Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re Commitment of Rendon, 2017 IL App (1st) 153201

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re COMMITMENT OF ENRIQUE RENDON (The People of the 

State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Enrique Rendon,

Respondent-Appellant).

District & No. First District, Third Division 

Docket No. 1-15-3201

Filed April 26, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 98-CR-80004; the 

Hon. Alfredo Maldonado, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed; remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Daniel T. Coyne, Matthew M. Daniels, Michael R. Johnson, and Kate 

E. Levine, of Law Offices of Chicago-Kent College of Law, of 

Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (David L. Franklin, 

Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Gopi Kashyap, Assistant 

Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Cobbs concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 This appeal is brought by the fourth person ever committed as a sexually violent person 

(SVP) under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq.

(West 2014)) in Cook County. Respondent, Enrique Rendon, voluntarily stipulated to being 

an SVP and was civilly committed in 2002, then underwent sex offender treatment designed 

to reduce his risk of recidivism. After being recommended for release in 2010, respondent 

entered conditional release, where he remained in the community while scrupulously 

supervised by Department of Human Services (the Department) mental health professionals. 

The State then successfully moved to revoke his conditional release in 2012, claiming that he 

was a danger to the safety of others in the community and that he had violated several 

conditions of his release, including his alleged failure to honestly answer questions about his 

sexual behavior and fantasies in polygraph examinations. This court reversed that judgment, 

and once the mandate issued, respondent was returned to conditional release, over the State’s 

specific objection. In re Commitment of Rendon, 2014 IL App (1st) 123090, ¶ 41. 

¶ 2 This particular appeal stems from the trial court’s determination, following review of 

respondent’s 2015 annual mental health report, that there was no probable cause to find 

respondent had made sufficient progress in treatment such that he was no longer an SVP. 

This probable cause decision came despite some noted progress in treatment and even though 

he obtained the lowest possible score in standard testing designed to gauge the risk of sexual 

offender recidivism. The trial court therefore denied respondent a full evidentiary hearing in 

the matter. Had respondent succeeded in obtaining a full hearing, it would have been his first 

chance to argue whether he had reached such a low risk of recidivism as to warrant 

discharge. We reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to conduct such an 

evidentiary hearing.

¶ 3 BACKGROUND

¶ 4 After being convicted and imprisoned for the kidnapping and sexual assault of an 

eight-year-old girl, respondent was imprisoned and was released after serving six years. He 

violated his parole just two years later by trying to lure children into his car. He was also 

found in bed by his 17-year-old daughter as he lay naked with her friend. The State then 

moved in 1998 to commit respondent under the Act. Four years later, respondent stipulated to 

the State’s petitions and entered mental health sex offender treatment under the auspices of 

the Department in a “Treatment and Detention Facility” (TDF), where he remained from 

2002 to 2010. This stipulation avoided any hearing in front of a judge or jury to decide 

whether he ought to have been committed as an SVP. During treatment, respondent admitted 

to a variety of sexual offenses apart from the sexual assault and luring incidents detailed 

above. We will not enumerate his many reported sexual offenses but do note that his 

self-reporting while in therapy filled more than three single-spaced pages and catalogued 

illegal sexual acts that reportedly began at age 11 and concluded at 50. He also boasted that 

on more than 20,000 occasions in public places like the “L” train, he had engaged in 

“frottage,” the act of rubbing against a person (in his case, young women) for sexual 

gratification.

¶ 5 In 2010, based principally upon the report of Dr. Edward Smith, respondent entered 

conditional release. Dr. Smith’s detailed report indicated that respondent had made 
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significant progress, mainly by understanding his offense cycle, and that he had completed a 

relapse prevention plan. Along with other findings, this led Dr. Smith to conclude that 

respondent was a candidate for a “highly structured and supervised” conditional release, 

despite the fact that he felt respondent was still an SVP. As noted above, respondent 

remained on conditional release in an apartment for some 21 months where he was 

consistently monitored and tested by mental health professionals. He was also prescribed 

Eligard, a drug that helped him lessen his deviant urges through the lowering of testosterone 

levels. After it was determined that respondent may have lied during a polygraph 

examination when questioned about his sexual behavior/fantasies, the State successfully 

moved to revoke respondent’s conditional release in June 2012, a judgment that was 

subsequently reversed by this court in November 2014. Id. ¶ 41.

