In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Nos. 00-3021 & 00-2972

Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company,

Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,

v.

Ronald Pribyl, James Harvey, Thomas Skrtic,

and Accu-Tech Plastics, Incorporated,

Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 99 C-0265-S--John C. Shabaz, Judge.

Argued May 11, 2001--Decided July 25, 2001

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Bauer and

Evans, Circuit Judges.

 Flaum, Chief Judge. The Minnesota Mining

and Manufacturing Company ("3M") produces

and markets a product known as carrier

tape. When the company discovered that

three of its employees had formed AccuTech Plastics ("Accu-Tech") to

manufacture and market resin sheeting,

the essential component of carrier tape,

3M brought suit. After dismissing certain

3M claims pursuant to Accu-Tech’s summary

judgment motion, the case proceeded to

trial. The jury ultimately determined

that Accu-Tech had misappropriated trade

secrets from 3M and that Accu-Tech’s

founders had breached duties of loyalty

owed to 3M. Following trial, the district

court overturned some of the jury’s find

ings of liability, upheld other findings,

and granted 3M’s request for a permanent

injunction barring the disclosure (but

not the use) of the trade secrets which

the jury found Accu-Tech had

misappropriated. When final judgment was

entered below, the parties filed crossappeals challenging decisions made by the

district court throughout the litigation.

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm

the district court’s decisions as they

pertain to Accu-Tech’s issues on appeal.

As for 3M’s claims of error, we affirm in

part, and reverse and remand in part the

decisions of the district court. 
I. BACKGROUND

 Since 1986, 3M has manufactured and sold

carrier tape through its Surface Mount

Supplies Division. Carrier tape, which is

used to transport sensitive electronic

components, is made principally from a

thin layer of plastic called resin

sheeting into which pockets are molded to

fit the components to be transferred. 3M

also manufactures the resin sheeting

necessary to produce carrier tape.

However, 3M, preferring the higher profit

margins that attend to the sale of

carrier tape, does not vend resin

sheeting in the open market (except to

its foreign subsidiaries). 

 Three individuals who were integral to

3M’s development and production of resin

sheeting and carrier tape were Ronald

Pribyl, Thomas Skrtic, and James Harvey.

Pribyl, who began working for 3M in 1989

as its Manager of Manufacturing for North

America, supervised the production of all

of 3M’s resin sheeting and carrier tape

in North America. Skrtic, an employee of

3M’s Surface Mount Supplies Division from

1986, was the primary developer of 3M’s

resin sheeting manufacturing process.

Finally, Harvey, who worked as 3M’s

quality supervisor, was the principal

author of a series of 3M manuals

documenting the operating, training, and

quality control procedures for producing

resin sheeting and carrier tape.

 In 1996, 3M announced that it was moving

its carrier tape business from Menominee,

Wisconsin to Hutchinson, Minnesota. For a

variety of reasons, Pribyl, Skrtic, and

Harvey did not wish to relocate to

Minnesota. Thus, in 1997, the trio, while

still under the employ of 3M, formed

Accu-Tech. Accu-Tech manufactures and

sells resin sheeting to various

companies, including those who use the

product to manufacture carrier tape.

However, Accu-Tech itself does not

produce any carrier tape. For

approximately two years, Pribyl, Skrtic,

and Harvey operated Accu-Tech while still

working for 3M. It was not until March of

1999 that their clandestine operation was

discovered by 3M. Upon learning of AccuTech’s existence, 3M terminated all three

individuals.

 On April 23, 1999, 3M brought a
diversity suit against Pribyl, Skrtic,

Harvey, and Accu-Tech, in the District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin. 3M asserted a litany of claims

against Accu-Tech’s founders, including

breach of fiduciary duty, breach of

employment contracts, and

misappropriation of trade secrets. The

complaint also alleged that Accu-Tech, as

a corporate entity, had misappropriated

trade secrets, engaged in unfair

competition, tortiously interfered with

prospective contractual relationships,

and tortiously induced Skrtic to breach

his employment contract with 3M.

 Following discovery, the parties filed

cross-motions for summary judgment. On

November 12, 1999, the district court

granted summary judgment in favor of

Accu-Tech and its founders on the breach

of contract and tortious interference

with contract claims. Additionally, the

court granted summary judgment to the

defendants on the claim for breach of

fiduciary duty to the extent that it was

based on alleged improper competition

with 3M by Accu-Tech’s founders. Finally,

the district court held that 3M’s unfair

competition claim was indistinguishable

from its claims for trade secrets

misappropriation and tortious

interference with contract. Thereafter,

on December 7, 1999, the court granted

summary judgment in favor of Accu-Tech

and its founders on 3M’s claim for

tortious interference with prospective

contractual relations.

 The case proceeded to a bifurcated

trial, which commenced on December 13,

1999. On December 16, the jury returned a

verdict on liability, finding that: (1)

Accu-Tech’s founders had each breached a

duty of loyalty to 3M, (2) 3M owned four

trade secrets, and (3) Accu-Tech and its

founders had misappropriated or

threatened to misappropriate two of those

four trade secrets. The two trade secrets

which the jury determined the defendants

had misappropriated were (1) the

operating procedures, quality manuals,

training manuals, process standards, and

operator notes for using plaintiff’s

equipment that makes resin sheeting ("op

erating procedures and manuals"), and (2)

customized resin formulations that

enhance the sheeting and thermoforming

capability of resin and give it

properties needed in the electronic
industry./1 The following day, the jury

returned its findings on damages. On 3M’s

claim for breach of the duty of loyalty,

the jury determined that Pribyl was

liable in the amount of $126,875, while

Harvey and Skrtic each owed 3M $46,000.

The jury additionally awarded damages

against Accu-Tech and its founders in the

amounts of $83,000 for misappropriation

of 3M’s trade secret in customized resin

formulations and $187,500 for

misappropriation of 3M’s trade secret in

the operating procedures and manuals. 

 Shortly thereafter, the defendants

filed a motion for judgment as a matter

of law or for a new trial. While that

motion was pending, 3M moved for the

entry of a permanent injunction. On

February 9, 2000, the district court par

tially granted 3M’s motion, permanently

enjoining the defendants from disclosing

any of the four trade secrets found by

the jury, and from using the two trade

secrets which the jury had not found use

or disclosure of. However, the court

denied 3M’s request for a permanent

injunction against the use of 3M’s

customized resin formulations and

operating procedures and manuals. 

 On March 2, 2000, the district court

granted, in part, defendants’ motion for

judgment as a matter of law. The court

partially overturned the jury’s verdict,

ruling that the defendants were not

liable for misappropriating 3M’s trade

secret in its customized resin

formulations. The court also ordered a

new trial on the issue of damages for

3M’s breach of loyalty claim, unless 3M

accepted a remittitur. Rather than face a

new trial on damages, 3M accepted the

remittitur. On July 20, 2000, the

district court entered its final

judgment. 

 Discontented with various decisions

below, the parties have now filed crossappeals in this court. For their part,

defendants argue three points of error.

