SEE DISSENTING OPINION

Filed 8/29/16

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, )

)

Petitioner, )

) S221038

v. )

) Ct.App. 1/2 A140035

THE SUPERIOR COURT )

OF SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY, )

) San Francisco County

Respondent; ) Super. Ct. JCCP No. 4748

 )

BRACY ANDERSON et al., )

 )

 Real Parties in Interest. )

____________________________________)

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS), a pharmaceutical manufacturer, 

conducts significant business and research activities in California but is neither

incorporated nor headquartered here. In March 2012, eight separate amended 

complaints were filed in San Francisco Superior Court by or on behalf of 678 

individuals, consisting of 86 California residents and 592 nonresidents, all of 

whom allegedly were prescribed and ingested Plavix, a drug created and marketed 

by BMS, and as a result suffered adverse consequences. BMS contests the 

propriety of a California court‘s exercising personal jurisdiction over it for 

purposes of adjudicating the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims. 

Under the particular circumstances present here, we conclude personal 

jurisdiction is authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10, which 
2

extends jurisdiction to the maximum extent permissible under the United States

Constitution. Although BMS‘s business contacts in California are insufficient to 

invoke general jurisdiction, which permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a 

defendant regardless of the subject of the litigation, we conclude the company‘s 

California activities are sufficiently related to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ suits to 

support the invocation of specific jurisdiction, under which personal jurisdiction is 

limited to specific litigation related to the defendant‘s state contacts. (See Vons 

Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 446 (Vons).)

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which held

that BMS was subject to the personal jurisdiction of the California courts on the 

basis of specific jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

BMS manufactures Plavix, a prescription drug used to inhibit blood 

clotting. In the eight amended complaints filed in the superior court, 86 California 

residents and 592 residents of 33 other states sued BMS and McKesson 

Corporation, a pharmaceutical distributor headquartered in California, for injuries

allegedly arising out of their use of Plavix.1 The state in which the largest number

of plaintiffs reside is Texas, with 92 plaintiffs, followed by the 86 California

plaintiffs, followed by Ohio, with 71 plaintiffs.

Each amended complaint contains the same 13 causes of action: strict 

products liability (based on both design defect and manufacturing defect); 

negligence; breach of implied warranty; breach of express warranty; deceit by 

 

1 A ninth case, filed in Santa Clara Superior Court by the County of Santa 

Clara against defendants was also joined with the other eight cases and assigned to 

a coordination trial judge of the San Francisco Superior Court. The complaint 

filed in that matter is not in the record before us nor is it a subject of dispute 

among the parties as to matters of personal jurisdiction. 
3

concealment (Civ. Code, §§ 1709, 1710); negligent misrepresentation; fraud by 

concealment; unfair competition (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200); false or misleading 

advertising (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500); injunctive relief for false or misleading 

advertising (Civ. Code, § 1750 et. seq.); wrongful death; and loss of consortium.

The plaintiffs allege that defendants engaged in ―negligent and wrongful 

conduct in connection with the design, development, manufacture, testing, 

packaging, promoting, marketing, distribution, labeling, and/or sale of Plavix.‖ 

According to the complaints, defendants allegedly promoted the drug to 

consumers and physicians by falsely representing it ―as providing greater 

cardiovascular benefits, while being safer and easier on a person‘s stomach than 

aspirin,‖ but defendants knew those claims were untrue because ingesting Plavix 

allegedly involves ―the risk of suffering a heart attack, stroke, internal bleeding, 

blood disorder or death [which] far outweighs any potential benefit.‖

Plaintiffs allege different injuries, and sometimes combinations of injuries, 

which they claim were caused from the ingestion of Plavix. These injuries include 

bleeding, bleeding ulcers, gastrointestinal bleeding, cerebral bleeding, rectal 

bleeding, heart attack, stroke, hemorrhagic stroke, subdural hematoma, thrombotic 

thrombocytopenic purpura, and death. The complaints allege that 18 of the 678

individuals whose injuries underlay these actions died as the result of ingesting 

Plavix.

The actions were assigned as a coordinated matter to a judge of the San 

Francisco Superior Court. 

BMS moved to quash service of summons on the ground that the court 

lacked personal jurisdiction over it to adjudicate the claims of the 592 nonresident 

plaintiffs, who are real parties in interest in this proceeding (hereafter referred to 

as ―the nonresident plaintiffs‖). BMS noted that the complaints‘ allegations do not 
4

include any factual claims that the nonresident plaintiffs‘ injuries occurred in 

California or that they had been treated for their injuries in California. 

In declarations supporting the motion, BMS officers stated that the 

company is incorporated in Delaware, is headquartered in New York City, and 

maintains substantial operations in New Jersey, including major research and 

development campuses. BMS has approximately 6,475 employees in the New 

York and New Jersey area, comprising 51 percent of its United States workforce.

BMS further asserted that its research and development of Plavix did not 

take place in California, nor was any work related to its labeling, packaging, 

regulatory approval, or its advertising or marketing strategy performed by any of 

its employees in this state. BMS has never manufactured Plavix in California. 

These activities were instead performed or directed from the company‘s New 

York headquarters and New Jersey operating facilities. According to data 

provided by the company, in a 12-month period ending in July 2012, BMS‘s sales 

revenue from Plavix sales in California constituted 1.1 percent of the company‘s 

total nationwide sales revenue of all of its products.

But the declarations submitted by BMS also disclosed that the company

maintains substantial operations in California, including five offices that are 

primarily research and laboratory facilities employing approximately 164 people. 

BMS additionally employs approximately 250 sales representatives in the state. 

BMS also has a small office in Sacramento to represent and advocate for the 

company in state government affairs.

In opposition to the motion to quash, plaintiffs submitted materials showing

that BMS sold almost 187 million Plavix pills to distributors and wholesalers in 

California in 2006-2012, with sales revenue of almost $918 million. Furthermore, 

plaintiffs noted that BMS maintains a registered agent for service of process in 

California.
5

The superior court denied BMS‘s motion to quash service of summons, 

concluding the company‘s sales and other activities in California were sufficiently 

extensive to subject it to the general jurisdiction of the state courts. 

BMS petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, naming the 

nonresident plaintiffs as real parties in interest. The Court of Appeal first 

summarily denied the petition on the same day as the United States Supreme Court 

announced its decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 

746] (Daimler), which clarified limits on general jurisdiction. We granted review 

and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal for issuance of an order to 

show cause in light of Daimler. After briefing and oral argument, the Court of 

Appeal again denied the writ, this time by an opinion holding that BMS‘s 

activities in California were insufficient to subject it to general jurisdiction in the 

state, but that, given the nature of the action and BMS‘s activities in California,

our courts may properly exercise specific jurisdiction over BMS in this matter.

We granted BMS‘s petition for review, requesting briefing on both types of 

personal jurisdiction, general and specific.

II. DISCUSSION

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 410.10, California courts ―may 

exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this 

state or of the United States.‖ ―The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment constrains a State‘s authority to bind a nonresident defendant to a 

judgment of its courts.‖ (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. ___, ___ [134 S.Ct. 

1115, 1121].) ―Due process limits on the State‘s adjudicative authority principally 

protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant — not the convenience of plaintiffs 

or third parties.‖ (Id. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at p. 1122].) 

Under the federal Constitution, a court exercising jurisdiction over a 

nonresident defendant comports with due process as long as the defendant ―has 
6

such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not 

violate  ̳ ―traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.‖ ‘ ‖ (Vons, supra, 

14 Cal.4th at p. 444, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 

U.S. 310, 316 (International Shoe).) Plaintiffs bear the initial burden of proving 

state contacts sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. (Vons, supra, 14 

Cal.4th at p. 449.) The jurisdiction of courts to render judgment against a person 

is historically grounded in the courts‘ power over the person, originally premised 

on a person‘s presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. 

(International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at p. 316.) Because ―the corporate 

personality is a fiction,‖ however, a corporation‘s ―  ̳presence‘ ‖ in a state must be 

determined by the activities of its agents (ibid.), and the demands of due process in 

this context ―may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the 

forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, 

to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.‖ 

(Id. at p. 317.) 

In some cases, the corporation‘s continuous activities within the state have 

been found ―so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on 

causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.‖ 

(International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at p. 318.) This has become known as 

―general,‖ or ―all-purpose,‖ jurisdiction. (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 

746, 751, 754].)

In other circumstances, where the company‘s activities in the forum state are 

more limited, general jurisdiction may be lacking but jurisdiction may nonetheless 

be proper because the litigation is derived from obligations that ―arise out of or are 

connected with the [company‘s] activities within the state.‖ (International Shoe, 

supra, 326 U.S. at pp. 319, 320.) This has become known as ―specific,‖ or ―caselinked,‖ jurisdiction. (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at pp. 751, 
7

754]; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. ___, ___ 

[131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851] (Goodyear).) 

―When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional 

grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the 

exercise of jurisdiction. [Citation.] Once facts showing minimum contacts with 

the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant‘s burden to 

demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. [Citation.]

When there is conflicting evidence, the trial court‘s factual determinations are not 

disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] When no 

conflict in the evidence exists, however, the question of jurisdiction is purely one 

of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent review of the record.‖ 

(Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 449.)

Although the briefing and record at the trial court did not have the benefit of 

being informed by the high court‘s decision in Daimler, there appears to be no 

material factual conflicts nor any dispute over any factual findings in the superior 

court. We, therefore, consider the possible exercise of each type of jurisdiction as 

a matter of law and on the undisputed facts. 

A. General Jurisdiction

1. Case law concerning general jurisdiction

The landmark 1945 decision of the United States Supreme Court in 

International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. 310, serves as the starting point of modern 

jurisprudence concerning general jurisdiction. Although the high court resolved 

that case under a specific jurisdiction theory, it also described general jurisdiction 

as embracing ―instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a 

state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on 

causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.‖ 
8

(International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at p. 318.) Subsequent to International Shoe, 

the high court has addressed the concept of general jurisdiction in only a handful 

of cases.

In Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437 (Perkins), the high 

court concluded that a company that had temporarily ceased mining operations 

abroad and had relocated its limited corporate activities to Ohio could be sued in 

Ohio on a cause of action unrelated to its Ohio corporate activities. (Id. at 

pp. 447-448.) In Perkins, because of the wartime Japanese occupation of the

Philippine Islands, a Philippine corporation had ceased mining operations on all its 

properties there, but it maintained limited corporate activities through its president 

and principal shareholder who had relocated to Ohio. A shareholder then sued the 

company in Ohio for unpaid dividends and for its failure to issue her certificates 

for her shares of stock. The high court applied the standard set forth in 

International Shoe and concluded that the president‘s business activities through 

his home in Ohio reflected ―a continuous and systematic supervision of the 

necessarily limited wartime activities of the company.‖ (Perkins, supra, 342 U.S. 

at p. 448.)

The high court in Perkins explained that after the company‘s mining 

operations ceased due to the occupation, the president of the company returned to 

his residence in Ohio. He kept a home office there, maintaining the company‘s 

files. From that office he ―carried on correspondence relating to the business of 

the company and to its employees,‖ drew and distributed salary checks on behalf 

of the company, used and maintained two active Ohio bank accounts carrying 

substantial balances of the company‘s funds, retained another Ohio bank to act as 

transfer agent for the stock of the company, held several directors‘ meetings in his 

home or home office, ―supervised policies dealing with the rehabilitation of the 

corporation‘s properties in the Philippines‖ from his Ohio home office, and 
9

dispatched funds from Ohio to cover purchases of machinery for such 

rehabilitation. (Perkins, supra, 342 U.S. at p. 448.)

The high court observed that although ―no mining properties in Ohio were 

owned or operated by the company, many of its wartime activities were directed 

from Ohio and were being given the personal attention of its president in that State 

at the time he was served with summons.‖ (Perkins, supra, 342 U.S. at p. 448.) 

Thus, the company‘s wartime operations had been effectively shifted almost 

entirely to the president‘s home office in Ohio, which meant that ―under the 

circumstances above recited, it would not violate federal due process for Ohio 

either to take or decline jurisdiction of the corporation in this proceeding.‖ (Ibid.) 

In other words, the requirements for the exercise of general jurisdiction were met. 

In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408 

(Helicopteros), the high court concluded that general jurisdiction was not 

supported in the forum state when the defendant corporation was based abroad,

had no physical presence in the forum state other than limited business purchases

and contract negotiations, and the cause of action arose abroad and was unrelated 

to the company‘s contacts with the forum state. In Helicopteros, the survivors of 

four United States citizens, who had died in a helicopter crash in Peru, filed 

wrongful death actions in Texas against the owner and operator of the helicopter, a 

Colombian corporation. (Id. at pp. 409-410.) Prior to the helicopter crash, the 

Colombian corporation had conducted contract negotiations in Texas with the 

decedents‘ Texas employer to provide helicopter services, bought helicopters in 

Texas, and sent employees there for training, but did not conduct other operations 

or maintain a place of business in the state. None of the plaintiffs or their 

decedents resided in Texas. (Id. at pp. 410-412.) The high court concluded that 

neither the negotiation of a single contract and receipt of contractual payment 

through a Texas bank, nor the purchase of helicopters and associated employee 
10

training sessions in Texas, constituted ―the kind of continuous and systematic 

general business contacts‖ that had justified general jurisdiction in Perkins. 

(Helicopteros at p. 416; see id. at pp. 416-418.)

More recently, in Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. ___ [131 S.Ct. 2846], and 

Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 746], the high court significantly 

elaborated upon its analysis of general jurisdiction, clarifying that in order to 

support the exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation its contacts with the 

forum state must be so extensive as to render the company essentially ―  ̳at 

home‘ ‖ in the state. (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at p. 751; see 

Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2851].) The United States 

Supreme Court‘s description of general jurisdiction for purposes of the federal due 

process clause, as set forth in Goodyear and Daimler, is binding upon us and, as 

explained below, dictates the conclusion that BMS is not subject to the general 

jurisdiction of California courts.

In Goodyear, the high court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish 

support for the exercise of general jurisdiction where the defendant companies 

were based abroad, sold only a limited quantity of their products in the forum 

state, and the cause of action — involving the defendants‘ products sold abroad —

also arose abroad. In that case, two young men from North Carolina were killed in 

a bus accident outside Paris, France. (Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. at p. ___ [131

S.Ct. at p. 2851].) Their parents attributed the accident to an allegedly defective 

tire manufactured by Goodyear‘s subsidiary in Turkey and filed suit in a North 

Carolina state court, naming Goodyear and its subsidiaries in Turkey, France, and 

Luxembourg as defendants. (Id. at pp. ___-___ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 2851-2852].) 

