IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Case No. 1:20-cv-2133

v. )

)

JENNIFER TAYLOR, )

)

Defendant. )

DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Defendant, Jennifer Taylor (“Taylor”), by and through her undersigned counsel, 

respectfully submits this response brief in opposition to the Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 

filed by Plaintiff, Fidelity Brokerage Services, LLC (“Fidelity”) (Dkt. 56).

I. THIS IS AN ANCILLARY INJUNCTION PROCEEDING – LIMITED IN SCOPE,

AND FILED IN AID OF FINRA ARBITRATION

This is a preliminary injunction proceeding, ancillary to a pending arbitration action before 

the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), which Fidelity filed against Ms. Taylor 

– a former Fidelity employee – based on her alleged breach of a client non-solicitation agreement. 

As Fidelity clearly statesin its Complaint, the purpose of this proceeding is to obtain “[p]reliminary 

injunctive relief ... to preserve the status quo until the merits of this case can be adjudicated by 

FINRA.” (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 13). Thus, the purpose of this action is not to determine the merits of the 

underlying dispute, or to consider the issue of damages; rather, the sole purpose of this proceeding 

is to determine whether injunctive relief is proper. (Id. at ¶ 11). Indeed, as Fidelity acknowledges 

in its Complaint, “the merits of this case will be resolved in arbitration before FINRA” – not in 

this proceeding. (Id. at ¶ 13). This ancillary proceeding is not the proper forum for Fidelity to 

adjudicate its purported claims against Ms. Taylor’s new employer, Fairhaven Wealth 

Management, LLC (“Fairhaven”).

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More than six months after filing its Complaint and pursuing expedited discovery, Fidelity 

now claims it would be “in the interest of justice to permit Fidelity to amend its Complaint so that 

this litigation can proceed and be resolved on the merits against both parties....” (Dkt. 56 at 7-8)

(emphasis added). However, Fidelity has repeatedly represented to Ms. Taylor – and, more 

importantly, to this Court – that this action is merely an ancillary injunction proceeding in aid of a 

pending FINRA arbitration, such that substantive claims cannot be resolved here. Fidelity, for 

instance, has stated, “[t]his matter has been brought for the limited purpose of seeking injunctive 

relief to preserve the status quo pending a FINRA arbitration which will fully and finally address 

the parties’ claims as to permanent injunctive relief, damages, and any counterclaims.” (Dkt. 49 

at 15) (emphasis added). Fidelity even acknowledges in the proposed Amended Complaint that

“Fidelity and Taylor are obligated to arbitrate the merits of this dispute,” and they are obligated 

to do so “before FINRA.” (Dkt. 56-1 at ¶¶ 12-13 (emphasis added); see also Dkt. 1 at ¶ 13). 

Having clearly defined the narrow scope of this limited proceeding, Fidelity cannot now 

be allowed to suddenly expand it by amending its Complaint to pursue substantive claims against 

an additional party. This is not the proper forum for Fidelity to adjudicate the merits of its 

purported dispute against Fairhaven, any more so than it would be permissible for Fidelity to 

litigate the merits of its claims against Ms. Taylor outside of FINRA.

II. FIDELITY – AND THE COURT – HAVE NOT ALLOWED MS. TAYLOR 

TO PURSUE ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCOVERY IN THIS ACTION

Fidelity should not be allowed to amend its Complaint to assert substantive claims against 

another party when both Fidelity and the Court have repeatedly cited the limited scope of this 

proceeding to restrict the discovery available to Ms. Taylor. For example, when Ms. Taylor filed 

a motion to compel (Dkt. 42), Fidelity argued the scope of discovery must be limited, because the 

scope of this proceeding is limited to its motion for preliminary injunction: 

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Fidelity sought expedited discovery limited to the issues presented 

in Plaintiff’s Motion [for Preliminary Injunction], as that is the only

aspect of the case to be decided in this Court, after which the 

question of Fidelity’s claims for permanent injunctive relief and 

damages will be decided by an arbitration panel at FINRA....

(Dkt. 49 at 2) (emphasis added). 

Fidelity also took the remarkable step of requiring Ms. Taylor to “pre-clear” her proposed 

deposition topics in advance, to ensure she did not ask any questions that would exceed “the limited 

scope” of this case. Indeed, Fidelity refused to allow Ms. Taylor to ask any deposition questions 

that could potentially be relevant to her substantive Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims:

 (See Exhibit A – 06/01/2020 S. Guerette e-mail) (emphasis added). 

Moreover, Fidelity used the limited scope of this proceeding to oppose Ms. Taylor’s 

request for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, even though the topics were expressly limited to the pending 

preliminary injunction motion. As Ms. Taylor explained to the Court:

She [Taylor] also requires testimony from a Rule 30(b)(6) corporate 

representative that – unlike the testimony from fact witnesses Meyers 

and Marshall – will be binding on Fidelity, and will address issues 

relevant to her defenses to the PI Motion, including inter alia:

contract formation, waiver and estoppel.

(Dkt. 17, PageID # 126, at ¶ 4(b)(ii)) (emphasis added). 

Fidelity opposed this request on the ground that “this is limited expedited discovery in aid 

of a preliminary injunction hearing....” (Id., at ¶ 4(a)). The Court adopted Fidelity’s rationale and 

denied Ms. Taylor this discovery, explaining it was beyond the limited scope of this proceeding:

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The parties have filed a joint status report setting forth the scope and 

schedule for expedited discovery should the Court permit it. The 

one area of disagreement noted in that regard is whether 30(b)(6) 

depositions of Fidelity and Fairview will be permitted. In the 

Court’s view, the burdens associated with those depositions

outweigh their utility in the context of this case. ‘Limited expedited 

discovery’ is just that. It is not intended to leave no stone unturned, 

but rather to provide an opportunity to develop the evidence that is 

most relevant and material to the dispute....

(Dkt. 29 at pp. 2-3).

That same rationale applies to Fidelity’s request to amend the Complaint in order to include 

Fairhaven as an additional defendant – doing so would go far beyond the limited scope of this 

ancillary injunction proceeding. Just as the Court denied Ms. Taylor’s request for a limited Rule 

30(b)(6) deposition, so too should the Court deny Fidelity’s request to assert substantive claims 

against Fairhaven.

III. IT IS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE TO EXPAND THE LIMITED SCOPE 

OF THIS ANCILLARY INJUNCTION PROCEEDING

Fidelity chose to limit the scope of this proceeding to its preliminary injunction motion 

against Ms. Taylor. From the very onset of the case, in its motion for expedited discovery, Fidelity 

represented to the Court that “requested discovery is narrowly-tailored to seek only evidence 

directly relevant to Fidelity’s request for a preliminary injunction.” (Dkt. 7 at 4). Yet, Fidelity 

now states that its proposed claims against Fairhaven in the Amended Complaint are “based on 

documents produced as a result of the subpoena directed to Fairhaven.” (Dkt. 56 at 5). It would 

appear that Fidelity’s representations about the limited scope of discovery may have been mere 

pretext, designed to allow Fidelity to embark upon a fishing expedition to identify claims against 

Fairhaven, while simultaneously preventing Ms. Taylor from going beyond the scope of the 

preliminary injunction motion. This ploy is made apparent by the fact that – five months after the 

Court allowed expedited discovery – Fidelity still has not presented its employees for deposition, 

yet it has made the time to move to amend the Complaint to assert claims against Fairhaven. It 

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would not be in the interest of justice to expand the scope of these proceedings; to the contrary, 

justice dictates that Fidelity should not be allowed to use third-party discovery for anything other 

than its stated purpose: the preliminary injunction hearing against Ms. Taylor.

If Fidelity believes that it has a viable damages claim against Fairhaven based on Ms. 

Taylor’s conduct, it should pursue that claim in the FINRA arbitration, not here. Allowing Fidelity 

to litigate the merits of its claim against Fairhaven in this ancillary proceeding, parallel to the

pending FINRA arbitration, would severely prejudice Ms. Taylor. Were this Court and FINRA to 

address the same allegations, at the same time, but in separate proceedings, that would lead to 

duplicative discovery, unnecessarily increased costs, the possibility of inconsistent rulings, and 

issues of collateral estoppel. Accordingly, it is not in the interest of justice to allow Fidelity to sue 

Fairhaven here; instead, Fidelity should simply amend its statement of claim in arbitration.

Similarly, justice does not require the Court to grant Fidelity leave to seek injunctive relief 

against Fairhaven. Regardless of whether Fairhaven is named as an additional defendant, any 

injunction that Fidelity obtains against Ms. Taylor would automatically enjoin Fairhaven as well. 

