### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A ugus t 26 , 200 8
STA TE OF TENNES SEE v . RANDALL A. MYERS

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forBlou nt County No. C-15714 Jon Ker ry Blackwood, Jud ge

No. E2007-01810-CC A-R3- CD - Filed January 5, 2009

The de fenda

nt, Randall A. My ers, a

ppeals the se ntence imposed by the Blount County

Circuit Court following his open g uilty plea to two counts of filing a fa lse repor t, Class D felonies, and one count of theft of proper ty under $500, a

Class A m isdemeanor . After hear ing the evidenc e pre sented at the sentenc ing he aring , the trial cour t imposed consecutive se ntence s of four year s , t h re e y ear s, and
e l e v e n m o n t h s an d t w e n t y - n i n e d ay s

. T h e c o u rt f u rt h e r o r d e r e d t h e s e n t e n c e s t o b e s e r v e d in confine ment. On appeal, t he defenda nt asser ts that: (1) the two felony

sentenc es ar e excessive; (2) the cour t er re d i n denying a

n alternative sentenc e; and ( 3) the trial c ourt err ed in imposing
consec utive sentenc es. F ollowing r eview of the re cord, w e af

firm the sente nces a s imposed. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circ uit Court Aff irme d

J OHN E VERET T W I L L I AMS , J., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which R OBER T W. W EDEMEYER a ndJ. C. M C L IN , JJ., joined.

Charles A. Car

penter (on appe al) a nd William Gribble (at trial), Maryville, Te nnessee , for the
app e lla nt, Ra nd a ll A . M ye rs

. Robert E. Cooper, Jr ., Attorney Ge nera l and Reporter ; Jennifer L. Bleds o e, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; William H. Cox, III , District Attorney Gene ral Pro Tempore ; and Nea l Pinks ton, Assistant District Attorney Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

The unde rlying fac ts of t he defenda nt’s three case s, as re cited at the guilty plea he aring , are a s f oll ow s: [I ]n 15 71 4, a

fa lse re po rt

fr om D e c e mbe r o f 2 00 4, a lle gati on s th a t [th e de fe nd ant]
re po rt e d to the B lou

nt C ounty She ri ff ’s De pa rtme nt a nd it w a s lat er t

ur ne d o ve r t o-2-

the TB Iof an a lleg ed murde r for hire of some inmate. A n d t h at p ro v ed - - by monitoring of r eports and phone conver sations, proved to be f alse.
[I n] 15715, false repor

t, the State would submit that there was a phone call from [the de fe nd ant] m a de 20 05 wh ile out on the bo nd fo r the oth e r fa lse re po rt , h e g a ve thi s repor t of a fa lse incident her e in B lount Count y . That, too, proved out to be f alse.

An d in 15 71 6, the ft

[und e r] f

ive hund re d, the St a te a lle g e s th a t [th e de fe nd ant] offe red to sell an individual g olf clubs i n the amount of $230. The c heck w as written and [cashed]; howeve r, the c lubs were never provided.

Ba sed upon these alleg ations, the defe ndant was indicted by a Blount County g rand jury for two counts of Class C filing a false r eport a

nd one count of

theft o f p ro p er t y l es s than $500. He subsequently

enter ed a be st interest plea a g ree ment. Pursuant to the ag ree ment, the def endant pled g uilty to two Class D felony filing a false repor t c harg es and to the theft of proper ty

