alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
II

Calendar No. 262

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H.R. 681

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER 22, 1997

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Governmental Affairs

NOVEMBER 6, 1997

Reported by Mr. THOMPSON, without amendment

AN ACT

To designate the United States Post Office building located

at 313 East Broadway in Glendale, California, as the

‘‘Carlos J. Moorhead Post Office Building’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

4 The United States Post Office building located at 313

5 East Broadway in Glendale, California, shall be known

6 and designated as the ‘‘Carlos J. Moorhead Post Office

7 Building’’.
2

•HR 681 RS

1 SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

2 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document,

3 paper, or other record of the United States to the building

4 referred to in section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference

5 to the ‘‘Carlos J. Moorhead Post Office Building’’.

Passed the House of Representatives October 21,

1997.

Attest: ROBIN H. CARLE,

Clerk.

Calendar No. 262

105TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H.R. 681

AN ACT

To designate the United States Post Office building

Building’’.fornia, as the ‘‘Carlos J. Moorhead Post Officelocated at 313 East Broadway in Glendale, CaliNOVEMBER 6, 1997

Reported without amendment
9486.

#### Davis *v.*The State.

Decided April, 2, 1918.

Indictment for burglary; from Houston "superior court—Judge Mathews. December 15, 1917.

Beoyies, P. J.

1. When considered *in*connection with its context, the excerpt from the charge of the court, to which exception was taken, was not erroneous for the reason assigned.

2. The evidence authorized a finding that the storehouse *Jin*question had been broken into and entered.

3. The verdict was supported *by*the evidence, and the court did *pot' err*in refusing a new trial.

' *Judgment affirmed.*

*Bloodworth and Harwell, JJ., concur.*

*120
      *B. N. Poltzclaw,*for plaintiff in error.

*John P. Boss, solicitor-general,*contra;'
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 32.2

                           CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                            18 U.S. SECTION 1350, AS
                         ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned chief financial officer of Tom's
Foods Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies, to his knowledge, that:

(1) the Company's quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the twelve weeks ended June
19, 2004 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly represents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of
and for the periods presented in the Report.

Dated: August 3, 2004



                                   /s/ Sharon M. Sanders
                                   --------------------------------------------
                                   Name:  Sharon M. Sanders
                                   Title: Acting Chief Financial Officer
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard A. Leister,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. R. Bard Inc. and Bard Peripheral 

Vascular, Inc.,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

MDL Case No. 2:15-md-02641-DGC

Civil Action No. CV-17-03414-PHX-DGC

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Freese & Goss PLLC - Birmingham, AL

(Name of plaintiff’s attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two 

copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court’s 

jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 

60 days from 10/23/2017, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail 

to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: October 26, 2017 /s/ Richard B. North, Jr.

Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

C. R. Bard, Inc. and Bard Peripheral

Vascular, Inc.

Printed name of parties waiving service of 

summons

Richard B. North, Jr. (Ga. Bar No. 545599)

Printed Name

Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, LLP

201 17th St., NW, Suite 1700, Atlantic Station, Atlanta, GA 30363

Address

richard.north@nelsonmullins.com

E-mail Address

(404) 322-6155

Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a 

summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff 

located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure. 

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8540 Filed 11/02/17 Page 1 of 2
2

“Good cause” does not include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has 

no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant’s property. 

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of 

a summons or of service. 

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the 

plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been 

served.

Case 2:15-md-02641-DGC Document 8540 Filed 11/02/17 Page 2 of 2
9556.

#### Baldwin State Bank *v.*National Bank of Athens.

Decided October 22, 1918.

Bloodworth, J.

Applying to the facts on the last trial of this case the rulings of the Supreme Court when the case was before that tribunal (144 Ga. 181), the trial judge did not err in directing a verdict for the plaintiff.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Harwell, J., conour.*

*736Complaint; from Banks superior court—Judge Cobb. February 2, 1918.

*J. J, & Sam Kimzey,*for plaintiff in error.

W. *M.*Smith, *T. S. Mell,*contra.
9989.

#### Jenkins *v.*The State.

Decided November 1, 1918.

Accusation, of violation of prohibition law; from city court of .Thomasville—Judge *W.*H. Hammond. July '8, 1918.

*J. M. Austin,*for plaintiff in error.

*II. J. MacIntyre, solicitor,*contra.

Bloodworth, J.

