IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

JENNIFER TAYLOR, FAIRHAVEN WEALTH )

MANAGEMENT, LLC, )

)

Defendants. )

__________________________________________) Case No. 1:20-cv-2133

)

JENNIFER TAYLOR, FAIRHAVEN WEALTH )

MANAGEMENT, LLC, )

)

Counter-Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC, )

)

Counter-Defendant. )

COUNTERCLAIMANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL

Counterclaimants, Fairhaven Wealth Management, LLC (“Fairhaven”) and Jennifer Taylor 

(“Taylor”), hereby move to compel discovery responses from Counter-Defendant, Fidelity 

Brokerage Services, LLC (“Fidelity”). 

I. INTRODUCTION

Ms. Taylor and Fairhaven’s discovery requests have been pending for more than a year –

since November 19, 2020. Counterclaimants timely served written and oral discovery requests 

shortly after filing their counterclaims in November of 2020. The Court then stayed all “merits 

discovery” pending Fidelity’s preliminary injunction motion. In January of this year, Fidelity 

voluntarily withdrew its request for a “Rule 13804” injunction before FINRA, thus mooting its 

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2

preliminary injunction. Accordingly, on March 4, 2022, in response to Counterclaimants’ motion 

(Dkt. 101), Fidelity formally withdrew its pending preliminary injunction motion, allowing merits 

discovery to finally move forward. (Dkt. 107). Now that the stay on merits discovery has been 

lifted, however, Fidelity still refuses to answer the merits discovery Counterclaimants propounded 

more than fifteen (15) months ago. 

Instead, Fidelity believes the Court should now stay this entire lawsuit, pending resolution 

of their FINRA arbitration, which has only just now begun (and for which no arbitrators have been 

appointed). Fidelity’s position is entirely untenable. There is no basis to stay this lawsuit, because 

none of the claims asserted by any of the parties in this action can be arbitrated before FINRA –

they can only be resolved in this Court:

• Fidelity’s complaint against Fairhaven cannot be arbitrated, because 

Fairhaven is not a FINRA-member firm;

• Fairhaven’s counterclaim against Fidelity cannot be arbitrated, for the 

same reason; and

• Ms. Taylor’s counterclaim against Fidelity cannot be arbitrated, because 

employment discrimination claims are exempt from FINRA arbitration.

One must keep in mind that Ms. Taylor is the victim of employment discrimination here. 

She experienced both sex and age-based discrimination at Fidelity, which then retaliated against 

her for complaining about it. (Dkt. 71, at 1-23). Ms. Taylor should not be further punished by 

having her lawsuit stayed, simply because Fidelity was able to easily “win the race to the 

courthouse” by hastily filing its FINRA arbitration action before Ms. Taylor had received her 

statutory right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 

Nor should Fairhaven, a small investment advisory firm, be punished by its competitor –

one of the largest financial institutions the world, with more than $4.2 trillion in assets under 

management – simply because Fairhaven hired a former Fidelity advisor. Instead, Fairhaven 

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should be allowed to proceed with its counterclaims in this case, independent of the FINRA 

arbitration that Fidelity filed against Ms. Taylor. Counterclaimants therefore respectfully request 

the Court to order Fidelity to respond to all outstanding discovery requests within thirty (30) days.

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Court initially allowed “expedited” discovery in connection with Fidelity’s motion for 

preliminary injunction. Fidelity then stretched that “expedited” discovery for a tortuous period of 

eight (8) months. After Ms. Taylor and Fairhaven filed counterclaims and served non-expedited, 

merits-based discovery, the Court stayed all non-expedited discovery pending resolution of the

preliminary injunction motion. Fidelity has now withdrawn its preliminary injunction motion, but 

takes the position that it still does not need to answer Counterclaimants’ discovery requests. 