As the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make clear, every restraining order binds not only the 

parties and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, but also any “other persons 

who are in active concert or participation with [them].” FED.R.CIV. P. 65(d)(2)(C). Thus, Fidelity 

does not need to amend the Complaint in order to enjoin Ms. Taylor’s employer; Fidelity would 

simply need to provide Fairhaven a copy of the preliminary injunction order (if any) entered in 

this case. 

Simply put, there is no good reason to include Fairhaven as an additional defendant in this 

ancillary injunction proceeding. Instead, Fidelity seeks to name Fairhaven as an additional 

defendant for purposes that are plainly improper.

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IV. FIDELITY SEEKS LEAVE TO AMEND FOR IMPROPER PURPOSES 

Because adding Fairhaven as a defendant would serve no legitimate purpose, Fidelity must 

wish to do so for an improper purpose – i.e., (a) for undue delay; (b) to gain improper settlement 

leverage by harassing Ms. Taylor’s employer; and/or (c) to tortiously interfere with her current 

employment in retaliation for her Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims. Either way, the 

Court should not countenance Fidelity’s bad faith litigation tactics.

A. Fidelity Seeks to Delay these “Expedited” Proceedings

Fidelity filed its Complaint, preliminary injunction motion, and expedited discovery 

motion on April 3, 2020. On May 22, 2020, the Court, over Ms. Taylor’s objections, granted 

Fidelity’s request for expedited discovery. (Dkts. 17, 29, 30). The Court allowed the parties three 

days to serve document requests, seven days to respond to document requests, and ten days after 

the completion of written discovery to take depositions. (Id.). On June 2, 2020, Ms. Taylor timely 

satisfied all of her discovery obligations, and produced the documents Fidelity had requested.1 

Fidelity, however, did not respond in kind. Indeed, Fidelity refused to produce nearly all 

of the documents Ms. Taylor requested: it timely produced just five (5) documents, forcing Ms. 

Taylor to file a motion to compel. (Dkt. 42). After the parties briefed the issue, the Court ordered 

Fidelity to produce most of the documents it was withholding, and to do so by July 2, 2020. (Dkt. 

53). Although Fidelity produced some additional documents on July 2, 2020, its production was 

incomplete. Fidelity, for instance, did not produce any calendar entries from Ms. Taylor’s 

“Fidelity” outlook account which were dated after March 6, 2020 (Ms. Taylor’s resignation date), 

even though Fidelity has accused Ms. Taylor of pre-soliciting clients by advance-scheduling 

meetings that she planned to conduct after her March 6, 2020 departure. Indeed, the Supplemental 

1 Fidelity later clarified its requests, and Ms. Taylor timely supplemented her production days later, on June 

5, 2020 and June 9, 2020. 

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Declaration of Scott Marshall that Fidelity submitted in this matter attaches several calendar entries 

– never produced in discovery – for meetings after March 6, 2020. (Dkt. 27-1 at 2, 4). On July 

28, 2020, following a lengthy Rule 37.2 discovery conference, Fidelity eventually agreed to 

produce all calendar entries post-dating March 6, 2020. (See Exhibit B). It is now late October 

and Fidelity still has not produced those documents. 

Similarly, Fidelity has continually delayed the depositions of its employees. On May 29, 

2020, Ms. Taylor noticed the depositions of Fidelity’s affiants, Charles Meyers and Scott Marshall, 

for June 9 and June 11, 2020. (Exhibit C). On June 1, 2020, Fidelity began its campaign of 

deposition delay and avoidance by demanding that Ms. Taylor “pre-clear” her intended deposition

topics with Fidelity’s counsel in advance, before either Mr. Meyers or Mr. Marshall would be 

produced. (Exhibit D). Fidelity’s unjustified demand necessitated a series of more than a dozen 

e-mails between June 1, 2020 and June 8, 2020, as well as another Local Rule 37.2 discovery 

conference. (Id.; Exhibit E). During this back-and-forth, Ms. Taylor agreed to postpone her 

depositions of Messrs. Meyers and Marshall until the resolution of her pending motion to compel. 

After the Court’s ruling on the motion to compel, and Fidelity’s supplemental (yet still 

incomplete) production on July 2, 2020, Fidelity still refused to allow the depositions of either Mr. 

Meyers or Mr. Marshall to proceed. Instead, Fidelity pressured Ms. Taylor’s employer (Fairhaven) 

to require her to agree to a stipulated injunction which, in turn, prompted a settlement dialogue. 

After still more back-and-forth with Fidelity’s counsel, Ms. Taylor’s counsel finally wrote on 

September 11, 2020: “[i]f Fidelity is not interested in discussing settlement, then ignore the 

attached [proposal] and let me know when you and Messrs. Meyers and Marshall are available for 

depositions.”2 Fidelity refused to provide dates. Instead, Fidelity continued (and continues) to 

2 Because these exchanges were part of settlement communications under FED. R. EVID. 408, Ms. Taylor 

does not attach them here. 

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postpone the depositions of its employees while it pursues third-party discovery against Fairhaven. 

Fidelity’s gambit to prevent Ms. Taylor from deposing its employees has caused “expedited 

discovery” in support of a preliminary injunction motion to morph into nearly six (6) months of 

intense third-party discovery against Fairhaven. 

Fidelity’s proposed amendment would only cause further delay. Ms. Taylor would be

forced to spend time (and money) filing an amended answer and affirmative defenses. In addition, 

given that Fidelity’s claims against Fairhaven are utterly baseless, Fairhaven will likely move to 

dismiss, causing more delay. But even if Fairhaven does not move to dismiss, it will likely seek 

its own discovery before any preliminary injunction hearing (and Fidelity will likely seek 

expanded first-party discovery). There is no reason to allow Fidelity to continue delaying these 

“expedited” proceedings, when it could have easily named Fairhaven in its original Complaint.

B. Fidelity is Harassing Ms. Taylor’s Employer to Force an “Agreed Injunction”

Fidelity’s delay tactic is an issue because the company has been using it to improperly 

strongarm (some might say “extort”) Ms. Taylor’s employer, Fairhaven, into forcing her to resolve 

this ancillary proceeding by: (i) agreeing to have an injunction entered against her, and (ii) allowing 

Fidelity to then continue pursuing its claims against her in the FINRA arbitration. More 

specifically, over the past several weeks, Fidelity has repeatedly threatened Fairhaven, stating that

if Ms. Taylor did not voluntarily agree to the entry of an injunction against her, then Fidelity would 

sue Fairhaven and drag them into this lawsuit:

(Exhibit F) (emphasis added).

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When Ms. Taylor refused to accede to Fidelity’s demands, Fidelity followed through on its 

threats and moved for leave to amend its Complaint. Even more egregiously, Fidelity has 

threatened to kick Fairhaven off of its investment platform if Ms. Taylor does not voluntarily agree 

to the entry of an injunction against her. This would be a significant blow to Fairhaven’s business, 

and to its clients (nearly all of whom custody their assets at Fidelity). Threatening to kick 

Fairhaven off of Fidelity’s platform based on whether Ms. Taylor agrees to a voluntary injunction 

is a gross breach of the fiduciary duties that Fidelity owes to the Fairhaven clients whose assets 

are custodied at Fidelity.

C. Fidelity Is Tortiously Interfering with Ms. Taylor’s Employment at Fairhaven 

in Retaliation for Her EEOC Charge

Fidelity’s threats, and following through on those threats by moving to join Fairhaven in 

this proceeding, constitute both tortious interference with Ms. Taylor’s current employment 

relationship, and continued Title VII post-employment retaliation against her. As Ms. Taylor 

explains in her Affirmative Defenses to the Complaint, her manager at Fidelity, Scott Marshall 

made it clear that he harbored a discriminatory animus against Ms. Taylor because of her age and 

gender. (Dkt. 55 at pp. 27-42). He continually harassed Ms. Taylor, and embarked upon a 

pretextual campaign to terminate her employment. When Ms. Taylor complained, Mr. Marshall 

retaliated against Ms. Taylor by giving her an extended “final warning,” and letting her know that 

her employment would likely be terminated. On June 16, 2020, Ms. Taylor filed a formal Charge 

of Discrimination with the EEOC, asserting claims for sex and age discrimination, and retaliatory 

discharge. (Exhibit G). 

Since then, Fidelity has continued to retaliate against Ms. Taylor by threatening and 

pressuring Fairhaven, in order to coerce Ms. Taylor into agreeing to a stipulated injunction. On 

September 11, 2020, the undersigned reminded Fidelity’s counsel that threatening Fairhaven

would constitute tortious interference and further Title VII retaliation. The undersigned reminded 

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Fidelity’s counsel of this again on September 17, 2020, and yet again on October 6, 2020.3 

Fidelity, however, ignored these warnings. Granting Fidelity leave to sue Fairhaven in this 

proceeding would reward Fidelity for its improper coercion, tortious interference, and retaliation. 

