On Fe bruar y 1, 2004, the leg islature cha ng ed the name of the f

ormer T exas Depar

tment of 1 Protective a

nd Reg ulatory Service s to the Texas Depar tment of Fa

mily and Protec tive Service s. See Act of June 2, 2003, 78th L eg ., R.S., ch. 198, § 1.11, sec. 40.002, 2003 Tex. Gen. L aws 611, 623. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00635- CV

Te xa s D e par tm e nt of P r ot e c ti ve and R e gul at or y Se r vic e s, App e lla nt

v. Dana Lyn n, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 261ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. GN301974 , HO NORAB LE CHARLES F . CAMP B ELL, JR., JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
This is an interlocutory

appea l from the denia l of a plea to the jurisdiction. See T e x. Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. § 51.014(8) ( West S upp. 2004-05). A p p el l ee, Dana L y nn, sued appellant, Te x as De partmen t o f P rotec tive and Regulatory Service s (the De partment), for r acia l 1 discrimination. See Tex. L ab. C ode Ann. § 21.051 (West 1996). I t is undisputed that L y nn filed her char g e of discr imination more than 180 day s after her te rmination from em p l o y ment. Se e id

.2

§ 2 1. 20 2 ( Wes t 19 96 ) (r e qu ir ing that c la ims un de r Te xas Com mis sio n on Human Ri g hts Ac t mu st be filed not late r than 180th day af t er date a lleg ed unlawf

ul employ

ment prac tice occ urre d). The Depa rtment filed a plea to the j urisdiction, contending that L y nn failed to meet the limit ations period beca use her termination date was the l atest poss ible date on whic h to commence the running of the statute of limitations, t here by barr ing he r cla im and depriving the district court of subj ec t -m att er jur isd ic tio n. L y

nn argue s th a t e ith e r t

he dis c ov e ry ru le or e qu ita ble e sto pp e l pr inc ipl e s o pe rate d to render h er fi l i n g timely . The district cour t denied the plea

to the jurisdiction. W e will vacate the order of the district cour

t and dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

BACK GR OUND On Fe bruar

y 7, 2000, the Depa

rtment hired Da

na Ly nn as a Statew ide I ntake Protective Servic es Specia list I

. As an intake specia list, Ly nn fielded repor

ts of child abuse on the Depa rtment’s abuse hotl i n e an d en t ere d those repor ts into t he De partment’s sy stem. L y nn spent approximately

eig ht hours per da

y ty ping c hild abuse re port entries into her computer. By September 2 0 0 0 , L y n nwa s d i agn o s ed wi t h ca rp al tu n n el s y n dro m e, p u rp o rt ed l y

d u e t o h er p ro l o n gedt y

p i n g. Acc ordi n g to evidence that L y nn prese nted in the district court, in De cembe r 2000 L y nn sent a letter

to the Reg ional Prog ram Administrator at the Depa rtment, Pam Chick, expressing

conce rns re g ardingher supe rvisor, Jane McCarty . L y nn, who i s Af

ri can- Americ an and f

emale, state d th a t Mc Cart

y wa s d isc ri min a tin g a g a ins t he r on the ba sis of he r ra c e . L y nn a c c us e d M c Cart

y of such be havior be cause , she alleg ed, McCarty had commented that she could not be lieve that L y nn had a ma sters deg ree , which Ly nn co n s t ru ed as an e x pression of disbelief that she, as a

n Afric an-The re cord doe s not refle ct how McCar ty beca me awa re of L y nn’s meetingwith Chick. 2 3 Americ an woman, ha d obtained an a dvance d deg ree . L y nn also cited e x amples of Mc Carty y elling at minorities in a demea

ning w ay . L y nn aver re d th a t s h e th e nme t w it

h Ch ic k to d is c u s s h e r

c o n c e r n s an d a s k e d that Chi c k tr ans fe r he r to a dif

fe re nt uni t. Chi c k told L y nn to w a it a pp ro xima te ly

thr e e mon ths to r e qu e st a tra nsfer , at which time L y

nn would have completed a y ear in McCarty ’s unit. Chick also told L y nn that, if she felt discriminated aga inst, she shoul d talk to a represe ntative from the Equal Employ ment Op p o rtu n it y Co mm is s io n ( E E O C)