A. FIDELITY’S “EXPEDITED” PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DISCOVERY

Fidelity’s original complaint in this action asserted claims against only Ms. Taylor for, 

inter alia, her alleged breach of contractual and fiduciary duties. (Dkt. 1). The only relief sought 

by Fidelity was a preliminary injunction, to aid its contemporaneously-filed FINRA arbitration 

action. Thus, the sole purpose of this action was originally to determine whether injunctive relief 

is proper. On May 22, 2020, the Court granted Fidelity’s request for expedited discovery in 

support of its preliminary injunction motion. (Dkts. 17, 29, 30). The Court allowed the parties 

three days to serve document requests, seven days to respond to document requests, and ten days 

after the completion of written discovery to take depositions. (Id.). 

1. Fidelity Staunchly Fought Production

On June 2, 2020, Ms. Taylor timely satisfied all of her discovery obligations, and produced 

the documents Fidelity had requested. (Fidelity later clarified its requests, and Ms. Taylor timely 

supplemented her production several days later, on June 5, 2020, and June 9, 2020.) Fidelity, 

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however, did not respond in kind. Instead, Fidelity refused to produce nearly all of the documents 

Ms. Taylor requested: it timely produced just five (5) documents, forcing Ms. Taylor to move to 

compel. (Dkt. 42). After the parties briefed the issue, the Court ordered Fidelity to produce most 

of the documents it was withholding, and to do so by July 2, 2020. (Dkt. 53). Although Fidelity 

produced some additional documents on July 2, 2020, its production was incomplete. On July 28, 

2020, following a lengthy Rule 37.2 discovery conference, Fidelity eventually agreed to produce 

some of the documents it was withholding (specifically, all calendar entries post-dating March 6, 

2020). It has been nearly two years, and Fidelity still has not produced those documents. 

2. Fidelity Obtained Pre-Suit Discovery from Fairhaven

As part of the expedited discovery process, the Court allowed Fidelity to serve a third-party 

subpoena upon Ms. Taylor’s employer, Fairhaven, which was not yet a party to this action. (Dkts. 

17, 29, 30). Fidelity used that expedited discovery to harass its competitor, Fairhaven, and to try 

and strongarm Ms. Taylor into settling on unreasonable terms. 

On or about May 27, 2020, Fidelity served Fairhaven with its third-party subpoena. (Dkt. 

58-1). During the summer of 2020, Fairhaven agreed to produce all of the documents Fidelity 

sought. By August 14, 2020, Fairhaven had produced around 3,000 pages of documents in 

response to the subpoena. Fidelity believed that Fairhaven was withholding documents, but 

Fairhaven confirmed that it did not have within its possession, custody or control any additional 

documents to produce. Nevertheless, on October 29, 2020, Fidelity moved to compel documents 

that Fairhaven had already confirmed did not exist. (Dkt. 58). In response, the Court ordered 

Fairhaven to produce any documents it was withholding or confirm in writing that it had no 

additional documents to produce. (Dkt. 67). Fairhaven, in fact, had no additional documents, as 

it had repeatedly told Fidelity. (Dkt. 70). 

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3. Fidelity Habitually Delayed “Expedited” Depositions

Fidelity continually delayed the “expedited” depositions of its employees. On May 29, 

2020, Ms. Taylor noticed the depositions of Fidelity’s affiants, Charles Meyers and Scott Marshall, 

for June 9 and June 11, 2020. On June 1, 2020, Fidelity began a campaign of deposition delay and 

avoidance by demanding that Ms. Taylor “pre-clear” her intended deposition topics with Fidelity’s 

counsel in advance, before either Mr. Meyers or Mr. Marshall would be produced, despite that 

neither were designated Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses. Fidelity’s unjustified demand necessitated a 

series of more than a dozen e-mails between June 1, 2020, and June 8, 2020, as well as another 

Local Rule 37.2 discovery conference. During this back-and-forth, Ms. Taylor agreed to postpone 

her depositions of Mr. Meyers and Mr. Marshall until the resolution of her then-pending motion 

to compel.

