alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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Exhibit 32.1


                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350,  as adopted  pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  in  connection  with the  filing of the  Quarterly
Report on Form 10-Q for the Quarter Ended June 30, 2009 (the  "Report") by Talon
International, Inc. ("Registrant"), the undersigned hereby certifies that:

1.       to the  best of my  knowledge,  the  Report  fully  complies  with  the
         requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities  Exchange Act
         of 1934; and

2.       to the best of my knowledge,  the  information  contained in the Report
         fairly presents, in all material respects,  the financial condition and
         results of operations of Registrant.



Dated:  August 14, 2009        /S/ LONNIE D. SCHNELL
                               -------------------------------------------------
                               Lonnie D. Schnell
                               Chief Executive Officer & Chief Financial Officer
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

JUN 16 1997

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

KEITH D. LARKINS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

R. MICHAEL CODY,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 96-6171

(D.C. No. CV-95-600-L)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before EBEL, HENRY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 
-2-

Petitioner Keith D. Larkins appeals from the district court’s judgment

denying his habeas petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Our jurisdiction

arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. On appeal, petitioner presents the following

arguments: 1) his Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims are cognizable on

habeas review; 2) the stop and search of petitioner was constitutionally invalid;

3) his sentence for possession of cocaine was excessive; and 4) his sentence

violates the Eighth Amendment. 

After careful consideration of the briefs and appendix filed on appeal, we

conclude that the district court correctly decided this case. Therefore, for

substantially the same reasons as set out in the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation, dated September 11, 1995, adopted by the district court on 

May 1, 1996, the judgment of the United States District Court for the Western

District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 13A-14 OF THE  SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT  TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

I, MICHAEL H. MCCLELLAN, Chief Financial Officer certify that:

1.     I
have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of ETS Payphones, Inc.;

2.     Based
on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

3.     Based
on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

4.     The
registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and we have:



5.     The
registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's
board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):



6.     The
registrant's other certifying officers and I have indicated in this annual report whether or not there were significant changes in internal controls or in other
factors that could significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material
weaknesses.

|Date: April 11, 2005 |  |                                                                                                            
|-------------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                     |  | /s/MICHAEL H. MCCLELLANMichael H. McClellan Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and
Treasurer

---



QuickLinks
Exhibit 32.2

Section 906 Certification of Chief Financial Officer

CERTIFICATION

In connection with the
quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2010 (the Form 10-Q) of Eastern Virginia Bankshares, Inc. (the Company), I, Ronald L. Blevins, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



| |  |  | the Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | - |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  | the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and the results of operations of the
Company as of and for the periods presented in the Form 10-Q.
| | - |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|    |  |                         |  |       |  |              |  | 
|--- |  | ----------------------- |  | ----- |  | ------------ |  | 
|By: |  | /s/ Ronald L. Blevins   |  | Date: |  | May 12, 2010 |  | 
|    |  | Ronald L. Blevins       |  |       |  |              |  | 
|    |  | Chief Financial Officer |  |       |  |              |  |
EXHIBIT 31.1



CERTIFICATION



I, Adam W. Shaffer, certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K/A of eCOST.com, Inc.;
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; and
|-- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|3. | Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report.
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



May 2, 2005



|                       
|-----------------------
|                       
|                       
|/S/    ADAM W.
SHAFFER 
|Adam W. Shaffer        
|Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 23.1


                        Consent of Independent Accountants

We  hereby  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in  the  Registration
Statement on Form S-3 (No.  33-94622) of Virbac Corporation of our reports dated
May 1, 2000 relating to the financial  statements,  which appear on page F-2 and
the  financial  statement  schedule,  which  appears on page S-1 of this  Annual
Report on Form 10-K.

/s/ PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Fort Worth, Texas
May 4, 2000




<PAGE>


                        Consent of Independent Accountants

We  hereby  consent  to the  incorporation  by  reference  in  the  Registration
Statement on Form S-8 (Nos. 33-86880, 33-86892,  33-93340, 333-3192,  333-48069,
and 333-48073) of Virbac Corporation of our report dated May 1, 2000 relating to
the financial  statements,  which appear on page F-2 and the financial statement
schedule, which appears on page S-1 of this Form 10-K.

/S/ PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
Fort Worth, Texas
May 4, 2000

<PAGE>




                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

As independent public accountants, we hereby consent to the incorporation of our
report dated January 20, 1999, for Virbac Inc. and  Subsidiaries  as of December
31, 1998 and for the two years in the period ended  December 31, 1998,  included
in the Virbac Corporation's Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1999, into
the Company's  previously  filed  Registration  Statements on Form S-3 (File No.
33-94622) and on Form S-8 (File Nos.  33-86880,  33-86892,  33-93340,  333-3192,
333-48069,  and  333-48073).  It should be noted  that we have not  audited  any
financial  statements of the Company as of any date or for any period subsequent
to December 31, 1998,  or performed any audit  procedures  subsequent to January
20, 1999, the date of our report.


