Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

In re Marriage of Little, 2014 IL App (2d) 140373

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re MARRIAGE OF CHERI LITTLE, Petitioner-Appellee, and 

DONALD LITTLE, Respondent-Appellant.

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-14-0373

Filed December 22, 2014

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

The trial court’s dismissal of respondent’s petition to vacate the 

parties’ marital settlement agreement pursuant to section 2-1401 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure was reversed and the cause was remanded for 

further proceedings, since the petition was sufficient to state a claim 

for relief based on the allegations that petitioner failed to disclose the 

assistance petitioner provided to her brother in establishing his 

business during the parties’ marriage and respondent exercised due 

diligence in presenting his claim to the trial court in the original action 

and in filing his petition.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kendall County, No. 10-D-240; the 

Hon. Marcy L. Buick, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Theresa A. McAdams, of McAdams & Associates, P.C., of Yorkville, 

for appellant.

Richard M. Ferguson and Thomas E. St. Jules, both of Dreyer, Foote, 

Streit, Furgason & Slocum, P.A., of Aurora, for appellee.
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Panel JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Schostok and Justice Hutchinson concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Respondent, Donald Little, appeals from the dismissal of his petition under section 2-1401 

of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)), in which he sought 

to vacate a marital settlement agreement (MSA) with petitioner, Cheri Little. Donald argues 

that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition, because the allegations of his petition, when 

viewed in the light most favorable to him, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under section 

2-1401 of the Code. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings.

¶ 2 On June 23, 2010, Cheri petitioned for the dissolution of her marriage to Donald. On 

October 10, 2012, the marriage was dissolved. The judgment of dissolution incorporated an 

MSA, which divided the assets and liabilities of the parties. In the MSA, Donald waived any 

interest in “Wife’s present or future interest in the marital business, formerly known as D&K 

Plastics.”

¶ 3 On May 7, 2013, Donald filed a petition to vacate the MSA under section 2-1401 of the 

Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)). In the petition, as amended, Donald alleged that, 

while the dissolution proceedings were pending, Cheri transferred assets belonging to the 

marital business, D&K Plastics, to her brother, Glen Dieter, and his company, Hydro-Master 

Parts Corp., with which she became involved. Donald alleged that Cheri testified to the 

contrary during the dissolution proceedings:

“10. Specifically, Cheri stated, under oath, in relevant part, the followings [sic]:

Q[.] What, if anything, did you have brought over or transferred from the Route 

47 location [D&K Plastics] to where Hydro Plastics [sic] is right now?

A[.] I didn’t have anything transferred.

Q[.] Did you gift or give any of these things to your brother, who is now 

president of that company?

A[.] Not that I know of, no.

Q[.] What have you done to help your brother run that company?

A[.] Bring in lunch.”

Donald maintained that he first learned of the transfer and of Cheri’s involvement in the 

company after the dissolution, when Cheri filed a two-count complaint, alleging breach of 

contract and detinue, against Dieter, Tyson Schmidt, and Hydro-Master Parts. Donald alleged 

as follows:
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“17. On February 15, 2013, Cheri filed a Complaint against Glen Dieter, Tyson 

Schmidt, and Hydro-Master Parts, in Kendall County under case number 2013 L 23, 

wherein she alleges Rescission-Breach of Contract and Detinue.

18. Cheri alleges, under oath and contrary to her February 1, 2012, in-court 

testimony that she helped form ‘Hydro-Master’ in August of 2011, with a 40% 

ownership, which she would receive said 40% ownership interest upon the completion 

of her then pending divorce proceedings.

19. Thus, Cheri acquired her 40% ownership in Hydro-Master Corporation during 

her marriage, however, Cheri willfully failed or refused to list this marital asset in any 

discovery and lied under oath regarding her interest in the business to avoid Donald 

receiving his ‘just proportion’ of this marital asset.

20. Also, she alleges in her complaint she [ ]worked for Hydro-Master, in her 

typical D&K capacity, from September 2012 [sic 2011] through March 2012.” 

(Emphasis in original.)

Thus, Donald argued that he had a meritorious claim, as he was entitled to an equitable 

distribution of the marital portion of Hydro-Master Parts and to a redetermination of the 

equitable distribution of other marital assets, due to Cheri’s dissipation of D&K Plastics’

assets.