CONCLUSION

At every turn, Fidelity has limited the scope of this proceeding, the type of discovery 

available to Ms. Taylor, the topics Ms. Taylor can raise during depositions, and the parties Ms. 

Taylor can depose. Fidelity should not be allowed to now expand the scope of this limited, 

ancillary proceeding in order to adjudicate the merits of substantive claims against Fairhaven. 

Instead, this matter should be allowed to proceed apace for its sole, limited purpose: determining 

whether preliminary injunctive relief against Ms. Taylor is warranted before Fidelity’s case-inchief proceeds, on the merits, before FINRA.

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth above, Defendant Jennifer Taylor respectfully asks 

this Court to enter an Order:

A. Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint (Dkt. 56);

B. Compelling Plaintiff to produce Charles Meyers and Scott Marshall for their

depositions at defense counsel’s office, regardless of the status of Fairhaven’s 

compliance with Plaintiff’s third-party subpoena; and

C. Awarding to Defendant any such other and further relief as this Court deems just, 

including her actual costs and attorneys’ fees incurred in responding to the instant 

motion. 

Dated: October 29, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

JENNIFER TAYLOR, Defendant

By: /s/ Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

One of Her Attorneys

3 These communications, too, were each made in the context of discussing settlement. Accordingly, Ms. 

Taylor does not attach them here, but would be happy to provide them to the Court upon request. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 10 of 45 PageID #:689
11

Christopher S. Griesmeyer (# 6269851)

Zachary Mulcrone (# 6300387)

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC

205 West Randolph Street, Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

(312) 428-2750

cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com 

zmulcrone@grglegal.com 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 29, 2020, I electronically filed the foregoing Defendant’s 

Response Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, with the 

Clerk of the Court via the CM/ECF System, which will send notification of such filing to those 

registered to receive electronic notices via email transmission, including Plaintiff’s counsel listed 

below:

Joel W. Rice

Franklin Z. Wolf

FISHER & PHILLIPS, LLC

10 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3450

Chicago, Illinois 60606

jrice@fisherphillips.com

fwolf@fisherphillips.com

Susan M. Guerette

FISHER & PHILLIPS, LLC

Two Logan Square, 12th Floor

 100 N. 18th Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103

sguerette@fisherphillips.com

/s/ Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

Christopher S. Griesmeyer (# 6269851)

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC

205 West Randolph Street, Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60606

Bus: (312) 428-2750

Fax: (312) 332-2781

cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com 

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EXHIBIT A

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Zachary Mulcrone

From: Chris Griesmeyer

Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2020 10:03 AM

To: Guerette, Susan

Cc: Rice, Joel; Wolf, Franklin; Zachary Mulcrone

Subject: RE: Taylor

Good morning, Susan. 

First, please copy my colleague, Zach Mulcrone, on all correspondence going forward. 

Second, your inquiry about our potential “lines of deposition questioning” below is far more expansive than your original 

query, and unquestionably invades the attorney work product doctrine. Nevertheless, I once again confirm that we do 

not intend to seek deposition testimony on Ms. Taylor’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims; instead, we 

intend to limit our depositions to those issues relevant to the claims that Plaintiff has asserted against Ms. Taylor. I 

believe that answers your question, and should provide you with all the assurances you require. However, if you would 

like to discuss the issue in a good faith attempt to resolve any differences that you believe exist, then we can schedule a 

Rule 37.2 conference. 

Finally, please let me know your availability this afternoon (or tomorrow morning) for a telephone call to discuss 

Plaintiff’s improper objections and insufficient document production in response to Defendant’s Rule 34 Requests. 

Thank you, 

Chris Griesmeyer 

Please note our new address: 

Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC 

205 W. Randolph Street | Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 428-2741 (Direct) 

(312) 339-7439 (Mobile) 

From: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2020 7:12 PM 

To: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Cc: Rice, Joel <jrice@fisherphillips.com>; Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Subject: Taylor 

Chris, 

We disagree with your assertion that “none of [y]our expedited discovery requests are intended to seek information 

related to Ms. Taylor’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims”. To the contrary, document requests 3 and 5 

clearly seek information about Ms. Taylor’s treatment as an employee relative to other allegedly similarly situated 

employees – essentially comparator evidence, which are prototypical questions that relate to alleged discrimination. We 

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2

do not believe that these subjects are appropriately within the scope of the limited expedited discovery ordered and 

authorized by the Court in this case. 

Can you please confirm that Ms. Taylor is not going to inquire at the upcoming expedited depositions of Fidelity’s 

managers into (a) the topics contained in her document requests 3 and 5, (b) any other lines of questioning relating to 

alleged discriminatory treatment of Ms. Taylor during her employment, (c) information about other Fidelity employees 

or Fidelity’s treatment of them, or (d) any alleged retaliation against Ms. Taylor during her employment with Fidelity? If 

you cannot confirm this, then we will need to move for a protective order. Thank you. 

Regards, 

Susan 

From: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2020 4:35 PM 

To: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Cc: Rice, Joel <jrice@fisherphillips.com>; Wolf, Franklin <fwolf@fisherphillips.com>; Zachary Mulcrone 

<zmulcrone@grglegal.com>; April Bernath <abernath@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Taylor 

Hi, Susan. 

First, regarding written discovery, below is a link to Defendant’s Rule 34 Responses and accompanying document 

production. Many of the documents have been designated “Confidential” under the parties’ soon-to-be-entered 

Stipulated Confidentiality Order (as a reminder, we’re still waiting to receive your counter-signed copy, and for your 

office to submit the Stipulated Order for entry by the Court). Accordingly, the link is password-protected, and I will 

forward the password under separate cover: 

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/2hqedqvzwubpipw/AABqkmIFIemIKmQ1ruVbklLva?dl=0

Second, regarding your below inquiry concerning Defendant’s anticipated deposition topics, please note that, consistent 

with Judge Tharp’s ruling on your motion for expedited discovery (Dkt. No. 29), we have not issued a Rule 30(b)(6) 

deposition notice to Plaintiff (and, you have made it clear that neither Mr. Meyers nor Mr. Marshall are being produced 

in their capacity as a Rule 30(b)(6) corporate representative of Fidelity). Accordingly, Defendant is under no obligation 

to “describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination,” and there is no basis for you to ask us to divulge 

our anticipated deposition topics. That said, I can assure you that: (a) none of our expedited discovery requests are 

intended to seek information related to Ms. Taylor’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims, and (b) we are 

not intending to pursue discovery on those claims at this time. Fidelity’s treatment of Ms. Taylor relative to other 

departing financial advisors is, however, relevant to her challenge of Plaintiff’s assertions regarding (inter alia) 

irreparable harm, a likelihood of success on the merits, the existence of a protectable right, and a balancing of the 

equities. 

If you have any questions, or would like to further discuss this issue, please let me know and we can schedule a Rule 

37.2 conference. 

Regards, 

Chris Griesmeyer 

Please note our new address: 

Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 14 of 45 PageID #:693
3

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC 

205 W. Randolph Street | Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 428-2741 (Direct) 

(312) 339-7439 (Mobile) 

From: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Sent: Monday, June 1, 2020 12:51 PM 

To: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Cc: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Subject: Taylor 

Chris, 

 

From your document requests it appears that Ms. Taylor intends to use the present expedited discovery process to seek 

information related to her threatened EEOC/discrimination claim. Fidelity does not believe those matters are 

appropriate for expedited discovery and would be beyond the scope of the Order issued by the Court. We would 

therefore object to such matters being the subject of any interrogation at the upcoming depositions. Please let us know 

whether Ms. Taylor intends to try to inquire into matters related to her EEO/discrimination claim at the upcoming 

depositions so that we can seek a ruling from the court as to the scope of appropriate questioning given the limited 

scope of expedited discovery in this case, which is targeted only to aid in the preliminary injunction hearing, not for all 

matters that are or may be part of the overall ultimate dispute(s) among these parties. Please let us know Ms. Taylor’s 

position on this matter by the close of business on Tuesday, June 2. Thank you. 

 

Regards, 

Susan 

Susan M. Guerette

Attorney at Law

Fisher & Phillips LLP 

150 N. Radnor Chester Road | Suite C300 | Radnor, PA 19087 

sguerette@fisherphillips.com | O: (610) 230-2133 | F: (610) 230-2151

 

vCard | Bio | Website On the Front Lines of Workplace LawSM

This message may contain confidential and privileged information. If it has been sent to you in error, please 

reply to advise the sender of the error, then immediately delete this message.