. Moreove r, the agr ee m en ts p ec i fi edt h at t h e d ef en d an twa s t o b e s en t en ce d as a R an ge I, s t an d ar d

o ff en d er , al t h o u gh he qualifie d as a Rang e I Ioffe nder. H oweve r, the a g ree m en t p ro v i d ed that the leng th of the sentenc es and the manner of their se rvice wer e to be de termined by the trial cour

t. At the subsequent se ntencinghear ing, the b o ard of probation and pa

role off icer who pre pare d the pre sentenc e re port testified and introduc ed the r epo rt i n t o evidenc e. Ac cordingto the office r, he ha d d if

fi cul ty com pl e tin g the re po rt be c a us e the de fe nd ant f

a ile d to c on ta c t th e of

fi c e r d e sp ite having been inf

ormed to do so. The offic er w as eve ntually able to intervie w the def

endant f ollowing his subsequent arr est. The pr esente nce r eport ind i ca t ed t h at the def endant ha d a leng th history of criminal convic tions, beg inning in 1987, and that the defe ndant had previously been revoke d from probation twice and par ole once

. After hear ing the evidenc e prese nted, the trial court imposed sentenc es of four y ear s for one count of filinga fa lse repor t, three y ear s for the se cond count, a nd eleve n months and twenty -nine day s for the the ft of prope rty . The c ourt furthe r orde red that t h e s en t en ces w ere to be serve d
consec utively

and in conf

inement. The de fenda

nt now appea ls the sentence s.
Ana lys is

On appea l, the defe ndant raises three challeng es to the sentenc es imposed. Fir st, he contends that the two sentenc es for filing a false r eport a

re e x cessive in leng th

. S ec o nd, he ar g ues that the
c ourt e rr e d in de nyingan a lte rn a tiv e se nte nc e . F ina lly , h e a sse rt s that it wa s e rr or

to i mpo se consec utive sentenc es.

I nitially , we note that the two felony offe nses for which the def enda nt w a s c onvicted occ urre d on Dec embe r 2 0 , 2 004, and May 25, 2005, althoug h he wa s not sentence d until J uly 2007. The misdemeanor the ft offe nse, which the defendant does not challeng e in t his appea l, was committed on J une 17, 2005. Eff

ective June 7, 2005, our sente ncingact was amende d in response to Blak e ly-3-

v. W ashington. See T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0( c ) ( Sup p. 20 05 ); cf

. T.C.A. § 40-35-210( c) (2003). I n the

“ Com pil e r’ s N ote s” se c tio n to thi s ame ndme nt, it s tate s: Acts 2005, ch. 353, § 18 pr ovided that the ac t shall apply to sentencing for c riminal of fe ns e s o n o r a ft e r Jun e 7, 20 05 . O ff e ns e s c omm itt e d p ri or

to Jun e 7, 20 05 , s ha ll be g ov e rn e d by pr ior law, wh ic h s ha ll a pp ly in a ll r e sp e c ts. Ho we ve r, fo r d e fe nd ants who ar e sente nced a fter June 7, 2005, for of fense s committed on o r afte r Jul y 1, 1982, the def

endant ma y el ect to be se ntence d under the provisions of the ac t by
e xec uti nga

wa ive r o f s uc h defen dan t’ s ex post facto protec tions. Upon ex ecuting such a w aiver , all provisions of the ac t shall apply to the defe ndant.

T.C.A. § 40-35-210, Compil er’ s Notes. I n the instant c ase, the rec ord is de void of any waiver of the de fe nd ant’ s e

xpo st f ac to protec tions. Thus, the 2005 amendments to the statute do not apply to the defe ndant’s fe lony

convictions. There fore , we review the trial court’s imposition of the sentenc es in this case pursuant to the former act, as modified by State v. Gome z , 239 S.W .3d 733, 740 (Tenn. 2007) (“ Gomez I

