UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION

______________________________________

 )

IN RE FICO ANTITRUST LITIGATION ) Judge Edmond E. Chang

______________________________________)

 ) Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman

This Document Relates to the )

Following Cases: ) No. 1:20-CV-02114

 )

INDIRECT PURCHASER CASES ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

______________________________________)

INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS’

AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 1 of 141 PageID #:2844
i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................1

II. PARTIES ........................................................................................................................6

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ............................................................................................8

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS ................................................................................................9

A. Credit Scores and Credit Reports...............................................................................9

B. The Markets for Credit Scores...................................................................................13

C. Fair Isaac’s FICO Score Has a Monopoly in the B2B Credit Score Market .............20

D. Fair Isaac Has Been Able to Maintain its Monopoly.................................................23

E. Fair Isaac’s Conduct in Furtherance of its Anticompetitive Scheme ........................27

1. Fair Isaac’s Anticompetitive Litigation .........................................................27

2. Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus’ Conspiracy.............................................31

a. Fair Isaac’s Anticompetitive Contracts with the Credit Bureaus.......34

i. The “No Equivalent Products Clause”...................................35

ii. The “Dynamic royalty Schedule” ..........................................38

iii. The “Level Playing Field” .....................................................40

3. Fair Isaac’s Negative Advertising Campaign in Furtherance of its 

Scheme...........................................................................................................42

F. Fair Isaac’s Anticompetitive Conduct has harmed Competition ...............................45

V. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ......................................................................................47

VI. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND TOLLING.................................................................50

VII. DEFENDANTS’ ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING VIOLATION...................53

VIII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF .........................................................................................................54

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT OF TRADE..................54

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 2 of 141 PageID #:2845
ii

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT

OF TRADE ........................................................................................................................57

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT OF TRADE ................60

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT OF TRADE............62

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: MONOPOLIZATION .........................................................65

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: CONSPIRACY TO MONOPOLIZE..................................67

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: VIOLATION OF STATE ANTITRUST

STATUTES ........................................................................................................................69

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: VIOLATIONS OF STATE CONSUMER 

PROTECTION LAWS ..........................................................................................................103

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: UNJUST ENRICHMENT.................................................134

PRAYER FOR RELIEF ........................................................................................................135

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL .............................................................................................135

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 3 of 141 PageID #:2846
1

Plaintiffs Garner Properties & Management LLC (“Garner”) and Lake City Exports, Inc.

(“Lake City”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), bring this action against Defendants Fair Isaac

Corporation (“Fair Isaac”), Equifax, Inc. (“Equifax”), Experian Information Solutions, Inc.

(“Experian”), and TransUnion, LLC (“TransUnion”) (collectively “Defendants,” with the latter 

three referred to collectively as the “Credit Bureaus” or “CBs”), individually and on behalf of 

proposed Classes of all end-users that purchased FICO Scores1 in the B2B Credit Score Market

from anyone other than Fair Isaac and/or a Credit Bureau from October 1, 2006 through the

present.2 Defendants have engaged in anticompetitive behavior, which forced Plaintiffs and 

members of the proposed Classes to pay artificially inflated prices for credit scoring services

and generated millions of dollars in supra-competitive annual revenues for Defendants. Fair 

Isaac has maintained a monopoly share in excess of 90% of the market for credit scores by 

suppressing competition and inhibiting innovation. Therefore, Plaintiffs and the proposed 

Classes seek damages, injunctive relief and other relief pursuant to federal antitrust laws, state 

antitrust, unfair competition, and consumer protection laws, and the laws of unjust enrichment, 

and demand a trial by jury. 

I. INTRODUCTION

1. A “credit score” is a three-digit numerical summary of a customer’s 

creditworthiness based on factors such as payment history and the duration of that history; 

balances, available credit, and the percentage of existing credit lines being utilized; public 

records like bankruptcies or adverse judgments; and the assumption of new debt. There are 

two distinct markets for such scores. The first is the market for the sale of such scores to 

banks, mortgage companies, credit unions, and other businesses that assess individual credit 

1 “FICO Score” includes a credit report that contains a FICO Score. 

2 “Third-party” constitutes any entity that who purchased a FICO Score from any Defendants. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 4 of 141 PageID #:2847
2

risk ‒ i.e., business-to- business sales. That market is referred to herein as the “B2B Credit 

Score Market.” The second is the market for the sale of such scores to the individual who is 

the subject of them ‒ i.e., business-to-consumer. That market is referred to herein as the “B2C 

Credit Score Market.” This case concerns the B2B Credit Score Market.

2. According to Fair Isaac, FICO Scores are used for over 90% of all lending

decisions in the United States. Fair Isaac’s FICO credit scores have dominated the market for

nearly three decades and have “maintained a 90-plus percent market share for at least 13 

years.”3

3. Credit Bureaus collect and maintain information for credit reports. The three 

major CBs in the United States are Defendants Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion. The CB

Defendants control virtually 100% ofaggregate credit-related data formed by aggregating credit

data collected from businesses, and theyjointly dominate the market for B2B credit reports.

4. Credit reports list bill payment history, loans, current debt, and other financial 

information. They show where consumers work and live and whether they have been sued, 

arrested, or filed for bankruptcy.

5. Credit reports help lenders decide if they will give consumers credit or approve 

a loan. The reports also help determine what interest rates consumers are charged. Employers, 

insurers, and rental property owners also use credit reports.

6. CBs purchase FICO Scores and then sell them as part of the credit reporting 

services they provide to millions of lenders, financial institutions, landlords, employers, and 

other businesses, that then use the credit reports to determine credit history and/or default risk. 

7. Fair Isaac also directly sells FICO Scores to creditors and other businesses 

3 TransUnion LLC’s Redacted Counterclaims, Dkt 38, Fair Isaac Corp. . TransUnion LLC, No. 1:17-cv-08318, ¶ 32

(N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2018)(“TransUnion Counterclaims”).)

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 5 of 141 PageID #:2848
3

‒bypassing the Credit Bureaus, and competing with them, when it does so.

8. Plaintiff Garner is a real estate brokerage and property management company 

that purchases Fair Isaac’s FICO scores from third-parties which, in turn, purchase those FICO 

Scores from one of the three major CBs. The third-parties pass on to Garner and all other Class 

Members the cost of each FICO Score.

9. Plaintiff Lake City is used automobile dealer that purchases Fair Isaac’s FICO 

scores from third-parties which, in turn, purchase those FICO Scores from one of the three

major CBs. The third-parties pass on to Lake City and all other Class Members the cost of 

each FICO Score.

10. In 2006, VantageScore Solutions, LLC (“VantageScore Solutions”) launched 

VantageScore - a credit score to compete against Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores. VantageScore

Solutions is an independent joint venture of the three major CBs, Equifax, Experian, and 

TransUnion. Similar to Fair Isaac’s FICO Score, VantageScore Solutions uses scoring codes and 

algorithms to convert a consumer’s information in a consumer credit report into a credit score. 

Thus, VantageScore presented a competitively priced alternative to FICO Scores.

11. In addition, a VantageScore has relevant and important advantages over a FICO

Score. For example, a VantageScore considers a consumers’ rental and utility payments, 

which enables it to provide a credit score for consumers with less than six months of credit 

history. Fair Isaac’s FICO Score cannot do this. A VantageScore therefore provides a credit 

score for tens of millions more Americans than Fair Isaac’s algorithms allow. If Plaintiffs and 

similarly situated businesses were able to purchase VantageScores on economically sensible 

terms, they would be able to see credit scores of tens of millions more consumers, enabling 

them to contract with millions more customers, tenants, and employees than they can using 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 6 of 141 PageID #:2849
4

FICO Scores alone.

12. Rather than compete on the merits with VantageScore, Fair Isaac undertook a

lengthy campaign of anticompetitive conduct to discourage the adoption of VantageScore and 

preserve its own monopoly. Fair Isaac also succeeded in recruiting the CBs to join a 

conspiracy to monopolize the B2B Credit Score Market, despite their own interest in 

VantageScore’s success.

13. Specifically, in 2006, Fair Isaac filed a lawsuit against TransUnion, Equifax, 

and Experian with the intended purpose of driving VantageScore Solutions out of business. 

Experian settled the case in 2008 and entered into a lucrative partnership with Fair Isaac 

following the settlement. TransUnion and Equifax fought on, eliminating most of Fair Isaac’s 

claims through a summary judgment motion and winning a jury trial on the remaining 

trademark claim.

14. When its lawsuit failed, Fair Isaac engaged in a further pattern of

anticompetitive conduct designed to discourage use of alternatives to FICO Scores, including

VantageScores. Fair Isaac accomplished this goal by abusing its monopoly power to enlist the

CBs in a conspiracy in which they entered into contracts that contained anticompetitive 

restrictions aimed at extracting supracompetitive profits from B2B purchasers. Those contracts 

include contractual provisions that: (1) prohibit CBs from marketing non-FICO credit scores 

(i.e., VantageScore); (2) charge discriminatory and prohibitively high prices for FICO Scores 

if a CB customer purchases a FICO Score while providing the consumer with a competing 

score (i.e., a VantageScore); and (3) eliminate price competition among the CBs, thereby 

disincentivizing the CBs from negotiating a lower price for FICO Scores. 

15. Upon information and belief, each of the CBs was aware of Fair Isaac’s 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 7 of 141 PageID #:2850
5

imposition of these restrictive terms on the other CBs and each CB agreed to the contracts 

despite the terms being against their own, as well as their collective, economic self-interest. 

The conspiracy and the contracts that effectuated it were intended to, and had the effect of, 

hobbling VantageScore Solutions’ ability to compete and forcing B2B Purchasers to pay 

supracompetitive prices for credit scores. 

16. As part of its goal of eliminating competition, Fair Isaac also waged a public

relations and advertising campaign to disparage VantageScores and create uncertainty about the

reliability of VantageScores. The purpose of FICO’s anticompetitive scheme is to prevent 

competition with VantageScore and other scoring systems and to preserve Fair Isaac’s 

monopoly.

17. Fair Isaac’s scheme worked. Through the anticompetitive conducted alleged 

herein, Fair Isaac succeeded in preventing VantageScore Solutions from gaining market share 

and thwarted the entry of other entities into the market for credit scores. Having successfully 

suppressed all other competition, Fair Isaac was able to, and did, artificially increase prices for 

its FICO products. 

18. For example, Fair Isaac’s net income for the third quarter of 2021 was more 

than double that of the previous year period, increasing from $64.1 million in Q3 2020 to 

$151.2 million in Q3 2021.4 Sources in the financial industry have attributed Fair Isaac’s

profitability to “[p]rice increases in its credit scoring segmentand gains in applications sold to

banking institutions,” which have “helped the company log year- over-year gains in revenue

and profit.”5 But for Fair Isaac’s and the CBs’ anticompetitive conduct, VantageScore and 

4 Press Release, Fair Isaac, FICO Announces Earnings of $5.18 per Share for Third Quarter Fiscal 2021 (Aug. 3, 

2021), https://investors.fico.com/news-releases/news-release-details/fico- announces-earnings-518-share-thirdquarter-fiscal-2021. 5 Motley Fool, Fair Isaac Corporation Scores 13% Revenue Growth in the First Quarter (Jan. 31, 2019), 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 8 of 141 PageID #:2851
6

other competitors of Fair Isaac would have gained market share, allowing for price 

competition and reducing the prices Plaintiffs and similarly situated businesses paid for FICO

Scores.

19. Plaintiffs and other indirect purchasers of Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores paid 

supracompetitive prices and have therefore suffered harm as a result of Defendants’

anticompetitive conduct, which harmed competition in the B2B Credit Score Market. Opening 

this market to competition will spur innovation so that credit scores are fairly priced and more 

accurate. 

20. Plaintiffs and other similarly situated businesses are indirect purchasers of Fair 

Isaac’s FICO Scores. They do not purchase FICO Scores directly from Defendants but instead 

purchase them from third-parties, who purchase them from Defendants. 

II. PARTIES

21. Plaintiff Garner Properties & Management LLC is a real estate brokerage and 

property management company located in Taylor, Michigan. During the Class Period, Garner

purchased Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores from third-parties which, in turn, purchased those FICO 

Scores from one of the three major CBs. The CBs, through the third-parties, sell FICO Scores 

to Plaintiffs and Class members pursuant to agreements between Fair Isaac and each Credit 

Bureau, which provide for royalty payments to be paid to Fair Isaac for each FICO Score sold 

to the Class. The artificially inflated cost of those FICO Scores is then passed on to Garner,

and all other Class members. 

22. Plaintiffs Lake City Exports, Inc., is a used automobile dealer located in Maine. 

During the Class Period, Lake City purchased Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores from third-parties which, 

https://www.fool.com/investing/2019/01/31/fair-isaac-corporation-scores-13- revenue-growth-in.aspx.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 9 of 141 PageID #:2852
7

in turn, purchased those FICO Scores from one of the three major CBs. The CBs, through the 

third-parties, sell FICO Scores to Plaintiffs and Class Members pursuant to agreements 

between Fair Isaac and each Credit Bureau, which provide for royalty payments to be paid to 

Fair Isaac for each FICO Score sold to the Class. The artificially inflated cost of those FICO 

Scores is then passed on to Lake City, and all other Class members.

23. Plaintiffs were injured in their business or property as a direct, proximate, and 

material result of Defendants’ violation of the law. Plaintiffs are also threatened with future 

injury to their business and property by reason of Defendants’ continuing violations of the law.

24. Defendant Fair Isaac is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of

business at 181 Metro Drive, Suite 700, San Jose, California, 95110.

25. Defendant Equifax is a Credit Bureau incorporated in Georgia that has its

principalplace of business at 1550 Peachtree St. NW, Atlanta, Georgia.

26. Defendant Experian is a Credit Bureau incorporated in Ohio that has its

principal place of business in the United States at 475 Anton Blvd., Costa Mesa, California.

27. Defendant TransUnion is a Delaware limited liability Credit Bureau that has

its principal place of business at 555 W. Adams St., Chicago, Illinois.

28. Plaintiffs bring this state law class action on behalf of the proposed Classes to 

recover actual and/or compensatory damages, double and treble damages as permitted, preand post-judgment interest, costs, and attorneys’ fees for the injuries caused by Defendants’

conduct in restricting the development and sale of credit scores and causing the prices of FICO

Scores to be artificially inflated. Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief under Sections 1 and 2 of 

the ShermanAct.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 10 of 141 PageID #:2853
8

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

29. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1331, 1332(d) and 1337(a) and Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a) 

and 26. This Court possesses supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 

U.S.C. § 1367.

30. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Defendants

transacted business, maintained substantial contacts, and are located and/or committed 

unlawful conduct in this District. Their unlawful scheme was directed at, and had the intended 

effect of, causing injury to persons residing in, located in, or doing business in this District.

31. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to, among other statutes, Section 12 of 

the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), (c) and (d). Defendants regularly 

transact business within this District and a substantial portion of the affected interstate trade and

commerce described in this Complaint were carried out in this District.

32. Defendants market their products and receive substantial payments across state 

lines. Defendants’ business activities that are the subject of this Complaint are within the law 

of and have substantially affected, interstate trade and commerce.

33. During the Class Period, Defendants used the instrumentalities of interstate 

commerce, including interstate wires, wireless spectrum, and the United States Mail, to 

effectuate their illegal scheme.

34. Defendants’ conduct also had a substantial effect on the intrastate commerce of

the states listed in counts Seven and Eight of this Complaint.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 11 of 141 PageID #:2854
9

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Credit Scores and Credit Reports

35. A credit score is a numerical expression of a person's credit history and is

designed to measure their creditworthiness. It helps creditors determine whether to give credit, 

decide the terms they offer and what interest rates consumers pay. Higher scores generally 

indicate that an individual or business poses less credit risk and is more likely to make

payments under a contract and manage money more responsibly. Thus, having a high credit score 

can make it easier to get a loan, credit card, lower interest rates, rent an apartment, or provide 

access to lower insurance rates. 

36. Credit scores typically are produced by applying scoring algorithms to a 

person’s consumer credit history. A credit score is based on multiple factors, such as payment 

history, outstanding balances, length of credit history, applications for new credit accounts, 

and types of credit accounts (e.g., mortgages, car loans, credit cards). 

37. Credit scores usually are accompanied by “reason statements,” which inform 

the purchaser about the factors that most significantly affected that individual’s credit score. A 

number or alphanumeric code - called a “reason code”- is associated with each reason 

statement. Examples of reason statements include: “Account payment history is too new to 

rate”; “Amount owed on accounts is too high”; and “Too many recently active accounts.”

VantageScore explains this process as follows:

No matter where you get your score, the documents that 

accompany it will include up to four or five statements 

explaining why your score wasn’t higher. These statements 

are called reason codes and sometimes go by several other 

names. Some people call them score factors; others call

them adverse action codes. They’re all the same thing.

The next time you see your credit score, regardless of where 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 12 of 141 PageID #:2855
10

it comes from, look for the reason codes. They’ll be worded 

and displayed something like this:

Your Credit Score Is: 705

32: Balances on bankcard or revolving accounts too high 

compared to credit limits

16: The total of all balances on your open 

accounts is too high

85: You have too many inquiries on your credit 

report

13: Your most recently opened account is too new

The numbers preceding each statement are numeric

identifiers; sometimes they appear with the text, and

sometimes they do not.

The four (or five) factors are listed in order of the impact 

they have. In this example, the number one reason the credit 

score is not higher is “Balances on bankcard or revolving

accounts too high compared to creditlimits.” That means the 

consumer’s credit card debt is too high relative to his or her

credit limits.

In our example, the reason with the second-greatest impact 

is “The total of all balances on your open accounts is too 

high.” That means the consumer is carrying too much debt

on his or her open accounts.

The third reason the score isn’t higher is “You have too 

many inquiries on your credit report.” This means the

consumer has recently applied for credit several times,

which led to some number of credit inquiries.

The fourth reason the score isn’t higher is “Your most 

recently opened account is too new.” Clearly this means the 

consumer has a very new account on his or her credit 

report.6

38. Fair Isaac has a webpage that sets forth its various “reason codes.”7

6 VantageScore Solutions, Reason Codes 101, https://www.reasoncode.org/reasoncode101. 7 Fair Isaac, US FICO® Score Reason Codes, https://www.fico.com/en/latest-thinking/solution-sheet/us-fico-scoreCase: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 13 of 141 PageID #:2856
11

VantageScore also has a dedicated website that explains its various “reason codes.”8

39. CBs collect and store financial data about individuals that is submitted to them 

by creditors, such as lenders, credit card companies, and other financial companies. Creditors

are not required to report to every credit-reporting company. Utilizing these files, the CBs

create a credit report.

40. The information in a credit report is often used to calculate a credit score. 

Credit reports list a consumer’s bill payment history, loans, current debt, and other financial 

information. They show where the individual works and lives and whether they have been 

sued, arrested, or filed for bankruptcy. CBs essentially collect consumer credit data and 

present the aggregated information in the form of a credit report. 

41. CBs continually gather credit and financial data about individuals from 

creditors, government entities, public records, collection agencies, and other third parties, and

compile this information into a credit file. The CBs then use an individual’s credit file to 

opulate a credit report on that individual for sale to businesses (B2B purchasers) and consumers

(B2C purchasers).

42. Credit reports help lenders decide if they will give credit or approve a loan. The 

reports also help determine what interest rate to charge. Employers, insurers, and rental 

property owners also look at credit reports.

43. Credit scores are the most widely used indicators of consumers’ 

creditworthiness in the United States and Fair Isaac’s FICO Score is, by far, the most widelyused credit score. According to Fair Isaac, FICO Scores are used in over 90% of U.S. lending 

reason-codes (link to download). 8 VantageScore Solutions, ReasonCode.org, https://www.reasoncode.org.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 14 of 141 PageID #:2857
12

decisions.9 They are crucial to millions of businesses that rely on indicators of 

creditworthiness to assess risk and make business decisions.

44. Credit scores and credit reports are separate and distinct products that can be 

sold together or independently. 

45. Fair Isaac works with the CBs to perpetuate and extend its monopoly. Fair

Isaac’s relationship with B2B purchasers is often dependent on B2B purchasers’ relationships

with the CBs, which facilitate the sale of FICO Scores to B2B purchasers.

46. FICO Scores and credit reports are often sold to businesses as a bundle. Such

bundles can be sold by the CBs, which are licensed by Fair Isaac to sell FICO Scores and in 

return, pay a royalty to Fair Isaac. Thus, when a B2B purchaser requires a credit score, it

purchases a credit report from a CB and a credit score from that CB and Fair Isaac, often

through a contract with both Fair Isaac and the CB. Although the payment for the credit report 

and the credit score may at times occur in a single transaction, the reality is that both the CB

and Fair Isaac act as the providers of the FICO Score. In this example, Plaintiffs and proposed 

Class members would then purchase the credit report and credit score from the B2B purchaser.

47. In its 2020 Form 10-K filed with the SEC, Fair Isaac states that, “[d]uring

fiscal 2020, 2019 and 2018, revenues generated from our agreements with Experian,

TransUnion and Equifax collectively accounted for 32%, 29%, and 25% of our total revenues,

respectively.”10

48. The FICO Score and credit report bundles can also be sold by Fair Isaac to 

businesses. “In those situations, Fair Isaac requests a credit score and credit report from the 

9 Fair Isaac, FICO: The Decisions Company Investor Overview, at 5 (Dec. 2019), https://fico.gcs-web.com/staticfiles/946e4204-cdbb-4797-b7e0-24d71191698b. 10 Fair Isaac, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Nov. 10, 2020), https://fico.gcs- web.com/node/23951/html

(hereinafter, “Fair Isaac 2020 10-K”).

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 15 of 141 PageID #:2858
13

CBs-selected by the lender or consumer. The CBs applies Fair Isaac’s CB-tailored FICO

algorithm to a consumer’s aggregated credit data and provides the consumer’s credit report 

and credit score to Fair Isaac. Fair Isaac then delivers the bundle to the consumer or lender. 

Fair Isaac pays the CB for the cost of processing and providing the bundle.”11 Thus, Fair Isaac 

and the CBs act as horizontal competitors and compete with each other for some B2B 

Purchasers.

