IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Juanita Balderas, )

Plaintiff, )

) No. 20 C 1857

v. )

) Judge Ronald A. Guzmán

Illinois Central Railroad Company, )

Erick Chasko, and Marcos Salamanca, )

 Defendants. )

ORDER

For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in 

part and denied in part. Judgment is granted to the Defendants on the sex-discrimination claims 

under Title VII and the Illinois Human Rights Act and denied as to the claim for retaliation and 

the claim under the Illinois Gender Violence Act.1

 The trial date stands. 

STATEMENT

Plaintiff, who was employed as a Leadman (it is disputed whether she is the first woman 

to have had this position) with the Illinois Central Railroad Company (“IC”), brought the instant 

lawsuit against IC for sex harassment and retaliation under Title VII and the Illinois Human 

Rights Act (“IHRA”), and against Marcos Salamanca, a coworker, pursuant to the Illinois 

Gender Violence Act (“IGVA”). Defendants move for summary judgment. 

Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any 

material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court 

“consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, 

and [ ] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the party opposing 

summary judgment.” Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citation 

and quotations omitted).

To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) unwelcome 

harassment; (2) based on a protected characteristic; (3) that was so severe or pervasive as to alter 

the conditions of employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) a 

basis for employer liability. Howard v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 989 F.3d 587, 600 (7th Cir. 

2021).2

 As summarized recently by the Seventh Circuit:

1 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims of disability discrimination.

2 The Seventh Circuit recently stated:
2

A hostile work environment is based on the totality of the circumstances. Courts 

consider “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether 

it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” This inquiry is 

“fact intensive.” For example, we account for “the specific circumstances of the 

working environment” as well as “the relationship between the harassing party 

and the harassed.” Finding a hostile work environment, then, “is not, and by 

its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test.” But when proved, one thing 

is certain: “the work environment was so pervaded by discrimination that the 

terms and conditions of employment were altered.” 

Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 977 (internal citations omitted). 

Plaintiff points to evidence that her subordinates did not recognize her authority, and she 

was subjected to a consistent stream of gender-related derogatory comments by her coworkers, 

who called her, among other things, “bitch,” “bossy bitch,” “stupid bitch,” and “woman who 

didn’t know her job.” They also made comments that they didn’t know why IC had women 

working at the company, and that they “don’t listen to their wives, so ‘why would they listen to 

her?’” 

Defendant does not deny the fact that comments were made to Plaintiff, but only argues 

that, under the law, the comments were not gender-based. The Court disagrees. See Passanti v. 

Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655, 665 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that courts have “recognized that . . . 

repeated use of the word ‘bitch’ to demean a female employee could support a claim of sexual 

harassment if it was sufficiently pervasive or severe and if the context showed a hostility to the 

plaintiff because she was a woman”); see also Hilgers v. Rothschild Inv. Corp., No. 15 C 3572, 

2017 WL 4164036, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2017) (“[T]he Seventh Circuit has held that sexist, 

sexual, or gender-based comments, when made on a regular basis, are sufficient to create a 

hostile work environment.”). 

In addition to the comments, Plaintiff states that she also feared for her physical safety on 

at least one occasion. According to Plaintiff, Marcos Salamanca, a subordinate, harassed and 

assaulted her when he came into the office, angry about an assignment Plaintiff had given him, 

and said to her in an aggressive manner: 

At times, this court has recited this test differently, “looking instead for evidence that the 

workplace was both subjectively and objectively offensive—either in lieu of the first 

prong—that the employee was subject to unwelcome harassment—or the third prong—

whether the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to rise to the level of a hostile 

work environment.” Johnson v. Advoc. Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 900 (7th 

Cir. 2018). But “[i]n the end, we have concluded that the inquiry is the same.” Id.

Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968, 977 (7th Cir. 2021)
3

Fuck you. I don’t know what the fuck you mean by that, and you jackass, I don’t 

know what the fuck I’m doing? You stupid bitch. You don’t know what the fuck 

you're doing . . . . Hell, you aren’t nothing but a little fucking ass with a magnet 

up your ass -- . . . you are nothing but a lazy, fat ass with a magnet on your ass. I 

don’t know why they have women working here.

Plaintiff asserts that three male coworkers were in the room when Salamanca made these 

comments, including one who restrained Salamanca and pushed him away from Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff states she was concerned for her safety, and as soon as Salamanca left, she ran out, got 

into her car, and drove away. Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s version of events but admit that 

Salamanca testified in his deposition that he was “not going to stand there and listen to her while 

she’s just yelling at me and starting – trying to poke at me, you know. My wife would be 

different, if my wife ever did it to me, it’s different, you know.” He also admitted he never 

commented to male supervisors that they were not his husband, and when asked why, Salamanca 

testified, “that’s different. She’s a woman.” (Defs.’s Ex. 8, Dkt. # 69-9, Salamanca Dep. 192:22-

193:20.) Plaintiff also states that pornographic images were placed inside the locomotives, in the 

public areas of the yard, and in many of the male employees’ personal workstations, which were

visible to anyone walking by. Defendants deny this. Plaintiff further asserts that she complained 

that the images made her uncomfortable and that at least one supervisor “just laughed” in 

response. Finally, Plaintiff refers to the testimony of Janet Washington, a senior supervisor at 

IC, that there are employees at IC who frown on seeing women in management positions. 

