3d Cir. 2010) 602 F.3d 512, 52 9 [2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 8140] ( Vosburgh ).) Therefore, “the passage of weeks or months here is less important than it might be in a case involving more fungible or ephemeral eviden ce, such as small quantities of drugs or stolen music.” ( Vosburgh
, at p. 529.) “[I]nformation concerning [child pornography] crim es has a relatively long shelf lif e. It has not been, and should not be, quickly deemed stale.” ( Ibid. )10 Here, investigators determined that Kuhn ’s computer contained child pornography files on July 26, 2009, and again on January 7, 2010. Officer Good sought issuance of the search warrant on August 31, 2010. Thus, there was a seven-and-a-half month delay
between the last identification of contraband files on Kuhn’s computer and issuance of the warrant. On the facts of this case, the delay did not render the information stale for several reasons. First, from the informati on in the affidavit, the magistrate could reasonably believe Kuhn continued downloadi ng child pornography several months after the initial download in July. From this, it was reasonable to infer Kuhn’s interest in Internet child pornography, and his downloading activity, was ongoing. Second, Officer Good—who had considerable experience in the investigation of child pornography—averred that persons who possess child pornography “rarely, if ever, dispose of sexually explicit images of minors because the images are treated as prized possessions.” Law enforcement officers may dr aw upon their expertise to interpret the facts in a search warrant application, and such expertise may be considered by the magistrate as a factor sup porting probable cause. ( People v. Nicholls (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 703, 711.) Here, Good had the necessary experien ce and training to describe the predilections and proclivities of pers ons who download ch ild pornography. Good’s statement, which was credited by the tr ial court, demonstrated the likelihood that the pornographic files likely remained on Kuhn ’s computer or other electronic media at the time the warrant was issued. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Lacy, supra, 119 F.3d at pp. 745-746 [upholding warrant based on information that defendant downloaded child pornography 10 months earlier, and on affiant’s asserti on that collectors of child pornography generally retain the images]; U.S. v. Gourde (9th Cir. 2006) 440 F. 3d 1065, 1072, and cases cited therein; United States v. Murray (D.Az. 2010) 696 F.Supp.2d 1044, 1049 [2010 U.S. Dist . LEXIS 26696] ( Murray ); cf. People v. Stipo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 672 [in computer hacking case, stalen ess argument rejected where the hacked
information could be used fo r identity theft, was therefor e valuable, and would likely
have been retained by defendant]; People v. Jones, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 742.)11 “Substantial delays do not render warrants st ale where the defendant is not likely to dispose of the items police seek to seize.” ( Stipo , at p. 672.) Third, Good averred that electronic file s or remnants of such files could be recovered months or even years after thei r original download using “readily-available forensics tools,” even if the user had dele ted the files. This fact suggested the pornographic files would be found on the computer regardless of the delay. (See Murray,