After the Court’s ruling on the motion to compel, and Fidelity’s supplemental production 

on July 2, 2020, Fidelity still refused to allow the depositions of either Mr. Meyers or Mr. Marshall 

to proceed. Instead, Fidelity pressured Ms. Taylor’s employer (Fairhaven) to require her to agree 

to a stipulated injunction which, in turn, prompted a settlement dialogue. After still more backand-forth with Fidelity’s counsel, Ms. Taylor’s counsel finally wrote on September 11, 2020: “[i]f 

Fidelity is not interested in discussing settlement, then ignore the attached [proposal] and let me 

know when you and Messrs. Meyers and Marshall are available for depositions.” Fidelity refused 

to provide dates and continued to delay.

On December 2, 2020, the parties filed status reports on the progress of expedited 

discovery. (Dkt. 73; Dkt. 74). The following day, the Court ordered that the depositions of Ms. 

Taylor and Fidelity’s employees (Mr. Marshall and Mr. Meyers) be completed by January 15, 

2021. (Dkt. 75). The parties completed the depositions by that deadline.

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B. FAIRHAVEN AND MS. TAYLOR HAVE NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO CONDUCT 

MERITS-BASED DISCOVERY ON THEIR CLAIMS

In the midst of all the discovery disputes described above, Fidelity filed an amended 

complaint on November 4, 2020, re-asserting its same claims against Ms. Taylor, adding a claim 

for civil conspiracy, and adding her new employer, Fairhaven, as an additional defendant. (Dkt. 

61). In addition to seeking injunctive relief against both defendants, Fidelity sought monetary 

damages (both compensatory and punitive) from Fairhaven under theories of misappropriation of 

trade secrets, unfair competition, tortious interference, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy. 

(Id.). Because Fairhaven is not a FINRA-member firm, Fidelity’s claims against Fairhaven cannot

be arbitrated before FINRA. Fidelity’s Amended Complaint, thus, grossly expanded the scope of 

this action from a limited preliminary injunction proceeding to a full case on the merits.

On November 18, 2020, Ms. Taylor and Fairhaven filed separate answers to the amended 

complaint. (Dkt. 71; Dkt. 72). Along with their respective answers, Ms. Taylor and Fairhaven 

each asserted a variety of counterclaims against Fidelity. (Dkt. 71; Dkt. 72). As explained below, 

these counterclaims cannot be arbitrated before FINRA, and can only be resolved in this Court. 

1. Ms. Taylor’s Counterclaims

In 2018, Fidelity assigned a new branch manager to Ms. Taylor’s office; the manager then 

embarked upon a campaign of discrimination and harassment based on her sex/gender (female) 

and age (over 40). (Dkt. 71, at 1-23). When Ms. Taylor complained about this discrimination and 

harassment to Fidelity’s management, her branch manager began retaliating against her and, in 

early 2020, constructively discharged her. (Id.). After she joined Fairhaven, Fidelity continued 

its campaign of retaliation against Ms. Taylor by, among other things, refusing to provide her 

contact information to former clients (in violation of its own policies and FINRA rules); cutting 

off Ms. Taylor’s access to “Wealthscape” (a Fidelity application that helps manage Fairhaven 

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client accounts custodied through Fidelity); filing this lawsuit and ancillary FINRA action; and 

otherwise tortiously interfering with her employment relationship with Fairhaven. (Id.).

On November 18, 2020, the same day her answer to the amended complaint was due, Ms. 

