### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Ma y 12, 200 5 S es sio n CATHY L. CHAPMAN, ET AL 

### . v. RIC K J. B EAR FIEL D
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Washin gton County No. 8999 Jean A. Stanley, Judge

No. E2004-02596-COA- R3-CV - F ILED AUGU ST 16, 2005

Cathy L . Chapman, B randon Chapma n, Kay lan L . Chapman, and D ana L . Chapman (“ Plaintiffs”) reta ined attorne y

Rick J . Be arf

ield (“D efe ndant”) to repre sent them in a medica l malprac tice ac tion. During the cour se of this repr esentation, De fendant f iled an amende d complaint repudiating a theory of the c ase origina lly

alleg ed. Plaintiffs later hire d new c ounsel and filed a leg al malpra ctice a ction ag ainst Defe ndant. Def

endant f iled a motion for summary judgme nt, which the Tria l Court gr anted
on the g ro un ds that Pla int if fs ’ e xpe rt ’s a ff

ida vit wa s d e fi c ie nt te c hn ic a lly a nd didno t c omp ly wi th the locality

rule. We vac ate the g rant of summary judgme nt.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Ci r c uit

Co ur t V ac at e d; Case Re m anded

D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., and S HAR ON G. LEE , J .J ., joined.

J o h n J. B a n d e ian , B r is to l, T e n n e s s e e , a n d D o n a ld K

. V o w e ll , K n o xv il le , T e n n e s s e e , for the Appellants, Cathy

L . Ch ap m an, B randon Chapma n, Kay lan L . Chapman, and D ana L . Chapman, Minors, by

and throug h their Mother and natura l Guardia n, Cathy L . Chapman.

J ason W. Blac kburn, Johns on City , Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llee, Rick J. Bear field.-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

Plaintiffs retained D efe ndant to file a me dical malpra ctice suit on their behalf. The malprac tice ca se ar ose out of the medic al treatment and death of Wil lia m C h ap m an , husband of plain t i ff C athy

L . Chapman, and f

ather of plaintiffs B randon Chapma n, Kay lan L . Chapman, and Dana L

. Chapman. Def

endant filed a complaint on Plaintiffs’ behalf in April of 2001 alleging that Wil liam Cha

pman died as a result of pulmonary embolus, an event which the complaint al l eged would have be en pre vented but for medical neg lige nce. I n J une of 2002, an ag ree d order was e ntere d allowing Def

endant to amend the complaint in the medical neg lige nce action. Def endant then f

iled
an ame nded complaint on Plaintiffs’ beha lf alleg ing that Wi lliam Chapma n’s death “was, in fa ct, not the re sult of a pulmonary embolus,” but was cau s ed by“g astrointestinal upset, ag onal emesis and aspiration, an a sphy x ial death with n o car diac c ontribution and no contribution bythe nonsubstantiated pulmonary

thromboembolus to the left lower lobe .”

Plaint if fs be c amedis sa

tis fi e d w ith

De fe nd ant’ s re presen tat io n, ret ain ed o th er co un se l, and filed this suit ag ainst Defe ndant in J uly of 2004 alleg ing le g al malpra ctice f or, among other things, a lleg ing in the am en d ed complaint “that there w ere no car diac c ontributions and that no pulmonary embolus was involved in [ Wil liam Chapman’s] death.” Plaintiffs also soug ht a stay of the leg al malpra ctice suit pending final re solution of the underly ing me dical malpra ctice a ction.

De fe nd a nt fi le d a mot ion fo r su mma ry jud g me nt su pp orte d by his ow n e xpe rt wi tne ss aff idavit opining that he w as familiar with “the standard of car e required of attorney s located in the upper Ea st Tennessee are a” and t h at he a nd the attorne y s under his direc tion did not fall below or deviate from t he st andar d of care. Plaintiffs opposed t he mot ion for summary judgme nt by

filing the expert witness aff

idavit of attorne y

Richard L . Dunca n. Mr. Duncan stated in his affida vit that he was “ familiar with the standa rd of c are fo r at t o rn ey s in medical malpra ctice c ases in Te nnessee .” Mr. Duncan’s af

fidavit also stated that he had re viewed doc ument s in c luding spe cified ple ading s and “expert witness af

fidavits submitt ed by

[ De fe n d an t ]...” and opined that De fendant brea ched the standard of

car e by repudiating in the a mended c omplaint a theory supported by

the evidenc e. Mr. Du nc a n’ s a ff

ida vit didno t ha ve a tta c he d to it the do cum ent s ref e rr e d to by

Mr . D un c a n in his aff idavit. On October

5, 2004, only

two day s befor e the he aring on the motion for summary judgme nt, D efe ndant filed his a mended aff idavit in which he ref

err ed to specific me dical re cords a nd written expert re ports. Def endant attached copies of some, but not all, of the documents re fer ence d in his amended a ffidavit.