                                 /S/ ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP


Fort Worth, Texas
May 4, 2000
9255.

#### KNIGHT *v.*ROGERS.

“The right to rule an attorney for money alleged to be in his hands as such depends upon the existence ofNthe relation of attorney and client, and is limited to the client;” and where, from .a petition for a rule to require an attorney to pay over money collected on an execution purchased by the petitioner, it appeared that the attorney made the collection before the purchase and before he was the petitioner’s attorney, the petition was properly dismissed on demurrer. ■

Decided May 15, 1918.

Money rule; from Jeff Davis superior court—Judge Highsmith. September 26, 1917.

*Newton Gaskins,*for plaintiff, cited:

Civil Code (1910), §§ 4954, 5342; 6 Corpus Juris, 713; Gillespie *v.*Mulholland, 33 N. Y. Supp. 754, 12 Misc. 40; *Haygood*v. *Haden,*119 *Ga.*463 (distinguished) .

*S. D. Dell,*for defendant, cited:

Civil Code, § 4954; *Haygood*v. *Haden,*supra.

Luke, J.

Knight brought a petition for a rule against Rogers, alleging that Rogers as an attorney at law was entrusted with a claim in favor of Leroi Turpentine Company, which was sued to judgment and was in the hands of Rogers for collection; that upon the representation of Rogers that the execution was collectible and that he would act as attorney for the petitioner in collecting it, -he (Knight) purchased the execution, and Rogers agreed to and did become attorney for the petitioner for the purpose of collecting the entire amount shown by the execution; that prior to the purchase *309of the execution. Eogers had collected $2,050 of the amount due thereon, but he concealed this fact from the 'petitioner until after the purchase of the execution; and that after the purchase the petitioner demanded that Eogers turn over to him the money so collected, and Eogers refused to turn over the money. He prayed for d rule requiring Eogers to turn over the money so collected. Eogers demurred on the ground that the petition sets forth no cause of action, because it shows on its face that the .relation of attorney and client as between Knight and himself did not exist at the time of the alleged collection, and therefore a money rule could not be maintained-; and that Knight could not be subrogated to the relation held by the plaintiff in fi. fa. sThe court sustained the demurrer and. dismissed the petition.

“The right to rule an attorney for money alleged to be in his hands as such depends upon the existence of the relation of attorney and client, and is limited to the client.” *Haygood*v. Haden, 119 *Ga.*463 (46 S. E. 625). The petition in this case shows that the money sought to be recovered by money rule was collected prior to. the purchase of the execution upon which the money was alleged to have been colledted, and at' a time when the relation of attorney and client did not exist between the plaintiff and defendant.- The court did not err in sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the petition. -

*Judgment affirmed.*

*TVade, G. J., and Jenldns, J., concur.*
#### William M. Jenkins *v.*Robert Bates, et al.

Pleading — Petition for Tort — Necessary Allegations — Demurrer.

A petition for aiding and abetting in tortiously taking property, without a description of the property taken, is demurrable.

Same — Answer Piled, and Depositions Taken.

After an answer has been filed and depositions taken, it is error to permit a withdrawal of the answer and a demurrer filed.

APPEAL PROM LETCHER CIRCUIT COURT.

September 27, 1870.

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Robertson:

The defect in the original petition was in charging the appellees, as *aiders*and *abettors*of a confederate officer in tortiously taking his property, without any description of the property ■which might so far identify it as to bar another action for the same trespass. On that technical - ground a demurrer to the petition, in the first instance, might have been sustained. But instead of demurring the appellees filed an answer waiving that objection and traversing all the material allegations. On the issue thus joined the appellant took depositions as required. *119proving that the appellees themselves took his property, and identifying it by a general and sufficient description. After all this the circuit court erred in permitting the appellees to withdraw their answer and file a demurrer to the petition, and also in thereiipon sustaining the demurrer. And, after the appellant had amended the petition by charging the appellees with being the principal trespassers and *converting*the property to their own use, the circuit court ought not to have rejected it and dismissed the petition.

Lilly, *for appellant.*

Rodman, *for appellees.*

Wherefore the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for amended pleadings and further proceedings.
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

IN RE :

EAN HOLDINGS, LLC d/b/a ENTERPRISE

RENT

- A

- CAR

Relator. §

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 23

- 00081

- CV

AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

IN MANDAMUS

J U D G M E N T

The Court has considered this cause on the Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus against

the Honorable Francisco X. Dominguez, Judge of the 205th District Court of Hudspeth County,

Texas, and concludes that Relator’s petition for writ of mandamu s should be conditionally granted.