49. This direct competition between Fair Isaac and the CBs, as well as the close 

relationship among them, continues to this day. At an August 3, 2021 earnings conference, 

Fair Isaac’s CEO, William Lansing, said, “we stay close to it [B2B scores] through our 

channel partners, the bureaus. But we also ‒ certainly for all of the major institutions, we have 

direct sales relationships.”12 TransUnion’s current Form 10-K acknowledges that it 

“compete[s] with FICO in the Financial Services” market for B2B purchasers.

13 Similarly, 

Equifax’s current Form 10-K acknowledges that it too “compete[s] with Fair Isaac 

Corporation with respect to certain of [its] analytical tools and solutions.”14 Experian has also 

recognized that its “comparator companies” include “FICO.

15

B. The Markets for Credit Scores

50. There are two distinct markets for credit scores—the “B2B Credit Score 

Market” and the “B2C Credit Score Market.”

51. The “B2B Credit Score Market” consists of sales from a business (a credit 

score generator, such as Fair Isaac, directly or through a CB, or indirectly through a third-party

11 Fair Isaac Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., No. 06-4112, 2008 WL 623120, at *2 (D. Minn. March 4, 2008). 12 Motley Fool, Fair Isaac Corp. (FICO) Q3 2021 Earnings Call Transcript (Aug. 3, 2021) (hereinafter, “Q3 

Earnings Call”), https://www.fool.com/earnings/call-transcripts/2021/08/03/ fair-isaac-corporation-fico-q3-2021-

earnings-call/. 13 TransUnion, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 16, 2021), at 12. 14 Equifax, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 25, 2021), at 8. 15 Experian plc, Annual Report 2021 (2021), at 127, https://www.experianplc.com/media/ 4223/experian-annualreport-2021.pdf.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 16 of 141 PageID #:2859
14

credit reporting company) to lenders, such as banks and credit card companies, financial 

institutions, and other businesses. The “B2C Credit Score Market” consists of credit scores 

sold to consumers to monitor their own credit records. The claims in this case concern the B2B 

Credit Score Market. The B2B Credit Score Market is the relevant product market in which 

the claims that require a market definition are to be assessed.

52. In the B2B Credit Score Market, businesses purchase the credit scores of 

individuals and businesses to help them understand credit risk, make better-informed lending 

decisions, assess creditworthiness, and make business decisions. The B2B Credit Score

Market also includes the FICO Scores that Plaintiffs and other businesses indirectly purchased

from Fair Isaac and the CBs.

53. In the B2C Credit Score Market, Fair Isaac and other credit score producers, as 

well as CBs, sell consumers their own credit scores. A consumer often purchases their own 

credit score for personal use, including to see how lenders view their creditworthiness, to 

understand the types and terms of financing they may be able to secure, to monitor their 

financial health, manage their debt, protect their identity, and to determine if they are 

potentially eligible to make certain purchases.

54. The B2B Credit Score Market for credit scores is a distinct product market

for antitrust purposes. The businesses that use credit scores to assess creditworthiness, manage 

risk, and make business decisions do not consider credit reports, insurance scores, or any part 

of an individual’s consumer and credit history to be a substitute for credit scores. Likewise, the

businesses that resell or otherwise provide credit scores to their own downstream customers do 

not consider credit reports, insurance scores, or any part of an individual’s consumer and 

credit history to be a substitute for credit scores. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 17 of 141 PageID #:2860
15

55. The relevant geographic market in which B2B credit scores are provided is the 

United States (including its territories). The restraints on competition contained in Defendants’

contracts relate to business and consumer credit scores in the United States.

56. Business customers, such as banks, credit card companies, financial 

institutions, real estate companies, insurance companies and other businesses, in the B2B

Credit Score Market are a separate and distinct group of purchasers of credit scores. Business 

customers who purchase credit scores in the B2B Credit Score Market do not use credit scores in 

the same manner as consumer customers who purchase credit scores in the B2C Credit Score

Market.

57. Business customers in the B2B Credit Score Market purchase credit scores to

make informed decisions, sell, advertise, or complement another product. On the other hand, 

consumer customers in the B2C Credit Score Market purchase the credit scores as an endproduct.

58. Business customers in the B2B Credit Score Market also purchase credit scores 

in ways that consumer customers do not. For example, business customers in the B2B Credit 

Score Market who engage in pre-screening, such as credit card companies, often purchase 

credit scores in batches as part of their marketing efforts. They use credit scores as a method 

of selecting consumers in a particular credit score range that they wish to extend credit card 

offers to under particular terms. However, consumer customers in the B2C Credit Score

Market only purchase their own score.

59. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) noted in a 2011 report to 

Congress that “many of the credit scores sold to lenders are not offered for sale to 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 18 of 141 PageID #:2861
16

consumers.”16 The agency went on to explain:

When a consumer purchases a score from a CRA [Credit Rating Agency], it 

is likely that the credit score that the consumer receives will not be thesame

score as that purchased and used by a lender to whom the consumer applies 

for a loan. This could occur if the score the consumer purchased is an

educational score that is not used by lenders, but differences between the

score a consumer buys and the score a lender buys can occur for other 

reasons as well. Since so many scores are in use in the marketplace, it could 

also be the case that the particular lender to which the consumer applies

uses a different scoring model than the one purchased by the consumer, or 

that the CRA from which the consumer obtains a score is not the same CRA

that the lender uses to obtain scores, or that the underlying data in the

consumer’s credit report changes significantly between the time the 

consumer purchases a score and the time the lender obtains a score for that 

consumer. It is also possible that a consumer and a lender could access 

different reports from the CRA, if they were to use different identifying 

information about the consumer. Any of these differences could lead to 

differences between the credit score a consumer sees and the credit score a

lender uses to assess that consumer.

17

60. The vast majority of the credit reporting and credit scoring industry, industry 

analysts, policy analysts, and investors recognize the B2B Credit Score Market as a separate 

market from the B2C Credit Score Market. Fair Isaac itself recognizes its Business and 

Consumer offerings as distinct product and revenue lines. Fair Isaac has divided its “Scores” 

profits and revenues into separate “business-to-business” or “B2B” and “business-toconsumer” or “B2C” segments in its Securities and Exchange Commission filings and 

shareholder calls over the last several years. In its 10-K and 10-Q filings for the past several 

years, Fair Isaac has distinguished between its “business-to-business scoring solutions and 

services” and its “business-to-consumer scoring solutions and services including my FICO 

solutions for consumers.”

61. Purchases in the B2B Credit Score Market for credit scores and B2C Credit 

16 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, The impact of differences between consumer- and creditor-purchased 

credit scores, at 1 (July 19, 2011), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/ f/2011/07/Report_20110719_CreditScores.pdf. 17 Id.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 19 of 141 PageID #:2862
17

Score Market for credit scores are also different. While business customers purchase credit scores 

from Fair Isaac through CBs and/or third-party intermediaries, credit scores in the B2C Credit 

Score Market are often sold to consumers directly, such as when consumers purchase their 

credit score from Fair Isaac at myFICO.com. 

62. The B2B Credit Score Market exhibits high barriers to entry. As noted in a 

2018 article: “The deep integration of FICO scores and products into companies’ operations 

has raised switching costs.”18

63. Likewise, VantageScore Solutions has observed that in the residential mortgage 

sector, FICO’s “imprint inhibits competition by raising switching costs and granting the 

irreplaceable brand value of utter ubiquity. It gives FICO unparalleled and highly controversial 

negotiating leverage with almost every participant in the industry.”19

64. “Larger lenders use the [FICO] score as an input to customized models they’ve 

built for specific situations or portfolios. After a recent review one major US lender recently 

identified over 600 places they were using a FICO score in their business processes. Switching 

to a new score not only means proving the new score is better (a long process in itself) but 

extensive testing to ensure all of those moving parts are still working as designed. Citibank 

recently announced that after an 18 month review they’ve decided it’s safe to switch to the 

latest version of the FICO score (FICO 8). This wasn’t a migration to a new score mind you, 

just a more recent version of the score they’re already using. The barriers to entry are indeed 

18 Fair Isaac: A Royalty on U.S. Credit Scoring (Sept. 25, 2018), https://seekingalpha.com/ article/4208014-fairisaac-royalty-on-u-s-credit-scoring. 19 Press Release, VantageScore, VantageScore Solutions Issues Statement Reacting to FHFA’s Proposed Rules for 

Validating and Approving New Credit Scoring Models (Dec. 17, 2018), 

https://vantagescore.com/press/vantagescore-solutions-issues-statement-reacting-to-fhfas- proposed-rules-forvalidating-and-approving-new-credit-scoring-models.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 20 of 141 PageID #:2863
18

high . . . and expensive.”20

65. “Network effects” ‒ i.e., the phenomenon where a product or service increases 

in value when the total number of customers increase – serve as a barrier to entry into the B2B 

Credit Score Market. As one analyst has noted: “The ‘network effects’ keeping FICO’s 

dominant position [are] indeed incredibly strong.”21

66. In 2011, at Fair Isaac’s Analyst/Investor Day, Fair Isaac’s then-CEO, Mark 

Greene, explained: “In about 10 seconds, an entire commerce transaction taking place because 

720 FICO was understood by the broker, by the mortgage banker on the other end of line and 

the customer to be shorthand for good credit risk, gave this guy a favorable mortgage rate. 

And that network effect, having everybody in the loop understand that shorthand and 

standardize on a FICO Score, that’s magic.”22

67. The anticompetitive conduct by Fair Isaac alleged herein accounts in significant 

part for the FICO Score’s dominance in the B2B Credit Score Market.

68. The CBs participate in a market for credit reports. A credit report contains 

detailed information about a consumer’s credit activity and current credit situation. The 

detailed information in a credit report is used to generate a FICO Score for a specific 

customer, which B2B lenders can use in making their lending decisions.

69. On information and belief, the CBs control virtually all of the credit report 

market (they have been called a “triopoly”) and enjoy roughly equivalent market shares.”23

70. The three CBs are all members of a trade association called the Consumer Data 

20 John Ulzheimer, Why FICO Isn’t Going Away Any Time Soon, Smart Credit (July 5, 2011), 

https://blog.smartcredit.com/2011/07/05/why-fico-isnt-going-away-any-time-soon/. 21 Harrison Schwartz, Fair Isaac: Share Buybacks Likely To End As Cash Reserves Run Low, Seeking Alpha (Dec. 

17, 2019), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4312953-fair-isaac-share- buybacks-likely-to-end-cash-reserves-run-low. 22 SA Transcripts, Seeking Alpha, Fair Isaac Corp. – Analyst/Investor Day (Nov. 3, 2011), 

https://seekingalpha.com/article/307417-fair-isaac-corp-analyst-investor-day. 23 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, List of Consumer Reporting Companies (2021), 

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-reporting-companies- list_2021-06.pdf.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 21 of 141 PageID #:2864
19

Industry Association (“CDIA”). Through the CDIA, the three CBs frequently work together, 

including to: (i) develop a standard electronic data reporting format called Metro 2®; (ii) issue 

joint statements on matters of public importance; (iii) provide guidelines to businesses that use 

credit reports; and (iv) respond to public criticisms of their industry. The three CBs also 

cooperated in the establishment of VantageScore Solutions as a joint venture.

24

71. The market for credit reports exhibits strong barriers to entry, resulting from the 

relationships that the CBs establish with businesses that supply information to them and to 

which they in return sell reports. As one market expert commented, “replicating the databases 

of the leading credit bureaus would be incredibly difficult.”25 Similarly, Fair Isaac has 

explained:

In order to compete with the Credit Bureaus, a new entrant must build a database 

that is equivalent to the databases built by the Credit Bureaus over decades. 

Building such a competitive database involves considerable time and costs to 

develop the infrastructure, to populate the database with current information and 

historical data, and to format and store the data (e.g., Experian’s FileOne database 

cost more than $100 million and took four years to develop, despite Experian 

already having much of the underlying data).

26

72. “As a result of their market power, the Credit Bureaus’ returns are well in 

excess of any reasonable estimate of the cost of capital.”27

24 See Consumer Data Industry Ass’n, About CDIA, https://www.cdiaonline.org/about/about- cdia/ (last visited Oct. 

21, 2021); Consumer Data Industry Ass’n, Metro 2 Format for Credit Reporting, 

https://www.cdiaonline.org/resources/furnishers-of-data-overview/metro2- information/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2021); 

Dana Fowle, Industry Pushes Back Against Claims of High Credit Reporting Errors, Fox5 Atlanta (Sept.

15, 2021), https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/industry-pushes-back-against-claims-of-high-credit- reporting-errors; 

Press Release, Consumer Data Industry Ass’n, Consumer Data Industry Association Releases Study on the Value of 

Credit Reporting in U.S. (June 15, 2020), https://cdianews.s3.amazonaws.com/White+Paper+Press+Release+6.15.20.pdf; Consumer Data Industry Ass’n, Equifax,

Experian, & TransUnion Endorse CARES Act, https://www.cdiaonline.org/equifax-experian-transunion-endorsecares-act/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2021); Consumer Data Industry Ass’n, COVID-19, 

https://www.cdiaonline.org/covid-19/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2021). 25 Brett Horn, Credit Bureaus’ Wide Moats Can’t Be Breached, Morningstar (Aug. 24, 2018), 

https://www.morningstar.com/articles/880439/credit-bureaus-wide-moats-cant-be-breached. 26 Third Amended Compl., Dkt. 436, Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Sols. (D. Minn. Nov. 10, 2018), ¶ 116. 27 Horn, supra n.25.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 22 of 141 PageID #:2865
20

C. Fair Isaac’s FICO Score Has a Monopoly in the B2B Credit Score Market 

73. Fair Isaac came into existence in 1956, possessed a monopoly on credit-scoring 

algorithms until the mid-1970s, and continues to wield a dominant market share.

28

74. Fair Isaac’s “FICO Classic” credit scores are the best known and most widely

used credit scores in the B2B Credit Score Market. Fair Isaac applies an algorithm to each

credit reporting agency’s data to generate a FICO Classic Score between 300 and 850 that 

purports to give an indication of the individual’s credit risk. It also generates a set of “reason

statements,” with corresponding codes, that explain the reasons the consumer has not been 

assigned the maximum score.

75. FICO Scores are the credit scores most widely used by lenders and are used in 

over 90% of U.S. credit lending decisions.29 Every year, lenders access billions of FICO 

Scores to help them understand people's credit risk and make better-informed lending 

decisions. 

76. On its website, Fair Isaac claims that “10 billion FICO Scores are purchased 

every year” and “27 million Fico Scores are purchased every day.” FICO Scores are also used in 

over 30 countries.30

77. Fair Isaac also advertises that its FICO Score is “widely accepted” and “used by 

90% of top U.S. lenders.” FICO Scores have been “an industry standard for over 30 years.”31

78. Fair Isaac’s executives have confirmed the dominance of Fair Isaac’s FICO

Score. In November 2017, at the JPMorgan Ultimate Services Investor Conference, Fair 

28 Raymond Anderson, A History of Credit Scoring, at 75-76 (2019), 

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Raymond_Anderson4/publication/331533723_Chapter_B0

6_History_of_Credit_Scoring/links/5c7ed843299bf1268d3ccc5d/Chapter-B06-History-of- CreditScoring.pdf?origin=publication_detail.

29 https://fico.gcs-web.com/static-files/946e4204-cdbb-4797-b7e0-24d71191698b. 30 https://www.ficoscore.com/about. 31 Id.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 23 of 141 PageID #:2866
21

Isaac’s CFO and Executive Vice President Michael Pung stated that the FICO scoring system 

“is the most widely used credit scoring system here in the U.S.,” that “[v]irtually every major

lender in the U.S. [uses] the FICO Score for some sort of credit lending decision,” and that Fair 

Isaac has “maintained a 90-plus percent market share for at least the [last] 13 years.”32 In 

2008, Craig Watts, a public affairs manager at Fair Isaac, described the FICO Score as the 

“800 pound gorilla.”33

79. Fair Isaac states in its 2020 Form 10-K:

Our products and services serve clients in multiple 

industries, including primarily banking, insurance, retail, 

healthcare and public agencies. End users of our products 

include 96 of the 100 largest financial institutions in the 

U.S., and two-thirds of the largest 100 banks in the world.

Our clients also include more than 600 insurers, including 

nine of the top ten U.S. property and casualty insurers; more 

than 300 retailers and general merchandisers; more than 150 

government or public agencies; and more than 200 

healthcare and pharmaceuticals companies, including nine 

of the world’s top ten pharmaceuticals companies. Eight of 

the top ten companies on the 2020 Fortune 500 list use one

or more of our solutions.In addition, our consumer services 

are marketed to an estimated 200 million U.S. consumers 

whose credit relationships are reported to the three major

U.S. credit reporting agencies.

34

80. An infographic on Fair Isaac’s website states: “10 BILLION FICO SCORES 

ARE SOLD EACH YEAR,” which is “FOUR TIMES the number of hamburgers McDonald’s 

sells WORLDWIDE in a year,” and “27,400,000 FICO scores are sold every day,” which is 

“OVER TWICE the number of cups of coffee Starbucks sells WORLDWIDE in a day.”35

32 TransUnion Counterclaims, ¶ 32. 33 Dana Dratch, What Does ‘Good’ Credit Really Mean?, CNBC (Oct. 30, 2008),

https://www.cnbc.com/id/27458815. 34Fair Isaac 2020 10-K at 10. 35Fair Isaac, Learn About the FICO Score and Its Long History, https://www.fico.com/25years/.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 24 of 141 PageID #:2867
22

81. Fair Isaac’s 2020 Form 10-K states that FICO Scores “are used in the majority 

of U.S. credit decisions, by nearly all of the major banks, credit card organizations, mortgage 

lenders and auto loan originators,” and it describes FICO Scores as “the standard measure in 

the U.S. of consumer credit risk.”36

82. A May 2021 report by Yale University’s Thurman Arnold Project, a 

collaborative project among Yale faculty and students, as well as other scholars dedicated to 

research on competition policy and antitrust enforcement, notes that Fair Isaac “enjoys a 

virtual monopoly in the credit score market” and that “[b]ecause of the lack of competition in 

36Fair Isaac 2020 10-K at 3, 7.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 25 of 141 PageID #:2868
23

this domain, there has been limited innovation in scoring methodology.”37

83. Fair Isaac’s monopoly in the B2B Credit Score Market has given it 

considerable power to control prices and impose monopoly rents. Fair Isaac’s CEO Will

Lansing has noted that, in the B2B Credit Score Market, Fair Isaac has “quite a bit of discretion 

in whether we want our margins to be higher or lower or where they are.”38

84. In February 2013, at a Morgan Stanley Conference, Lansing explained that Fair 

Isaac’s “Scores business, which is the cash generator, is a very, very high-margin business. It’s 

deeply embedded into the systems of the bank customers who use it.”39

D. Fair Isaac Has Been Able to Maintain its Monopoly

85. Despite Fair Isaac’s 90% share in the Business Market, several companies have 

attempted to compete with Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores. These competitors’ products use the same 

data as FICO Scores. However, many also incorporate data not used by FICO Scores—data 

such as, rental, utility, and telecom payment data and/or public records information, including

property deeds, mortgages, liens, personal property titles, tax records, and licensing data.

86. Some of these competitors to Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores in the B2B Credit Score 

Market include: SageStream’s Credit Optics Score; LexisNexis’s RiskView score; CoreLogic 

Credco’s Anthem Credit Score; PRBC; ChexSystems; L2C’s Link2Credit Score; and 

ScoreLogix LLC’s JSS Credit Score. 

87. Another competitor, VantageScore Solutions, represented the biggest threat to 

Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores in the B2B Credit Score Market because it was a joint venture 

37 Yale University Thurman Arnold Project, Updating Antitrust and Competition Policy: Finance Issues, at 14, 15 

(May 2021), https://som.yale.edu/sites/default/files/TeamFinance- Final.pdf. 38 TransUnion Counterclaims, ¶ 34. 39 Seeking Alpha, Fair Isaac’s CEO Presents at Morgan Stanley Technology, Media & Telecom Conference 

(Transcript) (Feb. 27, 2013), https://seekingalpha.com/article/1231981-fair- isaacs-ceo-presents-at-morgan-stanleytechnology-media-and-telecom-conference-transcript.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 26 of 141 PageID #:2869
24

founded by the three major CBs. As part of its attempt to compete against Fair Isaac’s FICO 

Scores in the B2B Credit Score Market, VantageScore Solutions introduced the VantageScore 

credit scoring system in March 2006. The three CB Defendants continue to own VantageScore 

Solutions.

88. VantageScore Solutions does not sell or market its VantageScore credit models 

or credit scores; instead, it licenses them to the three CB Defendants, which may incorporate 

VantageScores in their credit reports.

89. VantageScores are a competitor to FICO Scores in the B2B Credit Score 

Market.

90. In addition to being backed by the three major CBs, the VantageScore credit

scoring model provides reliable credit scores for millions more consumers than FICO Scores 

by relying on additional and alternative sources of data. VantageScore, for example, calculates 

scores for consumers who have not used credit for up to two years and use utility and 

telecommunications payment histories. As such, VantageScore provides insights into

individuals’ and businesses’ desirability as customers, clients, and/or tenants that Fair Isaac’s 

FICO Scores cannot. In contrast, Fair Isaac’s FICO scoring systems do not generate a score if 

a consumer does not have at least one credit account that has been open for six months or

more, or if no credit account of the consumer has been reported to the reporting CB. Thus, 

millions of otherwise creditworthy individuals do not have a FICO Score.

91. Obtaining a mortgage, car loan, credit card or reasonable interest rates on

personal lines of credit is almost impossible without a credit score. Landlords are also 

increasingly screening potential tenants using credit scores. Thus, those excluded by Fair 

Isaac’s traditional FICO scoring systems--including a disproportionate number of low-income 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 27 of 141 PageID #:2870
25

and minority consumers--face an increased risk of being denied access to credit in the form of

credit cards, auto and home loans, and housing.

92. For example, the CFPB has found that, as of 2010, 26 million consumers in the 

United States were “credit invisible” ‒ i.e., they lacked credit history with one of the 

nationwide credit reporting companies.40 Those individuals cannot be scored by FICO.