Looking at the totality of the circumstances, including but not limited to the demeaning 

gender-based comments, the pervasive presence of pornography, and the threatening encounter 

with Salamanca, the Court finds that Plaintiff has created a genuine issue of material fact as to 

the first three elements of a sex-harassment claim.3 

IC contends, however, that Plaintiff has not created a genuine issue of material fact as to 

the last element of her claim—that there is a basis for employer liability. Both parties’ 

discussions of this issue are brief and superficial. It is not the Court’s responsibility to add 

substance to the parties’ bare-bones assertions, particularly with respect to the critical element of 

employer liability. The Court has done its best to address this element with the sparse discussion 

provided by the parties. 

“Under both Title VII and the IHRA, an employer is liable for the harassment of a 

nonemployee or nonsupervisory employee if [the employer] was ‘negligent either in discovering 

or remedying the harassment.’” Nischan v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC, 865 F.3d 922, 931 (7th 

Cir. 2017). To the extent IC argues that Plaintiff did not complain about her harassment, this is 

3 Plaintiff also notes that she received a photo of a penis on her cell phone from an unknown 

number while she was serving as a Leadman, and she believes it was from one of her coworkers. 

Although Plaintiff was not able to determine who sent her the photo, the accompanying message 

said, “Hey Juanita,” and Plaintiff concluded it must have been someone from work, since her 

coworkers were the only people who referred to her as “Juanita.” The Court, however, does not 

consider the selfie as evidence of harassment given the lack of any evidentiary basis regarding 

the sender. 
4

simply inaccurate. Plaintiff asserts she lodged a formal complaint with Duane Spears and 

Angela Lee, employees in the Human Resources (“HR”) department at IC, about the ongoing 

gender-based harassment and the incident with Salamanca. IC admits that Plaintiff contacted 

Lee about these issues. (Defs.’s Resp. Pl.’s Stmt. Add’l Facts, Dkt. # 84, ¶ 16.) IC, however, 

contends that its HR department conducted a thorough investigation of the matter by 

interviewing 18 management and craft-union employees, and issued a formal notice of 

completion of the investigation. (Id. ¶ 17.) In that notice of completion, which was written on 

company letterhead and addressed to Plaintiff, IC states:

We have completed our investigation into your recent complaint that you brought 

on behalf of yourself against Marcos Salamanca, Electrician. In your complaint[,] 

you alleged you were involved in an altercation with Mr. Salamanca and he called 

you inappropriate names. In addition[,] you alleged as a lead man you were 

tormented and bullied by the employees and supervisors did not train you. Our 

investigation was conducted promptly, objectively, thoroughly and confidentially. 

Based on our investigation of your complaint, we were unable to conclude that 

any violation of our Prohibited Harassment, Discrimination, and Anti-Retaliation 

Policy occurred.

(Defs.’s Ex. 17, Dkt. # 65-18.) 

Plaintiff’s entire response to IC’s assertion that it responded to Plaintiff’s complaint with 

a full investigation is as follows:

. . . IC contends that after an “investigation,” it found no evidence that [Plaintiff] 

had been harassed. This is despite all the reasons why IC should have been aware 

of what was going on. And Janet Washington, a longtime female manager at IC, 

testified that IC did not conduct a real investigation into [Plaintiff’s] claims. As

such, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether IC was negligent in 

failing to take remedial steps to address the harassment.

(Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. # 77, at 12.) 

The only piece of evidence Plaintiff points to to undermine the validity of the 

investigation is Washington’s contention that it was not “real.” Plaintiff, however, fails to refer 

to any piece of record evidence that Washington had firsthand knowledge of whether a legitimate 

investigation was conducted. As already stated, it is not the Court’s role to scour the record to 

find evidence in support of either party’s position. A brief look at Washington’s deposition, 

however, indicates that Washington was not in the HR department. (Defs.’s Ex. 4, Dkt. # 65-5,

Washington Dep., at 117.) Indeed, when asked at her deposition, “Would you expect a formal 

investigation for any type of harassment or discrimination?”, Washington responded, “Yes, I 

would. I personally would, yes. But I don’t know how the company feels about that.” (Id. at 

142.) Thus, Washington admitted that she did not know whether it was company policy to 

conduct what she called a “real” or “formal” investigation when an employee complained of sex 

harassment. As such, Plaintiff’s only piece of evidence rebutting IC’s contention that it 
5

conducted a full investigation of Plaintiff’s complaints is testimony from an individual who has 

no direct knowledge of IC’s policy regarding the type of investigation that must be conducted 

regarding a complaint of sex harassment. Because Washington’s testimony fails to create a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether a valid investigation was conducted, IC’s reliance on 

its investigation remains unrebutted; therefore, the Court grants IC summary judgment on the 

Title VII and IHRA sex-harassment claims. 