¶ 6 Between the time respondent’s conditional release was revoked and while the matter was 

pending on appeal, respondent was returned to institutional treatment. There, he admitted that 

he had been regularly fantasizing about offending women and young females with frottage 

while on conditional release and thus engaging in high-risk, deviant fantasies and 

masturbatory behaviors. He had been making plans to bring women to his apartment. 

Specifically, in therapy respondent admitted that he had been “holding in” information by 

keeping secrets and being dishonest, especially prior to the allegedly failed polygraph and 

before the Eligard treatments. On a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the highest, he said he was 

at a 7 with regard to his sexual urges, deviant fantasies, and masturbatory behavior. He 

reported that during that period he was “slipping a lot” yet denied having any unauthorized 

people in his apartment. Respondent eventually joined “Phase V” of the therapy group, the 

highest therapy level intended to transition an SVP into the community. 

¶ 7 In spite of these noted problems and while waiting for this court’s opinion to issue, in 

August 2014, respondent petitioned for conditional release while also asking the court to 

appoint an expert on his behalf and asking for a probable cause hearing. As stated, some 

months later, in November 2014, this court reversed the trial court’s judgment terminating 

respondent’s conditional release. 

¶ 8 With that reversal and respondent’s pending release back into the community, the State 

moved to again revoke his conditional release based upon a January 2015 report by Dr. Smith 

in which he stated that despite respondent’s noted progress, respondent was an SVP who 

should remain in a treatment facility. One month later, a Dr. Raymond Wood prepared a 

report pursuant to respondent’s earlier request. In that report, Dr. Wood found that 

respondent had made progress but also believed that he should remain on conditional release, 

as opposed to discharge. (Not surprisingly, though it would have been statutorily admissible,

Wood’s report was not later submitted for the court’s consideration in the probable cause 

hearing.) In February 2015, pursuant to this court’s mandate and over the State’s objection, 

the trial court ordered respondent back on conditional release but of a type that was described 

as “maximum supervision,” enabling respondent to “take out his garbage, collect his mail 

and do laundry in his building.” 

¶ 9 Some four months into this second stint on conditional release, in June 2015, Dr. Smith 

conducted another annual reexamination. This is the reexamination that was used in the “no 

probable cause hearing” that is the subject of this appeal. In the 32-page report, Dr. Smith 

laid out, in detailed fashion, a litany of self-reported sexual offenses committed by 

respondent prior to his confinement, as well as the treatment that he had received over the 
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years while in the TDF and on conditional release, including consideration of annual 

reexaminations of respondent from 2008 to 2014. This analysis included reports of numerous 

professional tests of respondent designed to assess his truthfulness, i.e., whether he was still 

perseverating about sexual deviancy, whether he would react physiologically to materials 

designed to test or trigger his erotic responses, and otherwise gauging his progress in 

treatment. Respondent’s most recent 2013 penile plethysmography (PPG) test, for example, 

indicated no deviant arousal on the 22 segments of images presented. 

¶ 10 Dr. Smith opined that respondent met the criteria for five separate sexual disorders as 

listed in the fifth and latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual (DSM-5). Those 

diagnoses are “Pedophilic Disorder, Sexually Attracted to Females, Nonexclusive Type” 

(owing to his numerous sexual offenses against prepubescent females including the crimes 

that he was imprisoned for); “Other Specified Paraphilic Disorder, Non-Consenting Females”

(related to his reporting of numerous instances of using force, weapons, and intimidation to 

gain sexual compliance); “Frotteuristic Disorder” (stemming from his self-reported obsession 

with rubbing against people for sexual pleasure); “Alcohol and Stimulant Use Disorder”; and 

“Antisocial Personality Disorder.” Dr. Smith’s lengthy report and analysis established that 

respondent over the course of his time in the Department had made some significant progress 

while still identifying some very sobering issues related to the possibility that respondent was 

not being entirely truthful about his potential to reoffend, as respondent had admitted 

truthfulness problems. 