supra, 696 F.Supp.2d at p. 1049 [“Thanks to the long memory of computers, any evidence of [child po rnography] was almost certainly still on [defendant’s] computer, even if he had tried to delete the images”]; U.S. v. Gourde, supra, 440 F.3d at p. 1071; Vosburgh, supra, 602 F.3d at p. 529; People v. Stipo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 673 [staleness argument rejected where traces of network intrusion likely remained on the defendant’s computer because they were automatically ente red and difficult to remove].) Kuhn’s arguments that Officer Good fa iled to reliably determine he and his computer had actually moved to the Culver City address fare no better. The affidavit stated that on July 22, 2010, Good learned from a homeowner’s association representative at the Playa Del Ray apartments that there was no reco rd of Kuhn living in the apartment. On August 24—just a week before seeking the warrant—Good spoke to Postal Inspector Harjala and learned that Kuhn had filed a form on March 16, 2010, changing his address from West 91st Street in Playa Del Rey to the Culver Boulevard apartment. Inspector Harjala told Good that Kuhn had not su bsequently filed a change of address form. The most logical and reasonab le inference from this information was that Kuhn moved from the Playa Del Rey apartment to the Culver City apartment in March 2010. The absence of a subseq uent change of address form made it reasonably probable that Kuhn was still living at th e Culver City address when th e warrant was sought. It was a reasonable inference that, having once filed a change of address when moving to a new residence, Kuhn would have done so again ha d he moved from the Culv er City location. (See generally People v. Gibson, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at pp. 380-381 [where there was no reason to believe appellant had moved in the five to six months preceding issuance of12 the warrant, affidavit was not defective for failure to provide information she was still living there when the warrant was sought].) 3 It was eminently reasonable for the tria l court to believe Kuhn took his computer with him when he moved. Computers are hi ghly portable and usually quite valuable. Common sense and common experience teach that , in today’s society, computers are an oft-used and indispensible tool, and are gene rally used to store personal and financial data. They are not the type of item likely to be discarded or left behind when the owner moves. Kuhn’s move from Playa Del Rey to Cu lver City was not a transatlantic or crosscountry move, making it even less likely he w ould have neglected to take the computer with him. (See People v. Miller (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 194, 200 [affidavits must be interpreted in a common sense fashion rath er than a hypertechnical one; “[r]easonable and logical inferences may be drawn and the magistrate may consid er matters of common knowledge concerning human behavior”]; Vosburgh, supra, 602 F.3d at p. 529 [computers and computer equipment are not th e type of property “that is usually[,] quickly or continuously discarded”]; People v. Stipo, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 672 [because defendant was unaware he was a suspect, he was unlikely to dispose of his computer equipment during the six months between the crime and issuance of the warrant]; People v. Ulloa (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1 007 [it was reasonable to assume defendant’s computer wo uld be located at his home].) Kuhn argues Officer Good could have ta ken additional steps to verify he was living at the Culver City address, still owne d the computer, and ha d the computer with him, such as conducting surveillance or ch ecking utility, rent, Inte rnet provider, and

3 U.S. v. Rowland (10th Cir. 1998) 145 F.3d 1194, 12 05, cited by Kuhn, is factually distinguishable. That case involved an “anticipatory warrant” (that is, a warrant contingent on the occurrence of an anticipated future event), wher e government agents mailed child pornography to the defendant’s post office box as part of a sting operation. Because the delivery was made to the post office box, rather than the house to be searched, and the affidavit failed to establish a nexus between the contraband or criminal activity and the house, the warrant was invalid. ( Id. at p. 1206.) The instant case does not involve similar facts.13 Department of Motor Vehicles records. He also complains that Go od failed to establish the computer was not accessed by other persons, or via an unse cured Internet connection. Such further investigation and information might have bolstered the probable cause showing, but was not required to establish it. “ ‘[T]he term “probabl e cause” . . . means
less than evidence which would justify condemnation.’ ” ( United States v. Ventresca (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 107.) Ku hn’s arguments attempt to “s idestep the ‘fair probability’ standard and elevate probable cause to a test of near certainty,” in contravention of the teachings of the Supreme Court. ( U.S. v. Gourde, supra, 440 F.3d at p. 1072; Illinois v. Gates, supra, 462 U.S. at p. 235.) Kuhn’s citati on to cases in which a more extensive investigation was completed and additional evidence was presente d in support of a warrant is unavailing. Each case must be considered on its own facts ( People v. Carrington, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 163), and the circ umstance that more, or stronger, evidence was present in another case does not demonstrate the probable cause showing
was insufficient here.
b. The warrant affidavit was not based upon unsupported conclusions.
Kuhn next contends the warrant affidav it failed to estab lish probable cause because it was based on unsupporte d conclusions. We disagree. An affidavit based on mere suspicion or belief, or stating a mere conclusion without supporting facts, is insufficien t to establish probable cause. ( Illinois v. Gates,

