United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 8, 2017 Decided August 10, 2018

No. 15-3018

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JEFFREY HENRY WILLIAMSON, ALSO KNOWN AS JEFF 

WILLIAMSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:14-cr-00151-1)

Richard K. Gilbert, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed briefs for appellant.

Jeffrey H. Williamson, pro se, filed briefs for appellant.

Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Elizabeth 

Trosman and Frederick W. Yette, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and 

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SRINIVASAN.
2

SRINIVASAN, Circuit Judge: Jeff Henry Williamson was 

convicted of threatening to murder a federal law enforcement 

officer. Williamson raises several challenges to his conviction 

and sentence in this appeal. We reject most of his challenges, 

except that we remand the case to the district court to give 

Williamson access to jury-commission records as required by 

28 U.S.C. § 1867.

I.

This case arises out of a 911 phone call Williamson made 

on June 19, 2014. In the call, Williamson threatened to murder 

a special agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation named 

Brian Schmitt. Soon after, Williamson was charged with

making a threat against a federal law enforcement officer “with 

intent to retaliate against such . . . officer on account of the 

performance of official duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). 

Williamson chose to represent himself, and the case 

proceeded to trial. At trial, the government sought to show that 

the threatening 911 phone call was the culmination of 

Williamson’s longstanding obsession with Agent Schmitt, 

which dated back to a 2005 interaction between Schmitt and 

Williamson in Denver. In that interaction, Schmitt was

involved in issuing Williamson a misdemeanor ticket for 

making harassing phone calls to the local FBI field office. 

Over the next three months, Schmitt was involved in issuing 

Williamson two additional tickets for making similar calls. 

At trial, the government introduced evidence that, before 

the June 19, 2014, call at issue in this case, Williamson made a 

number of phone calls in which he had mentioned Schmitt. For 

example, on June 2, 2014, Williamson left fourteen messages 

for an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the District of Columbia. In 

his messages, Williamson complained about being harassed by 
3

FBI agents while he was in Washington, D.C., mentioning 

Schmitt by name several times. Williamson also referenced the 

tickets Schmitt had been involved in issuing him in Denver in 

2005 and 2006. The series of messages became increasingly 

angry and threatening. In the last message, Williamson said

that he would “smash the f— out of” the FBI agents he believed 

were harassing him, and “plead not guilty by reason of 

entrapment.” Suppl. App. 414. 

One week later, on June 9, Williamson called the office of 

FBI Agent Steven Olson, the agent who supervised Schmitt in 

Denver. Williamson told Olson’s assistant to “tell Brian 

Schmitt and Steve Olson that I am going to hunt them down 

and kill them.” Suppl. App. 86. Williamson then said 

something to the effect that he was going to “pop them in the 

heads and blow them away.” Id. 

Ten days later, on June 19, Williamson issued the threat 

giving rise to his charge and conviction in this case. In a call 

to a 911 line, Williamson left a message in which he repeatedly 

stated that he would shoot FBI Agent Brian Schmitt “in his 

f—in head.” United States v. Williamson, 83 F. Supp. 3d 394, 

399 (D.D.C. 2015). 

At trial, Williamson admitted that he “did make the 

threat.” App. 318. But he argued that he lacked the requisite 

intent to commit the crime because he had not issued the threat 

in retaliation against Schmitt for “the performance of official 

duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). Rather, Williamson alleged, 

Schmitt and other FBI agents had been harassing him over a 

period of years for his political activism and that the

harassment continued until Williamson made the 911 call. 

Williamson argued that he made the threat merely to stop the 

harassment. As a result, Williamson contended, he had not 

violated 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). 
4

Williamson also sought to argue that he had been 

entrapped into making the threat. He suggested that Schmitt’s

purpose for harassing him was to induce him to commit a 

crime. The district court denied discovery on entrapment and 

declined to issue an entrapment instruction, concluding that 

Williamson “failed to ‘proffer sufficient evidence from which 

a reasonable jury could find entrapment.’” App. 159 (quoting 

Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62 (1988)).