I ”).
On appe al, the par

ty challeng ing the sentenc e imposed by the t ri al co u rt has the burde n of
e sta bli sh ingthat th e se nte nc e is er ro ne ou s. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 40 1 (20 03 ), Se nte nc ing Com m’ n Cm ts. When a def

endant c halleng es the length, rang e, or manner of ser vice of a sente nce, it is the duty

of this court to conduct a de novo revie w of the r ecor d with a pre sumption t hat the determinations made by the cour t from which the a

ppeal is take n are corr ect. T.C.A. § 40-35-401( d). The presumption of cor rec tness is conditioned upon the aff irmative showingin the rec ord that t h e trial court considere d the sentenc ing pr inciples and all rele vant fac ts a nd circ umstances. State v. Pe ttus , 986 S.W. 2d 54 0, 54 3- 44 (T e nn . 1 99 9) . Howev er, if th e re c or d s ho ws tha t th e tr ia l c ourt

fa ile d to consider the sentenc ing pr inciples and a ll releva nt fac ts and circ u m stance s, then revie w of the
c h a l l e n g e d

s e n t e n c e i s p u r e l y de novo without the presumption of corr ectne ss. State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) . When conducting a de novo revie w of a sentenc e, we must consider: (1) a ny evidenc e re ceive d at the trial a nd/or sentenc ing hear ing; (2) t he pre sentenc e re port; (3) the principles of se ntencingand ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (4) the nature and char acte ristics of the off

ense; (5) any

mitigating or enhanc ement fac tors; ( 6) any statements made by the de fe nd ant o n h is o r h e r o wn be ha lf ; and (7 ) t he po te nti a l f

or re ha bil itatio n o r t

re a tme nt. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0; State v. Taylor , 63 S.W .3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)

. I. Sentence Length

Th e de fe nd ant a sse rt s th a t th e re sp e c tiv e fo ur -ye ar an d thr e e -ye ar se nte nc e s impo se d f or his two convictions for f

iling a f alse report are ex cessive “bec ause the trial court imposed a se ntence of confine ment that was only two (2) y ear s less than the maxim um possible sentence ” and be cause the court “ did not a

ppare ntly consider whether the sentenc e [i t] imposed was the lea st severe measure nece ssary to achieve the purposes f or which the sentenc e wa s imposed.”-4-

Under the law as it exis ted prior to the 2005 amendments, unless enha nceme nt fac tors wer e prese nt, the presumpti ve sente nce to be imposed for a Class D felony

was the minimum sentence within the applicable rang e. T.C.A. § 40-35- 210(c) . As the def endant wa s sentence d as a Rang e I offe nder, the appropr iate ra ng e wa s two to four y ear s. See T.C.A. § 40-35-112( a)( 4) (2 0 0 3). Te nn e sse e ’s pr e -2 00 5 s e nte nc inga c t pr ov ide d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt wa s to inc re a se the se nte nc e wi thi n the ra ng e base d on the exist ence of enha nceme nt fac tors and re duce the sentenc e as a ppropriate for any miti gat i n g fac tors. T.C.A. § 40-35-210( d), (e ). Our supr eme c ourt has held that, upon the finding of even one enhanc ement fac tor, “the statute a ffor ded to the judg e discre tion to choose an appropr iate sentence any

wher e withi n the s tatutory rang e.” State v. Gome z , 163 S.W .3d 632, 659 (Tenn. 2005) (“ Go me

z I ”). Mor eover , the law is we ll established that the weigh t as s i gned to an
e nh anc e me nt f

a c tor “ is l e ft to t he dis c re tio n o f t

he tr ia l c ourt so lon g a s th e tr ia l c ourt c omp lie s w ith the purposes and principles of t he sentencing act and its findings ar e supported by the re cord.” Sta te
v . G os ne ll , 62 S.W .3d 740, 750 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (citations omitted). Thus, based upon the applicable law, we must reje ct the def endant’ s contentions with reg ard to the leng th of the sentence. The rec ord of the pr ocee dings be low indicates that the tria l court considere d all rele van t p u rposes a nd principles of the sentenc ing a ct. I t was not err or for the trial court to impose a sente nce “ only two y ear s less than the maxim um possible sentence ” base d upon its discretion.

