Present: All the Justices 

WILLIAM WHITE, JR. 

v. Record No. 051737 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 November 3, 2006 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

 In this appeal, we consider whether the defendant was 

improperly denied the opportunity to present evidence to a 

jury supporting his insanity defense. 

I. Facts and Proceedings Below 

 William White, Jr. (“White”) intended to present evidence 

of his insanity at his jury trial on charges of first degree 

murder, a violation of Code § 18.2-32, and assault and battery 

of a police officer, a violation of Code § 18.2-57. However, 

the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to 

preclude White from presenting such evidence. Consequently, 

White entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere reserving 

the right to appeal the trial court’s ruling on the motion in 

limine. 

 On March 29, 2002, White was traveling in North Carolina 

when his car broke down on an interstate highway, and he made 

arrangements for a person he did not know, Elton Giliken 

("Giliken"), to drive him to New York. At approximately 10:00 

p.m. while traveling through Greensville County, Virginia, 

White directed Giliken to take him to a residence. White went 
2

to the front door at the house and inquired about someone 

named “Q.” White returned to the car and then requested that 

Giliken take him to a specific motel near Route 301. At the 

motel, White went to a room and asked the occupants for “Q.” 

He came back to Giliken’s car, and then returned to the same 

motel room where he conducted a conversation through the door 

with the occupant. At this point, Giliken was concerned about 

White’s actions and attempted to dial 911 on his cell phone, 

but was unable to get service. White returned to the car and 

asked Giliken to drive to the back of the motel where there 

were other rooms. White ingested what appeared to be cocaine, 

pulled out a knife, tied a bandana around his head, and asked 

Giliken to wait for him. Then he said, “I’m going to go kill 

me two mother f**kers” and exited the car. Giliken sped away 

and notified the police about White’s behavior and provided a 

description of him. 

 Minutes later, motel guests staying next door to the 

victim’s room heard banging sounds and saw a man run by 

outside their window. Upon entering the room, the motel 

guests discovered the victim’s body, which was later found to 

have had 27 stab wounds. Police investigating the murder 

determined that White was a primary suspect and a warrant was 

issued for his arrest. 
3

 The following day, State Police Trooper K.W. Spencer 

noticed a man walking on Interstate Highway 95 who was dressed 

in a “white fur coat, no shirt, red tights, and yellow 

shorts.” The trooper stopped to speak with the man, who was 

subsequently identified as White, and informed him that he 

“could not walk on [I-]95.” White was reluctant to leave the 

interstate and argued that his family was looking for him and 

“wouldn’t be able to see him” if he left the interstate 

highway. The trooper left but returned a few minutes later. 

On this occasion, he spotted White walking backwards on an 

exit ramp headed toward the interstate. White approached the 

trooper’s car and expressed frustration at Trooper Spencer for 

checking on him again. Trooper Spencer called for backup. 

After a physical altercation, Trooper Spencer and another 

officer subdued White. At that time, they discovered that a 

warrant for murder had been issued for White. 

 Prior to his trial, White followed the procedural steps 

required by statute to raise an insanity defense. He 

requested a psychiatric evaluation to determine his mental 

state at the time of the alleged offense and his competency to 

stand trial. He gave timely notice to the Commonwealth of his 

intent to present evidence of insanity pursuant to Code 

§ 19.2-168. The trial court appointed Dr. William D. Brock, a 
4

licensed clinical psychologist, to conduct the psychiatric 

examination and provide a report. 

 The Commonwealth sought to preclude White from presenting 

any evidence regarding his state of mind at the time of the 

offense. In its motion in limine, the Commonwealth asserted 

that Dr. Brock’s report did not support an insanity defense, 

that expert testimony is a “necessary predicate to asserting 

an insanity defense,” and that the defendant cannot “rise 

above his own evidence” citing to Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 

450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922).1

 Opposing the Commonwealth’s motion, 

defense counsel argued that Dr. Brock’s report could be 

“helpful” in establishing the existence of a mental disease or 

defect, and proffered additional testimony from lay witnesses 

to support White’s defense on this issue. 