The jury convicted Williamson of making a threat in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). The district court 

sentenced him to 96 months of imprisonment. See Williamson, 

83 F. Supp. 3d at 395.

On appeal, Williamson’s appointed counsel has submitted

briefs challenging Williamson’s conviction and sentence. This 

court granted Williamson leave to file supplemental pro se 

briefs, in which he has advanced the same arguments pressed

by his appointed counsel and also offered several additional 

ones.

II.

There are four arguments Williamson advances both 

through his appointed counsel and in his pro se briefs. First, he 

contends that the indictment was legally insufficient because it 

did not fairly inform him of the charged offense. Second, he 

argues that the district court erred in declining to instruct the 

jury on his proposed entrapment defense. Third, he submits

that the district court improperly denied him access to 

jury-commission records. Fourth, he contends that the district 

court abused its discretion in several ways in sentencing him to 

96 months of imprisonment. 
5

We agree that Williamson was entitled to inspect

jury-commission records under 28 U.S.C. § 1867, and 

therefore remand the case on that ground. We reject the three 

remaining arguments. 

A.

To be sufficient under the Constitution, an indictment 

“need only inform the defendant of the precise offense of which 

he is accused so that he may prepare his defense and plead 

double jeopardy in any further prosecution for the same 

offense.” United States v. Verrusio, 762 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 

2014); see United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108 

(2007). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) effectuates 

that understanding, requiring an indictment to contain “a plain, 

concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts 

constituting the offense charged.” To meet those requirements, 

“[i]t is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the 

offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as those words 

of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any 

uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary 

to constitute the offence intended to be punished.” Hamling v. 

United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

The Supreme Court’s decision in Resendiz-Ponce is 

illustrative. There, the government indicted the defendant for 

attempted reentry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(a). The statute bars certain “alien[s]” from 

“attempt[ing] to enter . . . the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(a)(2). The indictment echoed the statutory language,

while adding a time and place of the charged offense, stating: 

“On or about June 1, 2003,” the defendant “attempted to enter 

the United States of America at or near San Luis in the District 

of Arizona.” 549 U.S. at 105. The Court explained that, by 
6

using the statutory language and specifying the time and place 

of the offense, the indictment gave the defendant fair notice of 

the charge against which he would need to defend himself, and 

also enabled him to protect himself against future prosecution 

for the same offense. Id. at 108. In short, the case exemplified 

the understanding that “an indictment parroting the language of 

a federal criminal statute is often sufficient.” Id. at 109.

The indictment in this case is much like the one upheld in 

Resendiz-Ponce. Here, the statute makes it a crime to 

“threaten[] to assault . . . or murder” a “Federal law 

enforcement officer . . . with intent to retaliate against” the 

“officer on account of the performance of official duties.” 18 

U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). As in Resendiz-Ponce, the indictment 

echoes the operative statutory text while also specifying the 

time and place of the offense (as well as the identity of the 

threatened officer): “On or about June 19, 2014, within the 

District of Columbia, defendant . . . did threaten to assault and 

murder a Federal law enforcement officer, that is, Brian 

Schmitt, a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, with intent to retaliate against such . . . officer on 

account of the performance of his official duties.” App. 47. 

And just as in Resendiz-Ponce, by parroting the statutory 

language and specifying the time and place of the offense and 

the identity of the threatened officer, the indictment adequately 

informed Williamson about the charge against him so that he 

could prepare his defense and protect his double-jeopardy 

rights. 

Williamson contends that the indictment was insufficient 

because it did not identify particular “official duties” 

performed by Schmitt that motivated Williamson’s threat. The 

Court in Resendiz-Ponce rejected a similar argument. The 

defendant there, observing that the elements of the 

attempted-reentry offense include the commission of an overt 
7

act, contended that the indictment was deficient because it 

failed to allege any specific overt act he had performed. 549 

U.S. at 109. The Court, though, thought it was enough for the 

indictment to allege the performance of an overt act in general 

(which the indictment had implicitly done by alleging an 

attempt to enter the United States), and that there was no need 

to specify a particular overt act. Id. at 107, 110. Here, it was 

likewise enough for the indictment to allege—in concert with 

the statutory language—that a threat was made “on account of 

the performance of official duties” in general, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 115(a)(1)(B), without any need to specify a particular official 

duty.

