IN THE SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

2022 ND 138

David Ntoto Mbulu, Petitioner and Appellant

v.

State of North Dakota, Respondent and Appellee

No. 20210224

Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial 

District, the Honorable Kirsten M. Sjue, Judge.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Justice.

Samuel A. Gereszek, Grand Forks, ND, for petitioner and appellant.

Nathan K. Madden, Assistant State’s Attorney, Williston, ND, for respondent 

and appellee; submitted on brief.

FILED 

IN THE OFFICE OF THE 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

JULY 7, 2022 

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
1

Mbulu v. State

No. 20210224

VandeWalle, Justice.

[¶1] David Ntoto Mbulu appealed from a district court order granting his 

application for post-conviction relief in part and denying it in part. We conclude 

the district court did not err by denying Mbulu’s claims related to the jury 

instructions for the conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition charge. 

However, we also conclude the court erred by summarily dismissing Mbulu’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to the failure to call his codefendant as a witness during the criminal trial. We affirm in part, reverse in 

part, and remand.

I

[¶2] In 2017, Mbulu was convicted of conspiracy to commit gross sexual 

imposition, accomplice to gross sexual imposition, conspiracy to commit 

murder, and attempted murder. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. State 

v. Mbulu, 2018 ND 73, 908 N.W.2d 732.

[¶3] In 2018, Mbulu applied for post-conviction relief. He alleged various 

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including that his trial counsel failed

to subpoena and call his co-defendant, Jean-Michael Kisi, to testify during the 

trial. He claimed Kisi’s testimony would have resulted in a different outcome 

on the conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition and accomplice to gross 

sexual imposition charges. Mbulu later moved to amend his application to 

include claims that his trial and appellate attorneys were ineffective because 

they failed to object to errors in the jury instructions for the conspiracy to 

commit murder and conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition charges, 

which allowed him to potentially be convicted of non-cognizable offenses.

[¶4] The State moved for dismissal of Mbulu’s application for post-conviction 

relief. The district court partially granted the State’s motion to dismiss,

including dismissing Mbulu’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel because his trial counsel failed to subpoena Kisi. The court granted 

Mbulu’s motion to amend his application. The court denied the State’s motion 
2

to dismiss Mbulu’s claims about improper jury instructions related to the 

conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition

charges.

[¶5] After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the application 

in part and denied it in part. The court ruled Mbulu abandoned the jury 

instruction argument related to the conspiracy to commit gross sexual 

imposition charge. The court granted the application for relief on the jury 

instruction issue related to the conspiracy to commit murder charge, and 

ordered the conspiracy to commit murder conviction be vacated and remanded 

for a new trial. Judgment was entered.

II

[¶6] Mbulu argues the district court erred by summarily dismissing his 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to the failure to subpoena and 

call Kisi as a witness during the criminal trial. He contends he presented 

sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact and entitled him to 

an evidentiary hearing, including an affidavit from Kisi in which Kisi stated 

that he acted spontaneously and alone regarding the gross sexual imposition

charges and that he was willing to waive his right against self-incrimination

and testify at Mbulu’s trial.

[¶7] A claim for post-conviction relief may be summarily dismissed if there 

are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Pinkney v. State, 2021 ND 155, ¶ 13, 963 N.W.2d 

737. “If the State moves for summary dismissal, putting a petitioner to his

proof, a minimal burden shifts to the petitioner to support his application with 

admissible evidence, by affidavit or other comparable means, to raise a genuine 

issue of material fact.” Friesz v. State, 2022 ND 22, ¶ 7, 969 N.W.2d 465 

(quoting Morales v. State, 2020 ND 117, ¶ 3, 943 N.W.2d 761). “The party 

opposing the motion for summary disposition is entitled to all reasonable 

inferences at the preliminary stages of a post-conviction proceeding and is 

entitled to an evidentiary hearing if a reasonable inference raises a genuine 

issue of material fact.” Friesz, at ¶ 7 (quoting Davis v. State, 2013 ND 34, ¶ 25, 
3

827 N.W.2d 8). On appeal, the summary dismissal of a claim for post-conviction 

relief is reviewed like an appeal from summary judgment. Pinkney, at ¶ 13.