. H o u r s a f te r L y n n ’ s me e ti n g w it

h Ch ic k , M c Ca

rty , who had somehow lear

ned about L y

nn’s acc usations of rac ial discrimination, pulled L y nn into a cowor ker’ s of fi c e and y e lle d a t he r. L y

nn state d, “ [Mc Cart

y ] l a te r po int e d ou t I wa s the on ly B la c k p e rs on

in 2 her unit. She kept a sking me if I had a problem ‘being the only one.’ Itold her I wasn’t a war e I was the only one until she poi nted i t out, and that I did not have a problem being the only Bla ck in the unit.” L ate r t h at d ay , L y n nap p ro ac h edP edro L opez, a Depa rtment Human Resourc e Servic e S p ec i al i s t , re gar d i n g h er

d i s cr i m i n at i o nco mp l ai n t
. L y n n t o l d L o p ez t h at s h e wa n t ed t o fi l e ach ar ge with the EEOC, but L opez told L y nn that there was no ba sis for her complaint. L y

nn continued her

wo rk a t th e De pa

rtme nt. A fe w months later, in April 2001, L y nn discontinued work at the Depa rtment due to her c arpa l t

unnel sy mptoms after he r hea lth care provider, c hiroprac tor Donald McK inley of Texas Pain & Reha

bilitatio n C en t er s , had re stricted her ability to key board a nd prohibited her f

rom perf orming her data entry

tasks at the De partment. When McKinley comm u n i ca t ed the results ofAcc ording to the Depa rtment’s empl o ye e h a

n d b o o k , f u ll

- ti me e mp lo ye e s a c c r

u e e ig h t h o u rs 3 of sic k le a ve pe r m on th. To us e sic k le a ve fo r a pe ri od of mor e tha n thr e e c on tin

uo us wo rk ingda

y s, an employ ee must provide a doctor’s certific ation showing the nature of t he inj ury or i llness. The cer tification should specify any medically -nec essar y restric tions on the employ ee’ s duties, whether the employ ee is una

ble to return to wor

k, and whe n the employ ee w ill be able to re turn to work. Employ ees must ex haust all available sick leave befor e the De partment may place them on 4 L eave Wit hout Pay . Employ ees ma y be appr oved for

extended L eave Wit hout Pay for one to three months if they

meet the e ligibility

criter ia, but the Depa

rtment m ay

not approve more than thre e months of ext ended L eave Wit hout Pay in a fiscal y ear

without Ex ecutive D irec tor approva l. When an e mpl oy e e inc ur s a

pp ro ve d L e a ve With ou t Pay fo r mor e tha n tw e lve week s i n a t we lve -m on th pe ri od , th e De pa

rtme nt w ill re vie w the po sit ion to de te rm ine if the re is a bus ine ss n e c e ssi ty to f ill the position without further delay . I f a business ne cessity exis ts, the Depa

rtment may

terminate the employ ee. The F ML A entitles elig ible employ ees to a total of twelve wor

k wee ks of leave during any 5 tw e lve -m on th p e ri od

be c a us e of a se ri ou s h e a lthc on dit ion tha t mak es the e mpl oy e e un a ble to pe rf or m th e fu nc tio ns the e mpl oy e e ’s po sit io n. 29 U.S .C. A. § 2 61 2 ( Wes t 19 99 ). El ig ibl e employ ees w ho take F ML A leave are entitled, on return from such lea ve, to be r estored by

the employ er to the position of employ ment, or an e quivalent position, held by the employ ee w hen the leave commence d. Id . § 2614. 4 his ex amination to the Depa rtment by telephone, L

y nn’s supervisors state d that no position ex isted fo r Ly n nat t h e D ep ar t m en tt h at d i d n o ti n cl u d e t y

p i n g. L y nn did not return to work but, instead, use d her a ccrued paid va cation and sic k leave , which she e x hausted by May 1, 2001. The De partment beg an ca rry ing he r on a L eave 3 With ou t Pay

status
. On

May 8, 20 01 , L y

nn no tif ie d h e r s up e rv iso r t

hat sh e ha d a

se ri ou s h e a lth 4 condition that rende red her unable to perf orm the esse ntial functions of her job. On May

22, 2001, the Depa rtment informed Ly

nn that it had designated her medical leave a s Family and Medic al L eave Act (FML A) qualify ing a nd that she wa s entitled to job protection. See 29 U. S.C. A. § 2 61 4 ( Wes t 1999). 5Howeve r, on August 14, 2001, at t he Department’s request, Dr. Gar y Pamplin ex amined 6 L y nn, and he d etermined that L y nn’s re cords did not indicate that she suffe red f rom ca rpal tunnel sy ndrome. As a

result, Dr. Pamplin det er m i n ed that L y nn was c apable of per forming her r eg ular work duties at r eg ular hours. 5

On Aug ust 8, 2001, the Depa rtment notified L y

nn that her twe lve-we ek per iod of job protec tion ha d expired on Aug ust 2, 2001. I n the notice, the D epar tment also reque sted that L y nn provide a repor t from McKinley

stating w hen the De partment c ould expect her to return to work and what duties she would be capa ble of pe rfor

ming at that time. McKinley provided the D epar

tment
a wor k status report he prepa

red on June 14, 2001. I n the repor t, Mc Kinley stated that L y nn’s ca rpal tunne l sy nd ro me pr e ve nte d h e r f

ro m r e tur nin g to w or

k a nd tha t he e xpe c te d Ly

nn ’s c on dit ion

to continue throug h September 14, 2001. Mc Kinley war ned that Ly

nn’s occ up at i o n as a data intake sp e c ia lis t and the pr olo ng e d ty pin g it e nta ile d w ou ld m a ke he r c on dit ion mor e se ve re and

dif fi c ult to treat, incr easingthe likelihood that she would suffe r per manent dama g e. 6 I n late August or ear ly

