IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-20605

JONI FAITH SALOOM,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILD PROTECTIVE 

SERVICES; PEARLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT; CITY OF PEARLAND, 

TEXAS; JOHN SPECIA, JR.; CHERYL LYNN HARVICK, CPS Program 

Supervisor; LESLY DAMIAN-MURRAY, CPS Caseworker; KAREN 

COBLENTZ, CPS Program Director,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CV-1002

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Joni Faith Saloom appeals the district court’s dismissal of her 

claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1). For the following reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be 

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 19, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On May 3, 2012, Joni Faith Saloom refused to transfer her son, J.J.W., 

to his father for court-ordered visitation. According to her account of the facts, 

her five-year-old son had “revealed allegations of a very deviant and sexual 

nature” that had occurred during the child’s prior visit to his father. Efforts to 

report this incident to law enforcement, she contends, resulted in rudeness, 

dismissiveness, and ultimately, a conspiracy between numerous child 

protective services employees, police officers, and the child’s father to rob her 

of custody of J.J.W.

After the child’s father filed a petition to modify custody, the Texas 

Department of Family and Protective Services (“TDFPS”) temporarily 

separated Saloom from her child without a court order and subjected J.J.W. to 

an allegedly unnecessary sexual assault examination. The 310th Judicial 

District Court in Harris County, Texas held several custody hearings and

entered an order on March 19, 2013, granting custody to J.J.W.’s father.

Saloom subsequently filed this suit in federal court against various 

defendants, including TDFPS and the Pearland Police Department. Saloom 

sought relief that consisted primarily of the return of her child, the restoration 

of her custodial rights, and a permanent injunction to keep her child’s father 

away from her and her child.

The original defendants filed motions to dismiss for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction. Saloom responded by filing the First Amended (Original) 

Complaint, the live pleading, which substantially enlarged her original 

complaint.1 The amended complaint dropped all original defendants except 

TDFPS and Pearland Police Department, but added the City of Pearland, 

1 Saloom’s complaint blossomed from five pages to nearly a hundred.

2

 

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TDFPS commissioner John J. Specia, Jr., child protective services employees 

Cheryl Lynn Harvick, Lesly Damian-Murray, and Karen Coblentz, and police 

officers Paul Elton and William Lilly (collectively, the “defendants”). The 

amended complaint alleged due process and civil rights violations surrounding 

the removal of her child. The amended complaint substantially changed 

Saloom’s requested relief, dropping the request for the return of J.J.W. and 

instead requesting significant monetary damages, an injunction preventing 

defendants from committing “further violations,” an order requiring

defendants “to immediately implement policies, procedures, and hiring and 

training processes” to promote the best interests of children and to prevent 

future violations, and an order requiring the removal of Saloom’s name from 

databases that indicate that she is abusive or unstable.

The defendants moved for the dismissal of the amended complaint due 

to lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the Rooker2-Feldman3 doctrine, 

the Younger4 abstention doctrine, and the domestic relations exception to 

jurisdiction. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the lawsuit was an 

attempt to collaterally attack the propriety of the state court’s decision in 

violation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that Younger abstention principles 

compelled the federal court not to rule on any state court’s custody proceedings 

that were not yet final, and that the domestic relations exception barred 

consideration of the claims because they are so entangled with Saloom’s

domestic relations dispute. Saloom appeals.

2 Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

3 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

4 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

3

 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

“This Court evaluates de novo the district court’s grant of [a Rule

12(b)(1)] motion for dismissal applying the same standard used by the district 

court.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per 

curiam). A district court’s decision to abstain is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion, but “we review de novo whether the requirements of a particular 

abstention doctrine are satisfied.” Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 

518 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

“Absent specific law otherwise providing, [the Rooker-Feldman] doctrine 

directs that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain collateral 

attacks on state court judgments.” Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 

317 (5th Cir. 1994). But the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is “narrow” and only 

applies when the plaintiff seeks the “review and rejection” of a state court 

judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284

(2005). Thus, Rooker-Feldman does not bar a federal lawsuit simply because 

it challenges the state court’s legal conclusions or alleges that the parties 

misled the state court. Truong v. Bank of America, N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 383-84 

(5th Cir. 2013). A federal lawsuit is not barred if the alleged injuries were 

caused by the defendants’ actions rather than by the state court judgment, 

even if the defendants’ actions led to the state court judgment. Id. at 382-84. 

Here, Saloom does not seek the review or rejection of the state court’s custody 

order in the amended complaint.5 Instead, she challenges the actions taken by 

the defendants before the state court entered any orders, such as the 

defendants’ initial non-judicial seizure of her son and the allegedly

5 The original complaint asked the federal court to invalidate the state custody order, but 

that request for relief is irrelevant because the amended complaint is the live pleading.

4

 

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unnecessary sexual assault exam performed on him. Saloom also alleges that 

the defendants offered perjured and incorrect testimony in state court, but, 

again, claims that private parties misled the state court are not barred by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Moreover, while the amended complaint is not a 

model of clarity, Saloom seeks damages for injuries caused by the defendants’ 

actions rather than by the state court judgment, which is demonstrated by her 

emphasis on the defendants’ actions rather than the state court judgment. The

lawsuit is not barred simply because the defendants’ actions allegedly led to 

the state court judgment. See id. Therefore, the district court should not have 

found that Saloom’s suit was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Younger abstention prevents federal courts from enjoining certain 

pending state civil proceedings.6 Earle, 388 F.3d at 518-20. Younger

abstention is also appropriate if the plaintiff’s requested relief “would interfere 

with an ongoing state proceeding.” Bice v. La. Pub. Defender Bd., 677 F.3d 

712, 717 (5th Cir. 2012). Here, Saloom’s federal lawsuit does not seek to enjoin

or interfere with any pending state civil proceedings. Instead, she primarily 

requests monetary damages, and “requests for monetary damages do not fall 

within the purview of the Younger abstention doctrine.” Allen v. La. State Bd. 

of Dentistry, 835 F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1988). Saloom’s requests for equitable

relief are quite limited.7 Ordering the defendants to follow the law and to 

remove Saloom’s name from databases could not conceivably interfere with the

6 The district court only applied Younger abstention “to the extent that any custody issues 

remain pending in the state court.” The Court notes that Saloom denies and the defendants 

do not affirmatively assert that any state court proceedings are pending.

7 Again, Saloom asks for an injunction preventing the defendants from engaging in 

unlawful conduct in the future; an order requiring the defendants to implement better 

policies and training; and an order requiring that the defendants remove her name from any 

databases that imply that she is abusive or unstable. 

5

 

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state court’s custody proceedings. Therefore, the district court erred in

abstaining under Younger.

The district court ruled in the alternative that it could not assert 

jurisdiction due to the domestic relations exception. This exception only 

applies to prevent federal courts from issuing or modifying “a divorce, alimony, 

or child custody decree.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 701-02, 706-

07 (1992). Here, Saloom does not request the issuance or modification of a 

child custody decree. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the case 

based on the domestic relations exception.

On appeal, the Defendant City of Pearland argues in the alternative that 

the district court’s judgment should be affirmed due to the amended 

complaint’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This 

Court declines to rule on this issue until the district court considers it.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

REVERSED. The case is REMANDED to the district court for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. We express no opinion on whether Saloom’s

complaint may be dismissed on other grounds.

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