UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

RANDY LIEBICH, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 20-cv-2368

)

v. ) Hon. Steven C. Seeger

)

JOSEPH DELGIUDICE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

____________________________________)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In 2002, Plaintiff Randy Liebich was convicted of murdering two-year-old Steven Quinn 

Jr., and sentenced to sixty-five years in prison. The prosecution argued that Liebich used 

physical force against the child, causing a fatal brain injury. The state proved its case based in 

part on expert medical testimony. All along, Liebich maintained his innocence.

Then, nearly 16 years later, a state court vacated his conviction. A team of lawyers and 

medical experts presented evidence that undermined the state’s theory of what caused the brain 

injury. According to them, an abdominal injury or condition – not an acute head injury – caused 

the brain swelling that led to the child’s death. The state elected not to retry the case. 

Now, Liebich is suing a number of people involved in the original investigation. He 

brought claims against the officers and investigators who worked on his case, the doctors who 

allegedly cooperated and conspired with them, and the municipal corporations who employed 

them. He seeks compensation for wrongful imprisonment and for his emotional and physical 

injuries. Id. at ¶¶ 94–116. 

Liebich claims that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. He also brings 

state-law claims of malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, willful and 

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wanton conduct, and civil conspiracy. Id. at ¶¶ 117–41. He seeks to hold municipal entities 

liable, too, through theories of respondeat superior and indemnification. Id. at ¶¶ 142–52.

Currently before the Court are two motions to dismiss – one filed by DuPage County and 

the other filed jointly by two physician-defendants. See Dckt. Nos. 20, 37. The Court grants in 

part and denies in part the County’s motion to dismiss. The Court denies the physiciandefendants’ motion to dismiss.

Background

On February 8, 2002, Plaintiff Randy Liebich spent the day babysitting his girlfriend’s 

two-year-old son, Steven. See Cplt., at ¶¶ 29–30 (Dckt. No. 1). It was an eventful month for 

Liebich and his young family. His girlfriend Kenyatta Brown, Steven’s mother, had just given 

birth to their daughter, Angelique, and the four of them had just moved into a new apartment in 

DuPage County. Id. at ¶ 25.

After Brown returned home that afternoon, Liebich and Brown noticed that Steven was 

non-responsive, and they became concerned. Id. at ¶ 30. They took the child to the emergency 

room at Mount Sinai Hospital, where doctors discovered a problem with his brain. Id. at ¶¶ 31–

32. The toddler was then transferred to Rush University Medical Center to receive more 

neurological care. Id. at ¶ 32. He eventually underwent neurosurgery to try to relieve the 

pressure in his skull. Id. at ¶ 33.

Right from the get-go, investigators suspected foul play and zeroed in on Liebech as the 

primary suspect. In fact, the same night that Liebich and Brown rushed the child to the hospital, 

investigators questioned Liebich for 17 hours. Id. at ¶¶ 44–47. During those 17 hours, Liebich 

alleges that they denied him access to a lawyer, denied him his medication, refused to allow his 

family to see him, and verbally and physically threatened him. Id. at ¶¶ 44–63.

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Two-year-old Steven Quinn Jr. died on February 11, 2002, from complications related to 

his condition. Id. at ¶ 34. Two days later, DuPage County officers interrogated Liebich again, 

continuing to pursue a theory that physical force caused a traumatic brain injury that led to the 

child’s death. Id. at ¶¶ 67–70. 

Two doctors – Dr. Paul Severin and Dr. Lorenzo Munoz from Rush University Medical 

Center – provided medical opinions that the child had suffered an acute head trauma. Id. at ¶ 41. 

Liebich now claims that Severin and Munoz were in cahoots with the investigators, by 

“agree[ing] to provide false reports and opinions to point the finger” at him. Id. at ¶ 41; see also 

id. at ¶ 39 (alleging that “Defendants agreed to fabricate medical evidence to implicate him”). 

Throughout the investigation, Liebich consistently maintained that he did not hurt the child. Id. 

at ¶¶ 64, 70.

