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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Glenn Anderson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-15-08306-PCT-JJT

ORDER 

 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Glenn Anderson’s Application for Supplemental 

Security Income (“SSI”) by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) under the Social 

Security Act (“the Act”). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) with this Court seeking 

judicial review of that denial, and the Court now addresses Plaintiff’s Opening Brief 

(Doc. 12, “Pl.’s Br.”), Defendant Social Security Administration Commissioner’s 

Opposition (Doc. 16, “Def.’s Br.”), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 17, “Reply”). The Court 

has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 11, R.) and now affirms the 

Administrative Law Judge’s decision (R. at 31-40) as upheld by the Appeals Council 

(R. at 1-4). 

I. BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on December 20, 2011, for a period of 

disability beginning March 1, 2005. (R. at 339-42.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially 

on September 20, 2012 (R. at 267-69), and on reconsideration on May 9, 2013 (R. at 

237). Plaintiff then testified at a hearing held before an Administrative Law Judge 

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(“ALJ”) on February 11, 2014, at which Plaintiff asked to change his disability onset date 

to January 4, 2012. (R. at 48-88.) On May 2, 2014, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s SSI 

application. (R. at 31-40.) On October 26, 2015, the Appeals Council upheld the ALJ’s 

decision. (R. at 1-4.) The present appeal followed. 

 The Court has reviewed the voluminous medical evidence in its entirety and finds 

it unnecessary to provide a complete summary here. The pertinent medical evidence will 

be discussed in addressing the issues raised by the parties. In short, upon considering the 

medical records and opinions, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has severe impairments that 

include an adjustment disorder with depressed mood; polysubstance dependence; a 

history of major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, catatonic schizophrenia, and a 

schizoid personality disorder; status post open reduction internal fixation of a left forearm 

fracture; left ankle fracture; left radius and ulna fracture; multilevel degenerative disc 

disease with mild stenosis; cervical spondylosis; ulnar nerve and peripheral neuropathy; 

radiculopathy; lumbago; sciatica; wrist osteopenia; central hernia; and left knee medial 

meniscus tear. (R. at 33.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews 

only those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 

F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may set aside the Commissioner’s 

disability determination only if the determination is not supported by substantial evidence 

or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial 

evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant evidence 

that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the 

record as a whole. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the 

court must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a 

“specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence 

is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s 

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decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 

(9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 

follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 

proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. 

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ 

determines whether the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id.

At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the 

claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether 

the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals an 

impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, 

the ALJ proceeds to step four. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is still capable of 

performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, 

where he determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in the national 

economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Id. 

III. ANALYSIS 

 In this case, Plaintiff generally does not contest the ALJ’s consideration and 

weighing of Plaintiff’s treatment records and hearing testimony. Instead, Plaintiff asserts 

that the ALJ made a number of technical errors by (1) improperly concluding Plaintiff’s 

past relevant work included hand packager; (2) improperly concluding Plaintiff could 

work as a hand packager; (3) failing to find Plaintiff met the requirements under Listing 

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12.03 for psychotic disorders; and (4) failing to find Plaintiff met the criteria for the 

application of Medical-Vocational Rule 201.14. (Pl.’s Br. at 18-23.) 

 A. Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity 

At step four of the disability evaluation process, an ALJ must determine if the 

plaintiff has the RFC to perform past relevant work, either as the plaintiff performed it or 

as it is generally performed in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding that the job of hand packager was past 

relevant work because Plaintiff did not engage in that work long enough to learn the job. 

(Pl.’s Br. at 18-19.) Furthermore, Plaintiff argues, even if the job of hand packager was 

appropriate for the ALJ to consider, the Vocational Expert (VE) erred in concluding that 

Plaintiff has the RFC to work as a hand packager because that job requires constant 

handling and fingering, which Plaintiff does not have the ability to do. (Pl.’s Br. at 19-

20.) 

 Even if the ALJ erred in concluding that the job of hand packager was past 

relevant work, any error was harmless. At the hearing, the ALJ presented the VE with the 

hypothetical of 

an individual approaching advanced age with a limited education . . . and 

with the same work experience as [Plaintiff] who can perform a full range 

of light [work] with the following limitations. He can carry 20 pounds 

occasionally; 10 pounds frequently; stand, walk, and sit six hours of an 

eight-hour day; occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, 

crawling; never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. Or never climbing 

period. Frequent reaching, handling, and fingering; avoid working with 

heights and machinery; and with the following non-exertional limitations. 

Can perform simple instructions; no fast-paced work; no intense 

concentration for more than one hour without a five-minute break and 

focus; and occasional interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and the 

public. [Would] this person be able to perform his past relevant work either 

as actually performed, or as those occupations, again, are performed in the 

national economy? 

(R. at 83-84.) The VE responded that the individual could work in the hand packaging 

job as Plaintiff had performed it, which, as Plaintiff previously reported, required a 

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minimal amount of handling and fingering and did not require him to lift more than ten 

pounds. (R. at 84, 370.) Moreover, the VE testified that the individual could perform 

other light, unskilled jobs in the national economy, including inspector, bench assembler, 

and cleaner/housekeeper. (R. at 84-85.) The VE’s assessment did not change when the 

ALJ added the condition that the individual may be absent or off task five percent of the 

time. (R. at 85.) Finally, on the condition that the individual may be absent or off task ten 

percent of the time, the VE reported that the individual could work as a 

cleaner/housekeeper or as a mail clerk. (R. at 85.) 