supra, 462 U.S. at p. 239; People v. Garcia (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 715, 721.) Kuhn first attacks the portio n of the affidavit in which Officer Good described the typical characteristics of persons who possess child pornography. K uhn points to Good’s statements that: (1) certain characteri stics were “generally found in varying combinations in people who produce, trad e, distribute or possess images of child pornography”; (2) such persons “rarely, if ever, dispose of sexually explicit images of minors because the images are treated as pr ized possessions”; (3) “collectors of child pornography generally prefer to store images in electronic format as computer files”; and (4) collectors will go to great lengths to protect their pornography from discovery. According to Kuhn, Good failed to provide facts to support these statements, explain14 “what he mean[t] by a ‘collector’ of child por nography,” or state facts showing Kuhn met
the definition of a collector.
These contentions are meritless. As noted , the opinions of an experienced officer may be considered in the probable cause determination. ( People v. Nicholls, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 711; People v. Garcia, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 721; People v.
Deutsch (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1232.) Th e affidavit here detailed Good’s training in the area of investigating child pornogra phy crimes, which incl uded, in addition to training at the police academy and through Pea ce Officer Standards a nd Training courses, over 120 hours of training on In ternet crimes involving children. 4 He had personally examined digital videos, videotapes, and co mputer files depicting child pornography during the course of his work. It is not a stretch to believe Good’s training and experience encompassed the challenge d aspects of the affidavit. Good provided an explanation of why po ssessors of child pornography prefer to store it on computers as electronic files: “T he computer’s ability to store images in digital format makes a comput er an ideal repository for ch ild pornography. Portable disks can contain thousands . . . of child po rnography images. The portable digital media are particularly well suited to conceal images of child pornography.” The statement that collectors attempt to conceal pornography was based on Good ’s personal experience; as he explained in the affidavit, “I have pe rsonally witnessed collectors going to great lengths to protect their collection from discover y.” Thus, none of these statements lacked
a sufficient factual foundation. Nor are we persuaded by Kuhn’s argument that Good failed to adequately define “collector.” The term, as used in the affidavit, is readily understandable by reference to

4 Good had attended a 36-hour Internet Crimes Against Ch ildren Investigative Techniques course through the Office of J uvenile Justice and Delin quency Prevention; a 36-hour Internet Crimes Against Children Unde rcover Chat Class taught by experts in the field, which included instruction on the pr eservation of digital evidence; 20 hours of training by experts at the 20 09 Silicon Valley Internet Crimes Against Children Conference; and 36 hours of training at the 2010 Internet Crimes Against Children National Conference, where expe rts instructed regarding th e investigation of crimes related to the sexual exploitati on of children on the Internet.15 its plain meaning, that is, a person who down loads or otherwise obtains, and keeps, child pornography. There was a factual basis fo r a conclusion Kuhn was a collector who would retain his child pornography. The affi davit stated that on July 26, 2006, an IP
address later connected to Kuhn was sh aring 20 files with titles indicating child pornography. On January 7, 2010, Kuhn’s IP address was “identified 3 times” as “flagged for having SHA1 values of known child pornography.” A person who has over 20 child pornography files can reas onably be considered a collector. Kuhn also complains that Officer Good failed to describe the contents of the SHA1 files identified on January 7, 2010. From this he reasons that there was insufficient information the January 7 files “r eally [did] invo lve child pornography.” Not so. Good explained at length that a SHA1 valu e is essentially a digital signature, and no
two files will have the same SHA1 value unle ss they are identical. By matching SHA1 values with files already identified as contai ning child pornography, an investigator could reliably determine that a file contained su ch material, without actually viewing its
contents. The affidavit stated that a detec tive “discovered that IP address 76.171.169.96 was identified 3 times on January 7, 2010, as flagged for having SHA1 values of known child pornography.” Because the files, identified by their unique digital signatures, had already been determined to contain child pornography, Good did not need to further
describe the files’ contents in order for the trial court to reasonably conclude they
involved child pornography.
Kuhn next avers that G ood’s statement that possesso rs of child pornography always keep it is an impermissible “ ‘prof ile’ allegation that does not provide probable cause.” In support, he cites Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) 520 U.S. 385, 394. In Richards, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not permit a blanket exception to the knock- and-announce requirement in felony drug investigations. ( Id. at pp. 387-388.) Although felony drug investigations frequently involve both danger to police o fficers and the likelihood ev idence will be destroyed if advance notice is given, this did not justify dispensing with a case-by-case evaluation of the manner in which a search is executed. ( Id. at pp. 391, 394.) Kuhn attempts to16 analogize Richards and similar cases (e.g., U.S. v. Granville (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3d 1214, 1219; People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Cal.2d 586, 588), ar guing that “there is no such thing as ‘profile probable cause ’ to allow the search of the residence for items of a crime without individual specific info rmation that evidence of a cr ime would be at that location
at that time.” But this case does not involve a propos ed blanket exception to the knock-andannounce rule; Good’s stat ements about the proclivitie s of possessors of child pornography were not used to justify a per se exception to Fourth Amendment requirements. The warrant affidavit here did contain specific information regarding Kuhn that provided probable ca use for the search. Indeed, numerous federal courts have found similar statements by affiant officers supported a probable cause finding. (See,

