COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Huff, AtLee and Malveaux

Argued by videoconference 

DARRIUS DONTA COPELAND

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 0825-20-1 JUDGE MARY BENNETT MALVEAUX

OCTOBER 5, 2021

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE

Timothy S. Wright, Judge

Andrew M. Sacks (Sacks & Sacks, P.C., on brief), for appellant.

Rachel L. Yates, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Darrius Donta Copeland (“appellant”) was convicted of first-degree murder, in violation of 

Code § 18.2-32, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-53.1. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to strike and to 

set aside the verdict because the evidence was insufficient in establishing that he was the criminal 

agent in the shooting of the victim. He also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the 

finding of premeditation necessary for a conviction of first-degree murder. For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

“In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the 

light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v. 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

UNPUBLISHED
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Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381 

(2016)).

In August 2016, Timothy Croskey (“the victim”) was living with his mother, Tracy 

Croskey. The victim and Dequashia Copeland (“Dequashia”)1had a daughter, T.C., who was six 

years old at the time. Darrius Copeland (“appellant”) is Dequashia’s brother. 

The victim and Dequashia had been in a relationship, but that relationship had ended 

when T.C. was four or five years old. T.C. lived with Dequashia. At first, the victim and 

Dequashia had an informal custody arrangement, but they later went to court to determine 

custody arrangements. Dequashia and the victim had a custody agreement where the victim 

would get the child at certain periods, including a two-week visitation in both July and August. 

According to Croskey, the court further ordered that T.C. be exchanged in neutral locations 

because the victim and Dequashia had “a terrible relationship.” Croskey observed the victim and 

Dequashia argue during one exchange. 

In July 2016, the victim did not have T.C. for his two-week July visitation because 

Dequashia would not allow the child to go for her visitation. T.C. started her two-week August 

visitation with the victim on August 12, 2016. During this visitation, and while at Croskey’s 

house, T.C. often spoke with Dequashia via cell phone.

On August 18, 2016, the victim and Dequashia had a scheduled court date on the victim’s 

motion to reduce his child support obligation to her. The day prior to this scheduled court date, 

August 17, 2016, the victim came home from work around 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. and was going to go 

pick up his other daughter. T.C. called Dequashia and told her that she did not want to 

accompany the victim on this trip. With the cell phone on speaker phone, Croskey heard 

1 Because appellant’s sister has the same last name as appellant, we refer to her by her 

first name to provide clarity. 
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Dequashia tell T.C. that she did not have to go with the victim. The victim also heard this 

conversation, and stated, “She’s my daughter, too, and if I want to take her with me, I can do 

that.” In response, Dequashia, while on speaker phone, told him, “I’m going to have somebody 

kill you.”2 The victim then took the cell phone from T.C., took it off speaker phone, and “really 

started arguing” with Dequashia.

About twenty minutes later, around 5:00 p.m., Officer Brian Justice of the Chesapeake 

Police Department arrived at Croskey’s home to conduct a “wellness check” on T.C. Dequashia 

had called police and reported that T.C. had called her, “hysterical and crying,” to say that the 

victim had been “threatening to beat her up.” During the wellness check, which lasted about ten 

minutes, Justice did not observe any injuries on T.C. and decided not to take any action in 

relation to Dequashia’s call. Dequashia “seemed agitated and unsatisfied with [Justice’s]

handling of the situation” when the officer reported his findings to her. Dequashia told Justice 

that she wanted him to remove T.C. from Croskey’s home and return the child to her. The 

officer responded that he could not do that because Dequashia had to abide by the terms of the 

custody agreement.

After Officer Justice left Croskey’s residence, the victim left to pick up his other daughter

and told Croskey that he would be right back. Croskey then heard gunshots, opened the front 

door, and found the victim lying on the doorstep. When police arrived, they found the victim in 

this location and saw that he was suffering from multiple gunshot wounds. Police also found .45 

caliber cartridge casings near the front doorway of the house. Testing revealed that the casings 

were all fired from the same firearm. The victim died while being transported to the hospital. 

2 At trial, appellant objected to the introduction of this statement as hearsay. The trial 

court overruled the objection, finding that the statement was not hearsay because it was offered 

to show appellant’s motive rather than for the truth of the matter asserted. 
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At around 5:30 p.m. that evening, a neighbor of Croskey’s heard three gunshots. The 

neighbor had a security camera at his home and provided the video from that evening to police. 

The video was played for the jury. 

The security video shows a silver vehicle stopping a few blocks from the victim’s home 

at 5:27 p.m. A person dressed all in black got out of the car, which then made a U turn. Another 

neighbor of Croskey’s testified that the car stopped again after driving a short distance. The 

security video then shows the person in black walking down the street for about a block before 

turning onto another street in the direction of Croskey’s house. A few minutes later, the security 

video shows the person running away from Croskey’s house and retracing the path they had 

taken just minutes before. 

