### IN THE S UPREME COUR T OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Oc to be r 1, 200 8 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE V 

### . KEN NET H C. DAILE Y, III
App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro m th e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2004-B-1779 Steve R. Dozie r, Judge

No. M2007- 01874-SC-R11- CD - F iled Janu ary 2, 2009

We gr anted pe rmission to appea l the Def endant’ s cer

tified question of law to de termine whe ther the police violated the Defe ndant’s constit utional rig hts by subjecting him to a custodial interrog ation without f irst inf orming him of his c onstitut ional rig hts a s require d by the Supreme Court’s de cision in M ir and a

v. Ar izon a

. We ho ld that the De fe nd ant’ s c on fe ssi on s, bo th ob ta ine d in vio latio n of his fede ral a nd state constitutional privileg es ag ainst self-incr imination, shoul d have be en suppre ssed. Acc ording ly , the Def

endant’ s conviction must be vacated and the c harg e dismissed.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1; Judg m e ntof t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Reve rsed; Convict ion Vacated; Charge Dism issed

C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he cour t, in which J ANI CE M. H OL DER , C.J ., G A RY R. W ADE , and W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., J J ., and E. R I L EY ANDE R S ON , S P

. J ., joined.

J

. C ar l t o nD r

u m w r i g h t , B r e n t w o o d , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e a p p e l l an t , K e n n e t hC

. D a i l e y , III

. Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Mic ha e l E . M oo re , So lic ito r G e ne ra l; E liza be th T. Ry an, Associate Deputy Attorney Gene ral; Victor S. Johnson I I I , District Attorney Gene ral; and Pamela Sue Ande rson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.2 OP IN ION

P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND

This matter is befor e us for the second tim e. After being char g ed with first degr ee mur der, the Def endant f iled a m o t ion to suppress two incriminating statements he made to police offic ers conce rning his role in the victim’s homicide on the basis t hat he ha d been subje cted to a c ustodial interrog ation without t h e re q u i s i te Miranda war nings. A fter a

hear ing, the trial court de nied the Def endant’ s motion. The Defe ndant s ubsequently enter ed a g uilty plea to second deg ree murder but
re se rv e d f

or a pp e a l th e fo llo wi ngc e rt if ie d q ue sti on of law reg ard ingthe a dmi ssi bil ity of his state me nts :
Whether the Defenda nt was subjected t o a custodial interrog ation by Metro Police Detec tives on or about May 4, 2004 such that his subsequent stateme nts were taken in violation of hi s rig hts pursuant to Article 1, Section Nine of the Tenne ssee Consti t u t i o n, the Fif

th Amendment of the U nited States Consti tution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of t he United States Consti tution. The Def endant ga ve two statements t o detec tives on May 4, 2004. No Miranda wa rn i n gs wer e g iven by

the detec tives prior to the first stateme nt g iven by Def endant. I t is the Def endant’ s position t hat this was a c ustodial interrog ation there by requiring Miranda war

nings. Immediately

following Def

endant’ s first statem ent, Miranda
wa rn ing s w e re g ive n b y

the de te c tiv e s and the De fe nd ant g ave a se c on d s tate me nt. I t is the Defe ndant’s position that this s econd statement was obta ined b y the detec tives using inter

rog ation techniques e x pressly reject ed b y

the United States S u p re m e Court in Mi

sso ur i v . S

e ibe rt , 1 2 4 S. Ct

. 2 6 0 1 , 1 5 9 L

. E d

. 2 d 6 4 3 ( 2 0 04). Testimony

was g iven by Detec tive Mike Roland that the State’s proof of De fenda

nt’s g uil t con sis ts e nti re ly

of the state me nts he g ave on May 4, 20 04 the re by

makin g thi s question disposit ive of the c ase. The pa rties ag ree and the C o u rt aff irms that the cer

tified question set out above is e x pressly

rese rved a s part of the plea a g ree ment and that all parties consent to this reservation. Further , all parties a g ree t h at t h is question is di spositive of the
case

.
On appea l the first time, the Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appe al on the g rounds th a t t h e r e c o r d “ d o e s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e c e rt i f i e d qu e s t i o n i s d i s p o s i t i v e o f t h e c a s e

. ” We g ra nte d p e rm iss ion

to a pp e a l and

dis a g re e d w iththe int e rm e diate a pp e llate c ourt ’s ana ly sis , concludingthat the ce rtified question wa s disposit ive. We there fore rema nded the c ase to the Court of Criminal Appea ls for its consideration of the ce rtified question on its merits.

On re mand , the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls c on c lud e d th a t th e e vid e nc e did no t pr e po nd e rate
a g a ins t th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n that the De fe nd a nt ha d not be e n in c us tod

y wh e n h e ma de his initial confession. The intermediate appellate court there fore aff irmed the trial c ourt’s denia l of the De fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss. We gra

nte d th e De fe nd ant’ s app lic a tio n f or pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l.3 F AC TS

Me tr o N a sh vil le po lic e De te c tiv e Mik e Rol and te sti fi e d at the su pp re ssi on he ari ngthat, i n April 2004, a woman’s sever ely decompose d body was found in an abandoned ve hicle at Tommy ’s Wrecke r Service in Davidson County . A piece of rope was wr apped a round the woma

n’s nec k. The victim was transporte d to the Medica l Ex aminer’ s Offic e for examination and w as i d entified a s Na nc y Mari e L y on s.

I n an attempt to disc over information about the victim, Det. Roland interviewe d sever al of the W rec ker Service’ s employ ees. I n conjunction with the investig ation, all of the e mploy ees w ere asked to submit “elimination [ fing er]prints.” The D efe ndant, Kenne th C. Dailey , I I I , was one of the employ ees inter v i ew ed and f inge rprinted by

the police. Althoug h they had no for ensic or othe r evidenc e linking the Def endant to the body , the police, ba sed upon “gut fee lin gs and ins tincts,” subsequently

decide d that they wished t o interview him further

. Det. R oland asked the s on of the
o w n e r o f T o m m y ’ s W r e c k e r S e r v i c e t o t e l l t h e D e f

e n d an t t h a t t h e p o l i c e n e e d e d t o r e t a ke his fing erpr ints.

Det. Roland admitted that the rea l r eason for r equestingthe Def endant to come down to the police station was to inter view him a

nd that a second fing erpr inting was unnece ssary

. Det. Roland
a lso te sti fi e d th a t, at th e tim e the De fe nd ant r e po rt e d f or his se c on d me e tin g wi th t he po lic e , th e y

did
no t ha ve pr ob a ble c a us e to a rr e st h im. I nd e e d, De t. Rola nd state d that he “ ha d n o e vid e nc e to a rr e st [t he De fenda

nt] on” and that he “had not hing on him.” T he dec ision to ask for new pr ints was made beca use the off

icer “didn’t wa

nna [sic] scar e him.”

Acc ording to Det. Roland, the De fenda nt drov e to t he station at the a ppointed time and parke d acr oss the s tree t. When the Def endant e ntere d the police station, De t. Roland met him i n the front lobby

and aske d him “if it was okay if [they ], m ay

be, talked a

littl e bit b ef

ore [they ] di d the [finger ]prints .” De t. Roland descr ibed t heir ini tial interac tion as “plea sant.” When the De fenda nt ag ree d to spe ak with D et. Roland, the office r escor ted him ba ck to a

n interview room in the Criminal I nvestig ations Division (“CI D”) are a. The men passed thr oug h two sets of interior door s to reac h the CI D a re a . D e t. R ola

nd a sk e d the De fe nd ant to take a se a t be hin d the ta ble in t he int e rv ie w r oo m. After the Def endant did so, Det. R oland l eft to retrie ve his paper work. Det. R oland t estified that the Def endant was not in custody at t his time and was not handcuf fed; while he was g one, De t. Roland le ft the int e rv ie w ro om doo r ope n an d ungua rd e d. Whe n De t. Rola

nd re tur ne d to the int e rv ie w r oo m, he was acc ompanied by Serg eant Pat Postig lione. They enter ed the inter view room a

nd closed the do or be hin d th e m. De t. Rol and te sti fi e d that he wa s arm e d duri ngthe int e rv ie w; he did no t r e c a ll whether Sgt. Postiglione wa s arme d. Det. R oland and Sgt. P ostiglione procee ded to interview the De fe nd ant.

The intervie w was vide otaped a nd this Court has reviewe d the tape. It shows the Def endant seate d in a bac k corne r of the room at a diagona l from the door, f acinga table. D et. Roland is seated
acr oss the table and f

acing the Defenda

nt. Sgt. Postiglione a

ppear s to be seate d in front of the door , fac ing the Def

endant. The following summarizes the events portra y ed on the videota

pe.4

The intervie w beg an with a f ew minutes of casua l c onversation a bout unr elated matters. The Def endant voluntee red some inf ormatio n ab o u t how he sometimes close d up the wre cker shop, beg inning with, “O ne thing Iforg ot to tell y ou,” re fer ring to his earlier

conver sation at the wre cker shop with an offic er. A ll three men spoke in a conve rsational tone throug hout the interview.

After approximately

three minutes, Det. Roland asked the Defe ndant whethe r he ha d worke d the we e ke nd

be fo re the vic tim ’s bo dy

ha d b e e n f

ound . T he De fe nd ant a

ns we re d a ff

ir mativ e ly . Sg t. Posti g lione then aske d the Def endant if he worke d ever

y wee kend, and the Def

endant r esponded that he wo rk e d o ne we e ke nd

a month fo r t

he Wre c ke r S e rv ic e . T he De fe nd ant e xpla ine d th a t he wo uld g o to Tommy ’s Wrecke r Service at 6 p.m. on the Saturday s he worke d, close up the business at 10 p.m., le av e in th e b u s in e s s tr u c k , an d th e n r e tu

r n Sun d ay mo r

n in g

. D e t. Ro la

n d th e n asked the Def endant if he reme mbere d asking Det. Roland during the initial investigation whe ther the police would be able to solve the crime. T he De fenda nt stated that he re membere d asking that question and clar ified that he w as simply curious. De t. Roland then stated that they had “pr etty

much conc luded” their investig ation and told the Def endant that “ this is where it g ets a little bit tough for y ou.”

