IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

Gzim Selmani, 

 Plaintiff, 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. ) 

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) 

No. 20-cv-2097 

Village of Bartlett, et al., 

Defendants. 

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) 

Memorandum Opinion and Order 

 Plaintiff Gzim Selmani, a police officer employed by the 

Village of Bartlett Police Department, brings this action against 

Defendants—the Village of Bartlett (the “Village”), the Village 

President, and several Bartlett Police Department officials—

seeking damages stemming from the Village’s decision to put Mr. 

Selmani on unpaid medical leave in 2019 after psychological 

symptoms caused by a 2014 training incident intensified. 

Defendants move to dismiss Mr. Selmani’s eight-count complaint in 

its entirety [22]. For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ motion 

is granted. 

I. 

 In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a 

motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

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I “accept all well pled facts as true and draw all permissible 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate 

Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 334 (7th Cir. 2012). To survive a 

motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim “that is 

plausible on its face” after conclusory allegations are 

disregarded. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schumacher, 844 F.3d 670, 

675 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–

79 (2009)). 

 Mr. Selmani was hired as a police officer by the Village of 

Bartlett Police Department in September 2012. In August 2014, he 

accepted an assignment as a member of the Specialized Police 

Emergency Action Response (“SPEAR”) team. Following a SPEAR team 

training exercise on August 11, 2014, after Mr. Selmani had removed 

his protective equipment, Mr. Selmani’s team members, including 

several of the defendants, instructed Mr. Selmani to re-enter the 

training room and then fired thirty to fifty rounds of simulated 

ammunition from their AR-15 rifles at Mr. Selmani at close range. 

As a result of this incident, which Mr. Selmani characterizes as 

“hazing,” Mr. Selmani suffered both physical and emotional 

injuries. He alleges that he “struggled for years from recurring 

and disturbing nightmares and flashbacks of the traumatic event.” 

R. 1 ¶ 23. 

 Mr. Selmani resigned from the SPEAR team in 2017, and 

ultimately reported the incident to his employer in early 2019. 

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He sought counseling at that time, and as a result, he was 

eventually diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) 

and other psychological disorders. In February 2019, Mr. Selmani 

requested that he be put on paid leave. Instead, purportedly 

without explanation, the Village placed Mr. Selmani on unpaid leave 

in May 2019 and subsequently ceased providing employee benefits 

such as health care. Mr. Selmani complains that he is entitled to 

a year of salary and other benefits under the Public Employee 

Disability Act (“PEDA”), 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 345/1, but that the 

Village did not initially inform Mr. Selmani that he was eligible 

for those benefits, and then denied his application for reasons of 

timeliness and process. 

 Mr. Selmani’s complaint asserts eight causes of action, 

including both federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

state-law claims. Defendants move to dismiss the complaint in its 

entirety. I consider each claim in turn. 

II. 

 In Count I, Mr. Selmani brings a claim for due process 

violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, he claims 

that he was deprived of due process when he was placed on unpaid 

leave without a pre-decision hearing or other opportunity to be 

heard. 

 Due process claims such as Mr. Selmani’s present two “basic 

legal questions”: “(1) is there a property or liberty interest 

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protected by due process; and (2) if so, what process is due, and 

when must that process be made available?” Bradley v. Vill. of 

Univ. Park, 929 F.3d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Simpson v. 

Brown County, 860 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2017)). “The basic 

characteristic of a property interest is the continued flow of 

benefits, which may not be interrupted without an opportunity to 

be heard.” Ceko v. Martin, 753 F. Supp. 1418, 1423 (N.D. Ill. 

1990). “For public employees, a ‘protected property interest in 

employment can arise from a state statute, regulation, municipal 

ordinance, or an express or implied contract.’” Bradley, 929 F.3d 

at 882 (citing Crull v. Sunderman, 384 F.3d 453, 460 (7th Cir. 

2004)). 

 Mr. Selmani’s claim falters because he fails to allege a 

protected property interest in his employment. In his complaint, 

Mr. Selmani contends that the property interest arises from the 

collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that was in effect at the 

time, which he alleges provided that an officer “could not suffer 

suspensions or terminations without prior written notification and 

except for cause.” R. 1 ¶ 63. Defendants attached the applicable 

CBA to their motion to dismiss,1 however, and it does not provide 

1 I may consider the CBA because it is central to Mr. Selmani’s 

claim and referred to in the complaint. See Venture Assocs. Corp. 

v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993) 

(“Documents that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are 

considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the 

plaintiff’s complaint and are central to her claim.”). 

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as Mr. Selmani alleges. Section 13.5, which governs leave for 

illness or injury, provides only that “the Village may grant a 

leave of absence without pay” after the employee submits a written 

application for leave and provides other relevant information. R. 

22-2 at 19. It does not provide that the Village may grant unpaid 

medical leave only for cause or after providing notice and an 

opportunity to be heard. 

 In his reply brief, Mr. Selmani cites authority in which 

courts found that police officers had a property interest in their 

continued employment under 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-1-18. See, 

e.g., Ceko, 753 F. Supp. at 1422. That statute provides, in 

relevant part: 

No officer or employee of a police or fire department in 

the classified civil service of any municipality having 

500,000 or fewer inhabitants who is appointed under the 

rules and after examination, may be removed or 

discharged, or suspended for a period of more than 5 

calendar days, except for cause upon written charges and 

after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense. 

65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-1-18(b). Even setting aside that Mr. 

