In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Eastern District

DIVISION ONE

S.E.M., ) No. ED107403

)

Respondent, )

)

vs. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

) of St. Louis County

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, et al., ) 18SL-CC02526

)

Defendants, )

) 

and ) Honorable Ellen W. Dunne

) 

MISSOURI STATE HIGHWAY PATROL ) 

CRIMINAL RECORDS REPOSITORY, )

)

Appellant. ) Filed: November 26, 2019

OPINION

Missouri State Highway Patrol Criminal Records Repository (“MSHP”) appeals the 

judgment granting S.E.M.’s1 petition requesting expungement of two prior felony drug 

convictions under section 610.140 RSMo Supp. 2018 (effective August 28, 2018 through August 

27, 2019) (“the August 2018 version of section 610.140” or “the August 2018 version of the 

statute”).

2

 We affirm. 

 1 Initials should be used to protect the identity of the party. “To do otherwise would encourage a party which 

opposed the expungement to appeal the decision in order to create a readily available public record of the now 

expunged offenses and would discourage a party seeking expungement from appealing the denial of that request due 

to the readily available public record created by the appeal.” R.G. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 580 S.W.3d 

38, 39 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). 2 In the underlying case, S.E.M. filed a petition requesting expungement against several underlying defendants

including St. Louis County, Missouri and MSHP. MSHP is the only underlying defendant who has filed an appeal 

in this case. 
2

I. BACKGROUND

On November 21, 1987, S.E.M was charged with two unclassified felony drug counts in 

violation of section 195.020 RSMo 1986. S.E.M pleaded guilty and satisfied all obligations 

related to the disposition of the convictions in February 1993. 

Then, on April 12, 1993, S.E.M. pleaded guilty to a class A misdemeanor stealing charge 

under chapter 570 RSMo Cum. Supp. 1993. S.E.M. completed all obligations of the conviction. 

S.E.M. has not pleaded guilty or been convicted of a misdemeanor or felony since 1993. 

On June 22, 2018, S.E.M filed a petition in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County 

requesting expungement of the two felony drug convictions under section 610.140 RSMo Supp. 

2018 (effective January 1, 2018 through August 27, 2018) (“the January 2018 version of section 

610.140” or “the January 2018 version of the statute”). MSHP filed an answer asserting S.E.M. 

is ineligible for expungement due to the April 1993 stealing conviction. Subsequently, section 

610.140 RSMo was amended, and these amendments are reflected in the August 2018 version of 

section 610.140.3

 

On September 21, 2018, the trial court entered a judgment granting S.E.M.’s petition

requesting expungement of the two prior felony drug convictions under the August 2018 version 

of section 610.140. The trial court’s judgment expressly found that the August 2018 version of 

the statute operates and applies retrospectively. MSHP appeals. 

II. DISCUSSION

MSHP raises one point on appeal. MSHP does not assert the trial court erred in finding 

the August 2018 version of section 610.140 operates and applies retrospectively; instead, MSHP

only asserts the trial court erred in granting S.E.M.’s petition requesting expungement under the 

timing requirements of the August 2018 version of section 610.140.5. Nevertheless, before we 

 3 The relevant portions of the August 2018 version of section 610.140 are set out below in Section II.B.2. of this 

opinion. 
3

address the merits of MSHP’s particular argument on appeal, we find it is important to establish 

which version of section 610.140 RSMo applies in this case, because whether section 610.140 

RSMo operates and applies retrospectively appears to be an issue of first impression in Missouri. 

A. The Version of Section 610.140 RSMo that Applies in this Case

Generally, the version of a statute in effect at the time a petition is filed is the version 

applicable to a particular case. See Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 872 

(Mo. banc 1993). Changes in statutory provisions that are substantive operate prospectively 

unless the legislature expressly states otherwise. Id. However, there is an exception in Missouri. 

Id. Statutory provisions that are remedial or procedural operate retrospectively unless the 

legislature expressly states otherwise. Id. 

In this case, although the January 2018 version of section 610.140 was the version of the 

statute in effect at the time S.E.M.’s petition requesting expungement was filed, the trial court 

found the August 2018 version of the statute applies in this case because section 610.140 RSMo 

operates and applies retrospectively. This finding is correct under the circumstances of this case. 

Expungement statutes, including section 610.140 RSMo, are recognized as remedial and should 

be liberally construed. Martinez v. State, 24 S.W.3d 10, 19 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000); see generally 

section 610.140 RSMo. Because section 610.140 RSMo is remedial and the legislature has not 

expressly stated that the statute operates prospectively, section 610.140 RSMo operates 

retrospectively. See id.; Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 872. Moreover, the effective date of the 

August 2018 version of section 610.140 was August 28, 2018, and because the judgment was 

entered on September 21, 2018, the August 2018 version of the statute applies retroactively 

here.4

 See State ex rel. D&D Distributors, LLC v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, 579 

 4 Section 610.140 was amended effective August 28, 2019, and this is the version of the statute currently in place; 

however, these amendments do not apply here and have no effect on this case. 
4

S.W.3d 318, 325 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (generally, changes to remedial or procedural statutes 

apply to all pending cases unless it would invalidate actions taken in a previous proceeding). 

We now turn to the merits of MSHP’s argument on appeal. 

B. MSHP’s Argument on Appeal 

In MSHP’s sole point on appeal, it argues the trial court erred in granting S.E.M.’s 

petition requesting expungement of the two prior felony drug convictions under the timing 

requirements in subsection (1) and (2) of the August 2018 version of section 610.140.5.

5

 For the 

reasons discussed below, we disagree. 

1. Standard of Review 

A judgment from a court-tried case will be affirmed unless there is no substantial 

evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or 

applies the law. W.C.H. v. State, 546 S.W.3d 612, 614 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018). The trial court’s 

application of statutory requirements is a question of law, rather than fact, and is reviewed de 

novo. Id. 

2. Analysis

The facts in this case are undisputed. The sole issue presented is a matter of statutory 

interpretation which is a question of law that is subject to de novo review. Roesing v. Director of 

Revenue, 573 S.W.3d 634, 637 (Mo. banc 2019); Lumetta v. Sheriff of St. Charles County, 413 

S.W.3d 718, 720 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013); see also W.C.H., 546 S.W.3d at 614. Our primary rule 

in interpreting statutes is to determine the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give 

effect to the intent, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning. Dynasty 

Home, L.C. v. Public Water Supply District Number 3 of Franklin County, 453 S.W.3d 876, 879 

(Mo. App. E.D. 2015); see R.H. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol Criminal Records Repository, 

 5 MSHP does not dispute that S.E.M. met all other requirements for expungement under the August 2018 version of 

section 610.140. 
5

578 S.W.3d 398, 403 (Mo. App. E.D 2019) (“we must give words and phrases in the statute their 

plain and ordinary meaning[]”); see also Roesing, 573 S.W.3d at 639; Lumetta, 413 S.W.3d at 

720. “When the words [of a statute] are clear, there is nothing to construe beyond applying the 

plain meaning of the law.” Lumetta, 413 S.W.3d at 720 (quoting Bateman v. Rinehart, 391 

S.W.3d 441, 446 (Mo. banc 2013)).

Here, the words of the relevant portions of the August 2018 version of section 610.140.5

are clear:

. . . At any hearing, the court may accept evidence and hear testimony on, and 

may consider, the following criteria for each of the offenses, violations, or 

infractions listed in the petition for expungement:

(1) At the time the petition is filed, it has been at least seven years if the offense is 

a felony, or at least three years if the offense is a misdemeanor, municipal offense, 

or infraction, from the date the petitioner completed any authorized disposition 

imposed under section 557.011 for each offense, violation, or infraction listed in 

the petition; [and]

(2) The person has not been found guilty of any other misdemeanor or felony, not 

including violations of the traffic regulations provided under chapters 304 and 

307, during the time period specified for the underlying offense, violation, or 

infraction in subdivision (1) of this subsection[.] . . . 

(emphasis added). 

In this case, MSHP asserts the trial court erred in granting S.E.M.’s petition requesting

expungement of the felony drug convictions under the preceding timing requirements because 

S.E.M. had been found guilty of another crime (misdemeanor stealing in April 1993) during the 

seven-year period following completion of the authorized disposition imposed. MSHP argues 

the applicable time frame of seven years must have elapsed without future convictions –

measured from the date of completion of disposition of the felony drug convictions. So because 

S.E.M. was found guilty of a misdemeanor in April 1993, during the seven-year period after 

February 1993 (when S.E.M completed the disposition imposed for the felony drug crimes),

MSHP asserts expungement of S.E.M.’s 1987 felony drug crimes is forever barred. 
6

In support of the above argument, MSHP primarily relies on this Court’s decision in 

W.C.H., which held “‘the time period specified’ in section 610.140.5 (1) [RSMo. Cum. Supp. 

