J-A05007-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: H.C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: H.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1243 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered August 31, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): Adopt-019-2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: JUNE 17, 2022

Appellant, H.H., (“Mother”) appeals from the August 31, 2021 order 

terminating her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, to her dependent child, H.C., who was born in 

December 2010. We affirm.

This Court previously summarized the procedural history as follows:

On August 21, 2019, Susquehanna County Services for Children 

and Youth (“SCSCY”) filed a petition for involuntary termination of 

Mother's parental rights to H.C. (“termination petition”) pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (b).[FN2] On 

September 28, 2020, Mother executed a consent to adoption in 

which she agreed to the voluntary termination of her parental 

rights to, and adoption of, H.C. SCSCY petitioned the trial court 

to confirm Mother's consent to voluntary termination of her 

parental rights and adoption on November 5, 2020. On January 

15, 2021, the trial court found that Mother wished to revoke her 

consent to voluntary termination of parental rights and adoption, 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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and the trial court entered an order granting Mother's motion to 

revoke her consent and ordered that the matter proceed with an 

involuntary termination hearing.

[Footnote 2] A review of the certified record reveals that 

the parental rights of J.C., the child's biological father, 

(“Father”) were involuntarily terminated by trial court order 

dated September 30, 2020, and entered October 5, 2020. 

Father did not appeal the order terminating his parental 

rights and he is not a party to this appeal.

The trial court conducted an involuntary termination hearing 

virtually via advanced communication technology due to the 

COVID-19 global pandemic on March 1, 2021, March 23, 2021, 

June 30, 2021, and August 13, 2021, and conducted a 

person-to-person in-camera review of the child on July 1, 2021, 

at which only the child and guardian ad litem were present by 

stipulation of the parties. On August 23, 2021, the trial court 

entered an order terminating Mother's parental rights to H.C. On 

August 31, 2021, the trial court entered an amended order 

terminating Mother's parental rights to H.C. that included a 

correction as to Father's last name.

In re H.C., 2022 WL 816984, at *1 (Pa. Super. Mar. 18, 2022) (unpublished 

memorandum) (footnote 2 in original; record citations and footnote 3 

omitted). On appeal, this Court was unable to conduct a meaningful appellate 

review of the August 31, 2021 amended order terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to H.C. because the trial court’s order lacked an analysis with reference 

to the certified record. Id. at *7. We remanded the matter to the trial court 

in order that the trial court could file a comprehensive Rule 1925(a) opinion 

analyzing the applicable law and the facts of the case. Id. The trial court 

filed a supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion on April 7, 2022. Mother filed a 

response to the trial court’s supplemental opinion with this Court on April 21, 

2022, and SCSCY filed its response with this Court on May 6, 2022. Having 
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received the trial court’s supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion and the parties’ 

responses, we address the merits of Mother’s appeal.

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

[1.] Did the trial court err [or] abuse its discretion in terminating 

the parental rights of [Mother], where [SCSCY] failed to 

present sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) or [another] section not specifically 

mentioned in the trial court's [August 31, 2021] amended 

order?

[2.] Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in terminat[ing]

the parental rights of [Mother], where [SCSCY] failed to 

present sufficient evidence to establish that termination was 

in the best interest of H.C., [pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(b)]?

[3.] Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law [or]

manifestly abused its discretion by not sufficiently stating 

with specificity [and] reference to the record its basis for

terminating [Mother’s] parental rights [pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b)]?

[4.] Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law [or] 

manifestly abused its discretion in determining whether 

[SCSCY] presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the

grounds for termination of [Mother’s] parental rights under 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) or [another] section not 

specifically mentioned in the trial court's [August 31, 2021] 

amended order?

[5.] Even if [this Court] determines [SCSCY] presented sufficient 

evidence to satisfy the grounds for termination of [Mother’s]

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) of the 

Adoption Act or [another] section not specifically mentioned 

in the trial court's [August 31, 2021 amended] order, 

[whether] the trial court nevertheless erred as a matter of 

law [or] manifestly abused its discretion in determining 

termination of [Mother’s] parental rights [was] in the best 

interests of [H.C., pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)]?
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Mother’s Brief at 7-8 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

1

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is well-settled.

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or 

abused its discretion.” Id. “A decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id. The 

trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (original brackets omitted). “[T]he 

trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and 

is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in 

the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation 

omitted). “If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will 

affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re B.J.Z., 

207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

1 The fourth and fifth issues raised by Mother on appeal are duplicative of the 

first and second issues raised by Mother, respectively.
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The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for 

termination followed by an assessment of the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the [trial] 

court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. 

The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds 

for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the [trial] 

court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination 

of his or her parental rights does the [trial] court engage in the 

second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 921 (citation omitted). We have defined clear and 

convincing evidence as that which is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing 

as to enable the trier[-]of[-]fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 

1108, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). A child has a right to a 

stable, safe, and healthy environment in which to grow, and the “child's life 

simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the 

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 9 

(Pa. Super. 2009).