First, they assert that 3M failed to

offer any evidence that any specific

information within the scope of 3M’s

trade secret in the operating procedures

and manuals was actually secret to 3M or

used or disclosed by the defendants.

Thus, defendants argue that the district

court erred in not granting them judgment

as a matter of law on 3M’s
misappropriation claim regarding those

items. Secondly, defendants argue that

the district court’s order permanently

enjoining them from disclosing to any

third party 3M’s operating procedures and

manuals is overly vague, and thus

violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). Finally,

they put forth that the district court

erred in admitting excerpts from 3M’s

business conduct manual dealing with an

employee’s operation of a business that

is in competition with any 3M business. 

 For its part, 3M suggests four points of

error. First, 3M argues that the district

court erred in granting Accu-Tech summary

judgment on 3M’s claim that Accu-Tech had

tortiously interfered with defendant

Skrtic’s employment contract. Second, 3M

contends that the court similarly erred

in granting Accu-Tech summary judgment on

3M’s unfair competition claim against the

company. Third, 3M asserts that the

district court erred in overturning the

jury’s finding that the defendants had

misappropriated 3M’s trade secret in its

customized resin formulations. Finally,

3M claims that the district court erred

in denying the company a permanent

injunction against defendants’ use of

3M’s trade secrets that the jury found

had been misappropriated. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Accu-Tech’s Issues On Appeal

 1. Misappropriation of 3M’s Trade

Secret

 As noted above, the jury determined that

3M had a valid trade secret in its

operating procedures and manuals, which

in the course of forming and operating

Accu-Tech, the defendants had

misappropriated. Appellants’ primary

assertion on appeal is that the evidence

produced at trial was insufficient to

support either of those findings by the

jury, and that thus the district court

erred in not granting judgment as a

matter of law.

 Though we review the denial of a motion

for judgment as a matter of law de novo,

see Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of

Chicago, 95 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir.

1996), our inquiry is limited to

determining whether the evidence

presented, combined with all reasonable
inferences permissibly drawn therefrom,

is sufficient to support the jury’s

verdict when viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, see

Goodwin v. MTD Products, Inc., 232 F.3d

600, 606 (7th Cir. 2000); see also

Mangren Research and Dev. Corp. v.

National Chem. Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 937,

941 (7th Cir. 1996) (in a diversity case

we apply the federal standard for

judgment as a matter of law). We begin by

examining whether, under Wisconsin law,

3M’s operating procedures and manuals

constitute a valid trade secret.

 According to the Wisconsin Uniform Trade

Secrets Act, a trade secret is defined as

"information, including a formula,

pattern, compilation, program, device,

method, technique or process . . .

[which] derives independent economic

value, actual or potential, from not

being generally known to, and not being

readily ascertainable by proper means by,

other persons who can obtain economic

value from its disclosure or use . . .

[and which] is the subject of efforts to

maintain its secrecy that are reasonable

under the circumstances." Wis. Stat. sec.

134.90(1)(c); see also ECT Int’l, Inc. v.

Zwerlein, 597 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Wis. Ct.

App. 1999). The defendants do not dispute

that 3M has instituted elaborate security

measures designed to maintain the secrecy

of the material at issue. Rather, the

crux of their argument is that the

operating procedures and manuals

encompass a broad category of items that

are either of public knowledge, or relate

solely to the manufacturing of carrier

tape./2

 Throughout the course of their argument,

defendants press 3M to divulge what

specific information contained within the

more than 500 hundred pages of materials

could be considered secret. In doing so,

defendants seem to suggest that if 3M

cannot point to specific items within its

manuals that are not known by the

industry, then 3M cannot claim a trade

secret in the combined product. We

disagree. In order to be considered a

trade secret, a pattern, technique, or

process need not reach the level of

invention necessary to warrant patent

protection. A trade secret can exist in a

combination of characteristics and

components, each of which, by itself, is

in the public domain, but the unified
process, design and operation of which,

in unique combination, affords a

competitive advantage and is a

protectable secret. See Synthex

Ophthalmics Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d

677, 683 (7th Cir. 1983).

 There is no doubt that within the 500-

plus pages of manuals at issue, there are

a host of materials which would fall

within the public domain. For example,

3M’s instructions on how to clean the

area around its machines, and how to

properly assemble a cardboard box, surely

cannot be considered independent trade

secrets. Were 3M to bring Accu-Tech to

court, claiming misappropriation on the

basis that Accu-Tech was assembling

ordinary cardboard boxes in a similar

manner to 3M, we would not look favorably

on such a claim. Yet, when all the

cleaning procedures, temperature

settings, safety protocols, and equipment

calibrations are collected and set out as

a unified process, that compilation, if

it meets the other qualifications, may be

considered a trade secret.

 Contrary to defendants’ suggestion, 3M

is not attempting to preclude Accu-Tech

from folding cardboard boxes. Rather, the

company is seeking to prevent Accu-Tech

from using and disclosing a process which

it took the company six years and

considerable income to perfect. These

manuals and processes, even if comprised

solely of materials available in the

public domain, have been created by

combining those materials into a unified

system which is not readily ascertainable

by other means. Thus, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to

3M, we believe there was sufficient

evidence to support the jury’s finding

that 3M has a trade secret in the

operating procedures, quality manuals,

trade manuals, process standards and

operator notes for using 3M’s equipment

that makes resin sheeting.

 Turning to the issue of

misappropriation, we agree with the

district court that there was sufficient

evidence to support a powerful inference

that defendants used 3M’s operating

procedures and manuals in establishing

Accu-Tech’s operations. While it took 3M

six years and countless resources in

order to make its carrier tape operation

efficient and profitable, Accu-Tech was
able to almost immediately operate its

resin sheeting line effectively.

Furthermore, evidence adduced at trial

established that there are significant

similarities between 3M’s carrier tape

line and Accu-Tech’s resin sheeting line,

including the use of the same or similar

equipment and materials. Moreover,

testimony at trial suggested that AccuTech was disclosing to 3M customers and

competitors processes detailed in 3M’s

manuals. As the district court stated,

"[t]he inference is virtually inescapable

that defendants gained a significant head

start in their operation by using the

trade secret knowledge they learned from

plaintiff concerning the operation and

standards for the line." We agree that

when this evidence, along with all the

reasonable inferences that may be drawn

from it, is viewed in the light most

favorable to 3M, it constitutes

sufficient support for the jury’s

verdict. As such, we affirm the district

court’s denial of Accu-Tech’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law on the issue.

