1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

BENJAMIN WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 20 C 1537

v. )

) Judge Sara L. Ellis

COOK COUNTY, Cook County Jail )

Correctional Officers DANIEL WEYER, Star )

17565, ANTONIO HUGHES, Star Unknown, )

MARIO SPIZZIRRI, Star Unknown, and )

THOMAS J. DART, Cook County Sheriff, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

In February 2019, Benjamin Williams was a pretrial detainee at the Cook County Jail 

(“CCJ”), which the Cook County Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”) operates. Williams 

alleged that three correctional officers, Daniel Weyer, Antonio Hughes, and Mario Spizzirri (the 

“Defendant Officers”), sexually assaulted him or ignored his requests for help multiple times 

over a span of several days. After filing a series of inmate grievances with the CCJ, which the 

administration serially rejected, Williams sued the Defendant Officers, Cook County Sheriff 

Thomas Dart, and Cook County (“Defendants”) in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

After discovery closed, the Court granted summary judgment to Weyer, Hughes, and Dart, but 

determined that one of Williams’ claims against Spizzirri could survive to trial. See Doc. 135.1 

Now, Spizzirri and Cook County request summary judgment on the grounds that Williams failed 

to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claim against Spizzirri, and that 

Williams’ indemnification claim against Cook County must fail for lack of an individual 

1 Because one of Williams’ claims against an individual defendant survived, Cook County also remained as a 

defendant for indemnification purposes. See Doc. 135 at 25.

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defendant. Williams argues that the grievance process was effectively unavailable to him 

because Spizzirri intimidated him. As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Williams fails to 

present a dispute of material fact as to whether the CCJ’s grievance procedures were available to 

him, which obviates the need for the Court to hold a Pavey hearing to resolve Williams’ 

unavailability claim. See Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008). Regarding the 

merits of Spizzirri’s and Cook County’s motion, the Court finds that Williams failed to exhaust 

his administrative remedies for his claim against Spizzirri and grants their motion for summary 

judgment on the remaining claims.

BACKGROUND

The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts of this case, as discussed in the 

Court’s first Opinion granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. See Doc. 135 at 2–9.

I. CCDOC Policy

Williams has been a pre-trial detainee at the CCJ since March 2018. CCDOC operates 

the CCJ and implemented an Inmate Grievances policy (“the Policy”) that applies to all inmates

at the detention facility. The Policy instructs inmates how to complain about “problem[s] related 

to [their] conditions of confinement” including violations of “constitutional or other legal rights,” 

risks to “safety or well-being,” and “not receiving medical, dental or mental health help that you 

need.” Doc. 150-3 at 30. While the Policy mandates that inmates filing a grievance must submit 

one “within 15 days of the incident,” it provides that “[t]here is no time limit however for 

grievances involving sexual misconduct.” Id. at 32. When filing a grievance, inmates must 

“provide the specific date, location and time of the incident, problem or event that [they] are 

grieving.” Id. If CCDOC denies a grievance, the inmate has 15 days to appeal the denial (and 

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must do so to exhaust their administrative remedies pursuant to the Policy). Id. CCDOC 

published the Policy in the CCDOC Inmate Handbook, a copy of which Williams received when 

he arrived at the CCJ.

II. Williams’ Incidents with the Defendant Officers

A. February 1, 2019

Williams alleged that Weyer sexually assaulted him during a routine pat-down search 

before attending a medical appointment. Williams complained of Weyer’s conduct to Hughes, 

who disregarded his concerns. Weyer then allegedly pushed Williams into a wall. 

B. February 2, 2019

Williams alleged that Spizzirri assaulted and threatened him during a pat-down search 

outside of his cell. According to Williams’ amended complaint, Spizzirri “threatened Plaintiff 

for having filed a grievance against [Weyer], stating that the deputies would have Plaintiff killed 

for reporting” this behavior. Doc. 22 ¶ 37.