 The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion stating 

that “the introduction of the proffered testimony would not 

rise to the level of that which would warrant admissibility on 

the issue of insanity.” As a result, the trial court barred 

the admission of any evidence to support White’s insanity 

defense. After this ruling, White changed his plea to nolo 

contendere reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s 

ruling. White was then convicted and sentenced to life in 

 1

 The application, if any, of Massie v. Firmstone to this 

case is not an issue presented on appeal. 
5

prison for the first degree murder charge, and five years for 

the assault and battery of a police officer. 

 A panel of the Court of Appeals reversed White’s 

conviction, White v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 429, 605 S.E.2d 

337 (2004), but upon rehearing en banc, White’s conviction was 

affirmed, White v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 123, 616 S.E.2d 

49 (2005). White appealed to this Court upon one assignment 

of error: that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the 

trial court’s ruling which precluded the introduction of any 

evidence of the defendant’s mental state at the time of the 

offense. 

II. Analysis 

A. Proffered evidence 

 The defendant proffered evidence in support of his 

intended plea of insanity that included the original report 

submitted by Dr. Brock as well as lay witness testimony. Dr. 

Brock’s report noted that White’s medical history reflected 

two hospitalizations for psychiatric treatment, the first 

occurring in Louisiana several months before the alleged 

offense, and the second shortly after his arrest. Each time 

White was treated with Haldol, an anti-psychotic medication. 

Prior to this report, Dr. Brock did not review hospital 

records from the Louisiana inpatient treatment because they 

were unavailable, but he opined that during that 
6

hospitalization White was likely treated for a “drug-induced 

psychosis” caused by “rather heavy abuse” of narcotics. White 

reported to Dr. Brock that he used cocaine “multiple times 

daily” for at least three months preceding his arrest on these 

charges. 

White reported to Brock that he was traveling to New York 

because “‘God’ had something for him to do there;” he believed 

that God’s purpose would be revealed during the trip; he heard 

the voices of “both God and the Devil” during much of his 

journey; he was drawn to a particular motel room because of 

the number “15” on the door because “he believed the number 14 

to be a holy number and the number 15 to then mean ‘14 and 

me;’” the number “15” on the door caused him to believe that 

“he was to go to that room and, apparently, do battle with the 

individuals in it.” 

 With regard to White’s mental state at the time of the 

offenses, Dr. Brock opined that “[b]y all indications, Mr. 

White was, indeed, experiencing symptoms of a psychosis at the 

time of the offenses for which he currently stands charged.” 

The report cites numerous factors supporting Dr. Brock’s 

opinion, including (1) White’s history of psychiatric 

treatment for psychosis, (2) White’s decision to return to 

drug abuse and quit taking his anti-psychotic medication after 

the Louisiana hospitalization, (3) White’s account of the 
7

events surrounding the offense, and (4) his “bizarre behavior” 

in walking backwards down the interstate after being warned by 

police to stay away from that area. 

 Dr. Brock opined that while White “seems to meet the 

threshold criteria for an insanity defense,” his defense may 

not be “viable” for two reasons. First, White’s psychotic 

symptoms “appear to have either been the result of, or have 

been exacerbated by (most likely the former), his voluntary 

and excessive use of cocaine.” Second, White “made 

significant efforts to not be identified or get caught” which 

would indicate that he knew right from wrong. 

Dr. Brock submitted a second letter to the court after he 

had an opportunity to review the records from White’s first 

hospitalization. In this letter, he stated that the medical 

records “confirm[ed]” his prior hypothesis that White “was 

suffering from a drug-induced psychosis” at the time of his 

hospitalization in Louisiana, resulting from “his abuse of 

cocaine, antihistamines and marijuana.” Dr. Brock concluded 

that White’s psychotic symptoms were “almost surely the result 

of his substance abuse and not some other mental condition.” 

Additionally, White proffered the testimony of Joseph W. 

Skinner (“Skinner”), a licensed clinical social worker, who 

had treated White weekly for a period of about six months 

during his pre-trial incarceration. Skinner was not qualified 
8

as an expert pursuant to Code § 19.2-169.5; however, he was 

offered as a lay witness. Skinner would have testified that 

White told him on “many occasions” that he heard the voice of 

God “both before and after the incident and at times when he 

was not taking drugs.” 

 White next proffered the testimony of his roommate, Troy 

Whidbee, who would have testified that “at some time . . . 

prior to coming to Virginia, that [White] had advised him that 

someone was out to kill him” and “God needed soldiers.” 

