[Cite as State v. Skaggs, 2021-Ohio-2803.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

CRAWFORD COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 CASE NO. 3-20-13 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, 

 v. 

ROBERT A. SKAGGS, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Crawford County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 19-CR-0487 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: August 16, 2021 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Edwin M. Bibler for Appellant 

Ryan M. Hoovler for Appellee 

 
Case No. 3-20-13 

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WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Robert Skaggs (“Skaggs”) brings this appeal from 

the judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Crawford County denying his motion 

to suppress. On appeal, Skaggs claims that 1) the stop exceeded the scope and 

duration necessary to complete the traffic stop and 2) there was no reasonable, 

articulable suspicion for continuing the stop. For the reasons set forth below, the 

judgment is affirmed. 

{¶2} On December 3, 2019, the Crawford County Grand Jury indicted 

Skaggs on one count of Possession of Drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(C)(1)(a), 

a felony of the fifth degree. Doc. 1. The indictment was based upon drugs found 

during a traffic stop on November 12, 2019. Doc. 1. On March 25, 2020, Skaggs 

filed a motion to suppress the evidence. Doc. 19. A hearing was held on the motion 

on June 18, 2020 and the motion was eventually denied. Doc. 35. 

{¶3} At the hearing, Captain Joseph Greathouse (“Greathouse”) testified as 

follows. In 2016, the police received information that Skaggs may be bringing drugs 

into the area and selling them when he came up to visit family. Tr. 14-17. On May 

18, 2018, the police received a tip from an informant that Skaggs was selling drugs 

at an address inside Bucyrus. Tr. 19. The informant reported that the drugs arrived 

at the address via FedEx. Tr. 20. On July 16, 2019, the police received a letter 

claiming that Skaggs was selling narcotics in the Bucyrus area. Tr. 22. Then on 

July 21, 2019, the police received another tip that Skaggs, who lives in Tennessee, 
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would sell drugs in Bucyrus when he was in town to visit his girlfriend and identified 

the vehicle he was driving as a mint green Chrysler 300 with Tennessee tags. Tr. 

22-23. The tip gave substantial information regarding the names of the people 

involved in the trafficking, the methods used, and the ways the drugs are hidden 

while being transported. Tr. 22-26. On October 11, 2019, the police received 

another tip alleging that Skaggs was supplying drugs to a local dealer, drove a silver 

Chrysler 300, kept the meth in a black bag and stayed at the Holiday Inn when in 

town. Tr. 26-27. The police also had an informant claiming that his supplier 

received his drugs from Skaggs. Tr. 27. Greathouse testified that based upon all of 

this information, he was looking “to establish probable cause to obtain a GPS search 

warrant for [Skaggs] car” when he saw an opportunity to stop Skaggs’ vehicle. Tr. 

27-28. To get the information, Greathouse was going out in the evenings, locating 

Skaggs, and watching him to see what he was doing. Tr. 28. Greathouse did this 

three or four times in the month before the stop. Tr. 28. On November 8, 

Greathouse observed what he suspected was a drug transaction when a person on a 

motorcycle stopped outside of the residence of Skagg’s girlfriend, went inside for a 

few minutes then left. Tr. 29. Approximately two weeks before the stop, 

Greathouse observed Skaggs at a location where the target of a drug investigation 

was also present. Tr. 30. 

{¶4} Greathouse testified that on November 12, 2019, he was working in an 

unmarked car checking “hot spots” for drug activity. Tr. 31. While at one location, 
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he observed Skaggs driving his light green car with Tennessee tags. Tr. 31-32. 

Skaggs went to a residence while leaving his car running, then returned a couple 

minutes later. Tr. 32. Greathouse then contacted Officer Jason Pennington 

(“Pennington”) and told him that he suspected Skaggs was involved in drug activity. 

Tr. 32. This suspicion was because Skaggs “acted like he was in a hurry”. Tr. 33. 