C. February 6, 2019

Williams alleged that Spizzirri once again assaulted and threatened him for filing a 

grievance against Weyer related to the February 1, 2019 incident. According to Williams’ 

amended complaint, Spizzirri said he would “‘see to’ [Williams’] murder” and “grabbed 

[Williams’] genitals.” Id. ¶¶ 39–40.

III. Williams’ Grievances

Williams filed several grievances between February 1, 2019 and July 11, 2019—the date 

of the last available grievance in the record. 

On February 1, 2019, Williams filed a grievance against Weyer complaining about the 

pat-down search. Williams wrote that Weyer “fondling and squeeze my Genitals . . . And Put his 

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finger And my rectum.” Doc. 106-7 at 2. Williams also reported that, “As I walk To The 

interlock To Tell Sheriff hughes I Need help I was sexual Assault I will Like medical help And 

To call my mom Sheriff Lombardi Say No You going To Shu.” Id. The reviewing officer 

denied Williams’ grievance on February 5, 2019, and Williams appealed the same day. The 

CCJ’s Superintendent and Assistant Executive Director denied Williams’ appeal. They wrote 

that the video footage did not show that Weyer sexually assaulted Williams and found that 

Williams’ “grievance is frivolous in nature.” Id. at 6.

On February 4, 2019, Williams filed a grievance against Nurses Thomas and O’Mackie 

for “refus[ing] medical help for sexual assault [after] . . . Weyer . . . squeeze[d] [Williams’] 

genitals.” Id. at 9. CCDOC rejected Williams’ grievance and denied his appeal as frivolous. Id. 

at 10.

On February 10, 2019, Williams filed two grievances. He filed one grievance against 

Spizzirri regarding the February 6 alleged assault Williams pleaded in his complaint. Williams 

wrote that Spizzirri told Williams that he “will be killed and murder[ed] for doing grievance and 

press[ing] charges on Sheriff . . . Weyer.” Id. at 17. Williams did not allege that Spizzirri 

sexually assaulted him. CCDOC rejected Williams’ grievance and appeal. Williams filed a 

second grievance against unnamed mental health employees for not providing adequate mental 

health in the form of trauma counselors in response to Weyer’s alleged sexual assault on 

February 1, 2019. CCDOC rejected this grievance and subsequent appeal.

On February 16, 2019, Williams filed a grievance against Nurses Thomas and O’Mackie, 

Weyer, and others for the alleged sexual assault that occurred on February 1, 2019. CCDOC 

rejected the grievance and Williams’ appeal. 

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On February 17, 2019, Williams filed a grievance against Spizzirri, alleging that he 

sexually assaulted and harassed him on February 12, 2019. Williams complained that Spizzirri’s 

conduct was “for retaliation for reporting Sheriff Weyer” and wrote that he would “like to press 

char[g]es on Sheriff Spizzirri.” Id. at 11. CCDOC reviewed camera footage and found that 

“Spizzirri appear[ed] to be conducting himself in a professional manner.” Id. at 16. It therefore 

rejected Williams’ grievance and subsequent appeal.

On February 18, 2019, Williams filed a grievance against Spizzirri and other officers for 

allegedly retaliating against him for filing separate grievances in an incident that occurred on “2-

11-10-12.” Id. at 19. Williams wrote that he has “not been free from such abu[se] as well as free 

from retaliation for reporting Sheriff Ward, Serooulski, Spizzirri, and Tyler.” Id. CCDOC 

determined that no evidence supported Williams’ grievance, thereby rejecting it and his appeal. 

Id. at 27.

On May 31, 2019, Williams filed a grievance against a Sheriff Beyer for allegedly 

assaulting him on camera on May 28, 2019. CCDOC reviewed the camera footage and 

determined that Beyer and Williams never interacted on May 28, 2019 and dismissed Williams’ 

grievance.

On June 9, 2019, Williams filed a grievance against Officer Weyer for saying on June 7, 

2019, that Williams should “‘lick’ HIS Balls” and perform other oral sex acts. Doc. 150-6 at 36. 