The Trial Court hear d arg ument on the motion for summary judgme nt on October

7, 2004. At the hea

ring , Plaintiffs requeste d additional time to supplement their expert aff idavit. On October 8, 2004, the day

afte r t h e h ea ri ng , but before the Trial Court re ndere d its decision on October 18, 2004, Plaintiffs filed M r. Duncan’s amende d expert aff idavit with copies of the documents re fer ence d there in attache d. Mr. Dunc an ’s re v i sed af fidavit also stated that he was-3-

“fa miliar with the standard of car e for attorney s prac ticing medical malprac tice ca ses in Tenne ssee... including uppe r East Te nnessee and other simil ar c ommuniti es in Tenne ssee.”

The Trial Court entere d its orde r October 18, 2004, g ranting Def endant’ s motion for summary judgme nt. The Oc tober 18 orde r, int e r a lia , denied Plaintiffs’ or al motion to suppl ement their ex pert affidavit and ref used t o consider Mr. Dunca n’s amende d aff idavit filed by

Plaintiffs on October 8, 2004. The Oc tober 18 orde r also found and he ld that Plainti ffs’ e x pert’s a ffidavit wa s technica lly

defic ient as it did not have attac hed sworn or certified copies of all paper s or parts ther eof ref err ed to in the affidavit as required by Rule 56.06 and bec ause it did not meet the “ locality rule” for a n expert witness. The October 18 orde r also found and held, appa rently with this ground not having been raised by Def endant and there fore not addre ssed by Plaintiffs, that “[i] t does not appea r that Plaintiffs have suff

ere d any actua l injury ” bec ause a

motion to re -a m en d Plaintiffs’ medical malprac tice complaint had be en ar g ued but not y et dec ided. I n addition, the October 18 order denied Pla int if fs ’ m oti on fo r a

stay . Pl a int if

fs app e a l to thi s Co urt.

Discussion

Alth o u gh n o ts t at ed ex ac t l y as s u ch , P l ai n t i ffs ra i s e s ev en i s s u es o n ap p ea l : 1 ) w hether the Tria l Co urt e rr e d in dis a llo wi ng Pla int if fs ’ expe rt ’s a ff

ida vit be c a us e it did no t mee t th e loc a lit y rule for an expert witness; 2) whe ther the Trial Court erre d in disallowing Plain t i ff s ’ ex pert’s
a ff ida vit be c a us e sw orn o r c e rt if

ie d co pie s of al l pap e rs or pa rt s the re of a s re fe rr e d to in the a ff ida vit
wer e not attac hed; 3) whe ther the Trial Court e rre d by not permitting Plaintiffs time to supplement the af fidavit of t heir ex pert witness; 4) whether the Trial Court er red in g ranting summary

judgme nt based upon De fe n d an t ’s expert aff idavit; 5) whether

the Trial Court er

red in g ranting summary judgme nt on the g round that Plaintiffs had failed to establish an ac tual injury ; 6) whether the Trial Court erre d in not stay ing the leg al m alpra ctice c ase pe nding r esolution of the under ly ing me dical malp r a c ti c e a c ti o n ; an d , 7 ) w h e th e r th e T r ia l C o u r t e rr e d b y h o ld in g Pl a in ti f

f s to a h e ighte ned adher ence to the Rules of Civil P roce dure due to the fac t that this wa s an attorne y malprac tice ac tion.