Greathouse watched Skaggs driving away and asked Pennington to follow him “in 

an attempt to see if there’s any probable cause to initiate a stop.” Tr. 33. Both 

Greathouse and Pennington lost sight of Skaggs, but found him approximately five 

minutes later. Tr. 33. Greathouse then saw Skaggs stop at a stop sign, but he 

stopped beyond the stop bar. Tr. 34. Skaggs then made a right turn that caused him 

to travel left of center and appeared to be on his phone. Tr. 34. Greathouse then 

contacted Pennington and advised him of the violations so he could be stopped. Tr. 

34. At the time of contacting Pennington, the intent was to search the vehicle for 

drugs. Tr. 34. The plan was to stop the vehicle and use a canine sniff to search the 

vehicle. Tr. 35. 

{¶5} On cross-examination, Greathouse admitted that none of the tips

received were related to November 2019. Tr. 53. Greathouse also admitted that the 

home that he was observing on November 8, 2019, when he saw the motorcycle 

come and go quickly belonged to a relative of Skaggs which could explain why he 

was there. Tr. 54. As to the events of November 12, Greathouse saw Skaggs go to 

a residence where he only stayed a couple of minutes, but did not see Skaggs carry 
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anything in or out of the house. Tr. 55. The only thing suspicious was that he 

appeared to be in a hurry. Tr. 55. The video of the stop showed that Skaggs was 

stopped at approximately 8:15 pm. Tr. 56. The canine was requested at 8:20 pm. 

Tr. 57. The officers stopped attempting to write the warning citation at 8:20 pm as 

well. Tr. 61. The dog did not arrive until 8:38 pm. Tr. 61. Both sides stipulated 

that since only the time elapsed mattered, not the actual times, they would use the 

times shown on the police car’s video. Tr. 67-68. 

{¶6} Pennington testified that Greathouse contacted him on November 12, 

2019, and told him the traffic violations Greathouse had observed. Tr. 70-71. 

Greathouse wanted him to conduct a traffic stop based upon a stop bar violation and 

traveling left of center. Tr. 71. Pennington indicated that the vehicle was a Chrysler 

with Tennessee plates and was in working condition. Tr. 71-72. Pennington 

observed that Skaggs’ left arm was shaking and Skaggs stated that he may have 

went left of center because he “wasn’t from the area” and that he was using the GPS 

on his phone. Tr. 72. Pennington believed that Skaggs was lying because he was 

from the area and that in his opinion, Skaggs was shaking because he was nervous. 

Tr. 72. Pennington then asked permission from Skaggs to search the vehicle before 

he returned to the patrol car to write the warning, but Skaggs said no. Tr. 73. 

Pennington then returned to the patrol car and requested a canine and that it be 

expedited. Tr. 74. Pennington then went back to the vehicle and had Skaggs exit 

the vehicle so that he could conduct a pat down search for officer safety. Tr. 74. 
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This concern, pursuant to a statement on the video by Pennington, was based upon 

the shaking arm. No weapons were found on Skaggs, just some cash. Tr. 74. 

Pennington testified that Skaggs, when questioned about the cash, indicated it was 

for his rent in Tennessee. Tr. 74. Pennington indicated that this was a red flag 

because Skaggs also told him he did not know exactly how much cash was there. 

Tr. 75. In his experience people selling drugs frequently have large amounts of cash 

on them. Tr. 75. After searching Skaggs, Pennington then went back to his patrol 

car. Tr. 75. In the meantime, another officer in the patrol car wrote the written 

warning for the violations. Tr. 76. Pennington testified that he then called dispatch 

because he was unhappy that the canine had not arrived. Tr. 77. Dispatch informed 

him that since the canine unit was off, they had not called him yet, so Pennington 

called Deputy Chris Hulsmeyer (“Hulsmeyer”) to request his canine unit. Tr. 77-

78. Pennington then did nothing until Hulsmeyer arrived with the canine. Tr. 78. 

Once the canine alerted to the presence of narcotics, Pennington conducted a search 

of the vehicle where he found a small bag of methamphetamine. Tr. 78. 