It is true that, while parroting the statutory language is 

“often sufficient,” that is not invariably so. Resendiz-Ponce, 

549 U.S. at 109. Williamson relies, for instance, on Russell v. 

United States, in which the government had indicted the 

defendants for refusing to answer questions before a 

congressional subcommittee. 369 U.S. 749, 752 (1962). That 

statute barred individuals from refusing “to answer any 

question pertinent to the subject under inquiry” before a

congressional committee. 2 U.S.C. § 192. The indictment 

contained no information identifying the particular matter 

“under inquiry” before the subcommittee, instead using the 

generic terms of the statute. Russell, 369 U.S. at 752. The 

Court held that the indictment was insufficient. Id. at 764. 

Because “the very core of criminality” under the statute is

“pertinency to the question under inquiry,” the matter under

inquiry is “central to every prosecution under the statute.” Id. 

The Court thus held that the defendants could not be fairly 

informed of the charges against them unless the indictment 

identified the subject of the subcommittee’s inquiry. Id.

That is untrue of any particular “official duties” performed 

by a threatened federal officer for purposes of a prosecution 
8

under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). Specifying a particular 

official duty (or duties) that may occasion a threat against an 

officer is not at all “central to every prosecution under the 

statute.” Russell, 369 U.S. at 764. Nor is it “the very core of 

criminality” under the statute. Id. The statute speaks in terms 

of a threat made “on account of the performance of official 

duties,” not to draw attention to a particular official duty, but 

instead to assure that the threat generally relates to the officer’s 

performance of official duties rather than to a personal dispute 

having nothing to do with the officer’s job functions. For 

instance, the statute would not reach a threat arising from a

personal dispute with a neighbor who happens be a law 

enforcement officer, where the subject of the disagreement is 

entirely unconnected to the officer’s performance of his job. 

Here, the indictment, by restating the statutory language, 

fairly informed Williamson that he was being charged with 

threatening Schmitt in retaliation for Schmitt’s “performance 

of official duties,” 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1), as opposed to 

threatening Schmitt for reasons unrelated to his law 

enforcement responsibilities. There was no need for the 

indictment to go beyond the statute’s terms on that score. And 

more generally, the indictment fairly informed Williamson of 

the charge against him so as to satisfy the Constitution and Rule 

7(c). 

B.

Williamson argues next that the district court erred in 

declining to instruct the jury on his proposed entrapment 

defense. Reviewing the matter de novo and assuming that 

Williamson’s version of the facts is true, see United States v. 

Glover, 153 F.3d 749, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1998), we conclude that 

the district court properly rejected Williamson’s entrapment 

defense as a matter of law.
9

The entrapment defense protects defendants who would 

have refrained from committing an offense absent government 

inducement. The central question in an entrapment case is 

“whether government agents ‘implanted in the mind of an 

innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense 

and induced its commission in order that they may prosecute.’” 

United States v. McKinley, 70 F.3d 1307, 1311-12 (D.C. Cir. 

1995) (brackets removed) (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 

287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)). We consider entrapment under a 

two-step framework. 

First, the defendant must introduce evidence that the 

government induced her to commit the crime. Id. at 1312. 

“The government’s behavior amounts to inducement when it 

was ‘such that a law-abiding citizen’s will to obey the law 

could have been overborne.’” Glover, 153 F.3d at 754 (quoting 

United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). A

range of government conduct could qualify as inducement 

under that standard, including “persuasion, fraudulent 

representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises 

of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy or friendship.” 

United States v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(quoting United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 913 (D.C. Cir. 

1978)). But inducement generally “requires a showing that the 

government agent actually solicited or suggested the criminal 

conduct.” United States v. Solofa, 745 F.3d 1226, 1229 (D.C. 

Cir. 2014). 