 2. Specificity of the Permanent

Injunction

 On February 9, 2000, the district court

partially granted 3M’s request for a

permanent injunction. The court ordered

that Accu-Tech and its founders were

permanently enjoined from disclosing to

any third party (1) the operating

procedures, quality manuals, process

standards, and operator notes for using

plaintiff’s equipment that makes resin

sheeting; (2) plaintiff’s customized

resin formulations that enhance the

sheeting and thermoforming capability of

resin and give it properties needed in

the electronic industry; (3) plaintiff’s

slitting technology and experiment

results including the design and setup of

slitters; and (4) plaintiff’s winding

methods used to compensate for variations

in film calipher. However, contrary to

3M’s request, the district court did not

enter an order permanently enjoining the

defendants from using 3M’s operating

procedures and manuals or customized

resin formulation. Rather, the court

decreed that once the defendants had paid

the plaintiff $270,500 in partial

satisfaction of the jury verdict (or

provided security in an amount sufficient

to assure full payment and subsequent
costs), defendants were free to use the

two aforementioned trade secrets./3 

 On appeal, both parties assert that the

district court committed error in its

February 9 order. Accu-Tech and its

founders, focusing on the court’s

injunction against disclosure of 3M’s

operating procedures and manuals, contend

that the court’s order is too vague, and

thus does not comply with Fed. R. Civ. P.

65(d). For its part, 3M maintains that

the court incorrectly relied upon

defendants’ payment of damages as

justification for not permanently

enjoining the defendants from using 3M’s

misappropriated trade secret--an argument

we will address in Part B3. We review the

district court’s grant or denial of a

permanent injunction for abuse of

discretion. Knapp v. Northwestern Univ.,

101 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1996).

Factual determinations are reviewed for

clear error and legal conclusions are

given de novo review. A factual or legal

error may be sufficient to establish an

abuse of discretion. Id.

 The requirements for a valid injunction

are found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), which

provides, so far as pertinent here, that

"[e]very order granting an injunction . .

. shall set forth the reasons for its

issuance; shall be specific in terms;

shall describe in reasonable detail, and

not by reference to the complaint or

other document, the act or acts sought to

be restrained." As the Supreme Court has

noted, "the specificity provisions of

Rule 65(d) are no mere technical require

ments. The Rule was designed to prevent

uncertainty and confusion on the part of

those faced with injunctive orders, and

to avoid the possible founding of a

contempt citation on a decree too vague

to be understood." Schmidt v. Lessard,

414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974). Thus, district

courts must endeavor to strike a balance,

framing orders that provide plaintiffs

with the appropriate level of protection

while still placing defendants on notice

of the prohibited conduct. See American

Can Co., 742 F.2d at 333.

 The defendants here contend that the

injunction against disclosure entered by

the district court must be vacated

because, as a matter of law, the terms

are too vague to give them fair notice of

the prohibited conduct. In so arguing,
Accu-Tech and its founders propound that

3M has not identified what information

within the 500-plus pages of manuals it

considers to be secret, and that much of

the information contained in those pages

is either generalized business

information or information relating to

the manufacture of carrier tape, rather

than resin sheeting. 

 The problem of framing an appropriate

order may be particularly acute in trade

secrets cases, see id. at 332, and it for

that reason that courts have often set

aside trade secrets injunctions as

failing to comply with Rule 65(d)’s

specificity requirements, see, e.g., E.W.

Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408

F.2d 1108, 1113-17 (8th Cir. 1969)

(reversing, as too vague, an order

enjoining defendants from "using or

disclosing trade secrets and confidential

technical information of plaintiff");

Brumby Metals, Inc. v. Bargen, 275 F.2d

46, 49 (7th Cir. 1960) (finding language

in injunction that prohibited defendant

from selling furniture incorporating

plaintiff’s design feature "as offered in

the current sales literature of Schoolco,

Inc., or any variation thereof" to be

overly vague); cf. PMC, Inc. v. SherwinWilliams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir.

1998) (district court’s injunction

ordering Sherwin-Williams to take full

responsibility for the future remediation

of the PMC facility remanded for

redrafting because the term "full

responsibility" was hopelessly vague).

However, the challenges to the

injunctions in those cases are very

different from the challenge raised by

the defendants here.

 In this instance, the defendants do not

truly find error in the scope of the

injunction as protecting disclosure of

items beyond that which has previously

been determined to be the applicable

trade secret. Rather, to the extent that

defendants find fault with the district

court’s order, it is because they argue

that 3M cannot have a valid trade secret

in the operating procedures and manuals.

We found that argument unpersuasive

above, and simply because defendants have

refitted it as a challenge to the

district court’s permanent injunction

does not add any merit to it.

 Here, the district court’s order does
nothing more than prohibit the defendants

from disclosing the trade secret. In its

memorandum, the district court

acknowledged that defendants had sought a

more narrow injunction, identifying

specific secrets not to be used. However,

the court determined that, in part to

curb "the misconduct and evasive action

of defendant Pribyl," no opportunity for

loopholes should be allowed. We agree

with the district court’s decision that

more specificity in the injunction is not

mandated. Rule 65(d) does not "require

the impossible. There is a limit to what

words can convey. The more specific the

order, the more opportunities for

evasion." Scandia Down Corp. v.

Euroquilt, 772 F.2d 1423, 1431 (7th Cir.

1985). "If narrow literalism is the rule

of interpretation, injunctions will

spring loopholes, and parties in whose

favor injunctions run will be inundating

courts with requests for modification in

an effort to plug loopholes." Schering

Corp. v. Illinois Antibiotics Co., 62

F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal

citation omitted). Further, Rule 65(d)’s

specificity requirement does not demand

that the court issuing the

injunctiondisclose the trade secrets in

its order. See Synthex Ophthalmics, 701

F.2d at 683. 

 We are aware that certain materials

falling within the trade secret are

public information. However, we believe

it sufficient protection against the fear

of unfair surprise embodied in the cases

discussing Rule 65(d)’s specificity

requirement that injunctions are

construed narrowly, with close questions

of interpretation being resolved in the

defendant’s favor. See Schering, 62 F.3d

at 906. As such, we cannot hold that the

district court abused its discretion in

granting this permanent injunction

against disclosure.

 3. Admissibility of Evidence

 Subsequent to the conclusion of the

liability phase of the trial, the parties

debated whether certain exhibits would be

provided to the jury to consider during

deliberations. Specifically, Accu-Tech

and its founders quarreled over two

sections of 3M’s business conduct

manuals, exhibits 114 and 115, which 3M

sought to introduce in support of its

breach of loyalty claims. Exhibit 114,
entitled "Conflict of Interest Policy"

states that "3M employees should not

engage in activities that give rise to a

conflict of interest or the appearance of

a conflict of interest, without prior

management approval." The policy defines

a conflict of interest as any activity by

a 3M employee that (1) is inconsistent

with 3M’s activities or business

interests, or (2) could cause a

reasonable person to believe that the

employee’s judgment might be adversely

influenced. Furthermore, the policy

provides examples of real and potential

conflicts, which include operating a

business outside of the employee’s 3M

responsibilities which is in conflict

with any 3M business. Exhibit 115

likewise lists 3M’s conflict of interest

policy, and provides similar language to

that contained in exhibit 114. The

district court, over defendants’

objection, found that the exhibits were

relevant; a decision which Accu-Tech now

challenges.

 We review a district court’s ruling on

the admissibility of evidence for abuse

of discretion. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.

Wise, 184 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 1999).

However, a finding that a district

court’s admission of evidence did, in

fact, constitute an abuse of its

discretion does not automatically

necessitate an altering of the district

court’s judgment. See United States v.

