F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

A N G E L L O P E Z -V A L E

N Z U E L A ; I S A A C C A S T R O

- A R M E N T A , Plaintiffs-Appellants
,

v

.

J O S E P H M. A R

P A I O , Maricopa County Sheriff, in his official capacity ; C O U

N T Y O F M A R

I C O P A ; W I L L I A M G E R

A R D M O N T G O M E R

Y , Maricopa County

Attorney , in his official capacity
,

Defendants-Appellees

. N o. 11-16487

D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00660- SRB

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na Susan R. B olton, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted En B anc March 18, 2014—San F rancisco, California

F iled October 15, 2014

B efore: Alex Koz inski, Chief J udg e, and Diarmuid O’Scannlain, Sidney

R. Thomas, M. Marg aret McKeown, Ray mond C. F isher, Marsha S. B erz on, Richard C. Tallman, J ay S. B y

bee, Milan D. Smith, J r., J acqueline H. N g uy en, and Paul J . W atford, Circuit J udg es.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 2

Opinion by J udg e F isher; Concurrence by

J u dg e Ng uy en; Dissent by

J udg e Tallman; Dissent by

J udg e O’Scannlain

SUMMARY *

Civil Rights

The en banc court reve rsed the district court’s summary judg ment in a class action challeng ing Proposit i o n 1 00, a ballot measure passed by Ariz ona voters t h a t amended the
state constitution to preclude b ail for certain seri o u s felony offenses if the person charg ed has e n tered or remained in the U n i t e d States illeg ally and if the proof is evident or t h e presumption g reat as to the charg e.

The en b anc court held that Propositi o n 1 00, a nd its i mplementing laws a

nd rules, v iolate the substan t i v e component of the Due Process Clause of the Fo urteenth Amendment. Apply ing the heig htened substantive d ue process scrutiny set f

orth in United States v. Salerno
, 481 U.S. 739, 746-48 (1987), the e n banc court held that the Proposi tion 100 laws d o not a ddress an e stablished “particularly acute pr o b l e m ,” are not limited to “a specific categ ory of ex tremely serious offenses,” and do not afford the individualiz e d determination of flig ht risk or dang erousness that Sa l e rno deemed essential. Rather, the laws represent a scattershot attempt at addressing f lig h t risk and are not

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 3

narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. I n addition, the en banc court held that the challeng ed laws are e x cessive in relation to the state’s leg itimate interest in assur i n g arrestees’ presence for trial.

Concurring , J udg e Ng uy en ag reed with the majority that Proposition 100 violates substantive due process. She wrote separately to address the record of leg islative intent, which she believed demonstrates that Propos i t i o n 100 was intentionally d

rafted to punish u ndocumented immig rants for their “illeg al” status, e ven if they pose no flig ht risk or d a ng er to the community

. Dissenting
, J u d g e Tallman, joined by J udg e O’Scannlain,

s tated that Proposition 100 is not ex cessive in relati o n t o Ariz ona’s c ompelling reg ulatory int e r est in ensuring that illeg al aliens who commit serious f elony offenses stand trial.

Dissenting
, J udg e O’Scannlain stated that the question o f whether deny ing b ail to illeg a l immig ra n t s based on flig ht risk is unconstitut i o n a lly ex cessive should h ave been analy z ed under the Eig hth Amendment’s Ex cess ive B ail Clause. J u dg e O’Scannlain tentatively con c l u ded that the Eig hth Amendment does not restrict leg islative d iscretion to declare certain crimes nonbailable.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 4

COUNSEL

Andre I

. Seg ura and Esha B handari, American Civil L iberties Union F oundation, I mmig r ants’ Rig hts Project, New York, New York; Cecillia D. Wang ( arg u ed) and Kenneth J

. Sug arman, American Civil L i berties Union F oundation, I mmig r a nts’ Rig h t s P r o

j e c t , San F rancisco, California; Daniel Pochoda, ACL U F oundation o f Ariz ona, Phoenix
, Ariz ona, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Timothy J

. Casey ( arg ued), Schmitt Schneck Smy th Casey & E v en, P.C., Phoenix
, Ariz o na, for Defendants-Appelle e s Maricopa County

and J oseph M. Arpaio.

B ruce P

. W h i t e and Anne C. L o n g o, Deputy County Attorney s, Maricopa County Civil Se rvices D ivision, Phoenix
, Ariz ona, for Defendant-Appellee Maricopa County Attorney W illiam Montg omery

. Anthony O’Rourke, Associate Professor, SUNY B uf f a lo L aw School, for Amici Curiae Constitutional Crimi n a l L aw a nd I mmig r a tion L aw Professors.

Kathleen E. B rody
, Osborn Maledon, P

. A., Phoenix
, Ariz o na; Amy Kalman and Mikel Steinfeld, Off i c e of the Maricopa County Public Defender, Phoenix , Ariz o na; David Euchner, Office o f the Pima County Public Defender, Tucson, Ariz ona, for Amicus Curiae Ariz ona Attorney s for Criminal J ustice.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 5

OP INION

F I SHER, Circuit Ju d g e , w ith whom KOZ I NSKI
, Chief J udg e , and THOMAS, McKEOW N, B E R Z O N
, B YB EE, M. SMI TH and NGUYEN, Circuit J udg es, j o in in full, and w ith whom W A TF ORD, Circuit J udg e, joins ex cept as to section I I I .B .2:

Ariz ona law c ateg orically forbids g ranting u n d ocumented immig rants a

r r e s t ed for a wide r ang e of felony offenses any form of bail or pretrial release, even if the particular arrestee is not a f lig h t risk or dang erous. W e must decide whether such an absolute d e n ial comports with the su b s t antive

c o mponent of the Due Process Clause of the F ourteenth Amendment. W e hold that it does not.

I.

I n 2006, Ariz ona voter s o verwhelming ly a pproved an amendment to their state constitution k n o w n as Proposition 100. 1 Proposition 100 mandates that A r iz ona state courts may not set b ail “[ f] or serious felony o f f e n s es as prescribed by t h e l e g islature if the person charg ed has entered o r remained in the United States i l l eg ally and if the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the present charg e.” Ariz

. Con s t

. a rt

. 2, § 22(A)(4). I n a separate e nactment, the Ariz ona leg i s l ature defined “serious felony offenses” as any class 1, 2, 3 or 4 felony or a ggr a v a t ed driving

- under-theinfluence offense. S

ee Ariz

. Rev. Sta t

. Ann. § 13- 3961(A)(5)(b).

1 T h e Ar i zo n a leg islatu

re p assed th e leg islatio n an d ref erred it to th e

v o ters in May

2 00 5

. T h e v oters ap p ro v ed Pro p o sitio n 1 0 0 in No v em ber 2 0 0 6

.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 6

The Proposition 100 b ail determination is made at an initial appearance, which under Ariz o na law occurs within 24 h o u r s o f a

rrest. See Ariz

. R. Crim. P. 4.1(a). At the initi al
appearance, the court must deny bail, irrespective of whether the arrestee poses a flig ht r isk or a dang er to the community
,

“ i f the c ourt finds (1) that the proof is evident or the
p r esumption g reat that the person committed a seriou s offense, and (2) probable cause that the person en t er e d o r remained in the United States illeg a l l y

. ” A riz

. R. Crim. P. 7.2(b). An arrestee deemed inelig ible f or bail at the initial
ap p e a r an c e may move for reex amination, a nd a hearing on such motion “shall be h eld on the r e cord as soon a s practicable but not later than seve n d a y s after filing of the motion.” A r i z

. R. Crim. P. 7.4(b). At the follow-up proceeding
, k

nown as a Simpson/Segura heari n g , s e e S i m pson

v. Owens
, 85 P.3d 4 78 (Ari z

. C t

. App. 2004); Segura v

. Cunanan
, 196 P.3d 831 (Ariz

. Ct. App

. 2 0 0 8), the arrestee

can dispute whether there is p robable ca u s e t hat he or she entered or remained in the U nited States i l l e ga l l y , but may not refute Proposition 100’s irrebuttable presumption that he

or she poses an unmanag eable flig ht risk. Onc e t h e court determines that there is probable cause to believe an arrestee has entered or remained in the United States unlawfully
, the
court h as no discretion to r elease the arre stee under any circumstances, even if t h e court would find

– and the state would conced e – that the particular arrestee does not pose a flig ht risk or dang er to the community

.

I n 2008, plaintiffs Ang el L opez

- Valenz uela and I saac Castro-Armenta filed a class action complaint against Maricopa County
, the Marico p a C o u nty Sheriff, the Maricopa C o unty Attorney and the Presiding J udg e of the Maric o p a C ounty Superior Court, challeng ing the constitutionality of Proposition 100 and its implementing laws a nd rules ( “ theL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 7

Proposition 100 laws”). At the time the complaint was filed, both plaintiffs were charg ed w ith state crimes and held in Maricopa County jails as a result of orders finding that they ha d entered or remained in the U nited States illeg ally

. The complaint proposed a plaint iff class consisting of “ All
persons w ho have been or will be held inelig ible for r elease

on bond by an Ariz o n a state c o urt i n M a r icopa County pursuant to Section 22(A)(4) of the Ariz o na Constitution a nd Ariz . Rev. Stat. § 13-3961(A)(5).”

The plaintiffs alleg ed that the Proposition 1 00 laws viol ate the United States Constitution in a number of way s. As relevant here, t h e y alleg ed that the Proposition 100 laws violate the substantive d ue p rocess g uarantees of the F ourteenth Amendment on two theories: (1) arrestees have a liberty interest in being el i gible f or release on bond pending resolution of criminal charg es and the Propositi o n 100 laws

are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling g overnmental interest; and (2) the laws impermissibl y i m pose punishment before trial. The plaintiffs also alleg ed violations of the procedural due process g uarantees of the F ourteen th Amendment, the F ifth Amendment r i gh t ag ainst selfincrimination, the Six th Amendment r ig ht to counsel
, the Ex cessive B ail Clause of the Eig hth Amendment a n d the Supremacy Clause, alleg ing that the Proposition 100 laws a re preempted by federal law. They soug ht an ord e r d ec laring the Pro p osition 100 laws unconstitutional, enjoining the enforcement of those laws and af fording each of them an individualiz ed bail hearing at which they

may be considered for relea se, taking into account p articulariz ed facts about whether release would pose an unacceptable risk of flig h t or dang er to the community

.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 8

I n a December 2008 order, the d istrict co u r t g ranted the plaintiffs’ motion f

or class c e r tification, certify ing a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the F ederal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also g r anted the d efendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ preemption claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

The p arties filed cross motions for summary judg ment. I n a March 2011 order, the district court d enied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg ment and g ranted the def endants’ motion f or partial summary judg ment on t h e plaintiffs’

su b s t antive due process, procedural due process, Eig hth Amendment a

nd Six th Amendment c laims. See F ed. R. Civ. P. 56. The plaintiffs thereafter v o l untarily dismissed their F ifth A mendment c laim. The distr i c t court then entered a final judg ment, f

rom which the plaintiffs t i m ely appealed, challeng ing the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of their pr e e mption claims and the adverse summary ju d gm e n t ruling s on their substantive due process, procedural d u e process, Eig hth Amendment and Six th Amendment claims.

After a divided three-judg e panel of this cou r t affirmed the judg ment of the district cou rt, a majority of nonrecused active j u d ge s v o ted in favor o f rehearing en banc. See Lopez-Valenzuela v. Cnty. of Maricopa
, 719 F .3d 1054, 1073 (9th Cir. 2 013), reh’g en b anc gr a n t e d
, 741 F .3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2 014). W e have jurisdiction under 2 8 U.S.C. § 1291, a nd

we now reverse. 2

2 A lth o u g h w e assu

m e th at th e n am ed p lain tif f s are n o lo n g er in p retrial d eten tio n , n o o n e h as su g g ested th at th is case h a s b e co m e m o ot as a

co n seq u en ce. See Ba tes v. Un ited Pa r cel S erv., In c. , 5 1 1 F.3 d 97 4
, 9 8 7 (9 th C ir. 2 0 0 7 ) (en

b an c) (“ W ith

reg ard to m oo tn ess, th e Su p rem e Co u rt h eld th at th e ‘ cases o r co n tro v ersies’ req u irem en t o f A rticle III

– w h ich
req u ires a plain tif

f w ith a liv e case o r co n tro v ersy , n o t o n ly at th e tim e of f ilin g an d at th e tim e o f class certif icatio n , b u t also w

h en a co u rt rev iew sL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 9

II.

W e review de n ovo a district court’s g rant or denial o f
summary judg ment. See Russell Country Sportsmen v. U .S. Forest Serv.
, 668 F .3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011). W e also review de novo a district court’s g rant of a motion to dismiss under F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cousins

v. Lockyer
, 568 F .3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). W e r eview

a challeng e to the constitutionality o f a statute de novo a s well. See United States v. Gonzales , 307 F .3d 906, 9 09 (9th Cir. 2002).

III.

The plaintiffs cont end that the Proposition 1 00 laws violate substantive due process. W e ag ree.

A.

The Supreme Court has l o n g recog niz ed constitutional limits on pretrial detention. The Court has prohibi t e d

ex c e ssive bail, see Stack v. Boyl e , 342 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1951), required a judicial determination of p robable cause within 48 hours of arrest, see Cnty. o f R i v erside v. McLaughlin
, 500 U.S. 44, 5 6 (1991); Gerstein v. P ugh
, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975), b arred puniti v e c o nditions of pretrial confinement,

see Bell v. W

olfish
, 441 U.S. 520, 535–37 (1979), p rohibited pretrial d etention as punishment, see United States v

. S alerno
, 481 U.S. 739, 7 46–48 (1987); Schall v. Martin
, 467 U.S. 253,

th e case

– is satisf

ied b y ‘ a n am ed d efe n d a n t a n d a m em b er o f th e class
rep resen ted b y th e n am ed p lain tif f
, ev en th o u g h th e claim o f t h e n am ed
p lain tif f h as b eco m e m o ot.’ ” (q u o tin g S o sn a v. Io wa , 4 19 U.S. 3 9 3 , 4 0 2 (1 9 7 5))).L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 10

269–74 (1984), and held that restrictions on pretrial release o f adult a rrestees must be c arefully limited to serve a compelling
g overnmental interest, see Salerno , 481 U.S. at 748–51.

I n t h e f irst of these cases, Stack v. Boyle
, the Court observed t h a t t he “ traditional r ig ht to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation of a defense, and serves to pr e v e nt the infliction of punishment prior to

co n v i c t ion.” 342 U.S. at 4

. The Court noted that, “[ u ] nless this rig ht to bail before trial is preserved, the p r esumption o f innocence, secured o nly after centuries of stru ggl e, would lose its meaning ,” id.
, and it held that “[ b] ail s e t a t a f ig ure hig her than an am o u n t reasonably calculated to fulfill [ its]
purpose [ of a ssuring the pre sence of the accused at trial] is ‘ex cessive’ under the Eig hth Amendment,” id. at 5.

I n Gerstein v. Pugh
, the Court recog niz ed that “[ p ] retrial confinement may imperil the suspect’ s j o b
, interrupt his

source o f income,

. . . impair his family relat i o n s h i p s” a nd affect his “ability to assist in preparation of his d efense.” 420 U.S

. a t 1 14, 123. The Court h eld “that the F ourth Am e ndment requires a judicial determination of probable

cause as a prerequisite to ex tended restraint of li b erty following arre s t

. ” I

d. a t 114. This probable cause d e termination is “necessary to effect limited postarrest detention,” Salerno
, 481 U .S. at 752, and ord i n a r i ly must

occur within 4 8 h ours of arrest, see McLaughlin
, 500 U.S. at 56.

A f ew y ears later, in B e ll v. W olfish
, t h e Court emphasiz ed that, “under the Due Process Clause, a d etainee
may not be punished p rior to an adjudication of g uil t

. ” 4 4 1 U.S. at 535. According ly
, the Court held that “the Due Process Clause protects a detain ee from

. . . conditions a ndL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 11

restrictions of pretr i a l detainment” that “amount to punishment of the det a i n e e

. ” Id. at 533, 535. T h e Court outlined a two-prong ed test for determining when conditions

an d restrictions of p retrial detention amount to punishment, focusing f irst on whether the restrictions were imposed for a punitive purpose and, i f n o t, on whether the restrictions a re

ex c e ssive in relation to a leg itimate reg ulatory p u rpose:

A court must decide wh et h e r the disability is imposed for the purpose of p unis h m e nt o r

w h ether it is but an incident of some other leg itimate g overnmental purpose. Absent a showing of an e x pressed intent to punish on the part of detention f

a c ility officials, that determination g enerally w ill turn on whether

an a lternative purpose to which the restriction
may r ationally

be connected is assig n able for it, and whether it appears ex cessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assig ned to it. Thus, if a p a rticular c o n dition o r r estriction o f pretrial detention is reasonably rela t e d to a leg itimate g overnmental objecti v e , i t does not, without more, a mount to “punishment.” Conversely
, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a leg itimate g oal – if it is arbitrary or purposeless – a court permissibly

m a y i n f e r t h a t t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e g overnmental action is p unishment that may

n o t c o n s t i t u tionally be i n f l i c t e d u p o n detainees qua detainees.

Id. at 538–39 (alteratio n s, footnotes, citations and internal quotation marks omitted).L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 12

F ive y e ars later, in Schall v

. Martin
, the Court considered the substant i v e due p rocess implications of a state law authoriz ing p retrial detention o f juvenile o f f e nders found to present “a serious risk” of committing a crime pending their juvenile court proceeding s. 467 U .S. at 255. As it would later do in Salerno
, the Court applied a two-part substantive due process inquiry

. F irst, rely ing on g eneral due process principles, the Court considered whether the law constituted

an impermissible infring ement of the juveniles’ liberty interest. See Schall
, 467 U.S. at 263–68. The Court
recog niz ed that juveniles have a “substantial” i n terest in “freedom from institutional restraints,” id. at 265, but that interest had to be “qualified by the recog n ition that juveniles, unlike adults, ar e a lway s in some f orm of custody ,” id. According ly
, in lie u o f heig htened scrutiny
, the Court required the state to show only that the challeng ed law served

a “leg itimate interest.” I d. at 2 6 6

. This standard was satisfied because “[ s] o ciety has a le gi t i m ate interest in protecting a juvenile from the consequence s of his criminal activity – both from potential phy sical i n j u ry which may be suffered when a v ictim f

ig hts back or a policeman attempts to

ma k e a n a rrest a

nd from the downward spiral of criminal activity into which peer pressure may lead the child.” Id.