September 2001, the human resour ce staff at the De partment he ld a mee ti ng to d isc us s Ly nn ’s e mpl oy

me nt a nd the e xpir a tio n o f h e r F ML A p ro te c tio n. At thi s meeting , t h e h u m an resour ce sta ff de cided to re commend Ly nn’s termination and f

ill her position. On S eptember 12, 2001, Chick sent a memora ndum to the Depar

tment’s reg ional direc tor, Susan Thomson, in which she re commended that L y nn be dismiss ed

. C h i ck s t ated that the r eason f or dismiss al was Ly

nn’s exhaustion of her leave entitlements and her inability to return to wor

k. I n the memorandum, Chick also stated that there exis ted a critica l business nece ssity to fill L y nn’s position due to incre ased c all volume at the De partment duringthat time of the y ear .The duties of the Com m i s s i o n have sinc e bee n transfe rre d to the Texas Workforce 7 Commi ssion civil rights division. Tex . L ab. Code Ann. § 21.0015 ( West S upp. 2004-05). 6 On Octobe r 8, 2001, McKinley sent the De partment, at its request, ano t h er medical status cer tification, in which he stated that L y nn’s condition would probably continue until J anuar

y 15, 2002, or long er. McKinley also estimated t hat L y nn would need three to six m onths of phy sical thera py and reha

bilitation. On October 9, 2001, Thomson notifie d L y nn that the Depa

rt m en t h ad decide d to terminate he r due to the e x haustion of her FMLA leave , as d o cu m en t ed in the

rec ommendation from Chick.

F ro m aro un d th e tim e of

he r t e rm inatio n, L y

nn sh are d a n a pa rtme nt w ithMars ha

Ki m Stil es. L ike L y

nn, Stil es wa s an intake spe cialist with the Depa rtment and has suffe red f

rom ca rpal tunnel sy ndrome. Stil es is A ng lo. On September 9, 2002, almost a y ear afte r her termination, L y

nn lear ned fr om Sti les that, when Stiles beca me unable to ke y

board a s a re sult o f her

condition, the De pa rtme nt ne ith e r de sig nate d he r me dic a l leave a s FM L A- qu a lif y ing no r t e rm inate d h e r. Stil e s a lso informed Ly

nn that another

Ang lo intake spec ialist, L i s a Ka n n e, had suf fer ed fr om car

pal tunnel sy ndrome t h at l i m i t ed her

ability to key board, y et the De partment ha d not desig nated he r leave as F ML A- qu a lif

y inga nd did no t ter

min a te he r. Stil e s told L y nn that the De pa

rtme nt h a d o ff

e re d b oth Stil es and K anne non- key boardingjob tasks when their me dical conditions so require d. On September

16, 2002, L y

nn filed a cha

rg e of r acia l discrimination with the EEOC and the Te x as Commissi on on Human Rig hts (the Commiss ion) alleg ing that the Depa rtment had 7 for c e d h e r to ta k e F M L A le a v e , r e f

u s e d to a c c o mm o d a te h e r

me d ic a l c o n d it io n , an d

te r mi n ated he r— a ll b e c a

us e sh e is A fr ic an- Am e ri c an. Th e Com mis sio n is su e d it s n oti c e of ri g ht t o f ile a c ivi lThe De partment o ffe red two dates as the date of the a lleg ed misconduct—Ly nn’s 8 termination on Octobe r 9, 2001, and the date the D epa rt m en t d esig nated Ly nn’s leave as F ML Aqu alifying, Ma

y 7, 2001. There is no dispute that L y nn filed her

claim more tha

n 180 day s after October 9, 2001. 7 action on May

14, 2003. See Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 2 1 .252 (West 1996). On June 3, 2003, L y nn filed suit in dist rict cour

t. See id

. § § 2 1
. 2 5 4 , . 2 5 8 , . 2 5 8 5 , &
. 2 5 9 ( W e s t 1 9 9 6 & S u p p . 2 0 0 4

- 0 5 )

. In response , the Depa

rtment filed a ple a to the jurisdiction and moved for summ ary judgme nt, claiming that L y nn’s suit was time-bar

red be cause she had failed to file her complaint within 180 day s of the date of the De pa rtme nt’ s a lle g e d mi sc on du c t. Se e id . § 21 .2 02 . Ly nn ’s fa ilure to f

ile wi thi n th e tim e 8 limit , the Depa

rtment argued, depr ived the district cour t of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district

c ourt de nie d b oth the De pa

rtme nt’ s ple a to the jur isd ic tio n an d moti on fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. Th is appea l of the denial of the plea to the jur isdiction followed. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(8).
DI SCU SSIO N