[¶8] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the applicant 

for post-conviction relief must show: “1) counsel’s representation fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness and 2) there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Yoney v. State, 2021 ND 132, ¶ 7, 962 N.W.2d 617 (quoting 

Olson v. State, 2019 ND 135, ¶ 19, 927 N.W.2d 444). There is a presumption 

that the counsel’s representation fell within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance. Heckelsmiller v. State, 2004 ND 191, ¶ 3, 687 N.W.2d 

454. We have said the record and transcripts generally are not adequate to 

determine whether summary disposition is appropriate on claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Stein v. State, 2018 ND 264, ¶ 8, 920 N.W.2d 477.

[¶9] The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Mbulu’s claim 

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel 

failed to subpoena Kisi. The court explained the decision not to call Kisi as a 

witness was a trial strategy which was evidenced by trial counsel’s argument 

opposing consolidation of Mbulu’s and Kisi’s cases, in which counsel argued 

Kisi could not be compelled to testify and be subjected to cross-examination if 

the cases were joined. The court stated that to the extent Kisi’s affidavit 

contradicted the testimony Kisi gave at his own trial those contradictions could 

not be used to create a genuine issue of material fact. The court noted Kisi was 

tried after Mbulu and any statement Kisi made in Mbulu’s trial would have 

been used against him at his own trial, and Mbulu failed to provide an affidavit 

from Kisi’s trial counsel indicating he would have allowed Kisi to waive the 

privilege against self-incrimination and testify. The court concluded Mbulu 

failed to show a genuine issue of fact that his trial counsel’s failure to call Kisi 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that the outcome of the 

proceeding would have been different.

[¶10] Mbulu presented an affidavit from Kisi as evidence supporting his claim. 

In the affidavit, Kisi claimed he would have waived the right against selfincrimination and agreed to testify at Mbulu’s trial. He explained his version 
4

of the events leading to the charges. Kisi stated he was traveling with Mbulu 

and the victim in a vehicle, he stopped the vehicle, and Mbulu physically 

removed the victim from the vehicle. He alleged Mbulu and the victim got into 

a verbal and physical altercation, he tried to separate Mbulu and the victim, 

the victim’s pants started to come off, and Mbulu went back to the vehicle. Kisi

stated that he was trying to calm the victim down and he “inappropriately 

touched or fingered” the victim before he got back into the vehicle.

[¶11] The State charged Mbulu with conspiracy to commit gross sexual 

imposition, alleging Mbulu agreed with Kisi to commit gross sexual imposition

against the victim and engaged in one or more overt acts to further that 

objective. The State also charged Mbulu with accomplice to gross sexual 

imposition, alleging Mbulu, acting as a co-conspirator or with the intent that 

an offense be committed, aided Kisi in committing the offense of gross sexual 

imposition by physically restraining the victim while Kisi engaged in a sexual 

act. Mbulu filed an affidavit from Kisi providing evidence of what Kisi would 

have testified to if called as a witness and how that testimony likely would 

have led to a different result on the conspiracy to commit and accomplice to 

gross sexual imposition charges. Giving Mbulu all reasonable inferences, the 

affidavit from Kisi creates a genuine issue of material fact about whether 

Mbulu’s trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness.

[¶12] The district court stated it appeared Mbulu’s trial counsel at least 

considered calling Kisi as a witness because one of the grounds for opposing 

consolidation of Mbulu’s and Kisi’s trials was that Mbulu would be unable to 

compel Kisi to testify if the cases were joined. The court concluded “[t]he 

ultimate decision not to call Kisi as a witness was clearly a matter of trial 

strategy and within the range of choices that a reasonable attorney would 

make.” However, there was no testimony from Mbulu’s trial attorneys that this 

was trial strategy or about why Kisi was not called as a witness.

[¶13] The district court also noted Kisi’s statements in his affidavit contradict 

the testimony he gave at his own trial and any statements Kisi made at 

Mbulu’s trial would have been used against him by the State at his own trial, 
5

which is something “any reasonable criminal defense attorney would not have 

allowed to occur.” The court further stated Mbulu did not provide an affidavit 

from Kisi’s trial counsel indicating that he would have advised or permitted 

Kisi to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in 

order to testify. The privilege against self-incrimination belongs to the witness,

and it is the witness’s decision whether to waive it. See Rogers v. United States, 

340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (stating the privilege against self-incrimination is 

solely for the benefit of the witness and is purely a personal privilege of the 

witness). The decision to waive the privilege against self-incrimination 

belonged to Kisi and he could have ignored any advice from his attorney.