I n Bl air v . W e st To wn M

all , our Supreme Court r ece ntly re i t er at ed the standar ds applicable when appellate courts are revie wing a motion for summary judgme nt. Bl air v . W

e st To wn Mall, 130 S.W .3d 761 (Tenn. 2004) . I n Bl air , the Cou rt state d:

The standa

rds g overning an appe llate court’s revie w of a motion for summary judgme nt are well settled. Since our inquiry i n v o l v es p u rely a question of law , no pr e su mpt ion of

c or re c tne ss atta c he s to the low e r c ou rt ’s jud g me nt, a ndou r t a sk is confine d to review ing the rec ord t o d e te rmine whe ther the r equire ments of Tenne ssee Ru le o f Ci v il Pr o c e d u r e 5 6 h a v e b e e n me t. S ee S t a ples v. CBL & Assoc., Inc

. , 15 S.W .3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000) ; Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W .2d 49, 50-51 (Te nn. 1997); Cowden v. Sovran Bank /Central South, 816 S.W .2d 741, 744 (Tenn. 1991)

. Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e du re 56 .0 4 provid e s th a t su mma ry jud g me nt i s
app ro pria te wh e re : 1) the re is n o genu in e issue wi th r e g ardto the ma te ri a l f a c ts
re le va nt t o th e c la im o r d e fe ns e c on ta ine d in the mot ion , an d 2 ) the mov ing pa rt y is-4-

entitled to a judg ment as a matter of law on the undisputed fac ts. Staples , 15 S.W .3d at 88.

* * *

Whe n th e pa

rt y se e kin g su mma

ry jud g ment make s a

pr op e rl y sup p o rt ed motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth spec ific fa cts establish i n g t h e existence of disputed, material fac ts which must be resolved by the trier of

fac t.
To properly

support its mot ion, the moving pa rty must either aff irmatively neg ate an essential ele ment of the non-moving party ’s claim or conclusively establish an af firmative de fense . I f the moving par ty f a il s to n e g a te a

c laim e d b a s is f

o r th e s u it , th e n o n

- mo ving party ’s burde n to produce evidenc e esta blishing t he existence of a g enuine issue f

or trial is not trigg ere d and the moti on for summary jud g me nt mus t f

a il. I f the mov ing pa

rt y su c c e ssf ull y ne g a te s a cla im ed ba sis fo r the a c tio n, the no n- mov ing pa rt y ma y no t si mpl y rest upon the plea dings, but must offe r proof to establish the exis tence of the e ssential elements of the claim.
Blair, 1 3 0 S

. W

. 3 d at 7 6 3 , 7 6 7 (q u o t i n g Staples , 15 S.W . 3d at 88-89) ( citations omitt ed))

.

Our Supreme Court also has provided instruc tion r eg arding assessing the evidenc e wh en d ea l i n g wi th a m o t i o n fo r s u m m ar y j u d gm en ts t at i n g:

The stand ar d s g overning the assessment of evidenc e in the summary ju d gm en t contex t are also well established. Courts must view the e vidence in the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the no nmo vin g pa rt y a nd mu st also dr a w a ll r e a so na ble in f e r e n c e s in th e n o n mo v in g p ar ty ’ s f a v or. See R obinson v. Ome r, 952 S.W .2d at 42 6; Byrd v. H

all, 847 S.W .2d at 210-11. Courts should gr ant a summary judgme nt
on ly wh e n b oththe fa c ts a ndthe inf e rences to b e dr a wn fr om the fa c ts p e rm it a
rea sonable pe rson to rea ch only one conc lusion. See McCall v. W ilder, 913 S.W .2d 15 0, 15 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) ; Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995)

. Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc ., 15 S.W .3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000)

.

We b e g in b y

a dd re ssi ng wh e the r the Tria l Co urt e rr e d in di sall ow ing Pla int if fs ’ expert’s aff

idavit because it did not meet the locality rule for an ex pert witness. The “ locality rule” ref err ed to by

the Trial Court re quires an ex p er t t o be familiar with the acc eptable sta ndard of profe ssional prac tice, or the acc eptable standard of car e, in t hat locality with “locality ” being define d as that commun i ty

or a similar c ommunity . Def endant c ites case s from this Court that have interpre ted the Te nn es s ee Supreme Court’s opinion in Sp ald ing v . D av is , 674 S.W .2d 710 (Tenn.Spal di ng w a s o v e rr u le d in p a rt o n o the r g ro u n d s b y M e a d o w s v . S ta te , 84 9 S.W

. 2 d 74 8 , 75 2 (T enn. 19 9 3 ). 1

-5- 19 84 ) , to ha ve he ld t hat th e lo cal ity ru le is a pp lic able to l e g a l ma lpr a c tic e c a se s a s w e ll a s to 1 medical malpr actice case s. Underwood v. W aterslides of Mid-Americ a, Inc. 823 S.W .2d 171, 182-3 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 1) ; Anthony v. Felknor & Cunningham , C

