IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-1428

Filed November 23, 2021

IN RE THE DETENTION OF ADAM MAURO,

ADAM MAURO,

Respondent-Appellant,

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Randy V. Hefner, 

Judge.

Adam Mauro appeals the district court’s denial of his requests for placement 

in the transitional release program for sex offenders and release with supervision. 

AFFIRMED.

Jill Eimermann, Assistant Public Defender, Special Defense Unit, for 

appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Schumacher, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Judge.

Adam Mauro was civilly committed to a unit for sexual offenders. See In re 

Det. of Mauro, No. 07-1704, 2009 WL 398503, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009); 

see also Iowa Code §§ 229A.3(1), 229A.4(1), 229A.7(5) (2019). He underwent 

annual examinations, as required by statute. See Iowa Code § 229A.8. Mauro 

requested hearings in connection with his 2019 and 2020 annual evaluations. A 

consolidated hearing was held on both. The district court determined “beyond a 

reasonable doubt Mauro’s mental abnormality remain[ed] such that he [was] likely 

to engage in predatory acts that constitute[d] a sexually violent offense if 

discharged” and “all of the conditions identified in section 229A.8A(2) for

placement in [the civil commitment unit’s] transitional release program [were] not 

[] satisfied.” See id. § 229A.8(6)(d)(1), (2). 

On appeal, Mauro argues (1) “the State did not prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that [he] was not suitable for placement in the transitional release program”;

(2) “Iowa law permit[s] an individual placed in the transitional release program to 

reside at a location outside of the civil commitment unit for sex offenders in 

Cherokee, Iowa”; and (3) “the evidence was insufficient to find that [he] continue[d] 

to suffer from a mental abnormality and that he remain[ed] likely to commit a 

sexually violent offense if released with supervision.”

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence—Ineligibility for Transitional Release

The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that “[t]he 

committed person is not suitable for placement in a transitional release program 

pursuant to section 229A.8A.” Id. § 229A.8(6)(d). Section 229A.8A, in turn, states:
3

2. A committed person is suitable for placement in the 

transitional release program if the court finds that all of the following 

apply:

a. The committed person’s mental abnormality is no longer 

such that the person is a high risk to reoffend.

b. The committed person has achieved and demonstrated 

significant insights into the person’s sex offending cycle.

c. The committed person has accepted responsibility for past 

behavior and understands the impact sexually violent crimes have 

upon a victim.

d. A detailed relapse prevention plan has been developed and 

accepted by the treatment provider which is appropriate for the 

committed person’s mental abnormality and sex offending history.

e. No major discipline reports have been issued for the 

committed person for a period of six months.

f. The committed person is not likely to escape or attempt to 

escape custody pursuant to section 229A.5B.

g. The committed person is not likely to engage in predatory 

acts constituting sexually violent offenses while in the program.

h. The placement is in the best interest of the committed 

person.

i. The committed person has demonstrated a willingness to 

agree to and abide by all rules of the program.

. . . .

4. A committed person who refuses to register as a sex 

offender is not eligible for placement in a transitional release 

program.[1]

Mauro acknowledges “the State meets its burden if it proves at least one [of these 

conditions] does not exist.” He also acknowledges “[a] detailed relapse prevention 

plan” was not developed and accepted as required by section 229A.8A(d), 

establishing one of the criteria for ineligibility in the program.

2

 Our opinion could 

 

1 See Taft v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Linn Cnty., 879 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Iowa 2016) (“A 

different subsection adds a tenth condition requiring committed persons to agree 

to register as a sex offender to be eligible for placement in the transitional release 

program.”). 

2 Mauro argues the rule prescribing a relapse prevention plan at phase IV of the 

several phases of treatment was “arbitrary.” The department of human services 

does not appear to have promulgated a rule governing the phases of treatment at 

the civil commitment unit. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 441–31; Swanson v. Civ. 

Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders, 737 N.W.2d 300, 302 (Iowa 2007) (“The Iowa 

legislature amended chapter 229A in 2002 directing [the department of human 
4

end with these concessions. We elect to proceed to Mauro’s argument that the 

State expert’s “criticisms” of him are not “supported by science as she offered no 

scientific or medical correlation to connect her specific concerns to [his] risk to 

sexually reoffend.” 

