UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 96-4019

RODNEY KEITH INGRAM,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

James A. Beaty, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-95-171)

Submitted: October 29, 1996

Decided: December 17, 1996

Before WILKINS and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Carlton M. Mansfield, CHAVIS & RANSOM, Lumberton, North

Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney,

Richard S. Glaser, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,

North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Rodney Keith Ingram pled guilty to one count of possession of

cocaine with intent to distribute. He appeals the denial of his motion

to suppress the cocaine recovered from his automobile. We affirm.

All warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions." Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 357

(1967) (footnote omitted). One such exception is a search incident to

a lawful arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).

In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the Supreme Court held

that "when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the

occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of

that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." Id.

at 460 (footnotes omitted).

Ingram contends that he was no longer an occupant of the vehicle

at the time of his arrest, and therefore Deputy Webster had no authority under Belton to search the passenger compartment of his parked

and locked vehicle. This argument lacks merit, however, because we

have held that a police officer may search the passenger area of a

vehicle incident to the lawful arrest of its occupant, even when the

occupant has already been removed from the car and is under the control of the police. United States v. Milton, 52 F.3d 78, 80 (4th Cir.),

cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 64 U.S.L.W. 3246 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1995)

(No. 95-5231); see, e.g., United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 971-

72 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1021 (1989).

Here, Deputy Webster followed Ingram for a mile with his blue

police lights flashing. Webster was right behind Ingram as Ingram

turned into his driveway and parked his Mazda. Ingram sat momentarily in his car as the deputy stepped out of his vehicle. Ingram then

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hastily stepped out of his car and locked the door before ordered to

do so by the deputy. The two met at the rear bumper of the Mazda,

where Webster arrested Ingram for driving without a license. The

deputy then secured Ingram in his police vehicle before searching the

Mazda and recovering cocaine from its console.

Webster thus initiated contact with Ingram while he was an occupant of the vehicle and so was justified in searching the passenger

compartment under Belton. Ingram's voluntary separation from the

vehicle after that contact was initiated does not alter the analysis. See

United States v. Willis, 37 F.3d 313, 317 (7th Cir. 1994); United

States v. Franco, 981 F.2d 470, 472-73 (10th Cir. 1992).

Finally, the cases Ingram cites do not support his position. In those

cases, vehicle searches incident to arrest were found unjustified when

the police did not initiate contact with the suspects while they occupied the vehicle in question. See United States v. Adams, 26 F.3d 702,

704 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Strahan , 984 F.2d 155, 159 (6th

Cir. 1993); United States v. Fafowora, 865 F.2d 360, 362 (D.C. Cir.),

certified question dismissed, 489 U.S. 1002, aff'd, 881 F.2d 1088

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 829 (1989). Such was not the case

here. Although in Fafowora DEA agents pursued the suspects in the

automobile that the agents ultimately searched, the opinion is not

clear whether this pursuit immediately preceded the arrest. However,

the opinion does state that at the time the police"came upon the

arrestees" they were outside the vehicle. Id. In contrast, Deputy Webster came upon Ingram while he was still an occupant of the vehicle.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Ingram's

motion to suppress. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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