 With the exception of the ALJ’s minimization of Plaintiff’s alleged psychiatric 

conditions, which the Court addresses below, Plaintiff does not challenge the RFC the 

ALJ applied to Plaintiff in the hypotheticals he presented to the VE or argue that the RFC 

determination was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Even if the Court 

concluded that the ALJ erred in relying on Plaintiff’s previous job of hand packager as a 

baseline for his analysis, the RFC used was supported by substantial evidence, and the 

VE concluded that work in the national economy exists for an individual with Plaintiff’s 

RFC and other characteristics. As a result, any error on the part of the ALJ was harmless. 

See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that the 

Court need not remand or reverse an ALJ’s decision if it is clear from the record that the 

error is “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination”). 

B. Listing 12.03 

 Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred at step three of the disability evaluation 

process by failing to conclude that the objective medical and other findings satisfied the 

requirements of one of the listed impairments, Listing 12.03. (Pl.’s Br. at 20-22.) Listing 

12.03 is for “Schizophrenic, paranoid and other psychotic disorders” and provides that a 

plaintiff must meet specific requirements supported by medical documentation. See App. 

1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Plaintiff argues that the medical evidence supports a 

conclusion that he has a “poverty of content of speech” associated with “flat affect,” and 

the ALJ erred when he failed to consider this evidence in combination with Plaintiff’s 

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restrictions in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace and his episodes of 

decompensation. (Pl.’s Br. at 21-22; Reply at 4-5.) 

 As Defendant argues (Def.’s Br. at 7-12), in the absence of a “medically 

documented history of a chronic schizophrenic, paranoid, or other psychotic disorder of 

at least 2 years’ duration” under Listing 12.03 paragraph C—a finding that the record 

would not support—Listing 12.03 paragraph B criteria require that a plaintiff must have a 

record of marked difficulties in the activities of daily living; maintaining social 

functioning; maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or repeated episodes of 

decompensation, each of extended duration. Without meeting one of these paragraph B 

requirements, it is not dispositive that a plaintiff has a record of poverty of speech 

associated with flat affect under Listing 12.03 paragraph A. 

 The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has only mild restrictions in the activities of 

daily living and social functioning (R. at 34)—a conclusion that Plaintiff does not 

specifically contest—and the Court finds that those conclusions are supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. As for Plaintiff’s ability to maintain concentration, 

persistence, or pace, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has moderate—not marked—

difficulties. (R. at 34.) While Plaintiff disputes this conclusion (Reply at 5), the Court 

finds that it is also supported by substantial evidence in the record. Specifically, the ALJ 

noted medical opinions finding that Plaintiff has a history of drug, alcohol and tobacco 

dependence and has frequently abused pain medications and alcohol, among other drugs. 

(R. at 33-38.) The ALJ cited the opinions of state agency psychological consultants that 

Plaintiff suffers from anxiety but, absent his substance abuse, Plaintiff has only mild to 

moderate difficulties maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace. (R. at 34, 39, 226, 

1383.) Plaintiff has not challenged the reliability of that evidence or the ALJ’s 

consideration of it, and the Court finds that it supports the ALJ’s conclusions. 

 Plaintiff also disputes the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff has experienced no 

episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration. (Reply at 4.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff asks the Court to consider Plaintiff’s 24 visits to the hospital between 2003 and 

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2011 as episodes of decompensation. (Reply at 4.) However, as the ALJ notes in his 

decision (R. at 33-39) and Defendant points out in its brief (Def.’s Br. at 9-10), Plaintiff 

was not admitted in half of those hospital visits, three visits were for the purpose of 

attempting to refill prescriptions, and one visit was for physical injuries. (R. at 441-58, 

818-27, 867-68, 918-19, 929-30, 940-41, 978-97, 1048-51, 1101-02, 1149-52, 1190-92.) 

Only one psychiatric hospitalization lasted more than two weeks, in 2004 (R. at 506)—

eight years before the alleged onset date. The Court finds that substantial evidence in the 

record supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff has not experienced the requisite 

episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration, to meet the criteria of Listing 

12.03 paragraph B. Because the medical evidence does not support a finding that Listing 

12.03 paragraph B criteria are met, the ALJ did not err in declining to find Plaintiff 

disabled under Listing 12.03. 

C. Plaintiff’s Age 

 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not applying Medical-Vocational (or 

“GRID”) Rule 201.14—which considers a claimant of advancing age—in his analysis, 

essentially arguing that the ALJ improperly failed to consider Plaintiff’s age of nearly 50 

years old in assessing Plaintiff’s ability to work in the national economy. (Pl.’s Br. at 22-

23 (citing Rule 201.14 in App. 2 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404).) As the Court noted 

above, the ALJ specifically tailored the hypotheticals he posed to the VE to account for 

Plaintiff’s RFC as well as his prior work experience and advancing age. The Court also 

already noted that the objective medical record supports the RFC applied, and that 

conclusion does not change by weighing the assessment of Dr. Chad Hartley—which 

Plaintiff submitted to the Appeals Council over a year after the date of the ALJ’s decision 

(and three years after the alleged onset date)—against Plaintiff’s treatment records and 

the other objective medical evidence. As noted above, the VE considered Plaintiff’s age 

and prior work experience in concluding that Plaintiff is capable of performing jobs in the 

national economy. Because the ALJ’s hypotheticals were specifically tailored to 

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Plaintiff’s capacity and attributes, the ALJ did not err in declining to reference Rule 

201.14. 

Plaintiff raises no materially harmful error on the part of the ALJ, and the Court 

must therefore affirm the SSA’s decision denying Plaintiff’s Application for SSI benefits 

under the Act. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the May 2, 2014, decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge, (R. at 31-40), as upheld by the Appeals Council on 

October 26, 2015 (R. at 1-4). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment 

accordingly and close this matter. 

 Dated this 29th day of March, 2017. 

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge 

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