41

93. The CFPB’s research suggests “a strong relationship between income and 

having a credit record. Almost 30 percent of consumers in low-income neighborhoods are 

credit invisible and an additional 16 percent have unscored records. These percentages are 

notably lower in higher-income neighborhoods. For example, in upper-income neighborhoods, 

only 4 percent of the population is credit invisible and another 5 percent has an unscored 

record.”42

94. Moreover, the CFPB found “significant differences in the incidence of having 

a limited credit history across racial and ethnic groups,” specifically, while White and Asian 

individuals “are almost equally likely to be credit invisible or have an unscored record, the 

shares of [Black and Hispanic individuals] with limited credit history are much larger,” and 

individuals in those groups are thus less likely to be able to obtain a credit score.43

95. According to the CFPB, “[a]bout 15 percent” of Black[ ] and Hispanic[ ] 

individuals “are credit invisible . . . and an additional 13 percent of [Black individuals] and 12 

percent of [Hispanic individuals] have unscored records. . . . This elevated incidence . . . is 

observed across ages, suggesting that these differences across racial and ethnic groups 

40 CFPB Office of Research, Data Point: Credit Invisibles, at 4, 6 (May 2015),

https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201505_cfpb_data-point-credit-invisibles.pdf. 41 Id. 42 Id. at 24. 43 Id.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 28 of 141 PageID #:2871
26

materialize early in the adult lives of these consumers and persist thereafter.”44 

96. The CFPB went on to conclude that “[t]hese results suggest that the problems 

that accompany having a limited credit history are disproportionally borne by Black[ ], 

Hispanic[ ], and lower-income consumers.”45

97. Furthermore, it is widely recognized that FICO Scores are a measure of past 

ability to pay. Competing products incorporate an analysis of prospective creditworthiness. 

For example, Scorelogix's JSS score incorporates job and income stability to determine 

whether the borrower will have the ability to repay debt in the future. L2C offers an alternative 

credit score that uses utility payment histories to determine creditworthiness, including future 

ability to pay.

98. VantageScore has achieved some limited success. In a 2018 report, 

VantageScore Solutions stated: 

During the twelve months ending in July 2017, over 1.4 billion 

VantageScore credit scores were delivered directly to consumers 

by lenders like Chase and Capital One and educational websites 

like CreditKarma, Lending Tree, and Mint. These scores are 

calculated using the same VantageScore model used by lenders 

(i.e., not an “educational” model). They are most often provided 

free of charge as part of educational offerings that include 

simulators, credit reports, educational articles, and explanations.46

99. VantageScore Solutions went on to note that “[a]s lenders adopt VantageScore, 

we believe that such adoption will improve consumers’ access to credit in certain segments 

and enable many more borrowers to obtain fairer pricing.”47 VantageScore Solutions also 

reported that “[m]any of the most sophisticated secondary market participants use the 

44 Id. at 24-25. 45 Id. at 25. 46 VantageScore Solutions, VantageScore® Credit Scores and The Mortgage Market, at 8 (2018) (“VantageScore

Report”), https://vantagescore.com/pdfs/FAQs-VantageScore-Credit-Scores-and-the-Mortgage-Market.pdf. 47 Id. at 5.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 29 of 141 PageID #:2872
27

VantageScore model to help evaluate and monitor risk, and to price and benchmark deals more 

accurately.48

100. Despite the advantages of using VantageScore or another competing credit

scoring model, Fair Isaac continues to have a monopoly in the B2B Credit Score Market and 

extracts monopoly rents through anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct and by conspiring 

with the Credit Bureaus. In February 2013, at a Morgan Stanley Conference, Fair Isaac’s CEO 

Will Lansing explained that despite the existence of VantageScore, “there [is] not that much 

competition around our Scores business” because “FICO Scores are very much part of the

fabric of the banking industry” and “really deeply embedded.” 

E. Fair Isaac’s Conduct in Furtherance of its Anticompetitive Scheme

101. Fair Isaac anticipated the threat VantageScore could pose to its dominance in 

the B2B Credit Score Market. Fair Isaac’s own models of future losses predicted “substantial 

double-digit declines” if the use of VantageScore continued to expand.49

102. Faced with the prospect of a significant hit to its market dominance, and its 

profits, Fair Isaac used its monopoly power to coordinate a comprehensive attack on 

VantageScore that included filing anticompetitive litigation; enlisting the Credit Bureaus to 

sign on to licensing agreements that undermined their own joint venture; and undertaking a 

campaign of disparagement against, and disinformation about, VantageScore Solutions and 

VantageScore. 

1. Fair Isaac’s Anticompetitive Litigation

103. Fair Isaac, recognizing the creation of VantageScore as a competitive threat,

48 VantageScore Solutions, Myth: VantageScore Is Not Accepted by Investors in Securitization Markets (Mar.

23, 2016), https://vantagescore.com/education/blog/myth- vantagescore-is-not-accepted-by-investors-insecuritization-markets. 49 Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. CV 06-4112, 2008 WL 11348223, at *2 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 

2008).

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 30 of 141 PageID #:2873
28

initiated litigation against Equifax, Experian, TransUnion, and VantageScore Solutions. In 

October 2006, just after the introduction of VantageScore, Fair Isaac filed a meritless lawsuit

against them, alleging that the development of VantageScore violated the antitrust laws and 

constituted trademark infringement. Fair Isaac sought the elimination of VantageScore

Solutions requesting that the “Defendants be ordered to dissolve VantageScore.” Fair Isaac 

Corp. v. Equifax, Inc. et al, No. 0:06-cv-04112, ECF No. 1-1 at 65 (D. Minn. Oct. 11, 2006). 

This frivolous lawsuit represented Fair Isaac’s first attempt to kill VantageScore before it 

could gain traction in the market.

104. VantageScore Solutions characterized the litigation that Fair Isaac initiated as a 

“legal battle that sought to put us out of business, even as we scrambled to establish a 

competitive foothold.”50 Fair Isaac raised bogus antitrust claims that it knew lacked 

foundation, given its then-94% share of the B2B Credit Score Market. It also alleged 

trademark infringement that a jury found to be based on a trademark that Fair Isaac had 

fraudulently obtained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). In addition, Fair 

Isaac’s contention that the “300-850” marks were anything other than “merely” descriptive 

lacked all foundation because ‒ as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later held ‒ 

“consumers in this market immediately understand ‘300-850’ to describe the qualities and 

characteristics of FICO’s credit score ‒ that the credit score will be within the range of 300-

850.”51

105. Equifax settled the litigation in June 2008 and formed “a partnership [with 

Fair Isaac] to develop and sell advanced analytics and scoring solutions for businesses and 

50 VantageScore Solutions, Inc., 10 years, 10 milestones (Mar. 2016),

https://thescore.vantagescore.com/article/252/10-years-10-milestones. 51 Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 650 F.3d 1139, 1148 (8th Cir. 2011).

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 31 of 141 PageID #:2874
29

consumers.”52

106. The litigation against Experian and TransUnion lasted into 2011. While it was 

ongoing, VantageScore Solutions remained under a cloud, with Fair Isaac’s lawsuit hobbling 

its commercial prospects: Potential B2B Purchasers for VantageScore had no way of being 

sure that the product might not be declared infringing on Fair Isaac’s trademarks or that 

VantageScore Solutions would not be dissolved.

107. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the Credit Bureaus 

on the antitrust and false advertising claims. A jury found against Fair Isaac on the remaining 

claim for trademark infringement, finding that the mark “300-850” (which denoted the range 

of FICO Scores) was merely descriptive. It also found that: (1) Fair Isaac made a false 

representation during the application process to the PTO for the registrations of the “300-850” 

marks; (2) Fair Isaac knew that representation to be false when it was made and intended to 

deceive the PTO; and (3) the PTO relied on the false representation in deciding to issue the 

registrations.53

108. The district court upheld the verdict, noting that “[t]his extensive, expensive 

litigation seems to have been initiated largely in response to a perceived threat to Fair Isaac’s 

dominant position in the credit scoring industry.”54

109. In 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed 

both that decision and the earlier summary judgment ruling.55

110. VantageScore Solutions’s growth during its first few years was inhibited by 

52 Fair Isaac, Equifax and Fair Isaac Enter Partnership to Accelerate Development and Delivery of New Analytic

Solutions (June 10, 2008), https://www.fico.com/en/newsroom/equifax-and-fair-isaac-enter-partnership-acceleratedevelopment-and-delivery-new-analytic. 53 Fair Isaac, 650 F.3d at 1148-50. 54 Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1000 (D. Minn. 2010). 55 Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 650 F.3d 1139 (8th Cir. 2011).

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 32 of 141 PageID #:2875
30

the litigation, which was part of a continuing antitrust violation by Fair Isaac that goes on to 

this day. 

111. In December 2017, Fair Isaac sued TransUnion for unpaid royalties.56

112. In February 2018, TransUnion responded by filing antitrust counterclaims for, 

inter alia, monopolization against Fair Isaac. In paragraphs 42-60 of the counterclaims (which 

was partially redacted), the anticompetitive terms the Credit Bureaus and Fair Isaac had agreed 

upon were disclosed publicly for the first time. Those provisions are described in detail below.

113. Fair Isaac moved to dismiss the counterclaims. Judge Coleman denied the 

motion, ruling that “TransUnion has adequately pled actual and attempted monopolization” 

through allegations that “FICO engages in practices that are intended to drive out competition” 

through “exclusive dealing provisions [that] are unlawful attempts to ‘maintain monopoly 

power through exclusionary conduct.’”57

114. In November 2020, TransUnion and Fair Isaac settled on undisclosed terms. 

One effect of this settlement was to cut Plaintiffs and proposed Class members off from 

obtaining further information about the anticompetitive agreements between Fair Isaac and the 

CBs. Fair Isaac essentially bought TransUnion off. This inference is bolstered by the fact that, 

in August 2021, TransUnion announced that it had entered into a long-term (presumably 

lucrative) contract to distribute FICO Scores to lenders and consumers in Canada.58

115. The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice took notice 

of Fair Isaac’s conduct alleged in the TransUnion Action and instituted a civil investigation. 

56 See Complaint, Dkt. 1, Fair Isaac Corp. v. Trans Union LLC, No. 1:17-cv-08318 (N.D. Ill.Nov. 16, 2017). 57 Fair Isaac Corp. v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 17:cv-8318, 2019 WL 1382068, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 27, 2019). 58 See Press Release, TransUnion, TransUnion Enters New Long-term Agreement with FICOto Distribute FICO®

Score in Canada (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2021/08/03/2273895/0/en/TransUnion-Enters-New-Long-term-Agreement-with-FICO- to-Distribute-FICOScore-in-Canada.html.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 33 of 141 PageID #:2876
31

That investigation was closed without action in December 2020, shortly after TransUnion 

settled with Fair Isaac.59

2. Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureau’s Conspiracy

116. Business customers in the B2B Credit Score Market purchase credit reports and 

FICO Scores from CBs and third-party credit reporting companies. As part of this process, 

CBs have entered into contractual relationships, called “Credit Scoring Services Agreements” 

(“CSSAs”), with their customers that govern the terms by which businesses purchase FICO 

Scores. These terms include the amount(s) paid to the CB, the fee model for delivery of credit

score services, the method of payment, the mode of delivery, and restrictions on the business’s 

use of FICO Scores. 

117. The CBs and Fair Isaac have entered into separate licensing agreements which 

set forth the royalties that CBs must pay to Fair Isaac for the FICO Scores that the CBs sell to 

their customers. These royalties are passed on to Plaintiffs and other members of the proposed 

Classes. 

118. After its litigation efforts failed to eliminate VantageScore, Fair Isaac elected 

to take another approach. When its existing licensing agreements with each CB expired in 

2013 or 2015, Fair Isaac took it upon itself to function as a central coordinating party in a 

conspiracy with the CBs to crush the only real competition, VantageScore; maintain Fair 

Isaac’s monopoly; and extract monopoly rents from B2B Purchasers.

119. To effectuate the conspiracy, Fair Isaac and the CBs entered into new or 

renewed agreements that contained new provisions designed to restrict the competitive reach 

of VantageScore. Those provisions reflect Fair Isaac and the CBs’ conscious commitment to a 

59 See Press Release, Fair Isaac, FICO Statement Regarding Antitrust Investigation (Mar. 15,2020), https://fico.gcsweb.com/news-releases/news-release-details/fico-statement-regarding- antitrust-investigation.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 34 of 141 PageID #:2877
32

common scheme designed to achieve the unlawful objective of foreclosing competition in the 

B2B Credit Score Market. The anticompetitive contract provisions targeted the only 

significant competing credit score – VantageScore. And they specifically restricted the CBs’

ability to market VantageScore to B2B purchasers. On information and belief, the CBs agreed 

to those provisions – cutting their own joint venture off at the knees – in return for Fair Isaac’s 

acquiescence to a clause that protected them from price competition (and potentially in 

exchange for other benefits as well). The point of the conspiracy was to support 

supracompetitive prices for credit scores for the consumers – the B2B purchasers. In addition 

to other facts, the CBs’ agreement to those provisions makes them co-conspirators with Fair 

Isaac.

120. The CBs’ frequent business dealings with Fair Isaac and with each other gave 

them ample opportunities to communicate, coordinate behavior, and engage in other actions 

pursuant to their conspiracy. Because Fair Isaac monopolized the market for Credit Scores, 

and the three CBs dominated the market for credit reports, the conspiracy, which restricted 

choice, innovation, and price competition for purchases of credit scores and credit reports, 

required the cooperation of only a few entities (four), all of which had extensive experience 

dealing with each other. In addition to the CBs’ longstanding and continuing contractual 

relationships with Fair Isaac, the CBs cooperate with one another through CDIA, their trade 

association. Indeed, VantageScore Solutions was, and is, their joint venture.

121. The agreements were consummated at a critical time. In 2011 through the first 

part of 2013, developments occurred that should have furthered VantageScore’s ability to 

compete with FICO Scores. In 2011, VantageScore Solutions formed a partnership with the 

Consumer Federation of America, “a nonprofit association of nearly 300 consumer groups 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 35 of 141 PageID #:2878
33

founded in 1968 to advance consumers’ interests through research, advocacy, and education”; 

that alliance led to the “use of annual consumer surveys to gauge awareness of credit scoring 

related issues.”60 In October 2012, “the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) 

revised its rules for assessing default risk on loans issued by banks with deposits in excess of 

$10 billion. Instead of evaluating loans on any particular credit score, the revision called for 

examining the underlying probability of default associated with those loans at the time of 

origination.”61 In March 2013, VantageScore Solutions debuted a new scoring model, 

VantageScore 3.0, which “built on the strengths of its predecessors and drew extensive news 

coverage for its ability to score 98 percent of adult consumers in the United States (including 

30-35 million who cannot get scores from conventional credit-scoring models [i.e., FICO]); its 

disregard of paid collections (including paid medical debt); and its simplified reason codes.”62

And, in July 2013, VantageScore Solutions published a white paper explaining how 

VantageScore could be aligned with the FDIC’s new rules for evaluating probability of 

default.63

122. Fair Isaac’s response to these developments was to agree on anticompetitive 

contract terms with the CBs, commencing with Experian in May 2013, continuing with 

Equifax in November 2013, and culminating with the February 2015 Analytic and Data 

License Agreement (“ADLA”) between Fair Isaac and TransUnion. These clauses would 

preserve Fair Isaac’s monopoly while compensating the CBs for the marginalization of 

VantageScores. Fair Isaac and the CBs did not publicly reveal any of the terms of their 

agreements until February 2018. Many of the agreements’ terms remain confidential to this 

60 VantageScore Solutions, 10 Years, 10 Milestones, supra n.56. 61 Id. 62 VantageScore, 10 years, 10 milestones, supra n.56. 63 VantageScore Solutions, FDIC New Definition of High Risk Consumer Loan Securities (July 2013),

https://paperzz.com/doc/8033743/fdic-new-definition-of-high-risk-consumer-loan- and-securi. l

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 36 of 141 PageID #:2879
34

day.

a. Fair Isaac’s Anticompetitive Contracts with the CBs

123. The discussion that follows is based on TransUnion’s description of its ADLA 

in its counterclaims against Fair Isaac. The ADLA was filed under seal in the TransUnion 

action and is unavailable to Plaintiffs beyond what TransUnion has quoted in its 

counterclaims. While the counterclaims quote only the ADLA, TransUnion pled that “Fair 

Isaac represented to TransUnion that TransUnion’s two major competitors, Experian and 

Equifax, had already agreed to materially similar new contracts with Fair Isaac.”64 Thus, on 

information and belief, the same anticompetitive provisions that exist in the ADLA also exist 

in the agreements between Experian and Fair Isaac and TransUnion and Fair Isaac. The 

allegations that follow therefore apply to all three CB Defendants.

124. On information and belief, Fair Isaac informed all three CBs that the others 

had entered or would enter into the same anticompetitive contracts, and the CBs would not 

have agreed to the anticompetitive restrictions without assurance that each other CB would 

agree to and abide by the restrictions.65

125. The restraints imposed in the contracts consist primarily of: (a) “No 

Equivalent Products” provisions; and (b) “Dynamic Royalty Schedule” provisions. A third set 

of provisions, the “Level Playing Field” provisions, compensated the CBs for their agreement 

not to promote VantageScore under the former provisions at the expense of B2B Purchasers. 

On information and belief, each of the CBs recognized they were part of the conspiracy 

because they knew that the other CBs had agreed or would agree to these restrictive terms. 

Each CB knew at the time they entered into the agreements with Fair Isaac that these terms 

64 TransUnion Counterclaims, ¶43. 65 See id.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 37 of 141 PageID #:2880
35

undermined VantageScore Solutions, which competed with Fair Isaac and were therefore 

against their own individual as well as collective economic self-interest. And each Credit 

Bureau complied with and enforced the anticompetitive provisions in the contracts as part of 

the broader conspiracy.

i. The “No Equivalent Products Clause”

126. The “No Equivalent Products” clause is located at Section 12.5 of the ADLA

between Fair Isaac and TransUnion. This clause provides that TransUnion may not “internally 

develop” a credit scoring system that is “aligned to the odds-to-score relationship of any Fair 

Isaac Analytic” or uses more than a limited number of reason codes that “match” reason codes

used by any Fair Isaac Analytic. Section 12.5 of the ADLA further prohibits TransUnion from

distributing “any competing analytic” (i.e., credit scoring system) that is aligned with FICO 

Scores or uses too many of the same reason codes. The Section also expressly names

VantageScore Solutions, LLC as a developer of such a scoring system that may not be 

distributed if VantageScore were to offer an “Equivalent Product.”66

127. On information and belief, Fair Isaac has imposed similar or identical “No 

Equivalent Products” clauses on Equifax and Experian. Thus, these CBs have agreed to and 

acquiesced in these anticompetitive agreements and the resulting anticompetitive effects. 

128. Fair Isaac’s “No Equivalent Products” clause has effectively blocked the CBs 

from offering alternative credit scoring products, such as VantageScores, which would allow 

business customers in the B2B Credit Score Market to switch from FICO Scores without

incurring the significant switching costs that using a new scoring system would entail. It also 

prevents the use of VantageScore or other credit scoring systems alongside or interchangeably 

66 Id., ¶44.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 38 of 141 PageID #:2881
36

with FICO Scores without the business customer incurring those same switching costs.

129. The “No Equivalent Products” clause thus protects and sustains Fair Isaac’s 

monopoly.

130. For example, if an alternative credit scoring product such as VantageScore used 

a score of 700 to indicate a less-than-five-percent risk of credit delinquency, and if a FICO

Score of 700 also indicated the same risk of delinquency, the “No Equivalent Products” clause 

would prevent a CB from distributing the competing product. Similarly, if a competing credit 

score product used reason codes that match 20% of the reason codes used by FICO scoring 

systems, the “No Equivalent Products” clause would prohibit a CB from distributing the 

product.

131. Due to years of Fair Isaac’s dominance, many business customers of credit 

scores have modeled and designed their internal systems for FICO Scores. These business 

customers’ systems, models, and processes are calibrated to FICO’s odds-to-score

relationship (i.e., each given score has a given ratio of non-defaulting consumers to defaulting 

consumers), and reason codes (the particular reasons cited for increased risk of default). For

example, a bank’s software might be designed to accept one or more FICO Scores and reason

codes, combine this information with data that it collects internally, and automatically produce 

a lending decision. The “No Equivalent Products” clause effectively prohibits the CBs from 

selling an alternative to FICO’s credit scores since those scores would have to be incompatible 

with many businesses’ existing systems. Thus, they are prevented from providing business 

customers a legitimate choice between using FICO Scores and an alternative score. 

132. Notably, the “No Equivalent Products” clause does not sustain Fair Isaac’s 

intellectual property. Rather, it protects and sustains Fair Isaac’s monopoly. For example, the 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 39 of 141 PageID #:2882
37

odds-to-score relationship is not protectable intellectual property. It is the arbitrary 

assignment of a number (score) to a related risk probability. The intellectual property entitled 

to protection in this product market is the analysis and the process used to predict a 

consumer’s risk of default, not the shorthand numerical representation of a “less than-fivepercent-risk-of-default” as “700.”

133. Similarly, the reason codes that are prohibited from matching Fair Isaac’s, under 

the “No Equivalent Products” clause, were not invented by Fair Isaac. Rather, there is an 

established set of reason codes that reflect well-established industry measures of

creditworthiness. 

134. The “No Equivalent Products” clause was effective because when one CB stops 

using VantageScore, it becomes even less attractive to the other CBs. B2B purchasers will not 

want to use a credit scoring system unless all of the main CBs use it. This phenomenon is 

often referred to as the “network effect.” Presumably, the CBs coordinated through 

VantageScore in the first place due to the network effect, i.e., to ensure that B2B purchasers 

would want to use their new credit scoring product. Fair Isaac exploited this effect to attempt 

to destroy VantageScore Solutions and its VantageScore product. By imposing a “No 

Equivalent Products” term, Fair Isaac sought to block the CBs from enabling B2B purchasers 

to easily switch from FICO Scores to VantageScore without incurring the cost of redesigning 

their lending programs and systems and from using VantageScore alongside or 

interchangeably with FICO Scores.