I n tw o is su e s o n a

pp e a l, t he De pa rtment c on te nd s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in de nyingits ple a to the jur isd ic tio n be c a us e L y nn did no t file he r ch arg e of ra c e dis c ri min a tio n w ith the Commi ssion within 180 day s of the De partment’s a lleg ed misconduct a nd beca use the 180-da

y filing pe riod of sec tion 21.202 of the labor c ode is mandatory and jurisdictional, containingno tolling exceptions. L y

nn argues that t he fili ng period should be tol led unt il the date she first lear ned fr om Stil es that the De partment ha d treated her differ ently

with reg ard to he r ca

rpal tunnel sy

mptoms. As explained below, we need not r each wh ether a tolling e x ception exists under section 21.202 bec ause, e ven assuming it did, it would not be ava ilable her e as a matter of la

w.8

Stand ard of review

A p le a to t he jur isd ic tio n c ha lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a uth or ity to d e te rm ine a

c a us e of ac tion. Bland Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W .3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000)

. Be cause the denial of a p l eat o t h e j u ri s d i ct i o ni s a qu es t i o n o f l aw , we re v i ew t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fi n d i n g de novo

. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v . IT-Davy , 74 S.W .3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002)

. For the purposes of t his revie w, we liberally construe the pleading s in favor of j urisdiction, looking to the plaintiff’s intent. Texas De

p’t of Parks & W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). To inv ok e a

c ourt ’s a

uth or ity , a

pla int if f m us t a lle g e fa c ts that a ff ir ma tiv e ly demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction to hear the ca use. Blue , 34 S.W .3d at 554. To pre vail on

a plea to the jurisdiction, the defe ndant must show an incura ble jurisdictional de fec t appar ent from the fa ce of

the pleading s, making it impos sible for a ny amendment of the plaintiff’s pe tition t o confe r jurisdiction on the trial court. Bybe e v. F ireman’s Fund I

ns. Co. , 331 S.W .2d 910, 914 (Tex. 1960); City of S an An ge lo v . S

mi th , 6 9 S.W.3 d 303 , 305 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 02 , p e t. d e nie d) . Co ur

ts mus t consider e vidence when ne cessa ry to decide jur isdictional issues. Miranda , 1 3 3 S
. W
. 3 d a t2 2 1
. If the re levant evide nce is undisputed or fails to r aise a fac t question on the jurisdictional issue, a district court rule s on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of la

w. Id . at 228.
The Co m m iss ion on H um an R igh ts Ac t’ s e xha ust ion -o f-r e m e die s r e quir e m e nt An employ er c ommits an unlawf ul emplo y

ment prac tice if he or she discha rg es an ind ivi du a l or dis c ri min a te s in a ny oth e r m ann e r a g a ins t an in div idu a l in c on ne c tio n w iththe te rm s, conditions, or privileg es of e mploy ment beca

use of r ace . Tex. L ab. Code Ann. § 21.051. B efor eSee Te x. L a b. Cod e Ann. § 2 1. 20 1 ( Wes t 19 96 ); Schroede r v. Texas I ron W orks, Inc ., 813 9 S.W .2d 483, 485, 487-88 (Te x . 1991) (a ct “e stablishes a co m prehe nsive administrative re view sy ste m” ); se e als o Cze rwi ns k i v . U THS CH , 1 16 S.W. 3d

11 9, 12 1- 22 (Tex. App .—Ho us ton [14t h Di st. ] 2 00 2, pe t. d e nie d) ; Smith v. University of Tex. S.W . Med. Ctr. of Dallas , 101 S.W .3d 185, 188 ( T e x. A p p . — D a l l a s 2 0 0 3 , no pe t.) ; V i ncent v . W

est Tex. State Univ

. , 8 9 5 S. W. 2 d 4 6 9 , 4 7 3 ( T e x. App.—Amar illo 1995, no writ); Stinnett v. W illiamson County Sheriff’s Dep’ t , 858 S.W .2d 573, 576 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, writ denied).

See Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmiss ion Co. , 141 S.W .3d 172, 180-83 (Te x . 2004) 10 (statutory provision requiringcondemningentity in cond e mnation proce eding to state in petition that pa rt ie s are “ un a

ble to a g re e ” on

dama g e s w a s ma

nd a t o r y b ut no t juri sd ic tio na l) ; Dubai Petroleum Co. v . Ka zi , 1 2 S. W.3 d 7 1, 76 -7 7 (T e x. 20 00 ) ( pla int if f’ s f a ilure to e sta

bli shstatut or

y e le me nt o f c la im did no t im pli c a te dis tr ic t c ourt ’s s u

b j e c t
- m a tt e r j u r i sd ic tio n) ; see also Unive rsity of Tex. Med. Branc h at G alv esto n d

