UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2200

TOUGH MUDDER, LLC; PEACEMAKER NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER, 

LLC; GENERAL MILLS, INC.; GENERAL MILLS SALES, INC.,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

MITA SENGUPTA, Individually and as Personal Representative 

of Avishek Sengupta; BIJON SENGUPTA; PRIYANKA SENGUPTA,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, 

District Judge. (3:14-cv-00056-GMG)

Submitted: June 23, 2015 Decided: June 26, 2015

Before SHEDD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert N. Kelly, Michele L. Dearing, JACKSON & CAMPBELL, PC, 

Washington, D.C.; Alonzo D. Washington, FLAHERTY SENSABAUGH & 

BONASSO, PLLC, Morgantown, West Virginia, for Appellants. 

Robert P. Fitzsimmons, Clayton J. Fitzsimmons, FITZSIMMONS LAW 

FIRM PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia; Robert J. Gilbert, Edward J. 

Denn, GILBERT & RENTON LLC, Andover, Massachusetts, for 

Appellees.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Tough Mudder, LLC, Peacemaker National Training Center, 

LLC, General Mills, Inc., and General Mills Sales, Inc., 

(collectively “Appellants”) appeal the district court’s order 

dismissing their petition to compel arbitration for lack of 

jurisdiction. Appellants filed their petition to compel against 

Mita Sengupta, invoking the district court’s diversity

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012), after Sengupta filed a

state court wrongful death action against Appellants, Travis 

Pittman, and Airsquid Ventures, Inc. In dismissing the 

petition, the district court held that Pittman, who shared 

Maryland citizenship with Sengupta, was a necessary and 

indispensable party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, and that his 

joinder would defeat complete diversity. Appellants argue that 

the district court erred when it held that Pittman was both a 

necessary and indispensable party. Finding no error, we affirm. 

The threshold issue of subject matter jurisdiction is a 

question of law that we review de novo. Home Buyers Warranty 

Corp. v. Hanna, 750 F.3d 427, 432 (4th Cir. 2014). We review 

the district court’s dismissal of an action pursuant to Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 19 for abuse of discretion, and review the district 

court’s factual findings underlying the Rule 19 dismissal for 

clear error. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid of S.C., 

Inc., 210 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 2000). 
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For a court to have jurisdiction over an action pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), “diversity must be complete such that the 

state of citizenship of each plaintiff must be different from 

that of each defendant.” Home Buyers Warranty Corp., 750 F.3d 

at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under Rule 19, a 

district court must dismiss an action brought in diversity 

jurisdiction if a nondiverse, nonjoined party is “necessary” and 

“indispensable” to the action. Home Buyers Warranty Corp., 750 

F.3d at 433. In deciding whether to dismiss an action, Rule 19 

is to be applied “pragmatically, in the context of the substance

of each case, and courts must take into account the possible 

prejudice to all parties, including those not before it.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Among other reasons provided in Rule 19, a party is 

necessary to an action where “that person claims an interest 

relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that 

disposing of the action in the person’s absence may . . . leave 

an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring 

double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because 

of the interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii). The 

district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that 

Pittman was a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) because 

(1) Pittman, as a defendant seeking to compel arbitration in the 

state action, had an interest in the validity of the arbitration 
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provision; and (2) Sengupta faced the substantial risk of 

inconsistent results regarding the validity of the arbitration 

provision, potentially causing her to simultaneously pursue her 

claims through arbitration and trial. See Owens-Illinois v. 

Meade, 186 F.3d 435, 438-41 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that party 

faces “conflicting legal obligations” and is necessary to an 

action to compel arbitration where failure to join creates a

“high potential for inconsistent judgments”).

Having found Pittman a necessary party, we must assess, as 

did the district court, whether he is an indispensable one. 

Four factors control whether a necessary party is indispensable: 

(1) “the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person’s 

absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties”; 

(2) “the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or 

avoided”; (3) “whether a judgment rendered in the person’s 

absence would be adequate”; and (4) “whether the plaintiff would 

have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for 

nonjoinder.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b); see Home Buyers Warranty 

Corp., 750 F.3d at 435-36. Because Sengupta faces a substantial 

risk of inconsistent obligations, the first and third factors 

support the conclusion that Pittman is an indispensable party. 

See Owens-Illinois, 186 F.3d at 441-42 (noting that first and 

third factors of indispensable evaluation “address much the same 

concerns as the Rule 19(a)[(1)(B)] analysis”). Regarding the 
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second factor, Appellants suggested no way to mitigate the 

prejudice to Sengupta, and no remedy is apparent. Home Buyers 

Warranty Corp., 750 F.3d at 435-36; Owens-Illinois, 186 F.3d at 

442. Finally, as to the fourth factor, the West Virginia state 

courts provide Appellants an adequate forum to seek enforcement 

of the arbitration provision and the state courts are better 

positioned to apply West Virginia law to determine the validity 

of the provision.* Owens-Illinois, 186 F.3d at 442.

All four factors support the conclusion that Pittman is an 

indispensable party. Therefore, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion when it held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 

required joining Pittman as a petitioner. As Pittman’s joinder 

to the action would defeat complete diversity, the district 

court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and 

properly dismissed the petition. Home Buyers Warranty Corp., 

750 F.3d at 436; Owens-Illinois, 186 F.3d at 442.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal 

order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

 * Sengupta’s brief to this court notes that the state 

circuit court denied Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration,

and that Appellants are seeking appellate review of this denial 

in the West Virginia Supreme Court.
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED