COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Benton and Elder 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

BRANDON ALEXANDRIA DYER, s/k/a 

 BRANDON ALEXANDER DYER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1827-97-2 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 JUNE 30, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 

Richard H. C. Taylor, Judge 

 Patrick R. Bynum, Jr., for appellant. 

 Jeffrey S. Shapiro, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Brandon Alexandria Dyer (appellant) was convicted of 

possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation 

of Code § 18.2-248 and possession of marijuana in violation of 

Code § 18.2-250.1. He contends the trial court erroneously 

admitted evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful 

investigatory stop. For the following reasons, we affirm the 

conviction. 

 I. 

 At 3:00 a.m. on January 2, 1997, while patrolling alone in 

his police car, Sergeant Richard L. Farmer, Jr., observed a 

vehicle parked near a convenience store. The car caught the 

officer's attention because it was the only vehicle in the lot 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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and it was parked "all the way over on the right side" of the 

building, rather than "in front where normal traffic would have 

parked." As Farmer drove through the parking lot, the car exited 

the lot and turned north on Route 1. Farmer followed at a 

distance while he ran a license check to determine whether the 

vehicle was stolen. 

 After approximately one-half mile, Farmer observed that the 

vehicle "made a wide [right] turn, to the point where he went all 

the way onto the entire left side of the roadway and his vehicle 

was actually in the oncoming lane." When Farmer activated his 

emergency lights to stop the vehicle, appellant, who was driving, 

leaned forward over the steering wheel. As Farmer approached the 

stopped car on foot, appellant was still bent forward, and his 

right hand was hidden under his bulky sweatshirt. Farmer ordered 

appellant to show his hand and exit the vehicle. 

 As appellant got out of the car, Farmer believed he was 

hiding something which could have been a weapon. Farmer frisked 

him and felt a "large bulge that had a metallic feel to it" in 

the front of appellant's pants. When asked what the large bulge 

was, appellant reached into his pants. Concerned that appellant 

might be reaching for a weapon, Farmer "wanted to control the 

situation," and he grabbed appellant's wrist. Together they 

pulled out a "cloth . . . zipper-type bag" large enough to hold a 

knife or a gun. 

 Farmer asked what was in the bag, and appellant admitted 
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that it contained drugs. Still feeling something metallic in the 

bag, the officer took it from appellant and opened it. The bag 

contained illegal drugs, $116 in currency, a key, a number of 

loose coins, several miscellaneous papers, and a pack of 

cigarettes. 

 The trial court denied appellant's pre-trial motion to 

suppress the evidence seized during the traffic stop. At trial, 

appellant entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right 

to appeal the denial of the suppression motion. He was convicted 

by final judgment entered July 7, 1997. 

 II. 

 Appellant contends Sergeant Farmer lacked a reasonable and 

articulable suspicion necessary to justify the investigatory 

stop. He argues that Farmer's initial decision to follow 

appellant's car was based on a "hunch" and as such tainted the 

later stop of appellant's car. Appellant's argument lacks merit. 

 "'[W]hen the police stop a motor vehicle and detain an 

occupant, this constitutes a seizure of the person for Fourth 

Amendment purposes.'" Logan v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 437, 

441, 452 S.E.2d 364, 367 (1994) (quoting Zimmerman v. 

Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1988)). "As 

a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is 

reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a 

traffic violation has occurred." Whren v. United States, 116 

S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). 
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 In the instant case, Sergeant Farmer noticed appellant's 

vehicle parked in an unusual location, and he ran a check on the 

license plate number to determine whether the car was stolen. He 

did not stop appellant at that time; he merely followed at a 

distance while awaiting the results of the license check. 

Notwithstanding appellant's argument to the contrary, Farmer 

required no reasonable, articulable suspicion of illegal activity 

to record and check the license plate number and follow 

appellant's car at a distance for one-half mile, because these 

actions did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 

 It was undisputed that during this time, Sergeant Farmer 

observed appellant's vehicle make a wide right turn into the 

oncoming traffic lane, a violation of Code § 46.2-846.1

 This 

traffic infraction, which the officer witnessed, provided 

probable cause to justify Farmer's stop of the vehicle. 

 Additionally, appellant argues that even if the 

investigatory stop was justified, the subsequent pat-down search 

of his person was illegal. We disagree. 

 "'Ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable 

cause' . . . involve questions of both law and fact and are 

reviewed de novo on appeal." McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 

193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (quoting Ornelas v. United 

 

 1The relevant portion of the statute provides that "[b]oth 

the approach for a right turn and a right turn shall be made as 

close as practicable to the right curb or edge of the roadway." 

Code § 46.2-846. 
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States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1659 (1996)). "[W]e give due weight to 

the inferences drawn from [the] facts by resident judges and 

local law enforcement officers." McGee, 25 Va. App. at 198, 487 

S.E.2d at 261. 

 The appropriate standard to evaluate a pat-down search is 

well established: 

 It is not unreasonable for a police officer 

to conduct a limited pat-down search for 

weapons when the officer can point to 

"specific and articulable facts" "which 

reasonably lead[] him to conclude, in light 

of his experience, that 'criminal activity 

may be afoot' and that the suspect 'may be 

armed and presently dangerous.'" 

James v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 740, 745, 473 S.E.2d 90, 92 

(1996) (citations omitted). Factors that may be relevant in 

determining whether a pat-down was justified include "'the 

characteristics of the area where the stop occurs . . . as well 

as any suspicious conduct of the person accosted such as . . . 

any nervous conduct on the discovery of [the officer's] 

presence.'" Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 67, 354 

S.E.2d 79, 86-87 (1987) (citations omitted). 