Dr. Anna Salter interviewed Mauro for “3 hours and 20 minutes.” She noted 

that “[Mauro] has been in [the civil commitment unit] since 2007 and has been 

unable to change or subdue his sexual arousal to male prepubescent children, 

including boys under 5.” She cited a report of Mauro’s therapist stating “his deviant 

arousal to children remains so strong that he had only to walk in a restaurant on 

his second community outing before becoming instantly aroused by a 

prepubescent boy.” She continued, “[O]n three different occasions in the last few 

years, he has gone on supervised outings to restaurants and become sexually 

attracted to children. Apparently, he has only to see a boy of a certain age in 

person in order to become sexually preoccupied with that child.” After describing 

the various phases of treatment at the civil commitment unit,

3 she noted that Mauro 

was twice placed in the highest treatment phase “but was revoked each time.” She 

summarized two tests given to Mauro periodically throughout his commitment and

 

services] to ‘adopt rules pursuant to chapter 17A necessary to administer this 

chapter.’” Iowa Code § 229A.15B (2003). Currently, [the department] has not 

promulgated any rules. Instead, [the civil commitment unit] developed a ‘Patient 

Handbook and Orientation Manual.’ . . . The handbook explains the five phases of 

the program.”). There is no indication Mauro challenged the handbook provisions

as “arbitrary.”

3 Dr. Salter stated, “The phases are as follows: 1 Treatment

Engagement/Interfering Factors[;] 2 Identification of Dynamic Risk Factors/Long 

Term Vulnerabilities[;] 3 Specific Interventions for Dynamic Risk Factors/Long 

Term Vulnerabilities[;] 4 Maintenance of Change[;] 5 Transitional Release.”
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stated “every” one of the results “documented a deviant arousal to children.” 

Dr. Salter opined:

[Mauro’s] deviant arousal pattern, unchanged by his cognitive 

homework assignments and almost 20 years in secure settings, is a 

threat to his future and to the safety of young boys who cross his 

path. He is not helped by his narcissism, as it interferes with his 

recognizing that his only path to a good future is to use every tool 

that he can find to diminish his deviant arousal. His problem is . . .

the extent to which his sexual attraction to male children puts him at 

risk for future offenses.

Mauro responds to Dr. Salter’s report by reiterating that his undisputed 

pedophilia diagnosis is not sufficient to establish a risk or reoffending. Dr. Salter 

addressed this assertion at the hearing. She stated, “you can reduce your 

attraction to kids. Many people have through behavioral reconditioning, through 

medication, or through the application of appropriate interventions . . . . You can 

learn to control it.” She opined Mauro was “definitely not ready . . . for either the 

transitional release program or discharge.” When asked whether Mauro had 

“achieved and demonstrated significant insights into his sex offending cycle,” she 

responded: 

No. Not at all. . . . [H]e should be looking at the main fact 

which is he had been revoked twice because he couldn’t control, 

because he got so aroused by seeing a kid in a . . . restaurant. He 

doesn’t see that.

. . . . [H]e’s still defending writing 50 stories about children. 

He’s still defending his sexual preoccupation with children. He’s a 

smart man, and . . . I think his sexual preoccupation, attraction to 

boys, particularly, is distorting his thinking.

I think he’s capable of insight, I just don’t think he has it yet.4

 

4 Mauro takes issue with the State’s reliance on a story found on his flash drive. 

He asserts that he passed a polygraph test indicating he did not write the story. 

But his expert conceded he saw other stories in Mauro’s fiction folder that were 

about children in his victims’ age range. We find sufficient evidence to affirm the 

district court’s determination of Mauro’s ineligibility for transitional release without 

consideration of the story Mauro claims not to have authored.
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She opined Mauro would likely engage in predatory acts of sexual violence while 

in the transitional release program, reasoning:

His feeding the sexual preoccupation, his lack of insight into a sexual 

preoccupation, his resentments, his externalization of blame, failure 

to take responsibility for his behaviors, still thinks he shouldn’t have 

been revoked, all of these things mean that he just does not have the 

skills to be successful in transition.

Transition gets to the point where you are on your own. 

You’re not sitting in a restaurant with staff, you’re sitting in a 

restaurant by yourself. And he attempted to make eye contact with 

a child with staff sitting next to him and thought. That does not 

suggest that he would be safe without staff, which is the goal of the 

[transitional release program].