Williams also wrote that Weyer said that he would “kick [Williams’] ass like [Weyer] did the 

inmate in the interlock this morning.” Id. Williams said that he would like to press charges 

against Weyer. CCDOC reviewed the grievance and determined it had insufficient evidence to 

act. Id. at 38. CCDOC thus rejected Williams’ appeal for lack of evidence.

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On July 8, 2019, Williams filed two grievances. Williams filed his first grievance against 

Weyer, CCDOC, Sheriff Dart, a John Mueller, and “All [Lieutenant] [Sergeants]” stating that he 

is “being sexual harassed by Deputy D, Weyer.” Id. at 43. CCDOC denied his grievance and 

rejected the appeal. Williams filed his second grievance against all CCJ mental health 

employees and CCDOC, claiming that they provided inadequate mental health treatment after his 

sexual assault. CCDOC denied his grievance and rejected the appeal.

On July 11, 2019, Williams filed a grievance against Weyer for sexual assault, writing 

that “he touch[ed] my buttocks on camera.” Id. at 39. CCDOC denied his grievance and 

rejected the subsequent appeal.

IV. Procedural History

Williams sued Defendants on March 2, 2020, filing an amended complaint on June 1, 

2021. Pursuant to § 1983, Williams brought sexual assault claims against Weyer and Spizzirri;

failure to protect claims against Weyer, Spizzirri, and Hughes; a claim for Monell liability 

against Sheriff Dart; and an indemnification claim against Cook County. After discovery closed, 

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking judgment on all of Williams’ claims. 

The Court granted judgment to Defendants on all claims, except for Williams’ sexual 

assault claim against Spizzirri and his indemnification claim against Cook County. Although the 

evidence against Spizzirri created a material dispute of fact that required a jury to resolve, the 

Court noted that “[w]hether Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect 

to the February 2 and February 6, 2019 alleged assaults is an open question, especially given that 

there is no evidence of a grievance related to the February 2, 2019 incident and the grievance 

Williams filed on February 10, 2019 only relates to threats Spizzirri allegedly made against 

Williams.” Id. at 14 n.5.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment obviates the need for a trial where “there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). To determine whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, the Court must pierce the 

pleadings and assess the proof as presented in depositions, documents, answers to 

interrogatories, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits or declarations that are part of the record. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); A.V. Consultants, Inc. v. Barnes, 978 F.2d 996, 999 (7th Cir. 1992). 

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine 

dispute of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Bunn v. Fed.

Deposit Ins. Corp. for Valley Bank Ill., 908 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 2018). “A genuine issue of 

material fact exists when ‘there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to 

return a verdict for that party.’” Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). In response, the non-moving party 

cannot rest on mere pleadings alone but must use the evidentiary tools listed above to identify 

specific material facts that demonstrate a genuine dispute for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 627 (7th Cir. 

2014). The Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and 

draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Wehrle v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 719 F.3d 840,

842 (7th Cir. 2013). However, a bare contention by the non-moving party that an issue of fact 

exists does not create a factual dispute, Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 

2000), and the non-moving party is “only entitled to the benefit of inferences supported by 

admissible evidence, not those ‘supported by only speculation or conjecture,’” Grant v. Trs. of 

Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).

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ANALYSIS

Spizzirri and Cook County argue that Williams cannot proceed on his claims because he 

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”). The PLRA states that no “action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 

under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are 

exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This exhaustion requirement exists to give correctional 

officials the chance to address complaints internally before the initiation of a federal suit. Porter 

v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002); Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 983 (7th Cir. 2020). 

To have exhausted his administrative remedies, Williams must have grieved his claim through 

“all steps that the agency holds out,” and he must have “do[ne] so properly (so that the agency 

addresses the issues on the merits).” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (quoting Pozo v. 

McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)). An inmate “who does not properly take 

each step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust” administrative remedies and 

thus “is foreclosed by § 1997e(a) from litigating” his claims. Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1024. Where an 

inmate’s grievance “is substantively distinct from the allegation in his federal complaint,” then 

the inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Bowers v. Dart, 1 F.4th 513, 517 (7th 

Cir. 2021); see id. at 517–18 (“This disconnect between the grievance and complaint . . . meant 

that [plaintiff] had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.”). 

Of course, “[p]risoners need only exhaust ‘available remedies, not remedies that are 

unavailable.’” Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948, 956–57 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Hacker v. Dart, 

62 F.4th 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 2023)). “If administrative remedies are genuinely unavailable or 

nonexistent . . . [the courts] consider the prisoner to have satisfied the exhaustion requirement.” 

Id. at 957 (citing Pyles v. Nwaobasi, 829 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 2016)). “Administrative 

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remedies are primarily ‘unavailable’ to prisoners where ‘affirmative misconduct’ prevents 

prisoners from pursuing administrative remedies.” Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 842 (7th 

Cir. 2016) (quoting Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006)); see also Thomas v. 

Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2015) (remedies unavailable where correctional officer 

tells prisoner that prisoner cannot file grievance when in fact prisoner can do so); Kaba v. Stepp, 

458 F.3d 678, 680, 686 (7th Cir. 2006) (remedies unavailable where prisoner presents evidence 

that prison personnel have “denied [prisoner] grievance forms, threatened him, and solicited 

other inmates to attack him in retaliation for filing grievances”); Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 

656 (7th Cir. 2004) (remedies unavailable where prison personnel prevented prisoner access to 

grievance forms).

Ordinarily, when a plaintiff argues that the unavailability of administrative remedies 

excuses his failure to exhaust them, the district court must conduct a proceeding known as a 

Pavey hearing. See Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742; see Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 588 (7th 

Cir. 2015) (“Often exhaustion (or its lack) will be apparent, but when it is not, the district court 

must hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the question.”). While “as a matter of best practices” 

a court should conduct a Pavey hearing separate from a motion for summary judgment, the 

“purpose of a Pavey hearing is to resolve disputed factual questions that bear on exhaustion.” Id. 

at 591. Yet such a hearing is not required whenever a plaintiff claims that administrative 

remedies are unavailable: a plaintiff must point to evidence in the record that creates a dispute of 

material fact, which only then necessitates a Pavey hearing. See Lynch v. Corizon, Inc., 764 F. 

App’x 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Although a judge need not believe [plaintiff’s] assertions, a 

sworn affidavit that is ‘detailed, specific, and based on personal knowledge’ is competent 

evidence to warrant an evidentiary hearing.” (quoting Kaba, 458 F.3d at 681)). “A court, faced 

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with an allegation that remedies were unavailable, may still grant summary judgment on 

exhaustion grounds if it determines that there are no genuine disputes of material fact, and, 

viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the defendants satisfied their 

burden to show that remedies were available to the nonmovant as a matter of law.” Jackson, 105 

F.4th at 957.

As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the parties agree that Williams never filed a 

grievance regarding Spizzirri’s alleged sexual assault on February 2, 2019. Indeed, it is on this 

basis that Spizzirri and Cook County move for summary judgment. They are correct that, under 

the PLRA, “[a]n inmate ‘shall’ bring ‘no action’ (or said more conversationally, may not bring 

any action) absent exhaustion of available administrative remedies.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 

632, 638 (2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). 