[¶14] To the extent the district court weighed the credibility of Kisi’s affidavit, 

it was improper. When the court decides a motion for summary dismissal, it is 

required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party 

and it is not permitted to weigh the evidence or determine credibility. Cf. 

Schaefer v. Souris River Telecomms. Coop., 2000 ND 187, ¶ 8, 618 N.W.2d 175 

(stating a court is not permitted to weigh evidence or determine credibility in 

considering evidence submitted for a motion for summary judgment; rather, 

the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party).

[¶15] Mbulu presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material 

fact regarding his attorney’s failure to subpoena and call Kisi as a witness. 

Mbulu is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this issue. We conclude the 

district court erred by summarily dismissing Mbulu’s ineffective assistance 

claim related to calling Kisi as a witness.

III

[¶16] Mbulu argues the district court erred by dismissing his claim related to 

the jury instructions on the conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition

charge. He contends the claim was intertwined with his claim about the jury 

instructions on the conspiracy to commit murder charge, and the court erred 

by concluding he abandoned the claim.

[¶17] Mbulu asserted claims for relief related to the jury instructions on the 

conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition charge and the conspiracy to 
6

commit murder charge. The district court denied relief on the claim related to 

the jury instructions on the conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition

charge, concluding Mbulu abandoned the claim. The court ruled, “[W]ith 

regard to the Conspiracy to Commit Gross Sexual Imposition jury instruction, 

the Court concludes that Petitioner abandoned his claim for relief on that issue 

by failing to pursue or develop it in any way since the Court’s order granting 

amendment of his application for post-conviction relief and denying summary 

disposition on December 19, 2019.” The court noted Mbulu did not present any 

testimony, evidence, or argument related to the claim during the evidentiary

hearing and he did not raise or address the issue in his post-hearing brief.

[¶18] However, the district court granted Mbulu’s claim for relief related to the 

jury instructions on the conspiracy to commit murder charge. While Mbulu’s 

application was pending and after the parties filed their post-hearing briefs in 

the district court, this Court issued its decision in Pemberton v. State, 2021 ND 

85, ¶¶ 13, 17, 959 N.W.2d 891, in which we held attempted “knowing” murder 

is not a cognizable offense and the jury instructions in that case, which 

included the word “knowingly,” allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty of 

a non-cognizable offense. Citing Pemberton, the district court concluded the 

jury instructions for the conspiracy to commit murder charge were improper 

because they included the word “knowing.” The court reversed Mbulu’s

conviction for conspiracy to commit murder and remanded for a new trial.

[¶19] On appeal, Mbulu argues the district court improperly separated the 

issues related to the jury instructions for the two conspiracy charges to comply 

with the ruling in Pemberton, he did not have notice or an opportunity to be 

heard on the Pemberton issue, and he claims he should be afforded the proper 

due process to address the Pemberton case and its impact on the two conspiracy 

charges. The State did not appeal, but it also argues the district court 

improperly applied Pemberton without giving the parties an opportunity to 

address the issue.

[¶20] Mbulu first argued in his motion to amend his application for postconviction relief that the jury instructions related to the conspiracy to commit 

gross sexual imposition charge were improper and allowed the jury to 
7

potentially convict him of a non-cognizable offense. He claimed his argument 

on the conspiracy to commit murder conviction also applied to the conspiracy 

to commit gross sexual imposition conviction. He explained conspiracy is a 

specific intent crime requiring an intent to achieve a particular result that is 

criminal, the jury instruction on the conspiracy to commit gross sexual 

imposition charge eliminated the intent element of the offense, the intent 

element for gross sexual imposition is “willfully,” and the instructions should 

have included that the conspirators agreed to “intentionally compel.” He 

claimed the instructions allowed the jury to find him guilty of a non-cognizable 

offense because the district court did not provide the jury with an instruction 

as to the intent required for conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition.

[¶21] The district court granted Mbulu’s motion to amend his application. The 

court also ordered there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the jury 

instructions on the conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to commit 

gross sexual imposition charges, and an evidentiary hearing was warranted on 

those issues.