Next, White’s mother would have testified that her son was 

hearing voices prior to coming to Virginia, that he reported 

having “seen God in the woods,” and “that God and the Devil 

were talking to him trying to get him to do things regarding 

hurting himself and/or others. That he believed God and the 

Devil were fighting over his soul.” She would have testified 

that White had drawn red circles around “spiders” in his jail 

cell, which he alleged were brought there by jail personnel in 

order to kill him, and that the spiders could not cross the 

line because “the red symbolized the blood of Christ.” 

Finally, White proffered the testimony of two correctional 

officers who would have testified that White had expressed to 

them on several occasions after his arrest that he was hearing 

voices. 

B. Insanity Defense 
9

 Virginia has long recognized the common law defense of 

insanity. See Boswell v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 

860, 876 (1871). A criminal defendant is presumed to have 

been sane at the time of the commission of a criminal act. 

E.g., Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 717, 324 S.E.2d 

682, 688 (1985). However, under the M’Naghten test for 

insanity, recognized in Virginia, the defendant may prove that 

at the time of the commission of the act, he was suffering 

from a mental disease or defect such that he did not know the 

nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know 

it, he did not know what he was doing was wrong. E.g., 

Commonwealth v. Chatman, 260 Va. 562, 567, 538 S.E.2d 304, 306 

(2000); Price v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 452, 457, 323 S.E.2d 

106, 108-09 (1984); Boswell, 61 Va. at 868. We have 

previously stated: 

 The first portion of M'Naghten relates to an 

accused who is psychotic to an extreme degree. It 

assumes an accused who, because of mental 

disease, did not know the nature and quality of 

his act; he simply did not know what he was 

doing. For example, in crushing the skull of a 

human being with an iron bar, he believed that he 

was smashing a glass jar. The latter portion of 

M'Naghten relates to an accused who knew the 

nature and quality of his act. He knew what he 

was doing; he knew that he was crushing the skull 

of a human being with an iron bar. However, 

because of mental disease, he did not know that 

what he was doing was wrong. He believed, for 

example, that he was carrying out a command from 

God. 
10

Price at 459-60, 323 S.E.2d at 110 (citing 2 C. Torcia, 

Wharton's Criminal Law § 100, at 9 (14th ed. 1979)). In any 

case, when insanity is claimed as a defense, a mental disease 

or defect must be the cause of the defendant's failure to "know 

what he was doing" or to understand that "what he was doing was 

wrong." 

 In this case, White maintains that he proffered sufficient 

evidence to make a prima facie case of insanity and that it was 

error for the trial court to refuse to allow this evidence to 

be admitted for the jury's consideration. Prima facie evidence 

is "[e]vidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment 

unless contradictory evidence is produced." Black's Law 

Dictionary 598 (8th ed. 2004). We need only examine White's 

proffer of evidence supporting the existence of a mental 

disease or defect to resolve this appeal. 

C. Intoxication and "Settled Insanity" 

 Clearly, we have permitted the use of the insanity defense 

when prolonged, habitual, and chronic alcohol or drug abuse has 

created a mental disease or defect. We adopted the common law 

distinction between temporary intoxication and permanent 

insanity long ago. “Drunkenness is no excuse for crime.” 

Boswell, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) at 872. However, a mental disease 

or defect caused by chronic abuse of alcohol or drugs will 

support the defense of insanity. Id. (“[i]f permanent insanity 
11

be produced by habitual drunkenness, then, like any other 

insanity, it excuses an act which would be otherwise 

criminal”). We have also commonly referred to this permanent 

condition as "settled insanity." See Arey v. Peyton, 209 Va. 

370, 375, 164 S.E.2d 691, 695 (1968). Although he does not use 

the term, "settled insanity" is what White claims as his 

condition at the time of the offenses. 

 The defense of "settled insanity" is not new and it 

requires that the condition be produced over a significant 

period of time. See, e.g., People v. Travers, 26 P. 88, 91 

(Cal. 1891) ("[S]ettled insanity produced by a long-continued 

intoxication affects responsibility in the same way as 

insanity produced by any other cause."); Fisher v. State, 64 

Ind. 435, 440 (1878) (recognizing settled insanity defense 

"where the habit of intoxication, though voluntary, has been 

long continued, and has produced disease, which has perverted 

or destroyed the mental faculties of the accused"); State v. 

