Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion No. 20A03-1408-PC-293 | March 31, 2015 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stephen T. Owens

Public Defender of Indiana

Kelly A. Kelly

Deputy Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jeremy Ryan,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent

March 31, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No. 20A03-

1408-PC-293

Appeal from the Elkhart Superior 

Court 3

The Honorable George W. 

Biddlecome, Judge

Case No. 20D03-1304-PC-29

Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion No. 20A03-1408-PC-293 | March 31, 2015 Page 2 of 15

[1] The Elkhart Superior Court denied a petition for post-conviction relief filed by 

Jeremy Ryan (“Ryan”). Ryan appeals, claiming that the post-conviction court 

clearly erred in rejecting Ryan’s claims that his plea of guilty to Class A felony 

manufacturing methamphetamine was not knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently made and that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

Concluding that the post-conviction court’s decision was not clearly erroneous, 

we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On November 21, 2009, the police responded to a call of a domestic 

disturbance at a home where Ryan lived with his girlfriend and her two 

children. When the police searched the home, they found various items 

associated with the manufacture and use of methamphetamine, including one 

vessel with a liquid that contained methamphetamine and the 

methamphetamine precursors ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. 

[3] As a result, the State charged Ryan on November 24, 2009, with Class A felony 

dealing in methamphetamine in an amount of three grams or more, two counts 

of Class C felony neglect of a dependent, Class D felony domestic battery, Class 

D felony strangulation, and Class A misdemeanor interfering with the reporting 

of a crime. 

[4] Ryan was appointed counsel and reached an agreement with the State on 

March 3, 2010, whereby he agreed to plead guilty to Class A felony dealing in 

methamphetamine and two counts of Class C felony neglect of a dependent. In 
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exchange, the remaining charges would be dismissed, and Ryan’s sentence 

would be capped at thirty-five years. A plea hearing was held on March 4, 2010, 

at which Ryan was advised of his rights. Ryan indicated that he knew and 

understood his rights, and that he understood the terms of his plea agreement. 

Ryan, under oath, admitted to knowingly manufacturing more than three 

grams of methamphetamine. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and 

sentenced Ryan to thirty-five years on the Class A felony conviction, with 

twenty-five years executed and ten years suspended to probation, and two 

concurrent sentences of five years each on the Class C felony convictions, to be 

served concurrently with the sentence on the Class A felony. 

[5] On April 15, 2013, Ryan filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After 

the Indiana Public Defender’s office filed an appearance for Ryan, he filed an 

amended petition on December 2, 2013. In this petition, Ryan claimed that his 

plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because he was 

misled by his trial counsel with regard to whether the State could have proved

that he manufactured more than three grams of methamphetamine. Along these 

same lines, Ryan also claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

properly advise him that he had a defense to the Class A felony charge, i.e., that 

the State could not have proved that he manufactured more than three grams of 

methamphetamine. 

[6] The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Ryan’s post-conviction petition 

on March 4, 2014. At the hearing, Ryan called as a witness Indiana State 

Laboratory chemist Kimberly Ivanyo (“Ivanyo”), who had analyzed the 
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evidence submitted by the police in Ryan’s case. Of the two vials of liquid 

submitted by the police, one contained methamphetamine and the precursor 

ephedrine/pseudoephedrine. Ivanyo explained that she did not weigh the liquid 

in the vial because the laboratory measures liquids by volume, not weight. She 

also explained a conversion formula exists that can theoretically calculate the 

weight of solid methamphetamine that could be obtained from a liquid 

containing methamphetamine but that she did not use such a formula in Ryan’s 

case. 

[7] Ryan also called as a witness his trial counsel, who did not recall any specific 

discussion of the weight of the methamphetamine discovered by the police. He 

did, however, remember that Ryan had been very cooperative with the police, 

showing them where the various items were as they searched his residence. 

Ryan had also admitted to his counsel that he had been manufacturing 

methamphetamine. Ryan’s trial counsel recalled that he and Ryan agreed that a 

plea agreement was in Ryan’s best interest. 