Second, if the defendant introduces sufficient evidence of 

government inducement, the burden shifts to the government 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 

predisposed to commit the crime. Glover, 153 F.3d at 754. If 

the government fails to meet its burden of proving 

predisposition, the defendant will be entitled to acquittal on 

entrapment grounds. See id. 
10

A defendant is only “entitled to an entrapment instruction 

when there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury 

could find entrapment.” Mathews, 485 U.S. at 62. Here, the

district court determined that Williamson failed at the first step

because he did not introduce evidence of government 

inducement. See United States v. Williamson, 2014 WL 

12695537, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2014).

Williamson sought to argue that Agent Schmitt and other 

FBI agents had engaged in a pattern of harassment over several 

years with the specific aim of causing Williamson to commit a 

threatening or violent act for which he could be imprisoned. 

Williamson alleged he had complained about the harassment to 

various authorities, to no avail. According to Williamson’s 

account, the agents’ harassing conduct, coupled with the 

government’s failure to respond to his complaints, provoked 

him to issue the threat because that was his only means of 

stopping the harassment.

The district court correctly concluded that Williamson 

failed to proffer sufficient evidence of inducement for a 

reasonable jury to conclude that he was entrapped. It is 

undisputed that Williamson made no “showing that the 

government agent[s] actually solicited or suggested” that he 

make a violent threat against a law enforcement officer. Solofa, 

745 F.3d at 1229. 

Williamson notes the language in our decision in Sanchez

indicating that “harassment” could also amount to inducement. 

See 88 F.3d at 1249. Insofar as government agents’ harassment 

could constitute inducement, it could qualify as inducement 

under our decisions only if it amounted to a solicitation or 

suggestion that he threaten a law enforcement officer, Solofa, 

745 F.3d at 1229, and if it sufficed to overcome “a law-abiding 

citizen’s will to obey the law,” Glover, 153 F.3d at 754. As to 
11

the former, Williamson offered no evidence that the 

harassment was so aimed. As to the latter, as the district court 

explained, the government harassment, though significant

assuming the truth of the allegations, would not lead a 

law-abiding citizen to threaten to murder a federal law 

enforcement officer. See Williamson, 2014 WL 12695537, at 

*4.

A contrary conclusion, moreover, would risk giving the 

entrapment defense an unduly broad sweep. If the alleged 

harassment in this case could be seen as adequate inducement 

to cause an individual to threaten to assault or murder a federal 

law enforcement officer as a means of stopping the harassment, 

it might also be seen as adequate inducement to cause him to 

commit the assault or murder for the same reason. Beyond the 

anomalous results of such an understanding, recognizing 

entrapment under such circumstances would take the defense 

well beyond its purpose: to prevent law enforcement officers 

from “implant[ing] in the mind of an innocent person the 

disposition to commit the alleged offense” so that they “may 

prosecute” her. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.

For the reasons stated, Williamson failed to introduce 

evidence that the government induced him into threatening to 

murder Agent Schmitt. The district court thus did not err in 

declining to instruct the jury on Williamson’s proposed 

entrapment defense.

C.

Williamson argues next that the district court incorrectly 

denied him access to jury-commission records he was entitled 

to inspect under 28 U.S.C. § 1867. The government concedes 

that the district court erred in denying Williamson access to 

those records. Both sides are correct.
12

Section 1867(f) allows a defendant to “inspect, reproduce, 

and copy” jury records when preparing a motion to challenge 

the composition of the jury on the ground that it failed to reflect 

a fair cross section of the community. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a), (f). 

The district court denied Williamson access to jury records 

because he did not submit a sworn statement accompanying his 

request for the records and because he did not plausibly allege 

a violation of his right to a jury that represents a fair cross 

section of the community. But to access jury records under 

section 1867(f), a defendant need not submit a sworn statement 

containing such allegations: “a litigant has essentially an 

unqualified right to inspect jury lists.” Test v. United States, 

420 U.S. 28, 30 (1975) (per curiam). As Williamson points 

out, a sworn statement of that kind is required when ultimately 

submitting a motion to challenge the composition of a jury 

under section 1867(d), but not when seeking to inspect jury 

records as the initial step in deciding whether to file such a 

motion. See id.