Although a small percentage of their tires was distributed in North Carolina by 

other Goodyear affiliates, the foreign subsidiaries challenged the North Carolina 

court‘s exercise of general jurisdiction over them, contending that they did no 
11

direct business and employed no workers in North Carolina. (Id. at pp. ___, ___ 

[131 S.Ct. at pp. 2850, 2852].)

The high court first noted that North Carolina courts lacked specific 

jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy because the accident had occurred 

abroad and the allegedly defective tire had been manufactured and sold abroad. 

(Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2851].) The court then held

that the defendant corporations‘ contacts with North Carolina were also 

insufficient for general jurisdiction: ―Unlike the defendant in Perkins, whose sole 

wartime business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at 

home in North Carolina. Their attenuated connections to the State . . . fall far 

short of . . .  ̳the continuous and systematic general business contacts‘ necessary to 

empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to 

anything that connects them to the State.‖ (Goodyear, supra, at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. 

at p. 2857], quoting Helicopteros, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 416.) The Goodyear court 

explained its ―at home‖ rule for corporations as analogous to a natural person‘s 

domicile in the forum state: ―For an individual, the paradigm forum for the 

exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual‘s domicile; for a corporation, it is 

an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.‖ 

(Goodyear, supra, at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 2853-2854].) 

Three years after Goodyear, in Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 746],

the court further elaborated on its articulation of the ―at home‖ requirement. In 

Daimler, Argentinian residents brought an action in California against 

DaimlerChrysler AG (DaimlerChrysler), a German public stock company, alleging 

that its wholly owned subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, had ―collaborated 

with state security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill‖ the plaintiffs or their 

relatives in Argentina during that nation‘s ―  ̳Dirty War.‘ ‖ (Daimler, supra, at 

p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at pp. 750-751].) The plaintiffs‘ claim of general jurisdiction 
12

over DaimlerChrysler in California was based in significant part on the California 

activities of another DaimlerChrysler subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC 

(MBUSA). Although incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New Jersey, 

MBUSA had substantial facilities in California, using them to import and 

distribute Mercedes-Benz automobiles in the state. (Id. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at 

pp. 751-752].)

Even attributing to DaimlerChrysler the activities of its subsidiary, MBUSA, 

the high court nevertheless found DaimlerChrysler‘s contacts with California 

insufficient to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over it. (Daimler, supra, 

571 U.S. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at p. 760].) The court reiterated its observation in

Goodyear that a corporation‘s state of incorporation and its principal place of 

business are the two ―paradigm all-purpose forums.‖ (Daimler, supra, at p. ___ 

[134 S.Ct. at p. 760.) Although it did not limit general jurisdiction to those two 

circumstances, the Daimler court explained that general jurisdiction may not be 

based merely on activities in the forum state that can be characterized as 

continuous and systematic; rather, the corporation‘s activities must be ―  ̳so 

―continuous and systematic‖ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum 

State.‘ ‖ (Id. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at p. 761], quoting Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. at 

p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 2851].)

The Daimler court acknowledged that in an exceptional case such as Perkins

―a corporation‘s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation 

or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to 

render the corporation at home in that State.‖ (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at p. ___, 

fn. 19 [134 S.Ct. at p. 761, fn. 19].) The court, however, emphasized the truly 

―  ̳exceptional facts‘ ‖ of Perkins, where ―[g]iven the wartime circumstances, Ohio 

could be considered  ̳a surrogate for the place of incorporation or head office.‘ ‖ 

(Daimler, supra, at p. ___, fn. 8 [134 S.Ct. at p. 756, fn. 8].) DaimlerChrysler‘s 
13

activities in California, the court observed, ―plainly do not approach that level.‖ 

(Id. at p. ___, fn. 19 [134 S.Ct. at p. 761, fn. 19.)

Furthermore, in responding to a concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor,

the Daimler majority made clear that the general jurisdiction inquiry ―does not 

 ̳focu[s] solely on the magnitude of the defendant‘s in-state contacts.‘ ‖ (Daimler,

supra, 571 U.S. at p. ___, fn. 20 [134 S.Ct. at p. 762, fn. 20].) Instead, general 

jurisdiction ―calls for an appraisal of a corporation‘s activities in their entirety, 

nationwide and worldwide.‖ (Ibid.) Otherwise, a corporation with significant 

operations in many states would be deemed at home in all of them. (Ibid.) The 

majority reasoned that to allow the adjudication in California of a dispute arising 

solely in Argentina merely based on MBUSA‘s sales activities in the state would 

give the same global adjudicatory reach to every state in which DaimlerChrysler

or its subsidiary had sizeable sales. The court rejected such an ―exorbitant 

exercise[] of all-purpose jurisdiction‖ because it would defeat the ability of out-ofstate defendants to structure their conduct so as to have some predictability 

regarding the possibility of being subjected to litigation in a given forum state. 

(Id. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at pp. 761-762].)

The high court also made clear that because the plaintiffs in Daimler had 

never attempted to argue that California could assert specific jurisdiction over 

DaimlerChrysler, the court had no reason to undertake such an analysis. (Daimler,

supra, 571 U.S. at p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at p. 758].) 

2. Plaintiffs have failed to show that BMS is subject to general jurisdiction in 

California

The United States Supreme Court‘s at home rule for general jurisdiction over 

a corporation, as articulated in Goodyear and Daimler, and, to some extent 

Perkins, defeats the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claim that California may assert general 

jurisdiction over BMS. BMS may be regarded as being at home in Delaware, 
14

where it is incorporated, or perhaps in New York and New Jersey, where it 

maintains its principal business centers. Although the company‘s ongoing

activities in California are substantial, they fall far short of establishing that is it at 

home in this state for purposes of general jurisdiction.

Similar to the California subsidiary in Daimler, BMS has sold large volumes 

of its products in California. Nevertheless, the high court plainly rejected the 

theory that a corporation is at home wherever its sales are ―sizeable.‖ (Daimler, 

supra, 571 U.S. at p.___ [134 S.Ct. at p. 761].) BMS employed approximately

164 people in California in addition to its 250 sales representatives in this state. 

But the company‘s total California operations are much less extensive than its 

activities elsewhere in the United States. As noted earlier, in New York and New 

Jersey alone, BMS employed approximately 6,475 people, 51 percent of its United 

States workforce. In assessing BMS‘s California business activities in comparison 

to the company‘s business operations ―in their entirety, nationwide,‖ we find

nothing to warrant a conclusion that BMS is at home in California. (Daimler, 

supra, at p. ___, fn. 20 [134 S.Ct. at p. 762, fn. 20].) As the high court warned in 

Daimler, to conclude that BMS may be sued in California on any cause of action, 

whether or not related to its activities here, under a theory of general jurisdiction,

would be to extend globally the adjudicatory reach of every state in which the 

company has significant business operations.

The nonresident plaintiffs stress that in neither Goodyear nor Daimler did the 

high court strictly limit general jurisdiction to a company‘s state of incorporation 

or its principal place of business. Nevertheless, both decisions make clear that the 

suitability of general jurisdiction is rooted in the concept of an individual‘s 

domicile and its equivalent place for a corporation. (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at 

p. ___ [134 S.Ct. at p. 760]; Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. 437 [131 S.Ct. at

pp. 2853-2854].) Therefore, setting aside the state of a company‘s incorporation 
15

or its headquarters, a plaintiff has the burden of showing that a company‘s conduct 

in a given forum state may be so substantial and of such a kind as to render it at 

home there.

Goodyear and Daimler approved the finding of general jurisdiction in

Perkins, supra, 342 U.S. 437. That case involved the exceptional fact pattern of a 

mining company‘s wartime relocation of its overseas operations to Ohio, which 

functioned as the equivalent of the corporation‘s headquarters through a home 

office in the company president‘s own residence. Quite literally, the mining 

company in Perkins was also at home in this unique context. But nothing in the 

record of the present matter suggests that California has served as the equivalent 

of BMS‘s headquarters, even temporarily.

The nonresident plaintiffs also rely on the fact that BMS has long been

registered to do business in California and has maintained an agent for service of 

process here. California law, however, requires a foreign corporation transacting 

business here to name an agent in the state for service of process. (Corp. Code, 

§ 2105, subd. (a)(5).) As the high court has explained, ―[t]he purpose of state 

statutes requiring the appointment by foreign corporations of agents upon whom 

process may be served is primarily to subject them to the jurisdiction of local 

courts in controversies growing out of transactions within the State.‖ (Morris & 

Co. v. Ins. Co. (1929) 279 U.S. 405, 408-409, italics added.) Accordingly, a 

corporation‘s appointment of an agent for service of process, when required by 

state law, cannot compel its surrender to general jurisdiction for disputes unrelated 

to its California transactions. The ―designation of an agent for service of process 

and qualification to do business in California alone are insufficient to permit 

general jurisdiction.‖ (Thomson v. Anderson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 258, 268, 

citing DVI, Inc. v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1095; Gray Line 

Tours v. Reynolds Electrical & Engineering Co. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 190, 194.) 
16

Finally, the nonresident plaintiffs argue BMS is subject to general 

jurisdiction in California because it has contracted for distribution of Plavix with 

McKesson Corporation, which is headquartered in San Francisco, allowing BMS 

―to make a substantial profit within California through McKesson‘s California 

contacts.‖ As explained above, however, BMS‘s sizeable sales of its products in 

California are insufficient, under Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. ___ [131 S.Ct. 2846]

and Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 746], to make it at home in this state 

and subject it to the general jurisdiction of our courts. That some of these sales 

were made to or through a distributor headquartered here does not change the 

analysis.

As a result, we conclude that BMS is not subject to the general jurisdiction of 

the California courts.

B. Specific Jurisdiction

1. Case law concerning specific jurisdiction

Although the high court‘s recent cases have narrowed the scope of general 

jurisdiction, in Daimler the majority specifically commented on the continued 

viability and breadth of the court‘s preexisting specific jurisdiction jurisprudence. 

In responding to the concern expressed by Justice Sotomayor in her separate 

opinion in Daimler that the court was committing an injustice by limiting the 

availability of general jurisdiction, the majority remarked that ―Justice Sotomayor 

treats specific jurisdiction as though it were barely there‖ and that ―[g]iven the 

many decades in which specific jurisdiction has flourished, it would be hard to 

conjure up an example of the  ̳deep injustice‘ Justice Sotomayor predicts as a 

consequence of our holding that California is not an all-purpose forum for suits 

against [DaimlerChrysler].‖ (Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. at p. ___, fn. 10 [134 S.Ct. 

at p. 758, fn. 10].)
17

The basic precepts governing specific jurisdiction set forth in pre-Daimler

decisions are well settled. In ascertaining the existence of specific jurisdiction,

courts must analyze the ―  ̳relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 

litigation.‘ ‖ (Helicopteros, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 414, quoting Shaffer v. Heitner

(1977) 433 U.S. 186, 204.) The question of whether a court may exercise specific 

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant involves examining (1) whether the 

defendant has ―  ̳purposefully directed‘ ‖ its activities at the forum state (Keeton v. 

Hustler Magazine, Inc. (1984) 465 U.S. 770, 774 (Keeton)); (2) whether the 

plaintiff‘s claims arise out of or are related to these forum-directed activities 

(Helicopteros, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 414); and (3) whether the exercise of 

jurisdiction is reasonable and does not offend ―  ̳ ―traditional notions of fair play 

and substantial justice.‖ ‘ ‖

2 (Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 

480 U.S. 102, 113 (Asahi), quoting International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at p. 316.)

In our own jurisprudence, we have said that a plaintiff has the initial burden 

of demonstrating facts to support the first two factors, which establish the requisite 

minimum contacts with the forum state. The burden then shifts to the defendant to 

show that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable under the third factor. 

(Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062

(Snowney); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 477 

(Burger King) [―where a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at 

forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that 

 

2 BMS states it is not contesting the first or third factors and that the 

company is contesting only whether the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs are 

related to its activities in California. But, as we will explain, BMS‘s arguments 

are not as narrow as it contends. Accordingly, we will examine here all three 

factors relevant to the specific jurisdiction analysis.
18

the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction 

unreasonable‖].)

Our courts have also explained that the relatedness requirement for specific 

jurisdiction is determined under the ―  ̳substantial connection‘ test,‖ which ―is 

satisfied if  ̳there is a substantial nexus or connection between the defendant‘s 

forum activities and the plaintiff‘s claim.‘ [Citation.]‖ (Snowney, supra, 35 

Cal.4th at p. 1068.) This test requires courts to evaluate the nature of the 

defendant‘s activities in the forum and the relationship of the claim to those 

activities in order to answer the ultimate question under the due process clause: 

whether the exercise of jurisdiction in the forum is fair. Under the substantial 

connection test, ―  ̳the intensity of forum contacts and the connection of the claim 

to those contacts are inversely related.‘ ‖ (Ibid.) ―  ̳[T]he more wide ranging the 

defendant‘s forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the 

forum contacts and the claim.‘ [Citation.] Thus,  ̳[a] claim need not arise directly 

from the defendant‘s forum contacts in order to be sufficiently related to the 

contact to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction.‘ . . . Indeed,  ̳ ―  ̳[o]nly 

when the operative facts of the controversy are not related to the defendant‘s 

contact with the state can it be said that the cause of action does not arise from that 

[contact].‘ ‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (Ibid.) Finally, the defendant‘s activities in the forum 

state need not be either the proximate cause or the ―but for‖ cause of the plaintiff‘s 

injuries. (Ibid.)

2. Purposeful availment

As the high court has explained, ―[t]he Due Process Clause protects an 

individual‘s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a 

forum with which he has established no meaningful  ̳contacts, ties, or relations,‘ ‖ 

and that ―[b]y requiring that individuals have  ̳fair warning that a particular 
19

activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, ‖‘ the due 

process clause affords predictability and allows potential defendants to tailor their 

conduct ―  ̳with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will 

not render them liable to suit.‘ ‖ (Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 471-472.) 

―Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state 

defendant who has not consented to suit there, this  ̳fair warning‘ requirement is 

satisfied if the defendant has  ̳purposefully directed‘ his activities at residents of 

the forum, [citation], and the litigation results from alleged injuries that  ̳arise out 

of or relate to‘ those activities.‖ (Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 472, fn. 

omitted.) These activities cannot be the result of the unilateral actions of another 

party or a third person, because the ―  ̳purposeful availment‘ requirement ensures 

that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of  ̳random,‘ 

 ̳fortuitous,‘ or  ̳attenuated‘ contacts.‖ (Id. at p. 475.) ―When a [nonresident 

defendant]  ̳purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 

within the forum State,‘ [citation], it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, 

and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, 

passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing 

its connection with the State.‖ (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 

444 U.S. 286, 297 (World-Wide Volkswagen).)

In Snowney, a California resident filed a class action in this state against a 

group of Nevada hotels, alleging several causes of action related to their purported 

failure to provide notice of an energy surcharge imposed on hotel guests.

(Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1059-1060.) The hotels conducted no business 

and had no bank accounts or employees in California, but they advertised heavily 

in this state using California-based media, including billboards, newspapers, and 

ads aired on radio and television stations, as well as a Web site for room quotes 
20

and reservations. They also received a significant portion of their business from 

California residents who stayed at their hotels. (Id. at p. 1059.)

This court held that the Nevada hotels had purposefully availed themselves of 

the privilege of doing business in California because their Web site had touted

―the proximity of their hotels to California‖ and provided ―driving directions from 

California to their hotels,‖ thereby ―specifically target[ing] residents of 

California.‖ (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1064.) Furthermore, ―[a]side from 

their Web site specifically targeting California residents, defendants advertised 

extensively in California through billboards, newspapers, and radio and television

stations located in California‖ and ―regularly sent mailings advertising their hotels 

to selected California residents.‖ (Id. at p. 1065.) ―In doing so, defendants 

necessarily availed themselves of the benefits of doing business in California and 

could reasonably expect to be subject to the jurisdiction of courts in California.‖

(Ibid.)

In the present matter, there is no question that BMS has purposely availed 

itself of the privilege of conducting activities in California, invoking the benefits 

and protection of its laws, and BMS does not contend otherwise. Not only did 

BMS market and advertise Plavix in this state, it employs sales representatives in 

California, contracted with a California-based pharmaceutical distributor, operates 

research and laboratory facilities in this state, and even has an office in the state 

capital to lobby the state on the company‘s behalf. As in Snowney, supra, 35 

Cal.4th 1054, BMS actively and purposefully sought to promote sales of Plavix to 

California residents, resulting in California sales of nearly $1 billion over six 

years. Moreover, unlike the Nevada hotels in Snowney, BMS maintains a physical 

presence in California, employing well over 400 people here.

Accordingly, we conclude that BMS has purposefully availed itself of the 

benefits of California such that the first element of the test for specific personal 
21

jurisdiction is met concerning matters arising from or related to BMS‘s contacts 

with the state. On the basis of these extensive contacts relating to the design, 

marketing, and distribution of Plavix, BMS would be on clear notice that it is 

subject to suit in California concerning such matters. (World-Wide Volkswagen,

supra, 444 U.S. at p. 19.) 

3. Arises from or is related to

As previously described, ―for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction the 

intensity of forum contacts and the connection of the claim to those contacts are 

inversely related.‖ (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 452.) ―[T]he more wide ranging 

the defendant‘s forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between 

the forum contacts and the claim.‖ (Id. at p. 455.) Thus, ―[a] claim need not arise 

directly from the defendant‘s forum contacts in order to be sufficiently related to 

the contact to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction.‖ (Id. at p. 452.)

In Vons, we assessed, on relatedness grounds, whether California courts 

could exercise specific jurisdiction over nonresident companies for causes of 

action involving out-of-state injuries that did not arise directly from their 

California contacts. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th 434.) The plaintiffs in Vons were 

restaurant franchisees who brought an action for loss of business after 

contaminated hamburger meat caused illnesses in California and Washington, 

resulting in adverse publicity. In California, the franchisees sued two parties: the 

franchisor and the hamburger supplier, Vons Companies, Inc. (Vons), which 

processed hamburger patties in California and supplied them to the franchisor. 

Vons cross-complained against the franchisor and two Washington franchisees,

suing them for negligence and indemnification for failing to properly cook the 

hamburger meat at restaurants in Washington, causing the injuries and deaths to

customers there that gave rise to their joint liability with Vons. In Vons, the issue 
22

was whether the California court had specific jurisdiction over these two 

Washington-based franchisees, Seabest Foods, Inc., and Washington Restaurant 

Management, Inc. (WRMI). (Id. at pp. 440-442.)

Seabest‘s and WRMI‘s contacts with California included food purchases 

from California suppliers, sending personnel to franchisor training sessions in 

California, remitting franchise payments to California, permitting the franchisor‘s 

inspection of their restaurants by its California-based inspectors, and the 

negotiation of their franchise agreements in California, which agreements stated 

that any disputes would be governed by California law. Because Vons was not a 

party to the franchise contracts for either Seabest or WRMI, those franchisees‘

contacts with California did not directly give rise to the causes of action asserted 

by Vons. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 452.) Nevertheless, this court found 

personal jurisdiction was properly exercised over them in California because the 

forum contacts bore a substantial relation to the cause of action. We explained 

that requiring the two Washington franchisees to answer to Vons‘s claim ―is not to 

allow a third party unilaterally to draw them into a connection with the state; 

rather, it was Seabest and WRMI who established the connection.‖ (Id. at p. 451.)

This court further elaborated: ―A claim need not arise directly from the 

defendant‘s forum contacts in order to be sufficiently related to the contact to 

warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Rather, as long as the claim bears a 

substantial connection to the nonresident‘s forum contacts, the exercise of specific 

jurisdiction is appropriate. The due process clause is concerned with protecting 

nonresident defendants from being brought unfairly into court in the forum, on the 

basis of random contacts. That constitutional provision, however, does not 

provide defendants with a shield against jurisdiction when the defendant 

purposefully has availed himself or herself of benefits in the forum.‖ (Vons, 

supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 452.)
23

In the present matter, plaintiffs allege that BMS negligently designed and 

manufactured Plavix, failed to disclose material information in its advertising and 

promotion of Plavix and fraudulently and falsely advertised and promoted the 

product, and that BMS is liable to those who relied on such representations and

were injured by Plavix. Their complaints also contend that ―Plavix was heavily 

marketed directly to consumers through television, magazine and internet 

advertising.‖ BMS does not contest that its marketing, promotion, and distribution

of Plavix was nationwide and was associated with California-based sales 

representatives and a California distributor, McKesson Corporation, which 

plaintiffs allege is jointly liable. 

The California plaintiffs‘ claims concerning the alleged misleading

marketing and promotion of Plavix and injuries arising out of its distribution to 

and ingestion by California plaintiffs certainly arise from BMS‘s purposeful 

contacts with this state, and BMS does not deny that it can be sued for such claims

in California. As to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims, the Court of Appeal 

understood plaintiffs‘ complaints as alleging that BMS sold Plavix to both the 

California plaintiffs and the nonresident plaintiffs as part of a common nationwide 

course of distribution. BMS has not taken issue with that characterization, nor has 

it asserted that either the product itself or the representations it made about the 

product differed from state to state. Both the resident and nonresident plaintiffs‘ 

claims are based on the same allegedly defective product and the assertedly

misleading marketing and promotion of that product, which allegedly caused 

injuries in and outside the state. Thus, the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims bear a 

substantial connection to BMS‘s contacts in California. BMS‘s nationwide 

marketing, promotion, and distribution of Plavix created a substantial nexus 

between the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims and the company‘s contacts in 

California concerning Plavix.
24

Plaintiffs also allege that BMS negligently developed and designed Plavix, 

which serves as the basis of its claims of products liability, negligence, and 

breaches of express and implied warranties. BMS maintains research and 

laboratory facilities in California, and it presumably enjoys the protection of our 

laws related to those activities. Although there is no claim that Plavix itself was 

designed and developed in these facilities, the fact that the company engages in

research and product development in these California facilities is related to 

plaintiffs‘ claims that BMS engaged in a course of conduct of negligent research 

and design that led to their injuries, even if those claims do not arise out of BMS‘s

research conduct in this state. Accordingly, BMS‘s research and development 

activity in California provides an additional connection between the nonresident

plaintiffs‘ claims and the company‘s activities in California.

BMS and our dissenting colleagues attempt to characterize the claims of the 

California plaintiffs as ―parallel‖ to and failing to ―intersect‖ with the nonresident 

plaintiffs‘ claims and argue based on this characterization that BMS‘s conduct in 

California is insufficiently related to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims. More 

specifically, BMS contends that the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims would be 

exactly the same if BMS had no contact whatsoever with California. This 

characterization ignores the uncontested fact that all the plaintiffs‘ claims arise out 

of BMS‘s nationwide marketing and distribution of Plavix. The claims are based 

not on ―similar‖ conduct, as our dissenting colleagues contend, but instead on a 

single, coordinated, nationwide course of conduct directed out of BMS‘s New 

York headquarters and New Jersey operations center and implemented by 

distributors and salespersons across the country. (See Cornelison v. Chaney

(1976) 16 Cal.3d 143, 151 [reasoning that the interstate nature of a defendant‘s 

business, while ―not an independent basis of jurisdiction‖ weighs ―in favor of 

requiring him to defend here‖].)
25

Moreover, the argument that claims based on a nationwide course of conduct 

fail to establish relatedness for purposes of minimum contacts rests on the invalid 

assumption that BMS‘s forum contacts must bear some substantive legal relevance 

to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims, as the dissent explicitly contends. Yet in 

Vons, this court carefully considered and ultimately rejected such a substantive 

relevance requirement. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 475 [―we conclude that the 

substantive relevance test is inappropriate‖].) Rather, it is sufficient if ―because of 

the defendants‘ relationship with the forum, it is not unfair to require that they 

answer in a California court for an alleged injury that is substantially connected to 

the defendants‘ forum contacts.‖ (Id. at p. 453.) Here, BMS‘s forum contacts, 

including its California-based research and development facilities, are 

substantially connected to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims because those contacts

are part of the nationwide marketing and distribution of Plavix, a drug BMS 

researched and developed, that gave rise to all the plaintiffs‘ claims.

BMS relies on two cases to contend that California courts may not exercise

specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant sued by a nonresident plaintiff 

for injuries occurring outside the state. But in both cases, the defendant company 

conducted no business in California and had no employees here. (Fisher 

Governor Co. v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 222, 224 [the defendant had ―no 

employees or property in California and has not appointed an agent to receive 

service of process here‖]; Boaz v. Boyle & Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 700, 715

(Boaz) [the defendant had ―not been licensed to do business in California, and . . .

had neither salespersons, employees or representatives here, nor any offices, bank 

accounts, records or property in this state‖].) 

Our dissenting colleagues also rely on Boaz and a pharmaceutical case from 

the First Circuit, Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1st Cir. 1984) 744 F.2d 213, which held 

that specific jurisdiction had not been established because the plaintiff‘s cause of 
26

action did not ―arise from‖ the company‘s forum activities. (Id at p. 216.) 

Although the facts of Glater are also involve the sales and marketing of an 

allegedly defective drug, the pharmaceutical company‘s contacts with the forum 

state, New Hampshire, appear to have been far less substantial than BMS‘s 

contacts to California. 3

Moreover, none of these cases had the benefit of our reasoning in Vons, 

where we made clear that we had adopted a sliding scale approach to specific 

jurisdiction in which we recognized that ―the more wide ranging the defendant‘s 

forum contacts, the more readily is shown a connection between the forum 

contacts and the claim.‖ (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 455.) As previously 

described, BMS‘s contacts with California are substantial and the company has 

enjoyed sizeable revenues from the sales of its product here — the very product 

that is the subject of the claims of all of the plaintiffs. BMS‘s extensive contacts 

with California establish minimum contacts based on a less direct connection 

between BMS‘s forum activities and plaintiffs‘ claims than might otherwise be 

required.

In sum, taking into account all of BMS‘s activities in this state and their 

relation to the causes of action at issue here, we conclude that the second element 

of specific jurisdiction is met, and hence, absent a showing to the contrary by 

 

3 In addition, the dissent relies on Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235, 

where the plaintiffs filed suit in Florida against a Delaware-based trustee who had 

no purposeful contacts with Florida, other than those caused by the unilateral 

activity of the plaintiffs. The dissent‘s reliance on this case is inapposite because 

the high court concluded that the defendant in that matter had not purposefully 

availed herself ―of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, 

thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.‖ (Id. at p. 253.) Here, the 

parties do not contest that BMS has purposefully availed itself of California law.
27

BMS, it would be consistent with due process for it to be subject to litigation in 

this state concerning injuries allegedly caused by its product Plavix, including 

those injuries occurring out of state. Not only did BMS purposefully avail itself of 

the benefits of California by its extensive marketing and distribution of Plavix in 

this state and by contracting with a California distributor and employing hundreds 

of California-based salespersons, resulting in its substantial sales of that product 

here, but the company also maintains significant research and development

facilities in California. All of plaintiffs‘ claims either arose from these activities 

or are related to those activities. The circumstance that numerous nonresident 

plaintiffs have filed their claims alongside those of resident plaintiffs does not alter 

or detract from this substantial nexus.

As previously discussed, the due process protections afforded by the doctrine 

of specific jurisdiction are designed to give a potential nonresident defendant 

adequate notice that it is subject to suit there, and, accordingly, a prospective 

defendant can assess the extent of that risk and take measures to mitigate such risk 

or eliminate it entirely by severing its connection with the state. (World-Wide 

Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 297.) Indeed, far from taking measures to 

mitigate the risk of suit in particular forums, BMS embraced this risk by 

coordinating a single nationwide marketing and distribution effort and by 

engaging in research and development in California. In that regard, BMS was on 

notice that it could be sued in California by nonresident plaintiffs. In fact, our 

courts have frequently handled nationwide class actions involving numerous 

nonresident plaintiffs. (See Discover Bank v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 

148; Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 915; 

Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036; 

Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164; Canon U.S.A., 

Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1.)
28

To the extent that BMS‘s arguments imply that a California court lacks 

personal jurisdiction over BMS to adjudicate the claims of the nonresident 

plaintiffs simply because the nonresident plaintiffs have no connection to and did 

not suffer any Plavix-related injuries in the state, the high court has repeatedly 

rejected such a focus. The minimum contacts test assesses ―the relationship 

among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.‖ (Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, 

433 U.S. at p. 204.) As the high court explicitly declared in Keeton, a ―plaintiff‘s 

residence in the forum State is not a separate requirement, and lack of residence 

will not defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of defendant‘s contacts.‖ 

(Keeton, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 780; see also Walden v. Fiore, supra, 571 U.S. ___, 

___ [134 S.Ct. 1115, 1126] [―it is the defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, 

who must create contacts with the forum State‖]; Helicopteros, supra, 466 U.S. at 

p. 412, fn. 5 [the plaintiffs‘ ―lack of residential or other contacts with Texas of 

itself does not defeat otherwise proper jurisdiction‖]; Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 

U.S. 783, 788 [the ―plaintiff‘s lack of  ̳contacts‘ will not defeat otherwise proper 

jurisdiction‖]; Rush v. Savchuk (1980) 444 U.S. 320, 332 [―the plaintiff‘s contacts 

with the forum‖ cannot be ―decisive in determining whether the defendant‘s due 

process rights are violated‖]; see also Epic Communications, Inc. v. Richwave 

Technology, Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 314, 336 [―We fail to see how the nonCalifornia residency of plaintiff can make a  ̳compelling case‘ ‖ with respect to 

any of the factors supporting personal jurisdiction].)