[8] Ryan himself testified at the post-conviction hearing that he did not know how 

much methamphetamine the police had discovered at his home but that he 

believed the State had sufficient evidence to convict him based upon the advice 

of his trial counsel. Ryan also testified that he believed that he was facing a 

sentence of up to seventy-eight years and pleaded guilty to avoid such a lengthy 

possible sentence. Ryan further stated that he learned in 2012, years after his 

conviction, about a conversion formula that can be used to calculate the weight 

of solid methamphetamine that could be obtained from a liquid containing 
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methamphetamine. He also learned of recent developments in case law that he 

thought would have made the State’s case against him difficult to prove, thus 

motivating his petition for post-conviction relief. 

[9] On July 29, 2014, the post-conviction court issued findings of fact and 

conclusions of law denying Ryan’s petition. The court determined that, at the 

time of Ryan’s plea, the State did not have to prove the amount of solid 

methamphetamine and that the case law relied upon by Ryan was handed 

down two years after his conviction and sentence. The post-conviction court 

therefore determined that Ryan had not shown that his plea was not knowingly, 

involuntarily, and intelligently made. The court further determined that Ryan’s 

trial counsel was not ineffective based on the state of the law at the time of 

Ryan’s plea. Ryan now appeals. 

Post-Conviction Standard of Review

[10] Post-conviction proceedings are not “super appeals” through which a convicted 

person can raise issues he did not raise at trial or on direct appeal. Fowler v. 

State, 977 N.E.2d 464, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d on reh’g, 981 N.E.2d 623 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Instead, post-conviction proceedings afford petitioners a 

limited opportunity to raise issues that were unavailable or unknown at trial 

and on direct appeal. Id. Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature, and 

petitioners bear the burden of proving their grounds for relief by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Id. When a petitioner appeals the denial of postconviction relief, he appeals from a negative judgment. Id. Consequently, we 

may not reverse unless the petitioner demonstrates the evidence as a whole 
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leads unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the 

post-conviction court. Id. We accept the post-conviction court’s findings of fact 

unless they are clearly erroneous, but we do not defer to its conclusions of law. 

Id.

I. Voluntariness of Ryan’s Plea

[11] Ryan first claims that the post-conviction court erred in determining that Ryan’s 

plea of guilty was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Before 

accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must determine that the defendant 

understands the nature of the charges to which he is pleading, that the plea will 

waive certain rights, and the range of penalties he faces. See Ind. Code § 35-35-

1-2. These statutory requirements ensure that the guilty plea “represents a 

voluntary and intelligent choice.” Diaz v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1089, 1094 (Ind. 

2010). “[P]ost-conviction relief is a proper vehicle for challenging a guilty plea, 

and we look at all evidence before the post-conviction court that supports its 

determination that a guilty plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” 

Collins v. State, 14 N.E.3d 80, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). In this context, 

voluntariness is dependent “on whether the defendant knowingly and freely 

entered the plea[.]” State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258, 1266 (Ind. 1997). 

[12] Here, Ryan does not claim that the trial court misadvised him or failed to 

advise him regarding any of his rights. Instead, he claims that his plea was 

based on incorrect information regarding the evidence the State had against 

him, i.e., that the State could not prove the quantity of the methamphetamine
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he manufactured sufficient to support a Class A felony, i.e., three grams. See

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(b) (2008). 

[13] Ryan argues, “[b]ecause the State did not provide direct evidence for the weight 

of methamphetamine, an essential element of dealing as a Class A felony, it 

cannot show Ryan manufactured three grams or more of methamphetamine.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 10. However, Ryan did not proceed to trial; he instead 

pleaded guilty. Thus, the State was not required to present any evidence, as 

Ryan admitted that he manufactured more than three grams of 

methamphetamine. 

[14] Ryan argues, however, that his admission was based on incorrect information 

and advice given to him by his trial counsel. Specifically, Ryan notes no 

significant amount of solid methamphetamine was found at his home and that 

the methamphetamine in the intermediate liquid mixture found at his home 

was not weighed. He therefore claims that the State had insufficient evidence to 

convict him of a Class A felony and that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

advising him to the contrary. 