. A

. N o

. 1 4 6 , 1 9 8 8 T e n n

. A p p

. LE X IS 601 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 1988), appl. perm. appeal de nied Jan. 3, 1989 ; Cle c k ne r v . D ale , 719 S.W .2d 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). Se e als o M ar tin v . S ize mo re , 78 S.W .3d 249, 273 n.14 (Tenn. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Underwood and stating “Another

panel of this court has stated in dicta that the sa me loc a lit y

ru le that a

pp lie s to ph y sic ia ns a lso app lie s to la wy e rs g ivi ng e xpe rt op ini on s in leg al malpra ctice c ases.” )

We a c kn ow le dg e the se c a se s, bu t re sp e c tf ull y be lie ve the y

are ba se d u po n a n o ve rl y broad reading of the Supreme Court’s holding in Sp ald ing v . D av is . I n pertinent pa rt, Spalding v. Da v is state s:

The settled g ener al rule in most if not all American jurisdictions is t hat an attorney to whom th e conduct of litigation is entrusted may be held liable to his client for damag es re sulting fr om his failure to e x erc ise ordinary car e, skill, and dilige nce, or , as it i s f re qu e ntl y e xpre sse d, that de g re e of c are , s kil l, anddil ig e nc e wh ic h is commonly

possessed and e x erc ised by attorney s in practice in the jurisdiction.
Spalding, 674 S.W .2d at 714. Thus, Spalding s p ea k s about “the jurisdiction,” not “the locality .” The jurisdiction for a Tenne ssee attorney is Te nnessee

. We base this determination, in part, upon the fa c t th a t Spalding discusses t he “settled g ener al rule in most if not all American jurisdictions

... ,” which we can inter

pret only to m ean that the “jurisdictions” re fer red to a re the fifty

states. Id

. (empha sis added). Spalding should not be rea d to cre ate a locality rule in l eg al malpra ctice c ases a s it inst ead c reates a “

jurisdiction” rule with the “ jurisdiction” being Tenne ssee.

We further

base our determination that there is no locality rule in leg al malpra ctice actions on the absenc e of any statute cre ating such a rule. The locality rule app l i ca b l e i n m edical
ma lp r a c ti c e a c ti o n s is a c r e a ti o n o f s tatute

. See T en n . Code Ann. § 29-26- 115. This medical malprac tice loca lityrule is the only locality rule whic h our L eg islature has enac ted by statute. Our L eg islature spec ifically cre ated the locality rule for medical malpr actice case s, but did not create a simil ar statute a

pplicable to le g al malprac tice case s. Furthe r, we note that this Court has rec og nized th a t n o lo c a li ty ru le e xis ts in o th e r ty p e s o f p r o f

e s s io n a l ma lp r a c ti c e a c ti o n s. Un d er w o od , 823 S.W .2d at 183 (finding “that the r equire ment that an expert be f amiliar with the loca l standard of car e is the exception rather

than the rule. We find no case s that apply that exception to the standard of
car e applica

ble to eng ineer s and contra ctors in Tenne ssee.” ).
We hold that there is no locality rule for an expert witness in leg al malpractice
a c tio ns , o the r tha n th e e xpe rt wi tne ss mus t be famil ia

r w ith the stand ardof

c are “ wh ic h is c omm on ly possessed and e x erc ised by attorney s in practice in the jurisdiction,” here Tenne ssee. Spalding , 674-6-

S.W .2d at 714. I f Spalding c re a te d a “ loc a lit y ru le ” fo r le g a l ma lpr a c tic e a c tio ns , the “ loc a lit y ” is the State of Te nnessee

.

We also note t hat Defenda nt’s aff idavit states t hat he is familiar with the “ standard of c are re qu ir e d o f atto rn e y s lo c a te d in the up pe r E a st T e nn e sse e are a .” F rank ly , w e are un able to
acc ept that t he “upper East Tenne ssee area ” is a separate “jurisdiction” under Spalding . We further
no te that th e re vis e d e xpe rt a ff ida vit su bmi tte d b y

Pla int if fs , w hic h th e Tria l Co urt ref us e d to
c on sid e r, state s th a t Pla int if fs ’ e xpe rt a lso is f a mil iar w ith the stand ardof c are in th e “u pp e r E a st Tenne ssee” are a. We are just a s puzz led as to what sepa rate “jurisdiction” “uppe r East Te nnessee ” is supposed to be, whether it is ref err ed to in the Plaintiffs’ expert’s af fidavit or in the De fenda nt’s aff idavit.