Det. Roland informe d the Def endant that his fing erpr ints had b ee n found “in a place they sh ou ldn ’t have be e n. ” Th e De fe nd ant a sk e d w he the r h is p ri nts ha d b e e n f ound ins ide the c ar. De t. Rol and re sp on de d th a t he wa s n ot g oin g to t e ll the De fe nd ant al l of the inf or matio n th a t he ha d. De t. Roland then told the Defe ndant that the m atter w as “ve ry serious” f

or the De fenda

nt and that the
re a so n he wa

nte d the De fe nd ant to co me to the sta tio n w a s to g ive the De fe nd ant a n o pp or tun ity to talk to them about the matter be cause the Def endant wa s “rig ht in the middle of it.” The De fenda nt responde d, “okay .”

De t. Rola nd tol d the De fe nd ant that th e pr ob le m he ha d w a s n ot whether the Def endant wa s inv olv e d (in the vic tim ’s de a th) , b ut whyhe r d e a th h a pp e ne d. He tol d th e De fe nd ant h e wa nte d to know “why did this lady die? ” The Def endant answe red, “I have no idea, I know nothing a bout it.” Det. Roland then a ssured the D efe ndant that t here was “ no way around” the evidenc e they had and that the evidenc e was “ther e.” Det. Roland acknow ledg ed that the Def endant had a w ife a

nd son and stated that he did not see the Def endant a s a “c ruel, mea

n person.” Det. R oland then told the Def endant that he neede d the Defenda nt to tell him what happene d, to help him determine “ wher e we g o from her e.” D et. Roland continued, infor ming the D efe ndant that if they went “stric tly

on the evidenc e,” the y

would have to c harg e the Def endant with f

irst de g ree murder. I f the De fenda nt had a g ood explanation for the victim’s death, however , it was possible that they could proc eed w ith a lesser c harg e. Sgt. Postiglione then explained that whateve r information the Defe ndant provided to them
wo uld be tur ne d o ve r to the dis tr ic t atto rn e y

. Sg t. P os tig lio ne inf or me d th e De fe nd ant t

hat, i f h e sa id nothing, the vic tim’s death looked like a c old-blooded ruthless killing. He told the Defe ndant that the y kn e w h e w a s i n v o l v e d , t h a tt h e y w e r e o k ay

w i t ht h a t , b u tt h a tt h e y

w an t e d h i mt o e xp la in

“ e xac tly why thi s hap pe ne d. ” Th e De fe nd ant a c kn ow le dg e d w hat Sg t. P os tig lio ne wa s te lli nghim by re pe a tin g “ uhhuh” a

c ou ple of tim e s.5

Det. Roland re sumed speakingto the Def endant, tellinghim that they knew this was not the first time the Def

endant had picked a g irl up. He told the Def endant that they knew “ more than what y ou can imag ine.” The De fenda nt protested, “I

hadn’t picke d up a g irl.” De t. Roland contradicte d the Def endant a nd then told him that there we re “ so many things about the fore nsics that y ou don’t understand.” He told the De fenda nt that they could have simply come out and picke d the Def endant up and “just done our

thing,” but that h e felt the victim’s death might have been a ccide ntal or
occur red dur ing a

robber y . Det. Roland posited that t here wer e several possible explanations for the victim’s de ath and that he did not fee l it was “ruthless.” He then told the Def endant t h at t he Def endant wa s the onl y person who could give them an e x planation. Det. Roland e mphasized that it w ou ld n ot h e lp t

he De fe nd ant “ a t a ll” to r e fu se to t a lk t o th e m. Sg t. P os tig lio ne int e rj e c te d th a t, i f t he De fe nd ant d id n ot t e ll them wha t hap pe ne d, the n it appea red he was covering something up and that he was a cold-blooded individual. The De fenda nt retorte d that he wa s “not a c old-blooded individual.”

Det. Roland res u m ed an d t o ld the Def endant, “ now is when you need to talk to us.” The Def endant c h a ll e n g e d

them on the fing erpr ints. S g t. Post iglione r esponded the y had found pr ints that “only the p e r s o n inv o lv e d in th e h o mi c id e w o u ld ’ v e le f t. ” Sg t. Po s ti g li o n e r e it e r a te d th a t the y alre ady knew that the Def

endant wa s involved in the homicide and re minded the Def endant that he had a f amily . Sgt. Postiglione a dvised the De fenda nt not to paint him self into a cor ner. Sg t. Pos tig lio ne c on tin

ue d, te lli ng the De fe nd ant that De t. Rol a nd ha d be e n on th e ca se “24/7,” that they

wer e not mad at the Defenda nt, that they did not think he was a monster, but that he had to e x plain “why

this occurr ed.” T he De fenda nt responded, “ Idon’t know what to say .”

Both off icer s told the Defe ndant, “tell us what happene d.” De t. Roland added t h at t he Def endant wa s backinghimself into a corne r, i n t o a b ad position, and that the only way the Def endant c ould help himself was to tell them the truth. Det. Roland told the Def endant that he was

“ g oin g to hav e to an sw e r, ob vio us ly , f or wh a t’ s h a

pp e ne d, the re ’s no do ub t a bo ut i t.” Sg t. P o s t i gl i o n e ad v i s ed t h e D ef en d an tt o ex p l ai ni nas m u ch d et ai l as h e c o u l d , an d t h ey wo u l d t h en go from ther e. He told the D efe ndant that they understood he w as ner vous and that they

thought he g ot
c a ug ht u p in so meth ing . T he De fe nd ant a g a in r e sp on de d, “ Ido n’ t kn owwh a t to say .” Sg t. Pos tig lio ne tol d th e De fe nd ant t hat te lli ngthe m w hat ha d h a pp e ne d w ou ld “relie ve ” him , a c kn ow le dg ingthat th e De fe nd ant h a d a he art and so ul.

Det. Roland next asked the De fenda nt, “wher e did y ou meet her at? ” The De fenda nt paused
an d t h en re s p o n d ed , “M u rf

re es b o ro R o ad

. ” S gt

. P o s t i gl i o n e t h en ad v i s edth e D e fe n d an tt o “go throug h it like a story .” The Def endant explained that he had picked the vic tim up, and she indicated that she wa

nted to g o back to the D efe ndant’s plac e. The y drove back to the wrecke r busi ness. The victim wanted more money . She threatened him. The Defe ndant s tated, “I don’t know after that.” He sa id that the next t hing he knew, she was lay ing the re. H e thought he pushed her down, he wa s upset, and the ne x t thing he kne w, “she was de ad.”T he D ef end ant s t at ed s p eci f

i cal l y duri ng t he second round of q uest i o ni ng t hat he and t he vi ct i m had s ex at t he 1 wrecker s ho p and t hat t hey t hen argued ove r how m uch m o ney he o wed her.
6 Det. Roland aske d, “how wa s she dead? ” and Sg t. Post iglione told the De fenda nt that it was important for him to remembe r the de tails. The Def endant then told the office rs that he wa s on top of her , he had his ha

nds around he r throat, a

nd that he tried to cover

up what he ha d done by

putting a piec e of r ope ar ound her ne ck. De t. Roland asked a number of specific questions about the rope , which the De fenda

nt answer ed. The Def

endant a lso told t he off

icer s that he took the victim’s body and put it in one of the c ars on the lot.

After hear ing the Def

endant’ s expl anation of killing the victim, Det. Rol an d told the Def endant, “You understand that y ou have to be char g ed with something ? ” De t. Roland then said, “I want to make this off

icial bec ause that’s what’s g oing to he lp y ou,” and told the De fenda nt that he ha d to re a d h im h is r ig hts . D e t. R ola nd a sk e d the De fe nd ant if

he ha d e ve r h a d h is r ig hts re a d to him be fo re , to wh ic h th e De fe nd ant r e sp on de d, “ no .” Th e De fe nd ant as ke d De t. Rola nd , “d oe s th is mean I ’m staying he re tonig ht? ” D et

. R o l an d repeated that he was “ making it official” a nd that meant the De fenda

nt would be s taying the night. B y this point , approximately twenty -one minutes had ela psed since the conver sation beg an.
Det. Roland then re ad the De fenda nt his rights, duringwh i ch t h e Defendant stated that he was willing to ta lk. Det. Roland revie wed the rig hts waiver w ith the Defe ndant, and the D efe ndant signe d the waiver

. Det. Roland and Sgt. Posti g lione resumed questioning the Def endant. No br eak
wa s ta ke n a nd no ne of the me n le ft

the int e rv ie w r oo m. A t no tim e did De t. R ola

nd or Sg t. Pos tig lio ne te ll the De fe nd ant t hat th e state me nt h e ha d ju st g ive n w ou ld no t be a dmi ssi ble a g a ins t him

. Duringthe initial phase of the second round of questioni ng , Det. Roland made a couple of g ener al re fer ence s to their pre- war ning c onversation. Overa ll, h o we v er, the second r ound of interrog ation consisted of the D efe ndant re p eating his confe ssion, adding a fewdetails, and

1

ans we ri nga dd iti on a l sp eci fi c qu e sti on s b y the of fi c e rs ; f or ins tanc e , h owmuc h mo ne y the vic tim
c h ar g e d h i m , w h a th a d

h e d o n e w i t ht h e v i c t i m ’ s p u r s e , an d qu e s t i o n s a

b o u th i s p a s ta c t i v i t i e s in New Y ork and Florida. At the end of t he second round, t he officer s informed the D efe ndant that he would be cha

rg ed with a “ standard c riminal homicide ch ar ge.” The sec ond round of que stioning took approxim ately

eleve n minutes.

STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW
On appe al from a

denial of a

motion to suppress, we revie w the trial court’ s leg al conc lusions de no vo wi th n o p re sumpt ion of c or re c tne ss. State v. Wal ton , 4 1 S. W.3 d 7 5, 81 (T e nn . 2 00 1) ; State v. Yea rg an, 958 S.W .2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997). We will uphold a trial court’s f indings of f

act in a suppression hea

ring unless the evidence preponder ates to the contrary

. State v. Odom, 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) . Howeve r, whe re the evidenc e includes a co m plete and a ccur ate videota pe depiction of the police interview which is the subject of the suppression h ea ri ng , the trial cour t’sT he T enn es s ee C o nsti t ut i on al s o prot ect s i ndi vi dual s ag ai ns t comp el l ed s el f

- i ncr i mi nat i on: “ i n a l l cr i mi nal 2
p ro se c u tio n s, the a c c u se d

. . . sha ll n o t b e c o m p e lled to giv e e v id e n c e a g a ins t him se lf. ” T e n n . C o n st. ar t. I, § 9

.

T he Fo urt eent h A m end m ent s ecures app l i cat i o n of t he Fif t h A m end m ent t o t he several s tat es. M al l o y v. 3 H o g a n , 3 7 8 U .S . 1 , 8 (1 9 6 4 ).
7 finding s of fa ct with respe ct to the matters de picted on the videota pe ar e also s u b

j ec t to de novo revie w. State v. Pay

ne, 149 S.W.3d 20, 25 (Tenn. 2004).

AN AL YSI S
I. Que stioning i n a Custodial

Setting: Miranda v. Arizona

This c ase require s us to r eempha siz e a criminal defe ndant’s funda mental constitutional right ag ainst compelled self-incrimination as ex plicated in the s eminal Supreme Court c ase of Miranda

v. Ar i zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In that case , the Supreme Court unde rtook an e x haustive examination of the tension betwee n the g overnme nt’s interest in obtaining c onfessions of c riminal behavior and “t h e privileg e ag ainst self-incr imination–the essential mainstay of our a dversa

ry sy stem.” I d. at 460. That privileg e i s s et fo rt h in the Fifth Ame ndment to the United States Con st it ut ion: “ No pe rs on

. . . s ha ll b e c omp e lle d in any c ri min a l c a se to b e a

wi tne ss a g a ins t 2 himse lf

. ” A f te r o b s e r v in g th a t “ [w ]e s o me ti me s f o r g e t h o w lo n g it h a s ta

k e n to e s ta

blish the 3 privileg e ag ainst self-incr imination, the sources fr om which it came and the f ervor with which it was defe nded,” Mira

nda, 384 U.S. at 458, the Court set for th a long line of historical prec edent for the Fifth Ame ndment, including the Bible, id. a t 459 n.27, and the 1637 trial of John L ilburn, id. The Court then observe d that

we may view the historical development of t he privil eg e as one which g roped f or the proper scope of g overnme ntal power

over the citizen. As a ‘nobl e p ri n ciple ofte n transce nds its origins,’ the pr ivilege has come rig htfully to be re cog nized in part as an individual’s substantive rig ht, a ‘rig ht to a private e nclave wher e he may lead a private life . That rig ht is the hallmark of our dem o cr ac y

. ’ . . . All these policies [underly ing the rig ht ag ainst self-inc rimination] point to one ove rridingthought: the
c on sti tut ion a l found a tio n und e rl ying the pr ivi le g e is the re sp e c t a g ov e rnme nt– state
or fe de ra l–m

us t a c c or d to the dignit

y and int e g ri ty of its c iti zen s. To ma int a in a ‘ fa ir state -i nd ivi du a l ba lanc e ,’ to re qu ir e the g ov e rnme nt ‘t o s ho uld e r t he e nti re loa d, ’ t o respe ct the inviolability

of the human per sonality , our ac cusatory sy stem of cr iminal justice demands that the g overnme nt se ek ing to punish an individual produc e the
e vid e nc e a g a ins t hi m by

its ow n in de pe nd e nt l a

bo rs , r a the r t

ha n b y the c ru e l, s imp le expedient of compelling it from his own mouth. I n sum, the privileg e is fulfilled
on ly wh e n th e pe rs on

is gua ra nte e d th e ri g ht ‘ to r e main sil e nt u nle ss h e c ho os e s to speak in the unf

ettere d exercise of

his own will.’

I d. at 460 (c itations omi tted).W h ile th e S ta te m a y no t use a n un w a rn e d c o n fes sio n in its ca se -in-c h ie f, su c h a c o n fes sio n m a y b e a d m issib le 4 f o r i m p eachm ent purp o ses agai nst a de f end ant who t est i f

i es. See H arri s v. N ew Y o rk, 40 1 U .S . 2 2 2 , 22 4

- 2 6 (19 7 1 ); Stat e v. H art s, 7 S

. W

. 3 d 78 , 85 (T enn. C ri m

. A p p

. 19 9 9 ).
8 Upon re cog nizi ng that the Court had “consistently

. . . acc orded a liberal c onstruction” to the pr ivi le g e a g a ins t se lf

-i nc ri min a tio n, id. a t 46 1, the Court fa mou sly he ld a s f oll ow s:
when a n individual is t aken into custody or otherw ise deprive d of his fre edom by the
a u t h o ri t i es i nan y

s i gn i fi ca n twa y

an d i s s u b j ec t edt o qu es t i o n i n g, t h e p ri v i l ege ag ainst self-incr imination is jeopar dized. . . . [According ly ,] [ h]e must be warne d prior to any questioning

t h a th e h a s t h e r i g h tt o r e m a i n s i l e n t , t h a tan yt h i n g h e s ays can be used ag ainst him in a court of law , that he has the rig ht to the presenc e of a n attorney , and that if he cannot aff ord an attorney

one will be appointed f

or him prior to an y qu e s ti o n in g if h e s o d e s ir e s

. O p p o rtu n it y to e xe r c is e th e s e r igh ts must be aff orded to him throug hout the i nterrog ation. After such warning s have be en g iven,
and su c h op po rt

un ity a ff or de d him , the ind ivi du a l ma y kn ow ing ly

and int e lli g e ntl y wa ive the se ri g hts and

a g re e to a

ns we r q ue sti on s o r m ake a st ate me nt. B ut u nle ss and until such war

nings a nd waiver are demonstrated by the prosec ution at trial, no
e vid e nc e ob ta ine d a s a

re su lt o f i nte rr og a tio n c an b e us e d a g a ins t hi m.

I d. at 478-79 (e mphasis added) ; see also Ore g on v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 n.1 ( 1985) (obse rving th at “[ a] Mir and a

vio latio n d oe s n ot c on sti tutec o e r c io nb u t r a th e r a f f o r d s a b r igh t- li n e , leg al presumption of coer cion, requiring suppression of all unwar ned statements”) ; Walton, 41 S .W.3d at 86. 4
By

its own terms, Miranda a pplies to the questi oning of an indi vidual who has be en “taken into custody

or otherw ise dep ri v ed of his fr eedom by the authorities in any

signific ant way .” 384 U.S. at 478. Our fir st step toward re sponding to the c ertified que s t i on in this case is there fore a de te rm inatio n o f whe the r t he De fe nd ant w a s in c us tod y duri nghis ini tia l in te rr og a tio n b y De t. Rol and and Sg t. Post ig lio ne or wh e the r his c us tod y did no t com me nc e un til the po int a t w hic h D e t. Rol and de liv e re d th e Mir and a

wa rn ing s.

II. De fining “ Custodial ”: Anderson

I n Sta t e v

. Ander son, 937 S.W .2d 851 (Tenn. 1996) , this Court held that the test for deter mining whe ther a

person is in custody

so as to be entitled to the wa rning s require d by

Miranda is “whethe r, under

the totality

of the c ircumstance s, a re asonable person in the suspect’s position would consider himself or herse lf deprive d of fr eedom of movement to a degree associate d with a fo rm a l arr e st. ” I d. a t 85 5; s e e a lso B e rk e me r v . M c Cart y , 4 68 U. S. 4 20 , 44 2 (19 84 ). T o a ssi st i n applying this test, the Ande rson cour t set forth a n o n -e x clusive list of fac tors rele vant to that “o b j ec t i v e a s s es s m en t , ” i n cl u d i n g
the time and location of the interrog ati o n ; t he duration and char acte r of the questioning; the of

fice r’s tone of

voice a nd g ener al demea

nor; the suspec t’s method9

of tr ans po rt a tio n to the pla c e of qu e sti on ing ; th e numbe r o f p oli c e of fi c e rs pr e se nt; any limit ation on movement or other form of re straint imposed on the suspect during the interrog ation; any interac tions betwee n the officer and the suspec t, including the words spoken by

the offic er to the suspe ct, an d the suspect’ s verba l or nonverba l
re sponses; the extent to which the suspect is confr onted with the law e nforc ement office r’s suspicions of g uilt or evidenc e of g uilt; and finally , the extent to which the suspect is made a

war e t h at h e or she is free to refr ain from a nsweringquestions or to e nd the int e rv ie w at w ill

.
937 S.W .2d at 855. This Court stressed that the de termination of whe ther a suspect is in custody

for Miranda pur

poses is a “ve ry

fac t specific inquiry .” I d.