Finally, BMS and our dissenting colleagues further allege that permitting the 

exercise of specific jurisdiction in California for the claims of nonresidents based 

on the company‘s nationwide sales and marketing would effectively subvert the 

holding of Daimler, supra, 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 746], in which the court 

refused to base jurisdiction merely on nationwide sales. But BMS‘s argument 

overstates the effect of our conclusion that specific jurisdiction is properly 
29

exercised here. Our decision does not render California an all-purpose forum for 

filing suit against BMS for any matter, regardless of whether the action is related 

to its forum activities. Rather, as with any matter concerning specific jurisdiction, 

the minimum contacts test is applied on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the 

nature and quality of the defendant‘s activities in the state. (Burger King, supra, 

471 U.S. at pp. 474-475.) We simply hold under this specific set of circumstances 

that, for purposes of establishing the requisite minimum contacts, plaintiffs‘ claims 

concerning the allegedly defective design and marketing of Plavix bear a 

substantial nexus with or connection to BMS‘s extensive contacts with California 

as part of Plavix‘s nationwide marketing, its sales of Plavix in this state, and its 

maintenance of research and development facilities here so as to permit specific 

jurisdiction. 

4. The reasonableness of specific jurisdiction

As previously described, after a plaintiff meets the burden of showing that a

defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state, the 

burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the assertion of specific 

jurisdiction is unreasonable because it does not comport with ―  ̳traditional notions 

of fair play and substantial justice.‘ ‖ (International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at 

p. 316.) BMS does not argue that the assertion of jurisdiction in this case would 

be fundamentally unfair, but does advance several arguments it contends defeat

the claim that their causes of action arose from or are related to its contacts with 

California. Analytically, these arguments are more pertinent to consideration of 

whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction is reasonable, not whether the 

contested claims arise from or relate to the company‘s forum activities. The 

questions raised by BMS — whether California has an interest in litigating the 

claims of nonresidents, whether BMS will unfairly bear a disproportionate burden 
30

of defending itself against all nationwide claims in a single venue of relatively few 

resident plaintiffs, and whether California should expend its judicial resources on 

the claims of nonresident plaintiffs — are all circumstances relevant to the issue of 

whether BMS has established that the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable. 

They do not bear upon the issue of whether the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims arise 

from or are related to BMS‘s activities in the forum state. Accordingly, we will 

examine these arguments using the criteria governing reasonableness.

In determining whether the defendant has established that the exercise of 

specific jurisdiction is unreasonable, the court ―must consider the burden on the 

defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff‘s interest in obtaining 

relief.‖ (Asahi, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 113.) Although it must also weigh in its 

determination ―the interstate judicial system‘s interest in obtaining the most 

efficient resolution of controversies[,] and the shared interest of the several States 

in furthering fundamental substantive social policies ‖ (World-Wide Volkswagen, 

supra, 444 U.S. at p. 292), a requirement that may ―reflect[] an element of 

federalism and the character of state sovereignty vis-à-vis other States‖ (Insurance 

Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites (1982) 456 U.S. 694, 703, fn. 10), the due 

process clause ―is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement.‖ (Id. at 

p. 703, fn. 10.) Accordingly, ―[t]he relationship among the defendant, the forum, 

and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States . . . 

[is] the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.‖ (Shaffer v. 

Heitner, supra, 433 U.S. at p. 204.)

a. The burden on defendant in litigating the claims in California

BMS complains that joining the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs to those 

of the comparatively smaller group of California plaintiffs would unfairly 

distribute the company‘s burden of defending this mass tort action by requiring it 
31

to defend itself against all nationwide claims in a forum where only a minor 

portion of its sales occurred. However, as the Court of Appeal noted, regardless of 

whether California exercises jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims, BMS 

is already burdened by having to defend against the claims of 86 California 

plaintiffs. Certainly, the addition of 592 nonresident plaintiffs is a significant 

added burden, but the alternative is to litigate the claims of these other 592

nonresident plaintiffs in a scattershot manner in various other forums, in 

potentially up to 34 different states.4 Such an alternative would seem to be a far 

more burdensome distribution of BMS‘s resources in defending these cases than 

defending them in a single, focused forum.

Pretrial preparation and discovery concerning plaintiffs‘ claims may pose 

challenges given the diversity of their states of residence, but, as the Court of 

Appeal recognized, our state‘s Civil Discovery Act provides for taking depositions 

outside California for use at trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2026.010.) Moreover, 

information and documents relevant to plaintiffs‘ requests for discovery will likely 

be located in New York or New Jersey, as will the individuals whom plaintiffs are 

likely to seek to depose, regardless of the venue in which the plaintiffs‘ claims are 

filed.

Finally, BMS has provided no evidence to suggest that the cost of litigating 

plaintiffs‘ claims in San Francisco is excessive or unduly burdensome for BMS

 

4 Our dissenting colleagues note that nonresident plaintiffs presumably could 

file their claims in Delaware or perhaps New Jersey or New York, or in federal 

court, where they could be coordinated as part of multidistrict litigation, but 

nothing requires them to choose one of these forums rather than their home states. 
32

compared to any other relevant forum or forums.5 BMS, therefore, fails to show 

that its defense of plaintiffs‘ claims in California places on it an undue burden.

b. California’s interest in providing a forum for plaintiffs in this 

case 

BMS further claims that California has no legitimate interest in adjudicating 

the claims of nonresidents because they have no connection to the state. 

Admittedly, the fact that the nonresident plaintiffs greatly outnumber the 

California plaintiffs does give us some pause. But in ascertaining the 

reasonableness of exercising specific jurisdiction, no one factor, by itself, is 

determinative. More important, there are identifiable interests our state holds in 

providing a forum for both the resident and nonresident plaintiffs.

First, evidence of other injuries is ―admissible to prove a defective condition, 

knowledge, or the cause of an accident,‖ provided that the circumstances of the 

other injuries are similar and not too remote. (Ault v. International Harvester

(1974) 13 Cal.3d 113, 121-122; see also Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1984)

37 Cal.3d 540, 555 [evidence of prior accidents involving similar airplane with 

identical single-engine stall-spin characteristics was admissible].) To the extent 

that evidence of the injuries allegedly suffered by the nonresident plaintiffs may be 

relevant and admissible to prove that Plavix similarly injured the California 

plaintiffs, trying their cases together with those of nonresident plaintiffs could

promote efficient adjudication of California residents‘ claims. California, 

therefore, has a clear interest in providing a forum for this matter.

 

5 Of course, BMS is free to make such a showing on a motion asserting 

forum non conveniens. (Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 751.) We 

merely hold that, for purposes of defeating specific jurisdiction, BMS fails to meet 

its burden.
33

This interest is further underscored by the substantial body of California law 

aimed at protecting consumers from the potential dangers posed by prescription 

medication, including warnings about serious side effects and prohibiting false and 

misleading labeling. (See, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 4070-4078.) As this court 

has previously recognized, ―California has a strong interest in protecting its 

consumers by ensuring that foreign manufacturers comply with the state‘s safety 

standards.‖ (Asahi, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 53.) It also bears reemphasis that there 

are no fewer than 250 BMS sales representatives in California. Although at this 

early stage of the proceedings, the record contains very little evidence concerning 

the promotional and distribution activities of these sales representatives, California 

has a clear interest in regulating their conduct. 6 (Cf. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 

[permitting claims by nonresidents who are deceived by representations 

―disseminated from‖ the State of California].)

In addition, California also has an interest in regulating the conduct of 

BMS‘s codefendant, McKesson Corporation, which is headquartered in California, 

as a joint defendant with BMS. As noted above, in Vons, we held that specific 

jurisdiction was proper over cross-defendants who entered into contracts in 

California that gave rise to the joint liability and the corresponding right to 

 

6 Our dissenting colleagues contend that the record does not establish that 

BMS‘s sales representatives misled nonresident physicians concerning the safety 

and efficacy of Plavix or that McKesson was responsible for providing Plavix to 

any of the nonresident plaintiffs. (Dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., post, at pp. 11-12.) 

Certainly, the existence of such evidence would lend additional support to the 

question of whether the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs are not just related to 

but actually also arise out of BMS‘s contacts with California. But our discussion 

here is merely focused on the reasonableness of asserting specific jurisdiction in 

this matter because our state has an interest in regulating conduct in the 

pharmaceutical industry that could pose a danger to public welfare, regardless of 

residency. 
34

indemnification on which the cross-claims against them were based. (See Vons,

supra,14 Cal.4th at pp. 456-457.) California‘s interest in adjudicating claims on 

which McKesson Corporation, a California resident, may be jointly liable with 

BMS, a nonresident defendant, is readily apparent. Were BMS dismissed from 

nonresident plaintiffs‘ cases, California courts would be required to hear their 

claims against McKesson Corporation while the same plaintiffs litigated the same 

claims arising from the same facts and the same evidence against BMS in a forum 

potentially on the opposite side of the country.

c. Plaintiffs’ interest in a convenient and effective forum

Nonresident plaintiffs have obviously purposefully availed themselves of the 

jurisdiction of courts in this state by choosing to file all of their claims here —

strong evidence that the forum is convenient to them. Eighty-six of the 678 

plaintiffs reside in California; only Texas, with 92 plaintiffs, is home to more. 

Moreover, the current forum, San Francisco Superior Court, is equipped with 

a complex litigation department that is well suited to expeditiously handle such 

large cases. BMS has not shown that this forum is inconvenient for plaintiffs.

d. Judicial economy and the shared interests of the interstate 

judicial system

BMS argues that it would be a waste of California‘s judicial resources to 

provide a forum for the nonresident plaintiffs. To be sure, a single court hearing

the claims of hundreds of plaintiffs is a significant burden on that court. But the 

overall savings of time and effort to the judicial system, both in California and 

interstate, far outweigh the burdens placed on the individual forum court. The 

alternative that BMS proposes would result in the duplication of suits in in 

numerous state or federal jurisdictions at substantial costs to both the judicial 

system and to the parties, who would have to deal with disparate rulings on 

otherwise similar procedural and substantive issues.
35

For claims of mass injuries stemming from a single product or event, 

plaintiffs often resort to the mechanism of the class action, which promotes 

―efficiency and economy of litigation.‖ (Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker (1983) 

462 U.S. 345, 349.) But, unlike class actions in which common questions of law, 

fact, and proximate cause predominate among members of the plaintiff class, 

―mass-tort actions for personal injury most often are not appropriate for class 

action certification.‖ (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1123.) As 

this court has previously recognized, ―[t]he major elements in tort actions for 

personal injury — liability, causation, and damages — may vary widely from 

claim to claim, creating a wide disparity in claimants‘ damages and issues of 

defendant liability, proximate cause, liability of skilled intermediaries, 

comparative fault, informed consent, assumption of the risk and periods of 

limitation.‖ (Ibid.) 

Yet, because mass tort injuries may involve diverse injuries or harm not 

amenable to the efficiency and economy of a class action, they present special 

problems for the proper functioning of the courts and the fair, efficient, and speedy

administration of justice. Without coordination, ―those who win the race to the 

courthouse [and] bankrupt a defendant early in the litigation process‖ would 

recover but effectively shut out other potential plaintiffs from any recovery. (In re 

Exxon Valdez (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 790, 795-796.) Moreover, coordinated 

mass tort actions ―also avoid the possible unfairness of punishing a defendant over 

and over again for the same tortious conduct.‖ (Id. at p. 796.)

It is also important to note that many of the resident plaintiffs allege that 

Plavix caused them to suffer heart attacks, strokes, cerebral bleeding, and 

gastrointestinal bleeding. These are obviously severe medical conditions, and 

California has an interest in ensuring that litigation brought by its residents is 

resolved in a timely fashion. By separating the nonresident plaintiffs from the 
36

resident plaintiffs and forcing the nonresidents to sue in other states, it is fair to 

anticipate delays in the California proceedings that would be created by the 

litigation and appeals of discovery and factual conflicts in the various other 

forums. In that event, the California plaintiffs‘ litigation could be stalled for a 

significant period without resolution. Likewise, defendants would suffer the costs 

created by delay and uncertainty as to their potential liability, if any.

Moreover, the same concerns of delay and efficiency apply equally to the 

interstate judicial system. The other forums have an equally strong interest in the 

fair, efficient, and speedy administration of justice for both their resident plaintiffs 

and resident defendants. The consolidation of plaintiffs‘ claims in a single forum 

is a mechanism for promoting those interests.

Of course, the other potential forums also have a sovereign interest in 

seeing their laws applied to actions such as this one. But for purposes of 

establishing the propriety of personal jurisdiction, the high court has stated, ―we 

do not think that such choice-of-law concerns should complicate or distort the 

jurisdictional inquiry.‖ (Keeton, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 778.) Choice-of-law 

concerns might very well make a mass tort action unmanageable in certain 

circumstances, but that issue is not determinative at this stage of the proceedings.

Accordingly, BMS has failed to carry its burden of showing that the 

exercise of personal jurisdiction over it in this matter is unreasonable.

III. CONCLUSION

We conclude that BMS, despite its significant business and research activities 

in California, is not at home in our state for purposes of asserting general personal 

jurisdiction over it. However, we conclude that in light of BMS‘s extensive 

contacts with California, encompassing extensive marketing and distribution of 

Plavix, hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue from Plavix sales, a relationship 

with a California distributor, substantial research and development facilities, and 
37

hundreds of California employees, courts may, consistent with the requirements of 

due process, exercise specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs‘ 

claims in this action, which arise from the same course of conduct that gave rise to 

California plaintiffs‘ claims: BMS‘s development and nationwide marketing and 

distribution of Plavix. BMS cannot establish unfairness: Balancing the burdens 

imposed by this mass tort action, and given its complexity and potential impact on 

the judicial systems of numerous other jurisdictions, we conclude that the joint 

litigation of the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims with the claims of the California 

plaintiffs is not an unreasonable exercise of specific jurisdiction over defendant

BMS. 

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

WE CONCUR:

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.

The court holds today that 592 plaintiffs residing in states other than 

California may sue Bristol-Myers Squibb Company (BMS) in a California 

superior court for injuries resulting from these plaintiffs‘ use in their own states of 

BMS‘s prescription drug, Plavix. Because BMS is not incorporated or based in 

California, its activities in the state are insufficient to establish general personal 

jurisdiction—jurisdiction for disputes unrelated to the company‘s California 

activities—over it in California courts. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 2.) The majority, 

however, finds BMS‘s California contacts sufficient for specific, case-related 

personal jurisdiction, even though Plavix was not developed or manufactured in 

California and the nonresident plaintiffs did not obtain the drug through California 

physicians or from a California source, and despite the requirement for specific 

jurisdiction that there be a substantial connection between the plaintiff‘s claim and 

the defendant‘s forum activities. (Id. at pp. 16–28; see Vons Companies, Inc. v. 

Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 452 (Vons).) 

I respectfully dissent from the court‘s decision on personal jurisdiction. I 

agree the extent and type of contacts to support general jurisdiction are lacking. 

But I find in the record no evidence of contacts with California that bear a 

substantial connection to the claims of these nonresidents. I therefore would hold 

specific jurisdiction has also not been established. 
2

On a defendant‘s motion to quash service of process, the plaintiff asserting 

jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the extent of the defendant‘s forum 

contacts and their relationship to the plaintiff‘s claims. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 

p. 449; Gilmore Bank v. AsiaTrust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 

1558, 1568.) In this case, the nonresident plaintiffs (real parties in interest on 

BMS‘s petition for writ of mandate) have failed to show any substantial nexus, 

causal or otherwise, between their claims and BMS‘s activities in California.

One can imagine a number of factual circumstances that might justify 

specific jurisdiction in a case like this. Unfortunately, none of those circumstances 

have been established here:

If real parties in interest had purchased Plavix while in California or from a 

California source, their claims could be considered substantially related to BMS‘s 

sale of Plavix in this state. But the record contains no evidence connecting the 

Plavix taken by any of the nonresident plaintiffs to California.

If real parties had been prescribed Plavix by a California doctor, their 

misrepresentation claims might be considered substantially related to BMS‘s 

marketing of Plavix to physicians here. But there is no evidence of a California

connection through real parties’ prescribing physicians.

If the Plavix taken by real parties had been manufactured in California, one 

might well consider their defective product claims substantially connected to 

BMS‘s forum contacts. But the record shows Plavix has never been manufactured 

in California. 

If the Plavix taken by real parties had been distributed to their respective 

states by codefendant McKesson Corporation, which is headquartered in San 

Francisco, it could be argued real parties‘ defective product claims were related to 

the distribution agreement between BMS and McKesson. But real parties have 
3

adduced no evidence to show how or by whom the Plavix they took was distributed 

to the pharmacies that dispensed it to them.

If Plavix had been developed in California, real parties‘ defective product 

claims could be considered related to that California activity. But the record 

shows Plavix was developed not in California but in New York and New Jersey, 

where BMS has, respectively, its headquarters and major operating facilities.

If the labeling, packaging, or regulatory approval of Plavix had been 

performed in or directed from California, some of real parties‘ misrepresentation 

claims would arguably be related to those California activities. But BMS did none 

of those things in California.

Finally, if the ―nationwide marketing‖ campaign on which the majority relies 

(maj. opn., ante, at p. 27) had been created or directed from California, claims of 

misrepresentations in that marketing would have arisen from BMS‘s California 

contacts. But according to the record, none of that marketing work was performed 

or directed by BMS’s California employees.

In the absence of a concrete factual relationship between their claims and 

BMS‘s contacts with the forum state, on what do real parties, and the majority of 

this court, base their argument for specific jurisdiction over BMS in California 

courts? In brief, their argument rests on similarity of claims and joinder with 

California plaintiffs. First, real parties‘ claims arise from activities similar to 

those BMS conducted in California, because in marketing and selling Plavix 

throughout the United States, BMS sold the same allegedly defective product in 

California as in real parties‘ various states of residence and presumably made 

some of the same misrepresentations and omissions in those states and in 

California. Second, real parties are joined in this action with plaintiffs who are 

California residents and who allege similar claims. Neither of these factors, 
4

however, creates a connection between real parties‘ claims of injury and BMS‘s 

California activities sufficient to satisfy due process.

By statute, the personal jurisdiction of California courts extends to the limits 

set by the state and federal Constitutions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) 

Constitutional due process limits dictate that in the absence of general 

jurisdiction—which exists only if a corporation is incorporated in the forum state 

or conducts such intensive activities there as to make it ―at home‖ in that state 

(Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (2011) 564 U.S. 915, 919 

(Goodyear))—personal jurisdiction over the corporation to adjudicate a particular 

claim (specific jurisdiction) is established only if the controversy ―is related to or 

 ̳arises out of‘ ‖ the company‘s activities in the forum state. (Helicopteros 

Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408, 414 (Helicopteros).)

The majority‘s decision is not supported by specific jurisdiction decisions 

from the United States Supreme Court, this court, or the lower federal and state 

courts. (See pt. I, post.) And as I will discuss later (see pt. II, post), today‘s 

decision impairs important functions of reciprocity, predictability, and limited 

state sovereignty served by the relatedness requirement. By weakening the 

relatedness requirement, the majority‘s decision threatens to subject companies to 

the jurisdiction of California courts to an extent unpredictable from their business 

activities in California, extending jurisdiction over claims of liability well beyond 

our state‘s legitimate regulatory interest.

Just as important, minimizing the relatedness requirement undermines an 

essential distinction between specific and general jurisdiction. In Daimler AG v. 

Bauman (2014) 571 U.S.___, ___ [187 L.Ed.2d 624, ___, 134 S.Ct. 746, 751], the 

United States Supreme Court made clear that general jurisdiction—jurisdiction to 

adjudicate controversies unrelated to the defendant‘s forum contacts—is not 

created merely by commercial contacts that are ―continuous and systematic‖ 
5

(Helicopteros, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 416) but only by contacts so extensive as to 

render the defendant ―  ̳at home‘ ‖ in the forum state. (Daimler, supra, 187 

L.Ed.2d at p. 761.) The majority applies that holding to conclude, correctly, that 

general jurisdiction is lacking here. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 13–16.) But by 

reducing relatedness to mere similarity and joinder, the majority expands specific 

jurisdiction to the point that, for a large category of defendants, it becomes 

indistinguishable from general jurisdiction. At least for consumer companies 

operating nationwide, with substantial sales in California, the majority creates the 

equivalent of general jurisdiction in California courts. What the federal high court 

wrought in Daimler—a shift in the general jurisdiction standard from the 

―continuous and systematic‖ test of Helicopteros to a much tighter ―at home‖ 

limit—this court undoes today under the rubric of specific jurisdiction.

I. The Case Law Does Not Support Specific Jurisdiction in These 

Circumstances

Specific jurisdiction over a defendant—jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute 

connected to the defendant‘s contacts with the forum state—depends on the 

relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. (Helicopteros, 

supra, 466 U.S. at p. 414.) We have summarized the requirements for specific 

jurisdiction as threefold: (1) the defendant has purposefully availed itself of forum 

benefits; (2) the controversy arises out of or is otherwise related to the defendant‘s 

forum contacts; and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction in the particular 

litigation is reasonable in light of the burdens and benefits of forum litigation. 

(Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062 

(Snowney).)

BMS contests neither the first prong of this tripartite test, that the company 

has purposefully availed itself of forum benefits by its continuous course of 

substantial business activities in California, nor the third, that taking jurisdiction 
6

would impose unreasonable burdens on the company. (Snowney, supra, 35 

Cal.4th at p. 1070.) The key issue here is therefore whether the claims of the real 

parties in interest (plaintiffs residing in states other than California) arise out of, or 

are otherwise related to, BMS‘s activities in California.

A. The Relatedness Requirement for Specific Jurisdiction

The requirement that the litigation be related to the defendant‘s activities in 

or directed to the forum, by which it has purposefully availed itself of the benefits 

of doing business in the state, was first stated in the landmark decision of Internat. 

Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310 (International Shoe). The high court 

first noted that jurisdiction is well established when a corporation‘s ―continuous 

and systematic‖ activities in the state ―give rise to the liabilities sued on.‖ (Id. at 

p. 317.) Even when a corporation has engaged in only occasional activities in the 

state, due process may still be satisfied if those activities have created the 

obligations sued on: ―[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of 

conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the 

laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, 

so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within 

the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought

to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.‖ (Id. at p. 

319.)

In International Shoe itself, the relationship between the forum activities and 

the litigation was a straightforward one: The defendant corporation had employed 

salesmen in the State of Washington, which required it contribute to the state‘s 

unemployment compensation fund; the litigation concerned an assessment for 

unpaid contributions. (International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at pp. 312–313.) Thus 

―the obligation which is here sued upon arose out of those very [forum] activities,‖ 
7

making it reasonable for Washington ―to enforce the obligations which appellant 

has incurred there.‖ (Id. at p. 320.)

The United States Supreme Court has not, since International Shoe, greatly 

elaborated on its understanding of the relatedness requirement. The court in 

Helicopteros slightly reformulated the requirement: jurisdiction may be 

appropriate if the controversy ―arise[s] out of or relate[s] to‖ the company‘s forum 

contacts. (Helicopteros, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 414.) But the high court did not 

explain or apply that standard in Helicopteros, and in Goodyear, supra, 564 U.S. 

at page 919, the court again used a different formulation, suggesting a narrower 

vision of relatedness: ―Specific jurisdiction . . . depends on an  ̳affiliatio[n] 

between the forum and the underlying controversy,‘ principally, activity or an 

occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the 

State’s regulation.‖ (Italics added.) The Goodyear court went on, very briefly, to 

explain why specific jurisdiction did not exist in the case before it, which involved 

the deaths of two North Carolina boys in an overseas bus accident: ―Because the 

episode-in-suit, the bus accident, occurred in France, and the tire alleged to have 

caused the accident was manufactured and sold abroad, North Carolina courts 

lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.‖ (Ibid.) None of the 

injury-causing events having occurred in the forum state, the basis for specific 

jurisdiction was lacking.

Of the post- International Shoe decisions in which the high court actually 

found a factual basis for specific jurisdiction, each featured a direct link between 

forum activities and the litigation. (See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 

471 U.S. 462, 479–480 [specific jurisdiction in Florida courts proper where 

franchise dispute ―grew directly out of‖ contract formed between Florida 

franchisor and Michigan franchisee, whose breach ―caused foreseeable injuries to

the corporation in Florida‖]; Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783, 789 [California 
8

jurisdiction over writer and editor based in Florida proper for article distributed in 

California and defaming California resident, where the defendants‘ ―intentional, 

and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California‖ and they knew 

article ―would have a potentially devastating impact‖ on California resident]; 

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (1984) 465 U.S. 770, 776–777 (Keeton) [specific 

jurisdiction in New Hampshire courts proper over Ohio corporation where 

corporation‘s sale in New Hampshire of magazine defaming the plaintiff injured 

her reputation in that state]; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. (1957) 355 U.S. 

220, 223 [specific jurisdiction in California courts proper where action was based 

on a life insurance contract delivered in California and on which the insured, a 

California resident at his death, had paid premiums from the state].) Nothing in 

the high court‘s specific jurisdiction decisions suggests an abandonment or broad 

relaxation of the relatedness requirement.

This court did, in Vons, adopt a relatively broad standard for relatedness. 

After canvassing formulations put forward by scholars and lower courts, we held 

the relationship between the defendant‘s forum contacts and the plaintiff‘s claims 

in litigation need not be one of proximate legal causation or even ―but for‖ factual 

causation, nor need the forum contacts be substantively relevant in the plaintiff‘s 

action. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 460–475.) Rather, the relationship required 

for specific jurisdiction exists if the claims bear a ―substantial nexus or 

connection‖ to the activities by which the defendant has purposefully availed itself 

of forum benefits. (Id. at p. 456; accord, Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1067–

1068.) The test is not a mechanical one, but a weighing process in which ―the 

greater the intensity of forum activity, the lesser the relationship required between 

the contact and the claim.‖ (Vons, supra, at p. 453; accord, Snowney, supra, at 

p. 1068.) Specific jurisdiction in California courts is proper if ―because of the 

defendants‘ relationship with the forum, it is not unfair to require that they answer 
9

in a California court for an alleged injury that is substantially connected to the 

defendants‘ forum contacts.‖ (Vons, supra, at p. 453.)

Notwithstanding our relatively broad substantial connection standard, mere 

similarity of claims is an insufficient basis for specific jurisdiction. The claims of 

real parties in interest, nonresidents injured by their use of Plavix they purchased 

and used in other states, in no sense arise from BMS‘s marketing and sales of 

Plavix in California, or from any of BMS‘s other activities in this state. Nor is any 

other substantial connection apparent. 

BMS promoted and sold Plavix in this state, giving rise to the California 

plaintiffs‘ claims. BMS also engaged in such promotion and sales in many other 

states, giving rise to claims by residents of those states. As all the claims derive 

from similar conduct and allege similar injuries, the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims 

closely resemble those made by California residents. But I can perceive no 

substantial nexus between the nonresidents‘ claims and BMS‘s California 

activities. In each state, the company‘s activities are connected to claims by those 

who obtained Plavix or were injured in that state, but no relationship other than 

similarity runs between the claims made in different states. As BMS argues, its 

California contacts fail to ―intersect‖ with the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims.

Even a commentator ―sympathetic to an expanded role for specific 

jurisdiction‖ found the approach of the Court of Appeal in this case, which the 

majority in this court largely replicates, so overly broad as ―to reintroduce general 

jurisdiction by another name.‖ (Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections 

on Daimler and Its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States

(2015) 19 Lewis & Clark L.Rev. 675, 687 (hereafter Silberman).) ―A more 

plausible specific jurisdiction forum might be the state where the drugs were 

manufactured or distributed to both the California and non-California plaintiffs; all 

plaintiffs‘ claims might be said to  ̳arise from‘ such defective manufacture and 
10

thereby provide an alternative single forum in which to have all the plaintiffs 

assert their claims. In Bristol-Meyers [sic], no such connection to California can 

be established for the non-California plaintiffs. The claims of the California and 

nonresident plaintiffs are merely parallel.‖ (Ibid., fn. omitted.)

One form of substantial connection between a defendant‘s forum activities 

and the claims against it exists when the forum activities are legally relevant to 

establish the claims. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 469.) In that situation, the 

forum state‘s interest in regulating conduct occurring within its borders is 

implicated, as the plaintiff is seeking to impose liability, at least in part, for acts 

the defendant committed in the forum state. (Id. at p. 472.) But no such legal 

relevance connection is apparent here. The nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims rest on 

allegations that BMS deceptively marketed and sold Plavix to them or their 

prescribing physicians, but, as noted earlier, the record is devoid of any 

suggestion, nor do real parties claim, the nonresident plaintiffs bought or were 

prescribed Plavix from a California source. BMS‘s marketing and sales activities 

in California thus appear irrelevant to real parties‘ claims. To quote BMS‘s brief, 

the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims ―would be exactly the same if BMS had never 

set foot in California, had never engaged in any commercial activity in California, 

had never sold any product here, and had engaged only non-California 

distributors.‖

In addition to its interest in regulating conduct within its borders, each state 

has an interest in providing a judicial forum for its injured residents, regardless of 

whether the conduct sued on occurred in the state. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 

pp. 472–473.) ―[T]he state has a legitimate interest as sovereign in providing its 

residents with protection from injuries caused by nonresidents and with a forum in 

which to seek redress. This assertion of sovereignty with respect to nonresident 

defendants is fair when those defendants have availed themselves of certain 
11

benefits within the state and the claim is related to those contacts.‖ (Id. at p. 473.) 