I n any event, such a determination is unnece ssary as we believe Spalding ho lds on ly that the expert wi t n es s in a leg al malpra ctice c ase must be f amiliar with the standar d of ca re of
a tto rn e y s p ra c tic ing in the Sta te of Te nn e sse e . T he re fo re , th e Trial Co urt erred in r e fu sin g to consider Plaintiffs’ e x pert’s a ffidavit base d upon the “loca lityrule.” Having acknow ledged the differing inter

pretations of Spalding , w e re sp e c tf ull y su g g e st t h at th eq u e sti on of

wh e the r the re e xists a loca lityrule, other

than the “loc ality ” being Tenne ssee, f or expert witnesses in leg al malpra ctice actions is an appr opriate issue f or our Supre me Court to resolve.

Wen e xt w il l c o n s id e r

w h e ther the Trial Court erre d in disallowing Plaintiffs’ e x pert’s
a ff ida vit be c a us e sw orn o r c e rt if

ie d c op ie s o f a ll p ape rs or pa rt s th e re of

re fe rr e d to in the a ff

ida vit
we re no t a tta c he d. I n p e rt ine nt p art , T e nn e sse e Rul e of Civ il Pr oc e du re 56 .0 6 p ro vid e s:

56.06. F ormof Af

fi davits – Further Testim ony – De f en s e Re qui red. – Supporting a nd opposing aff idavits sha ll be made on pe rsonal knowledg e, shall set forth such f

acts a s would be admiss ible in evidenc e, and sha ll show affirmatively that the af fiant is competent to testify to the matters s t at ed t h er ein. S worn or c ertified
c op ie s o f a ll p ape rs or

pa rt s th e re of re fe rr e d to in a n a ff

ida vit sh a ll be a tta c he d th e re to
or ser ved ther ewith. . . . Expert opi nion affida vits shall be gove rned by Tenne ssee Rule of Evidenc e 703.

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ev ide nc e 70 3 p ro vid e s:

Ru l e 7 0 3. Bases of op inion test im ony by experts. – T h e f a c ts o r d a ta inthe pa rt ic ula r c a se up on wh ic h a n e xpe rt ba se s a n o pin ionor

inf e re nc e ma y

be tho se p er ceive d by

or made known to the expert at or be fore the hea ring . I f of a

type
rea sonably

relied upon by

experts in th e p ar t i cu lar fie ld in forming opinions or infere nces upon the subject, the fa cts or data need not be admissible in evidence . The court shall disallow testimony in the form of an opinion or infere nce if the under ly ing fa c ts o r d a ta

ind ic a te la c k o f t

ru stw orthi ne ss.-7-

Tenn. R. Evid. 703.

Rule 56.06 clea

rly states: “Sworn or c ertified c opies of all pape rs or pa rts there of
re fe rr e d to in a n a ff

ida vit sh a ll be a tta c he d the re to or se rv e d the re wi th. ” Mr

. Du nc a n’ s fi rs t a ff ida vit did not have attac hed copie s of pape rs or pa rts there of re fer

red to in his aff

idavit. Nor we re suc h
c op ie s se rv e d w ith it. Pla int if fs arg ue that be c a us e Te nn . R. Ev id. 70 3 state s: “ I f o f a ty pe re a so na

bly relied upon by experts in the pa rticular f ield in forming opinions or infere nces upon the subject, the fa c ts o r d a ta

ne e d n ot b e a dmi ss ibl e in e vid e nc e ,” thi s so me ho w t ru mps the ma nd a te c on ta ine d in Rule 56.06 that the documents must be attac hed. Howe ver, “ need not be admissible in evidence ” and “sha l l b e attac hed ther eto” a re two ve ry

differ ent conc epts. Docume nts may not need to be admissible unde r Rule 703, but unde r Rule 56.06 they clea rly must be attache d. Mr. D u n can’ s aff idavit did not have the docume nts attache d or ser ved with it, and there fore , the Trial Court did not
err when it re fused f

or this rea son to consider Mr. D uncan’ s first aff idavit.

