IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

RYLEND FARRIS,

Appellant.

No. 85718-5-I

DIVISION ONE

ORDER DENYING MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION AND 

WITHDRAWING AND 

SUBSTITUTING OPINION

Appellant Rylend Farris filed a motion to reconsider a portion of the opinion 

filed on July 15, 2024, in the above case. The panel has determined that the motion 

for reconsideration should be denied. The panel has also determined that the 

opinion in the above-entitled case filed on July 15, 2024 should be withdrawn and a 

substitute unpublished opinion be filed. 

Now, therefore, it is hereby

ORDERED that the opinion filed on July 15, 2024 is withdrawn and a 

substitute unpublished opinion shall be filed.

FOR THE COURT:
No. 85718-5-I/2

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

RYLEND FARRIS,

Appellant.

No. 85718-5-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

CHUNG, J. — Rylend Farris challenges his sentence on his conviction for 

residential burglary. Farris’s offender score, which was used to determine his 

sentence, included two juvenile adjudications. On appeal, Farris claims the 

juvenile adjudications should have been excluded, arguing that because a 

statutory amendment removing juvenile dispositions from a person’s offender 

score went into effect in July 2023, before his sentencing in August 2023, the 

amendment applies to his sentence. Under RCW 9.94A.345 and the savings 

clause, RCW 10.01.040, the law that applies to sentencing is the law in effect at 

the time of the offense. The plain language of the 2023 amendment conveys no 

legislative intent that it applies retroactively, and the amendment does not alter 

the calculation of his offender score. We therefore affirm Farris’s sentence.

FACTS

Farris pleaded guilty to one count of residential burglary committed while 

on community custody. In his statement on plea of guilty, Farris wrote, “On 
No. 85718-5-I/2

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January 5, 2023 in Snohomish County, WA I did unlawfully enter and remain in a 

dwelling. . . and did commit a theft of clothing from the dwelling.” The State 

calculated an offender score of seven, including two juvenile offenses, theft in the 

first degree and promoting prostitution in the first degree. At his May 4, 2023 

hearing on the guilty plea, Farris acknowledged this offender score and the 

parties agreed to a sentencing recommendation of 43 months of incarceration. 

The court accepted the guilty plea and set sentencing for June 1, 2023. The court 

subsequently granted a motion to continue the sentencing to August 3, 2023.

Between the court’s acceptance of Farris’s guilty plea and the August 

2023 sentencing, a new amendment to RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b), part of the 

Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), went into effect. See LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415 (H.B.

1324). Effective July 23, 2023, the amendment removes the majority of prior 

juvenile convictions from the calculation of offender scores. In his sentencing 

memorandum and at his sentencing hearing, Farris argued the amendment 

should apply prospectively to reduce his offender score and standard range 

sentence. The trial court disagreed and counted the juvenile offenses for an 

offender score of seven with a standard range of 43-57 months. The court 

sentenced Farris to the originally agreed recommendation of 43 months of 

incarceration, the low end of the standard range. 

Farris appeals.

DISCUSSION

Farris challenges his sentence, arguing the court wrongly included his 

juvenile convictions in his offender score calculation. According to Farris, the 
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plain language of RCW 9.94A.525(1) mandates that the court calculate the 

offender score by counting prior convictions as of the date of sentencing and, 

therefore, the court has no authority to include most juvenile convictions in 

sentencings occurring after July 23, 2023. We disagree.

Farris’s claim requires us to engage in statutory construction, which is a 

question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 346, 68 P.3d 

282 (2003). We “give effect to the intent of the legislature, and where the 

language of a statute is clear, legislative intent is derived from the language of 

the statute alone.” Id. We discern the plain meaning of a statutory provision from 

the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute, related 

provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 

578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009). If unambiguous, a statute’s plain language “provides 

the beginning and the end of the analysis.” State v. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d 708, 714, 

487 P.3d 482 (2021). A statute is unambiguous when not susceptible to more 

than one interpretation. Id.

RCW 9.9A.525 establishes the guidelines for calculation of the offender 

score. For the purposes of the offender score, “[a] prior conviction is a conviction 

which exists before the date of sentencing for the offense for which the offender 

score is being computed.” RCW 9.9A.525(1)(a). Farris reads this to mandate that 

the version of this statute that applies to his sentence is the version in effect on 

the date of sentencing, rather than the date of the offense—i.e., the amended 

version of RCW 9.9A.525(1)(b) that excludes his prior juvenile adjudications from 

the calculation of his offender score. 
No. 85718-5-I/4

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Farris is incorrect. RCW 9.9A.525(1) defines “prior conviction” for the 

purposes of calculating the offender score. This definition pertains to which 

convictions factor into the offender score, not what law applies to the calculation. 

RCW 9.94A.345 governs which version of the SRA applies to determine a 

sentence and explicitly states: “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any 

sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with the 

law in effect when the current offense was committed.” As our Supreme Court 

held in Jenks, “RCW 9.94A.345 clearly commands that sentences imposed under 

‘this chapter’—the SRA—be imposed under the law in effect at the time of the 

crime.” 197 Wn.2d at 715. Thus, RCW 9.94A.345 requires Farris to be sentenced 

under the statute in effect when he committed the crime in January 2023.