The trial c ourt in this case de termined that the D efe ndant wa s n o t in custody prior to the delivery of the Mira

nda wa rning s based upon its finding s that the Def enda n t ar rived at the police station voluntarily ; was not handcuf fed; ag ree d to speak with Det. R oland; was in the intervie w room alone a nd with the door open for a period; that Det. Roland’s “tone and demea nor wer e cour

teous and polite”; that ther e we re no limitati o n s on the Def endant’ s movement “other than one of

the detec tives being positioned betwee n the def endant and the door”; and that the Def endant ne ver a sked to leave or

to consult an attorney . The trial c ourt conc luded that “the defe ndant was not in custody
un til a ft e r h e ma de the ini tia l inc ri min a tin g state me nts to t he de te c tiv e s. ” Th e tr ia l c ourt fa ile d to explain, however, what pre cisely chang ed in the De fenda nt’s circ u m s t an ces a fter his initial confe ssion to transform his situation from noncustodial to custodial. Our re view of the rec ord ind ic a te s th a t th e on ly c ha ng e wa s De t. Rola

nd ’s state me nt to the De fe nd ant t hat he wo uld

have to be cha rg ed with something and that De t. Roland “want[ed] to m ak e t h is official be cause that’s wh at ’s go i n g t o help y ou.” At that point, Det. Roland told the Def endant that he (De t. Roland)
ne e de d to re a d th e De fe nd ant h is r ig hts

.
On a pp e a l, the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls c on c lud e d th a t th e e vid e nc e did no t pr e po nd e rate ag ainst the t rial court’s finding that the Defenda nt was not in custody prior to receivinghis Miranda
war nings. A s additional support for its conclusion, the interme diate appe llate cour t noted that the initial portion of the interview lasted a pproxi mately

twenty -one minutes; the door of the interview
ro om w a s n ot l oc ke d; a

nd the De fe nd ant ne ve r re qu e ste d to c a ll a nyon e . T he int e rm e diate a pp e llate
c ourt a lso de te rm ine d th a t th e De fe nd ant’ s qu e sti on to De t. Rol and a s to wh e the r he wo uld have to spend the nig ht at the pol ice station afte r Det. Roland informed him that Det. Roland had to “ make it official” indicated that, until that point, t he De fenda nt “believe d he wa s fre e to leave .”
Upon our re view of D et. Roland’s testimony at the suppre ssion hearingand the videotape of the interview , we disag ree with the Court of Criminal Appeals and hold that the evide nce e stablishes that th e De fe nd ant w a s in c us tod y pr ior to b e ingg ive n th e Mir and a wa rn ing s. Applying the Ander son fac tors, we find that the prepondera nce of the evide nce e stablishes the following . The De fenda nt drove himself to the police station during the ea rl y ev en ing on the false pr etext that he was g oing to be fing erpr inted ag ain to a ssist in the police inve stigation. Upon his a rrival, one of the investigating detec tives instead asked if he would first talk to the m

. T heT hi s i s t o be expect ed, of cour s e, wh en an on- dut y pol i ce of f i cer conduc t s t he i nt er vi ew. 5

10 interview took plac e in a small interrog ation room located in a sec ured por tion of the building. The initial phase of the inter

view wa s not prolong ed. The char acte r of the que stioning wa s acc usatory and dema nding, a imed at convincingthe Def endant that the police a lrea dy had suff icient evidenc e to convict him of m urder ing the victim and that he had to g ive them an e x planation. Det. Roland’s and Sg t. Post iglione’ s tone o f voice a nd g ener al demea

nor we re c onversational; however , at least one of the off icer s was ar

med. Two off

icer s q u es t i o n ed him. The Def endant’ s movements wer e 5 restra ined to the extent that he was place d in the back c orner of a small room with one door , the door
was c losed, and a

police off

icer was sitting be tween the Def endant a nd the closed door . The interac tions between the Def endant a nd the offic ers c onsisted of a few pref atory comments about the Def endant’ s prac tice of home schooling followed by incre asing ly focuse d acc usations and questions about the De fenda

nt’s involvement in the victim’s de ath. Only a few minutes into the interr og ation, Det. Roland told the Def endant t h at i f h e we n t “strictly on the evidenc e, [he had] to charg e [the Def endant] with first deg ree mu rder.” The Def endant’ s initi al re sponses ran the g amut from unequivoca l denials to challeng es to statements of “ Idon’t know what to s ay

. ” E v entually , afte r havin g be e n re pe a te dly tol d that the of fi c e rs kn e w the De fe nd ant wa s invo lve d in the vic tim ’s de a th and just neede d the details as to why , and that the police alre ady had sufficient evidenc e to convict him of first deg ree murder, the Def endant confesse d to killi ng the victim. The off icer s never inf or me d th e De fe nd ant t

hat he wa s f

re e to r e fr a in f

ro m ans we ri ngqu e sti on s o r that he wa s f re e to
e nd the int e rv ie w unti l a ft e r t he y ha d e xtra c te d a

c on fe ssi on

fr om h im.

This full recitation of the totality of the c ircumstance s surroundingthe Def endant’s initi al questioning c onvinces us that a r easona ble per son in the Defe ndant’s p o s it io n w o u ld h a ve conside red himself or her self “de prived of f ree dom of movement to a deg ree associate d with a forma l arre st,” at l ea s tb y

t h e po i n t at wh i ch De t

. R o l an d s t at ed , “i f I go s t ri ct l y

o nt h e e v i d en ce , Ih av e t o ch ar ge y ou wi th f ir st d e g re e mur de r. ” Th e De fe nd ant’ s e ve ntu a l qu e sti on a bo ut wh e the r he wo uld have to spend the nig ht–made only after Det. Roland infor med him that they

had to “make this official”– do e s n ot, in our e sti matio n, imp ly that the De fe nd ant be lie ve d up un til that po int that he wa s f

re e to leave . I t is equally

likely that he may

have be en wonde ring about the opportunities for ba il, or he
may have ho pe d th a t he wo uld be a llo we d to tur n him se lf in the ne xt day

a ft e r i nf or min g his fa

mil y of what had happe ned. I n any event, spe culation about the De fenda nt’s exact state of mind at the tim e he a sk e d th e qu e sti on is unn e c e ssa

ry and ir re le va nt: the inq

uir y fo c us e s on

wh a t a re a so na ble person in the De fenda

nt’s position would have concluded from t he circumstance s in which he f ound himself, not what the De fenda nt may actua lly have be en thinking at the time.

II I. “Qu esti on -F

irs t” I nte rroga tio n: Mi

sso ur i v . S

e ibe rt

Ha vin g de te rm ine d th at the De fe nd ant w a s in c us tod y fo r p ur po se s o f M ir and a

a t th e tim e he g ave his initial unwarne d confe ssion, we next consider whethe r the later wa rni ng s cure d the Miranda violation. In Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), the United States Supre me Court conside r e d

a c a s e in w h ic hth e p o li c e ar

r e s te d th e d e f e n d an t, to o k

h e r to th e p o li c e s tation, qu e sti on e d h e r a

bo ut a c ri me fo r t

hir ty to f or ty min ute s w it ho ut the b e ne fi t of Mir and a wa rn ing s, extracted a

confe ssion, and then g ave he r a twe nty minute break. Upon re suming the que stioning11

afte r t h e b rea

k, the police pr ovided the def endant he r Miranda

war nings, a nd she then e x ecute d a waiver

. A s ec o n d confession followed. Afte r she wa s char g ed with first deg ree murder, the defe ndant moved to s u p p re ss both her pre war ning a nd postwarningstatements. The tria l court suppressed the prew arning statement but a llowed the State to use the postwarning statement. A jury subsequently

convicted the defe ndant of sec ond deg ree murder.

At the Sup re me Court , th e c a se g e ne ra te d f our s e pa ra te op ini on s, wi th f

ive jus tic e s ult imate ly
co n c u r r in g th a t th e p o s tw ar

n in g s tate me n t w a s in a dmi s s ib le an d f o u r ju s ti c e s d is s e n ting on that iss ue . In a dd

re ssi ngthe int e rr og a tio n ta c tic s u se d b y the po lic e in S e ibe rt , th e plu ra lity op ini on fi rs t noted that “[t] h e te c hn ique of interr og ating in succe ssive, unwar ned and w arne d phases,” a tec hnique the plurality

ref err ed to as “ question-first,” ha d been pr o m o t ed b y “a national police tra ining org anization” with the object of “ rende r[ing] Miranda wa rning s ineffe ctive by

waiting for a particula r ly

o p p o rtu n e ti me to g iv e th e m, a f

te r th e s u s p e c t h a s a lr e a dy

c o n f e s s e d

. ” I d

. a t 6 0 9 -11. I n a sse ssi ngthe c on sti tut ion a lity of the pr a c tic e in l ig ht o f M ir and a , th e plu ra lity de te rm ine d th a t
[t ]he threshold issue when interrog ators question first and warn l ater is thus whether it w ou ld b e re a so na

ble to f ind that in the se c ir c ums tanc e s th e wa rn ing s c ou ld function ‘e ffe ctively ’ as Mira nda requires. Could the warning s eff ectively advise the suspect that h e had a

rea l choice a

bout givingan admissible statement at that juncture? Could they rea sonably convey that he could choose to stop t al k i n g even if he ha d ta lke d e arl ie r? Fo r u nle ss t he wa rn ing s c ou ld pla c e a su sp e c t wh o ha s ju st been inter rog ated in a position to make such a n informed c hoice, there is no prac tical justification for ac ceptingthe forma l warning s as compl iance with Miranda, or for treating the se cond stag e of inter ro gat i on as distinct from the first, unwa rned a nd ina dmi ssi ble se g me nt.