¶ 11 Nonetheless, when interviewed by Dr. Smith in June 2015, respondent reported he was 

transparent in therapy and kept his mind occupied so as to avoid deviant thoughts, thus 

steadily decreasing in deviant sexual fantasies, and stated he had not masturbated since 

returning on conditional release in February 2015. Fantasies came and went, but respondent 

successfully intervened, for example, when viewing young females on television and 

completed sexual fantasy/masturbation logs, budget sheets, and phone logs. He was taking 

Eligard, which he reported was quite successful in sublimating his deviant sexual urges. 

Respondent’s conditional release agent described him as compliant and self-reliant, having 

adjusted back to community living from the TDF with no rule violations and negative drug 

tests. Respondent, however, acknowledged he often thought about being at the TDF as a 

means of helping him cope with the challenges he encountered in the community. 

¶ 12 Dr. Smith noted that by statutory definition, a person is dangerous if it is “substantially 

probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.” 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 

2014). Dr. Smith tested respondent pursuant to a “Static-99R” test which has shown 

“moderate accuracy in ranking offenders according to their relative risk of recidivism.”

Respondent scored 1 out of 12, which placed him in the lowest risk of recidivism, i.e. the 

likelihood of being charged or convicted of another sexual offense. Dr. Smith reported that 

despite the “low risk” described on the Static-99R test, the Department of Corrections had 

decided that respondent fit within a “preselected high-risk/high needs” category, which 

eliminates all but 96% to 98% of sex offenders being released from prison in Illinois, and 

noted that other offenders with the same score of one on the Static-99R test from that 

preselected high-risk category had sexually reoffended at a rate of 9% in 5 years and 15.8% 

in 10 years. Dr. Smith opined that this re-designation was appropriate because the State had 

filed a petition to declare respondent an SVP, a circuit court found that there was probable 

cause that he was an SVP, and that “judge or jury concluded” that he was an SVP. Dr. Smith 
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also discussed the findings of a number of sex offender recidivism studies, all of which to 

one degree or another found that recidivism rates steadily decreased over time, with rates in 

several studies approaching zero after 60 years of age. Dr. Smith noted that research has not 

reached a general agreement as to how age affects recividism rates, but then he determined 

respondent’s age was a protective factor at this time, while also noting that factor was 

“mitigated by the circumstances that led to his Conditional Release being revoked in June 

2012.” 

¶ 13 Dr. Smith further identified “additional risk factors,” i.e. risk factors existing outside of 

risk assessment instruments, which included respondent’s antisocial personality disorder, 

self-regulation problems, impulsiveness/recklessness, early onset sexual offending, 

intoxication during an offense, deviant sexual interest, intimate relationship conflicts, 

substance abuse, neglect, and physical/emotional abuse. Dr. Smith opined that given the 

Static-99R, these additional risk factors and “the circumstances and behaviors that resulted in 

[respondent’s] Conditional Release being revoked in June 2012 suggest he is at a substantial 

probability to engage in acts of sexual violence.” Thus, despite the Static-99R score of one 

and studies predicting low recidivism after age 60, Dr. Smith opined that respondent was still 

an SVP under the terms of the Act and that his condition had not materially changed since his 

most recent reexamination. With that opinion, Dr. Smith effectively recommended against 

respondent obtaining a full hearing regarding whether he was entitled to discharge from the 

Department. That is, there was no reasonable ground to believe respondent had been cured as 

an SVP, although Dr. Smith nonetheless found conditional release was appropriate at that 

time.