Sections 2511(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

. . .

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably available to 

the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which 

led to the removal or placement of the child within a 

reasonable period of time and termination of the parental 

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2) and (5).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must 

be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect[,] or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect[,]

or refusal has caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his[, or 

her,] physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of 

the incapacity, abuse, neglect[,] or refusal cannot or will not 

be remedied.
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In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 

2003) (citation omitted). “The grounds for termination due to 

parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to 

affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may 

include acts of refusal[,] as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) 

(citations omitted).

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015).

Unlike subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a 

parent's refusal or failure to perform parental duties, but instead 

emphasizes the child's present and future need for essential 

parental care, control[,] or subsistence necessary for his physical 

or mental well-being. Therefore, the language in subsection 

(a)(2) should not be read to compel courts to ignore a child's need 

for a stable home and strong, continuous parental ties, which the 

policy of restraint in state intervention is intended to protect. This 

is particularly so where disruption of the family has already 

occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.

Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117 (citation omitted).

A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These 

needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this [C]ourt has 

held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance. This affirmative duty encompasses 

more than a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in 

the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and 

association with the child. Because a child needs more than a 

benefactor, parental duty requires that a parent exert himself[, or 

herself,] to take and maintain a place of importance in the child's 

life.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation, original 

quotation marks, and original paragraph formatting omitted), appeal denied, 

872 A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005).
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“[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a continued inability to conduct his [or 

her] life in a fashion that would provide a safe environment for a child, whether 

that child is living with the parent or not, and the behavior of the parent is 

irremediable as supported by clear and competent evidence, the termination 

of parental rights is justified.” Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1118 (citation omitted). “A 

parent's vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding 

the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely 

or disingenuous.” Id. (citation and original quotation marks omitted).

Section 2511, in “permitting the termination of parental rights[,] 

outlines certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must 

provide for their children, and a parent who cannot or will not meet the 

requirements within a reasonable time following intervention by the state may 

properly be considered unfit and have his [or her] parental rights terminated.” 

Id. (citation and original quotation marks omitted).

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his [or her] 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in 

the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while 

others provide the child with the child's physical and emotional 

needs.

Id. at 1119 (citation and original brackets omitted).

Termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(5) requires 

that: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for at 
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least six months; (2) the conditions which led to removal and 

placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child.

In re C.B., 230 A.3d 341, 348 (Pa. Super. 2020), appeal denied, 234 A.3d 

410 (Pa. 2020). In considering whether the conditions which led to removal 

and placement of the child continue to exist, courts should consider whether 

the parent cannot or will not remedy the conditions within a reasonable period 

of time and whether the services reasonably available to the parent are 

unlikely to remedy the conditions within a reasonable period of time. M.E.P., 

825 A.2d at 1273. In contrast to termination under Section 2511(a)(2), which 

addresses situations where remedial aid by an agency is not required, 

termination under Section 2511(a)(5) elevates consideration of the services 

provided to the parent by an agency and the likelihood that such services will 

remedy the conditions which let to the child’s removal. In re A.S., 11 A.3d 

473, 481-482 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Once the trial court determines that involuntary termination of parental 

rights is warranted under Section 2511(a), the trial court is required to engage 

in an analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) to determine whether termination 

is in the best interests of the child. Section 2511(b) states,

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 
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solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(b). The analysis under Section 2511(b)

focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best 

serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, [Section] 

2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the 

term “bond” is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, 

however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of 

our analysis. While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child 

is a major aspect of the [Section] 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the 

court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also 

consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, 

and stability the child might have with the foster parent. 

Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should 

consider the importance of continuity of relationships and 

whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943-944 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

and original brackets omitted), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 979 (Pa. 2018). A 

trial court may rely on a caseworker or social worker to determine the status 

of and nature of a parent-child bond. J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 944 (holding, a trial 

court “is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding 

evaluation be performed by an expert” (citation omitted)); see also In re 
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C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding, a trial court must 

“discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention 

to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond” (citation 

omitted)).

It is well-established that this Court need only agree with the trial court 

as to any one section of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order 

to affirm an order involuntarily terminating parental rights. C.D.R., 111 A.3d 

at 1215, relying on In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).

In terminating Mother’s parental rights to H.C., the trial court set forth 

the following 18 findings of fact in its August 31, 2021 amended order:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The subject child is [H.C.], [who was born in] December []

2010.

2. The petitioner is [SCSCY] with an address of 75 Public 

Avenue, Montrose, Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania,

18801.

3. [Mother was born in] July [] 1991[,] and [resided in]

Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania[.]

4. [Father was born in] May [] 1986, and [his] address is 

unknown.

5. [] Father's parental rights [to H.C.] were terminated [by trial 

court order dated] September 30, 2020[, and entered 

October 5, 2020].