We therefore conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to

vacate its order denying the motion for leave to designate a responsible third party. The writ will

issue only if the trial court fails to act in accordance with this opinion. This decision shall be

certified below for observance.

IT IS SO ORDERED THIS 16TH DAY OF JUNE, 2023.

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ

, Chief Justice

Before Rodriguez , C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ

. Palafox., J., concurring
**SYNOPSIS OF THE CASE**

**20 20**  **MT 69**  **: DA** **- 1**  **8 -** **06 61**  **, AGUSTIN**  **RAMON** , P laintiff and Appellant, v. **DAR RE** **N SHORT,**  **in his**  **official capacity**  **as Sheriff**  **of Lincoln**  **County and**  **Administrator of**  **Lincoln County Detention Center** , Defendant and Appellee . 1 The Montana Supreme Court has ruled that holding individuals pursuant to a federal civil immigration detainer request is an arrest under Montana law. And, Montana law does not provide Montana law enforcement officers with the authority to arrest individuals based on federal civil immigration violations through immigration detainer requests. Montana requires an arrest warrant issued by proper judicial authority. In August 2018, Agustin Ramon (“Ramon”), a resident of Eureka, Montana, was arrested on a charge of burglary and booked into the Lincoln County Jail. When Ramon attempted to post his $25,000 bond, the jail informed the bail

-bondsman that the Lincoln County Sheriff would continue to detain Ramon, even if his bond were paid because the U.S. Customs and Border Protection had sent the jail a civil immigration detainer request. 2 The Border Patrol had probable cause that Ramon was a removable alien under the federal Immigration and Nationality Act and requested that the Jail hold Ramon for up to 48 hours beyond the time he was entitled to release
. As a result of the Border Patrol’s detainer request, Ramon’s bondsman declined to post his bond since it would have been futile , and Ramon was not released. Ramon then filed a complaint in October 2018 alleging the Sheriff violated Montana law in honoring the Border Patrol’s request
. In November 2018 the lower court held against Ramon. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that Ramon’s continued detention for a new pur pose when he was otherwise entitled to release was an arrest under Montana law and that the Lincoln County Sheriff lacked state arrest authority to detain Ramon on the basis of his potential removal under federal immigration law. Arrest authority of Montana law enforcement officers is controlled by Montana law. A detainer request is not an arrest warrant and does not compel the re - arrest of a person otherwise entitled to release.

1 The Court prepared this synopsis fo r the reader’s convenience
. It co nstitutes no part of the Opinio n of the Court and may not be cited as precedent.
2 Use of f ederal c ivil immigrat io n detainers in Montana has recent ly increased. S ince 2003, approximately

5 43 detainers have been is sued in Montana and the years 2017, 2018, and 2019, saw a doubling of the previous three years wi th a total of 190 detainers is sued. 03/25/2020

Case Number: DA 18-0661
United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-40316

Summary Calendar

____________

Austin D. Birdow, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Isaac Kwarteng, Medical Director, 

Defendant—Appellee.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:21-CV-102

______________________________

Before Jolly, Engelhardt, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Austin D. Birdow, Texas prisoner # 02900272, filed a 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 suit against Dr. Isaac Kwarteng, Medical Director of the McConnell 

Unit where Birdow is housed, complaining that Dr. Kwarteng had been 

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when Birdow sought 

treatment for a laceration on his tongue. The district court determined that 

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 2, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 23-40316 Document: 49-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/02/2024
No. 23-40316

2

Dr. Kwarteng was entitled to qualified immunity because Birdow failed to 

show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dr. Kwarteng acted with 

deliberate indifference to Birdow’s serious medical needs and granted the 

doctor’s motion for summary judgment. See Pratt v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 822 

F.3d 174, 180 (5th Cir. 2016). 

Birdow reiterates his claims and asserts that the district court erred by 

granting the motion for summary judgment. We review de novo the district 

court’s ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Nickell v. Beau View of 

Biloxi, LLC, 636 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2011). 

The nature of Birdow’s allegations against Dr. Kwarteng is a challenge 

to the medical judgment he exercised when treating and accessing Birdow’s 

tongue injury, which does not give rise to a constitutional violation. See 

Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006). The district court did 

not err by granting Dr. Kwarteng’s motion for summary judgment and 

denying Birdow’s cross motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). 

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 

Case: 23-40316 Document: 49-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/02/2024