¶ 14 Accordingly, the State moved for a finding of no probable cause to believe that 

respondent was no longer an SVP. Respondent, who was present at the probable cause 

hearing and represented by an attorney, objected. Counsel for respondent argued that 

changed circumstances indicated respondent was no longer an SVP, and as such, he was 

entitled to a discharge hearing. Counsel cited respondent’s lack of a disciplinary record while 

in the TDF, the Static-99R score of one (showing that over 60% of sex offenders scored 

higher than respondent), respondent’s age of 68 and the accompanying age studies, and 

statistics indicating respondent was less likely to reoffend than the median average sex 

offender, per Dr. Smith’s report. Citing Dr. Smith’s statistic regarding an estimated 

recidivism rate of 9% in five years, counsel claimed it “falls far short of the statutory criteria 

for civil commitment.” Additionally, counsel noted that Dr. Smith did not sufficiently 

delineate how the dynamic risk factors influenced the low Static-99R score. Counsel 

criticized Dr. Smith’s problematic reliance on respondent’s 2012 conditional release 

revocation as a factor supporting Dr. Smith’s ultimate professional conclusion that he was 

still an SVP, when this court had reversed that revocation judgment. Counsel argued in short 

that this evidence “leads to the conclusion” that respondent is “not substantially probable to 

re-offend” and had presented a plausible account for a discharge hearing. 

¶ 15 In response to the trial court’s query, the State argued that Dr. Smith’s report was not on

its face “enough to trigger an evidentiary hearing.” The State argued the report, when 

considered comprehensively, showed respondent continued to meet the criteria of an SVP.

¶ 16 Following arguments, the trial court found no probable cause to warrant a full evidentiary 

hearing to determine whether respondent was no longer an SVP. In fact, the trial court found 

there was a plausible account to find respondent was still an SVP based on Dr. Smith’s 
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report, which was not at least contradicted by any other report in evidence, and given that 

respondent had not affirmatively filed a petition for discharge. This timely appeal followed. 

¶ 17 ANALYSIS 

¶ 18 Standard of Review and SVP Law

¶ 19 The parties contend, and we agree, that the question of whether there is probable cause to 

believe respondent is no longer an SVP so as to warrant a full evidentiary hearing is subject 

to de novo review. In re Commitment of Wilcoxen, 2016 IL App (3d) 140539, ¶ 28.

¶ 20 In Illinois, a respondent is entitled to be annually reexamined by mental health 

professionals to determine whether he or she has made sufficient progress to be on 

conditional release or discharged. 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2014). In this case, respondent 

was already on conditional release at the time Dr. Smith submitted the June 2015 

reexamination report. As such, under the statute, the filing of the reexamination report 

required the trial court to hold a probable cause hearing to determine whether respondent was 

entitled to discharge from custody, that is, unless respondent affirmatively waived his right to 

the petition. See 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1) (West 2014). Here, the record is clear that 

respondent neither asked for discharge nor specifically waived his right to do so. Therefore, 

the probable cause hearing necessarily ensued under the statute by operation of law without 

respondent having to affirmatively file the petition. There, while reviewing only the 

reexamination reports and parties’ arguments, the trial court was required to “determine 

whether facts exist to believe that since the most recent periodic reexamination ***, the 

condition of the committed person has so changed that he *** is no longer a sexually violent 

person.” Id. A sexually violent person is one who has been convicted of a sexually violent 

offense and is dangerous to others because he suffers from a mental disorder that makes it 

substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. 725 ILCS 207/5(f) 

(West 2014). A finding of probable cause garners a full evidentiary hearing in which the 

State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the committed person is still a 

sexually violent person. 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 2014). 

¶ 21 We note, initially, that respondent takes issue with the 2012 amendment to the discharge 

provision in section 65, which took effect immediately. See Pub. Act 97-1075 (eff. Aug. 24, 

2012). Under that amendment, and as stated, a court in considering probable cause according 

to section 65(b) must examine whether since “the most recent periodic reexamination” facts 

show a changed condition in the respondent, such that he is no longer an SVP. Id. The 

previous version of section 65(b) did not contain a reference to “the most recent periodic 

reexamination.” See id. Respondent argues the 2012 amendment is unduly restrictive, forcing 

a petitioner to essentially rely only on facts occurring since the most recent reexamination, 

within the preceding year. He argues this has a retroactive effect and we must therefore apply 

the pre-amendment statute. 