/b/ a J oh n Se aly Ho sp . v . B arre tt , 1 59 S.W. 3d 63 1, 63 2- 33 (T e x. 20 05 ) ( de c lin ingto decide whether whistleblower act’s mandatory administrative claims re solution procedure —which, the cour t concluded, did not re quire e x haustion—is jurisdictional). 9 seekinga re medy

in court, an a g g rieve d pers o n must first file a complaint with the Commissi on. 9 Any such cla ims must be filed w ithin 180 day s after the alleg ed discrimination occ urre d: (a) A complaint under

this su b ch ap t er must be f iled not later than the 180th day afte r the date the alleg ed unlawf ul employ

ment prac tice occ urre d. (b ) Th e c omm iss ion

sh a ll d ism iss an unti me ly c omp la int

. Id . § 21.202. The pa

rties do not dispute that L y nn’s alleg ed fa ilure to comply with this 180- day filing r equire ment implicates the subject- matter jurisdiction of the tria l court and c an be adjudicated throug h a plea

to the jurisdiction. We acknow ledg e that, in rec ent decisions, the supreme cour t has

ex p re s s ed re luctance to char acte rize elements or pr ere quisites of statutory claims as “jurisdictional.” Howeve r, the stat u t o ry require ments addre ssed in these re cent c ases a re 10 distinguishable f

rom the Commissi o n o n Hu m an Rig hts Act’s administrative proc ess, which theL ower courts, including this Court , h av e co nsistently adher ed to this view. Se e su pr a 11 note 9. Se e Sp e c ial ty

Re tai le rs, In c . v . D e

Mo ra nv ill e , 933 S.W .2d 490, 49 2 (Tex. 1996); 12 Schroede r , 8 13 S.W. 2d

a t 48 5- 86 ; c

f. W ilmer-Hutchins Inde

p. Sch. Dist. v. Sullivan , 51 S.W .3d 293, 293-295 (Te x . 2001) (pe r curiam) (dismissing claim ag ainst school district for wa nt of jurisdiction be c a us e pla int if

f f a ile d to e xha

us t a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s) ; Gene ral Se rvs. Comm’n v. L ittle-Tex Insulation Co. , 39 S.W .3d 591, 595-598 (Te x . 2001) (holding that ex h au s t i on of administrative pr oc e dure s und e r c ha

pte r 2 26 0 of g ov e rnme nt co de is p re re qu isi te to s uit un de r c ha

pte r 1 07 of

c ivi l pr a c tic e and re me die s c od e ); Texas De p’t of Transp. v. Aer-Ae rotron, Inc. , 39 S.W .3d 220, 220-221 (T e x. 20 01 ) ( same ); Es se nb ur g v . D all as Cou nty , 988 S.W .2d 188, 189 (Tex. 1998) (exhaus t ion require ment “see ks to assure that the a ppropriate body

adjudica t es the dispute—the hallmark of a jurisdictional statute.”). 10 suprem e co u rt has squar ely held to be an e x haustion-of-r emedies r equire ment. See Sc hroeder v

. Texas Iron W

orks, Inc ., 813 S.W .2d 483, 485-88 (Te x . 1991). Fa ilure to exhaust admini strative 11

reme dies is truly

jurisdictional in nature: it deprives c ourts of subject- matter jurisdi ct i o n over a claim. Id . at 485-86. Thus, unless and until the supreme c ourt depa rts from its view in Schroede r 12 that the C ommissi on on Human Rig hts Act requir es exhaustion of remedie s, we will continue to treat the 180-da

y filing r eq uirement a s “mandatory and jurisdictional.” See Spe cialty Retailers, Inc . v. De Mo ra nv ill e , 933 S.W .2d 490, 492 (Tex. 1996).
Whether se ction 21.202 was toll ed

Although the text of section 21.202 contains no such languag e, Ly nn contends that it impl iedly

permits the application of tolling exceptions. The Depa rtment disag ree s, relying on the supreme c ourt’s pre vious chara cter ization of the filing period a s “mandatory and jurisdictional” a

nd

case s where our sister cour ts, relying on that char acteri z at i o n , have r ejec ted the application of equitable tolling c oncepts. See D eMoranv ille, 93 3 S. W.2 d at 49 2; Schroede r , 813 S.W .2d at 485- 86 ; Cze rwi ns k

i v . U THS CH , 1 16 S.W. 3d

11 9, 12 1- 22 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14th Di st. ] 200 2, pe t.11

denied) (re

jecting application of equitable tolling to a g e discrimination c laim involv i n g l atedis c ov e re d e vid e nc e “ be c a us e the statut or

y fi lin g re qu ir e me nts are jur isd ic tio na l” ); Gu e v ara v. H.E. Butt Groc. Co. , 8 2 S. W.3 d 5 50 , 5 52 -5 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 02 , p et den ied ) (r e fu sin g to apply equitable tolling w here EEOC alleg edly ref used wrong fully

to acc ept complaint). L y nn is so m ew h at i n consi stent with reg ard to the nature of the tolling conc ept on which she r elies. I n the district court, she r efe rre d to “the discovery rule” in her re sponse to the D e p art m e n t ’ s p l e a

t o t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n . In h e r a p p e l l a t e b r i e f