Wimberly, 60 F.3d 281, 286 (7th Cir.

1995). Indeed, "[n]o error in either the

admission or the exclusion of evidence .

. . is ground for granting a new trial or

for setting aside a verdict or for

vacating, modifying, or otherwise

disturbing a judgment or order, unless

refusal to take such action appears to

the court inconsistent with substantial

justice." Fed. R.Civ. P. 61; see Old

Republic Ins. Co. v. Employers

Reinsurance Corp., 144 F.3d 1077, 1082

(7th Cir. 1998). A trial judge’s

evidentiary errors satisfy this standard

only if a significant chance exists that

they affected the outcome of the trial.

See Hasham v. California State Bd. of

Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035, 1048 (7th

Cir. 2000). 

 Accu-Tech and its founders argue that

the admission of the provisions in 3M’s

business conduct manuals regarding

operation of a business in competition
with 3M constitutes reversible error.

Specifically, they asseverate that

theadmitted portions were inadmissible as

irrelevant, see Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402,

and as unduly prejudicial and confusing

to the jury, see Fed. R. Evid. 403.

 In granting the defendants summary

judgment on 3M’s claim of breach of

loyalty based on improper competition,

the district court determined that the

defendants did not breach their duty of

loyalty with 3M merely by operating AccuTech, as Accu-Tech’s sale of resin

sheeting was not in direct competition

with 3M’s business (a ruling which 3M

disputes). Thus, at trial 3M’s breach of

loyalty claim was limited to being

predicated upon the misappropriation of

3M’s time and resources by Accu-Tech’s

founders in the process of starting AccuTech while still working for 3M. Given

that the district court did not permit 3M

to introduce evidence to the jury

suggesting that Accu-Tech had competed

with 3M, Accu-Tech asserts that the

sections of 3M’s manuals dealing with the

operation of a business in competition

with 3M were irrelevant. Furthermore,

Accu-Tech maintains that the admission of

those manuals may have unduly prejudiced

or confused the jury into ignoring the

relevant standard of law, and instead

finding the defendants guilty of breach

simply because they had violated 3M’s

conflict of interest policy.

 We disagree with defendants that the

district court erred in admitting 3M’s

conflict of interest policies. Certainly,

given the court’s decision that AccuTech’s founders did not breach a duty of

loyalty to 3M by forming their company,

the manuals were not relevant (at that

juncture) towards proving any theory of

liability based on improper competition

by the defendants. However, 3M did not

offer those manuals in order to prove

that Pribyl, Skrtic, and Harvey had

improperly competed with 3M. Rather, the

company sought introduction of those

materials to assist in proving that AccuTech’s founders, who had used 3M’s time

and resources, had read 3M’s policies and

thus knew that their actions were not

permitted. Hence, the introduction of

3M’s manuals was necessary, and therefore

relevant, in establishing the mens rea

for the plaintiff’s remaining breach of

loyalty claim.
 However, not all relevant evidence is

admissible, and we recognize that the

jury may have been confused by the

conflict of interest standard articulated

in 3M’s manuals. In this instance, a

strong argument can be made that the

probative value of exhibits 114 and 115

was substantially outweighed by the

prejudicial effect their admission might

have had on the defense. Yet ultimately,

Accu-Tech’s Rule 403 argument cannot

prevail. In suggesting evidentiary error,

the defendants become entrenched in a

Catch-22 from which they cannot extricate

themselves. The basis for the defendants’

claim here is that the admission of the

exhibits was inconsistent with the

court’s instruction that the defendants

did not breach a duty of loyalty by

starting and operating Accu-Tech.

However, it is that very instruction

which precludes the defendants from

establishing that any error actually

resulted in harm. This is because, absent

evidence to the contrary, we assume that

juries follow a court’s instructions. See

United States v. Jones, 248 F.3d 671, 676

(7th Cir. 2001); Rodriguez v. Peters, 63

F.3d 546, 559 (7th Cir. 1995). Ergo, we

must presume that despite any alternate

standard of liability which the jury may

have gleaned from examining exhibits 114

and 115, the district court’s instruction

that defendants did not breach their duty

of loyalty by forming and running AccuTech operated to cure those

misconceptions. Defendants have not

presented any evidence which would

justify abandoning the presumption that

this jury has followed instructions, and

our examination of the record has

likewise failed to adduce any basis for

doing so. Accordingly, we find that the

district court’s decision to submit

exhibits 114 and 115 to the jury during

their deliberations does not constitute

reversible error. 

B. 3M’s Issues On Appeal

 1. Summary Judgment

 On November 12, 1999, the district court

granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendants on 3M’s claims that (1) AccuTech had tortiously interfered with

defendant Skrtic’s employment contract

with 3M, and (2) Accu-Tech had engaged in

unfair competition with 3M. On appeal, 3M

asserts that the district court committed
error in granting the defendants summary

judgment, and thereby dismissing these

counts.

 A district court may only grant summary

judgment when there are no genuine issues

of material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. We review the

district court’s decision on summary

judgment de novo, viewing all of the

facts, and drawing all reasonable

inferences from those facts, in favor of

the nonmoving party. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986); Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d

896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001). With this

standard in mind, we turn to examine the

two decisions of the district court on

summary judgment. 

 a. Tortious Interference With Skrtic’s

Employment Contract

 In disposing of 3M’s tortious

interference claim, the district court

stated that "assuming that Skrtic had

breached his employment contract with 3M

by his actions in operating Accu-Tech, to

suggest that he was induced to do so by

the very corporation he created surely

cannot follow." The court noted that

Skrtic, as an officer and owner of AccuTech, was so intertwined with the

company, that "arguing the corporation

induced his breach is like arguing that

he induced himself to breach." Relying on

the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision

in Wausau Medical Center, S.C. v.

Asplund, 514 N.W.2d 34 (Wis. Ct. App.

1994), the court resolved that "[t]he

corporate fiction [could not] be

stretched that far."

 3M asserts that the district court’s

reliance on Wausau was misplaced. While

3M acknowledges that a party to a

contract cannot be held liable for

tortiously inducing his or her own

breach, see, e.g., Rao v. Rao, 718 F.2d

219, 225 (7th Cir. 1983), here, the

company asserts that Accu-Tech is a legal

entity separate and distinct from Skrtic

the individual. Thus, according to 3M, it

is possible that Accu-Tech, through

Pribyl and Harvey, tortiously interfered

with Skrtic’s 3M employment contract.

Hence, it propounds, the district court

erred in granting the defendants summary

judgment on this claim.
 Whether it is possible for a corporate

entity to have tortiously interfered with

the employment contract of one of its

founders may at times become an

interesting inquiry./4 Tortious

interference with a contract occurs when

someone intentionally and improperly

interferes with the performance of a

contract between another and a third

person by inducing or otherwise causing

the third person not to perform the

contract. See Wausau, 514 N.W.2d at 44.

Certainly, one could envision a scenario

where, when a limited number of

individuals form a corporate entity, that

one of the individuals, while taking part

in the formation, was still distinct from

the entity formed (and ambivalent) so

that a tortious interference claim could

be viable. However, we need not dwell on

such abstract inquiries at this time.