Second, rely ing o n the two-prong ed t e st articulated in Bell
, the C ourt considered whether the challeng ed law violated substantive due process by imposing confinement a s pu n ishment. See id. at 269–74. Apply ing the first prong o f the Bell tes t , the Court found no e vidence that the law was intended as puni s h m e n t

. See id. at 269. Turning to the second prong , the Court concluded that the law was not

ex c e ssive in relation to t h e state’s leg itimate reg ulatory
purpose in protecting juveniles f rom the consequences o f their c riminal activity
, because t h e detention was “strictlyL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 13

limited in time” ( to a max imum possible detention of 17 day s) and th e conditions of confinement were reg ulatory rather than punitive. Id. at 2 6 9

– 7 1

. The Court also f ound
pe rs u asive that every state in the country p ermitted preventive detention of juveniles accused of crime, see id. at 267, 274, citing “the widely shared leg islative judg ment that preventive d etention serves an import a nt and leg itimate function in the juvenile justice sy stem,” id. at 272.

Three y ears later, in United S t a tes v. Salerno
, the Court rounded out this series of pretrial detention cases b y considering the substantive due p rocess implications of a federal law authoriz ing pretrial detention of adult a rrestees. Salerno involved a challeng e to a provision of the federal B ail Reform Ac t of 1984 r equiring pretrial detention o f arrestees charg ed with certain seriou s felonies if the g overnment demonstrated by clear a nd convinc i n g evidence after an adversary hearing that n o r elease conditions “will reasonably

assure

. . . the safety of any other person and the community

. ” 18 U.S.C.§ 3142(e). As it had in Schall
, the Court applied a two-part substantive d

ue process inquiry
, albeit in the reverse order.

F irst, r ely i n g o n Bell a

nd Schall
, the Court considered

w h e ther the Act violated substantive due process b y authoriz ing “p u n i shment before trial.” Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 746. Under the f

irst Bell prong , the Court found no evidence that Cong ress had authoriz ed pretrial d etention for a punitive
purpose. See id. at 747. Ra t h e r, Cong ress had authoriz ed detention for the leg itimate reg ulatory purpose of “preventing dang er to the commu nity .” Id. Turning to Bell ’s second
prong , the Court held that “the incidents of pretrial detention”

were not “ex cessive in relation to th e r eg ulatory g oal Cong r ess soug ht to achieve,” b ecause: (1) the Act “carefullyL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 14

limits the circumstances under which detention may be
soug h t to the most serious of c rim e s , ” i ncluding “crimes o f violence, offenses for which the sentence is life imprisonment

or death, se rious drug o ffenses, or certain repeat o ffenders”; (2) “ [ t ] he arrestee is e n titled to a prompt detention hearing ” at which the arrestee could seek bail; and (3) “the max imum leng th of pretri a l d etention is limited b y the string ent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act.” Id. A c c o r ding ly
, the Court held “t h a t the pretrial detention contemplated by the B ail Reform Act is reg u lat ory in n ature, and does not constitute punishment before trial in violation o f the Due Process Clause.” I

d. at 748.

Second, as in Schall
, th e Court also applied g eneral d ue process principles and c onsidered whether the law constituted

an impermissib l e infring ement o f arrestees’ liberty interest. See id. at 748–51. W hereas Schall h ad applied a deferential standard of review, however, Salerno a p p lied heig htened scrutiny

. The Court n oted that, “[ i] n our society liberty is the
norm, and detention prior to trial or w i t h o u t trial is the carefully limited ex ception.” Id. at 755. I t cited “the ‘g eneral rule’ of substantive due process that the g overnment may not detain a p erson prior to a judg ment o f g uilt in a criminal trial.” Id. at 749. I t recog niz ed that the Act implicated “the individual’s strong interest in liberty .” Id. at 750. And it was careful “not [ to] minimiz e the importance and f undamental

n a t u re o f this rig ht.” Id. B u t the Court concluded that t h e B ail Reform Act satisfied heig htened scrutiny because it both served a “compelling ” and “overwhelmin g” g overnmental interest “in preventing c r ime by arrestees” and was “carefully limited” to a chieve that purpose. Id. at 749–50, 755. The A ct

was suff i ciently tailored because it “careful[ ly ] delineat[ ed]

. . . the circumstanc e s u nder which detention will be permitted.” Id. at 751. I t : (1) “ narrowly focuse[ d ] o n aL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 15

particularly acute problem in which the Government interests

are overwhelming
, ” id. at 750; (2) “o p erate[ d] only on individuals who have been arrested f or a specific c ateg ory o f

ex tremely serious offenses” – individuals that “Co n g ress specifically f

o und” were “ f

a r more likely to be responsible for dang erous acts in t h e community after arrest,” id. ; a nd (3) afforded arrestees “a f ull-blown adversary hear i n g” at which t h e g overnment was r equired to “convince a neutral decisionmaker by clear and c o nv incing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety o f the community or any person,” id. I t satisfied heig htened scrutiny because it was a “carefully limited ex ception,” id. at 755, not a “scattershot attempt” at preventing crime b y arrestees, id. at 750.

B.

Salerno and Schall establish the substantive due process framework that g overns here. W e first consider whether the Proposition 100 laws satisfy g e neral substantive due process principles. B e cause the Proposition 100 laws reg ulate adults rather than juveniles, we apply Salerno ’s heig htened scrutiny rather than Schall ’s m o r e deferential review. W e then consider in the alternative whether the Proposition 1 00 laws violate due proce s s , under Bell
, Schall and Salerno
, b y imposing punishment before trial. To succeed on their facial challen ge , the plaintiffs must show that the Proposition 100 la ws are unconstitutional in all of their applications. See W ash. State Grange v. W ash. State Republican P a rty , 552 U.S. 4 4 2
, 449 ( 2008) ( citing Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 745);

see also id. (“W hile some M e m bers of the Court have cri ticiz ed the Salerno formulation, all ag ree that a facial challeng e must fail where the statute h as a plainly leg itimateL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 16

sweep.” ( internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v

. Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010).

1.

W e f irst consider w hether the Proposition 100 laws s a t i sfy
g eneral substantive due process principles.

The g overning substantive due process standard is a familiar one. “The Due Pr o c e ss Clause

. . . provides heig htened protection ag ainst g overnment interf e rence with certain f undamental rig hts and liberty interests,” W ashington

v. Glucksberg
, 521 U.S. 702, 719

– 2 0 (1997), “forbid[ ding ] the g o vernment to infrin ge certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all
, no matter what process is provided, unless the infring ement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,” Reno v. Flores , 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).

W e apply heig htened scrutiny here because the Proposition 100 laws i n fring e a “fundamental” rig ht. Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 7 50. The d efendants’ brief sug g ests that th e P roposition 100 laws do not implicate a fundamental rig ht, b ecause “[ b ] ail

. . . is not a fundamental

. . . constitutional rig h t , ” b ut Salerno made clear that what is at stake h ere is “the individual’s strong interest in liberty
, ” a nd the Court was careful “not [ to] minimiz e the importance a nd f undamental nature of this rig ht.” I d. (emphasis a dded). I f there was any doubt about the l e v el of scrutiny applied in Salerno
, it has been r esolved in subsequent Supr e m e Court decisions, which h ave confirmed that Saler n o i nvolved a fundamental liberty interest and a p plied heig htened scrutiny

. See Flores
, 507 U.S. at 301–02; id. at 316 (O’Connor, J
., concurring ); Foucha v. Louisiana
, 504 U

. S

. 7 1
, 8 0–83 ( 1 992);L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 17

id. at 93 (Kennedy
, J
., dissenting ). Salerno and the cases that have followed it have recog niz ed that “[ f] reedom from bodily restraint has alway s b e e n a t the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause f r o m arbitrary g overnmental action.” Foucha
, 504 U .S. at 80

. T h u s , “[ t] he institutionaliz ation of an a d u lt by the g overnment trig g ers heig htened, substantive d ue process s c r u t iny .” Flores
, 507 U.S. at 316 (O’Connor, J

. , c o ncurring ). As the Court

ex p lained in Salerno
, 481 U.S. a t 755
, “ l iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited ex c eption.” See also Zadvydas v. Davis
, 533 U.S. 678, 6 90 (2001) ( “F reedom from i m p r i s onment

– from
g overnment custody
, detention, o r other forms of phy sical restraint – lies at the heart of the liberty t h at [ the Due Process] Clause protec t s.”); F o ucha
, 504 U .S. at 90 (Kennedy
, J

. , dissenting ) (“As incarceration of persons is the
most common and one of the most f eared instruments o f state oppression and state indifference, we ou gh t t o acknowledg e at the outset that f

reedom from this restraint is essential to the basic definition of liberty in the F ifth a nd F o u r t ee n th Amendments of the Constitution.”). Thus
, t h e Proposition 100 laws will satisfy substantive due process only if they a re “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling s t ate interest.” Flores , 507 U.S. at 302 (citing Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 746). 3

That the Pro position 100 laws reg ulate persons when there i s p r o b able cause to believe they have “entered o r remained in the United States illeg ally ,” Ar i z

. C onst. a rt. 2, § 2 2 (A)(4), does not a lter th e analy sis, as the defendants

co n cede. The Due Process Clauses of the F ifth a nd F ou r teenth Amendments p rotect every person within the

3 A t o ral arg u m en t, t

h e d e fe n d a n ts co n ced ed th at S a l ern o ap p lied h eig h ten ed scru t i n y

an d th at h eig h ten ed

scru tin y ap p lies h ere.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 18

nation’s borders from deprivation of li fe
, liberty o r property

w ithout due process o f law. See Mathews v. Diaz
, 426 U. S

. 67, 77 (1976). “Even one w hose p r es e n c e in this country is unlawful, involuntary
, or transitory is entitled t o that constitutional protection.” Id. 4

W e also bear in mind t h a t, reg ardless of whether an arrestee is a c i t iz en, a lawful resident or an undocumented immig rant, the costs to the a r r estee of pretrial detention a re profound. “Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships.” Gerstein
, 420 U.S. at 114. And it may affect “the defendant’s a

bil ity to assist in preparation o f his defense.” Id. at 123. As the Supreme Court stated in Stack
, 342 U.S. at 4, the “tr a ditional rig ht to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered preparation o f a d efense.” See als o A B A S tandards for Criminal J ustice: Pretrial Release 29 (3d. ed. 2007) (citing “considerable evidence that pretrial custody status is associated with the u l t i m ate outcomes o f
cases, with r eleased d e f

endants consistently faring better than defendants in detention”).

I n this c ase, the defendants arg u e that the Proposition 100 laws satisfy substantive du e process because they serve the state’s substantial interest in e nsuring that persons accused o f crimes a re a vailable for trial. They arg ue t h a t pretrial detention is a constitutionally acceptable means of furthering

4 S ee a lso Z ad vyd a s , 5 3 3 U.S. at 7 1 8 (Ken n ed y , J
., d issen tin g ) (“ A s p erso n s w ith in o u r j u risd i ctio n , . . . alien s are en titled to th e p ro tectio n of th e Du e P ro cess Clau se.”); cf. S h a u g hn essy v. Un ited S ta tes ex rel. M ezei
, 3 4 5 U.S. 2 0 6
, 2 1 2 (1 95 3 ) (“ [A ]lien s w h o h av e on ce p assed th ro u g h o ur g ates, ev en illeg ally
, m ay b e ex p elled o n ly af ter p ro ceed in g s co n f

o rm in g to trad itio n al stan d ard s o f f airn ess en co m

p assed in d u e p ro cess o f law .”).L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 19

that interest. A nd they contend that Proposition 100’s categorical denial of bail to undocu m e n ted immig r a nts, without any individualiz ed d ete r m i nation of flig ht risk, is justified because undocumented immig rants in general pose

an unmanag eable flig ht risk. T he district court accepted this rationale, concluding that “ [ t] he Ariz ona leg islature a nd Ari z o n a voters made the log ical assumption that a person who is unlawfully present in the U nited States may not appear for trial.” W e disag ree.

W e do not question that Ariz o na has a compelling interest in ensuring that persons accused of serious crimes, including undoc u m e n ted immig rants, a re available for trial. See Salerno
, 4 81 U.S. at 749 (noting t h a t “an a rrestee may be incarcerated u ntil trial if he p r e sents a risk of flig ht”); B ell
, 441 U.S. at 534 (recog niz ing the g overnmen t ’s “substantial interest in e nsuring that person s a c cused of crimes a re available for trials and, ultimately
, fo r s e r v ice of their sentences,” a

nd “that c onfinement of s u c h persons pending
t rial is a leg itimate means of f urthering that interest”). The plaintiffs properly conceded this point at oral arg ument.

W e d o, h owever, reject the p roposi tion that the Proposition 1 00 laws a re car e fully limited, as Salerno requires. Salerno concluded that the challeng ed provisions o f the B ail Reform Act satisfied th e tailoring requirement o f heig htened scrutiny b ecause they created a “ nar r o w ly focuse[d] ,” “ c arefully limited ex ception” to the “ ‘g eneral rule’ of substantive due process that the g overnment may not detain a p erson prior to a j u d g ment of g uilt in a criminal trial. ” S a lerno
, 481 U.S. at 7 49–50, 755 (emphasis added). The Act thus satisfied the h eig htened scrutiny standard because Cong r ess had chosen a “ careful delineation o f the circumstances under w hich detention will be p e rmitted”L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 20

rather than adopting a “ scattershot attempt” at advancing the
g overnment’s interest in p reventing crime by arrestees. Id. at 750–51 (emphasis added).

I n holding the Act sufficiently tailored to s a tisfy heig htened scrutiny
, Salerno focused on three considerations. F irst, that the challeng ed provisions addressed “a p a rticularly
acute problem.” Id. at 750. Second, that “[ t] he Act o perates only on individuals who h ave b e e n a rrested for a specific categ ory of ex tremely serious o ffenses,” where Cong ress h ad “specifically found that these individuals are far more likely
to b e r e s ponsible for dang erous acts in the community a fter arrest.” Id. Third, that the A c t r e q uired “a full-blown adversary hearing ” at which the g o vernment was required to “convince a neutral decisionmaker b y c l ear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any p e r s o n

. ” I d. None o f those considerations ex ist here.

a. The P roposition 100 Law s Do Not Address a P a rticularly Acute P roblem

.

First
, the record does not support the arg ument tha t the Proposition 10 0 laws addressed “a particularly acute problem.” Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 750. T he B a il Reform A ct at issue in S alerno addressed a

n “alarming probl e m of crimes committed by persons on release.” Id. at 742 ( q u o t ing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 3 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3 185) (internal quotation marks omitted). The record in Salerno contained empirical evidence establishing that the leg islation addressed “a pressing societal problem,” id. at 747 (citing S. Rep. No. 9 8 -225, at 4 –8, 1 984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3186–91), a

nd the law o perated only on individu a ls “Cong ress specifically found

. . . are far more likely to beL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 21

responsible for dang erous acts in the community after arrest,” id. at 7 5 0 ( citing S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 6–7, 1984 U.S.C.C

. A

. N

. at 3188–90). This evidence fig ured
p rominently in the Court’s d ecision to uphold the Ba i l Reform Act.

Similarly
, in Demore v. Kim
, 538 U .S. 510 (2003), where the Court upheld a federal immigration statute providing for mandatory detention o f certain convicted criminal a liens during the brief period of their civil removal proceeding s, the record contained evidence that the leg islation a d d r e ssed a particularly acute problem. The Court empha s i z e d a nd discussed at lengt h t he considerable evidence in the record, much of it q

uantitative, sho w i n g that the leg islation a pplied
to p ersons who were b oth dang erous and at risk of flig ht. See id. at 518–21, 528. 5

Here, there is n o evidence that the P roposition 100 laws

were adopted to address a particularly a c ute problem. I n

c o n trast to S

a lerno and Demore
, the record contains no finding s, studies, statistics or other e vidence (whether or not part of the leg islative record) showing t hat undocumented immig rants as a g roup pose e ither a n unmanag eable fl i g ht risk or a sig nificantly g r eater flig ht risk than lawful residents. The absence of such evidence both d isting u is h e s t his case

5 “ On e 1 9 8 6 stu d y sh o w ed th at, af ter crim in al alien s w ere id en tif ied as d ep o rtab le, 7 7 % w ere arrested at l east o n ce m o re an d 4 5 % – n early h alf

– w ere arrested m

u ltip le t im es b ef

o re th eir d ep o rtatio n p ro ceed in g s ev en b eg an .” Demo re , 5 3 8 U.S. at 5 1 8

. A n o th er stu d y sh o w ed th at “ [o ]n ce released
, m ore th an 2 0 % o f d ep o rtab le crim in al alien s f ailed to ap pear f

or th eir rem o v al h earin g s.” Id

. at 5 1 9

. Co n g ress also h ad em p irical ev id en ce th at, “ ev en w ith i n d iv i d u alized screen i n g , releasin g d ep o rtab le crim i n al alien s o n b o n d w o u ld lead t o an u n accep tab le rate o f f lig h t.” Id

. at 5 20 ;

see a lso id

. at 5 28 . Su ch

ev id en ce is lack in g h ere.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 22

from S alerno and supports the conclusion that Proposition 100 laws are not carefully limited, as they must be to survive heig htened scrutiny

under S alerno

. 6

6 In arg u in g th at P ro p o sitio n 1 0 0 ad d ressed a p articu larly acu te pro blem
, J u d g e T allm an f

o cu ses o n tw o f

acto rs: (1 ) statem en ts m ad e in su p p ort of P ro p o sitio n 1 00 b y t

h en

- Marico pa Co u n t

y A tto rn ey A n d rew T h o m as; an d (2 ) th at Ar i z o n a v o ters ap p ro v ed t h e Pro p o sitio n by a w id e m arg in

. Neith er arg u m en t is p ersu asiv e.