{¶7} On cross-examination Pennington admitted that he actually conducted 

two pat down searches of Skaggs and did not remove anything from Skaggs’ 

pockets. Tr. 79. When Pennington felt the money he asked what it was and if he 

could remove it. Tr. 80. After seeing it was money, Pennington put it back in 

Skaggs’ pocket. Tr. 80. Skaggs told Pennington he was from Tennessee, the car 

was registered in Tennessee, and Skaggs had a Tennessee driver’s license. Tr. 80. 
Case No. 3-20-13 

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Pennington admitted that he knew Skaggs was a musician and had just played a 

show in Bucyrus. Tr. 81. Pennington acknowledged that musicians are sometimes 

paid in cash and that could be the source of the cash. Tr. 81. A review of the vehicle 

tags showed that it was registered to Skaggs. Tr. 81. Skaggs’ license was valid and 

there were no warrants for him. Tr. 82. Pennington then began writing the warning 

citation. Tr. 82. Pennington admitted that he was frustrated that the canine was not 

there yet. Tr. 82. 

{¶8} Hulsmeyer testified that he is employed by the Crawford County 

Sheriff’s Office as a canine handler. Tr. 88. On November 12, 2019, he was 

working with a qualified drug detection canine. Tr. 89. On that evening, he was 

not working, but received a request from the Bucyrus Police Department to go to 

the scene of a traffic stop. Tr. 90. Hulsmeyer indicated that they made one lap 

around the car clockwise and then turned to go around counterclockwise. Tr. 90. 

The canine alerted on the rear passenger door during the second lap of the vehicle. 

Tr. 91. After that Hulsmeyer returned the canine to his vehicle and observed the 

search until Pennington found what was suspected as methamphetamines. Tr. 91. 

{¶9} On June 22, 2020, the trial court entered judgment denying the motion 

to suppress. Doc. 35. Skaggs later entered into a written plea of no contest to the 

indictment. Doc. 37. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Skaggs to five 

years of community control. Doc. 38. Skaggs filed a timely notice of appeal. Doc. 

40. On appeal, Skaggs raises the following assignments of error. 
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First Assignment of Error 

The trial court erred in denying [Skaggs’] motion to suppress the 

evidence where the stop of [Skaggs’] vehicle by officers of the

Bucyrus Police Department and Crawford County Sheriff’s 

Office exceeded the scope and duration necessary and there was 

no reasonable, articulable suspicion that drug activity was 

occurring on November 12, 2019. 

Second Assignment of Error 

The trial court erred in denying [Skaggs’] motion to suppress the 

evidence where there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion 

that drug activity was occurring at the time of the stop of 

[Skaggs’] vehicle on November 12, 2019. 

{¶10} In both assignments of error, Skaggs claims that the trial court erred 

in denying his motion to suppress. 

Under appellate review, motions to suppress present “mixed 

questions of law and fact.” State v. Yeaples, 180 Ohio App.3d 720, 

2009-Ohio-184, 907 N.E.2d 333, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.). 

“When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes

the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to 

resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. 

Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial court's 

findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible 

evidence. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must 

then independently determine, without deference to the 

conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the 

applicable legal standard.” (Citations omitted.) 

State v. James, 2016-Ohio-7262, 71 N.E.3d 1257, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.),

quoting State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 

797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. 

State v. Sullivan, 2017 -Ohio- 8937, ¶ 11, 102 N.E.3d 86 (3d Dist.). 
Case No. 3-20-13 

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{¶11} Here, Skaggs does not dispute that the stop of the vehicle was valid. 

The only issue is whether the stop was extended beyond a reasonable time. This 

Court recently addressed the issue of stops extended for an unreasonable time to 

allow time for a canine to arrive on the scene in State v. Lawler, 3d Dist. Union No. 