Mauro’s expert witness testified differently, stating he did not think Mauro 

was “at high risk to re-offend.” At the same time, he did not recommend discharge 

from the program. In his words, 

[W]hat I recommend is not total confinement in a secure facility 

because there is, transition is not considered total confinement, even 

though they spend the night there but during the day they’re getting 

out, so it’s a, that’s what my recommendation is.

The district court was free to credit Dr. Salter’s opinions over those of Mauro’s 

expert. See In re Det. of Shaffer, No. 19-1310, 2021 WL 616138, at *2 (Iowa Ct. 

App. Feb. 17, 2021) (citing State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 685 (Iowa 2000)). 

We find sufficient evidence to support the district court’s determination that 

Mauro was ineligible for placement in the transitional release program. The court 

did not err in approving the 2020 report filed by Dr. Salter. In re Det. of Betsworth, 

711 N.W.2d 280, 286 (Iowa 2006) (setting forth standard of review.). 

The same cannot be said of the report and recommendation filed on 

October 4, 2019. “A report of the results of each annual examination must be 

submitted to the court that ordered the committed person’s commitment.” Taft v.
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Iowa Dist. Ct., 828 N.W.2d 309, 313 (Iowa 2013) (citing Iowa Code § 229A.8(3)). 

The 2019 report was not included in our record, and the person who authored the 

report did not testify at the hearing. Because we have nothing to review, we cannot 

determine the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the State’s 2019 

recommendation.

That said, the issue of whether Mauro should have qualified for the 

transitional release program in 2019 is now moot because we cannot change the 

past. Cf. In re A.M.H., 516 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 1994) (finding challenge to ex 

parte removal order moot because “[a]ny error committed in granting the temporary 

ex parte order cannot now be remedied” and stating, “We cannot go back in time 

and restore custody based on alleged errors in the initial removal order”); In re Det.

of Taft, No. 18-2168, 2020 WL 1049850, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2020)

(concluding a respondent’s placement in transitional release following filing of 

notice of appeal did not moot the appeal because his challenge to the burden of 

proof might require reconsideration of his entire commitment); In re Hutchcroft, 

No. 15-1489, 2017 WL 108288, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2017) (concluding 

appeal was not moot based on district court’s placement of respondent in a 

transitional release program where the respondent argued if there were grounds 

for transitional release there were necessarily grounds for discharge). 

II. Residence Outside Civil Commitment Unit

Mauro wished to be placed in a transitional release program in Des Moines 

instead of the transitional release program at the civil commitment unit. But, as 

discussed he was found ineligible for transitional release. Accordingly, his request 

for placement elsewhere is premature. See State v. Tripp, 776 N.W.2d 855, 859 
8

(Iowa 2010) (concluding challenge to lifetime parole was not ripe for review where 

defendant was on probation); cf. Doe v. State, 688 N.W.2d 265, 269 (Iowa 2004)

(concluding defendant who was not claiming present deprivation of right to release 

but claimed “that the effect of [a department of corrections] rule [was] to remove 

him from the class of inmates who may be considered for early release” had a ripe 

claim). 

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence—Discharge, Release with Supervision

Mauro appears to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

district court’s determination that he was ineligible for discharge. See Iowa Code 

§ 229A.8(6)(d)(1). As noted, Dr. Salter recommended against discharge, as did 

Mauro’s expert. The record contains sufficient evidence to support the 

determination.

Mauro also cites Iowa Code section 229A.9A(1)(b) for the proposition that 

the district court had authority to release him with supervision independently of the 

criteria set forth in section 229A.8A. That provision states:

In any proceeding under section 229A.8, the court may order 

[a] committed person released with supervision if . . . [t]he court or 

jury has determined that the person should be released from a 

secure facility or a transitional release program, but the court has 

determined the person suffers from a mental abnormality and it is in 

the best interest of the community to order release with supervision 

before the committed person is discharged.

Id. § 229A.8A(1)(b). The district court concluded it lacked authority to exercise this 

option. We discern no error in the court’s conclusion because a separate 

subsection plainly states “[a] committed person may not petition the court for 

release with supervision.” Id. § 229A.9A(5). 
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We affirm the district court’s conclusion that Mauro was ineligible for 

discharge or a transitional release program.

AFFIRMED.