I d. at 611-12. The plurality was skeptica l about the ef fica cy of Miranda

war nings unde r such circ umstances, obse rving that “it is likely that if the interr og ators em p l oy the technique of wi thh old ing wa

rn ing s unti l af

te r int e rr og a tio n suc c e e ds in el ic iti ng a c on fe ssi on , th e wa rn ing s w ill be ine ff e c tiv e in p re pa

ri ngthe su sp e c t f

or su c c e ssi ve int e rr og a tio n, clo se in tim e and sim ila r i n content.” I d. at 613.
The plura lity

then set for

th a five- fac tor test pertinent to dete rmining whether late Miranda
war nings a re e ffe ctive:

th e completene ss and detail of the questions and answe rs in the first round of interrog ation, the over lapping content of the two statements, the timing a nd setting of the fir st and the second [i nterrog ation], the continuity of police personne l, a nd the deg ree to which the interr og ator’s questions treated t he second round as c ontinuous

w it hth e f ir s t [ r o u n d

o f qu e s ti o n in g ].

I d. at 615. Applying the se fac tors to the case befor e it, the plurality held the post-war ning statement t o b e i n ad m i s s i b l e. I d

. at 6 1 7

. I n s u p p o r t o f t h i s co n cl u s i o nt h at t h e e v en tu al M i ra n d a w arn i n gs we re i n ef fe ct i v e, t h e p l u ra l i t y

o p i n i o no b s erv edt h e f

o l l o wi n g:12

The unwa rned inter rog ation was c onducted in the s tation house, and the questioning was sy stematic, exhaustive, and mana g ed with psy cholog ical ski ll. When the police
wer e finished ther e wa s litt le, if any thing, of incriminating potential left unsaid. The
war ned phase of questioning proce eded afte r a pause of only 15 to 20 minutes, in t he same plac e as the unwar

ned seg ment. When the same office r who ha d conducte d the fi rs t ph a se re c ite d th e Mir and a wa rn ings, he sai d n oth ingto c ounte r t he pr ob a ble misim pression that the a dvice that a ny thing Seiber

t said could be used a g ainst her
a l s o a p p l i e d t o t h e d e t a i l s o f t h e i n c u l p a t o r y s t a t e m e n tp r e v i o u s l y

e l i c i t e d

. In particula r, the police did not advise that her pr ior statement could n ot be used. Nothing w as said or done to dispe l the oddity of wa rning about leg al rig hts to sil ence and counse l rig ht after

the police ha d led her

throug h a sy stematic interr og ation .

. . . The impression that the f urther que stioning wa s a mere continuati o n of the e arlier questions and re sponses was f ostered by

ref ere nces ba ck t o t he conf

ession alre ady g iven. I t would have be en re asonable to reg ard t h e t wo sessions as par ts of a continuum, in which it would have been unnatura l to ref use to r epeat at the second stag e what had bee n said befor e. These circumstances must be se en as c halleng ing the c omp rehens ib il ity

and e ff ic a c y of the Mir and a

wa rn ing s to the po int

that a
rea sonable person in the s uspect’s shoes would not have unde rstood them to convey a messag e that she r etained a choice about continuing to talk.

I d. at 616-17 (f

ootnotes omitt ed).

I n a sepa rate opinion, J ustice Ke nnedy ag ree d that the postwarningconf es s i o n by the defe ndant in Seibert wa s n o t ad missibl e. He disag ree d with the plurality ’s ana ly sis, however , e xpla ini ngthat th e plu

ra lity ’s te st envisions an objective inquiry from the perspe ctive of the suspect, and applies in the
c a se of bo th i nte nti on a l and

un int e nti on a l tw o- sta g e int e rr og a tio ns

. I n my vie w, thi s te st c uts too br oa dly . Mir and a ’s c lari ty is one of its str e ng ths , an d a mul tif a c tor te st t h a ta p p l i e s t o e v e r

y t w o
- s t a g e i n t e r

r o g a t i o nm ay s e r

v e t o u n d e r

m i n e t h a tc l ar i t y.

I d. at 621-22 (K ennedy , J ., concur ring in judgment) (citation omitted). J ustice Ke nnedy pref err ed to apply the principles of

Ore g on v. Elstad which held that “ a simple failure to administe r t he
war nings, una ccompa

nied by any actua l coer cion or other

circ umstances c alculate d to undermine the suspect’s a

bility to e x erc ise his f

ree will,” did not necessa

rily taint a subsequent, wa

rned c onfession. El sta d, 47 0 U .S. a t 30 9. Thus , Just ic e Ke nn e dy wo uld loo k to wh e the r t

he po lic e deli bera tely employ ed the “ two-step strate g y ” and, where they did, J ustice Ke nnedy

w o u ld e xc lu d e a p ostwarning statement that wa s relate d to the substance of the pre war

ning statement “unless c urative me asure s [were] taken be fore the postwarningstatement [was] made.” Seiber t, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kenne dy , J ., concurri n g in judgment) . J ustice Ke nnedy offe red a s one example of a c urative me asure , “a sub s ta n ti a l b r e ak

in ti me an d c ir c u ms ta

n c e s b e tw e e nth e p r e w ar n in g s tate me n t a

n d th e Miranda
war ning.” I d.W i t h res p ect t o t he m ul t i p l e o p i ni o ns generat ed by Sei b ert , we rei t erat e o ur ob ser vat i o ns i n N o rt hern: 6

“W h e n a fra g m e n te d C o u rt d e c id e s a c a se a n d n o sing le ra tio n a le e x p la inin g the re su lt e n jo ys t he assen t o f

f i ve Ju st i ce s, ‘ t he ho l d i ng o f t he C o urt m ay b e v i ew ed as that p o si t i o n take n b y t ho se M embe r s w h o c on cu r r ed i n t h e j u dg men t s on t h e n ar r owe s t g r ou n ds

. ’ ” M ar k s v

. U n i t ed St at es , 430 U

. S. 188, 193, 97 S. Ct

. 990, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 ( 1977) ( qu ot i n g G r eg g v

. G eor g i a, 428 U

. S. 153, 169 n.1 5 , 9 6 S

. C t

. 2 9 0 9 , 4 9 L

. E d .2d 8 5 9 (1 9 7 6 ) (o p i nio n of S t ew art, P o w ell , an d S t ev en s, JJ .)); see also C o e v. Stat e, 17 S.W

. 3 d 19 3 , 20 9 (T enn. 20 0 0 ). T al l y i ng t he vo t es f rom t he vari o us Se i b ert op i ni o ns p ro v id e s o n ly m inim a l cla rity as to the a n a lysis go v e rn ing the issu e in this c a se . Ju stice K e n n e d y’s

co ncurri ng op i ni o n i s general l y vi ewed as m o re narr o w t han t he p l ural i t y op i ni o n. [ Se e E d ward s v.
13 IV . A pp ly ing Se ibe rt: Sta te v . No rth e rn
This Court wa s first called upon to a pply Seibert in State v. Norther n, 262 S.W .3d 741 (Tenn. 2008). In Norther

n, the pol ice arre sted the defendant on drug c harg es and br oug ht him down to the police station. Prior to issuing Miranda war nings, the police sat the defe ndant in the ce nter of the

“ M u r d e r Squad Off

ice” wher e the de fenda

nt was surrounde d by

detec tives. The dete ctives discussed amongthemselves a shooting in which they suspected the defe ndant. “In g ener al, the conve rsation minimi zed the shooter’s r esponsibility and implied that t h e v i ct i m assumed the risk of be ing murdere d when he drove late at nig ht into a neig hborhood notoriou s fo r cr i m e. ” I d. at 745. The defe ndant listened to this conversation for about twenty minutes and then spontaneously announce d that he had be en prese nt a t the shooting. At that point, one of the detec tives reloc ated the def endant to an interviewroom and turne d on a videoc amer a. The detect i v e ad m i n i stered the Miranda
war nings a nd went over

a rig hts-waiver

form with the def

endant, whic h the defendant signed. The office r then interr og ated the de fenda nt about the shooting, to whic h the def endant “ confe ssed
rea dily .” I d. at 761.

I n a cha lleng e under

Seibert, we held that the initial conversation between the police off icer s in the d e f e n d an t’ s p r e s e n c e f

u n c ti o n e d a s th e e qu iv a le n t o f an inte r r o g a ti o n f

o r th e p u r

p o s es of Miranda. N orthern, 262 S.W.3d at 753. There fore , th e o vera ll interrog ation was nominallytwostep. We then undertook a car eful e x amination of the seve ral opinions written in Seibert. I d. at 757- 60. We rec og nized that J ustice B reyer indicated i n his separ ate concurr ing opinion a pre fer ence for a “simple rule ” that would “apply to the two-stag e interr og ation technique” and which w ould require
c ourt s to “ e xclu de the ‘f

ru its ’ o f t he ini tia l unwa

rn e d q ue sti on ingun le ss t

he fa ilure to w arn

wa s in g oo d f a ith .” Se ibe rt , 5 42 U. S. at 61 7 ( B re y e r, J., con c ur ri ng ). Justi c e B re y e r ne ve rt he le ss joi ne d in the plurality

opinion “in full.” I d. at 618. J ustice Ke nnedy expressed a pr efe renc e for “a na rrowe r test applicable only in the infre quent ca se . . . in which the two- step interrog ation technique w as used in ac a lc ulat e d w ay t o u n d e r m i n e t h e M i r an d a w ar

n i n g

. ” I d

. a t 6 2 2 ( K e n n e dy , J. , c o n c u r r i n g in judgme nt). Eventually , we f ound it unnecessa

ry in Northern “ to forete ll which, if any , of the Seiber t approa ches w ill eventually g arne r the a g ree ment of a ma jority of the [J ]ust ices,” Norther n, 262 S.W .3d at 760 , beca

use we deter

mined that the Miranda

war nings g iven prior to the se cond interrog ation in Northern w ere eff ective unde r any of the analy ses articulated in the various Seiber t op ini on s, id. I n th is c a se , w e a g a in d e te rm ine tha t it is u nn e c e ssa ry to p re dic t the e ve ntu a l outc ome of the competing Seibert approa ches beca use we find that the De fenda nt’s postwarningconfe ssion is i na dmi ssi ble un de r e ith e r t he plu ra lity ’s or Justi c e Ke nn e dy ’s te st. 6U n ited S ta te s, 9 2 3 A .2 d 8 4 0 , 8 4 8 n.9 (D .C . 2 0 0 7 ) (c iti n g c a se s h o ld ing tha t b e c a u se J u stice K e n n e d y’s

