1

We determine that the decisional process would not be significantly aided by

oral argument.  See Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

‐‐‐‐ooOoo‐‐‐‐

State of Utah,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Echo Marne Kurr,

Defendant and Appellant.

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PER CURIAM DECISION

Case No. 20110879‐CA

F I L E D

(July 19, 2012)

   2012 UT App 194

‐‐‐‐‐

Second District, Ogden Department, 101902904

The Honorable Noel S. Hyde

Attorneys: Samuel P. Newton, Kalispell, Montana, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and John J. Nielsen, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

‐‐‐‐‐

Before Judges McHugh, Voros, and Roth.

¶1 Echo Marne Kurr appeals her conviction of one count of retail theft in violation

of Utah Code section 76‐6‐602.  We affirm.1

¶2 Kurr asserts that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her trial

counsel failed to request a Long instruction or provide an eyewitness identification
2

A Long instruction refers to a jury instruction informing jurors of the weaknesses

inherent in eyewitness identification.  See State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ¶ 8, 223 P.3d 1103;

see also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986)

20110879‐CA 2

expert.2  “An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal

presents a question of law.”  State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162.  To establish

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate:  (1) that counsel’s

performance was objectively deficient; and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but

for the deficient performance, the defendant would have obtained a more favorable

outcome at trial.  See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162 (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

¶3 To demonstrate that Kurr’s trial counsel’s performance was objectively deficient,

she must overcome “the strong presumption that [her] trial counsel rendered adequate

assistance.”  State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996).  To do so, Kurr must

demonstrate that there was no “conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel’s actions.”

State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).  The law grants trial counsel a

wide latitude of discretion in making tactical decisions, and we will not question such

decisions if there was a reasonable basis supporting them.  See Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6.

Given the video surveillance clips, stills, and additional evidence that the getaway car

was registered to Kurr, defense counsel could reasonably have seen little value in

challenging the evidence identifying Kurr as the defendant.  Instead, it was within trial

counsel’s wide latitude of discretion to challenge whether the State had proved guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt on other factors.  For example, trial counsel argued that

there were gaps in the video surveillance clips where Kurr may have paid for the item,

and trial counsel also challenged the credibility of the State’s witnesses.  Kurr fails to

demonstrate that there was no conceivable tactical basis for her trial counsel’s trial

strategy.

¶4 In any event, Kurr fails to establish that she was prejudiced by her trial counsel’s

actions.  Establishing prejudice requires that a defendant show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.  See State v. Maestas, 2012 UT App 53, ¶ 57, 272 P.3d 769.  A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome of the trial.  See State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, ¶ 52, 276 P.3d 1207.  Given

the video surveillance clips, stills, and the additional evidence that the getaway vehicle
20110879‐CA 3

was registered to Kurr, she fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability that she would

have obtained a different outcome at trial had her trial counsel requested a Long

instruction or called an eyewitnesses identification expert.

¶5 Accordingly, Kurr’s conviction is affirmed.

____________________________________

Carolyn B. McHugh,

Presiding Judge

____________________________________

J. Frederic Voros Jr.,

Associate Presiding Judge

____________________________________

Stephen L. Roth, Judge