The complaint is thin on details about what happened after the child passed away. It does 

not mention anything about Liebich’s trial (the headings in the complaint jump from an alleged 

interrogation on February 14, 2002, to Liebich’s exoneration in 2018). And it does not reveal 

how the efforts to overturn his conviction got going. But the complaint does allege that Liebich 

was convicted of murder, and that the conviction was vacated in 2018. Id. at ¶ 88. 

Apparently medical experts reviewed the records and opined that an acute brain injury 

did not cause the brain swelling at all. Instead, the brain condition was secondary to an 

abdominal injury or infection that would have occurred days before February 8, 2002. Id. at 

¶ 86. Again, the complaint does not provide much detail about who offered that medical 

testimony. It simply mentions “multiple expert witnesses” who testified in “post-conviction 

proceedings.” Id. But the main point is crystal clear – the child did not suffer a brain injury 

from a traumatic blow to the head. 

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The new medical evidence led to Liebich’s freedom. After 16 years in prison, Liebich 

was released on bond. The prosecution dropped the case and dismissed all charges. Id. at ¶ 88.

Liebich later filed this lawsuit against a collection of individuals who played a role in the 

initial investigation, including officers in the DuPage County Sheriff’s Office, an officer in the 

Roselle Police Department, and investigators at the DuPage County Children’s Advocacy 

Center. See id. at ¶¶ 15–17. He also sued the two physicians, Dr. Paul Severin and Dr. Lorenzo 

Munoz, who allegedly conspired with the officers and investigators to falsify medical evidence 

to incriminate him. Id. at ¶ 19. Finally, he brought claims against DuPage County and the 

Village of Roselle, the Illinois municipal corporations that employed some of the individual 

Defendants. Id. at ¶¶ 20–21.

Analysis

Now before the Court are two motions to dismiss – one by Defendant DuPage County 

and the other filed jointly by the two physician-defendants. See Dckt. Nos. 20, 37. 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not 

the merits of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 

1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all wellpleaded facts in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See 

AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive, the complaint must 

give the defendant fair notice of the basis for the claim, and it must be facially plausible. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

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I. DuPage County’s Motion to Dismiss

Defendant DuPage County’s motion to dismiss is not a heavy lift because the parties 

agree on the proper result. The parties agree that DuPage County cannot be held liable on a 

theory of respondeat superior (Plaintiff’s Count X) because “neither the DuPage County 

Sheriff’s Office nor the Children’s Center are employees or agents of DuPage County.” See

Cty.’s Mtn. to Dismiss, at 2–3 (Dckt. No. 20) (citing Moy v. Cty. of Cook, 159 Ill. 2d 519, 640 

N.E.2d 926 (1994)); Pl.’s Resp. to Mtn. to Dismiss, at 3 (Dckt No. 30) (“Plaintiff does not seek 

to maintain a claim against Defendant County of DuPage on a respondeat superior theory of 

liability.”). The County concedes that it is a proper party for indemnification purposes, and 

Liebich agrees. See Cty.’s Mtn. to Dismiss, at 2 (Dckt. No. 20); Pl.’s Resp. to Mtn. to Dismiss,

at 3 (Dckt No. 30) (citing Askew v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 568 F.3d 632, 636 (7th Cir. 2009)

(supporting the notion that the County is a proper indemnification defendant)).

That agreement also takes care of the County’s request to dismiss any demand for 

punitive damages against the County. See Cty.’s Mtn. to Dismiss, at 4 (Dckt. No. 20). The 

County argues that it is immune from such damages. Id. (citing City of Newport v. Fact 

Concepts, 453 U.S. 247 (1981)). But Liebich has confirmed that he is seeking to hold the 

County liable for indemnification purposes only. So the County will not be held directly liable 

for punitive damages.

The motion to dismiss Count X, for respondeat superior liability, is granted. The motion 

to dismiss Count XI, for indemnification, is denied. The Court does not understand the County 

to have been named as a defendant on any other counts.1

 

1 The Court notes that Liebich has not brought a Monell claim against the County. Liebich stated that he 

may seek to amend his complaint to add such a theory if warranted by the evidence. See Pl.’s Resp. to 

Mtn. to Dismiss, at 3 n.1 (Dckt No. 30).