¶ 22 The State responds that the 2012 amendment explicitly provides that the amendment 

applies to petitions pending at the effective date of the amendment and petitions filed 

thereafter. 725 ILCS 207/65(c) (West 2014). Reading the statute in its plain language so as to 

divine legislative intent, as we must, and in context with the other provisions of section 65, 

“petition” refers to petitions for discharge, including petitions like the present one, that were 

filed by operation of law and not the initial petition for civil commitment of respondent. In re 

Detention of Hardin, 238 Ill. 2d 33, 40 (2010). As defendant’s petition for discharge was 
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filed by operation of law in 2015, several years after the amendment, the State contends, and 

we agree, that the circuit court’s probable cause determination was based on section 65 then 

in effect, which contained the amended language. Indeed, in the absence of contrary 

legislative intent or manifest injustice, courts will apply the law in effect at the time of their 

decisions. See Daley v. Zebra Zone Lounge, Inc., 236 Ill. App. 3d 511, 515 (1992); see also 

Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393, 407 (2009) (the expression of legislative intent 

must be given effect, absent constitutional prohibition). 

¶ 23 Moreover, respondent’s reading of the statute is itself unduly restrictive since review of a 

reexamination report does not preclude consideration of a respondent’s full mental health and 

sexual history or relevant historical facts. Indeed, in Dr. Smith’s June 2015 report itself, he 

reviewed the other annual reexamination reports from 2008 to 2014, thus taking them into 

account. Construing the statute logically, it simply means the court must consider the 

professional conclusions as to a respondent’s status in the most recent report and any 

changed circumstances. See In re Detention of Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶ 72. We agree 

with the State that the amendment is simply a clarification of what the circuit court was 

already tasked with determining in any case involving application for discharge or 

conditional release—i.e. whether the respondent’s current status reflects a mental disorder or 

that he is still a danger to society such that he is substantially probable to reoffend. See 

General Telephone Co. of Illinois v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 2d 363, 377 (1984) (if the amendment 

merely clarified the law as it existed before, then no substantive change occurred that would

raise a due process issue). Even absent the amendment, it is common sense that a court would 

turn to the most recent professional examination of a respondent to answer this very 

important public safety question. For example, if a sex offender had regressed in treatment to 

the point where a professional recommends no discharge, it would make little sense for a 

court to cite an examination report from two years prior stating that the respondent had made 

significant progress and then allow discharge based on that previous report. For those 

reasons, respondent’s contention as to the applicability of the pre-amendment statute fails. 

¶ 24 We thus return to the merits of determining whether the trial court erred in this instance. 

Respondent, who initially stipulated to the State’s SVP petition and who never formally 

petitioned for discharge, contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine 

whether he is still a sexually violent person as defined by the Act. We agree.

¶ 25 The Wilcoxen Case

¶ 26 We find the recent decision in Wilcoxen, 2016 IL App (3d) 140359, instructive. In 

Wilcoxen, the respondent was convicted of criminal sexual assault, and just as he was about 

to be released after serving only 10 years of his 22-year sentence, the State petitioned to have 

him declared an SVP. Seven years later, a jury agreed, and he was placed in a TDF. After the 

State filed several motions for a finding of no probable cause, the trial court eventually held a 

hearing and found that there was no probable cause to believe that the respondent was no 

longer an SVP. Removing the double negative, the court essentially ruled that there was 

probable cause to believe that he was still an SVP, which vitiated any evidentiary hearing. 

This decision was made by the trial court on the basis of reports submitted by two 

psychologists, one who was retained by the State and one retained by the respondent.