We therefore remand the case for the district court to allow 

Williamson access to jury-commission records pursuant to 

section 1867(f).

D.

We now take up Williamson’s arguments challenging his 

sentence. 

1.

After the jury found Williamson guilty of threatening to 

murder Agent Schmitt, the district court held a hearing to 

determine the sentence. Before the hearing, the court notified 

Williamson that it was considering an upward departure from 

the sentencing guidelines range in light of a guidelines 
13

comment providing that an upward departure might be 

warranted if a defendant engages in “a prolonged period of 

making harassing communications to the same victim.” 

Williamson, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 400 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 

cmt. 4(B)).

At the sentencing hearing, the court first determined that 

Williamson’s criminal history and offense level yielded a 

sentencing guidelines range of 15 to 21 months of 

imprisonment. The court then concluded, as it had suggested 

in its pre-hearing notice, that it would depart upwards and issue 

an above-guidelines sentence based “in part, not entirely, but 

in part” on Comment 4(B) of Guidelines Section 2A6.1. 

Suppl. App. 348. The court explained that Williamson had 

engaged in a series of threatening communications over a 

period of years related to Schmitt and the FBI.

The court then went on to consider the factors set out in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a). It explained that the same considerations 

underlying its departure based on Comment 4(B) also 

demonstrated that “the seriousness of the offense is quite 

grave” for purposes of section 3553(a)(2)(A). Suppl. App. 352. 

The court additionally explained that it sought to fix a sentence 

that appropriately took into account the importance of 

incapacitation, respect for law, and deterrence. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C). Based on those considerations, the court 

decided to impose a sentence of 96 months of imprisonment 

followed by 36 months of supervised release. The court later 

issued a written order elaborating on the reasons for its 

sentence. See Williamson, 83 F. Supp. 3d 394.

2.

We review sentencing challenges using a two-step 

analysis. First, we consider whether the district court 
14

committed a “significant procedural error” in arriving at the 

sentence. United States v. Lawrence, 662 F.3d 551, 556 (D.C. 

Cir. 2011); see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

Second, if the district court’s sentencing decision was 

procedurally sound, we consider whether the sentence is 

“substantively reasonable.” Lawrence, 662 F.3d at 556. In that 

regard, we examine “the totality of the circumstances, 

including the extent of any variance from the guidelines range.” 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Our review of both the procedural 

soundness and substantive reasonableness of a sentence is for 

abuse of discretion. Id. 

Williamson challenges his sentence on three grounds. 

First, he argues that the district court erred in relying on 

Comment 4(B) as a basis for departing from the guidelines 

range. Second, he contends that the district court unlawfully 

increased his sentence based on conduct protected by the First 

Amendment. Third, he submits that the length of his term of 

imprisonment is substantively unreasonable. Each of those 

arguments lacks merit.

a. 

Williamson first argues that the district court erred in 

departing upwards from the guidelines range based on 

Comment 4(B). That comment provides that an upward 

departure “may be warranted” if there is “a prolonged period 

of making harassing communications to the same victim.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 cmt. 4(B). Williamson contends that the 

district court could not rely on the comment because, in his 

view, it applies only if harassing communications are made 

directly to the victim rather than to some third party. We 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when 

it decided to impose an above-guidelines sentence of 96 
15

months of imprisonment based in part on Comment 4(B) and 

the concerns underlying it.

The district court’s decision to sentence Williamson above 

the guidelines range did not stand or fall on a determination 

that the precise terms of Comment 4(B) squarely apply to the 

circumstances of this case. To be sure, the court believed that 

the comment applies to the facts of the case and relied on the 

comment in explaining its decision to sentence Williamson 

above the guidelines. But the court made apparent that, 

regardless of whether Comment 4(B) directly applies by its 

terms, the court’s above-guidelines sentence was warranted in 

any event based on the factors set out in section 3553(a) and on 

the general concerns animating the comment.

