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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PRIORITY PATIENT TRANSPORT, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED May 2, 2017

v No. 329420 Wayne Circuit Court FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, LC No. 15-008254-NF

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: R IORDAN , P.J., and F ORT H OOD and S ERVITTO , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition in this acti on plaintiff brought pursuant t o the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101

et seq ., and where it also alleged brea ch of contract. We affirm.

Plaintiff, a medical transporta tion service provider, filed a c omplaint against defendant in the circuit court, alleging that defendant failed to tender per sonal injury protection (PIP) benefits for the medical transportation of 14 separate individuals in vi olation of the no-fault act and its automobile insurance contract. In response, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4), asser ting that the trial court lac ked subject-matter jurisdiction because plaintiff could not aggregate separate PIP claims to me et the amount in controversy threshold provided by MCL 600.8301(1). The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that its individual PIP claims, no ne of which individually exceed $25,000, can be joined and aggregated to meet the jurisd ictional minimum in circuit court. We disagree.

“This Court reviews de novo a claim that a trial court lacks j urisdiction to hear a case.” Wyoming Chiropractic Health Cl inic, PC v Auto-Owners Ins Co , 308 Mich App 389, 392; 864 NW2d 598 (2014) (footnote omitted), citing Packowski v United Food and Commercial Workers

Local 951 , 289 Mich App 132, 138; 796 NW2d 94 (2010). The trial court m ay properly grant summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) when it lacks j urisdiction over the subject matter presented. Wyoming Chiropractic Health Clinic, PC , 308 Mich App at 392. To make its determination, “[t]his Court examines whether the pleadings, af fidavits, depositions, admissions, and documents in the case show that the trial court lacked subj ect[-]matter jurisdiction.” Id

., citing Packowski , 289 Mich App at 138-139 (footnote omitted).-2- MCR 2.203(B) provides:

A pleader may join as either inde pendent or alternate claims as many claims, legal or equitable, as the pleader has against an opposing party. If a claim is one previously cognizable only after another claim has been prosecu ted to a conclusion, the two claims may be joined in a single action; bu t the court may grant relief only in accordance wi th the substantive rights of the parties.

Plaintiff argues that it has the ability to join its claims re lated to each of the injured individuals cited in its complai nt, and aggregate those claims to satisfy the threshold for jurisdiction in the circuit cour t. Thus, we address plaintiff’ s joinder claim in the context of the circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

Under MCL 600.605, “[c]ircuit courts have original jurisdictio n to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by
statute to some other court or w here the trial courts are denie d jurisdiction by the constitution or
statutes of this state.” Distri ct courts have “exclusive juris diction in civil actions when the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000.00.” MCL 600.830 1(1). The statute does not define “amount in controversy,” but in Hodge v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 499 Mich 211, 223-224; 884 NW2d 238 (2016), the Michigan Supreme Court held t hat “in its subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry, a district court determines the amount in controversy using the prayer for relief set forth in the plaintiff’s pleadings, calculated exclu sive of fees, costs, and interest.” (Footnote and citations omitted.) Thus, “the jurisdictional am ount is determined on the face of the pleadings.” Id . at 220.

In its first amended complaint, plaintiff requested that the t rial court enter judgment in its favor in an amount greater than $25,000, plus penalties, intere st, and attorney fees. Plaintiff listed the 14 individuals for whom it had provided medical tran sportation services, and the financial loss it suffered with regard to each individual as a result of defendant’s failure to tender PIP benefits. The precise issue presented to this Court is whe ther plaintiff can aggregate these
individual PIP claims for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction in the circuit court. Both parties
cite Boyd v Nelson Credit Ctrs, Inc , 132 Mich App 774; 348 NW2d 25 (1984), and Moody v

Home Owners Ins Co , 304 Mich App 415; 849 NW2d 31 (2014), rev’d on other grounds by Hodge , 499 Mich 211 (2016), in support of their arguments. 1 The Michigan Supreme Court’s
decision in Hodge , 499 Mich at 217, is also of guidance, where the Hodge Court recently elucidated the well-settled principles of law concerning determ ining a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the Hodge Court stated that “[o]ur courts have long held that courts are to determine their subject m atter jurisdiction by reference to the pleadings.” The Hodge
Court went on to observe:

1 Moody’s companion case was Hodge v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 304 Mich App 415; 849 NW2d 31 (2014).-3- The common-law rule is marked not only by its longevity but by its simplicity. The ad damnum clause in the plaintiff’s complaint is a straightforward measure of the court’s jurisdiction. [ Id . at 222-223.]