 

 

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EXHIBIT B

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1

Zachary Mulcrone

From: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com>

Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 10:27 AM

To: Zachary Mulcrone

Cc: Chris Griesmeyer; Guerette, Susan

Subject: RE: Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC v. Taylor

Zach, 

I have consulted with Fidelity and responses are below. Let me know if you have any questions. 

Regards, 

Susan 

1. As to Ms. Taylor’s calendar entries, we disagreed as to the meaning and scope of the Court’s order. You agreed to ask 

Fidelity whether it is willing to expand its production to include all of Ms. Taylor’s calendar entries with “Start Dates” on 

or after March 6, 2020. 

 Yes, we disagreed as to whether the court order covered calendar entries that were to have occurred (to start 

and end) during the time period ordered. You have requested that Fidelity also produce calendar entries that Ms. Taylor 

created to occur after her departure day of March 6, 2020. While Fidelity does not agree that this is what was ordered, 

Fidelity is willing to search the calendar entries already pulled, which were either created or set to occur during the time 

period ordered, and produced any calendar entries with a “Start Date” after March 6, 2020. 

2. You agreed to inquire as to why certain calendar entries have “Date Created” and “Date Modified” fields post-dating 

March 6, 2020, when Ms. Taylor no longer had access to her calendar. As you requested, the document Bates numbered 

FID_TAYLOR000573 is an example of a “Date Modified” field post-dating March 6, 2020, and the document Bates 

numbered FID_TAYLOR000672 is an example of a “Date Created” field post-dating March 6, 2020. 

 The “Date Modified” and “Date Created” dates can both be modified automatically by the system when 

Microsoft archives or re-indexes a calendar item, such as when Microsoft moves the item to a preservation hold folder 

in connection with a litigation hold. This is part of Microsoft’s storage process, and is not a result of a manual change by 

an individual. 

3. As to Request No. 5, we disagreed as to the meaning and scope of the Court’s order. With respect to the comparative 

performance spreadsheet Fidelity produced, I explained that the information in the spreadsheet is very unlikely to be 

the raw data. You agreed to ask Fidelity whether it is willing to produce the raw information it used to create the 

spreadsheet, and whether it is willing to expand the produced information to include Financial Consultants (as opposed 

to including only Vice President Financial Consultants). You also said that you would ask Fidelity whether it would be 

willing to produce documents showing Ms. Taylor’s compensation compared to other FCs and VPFCs in the Oak Brook 

office. You indicated, however, that Fidelity would not be willing to produce documents showing Ms. Taylor’s 

comparative performance on a cumulative basis for the entire period of Scott Marshall’s tenure (as opposed to the 

monthly performance metrics Fidelity produced). 

 Fidelity stands on its objections as I outlined in my July 15, 2020 letter. We have produced responsive 

documents as directed in the Court’s Order and are unwilling to produce more than required. Further, there is no 

relevance to the additional documents you are seeking as Ms. Taylor was not a Financial Consultant, she was in a higher 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 17 of 45 PageID #:696
2

role as a Vice President Financial Consultant, therefore information comparing her to employees in other positions 

would not be relevant and is not how she would have been compared in the Dashboard – where VPFC’s are compared 

against VPFC’s, and FC’s are compared against FC’s. That is in addition to our belief that none of the information sought 

on this topic is relevant to whether Taylor solicited customers. 

 Fidelity is also not willing to produce the compensation amounts paid to every other Financial Consultant and VP 

Financial Consultant in the Oak Brook office. Not only is that highly confidential, but it is completely irrelevant to 

whether Taylor solicited Fidelity customers. The Court’s directive was limited to the documents in paragraph 5 of 

Taylor’s Motion and we have produced those. 

 Finally, Fidelity is unwilling to produce additional information regarding the spreadsheet. It has already gone 

above and beyond by providing information when the documents directed were no longer available. It is not willing to 

provide detailed performance information broken down by each employee in the Oakbrook office. Fidelity has provided 

the information about other employees so that Taylor is able to see the average performance in the office and region for 

each category over time. That enables her to determine, and make an argument, that she was better or worse than the 

average to the extent that is relevant. Fidelity does not see any basis to provide detailed information regarding the 

specific performance of every other employee, and it does not believe that it has been directed to do so by the court. 

Accordingly, Fidelity declines to produce more than has been ordered. 

4. You are checking whether Fidelity’s production ends at FID_TAYLOR014005. 

 Yes, that is the last document that has been produced. 

To help protect your privacy, Microsoft Office prevented automatic download of this picture from the 

Internet.

http://fmla.laborlawyers.com/signatures/fp_logo.png Susan M. Guerette

Attorney at Law

Fisher & Phillips LLP 

150 N. Radnor Chester Road | Suite C300 | Radnor, PA 19087 

sguerette@fisherphillips.com | O: (610) 230-2133 | F: (610) 230-2151

vCard | Bio | Website On the Front Lines of Workplace LawSM

This message may contain confidential and privileged information. If it has been sent to you in error, please 

reply to advise the sender of the error, then immediately delete this message.

From: Zachary Mulcrone <zmulcrone@grglegal.com> 

Sent: Monday, July 27, 2020 3:34 PM 

To: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Cc: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC v. Taylor 

Susan, 

During our call last Monday, you said that you expected to hear back from your client within a couple of days. When can 

we expect a response? 

On a related note, we understand that Fairhaven produced some documents directly to Fidelity (i.e., not through the 

Polsinelli firm) several weeks ago. Please provide us with copies of those documents. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 18 of 45 PageID #:697
3

Thanks, 

Zach 

From: Zachary Mulcrone 

Sent: Monday, July 20, 2020 3:56 PM 

To: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Cc: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC v. Taylor 

Susan, 

This will confirm today’s discussion. 

1. As to Ms. Taylor’s calendar entries, we disagreed as to the meaning and scope of the Court’s order. You agreed to ask 

Fidelity whether it is willing to expand its production to include all of Ms. Taylor’s calendar entries with “Start Dates” on 

or after March 6, 2020. 

2. You agreed to inquire as to why certain calendar entries have “Date Created” and “Date Modified” fields post-dating 

March 6, 2020, when Ms. Taylor no longer had access to her calendar. As you requested, the document Bates numbered 

FID_TAYLOR000573 is an example of a “Date Modified” field post-dating March 6, 2020, and the document Bates 

numbered FID_TAYLOR000672 is an example of a “Date Created” field post-dating March 6, 2020. 

3. As to Request No. 5, we disagreed as to the meaning and scope of the Court’s order. With respect to the comparative 

performance spreadsheet Fidelity produced, I explained that the information in the spreadsheet is very unlikely to be 

the raw data. You agreed to ask Fidelity whether it is willing to produce the raw information it used to create the 

spreadsheet, and whether it is willing to expand the produced information to include Financial Consultants (as opposed 

to including only Vice President Financial Consultants). You also said that you would ask Fidelity whether it would be 

willing to produce documents showing Ms. Taylor’s compensation compared to other FCs and VPFCs in the Oak Brook 

office. You indicated, however, that Fidelity would not be willing to produce documents showing Ms. Taylor’s 

comparative performance on a cumulative basis for the entire period of Scott Marshall’s tenure (as opposed to the 

monthly performance metrics Fidelity produced). 

4. You are checking whether Fidelity’s production ends at FID_TAYLOR014005. 

We look forward to hearing back from you once you speak to your client. 

Thanks, 

Zach 

From: Zachary Mulcrone 

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2020 9:17 AM 

To: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Cc: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC v. Taylor 

Sure. I will call you then. 

From: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2020 9:16 AM 

To: Zachary Mulcrone <zmulcrone@grglegal.com> 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 19 of 45 PageID #:698
4

Cc: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC v. Taylor 

Zach, would you like to talk at 1 pm CT on Monday? 

Regards, 

Susan 

To help protect your privacy, Microsoft Office prevented automatic download of this picture from the 

Internet. Susan M. Guerette

Attorney at Law

Fisher & Phillips LLP 

150 N. Radnor Chester Road | Suite C300 | Radnor, PA 19087 

sguerette@fisherphillips.com | O: (610) 230-2133 | F: (610) 230-2151

vCard | Bio | Website On the Front Lines of Workplace LawSM

This message may contain confidential and privileged information. If it has been sent to you in error, please 

reply to advise the sender of the error, then immediately delete this message.

From: Zachary Mulcrone <zmulcrone@grglegal.com> 

Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2020 11:14 AM 

To: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Cc: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC v. Taylor 

Susan, 

I am available for a Local Rule 37.2 telephone conference to discuss these issues today from 1 to 3:30, tomorrow from 

9:30 to 4:00, and Monday from 12:00 to 4:30. Please let me know which time works best for you. 

Thanks, 

Zach 

Zachary Mulcrone 

205 West Randolph Street, Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60606 

Main: (312) 428-2750 

Direct: (312) 428-2746 

Fax: (312) 332-2781 

Cell: (847) 567-4556 

zmulcrone@grglegal.com 

www.grglegal.com

This message (and any associated files) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed and may 

contain information that is confidential, subject to copyright or constitutes a trade secret. If you are not the intended recipient you 

are hereby notified that any dissemination, copying or distribution of this message, or files associated with this message, is strictly 

prohibited. If you have received this message in error, please notify us immediately by replying to the message and deleting it from 

your computer. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 20 of 45 PageID #:699
5

From: Przybyszewski, Cheryl <cprzybyszewski@fisherphillips.com> 

Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2020 7:56 AM 

To: Zachary Mulcrone <zmulcrone@grglegal.com> 

Cc: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com>; Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Subject: Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC v. Taylor 

Good Morning, 

On behalf of Susan Guerette, please find the attached correspondence in connection with the above-referenced matter.

Thank you. 

To help protect your privacy, Microsoft Office prevented automatic download of this picture from the 

Internet. Cheryl Przybyszewski

Legal Secretary

Fisher & Phillips LLP 

Two Logan Square, 12th Floor | 100 N. 18th Street | Philadelphia, PA 19103 

cprzybyszewski@fisherphillips.com | O: (610) 230-2177

Website On the Front Lines of Workplace LawSM

This message may contain confidential and privileged information. If it has been sent to you in error, please 

reply to advise the sender of the error, then immediately delete this message.

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 21 of 45 PageID #:700
EXHIBIT C

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 22 of 45 PageID #:701
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:20-cv-2133

)

JENNIFER TAYLOR, )

Defendant. )

)

AMENDED NOTICE OF DEPOSITIONS

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the Defendant, Jennifer Taylor, by and through her 

undersigned counsel, and pursuant to Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 

Court’s May 22, 2020 Order (Dkt. No. 29; see also, Dkt. No. 17), hereby notifies the Plaintiff, 

Fidelity Brokerage Services, LLC, that Defendant shall take the following depositions at the law 

offices of Greiman, Rome & Griesmeyer, LLC, 205 West Randolph Street, Suite 2300, Chicago, 

Illinois, 60606, starting on the date(s) and time(s) indicated below:

DEPONENT DATE TIME

Charles Meyers June 9, 2020 9:00 a.m.

Scott Marshall June 11, 2020 9:00 a.m.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that you are required by this notice to have said 

deponent(s) present for oral examination on the date(s) and time(s) stated above; that the testimony 

provided by the deponent(s) shall be given under oath before an officer duly authorized to 

administer oaths and take depositions, and shall be recorded by stenographic, audio and/or

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 23 of 45 PageID #:702
2

audiovisual means; and that the depositions shall be conducted in accordance with the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure and shall continue until completed.

Dated: May 29, 2020 Respectfully submitted, 

JENNIFER TAYLOR, Defendant

By: /s/ Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

One of Her Attorneys

Christopher S. Griesmeyer (# 6269851)

Zachary Mulcrone (# 6300387)

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC

Two North LaSalle Street, Suite 1601

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 428-2750

cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com

zmulcrone@grglegal.com 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 24 of 45 PageID #:703
3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that, on May 29, 2020, I caused the foregoing Defendant’s Amended 

Notice of Depositions to be served upon the Plaintiff and all counsel of record via electronic mail:

Joel W. Rice

Franklin Z. Wolf

FISHER & PHILLIPS, LLC

10 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3450

Chicago, Illinois 60606

jrice@fisherphillips.com

fwolf@fisherphillips.com

Susan M. Guerette

FISHER & PHILLIPS, LLC

150 N. Radnor Chester Road, Suite C300

Radnor, PA 19087

sguerette@fisherphillips.com

Dated: May 29, 2020 By: /s/ Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

Christopher S. Griesmeyer (# 6269851)

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC

Two North LaSalle, Suite 1601

Chicago, Illinois 60602

(312) 428-2750

cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 25 of 45 PageID #:704
EXHIBIT D

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 26 of 45 PageID #:705
1

Zachary Mulcrone

From: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com>

Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2020 7:18 PM

To: Chris Griesmeyer

Cc: Rice, Joel; Zachary Mulcrone

Subject: RE: Taylor

That sounds great, I will call in then. 

Regards, 

Susan 

Susan M. Guerette

Attorney at Law

Fisher & Phillips LLP 

150 N. Radnor Chester Road | Suite C300 | Radnor, PA 19087 

sguerette@fisherphillips.com | O: (610) 230-2133 | F: (610) 230-2151

 

vCard | Bio | Website On the Front Lines of Workplace LawSM

This message may contain confidential and privileged information. If it has been sent to you in error, please 

reply to advise the sender of the error, then immediately delete this message.

From: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2020 8:17 PM 

To: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Cc: Rice, Joel <jrice@fisherphillips.com>; Zachary Mulcrone <zmulcrone@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Taylor 

Susan, we could do 1:30pm (2:30pm Eastern) tomorrow. Please confirm that works for you. Assuming it does, call-in 

information is as follows: 

Number: 1-888-296-6828 

Passcode: 169090# 

Thank you, 

Chris Griesmeyer 

Please note our new address: 

Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC 

205 W. Randolph Street | Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 428-2741 (Direct) 

(312) 339-7439 (Mobile) 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 27 of 45 PageID #:706
2

From: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2020 6:53 PM 

To: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Cc: Rice, Joel <jrice@fisherphillips.com>; Zachary Mulcrone <zmulcrone@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Taylor 

Chris, can you please let me know your availability for a call tomorrow? I do not want to delay our meet and confer 

further. If you are not available, let me know if you would like me to contact Mr. Mulcrone. 

Regards, 

Susan 

Susan M. Guerette

Attorney at Law

Fisher & Phillips LLP 

150 N. Radnor Chester Road | Suite C300 | Radnor, PA 19087 

sguerette@fisherphillips.com | O: (610) 230-2133 | F: (610) 230-2151

 

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This message may contain confidential and privileged information. If it has been sent to you in error, please 

reply to advise the sender of the error, then immediately delete this message.

From: Guerette, Susan 

Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2020 5:11 PM 

To: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Cc: Rice, Joel <jrice@fisherphillips.com>; Wolf, Franklin <fwolf@fisherphillips.com>; Zachary Mulcrone 

<zmulcrone@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Taylor 

Would sometime between 12 – 2 CST work for you? 

Susan M. Guerette

Attorney at Law

Fisher & Phillips LLP 

150 N. Radnor Chester Road | Suite C300 | Radnor, PA 19087 

sguerette@fisherphillips.com | O: (610) 230-2133 | F: (610) 230-2151

vCard | Bio | Website On the Front Lines of Workplace LawSM

This message may contain confidential and privileged information. If it has been sent to you in error, please 

reply to advise the sender of the error, then immediately delete this message.

From: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2020 5:05 PM 

To: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Cc: Rice, Joel <jrice@fisherphillips.com>; Wolf, Franklin <fwolf@fisherphillips.com>; Zachary Mulcrone 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 28 of 45 PageID #:707
3

<zmulcrone@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Taylor 

Susan, we also need to discuss Plaintiff’s discovery responses and document production. Can you please let me know 

what your schedule is tomorrow afternoon for a conference call? 

Thank you, 

Chris Griesmeyer 

Please note our new address: 

Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC 

205 W. Randolph Street | Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 428-2741 (Direct) 

(312) 339-7439 (Mobile) 

From: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2020 2:28 PM 

To: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Cc: Rice, Joel <jrice@fisherphillips.com>; Wolf, Franklin <fwolf@fisherphillips.com>; Zachary Mulcrone 

<zmulcrone@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Taylor 

Chris, 

We are happy to have a call to discuss the issues but we understand your email to be saying that you are not going to 

ask questions on the subjects we have listed below and therefore we are in agreement. If that is not the case, then let 

me know and we can meet and confer on that further. 

Regards, 

Susan 

Susan M. Guerette

Attorney at Law

Fisher & Phillips LLP 

150 N. Radnor Chester Road | Suite C300 | Radnor, PA 19087 

sguerette@fisherphillips.com | O: (610) 230-2133 | F: (610) 230-2151

vCard | Bio | Website On the Front Lines of Workplace LawSM

This message may contain confidential and privileged information. If it has been sent to you in error, please 

reply to advise the sender of the error, then immediately delete this message.