Howeve r, the Tennessee Supreme Court rec ently held that the trial c ourt’s enha nceme nt of a def endant’ s sentence based on fac tors that had not been found by a jury beyond a re asonable doubt vio late d a def

e nd ant’ s SixthAm e ndme nt r ig ht t o a jur y tr ia l a s in te rp re te d b y

the Sup re me Court

in Gomez I I , 2 3 9 S

. W

. 3 d

at 7 4 0 (c i t i n g Cun ningh am v . Ca lif or nia , 549 U.S. 270, 127 S. C t. 856, 860 (2 00 7) ); see also Blake ly v. W ashington , 542 U.S. 296, 301, 124 S. C t. 2531, 2536 (2004) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000)) (“‘ Other than the fa ct of a pr ior conviction, any fac t that incre ases the penalty for a crime be y ond the statutory maxi mum must be submitt ed to a jury , and proved beyond a rea sonable doubt.’”). Blak e ly was also clear

that a def endant’ s sentence could also be e nhance d base d u p o n fa cts “a dmitted by the def endant.” Blak e ly , 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S. Ct . at 2537.

I n de te rm ini ng the a

pp ro pr iate se nte nc e le ng th in thi s c a se , the tr ia l c ourt fo un d a s f oll ow s:
The Court finds that t he Defenda nt has a pr ior history

of cr iminal convictions
and c ri min a l be havior in a dd iti on to t ho se ne c e ssa

ry to e sta bli shthe a

pp ro pr iate rang e and that the Def

endant h as an u nwillingness to comply with a sentenc e involving re lease in the community . These e nhance ments outweig h the mitigating fac tor that his conduct neither cause d nor threatened se rious bodily injury

. Thus, the re cord e stablishes that the trial cour t imposed two enhanc ement fa ctors, as w ell as one mitigating fac tor. SeeT.C.A. § 40-35-114( 1), (8) , -113(1) (2003). On a ppeal, the de fenda

nt does not challeng e the a

pplication of these f

actor s. Howeve r, review of the record r evea ls that the trial
c ourt e rr e d in a pp lyingthe e nh anc e me nt f a c tor fo r t he de fe nd ant’ s p re vio us unwi lli ng ne ss to c omp ly-5-

with the conditions of a sentenc e involving rele ase into the community based upon Gomez I

I

. See Gomez I I , 239 S.W .3d at 740 (a tria l court’s e nhance ment of a de fenda nt’s sentenc e, on the ba sis of judicially deter mined fac ts other than a de fenda nt’s prior convic tions, viol ated that de fenda nt’s
c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts un de r t he Sixth A me ndme nt t o th e Un ite d St a te s Co ns tit uti on ); se e als o S

tate v . Phe dr e k

T. D av is , N o. M2 00 6- 00 19 8- SC- R11 -C D ( Te nn ., Oc t. 1 7, 20 08 ) ( fi nd ingwa s e rr or to apply the fa ctor for

previous unwillingne s s to comply with the conditions of a sente nce involving rele ase into the c ommunity beca use this contention was not put befor e the jury or admitted by

the de fe nd ant) . T ho ug h th e pr e se ntenc e rep or t, whic h e sta

bli sh e s th a t th e de fe nd ant h a d p re vio us ly violated probation and parole , was e ntere d without objection by the def endant, we cannot c onclude that is sufficient to constitute an a dmission for Six th Amendment purposes. This c o u rt has previously

held that an a dmission suffic ient to suppor t the enhanc ement of a

defe ndant’s sente nce under Blak

e ly must rest upon a d ef

en dant’s unequivoc al testimony , at trial or at the sentenc ing he ari ng , o r a fact ual a c kn ow le dg me nt i n th e pr e se nte nc e re po rt wh e n th e pr e se nte nc e re po rt is introduced a s an exhibit at the sente ncinghear ing w ithout objection. State v. Antho n y Riggs , No. M2007-02322-RM-CD (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May 7, 2008).