, s h e a l s o m e n t i o n s i n t e r c h an g e a b l y a
conce pt of “e quitable tolling” a kin to fraudulent c oncea lment under Te x as law. See Compute r Assocs. Int’l, Inc . v. Altai, Inc. , 918 S.W .2d 453, 455-56 (Te x . 1996) ( s t at i n g t h at “def err al in the context of fra

ud or conc ealment r esembles e quitable estoppel” ). We will assume without deciding that both conce pts can a

pply to section 21.202 and c onsider their a vailability

here

. The discove ry

rule postpones the a ccr

ual of a cause of ac tion until the plaintiff knew or, throug h the exercise of rea sonable dilig ence , should have known of the fa cts g iving r ise to the

cause of ac tion. W

agner &Brown, Lt d. v. Horwood , 58 S.W .3d 732, 734 (Tex. 2001). The f ocus of this tolli ng conce pt is the c hara cter of the injury

g iving r ise to the claim, not any wrong doing on the part of t he defenda

nt to concea l the injury

. Se e id

. The discovery rule ope rate s in circumstanc es in w hich t he n a tur e of

the inj ur y is i nh e re ntl y

un dis c ov e ra

ble and the e vid e nc e of

the inj ur y is objectively

verifia ble. Id . An injury

is inherently

undiscovera

ble if it is unlikely

to be discover ed within the prescr ibed limitations period de spite due dilige nce. S.V. v. R.V. , 9 3 3 S. W. 2 d 1 , 7 ( T e x. 1996). All that is require d to commence the running of the limitations per iod is the discovery of the injury and its g ener al ca

use, not the exact ca

use in fac t and the specific parties responsible for it. See R ussell v. Inge rsoll-Rand Co. , 8 41 S.W. 2d 34 3, 34 4 n .3 (T e x. 19 92 ). Te xas c ourt s g e ne ra llyThe Os hiv e r court c oncluded that whe re a defe ndant ac tively

misleads t h e plainti ff 13 re g ard ingthe re a so n f

or the pla int if

f’ s dis mis sa l, the statut e of lim itatio ns wi ll n ot b e g in t o r un un til 12 rec og nize the di scover

y rule as a li mited exception to st atutes of limitations. Al tai , 918 S.W .2d at 455-56 (r efusingto apply discovery

rule to toll two-y ear

statute of limitations for misappropriation of tr a de se c re t, b e c a

us e su c h injury is not , by natur e , inhe re ntl y un dis c ov e ra

ble ); see also Horwood , 58 S.W .3d at 734 ; G ibs on v . E lli s , 58 S.W .3d 818, 823 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) ; Li v. Un iv e rsi ty

of T e x . H e alt h S c i. C tr ., 984 S.W .2d 647, 651 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)

. Fr audulent conc ealment, by contra st, is an equitable doctr ine that estops a de fenda nt who conc eale d his wrong ful conduc t from asser ting the statute of l imitations

. Li , 984 S.W .2d at 653. To show that she is entitled to the estoppel eff ect of fra udulent conce alment, a plaintiff must show that (1) the de fenda

nt had actual knowledg e of the wrong, (2) a duty to disclose the wrong , and (3)

a fix ed purpose to conce al the wr ong . Id

. The claimant g ets the bene fit of def err ing the acc rual of her c ause of

action wh ere the fa cts forming the basis of he r injury wer e conc eale d. Altai , 918 S.W .2d at 455. L i m i t at i o n s beg in to run from the date the cla imant discovere d or, throug h the exercise of

rea sonable dilig ence , should have discove red the fra ud. Id .; Estate of Stonecipher v

. Es tat e of B utt

s , 5 91 S.W. 2d

80 6, 80 9 ( Te x. 19 79 ). Th is c on c e pt o f e qu ita ble tol lin g a lso a

pp lie s in sit ua tio ns wh e re the pla int if

f ha s be e n ind

uc e d or tr ic ke d by he r e mpl oy e r’ s mis con du ct i nto allowing the statutory

period to lapse. Czerwinski , 116 S.W .3d at 121-22. As support for a pply ing this e quitable tolling conce pt, L y nn relies on Oshiver v. Levin, Fi shbein, Sedran &Berman for the proposition that a limit ations period is tolled where the def endant “ has ac tively

misled the plaintiff respe cting the plain t i ff’s cause of ac tion.” See 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 ( 3rd Cir. 1994); se e als o 13the fa cts th at wo u l d s upport the plaintiff’s c ause of action ar e appa

rent or should be appar ent to a person w i t h a re as onably prudent re g ard f

or her rig hts. See O

shiver v. Lev in, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1389 (3rd C ir. 1994). Howeve r, t he court also stated t hat where a plaintiff’s suspicions of wrong ful dischar g e would have been suf ficient to lea d a re asonable person to fur ther inquire into the rea sons f

or her discharg e, the court would not a pply equitable tolling. Id . at 1388. Th e m o tion for summary judgme nt presente d issues substantially simil ar to the issues 14 prese nted in the Depa

rtment’s plea

to the jurisdiction.