e.g., U.S. v. Lacy, supra, 119 F.3d at p. 746; U.S. v. Gourde, supra, 440 F.3d at p. 1072 [“[t]he details provided on the use of comput ers by child pornographers and the collector profile” provided support for a finding of probable cause]; U.S. v. Riccardi (10th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 852, 860-861 [probable cause finding based in part on “the observation that possessors often keep electroni c copies of child pornography”]; Vosburgh
, supra, 602 F.3d at p. 528; U.S. v. Lemon , supra, 590 F.3d at p. 615 [“Many courts, including our own, have given substantial weight to tes timony from qualified la w enforcement agents about the extent to which pedophi les retain child pornography”]; U.S. v. Richardson,

supra, 607 F.3d at p. 370, a nd cases cited therein].) U.S. v. Weber (9th Cir. 1990) 923 F.2d 1338, and U.S. v. Zimmerman (3d Cir. 2002) 277 F.3d 426, cited by Kuhn, are distinguishable on their facts. 5

5 In Weber, the Ninth Circuit rejected informati on regarding the practices of child molesters because there was “not a whit of evidence” in the affidavit indicating the defendant was a child molester. ( U.S. v. Weber, supra, 923 F.2d at p. 1345.) In Zimmerman, the warrant application contained no information sugges ting the defendant ever possessed child pornogra phy in his home, and only minimal, stale evidence suggested adult pornography would be found th ere; on these facts, there was no probable cause to search for either. ( U.S. v. Zimmerman, supra, 277 F.3d at pp. 433-435.) In contrast, here the affidavit contained suffi cient evidence Kuhn had downloaded and collected files containing child pornography on his computer, which could reasonably be17 c. The warrant affidavit did not contai n recklessly misleading statements.
Kuhn next contends his motions should have been granted because the affidavit contained recklessly misleading st atements. He is incorrect. A defendant has a limited right to challenge the veracity of statements contained in an affidavit of probable cause made in sup port of the issuance of a search warrant. ( Franks v. Delaware (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 155-156; People v. Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 484; People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 988.) When presented with such a challenge, a trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing on the question if the
defendant makes a substantial s howing that (1) the affidavit contains statements that are deliberately false or were made in reckless di sregard of the truth, and (2) the affidavit’s remaining contents, after the false statements are excised, are insu fficient to support a finding of probable cause. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1297; Scott , at p. 484; Lewis and Oliver
, at p. 989; People v. Luera (2001) 86 Cal.Ap p.4th 513, 524- 525.) If the statements are proved false or reck less at the hearing, they must be excised. If the remaining contents of the affidavit are insufficient to establis h probable cause, the warrant must be voided and any evidence seiz ed pursuant to the warrant suppressed. ( Franks v. Delaware, supra, at pp. 155-156; Bradford
, at p. 1297.) “Innocent or negligent misrepresentations will not support a motion to traverse.” ( Scott , at p. 484;
Lewis and Oliver
, at pp. 988-989.) The defendant must make his or her showing by a preponderance of the evidence, and the affidavit is presumed valid. ( Scott , at p. 484.) Echoing his arguments in the preceding section, Kuhn urges that Officer Good’s
statements that collectors of child pornography typically store such materials as computer files and go to great lengths to protect them from discovery were “certainly reckless.” He repeats his concerns that the affidavit did not sufficiently define “collector” or provide information showing he was a collector. We ha ve already explained that the affidavit did
contain information sufficient to show Kuhn was a collector of child pornography. It
expected to be at the Cu lver City address. (See U.S. v. Lacy, supra, 119 F.3d at p. 746, fn. 6 [distinguishing Weber ]; Vosburgh, supra, 602 F.3d at pp. 530-531 [distinguishing Zimmerman ]; People v. Nicholls, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 713-714.)18 could not have been “reckless” for Good to de scribe the habits of collectors of child pornography, as such information was releva nt and based upon his training and expertise