While the district did hold that the

corporate fiction could not be stretched

as to allow a finding of distinctness be

tween Skrtic and Accu-Tech, the court

also provided an alternative basis for

granting Accu-Tech summary judgment on

the claim. As the court stated in

addressing the suggestion that Accu-Tech

had induced Skrtic to breach his contract

with 3M, "[t]his allegation is belied by

the undisputed facts surrounding the

formation of Accu-Tech. Skrtic and Pribyl

conceived, created and own Accu-Tech for

the purpose of conducting its present

business with Skrtic as an officer and

fiduciary . . . . The undisputed facts

establish that Skrtic initiated his own

actions and was not induced to do

anything by the corporation he created."

Though 3M argues that a tortious

interference claim could legally have

been maintained, it has not presented any

evidence to suggest a disputed issue of

material fact as to whether Accu-Tech

actually caused Skrtic to breach his

contract with 3M. Thus, even if such a

cause of action could be viable against

Accu-Tech, in this instance there was no

evidence presented that would have

properly allowed the claim to survive de

fendants’ motion for summary judgment. We

therefore affirm the district court’s

dismissal of 3M’s tortious interference

with contract claim.

 b. Unfair Competition Claim
 In its complaint, 3M alleged that AccuTech competes with 3M’s products and

processes, and that Accu-Tech unfairly

competed with 3M by hiring 3M employees

with knowledge of confidential

information and trade secrets, inducing

those employees to breach their

employment agreements with 3M and to use

3M’s trade secrets against it. In its

November 12 order, the district court

granted summary judgment in favor of

Accu-Tech, dismissing 3M’s unfair

competition claim. According to the

district court, because Wisconsin law

would not interpret "competition" so

broadly as to encompass the relationship

between Accu-Tech and 3M, 3M’s unfair

competition claim could not be grounded

in that theory. After examining other

possible bases for the unfair competition

claim, the district court determined that

"[t]o the extent that there is a claim

for unfair competition [the] issues are

identical to the trade secret and

tortious interference claims." Thus, the

court dismissed the unfair competition

claim as being repetitive. On appeal, 3M

challenges the decision of the district

court. First, it asserts that the issue

of competition was inappropriately

decided on summary judgment. Second, the

company contends that even if its unfair

competition claim was duplicative, that

is no reason to dismiss the claim at the

summary judgment stage.

 In determining that 3M and Accu-Tech

were not competitors, the district court

focused on the fact that 3M did not lose

a single sale or customer to Accu-Tech

during the course of defendants’

employment with 3M. The court also noted

that there existed a market for resin

sheeting which Accu-Tech was free to

enter into, and which 3M chose not to

penetrate. While the court acknowledged

that there was some customer overlap

between the two companies, the court

believed that "the companies were not

offering competing products, except in a

most indirect sense." 

 After reviewing the record in this

matter, we conclude that the issue of

competition was improperly resolved on

summary judgment. The district court,

relying on Zimmermann v. Brennan, 254

N.W.2d 719, 721 (Wis. 1977), stated that

Wisconsin narrowly construes what

constitutes competition by an employee.
In Zimmermann, the trial court had been

faced with the question of whether a

public relations firm which performed

limited services in commercial arts and

graphics should be considered a

"competitive business" to a commercial

art studio. The trial court determined

that the operations were not in

competition with one another, and the

Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed. We

must note, however, that the decision in

Zimmermann was grounded to a large extent

in the standard of review. The court

acknowledged that whether two employers

are engaged in competition is an issue of

fact, such that if the trier of fact’s

conclusion is not contrary to the great

weight and clear preponderance of the

evidence, it must be affirmed. See id. at

720. According to the court, "[t]he

evidence was in dispute, and the finding

that Barkin-Herman was not a ’competitive

business’ was not the only possible

finding in light of the facts adduced at

trial, but we are satisfied that the

finding made was sufficient under the

standard of review." Id. at 721.

 Had the issue of competition been

decided by the jury at trial, the

evidence relied upon by the district

court here would no doubt be sufficient

to withstand a motion for judgment as a

matter of law. However, we are presented

with this issue on appeal from a grant of

summary judgment, where we review de

novo, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to 3M, whether there

exists a genuine issue of material fact.

In such a setting, we must conclude that

there is such an issue. As an initial

matter, the record contains facts which

suggest that these companies were

somewhat intertwined. As the court noted,

there did exist some customer overlap

between 3M and Accu-Tech. As a result of

Accu-Tech marketing to 3M customers,

companies that required carrier tape were

presented with two options: (1) those

companies could simply purchase the

finished product from 3M, or (2) those

companies could purchase resin sheeting

from Accu-Tech and process their own

carrier tape. Furthermore, 3M presented

evidence that Accu-Tech was working in

concert with another company which sold

machinery to convert resin sheeting into

carrier tape, and that Accu-Tech offered

its customers advice on how to form

pockets in their resin sheeting. Such
evidence seems to suggest crosselasticity of demand, and contradict the

finding that these entities were not in

competition--thus creating a disputed

issue of material fact.

 Even assuming that the facts presented

by the district court were not in

dispute, we do not believe that those

facts dictate that Accu-Tech was entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed

R. Civ. P. 56. For example, we find that

whether there are distinct markets for

resin sheeting and carrier tape is of

little consequence to this

competitiondetermination. While we do not

dispute that there may be a submarket for

resin sheeting, that does not preclude

the fact that resin sheeting may be part

of a larger market which includes carrier

tape. As the Supreme Court has stated

"within [a] broad market, well-defined

submarkets may exist which, in

themselves, constitute product markets

for antitrust purposes." Brown Shoe Co.

v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325

(1962) (internal citation omitted). For

instance, while there may be a distinct

market for cellophane, in which there are

many competitors, that does not rule out

cellophane from being part of a larger

market which consists of cellophane and

other flexible packaging material. See

United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours

& Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-95 (1956). "In

considering what is the relevant market

for determining . . . competition, no

more definite rule can be declared than

that commodities reasonably

interchangeable by the consumers for the

same purposes make up that ’part of the

trade or commerce’, monopolization of

which may be illegal." Id. at 395; see

also Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325 ("[t]he

outer boundaries of a product market are

determined by the reasonable

interchangeability of use or the

cross-elasticity of demand between the

product itself and substitutes for it").

Morever, that determination of whether

two products are reasonably

interchangeable must be made in reference

to price, as "[a]t a high enough price

even poor substitutes look good to the

consumer." Richard A. Posner, Antitrust

Law: An Economic Perspective 128 (1976).

While Accu-Tech is correct in its

assertion that resin sheeting is not a

perfect substitute for carrier tape, if

the cost of purchasing Accu-Tech’s
product and transforming it into carrier

tape is comparable to the cost of

purchasing 3M’s finished product, then an

argument that the products are reasonably

interchangeable may be viable. However,

in the absence of an analysis of the

relevant market, and a more thorough

inquiry into the relationship between the

products, we cannot find that the issue

of competition was properly dismissed on

summary judgment. 