Shawn Marshall, who lived a few houses down from Croskey, is visible on the security 

video when he arrives home in his car. In the video, Marshall arrives after the person in black 

has walked toward Croskey’s house but before that person has run back. Marshall testified that 

before he got out of his car, he heard gunshots. Immediately after hearing the gunshots, Marshall 

saw a “[s]lender guy with all black on, black hat, black shirt with braids” running away down the 

street. At trial, Marshall stated that the individual seen running in the video was “consistent 

with” the person he saw immediately after he heard the gunshots.

Croskey testified that the person wearing all black in the security video was appellant. 

Croskey had “[n]o doubt” it was appellant because he “ha[d] a distinctive walk . . . like a gallop 

in a sense.” She also identified the silver vehicle as belonging to Devin Copeland, the brother of 

appellant and Dequashia.

That same evening, at about 5:30 p.m., John Allen saw a vehicle stopped near his home, 

which was “off to the left” several streets over from the shooting. Allen thought that the car had 

“broke[n] down.” Two men got out of the car and “jogged off.”
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Around 7:30 p.m. the evening of the shooting, a police officer saw a silver Dodge Stratus 

stopped near Allen’s house which appeared to have the same hubcap and rim as the vehicle 

shown in the security video. Police determined that the car was registered to Devin Copeland, 

who later that evening came to the car’s location near Allen’s house to ask about the vehicle. 

Police found a cigarette butt in the passenger side front door handle of the car. Appellant could 

not be eliminated as a major contributor to the DNA mixture found on the cigarette butt. Police 

found another car parked next to the Dodge Stratus, and inside this vehicle they found 

appellant’s wallet and driver’s license.

After the shooting, Officer Justice received a message from Dequashia asking him to call 

her. When he called her, Dequashia was “much calmer” than during the call earlier that day. 

Justice reported that Dequashia “wished to know if she still needed to follow the guidelines of 

the custody agreement or if she could come and pick up [T.C.].” She told Justice that she was 

asking because either T.C. or a neighbor had said that something had happened to the victim. 

She did not ask Justice what had happened to the victim.

After the Commonwealth rested, appellant moved to strike the evidence, which the court 

denied. Appellant presented no evidence, and then renewed his motion to strike, which the court 

again denied. 

The jury found appellant guilty of first-degree murder and use of a firearm in the 

commission of a felony. Following trial, appellant filed motions to set aside the verdict and for a 

new trial. The trial court denied those motions. This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to strike and to set aside 

the verdict because the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. 
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On appeal, when reviewing a sufficiency challenge, “an appellate court considers the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party below, and 

reverses the judgment of the trial court only when its decision is plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it.” Ellis v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 385, 387 (2019) (quoting Marshall 

v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 648, 652-53 (2019)). Further, “[i]f there is evidence to support 

the conviction[], the reviewing court [may not] substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion 

might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.” Rams v. 

Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 12, 28 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Clark v. 

Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636, 641 (2010)). 

Appellant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the person who 

shot the victim. He asserts that the evidence merely created a suspicion or probability that he 

committed the offense, and also failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, 

including that someone other than appellant shot the victim.

“At trial, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the identity of the accused as 

the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cuffee v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 353, 364 

(2013) (quoting Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 412, 423 (2003)). Identity may be 

proved by circumstantial evidence. Crawley v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 372, 375 (1999). 

This category of evidence “is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence.”

Breeden v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 169, 177 (2004) (quoting Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 

Va. 31, 53 (1983)). “[W]hile no single piece of evidence may be sufficient, the combined force of 

many concurrent and related circumstances . . . may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a 

conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Moseley, 293 Va. 455, 463 (2017) (second alteration in original) 

(quoting Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 479 (2005)). However, “circumstantial 

evidence [must be] sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of 
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guilt.” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 629 (2019) (quoting Pijor v. Commonwealth, 

294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)).

Contrary to appellant’s argument, the circumstantial evidence in this case was sufficient to

support the jury’s conclusion that he was the criminal agent in the shooting of the victim.

Notably, the Commonwealth’s evidence placed appellant in close proximity to the crime 

scene both immediately before and after the shooting. Appellant was recorded walking toward 

Croskey’s house at 5:27 p.m. Within minutes, the victim was fatally shot in front of Croskey’s 

home, and appellant was recorded fleeing from the crime scene. Appellant could not be eliminated 

as a contributor to the DNA profile that was found in his brother’s car and his driver’s license was 

found in a car parked next to his brother’s, allowing for the reasonable inference that appellant fled to 

this area following the shooting but was unable to drive away in his brother’s car, which appeared to 

be “broken down.” It is well established that “[f]light following the commission of a crime is 

evidence of guilt.” Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79, 93 (1996); see also Jones v. 