This ease was tried by the judge without a jury. There is evidence to authorize the finding of guilty, and the judgment must be

*Affirmed.*

*Broyles, P. J., and Harwell, J., concur.*
Exhibit 99.1

Annual Statement of
ComplianceProtective Life Secured Trust 2004-23 (the "Trust")

I, Millie
Cicero, a duly elected and acting officer of The Bank of New York ("Indenture Trustee"), do hereby certify on
behalf of the Indenture Trustee, that:

1.     I
have reviewed and examined the performance by the Indenture Trustee of the
collection and distribution of trust money pursuant to
Section 5.02 and, if applicable, Section 6.06 of the Indenture
pursuant to which the Trust's notes (the "Notes") were issued during the fiscal year
ending December 31, 2004 (the "Relevant
Year"); and

2.     Based
upon my review and examination described in 1 above, and except as provided in the Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm, dated March 30, 2005, prepared by the Trust's
independent registered public accounting firm in accordance with Section 10 of the Expense and Indemnity
Agreement, to the best of my knowledge, the collection of payments on the funding agreements and distribution of payments to noteholders
pursuant to Section 5.02 and, if applicable, Section 6.06 of the
Indenture was performed in a satisfactory manner in all material respects
throughout the Relevant Year.

THE BANK OF NEW YORK, as Indenture Trustee

|By: |  | /s/MILLIE CICERO
      Name:  Millie
      CiceroTitle:    Assistant Treasurer |  |  |  | 
|--- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |  |  |  | 

Date:  March 30, 2005
Order entered October 2 1, 2019

In The



## Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 19

- 00512

- CR

NIJEL JOHNSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 194th Judi cial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F 15

- 14038

- M



### O RDER

Before the Court is appellant’s October 17, 2019 motion to extend the time to file

appellant’s brief. We GRANT the motion and ORDER appellant’s brief filed on or before

Nove mber 18, 2019.

/s/ CORY L. CARLYLE

JUSTICE
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#### Joel Parker *v.*Joseph Milton.

Sale — Not Absolute, but Construed as Mortgage — Eight of Redemption.

A sale for a grossly inadequate price, for the exact amount of the execution levied, and that both parties regarded the debtor had a right to redeem the land, held to constitute a mortgage and not an absolute, unconditional sale.

APPEAL FROM WEBSTER COMMON PLEAS COURT.

March 4, 1870.

Opinion of the Court by

Judge Williams:

The illiterate and.ignorant character of appellee, together with the great inadequacy of the consideration of $224, for a tract of land- proved to be worth, at the time, from $1,500 to $2,000, in *695connection, with, the fact that appellant was one of the execution creditors who had the land levied on, and the $224 being the precise amount of the execution then levied, with the still more pregnant fact that both parties regarded the land as redeemable, rather that Milton had the right to redeem the land, shows that the sale was not an absolute unconditional one, .and in all such cases the law and the courts construe the transaction to be ,a mortgage rather than an absolute sale with a mere reserved right of redemption within a given time, and especially when the relation of debtor and creditor existed at the time. This view of the case is made the more imposing from a total absence of any proof as to the conditions or time within which Milton could redeem the land, sufficiently appears, but when and how do not. therefore the law will presume it was a mortgage under all the facts appearing, however -honest may have been appellant’s motive. His inability to show when and how Milton was to redeem may be regarded as more a misfortune than any bad motive, still, in the absence of these essential facts appearing, the law will regard it as a mortgage and compel him to receive back his money with interest; nor can the execution of the rent notes by Milton, under the circumstances alleged in his amended petition, which was not answered nor controverted, rescue the transaction from the legal presumption that it was a mortgage.

Vance, *for appellant.*

Givens, *for appellee.*

Wherefore, the judgment is *affirmed.*
#### James G. Arnold *v.*Louis Hall.

Deeds.

Execution, delivery and acknowledgment by officer of bank. Adverse possession sufficiently established.

APPEAL EROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT.

April 11, 1871.

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Lindsay:

The possessory title of the Bank of the United States to the lot of land in controversy was, we think, sufficiently established by *580proof of actual possession, held continuously for more than twenty years by said bank and its vendor, Biddle.

*O'Hara, for appellant.*

*Benton, for appellee.*

The deed from Biddle, the president of the bank, to Chester and Mansfield, executed in 1835, and probably acknowledged before an alderman of the city of Philadelphia (section 4, of an Act to amend the laws regulating conveyances, approved January 15th, 1831, Statute Laws, volume 2, page 450), and if such acknowledgement were not sufficient the execution of said deed is amply proven by the witnesses, Kirby and Mansfield, the latter of whom was made a cempetent witness by the release of Hall.

The execution and delivery of the deed from Ames and wife to Hall was clearly proven by the subscribing witness. Yenton, and being thus proved it was admitted as evidence of Hall’s title as against Arnold. Allen, &c., vs. Trimble, 4 Bibb 21.