6. The minor child was found dependent [by the trial] court on 

August 11, 2016.
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7. The minor [child] has been in placement since [August 

2016,] and [] expressed that she would like to be adopted 

by her pre-adoptive foster parents.[2]

8. The minor has had six [] previous placements.

9. [] Mother has not shown significant progress towards 

alleviating the circumstances that necessitated placement.

10. [] Mother has not shown that she is able to maintain stable, 

consistent housing.

11. [] Mother has not maintained any ongoing [or] significant 

contact with the child since placement.

12. [] Mother has relocated to Missouri.

13. Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), grounds exist for 

involuntary termination of [] Mother's rights in that the 

repeated and continuous inability, neglect[,] and refusal of 

[] Mother to perform her parental duties [] caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control[,] or 

subsistence necessary for her physical and mental 

____________________________________________

2 As discussed more fully infra, H.C. wrote a letter to the trial court expressing, 

inter alia, that she wished to be adopted by her foster family because “they 

loved [her] and [she] loved them.” In that letter, H.C. indicated that, at the 

time she wrote the letter, she was 9 years old and would be starting fourth 

grade “next year.” These statements support the inference that the letter, 

while undated, was written sometime after her 9th birthday, which occurred in 

December 2019, and before the start of fourth grade in September 2020, 

which is well before the termination hearing began in March 2021. Therefore, 

H.C.’s preference was to be adopted.

Since no conflict existed between H.C.’s legal interests, which were

synonymous with her expressed preference to be adopted, and H.C.’s best 

interests, which were to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights and 

to permit adoption, the appointment of the guardian ad litem as counsel 

representing both the child’s legal interests and her best interests was 

sufficient. See In re P.G.F., 247 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa. 2021) (stating that, 

when a child’s best interests and legal interests do not conflict, the trial court 

may appoint a single attorney to serve in the dual capacity of guardian ad 

litem and legal counsel).
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well-being, and the conditions and causes of the neglect and 

refusal cannot and will not be remedied by [] Mother.

14. The minor child has been removed from the care of [Mother]

by the [trial] court or under a voluntary agreement with 

[SCSCY] for a period of at-least six [] months, the conditions 

which led to the removal or placement of the child continue 

to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those 

conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services 

or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not 

likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child within a reasonabl[e] period of 

time[,] and termination of the parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the minor child.

15. [] Mother has not [] perform[ed] any parental duties for the 

minor child for a period in excess of six [] months.

16. [SCSCY] desires to terminate the parental rights of []

Mother so that the minor child can be adopted by suitable 

persons, previously identified in the dependency matter.

17. [SCSCY] is willing and able to take continued custody of the 

minor child until adoption can be finalized.

18. To the best of [SCSCY’s] knowledge, [Mother] is not entitled 

to the benefits of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 

1940, as amended 50 U.S.C.A. § 501, et seq.

Trial Court Amended Order, 8/31/21, at 1-3 (extraneous capitalization 

omitted). The trial court supplemented its findings of fact as follows:

Mother relocated to Missouri in [] December [] 2020[,] and has 

made little to no effort to communicate with [H.C.] since that time.

[A SCSCY] caseworker [] has been involved with this matter since 

September [] 2018, when the matter was transferred to 

Susquehanna County, but [H.C.] has been in placement since

August [] 2016. [The SCSCY caseworker] noted minimal

compliance and progress by Mother throughout the entirety of this 

matter. Because of Mother's minimal compliance, the supervised 

visitation schedule never changed throughout the years. [The 

caseworker] testified that when Mother resided locally, drug 

paraphernalia was found within the home. Dog urine and feces 

were present. There were accusations of domestic violence. 
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Mother was discharged from different medical providers for 

noncompliance. Mother relied on others to assist in paying bills. 

Mother relies on both marijuana and Xanax on a regular basis.

Since [H.C.] has been in placement, Mother [] moved four [] times 

into four [] different school districts. Mother moved to Missouri in

December [] 2020[,] and still resides there today. Mother []

frequently had individuals with substance abuse problems living 

in her home. Mother participated in therapy where she worked on 

things such as patience, age-appropriate reactions, control, 

disciplinary methods[,] and communication. Mother has been 

discharged from numerous therapists for noncompliance. 

Mother's last visit with [H.C.] was on December 9, 2020. Mother 

never requested [tele]phone contact with [H.C.,] and [H.C.] did 

not wish to speak to Mother because [H.C.] was angry with her 

Mother for relocating to Missouri.

Despite wanting to reunite with [H.C.], it is not Mother's intention 

to relocate back to Pennsylvania. Mother has several children but

has physical custody of none of them. Mother has not been to [a] 

counseling [session] since moving to Missouri in December []

2020. Mother is currently on Xanax, Hydroxyzine, Amitriptyline[,]

and medical marijuana[.]

When Mother told [H.C.] she was moving to Missouri during their 

last visit on December 9, 2020, the meeting did not end well. 