But reference to the state‘s interest in providing a forum for its residents to seek 

legal redress is of no help to real parties in interest here, as they are not California 

residents. California has no discernable sovereign interest in providing an Ohio or 

South Carolina resident a forum in which to seek redress for injuries in those states 

caused by conduct occurring outside California. A mere resemblance between the 

nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims and those of California residents creates no 

sovereign interest in litigating those claims in a forum to which they have no 

substantial connection.

The majority argues that taking jurisdiction over the nonresidents‘ claims 

furthers a California interest because evidence of their injuries may be admissible 

to help the California plaintiffs prove Plavix was a defective product. (Maj. opn., 

ante, at p. 32.) But admissibility of other injuries does not depend on joinder of 

the other injured person, as the cases the majority cites illustrate. In neither Ault v. 

International Harvester (1974) 13 Cal.3d 113 nor Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft 

Corp. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 540, where evidence of prior similar injuries was held 

admissible, were those injured in the prior accidents joined as parties in the action.

The majority also suggests that jurisdiction over the nonresidents‘ claims is 

proper because California law attempts to ―protect[] consumers from the potential 

dangers posed by prescription medication.‖ (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 33.) The 

statutes cited, however, regulate the dispensing of prescription drugs by California 

pharmacists (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 4070–4078), while the claims at issue in this 

case are against BMS, a drug manufacturer. Moreover, real parties in interest have 

neither alleged nor proven they were prescribed or furnished Plavix in California. 

How the cited California laws might apply to their claims is thus unclear, to say 

the least.
12

In the same passage, the majority implies that the activity of BMS‘s 

California sales representatives, whose representations California has an interest in 

regulating, might somehow be related to real parties‘ claims. (Maj. opn., ante, at 

p. 33.) In this instance as well, the majority ignores the complete absence of 

evidence showing any such relationship. Real parties in interest, who have the 

burden of proving forum contacts related to their claims, have not even attempted 

to establish that sales representatives in California misled physicians in other 

states about Plavix‘s efficacy and safety. While no doubt correct California has an 

interest in regulating dangerous conduct within our state (maj. opn, ante, p. 33, fn. 

6), the majority neglects to explain how that interest can be served by taking 

jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims of persons unaffected by any such conduct.

Finally, the majority asserts that California‘s interest in regulating the 

conduct of codefendant McKesson Corporation (McKesson), a pharmaceutical 

distributor headquartered in California, justifies adjudicating real parties‘ claims 

against BMS in a California court. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 33–34.) Of all the 

majority‘s red herrings, this is perhaps the ruddiest. Why plaintiffs sued 

McKesson as well as BMS is not obvious—BMS suggests it was merely to avoid 

removal to federal court (see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2))—but at no point have real 

parties argued McKesson bore any responsibility in providing them with Plavix. 

In their brief on the merits, real parties contended BMS‘s relationship with 

McKesson helped BMS make substantial profits ―within California,‖ and at oral 

argument their attorney acknowledged he had no evidence tying McKesson to the 

Plavix that allegedly injured real parties outside this state. The notion of a 

connection between McKesson‘s conduct in California and the claims of real 

parties in interest, which arise from their acquisition and use of Plavix in other 

states, is purely a product of the majority‘s imagination.
13

Notwithstanding the majority‘s speculative suggestions, as far as the record 

shows real parties‘ claims arise solely from conduct in other states and do not 

implicate California‘s legitimate interest in regulating conduct within its borders.

B. Jurisdiction Over Liability Claims for Pharmaceutical Drugs

Neither real parties in interest nor the majority cites any decision, state or 

federal, finding specific jurisdiction on facts similar to those here. In fact, courts 

in both systems have rejected jurisdiction over drug defect claims made by 

plaintiffs who neither reside in nor were injured by conduct in the forum state. 

In Boaz v. Boyle & Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 700 (Boaz), a group of 

plaintiffs, mostly residents of New York and New Jersey, but including one 

California resident, sued several manufacturers of the drug DES for injuries 

allegedly resulting from their grandmothers‘ ingestion of the drug in New York. 

(Id. at p. 704.) The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the action against 

defendant Emons Industries, Inc., which was not subject to California‘s general 

jurisdiction, holding the basis for specific jurisdiction was also lacking as the 

defendant‘s activities in California were unrelated to the plaintiffs‘ injuries. (Id. at 

p. 705.) ―It is conceded that none of appellants‘ grandmothers, who ingested DES, 

did so in California. Nor did any of them acquire the product as the result of any 

of Emons‘s activities related to California. Indeed, as we have seen, none of them 

except [the single California resident] has any connection with this state.‖ (Id. at 

p. 718.) Though the defendant had sold DES in California as it had in other states, 

that similarity of conduct did not subject it to personal jurisdiction for the purposes 

of adjudicating the out-of-state plaintiffs‘ claims, though, as the court noted, 

jurisdiction might be appropriate ―in a case arising out of ingestion in California or 
14

by purchase or prescription in California of DES.‖ (Id. at p. 721.)1 As in the 

present case, none of those facts had been or could be established.

Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1st Cir. 1984) 744 F.2d 213, presented a similar 

fact pattern in an individual suit. The plaintiff there sued a DES manufacturer in a 

federal court in New Hampshire for injuries she allegedly suffered from in utero

exposure to the drug. The plaintiff‘s mother took the drug in Massachusetts, 

where she lived. (Id. at p. 214.) That the manufacturer had marketed DES 

nationwide, including in New Hampshire, was insufficient to support specific 

jurisdiction: Although Lilly marketed and sold DES nationwide, including in New 

Hampshire, ―Glater‘s cause of action did not arise from Lilly‘s New Hampshire 

activities; rather, her injuries were caused in Massachusetts by exposure in utero

to DES which her mother purchased and consumed in Massachusetts.‖ (Id. at 

p. 216.) Were the defendant‘s New Hampshire contacts deemed sufficiently 

related to the cause of action arising in Massachusetts, the court ―would be obliged 

to hold that any plaintiff in Glater‘s position—a nonresident injured out of state by 

a drug sold and consumed out of state—could bring suit in New Hampshire for 

DES injuries.‖ (Id. at p. 216, fn. 4.) Such ―retributive jurisdiction‖ over claims 

 

1 As to the California resident, the Boaz court reasoned jurisdiction was 

lacking because her grandmother had not taken DES in California and therefore 

―any DES-related affliction she suffers has nothing to do with any of Emons‘s 

activities related to California.‖ (Boaz, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 718.) The 

court may have gone too far in this respect; California‘s interest in providing a 

forum for its residents to seek redress for actions having injurious effects in the 

state arguably justified specific jurisdiction over the California resident‘s claims. 

For the same reason, In re DES Cases (E.D.N.Y. 1992) 789 F.Supp. 552 can be 

distinguished as involving the claims of New York residents seeking a remedy for 

injuries occurring in New York; although the defendants challenging jurisdiction 

there did not market DES in New York, they bore legal responsibility for injuries 

there under the state‘s rule of market share liability. (See id. at pp. 592–593.) 
15

unconnected to the forum ―comports with neither logic nor fairness.‖ (Ibid.; 

accord, Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Company (1st Cir. 1970) 423 F.2d 584, 585, 

587 [suit in New Hampshire over drug taken and allegedly causing injury in 

Massachusetts ―did not arise [in New Hampshire], or as a result of anything which 

occurred there‖ and hence was an ―unconnected cause[] of action‖ that could only 

be justified by general jurisdiction, the basis for which was also lacking].)

Also similar, though less extensively reasoned as to specific jurisdiction, is 

Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc. (4th Cir. 1971) 444 F.2d 745. That decision 

addressed two consolidated cases brought in a federal court in South Carolina, 

both by residents of other states who bought and consumed the allegedly harmful 

drugs (not named in the decision), against drug manufacturers that conducted 

business in South Carolina but were not incorporated or headquartered there and 

had not made the subject drugs there. (Id. at p. 746.) The court observed that the 

plaintiffs were not residents of South Carolina and their causes of action ―arose 

outside the forum and were unconnected with the defendant‘s activities in South 

Carolina.‖ (Id. at p. 747.) Noting ―the lack of a  ̳rational nexus‘ between the 

forum state and the relevant facts surrounding the claims presented‖ such as would 

support specific jurisdiction, the court moved on to general jurisdiction (for which 

it also found the forum contacts insufficient). (Id. at p. 748.)

In all these cases, the defendants had sold their pharmaceutical drugs in the 

forum state. Indeed, in Boaz, California physicians accounted for 9 percent of the 

defendant‘s DES sales. (Boaz, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 715.)2 Yet these 

 

2 The majority (maj. opn., ante, at p. 25) notes that the defendant in Boaz, 

unlike BMS, did not employ salespeople or maintain offices in the state. Yet 

through ―advertising in selected professional magazines and professional journals, 

and targeted mailings of samples and brochures to obstetricians and 

gynecologists,‖ all ―done on a national scale‖ (Boaz, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at 

(footnote continued on next page)
16

courts— correctly, in my view— considered that forum activity to be unconnected 

to the plaintiffs‘ claims, which arose from use of the drugs in other states. Not 

until today‘s decision has specific jurisdiction over a drug liability claim arising 

from the nonresident plaintiff‘s purchase, use, and injury outside the forum state 

been premised on the fact that the defendant also sold the drug in the forum state.

C. Specific Jurisdiction Decisions Relied on by Real Parties

Turning from pharmaceutical liability to the broader case law, we see that 

none of the decisions real parties cite support specific jurisdiction based, as here, 

on the mere resemblance between the disputed claims and distinct claims brought 

by other plaintiffs that arose from the defendant‘s forum contacts. Each of these 

cited cases involved a substantial connection between the defendant‘s activities in 

the forum state and the plaintiff‘s claims, not merely a connection between the 

forum activities and similar claims made by other plaintiffs.

In Cornelison v. Chaney (1976) 16 Cal.3d 143 (Cornelison), a California 

resident sued for the wrongful death of her husband, who died in an automobile 

accident in Nevada. The defendant, a Nebraska resident, was a trucker hauling 

goods in interstate commerce. He made approximately 20 trips to California each 

year and was en route to this state with a shipment when his truck collided with 

the decedent‘s vehicle in Nevada, near the California border. (Id. at pp. 146–147.)

We concluded the plaintiff‘s cause of action did bear a substantial connection 

to the defendant‘s business activities in California: ―As we have seen, defendant 

 

(footnote continued from previous page)

p. 715), the company sold a large amount of DES—the same product at issue in 

the disputed lawsuits—in California. Like BMS, then, the defendant in Boaz

―enjoyed sizeable revenues from the sales of its product here.‖ (Maj. opn., ante, at 

p. 26.) Why the absence of other, dissimilar ties should serve to distinguish the 

case is unclear.
17

has been engaged in a continuous course of conduct that has brought him into the 

state almost twice a month for seven years as a trucker under a California license. 

The accident occurred not far from the California border, while defendant was 

bound for this state. He was not only bringing goods into California for a local 

manufacturer, but he intended to receive merchandise here for delivery elsewhere. 

The accident arose out of the driving of the truck, the very activity which was the 

essential basis of defendant‘s contacts with this state. These factors demonstrate, 

in our view, a substantial nexus between plaintiff‘s cause of action and 

defendant‘s activities in California.‖ (Cornelison, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 149.) In 

further support, we observed that California had an interest in providing a forum 

for the litigation because the plaintiff was a California resident. (Id. at p. 151.)

Cornelison has in common with the present case that the plaintiff‘s injury 

arose directly from the defendant‘s conduct outside California. But in Cornelison

the defendant‘s out-of-state conduct, his allegedly negligent driving in Nevada, 

was directed (literally) toward California and resulted in injury to a California 

resident. The connections to California that justified jurisdiction in Cornelison are 

missing from the claims of real parties in interest here.

In Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th 434, we held specific jurisdiction proper over two 

restaurant franchisees based and operating in Washington State. In multiparty 

litigation arising out of food poisoning incidents at their and other Jack-in-the-Box 

restaurants, the supplier of the allegedly tainted meat (Vons Companies, Inc. 

(Vons)) cross-complained against several franchisees, including the Washington 

franchisees, alleging their failure to cook the meat properly caused the poisoning. 

(Id. at pp. 440–441.) Among other contacts with California, the franchisees had 

executed the franchise agreements, which specified methods of preparing Jack-inthe-Box food products, in California, did regular business with the franchisor at its 
18

headquarters in San Diego, and had officers attend training sessions offered by the 

franchisor in California. (Id. at pp. 442–443.)

We held Vons‘s claims against the franchisees bore a substantial relationship 

to their contacts with California for two reasons: first, the franchise relationship—

formed in California, under which the franchisees bought meat Vons supplied to 

the franchisor—had drawn Vons and the franchisees into a relationship as alleged 

joint tortfeasors, with certain joint liabilities and rights of indemnification, rights 

upon which Vons‘ cross-complaint in part rested; second, the franchise 

relationship, by imposing uniform standards for cooking food, buying equipment, 

and training employees, was itself an alleged source of Vons‘ injuries, which Vons 

traced to the ―  ̳systematically deficient‘ ‖ procedures required by the franchisor. 

(Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 456–457.)

Real parties in interest rely on Vons for the propositions that for specific 

jurisdiction to be justified the defendant‘s forum activities need not be directed at 

the plaintiff or directly give rise to the plaintiff‘s claims. (See Vons, supra, 14 

Cal.4th at pp. 453, 457.) Both points are well taken. Nonetheless, in Vons the 

connection between the forum activities and the claim was far more substantial 

than in the present case. By their activities in California, including the formation 

of franchise relationships, the franchisees in Vons established the conditions that 

would ultimately allow the franchisor‘s meat supplier, Vons, to seek indemnity for 

their joint liability and redress for its own injuries. The franchisees‘ forum 

activities were not directed at Vons, with which they had no direct relationship, 

and may not have proximately given rise to Vons‘s claims, but by establishing a 

franchise relationship pursuant to which the franchisees bought Vons‘s meat and 

prepared it according to methods set out in the franchise agreement, they set the 

stage for those claims, to say the least. No such nexus is apparent here, where 
19

BMS‘s marketing and sales of Plavix in California did nothing to establish the 

circumstances under which it allegedly injured plaintiffs in other states.

