SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3654-19

B.A.,

1

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

A.S.,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________

Submitted October 14, 2021 – Decided November 19, 2021

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Gummer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket 

No. FM-07-0223-15.

Sekou Law Group LLC, attorneys for appellant 

(Torkwase Y. Sekou, on the brief).

Advokat & Rosenberg, attorneys for respondent 

(Jeffrey M. Advokat, on the brief).

1

 We use initials to protect the identities of the parties given the domesticviolence allegations and discussion of parenting-time plans. R. 1:38-3(d)(10), 

(13).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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PER CURIAM

In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, plaintiff appeals an April 17, 

2020 order implementing "on a monitored and gradual basis" a parenting plan 

in which the parties share joint legal and physical custody of their then nineyear-old son. Because the family-division judge did not abuse his discretion in 

issuing that order, we affirm.

The parties were legally married in 2013, separated in 2014, and divorced 

in 2016. A February 9, 2016 amended dual judgment of divorce incorporated 

their property settlement agreement (PSA), which gave the parties joint legal 

custody of their son, with plaintiff having parenting time from Thursday until 

Tuesday one week and Thursday until Friday the next week, plus alternating 

holidays and school vacations and two weeks each summer. 

On December 24, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion for sole custody of the

parties' son. Defendant cross-moved, seeking to amend plaintiff's parenting time 

and have it supervised. On January 4, 2019, plaintiff filed a domestic-violence 

complaint against defendant, alleging she had been harassing and stalking him

and threatening his family members. He testified defendant had harassed, 

stalked, and hit their son. A judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) 
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prohibiting defendant from having contact with plaintiff and their son and gave 

plaintiff temporary custody of their son.

Three days later, plaintiff filed an order-to-show-cause application, 

seeking, among other things, an order directing defendant to give plaintiff their 

son's passport. The judge who had been handling the parties' matrimonial action 

heard that application and ordered defendant to deposit the passport with the 

court. 

Approximately three weeks later, defendant filed an order-to-show-cause 

application in the matrimonial action after she learned plaintiff, without telling 

her, had enrolled their son in a school in a different district. During the hearing 

on that application, plaintiff, in an apparent effort to explain his actions, 

testified: "this case is not the case that it was three years ago or even one year 

ago or even six months ago." 

The judge found plaintiff had "secretly" removed the parties' son from his 

current school system for a "clearly . . . disingenuous" reason and had "sent 

[him] to an undisclosed location" and in doing so had not acted in the child's 

best interest. The judge stated plaintiff had indicated he was the minor's only 

living parent when he enrolled him in the new school. Holding the child could 

be irreparably harmed by being removed from his school and detached from his 
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mother, the judge granted defendant temporary sole legal and residential custody

of the minor and barred plaintiff from having any contact with him until further 

order of the court. The judge issued an amended TRO, leaving in place the 

restraints as to plaintiff and memorializing her award of temporary custody to 

defendant. Plaintiff subsequently sought, and the court granted, dismissal of the 

TRO. 

The day after the dismissal of plaintiff's TRO, defendant obtained a TRO 

against plaintiff and filed an order-to-show-cause application. The judge issued 

an order continuing defendant's temporary "sole legal and residential custody" 

of the parties' son, the suspension of plaintiff's parenting time, and the bar to

plaintiff contacting their son until further order of the court. In a subsequent 

consent order, defendant agreed to dismiss the TRO against plaintiff. On the 

return date of the custody motions, the judge reserved on plaintiff's application 

for sole custody and defendant's application to change plaintiff's parenting time;

appointed an expert to prepare a best-interest report; and scheduled a plenary 

hearing. The judge also ordered that plaintiff would have supervised parenting 

time in the interim. 

After the court-appointed expert submitted the best-interest report, the

judge then handling the matrimonial matter sent a copy of the report to counsel.
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He asked counsel to advise him if counsel (1) wanted to conduct discovery 

pursuant to Rule 5:3-3(f); and (2) were in agreement as to the opinions and 

recommendations set forth in the report. If they were in agreement, he would 

not conduct a plenary hearing on the custody motions. If they were not in 

agreement, he would conduct a plenary hearing. Counsel for defendant 

responded, stating he did not wish to conduct discovery and obtain a report from 

another expert. Counsel for plaintiff responded, stating she did not want further 

delay and requested an immediate date to end the dispute. The judge understood 

from that letter that plaintiff did not wish to conduct discovery or obtain a report 

from another expert. 