Selmani did not allege in the complaint that this statute created 

the property interest in question, Mr. Selmani does not allege 

sufficient facts to establish that this provision applies to him. 

Mr. Selmani has not alleged, for example, that he is properly 

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considered a “classified civil servant” or that he was “appointed 

under the rules and after examination.” 

 Accordingly, I conclude that Mr. Selmani has not alleged that 

he had a property interest in his continued employment, and I 

dismiss Count I without prejudice. 

III. 

 Mr. Selmani next brings a claim for First Amendment 

retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, he alleges 

in Count II that he was retaliated against after engaging in speech 

protected by the First Amendment—namely, reporting the misconduct 

of the SPEAR team members, reporting the injuries he sustained, 

and requesting pension and PEDA benefits to compensate him for his 

injuries. 

 To state a claim for First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff 

must establish that he spoke (1) as a citizen (2) on a matter of 

public concern. Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 481 (7th 

Cir. 2016). “[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to 

their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens 

for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 

insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Garcetti 

v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). “Determining the official 

duties of a public employee requires a practical inquiry into what 

duties the employee is expected to perform, and is not limited to 

the formal job description.” Kubiak, 810 F.3d at 481 (citing 

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Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 490 (7th Cir. 2008)). Whether 

speech is protected under the First Amendment is a question of 

law. Id. 

 Defendants argue that Mr. Selmani’s claim fails as a matter 

of law because he was not speaking as a private citizen, but rather 

within the scope of his official duties. I agree. Generally, an 

employee is expected to report his colleagues’ inappropriate 

behavior to a supervisor. See id. at 481–82. “[I]t makes even 

more sense to expect [police] officers to report that a fellow 

officer acted violently [because officers are] responsible for 

protecting the public from harm.” Id. at 482. Accordingly, the 

Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that police officers’ internal 

reports of fellow officers’ misconduct do not qualify as citizen 

speech for purposes of the First Amendment. See id. at 482 (police 

officer’s internal report that she had been verbally assaulted by 

fellow officer was not protected speech); Roake v. Forest Preserve 

Dist., 849 F.3d 342, 346–47 (7th Cir. 2017) (officer’s two internal 

reports of officer misconduct were made within scope of official 

duties). 

 Here, the speech at issue solely involves internal reporting 

of officer misconduct—either in isolation or in order to establish 

Mr. Selmani’s eligibility for benefits. Because Mr. Selmani’s 

internal reports regarding the SPEAR team incident are not citizen 

speech, his First Amendment retaliation claim is dismissed. 

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IV. 

 In Count III, Mr. Selmani brings a Monell claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Monell stands for the proposition that “[w]hile a 

municipality is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts 

of its employees, a constitutional deprivation may be attributable 

to a municipality ‘when execution of a government’s policy or 

custom . . . inflicts the injury.’” Montano v. City of Chicago, 

535 F.3d 558, 570 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). In order to maintain a Monell

claim against a municipality, a plaintiff must establish either 

“(1) an express policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional 

deprivation; or (2) that the constitutional injury was caused by 

a person with final policymaking authority.” Id. (citing Gable v. 

City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2002)). 

 Accordingly, Monell liability and the constitutional claims 

asserted by Mr. Selmani are intertwined. In order to prevail 

against the Village as a defendant under Counts I or II of the 

complaint, Mr. Selmani would have had to satisfy Monell. 

Conversely, to prevail on a Monell claim, Mr. Selmani must 

establish an underlying constitutional deprivation such as those 

asserted in Counts I and II. See Houskins, 549 F.3d at 493–94 

(Monell claim failed where plaintiff did not “establish that she 

was deprived of a constitutional right”); King v. East St. Louis 

School Dist. 189, 496 F.3d 812, 817 (7th Cir. 2007) (“It is well 

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established that there can be no municipal liability based on an 

official policy under Monell if the policy did not result in a 

violation of [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.”). 

 The constitutional violations underlying Mr. Selmani’s Monell

claim appear identical to those asserted in Counts I and II—namely, 

denial of due process and First-Amendment retaliation. See R. 1 

¶ 84 (denial of benefits “deprived Plaintiff of his rights under 

the law and was handled in such a manner . . . in order to retaliate 

against Plaintiff for having reported police misconduct and having 

sustained a mental injury as a result of said conduct”); see also 

R. 27 at 15. However, as described above, Mr. Selmani has not 

plausibly alleged due-process or First-Amendment constitutional 

violations. Because there is no underlying constitutional 

deprivation, I dismiss Mr. Selmani’s Monell claim. 

V. 

 The remaining five claims asserted by Mr. Selmani arise under 

Illinois law. See R. 1 ¶¶ 90–135. Having determined that Mr. 

Selmani fails to state a federal claim, I decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c) (“The district courts may decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district 

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction.”); Burritt v. Ditlefsen, 807 F.3d 239, 252 (7th Cir. 

2015) (“[O]nly in ‘unusual cases’ may a district court exercise 

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its discretion to assert its supplemental jurisdiction [after 

dismissal of federal claims] based upon the balance of factors of 

‘judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity’”); Groce v. 

Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is the 

well-established law of this circuit that the usual practice is to 

dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all 

federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.”). Accordingly, 

Counts IV-VIII are dismissed without prejudice. 

VI. 

 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [22] 

is granted. 

 ENTER ORDER: 

 ________________________ 

 Elaine E. Bucklo 

 United States District Judge 

Dated: September 17, 2020 

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