Sometime thereafter, [H.C.] mailed a handwritten letter to Mother 

inquiring whether Mother still loved her and asking Mother to 

respond by circling [“yes” or “no.”] Rather than responding

[directly to H.C., Mother sent a text message via her cellular 

telephone to a SCSCY caseworker instructing the caseworker] to 

tell [H.C.] she circled [“yes.”] Mother [further instructed the 

caseworker to tell H.C. that] "she should put her big girl pants on 

and call [Mother.”] At the time, [the SCSCY caseworker] did not 

know about the letter. Once [the caseworker] became aware of 

the situation, [she] arranged a video conference [call,] in [] April

[2021,] with Mother, [H.C.’s foster mother,] and [the caseworker]

to discuss [Mother] writing a letter back to [H.C.] Mother wrote a 

letter to [H.C.] sometime in May [2021,] and[,] following the 

receipt of [the letter, H.C.] indicated to [the caseworker that] she 

did not want to have [future] contact with Mother. As of the June 

30, 2021 [termination] hearing, the last contact [the caseworker]

had with Mother was on April 5, 2021[, for purpose of] the [video] 

conference [call] regarding the letter. Mother has not reached out 

regarding [H.C.] since that time.[FN2] Mother never consistently 
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reached out to [the caseworker] as it pertained to [H.C.] during 

[the caseworker’s] involvement in this matter.

[Footnote 2:] Mother came to Pennsylvania in [] July 

[]2021[,] for another proceeding and never attempted to 

contact [SCSCY] or [H.C. H.C.] saw Mother on the news 

and inquired to her foster parents why her Mother did not 

attempt to contact her.

During the [termination] hearing [a clinical psychologist] testified 

as an expert in clinical psychology, which encompasses the 

diagnosis of severe pathology and trauma-related disorders. [The 

clinical psychologist] met with Mother on two [] occasions and[,]

as a result, [] authored two [] evaluation reports dated October 

22, 2018[,] and June 29, 2020. Following the October 22, 2018 

evaluation, [the clinical psychologist] noted that Mother presented 

with characteristics of cluster B personality disorders and 

post-traumatic stress disorder [(“PTSD”)]. Personality disorder 

characteristics include the inability to consider the welfare of other

individuals. During the evaluation that resulted in the June 29, 

2020 report, [the clinical psychologist] noted that the personality 

traits were still significant and that during the interview, Mother 

was manipulative and resistant. Based upon [Mother’s]

evaluation, [the clinical psychologist] had concerns regarding 

Mother's ability to appropriately parent, to exercise good parental 

judgment[,] and her accountability. Mother reported [] that she 

did not have any feelings toward [H.C.]

[An] expert in social work and parent-child relationships

[[“relationships expert”)]] worked with Mother from March 13, 

2020[,] until November 18, 2020[,] to observe Mother with [H.C.]

approximately two [] times per week and to assist in relationship

development. When asked to describe her observations with

Mother and [H.C., the relationships expert] stated that Mother 

displayed inabilities to set boundaries with [H.C.] and their 

relationship was one of friendship rather than mother and child. 

During a [] meeting with Mother, [which was conducted via 

advanced communication technology, the relationships expert]

reported that Mother was grinding marijuana and Mother 

defended her actions by stating she had a medical marijuana card.

Mother is on medical marijuana for long term effects of staying on 

Xanax. [The relationships expert] further testified that Mother has 

difficulty with her coping skills, has anger issues, [demonstrates] 

an inability to set rules and boundaries[,] and [has] an inability to 

use age-appropriate language.
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[H.C.] was a different child when meeting individually with [the 

relationships expert] than when Mother was present. [H.C.] views

herself as the caretaker of her Mother. [H.C.] had a fear of 

Mother's rejection, anger[,] and how her Mother would respond if 

she was open and honest. Mother has [spoken negatively about 

H.C.’s] foster mother in front of [H.C.]

[H.C.] has been in foster care for approximately [63] months,

almost half of her life. [H.C.] resides in a stable home. She has 

friends. She desires to stay with her foster parents, whom she 

calls mom and dad, and with whom she is bonded. [H.C.’s] foster 

parents wish to adopt her[,] and [H.C.] wants to be adopted by 

her foster [parents]. [H.C.] has been in the same placement for 

approximately five [] years.

Trial Court Supplemental Opinion, 4/7/22, at 3-7 (record citations omitted).

In her first and fourth issues, Mother challenges the trial court’s

determinations under Section 2511(a)(2), arguing that the trial court failed to 

consider evidence of a “long-term pattern of sexual harassment and sexual 

assault of Mother in person and via social media” by Mother’s former attorney, 

who was appointed by the trial court to represent Mother in this matter. 

Mother’s Brief at 20. Mother asserts that the trial court erred in finding 

sufficient grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(2) despite Mother’s 

credible evidence of “receiving intensive mental health treatment after being 

victimized by [her former attorney], visiting [H.C.] over a hundred times, 

taking actions to be reunited with [H.C.] by complying with the family service 

plan[,] and attempting to maintain a meaningful relationship with [H.C.]” Id.

at 21 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

SCSCY asserts, and the guardian ad litem agrees, that, during H.C.’s 

placement, “Mother has never been fully involved or demonstrated an ability 
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to appropriately parent [H.C.]” SCSCY’s Brief at 19-20; see also Guardian 

Ad Litem’s Brief at 2-3.