Commonwealth, 279 Va. 52, 58 (2010) (explaining that flight from a crime scene “generally cannot 

be explained in terms of innocent human behavior” and therefore “a court may consider [such flight]

in the context of all the facts presented as evidence tending to show the defendant’s consciousness of 

guilt of the crime committed”). 

In addition, Dequashia, appellant’s sister, had “a terrible relationship” with the victim, the 

father of her child. The day following the shooting, Dequashia and the victim had a court date

scheduled regarding the victim’s request to lower his child support payment. During an argument the

same day of the shooting, Dequashia threatened to have someone kill the victim due to disagreements 

they had regarding their child, appellant’s niece. After the shooting, Dequashia seemed “much 

calmer” when talking to police and asked if “she still needed to follow the guidelines of the custody 

agreement.” The jury, as fact finder, could have reasonably inferred that appellant carried out his 

sister’s threat and shot the victim on her behalf. 
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Viewed in totality, the circumstantial evidence of appellant’s presence at and then flight from 

the crime scene, together with his motive, was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

was the criminal agent of the offenses.

However, appellant contends that the evidence failed to exclude the reasonable possibility 

that someone other than he shot the victim. Although appellant offers a hypothesis of innocence, the 

Commonwealth “is not required to disprove every remote possibility of innocence, but is, instead, 

required only to establish guilt of the accused to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.” Cantrell v. 

Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 269, 289 (1988) (quoting Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 

523, 526-27 (1986)); see also McCary v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 119, 127 (2003) (observing 

that the Commonwealth need only “exclude reasonable hypotheses of innocence that flow from 

circumstantial evidence”). In addition, “[b]y finding the defendant guilty, . . . the factfinder ‘has 

found by a process of elimination that the evidence does not contain a reasonable theory of 

innocence.’” James v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 671, 681 (2009) (quoting Haskins v. 

Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 9 (2004)). That conclusion “is itself a ‘question of fact,’ subject to 

deferential appellate review.” Id. Here, the jury rejected the appellant’s contention that another 

person shot the victim. Because the jury, sitting as fact finder, could have concluded that appellant’s 

hypothesis of innocence was unreasonable in light of the incriminating circumstantial evidence of his 

guilt, we will not disturb the jury’s finding on appeal.

Appellant further argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the element of 

premeditation necessary for first-degree murder and that at most the evidence was sufficient to 

support a conviction for second-degree murder. He contends that the evidence failed to establish that 

he had formed a specific intent to kill.

Code § 18.2-32 provides, in pertinent part, that “[m]urder . . . by any willful, deliberate, and 

premeditated killing . . . is murder of the first degree, punishable as a Class 2 felony.” 

Premeditation, or the “adopt[ion] [of] a specific intent to kill . . . is what distinguishes first[-] and 
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second[-]degree murder.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 259 (1990) (quoting Rhodes v. 

Commonwealth, 238 Va. 480, 485 (1989)). Although the accused need not have planned the killing 

for any specific period of time, “[t]he intent to kill must come into existence at some time before the 

killing.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 696, 700 (1980).

“Premeditation and formation of an intent to kill seldom can be proved by direct evidence. A 

combination of circumstantial factors may be sufficient.” Betancourt v. Commonwealth, 26 

Va. App. 363, 373 (1998) (quoting Rhodes, 238 Va. at 486). “Whether a killing was accidental or 

intentional and premeditated is a question of fact and, absent eyewitness testimony or a voluntary 

confession, that question necessarily turns upon the import of circumstantial evidence.” Edmonds v. 

Commonwealth, 229 Va. 303, 308 (1985). Relevant factors to determining premeditation and the 

intent to kill include “the brutality of an attack . . . [and] efforts to avoid detection.” Aldridge v. 

Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 618, 655-56 (2004). “Also, although ‘motive is not an essential 

element of the crime, it is relevant and often most persuasive upon the question of the actor’s 

intent.’” Id. at 656 (quoting Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 232 (1982)).

As recited above, in the instant case, appellant was recorded walking with deliberation 

toward Croskey’s home. Within minutes, appellant shot the victim several times and killed him. 

Appellant immediately fled from the crime scene to his brother’s waiting car. The victim and 

Dequashia, appellant’s sister, had a contentious relationship, and she threatened to have someone 

kill him. Based on these facts, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable 

doubt that appellant shot and killed the victim with premeditation and therefore he was guilty of 

first-degree murder.

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove that appellant was the criminal agent in 

the shooting of the victim. In addition, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the 
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finding that appellant premeditated the victim’s murder. Consequently, we affirm the judgment 

of the trial court.

Affirmed.