Taylor received her Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC. (Dkt. 71 at ¶ 20). Accordingly, on 

that date, Ms. Taylor asserted her now-ripe counterclaims for, inter alia: 

• Sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and the IHRA;

• Age discrimination in violation of the ADEA, Title VII and IHRA; and

• Retaliation under the ADEA, Title VII and IHRA. (Dkt. 71).1

Importantly, Ms. Taylor’s statutory employment counterclaims are not subject to FINRA 

arbitration, and must be adjudicated in this federal court lawsuit. Ordinarily, claims between 

member firms (such as Fidelity) and associated persons (like Ms. Taylor) are subject to FINRA’s 

mandatory arbitration rules. (FINRA Rule 13200(a)). However, the FINRA Code of Arbitration 

Procedure expressly states that statutory employment claims – such as Ms. Taylor’s Title VII 

counterclaims – cannot be arbitrated before FINRA unless all parties agree to do so: 

(a) Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims

“A claim alleging employment discrimination, including sexual 

harassment, in violation of a statute, is not required to be 

arbitrated under the Code. Such a claim may be arbitrated only 

if the parties have agreed to arbitrate it, either before or after the 

dispute arose...

(FINRA Rule 13201(a)). 

In this case, neither Ms. Taylor nor Fidelity have agreed to arbitrate her Title VII claims; 

consequently, those claims can only be resolved in this Court.

1

In this action, Ms. Taylor has also asserted common law tortious interference counterclaims. However, 

now that Fidelity has chosen to move forward with its FINRA arbitration, Ms. Taylor does not intend to 

pursue those claims here. She will pursue only her statutory employment counterclaims in this action. 

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2. Fairhaven’s Counterclaims

Fairhaven is a small, independent registered investment advisory firm that previously 

custodied its client accounts with Fidelity. During the course of this lawsuit (prior to naming 

Fairhaven as a party), Fidelity engaged in an unlawful extortion scheme against its competitor. 

More specifically, Fidelity threatened that if Ms. Taylor defended herself in this lawsuit and 

refused to agree to an injunction against her, Fidelity would (i) kick Fairhaven off of Fidelity’s 

investment platform, forcing Fairhaven to re-custody all of its client accounts with another 

brokerage firm; (ii) solicit Fairhaven’s clients to cease doing business with Fairhaven; and (iii) sue 

Fairhaven. Ms. Taylor refused to agree to an injunction; so, on November 4, 2020, Fidelity 

followed through on its threats. It added Fairhaven to this lawsuit, provided a 60-day notice of 

termination, and informed Fairhaven that it would be soliciting Fairhaven’s clients to cease 

working with Fairhaven. (See generally Dkt. 72). 

Based on that conduct, in its answer to the amended complaint, Fairhaven asserted 

counterclaims for:

• Breach of contract;

• Violations of the Defend Trade Secrets Act and Illinois Trade Secrets Act;

• Unfair competition;

• Breach of fiduciary duty;

• Tortious interference with business relationships;

• Unjust enrichment;

• Civil conspiracy; and

• Injunctive relief. (Dkt. 72). 

Because Fairhaven is not a FINRA-member firm, its counterclaims against Fidelity (like 

Fidelity’s claims against Fairhaven) can only be resolved in this federal lawsuit.

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4. Counterclaimants’ (regular, non-expedited) Merits-Discovery

Based on the counterclaims, the parties require discovery concerning, among other things, 

the circumstances surrounding Fidelity’s alleged sex/gender discrimination, harassment, and 

retaliation. This will include oral and written discovery concerning workplace complaints, 

disciplinary records, Fidelity’s investigation into discriminatory conduct, comparative 

performance, compensation, and personnel files, Fidelity’s decision to threaten Fairhaven, 

Fidelity’s decision to kick Fairhaven off Fidelity’s platform and Fidelity’s breach of fiduciary 

duties and interference with clients. The parties will also require oral and written discovery on the 

issue of “pre-text” concerning any legitimate non-retaliatory reasons proffered by Fidelity 

concerning its actions, which will include the facts and circumstances of other financial consultants 

who left Fidelity and engaged in conduct that is similar to (or worse than) the conduct allegedly 

engaged in by Taylor, including Fidelity’s post-employment conduct vis-a-vis those employees.