In terminating Mother’s parental rights under, inter alia, Section 

2511(a)(2), the trial court found that Mother failed to meet her parental duties 

towards, and the needs of, H.C. Trial Court Supplemental Opinion, 4/7/22, at 

7. The trial court stated that, since moving to Missouri in December 2020, 

Mother has made no effort to provide for H.C. and has had no communication 

with H.C. Id. The trial court noted, inter alia, that Mother failed to conduct 

her life in a fashion that provided a safe environment for H.C., was discharged 

from the care of numerous medical providers and therapists for 

noncompliance, indicated that she did not intend to relocate back to 

Pennsylvania, maintained a relationship with H.C. that was one of friendship 

rather than mother-child, and reported that she did not have feelings toward 

H.C. Id. at 3-6. The trial court found that despite having over five years to 

remedy the situation that caused H.C.’s placement, and to repair her 

relationship with H.C., Mother “failed to put forth anything more than minimal 

efforts” and continued to exhibit instability and inconsistency with regard to 

H.C. Id. at 7.

A clinical psychologist who evaluated Mother in October 2018, reported 

concerns about Mother’s ability to exercise good parental judgment and 
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appropriately parent H.C.3 N.T., 3/1/21, at 29. These concerns remained 

unchanged after further observations by the clinical psychologist in June 2020. 

Id. In the October 22, 2018 psychological evaluation report, the clinical 

psychologist authored the following diagnostic impression of Mother:

Based on the present evaluation of [Mother], there were 

significant concerns identified with respect to her ability to provide 

for the welfare of [H.C. These] concerns include psychological 

dysfunction[,] as well as impaired social and personal judgment. 

[Mother] appears to exhibit symptoms considered under the 

Cluster B category of personality disorders to include antisocial 

personality disorder [and] borderline personality disorder, as well 

as symptoms associated with anxiety related disorders to include 

[PTSD. Mother] presented with a pattern of unstable and intense 

interpersonal relationships which seem to mirror a theme of 

alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation. Her 

relationship with her mother[,] as well as intimate partners[,]

exhibits this pattern. She presents with instability of affect in 

terms of intense periods of anxiety, depression, anger [or] 

hostility, and social withdraw. [Mother] exhibits what appears to 

be stress[-]related paranoid ideation. She seems to lack 

emotional investment in relationships and lacks personal [and] 

social judgment. [Mother] is remarkably intelligent which 

contributes to her ability to manipulate others in a manner that 

she has a tendency to play the victim for personal gain. This is 

not an uncommon characteristic of individuals with personality 

disorders. While [Mother] clearly [] experienced adversities in her 

life such as dealing with her mother's mental health issues and 

becoming a mother herself at a young age, she presents with clear 

concerns at this present time. It is not denied that [Mother] has 

had traumatic experiences in her life[,] however[,] the details and 

circumstances are suspect. Her relationship[] with [H.C.]

appear[s] to be somewhat superficial in that she lacked emotional 

reaction as she described separation from [H.C.] She was much 

more focused on the perceived violations of [SCSCY] against her

[than] on the loss [and] separation from [H.C. Mother] displays 

____________________________________________

3 The trial court admitted the clinical psychologist as an expert in the field of 

clinical psychology. N.T., 3/1/21, at 21.
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gross impairment in the areas of personal and social judgment. 

She lacks an understanding of the potential deleterious effects

that her decisions have made on [H.C.’s] emotional and physical 

needs.

N.T., 3/1/21, at Exhibit 2 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

4

 In finding at 

the conclusion of the June 2020 evaluation that significant concerns continued 

to exist regarding Mother’s “ability to provide for the welfare of [H.C.] 

particularly in light of the lack of observable and measurable change in 

treatment and according to SCSCY[,]” the clinical psychologist stated,

[Mother] has been reportedly in therapy[,] however[,] it is difficult 

to determine what she [] addressed in therapy as there is no 

report on the specific goals she was working on and how her 

progress was measured or determined. To [Mother’s] great 

credit, she was able to identify what triggers her anger[,] and she 

is able to report several strategies to deal with her emotions. This 

____________________________________________

4 We note that certain SCSCY exhibits admitted at the termination hearing are 

not part of the certified record but do appear in the supplemental reproduced 

record filed by SCSCY with this Court on December 29, 2021. Generally, we 

may not consider documents contained in the reproduced record. One 

exception permits our consideration of such documents when the documents 

have been submitted to the trial court and the accuracy of the reproduction 

has not been disputed by the parties. El-Gharbaoui v. Ajayi, 260 A.3d 944, 

965 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating, “[g]enerally, we may not consider documents 

contained in the reproduced record if they were never filed with the trial court”

or if the accuracy of the documents is disputed); see also Commonwealth 

v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1145 n.4 (Pa. 2012) (stating, documents contained 

in the reproduced record may be considered if they have been submitted to 

the trial court and the accuracy of the reproduction is not disputed).