. Kuhn also complains that his child pornography was not hidde n, but was available to the general public through Gnutella. Assumi ng this assertion is accurate, it does not demonstrate the falsity of Good’s statement that collectors often attempt to hide their
materials

. Kuhn further complains that the affidavit contained an inaccurate statement that all three of the co-occupants of the Playa Del Re y apartment filed change of address forms in March 2010. According to the affidavit, Postal Insp ector Harjala told Good that Serrano, Pederson, and Nicholas also filled out change of address forms indicating a move from the Playa Del Rey ap artment to the Culver City apartment. According to a declaration filed by Kuhn’s coun sel in support of the suppression motion below, when the warrant was executed, “Serrano denied ever living at 7777 W. 91st Street . . . and Michael Kuhn and Jeffrey Pederson also denied that Felipe Serrano lived there.” Kuhn
asserts that this in accuracy “calls into question all the information from the Postal Inspector.” It does not. Assuming arguendo that co unsel’s averments were accurate, they do not demonstrate any deliberately false or r ecklessly misleading statements by Good. Even if Harjala was mistaken, there is no reason to assume Go od knew or had any reason to doubt her statements. (See People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 989; People v. Lieng (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213, 12 29.) Moreover, excising this
information from the warrant affidavit would have had no effect on the probable cause showing. The federal cases cited by Kuhn ( United States v. Stanert (9th Cir. 1985) 762 F.2d 775; United States v. Davis (9th Cir. 1983) 714 F.2d 896; United States v. Chesher (9th Cir. 1982) 678 F.2d 1353; U.S. v. DeLeon (9th Cir. 1992) 979 F.2d 761), are not factually similar to the instant matter.19 3. The warrant was not an overbroad “general warrant,” either as written or as
executed . Appellant next avers that the search warrant was an impermissible “general
warrant” that allowed a search for “esse ntially anything.” He is incorrect. The Fourth Amendment require s that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. ( People v. Eubanks, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 133; U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; see also Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; § 1525.) The Constitution prohibits the issuance of “ ‘[g ]eneral warrants’ ” that allow for a “ ‘ “general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.” ’ ” ( People v. Ulloa,

supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1004, citing Andresen v. Maryland (1976) 427 U.S. 463.) The particularized description requirement “ ‘ “ ‘makes general searches . . . impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discre tion of the officer executing the warrant.’ ” [Citations.]’ ” ( Ulloa
, at p. 1004.) A warrant that fails to particularly describe the evidence sought is unconstitutional. ( People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 95 ( Nasmeh ).) “ ‘Specificity has two aspects: particularity and breadth. [] Particularity is the requirement that the warrant must clearly state what is sought. [Citation.] Breadth deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which th e warrant is based.’ ” ( Ulloa
, at p. 1005.) Whether a warrant is sufficiently partic ular is a question of law subject to independent review by an appellate court. ( People v. Eubanks, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 133; People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1041; Nasmeh, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 95.) In analyzing this question, we consid er the purpose of the warrant, the nature of the items sought, and the tota lity of the circumstances surro unding the case. “A warrant that permits a search broad in scope may be appropriate under some circumstances, and the warrant’s language must be read in context and with common sense.” ( Eubanks
, at pp. 133-134.) Here, the warrant specified that the area s to be searched we re the Culver City apartment, including “any attics, basements, garages, storag e lockers, safes, buildings20 attached or unattached that ar e readily accessible to, under the control of or used by the occupants. It is also to include the vehi cles parked on the prop erty, adjacent to the property or in the street th at are owned by or under the co ntrol of any occupants of” the Culver Boulevard apartment. The “subject items” to be seized were described as: (1) “Any digital device capable of storing any ‘writi ng’ as defined by Evidence Code [s]ection 250 of child pornography as defined by Ca lifornia Penal Code [s]ection 311”; and (2) “Any ‘writing’ that constitutes evidence of child sexual explo itation as defined by California Penal Code [s]ection 311.3.” The warrant further defined “writing” and “digital device.” 6 The warrant allowed any digital devices or writings seized to be removed and subsequently searched for: visual depic tions of minors engaged in sexually explicit
conduct as defined in secti on 311; writings pertaining to the possession, production, reproduction, receipt, or distribution of such depictions; writings sent with the intent to seduce a minor, or for purposes of arranging to meet with a minor for the purpose of sexually exploiting the minor; writings showing use of digital devices containing such evidence; credit card information, bills, and payment records for In ternet services and receipt of child pornography; wr itings tending to identify the children depicted; items that
would show an unusual intere st in children or children’s activities, including collections of photographs and magazines depicting ch ildren; and writings showing dominion and