concu r r i ng opi ni on in Sei bert i s mo r e n ar r ow t han t he pl ur al i t y opi ni on, hi s opi ni on i s of s peci al sig n ifi c a n c e ).] H o w e v e r, J u stice K e n n e d y’s f o c u s o n the inte rr o g a ti n g o ff ic e r’s inte n t i s d ire c tly i nco nsi st ent wi t h the reasoning o f the ot her pl ural i t y jus t i ces and wit h t he reasoni ng of t he d i ss ent i ng ju stice s. In li g h t o f t h e s e v e n vo te s e x p licitly re je c ting J u stice K e n n e d y’s inte n t-b a se d tes t, d i sagr eem ent exi st s co ncerni ng t he anal y si s t hat Seibert i nst ructs c o urt s t o ap p l y when d et erm i ni ng t h e admi s s i bi l i t y of

pos t wa r n i n g s t at eme n t s

. Se e, e

. g

. , Edwa r ds v

. U n i t ed St at es , 923 A. 2d 840, 848 (D

. C

. 20 0 7 ) ( o b ser vi ng t hat “ t here i s som e d i sagr eem ent co ncerni ng the p reci se analy si s t hat Seibert

m and at es”); U ni t ed S t at es v. C arri zal es- T o l ed o , 4 5 4 F

. 3 d 1 1 4 2 , 1 1 5 1 (1 0 t h C i r. 20 0 6 ) ( “D et erm i ni ng the p ro p e r a p p lica tio n o f t h e M a rk s ru le to S e ib e rt is no t e a s y , b e c a u se a rg u a b ly Ju stice K e n n e d y’s p rop o sed ho l d i ng i n hi s co ncurrence wa s re je c ted by a majo ri t y of t he C o urt

. ”); U ni t ed Stat es v. St ewar t , 388 F. 3d 107 9, 109 0 (7t h Ci r

. 200 4) ( r eadi ng t he pl ur al i t y ’ s bal anc i ng test i nt o Jus t i ce K enned y ’ s requir em ent of “cur at i ve st ep s”); s ee al so D ani el S. N o o t er, Is M i ss o uri v. Seibert Pra ct i ca bl e?: Su pr eme C ou r t D an ce s t h e “ T wo- St ep” Ar ou n d M i r an da, 42 Am. Cr i m. L. Rev

. 1093, 1 0 9 4 (Sum m er 20 0 5 ).

2 6 2 S .W .3 d a t 7 5 9 -6 0 (fo o tno te p la c e d i n b ra c k e ts). W e a lso re c o g n iz e tha t t w o o f t h e J u stice s w h o p a rtic ip a te d in S e ib e rt a re no lo n g e r o n the S u p re m e C o u rt, re n d e rin g it s e v e n tua l co n stru c tio n b y the C o u rt e v e n m o re sp e c u la tive

.

T h e c irc u m sta n c e s su rr o u n d ing the v ic tim ’s b o d y w o u ld ha v e p ro v id e d the ne c e ssa ry c o rr o b o ra tio n . S e e S ta te 7

v. Sm i t h, 24 S.W

. 3 d 27 4 , 28 1 (T enn. 20 0 0 ).
14

V. Ap pli c ati on of t

heSe ibe rt P lurali ty

Test i n th is C

as e
The fir st factor

o f t he five -fa ctor Seiber t plurality test to determine whe ther the two- step “question-f

irst” interrog ation used in the instant case passes c onstitut ional muster is “the
c omp le te ne ss a

nd de ta il o f t he qu e sti on s and ans we rs in the fi rs t round of int e rr og a tio n. ” 54 2 U .S. at 615. In this c ase, Det. Roland and Sg t. Post iglione obta ined a c omplete and de tailed conf ession from the De fenda

nt before admi n i s t er ing the Miranda w arning s. The off icer s’ questioning was pointed and executed w ith psy cholog ical skill. I n response to their questions and claims of inc ri min a tin g e vid e nc e , th e De fe nd ant tol d the m wh e re he pic ke d up the vic tim , wh e re the y we nt, why they argued, how he killed her, what he did in an attempt to hide t hat he stra ng led her , and what he did with her b o d y . Were the D efe ndant’s initial confe ssion admissibl e, it would have be en sufficie nt to support the Defe ndant’s convic tion of second de g ree murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. 7 § 3 9- 13 -2 10 (2 00 3) . T his fa c tor we ig hs he avil y

a g a ins t th e e ff

ic a c y of the tard

y Mir and a

wa rn ing s.
The sec ond Seibert plurality fac tor is “the over lapping content of the two statements.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615. In this case, the ove rlap wa s considera ble. Only minor details wer e elicited in t he se c on d s tate me nt t

hat w e re no t a lso ob ta ine d in the fi rs t. T his fact or, too , w e ig hs he avil y a g a ins t th e e ff

e c tiv e ne ss o f t

he late Mir and a

wa rn ing s.

T h e t h i r d f a c t o r i s “ t h e t i m i n g an d s e t t i n g o f t h e f i r s t an d t h e s e c o n d ” i n t e r

r o g a t i o n s

. Id

. In this case, the second interrog ation took place mere minutes afte r t he first interrog ation, with no break in time. The second inter

rog ation took place in the same place as did the first: a small interrog ation
ro om i n a se c ur e d a re a of the po lic e statio n. Th e se c on d inte rr og a tio n w a s c on du c te d b y the same tw o p oli c e of

fi c e rs wh o c on du c te d th e fi rs t in te rr og a tio n, the fo ur th S e ibe rt fa c tor . B oth

of the se fa c tor s w e ig h a g a ins t th e e ff e c tiv e ne ss o f t

he e ve ntu a l Mi ra

nd a wa rn ing s.O f co urs e, whet her a s uspect i s “unde r a rr e st ” d o es not de p end on t he o f f i cer’ s subject i ve anal y si s. “ T he 8 subject i ve i nt ent of t he o f f i cer i s rel evant t o t he ass ess m ent [of whether a p ers o n has b een arres t ed ] onl y t o t he ext ent t hat t he o f

f i cer’ s i nt ent has b een co nveyed t o the p ers o n c o nf ronted. ” S t at e v. C rut cher, 9 8 9 S

. W

. 2 d 29 5 , 30 4 (T enn. 1 9 9 9 ) ( D row o t a, J. , dis sent i ng). D et

. R o l and never i nf o rme d t he D ef

end ant ab o ut hi s subject i ve und ers t and i ng t hat he had no evidence upo n whi ch t o ba se an arres t of t he D ef end ant

. T o t he co nt rary , D et

. R o l and repea t ed l y i nf o rme d t he D ef endan t t hat he d id h av e en ou g h e v i den ce t o s u ppor t t h e D ef en dan t ’ s a r r es t

. Se e al s o B er kem er, 468 U

. S. a t 442 ( hol di ng t hat “ [ a] p ol i ceman’ s unar t i cul at ed pl an ha s no bear i ng o n t he ques t i on whet her a s us pect was ‘ i n c us t od y ’ at
15 The fif th and final fa ctor looks to “the deg ree to which the interrog ator’s que stions treated the sec ond round as c ontinuous with t he first.” I d. I n this case, De t. R o l an d and S g t. Post iglione tr e a te d th e tw o rou

nd s of que sti on ing a s two po rt ion s of the same wh ole : th e se c on d b e ingme re ly the “of ficial” portion. At no time did either of them inform the De fenda nt that his ini tial statement could not be used a g ainst him. Cf. id. at 616. “Nothing w as s ai d or done to dispel the oddity of
war ning a bout leg al r i ghts to sil ence and counse l rig ht after the police ha d led [him ] t hroug h a sy stematic interrog ation.” I d. Moreove r, during the second round of questioning, D et

. Roland
re fe rr e d, a lbe it b riefly

and on ly tw ic e , to the De fe nd ant’ s in iti a l st a te me nt. Cf . id . A s in

Se ibe rt , “ [i]t w ou ld h ave be e n r e a so na ble to r e g ard

the tw o s e ssi on s a s p art s o f a c on tin uum, in whic h it would have be en unnatur al to ref use to repe at at the second stag e what had bee n said befor e.” I d. at 616-17. I ndeed, we are confide nt that a re asonable person in the De fenda nt’s shoes would have considere d his second stateme nt to be a for g one conc lusion, a nicety that simply

g ave him anothe r opportunity

to demonstrate his coope rativene ss in t he hopes of something le ss than a first de g ree murder c harg e.