135. By agreeing to the “No Equivalent Products” provisions, the CBs agreed 

among themselves and with Fair Isaac to eliminate or drastically reduce the competitive threat 

posed by VantageScore, thus preserving and strengthening FICO’s monopoly.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 40 of 141 PageID #:2883
38

ii. The “Dynamic Royalty Schedule”

136. Fair Isaac’s contracts with each Credit Bureau include a similar or identical 

“Dynamic Royalty Schedule” clause that allowed Fair Isaac to replace its existing royalty with 

a new one and thereby gave Fair Isaac the ability to control the prices of FICO Scores. The 

“Dynamic Royalty Schedule” is detailed in Section 9.2 of the ADLA between Fair Isaac and 

TransUnion. This provision states that “once every twelve (12) months during the Term, Fair 

Isaac shall have the right to replace the Royalty Schedule by providing a new royalty schedule 

to TransUnion in writing.”67 

137. According to TransUnion, “Fair Isaac has abused and exploited this provision 

in 2015, 2016, and 2017 by not only raising prices, but also introducing entirely new and nonnegotiated contract terms, royalty categories, and definitions.”68

138. In 2015, Fair Isaac inserted a new “Pre-Qualification” royalty category into its 

contracts with CBs. “Pre-Qualification” is defined as “an End User’s qualification of a 

potential consumer customer for an End User’s own internal lending offering.” This royalty

category created a distinction between: (1) lenders that use FICO Scores for “PreQualification” without providing any credit score or credit data to consumers, and (2) lenders 

that use FICO Scores for “Pre-Qualification” while also providing credit scores or credit data 

to consumers “in connection” with the “Pre-Qualification.” 

139. As an incentive, some business customers in the B2B Credit Score Market

provide to their consumer customers, to whom they are often offering credit, the opportunity 

to receive their personal credit score. This can serve as a valuable marketing tool for the 

business customers.

67 TransUnion Counterclaims, ¶ 50. 68 Id.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 41 of 141 PageID #:2884
39

140. Under Fair Isaac’s contracts with the CBs, the royalty price paid to Fair Isaac 

for use of its FICO Score for “Pre-Qualification” is directly tied to whether credit scores or 

credit data are provided to consumers. There is a lower per-score royalty rate if a business 

customer purchases a FICO Score for use in “Pre-Qualification” and does not provide any 

credit score or credit data to their consumer customer “in connection” with the “PreQualification.” If the lender purchases a FICO score for use in ‘Pre-Qualification’ and 

provides a VantageScore (or any other credit score) to the consumer ‘in connection’ with the 

‘Pre- Qualification,’” Fair Isaac charges the lender a seven times penalty rate for that FICO 

Score. That steep penalty is meant to dissuade lenders from providing competing credit 

scores, such as a VantageScore.69

141. The higher royalty rate can only be avoided if the business customer

exclusively purchases FICO Scores. One way to avoid paying the higher royalty rate is for the 

business customer to purchase the FICO Score but not provide a credit score or credit data to 

the consumer. A second way to avoid the higher royalty rate requires the business customer to 

purchase a bundled FICO product from Fair Isaac and provide the bundled FICO Score to its 

consumer customer. Fair Isaac offers bundled products to lenders that combine the use of

scores designed for use by business customers with the provision of scores to their consumer 

customers.70

142. TransUnion accepted, complied with, and made royalty payments according to 

the new “Pre-Qualification” royalty category. On information and belief, so have the 

remaining CBs.

71

143. The only reason for the higher royalty rate is to force all business customers 

69 Id., ¶52. 70 Id., ¶ 53. 71 See id., ¶55.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 42 of 141 PageID #:2885
40

that participate in “Pre-Qualification” to purchase FICO Scores alone and make it cost 

prohibitive for business customers that engage in “Pre-Qualification” to provide an alternative 

credit score to its consumers. There is no legitimate business justification for the higher royalty

rate Fair Isaac and the CBs jointly agreed upon for FICO Scores when the business customer 

also purchases a competing credit score (i.e. VantageScore) to provide its consumer 

customers. The higher royalty rate has anticompetitive effects and has assisted Fair Isaac in 

maintaining its monopoly position as, on information and belief, few, if any, business 

customers have opted to pay the higher royalty rate.

144. According to TransUnion, “[t]his scheme has been effective, and no B2B 

Purchasers from TransUnion have opted to pay the penalty rate.”72 The purpose and effect of 

this clause was to prevent VantageScore from obtaining market share.

iii. The “Level Playing Field”

145. In exchange for agreeing to the “No Equivalent Products” and “Dynamic 

Royalty” provisions in their agreements with Fair Isaac ‒ which effectively prevent the CBs

from marketing VantageScore to B2B purchasers ‒ Fair Isaac committed not to offer any CB a 

more favorable price for FICO Scores than any other CB. This commitment was embodied in 

the “Level Playing Field” clauses of the agreements with the CBs. Those provisions forbid 

Fair Isaac to charge any CB a price that is lower than the price it charges any other CB.

73

146. The CBs advanced Fair Isaac’s interests by agreeing to the No Equivalent 

Products and Dynamic Royalty Schedule clauses, which sabotaged the CBs’ own competing 

VantageScore and gave FICO flexibility to raise prices. The Level Playing Field clause, in 

return, protected the CB s from the risk that Fair Isaac would grant discounts that could expose 

72 Id., ¶54. 73 See id., ¶59.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 43 of 141 PageID #:2886
41

them to the risk of losing market share to their competitors. As Fair Isaac has pointed out, the 

CBs faced “the threat that independent scoring algorithm vendors, such as Fair Isaac, will 

facilitate the entry of new Credit Bureaus.”74 But by agreeing to the Level Playing Field 

provisions, Fair Isaac deprived itself of the only way of carrying out that threat ‒ by offering 

new credit bureaus prices lower than those it charges the incumbent CBs. Thus, the CBs have 

secured from Fair Isaac a significant source of protection from future competition in the 

market for the sale of credit reports to B2B Purchasers.

147. Moreover, the Level Playing Field clause reduced price competition among the 

CBs. As Fair Isaac has pointed out, “a Credit Bureau could not be sure what its competitors’ 

costs were and, consequently, to what extent its competitors could cut the price of their Credit 

Scores. This uncertainty could be used by Lenders to induce price competition among the 

Credit Bureaus.” Fair Isaac claimed in its earlier lawsuit that the CBs sought to use 

VantageScore so that “each Credit Bureau will know that it is paying exactly the same cost as 

its competitors for its scoring algorithm, and Lenders will no longer be able to use this 

uncertainty to play one Credit Bureau against the others.”75 In a rich irony, the Level Playing 

Field provision does exactly what Fair Isaac accused the CBs of trying to accomplish through 

VantageScore: prevent their customers from playing one CB against the others, thereby 

reducing price competition for credit reports.

148. The “Level Playing Field” section of the ADLA between Fair Isaac and 

TransUnion is located in Section 9.16. This provision mandates that the prices that are made 

available to TransUnion will also be made available to other CBs. 

149. On information and belief, Fair Isaac’s contracts with Equifax and Experian 

74 See Third Amended Complaint, Dkt. 436, Fair Isaac Corporation v. Experian Info. Sols.,No. 06-CV-4112 (D. 

Minn. Nov. 10, 2008), ¶140. 75 Id., ¶138.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 44 of 141 PageID #:2887
42

include similar or identical “Level Playing Field” clauses.

150. Collectively, the “Dynamic Royalty Schedule” and “Level Playing Field” 

clauses allow Fair Isaac to unilaterally increase the royalty prices it charges for FICO Scores. 

151. The “Level Playing Field” and “Dynamic Royalty Schedule” clauses 

disincentivize CBs from negotiating for lower royalty prices for Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores, 

because the CBs will not obtain a competitive advantage if they were to obtain lower pricing 

for royalty rates. The “Level Playing Field” clause does not provide Fair Isaac with any rights 

it does not have. Fair Isaac could offer the same royalty rates to all CBs absent the clause. The 

“Level Playing Field” clause exists to inform the CBs that negotiating for lower prices is

useless.

152. Notably, while TransUnion complained in its suit against Fair Isaac that the 

Level Playing Field provision raised costs for the CBs, it admitted that, to the extent the 

provision resulted in higher rates, those costs were ultimately also borne by “banks [and] 

mortgage lenders” (i.e., B2B purchasers).76 While the CBs’ agreement to the restrictive terms 

was against their self-interest, much of the cost was borne by B2B purchasers, while the CBs

were otherwise compensated by the Level Playing Field provisions. 

153. Fair Isaac and the CBs have used the “Level Playing Field” and “Dynamic 

Royalty Schedule” provisions in their contracts for anticompetitive purposes and to extract 

monopoly prices from all business customers in the B2B Credit Score Market.

3. Fair Isaac’s Negative Advertising Campaign in Furtherance of its 

Scheme 

154. Having successfully induced the CBs to agree with Fair Isaac and with each 

other to impose restrictions on VantageScore’s ability to compete with FICO, Fair Isaac also 

76 TransUnion Counterclaims, ¶60.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 45 of 141 PageID #:2888
43

engaged in an advertising campaign that disseminated false and misleading information with 

the goal of maintaining its monopoly in the B2B Credit Score Market. In advertisements, 

letters, and blog posts, Fair Isaac disparaged VantageScore and other credit scoring systems by 

calling them “FAKO” scores, falsely claimed that VantageScore and other alternative scoring 

systems do not reliably measure creditworthiness, and misrepresented the information

considered by VantageScore and other credit scoring systems.

155. For example, on December 12, 2017 Fair Isaac took out a full-page 

advertisement in the Wall Street Journal addressed to “Lenders, Policymakers and Consumer 

Advocates.” This advertisement that attacked VantageScore without identifying it by name. 

The advertisement contrasted Fair Isaac, which “is not owned by the credit bureaus” and 

whose FICO Scores have been used “by lenders and securitization investors for decades,” with 

an alternative credit score, which the is owned by CBs. According to the advertisement, the 

credit score owned by CBs (impliedly VantageScore) is less reliable than FICO Scores in

evaluating credit risk and does not use “sound practices” or “science-based credit evaluation.”

This advertisement conveyed Fair Isaac’s false message that VantageScore is “Weakening 

scoring standards, [and] harm[ing] consumers, and the lending system.”77

156. Furthermore, the Wall Street Journal advertisement directed readers to “Learn 

more at FICO.com/independent,” a Fair Isaac-owned website that links visitors to articles and 

blog posts that disparage VantageScore by name. One of these blog post claims: “Despite 

claims by VantageScore, weakening the minimum scoring criteria will not empower millions 

of low-risk mortgage credit seekers.”

157. Another example or Fair Isaac’s false and misleading advertising campaign can 

77 TransUnion Counterclaims, ¶ 66

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 46 of 141 PageID #:2889
44

be found on its website where a blog post claims that “Research results consistently showed that

scoring models relying solely on sparse or old credit data were weak and did a poor job 

forecasting future performance.” This statement is false and misleading. VantageScore and 

other scoring models consider an individual consumer or business’s full credit and financial 

history, even if the consumer has not used a traditional credit line in the last six months. 

Further, studies have shown that VantageScore and other competing credit scoring models are 

strongly predictive.78

158. A blog post written by Joanne Gaskin (“Gaskin”), the Vice President of Scores 

and Analytics at Fair Isaac, claims that whereas “FICO Score 9 differentiates medical from 

non-medical collections,” “VantageScore does not.”79 TransUnion responded “This statement 

conveys the false message that VantageScore does not differentiate medical from non-medical 

collections. In fact, VantageScore 3.0 was the first credit scoring system to address medical 

debt. VantageScore 4.0, the most recent version of VantageScore, distinguishes medical 

collection accounts from non-medical collection accounts and penalizes medical collections 

less than non- medical ones.”80

159. Similarly, Fair Isaac fought hard against the efforts to create a process that 

would allow alternative credit scoring models to be validated and approved by Fannie Mae 

and Freddie Mac when they purchase mortgages. Such a rule would clearly benefit 

VantageScore, which could then attempt to break Fair Isaac’s 100% monopoly in this sector. 

Public sentiment favored this move.81 Fair Isaac did not. Indeed, it deployed Gaskin to give 

78 See VantageScore Report, supra n.44, at 2, 4, 5-6 79 Joanne Gaskin, FICO BLOG, Truth Squad: Is FICO Score 700 the Same as VantageScore 700? (Feb. 6, 2017), 

https://www.fico.com/blogs/truth-squad-fico-score-700-same-vantagescore-700. 80 TransUnion Counterclaims, ¶71. 81 See Bloomberg Business News, This Monopoly Is Holding Back the Mortgage Market,(Jan. 18, 2018),

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-01-18/this-credit-score- monopoly-is-holding-back-the-mortgageCase: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 47 of 141 PageID #:2890
45

press interviews saying that Fair Isaac’s alleged monopoly is a “myth.”82 Fair Isaac also hired 

a research group to present the argument that VantageScore’s promise of home ownership to 

millions more Americans was deceptive and that the company’s ownership by the CBs was 

anticompetitive, an argument that failed during the trademark litigation discussed above.83 The 

FHFA ultimately adopted a final rule that permitted rival generators of credit scores to apply 

to serve Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, saying that “FHFA has concluded that allowing all 

credit score model developers to submit applications is more consistent with [the applicable 

statute], which does not prevent any credit score model from being considered for potential 

use in the mortgage market.” 84

160. Fair Isaac’s smear campaign against VantageScore was successful in sowing

doubt about the reliability and accuracy of credit scoring alternatives to FICO Scores. For 

example, a media outlet devoted to personal finance issues, thebalance.com, posted in 

February 2017 that, “If you purchased your credit score from anywhere but MyFICO.com, 

then it’s a FAKO score.”

161. The public statements described in the foregoing paragraphs were transmitted 

to and seen by a substantial number of businesses and consumers nationwide.

F. Fair Isaac’sAnticompetitive Conduct Has Harmed Competition 

162. Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive conduct has harmed and continues to harm 

business customers in the B2B Credit Score Market. Fair Isaac’s unlawful conduct, including 

market; Paul Weinstein, Jr., No Company Should Havea Monopoly on Credit Scoring, The Hill (Dec. 7,2017),

https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/363755-no-company-should-have-a-monopoly-on-credit- scoring. 82 FICO: The ‘Credit Score Monopoly’ is a Myth, DS News (Dec. 18, 2015),https://dsnews.com/news/12-18-

2015/fico-the-credit-score-monopoly-is-a-myth. 83 Quantilytic LLC, Risks and Opportunities in Expanding Mortgage Credit Availability Through New Credit

Scores, at 22 (Dec. 2017), https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/UpdatedCreditScoring_2017.pdf (research sponsored by Fair Isaac). 84 Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Validation and Approval of Credit Score Models Final Rule, 12 C.F.R. 1254 (Aug. 16,

2019).

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 48 of 141 PageID #:2891
46

conduct taken in concert with the CBs, has foreclosed competition in the B2B Credit Score

Market by eliminating fair opportunities for the major CBs to sell VantageScore or any other 

competing credit score product to B2B purchasers. This anticompetitive and exclusionary 

conduct has maintained Fair Isaac’s monopoly and allowed it to charge supracompetitive 

prices for B2B credit scores to B2B purchasers during the Class Period.

163. FICO’s Scores business operates with an incredibly high operating margin of 

86%.85 To maximize its monopoly rent, Fair Isaac has increased its prices for FICO Scores 

significantly in recent years. In 2018, FICO implemented a special pricing increase for 

mortgage customers that was an approximately 75% increase from $0.06/score to 

$0.10/score.86 In the following two years, FICO again rolled out special pricing increases to its 

auto customers and to some credit card customers.87

164. Fair Isaac’s conduct, in concert with the CBs, including through the agreements 

contained in contracts between the CBs and Fair Isaac, has reduced choice for business 

customers in the B2B Credit Score Market and frustrated the ability of business customers to 

purchase VantageScore or any other competing credit score. As a direct and proximate result 

of Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive conduct, Fair Isaac has been able to indirectly 

charge Plaintiffs and all similarly situated businesses supracompetitive prices for credit scores. 

As indirect buyers of Fair Isaac’s FICO Scores, Plaintiffs and all similarly situated business 

have been harmed by Fair Isaac’s supracompetitive royalty prices. 

165. Fair Isaac’s sales in the B2B Credit Score Market over the past five fiscal years

have been extremely profitable. Fair Isaac maintains a supracompetitive profit margin on the 

85Jose Karlo Mari Tottoc, Yahoo! Finance, Headwaters Capital: ‘Fair Isaac Corp (FICO) Can Grow Its Free Cash 

Flow by 15-20% Annually’ (Jan. 23, 2021), https://finance.yahoo.com/ news/headwaters-capital-fair-isaac-corp202237954.html.

86

Id. 87

Id.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 49 of 141 PageID #:2892
47

revenue it earns from its Business Credit Scoring Products. Plaintiffs and similarly situated 

businesses have vastly overpaid for FICO Scores due to Fair Isaac’s anticompetitive activities.

V. CLASS ACTIONALLEGATIONS

166. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and as a class action under 

Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking equitable and injunctive 

relief on behalf of the following class (the “Nationwide Class”):

All end-users who purchased a FICO Score in the B2B Credit 

Score Market from anyone other than Fair Isaac and/or a Credit 

Bureau from October 1, 2006 through the present (the “Class 

Period”).

167. Plaintiffs also bring this action on behalf of themselves and as a class action 

under Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure seeking damages pursuant 

to state antitrust, unfair competition, and consumer protection laws, as well as the law of unjust 

enrichment on behalf of the following class (the “Damages Class”): 

All end-users who in Indirect Purchaser States88 purchased a FICO 

Score in the B2B Credit Score Market from anyone other than Fair 

Isaac and/or a Credit Bureau from October 1, 2006 through the

present (the “Class Period”).

168. The Nationwide Class and the Damages Class are referred to herein as the 

“Classes.” 

169. These class definitions exclude any and all natural persons who are not members 

of these Classes by their definitions. Also excluded from the Classes are Defendants, their

parent companies, subsidiaries and affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities 

and instrumentalities of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies and 

instrumentalities, and persons who purchased FICO Scores directly or for resale. 

88 The “Indirect Purchaser States” are the states and Districts listed in the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Claims for 

Relief. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 50 of 141 PageID #:2893
48

170. While Plaintiffs do not know the exact number of the members of the Classes, 

Plaintiffs believe there are at least thousands of members in each Class. Members of the Classes 

are so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder is impracticable. Further, members 

of the Classes are readily identifiable from information and records in the possession of

Defendants.

171. Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes, and 

Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. Plaintiffs and members 

of the Classes were damaged by the same wrongful conduct of Defendants.

172. The interests of Plaintiffs are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of

members of the Classes.

173. Plaintiffs are represented by counsel who are competent and experienced in the 

prosecution of antitrust and class action litigation.

174. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Classes predominate 

over questions that may affect only individual Class members, thereby making damages with 

respect to members of the Classes as a whole appropriate. Questions of law and fact common to 

members of the Classes include, but are not limited to:

a. whether Fair Isaac monopolized, and whether Defendants conspired to

monopolize or unreasonably restrain, trade in violation of federal law;

b. whether Fair Isaac monopolized, and whether Defendants conspired to

monopolize or unreasonably restrain, trade in violation of certain state antitrust laws;

c. whether Defendants engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices in

violation of certain state laws;

d. whether Defendants were unjustly enriched to the detriment of Plaintiffs

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 51 of 141 PageID #:2894
49

and members of the Classes, thereby entitling Plaintiffs and members of the Classes to 

disgorgement of all benefits derived by Defendants;

e. what was the duration of the alleged unlawful conduct;

f. what injury was suffered by Plaintiffs and members of the Classes;

g. what damages were suffered by Plaintiffs and members of the Classes;

and

h. whether Defendants acted or refused to act on grounds generally

applicable to members of the Classes, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief

or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to members of the Classes as a whole.

175. Class action treatment is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication 

of the controversy. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to

prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the 

unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, or expense that numerous individual actions would

require.

176. The benefit of proceeding through the class mechanism, including providing 

injured persons or entities a method for obtaining redress on claims that could not practicably

be pursued individually, substantially outweighs potential difficulties in management of this 

class action.

177. The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Classes would

create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications, establishing incompatible standards of 

conduct for Defendants.

178. Plaintiffs know of no special difficulty to be encountered in the maintenance of 

this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 52 of 141 PageID #:2895
50

179. Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Classes, thereby 

making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Classes as a whole.

180. Plaintiffs have defined members of the Classes based on currently available

information and hereby reserves the right to amend the definition of members of the Class, 

including, without limitation, the Class Period.

VI. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND TOLLING

181. Plaintiffs had no knowledge of the scheme or conspiracy alleged herein, or of 

facts sufficient to place them on inquiry notice of the claims set forth herein, until (at the 

earliest) February 12, 2018, the date that TransUnion filed its Counterclaims against Fair Isaac. 

Prior to that time, no information in the public domain or available to Plaintiffs suggested that 

any Defendant was involved in an anticompetitive scheme or conspiracy involving the 

distribution of credit scores.

182. Defendants repeatedly and expressly stated throughout the Class Period, 

including on their public websites, that they maintained policies that prohibited the type of 

anticompetitive conduct alleged in this Consolidated Complaint. For example:

a. Fair Isaac’s Code of Business Conduct and Ethics states: “We 

seek to outperform our competition fairly and honestly. We seek competitive 

advantages through superior performance, never through unethical or illegal 

business practices.”89

b. Equifax’s Code of Ethics and Business Conduct states: “We 

believe in free and open competition and never engage in improper practices that 

89 Fair Isaac, Code of Business Conduct and Ethics, https://fico.gcs-web.com/static-files/ed6519a4-2148-4166-

82f2-4636e0713531.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 53 of 141 PageID #:2896
51

may limit competition.”90

c. Experian’s Code of Conduct states: “We will not engage in any 

form of agreement with competitors to fix prices, rig bids, allocate customers 

and/or restrict supply in the marketplace.” “We will comply with all applicable 

laws, rules, and regulations in every jurisdiction in which we operate, including 

but not limited to . . . antitrust/competition.”91

d. TransUnion’s Code of Business Conduct states: “All TransUnion 

Team Members must understand the extent to which competition and antitrust 

laws affect their daily work. You must fully and consistently comply with 

applicable competition and antitrust laws.92

183. It was reasonable for Plaintiffs and members of the Classes to believe that 

Defendants were complying with their own policies.

184. Moreover, on information and belief, Plaintiffs and members of the Classes

could not have discovered the anticompetitive provisions in the licensing agreements between 

Fair Isaac and the Credit Bureaus, such as the TransUnion ADLA, as those agreements are 

subject to confidentiality provisions that have prohibited the credit reporting agencies from 

disclosing their terms to third parties absent written authorization from Fair Isaac.93

185. For these reasons, the statutes of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs’ claims did 

not begin to run until the date that TransUnion filed its counterclaims against Fair Isaac and 

90 Equifax, Code of Ethics and Business Conduct (Aug. 2019), https://assets.equifax.com/

assets/corp/code_of_ethics.pdf.