¶ 27 The State’s psychologist, Dr. Gaskell, conducted a battery of tests that are substantially 

similar to those that were taken of respondent. These included the Static-99R, where the 
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respondent scored a four. Like Dr. Smith, Dr. Gaskell classified the respondent as a 

“high-risk/high needs” individual and estimated his risk of recidivism as 20.1% in 5 years 

and 29.6% in 10 years. Dr. Gaskell’s ultimate conclusion, like that of Dr. Smith, held that it 

was “substantially probable” that the respondent would reoffend if released, and he 

recommended that he remain classified as an SVP.

¶ 28 The respondent’s psychologist, Dr. Rosell, also used a number of tests, including the 

Static-99R where he scored the respondent as a 3 on the scale of 12. He conducted another 

test (MATS-1), which predicted an eight-year recidivism rate of 6% among individuals aged 

60-69 years old, although his score of four placed him in the high range. Dr. Rosell 

concluded that the respondent did not pose a substantial risk of reoffending. The respondent 

was 61 at the time he was tested by Dr. Rosell.

¶ 29 On appeal, the Third District found that the respondent had met his “very low burden” to 

obtain an evidentiary hearing, while acknowledging at the same time that the respondent 

possibly would not succeed in establishing at an evidentiary hearing that he is no longer an 

SVP. Relying on the supreme court’s decision in Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, the Wilcoxen

court noted that in a preliminary probable-cause discharge proceeding, which is intended 

only to establish essential or basic facts as to probability, the respondent bears the burden of 

demonstrating only a “plausible account” that he is no longer an SVP and the court must 

make this determination without weighing evidence like competing professional opinions. 

Wilcoxen, 2016 IL App (3d) 140359, ¶ 35. In other words, the respondent must present 

sufficient evidence that he no longer meets the elements for commitment, in so far as (1) he 

no longer has a mental disorder or (2) he is no longer dangerous to others because the 

person’s mental disorder no longer creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts 

of sexual violence. In other words, the evidence must show changed circumstances in the 

committed person, professional knowledge or methods, or legal definitions. Id. ¶ 36. 

¶ 30 In light of those standards, the Wilcoxen majority found that the respondent’s positive 

experience in treatment, his commitment to a treatment plan, his psychologist’s professional 

opinions relating to his low risk of recidivism, and the testing results all “supported 

respondent’s claim and warranted an evidentiary hearing.” Id. ¶ 37. As to the actuarial and 

PPG tests, the majority emphasized that the results, while meaningful, did not “compel a 

conclusion that it is ‘substantially probable’ that respondent will reoffend,” reasoning further 

that “if probable means it is more likely than not that respondent will reoffend and 

substantially probable means his reoffending is substantially more likely to occur than not, 

these results of objective, statistical tests militate against, not in favor of, that finding.” Id.

¶ 48.

¶ 31 Respondent’s Case

¶ 32 Likewise, in the case sub judice, respondent has adequately met his low burden to obtain 

an evidentiary hearing. The test result that established respondent’s recidivism rate at 1 on a 

scale of 12, his age of 68, the studies showing a low reoffense risk with increased age, 

respondent’s compliance with hormone drug therapy, and his current behavioral methods for 

handling his mental disorder, are all evidence constituting at least a plausible account that 

respondent is no longer an SVP. That is, it is plausible evidence of changed circumstances 

from the time respondent initially stipulated to the SVP designation and over the course of 18 

years in treatment and twice being on conditional release in the community. Indeed, when 
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compared to the respondent in Wilcoxen, respondent has completed more treatment and 

reached phase V in therapy, advanced more in age (68 compared to 61), scored a lower 

recidivism rate on the Static-99R test, and scored better on his most recent PPG examination. 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude respondent is at least entitled to an evidentiary hearing 

to determine whether he is no longer dangerous to others because his mental disorder no 

longer creates a substantial probability that he will engage in acts of sexual violence. As in 

Wilcoxen, we acknowledge that an evidentiary hearing may not lead to the conclusion that 

respondent is no longer a sexually violent person. To be sure, the State may very well 

establish by clear and convincing evidence at an evidentiary hearing that respondent should 

be denied discharge from the Department’s legal custody. That evidence might reference 

respondent’s significant difficulties during his first stint on conditional release and also his 

retained expert’s report, which was not presented at the probable cause hearing and which we 

have not reviewed since it does not appear in the record, but in which the expert reportedly 

opined that respondent was still an SVP who should remain in conditional release. 