 The district court predicated its grant

of summary judgment on the duplicative

nature of 3M’s unfair competition claim.

We have determined that the issue of

whether 3M’s carrier tape and Accu-Tech’s

resin sheeting are competing products is

a disputed factual inquiry, not

appropriate for resolution via summary

judgment. Thus, the possible competition

between Accu-Tech and 3M provides a

distinct, independent basis for 3M’s

unfair competition claim. Hence, assuming

arguendo that it is appropriate to

dismiss a cause of action on summary

judgment as being duplicative-- an issue

we will not weigh in on--here, there are

no duplicative claims which warrant such

a dismissal. As such, we must reinstate

3M’s unfair competition claim, and remand

the issue to the district court. 

 2. Misappropriation of 3M’s Customized

Resin Formulations

 As noted above, the jury concluded that

3M had a trade secret in the "customized

resin formulations that enhance the

sheeting and thermoforming capability of

resin and give it properties needed in

the electronic industry." The jury also

determined that the defendants had

improperly used or disclosed or

threatened to use or disclose that trade

secret, and awarded 3M $83,000 in

damages. In its motion for judgment as a

matter of law, Accu-Tech and its founders

renewed an argument that there was no

basis for a rational jury to find that

the defendants misappropriated any

customized resin formulations. The

district court, while resolving that the

jury had a basis for finding a trade

secret in the customized resin

formulations, also held that there was no

basis for finding misappropriation of any

customized resin formulation.
 In order to understand the basis for the

district court’s finding, a brief

explanation of the resin sheeting

manufacturing process is necessary. The

process for making resin sheeting begins

with a raw material called a resin

pellet. Resin pellets are widely

available in a myriad of different

formulations. In perfecting its resin

sheeting manufacturing process for making

carrier tape, 3M expended significant

resources in analyzing and experimenting

with different types of resin pellets.

Besides using these commercially

available resin formulations, 3M

independently developed one type of resin

formulation--a formula for polystyrene

resin. Polystyrene resins are

general-purpose, high-impact and

ignition-resistant resins that meet

application needs across a broad range of

market segments including the packing

industry. In granting the defendants

judgment as a matter of law, the district

court determined that the only resin

formula which could be considered a

customized resin formulation was the

polystyrene resin. However, the court

noted that while the defendants did use a

polystyrene resin for making resin

sheeting, they used a commercially avail

able polystyrene resin rather than

plaintiff’s customized formula. Thus, the

court found that there was no rational

basis for concluding that Accu-Tech had

misappropriated 3M’s customized resin

formulation.

 We review a district court’s grant of

judgment as a matter of law de novo. See

Massey v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Ill.,

226 F.3d 922, 924 (7th Cir. 2000). Under

Rule 50, a court should render judgment

as a matter of law when "a party has been

fully heard on an issue and there is no

legally sufficient evidentiary basis for

a reasonable jury to find for that party

on that issue." Fed R. Civ. P. 50(a).

Especially after a jury has evaluated a

case, we bear in mind that the question

is not whether the jury believed the

right people, but only whether it was

presented with a legally sufficient

amount of evidence from which it could

reasonably derive its verdict. See

Massey, 226 F.3d at 924. But there must

have been more than a "mere scintilla" of

evidence to support the verdict. When

examining the record, we look at the

totality of the evidence, and we view
that evidence and the inferences which

may be taken from it in the light most

favorable to the party against whom the

judgment was granted. See id. 

 3M asserts that the district court erred

in granting the defendants judgment as a

matter of law. First, 3M notes that the

defendants were operating Accu-Tech at

the time that 3M was developing its

polystyrene resin. Because Skrtic was

responsible for the manufacturing of the

polystyrene resin and admittedly had some

knowledge of this customized resin

formulation, 3M posits that the district

court ignored evidence that permits a

reasonable inference that the defendants

used 3M’s customized resin formulation.

Second, 3M argues that the district

court’s decision ignores the fact that

the jury’s verdict could have been based

on defendants’ threat to use or disclose

3M’s trade secret. Third, 3M suggests

that the district court’s decision that

there could be no customized resin

formulations simply because 3M bought its

resin on the open market was in error.

 We agree with the district court that no

rational juror could have found that

defendants used or disclosed 3M’s formula

for producing polystyrene resin. There is

no dispute that Accu-Tech operated in

secret while its founders were employed

by 3M. There is also no disagreement that

at that time, 3M was developing its own

polystyrene resin formula, which Skrtic

had some access to. Finally, it cannot be

contested that the defendants did in fact

use a polystyrene resin formulation in

making their resin sheeting. Yet, we

cannot draw from these facts a reasonable

inference that Accu-Tech was using 3M’s

polystyrene resin formulation. First,

while he did have access, there is no

evidence that proves that Skrtic had

knowledge of 3M’s polystyrene resin

formula. Furthermore, as the district

court noted, the evidence at trial

specifically established that Accu-Tech

was not using 3M’s polystyrene resin. The

testimony presented explicitly revealed

that while defendants were engaged in

producing resin sheeting from a

polystyrene resin, that they used a

commercially available resin formula

rather than 3M’s customized formula.

Against these undisputed facts, 3M’s

facts and the reasonable inferences that

may be drawn from them do not amount to
a scintilla of evidence.

 However, 3M is correct to point out that

the district court did not address in its

grant of judgment as a matter of law

whether the defendants had threatened to

use or disclose 3M’s customized resin

formulation. Yet, the district court’s

silence on this matter is of little

import. While vacating the jury award for

misappropriation, the district court left

intact a permanent injunction prohibiting

the defendants from disclosing 3M’s

customized resin formulations. Thus, even

assuming that the defendants knew 3M’s

customized resin formulations, 3M is

sufficiently protected against the threat

of disclosure by the district court’s

injunction. See e.g., PepsiCo, Inc. v.

Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir.

1995); American Can, 742 F.2d at 329. In

fact, 3M acknowledges that the company

would only be entitled to injunctive

relief to prevent the future disclosure

of the misappropriated secrets. As such,

the fact that the jury may have based its

finding of liability on the threat of

disclosure of 3M’s trade secrets--a

questionable assumption given the jury’s

award of monetary damages--would not

mandate a reversal of the district

court’s decision.

 Finally, we agree with the district

court that 3M does not have a claim for

misappropriation of a trade secret

incustomized resin formulations for

commercially available resin products.

Simply because 3M expended

significantresources in selecting from

the market the proper resin formula for

making its sheeting does not constitute

that selection as a customized resin

formulation. As the district court

correctly noted, "[t]esting many products

on the market to choose the one that

meets particular needs does not make that

product ’customized’ in any reasonable

sense of the word." To the extent that 3M

now argues that it modifies the

commercially purchased resin pellets by

blending them in carbon, we find that

fact does not assist 3M’s claim. The

purpose of blending carbon into a

commercially purchased resin is to create

a conductive polycarbonate resin.