Accordingly, on November 19, 2020, Fairhaven served Fidelity with Rule 33 

interrogatories and Rule 34 requests, along with a Rule 30 deposition notice. Similarly, Ms. Taylor 

served Fidelity with Rule 33 interrogatories and Rule 34 requests, along with a Rule 30 deposition 

notice – all focused solely on her non-arbitrable statutory employment counterclaims. 

5. The Court Stays Non-Expedited Discovery

When Fidelity amended its complaint in November 2020, it had yet to complete the 

“expedited” discovery in support of its preliminary injunction motion (which was originally 

supposed to be completed by mid-June 2020). In its December 2, 2020, discovery status report, 

Fidelity took the same position it takes now – i.e., that Counterclaimants’ non-expedited discovery 

requests were premature, and that non-expedited discovery should be stayed until after completion 

of the entire FINRA arbitration action. (Dkt. 74 at 2-3). 

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Fidelity based that position on a statement the Court made in a November 2, 2020, minute 

entry – before Ms. Taylor and Fairhaven had filed any counterclaims in this proceeding. At that 

time, the scope of this lawsuit was limited to Fidelity’s request for a preliminary injunction; thus, 

the Court reasonably stated that it “expects to set a briefing schedule on the plaintiff’s preliminary 

injunction motion and to stay further proceedings pending the arbitration of Fidelity's claims 

against defendant Taylor.” (Dkt. 60). A month later, however, Fairhaven had been joined as a 

Defendant, this matter had expanded from a request for a preliminary injunction to a full case on 

the merits, and Ms. Taylor and Fairhaven had filed counterclaims. It was wholly unreasonable for 

Fidelity to take the position that the Court’s earlier comments about the anticipated trajectory of 

this case were set in stone, no matter how drastically the circumstances changed. 

Rather than stay discovery until after the completion of the FINRA arbitration (as Fidelity 

had requested), the Court, on December 3, 2020, stayed discovery only until completion of the 

preliminary injunction motion.

2

 (Dkt. 75) (“No discovery concerning the Plaintiff’s claim against 

Fairhaven or the Defendants' counterclaims will be allowed before completion of the ‘expedited’ 

discovery that has previously been authorized and completion of briefing on the pending motion 

for preliminary injunction.”). In other words, the Court has already rejected the type of stay 

Fidelity now believes it is entitled to. 

C. THE PENDING (REGULAR, NON-EXPEDITED) MERITS-BASED DISCOVERY

On March 26, 2021, the parties finished briefing Fidelity’s preliminary injunction motion. 

(Dkt. 84; Dkt. 89; Dkt. 93). On January 12, 2022, Fidelity abandoned its request for Rule 13804 

injunctive relief before FINRA, mooting its then-pending motion for preliminary injunction. (Dkt. 

2 The Court also directed that “[d]epositions authorized as part of expedited discovery will not include 

questions pertaining to the counterclaims; deponents in ‘expedited’ depositions will therefore be subject to 

further deposition on issues relevant to the counterclaims.” (Dkt. 75). 

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101, 107, 108). Fidelity moved to withdraw its preliminary injunction motion and, on March 7, 

2022, the Court granted that motion. (Dkt. 107; Dkt. 108). Accordingly, by March 7, 2022, there 

was no question that (a) the earlier “expedited” discovery had been completed, and (b) any possible 

briefing on the preliminary injunction motion was completed. Pursuant to the Court’s December 

3, 2020, order, the discovery stay is now lifted and non-expedited, merits-based discovery may 

now proceed. (Dkt. 75).

3

D. THE PARTIES’ LOCAL RULE 37.2 CONFERENCE

On March 8, 2022, Counterclaimants’ counsel attempted to schedule a Local Rule 37.2 

Conference with Fidelity’s lead trial counsel, Susan Guerette, to discuss the issues raised in this 

motion. Eventually, Ms. Guerette agreed to conduct a telephonic Local Rule 37.2 conference with 

Counterclaims’ lead trial counsel, Chris Griesmeyer, on March 17, 2022. During that call, Fidelity 

stated that it would not respond to Counterclaimants’ merits-based discovery requests, and took 

the position that this entire lawsuit should be stayed until after Fidelity has completed its FINRA 

arbitration action against Ms. Taylor.4

We explained that there would be no basis to stay discovery once again in this matter, let 

alone any reason to do so pending the outcome of the FINRA arbitration between Fidelity and Ms. 