91 Experian, Our Code of Conduct (2019), https://www.experian.com/content/dam/

marketing/na/assets/corp/procurement-documents/experian-code-of-conduct-final-board- approved.pdf. 92 TransUnion, Code of Business Conduct (2017), https://investors.transunion.com/~/media/Files/T/TransunionIR/governance-documents/code-of-business-conduct-150618.pdf. 93 See Dkt. 32, Motion for Leave to File Under Seal, Fair Isaac Corp. v. Trans Union LLC, No. 1:17-cv-08318 (N.D. 

Ill. Jan. 22, 2018), ¶ 2 (“contracts between the Parties . . . are subject to confidentiality provisions that prohibit 

TransUnion from disclosing the terms of the contract tothird parties absent written authorization from Fair Isaac”).

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 54 of 141 PageID #:2897
52

have been tolled with respect to the claims that Plaintiffs have alleged in this Complaint.

186. The doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolled the statutes of limitations on 

Plaintiffs’ claims. During the Class Period, Defendants wrongfully and affirmatively concealed 

their unlawful conduct. Plaintiffs and members of the Classes had no knowledge of Defendants’ 

unlawful scheme and could not have discovered the scheme through the exercise of reasonable 

diligence until (at the earliest) February 12, 2018, when TransUnion filed its Counterclaims 

against Fair Isaac.

187. By their very nature, antitrust violations are inherently self-concealing. 

Throughout the Class Period, Defendants engaged in a secret conspiracy that did not put 

Plaintiffs or the Classes on inquiry notice that there was a conspiracy that raised the prices for 

credit scores above the competitive level. Credit scores are not exempt from antitrust regulation, 

and thus, before TransUnion filed its Counterclaims against Fair Isaac, Plaintiffs reasonably 

considered the market to be competitive. Moreover, Defendants employed deceptive tactics and 

techniques to avoid detection of, and to conceal, their anticompetitive scheme.

188. Defendants wrongfully and affirmatively concealed the existence of their 

anticompetitive scheme and conspiracy from Plaintiffs and members of the Classes by, among 

other things:

a. agreeing to confidentiality provisions that have prohibited the 

CBs from disclosing the anticompetitive provisions in the licensing agreements 

between Fair Isaac and the CBs, such as the TransUnion ADLA;

b. concealing the fact that Fair Isaac and the CBs agreed, through 

the “No Equivalent Products” clause, not to internally develop a competing 

credit scoring system that is aligned with FICO Scores or uses too many of the 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 55 of 141 PageID #:2898
53

same reason codes;

c. concealing the fact that the purpose of the “No Equivalent 

Products” clause was to prevent the CBs from offering credit scoring products 

that would allow business-consumers a legitimate choice between FICO Scores 

and VantageScore or another alternative scoring product, thereby sustaining 

FICO Scores dominance in the market;

d. concealing the fact that Fair Isaac and the CBs agreed, through 

the “Level Playing Field” clauses, that prices made available to one credit 

bureau be made available to all the others;

e. concealing the fact that the purpose and effect of the “Level 

Playing Field” and “Dynamic Royalty Schedule” clauses is to disincentivize 

each CB from negotiating lower royalty prices for FICO Scores; and

f. engaging in a false and misleading campaign about VantageScore 

Solutions and VantageScore to misrepresent VantageScore’s viability as a 

competitor to FICO Scores.

189. As a result of Defendants’ affirmative acts, misrepresentations, and 

nondisclosures as alleged herein, any applicable statutes of limitation on claims asserted by 

Plaintiffs and members of the Classes have been and are tolled, and Defendants are equitably 

estopped from raising statutes of limitations as a defense.

VII. DEFENDANTS’ ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING VIOLATION

190. In addition, and in the alternative, this Complaint alleges a continuing course of 

conduct (including conduct within the limitations periods), and Defendants’ unlawful conduct 

has inflicted continuing and accumulating harm within the applicable statute of limitations.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 56 of 141 PageID #:2899
54

191. A claim accrued for the Class each time FICO Scores were sold to the Class at 

prices artificially inflated by Defendants’ anticompetitive conduct. Each sale of FICO Scores at 

a supracompetitive price constituted another overt act in furtherance of Defendants’ continuing 

anticompetitive scheme. Moreover, Defendants’ statements and actions described above 

demonstrate that throughout the Class Period they engaged in new overt acts that further served 

the objectives of their anticompetitive scheme.

192. Defendants’ new overt acts were more than the inertial consequences of 

Defendants’ initial violation. Rather, their acts were new and independent acts that perpetuated 

their agreement and kept it current with market conditions, including by renewing agreements, 

or entering into new agreements, with anticompetitive terms. Defendants continuously renewed 

and refined their agreement to reflect market conditions. With each refinement of their 

agreement, Defendants inflicted new and accumulating injury on Plaintiffs and members of the 

Class. For instance, as alleged above, Fair Isaac exploited the ADLA Royalty Schedule 

Provision in 2015, 2016, and 2017 to introduce entirely new and non-negotiated contract terms, 

royalty categories, and definitions that expanded the anticompetitive scheme.

193. Therefore, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class are entitled to recover 

damages they suffered during any applicable limitations period.

VIII. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 

UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT OF TRADE

Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3

(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class 

for Injunctive and Equitable Relief)

194. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding 

paragraphs of this Complaint.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 57 of 141 PageID #:2900
55

195. This Claim is brought against all Defendants.

196. The relevant period of this Claim is from May 2013 through the date by which 

the anticompetitive effects of Defendants’ violations of law shall have ceased.

197. The B2B Credit Score Market in the United States and its territories 

constitutes the relevant market.

198. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have at least a 90% market share in the B2B 

Credit Score Market in the United States and its territories.

199. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in the B2B Credit 

Score Market.

200. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have the power to control prices and/or 

exclude competition in the B2B Credit Score Market.

201. Defendants entered into and engaged in a contract, combination, or conspiracy in

unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. 

§§ 1, 3). Specifically, Fair Isaac entered into agreements with Equifax, Experian, and 

TransUnion that contained anticompetitive terms whereby each CB agreed with Fair Isaac to 

contractual limitations that harmed the ability of the CBs to market VantageScore, a competing 

product, to Plaintiffs and members of the Class and forestalled price competition in the B2B 

Credit Score Market. The CBs agreed to those anticompetitive terms and complied with those 

terms with the knowledge that the other CBs would also agree to, and comply with, those terms. 

The CBs and Fair Isaac thus knowingly formed a scheme to unreasonably restrain trade in the 

B2B Credit Score Market.

202. The agreements between Fair Isaac and each of the CBs had substantial 

anticompetitive effects. The agreements effectively excluded VantageScore Solutions and every 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 58 of 141 PageID #:2901
56

other competing provider of credit scores from competing for a substantial portion of

transactions in the relevant market.

203. The agreements between Fair Isaac and each of the CBs raised prices for FICO 

Scores above the competitive level and otherwise injured competition without any offsetting 

procompetitive benefit to business customers.

204. The acts done by Fair Isaac and each of the CBs as part of, and in furtherance of, 

their contract, combination, or conspiracy were authorized ordered, or done by their officers, 

agents, employees, or representatives while actively engaged in the management of its affairs.

205. The anticompetitive acts were directed at the B2B Credit Score Market in the 

United States and had a substantial and foreseeable effect on interstate commerce and injured 

competition nationwide.

206. Defendants’ exclusionary and anticompetitive acts have injured and will 

continue to injure competition in this market.

207. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class have been injured and will 

continue to be injured in their business and property, and will continue to suffer such damages 

if Defendants do not cease their anticompetitive conduct.

208. Plaintiffs and all other members of the Nationwide Class are threatened with

future injury to their business and property by reason of Defendants’ continuing violation of 

Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act within the meaning of Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.

209. The alleged contract, combination, or conspiracy is a per se violation of the 

federal antitrust laws because they are agreements between and among Fair Isaac and the CBs, 

all of whom are horizontal competitors who compete for the sale of credit scores in the B2B 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 59 of 141 PageID #:2902
57

Credit Score Market. Each of the CBs was aware of Fair Isaac’s imposition of these restrictive 

terms on the other CBs, knew that each was agreeing to those terms, and knew that its and the 

other CBs’ acceptance of those terms would maintain or advance Fair Isaac’s monopoly, and 

was thus an act against their economic self-interest because it undermined the ability of 

VantageScore to compete. The CBs also knew that the Level Playing Field requirement in their 

agreements with Fair Isaac was meant to and did forestall price competition among the CBs in 

the market for credit reports, and hence was mutually beneficial for the CBs.

210. In the alternative, these agreements violate Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act 

(15 U.S.C §§ 1, 3) under a Rule of Reason analysis and the pro-competitive benefits do not 

outweigh the anticompetitive effects.

211. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class are entitled to an injunction 

against Defendants, preventing and restraining the violations alleged herein.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT OF TRADE

Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3

(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class

for Injunctive and Equitable Relief)

212. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding 

paragraphs of this Complaint.

213. This Claim is brought against Defendants Fair Isaac and Experian.

214. The relevant period of this Claim is from May 2013 through the date by which 

the anticompetitive effects of Defendants’ violations of law shall have ceased.

215. The B2B Credit Score Market in the United States and its territories

constitutes the relevant market.

216. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have at least a 90% market share in the B2B 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 60 of 141 PageID #:2903
58

Credit Score Market in the United States and its territories.

217. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in the B2B Credit 

Score Market.

218. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have the power to control prices and/or 

exclude competition in the B2B Credit Score Market.

219. Fair Isaac entered into an agreement with Experian that contained 

anticompetitive terms whereby Experian agreed with Fair Isaac to contractual limitations that 

harmed the ability of Experian to market VantageScore, a competing product, to Plaintiffs and 

members of the Class and forestalled price competition in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

220. The agreement between Fair Isaac and Experian had substantial anticompetitive 

effects. The agreement effectively excluded VantageScore and every other competing provider

of credit scores from competing for a substantial portion of transactions in the relevant market.

221. The agreement between Fair Isaac and Experian raised prices for FICO Scores 

above the competitive level and otherwise injured competition without any offsetting 

procompetitive benefit to business customers.

222. The acts done by Fair Isaac and Experian as part of, and in furtherance of, its

contract, combination, or conspiracy were authorized ordered, or done by its officers, agents, 

employees, or representatives while actively engaged in the management of its affairs.

223. The anticompetitive acts were directed at the B2B Credit Score Market and had a

substantial and foreseeable effect on interstate commerce and injured competition nationwide.

224. Fair Isaac’s and Experian’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts have injured 

and will continue to injure competition in this market.

225. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class have been injured and will 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 61 of 141 PageID #:2904
59

continue to be injured in their business and property and will continue to suffer such damages if 

Fair Isaac and Experian do not cease their anticompetitive conduct.

226. Plaintiffs and all other members of the Nationwide Class are threatened with

future injury to their business and property by reason of Fair Isaac’s and Experian’s continuing 

violation of Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act within the meaning of Section 16 of the

Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.

227. The alleged contract, combination, or conspiracy is a per se violation of the 

federal antitrust laws because Fair Isaac and Experian are horizontal competitors who compete 

for the sale of credit scores in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

228. In the alternative, the anticompetitive agreement between Fair Isaac and

Experian violates Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C §§ 1, 3) under a Rule of 

Reason analysis.

229. In addition to competing with Experian in the credit scores market, Fair Isaac 

licenses its algorithm to Experian, which uses the algorithm to calculate credit scores for B2B 

Purchasers. As a result of the exclusionary contract terms, Experian discourages its customers 

from using or purchasing access to competing credit scores. Because Experian has substantial 

market power, and because Experian knows that the other CBs have agreed to the same 

provisions, it can harm its customers in this way without taking the risk that they will switch to 

competing CBs. In return for conspiring with Fair Isaac to restrain trade in the credit scores 

market, Experian benefits from the Level Playing Field clause, which guarantees that Fair Isaac 

will not favor Experian’s competitors and reduces competition among the CBs in the B2B 

credit reports market.

230. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class are entitled to an injunction 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 62 of 141 PageID #:2905
60

against Defendants, preventing and restraining the violations alleged herein.

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 

UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT OF TRADE

Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3

(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide 

Class for Injunctive and Equitable Relief)

231. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding 

paragraphs of this Complaint.

232. This Claim is brought against Defendants Fair Isaac and Equifax.

233. The relevant period of this Claim is from November 2013 through the date by 

which the anticompetitive effects of Defendants’ violations of law shall have ceased.

234. The B2B Credit Score Market in the United States and its territories 

constitutes the relevant market.

235. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have at least a 90% market share in the B2B 

Credit Score Market in the United States and its territories.

236. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in the B2B Credit 

Score Market.

237. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have the power to control prices and/or 

exclude competition in the B2B Credit Score Market.

238. Fair Isaac entered into an agreement with Equifax that contained anticompetitive 

terms whereby Equifax agreed with Fair Isaac to contractual limitations that harmed the ability 

of Equifax to market VantageScore, a competing product, to Plaintiffs and members of the

Nationwide Class and forestalled price competition in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

239. The agreement between Fair Isaac and Equifax had substantial anticompetitive 

effects. The agreement effectively excluded VantageScore and every other competing provider

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 63 of 141 PageID #:2906
61

of credit scores from competing for a substantial portion of transactions in the relevant market.

240. The agreement between Fair Isaac and Equifax raised prices for FICO Scores 

above the competitive level and otherwise injured competition without any offsetting 

procompetitive benefit to business customers.

241. The acts done by Fair Isaac and Equifax as part of, and in furtherance of, its

contract, combination, or conspiracy were authorized ordered, or done by its officers, agents, 

employees, or representatives while actively engaged in the management of its affairs.

242. The anticompetitive acts were directed at the B2B Credit Score Market and had a

substantial and foreseeable effect on interstate commerce and injured competition nationwide.

243. Fair Isaac’s and Equifax’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts have injured 

and will continue to injure competition in this market.

244. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class have been injured and will 

continue to be injured in their business and property and will continue to suffer such damages if 

Fair Isaac and Equifax do not cease their anticompetitive conduct.

245. Plaintiffs and all other members of the Nationwide Class are threatened with

future injury to their business and property by reason of Fair Isaac’s and Equifax’s continuing 

violation of Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act within the meaning of Section 16 of the

Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.

246. The alleged contract, combination, or conspiracy is a per se violation of the 

federal antitrust laws because Fair Isaac and Equifax are horizontal competitors who compete 

for the sale of credit scores in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

247. In the alternative, the agreement between and Fair Isaac and Equifax violates

Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C §§ 1, 3) under a Rule of Reason analysis.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 64 of 141 PageID #:2907
62

248. In addition to competing with Equifax in the credit scores market, Fair Isaac 

licenses its algorithm to Equifax, which uses the algorithm to calculate credit scores for B2B 

Purchasers. As a result of the exclusionary contract terms, Equifax discourages its customers 

from using or purchasing access to competing credit scores. Because Equifax has substantial 

market power, and because Equifax knows that the other CBs have agreed to the same 

provisions, it can harm its customers in this way without taking the risk that they will switch to 

competing CBs. In return for conspiring with Fair Isaac to restrain trade in the credit scores 

market, Equifax benefits from the Level Playing Field clause, which guarantees that Fair Isaac 

will not favor Equifax’s competitors and reduces competition among the CBs in the B2B credit 

reports market.

249. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class are entitled to an injunction 

against Defendants, preventing and restraining the violations alleged herein.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 

UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT OF TRADE

Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3

(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class 

for Injunctive and Equitable Relief)

250. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding 

paragraphs of this Complaint.

251. This Claim is brought against Defendants Fair Isaac and TransUnion.

252. The relevant period of this Claim is from February 2015 through the date by 

which the anticompetitive effects of Defendants’ violations of law shall have ceased.

253. The B2B Credit Score Market in the United States and its territories 

constitutes the relevant market.

254. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have at least a 90% market share in the B2B 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 65 of 141 PageID #:2908
63

Credit Score Market in the United States and its territories.

255. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in the B2B Credit 

Score Market.

256. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have the power to control prices and/or 

exclude competition in the B2B Credit Score Market.

257. Fair Isaac entered into an agreement with TransUnion that contained 

anticompetitive terms whereby TransUnion agreed with Fair Isaac to contractual limitations that 

harmed the ability of TransUnion to market VantageScore, a competing product, to Plaintiffs

and members of the Nationwide Class and forestalled price competition in the B2B Credit 

Score Market. 

258. The agreement between Fair Isaac and TransUnion had substantial 

anticompetitive effects. The agreement effectively excluded VantageScore and every other

competing provider of credit scores from competing for a substantial portion of transactions in 

the relevant market.

259. The agreement between Fair Isaac and TransUnion raised prices for FICO 

Scores above the competitive level and otherwise injured competition without any offsetting 

procompetitive benefit to business customers.

260. The acts done by Fair Isaac and TransUnion as part of, and in furtherance of, its

contract, combination, or conspiracy were authorized ordered, or done by its officers, agents, 

employees, or representatives while actively engaged in the management of its affairs.

261. The anticompetitive acts were directed at the B2B Credit Score Market and had a

substantial and foreseeable effect on interstate commerce and injured competition nationwide.

262. Fair Isaac’s and TransUnion’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts have 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 66 of 141 PageID #:2909
64

injured and will continue to injure competition in this market.

263. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class have been injured and will 

continue to be injured in their business and property and will continue to suffer such damages if 

Fair Isaac and TransUnion do not cease their anticompetitive conduct.

264. Plaintiffs and all other members of the Nationwide Class are threatened with

future injury to their business and property by reason of Fair Isaac’s and TransUnion’s

continuing violation of Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act within the meaning of Section 16

of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.

265. The alleged contract, combination, or conspiracy is a per se violation of the 

federal antitrust laws because Fair Isaac and TransUnion are horizontal competitors who 

compete for the sale of credit scores in the B2B Credit Score Market. 

266. In the alternative, the agreement between and Fair Isaac and TransUnion violates

Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C §§ 1, 3) under a Rule of Reason analysis.

267. In addition to competing with TransUnion in the credit scores market, Fair Isaac 

licenses its algorithm to TransUnion, which uses the algorithm to calculate credit scores for 

B2B Purchasers. As a result of the exclusionary contract terms, TransUnion discourages its 

customers from using or purchasing access to competing credit scores. Because TransUnion has 

substantial market power, and because TransUnion knows that the other CBs have agreed to the 

same provisions, it can harm its customers in this way without taking the risk that they will 

switch to competing CBs. In return for conspiring with Fair Isaac to restrain trade in the credit 

scores market, TransUnion benefits from the Level Playing Field clause, which guarantees that 

Fair Isaac will not favor TransUnion’s competitors and reduces competition among the CBs in 

the B2B credit reports market.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 67 of 141 PageID #:2910
65

268. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class are entitled to an injunction 

against Defendants, preventing and restraining the violations alleged herein.

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: MONOPLIZATON

Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. § 2 

(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class 

for Injunctive and Equitable Relief)

269. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding 

paragraphs of this Complaint.

270. This Claim is brought against Defendant Fair Isaac.

271. The B2B Credit Score Market in the United States and its territories 

constitutes the relevant market.

272. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have at least a 90% market share in the B2B 

Credit Score Market.

273. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in B2B Credit Score 

Market.

274. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have the power to control prices and/or 

exclude competition in the B2B Credit Score Market.

275. Fair Isaac entered Isaac entered into agreements with Equifax, Experian, and 

TransUnion that contained anticompetitive terms that were designed to eliminate Fair Isaac’s

competitors and to keep prices for FICO Scores artificially high.

276. The agreements between Fair Isaac and the CBs had substantial anticompetitive 

effects. The agreements effectively excluded VantageScore Solutions and every other

competing provider of credit scores from competing in the market for B2B credit scores in the 

United States in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2).

277. Fair Isaac has demonstrated its ability to control prices and exclude competition 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 68 of 141 PageID #:2911
66

by raising prices without a corresponding increase in demand to supracompetitive levels.

278. Fair Isaac’s monopoly is not due to growth or development because of a superior 

product, business acumen, or historic accident.

279. Fair Isaac’s monopolization has raised prices for FICO Scores above the 

competitive level and otherwise injured competition without any offsetting procompetitive 

benefit to business customers.

280. The acts done by the Fair Isaac were authorized, ordered, or done by its officers, 

agents, employees, or representatives while actively engaged in the management of its affairs.

281. The anticompetitive acts were directed at the B2B Credit Score Market in the

United States and had a substantial and foreseeable effect on interstate commerce and injured 

competition nationwide.

282. Fair Isaac’s exclusionary and anticompetitive acts have injured and will continue 

to injure competition in this market.

283. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class have been injured and will 

continue to be injured in their business and property, and Plaintiffs and all other similarly 

situated businesses will continue to be injured if Fair Isaac does not cease its anticompetitive

conduct.

284. Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated businesses are threatened with future

injury to their business and property by reason of Fair Isaac’s continuing violation of Section 2 

of the Sherman Act within the meaning of Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §

26.

285. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class are entitled to an injunction 

against Defendants, preventing and restraining the violations alleged herein.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 69 of 141 PageID #:2912
67

SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 

CONSPIRACY TO MONOPOLIZE

Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. § 2 

(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class 

for Injunctive and Equitable Relief)

286. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations set forth in the preceding 

paragraphs of this Complaint.

287. This Claim is brought against all Defendants.

288. The relevant product market is the market for the sale of B2B credit scores.

289. The relevant geographic market for the sale of B2B credit scores is the United 

States and its territories.

290. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have at least 90% market share in the B2B 

Credit Score Market.

291. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have monopoly power in the B2B Credit 

Score Market.

292. Fair Isaac has had and continues to have the power to control prices and/or 

exclude competition in the B2B Credit Score Market.

293. Through unlawful, interconnected, and mutually reinforcing anticompetitive and 

exclusionary acts and agreements, Defendants have substantially foreclosed competition in the 

B2B Credit Score Market in the United States in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 

U.S.C. § 2).

294. Fair Isaac has demonstrated its ability to control prices and exclude competition 

by raising prices without a corresponding increase in demand to supracompetitive levels.