From: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Sent: Wednesday, June 3, 2020 11:03 AM 

To: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Cc: Rice, Joel <jrice@fisherphillips.com>; Wolf, Franklin <fwolf@fisherphillips.com>; Zachary Mulcrone 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 29 of 45 PageID #:708
4

<zmulcrone@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Taylor 

Good morning, Susan. 

First, please copy my colleague, Zach Mulcrone, on all correspondence going forward. 

Second, your inquiry about our potential “lines of deposition questioning” below is far more expansive than your original 

query, and unquestionably invades the attorney work product doctrine. Nevertheless, I once again confirm that we do 

not intend to seek deposition testimony on Ms. Taylor’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims; instead, we 

intend to limit our depositions to those issues relevant to the claims that Plaintiff has asserted against Ms. Taylor. I 

believe that answers your question, and should provide you with all the assurances you require. However, if you would 

like to discuss the issue in a good faith attempt to resolve any differences that you believe exist, then we can schedule a 

Rule 37.2 conference. 

Finally, please let me know your availability this afternoon (or tomorrow morning) for a telephone call to discuss 

Plaintiff’s improper objections and insufficient document production in response to Defendant’s Rule 34 Requests. 

Thank you, 

Chris Griesmeyer 

Please note our new address: 

Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC 

205 W. Randolph Street | Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 428-2741 (Direct) 

(312) 339-7439 (Mobile) 

From: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2020 7:12 PM 

To: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Cc: Rice, Joel <jrice@fisherphillips.com>; Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Subject: Taylor 

Chris, 

We disagree with your assertion that “none of [y]our expedited discovery requests are intended to seek information 

related to Ms. Taylor’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims”. To the contrary, document requests 3 and 5 

clearly seek information about Ms. Taylor’s treatment as an employee relative to other allegedly similarly situated 

employees – essentially comparator evidence, which are prototypical questions that relate to alleged discrimination. We 

do not believe that these subjects are appropriately within the scope of the limited expedited discovery ordered and 

authorized by the Court in this case. 

Can you please confirm that Ms. Taylor is not going to inquire at the upcoming expedited depositions of Fidelity’s 

managers into (a) the topics contained in her document requests 3 and 5, (b) any other lines of questioning relating to 

alleged discriminatory treatment of Ms. Taylor during her employment, (c) information about other Fidelity employees 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 30 of 45 PageID #:709
5

or Fidelity’s treatment of them, or (d) any alleged retaliation against Ms. Taylor during her employment with Fidelity? If 

you cannot confirm this, then we will need to move for a protective order. Thank you. 

Regards, 

Susan 

From: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2020 4:35 PM 

To: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Cc: Rice, Joel <jrice@fisherphillips.com>; Wolf, Franklin <fwolf@fisherphillips.com>; Zachary Mulcrone 

<zmulcrone@grglegal.com>; April Bernath <abernath@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Taylor 

Hi, Susan. 

First, regarding written discovery, below is a link to Defendant’s Rule 34 Responses and accompanying document 

production. Many of the documents have been designated “Confidential” under the parties’ soon-to-be-entered 

Stipulated Confidentiality Order (as a reminder, we’re still waiting to receive your counter-signed copy, and for your 

office to submit the Stipulated Order for entry by the Court). Accordingly, the link is password-protected, and I will 

forward the password under separate cover: 

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/2hqedqvzwubpipw/AABqkmIFIemIKmQ1ruVbklLva?dl=0

Second, regarding your below inquiry concerning Defendant’s anticipated deposition topics, please note that, consistent 

with Judge Tharp’s ruling on your motion for expedited discovery (Dkt. No. 29), we have not issued a Rule 30(b)(6) 

deposition notice to Plaintiff (and, you have made it clear that neither Mr. Meyers nor Mr. Marshall are being produced 

in their capacity as a Rule 30(b)(6) corporate representative of Fidelity). Accordingly, Defendant is under no obligation 

to “describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination,” and there is no basis for you to ask us to divulge 

our anticipated deposition topics. That said, I can assure you that: (a) none of our expedited discovery requests are 

intended to seek information related to Ms. Taylor’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims, and (b) we are 

not intending to pursue discovery on those claims at this time. Fidelity’s treatment of Ms. Taylor relative to other 

departing financial advisors is, however, relevant to her challenge of Plaintiff’s assertions regarding (inter alia) 

irreparable harm, a likelihood of success on the merits, the existence of a protectable right, and a balancing of the 

equities. 

If you have any questions, or would like to further discuss this issue, please let me know and we can schedule a Rule 

37.2 conference. 

Regards, 

Chris Griesmeyer 

Please note our new address: 

Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC 

205 W. Randolph Street | Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 428-2741 (Direct) 

(312) 339-7439 (Mobile) 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 31 of 45 PageID #:710
6

From: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Sent: Monday, June 1, 2020 12:51 PM 

To: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Cc: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Subject: Taylor 

Chris, 

 

From your document requests it appears that Ms. Taylor intends to use the present expedited discovery process to seek 

information related to her threatened EEOC/discrimination claim. Fidelity does not believe those matters are 

appropriate for expedited discovery and would be beyond the scope of the Order issued by the Court. We would 

therefore object to such matters being the subject of any interrogation at the upcoming depositions. Please let us know 

whether Ms. Taylor intends to try to inquire into matters related to her EEO/discrimination claim at the upcoming 

depositions so that we can seek a ruling from the court as to the scope of appropriate questioning given the limited 

scope of expedited discovery in this case, which is targeted only to aid in the preliminary injunction hearing, not for all 

matters that are or may be part of the overall ultimate dispute(s) among these parties. Please let us know Ms. Taylor’s 

position on this matter by the close of business on Tuesday, June 2. Thank you. 

 

Regards, 

Susan 

Susan M. Guerette

Attorney at Law

Fisher & Phillips LLP 

150 N. Radnor Chester Road | Suite C300 | Radnor, PA 19087 

sguerette@fisherphillips.com | O: (610) 230-2133 | F: (610) 230-2151

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reply to advise the sender of the error, then immediately delete this message.

 

 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 32 of 45 PageID #:711
EXHIBIT E

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 33 of 45 PageID #:712
1

Zachary Mulcrone

From: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com>

Sent: Monday, June 8, 2020 4:39 PM

To: Chris Griesmeyer; Zachary Mulcrone

Cc: Guerette, Susan; Rice, Joel

Subject: RE: Taylor

Chris, 

I have put our responses to your email below in blue after each section. 

Regards, 

Susan 

From: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Sent: Friday, June 5, 2020 1:25 PM 

To: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Cc: Zachary Mulcrone <zmulcrone@grglegal.com>; Rice, Joel <jrice@fisherphillips.com>; Wolf, Franklin 

<fwolf@fisherphillips.com>; April Bernath <abernath@grglegal.com> 

Subject: RE: Taylor 

Susan, 

To address you points below: 

1. We confirm that neither party will be pursuing discovery on Ms. Taylor’s employment discrimination claims at this 

time, and we do not intend to cover the topics you’ve listed below in points 1(a)-1(d), below. However, this would not 

preclude Ms. Taylor from: (i) later seeking discovery on those issues (including through additional depositions of Fidelity 

employees, including Scott Marshall and Charles Meyers) - We just want to clarify that the present agreement only is 

with respect to the limited expedited discovery ordered by the Court in aid of the preliminary injunction proceedings, 

and our agreements in that regard have no impact on the parties’ rights to take discovery later in the dispute, whether 

in arbitration or elsewhere, all of which rights are whatever the applicable forum specifies them to be, and are 

unaffected in any way by the present agreement. 

; (ii) questioning Mr. Marshall and/or Mr. Meyers about any documents Fidelity may produce in response to Defendant’s 

document request nos. 3 and 5 – Agree; and (iii) developing testimony concerning other aspects of her general 

employment at Fidelity. - Agree 

2. Understood. You also stated Fidelity would be producing the 2020 calendar entries from Ms. Taylor’s Fidelity Outlook 

Account today. You should have received those on Friday. 