6 The warrant defined “writing” as “handwriting, typewriting, printing, Photostatting, photogra phing, photocopying, tr ansmitted by electronic mail or facsimile, and every other means of recording upon any tangible thing, any form of communication or representation, including letters, words, pi ctures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations thereof, and any record thereby created, rega rdless of the manner in which the record has been stored.” “ ‘[D]igital device’ ” include d “any electronic system or device capable of storing and/or processing data in digital fo rm, including: central processing units; laptop or notebook computers; personal digital a ssistants; wireless communication devices such as telephone paging devices, beepers, and m obile telephones; peripheral input/output devices such as keyboards, printers, scanners , plotters, monitors, and drives intended for removable media; related communications devices such as modems, cables, and connections; storage media such as hard di sk drives, floppy di sks, compact disks, magnetic tapes, and memory chips; and security devices.”21 control of the property searched. The affidav it explained that searching digital devices is a highly technical process requiri ng expertise and specialized e quipment. Digital data is
vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modi fication or destruction, and in order to recover hidden, deleted, compressed, encrypte d, or password protected data, examination
in a controlled environment such as a law enforcement la boratory is essential to a complete and accurate analysis. Moreover, the volume of data typically stored on digital devices is so large as to make it impractical to search them at th e time the warrant is
executed.

a. Particularity. It is readily apparent from the foregoing th at the warrant described the items to be
seized with sufficien t particularity. (See People v. Ulloa, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.) It did not provide for a “wide open” s earch for “evidence of general offenses not mentioned in the affidavit,” or seizure of “virtually all ‘writing’ in the apartment,” as Kuhn contends. The affidavit specifically identified the alleged criminal activities at
issue. It authorized officers to search only the apartment and areas under the occupants’ control, only for writings and digital devices related to ch ild pornography activities. Officers had no discretion to seize writings th at did not pertain to child pornography, or search any items that could not contain such writings. Kuhn argues the warrant was not sufficiently precise because it failed to name him or his roommates specifically; fa iled to describe the subject computer by its IP address; and failed to list the “14 kids” video by name. But the “14 kids” file and the computer’s
IP address were described elsewhere in th e affidavit and obviou sly fell within the categories of items listed in the warrant. It was also clear from th e affidavit that Kuhn was one of the occupants of the Culver City ap artment, and the main focus of the search. Under these circumstances, we do not discer n how the failure to include his name, the “14 kids” file name, or the computer’s IP a ddress in the listing of items to be seized rendered the warrant unconstitutionally impreci se. “ ‘[T]he requirement that a search warrant describe its objects with particularity is a standard of “practical accuracy” rather22 than a hypertechnical one.’ [Citations.]” ( Nasmeh, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 96; see
also People v. Smith (1994) 21 Cal.App.4t h 942, 948-949.)
b. Overbreadth. Nor was the warrant’s scope overbroad. To the contrary, “the breadth of the
warrant . . . was commensurate with the scope of the investigation.” ( People v. Kraft,

supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1043.) As described ante , there was probable cause to believe Kuhn downloaded, possessed, or shared child pornogr aphy on his computer at his apartment. Based on his training and expe rience, Officer Good averred that child pornography collectors “store th e images in many different lo cations such as their home, their vehicle, their work areas, and other ar eas under their control” and sometimes go to great lengths to hide their pornography. Ther efore, the search of Kuhn’s entire apartment and other areas on the premises where he could have stored or concealed child pornography was reasonable and within the scope of the probable cause showing. “The
connection between the items to be seized and the place to be search ed need not rest on direct observation. It may be inferred from th e type of crime involved, the nature of the item, and the normal inferences as to where a criminal mi ght likely hide incriminating evidence.” ( People v. Miller, supra, 85 Cal.App.3d at p. 201.) The warrant was not overbroad in regard to the categories of writings sought. Obviously, a search for writings containing actual child pornography was justified by the probable cause showing. Evidence showing ownership of seized di gital devices, payment for internet services, and payment for pornography itself was relevant to the determination of who in the apartment had downloaded the pornography. (See People v. Eubanks, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 133-134 [search for items showing “dominion and control” was not overly broad or nonparticular]; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 575 [officers acted properly in seek ing independent evidence to establish defendant’s occupancy of apartment and cont rol over evidence se ized therefrom].) Likewise, items showing an unusual interest in children potentially had relevance to prove possession of child pornography.23 Kuhn nevertheless contends the scope of the warrant was overbroad in several respects. He avers the warrant improperly allo wed for the seizure of all digital devices in the apartment, whereas Good on ly had information that the single computer with the IP address 76.171.169.96 contained child pornog raphy files. But it is common knowledge that computer files can be move d, copied, or stored on more than one device. Therefore, the warrant provided probable cause to search digital devices in addition to the single computer previously identified. In a similar vein, he contends that the wa rrant should not have authorized a search for anything beyond the “14 ki ds” video or “at most” the a dditional SHA1 files identified in January 2010. The trial c ourt found this contention “absur d.” We agree. We see no reason why the search had to be limited to the files already identified. (See Andresen v. Maryland, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 479, fn. 10 [warrant allowing for “ ‘fruits,
instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknow n’ ” was lawful because in context, the phrase permitted officers to seiz e evidence of other fra udulent real estate
transactions relevant to the defendant’s methods and motives in the charged crime]; People v. Eubanks, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 134 [discussing Andresen ].) U.S. v. Rabe (9th Cir. 1988) 848 F.2d 994, cited by Kuhn, does not suggest a contrary conclusion. In Rabe,
the Ninth Circuit rejected an overbreadth challenge where the warrant for the most part
limited the officer’s search to materials de picting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, as well as documents ev idencing the purchase, sale, or trade of such material. ( Id. at pp. 997-998.) Rabe undercuts, rather than supports , Kuhn’s contention. Contrary to Kuhn’s argument, the instan t case bears no resemblance to People v. Frank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 711, or the fe deral cases he cites. Next, Kuhn complains the search was overb road as to time, because there was no
limit on the dates of materials to be seized and searched. While su ch an omission might be problematic in certain cases, here it was not. The fact a writing was not recent would not negate its relevance: if, for example, Kuhn possessed vintage magazines or photos showing child pornography, he would still have been in viol ation of section 311.11.24 Nor was suppression required because the warrant allowed officers to search for writings showing attempts to seduce or arrange a meeting with a minor. Kuhn argues that
because Officer Good had no info rmation he had or would enga ge in such behavior, there was no probable cause to seiz e items related to such activ ities. We do not necessarily agree with this contention. “[ T]here is no requirement that each item seized be supported by probable cause” and no requirement “that there must be a precise correlation between
the items in the warrant and the probable cause declarations in the affidavit.” ( People v. Ulloa, supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1005, 1007; People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1050.) But we need not reach this question because the record does not reflect that any evidence Kuhn attempted to meet with or seduce a minor was recovered in the search. Therefore, even if this aspect of the warrant was overbroad, he has no cause to complain. (See People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1043- 1044 [defendant contended portions of warrant were overbroad; howeve r, he “has not identified any item seized under any of [the assertedly overbroad] provisions that was admitted at trial. Accordingly, even if we assu me some provision of the wa rrant was overbroad, defendant has not shown that any evidence should have been suppressed”]; People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 607, fn. 7 [“ ‘Even when a warrant is overbroad in part , evidence will not be suppressed if it was seized pursua nt to a portion of the warrant which was