Howeve r, as noted, the defe ndant has not cha lleng ed the c ourt’s application of the enhanc ement fa ctor. Thus, the issue is waived, a nd our re view is limit ed to whethe r the trial c ourt committed plain error

in sentencingthe def

endant. Gomez I

I , 239 S.W .3d at 737. Rule 52(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure pr ovides that “[w]hen nece ssary to do subst an t ial justice, an appe llate cour

t may consider a

n err or that has a ffe cted the substantial rights of an accuse d at any time, even thoug h the er

ror wa s not raised in the motion for new trial or assig ned as e rror on appea l.” I n o rd e r t o c on sti tut e “ pla in e rr or ,” the e rr or mus t satis fy

the fo llo wi ngfa c tor s: (a) the rec ord must c lear ly establish what occur red in the trial court; (b) a cle ar a nd unequivoca l rule of law

must have bee n brea ched; (c) a substantial rig ht of the
acc used must have been adversely aff ecte d; (d) the acc used did not waive the issue for tac tical re asons; and (e ) consider ation of t he error is ‘nece ssary to do substantial justice.’

Sta te v . S mi th , 2 4 S

. W

. 3 d

2 7 4 , 2 8 2 (q u o t i n g State v. Adk isson , 89 9 S.W. 2d 62 6, 63 9 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 94 ). “[ A] ll fi ve fa c tor s mu st b e e sta bli sh e d b y

the re c or d b e fo re [a r e vie wi ngc ourt ] wil l
rec og nize the exi stence of plain er ror, a nd complete c onsideration of a ll the fac tors is not necessa ry w h e n it is c le ar f

r o m th e r e c o r d th a t a t le a s t o n e o f th e f a c to r s c an n o t b e e s ta

b li s h e d

. ” Id . at 283. I t is the defenda

nt who bear s the burden of persua sion to demonstrate p l ai n err or. Gomez I I , 239 S.W .3d at 737.

I n this case, r eview of

the re cord c lear ly

establi shes the existence of f our of the r equire d fac tors in this case, as the rec ord establishes what occur red at the sentenc ing h earing , a cle ar a nd unequivoca l rule of law was brea ched w ith the application of a n enhanc ement fa ctor other than prior criminal history or admit ted behavior, a subst antial right of the de fenda nt was af fec ted bec ause he was de nied his Six th Amendment rig ht to a jury trial, and the r ecor d fails to r efle ct waiver for tac tical
rea sons. Se e id . at 740-42. With reg ard to the f ifth fac tor, in Gomez I

I , our supreme court c oncluded-6-

that plain err or of a Blak

e ly infrac tion wa s nece ssary to do substantial just ice. Id . at 742. To make that decision in this case, pur suant to Gomez I I , we must look at what sentenc e we might impose on the basis of the de fenda

nt’s pri or cr iminal behavior a lone to decide if substantial justice require s plain err or re view in t his case

. I n short, we look at the relative impac t on sentence enhanc ement for prior cr iminal behavior ve rsus the other ina ppropriate ly

applied enha

nceme nt fac tor.

We f ind no e rror

in application of e nhance ment fac tor (1) ba sed upon the de fenda nt’s prior criminal history

of nine thef

t convictions, nine dec epti on business prac tices convic tions, one conviction for posse ssion of marijuana , and one conviction for hara ssment. Despite the fa ct that the court e rre d in its application of the second enhanc ement fa ctor, we are unable to conc lude that the defe ndant is entitled to relief. G iven the def endant’ s ext ensive c riminal h i story , when we ighe d ag ainst the single mitigator a pplied by the t rial court, we conclude that the enha nceme nt fac tor for prior cr iminal hist ory

was e ntitled to gre at weig ht and war rants the se ntence s imposed.