However, inmates “need only exhaust available remedies, not remedies that are 

unavailable.” Jackson, 105 F.4th at 956–57 (quotations omitted). And here, in response to 

Spizzirri’s and Cook County’s motion, Williams raises that argument. Williams did not provide 

an affidavit swearing that Spizzirri intimidated him, nor did he state that he filed a grievance 

against Spizzirri noting the correct date of the incident he claims. Instead, he points to 

allegations contained in his amended complaint and a single grievance he filed on February 10, 

2019 to argue that Spizzirri’s conduct on February 2, 2019 effectively made the Policy 

unavailable to him. The Court reproduces Williams’ recounting of the relevant facts supporting 

his argument in whole:

As noted above, Plaintiff’s [amended complaint] alleges that 

Spizzirri admitted that his motive for using excessive force against 

Plaintiff on February 2, 2019 was a desire to retaliate against 

Plaintiff for “having filed a grievance against WEYER.” [Doc. 22 

¶ 37.] This account is consistent with Plaintiff’s February 10, 2019 

grievance, which explicitly states that Spizzirri threatened to kill 

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him in “retaliation for reporting” the February 1, 2019 incident 

with Weyer. [Doc. 106-7 at 17.] Put simply, Plaintiff has 

consistently alleged that he was subjected to threats, intimidation, 

and physical abuse as retaliation for having used the Cook County 

Jail grievance process with respect to the February 1, 2019 

incident.

Doc. 161 at 4. Williams thus attempts to create a dispute of fact by pointing to one allegation 

from his complaint and a single line from a grievance that complains that Spizzirri attempted to 

intimidate him for filing a grievance against Weyer. This reliance solely on allegations and 

attorney argument to create a dispute of fact as to whether Spizzirri’s (alleged) intimidating 

conduct made the entire grievance process unavailable is ill-advised. See Sterk, 770 F.3d at 627

(nonmoving party “must ‘go beyond the pleadings (e.g., produce affidavits, depositions, answers 

to interrogatories, or admissions on file) to demonstrate that there is evidence upon which a jury 

could properly proceed to find a verdict in [their] favor’” (quoting Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 

F.3d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted))); cf. Kaba, 458 F.3d at 686 

(remedies deemed unavailable where prisoner presented evidence of prison staff’s malicious 

conduct intended to deter prisoner from filing grievances); Jackson, 105 F.4th at 957

(“[Plaintiff], though not in the clearest terms, pointed to evidence suggesting that the prison 

unjustifiably failed to process all of his grievances. This raised a genuine dispute about whether 

administrative remedies were unavailable for the issues raised in those grievances.”). 

The record before the Court instead shows that no dispute of fact exists, and that 

Williams’ claim that Spizzirri’s actions made the Policy unavailable finds no basis in the 

evidence. Williams’ own grievance history makes plain that—even accepting as true Williams’ 

allegation that Spizzirri threatened him for filing a grievance against Weyer—Williams was 

never deterred from filing any grievances, against Spizzirri or otherwise. Because Williams was 

complaining of a sexual assault, CCDOC afforded him unlimited time to submit a grievance 

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against Spizzirri’s conduct. In the period after the alleged February 2, 2019 incident, Williams 

filed: a grievance on February 4, 2019 against two nurses for providing him with inadequate 

medical treatment in the wake of Weyer’s alleged assault on February 1, 2019; a grievance on 

February 10, 2019 against Spizzirri for threatening and intimidating Williams in retaliation for 

filing a grievance against Weyer in an incident that allegedly took place on February 6, 2019; a 

grievance on February 16, 2019, reprising Williams’ February 1, 2019 grievance against two 

nurses and Weyer; and a grievance on February 17, 2019 against Spizzirri for sexual assault and 

retaliation for reporting Weyer, in an incident that allegedly occurred on February 12, 2019; and 

a grievance on February 18, 2019 against Spizzirri and other officers for retaliation, in an event 

that allegedly occurred on “2-11-10-12 2019,” Doc. 106-7 at 19. Williams continued to file 

multiple grievances for sexual assault against Weyer and other officers through July 2019. See 

Doc. 106-7 at 31–46. In short, in the days, weeks, and months after Spizzirri was supposed to 

have intimidated Williams, allegedly making him afraid to file grievances against Spizzirri or 

Weyer, Williams filed repeated and repetitive grievances against both Spizzirri, Weyer, and 

others.