[15] Ryan notes that our supreme court has held that, “in order to prove the element 

of weight of drugs or controlled substances, the State must either offer evidence 

of its actual, measured weight or demonstrate that the quantity of the drugs or 

controlled substances is so large as to permit a reasonable inference that the 

element of weight has been established.” Halsema v. State, 823 N.E.2d 668, 674 

(Ind. 2005). However, the statute criminalizing the manufacture of 
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methamphetamine criminalizes the manufacture of methamphetamine “pure or 

adulterated.” I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a). At the time of Ryan’s guilty plea, this court 

had repeatedly held that, when determining the amount of the drug involved, 

an intermediate mixture that contained the final drug was an “adulterated” 

drug. See Hundley v. State, 951 N.E.2d 575, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding 

that where the intermediate step is so near the end of the manufacturing process 

that the final product is present in the chemical compound, that substance 

qualifies as an “adulterated drug” for purposes of our manufacturing statutes), 

trans. denied; Traylor v. State, 817 N.E.2d 611, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding 

that evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant possessed over three 

grams of methamphetamine where evidence showed that defendant was in the 

process of producing methamphetamine, and the product in the reaction vessel 

weighed well over three grams), trans. denied.

[16] The case Ryan relies on, Buelna v. State, 20 N.E.3d 137 (Ind. 2014), disagreed 

with this approach. In Buelna, the defendant was convicted of Class A felony 

dealing in methamphetamine and, on appeal, challenged the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting his conviction, specifically the sufficiency of the evidence 

used to support the finding that he possessed more than three grams of 

methamphetamine. On appeal, this court observed that the liquid sample taken 

from the vessels recovered from the defendant contained some 

methamphetamine, and we therefore held the entire liquid mixture constituted 

“adulterated” methamphetamine. Buelna v. State, No. 20A04-1305-CR-223, 
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2014 WL 345994 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2014), trans. granted, opinion vacated

(citing Traylor, 817 N.E.2d at 620).

[17] On transfer, our supreme court disagreed with our holdings in Buelna, Traylor, 

and Hundley and held that “adulterated” methamphetamine is the “final, 

extracted product that may contain lingering impurities or has been 

subsequently debased or diluted by a foreign substance—not an intermediate 

mixture that has not undergone the entire manufacturing process.” Buelna, 20 

N.E.3d at 142. Thus, the weight of an intermediate mixture, such as the liquid 

in the containers in Buelna, “is probative of the weight enhancement only if the 

State presents evidence that establishes how much finished drug the 

intermediate mixture would have yielded if the manufacturing process had been 

completed.” Id. In so holding, the court abrogated the earlier holdings of this 

court in Hundley and Traylor.

[18] Here, Ryan claims that the State would have been unable to prove how much 

finished methamphetamine his intermediate mixture would have yielded had 

the manufacturing process been completed. Because his trial counsel advised 

him otherwise, Ryan claims, his plea of guilty was not knowingly, voluntarily, 

and intelligently entered. We disagree. 

[19] At the time Ryan entered into his plea agreement, our supreme court had not 

yet issued Buelna; in fact, Buelna was issued over four and one-half years after 

Ryan pleaded guilty.1 Accordingly, at the time of Ryan’s plea, Hundley and 

 1 Ryan pleaded guilty on March 3, 2010; Buelna was not handed down until November 13, 2014. 
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Traylor were still good law, and the State could have used the entire weight of 

the liquid containing methamphetamine to prove that he manufactured more 

than three grams of adulterated methamphetamine. Thus, at the time that Ryan 

entered his plea, the advice of his trial counsel was not incorrect, and we reject 

Ryan’s claim that his decision to plead guilty was not knowingly, voluntarily, 

and intelligently made. See Fowler, 977 N.E.2d at 467-68 (rejecting defendant’s 

claim that his plea was not voluntary and intelligent because he was not advised 

of change in case law that did not occur until after defendant had pleaded guilty 

and was sentenced), aff’d on reh’g, 981 N.E.2d 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

[20] Ryan also claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing 

to inform him that the State did not have enough evidence to prove the weight 

of the methamphetamine Ryan had manufactured. In Timberlake v. State, our 

supreme court set forth the standard governing claims of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel: 

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. This requires a showing that counsel’s representation 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the 

errors were so serious that they resulted in a denial of the right to 

counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 

Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance 

prejudiced the defense. To establish prejudice, a defendant must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.
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Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy 

and tactics, and we will accord those decisions deference. A 

strong presumption arises that counsel rendered adequate 

assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 

reasonable professional judgment. The Strickland Court 

recognized that even the finest, most experienced criminal 

defense attorneys may not agree on the ideal strategy or the most 

effective way to represent a client. Isolated mistakes, poor 

strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not 

necessarily render representation ineffective. The two prongs of 

the Strickland test are separate and independent inquiries. Thus, 

[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the 

ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be 

followed. 

753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). 

[21] Claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel following a guilty plea require 

certain other considerations. With regard to guilty pleas, two general types of 

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are accepted: (1) the failure to 

advise the defendant on an issue that impairs or overlooks a defense, and (2) an 

incorrect advisement of penal consequences. Manzano v. State, 12 N.E.3d 321, 

326 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (citing Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 496, 

500 (Ind. 2001). Ryan’s claim appears to fall within the first of these categories. 

[22] In Segura, the court also explained what a petitioner must establish on a claim 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel following a guilty plea: 

We conclude that Hill [v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985)] . . . 

requires a showing of a reasonable probability of success at trial if

the alleged error is one that would have affected a defense. This 

result seems preferable for several reasons. In [State v.] Van 
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Cleave, [674 N.E.2d 1293 (Ind. 1996),] we identified sound 

reasons for requiring that a petitioner who pleads guilty show a 

reasonable probability of acquittal in order to prevail in a 

postconviction attack on the conviction based on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. As Hill emphasized, the State 

has an interest in the finality of guilty pleas. This is in part 

grounded in the cost of a new trial, and the demands on judicial 

resources that are imposed by revisiting the guilty plea, but also 

in concerns about the toll a retrial exacts from victims and 

witnesses who are required to revisit the crime years later. 

Segura, 749 N.E.2d at 503 (citations omitted). Our supreme court therefore 

concluded that “[a] new trial is of course necessary if an unreliable plea has 

been accepted. But its costs should not be imposed needlessly, and that would 

be the result if the petitioner cannot show a reasonable probability that the 

ultimate result—conviction—would not have occurred despite counsel’s error 

as to a defense.” Id. Thus, contrary to Ryan’s claims,

2 to be successful in his 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he had to prove to the postconviction court that, but for his counsel’s alleged errors, he would not have 

been convicted. See id. 

[23] Turning now to the merits of Ryan’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel, the crux of Ryan’s argument is again that the State possessed 

 2 Ryan claims that we should follow the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which disagreed with our 

supreme court’s interpretation of Hill, and concluded that “a person who contends that ineffective assistance 

of counsel induced him to plead guilty establishes ‘prejudice’ by demonstrating that, but for counsel’s errors, 

he would have insisted on a trial.” See Manzano, 12 N.E.3d at 326 n.1 (citing Payne v. Brown, 662 F.3d 825, 

828 (7th Cir. 2011)). However, the Indiana Supreme Court has determined that Hill requires a defendant to 

show more than that he would not have pleaded guilty and instead must show that but for counsel’s errors, 

he would not have been convicted. Segura, 749 N.E.2d at 503. Because the Seventh Circuit’s decisions on 

federal law are not binding on us, we apply the standard established by our supreme court. See Manzano, 12 

N.E.3d at 326 n.1 (citing Jackson, 830 N.E.2d at 921). 
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insufficient evidence to convict him of manufacturing methamphetamine in a 

quantity of three grams or more and that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to inform Ryan of this deficit in the State’s evidence. Ryan contends

that, because the State could not prove the amount of methamphetamine 

involved, the most he could have been convicted of was a Class B felony, not 

the Class A felony to which his trial counsel advised him to plead guilty.3 

[24] In support of this claim, Ryan again relies extensively on the holding of our 

supreme court in Buelna to argue that the State had no evidence regarding the 

weight of the solid methamphetamine that could have been produced from the 

liquid containing methamphetamine and precursors found at Ryan’s home. We 

repeat, however, at the time of Ryan’s guilty plea, over four and one-half years 

before Buelna, this court had held that the State could use the entire weight of 

the liquid containing methamphetamine to establish the weight of “adulterated”

methamphetamine. See Hundley v. State, 951 N.E.2d at 581; Traylor, 817 N.E.2d 

at 620. 

[25] Thus, the advice of Ryan’s trial counsel was not incorrect at the time it was 

given. Nor can we fault his trial counsel for failing to anticipate our supreme 

 3 Ryan also claims that the other pending charges would have been considered part of a single episode of 

criminal conduct, thereby limiting his total sentence to thirty years. See Appellant’s Br. p. 12-13. In his 

petition for post-conviction relief, however, Ryan did not present a claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel based on the failure of his counsel to advise him that the charges might be considered a single 

episode of criminal conduct. We therefore will not consider this as a separate claim of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel. See Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 270 (Ind. 2014) (noting that court on appeal will not 

consider claim not presented in petition for post-conviction relief). Furthermore, Ryan cites no authority and 

provides no analysis supporting his position that his convictions would have been considered a single episode 

of criminal conduct. See Lyles v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1035, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that a party waives 

an issue for purposes of appeal where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate 

citation to authority), trans. denied. 
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court’s holding in Buelna. See Kendall v. State, 886 N.E.2d 48, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008) (noting that an attorney is not required to anticipate changes in the law in 

order to be effective). 

[26] Ryan claims that Buelna does not represent a change in the case law because the 

State has always been required to prove the weight of the drug involved. See 

Halsema, 823 N.E.2d at 674. He therefore argues that no proof of the weight of 

the methamphetamine is at issue here because the State Laboratory chemist 

testified that she did not weigh the liquid and did not use a conversion formula 

to determine how much solid methamphetamine could be produced from the 

liquid found at Ryan’s home. 

[27] However, this does not mean that had Ryan elected to go to trial, the State 

could not have weighed the liquid, which at the time could have been 

considered “adulterated” methamphetamine.4 See Traylor, 817 N.E.2d at 620. 

Given that three grams is an extremely small quantity,5 it was not unreasonable 

for Ryan’s trial counsel to advise him that the State could have convicted him 

of a Class A felony at that time.

6

 4 The fact that Ivanyo testified that the laboratory does not weigh liquids and that liquids are typically 

measured by volume instead of weight does not mean that liquids cannot be weighed. See Traylor, 817 

N.E.2d at 619 (noting that State's forensic scientist determined that liquid in a reaction vessel weighed 23.72 

grams). 

5 Three grams is equivalent to 0.1058 ounce, or 0.0066 pound. See Lewis V. Judson, Weights and Measures 

of the United States (1976), available at: http://physics.nist.gov/Pubs/SP447/sp447.pdf; see also Com. v. 

Montoya, 984 N.E.2d 793, 801 (Mass. 2013) (citing Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for 

Less Aggregation, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901, 937 (1991) (noting that five grams is weight of two pennies or five 

paper clips)). 

6 We have been unable to find any exhibit in the record before us that demonstrates precisely how much 

methamphetamine-containing liquid was in the vessel found in Ryan’s home. However, based on the 
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[28] We emphasize that it was not the State’s burden at the post-conviction hearing 

to show it had sufficient evidence to convict Ryan; it was Ryan’s burden on 

post-conviction to show that his counsel was ineffective. Given the evidence 

that the State possessed, which included one vial of a liquid containing 

methamphetamine, and the state of the law at the time of Ryan’s plea, we 

cannot say that Ryan’s counsel was ineffective for advising Ryan to plead 

guilty. 

Conclusion

[29] The post-conviction court did not err in concluding that Ryan failed to establish 

that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Similarly, 

the post-conviction court did not err in concluding that Ryan failed to establish 

that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

[30] Affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Bradford, J., concur.

 testimony, it appears that it was much more than 0.6 teaspoon, which is the approximate volume of three 

grams of water. See Commonly Used Metric System Units, available at: 

http://lamar.colostate.edu/~hillger/common.html.