Howeve r we next m ust co n s i d er w hether the Trial Court er

red by not permitting Plaintiffs tim e to supplement the aff idavit of their expert witness. Plaintiffs attempted to corr ect the te c hn ic a l de fi c ie nc y

dis c us se d a

bo ve by fi lin g a n a me nd e d a ff ida vit wi th c op ie s o f the do c ume nts ref ere nced attached to it one day afte r the hearing on the motion for summary judgme nt but before the Trial Court re ndere d its decision. The Tria l Court refuse d to consider this amende d aff idavit.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Civ il Pr oc e du re 56 pr ov ide s sp e c if ic ti me limits app lic able to mot ion s f or su mma ry jud g me nt. I n p e rt ine nt p art , Ru le 56 .0 4 p ro vid e s:

56.04. Mo ti o n a n d P roce edings T hereon. – Th e mot ion sh a ll b e se rv e d at le a st thirty (30) day s befor e the time fix ed for the hea ring . The a dverse party

may serve and file opposing aff

idavits not later than five (5) day s befor e the he aring

. . . .
Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04.

Plaintiffs did not comply with the five day time limit set out in Rule 56.04 when they fi le d th e ir e xpe rt ’s a me nd e d a ff ida vit the day

a ft e r the he ari ng . Impo rt a ntl y , h ow e ve r, ne ith e r d id Def endant when he filed his a mended aff idavit on October 5, 2004, a mere two day s b ef o re the Oc tob e r 7 , 2 00 4 h e ari ng

. P lai nti ff s w e re re qu ir e d b y

Rul e 56 .0 4 to fi le the ir

“ op po sin g a ff

ida vit s not lat er than five (5) befor e the he aring ...,” which at a minimum presupposes that the movant’s aff idavits are f

iled more than five (5) day s befor e the he aring . Def endant’ s filing his ame nded aff idavit only two day s befor e the hearing made it impossible for Plaintiffs to fi l e t h ei r o p p osing aff idavits in response to this amende d aff idavit not later than five (5) day s befor e the he aring . Yet the Trial Court appa

rent l y chose to consider De fendant’s amende d aff idavit and not to consider Plaintiffs’ amende d expert aff idavit f iled only three day s later. In addition, Defe ndant’s ame nded aff idavit suffer ed fr om the same tec hnical def iciency that P l ai n t i ffs’ origina l affida vit suffere d, namely , not all of the docume nts refe rre d to in it were attached or serve d with it.-8- We hold that it was e rror

for the T rial Court to ref

use to consider

Plaintiffs’ amende d
ex p er taf fi d av i tgi v en t h at t h e T ri al C o u rt co n s i d er ed De fe n d an t ’s am e n d ed af fi d av i tev en t h o u gh it wa s serve d and filed only two day s befor e the he aring and it suffe red the same tec hnical def iciency as Plaintiffs’ ori gi n al affidavit. To hold otherwise would a llow a movant to file a pe rfunc tory
a f f i d a v i tw h e n h e f

i l e s h i s m o t i o n f

o r s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t a n d w a i t u n t i l t w o d a ys , o r e v e n o n e d a y, befor e the he aring to file a much more detailed affidavit ther eby preve nting the a dverse party from either comply ing with the require ments of Rule 56.04 or ef fec tively addre ssing those matters ra ised in the movant’s amende d aff idavit. We, therefor e, vac ate the g rant of summary judgme nt.

O u r r e s o lu ti o n o f

Pl a in ti f f s ’ f ir s t th r e e is s u e s r e n d e r s th e r e main in g is s u e s mo o t. We
vacate the Tria l Court’s October 18, 2004 order in its entirety

. Our re solution of this appea l is to be take n in no way

a s a ny c omm ent ary as to the va lid ity or inv a lid ity

of Pla int if fs ’ c la im a g a ins t Def endant. A lth o u g h w e d o n o t d ir e c tl y a d d r e s s th e is s u e o f w h e th e r th e T r ia l Co u r t e rr e d in not stay ing this c ase pending a resolution of the underlying me dical malpra ctice a ction, we sug g est that th i s wo u l d be an a

ppropriate situation in which to ex erc ise the conse rvation of sc arc e judicial
resour ces. See Carve ll v. Bottoms, 900 S.W .2d 23 (Tenn. 1995)

.

Conclusion

The judgme nt of the Trial Court is vacated, and this cause is re manded to the Trial Court. The costs on appe al ar e asse ssed ag ainst the Appellee , Rick J . Be arf ield.

___________________________________ D. MI CHAEL

SW I NEY, JUDGE