Here certain exhibits were admitted as evidence during the termination 

hearing (see N.T., 3/23/21, at 85) and neither Mother nor the guardian ad 

litem have objected to the accuracy of the reproduction of the exhibits 

contained in SCSCY’s supplemental filing. Therefore, we will consider the 

exhibits and will reference them by exhibit numbers as gleaned from a review 

of the termination hearing transcript.
J-A05007-22

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is good progress[,] however[,] she continues to report problems 

with anger reactivity. She harbors a great deal of hostility toward 

her caseworker which she seems to focus on more [so] than [] 

what she needs to do to comply and spend quality time with [H.C.]

and foster a connection in the hopes of reunification.

[Mother] historically attempted to manipulate the evaluation 

process. During the last interview[,] she claimed she could not 

[read] the assessment to complete it[,] so a friend had to come

and bring her glasses. The first attempt to reevaluate her 

presented with scheduling difficulties on [Mother’s part] and then 

when it was scheduled, she did not attend and said she lost power 

in her home. On the date of the current evaluation[,] she stated 

that she had [methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus] with a 

fever and demanded that [H.C.] come into the evaluation. This is 

a clear example of the manipulative behavior pattern [in which]

she tends to engage. In the moment[,] it is believed that [Mother]

thinks that these are valid issues[,] however[,] after she is 

confronted[,] she seems to ultimately comply and participate.

The results of the [evaluation tests] were overall consistent with 

the last evaluation. Some differences were her level of depression 

reported [] was lower but her anxiety and somatoform symptoms 

were higher. [The evaluation results] indicated that she may have 

attempted to be deceptive or tried to present herself in a more 

positive light. This may have been due to the length of time it 

took her to complete the test or possibly her anxiety. All in all[,]

however[,] the results were consistent in terms of supporting a 

Cluster B personality disorder. She presents with an overall 

pattern of manipulative tendencies, interpersonal hostility, 

difficulty managing her reactivity, [and] a tendency to avoid 

emotionally intimate relationships. Further [Mother] seems to 

manifest most of her anxiety and stress physically. She endorsed 

a significant number of symptoms related to somatoform disorder 

in both assessments[,] as well as in her self[-]report during the 

interview.

[Mother] continues to endorse items related to PTSD and trauma 

therapy continues to be recommended in addition to anger 

management.

Id. at Exhibit 3.
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A relationships expert testified that she observed the interaction 

between Mother and H.C. during the period of March 2020, through November 

2020.5 Id. at 82. The relationships expert described the bond between 

Mother and H.C. as one of friendship, rather than mother-child. Id. at 84. 

The relationships expert stated, inter alia, that Mother possessed an inability 

to set boundaries with H.C., that she lacked any form of coping skills

necessary to deal with her emotions and difficult situations, she got angry 

very easily, and she did not know how to control that anger. Id. at 85. The 

relationships expert expressed that Mother’s ability to parent full-time was 

“non-existent” and this inability to parent full-time remained constant 

throughout the period of observation with no change despite the counseling 

and resources Mother received. Id. at 91-92, 114.

A SCSCY caseworker testified that H.C.’s placement was initially due to 

Mother’s incarceration and H.C.’s grandmother’s inability to care for the child. 

Id. at 124. Once Mother was released from incarceration, placement 

continued, the caseworker explained, because Mother did not have adequate 

housing. Id. at 125. Mother had been directed to maintain stable housing, 

obtain mental health treatment, attain financial stability for herself and H.C., 

avoid situations that may lead to domestic violence, remain drug-free, and 

maintain a drug-free living environment. Id. At the initial permanency review 

____________________________________________

5 The trial court admitted the relationships expert as an expert in social work 

and parent-child interaction. N.T., 3/1/21, at 81.
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hearing, Mother received a “minimal compliance, minimum progress” 

assessment in terms of meeting her assigned goals, which resulted in limited, 

supervised visitation with H.C. Id. at 119-120. The caseworker explained 

that because Mother continued to demonstrate “minimum compliance” and 

“minimum progress” at subsequent permanency hearings, Mother’s visitation 

with H.C. remained supervised and limited in duration. N.T., 6/30/21, at 

98-99. The caseworker testified that SCSCY has “not seen significant progress 

or compliance from [Mother] that she can provide day in day out care for 

[H.C.]” N.T., 3/23/21, at 15. The caseworker explained that Mother’s housing 

situation, financial solvency, and mental health issues continue to remain a 

concern. Id. at 16-20.

A mental health expert, who began seeing Mother as a mental health 

patient in April 2019, and who continued Mother’s treatment through the time 

of the termination hearing, testified on Mother’s behalf. Id. at 93. This mental 

health expert interacted with Mother via virtual tele-medicine sessions once 

Mother relocated to Missouri in December 2020.