2012]6 begins on the date that the ‘person making the application has completed’ any sentence of 

imprisonment or any period of probation or parole, not the date of the petitioner’s conviction for 

the offense he or she is seeking to expunge.” 546 S.W.3d at 615 (quoting section 610.140.5 (1) 

and (2) RSMo Cum. Supp. 2012). However, we find MSHP’s reliance on W.C.H. is misplaced 

because the version of section 610.140.5 (1) and (2) RSMo analyzed under W.C.H. is not 

substantially similar to the version of the statute at issue here. See W.C.H., 546 S.W.3d at 613 

n.1, 613-15 (interpreting section 610.140.5 (1) and (2) RSMo Cum. Supp. 2012); compare

section 610.140.5 (1) and (2) RSMo Cum. Supp. 2012 with the August 2018 version of section 

610.140.5 (1) and (2).7

Further, MSHP’s argument is contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the August 

2018 version of section 610.140.5 (1), which clearly states in relevant part that expungement of a 

 6 All references to section 610.140.5 (1) and (2) RSMo. Cum. Supp. 2012 incorporate legislative amendments made 

in 2012 and which were effective from August 28, 2012 through December 31, 2017. 7 Section 610.140.5 RSMo Cum. Supp. 2012 states in relevant part:

. . . At the hearing, the court may accept evidence and hear testimony on, and may consider, the 

following criteria for each of the offenses listed in the petition for expungement:

(1) It has been at least twenty years if the offense is a felony, or at least ten years if the offense is a 

misdemeanor, municipal offense, or infraction, since the person making the application [has] 

completed:

(a) Any sentence of imprisonment; or

(b) Any period of probation or parole;

(2) The person has not been found guilty of a misdemeanor or felony, not including violations of 

the traffic regulations provided under chapters 304 and 307, during the time period specified for 

the underlying offense in subdivision (1) of this subsection[.]

In contrast, as previously mentioned, the statute at issue in this case, the August 2018 version of section 

610.140.5, provides in relevant part:

. . . At any hearing, the court may accept evidence and hear testimony on, and may consider, the 

following criteria for each of the offenses, violations, or infractions listed in the petition for 

expungement:

(1) At the time the petition is filed, it has been at least seven years if the offense is a felony, or at 

least three years if the offense is a misdemeanor, municipal offense, or infraction, from the date 

the petitioner completed any authorized disposition imposed under section 557.011 for each 

offense, violation, or infraction listed in the petition;

(2) The person has not been found guilty of any other misdemeanor or felony, not including 

violations of the traffic regulations provided under chapters 304 and 307, during the time period 

specified for the underlying offense, violation, or infraction in subdivision (1) of this subsection[.] 
7

felony may be granted if, inter alia, “At the time the petition is filed, it has been at least seven 

years . . . from the date the petitioner completed any authorized disposition imposed . . . for each 

offense . . . listed in the petition . . ..” (emphasis added). We find by adding this emphasized 

statutory language, “[t]he legislature was focused on the time immediately prior to the filing of 

the petition for expungement because that is the period of time that would determine if the 

petitioner had changed their behavior so as to meet the statutory qualifications for expungement 

and deserves[s] the second chance provided by the statute.” See R.G. v. Missouri State Highway 

Patrol, 580 S.W.3d 38, 39-42, 41 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) and S.Y. v. Askren, 581 S.W.3d 

721, 721-23, 722 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (both similarly finding with respect to a pre-August 

2018 version of section 610.140.5 (1) and referencing the August 2018 version of the statute); 

see also the August 2018 version of section 610.140.5 (1).

Based on the foregoing, the phrase “[a]t the time the petition is filed” in the August 2018 

version of section 610.140.5 (1) clearly indicates the relevant seven-year period is the seven-year 

period immediately preceding the filing of the petition requesting expungement of a felony 

conviction. See id. In other words, the time period specified in the August 2018 version of 

section 610.140.5 (1) starts from when the petition for expungement is filed and counts 

backwards in time seven years. 

Here, S.E.M.’s petition requesting expungement of his two prior felony drug convictions 

was filed on June 22, 2018. It is undisputed S.E.M. has not pleaded guilty to or been convicted 

of any offense since 1993 and that all of the obligations relative to the disposition of the offenses 

have been completed well before the seven-year time period immediately prior to the filing of 

the petition requesting expungement (between June 22, 2011 and June 22, 2018). Therefore, 

MSHP’s argument that the trial court erred in granting S.E.M.’s request for expungement under 

the timing requirements of the August 2018 version of section 610.140.5 (1) and (2) has no 

merit. Point denied. 
8

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s judgment granting S.E.M.’s petition requesting 

expungement of two prior felony drug convictions is affirmed.

ROBERT M. CLAYTON III, Presiding Judge

Robert G. Dowd, Jr., J., and 

Roy L. Richter, J., concur.