J-S39043-17

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

RANDALL HOYT CHUMLEY,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 281 WDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 26, 2017, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County, 

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-37-MD-0000375-1976

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, and STRASSBURGER, JJ.*

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JULY 07, 2017

Randall Hoyt Chumley (Appellant) pro se appeals from the January 26, 

2017 order which denied his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

“On October 13, 1976, Appellant pleaded guilty to murder generally 

and, following a degree of guilt hearing, the trial court found Appellant guilty 

of second-degree murder. On November 2, 1976, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to a term of life in prison.” Commonwealth v. Chumley, 93 A.3d 

501 (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished memorandum at 1). “Our Supreme 

Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on November 18, 1978 

and, on March 19, 1979, the United States Supreme Court denied 

Appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari.” Id. See Commonwealth v. 

Chumley, 394 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1978), certiorari denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979). 
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On August 9, 2016, Appellant filed his fifth PCRA petition, which is the 

subject of this appeal. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an 

amended petition. After giving notice of its intent to dismiss the petition 

without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the PCRA court dismissed 

the petition by order of January 26, 2017. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the 

PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Appellant raises three 

substantive claims for relief. See Appellant’s Brief at v. 

Before we may consider the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must 

determine whether his PCRA petition was timely filed, as the timeliness of a 

post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 12 

A.3d 477, 479 (Pa. Super. 2011). Generally, a petition for relief under the 

PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one 

year of the date the judgment of sentence is final unless the petition alleges, 

and the petitioner proves, that an exception to the time for filing the petition 

is met. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545. 

It is clear that Appellant’s petition is facially untimely; his judgment of 

sentence became final in 1979. However, Appellant alleges that his petition 

is based upon a change in the law, referencing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 

460, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 

(2016). Appellant’s Brief at 3. Thus, it appears that Appellant is alleging 

that the following timeliness exception applies: “the right asserted is a 
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constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United 

States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided 

in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.” 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). 

In Miller, the Court held that the application of mandatory sentences 

of life imprisonment without possibility of parole to individuals who were 

juveniles at the time they committed homicides was unconstitutional. 

Miller, 567 U.S. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. In Montgomery, the Court 

determined that Miller announced a new substantive rule of law that applies 

retroactively. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736. 

Appellant was not a juvenile at the time of the murder; rather, he was 

19 years old. See Appellant’s Brief at 3 (“Appellant alleges that [a]lthough 

19 at the time of the commission of the crime....”). Accordingly, Miller and 

Montgomery are not applicable to Appellant’s petition. See 

Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(“[P]etitioners who were older than 18 at the time they committed murder 

are not within the ambit of the Miller decision and therefore may not rely on 

that decision to bring themselves within the time-bar exception in Section 

9545(b)(1)(iii).”). 

Because Appellant did not plead facts that would establish an 

exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirements, the PCRA court properly 

dismissed Appellant’s petition without holding a hearing. See 
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Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Pa. 2010) (affirming 

dismissal of PCRA petition without a hearing because the appellant failed to 

meet burden of establishing timeliness exception).

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/7/2017