3. Agreed with respect to depositions. Regarding your proposal to take depositions “virtually” – can you please explain 

in greater detail what you mean by that? We propose using Veritext which provides for virtual depositions (see details 

at this link https://www.veritext.com/services/veritext-virtual/) and has more sophisticated options for sharing 

exhibits. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 34 of 45 PageID #:713
2

Finally, we advised you yesterday that we would be supplementing Ms. Taylor’s production with her text messages and 

handwritten notes, based on the parties’ agreement to treat the Stipulated Protective Order as enforceable nunc pro 

tunc to June 2nd. Below is a link to those documents. I will forward the password under separate cover: 

https://www.dropbox.com/sh/l9f9hattm829s80/AAATUqRfVuTGKqrEko0tSwtKa?dl=0

Regards, 

Chris Griesmeyer 

Please note our new address: 

Christopher S. Griesmeyer 

GREIMAN, ROME & GRIESMEYER, LLC 

205 W. Randolph Street | Suite 2300 

Chicago, Illinois 60606

(312) 428-2741 (Direct) 

(312) 339-7439 (Mobile) 

From: Guerette, Susan <sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Sent: Friday, June 5, 2020 9:38 AM 

To: Chris Griesmeyer <cgriesmeyer@grglegal.com> 

Cc: Zachary Mulcrone <zmulcrone@grglegal.com>; Rice, Joel <jrice@fisherphillips.com>; Guerette, Susan 

<sguerette@fisherphillips.com> 

Subject: Taylor 

Chris, 

Following up on our meet and confer call yesterday, 

1) Fidelity agrees that it will not ask Ms. Taylor questions during her deposition relating to her employment 

discrimination claims. Please confirm, as we discussed yesterday, that Ms. Taylor is not going to inquire at the 

upcoming expedited depositions of Fidelity’s managers into (a) the topics contained in her document requests 3 

and 5, (b) any other lines of questioning relating to alleged discriminatory treatment of Ms. Taylor during her 

employment, (c) information about other Fidelity employees or Fidelity’s treatment of them, or (d) any alleged 

retaliation against Ms. Taylor during her employment with Fidelity. 

2) In follow-up to our meet-and-confer call yesterday, we are discussing with Fidelity whether the company would 

agree to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff’s Document Request Number 4. We will be back with you 

shortly on this. 

3) We have agreed to take the depositions off calendar for next week. The parties have agree to wait until their 

anticipated discovery motions have been resolved, and until the additional documents that we both agreed to 

produce have been produced, and then will coordinate rescheduling the depositions within approximately ten 

days of those resolutions. 

Regards, 

Susan 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 35 of 45 PageID #:714
3

Susan M. Guerette

Attorney at Law

Fisher & Phillips LLP 

150 N. Radnor Chester Road | Suite C300 | Radnor, PA 19087 

sguerette@fisherphillips.com | O: (610) 230-2133 | F: (610) 230-2151

vCard | Bio | Website On the Front Lines of Workplace LawSM

This message may contain confidential and privileged information. If it has been sent to you in error, please 

reply to advise the sender of the error, then immediately delete this message.

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 36 of 45 PageID #:715
EXHIBIT F

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 37 of 45 PageID #:716
150 N. Riverside Plaza, Suite 3000, Chicago, IL 60606  (312) 819-1900

Atlanta Boston Chicago Dallas Denver Houston Kansas City Los Angeles Nashville New York Phoenix 

St. Louis San Francisco Washington, D.C. Wilmington 

Polsinelli PC, Polsinelli LLP in California 

74870051.1 

September 25, 2020 Sohil M. Shah 

Direct: 312.463.6319 

sshah@polsinelli.com 

VIA E-MAIL 

Susan M. Guerette 

Fisher & Phillips LLP 

150 N. Radnor Chester Road, Suite C300 

Radnor, PA 19087 

sguerette@fisherphillips.com 

Re: Fidelity Brokerage Services LLC v. Jennifer Taylor 

Case No. 1:20-cv-02133

Dear Counsel: 

We are in receipt of your letter dated September 14, 2020 and our response is below. 

Communications with Fidelity Customers

We disagree with your characterization that the email communications Fairhaven 

produced “show extensive solicitation by both Taylor and her assistant.” This appears to be an 

unsupported and unnecessary legal conclusion. Additionally, your use of the word “finally” 

suggests a delay on Fairhaven’s part. Again, we disagree with this mischaracterization. We 

politely request that you refrain from making such mischaracterizations in discovery 

communications. 

You appear to assume that additional documents exist but have provided no reasonable 

basis for the existence of such documents in Fairhaven’s possession. You state as follows: “Ms. 

Lyon must have had Customer information provided to her by Taylor in order to know who to 

call on Ms. Taylor’s and Fairhaven’s behalf. The Customer list and any communications 

regarding the list, any direction to Ms. Lyon as to what to say to Customers, and any notes of her 

calls with Customers are directly responsive to Document Requests 1, 2 and 3 and must be 

produced.” Please provide the basis for this assumption. To the extent you have deposed Ms. 

Taylor and she outlined this process as you have described it, please let us know. To clarify, Ms. 

Taylor provided Ms. Lyon a list of customers and their phone numbers when she joined 

Fairhaven. Ms. Lyon only made announcement phone calls and she had no business 

development responsibility. She had a purely administrative role. When Ms. Lyon finished her 

calls, she returned the list to Ms. Taylor, along with any handwritten notes on such a list. Ms. 

Taylor and Fairhaven do not have this list and it no longer remains in their possession, custody, 

or control. Only Ms. Taylor can provide this list to Fidelity. 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 38 of 45 PageID #:717
September 25, 2020 

74870051.1 

Notes of Communications with Fidelity Customers

Your assumption in this section again is incorrect. Information for individuals was only 

added to Fairhaven’s Salesforce system if individuals were Fairhaven customers or after 

individuals had become Fairhaven customers. Such notes were used for client retention only. 

Additionally, no information was added to Fairhaven’s Salesforce system for potential clients or 

customers. We disagree that entries in Fairhaven’s Salesforce system corresponding to 

Fairhaven’s customers must be produced as they are not responsive to any of Fidelity’s 

document requests. 

Phone Records of Calls to Fidelity Customers

The following statement is a legal conclusion unsupported by legal authority and we 

disagree with such a conclusion: “As an employee of Fairhaven, Ms. Lyon’s conduct was as an 

agent of the company and she undoubtedly used Fairhaven’s phone systems to make these calls.” 

The following statement is also a legal conclusion unsupported by legal authority and we 

disagree with such a conclusion: “Ms. Lyon’s notes leave no doubt that she was soliciting 

Fidelity Customers to move their business.” This is simply incorrect. 

Ms. Lyon did use Fairhaven’s office phone system to make announcement phone calls. 

Fairhaven will agree to produce phone records for office phones for Ms. Lyon and the other 

relevant custodians, and will produce these records no later than October 2, 2020. 

Your legal conclusions in this section also suggest the non-occurrence of the 2020 global 

COVID-19 pandemic which effectively temporarily shut down Fairhaven’s offices soon after 

Ms. Taylor began working for Fairhaven. Fairhaven does not issue company cell phones to its 

employees and does not control those cell phones. Accordingly, Fairhaven cannot provide cell 

phone records for individual employees. 

Emails to Fidelity Customers

We disagree with your numerous assumptions, which again are based on conjecture 

alone. Specifically, the following statement is incorrect: “The documents produced also make it 

clear that Taylor, Ms. Lyon and Fairhaven sent additional emails to Customers that do not appear 

to have been produced.” Again, we have produced all responsive email communications and 

have not withheld any email communications in an effort of good faith on the part of Fairhaven. 

If there are specific emails you believe have not been produced, please provide the dates of those 

emails, and the participants in those email communications. We can then review our prior 

document productions. We have not withheld any responsive emails as part of our previous 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 39 of 45 PageID #:718
September 25, 2020 

74870051.1 

document productions. These additional emails referenced were never sent or they would have 

been produced. 

Mailings and Text Messages to Fidelity Customers 

Any documents that were mailed to Fidelity customers and which Fairhaven retained a 

copy of were part of the electronic files that Mr. Horner previously and directly produced to 

Fidelity this summer. Accordingly, Fidelity already has such documents. Moreover, Fairhaven 

did not keep an electronic or hard copy of every document it sent to potential customers. 

Accordingly, Fairhaven does not have custody or control over any additional documents. To the 

extent you need these documents, you will need to subpoena the recipients of such documents. 

Additionally, as stated above, Fairhaven does not have custody of or control over 

individual employees’ cell phones, and does not have access to any employees’ text messages. 

Documents Regarding Taylor’s Hire

We again disagree with your characterization regarding Fairhaven’s production of 

documents related to Fairhaven’s hiring of Ms. Taylor. Fairhaven has produced all such 

responsive documents. You make several statements are false or incorrect. 

