IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MATTHEW F.,1

Plaintiff,

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,2

Defendant.

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No. 20 C 1830

Magistrate Judge

Maria Valdez

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision 

of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Matthew F.’s claims for 

Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate 

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion 

to remand [Doc. No. 25] is denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment [Doc. No. 28] is granted.

1

 In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security 

Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by his first name and the first initial of his last 

name.

2

 Kilolo Kijakazi has been substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 25(d).

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BACKGROUND

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 15, 2014 and October 16, 2014, respectively, Plaintiff filed claims for 

DIB and SSI alleging disability since March 12, 2013. The claims were denied 

initially and upon reconsideration, after which he timely requested a hearing before 

an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was held on June 27, 2016. On 

September 27, 2016, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claims for benefits, finding him not 

disabled under the Social Security Act. Plaintiff then appealed to this Court, and, 

finding error, this Court remanded the case on May 31, 2018.

After remand, another hearing before the same ALJ was held on February 

14, 2019. Plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was 

represented by a non-attorney representative. A vocational expert (“VE”) also 

testified. On March 13, 2019, the ALJ again denied Plaintiff’s claims for benefits, 

finding him not disabled under the Act. The Social Security Administration Appeals 

Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s March 13, 2019 

decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the 

District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 

(7th Cir. 2005).

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II. ALJ DECISION

Plaintiff’s claims were analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential 

evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since his alleged onset date of March 12, 2013. At step 

two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: a spine 

disorder; dysfunction of a major joint (right knee); anxiety; depression; and 

posttraumatic stress disorder. The ALJ concluded at step three that Plaintiff’s

impairments, alone or in combination, do not meet or medically equal a listed 

impairment.

Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following additional 

limitations: can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders, ropes, 

or scaffolds; can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; should avoid 

concentrated exposure to unprotected heights and moving, mechanical parts, as well 

as vibration; is limited to occasional interaction with the public; is limited to simple 

and routine type work; and would be off-task up to 10% of the workday. At step 

four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be unable to perform his past relevant 

work as a maintenance mechanic helper, machine operator, heating and air 

conditioner installer-servicer helper, construction worker, automobile service 

station mechanic helper, or commercial cleaner.

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At step five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, 

work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform jobs existing in 

significant numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding that he is not 

disabled under the Social Security Act.

DISCUSSION

I. ALJ LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if she has an “inability to 

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a plaintiff is 

disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff

presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does 

the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments 

enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform her former 

occupation? and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920(a)(4). 

An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that 

the plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386, 

389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three, 

precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps 

one to four. Id. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the 

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burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in 

other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. 

II. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the 

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, 

shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus 

limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 

2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial 

evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v. 

Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even 

in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of 

‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not 

high. Substantial evidence is . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and 

means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019)

(citations omitted). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 

Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in 

evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also 

Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision 

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must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is 

adequately supported”) (citation omitted).

However, even under this relatively lenient standard, an ALJ is not absolved 

of her duty to support the decision with record evidence. See Meuser v. Colvin, 838 

F.3d 905, 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We will uphold an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by 

substantial evidence, but that standard is not satisfied unless the ALJ has 

adequately supported his conclusions.”). The ALJ is not required to address “every 

piece of evidence or testimony in the record, [but] the ALJ’s analysis must provide 

some glimpse into the reasoning behind her decision to deny benefits.” Zurawski v. 

Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001). In cases where the ALJ denies benefits to 

a plaintiff, “he must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his 

conclusion.” Clifford, 227 F.3d at 872. The ALJ must at least minimally articulate 

the “analysis of the evidence with enough detail and clarity to permit meaningful 

appellate review.” Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 

2005); Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An ALJ has a duty to 

fully develop the record before drawing any conclusions . . . and must adequately 

articulate his analysis so that we can follow his reasoning . . . .”); see Boiles v. 

Barnhart, 395 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2005). 

Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable minds to differ, the 

responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled falls upon the 

Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th Cir. 

1990). However, an ALJ may not “select and discuss only that evidence that favors 

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his ultimate conclusion,” but must instead consider all relevant evidence. Herron v. 

Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994). 

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision was in error for several reasons, 

including: (1) the ALJ failed to develop the record in regards to Plaintiff’s mental 

limitations; and (2) the ALJ failed to provide an accurate and logical bridge from the 

evidence to her RFC assessment. Each argument will be addressed below in turn.

A. The ALJ’s Development of Record Regarding Plaintiff’s Mental

Limitations

In advancing his first argument, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not fully 

and fairly develop the record regarding Plaintiff’s alleged mental limitations. More 

specifically, Plaintiff asserts that “the ALJ’s mental RFC determination is not 

supported by any medical opinion in the record, as none relate to such limitations.” 

(Pl.’s Memo at 5-6 (emphasis added).) According to Plaintiff, “[t]he ALJ’s failure to 

support her RFC determination with any opinion evidence whatsoever was error.” 

(Id. at 9 (emphasis added).)