II. Al te r nat ive Se nt e nc ing

Ne xt, th e de fe nd ant c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in or de ri nghis se nte nc e s b e se rv e d in the Depa rtment of Correc tion. Under the Criminal Sentenc ing Reform Act of 1989, trial judg es ar e encour ag ed to use a lterna t i v es to incarc eration, and an espe cially mitigated or

standard of

fende r convicted of

a Class C, D, or E fe lony is presumed to be a fa v o rable candidate for a lternative sentenc ing options in the abs en ce of evide nce to the c ontrary . T.C.A. § 40-35-102( 6) (2003)

. Be cause the def

endant wa s convicted of

Class D felonies, the presumption applies. Evidenc e to the contra ry may be esta blishing by

showing that: (1) conf

inement is neede d to pro t ec t society by
re str a ini nga

de fe nd ant who ha s a

lon g his tor

y of c ri min a l c on du c t; ( 2) con fi nem ent is ne e de d to avoid depr eciating the seriousness of the offense or that confine ment is particular ly suited to provide an ef fec tive deter

renc e to pe ople likely

to commit si milar offe nses; or (3) measure s less restrictive than conf inement have fre quently or recently been applied unsucc essfully to the defe ndant. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169 (c iting T.C.A. § 4 0 -3 5 -103(1) (A)- (C)). The court may also consider

the mitigating and enha

nceme nt f actor s set forth in T ennesse e Code Annotated se ction 40-35-113 a nd -1 14 a s th e y are rele va

nt t o th e se c tio n 4 0- 35 -1 03 c on sid e ra tio ns . T .C. A. 40 -3 5- 21 0( b) (5 ); Sta te v. Boston , 938 S.W .2d 435, 538 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Additionally , a cour t should consider the defe ndant’s potential or la ck of pote ntial for re habilitation when deter mining if a

n alternative
se nte nc e wo uld

be a pp ro pr iate . T .C. A. § 4 0- 35 -1 03 (5 ) ( 20 03 ); Boston , 938 S.W .2d at 438.

I n imposing sentenc es of c onfinement in this case , the trial cour t stated:

The Court also conside rs t h at measure s less restrictive ha ve bee n applied to the Def endant unsuc cessf

ully , his failure to appea

r for the probation - - or rather for the prese ntence r e p o rt. H is b r ie f v io lati o no f

p r o b a ti o np e r io d s in d ic a te a la c k of potential for r ehabilitation.-7-

The de fenda

nt’s argument supporting r elief is base d upon his a ssertion that the cour t failed to f ind “ that c on fi ne me nt w a s n e c e ssa ry to avo id depre c ia

tin g the se ri ou sn e ss o f t

he of fe ns e or to pr ov ide a det erren t to o the rs .” He a c kn ow le dg e s th a t th e c ourt did make sp e c if

ic fi nd ing s w ith reg ard to his exte n s ive criminal history and that mea sures less re strictive than conf inement have been
a ppli e d to the de fe nd ant. Th is a rgume nt i s c le arl y

mis pla c e d. Th e statut e se ts o ut t hr e e wa y s in which ev id e n c e to th e c o n tr ar y c an b e e s ta

b li s h e d

. I t d o e s r e qu ir e th a t e a c h o f th e three circ umstances be found to apply . A finding of one is suff icient to rebut the pr esumption in favor of alternative sentenc ing.

Af te r r e vie w, we c on c lud e that th e re c or d e sta bli sh e s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt a pp ro pr iate ly consi d er ed the principles of sentenc ing a

nd that the impositi on of sentenc es of c onfinement wa s proper . The re cord indicates t h at t h e defenda nt had numerous pr ior convictions and that he had previously b ee n gra n ted probation and parole , which he did not succ essfully complete. The prese ntence repor

t indicates he w as re voked fr om probation in 2001 and 2002, and he was re voked from par ole in 2004. As found by the t rial court, this ref lects poorly

on the def

endant’ s potential for reha bilitation. The defenda

nt is not entit led to relief

on this iss ue.