A s p art o f th e 2 0 0 6 cam

paig n in f av o r of P ro p o sitio n 1 00
, Co u n ty A tto rn ey T h om as asserted th at “ [f ]ar t o o m an y illeg al im

m ig ran ts accu s ed

o f serio u s crim es h av e j u m p ed b ail an d slip p ed acro ss th e bo rd er in o rd er to av o id j u stice in an A rizo n a co u rtro o m .” H e also to l d Lo u Do b b s To n ig ht th at A

rizo n a h ad a “ trem en d o u s p ro b l em w ith illeg al im m ig ran ts

co m i n g in to th e state, co m m i ttin g serio u s crim es, an d th en ab sco n d in g , an d n o t f acin g trial fo r th eir crim es, eith er b ecau se th ey j u m p b ail af ter th ey are o u t, o r b e c a u s e , w hen th ey are let o u t o n b ail, t h e f ed eral
g o v ern m en t d ep o rts th em

. ” T he reco rd d o es n o t su b stan tiate T h o m as’ claim s, h ow ev er, an d h e is n o t a cred ib le so u rce

. H e w as d isb arred in 2 0 1 2 f o r u s in g h is o f

f ice to d estro y p o litical en em ies, f ilin g m alicio u s an d

u n f o u n d ed crim in al ch arg es, co m m ittin g p erj u ry an d en g ag in g in a h ost

o f o th er crim es, an d t h e state b ar co m m ittee f ou n d th at h e h ad

“ ou trag eo u sly ex p lo ited p o w er,” “ f lag ran tly f

ostered f ear,” “ d isg racef

u lly

m isu sed t h e law ” an d “d i sh o n o red
, d esecrated
, an d d ef iled ” th e p u

b l ic
t r u st

. In re Th o ma s , No

. PDJ

- 2 0 11

- 9 0 0 2 (B ef o re th e P resid i ng Discip l in ary Ju dg e o f th e Su p rem e Co u rt o f A r i z o n a, A p r. 1 0
, 20 1 2) ( O p i n io n an d Ord er Im p osin g San ctio n s), at p

. 2 4 5
, a va ila b le a t h ttp ://w w w .azco u rts.g o v /m ed iaro o m / Hig h P ro f

ileCaseUp d ate.asp x (last

v i sited J u ly 1 0, 2 0 1 4 ). A lth o u g h J u d g e T allm an relies h eav ily o n T h o m as’ co m

m en ts (Dissen t at 53

– 5 4
, 5 8 & n .4 ), th e d ef en d an t s tellin g ly d o n o t ev en m en tio n th em

.

T h at A rizo n a v o t e r s a p p r o v ed P ro p o sitio n 1 0 0 b y a larg e m arg in (Dissen t at 5 3
, 5 8 & n .5
, 5 9, 6 1 ) a l s o do es n o t sh o w th at th e l eg islatio n ad d ressed a p articu l arly acu te p ro b l em

. A t m o st, th e v o te sh o w s th at

v o t e r s p erceived a p ro b l em , n o t th at o n e actu ally ex isted

. Mo reo v er , a s d iscu ssed b elo w in p art III.B .2 an d in J u d g e Ng u y en ’ s co n cu rren ce, th ere is su b stan tial ev id en ce th at A rizo n a v o ter s a p p ro v ed P ro p o sitio n 1 0 0 atL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 23

Contrary to J udg e T allman’s r e a d i ng of our opinion, we neither “dem a n d ” f

inding s, studies, statistics o r other evidence showing t h at undocumented immig rants pose an

u n manag e able flig h t risk nor impose an “empirical d a t a requirement” on the defe n d a n t s

. Dissent at 60–61. W e do
not hold Proposition 1 0 0 “ v oid

. . . for want of evidence,” Nix o n v

. S

hrink Mo. Gov’t P

AC
, 5 28 U.S. 377, 391 (2000), but rather that t h e Proposition 100 laws are not “carefully limited” under Salerno

. W hether Proposition 100 “narrowly focuses on a p ar t i c u larly acute problem” is part of that inquiry

. Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 750; see also Foucha
, 504 U.S.
at 81. Thus, althoug h we do not require the d e f en d a n ts to produce evidence o r point to leg islative f inding s, the absence of a ny cr edible showing that the Proposition 100 laws addressed a p articularly acute p roblem is one factor quite relevant to demonstrating that the l a w s a re not carefully limited.

b. The P roposition 100 Law s Are Not

Lim ited to a Specif

ic Ca t e gory of Extrem ely Serious Of

f enses.

Second
, the Propositi o n 1 0 0 laws are not limited to “a specific c ateg ory of ex trem e l y s erious offenses.” S alerno
, 481 U .S. at 750; cf. Demore
, 5 38 U

. S

. at 517–18, Kansas v

. Hendricks
, 5 2 1 U .S. 3 46, 357 ( 1997). I nstead, they
encompass an ex ceeding ly b road rang e of offenses, including
not only serious offenses but also relatively minor ones, such

a s unlawful copy ing of a sound recording
, altering a lott e r y ticket with intent to defraud, tampering with a computer with

least in p art f

o r reaso n s o th er th an a perceiv ed p ro b lem o f f lig h t risk

– to p u n ish u n d o cu m en ted im

m i g ran ts f o r p erceiv ed im

m ig ratio n an d crim in al

v io latio n s.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 24

the intent to d efrau d a n d theft of property worth b etween $3,000 and $4,000.

c. The P roposit i o n 100 Law s Do Not R e q u i r e a Fu l l

- b l o w n A d v e r s a r y Hearing at Which the State Is Required to P rove that an Individual Arrestee P resents an Unm anageable F light R isk.

Finally
, even if some undocumented immig rants pose an unmanag eable flig h t risk or undocumented immi gr a n ts on averag e p ose a g re a ter flig ht risk than other a rrestees, Proposition 100 plainly is not carefully limited because it employ s an o verbroad, irrebuttable presumpti o n rather than

an individualiz ed h earing to determine whether a p arti cular
arrestee p oses an u n manag eable flig ht risk. I n Salerno
, the
reg ulatory scheme was limited to arrestees who actually posed a dang er to the community

. F irst, i t w a s limited to “individuals who have been arrested for a s p e c i f ic categ ory of ex tremely serious offenses”

– w ho Cong r e ss found were “far more likely to be responsible fo r d a n ge r ous acts in the community

after arrest.” Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 750. Second,

even f or arrestees falling w i t h in that specific categ o ry , the scheme provided case-by -case determinations of the need for pretrial detention. Each arrestee w as entitled to a “full-blown adversary hearing ,” at which the g overnment w as required to prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that the individual presented “a demonstrable dang er to the community ” and that “no conditions of release c[ ould] reasonably a ssure the safety of the community .” Id. I t w a s o n l y “[ u ] nder these narrow circumstances” that the Court held that society ’s interest was suf ficient to outweig h the “individual’s strong interest in [ pretrial] liberty .” I

d.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 25

I n cont r a s t , Proposition 1 00 is not n arrowly focused on those arrestees who actually pose t h e gr eatest f lig ht risk. Demonstrably
, many undocumented immig rants are not unmanag eable flig ht risks. The record includes ex amples o f undocumented immig rants who were arrested b ef o r e Propositio n 100, g ranted bail or released on their o wn recog niz ance, and a

ppeared at their court dates and trials. Y et

even these individuals were needlessly remanded into state custody following Proposition 100’s passag e.

I n Hernandez v. Lynch
, 167 P

. 3d 1264 (Ariz

. Ct. App. 2007), for ex a mple, police found a social security c ard and a resident alien card in Hernandez ’s wallet after arresting him for possessi n g an open container of alcohol within the
passeng er compartment o f a motor vehicle. See id. at 1 2 6 5. Hernandez admitted that the cards w ere for g ed, that he h ad purchased them f

or $5,000 and that he h ad procured them in order to work and buy food. See id. a t 1 2 6 6

. The state charg ed h im with two counts of knowing ly possessing forg ed instruments w ith intent to defraud, a class 4 felony

. S e e id. He was released on h is own recog niz ance a fter a n initial
appearance hearing

. W h en he appeared vol u n t a rily for his preliminary hearing
, however, he was autom a t i cally denied bail b y operation o f P r o p o s i tion 100. See id. He ultimately pled g uilty to solicitation to c ommit forg ery , a class 6 felony
, and was placed on probation for one y ear. S e e id. Proposition 100 categ orically eliminates any opportunity for
persons such a s Mr. Hernandez to show that, n otwithstanding their immig ration status, they do not pose a fli gh t risk.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 26

I ndeed, it mandates pretrial detention even when the state concedes that the arrestee does not pose a flig ht risk. 7

W h ether a categ o r ical denial of b a i l for noncapital offenses could ever withstand heig htened scrutiny is an open question. S

ee United States v. Scott , 450 F .3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Neither Salerno nor any other case aut h oriz e s detaining someone in jail while awaiting trial, or the imposition of special b ail conditions, based merely on the fact of arrest for a particular crime. To the contrary
, Salerno

. . . upheld the constitutionalit y of a bail sy stem where pretrial defendants could be d etained only if the need to detain them

was d emonstrated on an individualiz ed basis.”). L awmakers
may rely on “reasonable p r e s umptions and g eneric rules,” Demore
, 538 U.S. at 526; Fl o r es , 507 U.S. at 313, when a reg ulation “ involves no deprivation of a ‘fundamental’ r ig ht,” Flores
, 507 U .S. at 311, but “‘administrative convenience’ is

a thoroug hly inadequate basis for the d e p r ivation of core constitutional rig hts,” id. at 346 (Stevens, J
., dissenting ); see Stanley v. Illinois
, 405 U.S. 645, 656– 58 ( 1972). As the defendants conced e d at o ral arg ument, irrebuttable presumptions are disfavored.

Thus, a t minim u m , to survive heig htened scrutiny any such categ orical rule, requiring pretrial detention in all cases without an individualiz ed determination of fl i gh t risk o r dang erousness, w ould have t o be carefully limited. The state’s chosen classification would have to serve as a

7 P ro p os i t i o n 1 0 0, f

or ex am p le, co v ers f

o reig n citizen s w

h o h av e n o leg al rig h t to retu rn to th eir h om e co u n tries. Co n v ersely
, P ro po sitio n 1 0 0

e x clu d es f ro m co v erag e in d iv id u als w h o w ou ld seem mo re l i kely t o fl e e

– su ch as f

o reig n citizen s w

h o are in th is co u n try law f u lly as to u rists an d
p erso n s h av in g d u al citizen sh i p

.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 27

convincing prox y f

o r unmanag eable flig ht risk o r dang erousness. I t has g enerally b e e n thoug ht, for ex ample, that capital offenses may be made categ orically nonbailable because “most defendants f acing a possible death penalty would likely flee reg ardl e s s o f what bail was set.” United States v. Kennedy
, 618 F

. 2d 557, 558-59 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). 8

There is no evidence that undocumented status c orrelates closely with unmanag eable flig ht risk. T he defendants speculate that undocumented immig rants pose a g reater flig ht risk than lawful residents because they supposedly lack strong ties to the community

and have a “ home” in another country to which they can f

lee. B ut this assumption i gn o r e s those

8 We d o n o t, as J u dg e T allm an w rites, “ ef f ectiv ely p reclu d [e] th e u se of irreb u ttab le p resu m

ptio n s in th e b ail co n tex t.” Dissen t at 6 2. Rath er, w e

co n clu d e th at w

h eth er a categ orical d en ial o f b ail f o r n o n cap ital o f

f en ses

co u l d e v er w ith stan d h eig h ten ed scru tin y is an o p en q u estio n , an d th en

assu m e w ith o u t d ecid in g th at su ch a ru le w ou ld b e co n stitu tio n al w ere i t ad eq u ately tailo red

. Ou r co n clu sio n t h at th is is an o p en q u estio n i s clearly

co rrect, g i v e n t h at n eith er th e Su p rem e Co u rt n o r an y f

ed eral co u rt of
ap p eals h as ad d ressed th e q u estio n

. T h e clo sest case is Hu n t v. Ro th
, 6 4 8 F.2 d 1 1 4 8 (8 th Cir. 1 98 1 ), va ca ted a s mo o t su b n o m. Mu rp h y v. Hu n t , 4 5 5 U .S. 4 7 8 (1 9 8 2 ), w

h ere th e Eig h th C ircu it h eld th at a p ro v isio n of th e Neb rask a Co n stitu

tio n categ o rically d en y in g b ail to p erso n s ch arg ed w i th certain sex u al o f

f en ses v i o lated th e Ex cessiv e B ail Clau se o f th e Eig h th A m en d m en t b ecau se it em p lo y ed an irreb u ttab le p resu m p tio n rath er th an req u irin g an in d iv id u alized d eterm in atio n o f f lig h t risk

. In lan g u ag e th at

o n e m ig h t ap p ly h ere as w ell, th e Eig h th C ircu it h eld th at “ [t]h e f atal f law in th e Neb rask a co n s titu tio n al am en d m en t i s th at th e state h as created an irreb u ttab le p resu m

p tio n t h at ev ery in d iv i d u al ch arg ed w ith th is p articu lar

o f f en se is in ca p a b l e o f assu rin g h is ap p earan ce b y co n d itio n in g i t u p on

reaso n ab le b ail o r is to o d an g ero u s to b e g ran ted release.” Hu n t , 6 4 8 F.2 d
at 1 1 6 4

. Hu n t , h o w ev er, w as l ater v acated as m o o t, so it rem ain s th e case th at n o f ed eral ap pellate co u rt h as y et ad d ressed in a p reced en tial d ecisio n

w h eth er a categ o rical d en ial o f b ail co m po rts w i th

th e Co n stitu

t io n

.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 28

undocumented immig rants who do have strong ties to their

commun i t y o r do not h a v e a home abroad. As our o wn court’s immig rat i o n docket reveals, many undocumented immig rants were broug ht here as y oung children and h ave no contacts or r oots in another country

. Many have “children born in the United States” and “long ties to the community

. ” A r izona v. U

nited States
, 1 32 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (20 1 2 )

. A
recent study of undocume n t ed immig rants in California, published by the Center for the Study o f I mmig rant I nteg ration a t the U niversity of Southern California, f ound that, “ contrary to p opular misperceptions,” undocumented immig rants are “a f

airly settled population.” M. Pastor & E. M a rcelli, W

hat’s at Stake: Undocumented Californians, Immigration Reform, and Our Futur e T o gether 9 (May 2013), available at h ttp://csii.usc.edu/undocumentedCA.html ( last visited J uly 28, 2014). The researchers f ound that “ nearly 50
p e r cent of undocumented immig rants have been in t h e country for more than 1 0 y e ars, a nd over 1 7 p e rcent o f household heads are homeowners.” Id.

Moreover, althoug h the defendants consistently refer t o

un d ocumented immig rant arrestees a s “flig ht r isks,” the pertinent inquiry is whether the arrestee is an unmanageable flig ht risk. There a r e a variety of methods to manag e flig ht risk, such as bond requirements, monitoring and reporting requirements. See, e.g. , A riz

. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 1 3-3967(D). Proposition 100 completely ig nores these tools for manag ing flig ht risk, instead mandating incarceration in every case.

B e fore Proposition 100 passed, A riz ona had an ex tensive bail scheme d e sig ned to help ensure that arrestees appear for trial. See Ariz

. Const. a r t. 2, § 22(A)(3); A riz

. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3967(B ). T h e se procedures already r equired judg es to c onsider f

acto rs such as “[ t] he accused’s familyL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 29

ties, employ

ment, financial r esources,” “leng th of residence in the community
, ” “ [w] hether the accused ha s entered o r remained in the United States i l l eg ally ” and “[ w ] hether the accused’s residence is in this state, in another state or outside the United States.” Ariz

. R ev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3967(B )(4), (8), (11)–(12). There is no evidence that this set o f
reg ulations, addressing flig ht risk on a case-by -case basis,

was inadequate to protect the state’s comp e l l ing interest in ensuring u n d ocumented immig rant a r restees’ appearance at trial. Cf. Demore
, 538 U.S. at 520, 528 (noting that Cong ress chose a mandatory detention rule only after evidence showed that in d i v i d ualiz ed screening h ad f ailed to address the problem of convicted c ri m i nal detainees in larg e numbers failing to appear at their removal h earing s). F urthermor e , Ariz ona added the l ast two of these considerations

– “[ w] hether the accused has entered or remained in the United States illeg ally ” a

nd “[ w] hether the a c cused’s r esidence is in this state, in another state or outside the United States,” Ariz

. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3967(B )(11)–(12) – only in J une 2006,

a few months before Proposition 100 was su b m i t t e d to the state’s v oters. See 2006 Ariz

. L e g is. Serv. Ch. 380 (H.B

. 2580) ( West). Ariz ona g ave these provisi o n s n o chance to

s ucceed before resorting to mandatory detention in e v e r y

case. T hus, althoug h J udg e Tallma n ’s dissent asserts that individualiz ed assessments of flig ht risk have been tried a nd failed (Dissent at 53, 6 2, 65), neither assertion is borne out b y the record.

The Propo s i tion 100 laws also do not reflect a “widely

s hared leg islative judg ment.” Schall
, 467 U.S. at 2 7 2

. T h e federa l c riminal justice sy stem does not categ orically deny bail to undocumented immig rant arrestees. See generallyL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 30

18 U.S.C. § 3142; se e i d

. § 3142(d). 9 Most states that categ orically prohibit b a il at all do so only for capital offenses 1 0 or f

or o ther very serious crimes. 1 1 Other than

9 P re- ad j u d icatio n elig i b ility f

or bail is also th e n o rm in f ed eral rem o v al
p ro ceed in g s. S

ee 8 U.S.C. § 1 22 6 (a). Fed eral law m an d ates d e t e n tio n d u rin g rem o v al pro ceed in g s o n l y f o r “ a lim i ted class o f d ep o rtab l e alien s

– i n clu d in g th ose co n v icted o f an ag g rav ated f elo n y .” Demo re , 5 3 8 U .S. at 5 1 7

– 1 8; see 8 U.S.C. § 1 2 26 (c).

1 0 S ee A l a. C o n st. art. I, § 1 6 ; A lask a Co n s t. art. I, § 1 1 ; A rk

. Co n st. art. 2
, § 8 ; Cal. Co n s t. art. I, § 1 2 ; Co l o

. Co n st. art. II, § 1 9 ; Co n n

. Co n st. art. I, § 8 ; Del. Co n st. art. I, § 12 ; Id ah o Co n st. art. I, § 6 ; Kan

. C o n st. B i ll of Rig h ts § 9 ; K

y

. Co n st. § 1 6 ; L a. Co n st. art. I, § 18 ; Me. Co n st. art. I, § 1 0 (cu rren t o r f

o rm er cap ital o f

f en ses n o n b ailab le); Min n . Co n st. art. I, § 7 ; Miss. Co n st. art. 3 , § 2 9 ; N.J . Co n st. art. I, ¶ 11 ; N.D. Co n st. art. I, § 1 1 ; Oh i o Co n st. art. I, § 9 ; Ok l a. Co n st. art. 2
, § 8; T en n . Co n st. art. I, § 1 5 ; T ex

. Co n st. art. I, § 1 1 ; W ash

. Co n st. art. I, § 2 0 ; W y o

. Co n st. art. 1
, § 1 4

.