First, you state: “The documents Fairhaven produced in response to this request, 

however, consist only of marketing materials and an unsigned employee agreement that does not 

even include Taylor’s name. These materials are not responsive or comprehensive.” We have 

advised you previously that Ms. Taylor has not executed an employee agreement. Fairhaven 

cannot produce a document that does not exist. The marketing materials Fairhaven produced 

were copies of the exact same documents Fairhaven handed to Ms. Taylor. 

Second, you state: “Fidelity cannot believe that an experienced Financial Advisor was 

hired by Fairhaven and not a single document was generated as a result. Responsive documents 

would include phone records to set up interviews, notes of discussions, calendar entries, text 

message or email communications, an offer letter, new hire documents and regulatory clearance 

documents. Fairhaven produced an unsigned Employment Agreement and indicated that it had 

not yet been signed. However, it did not produce any documents relating to the agreement, 

including any documents indicating that it was sent to or discussed with Taylor. Fairhaven did 

not even produce an offer letter or any document indicating what it offered to pay Ms. Taylor. 

Again, it is hard to believe that Ms. Taylor accepted a job offer without being informed in 

writing what her compensation would be.” Again, much of this information is incorrect and 

based on assumptions about Fairhaven’s hiring practices. While Fidelity may believe something 

does not make it true and correct. There are no notes of discussions, calendar entries, email 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 40 of 45 PageID #:719
September 25, 2020 

74870051.1 

communications, or text messages that are responsive to your document requests. We disagree 

with your assertion that phone records to set up interviews with Ms. Taylor would be responsive 

or relevant to the litigation at hand. Ms. Taylor can provide any cell phone records of phone 

calls with Fairhaven prior to her hiring, and any such phone records from Fairhaven are 

irrelevant to your claims in the litigation. Please clarify why such phone records from Fairhaven 

are relevant, and why you cannot obtain them from Ms. Taylor. 

Additionally, you assume, without any reasonable basis, that there are documents related 

to the unsigned employment agreement. This is incorrect and appears to be based on pure 

conjecture. You also assert that there was an offer letter or document indicating what Fairhaven 

offered to pay Ms. Taylor. Again, this is incorrect. There was no offer letter. We have relayed 

this to you previously, and cannot invent a document that does not exist. 

Fairhaven and Fidelity are valued business partners, and Fairhaven remains committed to 

being a cooperative partner going forward. However, your September 14, 2020 letter assumes 

the existence of documents that do not exist and makes many incorrect assumptions. 

Additionally, Fidelity has indicated to Fairhaven that it may drag Fairhaven into the lawsuit 

between Fidelity and Ms. Taylor in an effort to threaten Fairhaven into forcing Ms. Taylor into a 

settlement. To the extent Fidelity is bringing Fairhaven in as a party to the existing litigation, 

please advise us immediately. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ Sohil M. Shah 

Sohil M. Shah 

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 41 of 45 PageID #:720
EXHIBIT G

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 42 of 45 PageID #:721
EEOC Form 5 (11/09)

CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION Charge Presented To: Agency(ies) Charge

No(s):

This form is affected by the Privacy Act of 1974. See enclosed Privacy Act FEPA

Statement and other information before completing this form.

X EEOC 440-2020-05184

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS and EEOC

State or local Agency, if any

I want this charge filed with both the EEOC and the State or local Agency, NOTARY – When necessary for State and Local Agency Requirements

if any. I will advise the agencies if I change my address or phone number

and I will cooperate fully with them in the processing of my charge in

accordance with their procedures.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.

I swear or affirm that I have read the above charge and that it

is true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

SIGNATURE OF COMPLAINANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS DATE

(month, day, year)

Digitally signed by Jennifer Taylor on 06-16-2020 10:33 AM 

EDT

Name (indicate Mr., Ms., Mrs.) Home Phone Year of Birth

MS. JENNIFER A TAYLOR (630) 765-1795 1972

Street Address City, State and ZIP Code

606 PRAIRIE AVE, GLEN ELLYN, IL 60137

Named is the Employer, Labor Organization, Employment Agency, Apprenticeship Committee, or State or Local Government Agency

That I Believe Discriminated Against Me or Others. (If more than two, list under PARTICULARS below.)

Name No. Employees, Members Phone No.

FIDELITY BROKERAGE SERVICES LLC 501+ (800) 526-7260

Street Address City, State and ZIP Code

1415 WEST 22ND ST. STE 100, OAK BROOK, IL 60523

Name No. Employees, Members Phone No.

Street Address City, State and ZIP Code

 

DISCRIMINATION BASED ON (Check appropriate box(es).) DATE(S) DISCRIMINATION TOOK PLACE

Earliest Latest

RACE COLOR X SEX RELIGION NATIONAL ORIGIN 11-01-2019 03-06-2020

RETALIATION X AGE DISABILITY GENETIC INFORMATION

OTHER (Specify) CONTINUING ACTION

THE PARTICULARS ARE (If additional paper is needed, attach extra sheet(s)):

I began my employment with Respondent on or about September 4, 1994. My position was VP Financial 

Consultant. During my employment, I was disciplined. On or about March 6, 2020, I was constructively 

discharged. 

I believe I was discriminated against because of my sex, female, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 

Act of 1964. 

I also believe I was discriminated against because of my age, 48 (Year of Birth: 1972), in violation of the 

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended.

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 43 of 45 PageID #:722
CP Enclosure with EEOC Form 5 (11/09)

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT: Under the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. Law 93-579, authority to

request personal data and its uses are:

1. FORM NUMBER/TITLE/DATE. EEOC Form 5, Charge of Discrimination (11/09).

2. AUTHORITY. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b), 29 U.S.C. 211, 29 U.S.C. 626, 42 U.S.C. 12117, 42 U.S.C.

2000ff-6.

3. PRINCIPAL PURPOSES. The purposes of a charge, taken on this form or otherwise

reduced to writing (whether later recorded on this form or not) are, as applicable

under the EEOC anti-discrimination statutes (EEOC statutes), to preserve private suit

rights under the EEOC statutes, to invoke the EEOC's jurisdiction and, where dualfiling or referral arrangements exist, to begin state or local proceedings.

4. ROUTINE USES. This form is used to provide facts that may establish the existence

of matters covered by the EEOC statutes (and as applicable, other federal, state or

local laws). Information given will be used by staff to guide its mediation and

investigation efforts and, as applicable, to determine, conciliate and litigate claims of

unlawful discrimination. This form may be presented to or disclosed to other federal,

state or local agencies as appropriate or necessary in carrying out EEOC's functions. 

A copy of this charge will ordinarily be sent to the respondent organization against

which the charge is made.

5. WHETHER DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY; EFFECT OF NOT GIVING INFORMATION. Charges must

be reduced to writing and should identify the charging and responding parties and the

actions or policies complained of. Without a written charge, EEOC will ordinarily not

act on the complaint. Charges under Title VII, the ADA or GINA must be sworn to or

affirmed (either by using this form or by presenting a notarized statement or unsworn

declaration under penalty of perjury); charges under the ADEA should ordinarily be

signed. Charges may be clarified or amplified later by amendment. It is not

mandatory that this form be used to make a charge.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO REQUEST SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT REVIEW

Charges filed at a state or local Fair Employment Practices Agency (FEPA) that dualfiles charges with EEOC will ordinarily be handled first by the FEPA. Some charges

filed at EEOC may also be first handled by a FEPA under worksharing agreements. 

You will be told which agency will handle your charge. When the FEPA is the first to

handle the charge, it will notify you of its final resolution of the matter. Then, if you

wish EEOC to give Substantial Weight Review to the FEPA's final findings, you must

ask us in writing to do so within 15 days of your receipt of its findings. Otherwise, we

will ordinarily adopt the FEPA's finding and close our file on the charge.

NOTICE OF NON-RETALIATION REQUIREMENTS

Please notify EEOC or the state or local agency where you filed your charge if 

retaliation is taken against you or others who oppose discrimination or cooperate in

any investigation or lawsuit concerning this charge. Under Section 704(a) of Title VII,

Section 4(d) of the ADEA, Section 503(a) of the ADA and Section 207(f) of GINA, it is

unlawful for an employer to discriminate against present or former employees or job

applicants, for an employment agency to discriminate against anyone, or for a union

to discriminate against its members or membership applicants, because they have

opposed any practice made unlawful by the statutes, or because they have made a

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 44 of 45 PageID #:723
proceeding, or hearing under the laws. The Equal Pay Act has similar provisions and

Section 503(b) of the ADA prohibits coercion, intimidation, threats or interference with

anyone for exercising or enjoying, or aiding or encouraging others in their exercise or

enjoyment of, rights under the Act.

Case: 1:20-cv-02133 Document #: 59 Filed: 10/29/20 Page 45 of 45 PageID #:724