295. Fair Isaac entered into an agreement, combination, or conspiracy with Experian, 

Equifax, and TransUnion to maintain its monopoly power in the B2B Credit Score Market. Fair 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 70 of 141 PageID #:2913
68

Isaac created and maintained this conspiracy through a series of agreements that each of the 

CBs entered into with the knowledge that the others were also entering into the agreements. In 

these agreements, the CBs and Fair Isaac effectively agreed that the CBs would not offer or sell 

VantageScore or any other competing credit score to Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide

Class. Fair Isaac and the CB Defendants further agreed that the CBs would act as Fair Isaac’s 

agent in the sale of FICO Scores to Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class.

296. These agreements foreclosed competition in a substantial portion of the B2B 

Credit Score Market and unlawfully maintained Fair Isaac’s monopoly, resulting in Fair Isaac 

extracting supracompetitive prices for FICO Scores from Plaintiffs and members of the 

Nationwide Class.

297. Fair Isaac’s monopoly is not due to growth or development because of a superior 

product, business acumen, or historic accident.

298. Defendants’ conspiracy to monopolize has injured and will continue to injure 

competition in the B2B Credit Score Market.

299. Defendants have acted with the specific intent of allowing Fair Isaac to 

monopolize the market for B2B credit scores in the United States and its territories.

300. Defendants’ conspiratorial acts substantially affect interstate commerce and 

injure competition nationwide and in the territories of the United States.

301. The conspiracy raised the prices for credit scores above the competitive level 

and otherwise injured competition without any offsetting procompetitive benefit to consumers.

302. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class have been injured in their 

business or property by reason of Defendants’ violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 

U.S.C. § 2) within the meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. § 15).

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 71 of 141 PageID #:2914
69

303. Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class are threatened with future injury 

to their business and property by reason of Defendants’ continuing violation of Section 2 of the 

Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2) within the meaning of Section 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act (15 

U.S.C. § 26).

SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

VIOLATION OF STATE ANTITRUST STATUTES

(on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Damages Class)

304. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs of 

this Complaint. 

305. Defendants’ anticompetitive acts described above were knowing and willful and

constitute violations or flagrant violations of the following state antitrust statutes. 

306. This Claim is brought against all Defendants.

307. Arizona: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

Arizona Rev. Stat. § 44-1401, et seq.

a. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy 

between two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce

in the Business Market for credit scores, a substantial part of which occurred 

within Arizona.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Arizona; (2) credit score prices were raised, fixed, 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Arizona; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supraCase: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 72 of 141 PageID #:2915
70

competitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. Defendants established, maintained, or used a monopoly, or 

attempted to establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in the B2B Credit Score 

Market, a substantial part of which occurred within Arizona, for the purpose of 

excluding competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in the B2B 

Credit Score Market.

d. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Arizona commerce.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants entered into agreements in 

restraint of trade in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1401, et seq. 

f. Under Arizona law, indirect purchasers have standing to maintain

an action under the Antitrust Act based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. 

Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 206 Ariz. 9, 11-20 (2003).

g. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

or property and are threatened with further injury.

h. By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class are entitled to seek all forms of relief available under Arizona 

Revised Statute § 44-1401, etseq.

308. California: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

California Business and Professions Code, §§ 16700, et seq. 

a. The California Business & Professions Code generally governs

conduct of corporate entities. The Cartwright Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 73 of 141 PageID #:2916
71

16700-16770, governs antitrust violations in California.

b. California policy is that “vigorous representation and protection 

of consumer interests are essential to the fair and efficient functioning of a free 

enterprise market economy,” including by fostering competition in the 

marketplace. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 301.

c. Under the Cartwright Act, indirect purchasers have standing to 

maintain an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code § 16750(a).

d. A trust in California is any combination of capital, skills or acts 

by two or more persons intended for various purposes, including but not limited 

to creating or carrying out restrictions in trade or commerce, limiting or reducing 

the production or increasing the price of any commodity, or preventing 

competition in the market for a commodity. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720. 

Every trust in California is unlawful except as provided by the Code. Id. at § 

16726.

e. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy

between two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce

in the B2B Credit Score Market, a substantial part of which occurred within

California.

f. Defendants established, maintained, or used a monopoly, or 

attempted to establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in the B2B Credit Score 

Market, a substantial part of which occurred within California, for the purpose of 

excluding competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in the B2B 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 74 of 141 PageID #:2917
72

Credit Score Market.

g. But for Defendants’ conduct set forth herein, the price of FICO 

Scores would have been lower, in an amount to be determined at trial.

h. Defendants enacted a combination of capital, skill or acts for the 

purpose of creating and carrying out restrictions in trade or commerce, in 

violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16700, et seq.

i. Plaintiffs and members of Damages Class were injured in their 

business or property, with respect to purchases of FICO Scores in California and 

are entitled to all forms of relief, including recovery of treble damages, interest, 

and injunctive relief, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees andcosts.

309. Connecticut: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

Connecticut General Statute §§ 35-26 et seq. 

a. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Connecticut commerce. 

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Connecticut; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Connecticut; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Class have been injured in their business and 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 75 of 141 PageID #:2918
73

property and are threatened with further injury. 

d. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have restrained trade in 

violation of Connecticut General Statute §§ 35-26 et seq. 

e. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Class seek all forms 

of relief available under Connecticut General Statute §§ 35-26 et seq.

310. District of Columbia: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have

violated District of Columbia Code, Title 28, Chapter 45 (Restraints of Trade).

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to act in restraint 

of trade within the District of Columbia, and monopolized or attempted to 

monopolize the B2B Credit Score Market within the District of Columbia, in 

violation of D.C. Code § 28-4501, et seq. 

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout the District of Columbia; (2) Credit score prices were 

raised, fixed maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout the 

District of Columbia; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were 

deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class paid supra-competitive, artificially inflated prices for credit 

scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected District of Columbia commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 76 of 141 PageID #:2919
74

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of District of Columbia Code Ann. 

§§ 28-4501, et seq. 

f. Under District of Columbia law, indirect purchasers have standing 

to maintain an action under the antitrust provisions of the D.C. Code based on 

the facts alleged in this Complaint, because “[a]ny indirect purchaser in the chain

of manufacture, production or distribution of goods or services . . . shall be 

deemed to be injured within the meaning of this chapter.” D.C. Code § 28-

4509(a).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek 

all forms of relief available under District of Columbia Code Ann. §§ 28-4501, et

seq.

311. Illinois: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated the 

Illinois Antitrust Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/1, et seq.

a. Members of the Illinois Damages Class purchased FICO Scores

within the State of Illinois during the Class Period.

b. But for Defendants’ conduct set forth herein, the price of FICO 

Scores would have been lower, in an amount to be determined at trial.

c. Under the Illinois Antitrust Act, indirect purchasers have standing 

to maintain an action for damages based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. 

740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/7(2).

d. Defendants entered into contracts or engaged in a combination or 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 77 of 141 PageID #:2920
75

conspiracy for the purpose of fixing, controlling or maintaining prices for FICO

Scores sold within the State of Illinois.

e. Defendants further unreasonably restrained trade or commerce 

and established, maintained, or attempted to acquire monopoly power over the 

B2B Credit Score Market in Illinois for the purpose of excluding competition, in 

violation of 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 10/1, et seq.

f. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Illinois commerce.

g. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Class have been injured in their business and 

property and are threatened with further injury.

h. Members of the Illinois Damages Class were injured with respect 

to purchases of FICO Scores in Illinois and are entitled to all forms of relief, 

including actual damages, treble damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and

costs.

312. Iowa: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated the 

Iowa Competition Law, Iowa Code § 553.1, et seq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to restrain or 

monopolize trade in the B2B Credit Score Market, and attempted to establish or 

did in fact establish a monopoly for the purpose of excluding competition or

controlling, fixing or maintaining prices for credit scores, in violation of Iowa 

Code § 553.1, et seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 78 of 141 PageID #:2921
76

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Iowa; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Iowa; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Iowa commerce.

d As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Iowa Code § 553.1, et seq. 

f. Under Iowa law, indirect purchasers have standing to maintain an 

action under the Iowa Competition Law based on the facts alleged in this 

Complaint. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Iowa 2002).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek

all forms of relief available under Iowa Code §§ 553.1, et seq.

313. Kansas: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated Kan.

Stat. Ann. § 50-101, et seq.

a. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Kansas; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 79 of 141 PageID #:2922
77

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Kansas; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

b. Defendants combined capital, skills or acts for the purposes of

creating restrictions in trade or commerce of credit scores, increasing the price of 

credit scores, or preventing competition in the sale of credit scores, in a manner 

that established the price of credit scores and precluded free and unrestricted

competition among themselves in the sale of credit scores, in violation of Kan.

Stat. Ann. § 50-101, et seq

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Kansas commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Kansas Stat. Ann. §§ 50- 101, et 

seq. 

f. Under the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act, indirect purchasers have 

standing to maintain an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. Kan. 

Stat. Ann § 50-161(b).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all

forms of relief available under Kansas Stat. Ann. §§ 50-101, et seq.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 80 of 141 PageID #:2923
78

314. Maine: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated Me. 

Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 10, § 1101, et seq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired in restraint of trade 

or commerce of credit scores within the intrastate commerce of Maine, and

monopolized or attempted to monopolize the trade or commerce of credit scores 

within the intrastate commerce of Maine, in violation of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 

10, § 1101, et seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Maine; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Maine; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Maine commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. 10, §§ 1101,

etseq. 

f. Under Maine law, indirect purchasers have standing to maintain 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 81 of 141 PageID #:2924
79

an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 

10, § 1104(1).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all

relief available under Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. 10, §§ 1101, et seq.

315. Maryland: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

Maryland Code, Commercial Law, §§11-204 et seq. 

a. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Maryland commerce. 

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following effects: (1) 

Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout 

Maryland; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed maintained and stabilized at 

artificially high levels throughout Maryland; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages 

Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class paid supra-competitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Class have been injured in their business and property and 

are threatened with further injury. 

d. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have restrained trade in violation 

of Maryland Code, Commercial Law, §§11-204 et seq. 

e. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Class seek all relief available 

under Maryland Code, Commercial Law, §§11-204 et seq.

316. Michigan: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 82 of 141 PageID #:2925
80

the Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated §§ 445.771, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to restrain

or monopolize trade or commerce in B2B Credit Score Market, in 

violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.771, et seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Michigan; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Michigan; 

(3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and 

open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class 

paid supra-competitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct 

substantially affected Michigan commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful 

conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in 

their business and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. 

§§ 445.771, et seq. 

f. Under the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act, indirect 

purchasers have standing to maintain an action based on the facts alleged in 

this Complaint. Mich. Comp. Laws. § 445.778(2).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 83 of 141 PageID #:2926
81

seek all relief available under Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 445.771, et 

seq.

317. Minnesota: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

the Minnesota Annotated Statutes §§ 325D.49, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired in unreasonable 

restraint of trade or commerce in the B2B Credit Score Market within the 

intrastate commerce of and outside of Minnesota; established, maintained, used

or attempted to establish, maintain or use monopoly power over the trade or 

commerce in the B2B Credit Score Market within the intrastate commerce of 

and outside of Minnesota; and fixed prices for credit scores within the intrastate 

commerce of and outside of Minnesota, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 325D.49, et 

seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Minnesota; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Minnesota; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct 

substantially affected Minnesota commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful 

conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 84 of 141 PageID #:2927
82

business and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendant has entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Minnesota Stat. §§ 325D.49, et 

seq.

f. Under the Minnesota Antitrust Act of 1971, indirect purchasers 

have standing to maintain an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. 

Minn. Stat. § 325D.57.

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek

all relief available under Minnesota Stat. §§ 325D.49, etseq.

318. Mississippi: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

Mississippi Code Annotated §§ 75-21-1, etseq.

a. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy 

between two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce

in the B2B Credit Score Market, a substantial part of which occurred within

Mississippi.

b. Defendants established, maintained, or used a monopoly, or 

attempted to establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in the B2B Credit Score 

Market, a substantial part of which occurred within Mississippi, for the purpose 

of excluding competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in the B2B 

Credit Score Market.

c. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Mississippi; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 85 of 141 PageID #:2928
83

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Mississippi; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

d. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Mississippi commerce.

e. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

f. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Mississippi Code Ann. §§ 75-21-1,

etseq. 

g. Under Mississippi law, indirect purchasers have standing to

maintain an action under the antitrust provisions of the Mississippi Code based 

on the facts alleged in this Complaint. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-21-9.

h. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all

relief available under Mississippi Code Ann. §§ 75-21-1, et seq.

319. Missouri: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 407.010, et seq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired in restraint of trade 

or commerce of credit scores within the intrastate commerce of Missouri, and 

monopolized or attempted to monopolize the Business Market for credit scores 

within the intrastate commerce of Missouri by possessing monopoly power in the 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 86 of 141 PageID #:2929
84

market and willfully maintaining that power through agreements to fix prices and 

otherwise control trade, in violation of Mo. Ann. Stat. § 407.010, et seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Missouri; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Missouri; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Missouri commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Mo. Ann. Stat. § 407.010, et seq. 

f. Under Missouri law, indirect purchasers have standing to 

maintain an action under the MMPA based on the facts alleged in this 

Complaint. Gibbons v. J. Nuckolls, Inc., 216 S.W.3d 667, 669 (Mo. 2008).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek

all forms of relief available under Mo. Ann. Stat. § 407.010, et seq.

320. Nebraska: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

the Nebraska Revised Statutes §§ 59-801, etseq.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 87 of 141 PageID #:2930
85

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired in restraint of trade 

or commerce of credit scores within the intrastate commerce of Nebraska, and 

monopolized or attempted to monopolize the B2B Credit Score Market within 

the intrastate commerce of Nebraska by possessing monopoly power in the 

market and willfully maintaining that power through agreements to fix prices and 

otherwise control trade, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-801, et seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Nebraska; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Nebraska; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Nebraska commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Nebraska Revised Statutes §§ 59-

801, et seq.

f. Under Nebraska law, indirect purchasers have standing to 

maintain an action under the Junkin Act based on the facts alleged in this 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 88 of 141 PageID #:2931
86

Complaint. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-821.

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek 

all relief available under Nebraska Revised Statutes §§ 59-801, et seq.

321. Nevada: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated the 

Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated §§ 598A.010, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to restrain or 

monopolize trade in the B2B Credit Score Market, and attempted to establish or 

did in fact establish a monopoly for the purpose of excluding competition or

controlling, fixing or maintaining prices for credit scores, in violation of Nev. 

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 598A.010, et seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Nevada; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Nevada; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Nevada commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 89 of 141 PageID #:2932
87

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Nevada Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 

598A.010, et seq. 

f. Under Nevada law, indirect purchasers have standing to maintain 

an action under NUTPA based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. Nev. Rev. 

Stat. Ann. §598A.210(2).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek 

all relief available under Nevada Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 598A.010, et seq.

322. New Hampshire: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have

violated the New Hampshire Revised Statutes §§ 356:1, etseq.

a. Defendants fixed, controlled or maintained prices for credit 

scores and established, maintained or used monopoly power, or attempted to,

constituting a contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in

violation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 356:1, et seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout New Hampshire; (2) Credit score prices were raised, 

fixed maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout New 

Hampshire; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived 

of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages 

Class paid supra-competitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct 

substantially affected New Hampshire commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 90 of 141 PageID #:2933
88

conduct, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in 

their business and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of New Hampshire Revised 

Statutes §§ 356:1, et seq.

f. Under New Hampshire law, indirect purchasers have standing 

to maintain an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. N.H. Rev. 

Stat. Ann. § 356:11(II).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class

seek all relief available under New Hampshire Revised Statutes §§ 356:1, et

seq.

323. New Mexico: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

the New Mexico Statutes Annotated §§ 57-1-1, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, agreed, combined or conspired, and 

monopolized or attempted to monopolize trade for credit scores within the 

intrastate commerce of New Mexico, in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-1, et

seq.

b. Defendant’s combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout New Mexico; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout New Mexico; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supraCase: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 91 of 141 PageID #:2934
89

competitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected New Mexico commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of New Mexico Stat. Ann. §§ 57-1-

1, et seq. 

f. Under New Mexico law, indirect purchasers have standing to 

maintain an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. N.M. Stat. Ann. 

§ 57-1-3(A).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek 

all relief available under New Mexico Stat. Ann. §§57-1-1, et seq.

324. New York: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

the New York General Business Laws §§ 340, etseq.

a. Defendants established or maintained a monopoly within the 

intrastate commerce of New York for the trade or commerce of credit scores and 

restrained competition in the free exercise of the conduct of the business of credit 

scores within the intrastate commerce of New York, in violation of N.Y. Gen. 

Bus. Law § 340, et seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 92 of 141 PageID #:2935
90

eliminated throughout New York; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout New York; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected New York commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of the New York Donnelly Act, §§ 

340, et seq. The conduct set forth above is a per se violationof the Act.

f. Under New York law, indirect purchasers have standing to

maintain an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. N.Y. Gen. Bus. 

Law § 340(6).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all 

relief available under New York Gen. Bus. Law §§ 340, etseq.

325. North Carolina: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have

violated the North Carolina General Statutes §§ 75-1, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to restrain or 

monopolize trade in the Business Market for credit scores, and attempted to

establish or did in fact establish a monopoly for the purpose of excluding

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 93 of 141 PageID #:2936
91

competition or controlling, fixing or maintaining prices for credit scores, in 

violation of North Carolina General Statutes §§ 75-1, etseq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout North Carolina; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout North Carolina; 

(3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected North Carolina commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreementsin restraint of trade in violation of North Carolina Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1, et 

seq.

f. Under North Carolina law, indirect purchasers have standing to 

maintain an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. Hyde v. Abbott 

Labs., Inc., 123 N.C. App. 572, 584 (1996).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek 

all relief available under North Carolina Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1, et. seq.

326. North Dakota: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 94 of 141 PageID #:2937
92

violated the North Dakota Century Code §§ 51-08.1-01, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to restrain or 

monopolize trade in the Business Market for credit scores, and attempted to 

establish or did in fact establish a monopoly for the purpose of excluding

competition or controlling, fixing or maintaining prices for credit scores, in 

violation of North Dakota Century Code §§ 51-08.1-01, et seq. Defendants’

violations of North Dakota law were flagrant.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout North Dakota; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout North Dakota; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected North Dakota commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of North Dakota Cent. Code §§ 51-

08.1-01, et seq. 

f. Under North Dakota law, indirect purchasers have standing to 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 95 of 141 PageID #:2938
93

maintain an action under the Antitrust Act based on the facts alleged in this 

Complaint. See, e.g., Howe v. Microsoft Corp., 656 N.W.2d 285, 298 (N.D.

2003).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek

all relief available under North Dakota Cent. Code §§ 51-08.1-01, et seq.

327. Oregon: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated the 

Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 646.705, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined, or conspired in restraint of trade 

or commerce of credit scores, and monopolized or attempted to monopolize the 

trade or commerce of credit scores, in violation of Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.705, et 

seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Oregon; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Oregon; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Oregon commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 96 of 141 PageID #:2939
94

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Oregon Revised Statutes §§

646.705, etseq. 

f. Under Oregon law, indirect purchasers have standing under the 

antitrust provisions of the Oregon Revised Statutes to maintain an action based on 

the facts alleged in this Complaint. Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.780(1)(a).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all 

relief available under Oregon Revised Statutes §§ 646.705, et seq.

328. Rhode Island: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have

violated R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-1, et seq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to restrain or 

monopolize trade in the B2B Credit Score Market, and attempted to establish or 

did in fact establish a monopoly for the purpose of excluding competition or

controlling, fixing or maintaining prices for credit scores, in violation of R.I. Gen. 

Laws § 6-36-1, et seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Rhode Island; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Rhode Island; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 97 of 141 PageID #:2940
95

affected Rhode Island commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-1, et seq. 

f. Under the Rhode Island Antitrust Act, indirect purchasers have

standing to maintain an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. R.I. 

Gen. Laws § 6-36-11(a).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all 

forms of relief available under R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-1, et seq.

329. South Dakota: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have

violated South Dakota Codified Laws §§ 37-1-3.1, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired in restraint of trade 

or commerce of credit scores within the intrastate commerce of South Dakota, 

and monopolized or attempted to monopolize trade or commerce of credit scores 

within the intrastate commerce of South Dakota, in violation of S.D. Codified 

Laws § 37-1-3.1, et seq. 

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout South Dakota; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout South Dakota; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 98 of 141 PageID #:2941
96

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected South Dakota commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of South Dakota Codified Laws Ann. 

§§ 37-1, et seq. 

f. Under South Dakota law, indirect purchasers have standing under 

the antitrust provisions of the South Dakota Codified Laws to maintain an action 

based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. S.D. Codified Laws § 37-1-33.

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek 

all relief available under South Dakota Codified Laws Ann. §§ 37-1, et seq.

330. Tennessee: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

the Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 47-25-101, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to restrain or 

monopolize trade in the B2B Credit Score Market, and attempted to establish or 

did in fact establish a monopoly for the purpose of excluding competition or

controlling, fixing or maintaining prices for credit scores, in violation of Tenn. 

Code, § 47-25-101, et seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 99 of 141 PageID #:2942
97

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Tennessee; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Tennessee; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Tennessee commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Tennessee Code Ann. §§ 47-25-101,

et seq. 

f. Under Tennessee law, indirect purchasers have standing under the 

Tennessee Trade Practice Acts to maintain an action based on the facts alleged in 

this Complaint. Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 

520 (Tenn. 2005).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all 

relief available under Tennessee Code Ann. §§ 47-25- 101, et seq.

331. Utah: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated Utah 

Code Annotated §§ 76-10-3101, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to restrain or 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 100 of 141 PageID #:2943
98

monopolize trade in the B2B Credit Score Market, and attempted to establish or 

did in fact establish a monopoly for the purpose of excluding competition or

controlling, fixing or maintaining prices for credit scores, in violation of Utah 

Code Ann. § 76-10-3101, et seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Utah; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed maintained 

and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Utah; (3) Plaintiffs and 

members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open competition; and 

(4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supra-competitive, 

artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Utah commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-10-

3101, et seq. 

f. Under the Utah Antitrust Act, indirect purchasers who are either 

Utah residents or Utah citizens have standing to maintain an action based on the 

facts alleged in this Complaint. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-3109(1)(a).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 101 of 141 PageID #:2944
99

all relief available under Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-10-3101, et seq.