Riley, 13 S.W. 1063, 1064 (Mo. 1890) (holding that "longcontinued habits of intemperance producing permanent mental 

disease amounting to insanity" may relieve defendant of 

criminal responsibility); Cheadle v. State, 149 P. 919, 922 

(Okla. Crim. App. 1915) (recognizing settled insanity due to 

"excessive and long continued indulgence in alcoholic liquors, 

technically called 'delirium tremens' "); State v. Kidwell, 59 
12

S.E. 494, 495 (W.Va. 1907) (recognizing defense of settled 

insanity "superinduced by habitual and long continued 

intoxication"). For more recent cases illustrating the same 

principle, see, e.g., Evans v. State, 645 P.2d 155, 158 

(Alaska 1982) (recognizing insanity defense for "alcoholic 

psychosis such as delirium tremens, resulting from longcontinued habits of excessive drinking"); Kiley v. State, 860 

So. 2d 509, 511 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he 

defendant must show that his long term and continued use of 

intoxicants produced a fixed and settled frenzy or insanity 

either permanent or intermittent.") (quotation omitted); State 

v. Clokey, 364 P.2d 159, 164 (Idaho 1961) (upholding 

instruction defining settled insanity as "produced by long 

continued intoxication"); State v. Smith, 490 P.2d 1262, 1264 

(Or. 1971) (recognizing insanity defense where "excessive and 

long-continued use of intoxicants produces a mental condition 

of insanity, permanent or intermittent") (quotations omitted).2

 White was 28 years old at the time of the offenses. In 

his evaluation of White, Dr. Brock stated that White reported 

 2

 While the Supreme Court of Vermont in State v. Sexton, 

904 A.2d 1092 (Vt. 2006), declined to decide if settled 

insanity was a defense to murder, its opinion provides a 

thorough history of the defense and the reason for it. Id. at 

1100-04. The Court found it unnecessary to decide if the 

defense was available because, even if it were, proof of drug 

usage for two weeks would be insufficient to establish the 

defense. Id. at 1103-05. 
13

"a significant substance abuse history. He reports rather 

heavy abuse of cocaine, alcohol, and marijuana, as well as 

occasional use of crack cocaine. By Mr. White's report, he had 

been using cocaine multiple times daily for at least the three 

months prior to his arrest on the current charges." 

 Dr. Brock also stated that White: 

 [H]as a history of one prior psychiatric 

hospitalization while in Louisiana. This 

occurred about three months ago. The records for 

this hospitalization were not available at the 

time of this evaluation. Mr. White reports that 

he was treated through use of Haldol, an 

antipsychotic medication, which would suggest 

that he was being treated for psychotic symptoms 

at that time. The lack of psychiatric symptoms 

prior to age 27 or 28 and Mr. White's description 

of rather heavy cocaine abuse at that time would 

suggest that he likely was experiencing a druginduced psychosis at the time of that 

hospitalization. Mr. White discontinued his 

Haldol once he got out of the hospital and, by 

his report, almost immediately began abusing 

cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol (as well as 

ecstasy) again. 

 After reviewing the medical files from White's treatment 

in a psychiatric hospital while in Louisiana, Dr. Brock 

informed White's attorney, "Review of these records confirms my 

hypothesis that, at the time of his hospitalization in 

Louisiana, Mr. White was suffering from a drug-induced 

psychosis. This condition resulted from his abuse of cocaine, 

antihistamines and marijuana." Dr. Brock concluded that the 

"now available medical records simply confirm that Mr. White's 
14

psychosis was almost surely the result of his substance abuse 

and not some other mental condition." Dr. Brock added, "Again, 

while his drug-induced psychotic state may potentially serve as 

a mitigating factor, it does not, in my opinion, meet the 

criteria necessary for an insanity defense."3

 The requirement of proof of substance abuse of long-term, 

chronic, and habitual nature is consistent with the concern we 

expressed many years ago when we stated, "Insanity is easily 

feigned and hard to be disproved, and public safety requires 

that it should not be established by less than satisfactory 

evidence." Wessels v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 664, 674, 180 

S.E. 419, 423 (1935). In order to establish the existence of 

a mental disease or defect caused by alcohol or drug abuse, 

i.e., settled insanity, White's evidence would have to 

demonstrate long-term, chronic, and habitual abuse. White's 

proffered evidence on this question was insufficient to 

establish a prima facie defense of insanity. 

