COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis 

ROBERT GEORGE WOODWARD 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0504-96-3 PER CURIAM 

 AUGUST 13, 1996 

HARDEE'S/BODDIE NOELL ENTERPRISES, INC. 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Susan D. Oglebay, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Linda Davis Frith; Monica L. Taylor; Gentry, 

Locke, Rakes & Moore, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Robert George Woodward contends that the Workers' 

Compensation Commission erred in finding that the accident in 

which his wife, Joyce Woodward, died did not arise out of and in 

the course of her employment. Woodward argues that the 

decedent's accident arose out of and in the course of her 

employment under the "special errand doctrine" or the "personal 

comfort doctrine" or some other exception to the "coming and 

going" rule. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 

5A:27. 

Background

 The decedent worked as a breakfast manager at employer's 

restaurant. On May 19, 1993, the decedent worked from 4:00 a.m. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

to 11:59 a.m. She left her workplace and drove home. The drive 

from her workplace to her home took approximately one-half hour. 

 She had to return to her workplace at 2:00 p.m. for a manager's 

meeting. Returning to the meeting, the decedent fell asleep 

while driving and died as a result of a single automobile 

accident. 

 Shift managers were required to attend a manager's meeting 

once per month. Employer allowed managers to wait in the 

restaurant's main dining room after their work shift until the 

meeting time if they wished to do so. Employer paid managers for 

their time spent at the manager's meetings and required them to 

clock in when the meeting started and to clock out when the 

meeting ended. Employer did not pay managers for time spent 

traveling to the meetings or waiting in the restaurant before the 

meeting started. 

Special Errand Doctrine

 "Whether an accident arose out of and in the course of 

employment is a mixed question of law and fact and is properly 

reviewable on appeal." Kendrick v. Nationwide Homes, Inc., 4 Va. 

App. 189, 190, 355 S.E.2d 347, 347 (1987). Woodward bore the 

burden of proving that the decedent's accident arose out of and 

in the course of her employment. Id. 

 As a general rule, injury or death which occurs while an 

employee is traveling to or from work is not compensable. 

Sentara Leigh Hosp. v. Nichols, 13 Va. App. 630, 636, 414 S.E.2d 
 3 

426, 429 (1992) (en banc). This rule, the "coming and going" 

rule, is premised upon the principle that an employee traveling 

to or from his workplace "is not engaged in performing any 

service growing out of and incidental to his employment." 

Kendrick, 4 Va. App. at 190, 355 S.E.2d at 347. 

 The special errand doctrine, an exception to the "coming and 

going" rule, provides: 

 "When an employee, having identifiable time 

and space limits on his employment, makes an 

off-premises journey which would normally not 

be covered under the usual going and coming 

rule, the journey may be brought within the 

course of employment by the fact that the 

trouble and time of making the journey, or 

the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency 

of making it in the particular circumstances, 

is itself sufficiently substantial to be 

viewed as an integral part of the service 

itself." 

Harbin v. Jamestown Village Joint Venture, 16 Va. App. 190, 

193-94, 428 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1993) (citation omitted). This 

doctrine applies where "the employee is given 'a temporary, 

special assignment . . . [which] was outside the normal 

performance of [the employee's] duties, and it clearly 

represented a special benefit to the [employer].'" Id. at 195-

96, 428 S.E.2d at 757 (citation omitted). 

 The decedent was not on a special errand for the benefit of 

her employer while she traveled back to her usual place of 

employment to attend the manager's meeting. The meeting was a 

part of her regular employment duties and did not constitute an 

additional task or special assignment. The decedent's travel to 
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her employer's premises falls within the "going and coming rule" 

because she had not embarked on an "off-premises" journey at the 

direction of or for the benefit of her employer. 

Harbin, relied upon by Woodward, is distinguishable from 

this case. Unlike Harbin, the decedent was not required to be 

away from her employer's place of employment while performing a 

duty assigned by the employer. Accordingly, the commission did 

not err in finding that the special errand doctrine did not apply 

to the circumstances of this case. 

Personal Comfort Doctrine

 Under the personal comfort doctrine "occasional breaks and 

excursions for food, drink, rest and restroom visitation are 

deemed to be in the course of employment." Ablola v. Holland 

Road Auto Center, Ltd., 11 Va. App. 181, 183, 397 S.E.2d 541, 542 

(1990). The doctrine applies only if "'the employee uses the 

facilities furnished to him by the employer, or does not depart 

from the employer's premises, or go to some place thereon where 

he has no right to be.'" Kraf Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Ingram, 17 

Va. App. 295, 299, 437 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1993) (citation omitted). 

 Assuming the decedent sought personal comfort by travelling 

home before the meeting, she did not do so at facilities 

furnished by employer or on employer's premises. Accordingly, 

the commission did not err in finding that the personal comfort 

doctrine did not apply to the circumstances of this case. 

Other Exception
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 Woodward argues that, even if the special errand and the 

personal comfort doctrines do not apply, the commission erred by 

not creating a new exception to the "coming and going" rule 

because of the peculiar demands of the decedent's employment. We 

find no support in the Act or the case law for such a contention. 

 Because Woodward failed to prove that any exception to the 

"coming and going" rule applied to the circumstances of this 

case, the commission did not err in finding that Woodward's 

evidence did not prove that the decedent's accident arose out of 

and in the course of her employment. 

 For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.