332. Vermont: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

Vermont Stat. Ann. 9 §§ 2453, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to restrain or 

monopolize trade in the B2B Credit Score Market, and attempted to establish or 

did in fact establish a monopoly for the purpose of excluding competition or

controlling, fixing or maintaining prices for credit scores, in violation of Vermont 

Stat. Ann. 9 §§ 2453, etseq. Defendants’ violations of Vermont law were flagrant.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Vermont; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Vermont; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Vermont commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Vermont Stat. Ann. 9 §§ 2453, et

seq. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 102 of 141 PageID #:2945
100

f. Under Vermont law, indirect purchasers have standing to maintain 

an action under Vermont’s antitrust laws based on the facts alleged in this

Complaint. Elkins v. Microsoft Corp., 174 Vt. 328, 341 (2002).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all 

relief available under Vermont Stat. Ann. 9 §§ 2453, etseq.

333. West Virginia: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have

violated West Virginia Code §§ 47-18-1, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired to restrain or 

monopolize trade in the B2B Credit Score Market, and attempted to establish or 

did in fact establish a monopoly for the purpose of excluding competition or

controlling, fixing or maintaining prices for credit scores, in violation of West 

Virginia Code §§ 47-18-1, etseq. Defendants’ anticompetitive acts were knowing, 

willful and constitute violations or flagrant violations of the West Virginia 

Antitrust Act.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout West Virginia; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout West Virginia; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected West Virginia commerce.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 103 of 141 PageID #:2946
101

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of West Virginia Code §§ 47-18-1, et 

seq. 

f. Under West Virginia law, indirect purchasers have standing to 

maintain an action under the West Virginia Antitrust Act based on the facts 

alleged in this Complaint. W. Va. Code R. 142-9-2.

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all 

relief available under West Virginia Code §§ 47-18-1, et seq.

334. Wisconsin: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

Wisconsin Statutes §§ 133.01, etseq.

a. Defendants contracted, combined or conspired in restraint of trade 

or commerce of credit scores, and monopolized or attempted to monopolize the 

trade or commerce of credit scores, with the intention of injuring or destroying 

competition therein, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 133.01, et seq.

b. Defendants’ combinations or conspiracies had the following 

effects: (1) Credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout Wisconsin; (2) Credit score prices were raised, fixed 

maintained and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Wisconsin; (3) 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open 

competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supraCase: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 104 of 141 PageID #:2947
102

competitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

c. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially 

affected Wisconsin commerce.

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured in their business 

and property and are threatened with furtherinjury.

e. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have entered into 

agreements in restraint of trade in violation of Wisconsin Stat. §§ 133.01, et seq. 

f. Under Wisconsin law, indirect purchasers have standing under the 

antitrust provisions of the Wisconsin Statutes to maintain an action based on the 

facts alleged in this Complaint. Wis. Stat. 133.18(1)(a).

g. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all 

relief available under Wisconsin Stat. §§ 133.01, etseq.

335. Defendants’ anticompetitive activities have directly, foreseeably and 

proximately caused injury to members of the Damages Class. Plaintiffs and members of the 

Class in each of the above states have been injured in their business and property by reason of 

Defendants’ unlawful monopolization, conspiracy to monopolize, and conspiratorial 

agreements. Their injuries consist of: (1) being denied the opportunity to purchase lower-priced 

credit scores from Defendants and/or other sellers of credit scores, and/or (2) paying higher 

prices for FICO Scores than they would have in the absence of Defendants’ conduct. These 

injuries are of the type of the laws of the above States were designed to prevent, and flow from 

that which makes Defendants’ conduct unlawful.

336. In addition, Defendants have profited significantly from the aforesaid unlawful 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 105 of 141 PageID #:2948
103

conduct. Defendants’ profits derived from their anticompetitive conduct come at the expense 

and detriment of the Plaintiffs and the members of the DamagesClass.

337. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and the members of the Damages Class in each of the 

above jurisdictions seek damages (including statutory damages where applicable), to be trebled 

or otherwise increased as permitted by a particular jurisdiction’s antitrust law, and costs of suit, 

including reasonable attorneys’ fees, to the extent permitted by the above state laws.

EIGHTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF:

VIOLATIONS OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS

(on behalf of Plaintiffs and the Damages Class)

338. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs of 

this Complaint.

339. This Claim is brought against all Defendants. 

340. Defendants engaged in unfair competition or unfair, unconscionable, deceptive

or fraudulent acts or practices in violation of the state consumer protection and unfair competition 

statutes listed below.

341. Arkansas: Defendants have knowingly entered into an unlawful agreement in 

restraint of trade in violation of the Arkansas Code Annotated, § 4-88-101, etseq.

a. Defendants knowingly agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint 

of trade or commerce by affecting, fixing, controlling, and/or maintaining at 

non-competitive and artificially inflated levels, the prices at which credit scores 

were sold in Arkansas and took efforts to conceal its agreements from Plaintiffs

and members of the Damages Class.

b. The aforementioned conduct on the part of the Defendants

constituted “unconscionable” and “deceptive” acts or practices in violation of 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 106 of 141 PageID #:2949
104

Arkansas Code Annotated, § 4-88-107(a)(10).

c. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) 

credit score price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated 

throughout Arkansas; (2) credit score prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and 

stabilized at artificially high levels throughout Arkansas; (3) Plaintiffs and the 

members of the Damages Class were deprived of free and open competition; 

and (4) Plaintiffs and the members of the Damages Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

d. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct 

substantially affected Arkansas commerce and consumers.

e. As a direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of 

Defendants, Plaintiffs and the members of the Damages Class have been injured 

in their business and property and are threatened with further injury.

f. Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices in violation of Arkansas Code Annotated, § 4-88-

107(a)(10) and, accordingly, Plaintiffs and the members of the Damages Class 

seek all relief available under thatstatute.

342. California: Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, deceptive or fraudulent acts or practices in violation of California Business and 

Professions Code § 17200, etseq.

a. During the Class Period, Defendants marketed, sold, or distributed 

FICO Scores in California, and committed and continue to commit acts of unfair 

competition, as defined by Sections 17200, et seq. of the California Business and 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 107 of 141 PageID #:2950
105

Professions Code, by engaging in the acts and practices specified above.

b. The violations of federal antitrust law set forth above constitute 

violations of section 17200, et seq. of California Business and Professions Code.

c. This claim is instituted pursuant to sections 17203 and 17204 of 

California Business and Professions Code, to obtain restitution from these

Defendants for acts, as alleged herein, that violated section 17200 of the 

California Business & Professions Code, commonly known as the Unfair 

Competition Law.

d. Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein violated the UCL. The acts, 

omissions, misrepresentations, practices and non-disclosures of Defendants, as 

alleged herein, constituted a common, continuous, and continuing course of 

conduct of unfair competition by means of unfair, unlawful, and/or fraudulent 

business acts or practices within the meaning of the UCL, including, but not 

limited to, the violations of section 16720, et seq., of California Business and 

Professions Code, set forth above.

e. Defendants’ acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices, and nondisclosures, as described above, whether or not in violation of section 16720, et 

seq., of California Business and Professions Code, and whether or not concerted 

or independent acts, are otherwise unfair, unconscionable, unlawful or

fraudulent.

f. Defendants’ acts or practices are unfair to purchasers of FICO Scores in 

the State of California within the meaning of § 17200, California Business & Professions 

Code.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 108 of 141 PageID #:2951
106

g. Defendants’ acts and practices are fraudulent or deceptive within 

the meaning of § 17200 of the California Business & Professions Code.

h. Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class are entitled to full 

restitution and/or disgorgement of all revenues, earnings, profits, compensation, 

and benefits that may have been obtained by Defendants as a result of such 

business acts or practices.

i. The illegal conduct alleged herein is continuing and there is no

indication that Defendants will not continue such activity into thefuture.

j. The unlawful and unfair business practices of Defendants, as 

described above, have caused and continue to cause Plaintiffs and members of 

the Damages Class to pay supra-competitive and artificially inflated prices for

FICO Scores sold in the State of California. Plaintiffs and members of the 

Damages Class suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of 

such unfair competition.

k. The conduct of Defendants as alleged in this Complaint violated § 

17200 of the California Business & Professions Code.

l. As alleged in this Complaint, Defendants and its co-conspirators 

have been unjustly enriched as a result of their wrongful conduct and by 

Defendant’s unfair competition.

m. Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class are accordingly 

entitled to equitable relief including restitution and/or disgorgement of all 

revenues, earnings, profits, compensation, and benefits that may have been 

obtained by Defendants as a result of such business practices, pursuant to 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 109 of 141 PageID #:2952
107

California Business & Professions Code §§ 17203 and 17204.

343. District of Columbia: Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of District of Columbia Code §§ 28-

3901 et seq. 

a. Defendants agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce 

by affecting, fixing, controlling and/or maintaining, at artificial and/or non-competitive 

levels, the prices at which FICO Scores were sold, distributed or obtained in the District 

of Columbia. 

b. The foregoing conduct constitutes “unlawful trade practices,” within the 

meaning of D.C. Code § 28- 3904. 

c. Plaintiffs and members of the Class were not aware of Defendants’ illegal 

conduct and were therefore unaware that they were being unfairly and illegally 

overcharged. 

d. There was a gross disparity of bargaining power between the parties with 

respect to the price charged by Defendants for FICO Scores. Defendants had the sole 

power to set that price, and Plaintiffs and members of the Class had no power to negotiate 

a lower price. 

e. Moreover, Plaintiffs and members of the Class lacked any meaningful 

choice in purchasing FICO Scores because they were unaware of the unlawful overcharge 

and there was no alternative source of supply through which Plaintiffs and members of 

the Class could avoid the overcharges. 

f. Defendants’ conduct with regard to sales of FICO Scores, including their 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 110 of 141 PageID #:2953
108

illegal conduct with respect to fixing the price of FICO Scores at supracompetitive levels 

and overcharging consumers, was substantively unconscionable because it was one-sided 

and unfairly benefited Defendants at the expense of Plaintiffs and the public. 

g. Defendants took grossly unfair advantage of Plaintiffs and members of the 

Class. 

h. The suppression of competition that has resulted from Defendants’ 

conduct has ultimately resulted in unconscionably higher prices for purchasers so that 

there was a gross disparity between the price paid and the value received for the FICO 

Scores. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) FICO Scores’ price 

competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout the District of 

Columbia; (2) FICO Scores’ prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at 

artificially high levels throughout the District of Columbia; (3) Plaintiffs and members of 

the Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of 

the Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for FICO Scores. 

i. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Class have been injured and are threatened with further injury. 

Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 

violation of District of Columbia Code §§ 28-3901 et seq., and, accordingly, Plaintiffs

and members of the Class seek all relief available under that statute. 

344. Florida: Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair 

Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201, etseq.

a. The primary policy of the FDUTPA is “[t]o protect the consuming public 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 111 of 141 PageID #:2954
109

and legitimate business enterprises from those who engage in unfair methods of 

competition, or unconscionable, deceptive, or unfair acts or practices in the conduct of any

trade or commerce.” Fla. Stat. § 501.202(2).

b. A claim for damages under the FDUTPA has three elements: (1) a 

prohibited practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages.

c. Under Florida law, indirect purchasers have standing to maintain an action 

under the FDUTPA based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. Fla. Stat. § 501.211(a) 

(“anyone aggrieved by a violation of this [statute] may bring an action . . .”).

d. Members of the Damages Class purchased FICO Scores within the State 

of Florida during the Class Period. But for Defendants’ conduct set forth herein, the price

of FICO Scores would have been lower, in an amount to be determined at trial.

e. Defendants entered into a contract, combination or conspiracy between 

two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in the B2B 

Credit Score Market, a substantial part of which occurred within Florida.

f. Defendants established, maintained or used a monopoly, or attempted to 

establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in the B2B Credit Score Market, for the 

purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing or maintaining prices in Florida at 

a level higher than the competitive market level, beginning at least as early as 2006 and 

continuing through the date of this filing.

g. Accordingly, Defendants’ conduct was an unfair method of competition, 

and an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the conduct of commerce within the State

of Florida.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 112 of 141 PageID #:2955
110

h. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) FICO Scores’ 

price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout Florida; (2)

FICO Scores’ prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high 

levels throughout Florida; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Class were deprived of free 

and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Class paid supracompetitive, 

artificially inflated prices for FICO Scores.

i. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected Florida’s trade and 

commerce.

j. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

members of the Class have been injured in their business or property by virtue of 

overcharges for FICO Scores and are threatened with further injury.

k. By reason of the foregoing, the members of the Damages Class are entitled

to seek all forms of relief, including injunctive relief pursuant to Florida Stat. § 501.208 

and declaratory judgment, actual damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant 

to Florida Stat. § 501.211.

345. Hawaii: Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Hawaii Revised Statutes 

Annotated §§ 480-1, etseq.

a. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) credit score 

price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout Hawaii; (2) 

credit score prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high levels

throughout Hawaii; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of free

and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid supraCase: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 113 of 141 PageID #:2956
111

competitive, artificially inflated prices for credit scores.

b. During the Class Period, Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially affected 

Hawaii commerce and consumers.

c. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured and are threatened with 

further injury.

d. Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts 

or practices in violation of Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 480, et seq., and, accordingly, Plaintiffs

and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available under thatstatute. 

346. Massachusetts: Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of Mass. G.L. c. 93Aet seq.. 

a. Defendants were engaged in trade or commerce as defined by G.L. c. 93A.

b. Defendants agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce 

in a market which includes Massachusetts, by affecting, fixing, controlling and/or

maintaining at artificial and non-competitive levels, the prices at which credit scores were 

sold, distributed, or obtained in Massachusetts and took efforts to conceal its agreements 

from Plaintiffs and members of the DamagesClass.

c. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) credit score 

price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout Massachusetts; 

(2) credit score prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high 

levels throughout Massachusetts; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were

deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 114 of 141 PageID #:2957
112

Class paid supra-competitive, artificially inflated pricesfor credit scores.

d. During the Class Period, Defendants marketed, sold, or distributed FICO 

Scores in Massachusetts, and Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially affected 

Massachusetts commerce and consumers.

e. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were injured and are threatened with further

injury.

f. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants engaged in unfair competition and 

unfair or deceptive acts or practices, in violation of G.L. c. 93A, §2. Defendants’

violations of Chapter 93A were knowing or willful, entitling Plaintiffs and members of 

the Damages Class to multiple damages.

347. Missouri: Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Missouri Merchandising 

Practices Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010, et.seq.

a. Plaintiffs and the Damages Class purchased FICO Scores for personal, 

family, or household purposes.

b. Defendants engaged in the conduct described herein in connection with 

the sale of credit scores in trade or commerce in a market that includes Missouri.

c. Defendants agreed to, and did in fact affect, fix, control, and/or maintain, 

at artificial and non-competitive levels, the prices at which credit scores were sold, 

distributed, or obtained in Missouri, which conduct constituted unfair practices in that it 

was unlawful under federal and state law, violated public policy, was unethical, 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 115 of 141 PageID #:2958
113

oppressive and unscrupulous, and caused substantial injury to Plaintiffs and members of 

the DamagesClass.

d. Defendants concealed, suppressed, and omitted to disclose material facts 

to Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class concerning Defendants’ unlawful 

activities and artificially inflated prices for credit scores. The concealed, suppressed, and 

omitted facts would have been important to Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class 

as they related to the cost of credit scores they purchased. 

e. Defendants’ conduct concerning the price of credit scores was deceptive 

as they had the tendency or capacity to mislead Plaintiffs and members of the Damages 

Class to believe that they were purchasing credit scores at prices established by a free and 

fair market.

f. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) credit score 

price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout Missouri; (2) 

credit score prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high levels 

throughout Missouri; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of

free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid 

supra- competitive, artificially inflated pricesfor credit scores.

g. The foregoing acts and practices constituted unlawful practices in 

violation of the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act.

h. As a direct and proximate result of the above-described unlawful practices, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class suffered ascertainable loss of money or

property.

i. Accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 116 of 141 PageID #:2959
114

available under Missouri’s Merchandising Practices Act, specifically Mo. Rev. Stat. § 

407.020, which prohibits “the act, use or employment by any person of any deception,

fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, 

suppression, or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement 

of any merchandise in trade or commerce...,” as further interpreted by the Missouri Code 

of State Regulations, 15 CSR 60-7.010, et seq., 15 CSR 60-8.010, et seq., and 15 CSR 

60-9.010, et seq., and Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.025, which provides for the relief sought in this

count. 

348. Montana: Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Montana Consumer Protection 

Act, Mont. Code, §§ 30-14-101, etseq. and §§ 30- 14-201 et seq.

a. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) credit score 

price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout Montana; (2) 

credit score prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high levels 

throughout Montana; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class were deprived of

free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class paid 

supra- competitive, artificially inflated pricesfor credit scores.

b. During the Class Period, Defendants marketed, sold, or distributed FICO 

Scores in Montana, and Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially affected Montana 

commerce and consumers.

c. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct,

Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class have been injured and are threatened with 

further injury.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 117 of 141 PageID #:2960
115

d. Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts

or practices in violation of Mont. Code, §§ 30-14-101, et seq., and §§ 30- 14-201 et seq., 

and, accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class seek all relief available 

under thatstatute.

349. Nebraska: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated Neb.

Rev. Stat. § 59-1602, et seq.

a. Under Nebraska law, indirect purchasers have standing to maintain an 

action under the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act based on the facts alleged in this

Complaint. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1609.

b. Defendants have entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy

between two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in the

B2B Credit Score Market, a substantial part of which occurred within Nebraska.

c. Defendants established, maintained, or used a monopoly, or attempted to 

establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in the B2B Credit Score Market, for the 

purpose of excluding or limiting competition or controlling or maintaining prices, a

substantial part of which occurred within Nebraska.

d. Defendants’ conduct was conducted with the intent to deceive Nebraska 

consumers regarding the nature of Defendants’ actions within the stream of Nebraska 

commerce.

e. Defendants’ conduct was unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive within the 

conduct of commerce within the State of Nebraska.

f. Defendants’ conduct misled consumers, withheld material facts, and had a 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 118 of 141 PageID #:2961
116

direct or indirect impact upon Plaintiffs and members-of-the-Class’s ability to protect 

themselves.

g. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected Nebraska’s trade and 

commerce.

h. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

members of the Class have been injured in their business or property and are threatened 

with further injury.

i. By reason of the foregoing, the members of the Class are entitled to seek 

all forms of relief available under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 59-1602, et seq.

350. New Hampshire: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have

violated N.H. Rev. Stat. T. XXXI, § 358-A, et seq.

a. Under New Hampshire law, indirect purchasers have standing to maintain 

an action under the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act based on the facts alleged 

in this Complaint. LaChance v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Co., 156 N.H. 88, 92-100 

(2007).

b. Defendants have entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy

between two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in the

B2B Credit Score Market, a substantial part of which occurred within New Hampshire.

c. Defendants established, maintained, or used a monopoly, or attempted to 

establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in B2B Credit Score Market, for the purpose 

of excluding or limiting competition or controlling or maintaining prices, a substantial 

part of which occurred within New Hampshire.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 119 of 141 PageID #:2962
117

d. Defendants’ conduct was conducted with the intent to deceive New

Hampshire consumers regarding the nature of Defendants’ actions within the stream of 

New Hampshire commerce.

e. Defendants’ conduct was unfair or deceptive within the conduct of 

commerce within the State of New Hampshire.

f. Defendants’ conduct was willful and knowing.

g. Defendants’ conduct misled consumers, withheld material facts, and had a 

direct or indirect impact upon members-of-the-Class’s ability to protect themselves.

h. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected New Hampshire’s 

trade and commerce.

i. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

members of the Class have been injured in their business or property and are threatened 

with further injury.

j. By reason of the foregoing, the members of the Class are entitled to seek 

all forms of relief available under N.H. Rev. Stat. T. XXXI, §§ 358-A:10 and 358-A:10-

351. New Mexico: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-12-1, et seq.

a. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy between 

two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in the Business 

Market for credit scores, a substantial part of which occurred within New Mexico.

b. Defendants agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce 

by affecting, fixing, controlling and/or maintaining at non-competitive and artificially 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 120 of 141 PageID #:2963
118

inflated levels, the prices at which FICO Scores were sold, distributed or obtained in New 

Mexico and took efforts to conceal their agreements from Plaintiffs and members of the 

Class.

c. Defendants established, maintained, or used a monopoly, or attempted to 

establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in the Business Market for credit scores, a 

substantial part of which occurred within New Mexico, for the purpose of excluding 

competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in the B2B Credit Score Market.

d. Defendants’ conduct was unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive within the 

conduct of commerce within the State of New Mexico.

e. Defendants’ conduct misled consumers, withheld material facts, and 

resulted in material misrepresentations to and the members of the Damages Class.

f. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected New Mexico’s trade 

and commerce.

g. Plaintiff and members of the Class were not aware of Defendants’ illegal 

conduct and were therefore unaware that they were being unfairly and illegally 

overcharged. There was a gross disparity of bargaining power between the parties with 

respect to the price charged by Defendants for FICO Scores. Defendant Fair Isaac had the 

sole power to set that price and Plaintiffs and members of the Class had no power to 

negotiate a lower price. Moreover, Plaintiffs and members of the Class lacked any 

meaningful choice in purchasing FICO Scores because they were unaware of the 

unlawful overcharge and there was no alternative source of supply through which 

Plaintiffs and members of the Class could avoid the overcharges. Defendants’ conduct 

with regard to sales of FICO Scores, including their illegal conduct to fix the price of 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 121 of 141 PageID #:2964
119

FICO Scores at supracompetitive levels and overcharge consumers, was substantively 

unconscionable because it was one-sided and unfairly benefited Defendants at the 

expense of Plaintiffs and the public. Defendants took grossly unfair advantage of 

Plaintiffs and members of the Class. 

h. The suppression of competition that resulted from Defendants’ conduct 

has ultimately resulted in unconscionably higher prices for consumers so that there was a 

gross disparity between the price paid and the value received for the FICO Scores.

i. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) FICO Scores’ 

price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout New Mexico; 

(2) FICO Scores’ prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high 

levels throughout New Mexico; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Class were deprived of 

free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Class paid 

supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for FICO Scores. During the Class Period, 

Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially affected New Mexico commerce and 

consumers.

j. Defendants’ conduct constituted “unconscionable trade practices” in that 

such conduct, inter alia, resulted in a gross disparity between the value received by the 

members of the Class and the price paid by them for FICO Scores as set forth in N.M.