However, testimony at trial revealed that

3M does not make the conductive

polycarbonate resin that it uses, but

rather that it purchases it from an
outside source. More importantly, there

is not even a scintilla of evidence to

suggest that the defendants

misappropriated 3M’s blending method./5 

 Overturning a jury verdict is not

something that should be done lightly.

According to our civil justice system, as

enshrined in the Seventh Amendment to the

Constitution, the jury is the body best

equipped to judge the facts, weigh the

evidence, determine credibility, and use

its common sense to arrive at a reasoned

decision. As a reviewing court, we must

be "particularly careful . . . to avoid

supplanting [our] view of the credibility

or the weight of the evidence for that .

. . of the jury." Massey, 226 F.3d at

925. Here, even taking that generous

standard of review into account, we agree

with the district court that this claim

flounders for lack of evidence. Thus, we

affirm the district court’s grant of

judgment as a matter of law.

 3. District Court’s Failure to Enjoin

Future Use of 3M’s Trade Secrets

 Lastly, we return to the district

court’s February 9 decision, which

partially granted 3M’s request for a

permanent injunction. As noted above, the

district court, in rendering its

decision, relied upon the Fifth Circuit

decision in Next Level Communications LP

v. DSC Communications Corporation, 179

F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 1999), which held that

when a plaintiff has been compensated for

lost future damages, an injunction

against future use would amount to imper

missible double recovery. Here, the court

resolved that the jury had assessed

damages based on what it would have cost

the defendants to independently develop

the trade secrets at issue. Because,

according to the district court, payment

for the full cost of development of the

secrets deprives defendants of any unjust

enrichment that may have accrued from

their misappropriation, it decreed that

once the defendants had made (or

guaranteed) such a payment, they were

free to use the secret they had

misappropriated./6

 On appeal, 3M contends that the district

court’s ruling has ipso facto forced the

company to sell its trade secrets to

those who stole them from it. 3M argues

that without an injunction against use,
the company is not protected from the

future ongoing harm that may be caused by

Accu-Tech’s use of 3M’s trade secrets.

Further, to the extent that the district

court based its decision on Next Level

Communications, 3M asserts that the

decision was incorrect. Thus, it requests

that we remand this matter and direct the

district court to modify the permanent

injunction so as to forbid Accu-Tech’s

use of 3M’s trade secret. Once again, we

review the district court’s grant or

denial of a permanent injunction for

abuse of discretion, analyzing

conclusions of law under a de novo

standard and factual determination for

clear error. See Knapp, 101 F.3d at 478.

Notwithstanding the above, we note that

modification of a permanent injunction is

extraordinary relief, and requires a

showing of extraordinary circumstances.

See Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, 23 F.3d

1184, 1186 (7th Cir. 1994).

 The purpose of a permanent injunction is

to protect trade secret owners from the

ongoing damages caused by the future use

of trade secrets, rather than to

compensate for those damages. See Gillen

v. City of Neenah, 580 N.W.2d 628, 633

(Wis. 1998); Simenstad v. Hagen, 126

N.W.2d 529, 535 (Wis. 1964). As such, it

would appear that 3M is correct that

Accu-Tech’s payment of monetary damages

should have no impact on the court’s

decision to grant a permanent injunction

against use. Cost of development damages

assessed against a defendant do not

address the future harm caused by

continued use of misappropriated trade

secrets. 

 Yet, in presenting its argument, 3M has

overstated the importance of the district

court’s analogy to Next Level

Communications, and understated the

factual conclusions which truly propelled

the court’s determination. In Next Level

Communications, the jury had awarded the

plaintiff exorbitant damages for lost

future profits on sales of switched

digital video products containing trade

secrets which the defendant had

misappropriated. See 179 F.3d at 247.

After trial, when the plaintiff moved for

a permanent injunction against the

defendant’s future transfer or disclosure

of the plaintiff’s trade secrets, the

district court denied the request,

finding that the recovered monetary
damages rendered any such injunction a

duplicative remedy. See id. 3M suggests

that Next Level Communications is

inapplicable to these proceedings, as the

jury awarded damages compensating 3M for

the cost of development of its

misappropriated trade secret, rather than

for future lost profits. Hence, the

company maintains, the imposition of an

injunction against use would not be a

duplicative remedy, and that the district

court has created a rule of law whereby

companies can gain ownership of

misappropriated trade secrets simply by

paying the cost of development in

damages.

 We agree with 3M that the jury’s cost of

development award does not render the

granting of a permanent injunction

against use in this instance as a

duplicative remedy. Unfortunately for 3M,

the district court did as well. The

court’s reference to Next Level

Communications was not included in order

to suggest that the payment of any

damages for misappropriation gives the

misappropriator ownership of the trade

secret./7 In fact, the payment of

damages in this instance was largely

irrelevant to the court’s decision to

deny the injunction against use. The

court reliance on Next Level

Communications was simply for an

unexceptional analogy: that just as a

plaintiff who has been compensated for

lost future damages should not receive an

injunction against permanent use,

"[s]imilarly, when a plaintiff has

demonstrated no actual damages nor a

likelihood of future damages a permanent

injunction enjoining use is

inappropriate." In fact, had the court

not mentioned Next Level Communications,

the assertion that an injunction is

inappropriate when there is no likelihood

of future harm would have carried no less

weight.

 It is apparent that the district court’s

determination was not based on a legal

rule established in the Fifth Circuit.

Rather, the court denied 3M the permanent

injunction it endeavored because the

company had not established the

likelihood of any future damages. That is

a factual determination which 3M has not

sufficiently disputed, and which, under

our clearly erroneous standard of review,

we cannot find to be in error. See Knapp,
101 F.3d at 478. 

 Yet, the above should not suggest that

if monetary damages for lost profits are

not sought or quantified, that a

permanent injunction against future use

cannot be entered. The loss of a trade

secret cannot, in some instances, be

measured in monetary damages. See, e.g.,

FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus.

Co., Ltd., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir.

1984). Oftentimes, this is because the

greatest loss that results from a

misappropriation is the loss of the right

not to divulge a trade secret, regardless

of price. As the Supreme Court has

stated: 

 [t]he right to exclude others is

generally one of the most essential

sticks in the bundle of rights that are

commonly characterized as property . . .

[and] [w]ith respect to a trade secret .

. . central to the very definition of the

property interest. Once the data that

constitute a trade secret are disclosed

to others, or others are allowed to use

those data, the holder of the trade

secret has lost his property interest in

the data.

Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,

1011 (1984) (internal citations omitted).

Here, 3M contends that an injunction

should attach because it was deprived of

its right not to sell its trade secret to

the defendants. Without an injunction

against use, 3M declares that Accu-Tech

receives a benefit that it would not have

absent its wrongdoing.