6

 Id. at 93. The mental health 

expert stated that, while living in Missouri, Mother made significant progress 

with her life, having, inter alia, lost weight, obtained employment, and 

established living arrangements with her paramour, whom she lived with while 

residing in Pennsylvania. Id. 119-121. The mental health expert opined that 

____________________________________________

6 The trial court admitted the mental health expert as an expert in mental 

health trauma therapy with an emphasis on clinical psychology. N.T., 

3/23/21, at 92-93.
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Mother was “one hundred percent capable and willing to raise [H.C.] 

appropriately.” Id. at 126. On cross-examination, however, the mental 

health expert acknowledged that her assessment of Mother’s “significant 

improvements” was based upon Mother’s self-reporting to the expert during 

their virtual treatment sessions, as the mental health expert was located in 

Pennsylvania and Mother resided in Missouri. Id. at 130-131. The mental 

health expert stated that she accepted the findings of the clinical psychologist 

who evaluated Mother in October 2018, and again in June 2020, including the 

finding that Mother “tends to manipulate the [mental health evaluation and] 

testing process[.]” Id. at 133. The mental health expert admitted she never 

observed Mother interact with H.C. so her assessment that Mother’s parenting 

skills improved was based solely on Mother’s self-reporting. Id. at 134-135.

Mother testified that, in Missouri, she maintains a house with her 

paramour and has her own means of transportation. N.T., 6/30/21, at 29-30. 

Mother acknowledged that, in Missouri, she obtained a job for about two 

months on a probationary basis but that she was no longer employed due to 

the time she was absent from her job to resolve her legal issues. Id. at 11. 

Mother testified that, while still living in Pennsylvania, she stopped attending 

H.C.’s parent-teacher conferences and academic and extracurricular activities 

at H.C.’s school because H.C.’s foster mother “did not feel comfortable with” 

Mother attending. Id. at 44-45. Mother disagreed with the relationships

expert’s assessment that Mother lacked any form of coping skills, stating, 

instead, that she learned “dozens of different coping skills” that she uses 
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“almost every hour” in her day-to-day life. Id. at 48-51. Mother further 

stated that the clinical psychologist, who evaluated her in 2018, and 2020,

received information regarding Mother prior to the evaluations and that the 

clinical psychologist had “already made her decisions about [Mother] – her 

opinions about [Mother]” prior to meeting with Mother and conducting the 

evaluations. Id. at 55. When asked if Mother would relocate to Pennsylvania 

in order to reunite with H.C., Mother testified that it was not her intention to 

relocate to Pennsylvania but that she would “do anything and everything I can 

to be reunited with [H.C.]” Id. at 58, 82, 87.

Mother acknowledged that, as of the June 30, 2021 termination hearing, 

Mother’s last visit with H.C. occurred on December 9, 2020. Id. at 58. Some 

time after Mother moved to Missouri, H.C. wrote a letter to Mother asking if 

Mother still loved her and asked Mother to circle “yes” or “no” in her reply to 

H.C. Id. at 60, 88; see also N.T, 3/23/21, at 25. Mother did not reply directly 

to H.C. because, as Mother explained, “pretty much everything I’ve done so 

far has been twisted[.]” N.T., 6/30/21, at 64. Instead, Mother sent a cellular 

text message to the SCSCY caseworker, which stated as follows:

I want to talk to my daughter and I’m getting irritated with the 

situation. Tell [H.C.] that I said “I circled YES and there[ are] 

other important things I need to discuss with her so she should 

put her big girl pants on and call me.[”]

Also[, I am] rather sick of hearing your response [(referring to the 

caseworker)]. I want HERS in her real words this time. I’m not 

fond of her high[-]pitched squeaky words. Thanks.

Id.; see also N.T., 3/23/21, at Exhibit 5 (Text Message Screenshots).
J-A05007-22

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Based upon our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion 

by the trial court in finding sufficient grounds to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights to H.C. under Section 2511(a)(2). The record supports the trial court’s 

findings that Mother failed to perform her parental duties and failed to meet 

the needs of H.C. and that during the more than five years H.C. has been in 

placement, Mother put forth only minimal efforts to remedy the 

circumstances. The clinical psychologist, relationships expert, and SCSCY 

caseworker all testified that, during the period in which they evaluated, 

observed, or interacted with Mother, Mother failed to demonstrate significant 

improvement in addressing her housing and financial needs, as well as 

addressing her mental health needs, including, inter alia, developing coping 

skills for confronting life’s challenges in order to provide a stable and 

consistent environment for H.C. While Mother testified that she developed 

coping skills and would do anything necessary to reunite with H.C., the trial 

court found, and the record supports, that when H.C. asked Mother to state

whether Mother still loved her, yes or no, Mother chose to send a message to 

a SCSCY caseworker and then asked the caseworker to inform H.C. to “put 

her big girl pants on” and call Mother. Contrary to her affirmative parental 

obligation, Mother did not contact H.C. directly. See S.P., 47 A.3d at 828 

(noting a parent’s affirmative duty to “love, protect[,] and support [the] child 

and to make an effort to maintain communication and association with that 

child”). Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law on the part 
J-A05007-22