Stat. Ann. § 57-12-2E.

k. Defendants’ conduct was willful.

l. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

Plaintiffs and the members of the Damages Class have been injured and are threatened 

with further injury.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 122 of 141 PageID #:2965
120

m. By reason of the foregoing, members of the Damages Class are entitled to 

seek all forms of relief, including actual damages or up to $300 per violation, whichever 

is greater, plus reasonable attorney’s fees under N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-12-10. 

352. New York: Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law §§ 349 et seq. 

a. Defendants agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce 

by affecting, controlling and/or maintaining, at artificial and non-competitive levels, the 

prices at which FICO scores were sold, distributed, or obtained in New York and took 

efforts to conceal their agreements from Plaintiffs and members of the Class, who are 

Defendants’ consumers. 

b. Defendants made public statements about the prices of FICO Scores that 

omitted material information that rendered the statements that they made materially 

misleading; and Defendants alone possessed material information that were relevant to 

consumers but failed to provide the information. 

c. Because of Defendants’ unlawful trade practices in the State of New York, 

Class members who purchased FICO Scores were misled to believe that they were paying 

a fair price for FICO Scores or the price increases for FICO Scores were for valid 

business reasons; and similarly situated consumers were potentially affected by 

Defendants’ conduct. 

d. Defendants knew that their unlawful trade practices with respect to pricing 

FICO Scores would have an impact on New York consumers, including Plaintiffs and 

members of the Class. 

e. Defendants knew that their unlawful trade practices with respect to pricing

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 123 of 141 PageID #:2966
121

FICO Scores would have a broad impact, causing Class members who purchased FICO 

Scores to be injured by paying more for FICO Scores than they would have paid in the 

absence of Defendants’ unlawful trade acts and practices. 

f. The conduct of Defendants described herein constitutes consumer-oriented 

deceptive acts or practices within the meaning of N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349, which 

resulted in consumer injury and broad adverse impact on the public at large and harmed 

the public interest of New York State in an honest marketplace in which economic 

activity is conducted in a competitive manner. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the 

following effects: (1) FICO Scores’ price competition was restrained, suppressed, and 

eliminated throughout New York; (2) FICO Scores’ prices were raised, fixed, maintained, 

and stabilized at artificially high levels throughout New York; (3) Plaintiffs and members 

of the Class were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members 

of the Class paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for FICO Scores. 

g. During the Class Period, Defendants marketed, sold, or distributed FICO 

Scores in New York, and Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially affected New York 

commerce and consumers. 

h. During the Class Period, each Defendant named herein, directly, or 

indirectly and through affiliates they dominated and controlled, manufactured, sold 

and/or distributed FICO Scores in New York.

i. Plaintiffs and members of the Class seek all relief available pursuant to 

N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h).

353. North Carolina: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated

N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 75-1, et seq.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 124 of 141 PageID #:2967
122

a. Under North Carolina law, indirect purchasers have standing to maintain 

an action based on the facts alleged in this Complaint. Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 123 

N.C. App. 572, 584 (1996).

b. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint 

of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in the B2B Credit Score Market, a substantial

part of which occurred within North Carolina.

c. Defendants agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce 

by affecting, fixing, controlling and/or maintaining, at artificial and non-competitive 

levels, the prices at which FICO Scores were sold, distributed or obtained in North 

Carolina and took efforts to conceal their agreements from Plaintiffs and members of the 

Class. Defendants’ conduct could not have succeeded absent deceptive conduct by 

Defendants to cover up their illegal acts. Secrecy was integral to the formation, 

implementation, and maintenance of Defendants’ illegal activity. Defendants committed 

inherently deceptive and self-concealing actions, of which Plaintiffs and members of the 

Class could not possibly have been aware. Defendants’ public statements concerning the 

price of FICO Scores created the illusion of competitive pricing controlled by market 

forces rather than supracompetitive pricing driven by Defendants’ illegal conduct.

d. Defendants’ conduct was unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive within the 

conduct of commerce within the State of North Carolina.

e. Defendants’ trade practices are and have been immoral, unethical, 

unscrupulous, and substantially injurious to consumers.

f. Defendants’ conduct misled consumers, withheld material facts, and 

resulted in material misrepresentations to members of the Class.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 125 of 141 PageID #:2968
123

g. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected North Carolina’s 

trade and commerce.

h. Defendants’ conduct constitutes consumer-oriented deceptive acts or

practices within the meaning of North Carolina law, which resulted in consumer injury and

broad adverse impact on the public at large and harmed the public interest of North

Carolina consumers in an honest marketplace in which economic activity is conducted in 

a competitive manner.

i. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) FICO Scores’ 

price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout North Carolina; 

(2) FICO Scores’ prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high 

levels throughout North Carolina; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Class were deprived 

of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Class paid 

supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for FICO Scores.

j. During the Class Period, Defendants marketed, sold, or distributed FICO 

Scores in North Carolina, and Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially affected North 

Carolina commerce and consumers. During the Class Period, each Defendant named 

herein, directly, or indirectly and through affiliates they dominated and controlled, 

manufactured, sold and/or distributed FICO Scores in North Carolina.

k. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

members of the Class have been injured and are threatened with further injury.

l. By reason of the foregoing, members of the Class are entitled to seek all

forms of relief, including treble damages under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16.

354. Oregon: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated Or. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 126 of 141 PageID #:2969
124

Rev. Stat. § 646.608, et seq.

a. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy between

two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in the B2B 

Credit Score Market, a substantial part of which occurred within Oregon.

b. Defendants established, maintained, or used a monopoly, or attempted to 

establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in the B2B Credit Score Market, for the 

purpose of excluding or limiting competition or controlling or maintaining prices, a

substantial part of which occurred within Oregon.

c. Defendants’ conduct was conducted with the intent to deceive Oregon 

consumers regarding the nature of Defendants’ actions within the stream of Oregon

commerce.

d. Defendants’ conduct was unfair or deceptive within the conduct of 

commerce within the State of Oregon.

e. Defendants’ conduct misled consumers, withheld material facts, and had a 

direct or indirect impact upon members-of-the-Class’s ability to protect themselves.

f. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected Oregon’s trade and 

commerce.

g. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

members of the Class have been injured in their business or property and are threatened 

with further injury.

h. By reason of the foregoing, the members of the Class are entitled to seek 

all forms of relief available under Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.638.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 127 of 141 PageID #:2970
125

355. Rhode Island: Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the Rhode Island Unfair Trade 

Practice and Consumer Protection Act (R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 6-13.1-1 et seq.). 

a. Members of this Class purchased FICO Scores for personal, family, or 

household purposes. 

b. Defendants agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce 

in a market that includes Rhode Island, by affecting, controlling, and/or maintaining, at 

artificial and non-competitive levels, the prices at which FICO Scores were sold, 

distributed, or obtained in Rhode Island. 

c. Defendants deliberately failed to disclose material facts to Plaintiffs and 

members of the Class concerning Defendants’ unlawful activities and artificially inflated 

prices for FICO Scores. Defendants owed a duty to disclose such facts, and they breached 

that duty by their silence. 

d. Defendants misrepresented to all purchasers during the Class Period that 

Defendants’ FICO Scores prices were competitive and fair.

e. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) FICO Scores’ 

price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout Rhode Island; 

(2) FICO Scores’ prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high 

levels throughout Rhode Island; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Class were deprived of 

free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Class paid 

supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for FICO Scores. 

f. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violations of law, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Class suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 128 of 141 PageID #:2971
126

as a result of Defendants’ use or employment of unconscionable and deceptive 

commercial practices as set forth above. That loss was caused by Defendants’ willful and 

deceptive conduct, as described herein. Defendants’ deception, including their affirmative 

misrepresentations and omissions concerning the price of the FICO Scores, likely misled 

all purchasers acting reasonably under the circumstances to believe that they were 

purchasing FICO Scores at prices set by a free and fair market. 

g. Defendants’ affirmative misrepresentations and omissions constitute 

information important to Plaintiffs and members of the Class as they related to the cost of 

FICO Scores they purchased. 

h. Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts 

or practices in violation of Rhode Island Gen. Laws. §§ 6-13.1-1 et seq., and, 

accordingly, Plaintiffs and members of the Class seek all relief available under that 

statute.

356. South Carolina: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have

violated S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10, et seq.

a. Defendants have entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy

between two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in the

B2B Credit Score Market, a substantial part of which occurred within South Carolina.

b. Defendants established, maintained, or used a monopoly, or attempted to 

establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in the B2B Credit Score Market, for the 

purpose of excluding or limiting competition or controlling or maintaining prices, a

substantial part of which occurred within South Carolina.

c. Defendants’ monopolization had the following effects: (1) FICO Scores’ 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 129 of 141 PageID #:2972
127

price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout South Carolina; 

(2) FICO Scores’ prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high 

levels throughout South Carolina; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Class were deprived 

of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Class paid 

supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for the FICO Scores during the Class Period.

d. Defendants’ conduct was conducted with the intent to deceive South 

Carolina consumers regarding the nature of Defendants’ actions within the stream of 

South Carolina commerce.

e. Defendants’ conduct was unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive within the 

conduct of commerce within the State of South Carolina.

f. Defendants’ conduct misled consumers, withheld material facts, and had a 

direct or indirect impact upon members-of-the-Class’s ability to protect themselves.

g. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected South Carolina trade 

and commerce.

h. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially harmed the public interest of 

the State of South Carolina, as at least thousands of South Carolina businesses purchase 

FICO Scores.

i. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Class have been injured in their business and property and 

are threatened with further injury. Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or 

unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 et seq., 

and, accordingly, Plaintiffs and the members of the Class seek all relief available under 

that statute.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 130 of 141 PageID #:2973
128

357. South Dakota: Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of South Dakota Deceptive Trade 

Practices and Consumer Protection Act (S.D. Codified Laws §§ 37-24-6 et seq.). 

a. Defendants agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce 

in a market that includes South Dakota, by affecting, controlling, and/or maintaining, at 

artificial and non-competitive levels, the prices at which FICO credit scores were sold, 

distributed, or obtained in South Dakota. 

b. Defendants deliberately failed to disclose material facts to Plaintiffs and 

members of the Class concerning Defendants’ unlawful activities and artificially inflated 

prices for FICO credit scores. Defendants misrepresented to all purchasers during the 

Class Period that Defendants’ FICO credit scores prices were competitive and fair 

Defendants owed a duty to disclose such facts, and they breached that duty by their 

silence. 

c. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) FICO credit 

scores price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout South 

Dakota; (2) FICO credit scores prices were raised, maintained, and stabilized at 

artificially high levels throughout South Dakota; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Class 

were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Class 

paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for FICO credit scores. 

d. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violations of law, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Class suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property 

as a result of Defendants’ use or employment of unconscionable and deceptive 

commercial practices as set forth above. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 131 of 141 PageID #:2974
129

e. That loss was caused by Defendants’ willful and deceptive conduct, as 

described herein. Defendants’ deception, including their affirmative misrepresentations 

and omissions concerning the price of the FICO credit scores, likely misled all purchasers 

acting reasonably under the circumstances to believe that they were purchasing FICO 

credit scores at prices set by a free and fair market. 

f. Defendants’ affirmative misrepresentations and omissions constitute 

information important to Plaintiffs and members of the Class as they related to the cost of 

FICO credit scores they purchased. 

g. Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts 

or practices in violation of S.D. Codified Laws §§37-24-6 et seq., and, accordingly, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Class seek all relief available under that statute.

358. Utah: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated Utah

Code Ann. §§ 13-11-1, et seq.

a. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy between 

two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in the B2B 

Credit Score Market, a substantial part of which occurred within Utah.

b. Defendants are suppliers within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-

3.

c. Defendants established, maintained, or used a monopoly, or attempted to 

establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in the business market for credit scores, a 

substantial part of which occurred within Utah, for the purpose of excluding competition 

or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in the B2B Credit Score Market.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 132 of 141 PageID #:2975
130

d. Defendants’ conduct was unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive within the 

conduct of commerce within the State of Utah.

e. Defendants’ conduct and/or practices were unconscionable and were 

undertaken in connection with consumer transactions within the meaning of Utah Code

Ann. §§ 13-11-3.

f. Defendants knew or had reason to know that its conduct was

unconscionable.

g. Defendants’ conduct misled consumers, withheld material facts, and 

resulted in material misrepresentations to members of the Class.

h. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected Utah’s trade and 

commerce.

i. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, the 

members Class have been injured in their business or property and are threatened with 

further injury.

j. By reason of the foregoing, the members of the Class are entitled to seek 

all forms of relief, including declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and ancillary relief, 

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-19(5) and 13-11-20.

359. Utah: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated 

Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-5-1, et seq.

a. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy between 

two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in the B2B 

Credit Score Market, a substantial part of which occurred within Utah.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 133 of 141 PageID #:2976
131

b. Defendants established, maintained, or used a monopoly, or attempted to 

establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in the B2B Credit Score Market, a 

substantial part of which occurred within Utah, for the purpose of excluding competition 

or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in the B2B Credit Score Market.

c. Defendants’ conduct caused or was intended to cause unfair methods of 

competition within the State of Utah.

d. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected Utah’s trade and 

commerce.

e. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, the 

members of the Class have been injured in their business or property and are threatened 

with further injury.

f. By reason of the foregoing, the members of the Class are entitled to seek 

all forms of relief, including actual damages or $2000 per Class member, whichever is 

greater, plus reasonable attorney’s fees under Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-5- 14, et seq.

360. Vermont: By reason of the conduct alleged herein, Defendants have violated Vt. 

Stat.Ann. tit. 9, § 2451, et seq.

a. Defendants entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy between 

two or more persons in restraint of, or to monopolize, trade or commerce in the B2B 

Credit Score Market, a substantial part of which occurred within Vermont.

b. Defendants established, maintained, or used a monopoly, or attempted to 

establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in the B2B Credit Score Market, a 

substantial part of which occurred within Vermont, for the purpose of excluding

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 134 of 141 PageID #:2977
132

competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in the B2B Credit Score Market.

c. Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of 9 Vermont §§ 2451 et seq. 

Defendants agreed to, and did in fact, act in restraint of trade or commerce in a market 

that includes Vermont, by affecting, controlling, and/or maintaining, at artificial and noncompetitive levels, the prices at which FICO Scores were sold, distributed, or obtained in 

Vermont. Defendants deliberately failed to disclose material facts to Plaintiffs and 

members of the Class concerning Defendants’ unlawful activities and artificially inflated 

prices for the FICO Scores.

d. Defendants owed a duty to disclose such facts, and they breached that duty 

by their silence. Defendants misrepresented to all purchasers during the Class Period that 

Defendants’ FICO Scores prices were competitive and fair.

e. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) FICO Scores’ 

price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout Vermont; (2) 

FICO Scores’ prices were raised, fixed, maintained, and stabilized at artificially high 

levels throughout Vermont; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Class were deprived of free 

and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Class paid supracompetitive, 

artificially inflated prices for the FICO Scores.

f. Defendants’ conduct caused or was intended to cause unfair methods of 

competition within the State of Vermont.

g. Defendants’ unlawful conduct substantially affected Vermont’s trade and 

commerce.

h. Defendants’ misleading conduct and unconscionable activities constitutes 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 135 of 141 PageID #:2978
133

unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of 9 Vermont §§ 

2451 et seq.

i. As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, the 

members of the Class have suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result 

of Defendants’ use or employment of unconscionable and deceptive commercial practices 

as set forth above. That loss was caused by Defendants’ willful and deceptive conduct, as 

described herein. Defendants’ deception, including their affirmative misrepresentations 

and omissions concerning the price of FICO Scores, likely misled all purchasers acting 

reasonably under the circumstances to believe that they were purchasing FICO Scores at 

prices set by a free and fair market.

j. By reason of the foregoing, members of Class are entitled to seek all forms 

of relief available under Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2451, et seq.

361. West Virginia: Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair, 

unconscionable, or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit 

and Protection Act, W. Va. Code, §§46A-6-104 et seq. 

a. Defendants’ unlawful conduct had the following effects: (1) FICO credit 

scores price competition was restrained, suppressed, and eliminated throughout West 

Virginia; (2) FICO credit scores prices were raised, maintained, and stabilized at 

artificially high levels throughout West Virginia; (3) Plaintiffs and members of the Class 

were deprived of free and open competition; and (4) Plaintiffs and members of the Class 

paid supracompetitive, artificially inflated prices for FICO credit scores. 

b. During the Class Period, Defendants marketed, sold, or distributed FICO 

credit scores in West Virginia, and Defendants’ illegal conduct substantially affected 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 136 of 141 PageID #:2979
134

West Virginia commerce and consumers. 

c. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, 

Plaintiffs and members of the Class have been injured and are threatened with further 

injury. 

362. Defendants have engaged in unfair competition or unfair or deceptive acts or 

practices in violation of W. Va. Code, §§46A-6-104 et seq., and, accordingly, Plaintiffs and 

members of the Class seek all relief available under that statute.

NINTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 

UNJUST ENRICHMENT

(On behalf of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class)

363. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations in the preceding paragraphs.

364. This Claim is brought against all Defendants.

365. As a result of its unlawful conduct described above, Defendants have and will 

continue to be unjustly enriched by the receipt of unlawfully inflated prices of and unlawful profits 

from FICO Scores.

366. Defendants have benefited from their unlawful acts and it would be inequitable 

for Defendants to be permitted to retain any of the ill-gotten gains.

367. Under common law principles of unjust enrichment, Defendants should not be 

permitted to retain the benefits conferred on them by overpayments by Plaintiffs and members of 

the Class in the following states: Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, 

Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 

Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode 

Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 137 of 141 PageID #:2980
135

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, 

respectfully pray that this Honorable Court:

1. Order that this action may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) 

and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that it be named Representative of the Classes, 

that the undersigned Interim Co-Lead Counsel be named Co-Lead Class Counsel, and that

reasonable notice of this action be provided to members of the Class as provided by Rule 

23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

2. Adjudge that Defendants violated the federal antitrust laws as set forth above;

3. Adjudge that Defendants violated the state antitrust and unfair trade practices 

laws as set forth above;

4. Adjudge that Defendants were unjustly enriched as set forth above;

5. Award Plaintiffs and members of the Damages Class actual, double, treble, 

and exemplary damages as permitted;

6. Award Plaintiffs and members of the Classes pre-and post-judgment interest; 

7. Enjoin Defendants from continuing the unlawful actions alleged herein;

8. Award Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees and all other costs, including costs of consulting 

and testifying experts, reasonably incurred in prosecution of this action; and

9. Award such other relief as it deems just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand a 

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 138 of 141 PageID #:2981
136

Trial by Jury as to all issues so triable.

December 6, 2021 Respectfully submitted,

By /s/Garrett D. Blanchfield

Garrett D. Blanchfield

REINHARDT WENDORF & BLANCHFIELD

Garrett D. Blanchfield (Pro Hac Vice)

Brant D. Penney (Pro Hac Vice)

Roberta A. Yard (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

332 Minnesota Street, Suite W-1050 

St. Paul, MN 55101 

Tel: (651) 287-2100

Fax: (651) 287-2103

g.blanchfield@rwblawfirm.com 

b.penney@rwblawfirm.com

r.yard@rwblawfirm.com

SPECTOR ROSEMAN & KODROFF, P.C.

Jeffrey J. Corrigan (Pro Hac Vice) 

William G. Caldes (Pro Hac Vice) 

Icee N. Etheridge (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

2001 Market Street, Suite 3420

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Tel: (215) 496-0300

Fax: (215) 496-6611

JCorriganf@srkattorneys.com

BCaldes@srkattorneys.com

IEtheridge@srkattorneys.com

Interim Co-Lead Counsel for Class Plaintiffs

GUIN, STOKES & EVANS, LLC

Charles R. Watkins (3122790) 

321 South Plymouth Court Suite 1250

Chicago, IL 60604

Tel: (312) 878-8391

Fax: (205) 226-2357

charlesw@gseattorneys.com

Liaison Counsel for Class Plaintiffs

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 139 of 141 PageID #:2982
137

PRETI FLAHERTY, BELIVEAU 

& PACHIOS LLP

Michael S. Smith (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

Gregory P. Hansel (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

Randall B. Weill (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

Elizabeth F. Quinby (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

One City Center, P.O. Box 9546

Portland, ME 04101

Tel: (207) 791-3000 

msmith@preti.com

ghansel@preti.com

rweill@preti.com

equinby@preti.com

GLANCY PRONGAY & MURRAY LLP

Brian P. Murray (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

Lee Albert (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

230 Park Avenue, Suite 358

New York, NY 10169

Tel: (212) 682-5340

Fax: (212) 884-0988

bmurray@glancylaw.com

lalbert@glancylaw.com

FREED KANNER LONDON 

& MILLEN LLC

Douglas A. Millen

Brian M. Hogan 

2201 Waukegan Road, Suite 130

Bannockburn, IL 60015 

Tel: (224) 632-4500

dmillen@fklmlaw.com

bhogan@fklmlaw.com

FREED KANNER LONDON 

& MILLEN LLC

Jonathan M. Jagher (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

923 Fayette Street 

Conshohocken, PA 19428 

Tel: (610) 234-6487

jjagher@fklmlaw.com

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 140 of 141 PageID #:2983
138

BONI, ZACK & SNYDER LLC

Michael J. Boni (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

Joshua D. Snyder (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

John E. Sindoni (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming) 

15 St. Asaphs Road

Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004

Tel: 610-822-0200

Fax: 610-822-0206

mboni@bonizack.com

jsnyder@bonizack.com

jsindoni@bonizack.com

MCLAFFERTY LAW FIRM, P.C.

David McLafferty (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

Attorneys at Law

923 Fayette Street

Conshohocken, PA 19428

Tel: (610) 940-4000 ext. 12

www.McLaffertyLaw.com

SALTZ, MONGELUZZI & BENDESKY, P.C. 

Simon B. Paris, Esq. (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

Patrick Howard, Esq. (Pro Hac Vice forthcoming)

1650 Market Street, 52nd Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Tel: (215) 575-3985

Fax: (215) 496-0999

sparis@smbb.com

phoward@smbb.com

Attorneys for Class Plaintiffs

Case: 1:20-cv-02114 Document #: 122 Filed: 12/06/21 Page 141 of 141 PageID #:2984