To establish a claim for Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in 

statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a 

causal connection between the two. Burks v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 758 (7th Cir. 

2006). Such protected activity consists of opposing or complaining about discrimination or 

harassment by the employer based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e-2(a). As already noted above, Plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected activity when she 

complained to the HR department about the purported harassment and Salamanca’s 

confrontation with her. IC asserts that Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action 

when, after being placed on leave following her confrontation with Salamanca and during the 

investigation, she was demoted from Leadman to Laborer, as Plaintiff contends.4 Plaintiff 

responds that the adverse employment action was her demotion and IC’s “ultimate refusal to 

offer her the position of Relief Foreman after promising it to her during the investigation (then 

awarding it to a male).” (Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. # 77, at 13.) According to Plaintiff, the following 

questions of fact require a trial: “whether she accepted the Relief Foreman position; whether IC 

determined that it was no longer available to her, and why; whether IC demoted her to Laborer, 

and whether IC filled the position with a male of similar capabilities.” (Id.) 

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was offered, but refused, the position of Relief Foreman, 

pointing to testimony of Manuel Salazar, a supervisor, and Mike Kirka, Plaintiff’s union 

representative. (Defs.’s Ex. 3, Dkt. # 65-4, Salazar Dep., at 90:24-91:4 (“Duane [Spears, HR 

Senior Manager,] did ask her [at a meeting that Spears and Salazar attended with Plaintiff] 

multiple times if she wanted a relief foreman role at Woodcrest [a different yard], at which point 

she said, “No,” multiple times. She said that she just wanted to bid her job as a laborer, do her 

job, and go home. She did not want to be a relief foreman.”); Defs.’s Ex. 16, Dkt. # 65-17, Kirka 

Dep. at 61:8-61:23 (“I -- I don’t think she wanted to go back [to Kirk Yard] as a relief foreman, 

and unfortunately for the – for the seniority that she had, she couldn’t hold another job at Kirk 

Yard because there w[ere] more senior[] people over there, and she – she could not bump 

them.”).) According to Plaintiff, however, the night before she was scheduled to begin the Relief 

Foreman position at Kirk Yard, she received a text message from Kirka telling her that the Relief 

Foreman position was no longer available and that she would have to find another position on 

which to bid. (Defs.’s Resp. Pl.’s Stmt. Add’l Facts, Dkt. # 84, ¶¶ 27.) Plaintiff contends that 

the only open position was as a Laborer at Woodcrest Yard on the midnight shift. (Id.) As 

already noted, IC disputes this assertion. The parties do not discuss whether Plaintiff’s being 

forced to take a lower-paying position due to union rules is considered an adverse employment 

action under relevant precedent, so the Court does not address it. Because a genuine issue of 

4

 For purposes of this motion, IC does not dispute that Laborer is a demotion from Relief 

Foreman but asserts that Plaintiff declined the offer of Relief Foreman and voluntarily took the 

Laborer position. (Defs.’s Resp. Pl.’s Stmt. Add’l Facts, Dkt. # 84, ¶¶ 27-28.) 
6 

material fact exists as to whether IC offered her the Relief Foreman position and Plaintiff 

rejected it, IC’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim fails.

The IGVA allows “[a]ny person who has been subjected to gender-related violence . . . 

[to] bring a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or other appropriate relief against a person 

or persons perpetrating that gender-related violence.” 740 ILCS 82/10. Salamanca contends that 

Plaintiff “fails to address [whether] the substance of any alleged threats by [him] were motivated 

by her gender.” (Defs.’s Reply, Dkt. # 83, at 14.) One of the statutory definitions of genderrelated violence includes a “threat of an act described in item (1) or (2) causing a realistic 

apprehension that the originator of the threat will commit the act.” 740 ILCS 82/5. Items (1) 

and (2) state as follows:

(1) One or more acts of violence or physical aggression satisfying the elements of 

battery under the laws of Illinois that are committed, at least in part, on the 

basis of a person’s sex, whether or not those acts have resulted in criminal 

charges, prosecution, or conviction. 

(2) A physical intrusion or physical invasion of a sexual nature under coercive 

conditions satisfying the elements of battery under the laws of Illinois, 

 whether or not the act or acts resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or 

 conviction. 

Id. 

 Pointing to item (2), Salamanca asserts that Plaintiff has not pointed to any evidence that 

the threat was of a sexual nature. Plaintiff, however, has pointed to evidence that Salamanca’s 

purported assault was based on her sex under item (1). Therefore, Salamanca’s motion for 

summary judgment on the IGVA count is denied. 

Date: September 21, 2021 ______________________________ 

 Ronald A. Guzmán 

United States District Judge