13 Czerwinski , 116 S.W .3d at 121-22 (st at i n g that equitable tolling a pplies in situations wher e
c omp la ina

nt h a s bee n indu c e d or tr ic ke d by a dv e rs ary ’s mis c on du c t into a llo wi ng fi lin g de a dli ne to pass).
The evidence Whe n c on sid e ri ngthe dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jur isd ic tio n, we wi ll l oo k at a ll the e vid e nc e in the re cord. See M

iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 221. L y n n s u b m i t t ed an af

fidavit in response to the De pa rtme nt’ s mo tio n f

or su mma ry jud g me nt. In he r a ff

ida vit , L y nn state d that sh e se nt a

le tte r i n 14 Dec ember

2000 to Ch ic k

in f o r mi n g h e r o f alleg edly discriminatory

behavior by McCarty . McCarty ’s
co n d u ct al s o ca u s edL y

n nt o a p p r o a c h a r ep re s en t at i v e f ro m t h e E E OC t o d i s cu s s fi l i n g a discrimination char g e. This a ffidavit establishes that, as ear ly as Dec ember 2000, L y nn had ac tual kn ow le dg e that the De pa

rtme nt ha d e ng a g e d in wh a t L y nn c on te nd s wa s r a c ia l di sc ri min a tio n. Th is alleg ed discrimination occ urre d well bef ore Septe mber 9, 2002, the date L y nn lear ned from Sti les that th e De pa

rtme nt h a d p ur

po rt e dly tr e a te d s imi larl y -si tuate d w hit e e mpl oy e e s d if fe re ntl y tha n it h a d t r e a t e d h e r an d t h e d a t e L yn np r o p o s e s f o r t h e d a t e s h e d i s c o v e r e d

h e r i n j u r y. Both the discovery

rule a nd fra udulent conce alment will only toll the running of

the statut e of lim it ati on s o n Ly

nn ’s dis c ri min a tio n c la im unti l Ly nn kn e w, or

thr ou g h r e a so na

ble14

dilige n ce s h o u l d have know n, of the fa cts g iving r ise to her c ause of action. See H

orwood , 58 S.W. 3d a t 73 4; Altai , 918 S.W .2d at 455. L y nn’s af fidavit demonstrate s that she knew in De cembe r 2000 that there exis ted what she contends was racial discrimination at t he De partment, a nd she knew by October 2001 that the Depa

rtment had de signated her leave as F ML A-qua lify ing a nd had terminated he r. At that time, L y nn either knew or rea sonably should ha ve known that the desig nation and her termination may

have r esulted fr om further rac ial discrimination by

the Depa rtment. L y nn’s af fidavit, and the alleg ed dis crimination it details, is sufficie nt to neg ate the applicability

of the discove ry

rule, be cause it shows that, as of the date of he r termination, Ly nn had discovere d her injuries a

nd their g ener al ca

use. See Ru sse ll , 841 S.W .2d at 344 n.3. This is all that is nece ssary

to commence the running of the statute of limit ations. Id

. L y

n n ’s i njuries could not have be en inher ently

undiscovera

ble when L

y n n ad m i t s that she wa s awa re of issues of ra cial discrimination within the Depar tment. See H

orwood , 58 S.W .3d at 7 3 4
. T h er efore, the f acts of L y nn ’s c a se wi ll n ot s up po rt the a pp lic a tio n of the dis c ov e ry ru le to de fe r the a c c ru a l of he r c a us e of ac tion. Se e id

.

L ikewise, the doc umented knowledg e of a lleg edly discriminatory

behavior in L y nn’s

a f f i d a v i tn e g a t e s t h e a

p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t h e c o n c e p t o f f

r a u d u l e n t c o n c e a l m e n t o r e qu i t a b l e t o l l i n g . In Dec ember of 2000, L y

nn knew of fac ts forming the basis of he r discrimination claim, and the ref ore we cannot s ay that the facts forming the basis of her injury wer e conc eale d from her