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II. The Physicians’ Motion to Dismiss

Unlike the other motion, there is substantive disagreement about Dr. Severin’s and Dr. 

Munoz’s joint motion to dismiss. 

The doctors make three arguments in support of dismissal. First, they argue that they are 

absolutely immune from liability because their conduct was related to their testimony in 

Liebich’s criminal trial. Second, they argue that Liebich’s complaint lacks the factual detail 

necessary to state a claim for conspiracy. Third, they suggest that Liebich has failed to 

sufficiently allege that the doctors’ conduct counts as state action for purposes of § 1983 liability.

“To succeed on [a] § 1983 claim, [a] plaintiff[] must prove (1) the deprivation of a right 

secured by the Constitution or federal law and (2) that defendants were acting under color of 

state law.” See Wilson v. Warren Cty., 830 F.3d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 2016). “For a private actor to 

act under color of state law he must have had a ‘meeting of the minds’ and thus reached an 

understanding with a state actor to deny plaintiffs a constitutional right.” Id. (quoting Adickes v. 

S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 155 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also

Hanania v. Loren-Maltese, 212 F.3d 353, 356 (7th Cir. 2000) (requiring a showing of “a 

concerted effort between” a private actor and state actor and that the state actor and private actor 

“reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights”); Cunningham v. 

Southlake Ctr. for Mental Health, Inc., 924 F.2d 106, 107 (7th Cir. 1991) (“A requirement of the 

joint action charge . . . is that both public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional 

goal.”). “This is necessarily a factbound inquiry,” requiring the Court to sift facts and weigh the 

circumstances to determine if private conduct is fairly attributable to the state. See Morfin v. City 

of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1003 (7th Cir. 2003).

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Dr. Severin and Dr. Munoz first argue that they cannot be held liable because they acted 

as witnesses for the government, and witnesses are entitled to absolute immunity from civil 

damages. See Joint Mtn. to Dismiss, at 4–5 (Dckt. No. 37) (citing Brisco v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 

(1983)). Liebich does not take issue with that principle. See Pl.’s Resp. to Joint Mtn. to Dismiss,

at 6 (Dckt. No. 56). Instead, Liebich argues that his allegations relate not to their testimony, but 

to the investigatory work that led the state to charge Liebich in the first place. Id. (“Plaintiff’s 

claims arise out of the actions Defendant Cooperating Experts took to manufacture false 

evidence and provide false opinions and reports to frame Plaintiff.”). In other words, witness 

immunity should not apply because the claim is not about their trial testimony. 

The Court agrees that the complaint does not claim that the physicians violated his rights 

on the witness stand. Their testimony, in and of itself, did not give rise to the claim. The claim 

is about the investigation, not the trial testimony. 

Liebich alleges that “Defendants agreed to fabricate medical evidence to implicate him,” 

and that “Defendants Severin and Munoz provided reports and opinions that Steven suffered 

from a traumatic brain injury caused by physical force, and that his injury occurred on February 

8, 2002.” See Cplt., at ¶¶ 40–41 (Dckt. No. 1). Those allegations relate to the initial 

investigation into Steven’s death, not their role as witnesses at trial.

The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of distinguishing between working on 

an investigation (on the one hand) and preparing for trial testimony (on the other). Investigations 

often lead to trial testimony. If immunity extended to anything that culminated in trial 

testimony, immunity would sweep so broadly that it would run the risk of immunizing all 

investigatory conduct. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 276 (1996) (“A prosecutor 

may not shield his investigative work with the aegis of absolute immunity merely because, after 

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a suspect is eventually arrested, indicted, and tried, that work may be retrospectively described as 

‘preparation’ for a possible trial[.]”). The same logic applies to government witnesses. See 

Stinson v. Gauger, 868 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting immunity where “claims 

focus[ed] on [defendants’] conduct while the murder was being investigated, not on their trial 

testimony or trial testimony preparation”).