not ’ ”]; People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1101-1102; U.S. v. Rabe, supra, 848 F.2d at p. 998 [even if sections of warrant were impermissibly overbroad, “no evidence was obtained in reliance upon them”].) For the same reason, we reject Kuhn’s co ntentions that the warrant was overbroad
because it allowed a search of the entire apartment, as oppos ed to only his room and the common areas; of buildings or vehicles accessi ble to the all occupa nts of the apartment; and of computers and digital equipment that belonged to his roommates, rather than to him. Again, while we do not necessarily ag ree these categories were overbroad, the only
items seized in the search were found in Kuhn’s bedroom in the Culver City apartment.
Because no items were seized pursuant to the portions of th e warrant Kuhn c ontends were overbroad, he fails to show suppression of any of the evidence was required. ( People v.25 Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1043-1044; People v. Camarella
, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 607, fn. 7; People v. Farley, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 1101-1102.) Kuhn argues that as execute d, the search actually conducted amounted to a general warrant search. (See United States v. Rettig (9th Cir. 1978) 589 F. 2d 418, 423 [although warrant was not a general warrant on its face, agents did not confine their search in good faith to the objects of the warrant].) The only basis for Kuhn’s assertion appears to be
that the officers searched “a ll the digital devices in the apartment for essentially any writing or crime involving children.” Howe ver, as we have explained, the warrant properly allowed for a search of all digital devi ces. Kuhn points to nothing in the record showing the officers searched for evidence of crim es other than those related to child pornography, or otherwise exceeded the parameters of the warrant. Finally, Kuhn complains that “the search warrant did not set forth a protocol for a limited search of the digital stor age devices” and “did not restri ct its execution to a digital expert using a ‘hashing’ program.” However, Kuhn cites no California or United States Supreme Court case requiring such a protocol . The Ninth Circuit cases he does cite— U.S. v. Comprehensi ve Drug Testing, Inc. (9th Cir. 2010) 621 F.3d 1162 [2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 19070] ( CDT ), and United States v. Tamura (9th Cir. 1982) 694 F.2d 591, do not impose such a requirement either. Tamura was decided in 1982, “j ust preceded the dawn of the information age,” and concerned paper, not electronic, records. ( CDT , at p. 1169;
see also U.S. v. Stabile (3d Cir. 2011) 633 F.3d 219, 324 [2 011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1945].)
CDT involved a federal investigation into steroi d use by professional ba seball players. In CDT, the Ninth Circuit offered “[c]oncluding [t ]houghts” about “the challenges faced by
modern law enforcement in retrieving information it need s to pursue and prosecute wrongdoers, and the threat to the privacy of innocent parties from a vigorous criminal investigation.” ( CDT , at p. 1175.) The court opined that the “pressing need of law
enforcement for broad authorization to examin e electronic records . . . creates a serious risk that every warrant for electronic info rmation will become, in effect, a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment irrelevant.” ( Id. at p. 1176.) The court explained that electronic files are generally found on media containing “thousands or26 millions of other files among whic h the sought-after data may be stored or concealed. By necessity, government efforts to locate partic ular files will require examining a great many other files to exclude the possibility that the sought-after data are concealed there.” ( Ibid. ) In a concurrence, Chief Judge Kozinski offered “guidance” about “how to deal with searches of electronically stored data in the future so that the public, the government
and the courts of our circuit can be confiden t such searches and seizures are conducted lawfully.” ( CDT , supra, 621 F.3d at p. 1178.) Among other things, Judge Kozinski suggested the following: “The process of so rting, segregating, decoding and otherwise separating seizable data (as defined by the warrant) from all other data should . . . be designed to achieve that purpo se and that purpose only. Thus, if the government is allowed to seize information pertaining to ten names, the search protocol should be designed to discover data pertaining to thos e names only, not to others, and not those pertaining to other illegality. For example, the government has sophisticated hashing tools at its disposal that allow the identific ation of well-known illega l files (such as child pornography) without actually opening the file s themselves. These and similar search
tools should not be used w ithout specific authorization in the warrant, and such permission should only be given if there is pr obable cause to believe that such files can be found on the electronic medium to be seized .” ( Id. at p. 1179 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring), italics added.) Thus, apart fro m the facts that Chief Judge Kozinski’s concurrence comprised guidance, rath er than mandatory procedures, and CDT is not binding on this court ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 190), CDT did not require that files in child po rnography cases be examined onl y using a “hashing tool” as Kuhn appears to suggest. 7

7 Because we conclude that the information in the affi davit provided pr obable cause to support the search warrant, which met th e particularity requirement, we need not consider the People’s assertion that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement applies. ( People v. Jones, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 742.)27 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.

We concur:

CROSKEY, Acting P. J.

KITCHING, J.