¶ 4 Donald further argued that he exercised due diligence in discovering the claim in the 

original action and in filing the petition to vacate. Donald set forth numerous actions that he 

took in an attempt to discover the claim. Donald alleged that he (1) filed a motion to return 

personal/marital property; (2) reviewed Cheri’s December 1, 2010, comprehensive financial 

statement; (3) obtained a court order prohibiting Cheri from transferring property; (4) served 

Cheri with a notice to produce and marital interrogatories; (5) sent a letter under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 201(k) (eff. Jan. 1, 2013); (6) conferred with Cheri’s counsel; (7) filed a 

petition for a rule to show cause against Cheri for her failure to provide an accounting for the 

funds from the sale of business equipment; (8) reviewed Cheri’s January 18, 2012, 

comprehensive financial statement; (9) obtained Cheri’s sworn testimony that she did not 

transfer any assets to Dieter and did not have any involvement in his business; (10) sent a 

subpoena duces tecum to Old Second National Bank for documents relating to Dieter and his 

company; (11) fought Dieter’s motion to quash the subpoena and eventually obtained a court 

order to review the requested documents; and (12) paid almost $11,000 to private investigators 

in an attempt to determine whether Cheri had dissipated any marital assets or whether she was 

involved in Hydro-Master Parts. Concerning his diligence in filing the petition to vacate, 

Donald alleged that he first learned of the claim on May 1, 2013, after Cheri filed her 

complaint in February 2013, and that he filed his original petition to vacate on May 7, 2013.

¶ 5 On November 25, 2013, Cheri moved to dismiss Donald’s second amended petition, under 

section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012)).1 Cheri argued that Donald failed 

to state a meritorious claim, because he failed to allege facts showing that Cheri had any 

ownership interest in Hydro-Master Parts that could be divided as a marital asset. She 

 

1Cheri argued that Donald’s second amended petition raised arguments identical to those contained 

in his first amended petition, which had been dismissed without prejudice on October 11, 2013. Thus, 

in support of her motion to dismiss Donald’s second amended petition, she relied on the arguments set 

forth in her previous motion to dismiss.
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maintained further that, even if she had such an interest, Donald waived any claim to it in the 

MSA. Cheri also argued that Donald failed to allege facts showing that he exercised due 

diligence in presenting the claim in the original action. According to Cheri, even though 

Donald suspected Cheri’s involvement in Hydro-Master Parts and took numerous actions to 

determine her involvement, he neglected to depose Dieter or Schmidt, he waived his right to a 

bench trial, and he freely and voluntarily entered into the MSA, wherein he waived his rights to 

Cheri’s interest in D&K Plastics. Cheri also argued that Donald’s claim that Cheri fraudulently 

concealed marital assets was contradicted by Cheri’s October 27, 2010, comprehensive 

financial statement, wherein her interest was disclosed.

¶ 6 Following a hearing, the trial court granted Cheri’s motion to dismiss, with prejudice.

Donald timely appealed.

¶ 7 Donald argues that the trial court erred in granting Cheri’s motion to dismiss his petition to 

vacate the MSA, because the allegations of his petition, when viewed in the light most 

favorable to him, are sufficient to state a claim for relief under section 2-1401. We agree.

¶ 8 As an initial pleading, a section 2-1401 petition is the procedural counterpart of a 

complaint and subject to all the rules of civil practice that that character implies. People v. 

Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (2007). A motion to dismiss under section 2-615 attacks the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint on the basis that, even assuming the allegations of the complaint 

are true, the complaint fails to state a cause of action that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.

735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2012). On a section 2-615 motion, the relevant question is whether, 

taking all well-pleaded facts as true, the allegations in the complaint, construed in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be 

granted. Khan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 2012 IL 112219, ¶ 47. A cause of action should not be 

dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can be proved that will 

entitle the plaintiff to recover. Khan, 2012 IL 112219, ¶ 47.

¶ 9 To obtain relief under section 2-1401, a petitioner must affirmatively set forth specific 

factual allegations supporting: (1) the existence of a meritorious defense or claim against the 

judgment; (2) due diligence in presenting the defense or claim to the trial court in the original 

action; and (3) due diligence in filing the petition. In re Marriage of Roepenack, 2012 IL App 

(3d) 110198, ¶ 30. The purpose of a section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment is to raise

facts that, if known at the time of judgment, would have prevented its entry. Id. A section 

2-1401 petition is subject to a motion to dismiss where it either fails to state a cause of action or 

shows on its face that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Ostendorf v. International 

Harvester Co., 89 Ill. 2d 273, 279-80 (1982). We review de novo the trial court’s dismissal of a 

section 2-1401 petition. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 14-18.