In addition to the unambiguous language of RCW 9.94A.345, the savings

clause statute prevents application of the amended sentencing statute to Farris’s 

sentencing. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 719; State v. Troutman, 30 Wn. App. 2d 592,

594, 546 P.3d 458 (2024). The savings clause states:

Whenever any criminal or penal statute shall be amended or 

repealed, all offenses committed or penalties or forfeitures incurred 

while it was in force shall be punished or enforced as if it were in 

force, notwithstanding such amendment or repeal, unless a 

contrary intention is expressly declared in the amendatory or 

repealing act, and every such amendatory or repealing statute shall 

be so construed as to save all criminal and penal proceedings, and 

proceedings to recover forfeitures, pending at the time of its 

enactment, unless a contrary intention is expressly declared 

therein.

RCW 10.01.040. This savings clause is read into every repealing or amending 

penal statute. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 719; State v. Ross, 152 Wn.2d 220, 237, 95 

P.3d 1225 (2004); RCW 10.01.040. Under the terms of this statute, the 
No. 85718-5-I/5

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sentencing court was required to sentence Farris under the law in effect at the 

time he committed the offense unless a contrary intent was indicated by the 

legislature. The legislature is not required to explicitly state its intent for an 

amendment to apply retroactively to pending prosecutions. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 

720. Intent need only be expressed in words that “fairly convey that intention.” 

Ross, 152 Wn.2d at 238 (quoting State v. Kane, 101 Wn. App. 607, 612, 5 P.3d 

741 (2000)).

Farris argues the statutory amendment’s statement of intent “uses strong 

words that convey the legislature’s intent to eliminate sentencing standards that 

automatically increase a person’s punishment based on their actions as a child.” 

The intent section states:

The legislature intends to:

(1) Give real effect to the juvenile justice system’s express goals of 

rehabilitation and reintegration;

(2) Bring Washington in line with the majority of states, which do 

not consider prior juvenile offenses in sentencing range calculations 

for adults;

(3) Recognize the expansive body of scientific research on brain 

development, which shows that adolescent’s perception, judgment, 

and decision making differs significantly from that of adults;

(4) Facilitate the provision of due process by granting the 

procedural protections of a criminal proceeding in any adjudication 

which may be used to determine the severity of a criminal 

sentence; and

(5) Recognize how grave disproportionality within the juvenile legal 

system may subsequently impact sentencing ranges in adult court.

LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415, § 1. But as we observed in Troutman, the plain language 

of this section “says nothing about retroactivity.” 30 Wn. App. 2d at 599.

Therefore, the savings clause applies to Farris’s sentence.

1

 1 Farris also claims the savings clause does not change his analysis because “the offender 

score statute required the court to calculate the offender score at the time of sentencing, even 
No. 85718-5-I/6

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Finally, Farris contends the statutory amendment applies prospectively to 

his pending case because it is remedial. Remedial statutes relate to practice, 

procedure, or remedies, and do not affect a substantive right. State v. Pillatos, 

159 Wn.2d 459, 473, 150 P.3d 1130 (2007). However, our Supreme Court has 

“repeatedly made clear that changes to criminal punishments are substantive, 

not procedural.” Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 721 (citing State v. Smith, 144 Wn.2d 665, 

674, 30 P.3d 1245 (2001) (changing the meaning of the term “criminal history” in 

the SRA was a substantive change)). Moreover, “even a remedial amendment 

will be applied prospectively only if it contradicts a previous interpretation of the 

amended statute by this court,” Pillatos ̧159 Wn.2d at 473, and Farris makes no 

argument to satisfy this requirement. 

The law that governs Farris’s sentence is the law in effect at the time he 

committed his offense. The statutory amendment restricting inclusion of juvenile 

offenses in the offender score was enacted after Farris committed his offense 

and does not govern the calculation of his offender score. At the time of his 

sentencing, Farris had two juvenile and five adult felony prior convictions, 

amounting to an offender score of seven. The trial court properly calculated the 

offender score for purposes of sentencing Farris. 

Affirmed.

 before the legislature amended it” such that “[t]he amendment did not change the date of 

calculation; it only removed certain offenses from that calculation.” Farris is correct that the 

amendment does not change the requirement in RCW 9.94A.525(1) that the offender score is 

calculated as of the date of sentencing. Farris also argues that HB 1324 should apply to his 

sentence because it is pending on appeal, and the “triggering event” for the offender score statute 

is sentencing. However, as discussed above, RCW 9.94A.345 of the SRA and the savings clause, 

RCW 10.01.040, together unambiguously mandate that the date of the offense determines the law 

that the sentencing court must apply at the time of sentencing. Therefore, Farris’s arguments are 

unavailing.
No. 85718-5-I/7

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WE CONCUR: