J-S22027-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SHAWN SEIF 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 929 WDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 20, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0010893-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: August 30, 2024

Shawn Seif (“Seif”) appeals from the order denying his first petition for 

relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 Additionally, 

Seif’s court-appointed counsel, Rachel Santoriella, Esquire (“Attorney 

Santoriella”), has filed a motion to withdraw from representation and a “nomerit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 

1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en 

banc). We grant Attorney Santoriella’s motion and affirm the PCRA court’s 

order denying the petition.

In 2017, Seif assaulted his former paramour, Monique Dalton, and her 

two minor children at her home. On the night of the assault, Seif began to 

repeatedly punch Dalton in her bedroom. When her children heard the 

commotion and attempted to intervene, Seif shoved one child into a couch 

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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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and the other into a wall, causing the child to sustain a bloody nose and lip.

After Dalton told her children to leave and seek help, Seif confined Dalton to 

the bedroom where he repeatedly punched, strangled, and sexually assaulted

her until police arrived and arrested him. Police then filed numerous charges 

against Seif for the assaults on Dalton and her children.

On May 21, 2018, following a guilty plea colloquy conducted by the 

Honorable Mark V. Tranquilli, Seif entered an open guilty plea to all charges 

filed against him related to the assaults.

2

 After accepting Seif’s plea, Judge 

Tranquilli sentenced him to an aggregate term of seven and one-half to fifteen 

years’ incarceration, followed by five years’ probation. Seif filed a postsentence motion which the trial court denied. Seif subsequently filed a timely 

notice of appeal in which he challenged the legality of his sentence. On appeal, 

this Court determined that Seif’s sentence was illegal, vacated the judgment 

of sentence imposed by Judge Tranquilli, and remanded for resentencing. See 

Commonwealth v. Seif, 240 A.3d 918 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished 

memorandum) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because the two 

counts for aggravated indecent assault should have merged for sentencing 

purposes).

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2 Specifically, Seif pled guilty to aggravated assault, endangering the welfare 

of children, unlawful restraint-serious bodily injury, simple assault, indecent 

assault-forcible compulsion, strangulation, and two counts of aggravated 

indecent assault without consent. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 

4304(a)(1), 2902(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), 3126(a)(2), 2718(a)(1), 3125(a)(1).
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On remand, the case was reassigned to the Honorable Bruce R. Beemer

who, on May 13, 2021, re-sentenced Seif to an aggregate term of seven and 

one-half to fifteen years’ incarceration. This Court affirmed the judgment of 

sentence, and on August 23, 2022, our Supreme Court denied allowance of 

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Seif, 276 A.3d 259 (Pa. Super. 2022) 

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 284 A.3d 119 (Pa. 2022). 

On October 4, 2022, Seif filed the instant timely pro se PCRA petition, 

his first, wherein he claimed that he was eligible for PCRA relief because he 

received an illegal sentence. See Pro Se PCRA Petition, 10/4/22, at 3. Seif 

additionally indicated that he was sentenced by Judge Tranquilli on May 18, 

2017 following a guilty plea. See id. at 2. Seif identified his specific claim of 

error as follows: “Judge Mark Tranquilli was removed from his court room, for 

handling such like in my case (illegal sentence, illegal plea deals, etc.).” Id. 

at 4. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw and 

a “no-merit” letter pursuant to Turner/Finley. On June 16, 2023, the PCRA 

court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and issued notice of its intent to 

dismiss Seif’s petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Seif 

did not respond to the notice. On July 20, 2023, the PCRA court entered an 

order denying the petition. 

Seif filed a timely notice of appeal, and the PCRA court appointed 

Attorney Santoriella as appellate counsel. The PCRA court ordered Seif to file 

a concise statement of errors complained on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b). In lieu of filing a concise statement, however, Attorney Santoriella 
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filed in this Court a petition to withdraw as counsel and a “no-merit” letter

pursuant to Turner/Finley. 

Prior to addressing the issues identified in the “no-merit” letter, we must 

first address Attorney Santoriella’s petition to withdraw. Pursuant to 

Turner/Finley, independent review of the record by competent counsel is 

required before withdrawal on collateral appeal is permitted. See 

Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009). In Pitts, our 

Supreme Court explained that such independent review requires proof of:

1. A “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel detailing the nature and 

extent of [counsel’s] review;

2. The “no-merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel listing each issue the 

petitioner wished to have reviewed;

3. The PC[R]A counsel’s “explanation,” in the “no-merit” letter, of 

why the petitioner’s issues were meritless;

4. The PC[R]A court conducting its own independent review of the 

record; and

5. The PC[R]A court agreeing with counsel that the petition was 

meritless.

Id. (citation and brackets omitted). Further, counsel must also send a copy 

of the “no-merit” letter to the petitioner, along with a copy of the petition to 

withdraw and inform the petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or to retain 

new counsel. See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa. 

Super. 2007). Substantial compliance with the requirements to withdraw as 

counsel will satisfy the Turner/Finley criteria. See Commonwealth v. 

Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940, 947 (Pa. Super. 2003). If the brief meets these 
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requirements, we then conduct an independent review of the petitioner’s 

issues. See Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 511 (Pa. Super. 

2016). 