At an April 17, 2020 hearing, the judge confirmed with both counsel the 

parties did not intend to conduct discovery or submit another expert report. The 

judge asked plaintiff's counsel if plaintiff wanted a hearing during which the 

parties could cross-examine the court-appointed expert. Plaintiff's counsel 

initially advised the judge plaintiff did not want a hearing and then asked if she 

could have time to confer with her client. After the judge had granted her request 

and after she had spoken multiple times with plaintiff, plaintiff's counsel advised 

the judge, "I consulted with my client; you can go forward . . . without the crossexamination . . . ." Defendant's counsel confirmed defendant also was waiving 
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her right to cross-examine the court-appointed expert. The judge scheduled oral 

argument on the pending motions to take place that afternoon. 

At oral argument, the judge again confirmed each party had waived their

rights to conduct discovery, submit a report from another expert, and crossexamine the court-appointed expert and that, with those waivers, the courtappointed expert's report would be the only evidence considered by the judge. 

Counsel did not object. The judge then gave counsel the opportunity to argue 

the motions. In her presentation, plaintiff's counsel advised the judge she 

"agree[d] with the evaluation." In his presentation, defense counsel advised the 

judge he also agreed to the adoption of the expert's recommendations. 

After noting, without objection, "both parents agree that this report says 

it all," and after making detailed factual findings based on information contained 

in the report, the judge agreed with the expert's recommendation that it was in

the minor's best interest for the parties to share legal and physical custody and 

that "this be implemented in a monitored and graduating manner" so the parties 

could "learn[] how to work with one another for the best interest of the child." 

The judge ordered the retention of a parenting coordinator and adopted the 

recommendations that "there needs to be a psychotherapeutic intervention as a 

prerequisite to a more equitable parenting plan" and that "a graduated and 
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monitored parenting plan be implemented by the parenting coordinator, 

ultimately terminating in the [restoration] of [plaintiff's] parenting time, and 

contingent upon complying." That day, the judge issued a written order 

memorializing his directives. 

Plaintiff appeals from that order, arguing: 

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT KEEPING 

AN ACCURATE RECORD OF ITS PROCEEDINGS 

AS NUMEROUS TRANSCRIPTS AND CD

RECORDINGS OF THE HEARINGS ARE MISSING 

OR INCOMPLETE.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING A 

TELEPHONIC HEARING APRIL 17, 2020, WHEN 

PLAINTIFF HAD NO KNOWLEDGE THAT THE

DEFENDANT WAS NOT PRESENT AND SWORN 

IN, NOR SERVED WITH NOTICE OF THE 

HEARING.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING 

SOLEY ON THE PSYCHOLOGIST'S REPORT TO 

MAKE ITS RULING.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING 

AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE FACTS, 

WHEN THE CASE WAS TRANSFERRED FROM 

THE PREVIOUS TRIAL COURT JUDGE AFTER 

PLAINTIFF MADE A MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF 

SAID JUDGE.

V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONTINUING 

THE RESTRAINTS ON THE PLAINTIFF'S 

PARENTING TIME UNTIL PLAINTIFF 

COMPLETED THERAPY SESSIONS WITH THE 
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CHILD IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY FINDINGS 

WARRANTING SUCH RESTRICTIONS.

VI. ON REMAND, THIS MATTER SHOULD BE 

HEARD BY A DIFFERENT JUDGE

We find insufficient merit in plaintiff's arguments to warrant discussion 

in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and add only the following brief 

comments. 

In this appeal, plaintiff faults the judge for "relying solely on the 

psychologist's report" and for not taking testimony from the parties and asserts

plaintiff "did not agree, nor did [c]ounsel waive any rights." That bald assertion 

is contradicted by the record. The judge gave the parties an opportunity to 

conduct discovery, submit a report from another expert or other evidence, and 

cross-examine the court-appointed expert. Plaintiff's counsel advised the judge

in writing before the April 17, 2020 hearing that she did not want further delay. 

At the hearing, the judge confirmed the parties did not want to conduct discovery 

or submit other expert reports and plaintiff's counsel, after conferring with 

plaintiff, stated on the record the judge could proceed without cross-examination 

of the court-appointed expert. When the judge confirmed the agreed-upon 

procedure – no discovery, no other reports or evidence, and no crossexamination, leaving the court-appointed expert's report as the only evidence 
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before the judge – plaintiff's counsel did not object. In fact, she stated her 

agreement with the report during oral argument. 

Recognizing "[a]ppellate review of a trial court's findings in a custody 

dispute is limited," W.M. v. D.G., 467 N.J. Super. 216, 229 (App. Div. 2021),

we see no error in the judge's reliance on the court-appointed expert's report or 

in his order requiring the implementation of a parenting plan on a "monitored 

and gradual basis," which was supported by the expert's report. 

Affirmed.