IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS BARNES, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) No. 20-cv-2137

)

ROB JEFFREYS, in his official ) Hon. Virginia M. Kendall

capacity as the Director of the Illinois )

Department of Corrections, )

)

Defendant. )

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR 

PROPOSED PERMANENT INJUNCTION ORDER

On September 20, 2021, this court granted Plaintiffs’ request for a permanent 

injunction. ECF 137. The court asked the parties to prepare and submit a proposed 

order. Id. The parties have conferred and are in substantial agreement regarding 

the language of a proposed order.1 The parties’ respective drafts are attached hereto 

as Exhibits 1 (Plaintiffs’ Proposal) and 2 (Defendant’s Proposal). Despite the parties’ 

good faith efforts to reach an agreement, they remain in dispute over the proposed 

language. The parties’ dispute concerns only a single sentence in the entire 

proposed order. The particular sentence in dispute reads as follows: 

IDOC retains the discretion to deny sex offenders release to host sites 

deemed unsafe or likely to impede the sex offender’s rehabilitation.

Plaintiffs object to this language being included; Defendant is committed to its 

inclusion. Plaintiffs explain below why they object to the inclusion of this language.

1 Defendant has reviewed and commented on the language of the proposed order, but does 

not agree to entry of a permanent injunction. 
2

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs object to inclusion of this language for four reasons.

First, is improper for a court to include language in a permanent injunction that 

does not address the particular violation that is the subject of the injunction. See 

Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1977) (“The well-settled principle that the 

nature and scope of the remedy are to be determined by the violation means simply 

that federal-court decrees must directly address and relate to the constitutional 

violation itself.”); id. at 280 (“The remedy must therefore be related to the condition 

alleged to offend the Constitution.”) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, the disputed language goes beyond the particular dispute of this litigation. 

This lawsuit concerns whether the IDOC can continue to enforce 730 ILCS 5/3-3-

7(a)(7.6) (the “One-Per-Address Statute”), a section of the Illinois Uniform Code of 

Corrections which prohibits an individual on parole or MSR for a sex offense from 

living “at the same address or in the same condominium unit or apartment unit or 

in the same condominium complex or apartment complex with another person he or 

she knows or reasonably should know is a convicted sex offender or has been placed 

on supervision for a sex offense.” The disputed sentence, however, goes well beyond 

the question of the constitutionality of the One-Per-Address Statute. It addresses

the power accorded the IDOC to review and approve host sites more generally. The 

discretion IDOC retains to deny host sites for reasons other than the presence of 

another registrant at the same address is a matter set forth in other sections of the 
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Code of Corrections that will be unaffected by any order entered by the court in this 

case.

Second, Plaintiffs object to the inclusion of the disputed language because the 

scope of the IDOC’s discretion to reject host sites is presently in dispute in Murphy

v. Raoul, 16-cv-11471. In particular, Plaintiffs have raised concerns regarding the 

propriety of the Department of Corrections’ vesting sex offender therapists with the 

authority to reject proposed host sites that are compliant with the restrictions 

imposed by Illinois law on the sole basis that a therapist believes a site to be 

“unsuitable,” “not an appropriate environment,” or likely to “increase the risk of reoffense.” See 16-cv-11471, ECF Nos. 179, 194, 216 (Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Rule to 

Show Cause and supporting briefing). The effect of including the disputed language 

would be to resolve this important and disputed legal question in Defendant’s favor.

Third, the inclusion of this disputed language in the permanent injunction order 

runs the risk of causing confusion and would seem to give powers to the IDOC that 

the lawsuit was meant to restrain—i.e., the power to deny release to a host site 

because in the individual judgment of a parole agent or therapist it isn’t appropriate 

or desirable to have more than one registrant residing at the same address. 

Finally, the disputed language is redundant of language already included in the 

proposed order (see bullet point 3), which makes clear that all proposed host sites 

must meet the requirements imposed by “the applicable provisions of the Illinois 

Criminal Code, the Illinois Code of Corrections, and/or any other applicable laws, 

regulations, and policies and procedures” and must still undergo the IDOC’s normal 
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investigation and approval process. Indeed, the language that Plaintiffs have 

suggested exactly replicates the language that has been included in the Court’s 20 

previous preliminary injunction orders. See, e.g., ECF 134, Order Granting 

Plaintiffs’ 20th Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, at 3 (“The release of the aboveidentified class members is subject to the approval of the host, program operator, or 

landlord at each housing location; and subject to the proposed housing locations 

otherwise being approved by IDOC as meeting all requirements and satisfying 

applicable provisions of Illinois law.”); Ex. 1, Plaintiff’s Proposed Order (“Approval 

of proposed host sites is subject to acceptance by the host, program operator, or 

landlord; and subject to the proposed housing locations’ otherwise being approved 

by IDOC as meeting all requirements and satisfying applicable provisions of Illinois 

law.”)

For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter a 

permanent injunction consistent with Plaintiffs’ proposed order, attached hereto as 

Exhibit 1. 

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Adele D. Nicholas

/s/ Mark G. Weinberg 

Counsel for Plaintiffs 

Law Office of Adele D. Nicholas

5707 W. Goodman Street

Chicago, Illinois 60630

(847) 361-3869

adele@civilrightschicago.com
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Law Office of Mark G. Weinberg

3612 N. Tripp Avenue

Chicago, Illinois 60641

(773) 283-3913

mweinberg@sbcglobal.net