Finally as to California cases, real parties in interest cite Snowney, supra, 35 

Cal.4th 1054, in which we held a California resident could sue a group of Nevada 

hotels in a California court for the hotels‘ failure to provide notice that they would 

impose an energy surcharge on their room prices. (Id. at p. 1059.) In a relatively 

brief discussion of the relatedness issue (the bulk of our analysis concerned the 

question of purposeful availment), we held the plaintiff‘s claims had a substantial 

connection to the defendants‘ California forum activities because the plaintiff‘s 

false advertising and unfair competition claims were based on the hotels‘ alleged 

omissions in their California advertising and in the reservation process. (Id. at 

p. 1068.) ―Because the harm alleged by plaintiff relates directly to the content of 

defendants‘ promotional activities in California, an inherent relationship between 

plaintiff‘s claims and defendants‘ contacts with California exists.‖ (Id. at p. 1069.)

Real parties rely on Snowney for its adherence to the substantial connection 

test articulated in Vons and for its reiteration of Vons‘s statements that the required 

intensity of forum contacts and connection of the claim to those contacts are 

inversely related (the greater the contacts, the less of a relationship need be shown) 

and that the forum contacts need not be directed at the plaintiff or give rise directly 

to the plaintiff‘s claim. (See Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1068.) I find those 

principles unavailing in this case. However intense the defendant‘s activities in 

California, they must still bear a substantial relationship to the plaintiff‘s claims, 

and neither Snowney nor any of the other decisions real parties cite suggests that a 

mere resemblance between the plaintiff‘s claims and those made by other 

plaintiffs that are based on the defendant‘s California contacts establishes a 

substantial connection. 
20

Cornelison, Vons and Snowney establish that we do not demand the 

relationship between the defendant‘s California contacts and the plaintiff‘s claims 

be causal or direct. They do not, however, support specific jurisdiction on the 

tenuous basis of a resemblance to other claims by other plaintiffs. (See 

Greenwell v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 783, 801 [Vons and 

Snowney require a substantial connection between the plaintiff‘s claims and the 

defendant‘s forum contacts; test is not satisfied whenever there is ―any 

relationship at all‖].)

In Keeton, supra, 465 U.S. 770, the United States Supreme Court upheld the 

assertion of specific jurisdiction in New Hampshire to adjudicate the libel claims 

of a New York resident against an Ohio corporation with its principal place of 

business in California. (Id. at pp. 772–774.) The high court found the defendant‘s 

regular circulation of magazines in New Hampshire was sufficient to support the 

state‘s jurisdiction over a libel claim based on the magazine‘s contents, even 

though the plaintiff could, under the ―  ̳single publication rule‘ ‖ followed in New 

Hampshire, recover damages from publication of the magazine throughout the 

United States. (Id. at pp. 773–774.) The court emphasized that the plaintiff was 

suing, in part, for damages she suffered in New Hampshire, ―[a]nd it is beyond 

dispute that New Hampshire has a significant interest in redressing injuries that 

actually occur within the State.‖ (Id. at p. 776.) 

Unlike the plaintiff in Keeton, real parties in interest suffered no injury in 

California or from BMS‘s conduct in California. They nonetheless argue Keeton

is analogous because the plaintiff there sought recovery, in large part, for injuries 

incurred outside the forum state. For two reasons, however, the analogy does not 

hold.

First, the single publication rule at work in Keeton was a state law rule 

governing the measure of damages for defamation, not one governing the joinder 
21

of claims or claimants. The propriety of that state law damages rule was not itself 

a jurisdictional issue; rather, the question was whether personal jurisdiction in 

New Hampshire violated due process given the state‘s single publication rule (and 

its unusually long statute of limitations). (Keeton, supra, 465 U.S. at pp. 773–

774.) In contrast, BMS‘s motion to quash service of summons as to the claims of 

the nonresident plaintiffs directly presents the jurisdictional issue as to those 

plaintiffs. We ask whether the superior court may take jurisdiction over defendant 

to adjudicate those claims, and are not required to decide whether the entire suit, 

including the claims of the California residents, would be subject to dismissal for 

lack of jurisdiction if the nonresidents‘ claims were included in it.

Second, New Hampshire had an interest in adjudicating the out-of-state 

damages that does not translate to the factual context of this case. (See Keeton, 

supra, 465 U.S. at p. 777.) To prevent the extraordinary burden on courts and 

litigants of having a defamation plaintiff sue separately in 50 states—and to allow 

effective application of a statute of limitations for publications that continue or 

recur over lengthy periods—most states have adopted the single publication rule, 

allowing only a single action per publication, but one in which all damages from 

the publication may be recovered. (See Civ. Code, § 3425.3 [Cal. Uniform Single 

Publication Act]; Christoff v. Nestlé USA, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 468, 477–479; 

see also Keeton, supra, at p. 778.) 

On the facts of this case, there is no analogous state interest of similar force 

that would justify California courts adjudicating the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims. 

This is not a case in which the individual California plaintiffs would be stymied by 

procedural obstacles or restrictive damages rules were the nonresidents excluded 

from the action. Plaintiffs allege they suffered ―severe physical, economic and 

emotional injuries‖ from their use of Plavix, including bleeding ulcers, 

gastrointestinal bleeding, cerebral bleeding, heart attack and stroke. Even if some 
22

of the California plaintiffs might have individual claims too small to justify suit, 

the consolidation of scores of such claims from within California would remedy 

that insufficiency without the addition of hundreds of nonresidents‘ claims. 

California can thus provide an effective forum for its residents to seek redress 

without joining those claims to similar claims by nonresidents. Nor does this case 

raise the specter of a continually restarting statute of limitations that would subject 

defendants like BMS to the harassment of unending suits for the same conduct 

(see Christoff v. Nestlé USA, Inc., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 478), as was the case

with the defamation suit in Keeton.

The majority argues jurisdiction over nonresidents‘ claims is justified by the 

efficiencies of litigating all claims arising from a ―mass tort‖ in a single forum and 

by the existence of a complex litigation division in San Francisco Superior Court 

―well suited to expeditiously handle such large cases.‖ (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 35, 

34.) If these 678 plaintiffs were all the injured Plavix users in the United States, 

and the only options for the nonresident plaintiffs were participation in this action 

or individual actions in their home states, then joint proceedings in California 

would likely be the most efficient procedure, though the extent of that efficiency 

would depend on how choice of law questions are resolved, among other factors. 

(See Silberman, supra, 19 Lewis & Clark L.Rev. at p. 687 [―As for the efficiency 

arguments relied on by the California appeals court, only the issue of the defective 

quality of the drug is common to all the claims.‖].) 

But these plaintiffs do not constitute the entire universe of those claiming 

injury from Plavix—far from it—and real parties‘ options are not limited to 

joining this action or each bringing separate actions in their respective states. In 

addition to consolidated multidistrict federal litigation in the District of New 
23

Jersey, individual, mass or representative actions have been brought in several 

other states.3 Whether or not real parties‘ claims are heard together with those of 

the California plaintiffs, inefficiency and the potential for conflicting rulings will 

exist so long as actions are simultaneously pending in several state and federal 

courts. (See generally Miller, Overlapping Class Actions (1996) 71 N.Y.U. 

L.Rev. 514, 520–525.) 

No mechanism exists for centralizing nationwide litigation in a state court; 

there is no means by which pending actions in Illinois courts, for example, can be 

transferred to a California court. The San Francisco Superior Court, no matter 

how well equipped for trying complex cases, cannot adjudicate the entire dispute 

between injured Plavix users and BMS. If efficiency is the goal, federal litigation 

 

3 See In re Plavix Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability 

Litigation (No. II) (U.S. Jud. Panel Multidist. Litig. 2013) 923 F.Supp.2d 1376, 

1379–1381 (centralizing in District of New Jersey litigation arising in that state 

and in Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, New York, and Pennsylvania, and potentially 

centralizing additional actions from California and Mississippi); Mills v. BristolMyers Squibb Co. (D.Ariz., Aug. 12, 2011, No. CV 11-968-PHX-FJM) 2011 WL 

3566131, at *1 (individual action); Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. Bristol-Myers Squibb 

Co. (D.Hawaii, Aug. 5, 2014, No. CIV. 14-00180 HG-RLP) 2014 WL 3865213, at 

*2 (parens patriae action brought by the Attorney General of Hawaii remanded to 

state court); Davidson v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (S.D.Ill., Apr. 13, 2012, No. 

CIV. 12-58-GPM) 2012 WL 1253165, at *5 (action by 83 plaintiffs remanded to 

state court); Boyer v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (S.D.Ill., Apr. 13, 2012, No. CIV. 

12-61-GPM) 2012 WL 1253177, at *5 (same, as to action by 71 plaintiffs); Anglin 

v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (S.D.Ill., Apr. 13, 2012, No. CIV. 12-60-GPM) 2012 

WL 1268143, at *5 (same, as to action by 67 plaintiffs); Tolliver v. Bristol-Myers 

Squibb Co. (N.D.Ohio, July 30, 2012, No. 1:12 CV 00754) 2012 WL 3074538, at 

*1 (individual action); Employer Teamsters-Local Nos. 175/505 Health and 

Welfare Trust Fund v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (S.D.W. Va. 2013) 969 

F.Supp.2d 463, 466 (action by third party payors alleging misleading and false 

marketing of Plavix).
24

centralized through the multidistrict procedure offers a more promising path than a 

series of uncoordinated state and federal court actions.

Keeton, in which jurisdiction was found proper despite a state law rule 

allowing damages for out-of-state injuries, thus fails to support real parties‘ 

contention that jurisdiction over litigation brought by nonresident plaintiffs whose 

claims arose in other states may be obtained by joining their cases to similar ones 

brought by California plaintiffs. Such jurisdiction by joinder, moreover, would 

run counter to the holding of Hanson v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235 (Hanson).

In Hanson, the high court held a Florida court considering the validity of a 

trust created in Delaware did not have personal jurisdiction over the Delaware 

trustee, who had performed no relevant acts in Florida (357 U.S. at p. 252),4 even 

though other parties to the dispute resided in Florida and could be brought before 

the Florida court: ―It is urged that because the settlor and most of the appointees 

and beneficiaries were domiciled in Florida the courts of that State should be able 

to exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident trustees. This is a non 

sequitur. With personal jurisdiction over the executor, legatees, and appointees, 

there is nothing in federal law to prevent Florida from adjudicating concerning the 

respective rights and liabilities of those parties. But Florida has not chosen to do 

 

4 The majority‘s account of Hanson as resting solely on the purposeful 

availment prong of the specific jurisdiction test (maj. opn., ante, at p. 26, fn. 3) is 

incomplete. The trust settlor in Hanson had moved to Florida after establishing 

the trust; the trustee then paid the settlor trust income in that state and received 

from her directions for trust administration, including the execution of two powers 

of appointment. (Hanson, supra, 357 U.S. at p. 252 & fn. 24.) But because the 

litigation concerned the validity of the trust agreement itself (id. at p. 253), the 

cause of action was ―not one that arises out of an act done or transaction 

consummated in the forum State.‖ (Id. at p. 251.) Hanson‘s holding was thus 

based on the lack of a relationship between the litigation and the defendant‘s 

forum contacts as well as on the paucity of those contacts.
25

so. As we understand its law, the trustee is an indispensable party over whom the 

court must acquire jurisdiction before it is empowered to enter judgment in a 

proceeding affecting the validity of a trust. It does not acquire that jurisdiction by 

being the  ̳center of gravity‘ of the controversy, or the most convenient location 

for litigation.‖ (Id. at p. 254, fn. omitted.)

It is likewise a non sequitur to argue that because many Californians have 

sued BMS for injuries allegedly caused by their use of Plavix, and the superior 

court‘s jurisdiction to address their claims is not disputed, the claims of 

nonresidents injured in other states should also be adjudicated here. California 

might or might not be an especially convenient and efficient forum for nationwide 

Plavix litigation, but joinder of California plaintiffs cannot confer personal 

jurisdiction over BMS to adjudicate claims that do not arise out of, and are not 

otherwise related to, BMS‘s business activities in California.

The majority posits two bases for deeming BMS‘s California activities 

related to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims. First, despite a silent factual record 

on this point, the majority infers that BMS employed the ―same . . . assertedly 

misleading marketing and promotion‖ in California as in the states where real 

parties resided and were allegedly injured.5 (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.) I have 

shown above that neither the case law nor an analysis of forum state interests 

supports basing specific jurisdiction on a similarity between activities in the forum 

state and those outside the forum. Characterizing BMS‘s multistate marketing 

activities as ―coordinated‖ (maj. opn., ante, at p. 24) adds nothing to the 

 

5 Despite relying on BMS‘s nationwide marketing of Plavix as a basis for 

jurisdiction, and despite bearing the burden of proof on contacts and relatedness, 

real parties in interest introduced no evidence of particular marketing materials or 

broadcasts deployed in any state.
26

jurisdictional argument given that, as the majority concedes, the record shows 

BMS‘s marketing campaign for Plavix was coordinated from New York and New 

Jersey rather than from California. The majority‘s supposition that California 

courts have personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant to adjudicate a 

claim arising from deceptive advertising in, say, Maryland because the defendant 

used a common marketing strategy in California, Maryland and other states is 

without rational foundation.

Nor does calling BMS‘s nationwide marketing of Plavix a ―course of 

conduct‖ (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 24, 25, 36) advance the majority‘s cause. As 

already noted (fn. 5, ante), real parties introduced no evidence of marketing 

materials or broadcasts used in any state. Other than that some degree of 

commonality existed, which BMS conceded, the extent of marketing overlap 

among the states is simply unknown. Certainly, this record provides no basis for 

assuming that real parties and the California plaintiffs were all injured by a single 

television broadcast made simultaneously in every media market or a single print 

advertisement published simultaneous in newspapers and magazines throughout 

the nation. This is not a case, that is to say, of a single act injuring plaintiffs in 

multiple states at one blow, where the argument for common jurisdiction might be 

stronger. All that appears is that Plavix was marketed nationwide and that BMS 

may have used many of the same materials—none of them generated in 

California—in various states. Such similarity of causes is not sufficient to give 

our courts jurisdiction over all claims, wherever they arise, based on 

misrepresentations or omissions in a company‘s marketing materials.