14-19-25, 2020-Ohio-849, 152 N.E.3d 962. In Lawler, the defendant was driving 

on US 33 near Marysville, Ohio, when a state trooper saw them and thought they 

looked suspicious. Id. at ¶ 2. The trooper followed the vehicle and stopped it around 

5:16 p.m. after the driver changed lanes without using the turn signal. Id. After 

speaking with the driver and the passenger for a few minutes, the trooper learned 

that neither of them were the registered owners of the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 3. The trooper 

asked dispatch to contact the registered owner and also requested the presence of a 

canine based upon the behavior of the vehicle’s occupants. Id. At 5:24 p.m., 

dispatch notified the trooper that the occupants were permitted to use the vehicle, 

but the defendant was supposed to be the one driving. Id. at ¶ 4. The trooper also 

learned that the driver had a suspended license. Id. The trooper did not continue to 

process the traffic stop or return to the vehicle to speak with the occupants, but 

instead chose to remain in his vehicle until the canine arrived at 5:49 p.m. Id. The 

canine walked around the vehicle and alerted to the presence of drugs, which led to 

the arrest of the defendant. Id. The defendant was subsequently indicted on several 

felonies. Id. at ¶ 5. He eventually filed a motion to suppress alleging that the trooper 

had unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop to await the arrival of the canine. Id. at 
Case No. 3-20-13 

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¶ 6. The trial court agreed and the State filed a notice of appeal alleging that the 

stop was not unreasonably prolonged. Id. at ¶ 7-8. 

{¶12} On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Id. at 

¶ 48. When reviewing the issue, this Court held that a traffic stop “can become 

unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required” to issue a ticket. 

Id. at ¶ 13 quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 

L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). 

“‘When an officer detains a motorist for a traffic violation, the 

stop should delay the motorist only for the amount of time 

necessary to issue a citation or warning.’” State v. Hall, 2d Dist. 

Darke, 2017-Ohio-2682, 90 N.E.3d 276, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Hill, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26345, 2016-Ohio-3087, ¶ 9, citing State 

v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, 

¶ 12; State v. Troutman, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-11-17, 2012-Ohio407, ¶ 22 (“[T]he duration of the stop ‘is limited to “effectuate the 

purpose for which the initial stop was made.” ’ ”), quoting State 

v. Smith, 117 Ohio App.3d 278, 285, 690 N.E.2d 567 (1st 

Dist.1996), quoting State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655, 645 

N.E.2d 831 (4th Dist.1994). “ ‘The reasonable stop time includes 

the amount of time it takes to conduct a computer check on the 

driver's license, registration, and vehicle plates.’ ” Hall at ¶ 8, 

quoting Hill at ¶ 9; Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355, 

135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (“[A]n officer's mission

includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop’ * * * 

[such as] checking the driver's license, determining whether there 

are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the

automobile's registration and proof of insurance.”), 

quoting Caballes at 408. “‘“In determining if an officer completed 

these tasks within a reasonable length of time, the court must 

evaluate the duration of the stop in light of the totality of the 

circumstances and consider whether the officer diligently 

conducted the investigation.”’” Batchili at ¶ 12, quoting State v. 

Howard, 12th Dist. Preble Nos. CA2006-02-002 and CA2006-02-

003, 2006-Ohio-5656, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio 
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App.3d 585, 598-599, 657 N.E.2d 591 (9th Dist.1995). 