Pertinent to Plaintiff’s argument in that regard, the Seventh Circuit has 

made clear that “[t]he claimant bears the burden of producing medical evidence that 

supports her claims of disability.” Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 

2008); see also Punzio v. Astrue, 630 F.3d 704, 712 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The claimant 

bears the burden of submitting medical evidence establishing her impairments and 

her residual functional capacity.”) (citations omitted). Further, specifically 

concerning Plaintiff’s argument pertaining to a purported dearth of medical 

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opinions, it was his burden to present medical opinions supporting his alleged 

mental limitations. See Roth v. Berryhill, No. 17 C 50196, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

198438, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2018) (“It was Plaintiff’s burden to present medical 

opinions supporting her position and [to] develop legal arguments as to why the 

decision was erroneous. Plaintiff did neither.”).

Based on this legal framework, the first point of error raised by Plaintiff 

necessarily fails, as Plaintiff himself did not offer the medical opinions he now 

claims were lacking. See Frank J. v. Saul, No. 19 C 3176, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

204693, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2020) (rejecting claimant’s substantial evidence 

argument where “[c]laimant did not submit to the ALJ any medical opinion that his 

impairments caused more limitations than the ALJ assessed”); Charles F. v. Saul, 

No. 18 C 618, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134940, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2019) (“[The 

claimant] contends that the treating doctor’s opinion would be ‘valuable 

information’ to support his claim. Therefore, the burden was on [claimant] to supply 

an opinion from Dr. Vermillion.”).

As stated above, Plaintiff was represented by a non-attorney representative 

at the hearing. However, Plaintiff does not argue that he did not validly waive his 

right to counsel. Relatedly, Plaintiff has not asserted that – in light of his nonattorney representation – the ALJ had a heightened duty to develop the record 

regarding Plaintiff’s alleged mental limitations. Cf. Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 

1098 (7th Cir. 2009) (ALJ’s duty to develop the record “is enhanced when a claimant 

appears without counsel; then the ALJ must scrupulously and conscientiously [ ] 

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probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts”) (internal quotes and 

citation omitted). Furthermore, as Defendant points out, and Plaintiff does not 

rebut, Plaintiff in fact “had representation throughout the life of this claim” as he 

“retained an attorney for his district court claim regarding the September 2016 

decision.” (Def.’s Memo at 5.) Ultimately, “Plaintiff has had ample time over the 

long arc of this case to procure a medical opinion to strengthen [his] case, but [he] 

has not obtained one.” Katie P. v. Saul, No. 19 CV 50078, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

84340, at *23 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2020). Plaintiff cannot now blame the ALJ for his 

own lapse in that respect.

B. The ALJ’s RFC Assessment

In advancing his second argument, Plaintiff contends broadly that “the ALJ 

failed to include a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supported her 

RFC determination.” (Pl.’s Memo at 10.) According to Plaintiff, the ALJ’s statement 

that “the above residual functional capacity is supported by the medical findings, 

nature and frequency of treatment, and other factors discussed above” is a “blanket 

statement [that] fails to build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to 

the ALJ’s very specific RFC determination.” (Id.)

Pertinent to Plaintiff’s argument, the Seventh Circuit has held that 

“[a]lthough the RFC assessment is a function-by-function assessment, the 

expression of a claimant’s RFC need not be articulated function-by-function; a 

narrative discussion of a claimant’s symptoms and medical source opinions is 

sufficient.” Knox v. Astrue, 327 F. App’x 652, 657 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations and 

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internal quotations omitted) Put differently, “[w]hile not requiring a function-byfunction analysis, . . . an ALJ’s RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion 

describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts 

(e.g., laboratory findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, 

observations).” Kaczmarek v. Berrhill, No. 17 C 2785, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

201135, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2018) (citations and internal quotations omitted).

Here, despite Plaintiff’s contentions, in analyzing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ 

did provide a lengthy narrative discussion of Plaintiff’s symptoms, pertinent 

medical evidence and opinions, and nonmedical evidence, and the ALJ’s cited 

evidence does support her ultimate RFC determinations. (R. 807-816.) The Court 

need not recite the ALJ’s 10-page analysis herein. The ALJ was not required to 

engage in a function-by-function analysis, as Plaintiff essentially calls for.

Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s second argument.3

3 As set forth above, in her RFC assessment, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff would be off 

task up to 10% of the workday. Plaintiff complains that “[n]owhere in the decision is this 

limitation explained.” (Pl.’s Memo at 11.) However, Plaintiff’s argument in that regard fails, 

as the ALJ’s determination is generally supported by the evidence she cited. Furthermore, 

Plaintiff does not actually argue that he in fact would need to be off task more than 10% of 

the workday.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the points of error raised by Plaintiff are not welltaken. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to remand [Doc. No. 25] is denied, and the 

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 28] is granted.

SO ORDERED. ENTERED:

DATE: January 7, 2022 ___________________________

HON. MARIA VALDEZ

United States Magistrate Judge

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