Second, the majority notes that BMS maintains some research facilities in 

California, although the majority concedes Plavix was not developed in those 
27

facilities.6 (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.) This second ground of relatedness is both 

illogical and startling in its potential breadth. Because BMS has performed 

research on other drugs in California, claims of injury from Plavix may, according 

to the majority, be adjudicated in this state. Will we in the next case decide that a 

company may be sued in California for dismissing an employee in Florida because 

on another occasion it fired a different employee in California, or that an Illinois 

resident can sue his automobile insurer here for bad faith because the defendant 

sells health care policies in the California market? The majority points to no 

substantial connection between Plavix claims arising in other states and research 

on unspecified other products in this state.

II. The Relatedness Requirement Serves Important Functions and 

Should Not Be Minimized

As shown in part I, ante, the case law on specific jurisdiction does not 

support a California court taking jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims, 

arising from their use of Plavix in other states. BMS marketed and sold Plavix to 

other plaintiffs within California, but those forum activities are not substantially 

related to the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims. In the absence, however, of any 

United States Supreme Court decisions closely on point, stare decisis does not 

prevent the majority from giving the relatedness requirement scant consideration, 

while relying on its theory that the asserted benefits of consolidating multistate 

claims in California outweigh the burdens for BMS of defending real parties‘ 

 

6 This is not a matter of the absence of evidence. In support of its motion to 

quash service, a BMS executive submitted a declaration stating that ―none of the 

work to develop Plavix took place in California,‖ and that all development, 

manufacture, labeling, and marketing of Plavix was performed or directed from 

New York or New Jersey; none was accomplished or directed by California 

employees. 
28

claims here together with those of the California plaintiffs. (Maj. opn., ante, at 

pp. 29–35.) Nevertheless, this approach is, in my view, a serious mistake. By 

essentially ignoring relatedness and merely satisfying itself that defendant is not 

being haled into an inconvenient forum where it has no significant contacts, the 

majority blurs the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction and impairs 

the values of reciprocity, predictability, and interstate federalism served by due 

process limits on personal jurisdiction.

Reciprocity, in this context, refers to the idea that the litigation to which a 

defendant is exposed in a particular forum should bear some relationship to the 

benefits the company has sought by doing business in the state. (See Moore, The 

Relatedness Problem in Specific Jurisdiction (2001) 37 Idaho L.Rev. 583, 599 

[―The party has garnered the benefits offered by the government in which the 

court sits. These benefits include the laws, the administrative framework and their 

restraining effects. In return, the party concedes to that government a quantum of 

power to govern his conduct, a power which he himself holds in a natural 

autonomous state.‖].) Such reciprocity is most clearly maintained by the state 

taking jurisdiction over disputes arising directly from the defendant‘s activities in 

the state. As the high court said in International Shoe, where ―[t]he obligation 

which is . . . sued upon arose out of those very activities,‖ it will generally be 

―reasonable and just . . . to permit the state to enforce the obligations which 

appellant has incurred there.‖ (International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at p. 320.) 

More broadly, enforcing a meaningful relatedness requirement ensures some 

degree of reciprocity; because the forum‘s assertion of jurisdiction cannot 

encompass disputes that have no substantial connection with the defendant‘s 

forum activities, the liabilities to which the defendant is exposed in the forum will 

tend to bear a relationship to the benefits it has sought in doing business there. 

―Relationship helps test whether the benefits and burdens are similar. When a suit 
29

concerns the activities from which the corporation received in-state benefits, there 

is some similarity in the burden imposed by the assertion of jurisdiction. . . . 

Relatedness may be a rough measure, but it placed a logical limit on the burdens 

arising from in-state activities.‖ (Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem 

Overlooked in the National Debate About “Class Action Fairness” (2005) 58 

SMU L.Rev. 1313, 1345–1346 (hereafter Andrews).)

Relatedness bears on predictability in much the same way. ―In order for a 

business to properly structure its behavior—set consumer costs, procure insurance, 

or sever its relationship with a particular state—it must not only know that a 

contact has been made in a particular state (an aim protected through the 

purposeful availment standard), but it also must have some minimal appreciation 

of the effect of that contact. The relationship standard helps give this knowledge. 

If a business entity chooses to enter a state on a minimal level, it knows that under 

the relationship standard, its potential for suit will be limited to suits concerning 

the activities that it initiates in the state.‖ (Andrews, supra, 58 SMU L.Rev. at 

p. 1346; see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297 

(World-Wide Volkswagen) [observing that when a corporation sells its products in 

a state, ―it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there,‖ and jurisdiction over a 

suit would not be unreasonable ―if its allegedly defective merchandise has there 

been the source of injury to its owner or to others.‖].) 

Finally, limiting specific jurisdiction to litigation that is substantially 

connected to the defendant‘s forum activities prevents states from straying beyond 

their legitimate regulatory spheres. Appropriately limited, specific jurisdiction 

―acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the 

limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.‖ 

(World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 292.) As the high court explained 

in Hanson, the growth in interstate commerce and the easing of communications 
30

and transportation may have tempered, but they have not eliminated, the role that 

territorial limits on state regulation play under due process. Due process 

restrictions on personal jurisdiction ―are more than a guarantee of immunity from 

inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations 

on the power of the respective States.‖ (Hanson, supra, 357 U.S. at p. 251.) 

Expanding on this point in World-Wide Volkswagen, the court explained that 

while the Constitution‘s Framers foresaw a nation of economically interdependent 

states, they ―also intended that the States retain many essential attributes of 

sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their 

courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the 

sovereignty of all of its sister States—a limitation express or implicit in both the 

original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.‖ (WorldWide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 293.) Thus even in the modern era due 

process limits on personal jurisdiction retain a territorial aspect: ―Even if the 

defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to litigate 

before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong interest 

in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most 

convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument 

of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to 

render a valid judgment.‖ (Id. at p. 294; accord, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. 

Nicastro (2011) 564 U.S. 873, 879 (plur. opn. of Kennedy, J.) [―The Due Process 

Clause protects an individual‘s right to be deprived of life, liberty, or property 

only by the exercise of lawful power. . . . This is no less true with respect to the 

power of a sovereign to resolve disputes through judicial process than with respect 
31

to the power of a sovereign to prescribe rules of conduct for those within its 

sphere.‖].)7

The relatedness requirement for specific jurisdiction plays a key role in 

implementing these interstate federalism limits. By conducting business within a 

state or directing its efforts at the state, a company brings its activities within the 

state‘s core regulatory concerns. Litigation that arises from those activities falls 

squarely within the state‘s sovereign power to adjudicate. In contrast, litigation 

arising outside the state is unlikely to be a fit subject for state court adjudication 

except to the extent it involves state residents. ―A state has sovereignty with 

regard to activity conducted within its borders, and it thus has power over claims 

arising from that activity. . . . A state seemingly has no sovereignty over activity 

that neither involves its citizens nor occurs within its borders.‖ (Andrews, supra, 

58 SMU L.Rev. at p. 1347.) Relatedness thus ―helps limit the reach of states so 

that they do not exceed legitimate state interests.‖ (Id. at p. 1348.) As this court 

remarked (in a choice of law discussion, but with equal applicability to 

jurisdiction), our state‘s legitimate regulatory interest does not ordinarily extend to 

measures aimed at ―alter[ing] a defendant‘s conduct in another state vis-à-vis 

another state‘s residents.‖ (Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. (2006) 39 

Cal.4th 95, 104, italics omitted.)

 

7 In Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee

(1982) 456 U.S. 694, 703, footnote 10, the high court noted that concern for 

federalism is not ―an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court,‖ 

but rather ―a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due 

Process Clause,‖ waivable by the party. Though not an independent, unwaivable 

restriction on jurisdiction, interstate federalism remains an important consideration 

in determining how the due process limits on jurisdiction should be applied. ―The 

defendant has a due process right to have states act only within the limits of their 

sovereignty.‖ (Andrews, supra, 58 SMU L.Rev. at p. 1347.)
32

Basing specific jurisdiction on mere similarity between a corporation‘s forum 

activities and those outside the state, as the majority does in this case, defeats the 

relatedness requirement‘s functions of reciprocity, predictability, and interstate 

federalism. If BMS must answer in a California court for Plavix claims arising 

across the country simply because some Californians have made similar claims, 

the link between the benefits BMS has sought by doing that business in the state 

and the liabilities to which it is exposed here has been severed. In the same way, 

predictability has been severely impaired, as the company‘s potential liabilities 

cannot be forecast from its state activities. And interstate federalism is perhaps 

most directly impaired; by taking jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute arising only 

from BMS‘s actions in, for example, Texas, and allegedly resulting in injuries 

only to a Texan, the California courts infringe directly on Texas‘s sovereign 

prerogative to determine what liabilities BMS should bear for actions in its borders 

and injuring its residents. ―[T]he forum state arguably exceeds its sovereignty 

when it asserts jurisdiction over claims that are merely similar to activities within 

its borders, as opposed to causally connected to the forum conduct.‖ (Andrews, 

supra, 58 SMU L.Rev. at pp. 1354–1355.)

For decades, commentators have rejected similarity as an adequate criterion 

of connection or relatedness, recognizing that its excessive breadth would create 

jurisdiction in every state for every breach by a national corporation, wherever it 

occurred. ―Thus the similarity test would apparently have to allow jurisdiction in 

any State in the country where the defendant has engaged in similar activities.‖ 

(Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court 

Jurisdiction (1980) Sup.Ct.Rev. 77, 84; accord, Rhodes & Robertson, Toward a 

New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction (2014) 48 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 207, 242 

[allowing specific jurisdiction ―in every forum in which the defendant conducts 

continuous and systematic forum activities that are sufficiently similar to the 
33

occurrence in dispute . . . would give the plaintiff the choice of essentially every 

state for proceeding against a national corporation‖].) Today, the majority, by 

holding the presence of California plaintiffs with claims similar to those of real 

parties in interest constitutes a substantial connection between real parties‘ claims 

and BMS‘s California activities, effectively sanctions California courts taking 

jurisdiction over actions by plaintiffs throughout the nation alleging injuries from 

any nationwide business activity. 

As California holds a substantial portion of the United States population, any 

company selling a product or service nationwide, regardless of where it is 

incorporated or headquartered, is likely to do a substantial part of its business in 

California. Under the majority‘s theory of specific jurisdiction, California 

provides a forum for plaintiffs from any number of states to join with California 

plaintiffs seeking redress for injuries from virtually any course of business conduct 

a defendant has pursued on a nationwide basis, without any showing of a 

relationship between the defendant‘s conduct in California and the nonresident 

plaintiffs‘ claims. The majority thus sanctions our state to regularly adjudicate 

disputes arising purely from conduct in other states, brought by nonresidents who 

suffered no injury here, against companies who are not at home here but simply do 

business in the state.

Such an aggressive assertion of personal jurisdiction is inconsistent with the 

limits set by due process. Although those limits are more flexible and less strictly 

territorial than in the past, the high court has explained that they still act to keep 

any one state from encroaching on the others: ―[W]e have never accepted the 

proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, 

and remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism embodied in the 

Constitution.‖ (World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at p. 293.) That BMS 

marketed and sold Plavix throughout the United States, presumably using much of 
34

the same advertising in many markets, does not give California authority, under 

our federal system, to assert jurisdiction over claims arising throughout the nation. 

Speaking of the limits to jurisdiction set by interstate federalism, the court in 

Boaz—also involving a pharmaceutical drug marketed throughout the nation—

observed: ―We have no warrant to jettison these principles in favor of an approach 

which recognizes no defined limits to the assertion of jurisdiction against any 

defendant whose national marketing somehow affects commerce in the forum 

state.‖ (Boaz, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 721.)

Assessing the fairness of specific jurisdiction ―  ̳in the context of our federal 

system of government‘ ‖ (World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at pp. 293–

294), we should be restrained here by the absence of any discernable state interest 

in adjudicating the nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims. Where the conduct sued upon 

did not occur in California, was not directed at individuals or entities in California, 

and caused no injuries in California or to California residents, neither our state‘s 

interest in regulating conduct within its borders (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 472) 

nor its interest in providing a forum for its residents to seek redress for their 

injuries (id. at p. 473) is implicated. On the critical question of why a Texan‘s 

claim he was injured in Texas by taking Plavix prescribed and sold to him in 

Texas should be adjudicated in California, rather than Texas (or in Delaware or 

New York, BMS‘s home states), the majority offers no persuasive answer.
35

CONCLUSION

Like the majority, I conclude BMS, despite its significant business activities 

in California, is not at home in our state for purposes of asserting general personal 

jurisdiction over it. But neither, in my view, is specific jurisdiction over the 

nonresident plaintiffs‘ claims proper. No substantial connection has been shown 

between BMS‘s activities in California and the nonresidents‘ claims, which arose 

out of BMS‘s marketing and sales of Plavix in other states. 

For this reason, I respectfully dissent. 

WERDEGAR, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted XXX 228 Cal.App.4th 605

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S221038

Date Filed: August 29, 2016

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: San Francisco

Judge: John E. Munter

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Lea Brilmayer; Horvitz & Levy, Jon B Eisenberg; Arnold & Porter, Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Sean M. SeLegue, 

Sharon D. Mayo, Jeremy McLaughlin, Steven G. Reade, Daniel S. Pariser, Anna K. Thompson, Maurice A. 

Letter and Anand Agneshwar for Petitioner.

Mayer Brown and Donald M. Falk for Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, California 

Chamber of Commerce and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amici Curiae on 

behalf of Petitioner.

Goodwin Proctor, Richard A. Oetheimer, Sarah K. Frederick, David J. Zimmer and Claire C. Jacobson for 

Generic Pharmaceutical Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Pepper Hamilton, Nicholas M. Kouletsis, Christopher W. Wasson and Eric S. Wolfish for American Tort 

Reform Association, National Association of Manufacturers, National Federation of Independent Business 

and Juvenile Products Manufacturers Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

Utrecht & Lenvin and Paul F. Utrecht for Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 

Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Napoli Bern Ripka Shkolnik, Kelly McMeekin, Hunter J. Shkolnik, John Lytle, Jessica Y. Lee, Shayna E. 

Sacks, Priya Gandhi; Audet & Partners, William M. Audet, Joshua C. Ezrin, Mark E. Burton; Esner, Chang 

& Boyer and Stuart B. Esner for Real Parties in Interest.

J. Burton LeBlanc; Andrus Anderson, Lori E. Andrus, Jenny Lee Anderson; Law Offices of Collyn A. 

Peddie and Collyn A. Peddie for American Association for Justice as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real 

Parties in Interest.

The Arkin Law Firm, Sharon J. Arkin; Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd and Kevin K. Green for 

Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Anand Agneshwer

Arnold & Porter

399 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10022-4690

(212) 715-1000

Stuart B. Esner

Esner, Chang & Boyer

234 East Colorado Boulevard, Suite 750

Pasadena, CA 91101

(626) 535-9860