Lawler at ¶ 14. Lawler noted that a canine sniff is not a typical action taken in an 

ordinary stop because it does not have “the same close connection to roadway safety 

as the ordinary inquiries” and is not a part of an officer’s traffic mission. Id. at ¶ 15 

quoting Rodriguez, supra. An officer is permitted to conduct a canine sniff of a 

vehicle during a traffic stop without reasonable suspicion of additional illegal 

activity as long as it is completed before the traffic stop would normally end. Lawler

at ¶ 15. However, if the stop is extended to conduct a canine sniff, the officer must 

have reasonable suspicion based upon additional facts to believe that the vehicle 

contains drugs in order to detain the driver for the extra time it takes for the canine 

to arrive. Id. at ¶ 16. See State v. Elliott, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 11 MA 182, 2012-

Ohio-3350, ¶ 23; Batchili, supra at ¶ 15 (holding that the stop may be extended 

beyond the normal time if additional facts are found during the stop to give rise to 

a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity). The analysis of whether 

there is reasonable and articulable suspicion is based upon the collection of factors, 

not on a single individual factor. Lawler at 16. 

{¶13} When reviewing the factors presented by the officer in Lawler, the trial 

court noted that the stop was for a minor traffic offense, but that the trooper learned 

that the driver’s license had been suspended and that the vehicle had been loaned to 

the defendant. Id. at ¶ 17. The trial court noted that the stop went on for 

approximately 28 minutes before the drug dog arrived on the scene. Id. This Court 
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noted in its review that the trooper had testified that the driver and defendant reacted 

oddly to the stop by the driver throwing his head back against the seat and only 

rolling the window down part way. Id. at ¶ 19. The trooper also indicated that the 

driver and the defendant appeared to be lying to him about why they were using the 

vehicle. Id. The trooper noted that both the driver and the defendant were “staring 

straight ahead and sitting upright and rigid” Id. at ¶ 20. This behavior was why the 

trooper called for the canine. Id. The State argued on appeal that based upon the 

trooper’s testimony about the additional factors, the extension of the traffic stop was 

permissible. Id. at ¶ 29. This Court disagreed. Id. at ¶ 30. 

{¶14} This Court held that although these actions and learning that the driver 

lacked a valid license would provide some justification for extending the stop, the 

extension was only permitted “for such time as would have been reasonably 

necessary to investigate these additional potential infractions.” Id. at ¶ 31. See

United States v. Winters, 782 F.3d 289, 296 (6th Cir.2015) (holding the extension of 

a traffic stop based on new reasonable suspicion is limited in the scope and duration 

to what is reasonable). While the stop may be extended, the officer still is required 

to diligently pursue the investigation to either confirm or dispel the suspicions 

quickly.” Lawler at ¶ 31. After reviewing the record in Lawler, this Court held that 

the trooper did not diligently pursue his investigation because by his own admission, 

he did nothing addition to further the investigation, instead just waiting for the 

canine to arrive. Id. at ¶ 32. This Court determined that the canine sniff did not 
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occur within the reasonable time necessary to complete a normal traffic citation. Id. 

at ¶ 33 (trooper testified normal stop would ideally be 3-4 minutes). See In re 

$75,000.00 U.S. Currency, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga, 2017-Ohio-9158 (the longest a 

traffic stop should take is 15 minutes); State v. Eggleston, 11th Dist. Trumbull N. 

2014-T-0068, 2015-Ohio-958, 29 N.E.3d 23 (typical traffic stop takes 8-10 minutes 

when a citation is issued); and State v. Ramos, 155 Ohio App.3d 396, 2003-Ohio6535, 801 N.E.2d 523 (2d Dist.) (holding that even assuming that 30 minutes was 

justified for a stop, the officer must still diligently be writing the citation and not 

just waiting for the canine to arrive). Since the trooper was not diligently finishing 

the traffic stop and his “primary motivation for extending the traffic stop may have 

been to allow for an exterior sniff of the [vehicle]”, this Court held that he had 

impermissibly extended the stop. Lawler at ¶ 35. 