For instance, in considering the need for the sentence “to 

reflect the seriousness of the offense,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2)(A), the court explained that, “with or without the 

commentary as to [the] prolonged period of making threats,” 

“the duration of these threats, the repetition of these threats, 

[and] the increased nature of violence or threatened violence” 

all led the court “to find that [the offense is] very serious.” 

Suppl. App. 352 (emphasis added). When rejecting 

Williamson’s narrower interpretation of the terms of Comment 

4(B), the court explained that “the spirit behind Comment 

n.4(B) amply applies,” and also noted that Williamson “fail[ed] 

to recognize that the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer 

mandatory.” Williamson, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 402 & n.6 

(emphasis added). Similarly, when the court gave notice to 

Williamson that it was considering an upward departure in light 

of his prolonged period of threats, it reasoned that “an upward 

departure may be warranted” pursuant to “comment n.4(B) and

common sense.” Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
16

Additionally, the court explained that other factors in 

section 3553(a) justified its above-guidelines sentence. In 

considering the need for the sentence “to promote respect for 

the law,” “afford adequate deterrence,” and “protect the public 

from further crimes of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C), the court recounted Williamson’s 

criminal history and record of renewing criminal conduct after 

release from imprisonment. In light of his nearly immediate 

resumption of threatening conduct towards Agent Schmitt 

upon release from prison in the past, the court had “no 

confidence that Mr. Williamson . . . will be law-abiding in the 

future.” Id. at 403. The court found “[m]ost troubling” that 

Williamson “already has served an above-Guidelines sentence 

in Texas of 42 months for threatening to blow up FBI 

headquarters and that sentence failed to deter him from 

committing further crimes.” Id. A sentence of 96 months of 

imprisonment, the court determined, was necessary to address 

those considerations. Id. at 404.

The court’s analysis makes evident that its decision to 

impose that sentence would have been the same regardless of 

whether the terms of Comment 4(B) directly apply to the 

circumstances of the case. And we cannot say that the district

court, relying in part on the section 3553(a) factors and on the 

“spirit” animating Comment 4(B), abused its discretion in 

concluding that an above-guidelines sentence of 96 months is

appropriate in the circumstances.

b.

Williamson next contends that the district court unlawfully 

enhanced his sentence based on First Amendment-protected 

activity: namely, his various phone calls and letters petitioning 

the government for relief from alleged government harassment. 

We conclude that the district court properly considered the 
17

history of Williamson’s communications with government 

officials in crafting an appropriate sentence.

In Dawson v. Delaware, the Supreme Court held that the 

Constitution does not prevent a sentencing court from 

considering an individual’s First Amendment-protected 

“beliefs and associations” in fixing a sentence, when those 

beliefs and associations are relevant to determining an 

appropriate sentence. 503 U.S. 159, 165 (1992). Here, all of 

the ostensibly First Amendment-protected activity considered 

by the district court was relevant to the sentencing decision. 

Under Dawson, the court therefore could take into account that 

activity in determining a suitable sentence. The court found 

that Williamson’s communications established a pattern of 

disturbing conduct that worsened over time, bearing on both 

the seriousness of his offense and on the need to protect the 

public generally (and Agent Schmitt specifically) from harm. 

The court did not violate the First Amendment in doing so.

c.

Williamson last argues that his sentence is substantively 

unreasonable. We again disagree.

In considering a defendant’s challenge to the substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence, we ask the following question: 

“In light of the facts and circumstances of the offense and 

offender, is the sentence so unreasonably high or unreasonably 

low as to constitute an abuse of discretion by the district court?” 

United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 

2008). “It will be the unusual case when an appeals court can 

plausibly say that a sentence” is substantively unreasonable in 

light of all the circumstances. In re Sealed Case, 809 F.3d 672, 

676 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
18

Williamson was sentenced to 96 months of imprisonment 

based on a guidelines range of 15-21 months. Williamson, 83 

F. Supp. 3d at 401, 404. According to Williamson, no other 

person convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) with the same 

criminal history has received a term of imprisonment so 

lengthy as Williamson. See App. 405. We conclude that, while 

Williamson’s sentence represents a significant increase above 

the upper end of the guidelines range, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in imposing that sentence.