11 S ee Fla. Co n s t. art. I, § 1 4 (cap i tal o f f en ses an d o f

f en s es pu n ish ab le b y lif e im p riso n m en t n o n b ailab le); Ill. Co n s t. art. I, § 9 (cap ital o f f en ses

an d o f f en s e s p u n ish ab le b y lif

e im p riso n m en t n o n

b ailab le); In d

. Co n st. art. 1
, § 1 7 (m

u rd er an d t r e a s o n n o n

b ailab le); Md

. Co d e A n n ., Crim

. P ro c. § 5

- 2 0 2 (p ro h ib itin g p retrial release f o r an arrestee ch arg ed w ith escap in g f ro m a co rrectio n al f

acility ); Mass. G e n

. La w s ch

. 2 7 6
, § 20 D (cap ital

o f f en ses an d o f

f en ses p u n ish ab le b y lif

e im p r i s o n m e n t n o n b ailab le); Mich

. Co n st. art. I, § 1 5 (m

u rd er, treaso n , rep eat v io l en t f elo n ies an d f

elo n ies

co m m itted w h ile o u t o n b ail, p ro b atio n o r p aro le f o r a p rio r v io len t f

elo n y

n o n b ailab le); Neb

. Co n st. art. I, § 9 (m u r d e r , t reaso n an d serio u s sex u al

o f f en ses n o n b ailab le); Nev

. Co n st. art. 1
, § 7 (cap ital o f f en ses o r m

u rd ers p u n ish ab le b y lif

e im p riso n m en t w ith o u t p o ssib ili t y o f paro le

n o n b ailab le); N.H. Rev

. S tat. A n n

. § 5 9 7 :1

- c (o f

f en ses “ p u n i s h ab le by u

p to lif e in p riso n ” n o n

b ailab l e); N.M. Co n st. art. II, § 1 3 (cap ital o f f en ses

an d ce r t a i n rep eat f

elo n y o f f en d ers n o n

b ailab le); Or. Co n st. art. I, § 1 4 (m u rd er an d treaso n n o n

b ailab le); P a. C o n s t. art. I, § 1 4 (cap ital o f f en ses

o r o f f en ses p u n ish ab le b y lif

e im p riso n m en t n o n

b ailab le); R .I. Co n st. art. I, § 9 (o f

f en ses p u n ish ab le b y lif

e im priso n m en t, o f

f en ses in v o l v in g d an g ero u s w eap o n s b y arrestees prev i o u sly co n v icted o f o th er o f f en ses

an d certain co n tro lled su

b stan ce o f

f en ses n on b ailab le); S .C. Co n s t. art. I,L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 31

A r i zo n a , o n l y M i s souri sing les out undocumented immig rant s for the cate go r ical d enial of bail. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 544.470(2). 1 2 The American Ba r Association’s Standards for Criminal J ustice do n ot m a ke any offenses categ orically nonbailable. They provide that “ only defendants charg ed with dang erous or viol ent crimes o r , in certain c ases, with other serious crimes, may even be c o nsidered for detention,” and they state that “ [ a] decision to d e tain should b e m ade only upon a c l ear showing of evidence that the defendant
poses a da ng e r to public safety or a risk of non-appearance that r equires secure detention.” AB A Standards for Criminal J ustice: Pretrial Release 35, 51 (3d ed. 2007).

I n an attempt to establi sh that the Proposition 100 laws satisfy due p rocess, the defendants rely heavily o n D emore v

. Kim

. This reliance is mis p l a c e d

. Demore did uphold a categ orical denial of bail without an ind i v i dualiz ed determination of flig ht risk or d ang e r ousness for c ertain

§ 1 5 (cap ital o f

f en ses, o f f en s es p u n ish ab l e b y lif

e im p riso n m en t an d certain v io len t o f

f en ses no n

b ailab le); Utah Co n st. art. I, § 8 (cap ital

o f f en ses an d f

elo n y o f f en ses co m

m i tted w h ile ou t o n b ail, p ro b atio n or p aro le f or p rio r f elo n y o f f en se n o n b ailab le).

1 2 A lab am a f

o rm erly categ o rically d en ied b ail to u n d o cu m en ted im m ig ran ts as w ell, see A la. C o d e § 3 1 -1 3 -1 8 (b ), b u t th e state h as

co n clu d ed th at § 3 1

- 1 3- 18 (b ) v io lates th e A lab am a Co n stitu t io n , an d th e law is n o lo n g er in f

o rce. S ee Dism issal Ord er an d Stip u lated P erm an en t In j u n ctio n , Hisp a n ic In terest Co a l. o f Ala b ama v. Ben tley
, No

. 5 :1 1

- CV2 4 8 4

- S L B (N.D. A la. N o v

. 2 5
, 2 01 3 ), at 2 n .4 (“ T h e S tate Def en d an ts fu r t h e r rep resen t th at in lig h t o f A rticle 1
, Sectio n 1 6
, o f th e A lab a m a Co n stitu tio n , t h ey u n d erstan d t

h at Sectio n 1 9 (b ) o f H.B

. 5 6 (A la. Co d e § 3 1

- 1 3- 1 8 (b )) can o n ly

b e ap p lied to d en y

b ail to p erso n s arrested f o r a cap ital crim e, an d can n o t b e ap p lied t o d en y b ail to in d iv id u als arrested f or

o r ch arg ed so lely w ith n o n

- cap ital crim es, reg ard less o f th eir i m m ig ratio n statu s.”).L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 32

convicted c riminal aliens briefly detained during their civil deportation p roceeding s. Demore
, however, applied rational basis review, not heig htened scrutiny
, because it invol v ed federal reg ulation of immig r ation. See D emore , 538 U.S. at 5 2 1

– 28. Such reg u lations have to meet only “ t h e (unex acting ) standard o f r a t i o n a l l y a d

vancing some leg itimate
g ov e rn m ental purpose,” Flores
, 507 U.S. a t 306; see also Fiallo v. Bell
, 430 U.S. 787, 793 (1977); Mathews
, 426 U.S.
at 79–80, not the heig htened scrutiny required under S alerno

. Demore
, moreover, involved a class of detainees who h ad already been convicted of serious crimes, see 538 U.S. at 513,

a “v e ry limited” period o f detention, id. at 529–30 & n.12, and ex tensive evidence and finding s establishing the need for the policy
, see id. at 513, 518–20, 528.

I n sum, we h old that the Propo s i t i o n 100 laws do not satisfy the heig htened substanti v e d ue process scrutiny Salerno requires. Althoug h the state has a compelling interest in assuring that arrestees, including undocumented immig rants, appear for trial, Proposition 100 is not carefully limited to serve that interest.

W e f urther hold that the laws a

r e f acially u nconstitutional. See W ash. State Grange
, 552 U.S. at 449. Be cause Proposition 100 i s n o t “carefully limited” as S alerno ’s heig htened s cr u t i ny test requires, “the entire statute f ails [ S a l e rno ’s] d ecision rule and would thus be invalid in all o f its applications.” Scott A. Keller & Misha Tsey tlin, Applying Constitutional Decision Rules Versus Invalidating S tatutes in Toto
, 98 V a. L

. Rev. 301, 331 (2012) (emphasis added). Even persons who could b e d e tained consistent with d ue process under a different categ o rical statute, or who would be d e t ained under Proposition 100 if it afforded an individualiz ed determina t i on, could successfully challeng eL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 33

the Proposition 100 laws on the same g rounds relied on in our opinion, namely , failure to provide either a valid categ orical

ex c lusion from bail or an individualiz ed determination. See Foucha
, 504 U.S. at 8 0–83 (invalidating in toto a statute that categ orically r equired c o m mitment of a ll people found not g uilty by reason of insanity as a violation of substantive due
process (citing Salerno
, 481 U.S. a t 747–51, 75 5 ) ) ; Citizens United v

. F

ed. Election Comm’n
, 558 U.S. 310, 3 76 (2010) (Roberts, C.J

. , concurrin g ) ( e xp l a ining that facial invalidation is appropr i a t e w hen, “ [ g ] iven the nature of th[ e ] claim a nd defense, .

. . any other [ plaintiff] raising the same challeng e would also win”); K eller & Tsey tlin, supra , a t 322 (“[ E] very person has the rig ht not to be subj ect to an unconstitutional law – t h a t is, a law that violates a tex tual decision rule.”). 1 3 There ex ists, therefore, “ ‘no set of c ircumstances

. . . under which [ the Proposition 100 laws] wo uld be valid.’” W ash. State Grange , 552 U.S. at 449 (quoting Salerno
, 4 81 U.S. at 745).

13 Keller an d T se y t l i n e x p lain th at “ th e Su p rem e Co u rt h as created

v ario u s co n stitu

tio n al d e c i sio n ru les to en f o rce th e Co n stitu

tio n ’ s p ro v isio n s an d co n strain lo w er c o u rts as t h ey ad j u d icate co n stitu

tio n al d i s p u t e s

. ” Keller & T sey tlin
, su p r a , at 3 2 0

. T h e au th o rs id en tif y “ tw o b ro ad categ o ries o f d ecisio n ru les: t ex tu al d ecisio n ru les an d en f orcem en t d ecisio n ru les.” Id

. at 32 2

. T ex tu al d ecisio n ru les “ req u ire co u rts to

ex am in e t h e statu to ry tex t en acted by th e leg islatu re o r th e circu m stan ces

su rro u n d in g th at t ex t’s e n a c tm en t.” Id

. En f orcem en t d ecisio n ru les, b y

co n trast, “ d irect co u rts to ex am in e th e partic u l a r f acts su rro u n d in g th e

ex ecu tiv e’ s o r t

h e j u d iciary ’ s en f

o rcem en t of a statu te i n s t e a d o f th e statu to ry tex t i tself

.” Id

. at 3 2 4. S

a lern o ’ s h eig h ten ed scru tin y su b s tan tiv e d u e p ro cess test, w

h ich w e ap p ly h er e , is a tex tu al d ecisio n ru l e, an d
ap p licatio n

o f su ch a ru le w ill lead t o in to to in v alid atio n

w h ere, as h ere,

“ t h e litig an t s’ arg u m en t s a n d th e co u rts’ in q u iries f

o cu sed o n th e en t ire
statu to ry co v erag e.” Id

. at 3 3 9

.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 34

Furthermore, the Proposition 100 laws have b een ful l y implemented, s o there is no p ossibility that Ariz ona o r Maricopa County will implement them in a narrow e r, constitutional manner, cf. W ash. S tate G range , 552 U.S

. at 450, and the defendants h ave n o t sug g ested any “reasonable”

or “readily apparent” narrowing co nstruction that would make the laws const itutional, S tenberg v. Carhart
, 530 U.S. 914, 944 (2000) (quoting Bo os v. Barry
, 485 U.S. 312, 330 (1988)) (internal quotation m a r ks omitted)). According ly
, the laws are facially

unconstitutional.

2.

W e nex t c onsider w h e t her the Proposition 100 laws violate substantive d u e process by imposing punishment before trial. See Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 746. “To d e t e r mine whether a restriction o n liberty c o nstitu tes impermissible punishment or permissible r eg ulation, we first look to leg islative intent.” Id. at 747. “Unless [ the l e g islature]

ex p ressly intended to impose p unitive restricti o n s , the
p unitive/reg ulatory distinction turns on whether a n a l t e r n a t i v e purpose to which the restriction may rationally be connected is assig nable for it, and whether it appea r s ex cessive in relation to the alternative purpose assig ned to it.” Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

To discern leg islative intent, the district c ourt considered both (1) the leg islative record before the Ariz ona leg islature that passed a

nd referred Prop o sition 100 to the voters a nd (2) statements m a de during the referendum drive and in election materials. The court concluded that the leg islative record “sug g ests that Proposition 100 m a y have been motivated by a de s i r e to punish for past crimes, but there is also e vidence that leg islators considered the issue of flig htL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 35

risk.” Similarly
, the court concluded that the “voter materials contained some official statements reflectin g a punitive
purpose, but ultimately the messag e w as mix ed.” And the
court ultimately concluded t h at “ the record as a whole does not support a finding that Proposition 100 was motivated by

an improper punitive purp o s e

. ” Given the mix ed nature o f the evidence of leg islative and voter intent, and the d ifficulty in attrib u t i n g motives to the electorate, we see n o reason to revisit those conclusions on a p p e al. B y assuming without deciding that Proposition 1 00 does not have a punitive
purpose, however, we d o not minimiz e t h e considerable evidence of punitive inte n t found in this record. 1 4 There is

14 A p artial su

m m ary o f th at ev id en ce: State Rep resen tativ e Ru ssell P earce, th e b ill’ s sp on so r, stated th at P ro p o sitio n 1 0 0 “ j u st sim p ly b rid g es th e g ap , a lo o p h ole in t

h e law th at w o u ld allo w p eo p le w h o are n ot in th is

co u n try [ ]leg ally w

h o h av e n o b u sin ess to b e released if th ey co m m i t an y crim e, th ey

h av e n o b u sin ess b ein g released if th ey co m m it n o crim e, n o ad d itio n al crim e [b e]cau se th ey ’ re alread y in th is co u n try illeg ally .” S en a te Ju d icia r

y Co mmittee Meetin g o n H .B. 2 3 8 9 a nd HCR 2 0 2 8
, 47 th L eg ., 1 st Reg u lar Sess. (A riz. 2 00 5 ). Said Pearce, “ [B ]ad en o u g h y o u ’ re illeg al b u t y o u co m

m it a s erio u s crim e y o u o u g h t n o t to b e b o n d ab le.” Id

. He ad d ed : “ [T ]h is bill targ ets v ery sim p ly th o s e w h o co m

m it serio u s, serio u s [crim i n al] a c ts in o u r co m m u n ity

. A v ery resp o n sib le b ill to p ro tect ou r citizen s f

ro m th o se w

h o w o u ld en ter ou r co u n try illeg ally an d

co m m it serio u s crim es ag ain st u s

. . . .” Id

. Rep

. P earce p ro m o ted th e bill

o n th e g ro u n d th at “ all illeg al alien s in th i s co u n t ry o u g h t to b e d etain ed
, d eb rief ed an d d ep o rted .” I

d

. H e reiterated : “ If y o u ’ re in th is co u n try illeg ally y o u o u g h t to b e d etain ed [an d ] d ep o rted [.] [E]n d o f sto ry ,” an d h e d e fen d ed th e b ill as a “ reaso n ab l e ap pro ach ” to b o rd er secu rity

. Id

. State Rep resen tativ e Ray Barn es ex p ressly p ro m o ted th e bill on th e

assu m p tio n th at “ th e m ere fa c t t h at th ey ’ re h ere u n d o cu m en ted [m ean s] th at t h e crim e h as alread y b een co m m itted .” Ho use Ju d icia ry Co mmittee Meetin g o n H.B. 2 3 8 9
, 4 7 th L eg ., 1 st R eg u lar Sess. (A riz. 2 00 5 ). State Sen ato r J ack Harp er said
, “ w h at p art o f i l l eg al d o n ’ t w e u n d erstan d ? I l l e g al alien s sh o u ld n ’ t b e ab le to g et b o n d f o r an y th in g .” Sen a te Ju d icia ry Co mmittee Meetin g on H.B. 2 3 8 9 a n d HCR 20 2 8
, 4 7 t h L eg ., 1st Reg u lar Sess. (A riz. 2 0 0 5 ). In a h earin g o n a b ill to im p lem en tL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 36

strong evidence that Proposition 1 00 was motivated at least in sig nificant part by a d esire to p u nish undocumented immig rants for (1) entering and remaining in th e country without a

uthoriz ation and (2) a lleg edly c ommitting the charg ed offense. 1 5

Nevertheless, assuming that Proposition 100 was adopted for the p ermissible reg ulat ory purpose of manag ing flig ht risk, “the punitive/reg ulatory distin c t i o n turns on whether” Proposition 1 00 “appears e x c e s sive in relation to the alternative purpose assig ned to it.” Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 747 (altera t i o n s and internal quotation marks omitted). A s discussed e arlier, Salerno held that the B ail Reform Act was not e x ces s i ve where it addressed a “pressing societal

P ro p o sitio n 10 0 af

ter its p assag e, St a t e Rep resen tativ e Jo h n Kav an ag h said : “ I’ m am azed t h at w e p ro v i d e bail to an y bo d y w h o’ s arrested f

o r a crim e th at’ s an illeg al alien

. . . . I t h eref o re su p p o rt th is b ill as a f

irst s tep to w h at w e sh o u ld b e really d oin g an d th at’ s dep o rtin g an y b o dy h ere illeg a l ly .” Ho use Flo o r Meetin g o n S.B. 1 2 6 5
, 4 8 th L eg ., 1st Reg u lar Sess. (A riz. 2 00 7 ).

15 Den y in g an arrestee b ail f o r eith er o f th ese reaso n s w o u ld b e im p erm issib le. B ein g presen t in th e Un ited States w ith o u t au th o rizatio n is n o t a crim e, see Arizo na v. U n ited S ta tes , 1 3 2 S. Ct. at 2 5 0 5 (“ A s a g en eral ru le, it is n o t a crim e f or a rem o v ab le alien to rem ain p resen t in th e Un i ted States.”), an d ev en if it w ere, o n ly th e f ed eral g o v ern m en t w ou ld b e p erm itted to im

p o se p u ni sh m en t f

o r it, see id

. at 2 5 0 9 (“ [I]t w ou ld d isru p t th e f ed eral f ram ew o rk to p u t state o f f ice r s in th e po sitio n of h o ld in g alien s in cu st o d y f o r p o ssib le u n law f

u l presen ce w ith ou t f

ed eral d irectio n an d su

perv isio n. ” )

. An d b ail co u ld n o t b e den ied to pu n ish
arrest e es f

o r th eir ch arg ed
, b u

t u n p ro v en , crim es. S

ee Bell
, 4 4 1 U.S. at 5 3 5 (“ [U]n d er th e Du e P ro cess Clau s e, a [d ef en d an t] m ay n o t b e p u

n ish ed
p rio r to an ad

j u d icatio n of g u i lt i n acco rd an ce w i th d u e p ro cess o f law .”); S a lern o , 4 8 1 U.S. at 7 4 6 (citin g Bell f o r th e p ro p o sitio n th at p r e t rial d eten tio n v io l ates su

b s tan t i v e d u e p ro cess w h en it co n stitu

tes

“ i m p erm i ssib le p u n ish m en t b ef o re trial”).L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 37

problem,” “carefully limit[ ed] the c ircumstances under which d e tention may be soug ht to the most serious o f crimes” a n d entitled the arrestee to “a prompt detention hearing ” a t which

an i n dividualiz ed determination of dang erousness was required. Id. B y contrast, Proposition 100 is e x cessive in relation to its stated leg itimate p urpose b ecause it purports to deal with a societal ill – unmanag eable flig ht r isk posed b y undocumented immig rants as a class – that has n ot been shown to ex ist. Even if we as s ume that a problem ex ists, Proposition 100 employ s a profoundly overbroad irrebuttable presumption, rather than an in d i vidualiz e d evaluation, to determine whether an arrestee is a n unmanag eable flig ht risk. As discussed
, this mechanism necessarily r esults in the deprivation o f liberty even where n ot necessary to ensure appearance at trial, becaus e undocumented immig rants w ho do not pose a flig h t risk or w ho pose a ma n a ge a b l e o ne a re categ orically denied bail based solely on their status. Given this severe lack of fit between the a sserted nonpunitive
purpose and the actual o peration of the law, we conclude that Proposition 100’s bail provisions a re p unitive rather than
reg ulatory

. T hus, the Proposition 10 0 laws facially violate substantive due process by imposing punishment before trial.