Accordingly, we are cognizant of the Michigan Supreme Court’s directive in Hodge that the pleadings alone will determine a court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 217, 219. However, in Hodge

, the Michigan Supreme Court did not address the factual scenario presented here, where an individual plaintiff is attempting to aggregate the PIP claims of multiple individuals in an effort to satisfy the jurisdiction requi rements of the circuit court.

Boyd involved an action by multiple plaintiffs against a single def endant for breach of
contract and other claims. Boyd , 132 Mich App at 777. Acknowledging it was an issue of first impression, this Court held that in an action which is not a cl ass action, the individual claims of multiple plaintiffs could not be aggregated to “establish the j urisdictional minimum for circuit

court.” Boyd , 132 Mich App at 780-781. In Moody , which involved consolidated appeals, an individual named Moody filed a complaint in district court agai nst an insurance company for nofault benefits, alleging that his claim for damages did not exc eed $25,000. Moody , 304 Mich App at 420. The district court consolidated Moody’s case with a case filed by three of his service providers, seeking reimbursement for services provided to Moody as a result of his motor
vehicle accident. Id . On appeal, this Court held t hat a trial court may look beyon d the pleadings to determine the amount in controversy pursuant to MCL 600.8301 (1), concluding that the district court lacked subject-m atter jurisdiction because Moody ’s pretrial discovery answers, arguments before trial, and evidence at trial demonstrated that the amount in controversy exceeded $25,000. Id . at 428-431.

In Hodge , 499 Mich at 223-224, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed this Court’s holding in Moody that the limits of the district court’s jurisdiction can be det ermined by considering matters outside the four corners of the complaint. However, portions of the Moody Court’s opinion that were not overruled are relevant to the det ermination of the issue presented here and must be addressed. Along with concluding that the dis trict court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case, the Moody Court rejected the providers’ assertion that their claims could be saved, and could be hea rd in district court, if severe d from Moody’s case. Moody , 304 Mich App at 438, 440. The Moody Court reasoned that “the providers’ claims actually belong[ed] to Moody because ‘the right to bring a n action for p ersonal protection insurance [PIP] benefits, including claims for a ttendant care services, belongs to the injured party.’” Id . at 442, citing Hatcher v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co , 269 Mich App 596, 600; 712 NW2d 744 (2005). Thus, under the specific facts of Moody , where the cases were consolidated, there was “such an identity between the providers’ and Moody’s claims that consoli dation for trial resulted in merging the claims for purpose of determining the amount in con troversy under MCL 600.8301(1).” Moody , 304 Mich App at 443. This Court also distinguished Boyd , stating, “[b]ecause the providers’ claims are derivative of Moody’s clai ms, we find applicable the exception noted in Boyd that permits aggregating the claims of a single plaintiff for the purpose of determining whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction because the amount-incontroversy limitation is satisfi ed or, as here, exceeded.” Id . at 441, citing Boyd , 132 Mich App

at 781.-4- After a close review of Moody , it is clear that the Moody Court’s legal determination that Moody and the providers’ claims were merged for purposes of det ermining the district court’s jurisdiction was premised on the particular facts of that case, where the cases had already been
consolidated for trial. Id . Likewise, the Moody Court’s determination that the general rule set
forth in Boyd precluding the merging of the claims of multiple plaintiffs to meet the circuit court’s threshold jurisdiction wa s inapplicable was also ground ed in the specific facts of Moody

. After reviewing plaintiff’s firs t amended complaint and conside ring the facts of this case, it is clear that plaintiff is essentially attempting to subvert the r ule first articulated by this Court in Boyd . Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, we conclu de that plaintiff’s attempt to bring its claims within the circuit court’s jurisdiction by agg regating the claims of several individuals is not permissible. Accordingly, the circuit court correctly determined that it does not have jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims. 2

Affirmed. Defendant, as the pr evailing party, may tax costs p ursuant to MCR 7.219.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood

2 Given our conclusion that the circuit court correctly conclude d that it did not have jurisdiction in this case, we need not addre ss plaintiff’s perfunctory argum ent that it serves the interests of judicial economy to allow plaint iff to pursue its claims in the circuit court.