As explained, the district court offered a thorough 

explanation for its above-guidelines sentence, based on its 

experience with—and assessment of—the facts and 

circumstances of the case. The court concluded that 

Williamson’s offense was significantly more serious than the 

statute captured, that a guidelines sentence would not 

adequately deter Williamson in light of his repeated history of 

similar misconduct and the failure of a previous 

above-guidelines sentence to cause him to correct his ways, and 

that he presented a substantial danger to the public and to Agent 

Schmitt. The district court thus made “the kind of 

defendant-specific determinations that are within the special 

competence of sentencing courts.” Gardellini, 545 F.3d at 

1095. We cannot conclude that the district court’s sentence 

was substantively unreasonable. 

III.

Williamson makes a number of additional arguments in his 

pro se briefing. We have given those arguments thorough 

consideration and have concluded that they lack merit. We 

specifically address two of them here: first, Williamson argues 

that the district judge should have recused herself; and second, 

Williamson argues that his Sixth Amendment right to 

self-representation was violated during pre-trial proceedings. 
19

A.

Recusal is required under 28 U.S.C. § 455 if “a reasonable 

and informed observer would question the judge’s 

impartiality.” SEC v. Loving Spirit Found. Inc., 392 F.3d 486, 

493 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Recusal is required 

under 28 U.S.C. § 144 if a judge “has a personal bias or 

prejudice” either against or in favor of a party. We review the 

denial of a motion to recuse under section 455 for abuse of 

discretion. Id. We have not decided the appropriate standard 

of review with respect to recusal motions filed under 

section 144. See id. at 492. Some circuits apply a de novo 

standard, while others use abuse of discretion. Id. We need 

not resolve the issue here because Williamson’s argument for 

recusal fails even under de novo review. 

The majority of Williamson’s arguments in favor of 

recusal are rooted in legal disagreements with the district 

judge’s rulings against him, which do not afford grounds for a 

recusal. See id at 493. Williamson also contends that the 

district judge dealt with him unduly harshly during pretrial and 

trial proceedings. Our review of the proceedings confirms, 

however, that the district judge treated Williamson 

even-handedly and afforded him significant latitude to make 

extended arguments on the issues he wanted to discuss. See 

App. 1-41 (documenting numerous motions that Williamson 

filed); Suppl. App. 130-208 (defendant’s questioning of Agent 

Schmitt at trial); Suppl. App. 311-47 (defendant’s sentencing 

arguments). The district court therefore did not err in declining 

to grant Williamson’s motion for recusal.

B.

Williamson argues that the district court allowed standby 

counsel to take over his defense, infringing his Sixth 
20

Amendment right to represent himself at trial. See Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The Supreme Court has 

generally upheld the appointment of standby counsel when a 

defendant exercises the right of self-representation, subject to 

two conditions. “First, the pro se defendant is entitled to 

preserve actual control over the case he chooses to present to 

the jury.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984). 

“Second, participation by standby counsel without the 

defendant’s consent should not be allowed to destroy the jury’s 

perception that the defendant is representing himself.” Id. 

Here, Williamson’s argument is grounded in a complaint 

that standby counsel did not give him sufficient notice of a 

pre-trial hearing at which he was asked to justify his request for 

access to certain government officials whom he hoped to call 

as defense witnesses. The result, Williamson submits, is that 

standby counsel effectively blocked him from calling certain 

witnesses. Williamson’s contention lacks merit. Williamson 

had sufficient time to explain why the witnesses were 

necessary to his case and failed to do so. Any actions by 

standby counsel in asking for the hearing did not vitiate 

Williamson’s control over the case he wanted to present to the 

jury, and could not have affected the jury’s perception of 

Williamson’s control over the case because the events occurred 

before the jury was empaneled. 

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Williamson’s 

conviction and sentence except that we remand the case to the 

district court so that it can give Williamson access to 

jury-commission records consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1867.

So ordered.