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of the trial court in concluding that sufficient grounds existed to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights to H.C. under Section 2511(a)(2)

In her second and fifth issues, Mother challenges the trial court’s finding

that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of H.C. 

under Section 2511(b). Mother’s Brief at 21-24. Mother asserts that there is 

a “strong bond and attachment between Mother and” H.C., citing as an 

example a card H.C. sent to Mother “where [H.C.] stated she loved Mother 

[and] asked if Mother still loved [H.C.] even though they had not visited in 

person since December 2020.” Id. at 23. Mother contends that maintaining 

H.C.’s contact with Mother “best serves [H.C.’s] needs and welfare[.]” Id. at 

23-24.

The trial court found that Mother’s relationship with H.C. was “one of 

friendship rather than mother and child.” Trial Court Supplemental Opinion, 

4/7/22, at 6. The trial court further found that H.C. “views herself as the 

caretaker of her Mother” and has “a fear of Mother’s rejection, anger[,] and 

how [] Mother would respond if [H.C.] was open and honest” with Mother. Id. 

In finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights, and, thereby,

permitting H.C. to be adopted by her foster parents, was in the best interest 

of H.C., the trial court noted that H.C. “resides in a stable home[,] has 

friends[,] and desires to stay with her foster parents, whom she calls mom 

and dad, and with whom she is bonded.” Id. at 7.

The relationships expert testified that, during her observations of Mother 

and H.C. together versus H.C. alone, she noted that H.C. “was a different 
J-A05007-22

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person” when she was not with Mother. N.T., 3/1/21, at 86. Upon inquiry, 

H.C. explained to the relationships expert that

she felt she had to act a certain way around [Mother]. She felt 

that she could not be herself because [Mother] wouldn’t accept 

her and that she was unable to speak with [Mother] about 

anything that bothered her about the relationship out of fear of 

[Mother’s] anger or rejection.

Id. at 87. The relationships expert stated that H.C. felt she was responsible 

for Mother, that she was the caretaker of Mother, worrying about where 

Mother was living, how Mother’s relationship with her paramour was going, 

and whether Mother was financially stable.7 Id. H.C. described her life with 

her current foster family as a “stable home,” referred to her foster parents as 

mom and dad, and indicated that she wanted to remain with her foster family. 

Id. at 88. 

The SCSCY caseworker stated that, despite her efforts to initiate 

communication between Mother and H.C., H.C. has not wanted to 

____________________________________________

7 H.C. wrote a letter to the trial court that stated as follows:

My name is [H.C.] and I am 9 years old. I will be going into 

[fourth] grade next year. I have lived with [my foster family] 

since I was [five]. I like living with them too. They are my family. 

I like my school and friends. I love my mom [(referring to 

Mother)] too. I’m not sure [Mother] can take care of me. I don’t 

want to go through this again. When I see [Mother,] I just know 

something is wrong but she won’t tell me. I worry about 

[Mother’s] boyfriends and I don’t trust them. She moves on from 

them for a reason. I want [my foster family] to adopt me because 

they love me and I love them.

N.T., 3/23/21, at Exhibit 6.
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communicate with Mother, either virtually over the internet or via telephone, 

since Mother relocated to Missouri. N.T., 3/23/21, at 26. In an in-camera 

interview of H.C. conducted by the trial court, with only the guardian ad litem

present, H.C. stated that she thought it was better for both parties that Mother 

moved to Missouri and that she did not want to see or talk to Mother. N.T., 

7/1/21, at 20-21. H.C. explained that if she returned to living with Mother, 

she was more likely to be in danger because, inter alia, Mother had a firearm, 

and that she would not be in danger if she continued to live with her foster 

family. Id. at 25, 27.

Based upon our review of the record, we find clear and convincing 

evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights to H.C. serves the best interest of the child. The evidence 

supports that, while a limited bond may exist between Mother and H.C., that 

bond is one of friendship in which H.C. assumes the role of “the parent”

expressing worry and concern over Mother’s well-being and stability. 

Conversely, Mother, when given the opportunity to communicate directly with 

H.C., chose instead to communicate via text messaging with the SCSCY 

caseworker, telling the caseworker to convey a message to H.C. to put on her 

“big girl pants” and call Mother. H.C. has a strong bond with her foster 

parents, having spent more than half of her life in their care, and her foster 

parents are in the best position to provide a stable home and continuous 

parental care to H.C. Mother, on the other hand, after more than five years 

of receiving services and assistance, continues to put forth minimal efforts 
J-A05007-22

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and achieve minimal progress towards reuniting with H.C. Therefore, we 

discern no abuse of discretion or error of law on the part of the trial court in 

concluding that termination of Mother’s parental rights to H.C. is in the best 

interest of the child.

Order affirmed.8

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/17/2022

____________________________________________

8

In light of our disposition in this matter, Mother’s third issue is moot.