## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 05-2143

___________ United States of America, * * Plaintiff-Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Western District * of Missouri Esteban Rivera, * * Defendant-Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: December 13, 2005 Filed: March 6, 2006

___________ Before MELLOY, COLLOTON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Esteban Rivera was convicted of cons piracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana and cocaine . He was sentenced to the statutory mandatory minimum of sixty months in pris on. Based on Rivera’s status as a career offender, his Guidelines sentencing ra nge was 188 to 235 months. The government appeals, arguing that a sixty-month sentence is unreasonable under the facts of this case. Based on the record before us, we are unable to make a reasonableness determination and therefore reve rse and remand for resentencing.-2- Rivera escorted Juan Carlos Rivera (Juan) on trips to deliver cocaine and marijuana. Juan is Rivera’s older cous in by six years. Based upon information from other members of the drug conspiracy, the authorities identified Juan as a source of drugs entering Missouri from Chicago, Illinois.
On a trip from Chicago to Springfield, Illinois, an Illinois state trooper stopped the car Juan was driving in which Rivera was a passenger. Although the reason for the stop was speeding, the officer had his can ine perform a sniff search of the vehicle because of inconsistent statements made by Juan. The officer discovered thirty-four kilograms of marijuana and 503 grams of cocaine in the trunk of the car.
Rivera cooperated with the police and pled guilty as part of an agreement with the government. The extent of Rivera ’s cooperation was limited by his knowledge about the drug conspiracy. He told the poli ce that he was not pa id for the trips and only knew of Juan’s role as a drug distributor. The government did not need Rivera’s assistance in investigating or convicting Juan.
At sentencing, Rivera’s attorney outlin ed a number of reasons why she felt a sentence of sixty months would be a reasonable sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Among the factors discussed by Rivera’s atto rney were Rivera’s limited role in the offense (for which he could not get a mi nor role adjustment under the guideline because he was a career offender), two y ears of good performance on pre-trial release, family obligations, over representation of criminal history in the career offender computation, the fact that two more culpable defendants (including his cousin Juan) received substantial sentence reductions b ecause of their cooperation, and the fact Rivera attempted to cooperate but was unsuccessful becau se of his limited role and lack of knowledge about the conspiracy.
In sentencing Rivera, the district cour t stated “[w]ell, I think the mandatory minimum is sufficient penalty under the circ umstances that have been placed here in-3- the record.” The district court did not make any other statements about the reasoning behind its decision.

II.

We review a challenge to the reasonabl eness of a criminal sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Dalton , 404 F.3d 1029, 1032 (8th Cir. 2005). Under United States v. Booker , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we must determine if a sentence is unreasonable with regard to the factors ou tlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Pizano , 403 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2005). In United States v. Haack , 403 F.3d 997, 1002-03 (8th Cir. 2005), we outlined the pr ocedure a district court is to follow in imposing a post-Bookersentence. First, the district court should determine the Guidelines sentencing range. Second, the di strict court should determine whether any traditional departures are appropriate. Third, the district court should apply all othersection 3553(a) factors in determining whether to impose a Guidelines or nonGuidelines sentence.

In this case, there is no dispute about the Guidelines sentencing range. Rivera is a career offender with a range of 188 to 235 months. However, we are left with an inadequate record upon which to determine whether the district court felt a Guidelines departure was appropriate, what non-Guide lines 3553(a) factors predominated, and what combination of departures and va riances warranted a sixty-month sentence. Without an adequate record we are unable to discharge our function as an appellate court in deciding whether the district court abused its discretion and imposed an unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Porter , 417 F.3d 914, 917-18 (8th Cir. 2005) (ordering re sentencing by the district court because the district court’s reasoning for applying an alternative senten ce was unclear based upon the record); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (noting that the distri ct court must “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particul ar sentence”); United States v. Shafer , 2006-4- WL 453200, *2 (8th Cir. Feb. 27, 2006) (stati ng that for a “court to properly carry out the appellate review mandated by Booker , it is essential that th e district court explain why it imposed a sentence below the guidelines range”).

It might be argued that the district court’s comment that the sentence was imposed “under the circumstances that have been placed here in the record,” is an indication that the district court was adop ting the arguments and reasoning of defense counsel. See, e.g. , United States v. Thurmon , 368 F.3d 848, 853 n.5 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming a district c ourt’s decision pre-Booker when “the district court did not explicitly state its ground for denying an ad justment,” but rather “appear[ed] [to] adopt[] the prosecutor’s argument”). However, in this post-Booker era of sentencing we feel something more is required of district courts. At a minimum the court should indicate which arguments are being adopted, state why they are relevant, and offer some explanation as to how the a dopted factors affect the sentence.

Based on the record before us we are unable to conduct a meaningful reasonableness review. Accordingly, we reverse and remand fo r resentencing. At resentencing the district court should follow the procedure outlined in Haackand provide an explanation as to how it arrives at the sentence imposed.

______________________________