### *As of March 31, 1995, the Social Security

Administration became an independent agency from the Department of Health and Human Services. Therefore, the court has substituted Shirley S. Chater for Donna E. Shalala pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c). The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, Chief Judge, United States 1 

### District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. _____________ No. 95-1499

_____________ Robert Lorenzen, * * Plaintiff-Appellant, * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the v. * Southern District of Iowa. * Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * of Social Security, * *
* Defendant-Appellee. *

_____________ Submitted: September 15, 1995 Filed: December 8, 1995

_____________ Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, McMILLIAN and HANSEN, Circui t Judges.

_____________ HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Robert Lorenzen appeals from the district court's grant of summary 1 judgment, which affir med the Social Security Administration's decision to deny his applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. We affirm.
In his applications, Lorenzen alleged a disability onset date

### 2

of July 2, 1987, due to back trouble. The Social Security Administration denied his applicatio ns both initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing held in 1992, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) also denie d Lorenzen's applications for benefits. Subsequently, the appeals council of the Soc ial Security Administration remanded the case to an ALJ fo r further proceedings.
On March 22, 1994, following a supplemental hearing, the ALJ re ndered
a decision denying benefits upon finding that Lorenzen was not disabled. The ALJ found that Lorenzen has severe lumbosacr al stenosis with a history of two surgeries for the problem, the second of which showed a marke d reduction of pain; a personality disorder; and a history of alcohol abuse. The ALJ concluded, however, that these impairments are not severe enough to meet or, in combination, to equal a listed impairment.
The ALJ discredited Lorenzen's testimony concerning the extent of his limitations, finding that Lorenzen took no medication for his alleged pain , that he has refused all but the briefest treatment for alcoholism, and tha t nothing in the record indicates that his inactivity is medically necessary

. Med ical records indicated that Lorenzen was doing well after his secon d lumbar surgery, and the only limitations specifically imposed upon him wer e to avoid heavy lifting and heavy activity for six weeks. While th e residual functional c apacity assessments made by two physicians indicated
some s evere pain and limitations, the ALJ discounted these assessment s because they were made during a relapse which occurred before Lorenzen's second surgery. Similarly, although the ALJ did not specificall y articulate this with regard to her testimony, the testimony of Lorenzen's past employer, Carol Bennett, concerning Lorenzen's pain and limitations was also based upon Lorenzen's condition prior to his second surgery.
The ALJ posed three hypothetical questions to a vocational

### Since the ALJ's decision denying benefits in this case, 2 

### Lorenzen submitted another application for disability insurance benefits, and the Administration awarded benefits on that application. Thus, only a 3 1/2 year period is in dispute here.
3 expert (VE), asking the VE to determine the potential employmen t opportunities available to a person with Lorenzen's impairments, education , age, and capabilities and who could tolerate a s tress level of either 3 or 4 on a scale of 1 to 10 (10 being the greatest level of stress). The VE conclu ded that while such a person would be unable to return to pas t relevant work as a cook or maintenance engineer, the person would retain the residual functional capacity to engage in substantial gainful unskille d employment that exists both in the national econ omy and statewide. The VE listed some specific jobs as examples. Adding t he consideration of two to three unscheduled abs ences per month to the hypothetical question, the VE concluded that this limitation alone would preclude all employment.

Ba sed upon this record, the ALJ determined that Lorenzen was no t under a disability at any time through the date of the decision and , acco rdingly, denied Lorenzen's applications for benefits. The appeal s 2 council denied Lorenzen's request for review of this decision.
Lorenzen sought judicial review. Th e district court determined that the de cision of the Social Security Administration was supported b y subst antial evidence on the record as a whole. Lorenzen appeals , contending that the ALJ erred (1) by excluding certain relevant limitation s from the hypothetical question posed to the VE (namely those reported prio r to his second surgery and those resulting from absences and relate d problem s attributable to his alcohol abuse); (2) by using a numerica l stress sc ale in the hypothetical question; and (3) by failing to make a specif ic determination of the credibility of the testimony of Caro l Bennett, Lorenzen's past employer.

### 4 We review the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits by deter mining the limited question of whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Harris v. Shalala , 45 F.3d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir. 1995). If supporte d by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's findings and decision must be affirmed. Id.

After c areful consideration of the record, we conclude tha t sub stantial evidence on the whole record supports the ALJ's decision t o deny benefits in this case. First, the hypothet ical question that the ALJ asked of the VE prope rly set forth all of Lorenzen's impairments that are supported in the record. See Chamberlain v. Shalala , 47 F.3d 1489, 1495 (8th C ir. 1995) (hypothetical question must include all credibl e impairments). Since Lorenzen has been unwilling to accept treatment for his alcoholism, his c laimed limitations based upon alcohol abuse need not be credited by the ALJ or included in the hypothetical question. Se e Shelltrack v. Sullivan , 938 F.2d 894, 897 (8th Cir. 1991) (disability base d
on alcoholism requires, in part, a showing that claimant is unable , no t merely unwilling , to seek and use means of rehabilitation).

Second, the ALJ did not commit error by using the numerical stres s scale or by labeling the level of stress that Lorenzen could endure as a level 3 or 4 on a scale of 1 to 10, because the record supports th e conclusion that Lorenzen had a "fair" ability to deal with work stresses when he was not drinking. See Montgomery v. Cha ter , No. 95-1387, slip op. at 4 (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 1995) (use of a numerical stress scale "is a n acceptable shorthand for identifying a claimant's stress tolerance," when supported by the evidence).

Third, although the ALJ failed to list specific reasons fo r discrediting the testimony of Carol Bennett, it is evident that most of he r testimony concerning Lorenzen's capabilities was

### 5

discredited by the sa me evidence that discredits Lorenzen's own testimony concerning his limitations. See Robinson v. Sullivan , 956 F.2d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 1992) (argu able deficiency of failing to specifically discredit witne ss has no bearing on outcome when the witness's testimony i s discre dited by the same evidence that proves claimant's claims no t credible).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.