¶ 10 We first consider whether, viewing the petition in the light most favorable to Donald, 

Donald alleged the existence of a meritorious claim. Donald argues that, under section 503(d) 

of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2012)), 

which requires the trial court to divide the marital estate in “just proportions,” he has a claim to 

Cheri’s interest in Hydro-Master Parts. In response, Cheri argues that Donald failed to allege 

facts establishing that Cheri had an ownership interest in Hydro-Master Parts that could be 

divided as a marital asset. Further, Cheri argues that, even if she had an interest in 

Hydro-Master Parts, Donald has no claim to it because he “voluntarily and unequivocally 

waived any such interest or claim within the [MSA].”
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¶ 11 We find that Donald’s allegations were sufficient to allege the existence of a meritorious 

claim. Donald alleged that, based on Cheri’s allegations in her complaint, Hydro-Master Parts 

was created during the parties’ marriage with marital assets and Cheri’s efforts, and Cheri was 

to receive a 40% ownership interest upon completion of the divorce proceedings. Taking this 

allegation as true, it is sufficient to establish a meritorious claim. As Donald notes, had Cheri 

worked at a job during the marriage but received her paycheck only after the divorce, the 

money earned during the marriage would be a marital asset. See, e.g., In re Marriage of 

Shores, 2014 IL App (2d) 130151, ¶¶ 33-36 (benefit earned during marriage but received after 

dissolution is marital unless entitlement was speculative until received). As framed by 

Donald’s petition, the present case is no different. Further, although Cheri argues that Donald 

waived his interest in Hydro-Master Parts, the MSA does not mention any such interest. Thus, 

Donald has stated a claim to the alleged marital asset.

¶ 12 We next consider whether Donald sufficiently alleged due diligence in presenting the 

claim to the trial court in the original action. In his petition, Donald listed the many steps that 

he took to determine whether Cheri had any interest in Hydro-Master Parts. He alleged that he 

settled the case because Cheri testified that she did not transfer any marital assets to 

Hydro-Master Parts and had no interest in the company. Cheri argues that Donald was not 

diligent, because he failed to depose Dieter and Schmidt and because he waived his right to a 

bench trial at which he could have confronted Cheri about her alleged ownership in 

Hydro-Master Parts.2

¶ 13 We find that Donald sufficiently alleged due diligence in presenting the claim to the trial 

court in the original action. In light of the many steps that Donald allegedly took to discover his 

claim, we cannot hold that his failure to take the additional steps that Cheri identifies defeats 

his claim of diligence as a matter of law. At most, Cheri’s arguments raise questions of fact on 

the issue of Donald’s diligence, which cannot be resolved on a section 2-615 motion to 

dismiss. Lee v. City of Decatur, 256 Ill. App. 3d 192, 195 (1994) (“Questions of fact can never 

be resolved in a section 2-615 motion.”). This is especially so in light of the fact that Cheri 

testified that she did not transfer marital assets to Dieter and that her only involvement in 

Hydro-Master Parts was to “[b]ring in lunch,” while Dieter maintained, in a motion to quash a 

subpoena sent to Hydro-Master Parts’ bank, that Cheri had no ownership interest in 

Hydro-Master Parts. As Donald notes, those events cast doubt on whether the additional steps 

would have revealed the claim. Accordingly, we find that Donald’s petition sufficiently 

alleged that he was diligent in presenting the claim to the trial court in the original action.

¶ 14 Finally, we consider whether Donald sufficiently alleged due diligence in filing the petition 

to vacate. “A petitioner must file [his] petition without undue delay after becoming aware of 

the factual basis for a petition.” People v. Davis, 2012 IL App (4th) 110305, ¶ 20. Cheri 

maintains that, because Donald’s petition was “based upon information that Donald *** was 

clearly aware of” during the dissolution proceedings, the filing of the original petition seven 

months after the dissolution cannot be found diligent. Thus, Cheri’s argument is premised on 

Donald’s supposed knowledge of her alleged interest in Hydro-Master Parts during the 

proceedings. However, Donald clearly alleged in his petition that he did not learn of Cheri’s 

 

2Cheri also asserts that her October 27, 2010, comprehensive financial statement defeats Donald’s 

contention that she fraudulently concealed “D&K Plastics.” However, Donald’s claim is that Cheri 

concealed her interest in Hydro-Master Parts, not any interest in D&K Plastics.
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interest in Hydro-Master Parts until May 1, 2013, after she filed her complaint on February 15, 

2013. He filed his original petition six days later. Clearly, then, Donald alleged diligence in 

filing the petition. See G.M. Sign, Inc. v. Schane, 2013 IL App (2d) 120434, ¶ 42 (due 

diligence established where the petition was filed within 30 days of discovering the facts on 

which the petition was based).

¶ 15 For the reasons stated, we find that the allegations of Donald’s petition are sufficient to 

state a claim for relief under section 2-1401. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal 

of the petition under section 2-615, and we remand for further proceedings. We reiterate that 

we are holding only that Donald’s petition is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under 

section 2-615 and that we are remanding for further proceedings as would be appropriate for 

any civil complaint. See Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d at 8. We are not articulating any holding on the 

ultimate merits of Donald’s claim for relief under section 2-1401.

¶ 16 Reversed and remanded.