Notwithstanding those possibilities, for our present purposes and given the record before us, 

respondent has presented sufficient evidence to show probable cause for an evidentiary 

hearing.

¶ 33 In reaching this conclusion, we wish to address several matters raised during oral 

arguments on this case. We first address respondent’s claim as to his burden at the probable 

cause discharge hearing. Respondent notes that his discharge petition was filed by operation 

of law, as he was reexamined yet did not waive his right to petition, which automatically 

triggered the trial court’s duty to conduct a probable cause hearing under section 65(b)(1). 

Respondent argues that in such an instance, he should have no burden at the hearing, thus 

distinguishing his case from one where the respondent affirmatively files a petition for 

discharge over the Secretary of Human Services’ objection under section 65(b)(1) and then 

has a probable cause hearing. 

¶ 34 This argument is directly contradicted by Stanbridge, which drew no distinction between 

a discharge petition filed by operation of law and one filed affirmatively by a respondent. In 

both scenarios, Stanbridge held “the movant bears the burden to show sufficient evidence to 

warrant a hearing on whether the person is ‘still a sexually violent person.’ ”

1

(Emphasis 

omitted.) Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶ 67 (quoting 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(1), 70 (West 

2008)).

¶ 35 This brings us to the State’s argument that respondent, in order to fulfill his burden at the 

probable cause hearing, was required to present his own evaluator’s report. The State notes 

that respondent’s case is different from the fact pattern in Wilcoxen, since there, the 

respondent had an appointed psychologist opining that he was no longer an SVP. Here, Dr. 

Smith opined that respondent was most definitely still an SVP and thus not entitled to any 

further hearing. 

 

1

In Stanbridge, the court addressed the 2008 Act. Under the 2008 Act, section 65(b)(1) contained 

the provision wherein a discharge petition is filed by operation of law, while section 70 contained the 

provision wherein the respondent affirmatively filed the petition. The 2012 amendment collapsed these 

statutory sections into one, section 65, and repealed section 70, but the amended content of section 

65(b)(1) is not appreciably different from the 2008 version insofar as the respondent can obtain a 

probable cause hearing by operation of law or by affirmatively filing a petition. 
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¶ 36 The State’s arguments are resolved by carefully reviewing the Act. Section 65(b)(1) 

mandates only that the court consider the submitted “reexamination reports.” See 725 ILCS 

207/65(b)(1) (West 2014). This necessarily includes the Department’s reexamination report 

filed annually under section 55. See 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2014). While section 65(b)(1) 

does not mandate that a respondent submit his own evaluator report, it also does not foreclose 

respondent from doing so. See 725 ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2014) (“At the time of a 

reexamination under this Section, the person who has been committed may retain or, if he or 

she is indigent and so requests, the court may appoint a qualified expert or professional 

person to examine him or her.” (Emphasis added.)). At the same time, the Act expressly 

provides that the State can choose its own expert to evaluate respondent at a full evidentiary 

hearing. See 725 ILCS 207/65(b)(2) (West 2014). From examining the above-stated 

provisions, we think the Act makes clear that the Department evaluators are neutral in the 

sense that they are neither aligned with the petitioning party, nor the party opposing the 

petition, albeit necessarily employed by the State of Illinois. Thus, presenting a Department 

evaluator report does not automatically mandate a finding in favor of the State, and either 

party may argue for or against the report. 