In sum, Williams failed to present any evidence that Spizzirri’s alleged conduct 

intimidated him and rendered the grievance process unavailable, meaning no dispute of material 

fact exists as to whether Williams had access to the CCDOC’s grievance process. These facts 

make this case unlike circumstances where prison officials’ conduct makes the grievance process 

unavailable to an inmate. See, e.g., Thomas, 787 F.3d at 847–48 (remedies unavailable where 

correctional officer tells prisoner that prisoner cannot file grievance when in fact prisoner can do 

so); Kaba, 458 F.3d at 680, 686 (remedies unavailable where prisoner presents evidence that 

prison personnel have “denied [prisoner] grievance forms, threatened him, and solicited other 

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inmates to attack him in retaliation for filing grievances”); Dale, 376 F.3d at 656 (remedies 

unavailable where prison personnel prevent prisoner access to grievance forms). Instead, the 

record shows that Williams filed multiple grievances against Spizzirri, Weyer, and other CCJ 

officers and employees even after Spizzirri’s allegedly intimidating conduct—meaning the 

grievance process was available to Williams. See King v. Dart, 63 F.4th 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2023) 

(deeming administrative remedies available and satisfied after prisoner “had filed a grievance 

and appealed the Jail’s response”). Accordingly, the Court need not conduct a Pavey hearing 

because Williams failed to raise “sufficient factual allegations demonstrating a genuine dispute 

as to whether the administrative remedies were available to him.” Smallwood v. Williams, 59 

F.4th 306, 318 (7th Cir. 2023) (“A court can grant a motion for summary judgment without 

holding a Pavey hearing only if, after taking the facts in the light most favorable to the 

nonmovant ([Plaintiff]), the court determines that there are no genuine issues of material fact, 

and the defendants met their burden of establishing that the grievance process was available to 

[Plaintiff] as a matter of law.”). 

The Court returns to where it began. Williams never filed (and does not claim to have 

filed) a grievance claiming that Spizzirri assaulted and threatened Williams in retaliation for his 

grievance against Weyer on February 2, 2019—the allegation in his amended complaint on 

which his claim against Spizzirri rests. See Ross, 578 U.S. at 638 (“An inmate ‘shall’ bring ‘no 

action’ (or said more conversationally, may not bring any action) absent exhaustion of available 

administrative remedies.” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a))). Although Williams filed grievances 

against Spizzirri for incidents that allegedly occurred on February 6, 2019, February 12, 2019, 

and “2-11-10-12,” 150-6 at 19, the absence of a grievance for an incident that occurred on 

February 2, 2019, means that he never grieved this claim according to CCDOC’s procedures. 

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See Doc. 150-3 at 32 (stating that the Policy requires inmates to “provide the specific date, 

location and time of the incident, problem or event that [they] are grieving”); see also Bowers, 1 

F.4th at 517 (when there is a “disconnect between the grievance and complaint” the PLRA bars 

the complaint). And Williams cannot point to his other grievances listing incidents that allegedly 

occurred on other dates since those are all “substantively distinct from the allegation in his 

federal complaint.” Bowers, 1 F.4th at 517. The PLRA thus poses an insurmountable bar to

Williams’ claim against Spizzirri. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“There is no 

question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be 

brought in court.”). Accordingly, the Court grants Spizzirri’s motion for summary judgment and 

enters judgment for him against Williams’ complaint.

Because the Court has now granted summary judgment to all the Defendant Officers 

against whom Williams brought claims, the Court also grants summary judgment to Cook 

County on Williams’ indemnification claim as there is no party left for Cook County to 

indemnify. See 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/9-102 (“A local public entity is empowered and directed 

to pay any tort judgment . . . for which it or an employee while acting within the scope of his 

employment is liable[.]”).

CONCLUSION

The Court grants Spizzirri’s and Cook County’s motion for summary judgment [149]. 

The Court enters judgment for all Defendants on Williams’ amended complaint and terminates 

this case.

Dated: August 12, 2024 ______________________

SARA L. ELLIS

United States District Judge

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