Defendants attempt to distinguish Stinson by arguing that the witnesses in that case were 

hired by the government. See Joint Reply Brf., at 2–3 (Dckt. No. 57). But that argument goes to 

whether the witnesses were state actors, not whether they enjoyed witness immunity. Nothing in 

Stinson suggests that witnesses not hired by the government receive enlarged immunity for their 

role in the investigative process. Accordingly, Dr. Severin and Dr. Munoz cannot rely on 

witness immunity as a shield against Liebich’s claims.

Defendants next argue that Liebich has failed to include enough factual detail in his 

complaint to state a claim for conspiracy. In making this argument, Defendants rely on 

“heightened pleading requirements” for conspiracy claims and the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 

Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 976 (7th Cir. 2009). See Joint Reply Brf., at 3–6 (Dckt. No. 57).

“There is no heightened pleading standard for conspiracy claims[.]” See Sanchez v. 

Village of Wheeling, 447 F. Supp. 3d 693, 705 (N.D. Ill. 2020); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 2020 

WL 4349855, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (same). Instead, in order to adequately allege a conspiracy 

under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the individuals reached an agreement to deprive 

him of his constitutional rights, and (2) overt acts in furtherance actually deprived him of those 

rights.” Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2015). “[I]t is enough 

in pleading a conspiracy merely to indicate the parties, general purpose, and approximate date, so 

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that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with.” Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 

1007 (7th Cir. 2002).

Liebich’s complaint satisfies that standard. He alleges that Dr. Severin and Dr. Munoz, 

together with the DuPage police, agreed to falsify “reports and opinions to point the finger at Mr. 

Liebich” during the initial investigation in early February 2002. See Cplt., at ¶¶ 39–42 (Dckt. 

No. 1). Those allegations are enough to put Defendants on notice of Liebich’s claims within the 

meaning of the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Walker.

Cooney does not imply a contrary result. There, the Seventh Circuit took issue with a 

“bare allegation of conspiracy,” holding that it was insufficient to “survive a motion to dismiss.” 

See Cooney, 583 F.3d at 970. But the Seventh Circuit in Cooney explicitly endorsed Walker and 

applied the familiar pleading standard described by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal. 

Id. Unsurprisingly given that standard, the Seventh Circuit held that a complaint is subject to 

dismissal when “[n]o factual allegations tie the defendants to a conspiracy with a state actor.” Id. 

at 971. As described above, Liebich’s complaint includes factual allegations beyond the mere 

assertion that a conspiracy existed, and Cooney therefore does not support dismissal here.

The doctors’ final argument is that Liebich’s complaint fails to allege that their activities 

constituted state action within the meaning of section 1983 and fails to sufficiently allege statelaw claims for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, willful and 

wanton conduct, and civil law conspiracy. See Joint Reply Brf., at 7 (Dckt. No. 57). 

Defendants’ arguments rely on the theory that the “allegations of conspiracy are legally 

insufficient.” Id.; see also id. at 8 (arguing that “if the conspiracy theory counts are dismissed as 

required by law, the remaining counts all fall because of their direct reliance upon the allegation 

of a conspiracy”). But the Court has concluded that the conspiracy claim passes muster.

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Plus, to the extent that Defendants advanced an independent argument suggesting that Dr. 

Severin and Dr. Munoz were not acting under color of state law, that argument also fails. A 

conspiracy with the government is enough to render a private citizen a state actor. See Morfin, 

349 F.3d at 1003 (explaining that a private citizen can be a state actor “because he has acted 

together with . . . state officials”) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 

(1982)). And besides, the inquiry into whether a private citizen has acted under color of state 

law for section 1983 purposes is “necessarily factbound.” Id. Here, that inquiry would mean 

parsing the relationship between the doctors and the officers, and exploring what they agreed to, 

and when. The factual nature of that inquiry makes it an inappropriate ground for dismissal. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part DuPage County’s 

motion to dismiss. The Court denies Dr. Severin’s and Dr. Munoz’s joint motion to dismiss.

Date: March 22, 2021

 

Steven C. Seeger

United States District Judge

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