I n this case , all five of the S eiber t plurality fac tors weig h ag ainst the effec tiveness of the tardy Miranda w arning s. This case is ther efor e distinguishable from Nor thern i n wh ic h w e deter mined that
on ly on e of the fi ve fa c tor s (t he c on tin uit y of po lic e pe rs onne l) po se d a thr e a t to the e ff

e c tiv e ne ss of t he late war

nings. See Northern, 262 S.W .2d at 761-63. We emphasize that, unlike the defe ndant in Northern, the Def

endant in this case was not wa rned of his right to remain silent until afte r he had
a lr e a dy c on fe sse d in

re sp on se to s pe c if

ic , ta rg e te d q ue sti on s. Un inf

or me d a bo ut t he ina dmi ssi bil ity of his fi rs t st a te me nt, the De fe nd ant ha d no wa y to k no w that a

po stw arn ingre fu sa l to inc ri min a te himself would be in any way effective. We f

ind, theref

ore, that a re asonable person in the De fe nd ant’ s sh oe s w ou ld not have un de rs too d th e e ve ntu a l Mi ra nd a wa rn ing s g ive n in

thi s c a se to have “ c on ve y [ed ] a m e ssa g e tha t [ he ] re ta ine d a

c ho ic e a bo ut c on tin

uin g to t a lk. ” Se ibe rt , 5 42 U. S. at 617. Acc ording ly , th e t ar d y M i randa war nings in this case wer e not ef fec tive to apprise the De fe nd ant t

hat he ha d a

re a l, c on se qu e nti a l op po rt un ity to c ho os e to r e ma in s ile nt at th a t po int

.
VI . A pp lic ati on of J

us tic eKe nn e dy ’s “Nar

ro we r Te st”
Applying Justice Kenne dy ’s test in this case, we first consider wh et h er the police off icer s deliberately

employ ed the two- step interrog ation technique so as to unde rmine the eve ntual Miranda
wa rn ing s. De t. R ola

nd wa s a sk e d d

ur ingc ro ss- e xami natio n at th e su pp re ssi on he ari ngwh e the r i t
wa s “ a con sci ou s dec isi on on [his ] part , b e fo re [he ] int e rv ie we d [th e De fe nd ant], no t to g ive him Miranda w arning s? ” De t. Roland responded, “ I t was a ve ry co n s ci o u s decision, that he wa s not
un de r a rr e st, tha t I ha d no e vid e nc e to arr e st him on , and that it w a s a bs olute ly no re a so n to re a d h im his Miranda rig hts.” Thus, Det. R oland readily admitted that he consciously decide d not to provide 8a p a rtic u la r tim e ; t h e o n ly re le v a n t in q u iry is h o w a r e a so n a b le m a n in the su sp e c t’s p o sitio n w o u ld ha v e un d e rs to o d his

si t uat i o n”). W e al so reco gni ze, as has t he Sup rem e C o urt , t hat “ t he t ask of de f i ni ng ‘ cust o d y ’ i s a sl i p p ery one , and

‘ pol i ce men i n v es t i g at i n g s er i ou s c r i mes [ ca n n ot r ea l i s t i ca l l y be ex pec t ed t o] m ak e n o er r or s w h at s oev er

. ’ ” El s t ad, 470 U .S . at 3 0 9 (q u o ting M ic h iga n v. T u c k e r, 4 1 7 U .S . 4 3 3 , 4 4 6 (1 9 7 4 ))

.

In thi s case, we have D et

. R o l and ’ s very cand i d t est i m o ny ab o ut hi s m i nd

- set at t he t i m e he b e g a n his 9 i n t er r og at i on of

t h e D ef en dan t

. As r ec og n i ze d by t h e Se i ber t pl u r al i t y , h owe v er , “ t h e i n t en t of t h e of f i ce r w i l l r ar el y be

. . . ca ndi dl y admi t t ed. ” Sei bert , 54 2 U

. S. at 61 6 n

. 6. Jus t i ce K enn edy ’ s t es t becomes eve n more probl emat i c i n c as es inv o lvin g les s c a n d id tes tim o n y.
16 the De fe nd ant w ith Mi rand a warning s, but pr ote ste d th a t th e c ir c ums ta nc e s d id n ot r e qu ir e the m. This response hig hlights the diff iculties with applying Justice Kenne dy ’s test. A t est that focuse s 9

on t h e s u b

j ective mind-set and motivations of the interrog ating police off icer (s) c reates the po ssi bil ity

that a po lic e of fi c e r co uld manip ulate the sc e ne of the int e rr og a tio n a nd the n s ub se qu e ntl y claim that his failure to issue Miranda warning s was in “g ood faith.” This c ircular rea soning is not h e l p f u l t o t h e c r

u c i a l qu e s t i o no f

w h e t h e r t ar dy M i r an d a

w ar n i n g s f u n c t i o ne f

f e c t i v e l y. We find that Det. Roland and Sgt. Posti g lione deliberately set the stag e for

the Def endant’ s tw o
- s t e p i n t e r

r o g a t i o n s o a s t o u n d e r

m i n e h i s e v e n tu a l M i r an d a w ar n i n g s

. I n s u

p p ort of thi s conclusion, we emphasize the fa lse prete nses under which the De fenda

nt was ca lled to the police station, the office rs’ failure to a dvise the Def endant during the first stag e of the interrog ation that he was not under

arr est and that he was fr ee to lea ve at a ny time, and their subs eq u en t fa ilure at the
commence ment of the sec ond stag e of the i n t er ro gati on to inform the Def endant that his initial statement would not be a dmissibl e ag ainst him.

The sec ond prongof Jus tice Ke nnedy ’s test is whether sufficie nt cu rative me asure s were taken pr ior to the Def

endant’ s second c onfession “to ensure that a rea sonable pe rson in the suspect’ s situation would unde rs t an d the import and ef fec t of the Miranda

war ning a nd of the Mira

nda waiver .” Seiber

t, 542 U.S. at 622 (Kenne dy , J ., concu rr i n g i n judgme nt). We hold that no such sufficie nt curative measure s were taken in this case . Ag ain, the off icer s fa i l ed t o inform the Def endant that his first confession would not be admissi ble aga inst him . There was no bre ak in time, pla c e , o r p e rs onne l, a

nd the on ly ind ic a tio n th a t anything about the Def endant’ s circumstanc es had
c ha ng e d w a s D e t. R ola

nd ’s de c laratio n f

oll ow ingthe De fe nd ant’ s in iti a l st a te me nt t hat th e y ha d to

“ make it o ff

ic ia l.” No re a so na

ble pe rs on

in t he D efen da

nt’ s p os iti on

a t th a t ti me and

un de r t ho se ci rc u m s t an ces would have unde rstood t h e i mp o rtan d ef fe ct o f t h e p o s t -c o n fe s s i o nM i ra n d a w arn i n gs and wa iver.

Our c onclusion that the Def endant’ s postwarning confe ssion was not admissible under either of th e S e ibe rt

a pp ro a c he s le ave s u s w ithno c ho ic e but to fi nd tha t th e De fe nd ant’ s mo tio n to
su pp re ss b oth

of his state me nts sh ou ld h ave be e n g ra nte d be c a us e his ini tia l st a te me nt w a s ta ke n in

v i o l at i o no f h i s Fi ft hAm en dm en tri gh t aga i n s t s el f- i n cr i m i n at i o n , an d t h e t ar dy M i ra n d a w arn i n gs did not function eff

ectively so as to rende r his second state ment admissible.17 VII. Tenne

ssee Constitution

Th e Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion a lso pr ote c ts pe rs on s ag a ins t com pe lle d sel f- inc ri min a tio n: “i n all criminal prose cutions, the ac cused . . . shall not be compelled to g ive evidenc e ag ainst himself.” Tenn. Const. art. I , § 9. This Court has co n cl uded that “the test of voluntariness for confe ssions

u n d er Ar t i cl e I , [section] 9 is broader and more protec tive of individual rig hts than the test of voluntariness under

the Fif th Amendment.” State v. C ru mp, 834 S.W .2d 265, 268 (Tenn. 1992) (citing State v. Smit h, 834 S.W .2d 915 (Tenn. 1992) ). Indeed, w e have held that the

extraction of an ill ega l , u nwar ned conf ession from a de fenda

nt raises a re bu tta ble presum p ti o nth a t a

s u b s e qu e n t c o n f

e s s io n , e v e nif

p r e c e d e d b y p r o p e r M ir anda
war nings, is tainted by

the initial illeg ality

. That presumption may be over come by the prosec ution, howe ver, if the State ca n establish “that the taint is so attenuate d as to justi fy admission of the subsequent c onfession.”

Smit h, 834 S.W .2d at 919 (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 335 (B renna n, J ., dissenting) ).

I n Sm ith , th is C ourt

de te rm ine d th a t

the cr ucial inquiry fo r t h e courts bec omes whethe r the e vents and c ircumstance s surroundingand followingthe initial, ill eg al conduc t of t he law e nforc ement off icer s pr e ve nte d th e a c c us e d f

ro m subs e qu e ntl y (1 ) makin g a fr e e and inf or me d ch oic e to waive the State constitutional rig ht not to pr ovide evidenc e ag ainst one’s self , and (2) voluntarily

confe ssing his involvement in the cr ime.

I d. We t he n s e t f or th a lis t of nin e fa c tor s that c ourt s sh ou ld c on sid e r whe n e xami nin g the tot a lity of the c ircumstance s surroundingthe two conf es s i o n s in order to de termine whe ther the se cond confe ssion “ca

n truly be ter med a knowingand voluntary statement.” I d. at 920. Those nine f actor s are :
1. The use of

coer cive tac tics to obtain the initial, ill eg al conf ession and the c ausal
connec tion be tween the illega l conduct and the challeng ed, subseque nt confe ssion;

2. Th e te mpo ra l pr oximi ty of the pr ior and su bs e qu e nt c on fe ssi on s;
3. Th e r e a d in g an d e xp la n a ti o n o f M ir an d a r igh ts to th e d e f e n d an t b e f

ore the subsequent conf

ession;

4. The c ircumstance s occur ring afte r the ar

rest and c ontinuing up until the making of the subseque nt confe ssion including, but not limit ed to, the leng th of the dete ntion
and the de pr ivatio n o f f

oo d, re st, and

bathr oo m f

a c ili tie s;

5. The coer civene ss of the atmosphere in which any questioning tookp lace inc lud ing , b ut n ot l imi te d to, the pla c e wh e re the qu e sti on ingoc c ur re d, the ide nti ty18

of the interr og ators, the f

orm of the questions, and the re peate d or prolong ed natur e o f t h e q u es t i o n i n g; 6. The pre s en ce of interve ning f actor s including, but not limited to, consultations wi th c ouns e l or

fa mil y me mbe rs , o r t

he op po rt un ity to c on su lt w ithc ouns e l, i f desired;
7. The psycholog ical eff

ect of havingalre ady

confe ssed, and whe ther the de fenda nt
wa s a dv ise d th a t th e pr ior c on fe ssi on

may no t be a dmi ssi ble a t tr ia l;