 Here, Farmer observed appellant's traffic infraction and was 

concerned that he might be driving under the influence of drugs 

or alcohol. From the moment the officer activated his emergency 

lights until he approached the vehicle, appellant was bending 

forward over the steering wheel with his hand hidden beneath his 

sweatshirt. Farmer believed appellant was hiding something from 

him, and he reasonably suspected that it might be a weapon. This 
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behavior, combined with the fact that Farmer was patrolling alone 

at 3:00 a.m., provided an articulable suspicion that appellant 

posed a threat to the officer's safety. We hold that a limited 

pat-down of appellant's outer clothing was reasonable under the 

circumstances. 

 Finally, appellant contends the seizure of the drugs was 

unauthorized because the officer could not reasonably believe, 

upon feeling the bag, that it was a weapon. While an officer is 

conducting a pat-down search, if he feels an object that he 

reasonably believes could be a dangerous weapon, the officer may 

seize the object from the suspect's person. See Bolda v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 315, 317, 423 S.E.2d 204, 206 (1992). 

"The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual 

is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the 

circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or 

that of others was in danger." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 

(1968). 

 Under these facts, when appellant reached for the bulge with 

the "metallic feel" in his pants, Farmer could reasonably believe 

he was in danger. The officer's attempt to control the situation 

by grabbing appellant's wrist was justified by his concern that 

appellant might be drawing a weapon. Once appellant and the 

officer removed the bag from the front of appellant's pants, 

appellant admitted it contained drugs. That admission, in 

conjunction with the officer's continuing concern that the 
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metallic object in the bag was a weapon, provided Farmer with a 

reasonable basis to conclude the bag contained contraband and 

possibly a weapon. Therefore, the seizure of the bag was 

justified. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court 

properly denied appellant's motion to suppress evidence of the 

contents of the bag and affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed.
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Benton, J., dissenting. 

 "Under the circumstances of this case, [Brandon Alexandria 

Dyer's] conduct, viewed either in isolation as the officer 

considered it or along with the other behavior as the court must 

examine it, is utterly insufficient to generate a reasonable 

suspicion that [Dyer] was involved in criminal activity." 

Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 612, 363 S.E.2d 708, 710 

(1988). The evidence proved that the officer saw the defendant 

in his automobile and lawfully parked at a convenience store near 

pay telephones. Although the officer did not observe Dyer 

violating any law, he concluded that Dyer was suspicious. When 

the officer decided to "run[] the license on the vehicle," the 

officer drove "slowly . . . behind [Dyer's] vehicle, look[ed] at 

[Dyer], look[ed] at the license plate, [drove] around to the left 

side, back[ed] up, and then watch[ed] . . . as [Dyer] backed up 

and left." The officer saw Dyer commit no traffic or other 

violations in the parking lot, leaving the parking lot, or 

entering the highway. The officer followed Dyer from a distance 

of "at least ten car lengths" as Dyer drove north on Route 1. 

The officer saw Dyer commit no traffic offenses on Route 1. 

 At Old Keaton Road, a secondary road that is not marked 

except for a road sign, Dyer turned right. The officer testified 

that Dyer's wide turn onto Old Keaton Road "heightened [the 

officer's] suspicion as far as possibly . . . . driving under the 

influence." When Dyer completed his turn, Dyer drove into the 
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proper travel lane. After Dyer made the turn and drove in his 

proper lane, the officer saw nothing else to indicate that Dyer 

was not properly operating his vehicle. The officer followed 

Dyer a short distance on Old Keaton Road and signaled Dyer to 

stop. 

 Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupant 

constitutes a seizure within the parameters of the Fourth 

Amendment, even when the purpose of the stop is limited. See

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). "Manifestly, 

[Dyer's] conduct falls below activity necessary to justify a 

reasonable suspicion that a violation of law had occurred or was 

occurring." Zimmerman, 234 Va. at 612, 363 S.E.2d at 710. Not 

every seemingly suspicious motion of a vehicle gives rise to a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. See, e.g., Barrett v. 

Commonwealth, 250 Va. 243, 247-48, 462 S.E.2d 109 (1995). 

 In making a turn, "[b]oth the approach for a right turn and 

a right turn shall be made as close as practicable to the right 

curb or edge of the roadway." Code § 46.2-846. This statute 

does not require a driver to make a perfect turn. "[A] slightly 

flawed right turn was not in and of itself enough to give an 

officer a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver 

was under the influence of alcohol." City of Mason v. Loveless, 

622 N.E.2d 6, 7 (Ohio App. 1993). Indeed, if failures to follow 

"perfect vector[s] down the highway . . . were sufficient reasons 

to suspect a person of driving while impaired, a substantial 
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portion of the public would be subject each day to an 

[unreasonable] invasion of their privacy." United States v. 

Lyons, 7 F.3d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1993). 

 The evidence proved the officer saw Dyer maneuver his 

automobile without incident in the convenience store's parking 

lot. After Dyer backed his automobile, he drove from the lot and 

turned onto Route 1. He violated no driving prohibitions in so 

doing. The officer followed Dyer along Route 1. Dyer committed 

no traffic violations while driving on Route 1. No evidence 

proved that Old Keaton Road, a secondary road, had lane markings. 

 It was nighttime. No evidence proved that the intersection was 

illuminated. When Dyer turned onto the street, which was marked 

only by a street sign, no traffic was approaching. No evidence 

proved that a safety problem was created or that Dyer drove 

erratically. He merely made a wide turn onto a secondary road. 

When viewed in its totality, this "isolated incident" failed to 

generate a reasonable suspicion that Dyer was committing a 

traffic violation or driving under the influence of alcohol. See

United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 978-79 (10th Cir. 1996). 

 For these reasons, I would hold that the stop was illegal 

and that the evidence seized as a result of the seizure should 

have been suppressed.