III. Conclusion 

 3

 Significantly, White's proffered testimony of Dr. 

Skinner included no discussion of White's drug use, or its 

duration, and concluded that White "had a type of psychosis 

that was a religious obsession." Although Dr. Skinner 

testified at the sentencing hearing, his testimony reflected 

little on the subject of duration of abuse. Additionally, his 

testimony was offered at the sentencing hearing and cannot be 

considered by this Court on appeal because it was not 

presented to the trial court contemporaneously with its 

decision which was made upon motion in limine prior to the 

guilt phase of trial. 
15

 We hold that the trial court did not err in excluding 

White's proffered evidence of insanity. The judgment of the 

Court of Appeals will be affirmed. 

Affirmed. 

JUSTICE KOONTZ, dissenting. 

I respectfully dissent. I do so guided by the axiomatic 

principle that an accused is entitled to have a jury issue 

resolved by a jury and not by the trial court or appellate 

courts, including this Court. Where, as here, there is 

evidence to indicate that the accused was legally insane at 

the time he committed a crime and there is other evidence 

showing that he was not, that conflict in the evidence 

presents an issue to be determined by the jury. Jones v. 

Commonwealth, 202 Va. 236, 239-40, 117 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1960). 

In my view, in the present case in considering the 

Commonwealth’s motion in limine the trial court decided the 

merits of the insanity defense of William White, Jr. as an 

issue of law rather than permitting the jury to determine 

factually whether White was or was not legally insane.∗

 ∗

 White’s trial was scheduled to be conducted with a jury. 

As a result of the trial court’s granting the Commonwealth’s 

motion in limine on the morning of the trial, White’s sole 

defense of insanity was eliminated from further consideration 

in the guilt determination phase of the trial. Consequently, 

White’s trial proceeded without a jury upon White’s 

conditional plea of nolo contendere and the Commonwealth’s 

uncontested summary of the evidence. 
16

While insanity is an affirmative defense in Virginia that 

the accused must prove to the satisfaction of the fact finder 

by a preponderance of the evidence, Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 

221 Va. 760, 769, 274 S.E.2d 305, 310 (1981), whether the 

evidence would meet that standard is not at issue in this 

appeal. Rather, the sole issue is whether the evidence 

proffered by White in opposition to the Commonwealth’s motion 

in limine to exclude all evidence of his insanity defense was 

sufficient merely to establish a prima facie case of insanity. 

I will not unnecessarily lengthen this opinion by 

reciting the proffered evidence pertinent to this inquiry. 

The majority accurately recites that evidence which is not in 

dispute. However, under familiar principles of appellate 

review, because the Commonwealth was the proponent of the 

motion in limine, the evidence proffered in support and in 

opposition to that motion is to be considered in a light 

favorable to White, the non-moving party. Cf. Huffman v. 

Love, 245 Va. 311, 314, 427 S.E.2d 357, 360 (1993) (evidence 

viewed on appeal in light most favorable to one whose claim 

was stricken at trial); see also McGowan v. Lewis, 233 Va. 

386, 387, 355 S.E.2d 334, 334 (1987) (upon review of the grant 

of a motion to strike, appellate court will consider the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, resolving 
17

any doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence in favor of 

that party); Food Lion v. Melton, 250 Va. 144, 149-51, 458 

S.E.2d 580, 584-85 (1995) (same); Waters v. Safeway Stores, 

Inc., 246 Va. 269, 270, 435 S.E.2d 380, 380 (1993) (same). 

The thrust of the Commonwealth’s motion in limine was 

that the only expert who had examined White was Dr. William 

Brock, who would testify that White was not legally insane at 

the time White committed the crimes in question because, in 

Dr. Brock’s opinion, White was suffering from a drug induced 

psychosis but knew the difference between right and wrong. 

Accordingly, in the absence of any other expert evidence that 

White suffered from a “disease of the mind,” White could not 

introduce “lay evidence” to support his insanity defense. 

We have stated, however, that “[t]here is nothing 

sacrosanct about the evidence of an expert witness.” Wessells 

v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 664, 671, 180 S.E.2d 419, 422 (1935). 