III . C ons e c ut ive Se nt e nc ing Finally , the def

endant c ontends that the t rial court err ed in order ing that the sentenc es for the defe ndant’s thre e convic tions be serve d consec utively . A trial cour t may impose consec utive
s en t en ci n g u pon a dete rmination that one or more of the c riteria se t forth in Tenne ssee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-115( b) exists

. This section per mits t he trial c ourt to impose consec utive
se nte nc e s if

the c ou rt fi nd s th a t “ [t]he de fe nd ant i s a pr of e ssi on a l c ri min a l w ho ha s k no wi ng ly devoted suc h defe ndant’s life to c riminal acts as a major sourc e of livelihood” or “[t] he def

endant is an offe nder w hose re cord of criminal ac tivity

is extensive.” T.C.A. § 40-35-115( b)(1) , (2) ( 2003). The length of the s entenc e, when consec utive in nature , must be “justly deser ved in re lation to the seriousness of the offe nse” a nd “no g reater than that deserve d” under the circ umstances. T.C.A. § 40-35-102( 1), -103( 2).

I n imposing conse cutive sente nces, the trial court f ound:
[T] he def endant ha s an extensive history of cr iminal convictions and criminal behavior and he ha s, acc ording to the p re sentenc e re port, devoted himself to no livelihood - - no other liveliho o d other than through crime. And lastly , that the protec tion of the public demands that c onsecutive se nten ce s b e im posed to protec t the pu bli c fro m an in div idu a l w ho se c ri min a l a c tiv ity is e xten siv e and

a pp e ars to have no othe r livelihood other than throug h theft and c riminality

. The de fenda

nt c ontends that the trial court err ed, asser ting that “ther e is no evidenc e in the
rec ord that ca

n proper ly

stand for the proposition that [t he defenda nt] is ‘a professional criminal who has knowing ly

devoted his life to cr iminal acts as a major source of livelihood.’” He a sserts that the State’s fa ilure to prese nt evidence that the defendant’s criminal acts had provided a ma jor source of-8-

liv e lih oo d p re c lud e d th e c ourt ’s re lia nc e up on thi s f a c tor . H e a lso a sse rt s th a t t he court e rr e d in finding that the def

endant ha d an extensive criminal his tory beca use while the de fenda

nt’s “cr iminal history looks ex tensive at fir st blush, a closer look re veals t h at t he bulk of his convictions ar e misdemeanors a

nd resulted f

rom pleas e ntere d in November 2000. But for

those pleas, [the defe ndant] would not have an e x tensive cr iminal hist ory .”

Review of the rec ord g ives s o m e m erit t o the def endant’ s contention with reg ard to the finding that he wa s a prof

essional cr iminal. W e ag ree that the pre sentenc e re port establishes that the defe ndant has a

very sparse employ

ment history , working only “off and on.” Howeve r, t here was no evidenc e pre sented re flec ting the amount of money that the def

endant de rived fr om criminal offe nses or that he used that income to support himself. See State v . GeorgeHampton , No. W2004- 0 1 2 4 8 -C C A- R 3 -C D ( T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. , at J ac k s o n , J u l

. 1 4 , 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g State v. De sirey , 909 S.W .2d 20 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)). Be cause the State fa iled to prove that the de fenda nt’s criminal
a c ts p ro vid e d a

ma jor so ur c e of liv e lih oo d, we c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt ’s c on sid e ratio n o f t his fac tor was inappr opriate.

Howeve r, the re cord a

mply supports that court’s f

inding that the defendant ha s an extensive criminal history . Fr om 1987 to 2005, the defe ndant amasse d five fe lony convictions and fifte en misdemeanor c onvictions. Despite his assertion to th e co n t ra ry , we a g ree with the trial court that thi s is an e xten siv e c ri min a l his tor y . T hat se ve ra l of

the c ri me s are mis de me ano rs and oc c ur re d in
a re latively

short period of time is of little importan ce t o t his finding. We conc lude there was no err or in the trial cour

t’s deter mination that consecutive se ntencingwas a ppropriate in this case.

CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing, the sentenc es ar e af firmed a s imposed.

___________________________________ JOHN EVE RETT WILL IAMS, JUDGE