. See Altai , 918 S.W .2d at 455. L y

nn’s knowledg e of possible discrimination a t the Depa rtment in 2000 would have put a per son of reasonable prudenc e with reg ard to her rights on notice that further discrimination might have motivated the Department’s decisions to desig nate her l eave as FML A-qua lify ing a nd to terminate he r. Se e Os hiv e r, 38 F.3d at 1389. L y nn’s awa rene ss o f p o s s i b le past discriminationWe assume without deciding that the date of L y nn’s termination is the date he r ca use of 15 action ac crue d beca

use the date of ter

mination, October 9, 2001, is the latest possible date that the Depa rtment could have eng ag ed in discriminatory behavior towards he r. F ur the rm or e , Ly

nn ple d ne ith e r of the se tol lin g c on c e pts in t he dis tr ic t c ourt , a

de fe c t th a t, 16 standing alone, mig ht have be en cur able by reple ading

. Texas De

p’t of Parks & W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 226-27 (Te x . 2004). Both the discovery rule and equitable e stoppel are counter
defe nses that must be pled by a par ty that asser

ts them. See KPMG Peat Marwick v. Ha rrison Cou nty Ho us . F in. Co rp ., 988 S.W .2d 746, 749-50 (Te x . 1999) (r equiring that party asser ting fr a ud ule nt c on c e a lme nt a s a ff

ir ma tiv e de fe ns e to s ta tut e of lim itatio ns ha s b ur de n to ple a d d e fe ns e and pr ov ide su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e to r a ise qu e sti on of fa c t f or e a c h e le me nt) ; Houston Livestock Show & Rodeo, Inc . v. Hamric k , 125 S.W .3d 555, 570 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (re quiring that pa rt y se e kin g to a

va il i tse lf of dis c ov e ry

ru le mus t pl e a d r

ule , e ith e r i n o ri g ina l pe tit ion or in amende d or supplemental pe tition i n response to de fenda nt’s asser tion of aff irmative defe nse, and bear s burden of

proving and sec uring favor able f indings ther eon). Ly

nn’s pleading s are silent reg ardingany

misconduct or conc ealment by the De p ar t m ent. See O

shiver , 38 F.3d at 1391 n.3 (Refusingto apply

equitable toll ing doc trine to failure to hire cla im “beca use nowhe re in the 15 would have be en suff

icient to lead a

rea son able pe rson to further inquire into the rea sons for her discharg e. Se e id

. There is no support for tolling limit ations on the basis of fr audulent conc ealment for a claimant fr om whom the fac ts giving rise to a c laim of rac ial discrimination wer e not conceale d.
St at ut e of li m it at ion s

B e c a us e ne ith e r t

he dis c ov e ry

ru le e xce pti on

no r e qu ita

ble tol lin g pr in cip les a

pp ly in this case, the limitations period for a sserting L y nn’s discrimination c laim beg an running , at the latest, on the date of L y

nn’s t ermination, October 9, 2001. There fore , in order to pr operly asser t 15 her c laim, L y

nn would h av e t o h av e fi led her complaint with the Commi ssion within 180 day s of October 9, 2001. Be cause L y

nn did no t fi l e h er ch arge until S eptember 16, 2002, more than 180 day s after October 9, 2001, her c laim is ti me-ba rre d. As such, ther e exists an incurable jurisdictional defe ct that makes it impossible for any amendment of L y nn’s petition to confer

jurisdiction on the district court. See B

ybee , 3 3 1 S
. W
. 2 d at 914. We theref ore f ind that the district court lac ked 16c omp la int do e s O sh ive r a lle g e that the law fir m misle d he r, a c tiv e ly

or oth e rw ise , w ithre g ard

to t his claim.”)

. The closest L y

nn comes to pleading the di scover y rule is i n stating, “ Plaintiff discovere d the ra ce- based motive for her te rmination on September 9, 2002 .

. . . ” Ne verthe less, such a statement fa lls short of demonstrating that the nature of Ly nn’s injury , rac ial discrimination, was such that it was inher ently undiscovera ble during the limitations period de spite her due diligenc e. See S.V . v. R.V. , 933 S.W .2d 1, 7 (Tex. 1996)

. L y nn’s pleading s aver

that she did not in fact discove r her injury within the limi tations period, but they fail t o support the contention that she c ould not have done so. 16 ju r is d ic ti o nto h e ar

L y n n ’ s s u it an d e r r e d in d e n y in g th e D e p artm e n t’ s p le a to th e ju r is d ic ti o n . We
su sta in t he De pa rtme nt’ s is su e s.
CO NC LU SION Havingconclude d that L y nn’s cause of action is time-barr ed, we vacate the district court’s de nial of the De partment’s ple a to the jurisdiction and dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Our dispositi on turns solely

on our application of the Commis sion on Human Rights Act’ s “mandatory and jurisdictional” e x haustion-of-r emedies r equire ment and the 180- d ay limit ations period the le g isl a tur e ha s c ho se n. We e xpre ss no o pin ion re g ard ingthe me ri ts o f L

y nn ’s dis c ri min a tio n c la im,

muc h le ss c on do ne the ty pe of c on du c t sh e a lle g e s.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Vac ated a nd Dismissed for Want of J urisdiction Filed: August 19, 2005