IV.

To conclude, Proposition 100 categ orically denies bail o r other pretrial release and thus r equires pretrial d e t e n tion for
every undocumented immig r ant charg ed with any of a broad
rang e of f elonies, reg ardless o f the seriousness of the offense

or the individual circumstances of the arrestee, including the arrestee’s strong ties to a n d d eep roots in the community

. The defendants maintain that this unusual, sweeping pretrial d e t e n t i o n s t at u t e , d i rected solely at undocumen t e d immig rants, comports with substantive due p rocess. I t d o e sL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 38

not. The Supreme Court h as made clear that “[ i] n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited e x ception.” Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 755. The “narrowly focuse[ d] ” pre t r ial release statute upheld in Salerno provided a “careful delineation of the circumstances under w hich detention w ill be permitted.” Id. at 750–51. I n contrast, the Proposition 100 laws do not address an established “particularly acute problem,” are n ot limited to “a specific categ o ry of ex tremely seriou s o f f e nses,” and do not afford the individualiz ed det e r m ination of flig ht risk o r dang erousness that Salerno dee m e d essential. Id. at 750. These laws represent a “scattershot attempt” a t a d d ressing flig ht risk and a

re not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Id. I n addition, and f or the same reasons, the challeng ed laws are ex cessi v e in relation to the state’s leg itimate interest in assuring arrestees’ presence for trial. They therefore impermissibly impo s e punishment before an adjudication of g uilt. F or these reasons, w e hold that the P r o position 100 laws violate the substantive component o f t h e Due Process Clause of the F ourteenth Amendment o n t hese
two independent g rounds. B ecause we hold that the l a w s facially violate substantive due process, we do not reach the plaintiffs’ p rocedural due process, Eig hth Amendment, Six thL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 39

Amendment a

nd preemption c laims. 1 6 The judg ment o f the district court is reversed.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

NGUYEN, Circuit J u dg e, concurring :

I ag ree with the majority that Proposition 100 violates substantive d

ue process. Howe v e r , the majority assumes, without deciding
, that Proposition 100 was not motivated b y

an improper p unitive purpose. I w r i te separately to address the ex traordinary record o f leg islative intent, w hich I believe demonstrat e s that Proposition 100 was intentionally drafted
to punish undocumented immig rants for their “illeg a l” status,

even if they p o s e no flig ht risk or dang e r to the community

. This record also sheds lig ht on why the law’s provisions a re

ex c e ssive in so many respects. Acknowledg ing the improper

16 W e d isag ree w ith J u d g e O’ Scan n lain ’ s arg u m en t th at th e P ro p o sitio n 1 0 0 law s m

u s t b e ev alu ated u n d er th e Ex cessiv e B ail Clau se o f th e Eig h th A m en d m en t rat her th an t h e s u b stan tiv e co m

p o n en t o f th e D u e P ro cess Clau se o f th e Fo u rteen th A m en dm en t. Dissen t at 6 6

– 7 0

. T h e S u p rem e Co u rt ap p lied su

b stan tiv e d u e p ro cess rev i e w t o b ail- d en ial s ch em es in S a lern o an d S

ch a ll

. J u d g e O ’ Scan n lain w o u ld d istin g u i sh th o se cases on th e g ro u n d th at th ey in v o lv ed th e d en ial o f b ail f o r d an g ero u sn ess rath er th an f l ig h t risk
, b u t th e S u

prem e Co u rt h as n ev er r e c o g n ized

– o r ev en

su g g ested

– th at d istin ctio n

. S ee, e.g

. , Za d

vyd a s , 5 3 3 U.S. at 6 9 0 (citin g S a lern o as settin g o u t th e g en eral stan d ard f o r d eten tio n in crim in al cases); Fo u ch a , 5 0 4 U.S. at 8 3 (citin g S a lern o as settin g o u t th e g en eral stan d ard f o r th e “ pretrial d et e n t io n o f arrestees”). A s J u d g e O’ Scan n lain

reco g n izes, Dissen t at 71
, th e p arties also ha v e n o t “ th o ro u g h [ly ] b rief [ed ]” th e Eig h th A m en dm en t i ssu es. Fo r th ese reaso n s, w e p ro p erly rely o n su

b stan tiv e d u e p ro ce s s r a t he r th an t h e Eig h th A m en d m en t to ad d ress P ro p o sitio n

1 0 0 ’ s co n stitu

tio n ality

.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 40

leg islative purpose in this case not only aids our substantive due process a

naly sis, but also r ea ffirms our constitutional commitment to pro v i de due process to all, reg a rdless o f immig ration status.

I

The Supr eme Court has instructed that “[ t] o determine whether a restriction o n liberty c o nstitutes impe rmissible punishment or permissible r eg ulation, we first look to leg islative intent.” United States v. Salerno
, 4 8 1 U .S. 739, 7 4 7 ( 1 987) (citing Schall v

. Martin
, 467 U.S. 253, 2 6 9 (1984)). Absent evidence o f ex press intent t o punish, the analy sis depends on whether the r estrictions are reasonably connected to a leg itimate purpose, and whet h e r they appear

ex c e ssive in relation to that p urpose. Bell v. W olfish
, 441 U.S. 5 20, 538–39 (1979); Sale r n o , 481 U.S. at 747. However, whether a statute is intended a s p u n itive, o r

ex c e ssive in relation to some leg itima t e purpose, are not analy tically distinct inquiries. One informs the other:

Thus, if a particular restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a leg itimate
g overnmental objective, it d oes not, without
more, a mount to “punishment.” Conversely
, if a restriction or c o ndition is not reasonably related to a leg itimate g oal—if it is arbi t r ary

or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the g overnmental a ction is punishment that may not constitution a lly be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.

Bell
, 441 U.S. at 539 (footnote omitted). Conceptually
, this makes sense. B ecause the ultimate question is whether or notL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 41

a statute constitutes impermi s s i b le punishment, we may consider bot h what leg islators had to say about the law they crafted, a

nd the e x tent to which the law was dr a wn according ly

. Sig nifi c a ntly
, “the mere invocation o f a leg itimate
purpose w ill not justify particular restrictions and conditions of confinement amounting to punishment.” S chall
, 467 U.S.
at 2 69. Even if the r estrict ions “ serve leg itimate reg ulatory purposes, it is still n ecessary to determine whether the terms and conditions of confinement under [ the challeng e d statute]

are in fact c ompatible with tho s e purposes.” Id. (citing K e n nedy v. M

e ndoza-Martinez
, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963)).

These inquiries do not lend themselves to a rig id, formulaic approach. Rather, “each case has turned on its o wn hig hly p a rticulariz ed contex t.” Flemming v. Nestor
, 3 63 U.S. 603, 616 ( 1960). W here the record o f leg i s l a tive intent is inconclusive, the Supr eme Court has not hesitated to consider—rather ex pansively
, in fact—the nature and history of the restraint, among other factors. M en d o z a-Martinez
, 372 U.S. at 168–69. See also Bell
, 441 U. S

. a t 538 (“The factors identified in Mendoza-Martinez provide u s eful
g uideposts in d etermining whether p a r ticular restrictions a

nd conditions accompany

ing pretrial det e ntion amount to punishment in the constitutional sense of that word.”).

The f acts of t h i s case illustrate precisely why leg islative intent a nd tailoring have be e n c onsidered two sides of the

same c o i n

. I therefore turn to some o f the record evidence that informs my judg ment r e g arding the unconstitutionality of Proposition 100.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 42

II

A

Proposition 100 was sponsored by former State Representative Russell P e a r c e. I ntroducing the bill to the S e n a t e Ju d iciary Committee, Representative Pear c e n o t e d t h a t

a majority of Americans “ w ant the border secured, [ and] our laws e nfo r c e d ,” and described Proposition 100 as a “very reasonable approach” to accompli shing those ends. 1 Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting on H.B. 2 389 a n d H.C.R. 2028
, Mar. 28, 2005, 47th L eg ., 1st Reg u lar Sess. (Ariz

. 2005). He described the pur

pose of Proposition 100: “[ W ]hen people a re in this country illeg ally and they c o mmit a serious felony they
oug ht not to be bondable

. . . .” Id. Althoug h he a lluded
g e n e r ally to the supposed d ang ers that “ violent aliens” pose t o t h e public, he did not cite a sing le ex ample o r any ot h e r evidence of the problem, 2 and instead elaborated:

1 A cco rd in g to P earce, P ro p ositio n 1 0 0 w as o rig in ally p art o f a p ack ag e

o f leg islatio n i n ten d ed t o “ s ecu re th e b ord ers.” T h e p ack ag e also in clu d ed : th e F air an d L eg al Em p lo y m en t A ct, A riz. Rev

. Stat. § 2 3

- 2 1 2
, w h i ch i m

p o ses p en alties o n em p lo y ers f

o r h irin g u n d o cu m en t e d im m ig ran ts; P ro p o sitio n 1 0 2
, A riz. C o n s t. art. II, § 3 5
, a co n s t i t u t i o n al

am en d m en t to d en y u n d o cu m en ted im m ig ran ts stan d in g to reco v er in civ i l

su its; P ro p o sitio n 1 03
, A riz. Co n st. art. XXVIII, § 2
, d eclarin g En g lish as th e o f f icial lan g u ag e o f A rizo n a ; a n d P ro p o s itio n 3 00
, A riz. Rev

. Stat. § § 1 5

- 1 9 1.0 1
, 1 5

- 2 3 2
, 1 5

- 1 80 3, 15

- 1 8 2 5, 46

- 8 0 1
, 4 6

- 8 0 3
, w h i c h p r o h i b its

u n d o cu m en ted alien s f

ro m receiv in g ch ild care assistan c e , an d th ose

en ro lled in p u

b lic co m m u n ity co lleg es an d u n iv ersities f ro m receiv in g th e b en ef it o f in

- state tu itio n rates an d f in an cial aid , o r p articip atin g in ad u l t ed u catio n classes.

2 T h e reco rd ref

lects t h at P ro p o sitio n 1 0 0’ s sp o n so rs an d su p p o rters also
p resu m e d th at u n d o cu m en ted im m ig ran ts are ca teg o rica lly m ore d an g ero u s th an oth er arrestees. In th ese p ro ceed in g s, h o w ev er, ap p elleesL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 43

I m ea n, y ou k

now bad e noug h y ou’re illeg al but y o u commit a serious crime y ou oug ht not to be bondable unless y ou’r e released a fter prosecution, a f

t e r y ou do y our time to I CE and then to be deported. I n fact, all illeg al aliens in this country oug ht to be detained, debriefed, and deported . . . .

Id. He continued:

Violent criminals in our society wh o , ag ain,
may n ot be broug ht to justice if they ’re released and should not be released f irst of all,

ac c o r d ing to federal law, but they ’re to be deported, so seriously
, they ’ve committed [ a] serious crime, I think that th i s just simply bri dg es the g ap, a loophole in the law that would allow pe o p l e who are not in this country [ ] leg ally who have no business to be releas e d if they commit any c r ime, they have

no business being released if the y commit no crime, no additional crime [be] cause they’re already in this country illegally

.

Id

. ( emphasis added). Maricopa Cou n t y A ttorney Andrew Thomas, whose office play ed a central r ole in drafting P r o p o s ition 100, also testified before the Committee. Thom a s

ex p lained the purpose of the bill as follows:

I believe it is time to end the f irst class tickets that we have been g ivi n g f rom our jails for

h av e w isely ab an d o n ed th is p rem i s e b ecau se it is co m p letely

u n su b stan tiated

.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 44

serious c rim inals.

. . . [ C] ertain serious criminals currently enjoy this simply because of their status as illeg al immig rants and I believe that we need to take action to put an end to this.

Id. I n his testimony
, Thomas, much l i k e Representative Pearce, alluded to “numerous ex amples of serious and violent crimi n als that Maricopa County Attorney ’s Office has prosecuted in the p ast that have escaped justice ”

— b u t also could not cite a s ing le case to support his position. 3 Testify ing later in these proceeding s, Thomas ag a in could not identify a sing le such case, and further conc e d ed that his office did not possess any data or information illustrating the problem.

During t h e same J udiciary Committee hearing
, State Senator B ill B rotherton raised concerns about the breadth o f the bill. Senator B r otherton g ave an ex a mple—a student w ho overstay ed his or her visa and was charg e d wi th pirating music online would automatically be denied b ail, even thoug h

a judg e mig ht not consider such a de f endant a flig ht risk. Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting on H.B. 2389 and H.C.R. 2028
, Mar. 28, 2005, 47th L eg ., 1st Reg ular Ses s

. (Ariz

. 2 005). Represent a t i ve Pearce dismissed this concern

3 T h e o n l y sp ecif

ic case T h o m as d iscu ssed w as th at o f O scar Garc i a Martin ez, w

h o , acco rd in g to T h o m as, w as released o n b ail, an d d ep o r ted b y th e fed era l g o vern men t , ren d erin g h im u n av ailab le to th e s t a te. Id

. So m etim e l ater M artin ez ap p aren t ly reen t ered
, an d w as p resen t at a

co n f ro n tatio n th at resu lted in th e sh o o tin g o f a po lice o f f i c e r b y a th ird
p arty

. Id

. Ho w ev er tro u b l in g Martin ez’ s case m ay b e, it certain ly d o e s

n o t d em o n strate t

h at u n d o cu m en ted im

m ig ran ts p o se a g reater f

lig h t risk
, g iv en th at it w as th e f

ed eral g o v ern m en t th at ren d ered Martin ez ab sen t.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 45

as an attempt to “ m u d dy the waters,” id.
, and reiterated the intent of the bill:

The f act that we w ould continue to try to put

som e veil o ver what’s really happening a nd try to paint this face of this poor student who overstay s his visa, every

body knows what this is targ e ting

. This is, y ou know, and my issue is very simple. This bill doesn’t g o as far as it
oug ht to g o. This is a very modest b ill. I f
y ou’re in this country illeg ally y ou oug ht to be detained, deported[ ,] end of story

.

Id

. Similarly
, when Senator B rotherton ex pressed his concern that altering a lotte r y ticket oug ht not to be a non-bondable offense, State Senator J ack W

. Harper interjected:

To t hat point, what p art of illegal d on’t we understand? Illegal aliens shouldn’t be able
to get bond

for anything let alone a Class 1, 2,

or 3 felony

. . . . W e need to just g et off the

s u b j e c t o f l o t t e r y t i c k e t [ s ] b e c a u s e fraudulently

altering lottery tickets is a crime and they shouldn’t make bail for anything
, so let’s just move on.

Id. (em p hases added). Ultimately
, the Committee amended the leg islation to specify that, should the ballot measure pass, t he L e g islature would reserve to itself the task of defin i n g “serious felony offense.” To that end, Representative Pearce introduced leg islat i o n that would define “serious felony offense” as entailing any

class 1, 2, 3, or 4 felony
, a s well as
ag g r avated driving u nder the influence. House F loor Meeting

on H.B. 2580
, Mar. 7, 2006, 4 7 th L e g ., 2nd Reg ular Sess.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 46

( A r iz

. 2 006). That bill w as eventually passed by t h e L eg islature, and sig ned into law.

Months later, Proposition 100 was referred to the state’s
voters. The ballot materials did not inform voters o f t h e definition of “serious felony offense,” or that it included
many non-violent offenses. I n stead, in a statement of support

on the b a l l o t , Representative Pearce warned voters o f “[ l] arg e, well-org aniz ed g ang s of illeg a l aliens,” and the need
to keep su c h “ d a ng erous thug s in jail r ather than r eleasing them onto the streets.” Pu b l i c ity Pamphlet I ssued b y J anice K. B rewer, then-Ariz ona Secretary of State, B allot Propositions & J udicial Performance Review, Gen eral Election, Nov. 7, 2006, a vailable at http:// w w w.az sos.g ov/

e l e c t i o n / 2 0 0 6 / i n f

o / p u b p a m p h l e t / e n g l i s h / P r o p 1 0 0

. h t m

. Maricopa County

Attorney Thomas urg ed voters 4 :

Thanks to an amendment approved

o verwhelming ly by v oters in 2002, t h e Ariz ona Constitution now denies b ail to defendants accused of rape and child molestation. This p r o p o s ition similarly would deny bail to il l e ga l immig r ants who pose a clear dang er to society and who too often use

4 T h o m as also claim ed : “ Oth er ex am p les o f illeg al im

m ig ran ts w

h o

m ad e b ail an d av o id ed p ro secu tio n fo r s erio u s crim es in clu d e accu s ed ch ild p red ato rs, arm ed ro bb ers, d ru g d ealers an d o th er accu sed crim in als.” Id

. T h e o n ly ex am

p le T h o m as p ro v id ed
, h o w ev er, w as th e case o f Oscar Martin ez. S

ee su p ra at n o te 3 . A n d , as an oth er leg islato r later co rrectly

n o ted
, “ [t]h o se in d iv id u als w h o are accu sed of co m

m ittin g h ein o u s crim es [su ch as t h o se cited b y P ro po s itio n 10 0 ’ s su p p o rters] are alread y d en ied b ail u n d er cu rren t state statu tes

. . . .” Ho u se Flo o r Meetin g o n S .B. 1 2 6 5
, J u n e 7
, 2 0 0 7, 4 8 th L eg ., 1st R eg u lar Sess. (A riz. 2 0 0 7 ) (statem en t o f Rep

. Kry sten Sin em a).L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 47

o u r border as an escape route. Our state

c o nstitution was not intended to “bail ou t ” illeg al immig ration. I urg e y ou to vote y es to end this abuse of our criminal justice sy stem.

I d. Don Goldwater, a g ubernatorial candidate, place d t h i s statement on the ballot:

I commit to y ou that, as y our Governor, I will apply all leg al measures to protect and d efend Ariz onans f

rom the illeg al invasion. This B a llot Measure addresses one area that needs
t o b e resolved in this fig ht to secure o u r borders and reduced the level o f crime in our neig hborhoods.

I t is embarrassing to have our state lead the nation in crime. Unfortunately
, the current g overnor has vetoed ten separate bills sent to her desk the l e g islature that were written to protect y ou from illeg al immig ration.