¶ 37 We thus reject the State’s related argument that respondent had to show a “plausible 

expert opinion” that he’s no longer an SVP, since the Stanbridge holding clearly requires 

only that the trial court find from the discharge hearing evidence “a plausible account” that 

the committed person is no longer an SVP. Stanbridge, 2012 IL 112337, ¶¶ 62, 67. Here, as 

stated and under our de novo review, we conclude a trier of fact could find that the actuarial 

tests, respondent’s age, and present treatment status rebutted the conclusion reached by Dr. 

Smith that respondent was still an SVP. In other words, Dr. Smith’s conclusion drawn from 

the facts in his report does not preclude our determination that respondent has presented a 

plausible account that he is no longer an SVP. Again, the quantum of evidence is low, and 

Dr. Smith, a mental health professional, did not address that statutory matter specifically. 

Likewise, the prohibition against weighing evidence or making credibility determinations at 

this stage does not preclude critical consideration of the evidence in a doctor’s report, 

weighing the related inferences, and determining whether that evidence is consistent with the 

doctor’s final opinion. Cf. id. ¶ 58 (at the probable cause stage, the role of the trial court is 

not to choose between conflicting facts or inferences or to engage in a full and independent

evaluation of the expert’s credibility and methodology, but rather to consider whether 

plausible evidence or reasonable inference supports the movant’s claim). This will help avoid 

simply rubber-stamping doctor’s reexamination reports, especially where liberty is at stake. 

¶ 38 In that sense, we must address certain frailties in Dr. Smith’s report, while 

acknowledging that the law and mental health can clearly diverge at times. Even considering 

the face value of Dr. Smith’s actuarial test analysis, it is arguably reductio ad absurdum, as it 

holds that anybody who is found to be an SVP under the State’s commitment petition, 

whether by judge or jury, is automatically excluded from the 96% to 98% of sexual offenders 

who have a very low risk of recidivism and instead should be subject to a preselected group 

of offenders who are at a higher risk (5% at 5 years and 15.8% at 10 years). This necessarily 

means that every person who is found to be an SVP would, a priori, forever remain an SVP, 

a conclusion which is markedly inconsistent with the gravamen of the Act itself. The SVP 

law is predicated upon the possibility that a person can successfully be engaged in treatment 

that would remove the “diagnosis” of SVP, thus entitling him to release. See 725 ILCS 
- 11 - 

207/40(a) (West 2014) (“If a court or jury determines that the person who is the subject of a 

petition under Section 15 of this Act is a sexually violent person, the court shall order the 

person to be committed to the custody of the Department for control, care and treatment until 

such time as the person is no longer a sexually violent person.” (Emphasis added.)). Accepting 

this opinion is equivalent to stating that the finding of SVP status by a court and a jury is 

equivalent to a civil form of life imprisonment without an evidentiary hearing ever being held 

to determine whether the individual respondent should be released. We cannot sanction such 

a result.

¶ 39 Dr. Smith’s report is also replete with analyses of studies that reflect a greatly reduced 

rate of recidivism among offenders as they age, with recidivism being virtually unreported 

after the age of 60. In addition, Dr. Smith’s stated basis for finding respondent substantially 

likely to reoffend included not just the Static-99R, but “the circumstances that led to his 

Conditional Release being revoked in June 2012.” Dr. Smith also cited as support the 

so-called dynamic risk factors, which were almost all factors (like deviant sexual interest, 

intoxication during an offense, etc.) that landed respondent in civil commitment in the first 

place. Thus, Dr. Smith appears to have put respondent into a higher risk of recidivism than 

some authoritative literature would have suggested based upon the circumstances that this 

court specifically held were inappropriate reasons for his removal from conditional release 

and based upon respondent’s initial admitted status as an SVP. See Rendon, 2014 IL App 

(1st) 123090. After a full evidentiary hearing, a fact finder could weigh Dr. Smith’s report 

and conclude that it could be meaningfully challenged.

¶ 40 CONCLUSION

¶ 41 Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the trial court finding no probable 

cause for an evidentiary hearing. We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

¶ 42 Reversed; remanded.