{¶15} This Court then went on to discuss how the stop may still be prolonged 

as long as the law enforcement officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that 

the vehicle contains drugs at that time. Id. at ¶ 36. Although we are to look at the 

factors as a whole when evaluating whether there was a reasonable and articulable 

suspicion of drug activities, “it is appropriate to assess the extent to which a given 

factor is [individually] indicative of criminal activity.” Id. at ¶ 37 citing United 

States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d 200 (4th Cir.2018) and United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 

651 (6th Cir.2012). In Lawler, this court reviewed the factors and found that 

although the defendant and the driver may have shown odd behavior that indicated 
Case No. 3-20-13 

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nervousness, there were no signs of heightened nervousness, no indication of bizarre 

or implausible explanations for what they were doing, and nothing in sight that 

would indicate criminal activity. Lawler, supra. This Court then affirmed the 

judgment of the trial court granting the motion to suppress. 

{¶16} In this case, there is no question that the primary purpose of this stop 

was to obtain a canine sniff of the vehicle in order to search the vehicle for drugs. 

Greathouse testified that this was the purpose. Tr. 34. Pennington testified that 

after Skaggs denied his request to search the vehicle, he returned to the patrol car to 

call for the canine unit and to write the warning citation. Tr. 74. The undisputed 

evidence was that the warning citation was never issued and that Pennington and 

the other officer who was in his patrol car and writing the citation stopped writing 

it when they learned that the dog would be delayed. Pennington admitted that he 

was not proceeding with the investigation into the basis for the stop, which allegedly 

was Skaggs crossing the stop bar and using his phone while driving. Pennington 

was frustrated that the dog did not appear for approximately 23 minutes. Even the 

trial court conceded that if this had been a “routine traffic stop and not a drug 

investigation * * * [t]he evidence would be excluded, because through probably 

nobody’s real fault, the stop was extended longer than necessary.” Tr. 103. The 

trial court noted that this matter could have been concluded in 10-15 minutes at 

most. Tr. 104. Thus, it is clear that Skaggs was detained beyond the time reasonably 

required to complete the traffic-related investigation. 
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{¶17} Since the stop was extended past the permissible time, the question 

then becomes whether the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the 

vehicle contained drugs or that the occupant was engaged in a drug-related activity 

at that time. Lawler at ¶ 36. This Court notes that the question is about the criminal 

activity at that time, not just whether the officer has a reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that the driver may be a criminal at some other time. See State v. Hawkins, 

12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2017-07-013, 2018-Ohio-1983, ¶ 16 (traffic stop is 

permissible if based upon reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 

imminent). As in Lawler, this court needs to look at the factors. There were 4 

factors pointed out as the basis for the reasonable articulable suspicion: 1) lying 

about using GPS when stopped as an explanation for being on his phone; 2) the fact 

that this was a pretextual stop; 3) the shaky arm; and 4) the cash that Skaggs claimed 

was for his rent. Like in Lawler, we will look at these factors individually to see 

the extent it is indicative of criminal behavior at the time of the stop. 

{¶18} The first element was the trial court’s determination that Skaggs was 

being dishonest in his claim that he was on his phone using Mapquest. The trial 

court determined he was not honest because the trial court did not think a person 

who was originally from Bucyrus would need to use Mapquest in town. However, 

a review of the video shows that the officer asked Skaggs if he was texting, which 

Skaggs denied and said he was using Mapquest. The fact that one may not admit to 

texting while driving, which could result in an additional ticket, does not necessarily 
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indicate they are engaged in criminal activity at that time. Additionally, just because 

a person may be familiar with an area does not mean that they may not need 

directions to find a specific location. Familiarity does not equal knowing where 

everything is located without help, thus the explanation was reasonable and standing 

alone is not necessarily indicative that any criminal activity was occurring. 