[¶22] During the evidentiary hearing, one of Mbulu’s trial attorneys testified 

about her decisions related to the jury instructions for conspiracy to commit 

murder charge. Mbulu did not ask her about the jury instructions for 

conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition. Mbulu’s appellate counsel also 

testified about conspiracy to commit murder and whether there was an 

appealable issue related to the instructions for that offense. His appellate 

counsel was not asked about the instructions for conspiracy to commit gross 

sexual imposition.

[¶23] In his post-hearing brief, Mbulu did not make any specific arguments 

about the jury instructions for conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition. 

His started his brief by stating:

[O]nly two issues remain for the Courts consideration, which is 1) 

Whether Mr. Mbulu received ineffective assistance of counsel from 

his trial attorney or appellate attorneys based on a failure to object 

to jury instructions relating to [a conspiracy to commit] murder 
8

charge and 2) Whether his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing 

to raise issues relating to Mr. Mbulu’s mental state.

His arguments about the jury instructions were related to the conspiracy to 

commit murder charge. He claimed that including the culpability level of 

“knowing” in the jury instructions permitted the jury to find him guilty of 

conspiracy to knowingly commit murder, which is a non-cognizable offense.

[¶24] Although Mbulu contends on appeal that his arguments about the two 

conspiracy charges were intertwined and that the district court erred by 

separating the two issues, the jury instructions for the two offenses were 

different. The jury received an instruction defining the different levels of 

culpability, including definitions for “knowingly” and “willfully.” The 

instructions for conspiracy to commit murder informed the jury that the State’s 

burden of proof was established if the evidence showed beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Mbulu agreed with Kisi “to intentionally or knowingly kill” the 

victim and Mbulu or Kisi engaged in one or more overt acts to further the 

objectives of the conspiracy. The final jury instructions for conspiracy to 

commit gross sexual imposition contained very different language, stating:

A person who agrees with one or more other persons to 

compel a person to engage in a sexual act with another by 

compelling them to submit through the use of force or by the threat 

of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping to be 

inflicted on any human being, and where one or more of those 

persons engages in one or more over[t] acts to further the objective 

of the conspiracy is guilty of Conspiracy to Commit Gross Sexual 

Imposition.

Essential elements:

The State’s burden of proof is established if the evidence 

shows beyond a reasonable doubt, the following essential 

elements:

1) On or about November 20, 2015, in Williams County, North

Dakota;

2) The Defendant, David Mbulu, agreed with Jean-Michael Kisi to

compel [the victim], to engage in a sexual act with another by

compelling [the victim] to submit by force or by threat of imminent
9

death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping to be inflicted on [the 

victim], a human being; and

3) The Defendant and/or Jean-Michael Kisi engaged in one or more

overt acts to further the objectives of the conspiracy.

The conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition instruction did not use the 

words “knowingly” or “willfully.”

[¶25] Because the instructions for the two conspiracy charges are different and 

do not use the same language, Mbulu’s argument about being convicted of a 

non-cognizable offense based on the word “knowingly” being included in the 

jury instruction for the conspiracy to commit murder charge does not apply to 

the jury instruction for the conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition

charge. By failing to present any evidence or make any argument specifically 

about the conspiracy to commit gross sexual imposition instructions at the 

evidentiary hearing or in his post-hearing brief, Mbulu abandoned the issue. 

See Berg v. Dakota Boys Ranch Ass’n, 2001 ND 122, ¶ 13, 629 N.W.2d 563

(stating issue was abandoned at trial when no argument was offered and party 

failed to present evidence supporting the issue); Livingood v. Meece, 477 

N.W.2d 183, 195 (N.D. 1991) (holding district court did not err in dismissing

claim because the claim was abandoned when argument was not further 

developed or addressed after the claim was made in the complaint).

[¶26] We conclude the district court did not err by dismissing Mbulu’s claim 

that the jury was improperly instructed on the conspiracy to commit gross 

sexual imposition charge. Because the district court granted Mbulu’s claim for 

relief related to the conspiracy to commit murder charge and the State did not 

appeal the court’s decision, we will not consider whether the court’s decision 

should be reversed and remanded to give the parties an opportunity to address 

the Pemberton opinion.

IV

[¶27] We affirm the order in part, reverse in part, and remand.

[¶28] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

Gerald W. VandeWalle
10

Daniel J. Crothers

Lisa Fair McEvers

Jerod E. Tufte