We, therefore, conclude that the evidence is sufficient to uphold the verdict of the jury, and it only remains to enquire whether or not the instructions of the court to the jury were correct. Instructions Nos. 1, 2 and 3, given at the instance of Hall, as qualified by instruction No. 3, given upon the motion of Arnold, are, in our opinion, unobjectionable. Instruction No. 2, asked for by Arnold, was properly refused, and instruction No. 1 was also properly refused in view of the fact that No. 3 stated the law upon the subject of actual adverse possession far more accurately and with greater clearness.

There appears to be no error in the record prejudicial to the substantial rights of appellant.

Wherefore, the judgment is affirmed.
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# Providing an Order of Succession Within the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service

# Memorandum for the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service

                        By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 5 U.S.C. 3345*et seq.*                         (the “Act”), it is hereby ordered that:                    

**Section 1**                        .                         *Order of Succession.*                         Subject to the provisions of section 2 of this memorandum, and to the limitations set forth in the Act, the following officials of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, in the order listed, shall act as and perform the functions and duties of the office of the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (Director), during any period in which the Director has died, resigned, or otherwise become unable to perform the functions and duties of the office of Director:                    

(a) Deputy Director, Mediation Services and Field Programs;

(b) Deputy Director, National and International Programs;

(c) Director of Field Operations; and

(d) Most senior Director of Mediation Services (seniority being defined as the individual with the longest tenure in the position of Director of Mediation Services).

**Sec. 2**                        .                         *Exceptions.*                         (a) No individual who is serving in an office listed in section 1 of this memorandum in an acting capacity, by virtue of so serving, shall act as Director pursuant to this memorandum.                    

(b) No individual listed in section 1 of this memorandum shall act as Director unless that individual is otherwise eligible to so serve under the Act.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of this memorandum, the President retains discretion, to the extent permitted by law, to depart from this memorandum in designating an acting Director.

**Sec. 3**                        .                         *General Provisions.*                         (a) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.                    

                        (b) You are authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the                         *Federal Register*.                    

[FR Doc. 2014-25564

Billing code 6732-01
NO. 12-09-00184-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

KEVIN BENTI DAVIS, JR., § APPEAL FROM THE 217TH

APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE § ANGELINA COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

This appeal is being dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Appellant was convicted of

aggravated robbery. Sentence was imposed on May 11, 2009.

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.2 provides that an appeal is perfected when notice of

appeal is filed within thirty days after the day sentence is imposed orsuspended in open court unless

a motion for new trial is timely filed. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1). Where a timely motion for new

trial has been filed, notice of appeal shall be filed within ninety days after the sentence is imposed

or suspended in open court. TEX.R.APP.P. 26.2(a)(2). Appellant did not file a motion for new trial.

Therefore, his notice of appeal was due to have been filed on or before June 10, 2009. However,

Appellant did not file his notice of appeal until June 11, 2009, and did not file a motion for extension

of time to file his notice of appeal as permitted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 26.3 (appellate court may extend time for filing notice of appeal if, within fifteen days

after deadline for filing notice of appeal, appellant files notice of appeal in trial court and motion

complying with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 10.5(b) in appellate court).

By letter dated June 17, 2009, this court notified Appellant that the information received in

this appeal does not show the jurisdiction of the court because there was no notice of appeal filed

within the time allowed by rule 26.2 and no timely motion for an extension of time to file the notice
2

of appeal as permitted by rule 26.3. Appellant was warned that the appeal would be dismissed unless

the record was amended on or before June 29, 2009 to show the jurisdiction of this court. However,

Appellant did not comply with or otherwise respond to this court’s June 17, 2009 notice.

Because this court has no authority to allow the late filing of a notice of appeal except as

provided by rule 26.3, the appeal must be dismissed. See Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1998); Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Accordingly, the

appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 

Opinion delivered July 8, 2009.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**Section 906 Certification**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER OR**

**PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICERPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

In connectionwith the accompanying Form 10-Q of Fog Cutter Capital Group Inc. for the sixmonths ended June 30, 2004, I, Donald J. Berchtold, Chief Executive Officer ofFog Cutter Capital Group Inc., hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, asadopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1) such Form10-Q for the six months ended June 30, 2004 fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

 

(2) theinformation contained in such Form 10-Q for the six months ended June 30, 2004fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of Fog Cutter Capital Group Inc.

 

This writtenstatement is being furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission as anexhibit to such Form 10-Q.

 

 
| August 16,  2004 |   | /s/  Donald J. Berchtold |   |
|------------------|--------|-------------------------------|--------|
| Date             |   | Donald J.  Berchtold          |
|             |   | Chief  Executive Officer      |

 

 

A signedoriginal of this written statement required by § 906 has been provided to theCompany and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities andExchange Commission or its staff upon request.

 

----