“The evidence of an expert witness [on insanity] should be 

given the same consideration as is given that of any other 

witness, considering his opportunity for knowledge of the 

subject and subject matter as to which he testifies, his 

appearance, conduct, and demeanor on the stand.” McLane v. 

Commonwealth, 202 Va. 197, 206, 116 S.E.2d 274, 281 (1960). 

And we also have stated that “[a]lthough sanity or insanity 

may be established by lay witnesses, it is generally 
18

recognized that it is advisable to adduce expert testimony to 

better resolve such a complex problem.” Shifflett, 221 Va. at 

769, 274 S.E.2d at 311. (Emphasis added). This is so because 

a “lay witness” can testify only to facts, and cannot express 

an opinion as to the existence of a person’s mental disease or 

state of mind. See Jones, 202 Va. at 241, 117 S.E.2d at 71. 

But see Ford v. Ford, 200 Va. 674, 680, 107 S.E.2d 397, 401 

(1959); Davis v. Alderson, 125 Va. 681, 691, 100 S.E. 541, 544 

(1919). 

Based solely upon Dr. Brock’s evidence, a jury would be 

compelled to conclude that White was psychotic at the time he 

committed the crimes. In common parlance, White then was 

suffering from a severe mental disorder associated with a loss 

of contact with reality. Clearly, because no evidence in the 

record suggests that White was not psychotic at that time, the 

jury could reasonably have accepted White’s psychotic state of 

mind as a fact. 

Dr. Brock further opined that while White “seems to meet 

the threshold criteria for an insanity defense,” his defense 

may not be “viable” because of his “efforts not to be 

identified or get caught” after committing the crimes and 

because his psychotic symptoms “were the result of his 

voluntary and excessive use of cocaine.” Undoubtedly, White 

was an admitted abuser of cocaine and other narcotic drugs and 
19

had previously been admitted to a psychiatric hospital as a 

result. The totality of this evidence would indicate that 

White, although psychotic, was not legally insane because his 

abuse of drugs was voluntary and apparently not of long 

standing. 

However, White proffered the evidence of numerous lay 

witnesses, including his mother, his roommate, a licensed 

clinical social worker, and prison personnel, that he 

displayed psychotic symptoms both before and after he 

committed the crimes when he was not taking drugs. That 

evidence coupled with the other evidence of these lay 

witnesses that White believed he heard the voice of God 

directing his actions created a conflict in the evidence 

whether White’s psychotic state of mind resulted from his drug 

abuse or some other underlying mental disorder. 

In applying the M’Naghten test for insanity we have not 

required the accused to establish an expert diagnosis of the 

underlying mental disorder manifested by the accused’s 

psychotic state of mind in order to satisfy the first portion 

of that test. Undoubtedly mental health experts would be the 

first to concede that satisfaction of such a requirement would 

not always be within the current expertise of those in the 

mental health field. Nevertheless, in Price v. Commonwealth, 

228 Va. 452, 459-60, 323 S.E.2d 106, 110 (1984), we explained 
20

the application of the M’Naghten test for insanity that we 

follow in Virginia and that is facially implicated in this 

case. There we explained that: 

The first portion of M’Naghten relates to an 

accused who is psychotic to an extreme 

degree . . . . The latter portion of 

M’Naghten relates to an accused who knew the 

nature and quality of his act. He knew what 

he was doing . . . . However, because of 

mental disease, he did not know that what he 

was doing was wrong. He believed, for 

example, that he was carrying out a command 

from God. 

Id. 

If accepted as fact by the jury, the evidence of the lay 

witnesses and White’s confirmation of that evidence in his 

account to Dr. Brock that he did not know that committing the 

crimes in question was wrong because he was carrying out a 

command from God provides an independent evidentiary basis to 

support White’s insanity defense. That evidence is in sharp 

conflict with the evidence that White’s psychotic state of 

mind resulted solely from drug abuse as the trial judge, the 

majority of the Court of Appeals, and the majority of this 

Court seem to have accepted as a fact. They all may be 

correct, but such was for the jury to decide because White’s 

proffered evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie 

case of his insanity. 
21

 For these reasons, I would reverse the majority decision 

of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for a new trial 

in which the jury is allowed to decide whether or not White 

was legally insane at the time he committed the crimes in 

question.