IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0570

Filed March 3, 2021

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CHRISTOPHER RYAN NICHOLS,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Patrick W.

Greenwood, Judge.

Christopher Nichols appeals his prison sentence. AFFIRMED.

Scott M. Wadding of Sease & Wadding, Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by May, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
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MAY, Presiding Judge.

Christopher Nichols appeals his prison sentence. Nichols claims his 

sentence should be vacated because victim impact statements “introduced 

unproven, unrelated, and prejudicial information for the sentencing court’s 

consideration.” We affirm.

The State charged Nichols with (1) delivery or possession with intent to 

deliver methamphetamine to a person under eighteen years old, a class “B” felony;

and (2) sexual abuse in the third degree, a class “C” felony. Nichols and the State 

reached an agreement that (1) Nichols would plead guilty to sexual abuse in the 

third degree; (2) the State would dismiss the methamphetamine charge; and 

(3) the parties would jointly recommend a ten-year prison term.

At the plea hearing, Nichols admitted he committed the offense of sexual 

abuse in the third degree by inappropriately touching a victim who was fifteen years 

old when Nichols was four or more years older. The court accepted Nichols’s plea 

and proceeded directly to sentencing.

1

 The State presented verbal victim impact 

statements from the victim’s mother, the victim, and the victim’s grandfather.2 The 

victim’s mother and grandfather described (1) Nichols’s abuse of the victim and 

also (2) alleged abuse by Nichols of the victim’s mother. The victim’s mother also 

alleged Nichols abused her son. Nichols raised no objection to these statements.

 

1 Nichols waived his right to delayed sentencing, his right to the use of a 

presentence investigation report for purposes of sentencing, and his right to file a 

motion in arrest of judgment.

2 Prior to the hearing, a written statement by the victim’s mother was also filed with 

the court. A note from the victim’s therapist was attached to the mother’s 

statement.
3

The district court sentenced Nichols to prison. In this appeal, Nichols asks 

us to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.3

“A sentencing court’s decision to impose a specific sentence that falls within 

the statutory limits ‘is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only 

be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate 

matters.’” State v. Boldon, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2021 WL 297435, at *8 (Iowa 

2021) (quoting State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002)). “We afford 

sentencing judges a significant amount of latitude because of the ‘discretionary 

nature of judging and the source of the respect afforded by the appellate process.’” 

Id. (quoting Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725). 

Even so, “[a] remand for resentencing is appropriate if the record contains 

‘clear evidence’ that the sentencing court relied on unproven or unprosecuted 

offenses.” State v. Olson, No. 19-1960, 2020 WL 5650580, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.

Sept. 23, 2020) (quoting State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 762–64 (Iowa 1998)).

“Even if a victim impact statement discloses unproven offenses, ‘there must be an 

affirmative showing the court relied on . . . improper evidence.’” Id. (alteration in 

original) (quoting Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 762). “We look at the court’s reasons for 

imposing the sentence to determine whether any of them pertain to the 

impermissible statements.” Id. (citing Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 763).

Nichols claims the mother and grandfather’s victim impact statements 

introduced inappropriate matters, namely, alleged wrongs against the victim’s 

 

3

Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2020) prohibits direct appeals from guilty pleas

unless the defendant appeals from a class “A” felony or has “good cause.” 

Because Nichols only appeals his sentence, he has good cause and we may 

consider his direct appeal. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020).
4

mother and brother. And Nichols contends that, because the court acknowledged 

listening to those statements,4the court considered inappropriate matters when 

determining his sentence.

We begin by noting Iowa Code section 915.21(1) expressly authorizes 

victims to “present a victim impact statement to the court.” And section 901.5 

expressly requires sentencing courts to “receiv[e] and examin[e] . . . victim impact 

statements.” So we do not fault the district court for acknowledging it listened to 

the mother and grandfather’s statements. Cf. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 763 (noting 

court was “unable to discern any reliance on improper factors which would 

overcome the presumption that the district court properly exercised its discretion” 

from district court’s statement that it had “considered the amount of the financial 

loss to the victim of this offense” and further noting this “statement appears to 

merely list sentencing factors which must be considered pursuant to” 

section 901.5).

As noted, though, remand would be appropriate if the record “affirmative[ly]

show[ed]” through “clear evidence” that the sentencing court had relied on

unproven offenses described in the victim impact statements. See Olson, 2020 

WL 5650580, at *4 (quoting Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 762–64). But it does not. When 

explaining the reasons for its sentence, the court said it had considered (1) “the 

impact of his offense on the victims,” (2) “the nature of the offense that Mr. Nichols 

 

4 According to the transcript, the court said: “I’ve listened to the victim impact 

statement made those [sic], and I have reviewed those that are on file in this case. 

And specifically that filing was made February 29th of this year and includes [the 

victim’s mother’s] handwritten statement as well as the attached document from 

the [victim’s] therapist.”
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committed,” (3) “the fact that the offense had considerable impact on the victim,”

(4) “the crime Mr. Nichols committed,” (5) “the impact that it had on the victims of 

the offense,” (6) “the fact [Mr. Nichols] doesn’t appear [a] slight[] bit remorseful 

about the offense,” and (7) the fact “probation would, of course, unduly depreciate 

the seriousness of the offense.” (Emphasis added.) Seven times the court used 

the singular to show that its focus was on the offense to which Nichols pled guilty. 

And although the court also mentioned other proper considerations such as 

Nichols’s age and employment, the court never mentioned the other wrongs 

alleged in the mother and grandfather’s statements. This suggests the court 

properly exercised its duty to “filter out” those improper considerations. See Sailer, 

587 N.W.2d at 764 (noting that, although allowing victim impact statements “may 

at times result in the airing of allegations which are unproven, we trust that our 

district courts, when weighing such statements as part of the sentencing 

determination, will filter out improper or irrelevant evidence” and further noting 

“[w]ithout any clear evidence to the contrary, we assume the district court did so in 

the case at bar”).

Even so, Nichols suggests resentencing is required by State v. Matheson, 

684 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 2004), and State v. Hintze, No. 18-1418, 2019 WL 

1056082 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2019). We disagree. In Matheson, the district 

court overruled a defendant’s objections to victim impact statements that contained

impermissible information. 684 N.W.2d at 244–45. By overruling the objection, 

the district court implied it could consider the impermissible information when 

making the sentencing determination. But that did not happen here. For one thing, 

because Nichols did not object to the victim statements, the court ruled on no 
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objections. Nor did the court otherwise suggest it relied on unproven offenses

described in the statements. So we think Matheson is distinguishable.

Hintze is also distinguishable. There, the district court made conflicting

statements as to whether it was considering unproven allegations. Hintze, 2019 

WL 1056082, at *2 (“The mother’s statement introduced facts not otherwise in the 

record and included serious allegations against Hintze that mirrored Hintze’s prior 

offenses. The court stated it was not taking the mother’s statement into 

consideration for sentencing purposes, then cited the minutes of testimony where 

a police report noted M.G. making the same allegations.”). But here, there was no 

conflict. The district court consistently focused on the single offense to which 

Nichols pled. The court gave no reason to believe it was relying on other offenses.

The record does not show the district court relied on improper sentencing 

considerations. So we affirm.

AFFIRMED.