Our review discloses that Attorney Santoriella has substantially 

complied with the above requirements. In her petition, Attorney Santoriella 

detailed the nature and extent of her review of Seif’s case, listed the issue 

that Seif wished to have reviewed, and explained her reasoning for concluding 

that the issue is meritless. Additionally, Attorney Santoriella provided Seif 

with a letter notifying him of her intention to seek permission to withdraw 

from representation as well as a copy of the Turner/Finley “no-merit” letter, 

and advised Seif of his rights in lieu of representation. Thus, we conclude that 

Attorney Santoriella has substantially complied with the requirements 

necessary to withdraw as counsel. See Karanicolas, 836 A.2d at 947. 

We now independently review the issue that Seif wished to raise on 

appeal to ascertain whether he is entitled to relief. In the “no-merit” letter,

Attorney Santoriella framed the issue as follows:

[Seif] contends that his [PCRA] petition should not have 

been denied as he received an illegal sentence and that he should 

receive a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that Judge 

Tranquilli, who presided over his guilty plea was removed as a 

judge because of illegal sentences and illegal plea deals. 

“No-Merit” Letter, 3/30/24, at 2.

Our standard of review of an order denying a PCRA petition is wellsettled:
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We review an order [denying] a petition under the PCRA in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. 

This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the 

evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it 

is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This 

Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the 

record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the 

factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those 

findings unless they have no support in the record. 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted). 

To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, a petitioner must plead and 

prove that that his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more specified 

circumstances. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i)-(viii). When raising an 

illegality of sentence claim under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and 

prove “[t]he imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful maximum.” Id. 

§ 9543(a)(2)(vii). Our Supreme Court has recognized four categories of illegal 

sentencing claims: (1) a claim that a sentence was imposed pursuant to a 

facially unconstitutional sentencing statute; (2) a claim that a sentence was 

imposed without the fulfillment of statutory preconditions to the court’s 

sentencing authority; (3) a claim that alleges a violation of a substantive 

restriction that the Constitution places upon a court’s power to apply the 

statutory sentence to the defendant; and (4) a claim that the statutory 

support for the underlying conviction is void ab initio. See Commonwealth

v. Prinkey, 277 A.3d 554, 562 (Pa. 2022). The High Court noted that for all 

four categories, “the inquiry is whether, assuming the appellant’s claim 
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prevails, the result would be that the trial court lacked authority to impose the 

sentence at issue.” Id. at 563. 

Further, in order to be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner must 

establish that his allegation of error has not been previously litigated or 

waived. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3); see also Commonwealth v. Spotz, 

18 A.3d 244, 281 (Pa. 2011) (stating previously litigated claims are not 

cognizable under the PCRA). An issue is deemed previously litigated for 

purposes of the PCRA if “the highest appellate court in which the petitioner 

could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the 

issue[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2). 

Seif’s sole issue on appeal concerns whether his sentence is illegal based 

on information that Judge Tranquilli has since been removed from the trial 

court bench for actions relating to the issuance of illegal sentences and the 

acceptance of illegal plea deals. Prior to considering the merits of this issue, 

however, we must first determine whether Seif’s claim is eligible for relief 

under the PCRA. 

Notably, in purporting to raise an illegal sentencing claim, Seif has not 

pleaded or proved any of the four types of illegal sentencing claims recognized 

by our Supreme Court in Prinkey. To be sure, Seif does not claim that his

current sentence is illegal, or that Judge Beemer lacked authority to impose

it. Instead, Seif vaguely claimed that his previously vacated sentence is illegal

because Judge Tranquilli was removed from the bench due to misconduct in
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other criminal cases.

3

 Such a claim, falls decidedly short of the necessary

foundational assertion that “the trial court lacked authority to impose the 

sentence at issue.” Prinkey, 277 A.3d at 563 (emphasis added). 

Consequently, because Seif failed to plead and prove that his conviction or 

sentence resulted from one or more of the circumstances specified in section 

9543(a)(2), we determine that his purported illegal sentencing claim is 

ineligible for relief under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i)-(viii).

Moreover, even if his illegal sentencing claim were cognizable under the 

PCRA, we nevertheless determine that it would still be ineligible for PCRA relief

because it was previously litigated. As the PCRA court emphasized in its 907 

notice, Seif previously challenged the legality of the May 21, 2018 sentence

imposed by Judge Tranquilli on direct appeal to this Court in 2020. See Rule 

907 Notice, 6/16/23, at unnumbered 2; see also Seif, 240 A.3d at 918 

(unpublished memorandum). As explained above, this Court determined that 

the May 21, 2018 sentence imposed by Judge Tranquilli was illegal and 

vacated that sentence in its entirety. See Seif, 240 A.3d at 918 (unpublished 

memorandum). Thus, the record supports the PCRA court’s determination 

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3

In its Rule 907 Notice, the PCRA court observed that, “[a]lthough [Seif’s] 

claim states that Judge Tranquilli was removed, [i]t is clear from the 

November 19, 2020 order . . . issued by the Court of Judicial Discipline that 

Judge Tranquilli resigned from his position [and that, although he] stipulated 

to the factual allegations of the complaints, . . . the allegations did not involve 

complaints of illegal sentences or pleas[,] as [Seif] asserts in his claim.” Rule 

907 Notice, 6/16/23, at unnumbered 2.
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that Seif’s challenge to the legality of that sentence was previously litigated 

for purposes of the PCRA and is therefore ineligible for relief. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9543(a)(3), and 9544(a)(2). 

Accordingly, we grant Attorney Santoriella’s petition to withdraw and 

affirm the PCRA court’s order denying the petition.

Petition to withdraw granted. Order affirmed. 

August 30, 2024