Taylor. Fidelity’s claims against Fairhaven cannot be arbitrated before FINRA, Fairhaven’s 

claims against Fidelity cannot be arbitrated before FINRA, and Ms. Taylor’s Title VII claims 

cannot be arbitrated before FINRA. Nonetheless, although it could provide no authority for its 

position, Fidelity’s counsel refused to budge. Consequently, after consultation by telephone 

3

In its December 3, 2020, Minute Order, the Court also stated that it “will address further discovery 

scheduling and supervision after briefing on the motion for preliminary injunction has been completed.” 

(Dkt. 75). The Court has not yet set any deadlines by which time this discovery must be completed. 

4 Of course, while refusing to answer Counterclaimants’ discovery, Fidelity’s counsel has recently taken 

the inconsistent position that Fidelity should be allowed to “commence discovery” on its claims against Ms. 

Taylor. (Dkt. 105 at 4).

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between the parties’ respective trial counsel, and good faith attempts to resolve their differences, 

the parties are unable to reach an accord. Counterclaimants must now seek relief from the Court. 

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The Court should not grant another stay of discovery. The party seeking a discovery stay 

does not have an automatic right to a stay. U.S. ex rel. Robinson v. Indiana Univ. Health Inc., 

1:13-CV-02009-TWP, 2015 WL 3961221, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 30, 2015) (declining to stay 

discovery). Instead, the party seeking a stay – i.e., Fidelity – bears the burden of establishing that 

there is good cause to stay discovery. AOT Holding AG v. Archer Daniels Midland Co., No. 19-

2240, 2020 WL 1472266, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2020) (declining to stay discovery); FED. R. CIV.

P. 26(c). Here, Fidelity has not moved for another stay, much less satisfied the burden of 

establishing good cause for a stay. 

Even if Fidelity had moved for a stay – or, if it does so prior to the Court’s March 23, 2022, 

status hearing, Fidelity could not possibly satisfy its burden. “Courts in this circuit have considered 

the following factors when deciding whether to stay an action: ‘(i) whether a stay will unduly 

prejudice or tactically disadvantage the non-moving party, (ii) whether a stay will simplify the 

issues in question and streamline the trial, and (iii) whether a stay will reduce the burden of 

litigation on the parties and on the court.’” AOT Holding, 2020 WL 1472266, at *1 (quoting 

E.E.O.C. v. Fair Oaks Dairy Farms, LLC, No. 2:11 CV 265, 2012 WL 3138108, at *2 (N.D. Ind. 

Aug. 1, 2012) (declining to stay discovery)). None of these factors weighs in favor of a stay. 

First, Fairhaven and Ms. Taylor would be prejudiced by another stay of discovery in this 

lawsuit. A further stay may, for instance, cause memories of witnesses to fade. See AOT Holding, 

2020 WL 1472266, at *1. Indeed, one of the key individuals Fidelity claims Fairhaven improperly 

solicited was an elderly man then residing in a memory home (presumably with deteriorating 

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memory). Similarly, individuals might continue to leave Fidelity’s employ, in which case their 

knowledge of the circumstances at issue might be lost to Fidelity for Rule 30(b)(6) purposes. And, 

to the extent Fidelity is seeking prejudgment interest, that would continue to mount. 

Moreover, Rule 1 requires that the Federal Rules “be construed, administered, and 

employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of 

every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added). The 1993 Advisory Committee 

Notes to Rule 1 also emphasize that courts should “ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only 

fairly, but also without undue cost or delay.” Accordingly, “when extreme, ‘delay itself may be 

considered prejudicial’....” Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 838 F.2d 904, 909 (7th Cir. 