Id. B y contrast, the sole statement o f opposition to Proposition 100, sig ned by several individuals, cautioned:

Prop 100 would

. . . create a sub-class o f people within the justice sy stem based solely

on race or national o r ig in, and u n necessarily penaliz e peo p l e w ho pose little or no risk to the community

. This proposition would do nothing more than inst i tutionaliz e bias a ndL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 48

d iscrimination in the justice sy stem, at tax pay e r ex pense.

Id. Voters approved the constitutional amendment.

After the popular vote, foll ow-on leg islation was int roduced that would have lowered the standard of proof applicable to the d etermination of immig ration sta t u s from “proof evident and presumption g reat,” to “preponderance o f the evidence

. ” P e a rce rose o n the floor of the House to oppose the bill b e c ause, in his view, it did no t l o wer the standard even f

urther, to “ probable cause.” I n his o pposition, Pearc e r epeatedly emphasiz ed the immig rants’ “illeg al”
status:

You don’t need to make that kind of a standard for preponderance o r a ny thing else to the c harg e[ ,] they are h e re illeg ally

. . . . they

are h ere illeg ally
, they have no business being released n o [ matter] w hat the charg e in reality because they ’re a flig ht risk. T hey ’re here illeg ally

. They need to be turned over to I CE

. . . .

House Floor Meeting o n S.B. 1265
, J une 7, 2007, 48th L eg ., 1st Reg ular Sess. (Ariz

. 2007). Rep r e s e ntative J ohn Kavanagh raised similar arg uments. Id. Ultimately
, the

measure to set t h e burden of proof at “preponderance of the evidence” failed. D ay s later, discussing an ame n d m ent to lower the standa r d t o “probable cause,” Representative Kavanagh ex p lained his support for the latter:

I ’m amaz ed that we p rovid e b a i l to any body who’s arrested for a crime that’ s an illeg alL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 49

alien. I th i n k any

b ody
, reg ardless if it’s seri ous or a minor crime[
, ] should be denied bail

. . . . W e should deny ba i l to any body here illeg ally who’s picked u p

. I therefore

s u p p ort this bill as a first step to what w e should be really doing and that’s d e porting
any b ody here illeg ally

.

House Floor Meeting on S.B. 1265
, J une 13, 2007, 48th L eg ., 1st Reg u lar Sess. (Ariz

. 2007). The amendment lowering the standard of proof to “probable cause” passed.

W h ile this is by no means a n ex haustive survey of the evidence of p unitive intent to b e found in t he record, the foreg oing summary at l e a s t convey s the tenor o f the leg islative debates and b allot materials. The hostility directed toward u ndocumented immig rants b ased solely on their status could not be more obvious.

B

I acknowledg e, of course, that there are references in the record to flig ht risk—indi s p u tably
, a leg itimate objective o f
reg ulation, S

a lerno
, 481 U.S. at 7 49; Bell
, 441 U.S. at 534—and more spec i fically
, the unsupported premise that undo c u mented immig rants inherently pose a g reater flig ht risk than o ther arrestees. 5 B u t there is nothing unusual about

5 Fo r ex am

p le, in on e ex ch an g e, Re p r e se n tativ e P earce ask ed :

“ [W ]o u ld n ’ t y o u ag ree th at so m eb o dy th at’ s n o t in th is c o u n try leg ally
p ro b ab ly is a g reater f

lig h t risk th an s o m eb o dy w h o is, w h o h as ro ots h ere

an d i s a citizen h ere? ” H

o u se Flo o r Meetin g on S

.B. 1 26 5
, J u n e 7, 2 0 0 7
, 4 8 th L eg ., 1 st Reg u l ar Sess. (A riz. 2 0 07 ). State Rep resen tativ e Pete Rio s,

w h o p rev io u sly se r v e d a s th e f irst L atin o p resid en t o f A rizo n a’ s State Sen ate, resp on d ed : “ I k

n o w o f so m e p eo p le in t

h is co u n try w

h o do n ’ t h av eL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 50

a “mix e d” leg islative record; leg islators and voters often take positions for diverse reasons.

I ndeed, the very concept o f l eg islative intent can be “elusive,” Mendoza-Martinez , 372 U.S. at 168, and

[ j] udicial inquiries into [ l eg islative] motives
are at best a haz a

rdous matter, and when that inquiry seeks to g o behin d objective manifestations it becomes a dubi ous affair ind eed. Moreover, the p resumption o f constituti o nality with which this enactment, l i ke any other, comes to us forbids us lig htl y to c h o o se that reading o f the statute’s setting which will invalidate i t o v er that which will save it.

Flemming
, 363 U.S. at 617. B ut recogn i z ing the perils o f second-g uessing leg islative intent does not relieve us o f the responsibility to ascertain the law’s purpose, particularly here because, in my view, the overriding l eg islative intent is so apparent. See S

a l erno , 481 U.S. at 747 (in evaluating restrictions on liberty , “we first look to leg islative intent”).

That there are references to flig ht r isk, a s n o t e d by the dissent, illustrates why the Supreme Court has prescribed a mutually -reinforcing
, twin-pron g ed framework for analy sis. Se e Be l l
, 4 4 1 U.S. at 539. To the ex tent there is any doubt about the pu r

p o s e of Proposition 100, the statements in the

p ro p er d o cu m en tatio n th at p ro bab ly h a v e d e ep er ro o ts in th e state of A rizo n a th an I d o

. T h ey ’ v e b een h ere f o r a co u p le o f g en eratio n s, th ey ’ v e g o t g ran dk id s, s o I m ean t h at, in itself

, I th in k do es n o t d eterm i n e w h eth er

o r n o t o n e is a f

lig h t risk .” Id

.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 51

l e g islative r ecord further support the conclusion, consist e n t with the majority ’s analy sis of its various provisions, that the law was intended as punishment.

This principle ring s true a t a g eneral level—naturally
, the law’s drafting and desig n sheds lig ht on its purpose, a nd vice versa—but it also i n fo r m s my analy sis of the law’s specific provisions. F or ex ample, a number of Prop o s i tion 100’s

ex c e sses, including the evident overbreadth of the critical
t erm “serious felony offense,” were pointed out to the b i l l ’s
sponsors in Committee. As n oted a b ove, Senator B rotherton drew attention to the specific e x amples of illeg al d o w nloading and alteration of a lottery ticket to emphasiz e the law’s ex c essive reach. See Senate Judic iary Committee Meeting on H.B. 2389 and H.C.R. 2028
, Mar. 28, 2005, 47th L eg ., 1st Reg ular Sess. (Ariz

. 2005). Yet, Proposition 100’s
sponsors declined t o n a

r row the definition of covered “serious felonies,” which renders “an ex ceedin gly broad rang e o f offenses” non-bondable. Maj. Op. at 23. W hy Senator B r o t h e r t o n ’ s c o n c e r n s r e g a r d i n g P r o p o s i t i o n 1 0 0 ’ s

ex c e ssiveness wer e brushed aside is plain from the record—because
, as ex pressed by the b ill’s supporters, “illeg al aliens” “shouldn’t m a k e bail for any thing .” Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting on H.B. 2389 a n d H.C.R. 2028
, Mar. 28, 2005, 47th L eg ., 1st Reg ular Sess. (Ariz

. 2005). The leg islative d e b a te over the standard of proof is also illustrative. Statements such as, “I ’m amaz ed that we provide ba i l to any

body who’s arrested for a crime that’s an illeg al alien,” H ouse Floor Meeting on S .B. 1265
, J une 13, 2007, 48th L e g

. , 1 s t Reg ular Sess. (Ariz

. 2007), strong ly sug g e st that the standard of proof w as lowered in order to t arg et undocumented immig rants as such, w ithout respect to flig ht risk.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 52

I ag ree with the majority tha t w e d o not affirmatively require formal leg islative finding s o r other e vidence, y e t may find the a bsence of such a r ecord to be sig nificant. 6 Maj. Op.
at 23. I also readily a c k n o w ledg e that there may be many

cases where the mix e d rec o r d renders leg islative intent too elusive, or otherwise unknowable. This case, however, is not

one of them. I ntentionally meting o ut pretrial punishment for charg e d but unproven crimes, or the nonex istent crime o f being “in this country illeg ally ,” 7 i s w ithout question, a violation of due process p r inciples. Mendoza-Martin e z , 372 U.S. at 167; Bell , 441 U.S. at 539.

III

“[ I ] t is not on slig ht implication and vag ue c onjecture that the leg islature is to be pronounced to have transce nded its
powers, and its acts considered to be void,” Fletcher v. Peck
, 6 Cranch 87, 128 (1810) (Marshall, C.J .), and I do not reach that conclusion lig htly

. However, the unequivocal

ex p ressions of penal intent in the r ec ord, viewed tog ether with the ex c esses of the law’s various provisions, lead me to conclude that Proposition 100 is facially unconstitutional.

6 N o b o d y d i s p u t e s th at th ere is n o su ch ev id en ce in th e reco rd

. T h e d issen t o b serv es th at u n d o cu m en ted im m ig ran ts rep o rted ly co m m i t a d isp ro p ortio n ate sh are of f elo n ies i n A r izo n a. T allm an d issen t at 5 9 (citin g Arizo na v. Un ited S ta tes , 1 32 S. Ct. 24 9 2
, 2 5 0 0 (2 0 1 2 )). B u t ev en

assu m in g th at is t r u e , it d o es n o t su g g est u n do cu m en ted im

m ig ran ts

o v erall are m o re likely to flee th an o th er arrestees, n o r d o es it sh ed lig h t on th e f lig h t risk p o sed b y an y g iv en in d iv id u al d ef

en d an t.

7 T h e m aj o rity co rrectly po in t s ou t th at, “ [a]s a g en e r a l ru le, it is n o t a crim e f o r a rem o v ab le a lien to rem ain p resen t in th e Un ited States.” Arizo n a , 1 3 2 S. Ct. at 2 5 05

.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 53

TAL L MAN, Circuit J udg e , w ith whom Circuit J udg e O’SCANNL AI

N joins, dissenting :

I n striking down Proposition 100, the majority sets aside the policy judg ment of the Ariz ona leg islature and nearly 80 percent of Ariz ona’s voting e lectorate, telling the S tate it really d oesn’t have an illeg al immig ration problem adversely affecting its criminal justice sy stem. B u t Ariz onans thoug ht Proposition 100 was the solution to an ineffective bail sy stem that was letting too many illeg a l aliens avoid answering for their serious felony charg es. They were concerned that these offenders, w ho often lack community ties, too often skirt justice by fleeing the state or the country before trial. Plaintiffs-Appellants L opez -Valenz u ela and Castro-Armenta

are g ood ex amples. B etween the two of them they were charg ed with ag g ravated ass a u lt with a deadly weapon, kidnapping
, theft by e x tortion, assisting a criminal sy ndicate, and transportation of a dang e rous drug

. Today ’s holding leaves Ariz ona n owhere to turn. F o r y ears before A riz ona passed Proposition 100, it tried to assess flig ht risk based on family ties, e m p l o y ment, and leng th o f residency in the comm u n i t y on a n individualiz ed basis. I mmig r a tion status was as s u redly a critical consideration in
t his assessment, even w ell before Proposition 1 00’ s enactment. The majority ig nores reality to sug g est otherwise. Y e t despite these individualiz e d f lig ht-risk assessments, t h e Maricopa County Attorney ex plain ed in 2006 that A riz o na still had a “tremendous problem with illeg al immig rants coming into the state, committing serious crimes, and then absconding
, and not facing trial for their crimes.” Lou D obbs Tonight (CNN televisio n b roadcast Oct. 13, 2006). F a ced with this continuing problem, Ariz ona took a log ical nex t step by deny ing bail to illeg al aliens who commit serious fel onyL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 54

offenses. B e cause Proposition 100 is not ex cessive in relation
to Ariz ona’s c o m pelling reg ulatory interest in ensuring that illeg al aliens who commit serious f elony offenses stand trial, I respectfully

dissent.

I

A

The majority ’s e r rors beg in with its substantive d ue pr o c e s s framework. I t applies what it calls “ S alerno ’s heig htened scrutiny ” to Proposition 100. Maj. Op. a t 15; see United S tates v. Salerno
, 4 81 U.S. 739 (1987)

. Under this test, it say s, the law survives o n ly when it is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Maj. O p. at 17. This is strict scrutiny

. S

ee, e.g. , Green v. City of Tucson
, 340 F .3d 891, 8 96 (9th Cir. 2003) (F ishe r, J .) (Under “strict scrutiny ,” “the statute will be upheld only if the s t at e can show that the statute is narrowly d rawn to serve a compelling
state interest.”). However, y ou will n ot find strict s c r u t i n y mentioned, let alone applied, any where in Salerno

. 1

T he majority mistakenly applies strict scrutiny b y misreading Salerno
, which addressed the consideration o f dang er to the community in bail d e terminations, as holding that the B ail Reform Act implicated a fundame n tal liberty interest. S

alerno h e l d j u s t the opposite. The Court

1 If y o u f in d it p ecu liar t h a t t h e Su p rem e C o u rt w o u ld ap p l y strict

scru tin y w ith o u t tellin g u s , y o u h av e g o o d reaso n

. It certain ly k n o w s h o w to say th at it is ap ply in g strict s cru t in y w h en it d o es so

. S

ee, e.g

. , Jo h nso n

v. Ca lifo rn ia
, 54 3 U.S. 4 9 9, 5 0 7 (2 0 0 5 ) ( e x plain in g th at it is ap p ly in g

“ s trict scru tin y ”); Bu sh v. Vera
, 51 7 U.S. 9 52
, 9 7 6 (1 9 9 6 ) (sam e); Miller

v. Jo h nso n , 5 1 5 U.S. 9 0 0
, 9 20 (1 9 95 ) (sam e); Bern a l v. Fa in ter , 4 6 7 U .S. 2 1 6 , 2 2 7 (1 9 8 4 ) (sam e).L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 55

acknowledg ed that liberty
, in its broadest sense, is a fundamental r i ght. Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 750. I t ex plained, however, that the rig ht asserted in Salerno was more limited; it was the rig ht to b ail after “the Government proves by clear and convincin g e vidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulabl e threat to an individual or the community .” Id

. at 751. As to that rig ht, the Court said: “we
cannot categ oric a l l y state that pretrial detention ‘ offends

some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions a nd conscience of our people a s to be ranked as fund amental.’” Id

. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts
, 291 U.S

. 9 7
, 105 (1934)). Thus, rather than holding that lib e rty is a f u n d a m e n tal r ig ht in all instances, the Court h eld that the liberty rig ht “under the[ ] circumstances” of the B ail Reform Act was not

fundamental. Id

.

The Court’s narrow c onstruction of the liberty interest at stake in Salerno is consistent with its instruction that “‘[ s] ubstantive due process’ analy sis must beg in with a careful description of the a sserted rig ht, for the doc t r i n e o f judicial self-restraint requires us to ex ercise the u t m o st care whenever we are asked to break new g round i n t h is field.” Reno v. Flores
, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (citations a nd internal quo t a t i ons omitted). Thus, we must “carefully formulat[ e] ” the l i berty interest, W ashington v. Glucksberg
, 521 U .S. 7 02, 722 (1997), and define it “ narrowly ,” Flores v

. M eese , 913 F .2d 1315, 1 330 ( 9th Cir. 1990) (emp h a s i s supplied). Only then can we d e termine whether the asserted rig ht is fundamental.

The majority ig nore s t h a t instruction and concludes that
t h e Bail Reform Act and Proposition 100 imping e on s o m e g eneraliz ed funda m ental liberty rig ht. I n fact, the majority makes no effort to even define the rig ht at stake. B ut it isn’tL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 56

simply “liberty ” as the majority would ha ve it. Rather, Proposition 100 implicates an arrestee’s alleg ed rig ht to bail where t h e proof is evident or the p resumption g reat that the

ar r e s t e e committed a serious felony offense, 2 and there is probable c ause to believe the arrestee has entered or remained in the United States illeg a lly

. That is, the rig ht is not merely
to be free from detention, but to be free from detention “ under these circumstances.” Salerno , 481 U.S. at 751.

I n my view, t h is asserted rig ht is not “so rooted in the
tr aditions and conscience of our people a s to be r anked fundamental.” Id

. ; see, e.g. , Demore v. Kim
, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (stating
, in approving the detention of a liens awaiting d e portation, that “this Court has firmly a nd repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Cong ress may make rules as to aliens that would be u nacceptable if ap p l i ed to citiz ens”); Carlson v. Landon
, 3 4 2 U.S. 524, 545 (1952) (“The bail clause w as lifted with sli gh t c h ang es from the Eng lish B ill of Rig hts Act. I n Eng land that clause has never been thoug ht to accord a rig h t to bail in all cases[ .] ”); United S t a t e s v. Edwards
, 430 A.2d 1 321, 1327 (D.C. App. 19 8 1 ) (“[ A] fundamental rig ht to bail was not universal among the colonies or among the e arly states;” “the lang uag e of several
state c onstitutions e x plicitly limiting the power of t h e judiciary to set ex cessive bail neg ates any sug g estion that the

ex c e ssive bail clause was intended to restrict the definition o f bailable offenses by the leg islature.”), cert. denied
, 455 U.S.

2 “ Serio u s f

elo n y o f f en se” is statu to rily

d ef in ed as “ an y class 1
, 2 , 3 o r 4 f elo n y or [ag g rav a t e d d riv in g u n d er th e in f lu en ce].” A riz. Rev

. Stat. A n n . § 1 3

- 3 9 61 (A )(5 )(b ).L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 57

1 0 2 2 ( 1982). B ecause the r ig ht is not fundamental, stric t scrutiny does not apply

. 3

B

W h atever substantive due process standard Salerno provides—and I concede that there i s s ome ambig uity

— Proposition 1 00 meets it. Nobody disputes that “Ariz ona has

a compelling interest in ens u r ing that persons accused o f serious crimes, including u ndocumented immig rants, a re available f

o r trial.” Maj. Op. a t 19. And Proposition 100 is

3 Giv en th at th e Co u rt in S alern o said th at th e rig h t at issu e w a s n o t f u n d am en tal, id

. at 7 5 1
, an d n ev er ap plied strict scru t i n y , h o w d oes th e

m aj o rity d iv in e th at s trict s cru t in y ap p lies to P ro p o sitio n 1 0 0 ? A p paren tly fr o m a c o u

p le o f f ractu red Su

p rem e Co u rt o p in io n s t

h at h in t , b u t d o n o t h o ld
, th at S

alern o m ay h a v e m ean t so m eth in g it n ev er said

. S ee Flo res , 5 0 7 U

. S. a t 3 0 2 (in clu d in g S a lern o in a strin g cite ab o u t d ef in in g

“ s u b stan tiv e d u e p ro cess”); Fo u ch a v. Lo u isia n a , 5 0 4 U

. S. 71
, 8 0

– 8 3 (1 9 9 2) (d iscu ssin g S

a lern o b u t n ot elu cid atin g its stan d ard ). I am n o t

co n v in ced

.