 Once again, 3M has ignored the factual

predicate of the district court’s

determination. Instead, 3M suggests that

when a party has been found guilty of

misappropriation, that party should be

enjoined in perpetuity from using the

misappropriated trade secret. However, to

impose such a draconian rule would be to

fundamentally alter the purpose behind

the permanent injunction. An injunction

is not a punitive tool, but rather a

vehicle for preventing injury. See

Gillen, 580 N.W.2d at 633. According to

Wisconsin law, though a court may grant

injunctive relief against a person who

misappropriated a trade secret, the court

should continue that injunction only for

a period of time reasonable to eliminate

commercial advantage which the person who
misappropriated a trade secret would

otherwise derive from the violation. See

Wis. Stat. sec. 134.90. "Once the

defendant has discovered, or would have

discovered, the trade secret without the

misappropriation, any lost profits from

that time forward are not caused by the

defendant’s wrongful act." Sokol Crystal

Products, Inc. v. DSC Communications

Corp., 15 F.3d 1427, 1433 (7th Cir 1994).

 In this instance, the district court

made a factual determination that AccuTech would have been able to

independently develop 3M’s trade secret

in a period of less than two years--a

conclusion which 3M does not dispute.

Given that Accu-Tech’s founders were the

individuals responsible for creating the

materials for 3M in the first place, it

would be nonsensical to suggest that they

would not have been able to duplicate the

materials on their own. As such, by the

time the district court was faced with

determining whether to enjoin Accu-Tech’s

use of 3M’s trade secret, the court

believed that Accu-Tech would have

discovered 3M’s trade secret. Hence, the

district court properly determined that

once payment to 3M had been made to

alleviate any commercial advantage, there

would be nothing further gained by

enjoining Accu-Tech from using the trade

secret which they would have by that time

developed. While 3M is correct that AccuTech was able to develop its resin sheet

ing line with more celerity as a result

of its misappropriation, we believe, as

the district court did, that the

juryfactored in that monetary benefit in

its award to 3M, thereby negating (as

best as possible) any commercial

advantage which Accu-Tech’s iniquity

parented. Giving the appropriate

deference to the conclusions of fact made

by the district court, we do not believe

that the court abused its discretion in

not granting 3M a permanent injunction

against use./8 

III. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, we Affirm the

decisions of the district court on all

counts, except that we Reverse and Remand

the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to Accu-Tech on 3M’s claim for

unlawful competition.

FOOTNOTES
/1 The jury also determined that 3M had a trade

secret in its slitting technology and experiment

results including the design and setup of slitters, and in its winding methods used to compensate for variations in film calipher. However,

the jury did not find that any of the defendants

had improperly used or disclosed, or threatened

to use or disclose either of these trade secrets.

/2 Because the purpose of trade secret law is to

encourage innovation and development, protection

should not extend beyond the limits needed to

protect genuine trade secrets. See American Can

Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir.

1984). The umbrella of trade secret classification should not be deployed to suppress legitimate competition. Id. As such, the plaintiff must

do more than direct the court to a broad area of

technology and assert that something there must

have been secret and misappropriated. The plaintiff must point to concrete secrets. See Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962

F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1992).

/3 As for the plaintiff’s trade secrets in slitting

technology and winding methods, the district

court permanently enjoined the defendants from

making use of those secrets.

/4 While not crucial to the disposition of this

matter, we note that under Wisconsin law, the

elements of a tortious interference with contract

claim are: (1) the plaintiff had a contract or

prospective contractual relationship with a third

party, (2) the defendant interfered with that

relationship, (3) the interference was intentional, (4) a causal connection exists between the

interference and the damages, and (5) the defendant was not justified or privileged to interfere. See Dorr v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 597 N.W.2d

462, 478 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).

/5 3M urges this Court that the jury’s verdict

should not be overturned on insufficiency of

evidence grounds, given the fact that the district court determined that the defendants had

engaged in spoliation of evidence. At the heart

of 3M’s claim lies the fact that the evening

before Pribyl was to turn over his computer

pursuant to a discovery request, six gigabytes of

music was downloaded onto his hard drive. This

enormous volume of data consisted of the same

songs being recorded multiple times in a short

time span. While defendants argued that the

spoliation was conducted by Pribyl’s children who

use the computer, the district court instructed

the jury that they could draw a negative inference from the act of destruction. 3M maintains

that by overturning the jury verdict on the basis
of lack of evidence, the court below negated its

instruction and rewarded defendants for their

spoliation.

 We find the downloading of six gigabytes of

music files onto Pribyl’s hard drive on the eve

that it was to be turned over for examination

troubling, and his proposed justifications difficult to accept. Discovery is a meaningful part of

our adversarial system, and were parties to

circumvent discovery requests by selectively

destroying potentially damaging information, the

process would become ineffectual. There is no

doubt that the district court was correct in

giving a negative inference instruction, and that

it could have rightly imposed sanctions on Pribyl. However, the fact that hard drive space was

destroyed on Pribyl’s computer does not relieve

3M of having to prove the elements of its claims.

3M has not suggested how the evidence it believed

it would have received from the computer would

have impacted its misappropriation claim. Without

at least some suggestion that the computer contained information which would have assisted 3M’s

claim, we cannot allow 3M to prevail on any claim

for which there was insufficient evidence. Furthermore, we recognize that the district court

was in a unique position to examine the impact

that any spoliation may have had on 3M’s claims.

The court, while aware of the spoliation, was

still comfortable in determining that there was

insufficient evidence to support 3M’s claim.

Sitting as a court of review, we do not dispute

that determination.

/6 Originally, the district court had not enjoined

Accu-Tech from using 3M’s customized resin formulations. However, in light of the district

court’s decision on motion for judgment as a

matter of law that the defendants had not misappropriated 3M’s trade secret is customized resin

formulations, the district court, as part of its

April 3 order, added customized resin formulations to the list of trade secrets which AccuTech was forbidden to use (as well as disclose).

Thus, the only 3M trade secret which Accu-Tech

can use as a result of the district court’s

orders is the company’s trade secret in the

operating procedures and manuals.

/7 Such a system would encourage parties to bypass

the market and misappropriate trade secrets,

knowing that if caught, the party would merely

have to pay the amount it would have had to

negotiate for in the first instance. Though we do

not read the decision in Next Level Communications to establish such a regime, to the extent

that the opinion can be interpreted to do so, we

reject that logic.
/8 We note in closing that, contrary to 3M’s assertion, Accu-Tech, as a result of the district

court’s decision, has not simply bought the trade

secret that it misappropriated. By its malfeasance, Accu-Tech was surely able to acquire 3M’s

trade secret with greater rapidity than it otherwise would have. But as a result, not only has

Accu-Tech been forced to repay 3M the cost of

development, but it has been permanently forbidden from acquiring complete ownership over those

trade secrets. Within the bundle of rights commonly characterized as ownership of property also

lies the right to transfer ownership. That stick

in the bundle is no less essential than the right

to exclude others. Yet, as a result of the

district court’s order, which Accu-Tech has not

challenged on appeal, Accu-Tech is forbidden from

disclosing 3M’s trade secret to any third party,

despite the court’s finding that the company

could have independently developed 3M’s trade

secret. Thus, far from leaving 3M with no protection against the future harm caused by AccuTech’s misappropriation, the district court’s

decision has provided 3M with a blanket of protection that it would not have received otherwise.