{¶19} The second element was that this was a pretextual stop. All of the 

testimony was that the officers were looking for a reason to stop him so that they 

could search the car. This was based upon prior tips they had received that indicated 

Skaggs was dealing drugs. However, these tips were not for the relevant time 

period, but rather for past situations. The closest tip in time was from a month 

before the stop. Two weeks before the stop, Greathouse testified that he saw a 

motorcycle pull up to the home of Skaggs’ girlfriend, enter the house, and leave 

quickly, which he thought was indicative of drug activity. However, this was 

nothing more than supposition as the motorcycle was not stopped and no 

investigation was completed regarding that incident. Greathouse even admitted that 

the only involvement he personally knew of regarding Skaggs before the stop was 

that in the two weeks prior to the stop, Skaggs was seen entering a home frequented 

by one of Greathouse’s targets. Tr. 29-30. Greathouse testified that on the day of 

the stop, he saw Skaggs go into a house that was owned by a relative of Skaggs. 

There was no testimony whether anyone else was home at the time or that anyone 

else came to the home while Skaggs was there. Greathouse testified that Skaggs 
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was not there for very long, but Greathouse admitted that he did not observe Skaggs 

carrying anything in or out of the home. Greathouse’s explanation for suspecting 

that Skaggs might have drugs in the car was that Skaggs appeared to be in a hurry. 

Being in a hurry can describe many people on a daily basis. It alone is not 

necessarily indicative of criminal activity. Even the trial court noted that before the 

stop “there was nothing extra” to provide reasonable, articulable suspicion for 

extending the stop. Tr. 108. 

{¶20} The third factor was that Skaggs’ arm was shaking. Pennington stated 

on the video that the reason he conducted the pat down search was because of the 

shaky arm. Skaggs’ response was that it always shakes. Pennington testified that 

Skaggs’ told him it was shaking because it was cold from brushing snow off the 

front windshield. Pennington testified that he was suspicious of that explanation 

because the jacket was not wet.1

 However, the trial court even noted that since it 

was only one arm that was shaking, it could be the result of nerve damage. Tr. 108. 

Merely having a shaky arm is not alone necessarily indicative that any criminal 

activity was occurring. 

{¶21} The fourth factor the trial court noted was the cash in Skaggs’ pocket. 

The trial court acknowledged that the amount of cash was not suspicious. Tr. 111. 

However, the trial court noted that Skaggs “said it was for his rent and when he 

1

 A review of the video shows that Skaggs appeared to be wearing a leather coat. This would make it very 

easy to brush the snow off before it melted on the surface and soaked into the coat leaving a wet spot. 
Case No. 3-20-13 

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didn’t know what his rent was, that again I believe is suspicious.” Tr. 111. A review 

of the video and the testimony of Pennington shows that Skaggs was never asked 

what the amount of his rent was. Pennington testified that he asked Skaggs why he 

had the money and Skaggs said it was to pay his rent. Tr. 74. Then Pennington 

asked him how much money was there and Skaggs said he did not know. Tr. 75. 

Although Pennington testified that in his experience people with an “abundancy of 

cash” that don’t know how much they have are likely to be involved in drugs, the 

trial court found the amount of cash to not be suspicious, so it would not qualify as 

an “abundancy” of cash. The mere fact that a person does not know exactly how 

much cash is in their pocket or wallet at a given time is not alone indicative of 

criminal activity. 

{¶22} The trial court found that although the evidence in this case was not 

“overwhelming” that the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion, the trial court 

believed that the State had met its burden. Based upon that finding the trial court 

denied the motion to suppress. As discussed above, none of the individual factors 

taken alone would provide reasonable, articulable suspicion for delaying the traffic 

stop. However, when taken as a whole, they could be found to provide a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion. See State v. Batchili, supra at ¶ 17, (the totality of the 

circumstances must be evaluated to determine whether there is reasonable and 

articulable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop). The trial court made such a 

determination in this case after it made findings of fact based on the evidence before 
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it. This Court is required to accept the findings made by the trial court and may not 

reverse merely because we may have reached a different conclusion. Thus, we do 

not find that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The assignments 

of error are overruled. 

{¶23} Having found no error in the particulars assigned and argued, the 

judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County is affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

ZIMMERMAN and SHAW, J.J., concur. 

/hls