Fl o r e s c ited S

a lern o m erely f

or th e p ro p o sitio n t

h at t h ere is “ a

su b stan tiv e co m

p o n en t” to t

h e Co n stitu

tio n ’ s d u e p ro cess g u ar a n tee. Flo res , 5 0 7 U.S. at 3 0 2 –0 3

. S u rely th e m aj o rity w o u ld n ot su g g est th at th e o t h er cases cited in th e sam e s t rin g cite— Co llin s v. City of Ha rker Heig h ts, Tex.
, 50 3 U

. S

. 1 1 5 ( 1 9 9 2), an d Bo wers v. Ha rd wick
, 4 7 8 U .S. 1 8 6 (1 9 86 )—ap p lied strict scru tin y to an y f u n dam en tal rig h t. Mo reo v er, th e p ag e o f S

a lern o cited s im

p ly d ef in es “ su b stan tiv e d u e p ro cess”; it d oes

n o t m en tio n f

u n d am en tal rig h ts o r strict scru tin y

. S ee 48 1 U.S. at 74 6

. Sim ilarly
, Fo uch a cites t h e sam e p ag e o f S

a lern o f or th e sam e lim ited
p ro p ositio n , su

rro u n d ed b y citatio n s t o cases th at m erely d escrib e

su b stan tiv e d u e pro cess. 5 0 4 U.S. at 8 0 (citin g Zin ermo n v. Bu rch
, 4 9 4 U.S. 1 1 3 (1 9 9 0 ); Sa lern o , 4 8 1 U.S. at 7 4 6 ; an d Da niels v. W i llia ms , 4 7 4 U.S. 3 2 7 (1 9 8 6 )). T ru e, Fo u ch a d iscu s ses S a lern o at g reater len g th
, b u t f o r t h e circu m stan ces in w

h ich a p erso n can b e d etain ed b ecau se h e p o ses “ a dan g er to o t

h ers o r to th e co m

m u n ity ,” n o t b ecau se o f f

lig h t risk

. Id

. at 8 1

.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 58

“careful[ ly ] delineat[ ed] ” and “carefully limited”—it is even “narrowly focuse[ d ] .” Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 7 5 0 –51, 755. Several fundamental errors in the majority ’s opinion lead it to conclude otherwise.

F irst, by ig noring a ll ev i d e n ce to the contrary , the majority concludes that “ unmanag eable flig h t risk p o s ed b y undocumented immig rants

. . . has n o t been shown to ex ist.” Maj. O p. at 3 7

. Tell that to the Maricopa County A ttorney who, from h i s v a n t a g e on the front line just a month before the Pro p o s i t ion 100 vote, thoug ht flig ht risk among illeg al aliens i n Ar i z ona w as “a tremendous problem .” Lou D obbs Tonight ( CNN television broadcast O ct. 13, 2 006) (emphasis supplied). 4 Th e majority insists that the record does not substantiate this c l a i m , but the claim—by the Maricopa Co u n t y A ttorney no less—is part of the record. 5 I t is o ne thing for my

colleag ues to declare that Proposition 1 00 is an

ex c e ssive measure to address Ariz o na’s f lig ht problem; reasonable minds c an disag ree. I t is q uite another for an Article I I I court to tell Ariz ona, base d on this record a nd considering the majority vote o f the A r iz ona leg islature a nd electorate in f

avor of Proposition 1 0 0
, that its p erceived

4 T h e p ro s ecu to r also testif i ed b ef o re th e A rizo n a S en ate J u d iciary Co m m i ttee, ex p lain in g th at th ere w ere “ n u m ero u s ex am

p les o f serio u s an d

v io len t crim in als th at [th e] Ma r i co p a Co u n ty A tto rn ey ’ s Of f ice h as p ro secu ted in th e p ast th at h av e escap ed j u stice b ecau se th ey h av e [] slip p ed b ack acro ss th e b o rd er a ft er th ey ’ v e b een released .” Sen a te Ju d icia ry Co mmittee Meetin g on H.B. 2 3 89
, Mar. 2 8
, 2 0 0 5
, 4 7 t h L eg ., 1st Reg u lar Sess. (A riz. 2 0 0 5 ).

5 T h e m aj ority resp o n d s to th e Marico p a Co u n ty A tto rn ey ’ s statem en ts b y attem p tin g to d iscred it h i s testim o n y th ro u g h ex tra- reco rd ev id en ce n o t cited to o r relied on b y an y party

. Maj

. Op

. at 2 2

– 2 3
, n .6

. Of co u rse, th e

m aj o rity can n o t so easily im p each th e f

o u r o u t o f f

iv e A rizo n a v o ters w

h o

m u st liv e w ith

th e p ro b lem

th e m aj o rity

co n clu d es d o es n o t ex ist.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 59

problem is not really a problem. Maj

. O p

. a t 3 7

. Even the Ariz ona courts have concluded that “Proposition 100 reflects that [ the Ariz ona ] electorate and L e g islature p erceived pretrial detention as a potential solution to a pressing societal problem.” Hernandez v. Lynch
, 167 P.3d 1264, 1274 (Ariz

. Ct. App. 2007) (intern a l quotations and citations omitted). They are the ones who have to live with it.

Second, the majority takes issue with Proposition 100 not being a widely shared leg islative judg ment because few states categ orically deny

bail for illeg al aliens. Maj. Op. at 29–30. W h ile factually true, perspective here is critical. As an initial matter, novelty alone does not render a law u nconstitutional. See Ewing v. California
, 538 U.S. 11, 2 4 (2003) (holding that defendant’s sentence under California’s n ovel “three strikes” law was not unconstitutional). I n Ewing
, the Supreme Court

ex p lained that “[ t] h oug h three strikes laws may be relatively
new, our tradition of deferring to state leg islatures in making and implementing such i m p o r tant policy decisions is long standing .” Id

. My colleag ues g ive n o d eference to the policy judg ment of the Ariz ona leg islature or the democratic views of the electorate.

Moreover, we cannot judg e this c a se with blinders on. Ar i z o na faces unique challeng es as one of f our states bordering M e x i co. I ndeed, “ A riz ona bears many of the
consequences of unlawful immig ration

. . . . U n a u thoriz ed aliens who remain in the State comprise, by one e s timate, almost six percent of the population.” Arizona v

. United States
, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 ( 2012). “ [ I ] n the State’s most populous county , these aliens are reported to b e re sponsible f o r a disproportionate share of serious crime.” Id

. I f i n d i t hardly surprising that other states have not enacted their o wn Proposition 100 laws. Kansa s , for ex ample, may have itsL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 60

share of illeg al immig rants, but certainly not to the ex tent of Ariz ona. More importantly
, only f our states—Ariz o na among them—provid e s e rious felony offenders with such a quick and convenient r o u te into Mex ico. 6 Thus, while P roposition 100 may be relatively unique among the f i f t y states, that’s nothing more than a reflection of Ari z ona’s unique flig ht risk problem and g eog raphy

.
Third, the majority mistakenly d emands “finding s, studies, sta t i s t i c s or other evidence

. . . showing that undocumented im m i grants as a g r oup p ose either an unmanag eable flig ht r isk or a sig nificantly g reater flig ht risk than lawful r esidents

. ” M aj. O p. at 2 1. A riz ona is not required to support its leg islative judg ment with empiric al studies. This is a slippery slope on which the majori t y is
qu i c k to tread, and one w hich threatens the delicate balance between the judiciary

and the people we serve.

W h ile we have imposed empirical fact-finding requirements in a f

ew contex ts, 7 those are the ex cep t i o n s to

6 T h e m aj o rity ’ s arg u m en t al so ig n o res a h o st o f p ractical co n cern s f acin g b ord er states lik e A rizo n a, su ch a s th e tim e an d ex p en s e in t ry in g to ap p reh en d f

elo n y f u g iti v e s in Mex ico an d elsew h ere, an d th e

cu m b erso m e an d len g th y ex trad itio n p ro c e ss req u ired to b rin g f u g itiv es b ack to A rizo n a to f

ace j u stice.

7 T h e m o st p rev alen t ex am p l e i s i n th e co n tex t o f co n ten t- b ased
reg u latio n s u n der th e First A m en d m en t. S ee Vid eo S o ftwa r e D e a lers Ass’n v. S ch wa rzen eg

ger , 5 5 6 F.3 d 9 5 0, 96 2 (9 t h Cir. 2 0 0 9 ). B u t ev en in th e First A m en d m en t co n tex t, th e Su prem e Co u rt h as ex p lain ed th at “ [t]h e q u an tu m of e m

p irical ev i d en ce n eed ed to satisf y h eig h ten ed j u d icial

scru tin y o f leg islativ e j u dg m en ts w ill va r y u p o r d o w n w ith t h e n o v elty

a n d p lau s ib ility o f th e j u s t if icatio n raised .” Nixo n v. S h r in k Mo

. Go v’t PAC
, 5 2 8 U.S. 3 7 7
, 3 7 8 (2 00 0 ). I f in d it n eith er n o v el n o r im p lau sib le th at a b o rd er state stru g g les to p rev en t serio u s f elo n y o f f en d ers w h o areL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 61

the rule. See, e.g.
, G onzales v. Raich , 545 U.S. 1, 21 (2005) (“[ W ] e have never required Cong ress to make particulariz ed finding s in order to leg islate, absent a special concern such a s the protecti on of free speech.” (citations omitted)). I ndeed, the Supreme Court has ex plained that “[ w] hile Cong ressional finding s a re certainly helpful

. . . the absence of particulariz ed finding s does not c a l l into question Cong ress’ authority to leg islate.” Id . W e have never held that a state leg islature— le t a lone a state’s v oting electorate, as here—must prove its flig ht-ris k concerns with empirical data. Nor have w e been instructed to r e q

uire supporting data in connection with pretrial detention schemes—not in S ale rno and not in Demor e

. 8 T he majority ’s e mpirical data requirement, imposed today by judicial fiat, is particularly inappropriate and d ang erous in this case, where Ariz ona voters passed Proposition 1 00 by a whopping 78 p e r c e n t

. See Nixon
, 528 U.S. at 3 94 ( observ ing
, even under the heig htened requirements o f F irst Amendment c hallenge s , that a 74- percent statewide vote passag e rate “certainly attested to the

in th e co u n try illeg ally f

ro m f leein g b ef o re t rial. T h e m aj o rity d ecrees th at A rizo n an s w ill j u st h av e to liv e w ith it.

8 In S a lern o , th e Su

p rem e Co u rt m erely m en tio n ed
, in a sin g le sen ten ce

an d w ith o u t an y h in t o f a req u i rem en t, th at Co n g ress m ad e fin din g s in

en a ctin g th e B ail Ref

o rm A ct. 4 81 U .S. at 7 5 0

. In Demo r e , th e resp on den t arg u ed th at Co n g ress h ad n o ev id en ce th at in d iv id u alized b o n d h earin g s w o u l d b e in ef

f ectiv e, b u t th e Co u rt o b serv ed th at Co n g ress h ad

ev id en ce s u g g estin g th at p erm ittin g d i scretio n ary release o f alien s p en d in g th eir rem o v al h earin g s w o u ld lead to larg e n u m b ers o f d ep o rtab le crim in al alien s ab sco n d in g

. 5 3 8 U.S. at 52 8

. Demo re d id n o t h o l d t h at

co n g ressio n al f

act- f in din g w as req u i r e d ; b u t ev en if w e read in su ch a req u irem en t, A riz o n a ’s leg islato rs m et th at req u i rem en t b y tak in g testim o n y t o th at ef

f ect. S ee S en a te Ju d icia ry Co mmittee Meetin g o n H.B. 2 3 8 9 , Mar. 2 8 , 2 0 0 5 , 4 7 th L eg ., 1 st Reg u lar Sess. (A riz. 2 0 0 5 ).L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 62

perception” that the c halleng ed law w as necessary to remedy the state’s identified concern).

F inally
, the majority errs by effectively precluding the use of irrebuttable presumptions in the bail contex t. Proposition 100 “plainly is not carefully limited,” say s the maj o r i ty , “because it employ s an overbroad, irrebuttable pres u m p tion rather th an an individualiz ed hearing ” to assess flig ht risk. Maj. O p. a t 2 4

. T h a t c o nclusion relies on the premise that individual i z ed hearing s would solve Ariz ona’s troubles. I n Demore
, the Supreme C o u rt upheld a categ orical bail prohibi t i o n in part because individualiz ed hearing s h ad
proven u nsuccessful. 538 U.S. a t 5 28. Here, like in D emore , Ariz ona h as a lrea dy tried determining flig ht risk on an individualiz ed basis, considering factors such as f amily ties, employ ment, and leng th of residency in the community

. I f
y ou believe the record—and Plaintiffs-Appellants have g iven

us no reason n ot to—the pressing problem o f illeg al a liens

a b s c onding before trial survived these individualiz ed hearing s. T hus, Proposition 100’s lack o f i ndividualiz ed flig ht risk determinations c a nnot render i t s irrebuttable presumption ex cessive. S ee Demore , 538 U.S. at 528.

Apply ing well-established substantive du e process principles to this record reveals that Proposition 100—while distasteful t o s o m e

— s u

r v i ves substantive due process review.

II

The majority also errs by finding Propositio n 1 00 imp ermissibly p unitive, althoug h it purports to leave untouched the district court’s f actual c onclusion that P ro p osition 100 was n ot intended to impose punitive restrictions. Salerno provides the two-part test to determineL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 63

w h e ther the pretrial detention scheme at issue constitute s “imperm issible punishment or p e r missible reg ulation.” Salerno , 481 U.S. at 747. F irst, we look to leg islative intent
to determine whether the leg islature “ex pressly intended to impose punitive restrictions.” Id

. Second, we ask “whether

an alternative p urpose to which the restriction may rationally be connected is assig n able for it, and whether it appears

ex c e ssive in r elation to the a lternative purpose assig ned to it.” Id

. (alterati o n s a n d internal quotation marks omitted). I n other words, in the absence of an ex press punitive intent, “the punitive/reg u latory distinction turns on” whether the pretrial detention scheme is “ e x ce s s ive in relation to the reg ulatory
g oal [ the leg islature] soug h t to achieve.” Id

. Reviewing the record as a whole, including leg islative history a nd election-related materials, it is clear that A riz o na leg islators and voters passed Proposition 100 as a reg ulatory

measure to ensure illeg al aliens who com m i t serious felony

o f f enses stand trial. B ut don’t just take my word for it, see Lopez-Vale n z u e l a v. Cnty. of Maricopa
, 719 F .3d 1054, 1 0 60–61 (9th Cir. 2013) (reviewing the record de nov o ) ; District J udg e Susan B olton and the Ariz ona Court o f Appeals conducted their own independe nt review of the record and reached the same conclusion, Lopez-Valenzuela v

. Maricopa Cnty.
, N o

. 0 8

- 00660, at 10 (D. A riz

. March 29, 2011) (“Having reviewed the voluminous eviden c e submitted i n this case, the Court f

inds that the record as a whole do e s not support a finding that Proposition 100 was motivated by

an improper punitive purpose.”); H ern a n de z , 167 P.3d at 1273 (“[ W ] e hold that the purpose behind Proposition 100

was not to punish illeg al a l i e n s , but to prevent them from fleeing before trial.”). T he majority wisely declines to disturb these finding s. Maj. Op. at 35 ( “[ W ]e see no reason to revisitL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 64

those conclusions on appeal.”). Yet my c o l l eag ues spend several pag es attempting to impeach them.

Turning to the second step, we all ag ree that “Ariz ona has

a compelling interest in e nsuring that persons accused o f serious crimes, including u ndocumented immig rants, a re

ava ilable for trial.” Maj. Op. a t 19. B ut the majority concludes that Proposition 100 is ex cessive in relation to its purpose. Maj. Op. at 37. It isn’t.

Proposition 100, like the B ail Refo r m A ct, “carefully limits the circumstances under which detention may be

s o ug ht.” Salerno
, 481 U.S. at 747. Two thresh o l d requirements must b e met before an individual can be denied bail pursuant to Proposition 100. F i r s t , the court must f ind,
at the arrestee’s initial appearance, that there is probable

cause t o b e lieve that the arrestee h as e ntered or remained in the United States illeg ally

. Ariz

. R. Crim. P. 7.2( b )

. B ut

more than that, the court must also f in d t h a t t h e proof is evident or the presumption g reat that the individual committed a “serious felony offense.” I d

. ; A r iz

. Const. art. I I § 22(4).

An a rrestee i s also able to c halleng e this initial determination by “mov[ ing ] for r eex amination of the conditions of release.” Ariz . R. Crim. P. 7.4(b). Upon such

a motion—and whether o r not the a rrestee alleg e s n e w fa c t s —a h earing must be held on the record “as soon a s practicable but not later than seven day s aft er f i l i ng of the motion.” Id

. These procedural and substantive p rotections make Proposition 100 far from a “scattershot at t e m p t to incapacitate those who are merely suspected ” of being in the country illeg ally or o f committing a s erious felony offense. Salerno , 481 U.S. at 750 (emphasis supplied).L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 65

F or y ears, Ariz ona tried making individualiz ed flig h t-risk determinations for aliens alleg ed t o have committed serious felony offenses. That sy stem didn’t solve A r i z o na’s particularly a cute flig ht-risk p roblem. I ts v oters then overwhelming ly approved Propositio n 1 0 0 as a measured
response in lig ht of the state’s prior efforts. How can that be

ex c e ssive?

III

The majority does not reach Plaintiffs-Appellants’ remaining claims b e c au s e it doesn’t have to. However, I remain convinced that the d istri c t c o urt properly awarded Defendants-Appellees summary judg ment on those claims a s well. I stand by the r e a s o n s s e t f orth in that opinion. See Lopez-Valenzuela
, 719 F .3d a t 1 0 6 4–73. F o r a ll these reasons, I respectfully

dissent.

O’SCANNL AI

N, Circuit J udg e, dissenting :

Today
, the majorit y d i v ines, under the rubric o f substantive due process, that Ariz o na’s categ orical denial of bail is “ex c essive” notwithstanding the State’s interest in mitig ating f

lig ht risk. Remarkably
, the majority scarcely mentions the Constitution’s command that “[ e] x cessive bail shall not be required.” U.S. Const. amend. VI I I

.