1988) (quoting Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 139 (1st Cir. 1985)); see also Ernst 

v. City of Chicago, No. 08 C 4370, 2012 WL 27594, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2012) (“there is a point 

where delay, itself, becomes prejudicial”). Counterclaimants served their discovery requests 

fifteen (15) months ago. Any further delay would be extreme and, thus, prejudicial in itself. 

Second, a stay of discovery will not simplify the issues. The FINRA arbitration will have 

no effect on any of the claims currently pending in this Court. Moreover, “a stay of discovery is 

generally appropriate only when a party raises a potentially dispositive threshold issue such as a 

challenge to a plaintiff’s standing ... or pending resolution of qualified immunity claims.” New 

England Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 12 C 1662, 2013 WL 

690613, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2013) (declining to stay discovery). Here, there is no threshold 

issue dispositive of this whole case. While Fidelity has moved to dismiss the counterclaims, 

Fairhaven has not moved to dismiss Fidelity’s claim against it. Thus, there is no question that this 

case will remain pending – and require will discovery – no matter the outcome of Fidelity’s 

motions to dismiss the counterclaims, and no matter the outcome of the FINRA arbitration.

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Third, staying discovery would not reduce the burden of litigation. Fidelity’s claims 

against Fairhaven, Fairhaven’s counterclaims against Fidelity, and Ms. Taylor’s Title VII 

counterclaims against Fidelity will all remain pending no matter the outcome of the FINRA 

arbitration. Similarly, Fidelity’s claim against Fairhaven will remain pending no matter the 

outcome of Fidelity’s motions to dismiss the counterclaims. The discovery Fidelity will seek on 

that claim, and the discovery Fairhaven has sought regarding its affirmative defenses to that claim, 

overlaps almost entirely with the counterclaim-related discovery. “Where,” as here, “a stay of 

discovery is unlikely to significantly expedite the litigation, and may actually slow it down, [the 

court] will decline to interfere.” New England, 2013 WL 690613, at *2 (quotations omitted). 

In short, if Fidelity had sought a discovery stay, it would not have met its burden of showing 

“good cause” for a stay. There is no reason for this Court to continue delaying discovery on claims 

that could never be arbitrated before FINRA, and can only be resolved in this lawsuit. 

IV. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Defendants/Counterclaimants, Jennifer Taylor (“Taylor”) and Fairhaven 

Wealth Management, LLC (“Fairhaven”), respectfully request that the Court enter an order:

A. Requiring Fidelity to respond to Counterclaimant’s pending discovery requests 

within thirty (30) days; and

B. Granting any further relief the Court deems just and reasonable. 

Dated: March 17, 2022 Respectfully submitted, 

JENNIFER TAYLOR and FAIRHAVEN 

WEALTH MANAGEMENT, LLC

Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs

By: /s/ Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

One of Their Attorneys

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Christopher S. Griesmeyer (# 6269851)

Zachary Mulcrone (# 6300387)

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC

205 West Randolph Street, Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

(312) 428-2750

cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com 

zmulcrone@grglegal.com

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on March 17, 2022, I electronically filed the foregoing 

Counterclaimants’ Motion to Compel with the Clerk of the Court via the CM/ECF System, which 

will send notification of such filing to those registered to receive electronic notices via email 

transmission at the email addresses provided by them including:

Joel W. Rice

Franklin Z. Wolf

FISHER & PHILLIPS, LLC

10 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3450

Chicago, Illinois 60606

jrice@fisherphillips.com

fwolf@fisherphillips.com

Susan M. Guerette

FISHER & PHILLIPS, LLC

150 N. Radnor Chester Road, Suite C300

Radnor, PA 19087

sguerette@fisherphillips.com

 /s/ Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

Christopher S. Griesmeyer (ARDC No. 6269851)

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC

205 West Randolph St., Ste. 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60606

Bus: (312) 428-2750

Fax: (312) 332-2781

cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com 

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