8. Whether the defe ndant initiated the conver sation that led to t h e s u b s equent confe ssion; and

9. The de fenda

n t ’s sobriety , education, intelli g ence level, and e x perie nce w ith the law, as such fac tors relate to the def endant’ s ability

to understand the a dminist ere d Mir and a ri g hts

.
I d. at 919-20. The application of the se fa ctors in this case mak es cl ea r t h at the Def endant’ s postwarningconfe ssion was taken in violation of his Tenne ssee c onstitut ional ri gh t aga inst selfinc ri min a tio n a

nd c ann ot b e us e d a g a ins t hi m.
Wit h respe ct to the first fa ctor, we find that Det. R o l and and Sg t. Post iglione use d tactics desig ned to convince the Def endant that his re fusal to conf ess would b e t o n o av ail beca use, they
c la ime d, the re wa s a lr e a dy e no ug h e vid e nc e to c on vic t hi m of fir st de g re e mur de r. Th e c le ar t hr us t of their pr ewa

rning interrog ation was that the only way the Def endant c ould avoid a convic tion of first deg ree murder w as to confe ss. I n the context of our ana ly sis of this ini tial Smi th fac tor, we f ind a stro n g cau s al co n n ec t i o nb et we en t h e o ff i ce rs ’ i l l ega l p re wa rn i n g i n t erro gat i on and the De fenda nt’s subsequent wa

rned c onfession. Aga in, the office rs employ ed tac tics desig ned to convince the Def endant that his only hope of avoiding a first deg ree murder c onviction was to confe ss. Since he
was ne ver told that his first confe ssion was not admissible or that t h ere was, in fa ct, no other
e vid e nc e c o n n e c t i n g h i m t o t h e c r i m e , t h e D e f e n d an t h a d n o r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t e xe r c i s ing his rig ht ag ainst self-incr imination (once he was fina lly informed o f that rig ht) would be in any way me anin g fu l.
The tempora l prox i m i ty

betwee n the two conf

essions was ver

y close. As soon a s the Def endant told the off

icer s what they

wanted to know during his unwarne d statement, the off icer s Mirandized him and then continued, without interruption, to solicit the second c onfession.

After the Def

endant c onfesse d to the office rs’ satisfa ction, Det. Roland re ad the De fenda nt his rights, we nt over the waiver with him, and had the De fenda nt sign the w aiver

of rig hts form. The Def endant wa s not subjected to a pr olonge d detention betwe en his first statement a nd h i s second statement, nor doe s it appear that he wa s deprived of food, re st, or bathroom facilities. The qu es t i o n i n g t o o k p l ac e at t h e po l i ce s t at i o n , i n a cl o s ed i n t erv i ew ro o m , wi t h t wo o ff i ce rs

. Al t h o u gh the questioning was not prolong ed, it was e x tremely focuse d, acc usatory , and demanding. We have19

alre ady deter mined that the questi oning was custodial. We rec og nized in S mith that “police custody is inherently

coer cive a

nd compelling .” I d. at 920.

There wer e no interve ning f actor s such as c onsultations with co u n sel or fa mily members be tw e e n th e fi rs t r ound

of qu e sti on ingand

the se c on d. Th e De fe nd ant w a s n e ve r a dv ise d th a t his first confe ssion would not be admissible at tr ial. The De fenda nt did not ini tiate the conve rsation that led to the sec ond confe ssion.

Th e De fe nd ant a

pp e are d so be r duri ng the vid e ota pe d int e rv ie w, a lth ou g h n o q ue sti on s a s to his sobriety

wer e aske d. He de nied eve r havingbeen r ead his Mira nda rig hts before . The Def endant’ s education is unknown. The Def endant’ s intelligenc e appear s within the normal rang e. The De fenda

nt did not admit t o any

previous experienc e with the law.

Re vie wi ngthe tot a lity

of the c ir c ums tanc e s su

rr ound ingthe Defe nd ant’ s tw o c on fe ssi on s, we hold that the State ha s failed to establish under Smit h that the taint of the first illeg al conf ession was so attenuated as to justify admission of t he second confe ssion. I ndeed, the only attempt by

the office rs in this case to attenuate t he second confe ssion from the first confe ssion was to inform the Def endant a fter his fir st confession that they had to “make it official,” which included a rec itation of his ri g hts . Sig nif

ic antl y , th e De fe nd ant w a s n e ve r i nf or me d th a t hi s “ un of

fi c ia l” c on fe ssi on

wo uld not be admissible ag ainst him. The psy cholog ical ef fec t of having alre ady confe ssed was ther efor e ma g nif ie d. Com

bin e d w iththe of

fi c e rs ’ r e pe a te d c la ims that th e y a lr e a dy ha d the e vi dence to convict him of first degree murder, a nd that a conf

ession was the m ea n s by

which the De fenda

nt mig ht b e e nti tle d to a

le sse r c ha

rg e , th e De fe nd ant had little ho pe of un de rs tand ing , mu c h le ss exercising , his right a g ainst self-incr imination by the time he wa s finally

advised of it.

Ac c or din g ly , w e ho ld t

hat bo th of the De fe nd ant’ s state me nts we re take n in vio latio n o f h is ri g ht a g a ins t sel f- inc ri min a tio n und e r the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion

. Th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in fa ili ngto
su pp re ss b oth

state me nts and

the Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls e rr e d in a ff ir min g the tr ia l c ourt

.
CO NC LU SION

The victim in this c ase was the subject of a senseless murder. The de lay in discoveringthe crime e liminated evidence and made solving the victim’s mur der extremely difficult. We la ud the
e ff or ts o f o ur law e nf or c e me nt of

fi c e rs in s e e kin g re le va

nt i nf or matio n w ithwh ic h to so lve the c a se and appr ehend the perpe trator. As rec og nized by the United States Supreme Court, “ [n] o mission of law e nforc ement off

icials is more important.” B rew er v. Willia m s , 4 3 0 U.S. 387, 406 (1977). Unfortunately , howeve r, “‘ [d] isinterested zeal for the public g ood does not a ssure either wisdom or rig ht in the methods it pursues.’” I d. (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 605 (1948) (F rankf urter, J . concur ring in judgment) ).

W e d o n o t qu es t i o n t h e u s ef u l n es s an d ef

fi ca cy o f a l aw en fo rc em en to ff i ce r’ s “gu tfe el i n gs and instincts” which we re, in this case , very acc urate

. Howeve r, the interr og ation techniques use d by Det. Roland and Sg t. Post iglione in this matter cannot be e mploy ed duringcustodial interrog ation
un le ss p re fa c e d b y

the wa rn ing s r e qu ir e d b y Mir and a

. We re c og nize that “[t]he pr e ssu re s on st a te20

e xec uti ve and

jud ic ia l of

fi c e rs char g e d w iththe a dmi nis tr a tio n o f t he c ri min a l la

w a re g re a t, espec ially when the c rime is murder . . . .” B rew er, 430 U .S. at 406. We must also rec og nize, ho we ve r, that “ it i s p re c ise ly the pr e dic ta

bil ity of tho se pr e ssu

re s th a t make s im

pe ra tiv e a re so lut e loy alty to the g uara

ntees that the Constitution ex tends to us all.” I d.

Unsolved cr imes injure eve ry member of

our society . But so do unconstitutional actions by ag ents of our g overnme nts. The pol ice of fice rs’ tac tics in this case, thoug h utiliz ed with the best of intentions, viol ated the D efe ndant’s fe dera l and state c onstitut ional rig hts ag ai nst compelled selfincrimination. Those tac tics forc e us to vac ate the Def endant’ s conviction. Be cause the State has sti pu late d th a t t he a dmi ssi bil ity of the De fe nd ant’ s c on fe ssi on is d isp os iti ve of

the c a se and

that, absent the D efe ndant’s conf ession, it has no other evidence sufficie nt to support his conviction, we al s o m u s td i s m i s s t h e c h ar ge a gai n s th i m

. N e e d l e s s t o s ay , t h i s re s u l ti s d ee p l y d i s tu rb i n g. Neve rtheless, a s observe d by Mr. J ustice B rande is of the United States Supreme Court,

De c e nc y , s e c ur ity , a

nd lib e rt y a lik e de mand

that g ov e rnmen t off

ic ia ls s ha ll be s u b j ec t ed t o the same r

ules of conduc t that are commands to the citizen. I n a g ov e rnme nt o f l aws , e xiste nc e of the g overnm ent will b e imp e ri lle d if it f a ils to observe the law scrupulously

. Our g overnme nt is the potent, the o m n i p rese nt te a c he r. F or

g oo d o r f

or ill , it te a c he s th e wh ole pe op le by its ex amp le. Cr ime is contag ious. I f the g overnme nt becomes a law-br eake r, it bree ds contempt for la w; it invites ever

y man t o become a law unto himself; it invi tes ana rchy . To dec lare that in the administration of the cr iminal law the end justifies the m eans .

. . would bring terrible r etribution. Ag ainst that pernicious doc trine this court should resolutely set its face

. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) ( Br andeis, J., dis senting ).

Th e jud g me nt o f t

he Court of Cr imi na l App eals is re ve rs e d, the De fe nd ant’ s c on vic tio n is
va c a te d, and

the c ha rg e a g a ins t th e De fe nd ant i s d ism iss e d. Cos ts o f t his c a us e are ta xed

to t he State
o f T e n n e s s e e , f

o r w h i c he x e c u t i o nm ay i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________ CO RN EL I A A . CLARK, JUSTI CE