I respectfully dissent from our e x pansion of substantive due process and neg lect of ex p ress constitutional tex t. 1

1 B ecau se I b eliev e th at th e m aj o rity ’ s su b stan tiv e d u e p ro cess an aly s is is w ro n g as w ell as u n n ecessary , I also j o in J u d g e T allm an ’ s d issen t.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 66

I

A

“[ R] eluctant to ex p and the c o ncept o f s ubstantive d ue process,” Collins v. C i t

y of Harker Heights, Tex.
, 5 03 U.S. 115, 1 25 (1992), the Supreme Court h e l d in Graham v

. Connor
, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), that “[ w] here a particular Amendment provides an ex p l i ci t tex tual source o f constitutional protection ag ainst a pa r t i c ular sort o f
g overnment behavior, that Amendment, not the more g eneraliz ed notion of substantive due process, must be the
g uide for analy

z ing these claims.” Cnty. of S a c r a m e nto v

. Lewis
, 523 U.S. 833, 842 ( 1 9 9 8 ) (alteration in orig inal) (quoting A lbright v

. Oliver
, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J .)). “ Graham

. . . requires that if a constitutional claim i s c o vered b y a specific constitutional provision, such as the F o urth or Eig hth Amendment, the claim must be analy z e d u nder the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric o f substantive d

ue p rocess.” United Sta t e s v. Lanier
, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (emphasis added) (citing G r a ham
, 490 U.S. at 394).

The majority flouts this r equirem e n t

. I t “first” analy z e s the Proposition 100 la w s under “g eneral substantive d ue process principles,” Maj. O p. a t 1 5, 15–34, then considers whether the Proposition 100 laws v iolate the sp e cific d ue process prohibition on imposing punishment before trial, id.
at 15, 3 4–37. My colleag ues in the majority decline to consider—ever—whether t he Proposition 100 laws violate the Eig hth Amendment. Id. at 38–39 & n.16.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 67

One would hardly know, after r eading the maj o rity ’s forty -three pag e opinion—analy z ing whether Ariz ona’s denial o f bail was ex cessive in lig ht of the flig ht risk posed b y illeg al immig rants—that, under the Eig hth Amendment of the Constitution itself, “[ e] x cessive bail shall not be r e quired.” 2 I ndeed, o ne mig ht think that “ [ t] he Court has prohibited

ex c e ssive bail.” Maj. Op. at 9 (emphasis added).

B

To be sure, specific constitutional p r ovisions do not prec l u d e recog nition of substantive due process rig hts that touch on related subjects. Lewis
, 523 U.S. at 8 4 3 (“Substantive due process analy sis is therefore inappropriate in this c ase only if respondents’ claim is ‘covered by ’ the F ourth Amendment.”); see, e .g. , Lanier
, 520 U.S. at 272 n

. 7 ( G raham did “not hold that all constitutional claims relating
to phy sically abusive g overnment conduct must a rise under either the F ourth or Eig hth Amendments.”). Not every conceivable constitutional dispute reg arding bail is resolved by the Eig hth Amendment. B ut the question whether deny ing bail to illeg al immig rants based on flight risk is unconstitutionally ex cessive is p osed, precisely
, b y t h e Ex cessive B ail Clause. See Stack , 342 U.S. at 4–5.

The majority relies primarily on United States v. S alerno
, 481 U.S. 739 (1987 ), t o justify its substantive due process inquiry
, but I sug g est that it has not r e ad that case carefully
enoug h. Salerno does n ot ex cuse the majority ’s disreg ard o f

2 A sh arp

- ey ed read er m ig h t sp ot t h e m aj o rity ’ s b rief g estu

res t o w ard th e Eig h th A m en d m en t ’ s p ro h ib itio n i n its d iscu ssio n o f S t a ck v. Bo

yle
, 3 4 2 U.S. 1 (1 9 5 1 ). Maj . Op . at 9

– 1 0.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 68

the Eig hth Amendment, because this case, u n l i k e S alerno
, concerns detention based on flight risk

.

Two substantive due process a rg uments ag ainst the B ail Reform A ct o f 1 984 were rejected in Salerno : The Court analy z ed whether “the Due Process Clause prohibits pretrial detention on the g round of dang er to the community .” Id. at 7 4 8

. A n d t h e C o u rt c o n s i d e re d w h e t h e r it w a s unconstitutional “because the pretrial detention it authoriz e s constitute s impermissible punishment before trial.” I d

. at 746. B oth claims were g rounded in the Court’s s u b s t a n tive due process precedents; they re q u ired the Court to decide whether the B a il Reform Act violated already established d ue process rig hts. See id. at 749–51 (detention b ased on dang erousness) (citing
, inter alia
, Schall
, 467 U.S. 253, Addington v. Texas
, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), and Carlson v

. Landon
, 3 42 U.S. 524 (1952)); id

. at 7 46–47 (punishment before trial) (citing Bell v. W o lfish
, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) and Schall v. Martin
, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)). Neithe r c l aim i m p l icated the E ig hth A mendment inquiry proper to this case—whether the Prop o s i t i o n 1 0 0 b a i l l a w s a re constitutionally

“ex cessive” based on flig ht risk.

1

As to its “g eneral substantive d u e process principles,” the majority misreads Salerno by co n flating detention based on dang erousness, which the Court considered, w ith detention based on flig ht risk, which the Court did not. I n Salerno
, the Court rej ected the “ c ateg orical imperative”—advanced by the Sec ond Circuit—that the Due Process Clause “prohibits pretrial detention on the g round of danger to the community

. ” Id. at 748 ( e mphasis adde d )

. B e cause due process does not “erect[ ] an impenetrable ‘wall’” to such detention, the CourtL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 69

reasoned “that the p r e s ent statute providing for pretrial detention on the basis of d angerousness must be evaluated in precisely the same manner”—apply ing means-end scrutiny

— “that we evaluated the laws in the cases discussed above.” Id. at 748–49 (emphasis added).

Nothing in Salerno sug g ests that detention based on flight risk should be evaluated in the same manne r

. See id. at 749 (Detainees “concede and the Court of Appeals noted that an arrestee may b e incarcerated until trial if he presents a risk o f flig ht.”). 3 I ndeed, the Eig hth Amendment secures the specific rig ht not to b e required to post ex cessive bail in lig ht of flig ht risk. See Stack
, 3 42 U .S. at 4–5. T he majority ’s substantive due process inquiry is thus inappropriate under G raham

. See,
e.g. , John Corp. v. City of Houston
, 214 F .3d 573, 582 ( 5 th Cir. 2 000) (“The purpose of Gr a h a m is to avoid ex panding the concept of substantive due process wh e re another constitutional provision protects ind i v iduals ag a inst the challeng ed g overnmental action.”).

2

The Court’s substantive d

ue process jurisprudence indeed

secures the specific r i ght to be free from punishment before
t r i al. E.g.
, Schall
, 467 U.S. at 269. B ut the majority misapplies that juris p r u d ence, asking under substantive d ue process questions properly considered under the Ei gh t h Amendment and thereby displacing specific constitutional
tex t.

3 T h u s, th e d i stin ctio n b etw een d en i al o f b ail f o r d an g ero u s n ess an d d en ial o f b ail based o n f

lig h t risk is “ reco g n i zed ” in S a lern o i tself

, co n t ra Maj

. Op

. at 3 9 n .1 6
, th e m aj o rity ’ s m isin terp reted d icta n o tw ith stan d in g , cf. T allm an

Dissen t at 5 7 n .3

.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 70

Our role is to question whether a particular “disability is imposed for the purpo s e o f punishment.” Bell v

. W olfish
, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). To decide w hether the leg islative
purpose was punitive, in the a b sence of an “ex press intent to pun i s h ,” we must d iscern whether pretrial detention is “ex c essive in relation to the alternative purpose assig ned [ to it] .” I d. A nsweri n g that question, S a lerno considered the

“ incidents of pretrial detention” u nder the B ail Reform Act— such as prompt detention hearin gs a n d whether pretrial detainees were h o u s e d separately from postconviction detainees—and conclud ed that they did not reveal an improper punitive purpose. 481 U .S. at 747 ( emphasis

a dded). B y contrast, the majority here considers the substance of P roposition 100—categ orical denial o f bail—and decides it i s e x cessive notwithstanding the heig htened risk of flig ht, the very question properly considered under the Eig

hth Amendment. 4

C

The Supreme Court t e l l s us not to rely on g eneraliz ed substantive due process “because g uideposts for responsible decisionmaking in thi s u n c hartered area are scarce a nd open-ended.” C o l l i n s , 503 U.S. at 125. The majority ’s incautious ex pansion of substantive due process c onfirms the

4 T h e m aj o rity ’ s co n f

u s io n is also ev id en t in

w h at m ean in g it af

f o rd s a f in d in g o f “ ex cessiv en e s s. ” In S ch all
, 4 6 7 U.S. at 2 6 9
, an d i n S a lern o , 4 8 1 U.S. at 7 4 7, ex cessiv en ess ma y in dicate an im

p ro p er p u n i t iv e p u rp o se. In th e m aj o rity ’ s v iew
, h ow ev er, “ ex cessiv en ess” is a n i n d ep en d en t

co n stitu tio n al v i o lat i o n u n d er su

b stan tiv e d u e p ro cess. S ee Maj

. Op

. at 3 6

– 3 7

. Here, th e m aj o rity assu m es “ th at P ro p ositio n 1 0 0 w as ad op ted f or t h e p erm issib le reg u lato ry p u rp o s e o f m an ag in g f lig h t risk .” Id

. at 3 6

. Un der su b stan tiv e d u e pro cess , t h a t s h ou ld h av e b een th e en d o f th e in q u iry

.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 71

wisdom of such advice. Grounded in n either tex t nor history
, the majority ’s due process inquiry simply replaces leg islative and p opular judg ment with its o wn, at least until A riz o na provides sufficiently robust statistical analy sis to suit.

I f we must remove “a difficult question of public policy

. . . from the reach of the voters” o f Ariz ona, Schuette v

. Coal.
to Defend Affirmative Action , 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1637 (2014),

we should pay them the respect of g rounding our d ecision in the tex tual g uarantees of the Co n s titution, not the nebulous haz e of substantive due process.

I I

The question we o ught to have considered is whether the Eig hth Amendment contains a ny subst a n t ive restrictions on Ariz ona’s authority to declare certain classes o f c ri m es o r criminals nonbailable, and, if so, wheth er Proposition 100 violates such restrictions. 5 Without thoroug h briefing o n such questions from the p arties, but g uided by sparse discussion in Supreme Court precedent, I offer a tentative answer.

I n Carlson
, the Supre m e C o urt rejected the proposition that the E ig hth Amendment r equired ce r t ain detainees to be admitted to bail:

The bail c lause was lifted with slig ht chang es from the Eng lish B ill of Rig hts Act.

5 Fo r th e p u rp o ses o f th is d i s s e n t , I assu m e th e Ex cessiv e Bail Clau s e h as b een in co rp o rated ag ain st th e States. S e e M cDo n ald v. City o

f C h i ca g o , 1 3 0 S. C t. 3 02 0
, 30 3 4 & n .1 2 (2 0 1 0) (citin g S ch ilb v. K u e b e l
, 4 0 4 U.S. 3 5 7
, 3 6 5 (1 9 71 ) (n o t in g th at th e Ex cessiv e B ail Clau se “ h as b een

assu m ed to h av e ap p licatio n

to th e States”)).L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 72

I n E ng land that clause has n ever been thoug ht
t o a c cord a rig ht to bail in all cases, b u t merely to provide that b ail s h a ll n ot be

ex c essive in those cas e s wh e re it is proper to g rant bail. W h en this clause was carried over into our B ill of Rig ht s , n othing was said that indicated any different concept. The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases i n w h ich bail shall be allowed in this country.

342 U.S

. 5 2 4, 545–46 (1952) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitt e d )

. I n Salerno
, the Court reserved the question “whether the E x cessive B ail Clause speaks at all to Cong ress’
power to define the classes of c riminal arrestees who shall be admitted to bail.” 481 U.S. at 754. 6

As noted in Carlson
, the Eig hth Amendment e choes the Eng lish B ill of Rig hts of 1689. Compare U.S. Const. amend. VI I I (“Ex cessive bail shall not be req u i r ed, nor e x cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and u nusual punishme n t s i n f l i c t e d

. ” )
, with Eng lish B ill o f Rig hts 1689 ( declaring that “ex cessive bail o ug ht n ot to be required, n o r ex cessive fines imposed,

nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”). B ut “ bail was not an absolute rig ht in Eng land.” W illiam F. D uker, The Right to Bail: A H

istorical Inquiry
, 4 2 Albany L

. Rev. 33, 77 (1977). The Eng lish B ill of Rig hts did not restrain Parliament

6 L o pez an d Castro rely
, as d id th e d etain ees in S a l ern o , o n S t a ck ’ s d ictu m th at “ [b ]ail set at a f ig u re h ig h er th an an am o u n t reaso n ab ly calcu lated to [to assu

re th e p resen ce o f

th e accu sed ] is ‘ ex cessiv e’ u n der th e Eig h th A m en dm en t.” 3 4 2 U.S. at 5

. B u t th at stan d ard ad d resses h o w th e Eig h th A m en dm en t co n strain s co u rts. It d o es n o t an sw er h o w , if at all, th e A m en d m en t co n strain s leg islatu res.L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 73

f r o m declaring which classes of crimes were bailable. Se e Hermine Herta Mey e r, Constitutio n a l ity of Pretrial Detention
, 60 Geo. L

. J

. 1139, 1155–58 (1972); see also Du k e r, supra , at 81. O f course, “ that Parliament classified certain offenses a s nonbailabl e is not an absolute indication that Cong ress was to enjoy the same power” under the Eig hth Amendment, “to define bail a b le and n onbailable offenses.” Hunt v. Roth
, 648 F .2d 1148, 1159 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom. Murphy v. Hunt , 455 U.S. 478 (1982).

Ea r l y American constitutions sug g e st, nonetheless, that their prohib i tions of “ex cessive bail” limited the judiciary

, not the leg islat ure. E.g.
, Md. Const. of 1776, § 2 2 (“That

ex c e ssive bail oug ht not to be required

. . . b y t h e c o urts o f law.”); N.H. Const. o f 1784, art. I
, § 33 (“No mag istrate o r court of law shall demand ex cessive bail or sureties

. . . .”);

see generally
, Duker, supra , at 79–83. “[ B ] y the time of the formulation of the B ill of Rig h ts by the first Cong ress of the United States, the ex perience in Americ a h a d been to g rant bail in cases which were bailable, as determine d b y t he legislature .” I

d. at 83 (emphasis a dded )

. L e g islatures were free to d eclare horse stealing
, f o r ex ample, bailable or not. Compare Caleb F oote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis: Part I
, 113 U. Pa. L

. Rev. 959, 976–77 (1965) (describing the failure by o n e vote of J efferson’s bill to render horse theft bailable), with Duker, supra , at 8 2 & n. 293 (n o ting that Georg ia’s leg islature denied bail for horse stealing despite constitutional g uarantee that “ex cessive bail” shall not be “demanded”).

The F irst Cong ress’s debates over the Bill of Rig hts contain no hint that the orig inally understood meaning of the E i g hth Amendment’s E x c essive B ail Clause was any different from the rig ht g uaranteed by the same words in theL O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 74

Eng lish B ill o f R i gh t s o r the State constitutions. Carlson
, 342 U.S. at 545 & n. 44; see also Duker, supra , at 85–86.

I tentatively

conclude, therefore, based on the tex t of the Constitution and the h ist o r y of the rig ht to bail, that the Eig hth Amendment secures a rig ht to reasonable b a il where

a court has discretion to g rant bail. Cf. Ex p arte W atkins
, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 573–74 ( 1833) (Story
, J .) (“The [ E] ig hth [ A] mendment is addressed to courts of the U nite d S tates

ex e r cising criminal jurisdiction

, and is d oubtless mandatory
to them and a limitation upon their discretion.”). I t d oes not, howe v e r, restrict leg islative discretion to declare c ertain crimes nonbailable. See Duker, supra , at 86–87 (“Althoug h the amendmen t l imits the discretion of the courts in setting bail, C o n gress is free to determine the cases for which bail shall be allowed, or whether it shall be allowed at al l .”); Mey er, supra , at 1194 ( The Constitut i o n “ reserved for Cong r ess the rig ht to make leg islati v e c h a ng es [to bail] whenever required by chang ed c ircumstances.”). I h a ve found no evidence to sug g est that the Ex cessive B ail Clause, as orig inally

understood, limited leg islative discretion. 7

7 Ev en P ro f

esso r Fo o te, f

o rem o st p ro p o n en t o f th e v iew th at th e Eig h th A m en d m en t w as “ m ean t t o p ro v id e a co n stitu tio n al rig h t t o b ail,”

co n ced ed t

h at “ t h e u n d erly in g rig h t to th e rem ed y o f b a i l i t self

. . . w as

o m itted ” f

ro m th e Co n stitu

tio n , alb eit th ro u g h “ in ad v erten ce.” Fo o te,

su p ra , at 9 6 8
, 9 8 7

. I ag ree w ith th e percep tiv e law stu d en t w h o d i s m issed Fo o te’ s arg u m en t as su

p p o rted by “ little m ore th an sp ecu latio n ab o u t th e

w o rk in g s o f t

h e m in d s o f Geo rg e Maso n an d t h e Fram ers,” an d “ f

law ed ”
sp ecu l atio n at th at. Do n ald B

. V errilli, J r., N o te, Th e Eig h th Amen d m en t

a n d t h e Rig h t t o Ba il: Histo rica l Persp ectives
, 8 2 Co lu m

. L

. Rev

. 3 2 8
, 3 4 0 (1 9 8 2).L O P E Z -V A L E N Z U E L A V

. A R P A I O 75

I I I

During Cong ress’s debates on the B ill of Rig hts, the only
comment on the Ex cessive B ail Clause was by Samuel L ivermore, Representative f or New Hampshire, “who

r e marked: ‘The clause seems to have no meaning to it
, I d o not think it necessary

. W hat is meant by the terms e x cessive bail? W ho a

re the judg es

. . . ? ’ ” 8 I g noring the first question,
reg rettab l y , the majority f irmly answers the second: “W e are.”

On the majority ’s chosen g round, J udg e Tallman has the better of the arg ument, so I happil y join his dissent. B ut I
reg ret the majority ’s impulse to clash in the terra incognitia

o f substantive due process. Guided by tex t and histor y , w e mig ht have found surer footing b y a pply ing the Ex cessive B ail Clause.

I respectfully

dissent.

8 Du k er, su

p r a , at 8 6 (q u otin g 1 Co n g

. D eb

. 7 5 4 (Gales & Seato n ed s. 1 8 3 4 )).